[Senate Hearing 111-701, Part 4]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-701 Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3454
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 4
AIRLAND
__________
APRIL 13 AND 15, 2010
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-157 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Airland
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Department of the Air Force and Department of the Navy Tactical
Aircraft Programs
april 13, 2010
Page
Architzel, VADM David, USN, Principal Deputy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition); Accompanied by Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III,
USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps, and
RADM David L. Philman, USN, Director, Air Warfare, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations.................................. 5
Shackelford, Lt Gen Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition;
Accompanied by Maj Gen Johnny A. Weida, USAF, Assistant Deputy
of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Department of
the Air Force.................................................. 20
Army Modernization
april 15, 2010
Lennox, LTG Robert P., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army (G-8).... 77
Phillips, LTG William N., USA, Principal Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology, and Director, Acquisition Career Management........ 87
Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 87
Duma, David W., Principal Deputy Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 97
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
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TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Hagan,
Begich, Burris, Kaufman, Chambliss, Thune, and Brown.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; and Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Perrin Cooke, assistant to Senator Hagan; Roosevelt Barfield,
assistant to Senator Burris; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Scott M.
Clendaniel, assistant to Senator Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
I want to extend a welcome to the witnesses. Thank you very
much for appearing before the subcommittee today.
Also, welcome to our colleague Senator Scott Brown from
Massachusetts. I believe this is the first time you've been at
one of the subcommittee hearings.
Senator Brown. That's correct.
Senator Lieberman. It's the first subcommittee hearing
we've had this session. So, I don't mean to suggest you've been
guilty of absenteeism. [Laughter.]
Anyway, it's a pleasure to welcome you.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. I look forward to your contribution to
our work.
At each of these hearings, I always believe it's important
to pause for a moment to acknowledge the service, heroism, and
professionalism of the American military; the people who fight
our Nation's wars, and do so with such extraordinary valor and
effectiveness.
For decades, they have fought with the knowledge that
American airmen and aviators control the skies wherever our
country sends them. That confidence is, of course, based on the
quality of our fighter aircraft, as well, most importantly, as
the skill of the men and women who fly those aircraft. So, it's
in that context that we convene this session of the Airland
Subcommittee to discuss our Nation's military tactical aircraft
(TACAIR) programs.
Every year, we have a responsibility to balance competing
demands for resources to support our military. The decisions we
make in the face of these demands will help to determine
whether future generations of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines will also know that their brothers and sisters in arms
control the skies.
To help inform our committee's decisions, we have an
extraordinary group of witnesses today: Lieutenant General Mark
Shackelford, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition; Major General Johnny Weida,
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for
Operations, Plans, and Requirements; Vice Admiral David
Architzel, Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; Lieutenant
General George Trautman, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps
for Aviation; and Rear Admiral David Philman, Director for Air
Warfare in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
I'm happy to see General Shackelford, General Trautman, and
Admiral Architzel again. They are recidivists before this
committee, but we always like to see them.
We welcome General Weida and Admiral Philman, for their
first appearance before the committee.
The most important issue before us is the recently
announced cost, growth, and schedule delays for the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) program, which has breached a critical
Nunn-McCurdy baseline, which is to say that program acquisition
unit cost and average procurement unit cost have both increased
more than 50 percent above the original estimate.
I know that our witnesses know well what this means,
because the JSF is the cornerstone of tactical aviation
modernization for each of our Services. Excessive cost growth
in this program is bound to hurt American air power in the
years ahead.
We know that the Department of Navy, for instance, faces
large gaps between the forces that the CNO has said he needs
and the forces that will be available to his successors. Two
years ago, the Department of the Navy estimated that we would
face a TACAIR shortfall in 2017 that could be as high 125 of
the fighters needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier airwings,
and 3 Marine Corps airwings.
Last year, the Navy estimated that the maximum shortfall
could be nearly twice that large; almost 250 aircraft. This
year, the estimate is that, absent certain actions by the
Department of Defense (DOD), the shortfalls could reach 267
aircraft. Those are big numbers.
However, the Navy believes that by taking certain actions
that we'll discuss this morning, such as reducing squadron
size, conducting service-life extensions on some aircraft, and
reducing amount of time that aircrafts spend in the depots,
they could reduce the gap to roughly 150 aircraft.
I'm grateful that the Department is trying to manage its
shortfall, and I look forward to hearing more about these
efforts this morning, but frankly, I'm not satisfied that the
steps taken are sufficient.
The Air Force faces similar challenges. In 2008, the Air
Force projected a potential shortfall of Air Force tactical
fighters in excess of 800 aircraft around 2025. Last year, the
Air Force proposed to retire roughly 250 aircraft earlier than
planned, to achieve operating savings that would be invested in
other areas. All of this amounts to what our witnesses will
describe this morning as increased short- to mid-term
warfighting risk.
Congress recently received a report to help quantify the
nature of that risk, and I hope that our witnesses will discuss
that with us today in greater detail. Of course, I also hope
that the witnesses will describe the steps the Air Force is
taking to make sure that cost growth in the JSF program does
not prevent the Service from addressing this shortfall and
achieving its modernization goals.
These questions are all subject to pending decisions
regarding force structure requirements for the Navy and Marine
Corps and Air Force TACAIR programs. I must say that, though
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was supposed to evaluate
fighter requirements and capabilities, it didn't reach any firm
conclusions on TACAIR force structure requirements. So, we're
left to speculate about whether DOD will be recommending
changes in requirements at some time in the months and years
ahead. If DOD does propose significant changes, particularly
those that redefine requirements so as to explain away force
structure gaps, our subcommittee, naturally, will expect to
receive the analysis behind those changes, and will exercise
our own responsibility to review them carefully.
So, this is an unhappy story that repeats itself about our
really extraordinary aircraft program, the JSF, which is that
it's coming in a lot more expensive and later than any of us
hoped. I look forward to discussing, with this very excellent
group of witnesses, how we're going to react to those
realities.
Thank you very much.
Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for holding this important hearing, and
also thank our witnesses for their attendance today, as well
as, of course, for their selfless service to our Nation.
On the occasion of today's discussion on combat tactical
aviation, let me first take a moment to convey my condolences
to the family of the three servicemen and one civilian who were
killed and all those who were injured during the crash of the
Air Force CV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft last Thursday in
southern Afghanistan. I would appreciate any update that our
Air Force witnesses can provide on its investigation of that
casualty.
There can be no doubt that, among the entire defense
enterprise, combat tactical aviation presents some of the most
significant challenges for all of the Services. Perhaps chief
among those challenges are gaps in fighter capability and
strike fighter capability that the Air Force and the Navy,
respectively, are seeing in the intermediate term.
Important elements of those Services' ability to fill those
capability gaps are their efforts to hedge against further
slips in schedule and growth and cost in the JSF program by,
among other things, extending the service life of their legacy
tactical fleets. So, I'd like an update on those efforts, as
well.
In that context, the need for DOD and the prime contractor
to execute the Department's plan to restructure the JSF program
cannot be overstated. The next few months will be very telling
for the program. That's because, within that period of time,
key milestones must be met, including achieving first flight of
the Navy's carrier variant no later than May, delivering Block
1 software to the flight test aircraft, beginning flight
training at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), and completing 400 test
flights by the end of the year.
By midsummer, the Department's independent cost estimator
will have provided a new cost estimate for the program. From
our witnesses today, I would like to hear about any concerns
that they may have about the program's ability to execute the
restructured plan on time and at cost.
While we're here to discuss combat tactical aviation, I
would also like to engage the witnesses briefly on the long-
range bomber. From DOD's examination of the requirements
supporting the long-range bomber, the Department appears
interested in fielding a family of systems, each designed to
conduct a specific type of mission originally envisioned for a
new deep-penetrating bomber.
With the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
and the recently signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), I would like today's witnesses to describe what role a
next-generation bomber will play in the Air Force's overall
strategy for developing long-range strike capability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Thune. I
look forward to working with you again this year, as we have in
the past, in a real partnership, which obviously goes beyond
party.
Admiral Architzel, I think seniority, which, of course, I'm
a great believer in, suggests that we call on you first.
STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION); ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. GEORGE
J. TRAUTMAN III, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S.
MARINE CORPS; AND RADM DAVID L. PHILMAN, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR
WARFARE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Architzel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman and Senator Thune, distinguished members
of the subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the Department of the Navy's aviation procurement
programs. Joining me today are Lieutenant General George
Trautman, Deputy Commandant for Marine Corps Aviation, and Rear
Admiral David Philman, Navy's Director for Air Warfare.
With permission of the subcommittee, I propose to keep my
opening remarks brief and submit a combined statement for the
record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection.
Admiral Architzel. Thank you, sir.
The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2011 budget
requests funding to procure 206 aircraft: 103 fixed-wing, 100
rotary, and 3 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Aviation
programs represent the Department's greatest warfare
investment. This year's programs continue recent trends, which
have steadily increased our aviation procurement.
In formulating our investment strategy, we are mindful to
balance cost, schedule, and performance and risk, to ensure our
ability to meet the warfighters' needs, both today and in the
future.
Specifically, we are leveraging stable procurement in
rotary wing programs with continued procurement of the H-60
Sierras and Romeos, H-1 helicopters, and MV-22 Ospreys. We're
establishing a strong technical foundation and putting in place
the tools to control costs for the P-8A Maritime Patrol
Aircraft, E-2D Hawkeye, and the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement
programs. We're investing in next-generation technologies and
opportunities that come from unmanned aircraft systems.
Our commitment to the JSF program is unequivocal. Now,
within the framework of the restructured program, it's
essential that we delivery the cost and schedule performance
that matches our commitment to the program. While we are
procuring the F/A-18 E, F, and G series production to include
pursuing a multiyear procurement for 124 aircraft in fiscal
year 2010 through 2013, we do so with an absolute commitment to
the continuing development and ramping-up procurement of the F-
35 JSF.
The Department has long recognized that to affordably meet
our requirements also relies upon our ability to manage the
service life of our aviation fleet. As an example, the P-3's
sustainment, with Congress' help, we were able to ensure that
those aging aircraft are able to meet our operational
requirements while we await the arrival of the more capable
aircraft.
Similarly, the Department is aggressively managing service
life on the legacy F/A-18 A-D aircraft and AV-8 Harrier, until
their replacement by the JSF. To this end, we are initiating
further steps to mitigate the impacts of delays associated with
the restructured JSF program.
Again, we thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to
discuss Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, and we look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Architzel, General
Trautman, and Admiral Philman follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by VADM David Architzel, USN, Lt. Gen. George
J. Trautman III, Marine Corps, and RADM David L. Philman, USN
naval aviation programs overview
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget implements a
recapitalization strategy for new capabilities and initiatives, reduced
operating costs, and sustainment of legacy fleet aircraft that are
performing magnificently in current operations. We are always aware
that our decisions on programmatics, budgeting and procurement have a
direct impact on the young men and women we send overseas to fight and
win our Nation's wars, and providing the proper weapons systems for
those warfighters is a charge we take very seriously.
We continue to work with industry in seeking ways to reduce costs
in production contracting strategies on the F/A-18 E/F, the H-1, the F-
35B, and F-35C, the MH-60R/S and the MV-22B. The Department of the Navy
(DoN) continues the development and low rate procurement of the F-35 B
and C models, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement,
unmanned aircraft systems and new strike weapons capabilities. In
total, with our fiscal year 2011 funding, Navy and Marine Corps
aviation will procure 103 tactical and fixed-wing aircraft, 100 rotary-
wing aircraft, and 3 MQ-8 vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial
vehicles (VTUAVs) for a total of 206 aircraft.
tactical aircraft/tactical aircraft systems
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
The DoN is committed to both the short takeoff vertical landing
(STOVL) and carrier variant (CV) of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as
they are essential to our long-term Naval and Marine Corps Aviation
strategy and the Nation's security. The fiscal year 2011 President's
budget requests $1.4 billion in RDT&E and $4.7 billion in Aircraft
Procurement, Navy (APN) for 20 JSF aircraft (13 F-35B and 7 F-35C) and
associated aircraft hardware and spares. These resource requirements
reflect the F-35 program's restructure recently approved by the
Secretary of Defense.
The commonality designed into the joint F-35 program will minimize
operating costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, and allow
enhanced interoperability with our sister service, the U.S. Air Force
(USAF) and the eight partner nations participating in the development
of this aircraft. The F-35 aircraft will provide combatant commanders
greater flexibility across the range of military operations. A true
fifth-generation aircraft, the JSF will enhance precision strike
capability through unprecedented stealth, range, sensor fusion, radar
performance, combat identification and electronic attack capabilities
as compared to legacy platforms.
It is important to stress that after the extensive review that led
to the recent F-35 program restructure, no fundamental technology or
manufacturing problems were discovered, nor were there any changes to
F-35 performance requirements. It will also add sophisticated
electronic warfare capabilities, as compared to the legacy platforms to
be replaced, and will tie together disparate units scattered across the
battlefield, in real time. All F-35 variants are projected to meet
their respective Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).
The F-35B STOVL variant combines the multi-role versatility and
strike fighter capability of the legacy F/A-18 with the basing
flexibility of the AV-8B and the potential for electronic warfare
dominance of the EA-6B. The Marine Corps intends to leverage the F-
35B's sophisticated sensor suite and the very low observable (VLO)
fifth-generation strike fighter capabilities, particularly in the area
of data collection and information dissemination, to support the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) well beyond the abilities of today's
MAGTF expeditionary attack, strike and electronic warfare assets.
Having these capabilities in one aircraft will provide the joint force
commander and the MAGTF commander unprecedented strategic and
operational agility. The F-35C CV complements the F/A-18 E/F Block II
and EA-18G in providing survivable, long-range strike capability and
persistence in an access denied environment. The F-35B and F-35C will
provide the Expeditionary Strike Group and Carrier Strike Group
commanders a survivable, ``day-one'' strike capability in a denied
access environment with the tactical agility and strategic flexibility
to counter a broad spectrum of threats and win in operational scenarios
that cannot be addressed by current legacy aircraft.
Four System Development and Demonstration (SDD) jets (AF-1, BF-1,
BF-2, and BF-3) are now in flight testing, while AA-1 has completed its
flight testing requirements and awaits a live fire test at the Naval
Air Warfare Center, China Lake. CF-1 is in the run station with an in-
service release engine. CF-2 has recently left the production line and
is going through system checkout. BF-4 is currently in ground tests in
Fort Worth and is expected to ferry to Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent
River by May 7, 2010. The remaining SDD jets and ground test articles,
plus low-rate initial production (LRIP) I, LRIP II, and LRIP III
aircraft, are in various stages of production. With regard to the
flight test program, the initial conventional takeoff and landing
(CTOL) aircraft (AA-1) has demonstrated outstanding performance with 91
sorties ( 126 flight hours) flown through March 2010.
BF-1, the first STOVL flight test jet, has flown more than 40
sorties, in preparation to its first vertical landing (VL) last month.
It has demonstrated smooth and positive flight characteristics during
transitions from conventional flight to slow speed flight and
accomplished the first STOVL transition to a vertical landing flight on
the 18th of March 2010. BF-2 has ferried to NAS Patuxent River and has
completed 20 sorties with more than 34 hours of accumulated test time.
BF-3 was ferried to NAS Patuxent River in February 2010 and completed
its initial 14 test sorties and BF-4's first flight occurred last week.
We have been pleased that the initial STOVL/F-35B test aircraft that
have arrived at NAS Patuxent River have required little postflight
work, as this demonstrates that the prime contractor is continuing to
mature its production line.
The F-35B structural testing that has been completed will enable
expansion to the full STOVL envelope--though we have had recent
challenges with the STOVL door operations we continue to fly as we
investigate and make any required modifications. F-35C full scale drop
test was started on March 4 at Vought Aircraft Test Laboratory in
Dallas, TX. Structural drop testing of simulated carrier landings has
demonstrated sink rates above those experienced during normal carrier
landings. Testing continues to investigate variations in aircraft
attitude, but data thus far has matched well with predictions. The
mission systems testing completed to date has provided us additional
confidence in F-35 integrated sensor functionality--and we plan to
continue to further mature this fifth-generation integrated sensor
performance during the next 12 months. Additionally, we have recently
cleared BF-2 to utilize its on-aircraft speech recognition capability
for flight test, which, when completed, promises to enhance warfighting
capability and reduce pilot workload. The signature testing completed
to date has built confidence in the VLO performance as we await the
first full signature jet to demonstrate overall operational mission
effectiveness.
The DoN has taken special interest in the F-35 air/ship
integration. Initial ship suitability testing has been completed and
our computational fluid dynamic models are being validated to ensure
the effects of F-35 propulsion systems on LH and CVN-class ships and
ship systems are well understood and addressed. To date, there are no
known air-ship integration issues which we cannot overcome; future test
events will refine our integration efforts and validate our initial
analysis. With respect to logistic support for test and deployment,
dedicated aircraft/ship variant teams are in place, all known
logistical risks have mitigation plans, and the test and operational
use of our autonomic logistics and global sustainment (ALGS) systems
will continue to shape and mature our global sustainment implementation
plans with our eight partner countries.
The initial operational capability (IOC) is determined by the
Service based on both the program's performance and how the Service
defines IOC. For the Marine Corps F-35B, IOC is defined as a squadron
of ten aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR directed
mission sets and to deploy on F-35B-compatible ships and to austere
expeditionary sites and is projected to be 2012. The Marine Corps plans
to IOC with a multi-mission capable Block 2B aircraft as described in
the JSF Operational Requirements Document (ORD) CN-3. For the Navy F-
35C, IOC is projected to be 2016 and is based on three items:
sufficient aircraft quantities, desired capability to conduct all ORD
missions, to include, but not limited to: air interdiction (AI),
offensive counter air (OCA), defensive counter air (DCA), close air
support (CAS), suppression of enemy air defense/destruction of enemy
air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) and CSAR in a denied, near-peer environment
better than legacy aircraft; and completion of operational test of that
capability. The current aircraft procurement rate is critical to
enabling the necessary training requirements to stand up squadrons for
both Marine Corps and Navy.
The F135 propulsion system has begun the transition from
development to production with the delivery of the first three LRIP I
engines. Six additional production engines are in assembly and
deliveries will ramp up to three engines per month by the third quarter
of 2010. Notwithstanding this significant progress, we continue to
focus on engine cost. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
chartered a Joint Assessment Team (JAT) to investigate F135 cost and
cost objectives. The JAT assessed that the F135 engine cost goals are
achievable with the proper investment in cost reduction initiatives.
The focus in the coming year will be to ensure the engine manufacturer
and the government implement the necessary efforts to achieve the cost
goals. The current LRIP IV engine proposal shows that the engine
manufacturer has begun to reduce cost in alignment with the JAT
assessments and recommendations.
F/A-18 Hornet
TACAIR is made up of 1180 total aircraft, of which 88 percent are
Navy and Marine Corps Hornets (20 Navy squadrons totaling 400 Super
Hornets; 17 Navy and 13 Marine squadrons totaling 635 legacy A-D
Hornets). Super Hornets and legacy Hornets have conducted over 130,000
combat missions in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Enduring Freedom (OEF) since September 11, 2001. While deployed both
ashore and at sea aboard our aircraft carriers, F/A-18s have brought
significant numbers of precision ordnance and laser-guided munitions to
the fight, and have employed numerous rounds of 20mm ammunition
supporting forces during strafing runs. These aircraft continue to
provide vital overwatch and direct support to our troops on the ground
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D (Legacy) Hornet
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request is $258.0 million
in APN for the continuation of the systems upgrade programs for the F/
A-18 platform. As the F/A-18 program transitions to the F/A-18 E/F and
JSF, today's inventory of 635 F/A-18 A/B/C/Ds will continue to comprise
more than half of the Navy's strike fighter inventory until 2013. In
order to maintain a tactical advantage, we will procure and install
advanced systems (Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), Multi-
Function Information Distribution System (MIDS) and Advance Tactical
Forward Looking Infra-Red) (ATFLIR)/LITENING) on selected F/A-18 A/B/C/
D aircraft. The requested funds will support the APG-73 radar
obsolescence management program and procure APG-79 radars in order to
replace APG-73 radars in early Block II Super Hornets, each a vital
piece of the TACAIR mission for the near future.
These funds will also procure and install centerbarrel
modifications, which will be a major contributor to extending the
service life of the F/A-18 C/D fleet from 6,000 to 8,000 hours and
beyond. The Service Life Management Program (SLMP) continues to monitor
and improve the health of the legacy F/A-18 A-D fleet through analyses
of TACAIR inventories and the service life of each airframe.
The Marine Corps will upgrade 56 Lot 7-9 F/A-18As and 30 Lot 10/11
F/A-18Cs to a Lot 21 avionics capability with digital communications, a
tactical data link, JHMCS, MIDS and LITENING. The Marine Corps will
also upgrade 72 F/A-18D models' APG-73 radars with the Expand 4/5
upgrade, providing an enhanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
capability. The Marine Corps anticipates these upgrades will enhance
the current capabilities of these aircraft with the digital
communications, tactical data link and Advanced Tactical Airborne
Reconnaissance Systems (ATARS) required for them to remain viable and
relevant. The Marines expect the F/A-18 (A++/C/D) to remain in the
active inventory until fiscal year 2022 and in the Reserve inventory
until fiscal year 2023.
The Marines are also employing the LITENING targeting pod on F/A-18
A+/C/D aircraft in expeditionary operations including OEF. When
combined with data link hardware, the LITENING pod provides real-time
video to ground forces through Remotely Operated Video Enhanced
Receiver (ROVER) and Video Scout ground workstations.
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $1.8 billion in
APN-1 for 22 F/A-18 E/F Block II aircraft. The F/A-18 E/F continues to
transition into the fleet, improving the survivability and strike
capability of the carrier air wing. The Super Hornet provides a 40
percent increase in combat radius, 50 percent increase in endurance and
25 percent increase in weapons payload over the legacy Hornets. The
program will complete procurement of the 515 budgeted aircraft in 2013.
Production line shutdown will begin in fiscal year 2013 with the final
shutdown occurring in fiscal year 2015.
The APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system
was installed in all production F/A-18 E/Fs and EA-18Gs beginning with
Lot 30, and a retrofit program is modifying 135 Lot 26-29 Block IIs
with APG-79 radars. All 458 Block II Super Hornets will be AESA
equipped, providing the Super Hornet a significant increase in
detection range, lethality and survivability over the legacy Hornets.
AESA squadrons have been successfully deploying since 2008 and are
highly valued by Fleet Commanders.
The Super Hornet uses an incremental development approach to
incorporate new technologies and capabilities--the JHMCS, ATFLIR (with
shared real-time video), Shared Reconnaissance Pod System and MIDS
datalink. The F/A-18 E/F fiscal year 2011 budget request also includes
$84.4 million in APN to implement commonality, maintain capabilities
and improve reliability and structural safety. The Navy continues to
explore the possibility of a multiyear procurement for 124 F/A-18 E/F
and EA-18G series aircraft (fiscal years 2010-2013) with the Secretary
of Defense.
AV-8B Harrier
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $22.9 million in RDT&E funds
to continue development of the AV-8B Readiness Management Plan (RMP),
Digital Improved Triple Ejector Racks (DITER), and Engine Life
Management Plan (ELMP) to include continued Accelerated Simulated
Mission Endurance Testing (ASMET). The DITER effort will increase the
digital weapons carriage capability of the Harrier and thereby support
combat operations more effectively. The fiscal year 2011 budget also
requests $19.4 million procurement funds for ELMP upgrades and the RMP,
which addresses aircraft obsolescence and deficiency issues associated
with sustaining the Marine Corps' AV-8B fleet.
Today's Harrier--equipped with precision weapons, LITENING
targeting pods with a video downlink to ROVER ground stations, and
digitally-aided close air support (CAS) (Marine Tactical System (MTS)
protocol)--has proven to be an invaluable asset for the MAGTF and joint
commander across the spectrum of operations. The AV-8B program
continues to address attrition recovery and other inventory sustainment
efforts to mitigate significant legacy inventory shortfalls and
obsolescence issues. The AV-8B continues to be deployed heavily in
support of OEF and for other emerging operational contingencies; each
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that sails does so with embarked AV-
8Bs. In 2009 the Harrier ended a highly successful 6-year rotation in
Iraq; we then transitioned the aircraft to Afghanistan. There the AV-8B
is supporting ground forces with its precision weapons, 25-millimeter
cannon and sophisticated sensor suite. The Harrier has a proven combat
record, and its weaponry and basing flexibility have been invaluable as
we deploy it into the fight from the decks of L-class ship as well as
ashore in the austere Afghanistan environment. Planned capability
upgrades, obsolescence mitigation and readiness initiatives will ensure
the AV-8B remains relevant, healthy and sustained through at least
2022.
Although the LITENING targeting pod is managed by the AV-8B program
office, the pod is carried on all three Marine Corps TACAIR platforms.
Building on its extensive and proven combat record, the Air Force and
Marine Corps are upgrading the LITENING pod to the G4 (fourth
generation) standard to support engaged Marine Corps, joint and
coalition warfighters. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $72.1
million in procurement funding for Marine Corps expeditionary LITENING
targeting pod upgrades, which include enhanced forward looking infra-
red (FLIR) and charge-coupled device (CCD) optics, a laser target
imaging processor (LTIP), a more powerful video downlink transmitter,
and improved ground moving target and air-to-air target tracking
systems.
TACAIR Inventory Management
In 2009, we estimated the DoN strike fighter shortfall (SFS) to be
146 aircraft. With the changes in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget, the Strike Fighter Shortfall Analysis was updated and the peak
DoN Shortfall rose from 146 to 177 aircraft--primarily due to the F-35
delivery ramp reduction of 55 aircraft and removing the assumption of
aircraft reaching 10,000 flight hours. Today, with the application of
our management strategies and levers, the peak can be managed to about
100 aircraft in 2018 by performing service life extension program
(SLEP) to a number of aircraft.
We are closely managing the flight hours and fatigue life of our
tactical aircraft. Since 2004, we have provided guidance and actions to
optimize aircraft utilization rates while maximizing training and
operational opportunities. The F/A-18 A-D Inventory Management
Forecasting Tool is used to project the combined effects of TACAIR
transition plans, retirements, attrition and pipeline requirements on
the total F/A-18 A-D aircraft inventory. The model is updated with the
most recent data and forecasts the strike fighter inventory compared to
the existing requirements. Critical model variables include JSF
deliveries, force structure, usage rates, life limits, depot turnaround
time, fatigue life expended (FLE), catapult launches and arrested
landings, and field landings.
Faced with an increased shortfall, the DoN has continued to
identify further opportunities to reduce its impact. The Marine Corps
has modified it's F-35 transition plan by transitioning some Hornet
squadrons earlier and leveraging the service life remaining in the AV-
8B fleet. Management ``levers'' have been identified: accelerating the
transition of 5 legacy F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F; transitioning 2
additional F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F using the remaining
attrition F/A-18 E/F Reserve aircraft; reducing the Navy Unit
Deployment Program (UDP) and Marine Corps Expeditionary F/A-18 A+/C/D
squadrons from 12 to 10 aircraft per squadron. Some of these measures
are dependent on reduced demand in Global Force Management (GFM)
requirements.
We are continuing to perform high flight hour (HFH) inspections to
extend the service life limits of F/A-18 A-D aircraft from 8,000 to
8,600 flight hours. Analysis revealed that extensive areas of the
legacy F/A-18 airframe require SLEP inspections and modifications in
order to reach the service life goals of 10,000 hours. The F/A-18 A-D
SLEP engineering development program will complete in 2012. Together
these efforts can extend the F/A-18 A-D service life and reduce the
impact of the strike fighter shortfall.
The 146 Marine Corps AV-8B aircraft (in seven squadrons) currently
are not challenged by FLE as are the DoN's F/A-18 aircraft. However,
continued investment in engine sustainment, in avionics and in managing
airframe component obsolescence are critical to ensuring these aircraft
remain viable contributors to the TACAIR transition. Continued
investment in program related engineering (PRE)/program related
logistics (PRL) in the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) is
critical for sustaining the combat relevancy of the DoN's legacy
platforms through the TACAIR transition.
The DoN long-term shortfall reduction strategies will be addressed
in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget development. Currently,
items under review are the F/A-18 A-D SLEP and opportunities for
optimizing depot turn around times. We will continue to explore other
mitigation alternatives. Applying the mitigation levers available to us
and considering long-term strategies such as SLEP, the DoN believes the
strike fighter shortfall is manageable.
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)/EA-18G Growler
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request is $22.0 million in
RDT&E,N for correction of deficiencies and $1.0 billion in APN for 12
full-rate production (FRP) EA-18G aircraft. The program completed
operational evaluation in May 2009. The Fleet Replacement Squadron
(FRS) has achieved ready for training (RFT) and the first deployable
EA-18G squadron achieved safe for flight in September 2009. Initial
operating capability (IOC) was achieved in September 2009 and a
favorable FRP decision was obtained in November 2009.
The EA-18G began replacing carrier-based Navy EA-6B aircraft in
2009 and is currently programmed to continue these transitions through
2014. A total of 34 aircraft have been procured to date. As directed by
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy will procure an
additional 26 EA-18G aircraft across the FYDP to increase joint force
capacity to conduct expeditionary electronic attack, increasing the
program of record to 114. These additional aircraft will be utilized to
fill the Navy's four expeditionary electronic attack squadrons
currently using the legacy EA-6B Prowler.
The Navy is completing an analysis of alternatives (AoA) to
determine the best path forward for the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ).
The NGJ will replace the ALQ-99 pods currently flown on the EA-18G and
EA-6Bs and will provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and the Services an opportunity to introduce a comprehensive electronic
attack capability to the EA-18G as well as all variants of the F-35
JSF.
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)/EA-6B Prowler
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request includes $24.3
million in RDT&E for electronic warfare counter response, $33.8 million
in APN for common AEA systems and $29.9 million in APN for all EA-6B
series aircraft. Currently there are 92 EA-6Bs in the DoN to support 61
operational aircraft in 14 Active component squadrons and one Reserve
component squadron. This includes 76 Navy and Marine Corps ICAP II
aircraft and 16 Navy improved capability (ICAP) III aircraft. The
replacement of Navy EA-6B aircraft with EA-18G was expected to be
completed in 2012; however, the Navy now plans to complete its EA-6B
program of record in 2014.
The Marine Corps currently has 20 operational EA-6B ICAP II
aircraft in 4 VMAQ squadrons. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funds were used to purchase 16 ICAP III modification kits and
installations. The transition to the ICAP III aircraft began in March
2010 and is planned to complete in 2013. As the Navy transitions ICAP
III squadrons to EA-18G, those aircraft will be transferred to the
Marine Corps. Once the transition is complete, the Marine Corps will
have 32 ICAP III to support its EA-6B program of record through 2019.
Aircrew training for the DoN will be conducted at VAQ-129 through 2014.
Once the Navy has completed its transition from the EA-6B, the Marine
Corps may be required to establish a Fleet Replenishment Squadron (FRS)
to support its program of record.
Marine Prowlers have been employing the LITENING targeting pod in
expeditionary operations including OEF. When combined with data link
hardware, the LITENING pod provides real-time video to ground forces
through ROVER workstations. Additionally, the Collaborative On-line
Reconnaissance Provider/Operationally Responsive Attack Link (CORP/
ORAL) Joint Combat Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is demonstrating the
concept of networked, on-demand intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare from manned and unmanned
platforms utilizing the link capabilities in LITENING pods.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE)
The E-2D AHE replaces the current E-2C Hawkeye aircraft. E-2D will
be a critical enabler of transformational ISR capability and one of the
pillars of theater air and missile defense. Its radar will provide
enhanced detection and surveillance capability in overland, littoral
and open ocean environments.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $171.1 million in
RDT&E,N for continuation of SDD and $937.8 million in APN for four LRIP
III aircraft and advanced procurement for fiscal year 2012 LRIP IV
aircraft.
A Milestone C decision was achieved in the third quarter of 2009
and a contract awarded for two LRIP I aircraft. In fiscal year 2010
Congress appropriated $742.1 million APN for three LRIP II aircraft and
advanced procurement for fiscal year 2011 LRIP III aircraft.
T-6B Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
The T-6 is the primary flight training aircraft for Navy and Marine
Corps pilots and naval flight officers (NFO), replacing the T-34C. The
current requirement is for 315 aircraft, of which 161 aircraft have
been procured and 60 aircraft delivered to date. Of those 60 aircraft,
6 are the newer T-6B aircraft which is the upgraded avionics variant of
the T-6A. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request includes
$266.1 million to procure 38 aircraft under a USAF contract. The JPATS
program delivered the first two T-6B aircraft to the Navy in August
2009. The program is on track for T-6B IOC in April 2010 at NAS Whiting
Field, FL. Funding requested in the President's budget will also
support the critical sustainment of the TH-57, the training helicopter
for Navy and Marine Corps helicopter pilots, and of the T-45, the
Navy's training jet for future jet pilots and naval flight officers.
attack/surveillance aircraft
P-8A Poseidon
The future of the Navy's maritime patrol force includes plans for
sustainment, modernization, and re-capitalization of the force. The P-
8A Poseidon is the replacement aircraft for the P-3C Orion. The fiscal
year 2011 President's budget requests $929.2 million in RDT&E for
development and $1.991 billion in APN for procurement of seven P-8
Poseidon aircraft. Fiscal year 2011 development funding will support
the continued development of the P-8A and associated testing. Fiscal
year 2011 funds support the procurement of the seven LRIP P-8A aircraft
which are scheduled to begin delivery in January 2013 and advanced
procurement for the subsequent LRIP. The program is on track for IOC in
late 2013 when the first squadron will have transitioned and be ready
to deploy forward in support of the combatant commander. The P-8A
program is meeting all cost, schedule and performance parameters in
accordance with the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).
The program completed the interim program review in April 2009 and
awarded the advanced acquisition contract for LRIP advanced
procurement. The first five test articles (three flight test aircraft
and two ground test articles) are on schedule for delivery. Boeing has
completed fabricating the first five of eight test aircraft. The
remaining three flight test aircraft will commence fabrication this
year. The first test flight using T-1, the airworthiness test aircraft,
occurred on October 15, 2009, in Seattle, WA. After an initial period
of flight testing T-1 completed its last phase of installation and
check-out for the aircraft instrumentation system. The program is
currently undergoing ground testing in preparation for resuming flight
tests in April 2010.
P-3C Orion
In fiscal year 2011, $228.0 million is requested to sustain the P-
3C until transition to the P-8A. More than half of this amount ($153.5
million) is for wing modifications, which will allow airframe
sustainment to support the CNO's P-3 Fleet Response Plan, as well as
supporting EP-3E requirements, which are executed within the P-3
Airframe Sustainment Program. The P-3 is being sustained to keep the
aircraft a viable warfighter until it is replaced by P-8. Results of
the P-3 Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) revealed the need for an
aggressive approach to P-3 airframe sustainment. The aircraft is well
beyond planned fatigue life of 7,500 hours for critical components,
with an average airframe usage of 16,000 hours.
In December 2007, ongoing refinement of the model used to calculate
wing stress indicated that the lower aft wing surface (Zone 5) of the
P-3 aircraft had fatigue beyond standards for acceptable risk resulting
in the grounding of 39 P-3 aircraft. As of March 31, 2010 a total of 49
aircraft have been grounded for Zone 5 fatigue. There have been 15
Zone-5 modifications completed and the aircraft returned to the fleet;
there are 34 Zone-5 aircraft in work. Current mission aircraft
availability is 62. Key elements of the sustainment approach are strict
management of requirements and flight hour use, special structural
inspections to keep the aircraft safely flying, and increased use of
simulators to satisfy training requirements. In fiscal year 2011, a
systems sustainment and modernization budget of $74.5 million is
requested to continue to address a multitude of mission essential
efforts to replace obsolete components, integrate open architecture
technology, and leverage commonality.
The Navy will continue to closely manage the service life of the P-
3C as the Maritime and Patrol Reconnaissance Forces transition to the
P-8A Poseidon. Until force levels recover, allocations of aircraft must
be balanced to meet mission and minimum training while preserving
remaining P-3C service life. Currently, P-3Cs are meeting combatant
commander allocations for deployed aircraft.
EP-3 Aries Replacement/Sustainment
The EP-3E continues to be a high demand ISR asset in current OCO.
In fiscal year 2011, the President's budget request is $90.3 million in
APN to address EP-3E signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications
obsolescence. This APN request supports the LRIP buy for communications
intelligence modifications necessary to pace the evolving threat. The
EP-3E program continues to modify aircraft with multi-intelligence
capability to meet emergent classified requirements. Modifications are
necessary to keep the platform viable until the replacement platform
can be fielded.
Navy removed funding for EP-X in PR-11 and terminated the program,
based on the high cost in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) fiscal
year 2010 acquisition strategy. Navy and OSD realize the critical
capability gaps that exist with legacy systems/sensors, which led to
OSD direction to conduct an AoA for this future airborne ISR
capability. AoA results are due in April 2010 in order to inform POM-12
decisions on how this necessary and comprehensive ISR capability can be
met using either a single material solution or multiple solutions
(system of systems). Navy will develop an achievable acquisition
strategy to procure known and affordable technology to satisfy future
requirements.
As stated in the administration's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget,
``Once the Department completes its review, the most efficient and cost
effective program for replacing the current surveillance aircraft, the
EP-3, can be selected.'' In the interim, Navy will continue to replace
obsolete equipment with mission-critical sensor improvements on board
the EP-3 to support US and coalition forces currently engaged in OCO.
As a result, the current EP-3 fleet will be capable of performing its
mission beyond 2020 while the replacement capability is developed and
fielded.
MH-60R and MH-60S
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $1.059 billion for
24 MH-60R aircraft including advanced procurement for 24 fiscal year
2012 aircraft, and $55.8 million in RDT&E,N for continued replacement
of the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK III SH-60B and
carrier-based SH-60F helicopters with the MH-60R. The $55.8 million is
to continue development of the Ku-band data link, automatic radar
periscope detection and discrimination (ARPDD) program, which is a
fleet-driven capability upgrade to the APS-147 Radar, and Mode V
interrogation capability in its identification friend-or-foe (IFF)
system. The MH-60R is used in both anti-submarine warfare (ASW) with
its dipping sonar, sonobuoys and torpedoes and in the surface warfare
(SUW) role with its electronics surveillance measures system, multimode
radar with inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), FLIR system and
Hellfire missiles. It has demonstrated three to seven times the
capability in the ASW role and significant increases in its SUW
capability over legacy systems. The MH-60R program is post-milestone
III, having received approval for FRP in 2006. The first operational
squadron, HSM-71, returned from a successful deployment in carrier
strike group aboard the USS John C Stennis (CVN-74) in July 2009. There
are currently three operational carrier air wing squadrons and two
fleet replacement squadrons operating the MH-60R. Two additional
operational squadrons will transition or standup by the end of fiscal
year 2011.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $548.7 million in
APN for 18 MH-60S aircraft including advanced procurement for 18 fiscal
year 2012 aircraft and $38.9 million in RDT&E, N funds for the MH-60S
to continue development of the organic airborne mine countermeasures
(OAMCM) (Block II) and the armed helicopter (Block III) missions. The
MH-60S is the Navy's primary combat support helicopter designed to
support carrier and expeditionary strike groups. It will replace four
legacy platforms with one H-60 variant. The basic MH-60S reached IOC
and FRP in 2002. Armed helicopter configuration reached IOC in June
2007 and OAMCM is scheduled to reach IOC in fiscal year 2011. HSC-8
completed its first carrier deployment with Carrier Strike Group aboard
the USS John C Stennis (CVN-74) from January to July 2009. HSC-9
operated eight helicopters, including six aircraft in the armed
helicopter configuration which includes the multi-spectral targeting
system (MTS) FLIR, Link-16, self defense equipment, two 50 caliber
crew-served weapons and 8 Hellfire missiles.
The Army and Navy are executing a joint platform multiyear contract
that includes both the MH-60R and MH-60S airframes along with the
Army's UH-60M. The Navy is also executing a multiyear contract for
integration of mission systems into the MH-60R.
light attack and utility aircraft
UH-1Y Venom/AH-1Z Viper
The H-1 Upgrades Program is replacing the Marine Corps' UH-1N and
AH-1W helicopters with state-of-the-art UH-1Y and AH-1Z aircraft. The
legacy aircraft have proven enormously effective over decades of heavy
use, and as these aircraft reach the end of their service lives we look
forward to expanding utility and attack helicopter capabilities. The
new Yankee and Zulu aircraft are fielded with integrated glass
cockpits, world-class sensors and advanced helmet-mounted sight and
display systems. The future growth plan includes a digitally-aided
close air support (CAS) system designed to tie these airframes, their
sensors and their weapons systems together with ground combat forces
and fixed-wing aircraft. Low-cost weapons systems currently in
development, such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II
(APKWS II), will provide lethality while reducing collateral damage.
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $60 million in RDT&E,N for
continued product improvements and $827 million in APN for 31 H-1
Upgrades aircraft (18 UH-1Y, 10 baseline AH-1Z, and 3 AH-1Z OCO
aircraft). The program is a key modernization effort designed to
resolve existing safety deficiencies, enhance operational
effectiveness, and extend the service life of both aircraft.
Additionally, the 84 percent commonality between the AH-1Z and UH-1Y
will significantly reduce lifecycle costs and logistical footprint,
while increasing the maintainability and deployability of both
aircraft. The program will provide the Marine Corps with 123 UH-1Y and
226 AH-1Z helicopter models through a combination of remanufacturing
and new production. This represents an increase of 69 aircraft above
the previous inventory objective of 280 aircraft. The revised objective
was driven by the need to increase our active-duty Marine light attack
helicopter squadrons (HMLAs) from six to nine as part of the Marine
Corps' directed increase in force structure and manning. This increase
in active-duty HMLA squadrons started in fiscal year 2009 and will
conclude with the stand-up of HMLA-567 in fiscal year 2011.
The UH-1Y Venom aircraft achieved IOC in August 2008 and FRP in
September 2008. The UH-1Y program was given priority status in order to
replace the under-powered UH-1N fleet as quickly as possible. AH-1Z
testing and LRIP continues, with an operational evaluation (OT-II3C)
starting later this month. The AH-1Z Viper's FRP decision is scheduled
for the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. 58 AH-1Zs will be built new
to support the increased inventory objective, which exceeds the
quantity of existing AH-1W airframes available for remanufacture. As of
March 2, 2010, a total of 33 aircraft (25 UH-1Ys and 8 AH-1Zs) have
been delivered to the Fleet Marine Force, and an additional 36 aircraft
are on contract and in production. To date, all fiscal year 2009 and
2010 aircraft deliveries have been 30 days or more ahead of contract
date and the program has not shown any significant impacts from the
summer 2009 labor strike at Bell Helicopter.
In 2009, the Marine Corps successfully executed the first UH-1Y
shipboard deployment, with three UH-1Ys deployed with the 13th MEU.
During this deployment, those three aircraft flew over 600 flight hours
and posted mission capable rates in excess of 76 percent, while
supporting a variety of maritime special-purpose force missions to
include the rescue of Captain Phillips of the Maersk Alabama from the
Somali pirates.
The second UH-1Y deployment, with nine of these aircraft deployed
into combat in Afghanistan, began in November 2009. In the first 3
months of that second deployment, HMLA-367 posted UH-1Y mission capable
rates in excess of 77 percent while flying an average of 40 flight
hours per aircraft per month. This is more than twice the planned
utilization rate of 18.9 hours per aircraft per month. In just 3 months
those aircraft lifted over 800 passengers and 15,000 pounds of cargo
and responded to more than 650 calls from ground forces for assault
support and offensive air support. The crews flying these new aircraft
have not missed a single assigned launch to date and played a critical
role in providing troop and cargo transport, command and control,
aerial and armed reconnaissance, armed escort, and close air support
during Operation Cobra's Anger in the Now Zad valley of Helmand
Province.
assault support aircraft
CH-46E Sea Knight
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $17.7 million for CH-46
sustainment targeted at replacing worn equipment and aircraft
components that will ensure the health and viability of the airframe as
we progress through the transition to the MV-22B Osprey. Our medium
lift evolution to the MV-22B is progressing on schedule, with 50
percent of our medium lift fleet having begun or successfully completed
the transition. The CH-46E continues to perform well and is prepared to
maintain operational relevance through its projected retirement in
2018.
V-22B Osprey
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request includes $2.7
billion for procurement of 35 V-22s and for continued development of
follow-on block upgrades. Fiscal year 2011 is the fourth year of the V-
22 multiyear procurement contract. Our multiyear procurement strategy
supports a continued cost reduction and affordability trend, provides a
stable basis for industry, and best supports the needs of the
warfighter. The fiscal year 2011 appropriations will fully fund Lot 15
and procure long-lead items for Lot 16 under the V-22 multiyear
contract. Over the past 12 months, Bell-Boeing has continued to
consistently perform better than required on production contracts,
delivering aircraft on or ahead of schedule. The Marine Corps continues
to field and transition aircraft on time.
The MV-22B Osprey is now combat tested and forward deployed
supporting combat operations and responding to contingencies around the
world. As our premier medium lift assault support platform, the Osprey
brings unprecedented range, speed and survivability to the warfighter,
in a platform that far exceeds the capabilities of the CH-46E it is
replacing. The MV-22B has been continuously supporting our marines, in
combat and in contingencies, since October 2007. During three
consecutive squadron deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) (fiscal year 2008-2009), Osprey squadrons logged over 9,000
flight hours, carried over 40,000 passengers, and lifted over 2 million
pounds of cargo while flying every mission profile assigned by the
Multi-National Force-West Commander. The MV-22B also completed its
first shipboard deployment as part of a marine expeditionary unit (MEU)
last November, capping its 6-month deployment by flying 510 nautical
miles from USS Bataan (LHD-5) to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The
shipboard squadron conducted a relief in place with another squadron to
begin support of OEF.
The Osprey continues to redefine the speed and range at which the
MAGTF commander can influence his operational area. The second MV-22B
shipboard deployment is currently underway supporting humanitarian
relief efforts in Haiti and follow-on presence in the U.S. Central
Command area of operations. The CV-22 program has conducted multiple
SOCOM deployments, including a successful trans-Atlantic operational
deployment in support of operations in Africa and at locations in
CENTCOM.
As we continue to explore the tremendous capabilities of tilt-rotor
aircraft, we are learning valuable lessons with respect to readiness
and operating costs. As of December 2009, the V-22 had exceeded 70,000
total flight hours. More flight hours have been flown on this aircraft
in the last 2 years than in the previous 18 years combined. Like other
types of aircraft in the early operational phase of their lifecycles,
the MV-22 has experienced lower-than-desired reliability of some
components and therefore higher operations and support costs. Despite
our readiness challenges, the MV-22 squadron in Afghanistan continues
to meet mission tasking through hard work and aggressive sparing. We
are meeting mission, but only at supply, maintenance, and operating
costs that are inconsistent with our expeditionary nature and cost-
conscious culture.
Fleet wide, our Block B combat deployable aircraft averaged
approximately 60 percent mission capable (MC) in Continental United
States (CONUS) for 2009. With focused logistical support provided to
our deployed aircraft, however, we average nearly 7 of 10 aircraft
available on a daily basis in Afghanistan. This compares favorably with
the 71.6 percent availability over 18 months of operations in Iraq, and
71.0 percent availability for aircraft in the 22nd MEU. With the
cooperation and support of our industry partners, we are tackling these
issues head on, with aggressive logistics and support plans that will
increase the durability and availability of the parts needed to raise
reliability and concurrently lower operating costs of this aircraft.
V-22 capability is being increased and fielded over time via a
block upgrade acquisition strategy. MV-22B Block A aircraft are now
used predominantly in training squadrons. 61 MV-22B Block B aircraft
have been fielded with our operational squadrons and more will continue
to be delivered under the current MYP. MV-22B Block C aircraft will
provide additional mission enhancements, primarily in the areas of
environmental control systems upgrades, weather radar, and mission
systems improvements. The targeted delivery for Block C aircraft is Lot
14, in fiscal year 2012.
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Program
In fiscal year 2011 the President's budget requests $577 million
RDT&E,N to continue SDD of the CH-53K. In the past year, the CH-53K
program closed out its preliminary design review (PDR), has begun
producing long-lead items in preparation for building test articles
under the SDD contract, and is scheduled to conduct critical design
review (CDR) in July 2010. In fiscal year 2011, the program transitions
to assembly of the static and fatigue test articles and of the ground
test vehicle and continues developmental test activities.
During fiscal year 2009, the program encountered a schedule delay
(and associated growth to program cost due to the delay), driven
primarily by an overly aggressive initial program schedule. It is
important to note that these delays were not driven by technical
issues, and the program remains on a sound technical footing as it
enters CDR later this year. Additionally, the program has corrected the
planning issues that caused those delays and is now maintaining cost
and schedule performance. This program is not in danger of breaching
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. The requested funds will permit an orderly
restructuring of the program leading to IOC in fiscal year 2018.
The new build CH-53K will replace the current legacy fleet of CH-
53D and CH-53E helicopters with an aircraft that provides the
performance necessary to support our future warfighting requirements.
The CH-53D Sea Stallion and CH-53E Super Stallion provide unparalleled
combat heavy lift to the MAGTF and are among the Marine Corps most-
stressed aviation communities. CH-53s, providing vital lift of heavy
equipment, supplies and troops, are currently deployed in Afghanistan,
the Horn of Africa and Haiti, and are flying with MEU. Since ramping up
operations in Afghanistan in May 2009, these aircraft have flown nearly
11,000 hours, carried more than 62,000 passengers, and moved over 10
million pounds of cargo in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan
and the Horn of Africa, while flying well above their programmed rates
in austere, expeditionary conditions.
To keep these platforms viable until the CH-53K enters service, the
fiscal year 2011 budget requests $62.1 million for both near- and mid-
term enhancements, including the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below, Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic System, T-64 Engine Reliability
Improvement Program kits and Directed Infrared Countermeasures. While
these aircraft are achieving unprecedented operational milestones, they
are nearing the end of their service life; the CH-53E is approaching 30
years of service and the CH-53D has been operational for almost 40
years.
Ultimately, these aircraft will be incapable of supporting the
Marine Corps' future warfighting concepts and will be replaced by the
CH-53K. The new-build CH-53K will fulfill land- and sea-based heavy-
lift requirements not resident in any of today's platforms, and
contribute directly to the increased agility, lethality, and presence
of joint task forces and MAGTF. The CH-53K will transport 27,000 pounds
of external cargo out to a range of 110 nautical miles, nearly tripling
the CH-53E's lift capability under similar environmental conditions
while fitting under the same shipboard footprint. The CH-53K will also
provide unparalleled lift capability under high altitude, hot weather
conditions similar to those found in Afghanistan, thereby greatly
expanding the commander's operational reach.
Maintainability and reliability enhancements of the CH-53K will
decrease recurring operating costs significantly, and will improve
aircraft efficiency and operational effectiveness over the current CH-
53E. Additionally, survivability and force protection enhancements will
increase protection dramatically, for both aircrew and passengers,
thereby broadening the depth and breadth of heavy lift operational
support to the Joint Task Force (JTF) and MAGTF commander.
Expeditionary heavy-lift capabilities will continue to be critical to
successful land- and sea-based operations in future anti-access, area-
denial environments, enabling seabasing and the joint operating
concepts of force application and focused logistics.
executive support aircraft
VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget includes $94.7 million for
the settlement of the VH-71 termination, and $65.1 million for
continuing efforts on VXX, the follow-on program for presidential
helicopters.
Receipt of the VH-71 termination proposal is anticipated late in
fiscal year 2010 with negotiations and the anticipated settlement
expected in fiscal year 2011. The Navy is currently working closely
with DCMA in a complex effort to disposition all the assets acquired as
part of the VH-71 program cancellation. The majority of VH-71 specific
tooling has been sold back to Agusta-Westland in Europe. The process to
disposition non-aviation related assets is well underway in the United
States, and is beginning in Europe. The Navy has begun preliminary
negotiations with various operators of the EH-101 and other Federal
entities concerning disposition of VH-71 aircraft and parts.
VXX activity will include continuing effort that began in fiscal
year 2010, specifically the AoA, capability based assessments, concept
of operations development, trade study analysis, specification
development, system concept development and threat analysis leading to
a successful Milestone A decision. Following Milestone A and beginning
the technology development phase, remaining fiscal year 2011 activities
will focus on the proposed material solutions, specifically, reducing
technology risk by determining and maturing the appropriate set of
technologies and demonstrating technology on prototypes.
The VXX AoA will address all feasible options with a holistic
assessment of requirements, capabilities, cost drivers, schedule
implications, and risks. The requirement for a replacement presidential
helicopter was validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council;
however, the details and specifications on how the requirement will be
safely and affordably met have not been finalized. As a first step in
the process to determine how best to satisfy the need to transport the
President, data will be analyzed and matured by the government study
team into executable alternatives. This AoA process is underway and
will support the development of an acquisition strategy, at which time
cost/capability trades will be made.
VH-3D/VH-60N Executive Helicopters Series
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests an investment of $43.4 million
to continue programs that will ensure the aging legacy presidential
fleet remains viable until its replacement is fielded. Ongoing efforts
include the Cockpit Upgrade Program (CUP) for the VH-60N and
Communications Suite Upgrade (CSU), Structural Enhancement Program
(SEP), and Obsolescence Management Program (OMP) for both the VH-3D and
VH-60N. Current service life extension analyses for both VH-3 and VH-60
fleets are underway with results expected in early fiscal year 2011.
The Trainer Conversion Program will start in fiscal year 2011 and will
reduce training usage significantly on our VH-3D and VH-60N national
assets. Future investments in the legacy fleet will be required to
ensure continued safe and reliable executive transportation until the
replacement aircraft is fielded.
weapons
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $12.6 million for
continued JSOW-C-1 developmental activity and $131.1 million for
production for 333 all-up rounds. While these much needed procurements
will help meet the fleet's weapons loadout requirements, JSOW continues
to remain below approved non-nuclear ordnance requirements. Development
of the JSOW-C-1 variant adds a moving maritime target capability to the
highly successful baseline JSOW-C, and adds a data link and guidance
software improvements. The combat-proven JSOW family of weapons
procurement continues on cost and schedule.
Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $44.1 million of
RDT&E for the continued development of this joint DoN/Department of the
Air Force program. SDB II provides an adverse weather, day or night
standoff capability against mobile, moving, and fixed targets, and
enables target prosecution while minimizing collateral damage. SDB II
is of special interest to the DoN, as it will be integrated into the
internal carriage of both the Navy (F-35C) and Marine Corps (F-35B)
variants of the JSF. SDB II acquisition consists of a competitive
development risk reduction phase between two industry teams, with a
down-select at Milestone B planned for the third quarter fiscal year
2010.
Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $21.7 million for
the completion of production acceptance testing and an initial order of
700 weapons. DAMTC was originally initiated as a fiscal year 2007 Rapid
Deployment Capability in response to an urgent requirement identified
by the combatant commander overseeing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. DAMTC improves the warfighter's ability to attack and
strike moving targets by leveraging highly successful dual-mode
systems.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $7.8 million for
the follow-on development and test program and $54 million for
production. The AARGM development program transforms the legacy High-
speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) into an affordable, lethal, and
flexible time-sensitive strike weapon system. AARGM adds multi-spectral
targeting capability with supersonic fly-out to destroy sophisticated
enemy air defenses and expand upon the traditional anti-radiation
missile target set. The program began its formal test program in fiscal
year 2007 and was approved for LRIP in fiscal year 2008. Initial
operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is scheduled to begin in
the third quarter of fiscal year 2010, with IOC on the F/A-
18C Hornet in 2011.
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $8.8 million of
PAN,MC for procurement of 600 APKWS II precision guidance kits. The DoN
assumed program authority for the APKWS II on September 30, 2008.
Congress appropriated funding and approved a DoN above-threshold
reprogramming (ATR) request in fiscal year 2008 to complete APKWS II
SDD. Integrated test completed in January 2010. Milestone-C was
completed March 29, 2010. IOC is planned for the second quarter of
fiscal year 2011. APKWS II will provide an unprecedented precision
guidance capability to our current unguided (and thus less accurate)
rockets, improving accuracy and minimizing collateral damage. The
program is on schedule and on budget to meet the needs of our
warfighters in today's theaters of operations.
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $100.8 million of
RDT&E to support the continued development of this critical weapons
program. JAGM will become the next-generation precision-guided missile
launched from Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and
unmanned platforms. The DoN, in conjunction with the United States Army
(Executive Service), received formal approval to proceed with the
development of the JAGM in January 2008. JAGM is the first weapons
program to be developed under the new competition and prototyping
strategy, intended to improve program success rates and reduce costs.
In September 2008, fixed price incentive contracts were awarded to two
industry teams. During a 27-month technology development phase, these
two competing contractors will carry their design through a system-
level preliminary design review phase and will conduct ground launches
of their prototype missiles.
Hellfire Weapon System
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $109.5 million,
including $66.0 million of OCO funding, for 1,219 Hellfire all-up-round
weapons. Hellfire procurements are a mix of thermobaric, blast/
fragmentation, and anti-armor warheads, to provide maximum operational
flexibility to our warfighters. This procurement quantity will bring
the inventory total to approximately 50 percent of the requirement, and
will increase our training assets. While the DoN develops the JAGM, we
request continued support for legacy Hellfire weapons. Hellfire
continues to be a priority weapon for current military operations as it
enables our warfighters to attack targets in the caves of Afghanistan
as well as to prosecute military operations in urban environments.
Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile (AIM-9X)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $0.9 million for
RDT&E efforts and $55.2 million for production of a combined 155 all-
up-rounds and captive air training missiles and missile-related
hardware. The joint Navy/Air Force AIM-9X Sidewinder missile is the
newest in the Sidewinder family. The Sidewinder is the only short-range
infrared air-to-air missile integrated on USN/USAF strike-fighter
aircraft. This fifth-generation weapon incorporates high off-boresight
acquisition capability and increased seeker sensitivity through an
imaging infrared focal plane array seeker with advanced guidance
processing. It also uses an advanced thrust vectoring capability to
achieve superior maneuverability and to increase probability of
intercept of adversary aircraft.
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) (AIM-120)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $2.6 million for
continuing RDT&E efforts and $155.6 million for production of 101 all-
up-rounds and captive air training missiles with associated missile-
related hardware. AMRAAM is a joint Navy/Air Force missile that
counters existing aircraft and cruise missile threats. It uses advanced
electronic attack capabilities at both high and low altitudes, and can
engage from beyond visual range as well as within visual range. AMRAAM
provides an air-to-air first look, first shot, first kill capability,
while working within a networked environment in support of the Navy's
theater air and missile defense mission area.
Tactical Tomahawk BLK IV Cruise Missile
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $300.2 million for
an additional 196 BLK IV weapons and associated support. The Navy
supports strongly the continued procurement of this combat-proven,
deep-attack weapon in order to meet ship-fill loadouts and combat
requirements.
Theater Mission Planning Center
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $10.6 million
RDT&E and $88.7 million OPN for continued Theater Mission Planning
Center (TMPC) development and support. The TMPC is the mission planning
segment of the Tomahawk Weapon System. TMPC develops and distributes
missions for the Tomahawk Missile; provides strike planning, execution,
coordination, control and reporting; and enables maritime component
commanders the capability to plan or to modify conventional Tomahawk
Land-Attack Missile (TLAM) missions. Under the umbrella of the Tomahawk
Command and Control System (TC2S), TMPC has evolved into 5 scalable
configurations deployed at 125 sites, to include: cruise missile
support activities; Tomahawk strike mission planning cells; carrier
strike groups, command and control nodes and labs/training classrooms.
TC2S version 4.2 was released in March 2009 and has aligned Navy
Tomahawk strike and mission planning with existing decisionmaker
operational processes and support tools. Fiscal year 2011 resources
will continue the development of TC2S versions 4.3 and 5.0 to improve
joint interoperability and system usability.
unmanned aviation
RQ-4 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAS
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $529.3 million
RDT&E,N to continue SDD of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
UAS and $42.2 million MILCON to begin construction of test and
evaluation facilities at NAS Patuxent River. The Milestone B decision
for the BAMS UAS program was achieved on April 18, 2008. The program is
on schedule and conducted the systems requirement review (SRR) in
January 2009, SFR in June 2009, integrated baseline review in July
2009, and the preliminary design review (PDR) in February 2010. The
BAMS UAS program will meet the Navy requirement for a persistent ISR
capability as well as providing a communication relay capability. The
BAMS UAS is a larger Group-5 system which will be a force multiplier
for the fleet commander, enhancing situational awareness of the battle-
space and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill chain. BAMS UAS will
work as an adjunct to the new P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft
(MMA) to provide a more affordable, effective and supportable maritime
ISR option than current ISR aircraft provide. The Navy also procured
two USAF Global Hawk (Block 10) UASs in fiscal year 2003, for
demonstration purposes and to perform risk reduction activities for the
BAMS UAS Program, known as the BAMS-Demonstrator (BAMS-D) program. One
of the two BAMS-D UASs has been deployed to the CENTCOM theater of
operations for over a year.
MQ-8 Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $10.7 million
RDT&E to continue development of the MQ-8, commonly referred to as the
Fire Scout UAS and $51.0 million APN for the production of three Fire
Scout MQ-8B aircraft and for initial spares. The MQ-8 Fire Scout is an
autonomous VTUAV designed to operate from all air-capable ships, carry
modular mission payloads, and operate using the Tactical Control System
and Line-Of-Sight Tactical Common Data Link. The Fire Scout UAS is a
medium-to-large sized Group 4 system that will provide day/night real
time ISR and targeting as well as communication relay and battlefield
management capabilities to support core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
mission areas of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine interdiction
warfare, and anti-surface warfare for the naval forces. The fiscal year
2011 RDT&E budget request included funding to continue integrating a
maritime search radar system that will significantly increase
surveillance capability of the MQ-8B and support Littoral Combat System
(LCS) developmental testing. While in developmental testing, the MQ-8B
system is continuing a military utility assessment on the USS McInerney
(FFG-8) in order to evolve fleet concepts for operation of the system.
Deploying this system on the USS McInerney has documented lessons
learned that will provide valuable insight into continued development
and will reduce LCS developmental and operational test risks. However,
the program may not be able to complete all operational test objectives
prior to the end of the USS McInerney deployment. The Navy is
investigating additional ship schedules to complete OPEVAL and conduct
follow-on operational testing. The Fire Scout program will also
continue to support integration and testing as a mission module on LCS.
The Navy continues to cooperate with the Coast Guard for their ship-
based UAS planning.
Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $266.4 million
RDT&E for the continuation of the Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System
(NUCAS) efforts to research a large, Group 5, carrier-suitable, long
range, low observable, penetrating, persistent, unmanned aircraft
system capability to conduct ISR/strike missions in denied access
environments. The NUCAS efforts consist of continuation of the UCAS
carrier-suitability demonstration (UCAS-D), acquisition planning and
associated technology development. The UCAS-D effort will mature
technologies associated with unmanned carrier-suitability, including
launch, recovery, and carrier-controlled airspace integration, to the
technology readiness levels required for a potential follow-on
acquisition program. The demonstration will include catapult launch and
arrested landings aboard an aircraft carrier. Additionally, the program
will demonstrate autonomous aerial refueling using the same unmanned
systems from the carrier suitability demonstration. The demonstrations
will be complete in fiscal year 2013, though we expect needing
additional technology maturation. Northrop Grumman, prime contractor
for the UCAS carrier suitability demonstration, is on track to achieve
first flight in fiscal year 2010.
Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $38.9 million in
RDT&E ($12.7 million Navy, $26.2 million Marine Corps) and $35.3
million in procurement ($9.0 million APN and $26.3 million PMC) for the
Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) program that will
address Marine Corps and Navy ISR capability shortfalls identified in
the OCO and currently supported by service contracts. The Group 3 UAS
will provide persistent, ship- and land-based ISR support for tactical-
level maneuver decisions and unit-level force defense/force protection.
The Milestone B decision to enter engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) is scheduled for the next quarter. STUAS is currently
in source selection for a contract award to coincide with the Milestone
B decision. An interim commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution
referred to as STUAS Lite, is budgeted in fiscal year 2011 with $5.4
million in RDT&E and $14.4 million in APN. Fiscal year 2011 PMC is
planned to procure STUAS systems as an early operational capability.
Marine Corps Tactical UAS (MCTUAS)
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests $0.9 million RDT&E
and $18.1 million in baseline APN, as well as $8 million in an OCO
request for continued product improvement, upgrades, and retrofits.
MCTUAS is the same system as the Army's RQ-7B Shadow UAS, and is a
Group 3 system procured as an interim replacement for the RQ-2B Pioneer
UAS until a suitable Group 4 UAS can be fielded in fiscal year 2016.
The transition to the RQ-7B Shadow began in fiscal year 2007 and the
Marine Corps procured its thirteenth and final system in fiscal year
2010. The Shadow UAS provides rapid fielding of a capability that meets
urgent Marine Corps operational requirements and brings immediate
interoperability and commonality between Army and Marine Corps unmanned
aircraft units operating side-by-side in Afghanistan.
summary
Since 2001, the Navy and Marine Corps have been fighting shoulder-
to-shoulder overseas, supporting an extremely high operational tempo in
two theaters and in numerous contingencies while growing our force,
introducing new aircraft and systems, and looking beyond the current
fight to how we will shape the naval aviation structure of the future.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget reflects the Navy-Marine
Corps team's solutions to the challenges we face together. The DoN's
aviation programs balance sustaining fielded capabilities, as they are
employed in the OCO and continued forward presence worldwide, and a
substantive recapitalization effort that will deliver significantly
better capabilities to the warfighter. The naval aviation team
continues to work aggressively to identify efficiencies in the
development, testing, procurement and sustainment of aviation
platforms, components, and weapons systems in order to provide the
proper tools to the fleet. USD(AT&L) Dr. Carter recently testified
that: ``I support, as does the Secretary, the initiatives Congress
directed when it unanimously passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. Acquisition Reform is one of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) High Priority Performance Goals presented in the
Analytic Perspectives volume of the President's fiscal year 2011
budget. The Department is moving out to implement these initiatives.''
Our recapitalization and efficiency initiatives here are part of and
consistent with WSARA implementation and DOD's acquisition reform goal.
We thank you again for the opportunity to testify today regarding
the DoN's aviation procurement programs and look forward to your
questions.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Admiral.
Now we'll ask General Mark Shackelford if he would make an
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY
DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. JOHNNY A. WEIDA, USAF,
ASSISTANT DEPUTY OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND
REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Shackelford. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing
and for the opportunity to provide you with an update on Air
Force modernization efforts.
I'm joined this morning by Major General Johnny Weida,
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Airspace and Cyberspace
Operations.
Your Air Force is fully engaged in operations across the
globe, engaged in overseas contingency operations and providing
support to the combatant commanders to enable them to
successfully execute their missions.
In the coming year, we will assess how the fiscal year 2011
budget aligns with our standing operational requirements, along
with the upcoming needs of the entire Air Force. The 2010 QDR
set forth four objectives to guide our current actions and
future planning: (1) prevail in today's wars; (2) prevent and
deter conflict; (3) prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed
in a wide range of contingencies; and (4) preserve and enhance
the All-Volunteer Force.
Your Air Force is vectoring to meet these objectives, and
we are committed to working together to determine the right
procurement, sustainment, and retirement strategies to ensure
we are prepared for the current fight, as well as posturing for
future demands. Dominance of airspace and cyperspace continues
to be requisite to the defense of the United States.
Major General Weida and I thank the subcommittee for
allowing us to appear before you today, and for your continued
support of the Air Force.
I request our combined written statement be submitted for
the record.
We look forward to your questions.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much.
Without objection, it will be submitted for the record.
[The joint prepared statement of General Shackelford and
General Weida follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford, USAF, and
Maj. Gen. Johnny A. Weida, USAF
i. introduction
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing, and for the
opportunity to provide you with an update on Air Force modernization
efforts and other matters important to our Air Force and to the Nation.
Your Air Force is fully engaged in operations across the globe,
including overseas contingency operations (OCO) and supporting the
combatant commanders (COCOMs) and enabling them to successfully execute
their missions. In the coming year, we will assess how the fiscal year
2011 budget aligns with standing operational requirements and future
needs of the entire Air Force. The Secretary of Defense, in the recent
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), set four objectives to guide our
current actions and future planning: prevail in today's wars, prevent
and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide
range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer
Force. Your Air Force is vectoring to meet these objectives, balancing
risk appropriately, and preparing to prevent, prevail, and preserve
well into our Nation's future.
We frame our decisions and recommendations using the 2010 QDR and
the Air Force's top five priorities, established by the Secretary and
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. We understand your focus today is on
the Air Force's priority to modernize our air and space inventories,
organizations and training. Our rapidly aging aircraft fleet drives our
urgent need to balance between acquiring new inventory with sustaining
our current fleet. We look forward to discussing how we can match the
requirements with available resources in order to execute the National
Military Strategy.
ii. contributions of our air force
Today, your Air Force flies and fights in air, space, and
cyberspace--globally and reliably--as a valued member of our joint and
coalition teams. More than 40,000 airmen are deployed, with over 29,000
in and around Afghanistan and Iraq, as we unwaveringly do whatever it
takes to prevail in today's wars. Airmen, soldiers, sailors, and
marines who cross outside the wire do so with the asymmetric advantage
of armed overwatch, globally integrated intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, and aero-medical evacuation.
In Afghanistan alone, last year your Air Force flew 26,474 close air
support sorties, a 39 percent increase over 2008. Our joint force in
the Central Command area of responsibility is sustained by around-the-
clock rapid global mobility operations that included, in 2009, 52,905
airlift sorties delivering 264,839 short tons of cargo, over 32 million
pounds of air-dropped cargo, and 1.3 million passengers. In addition,
sometimes overlooked is the fact that approximately 43 percent of our
total force is daily engaged in out-of-theater support to COCOMs; a
remarkable contribution enabled by past investments in technology and
infrastructure that allow your Air Force to project global vigilance,
reach, and power while minimizing vulnerability.
On the home front, since September 11, 2001, your Air Force has
flown over 57,942 total sorties under Operation Noble Eagle, including
41,269 fighter sorties, 11,511 tanker sorties, and 1,850 early warning
sorties. As a testament to the total force, the Air National Guard has
flown more than 70 percent of these sorties and currently operates 16
of 18 air sovereignty alert sites. As we continue to accomplish our
current mission sets and plan for future threats, we must remain
mindful of the increasing age and costs of operating our air fleet. Our
Air Force leadership is scrutinizing programs and budgets to find
acceptable solutions to meet growing demands that are competing for
limited funds.
iii. fighter aircraft shortfalls
We constantly assess the combat Air Force structure in relation to
the dynamic security environment and the evolving needs of our joint
force. At this time, your Air Force does foresee a fighter inventory
shortfall when we compare force structure to COCOM plans and
requirements.
In April 2008 the Air Force informed Congress of a projected
fighter gap of over 800 aircraft in 2024. Since that testimony, three
key fighter force structure assumptions have changed. First, during the
fiscal year 2010 budget cycle the Air Force elected to accept increased
short- to mid-term warfighting risk and a subsequent smaller fighter
force in exchange for modernization. Second, the F-35 procurement rate
was officially increased from 48 to 80 per year. Third, the approach to
fighter service life computations was refined. The combination of these
changes significantly reduced the fighter gap. Numerous internal and
external assessments of the future security environment, including the
2010 QDR, have determined our current fighter force plans will fulfill
COCOM requirements with a moderate amount of risk.
iv. status of combat aircraft acquisition
Fighter Force
The average age of all combat Air Force aircraft is 21.7 years. In
August of this year, your Air Force will have been engaged in combat
operations for over 21 continuous years. The assessment of our
aircraft's longevity is complicated by the fact that we are currently
flying the oldest Air Force fleet in our history and using them longer
and more frequently than was envisioned during their design. This
presents considerable challenges in a difficult fiscal environment. In
response, we have conducted an extensive investigation into the service
life of our fighter aircraft. This is an ongoing effort and will be
informed by detailed fatigue testing of our A-10, F-15, and F-16
fighters to better understand the life-limiting factors of these
aircraft, and the feasibility of extending their service life given the
economic and operational environment. The work to date has reinforced
our need to recapitalize our aging fleet by acquiring next-generation
systems and modernizing selected legacy platforms.
A-10
The A-10 provides our Joint Force Commanders lethal, precise,
persistent, and responsive firepower for close air support and combat
search and rescue. It has performed superbly in Operations Desert
Storm, Allied Force (OAF), Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Iraqi Freedom
(OIF). However, the A-10's age and high operations tempo have taken a
toll on the fleet. The A-10 fleet's aircraft availability rating for
fiscal year 2010 is 52 percent.
Your Air Force plans to retain the venerable A-10 fleet beyond
2030, based on implementation of the proper care, investment, and fleet
management recommendations specified by the 2006 Fleet Viability Board.
In fiscal year 2007 the A-10 fleet began a robust depot-level
modification schedule that runs through the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP). This year we begin installing ``thick-skin'' center
wing panels on 233 A-10s--nearly two-thirds of the fleet, and begin
improving the fuselage structure. Your Air Force is also modernizing
347 A-10s to the ``C'' configuration with anticipated completion by
April of fiscal year 2011. This upgrade includes precision engagement
modifications to integrate targeting pods and digital data links into
the aircraft avionics, enabling use of global positioning system-aided
munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and Wind
Corrected Munitions Dispenser. Also, we integrated a digital data link
and advanced targeting pods with video downlink and replaced monochrome
cockpit displays with color multi-function displays. In addition, we
installed new pilot throttle and stick controls, a moving map
capability and a mass-memory upgrade. Finally, we integrated beyond
line-of-sight radios into the A-10 for faster communication with ground
units, forward controllers, and command and control centers. Together,
these modifications will allow the A-10 to continue its record of close
air support excellence over the next two decades.
F-15 C/D
The F-15 C/D is an air superiority fighter with an average age of
over 25 years. We project the F-15 C/D fleet is viable until 2025-2030
and will consider the airframe's service life extension requirements
following full-scale fatigue testing. This testing is scheduled to
begin this summer and conclude in fiscal year 2014. Your Air Force is
managing the fleet through scheduled field and depot inspections under
an individual aircraft tracking program. For fiscal year 2010, the F-15
C/D's aircraft availability is 65 percent.
We continue to modernize our long-term F-15 fleet with active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, infrared search and track
capabilities, and a more capable aircraft mission computer to boost the
air superiority capabilities of this aircraft. We expect these efforts
to successfully enable the 176 F-15 C/D ``Long-Term Fleet'' to operate
safely and effectively through at least 2025, as determined by the
full-scale fatigue test.
In addition, in fiscal year 2010 the USAF reduced F-15C/D force
structure by 132 permanently assigned aircraft and retired 112 aircraft
to the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group at Davis-Monthan
Air Force Base (AFB) in Arizona. This leaves 199 permanently assigned
aircraft (250 total active inventory) for fiscal year 2011 and beyond.
F-15E
The F-15E fleet, with an average age of over 16 years, continues to
provide support for ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like
the A-10, the F-15E performed superbly in Operations Desert Storm, OAF,
OEF, and OIF. In 2009, F-15Es delivered 54 percent of the 2000 lb.
JDAMs and 29 percent of the 500 lb. JDAMs employed in that area of
operations. The fiscal year 2010 aircraft availability rate for the F-
15E is 59 percent.
Your Air Force works hard to improve the F-15E's ability to rapidly
engage and destroy time-sensitive targets. This includes adding secure
radios and data links for faster communications with ground units and
forward controllers. In addition, we integrated the latest precision
weapons to hit targets accurately and reduce collateral damage. Also,
your Air Force added a helmet-mounted cueing system that will reduce
the F-15E's time to engage a target by up to 80 percent. Finally, we
added the state-of-the-art AESA radar system that advances capabilities
to identify and engage targets as well as share information with other
aircraft. Your Air Force plans for the F-15E to be an integral part of
the Nation's force through at least 2035.
F-16
Our multi-role F-16 comprises the majority of the fighter fleet.
There has been a 3.6 percent drop in the F-16 fleet's aircraft
availability since fiscal year 2005. Drivers contributing to this
decline are the Falcon STAR (all blocks) structural integrity program,
341 bulkhead repair/replacement (block 40/50), engine inlet ram (all
blocks), lower wing skin cracking (blocks 25/30/32), and aft cockpit
corrosion for the two seat aircraft. We expect these drivers to
continue to impact aircraft availability through fiscal year 2015. The
F-16's fiscal year 2010 aircraft availability is 67 percent.
Extensive flight hours and more stressing mission profiles resulted
in the need for significant structural modifications to the F-16. This
upgrade program, scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2013, replaces
known life-limited structural components and will maintain the original
design airframe life of 8,000 flight hours. Wing pylon rib corrosion, a
known problem with the F-16, is an issue we monitor closely through
inspections every 800 hours. This corrosion can prevent the F-16s from
carrying pylon-mounted external fuel tanks which limits its effective
combat range. In partnership with industry, the Air Force has recently
developed and certified a procedure that repairs affected aircraft at
the unit in a single day rather than a lengthy overhaul at the depot.
In other inspections, maintainers have found bulkhead cracks in
approximately 68 percent (271 of 397) of our Block 40/42 F-16 aircraft.
170 aircraft have been repaired and 49 aircraft had the bulkheads
replaced with 13 more in progress. An additional 145 aircraft continue
to fly with increased inspection requirements to measure crack growth.
We will continue to monitor this situation closely. Similar to the F-
15, the Air Force will start conducting a full-scale durability test
for the F-16 in fiscal year 2011 todetermine the modifications required
to extend the service life of the newer F-16s (Blocks 40-52) beyond
8,000 equivalent flight hours.
The Common Configuration Implementation Program is a top F-16
priority and will enable the maintenance of a single operational flight
program configuration on the Block 40/42/50/52 F-16s. The Block 50/52
modification is complete, and the Block 40/42 modification will be
complete this year. It combines several modifications including a new
mission computer, color displays, air-to-air interrogator (Block 50/52
only), Link-16, and Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System. The F-16 is
expected to be a capable element of the fighter force well into 2024.
Fifth Generation Fighters
Fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and the F-35 are key
elements of our Nation's defense and ability for deterrence. Hostile
nations recognize that U.S. airpower can strike their vital centers
with impunity which enhances all other U.S. Government instruments of
power. This is the timeless paradox of deterrence; the best way to
avoid war is to demonstrate to your adversaries that you have the
capability and will to defeat them.
The F-22A and F-35 represent our latest generation of fighter
aircraft. Both aircraft are necessary to maintain a margin of
superiority that permits our air and ground forces freedom of maneuver
and attack. The F-22A and F-35 each possess unique, complementary, and
essential capabilities that provide the synergistic effects across the
spectrum of conflict. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led
2006 QDR Joint Air Dominance study underscored that our Nation has a
critical requirement to recapitalize TACAIR forces. Legacy fourth
generation aircraft simply cannot survive to operate and achieve the
effects necessary to win in an integrated, anti-access environment.
F-22A Future Capabilities and Modifications
The F-22A Raptor is your Air Force's primary air superiority
fighter providing unmatched capabilities for air supremacy and homeland
defense for the joint team. The multi-role F-22A's combination of
speed, stealth, maneuverability and integrated avionics ensures this
remarkable aircraft accesses and survives high-threat environments. Its
ability to find, fix, track, and target enemy air- and surface-based
threats ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for all Joint
forces.
Similar to every other aircraft in the U.S. inventory, there is a
plan to regularly incorporate upgrades into the F-22A to ensure it
remains the world's most dominant fighter in the decades to come. The
F-22A modernization program consists of two major efforts that will
ensure every Raptor maintains its maximum combat capability: the Common
Configuration program and a preplanned product improvement program
(Increments 2, 3.1, and 3.2). We are approximately at the mid-point of
this effort.
As of 2 April 2010, your Air Force had accepted 158 F-22A aircraft
out of a programmed delivery of 187. We will continue to upgrade the F-
22A fleet under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved
Increment 3 upgrade designed to enhance both air-to-air and precision
ground attack capability. Raptors from the production line today are
wired to accept Increment 3.1. This upgrades the APG-77 AESA radar for
synthetic aperture radar ground mapping capability, provides the
ability to self-target JDAMs using on-board sensors and allows F-22As
to carry and employ eight Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs). Your Air Force
will begin to field Increment 3.1 in fiscal year 2011.
Responding to current threat assessments, the next upgrade will be
Increment 3.2 ``Accelerated'' which will complete development in fiscal
year 2013. 3.2 ``Accelerated'' is a software-only upgrade and provides
significant additional electronic protection, Link 16 improvements, and
a better combat identification capability. In the future, F-22As will
receive the Increment 3.2 full upgrade, which features multi-function
advanced data link, improved SDB employment capability, improved
targeting using multi-ship geo-location, additional electronic
protection and combat identification, automatic ground collision
avoidance system and the capability to employ our enhanced air-to-air
weapons (AIM-120D and AIM-9X). Increment 3.2 should begin to field in
fiscal year 2016. The current F-22A modernization plan will result in
34 Block 20 aircraft used for test and training, 63 Block 30s, 87 Block
35s, and two Edwards AFB-test coded aircraft.
F-22A Procurement Plans
The F-22A production program is currently delivering Lot 8 aircraft
ahead of scheduled contract delivery dates at a rate of about two per
month. Lot 8 Raptors are the second lot of the 3-year multiyear
procurement contract awarded in the summer of 2007. The Air Force
completed F-22A deliveries to Elmendorf AFB, AK, and is currently
delivering to two squadrons at Holloman AFB, NM, with expected
completion in January 2011.
When the plant delivers the last Lot 10 aircraft in 2012, we will
have completed the program of 187 Raptors. The average unit cost for
the 60 aircraft in the multiyear procurement was $142.6 million. The
Lot 10 unit flyaway cost is estimated at $153.2 million. This is $10.6
million higher than under the multiyear procurement due to higher
material costs for a much smaller lot buy, loss of the multiyear
procurement savings in parts and labor and inflation.
F-35
The F-35 program will develop and deploy a family of highly
capable, affordable, fifth generation strike fighter aircraft to meet
the operational needs of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Allies
with optimum commonality to minimize life-cycle costs. The F-35 was
designed from the bottom-up to be our premier surface-to-air missile
killer. It is uniquely equipped for this mission with cutting edge
processing power, synthetic aperture radar integration techniques, and
advanced target recognition. The F-35 also provides ``leap ahead''
capabilities in its resistance to jamming, maintainability, and
logistics support. The F-35 is currently in the 9th year of a 14 year
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase.
The F-35 is projected to meet all key performance parameters and as
of 17 December 2009, AA-1 completed its 91st and final test flight. The
second F-35A, AF-1, completed its first flight test on 14 November
2009. The first short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) flight test
aircraft, BF-1, successfully completed several flights leading toward
the program's first vertical landing, which occurred on 18 March 2010.
Currently, there are three STOVL flight test aircraft at Patuxent River
Naval Air Station. As of March 2010, 16 of 19 development test aircraft
have been produced, including 6 ground test aircraft and 10 flight test
aircraft. In addition, the F135 conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL)
engine reached initial service release on 5 March 2010, and the first
F135 production engine was delivered to the government on 29 January
2010. The Cooperative Avionics Test Bed continues to provide
unprecedented risk reduction at this stage in a major weapon system not
seen in any legacy program. The F-35 program was restructured and
funded to be consistent with the most recent independent estimates,
removing $2.3 billion from procurement and adding $1.4 billion to RDT&E
across the FYDP. In addition, CTOL quantities were reduced by 67 across
the FYDP. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget provided funding for
22 CTOL, 13 STOVL, and 7 CV aircraft, as well as 1 OCO CTOL aircraft.
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Alternate Engine Program
Your Air Force's position regarding the JSF alternate engine
program is that a second engine is unnecessary, too costly, and risks
diverting resources from production. The fiscal year 2011 Presidential
budget does not request funding for the development and procurement of
the F136 alternate engine. The Air Force and Navy continue to execute
the funding appropriated by Congress in the previous budgets to
continue the F136 program.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation estimated that the Department of Defense will have
to fund approximately $2.9 billion to take the F136 engine to
competition in fiscal year 2017, including development, directed buys,
and the necessary logistics support. Continued funding for the F136
engine carries cost penalties to both the F135 and F136 engines in the
form of reduced production line learning curves and inefficient
economic order quantities. The department concludes that maintaining a
single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. We
believe the risks associated with a single source engine supplier are
manageable due to improvements in engine technology and do not outweigh
the investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft
MQ-9A Reaper
The MQ-9 Reaper is a multi-role remotely piloted aircraft capable
of providing battlespace awareness, armed over-watch and light strike
against critical, emerging time-sensitive targets with self-contained
hard-kill capability. SDD for the first increment began in fiscal year
2005, and additional SDD efforts are currently ongoing. An interim
combat capability aircraft deployed to CENTCOM in September 2007 and
more have continued to deploy. There are 13 U.S. MQ-9 combat air
patrols (CAPs) supporting Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR). The MQ-9 has military-standard 1760-based stores
management capability, GBU-12/AGM-114 Hellfire weapon and 500-lb. JDAM
(GBU-38) capabilities. As of June 2009, the MQ-9 was designated a Major
Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). The fiscal year 2011 President's
budget requests increased procurement of MQ-9s to achieve 65 combat air
patrols (CAP). Rapid MQ-9 fleet expansion with concurrent development
and integration of advanced payloads is stressing its development and
testing capacity.
MQ-1B Predator
The MQ-1 Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance, remotely
piloted aircraft for providing battlespace awareness with the ability
to provide modest armed over-watch and reconnaissance against critical,
perishable targets. When the MQ-1 is not actively pursuing its primary
mission, it acts as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander-owned
theater asset for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition
in support of the Joint Forces commander. Airmen made history in March
2010 when they surpassed the 700,000 flight hour mark in the MQ-1B. The
last 200,000 Predator hours were flown in just over 12 months. There
are 28 MQ-1 CAPs supporting CENTCOM's AOR. The MQ-1B is also
transitioning to a MDAP. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget
extends the lifetime of MQ-1Bs to achieve 65 CAPs and provides funding
to continue MQ-1 operations beyond the FYDP.
Missile Programs
Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile
The Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) is the Nation's
only stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave, stand-off
missile capable of being launched from fighter and bomber aircraft. The
JASSM achieved operational capability on the B-52, B-1, F-16 and B-2
and puts an adversary's center-of-gravity targets at risk even if
protected by next-generation air defense systems.
The Air Force postponed the JASSM fiscal year 2009 production
contract due to unsatisfactory flight tests of the Lot 5 JASSM
production missiles. Of the 10 flight tests, we considered 6 to be
complete successes. To address issues discovered during the JASSM test
program to date, we paused fiscal year 2009 missile production to
incorporate reliability improvements and conducted Lot 7 reliability
tests which achieved 15 for 16 successful hits. The fiscal year 2011
President's budget requests funds for the procurement of 171 missiles
to include the first order of the extended range variant.
Legacy Bomber Fleet
The B-1, B-2, and B-52 remain engaged in today's fight while
retaining an ability to meet future challenges. Air Force bombers have
been on rotating deployments to Southwest Asia since September 11. The
bomber aircraft inventory is 162 and averaged at 33.7 years old. Your
Air Force continues its commitment to future long-range strike
capabilities as part of a comprehensive, phased plan, valued at $5.5
billion over the FYDP, to modernize and sustain our bomber force.
B-1
B-1 aircraft availability rates remained relatively level for
fiscal years 2002-2007 with a drop in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year
2009 primarily driven by modernization efforts. To mitigate manpower
shortages and reduced maintenance experience levels, B-1 bases have
been augmented by a contract field team which will continue through
April 2011. Manning authorizations have been approved but manning will
continue to affect the B-1's aircraft availability rating into the
distant future while personnel are trained and gain experience.
The B-1s has maintained an unflagging deployed presence since
September 11, 2001 in support of OEF and OIF. During that time, the B-1
fleet and its crews have flown more than 6,900 missions and amassed
more than 70,000 combat hours. In OEF alone, the B-1 has employed
nearly 40 percent of all munitions while flying only 5 percent of all
sorties.
Given the B-1's critical contributions to today's fight and its
corresponding high operations tempo, your Air Force places great
emphasis on sustaining the B-1 fleet. B-1 sustainment efforts address
several issues which, if left unchecked, could critically limit
aircraft availability and leave a gap in our power projection
capability. Although these modifications represent a significant
investment, they are critical to supporting our deployed combat forces
by ensuring continued B-1 availability.
Your Air Force's primary B-1 modernization effort is the Fully
Integrated Data Link (FIDL). FIDL gives aircrew enhanced situational
awareness and combat effectiveness by incorporating Link-16 data link
and joint range extension beyond line-of-sight capabilities. FIDL also
provides the backbone infrastructure for a substantial upgrade to the
existing cockpit including modern multi-function color displays that
provide aircrew with a new level of fused data.
Your Air Force continues to deploy the highly successful laptop-
controlled targeting pod (LCTP) modification for the B-1. Initiated in
2007 in response to an urgent need request and operational since 2008,
LCTP provides the B-1 with targeting pod capabilities via the Sniper
advanced targeting pod (ATP). The B-1 combined with the Sniper ATP
delivers an unprecedented level of payload precision to the fight.
Efforts continue to outfit the entire B-1 fleet for Sniper operations
and provide a moving target kill capability via employment of laser-
guided weapons.
B-2
The B-2 is significant to Pacific Command's (PACOM) continuous
bomber presence to assure allies and support U.S. interests in the
Pacific. The B-2 Spirit Advanced Technology Bomber provides a lethal
combination of range, payload, and stealth. It remains the world's sole
long-range, low observable bomber. It is the only platform capable of
delivering 80 independently targeted 500-lb JDAMs (GBU-38). While B-2
availability has steadily increased over the past 5 years, in part due
to enhancements in low observable maintenance such as the highly
successful alternate high frequency material program, it faces
increasing pressures to upgrade avionics originally designed over 20
years ago. The extremely high frequency satellite communications and
computer upgrade program (EHF SATCOM and computer upgrade) has three
increments. Increment 1 upgrades the Spirit's flight management
computers as an enabler for future avionics efforts. Increment 2
integrates the family of beyond-line-of-sight terminals (FAB-T) along
with a low observable antenna to provide secure, survivable strategic
communication, and Increment 3 connects the B-2 into the global
information grid. Increment 1 of EHF SATCOM and computer upgrade is in
EMD and on track to begin procurement in fiscal year 2011 for fleet
installations beginning at the end of fiscal year 2013. The Department
is also investing in the B-2's defensive management system to ensure
continued survivability. This will allow the B-2 to continue operations
in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance
required operating the system.
We will also replace the B-2's original radar antenna, upgrade
selected radar avionics and change the radar operating frequency as
part of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP). We signed the low-rate
initial production (LRIP) contract for the first six production radar
kits in December 2008 and contracted the second and final full-rate buy
for the remaining seven ship sets in November 2009. Also, we bought 7
radar ship sets during development and are installing in fleet aircraft
to round out the 20 aircraft B-2 fleet. The developmental units will be
retrofitted to the final production configuration. This program
successfully achieved required assets available on 15 March 2010.
Thanks in large part to congressional support, the RMP acquisition
strategy was modified to include life-of-type component buys to avoid
diminishing manufacturing source issues during the production run.
B-52
The B-52 Stratofortress is our Nation's oldest frontline long-range
strategic bomber with the last airframe entering service in 1962. It
amplifies the consistent message of long-range US airpower in a theater
like USPACOM where distances drive decisions. Equipped with advanced
targeting pods, the B-52s can also provide real-time intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance with full-motion video, enhanced
situational awareness, a demonstrable overwatch presence and precision
joint fires in support of USPACOM's objectives. In addition to
supporting the continuous bomber presence at Anderson AFB on Guam, the
B-52 continues to maintain a high-state of readiness for the nuclear
deterrence mission.
Your Air Force has invested in modernization programs to keep the
B-52 platform viable and operationally relevant. Major B-52
modernizations include the combat network communications technology
(CONECT), EHF SATCOM, strategic radar replacement (SR2), and the 1760
internal weapons bay upgrade programs. CONECT provides an integrated
communication and mission management system with machine to machine
data link interfaces for weapons delivery. The digital infrastructure
provided in CONECT is the backbone for EHF SATCOM and SR2. The EHF
SATCOM program integrates the FAB-T providing assured, survivable two-
way strategic command and control communications. The SR2 program,
starting in fiscal year 2010, integrates modern non-developmental radar
to address systemic sustainment issues, replacing the legacy APN-166
radar. Finally, the 1760 internal weapons bay upgrade provides internal
J-series weapons capability through modification of common strategic
rotary launchers and an upgrade of stores management and offensive
avionics software. Updated with modern technology the B-52 will be
capable of delivering the full complement of jointly developed weapons
and will continue into the 21st century as an important element of our
Nation's defenses.
Long-Range Strike
The fiscal year 2011 Presidential budget began funding for
technology industrial base sustainment in anticipation of a future
long-range strike (LRS) platform program. This effort develops and
demonstrates LRS technologies and concepts in support of Air Force
global strike and global persistent attack concepts of operations. This
effort will provide capability improvements in the areas of strike
responsiveness, survivability, lethality, connectivity, and
affordability. The QDR-directed study will help inform and shape the
requirements for LRS.
The fiscal year 2011 Presidential budget adds $199 million in
fiscal year 2011 and $1.7 billion over the FYDP for LRS. Fiscal year
2011 investments will reduce technology risk, preserve critical
technology industrial base skills and refine requirements for a future
long-range strike platform. Investment areas of interest include
advanced sensors, electronic warfare and countermeasures,
survivability, manufacturing readiness, net-ready communications, open
systems and multi-level security architectures, mission management,
weapon effectiveness and survivability, and combat identification.
v. closing
Your Air Force stands ready to win today's joint fight and plan for
tomorrow's challenges. We are committed to working together to
determine the right procurement, sustainment and retirement strategy to
ensure we are prepared for the current fight as well as posturing for
future demands. Dominance of air, space, and cyberspace continues to be
requisite to the defense of the United States. USD(AT&L), Ash Carter
recently testified that: ``I support, as does the Secretary, the
initatives Congress directed when it unanimously passed the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) or 2009. Acquistion reform is
one of the DOD's High Priority Peformance Goals presented in the
Analytic Perspectives volume of the President's fiscal year 2011
budget. The Department is moving out to implement these initiatives.''
The Air Force TACAIR Program actions described above are consistent
with WSARA implementation and DOD's acquisition reform goal. We
appreciate your continued support and look forward to working in
concert to ensure our decisions enable us to strengthen our Air Force
to meet future requirements.
Senator Lieberman. General Trautman, or any of the others,
would you like to make an opening statement?
General Trautman. No, Senator. I'll combine my verbal and
written statement with Admiral Architzel's.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, thanks.
Let's proceed to questioning.
Let me begin with an open-ended question and ask, beginning
with Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford and anybody else
who wants to get into this, if somebody were walking in here,
maybe sitting in the back of the room, not particularly
experienced in all the details of military acquisition,
development, construction, et cetera, and asked, ``Why is this
JSF, which all of us acknowledge is an extraordinary program
and a great plane, why is it now behind schedule and costing so
much more than we thought it would cost?'' In my days as
attorney general of Connecticut, we used to call this the law
in plain language. In other words, if you can explain to us--
and through us, to the American people--what's the problem
here?
Admiral Architzel. Senator Lieberman, if I could start.
I would say that the JSF program, unlike any we've ever had
before, is a tremendously challenging program technically. It
is also one that takes on not one aircraft, but three aircraft
types.
Senator Lieberman. Each for the different Services.
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Architzel. From the F-35A for the Air Force, the F-
35B for the Marine Corps short takeoff, vertical landing
(STOVL) variant, and F-35C, which is the carrier variant for
the program.
In the process of developing these aircraft and the
technology that goes with them, the advancement of the program
and the technical risks that were encountered did not meet the
schedule and costs. That was clearly pointed out with a Joint
Assessment Team (JAT), which was done in 2008, to show that the
program needed additional time and investment to meet goals.
That action was taken at the end of 2009 to fund that estimate.
The continued pressure of slides in the program or not meeting
expectation of delivery, additional efforts were taken to
understand the reasons. That was associated with the Joint
Estimating Team II, an Independent Management Review Team,
which went into the manufacturing and the ability to ramp up on
those production areas, as well as an assessment of the 135
engine, which were all conducted in 2009.
At the conclusion of those reviews, Dr. Carter pulled
together a group of senior officials, including General
Shackelford and myself, to look and analyze, what did we gain
from those analyses and where we're headed with the program?
Clear indication was that while concurrency in these programs
has been there from the beginning, the issue is, do you have
too much concurrency? When you have too much, do you need to
take and slow that down somewhat to allow you to have the right
amount of concurrency?
Senator Lieberman. Define concurrency for this mythical
person in the back of the room.
Admiral Architzel. All right, sir. We are at a point where
we are building aircraft, we are testing aircraft, and we're
beginning to field aircraft. There starts to be a concurrency
not just in that overlap, but also concurrency between the
various models I mentioned, the A, the B, and the C, as they
come through. So, the program is built on a certain level of
concurrency, which is healthy.
What concurrency can bring you is added learning, it can
bring you manufacturing stability, it can bring you a lot of
things that go forward. But, with too much concurrency, you
need to then take a look and say, ``do we have this right?''
The estimate of the Department was that we needed to take an
additional 13 months in the development phase of the program.
We needed to put additional funding in that program, which is
about $2.8 billion to finish that effort. We also took measures
that we wanted to come through that period, and we needed
additional test assets that weren't in the plans, so we added
an additional carrier variant. We took three additional
airplanes from the limited low-rate initial production (LRIP)
series, to bring that so we could have additional test assets.
We also revised the ramp to have the ramp which was in line
with the Independent Management Review Team's recommendation,
which is the ramp that we have today in our proposal.
Senator Lieberman. Excuse me, a second.
Let me go back to concurrency, because part of the appeal
of the program, obviously, was that this was a JSF, that this
was going to be essentially a single plane model. Obviously,
there'd be some variants there, but that part of the appeal of
it was that there would be a lot of commonality between the
planes for the different Services, and so we'd be saving money
in a host of different ways, and hopefully achieving a speedier
production. But am I hearing you say that that part of the
problem is that that didn't work out and that there were unique
needs of the various Services that are part of the reason why
this program is now behind?
Admiral Architzel. I think that in order for this program
to work effectively, some concurrency had to be built into the
program.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Architzel. It's based on that. There's an absolute
need. In order for the manufacturer to produce the fifth-
generation aircraft we need, we have to have some concurrency
just to get the learning and the ramp we would need to produce
this in an economical fashion. A certain amount of that is
healthy and will get us where we want to go. It's when you end
up in a situation with too much; basically the restructuring
will be done with an eye towards slowing 13 months in the
development phase, and we will then have the ability, with the
added test assets I mentioned, and with the funding, to get the
program back on track with the right level of challenge to it
and with the confidence that both the contractor and we can
train and be able to support needs as we go forward.
Senator Lieberman. General, let me ask this question. As
you look back, did we underestimate at the beginning? At worst,
were we misled or were we misleading ourselves to think that we
could turn this plane out more quickly and less expensively
than we're getting it now?
General Shackelford. Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking
that. DOD acquisition is much about setting expectations. In
2001, when we established the cost baseline for the development
program, we had a different set of circumstances than we do
now. But, consider that cost estimating, in spite of it being a
fairly mature process that we use within the Department, it
leaves a great deal of potential to make errors in the
estimate. The process that we follow in DOD acquisition sets an
expectation with that initial independent cost estimate (ICE)
that we're measured against, that results now in the Nunn-
McCurdy breach, as you have observed.
I don't think this is a matter of misleading.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Shackelford. I think our cost estimating community
does the best job that they can do, with the tools that they
have and the people they have, to assess what might be the
future of a program, when, in reality, they're looking at, in
this case, more than a decade out into the future, and judging
what reality might be at that time.
A year ago, when I was here testifying before this
subcommittee, what I told you was that over the next year we
would find out a great deal more about the assumptions that go
into, for instance, the cost estimate.
At that time, we were looking forward to having virtually
all of the flight-test aircraft delivered during calendar year
2009. That didn't happen. Why might that not have happened?
These flight-test aircraft, unlike those that are often built
into legacy aircraft programs, were being built on the
production line, the same production line that is turning out
the LRIP aircraft today. That transition, for a contractor, is
a significant event, in terms of changing focus from
development into production, and facilitating that production
line. It comes down to things like efficiency on the production
line, the provision of the parts to go into the aircraft as you
go from fabrication into assembly and then final assembly. To
the extent that you have changes in the design. These would be
small changes--this is some component that doesn't fit, for
instance, as they expected it to fit--that result in a certain
amount of churn that now reflects back on incomplete work that
now needs to be fixed later in the production line.
The result of all of that--and there was a great deal of
change traffic a year ago--is, that production line is very
unstable at that point, and its predictability is not as sound
as we would like it to be. The result of that is late delivery
of aircraft, which, in this particular year would have been the
year to start the flight test program and have the flight test
aircraft as productive test assets to verify such assumptions
that go into a cost estimate as numbers of effective sorties
per month, number of effective test points per sortie, how much
progress we could make in the developmental test program, that
pretty much got stiff-armed by a year.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Shackelford. So, we're in the same situation now,
where we expect to get all of those flight-test aircraft
delivered this year. But, we have found through the production
of the flight-test aircraft, and then to the LRIP aircraft,
stabilization and change traffic, a higher rate of available
parts, and less out-of-station work; in other words, that line
is starting to mature. It will take a couple of lots of LRIP to
catch up.
But, at this point, we've pretty much turned the corner on
that. Now, we just need to get those aircraft active flyers,
and that will then help us understand whether the assumptions
that we have put in to the flight-test schedule, which is
largely what amounts to the cost estimate for engineering and
manufacturing and development, to see how valid that's going to
be.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, thank you. We'll continue the
discussion. My time is up.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford, in its most
recent selected acquisition report on the JSF program, DOD
warned Congress that the overall costs for buying the JSF
aircraft could increase, yet again, after a new ICE comes out
in the summer. The magnitude of that revised ICE could raise
basic questions about the Department's plans for, and the
commitment of the program's international partners to, the
program, at least as it's currently envisioned.
Does either the Navy or the Air Force have a fallback plan
if schedule slips and cost growth continue in the JSF program?
If so, what are they?
Admiral Architzel. The Department has taken extraordinary
measures now to look in detail at the JSF program, and with the
restructuring of that program, we firmly believe that we can
deliver on the program, avoiding future cost and schedule
impacts. That was not taken lightly, moving forward, mentioning
all the things General Shackelford has also mentioned, but the
idea of revising the ramp and then holding to the testing that
we need to get done, and also resourcing the tests that has to
happen to go forward. I believe with the maturing of the
product line, and the moving forward, we will see ourselves
begin to recapture the progress we need to see on the JSF
program.
In terms of alternatives, what we have to look for and be
mindful of is we do have to maintain a strike fighter base.
That gets into our maintaining of our legacy fleet of aircraft,
as well as where we go from there. So, that may be something we
want to come back to and address how we manage it. Because,
essentially this is a two-fold effort, if you will; it's
managing of the fleet aircraft we have today, and it's about
also ensuring we do everything we can to bring the JSF on in
the numbers we need, which is to recapitalize our fleet.
At the end of the day, we absolutely need requirements
brought by the fifth generation and the JSF. So we are
committed to that, as we go forward.
General Shackelford?
General Shackelford. Senator, likewise, the Air Force is
committed to the F-35 as the fifth-generation solution for
recapitalizing our fighter force structure.
The Air Force, likewise, is committed to the JSF as being
our solution for recapitalization of our fighter force
structure. As such, we are putting the proper pressure, in
terms of bringing that program along in as successful a manner
as we can, such that we can build a confidence to get the
production ramp rate up to something that will flow those
aircraft into the inventory as quickly as we're able to.
Regarding our legacy systems, we're primarily modernizing
those aircraft--these would be A-10s, F-15s, F-15Es, and F-
16s--with avionics. We are putting new wings on a large number
of the A-10. That's a structural replacement; likewise,
structural repairs on the F-16 fleet, to ensure it can meet its
8,000-hour service life. But, in general, providing state-of-
the-art avionics capability with weapons capability to match is
how we are approaching the legacy fleet. But, we're focused on
that fifth-generation fleet.
Senator Thune. You touched on it maybe a little bit, but I
wanted to follow up on something that the Air Force Chief of
Staff, General Schwartz, recently confirmed, and that is that
the Air Force has begun stress tests on the fleet of F-16
Falcons to help determine how to keep several hundred of the
jets airworthy through the end of the decade, hedge against
delays in the delivery of the JSFs. Can you shed some light on
that, and maybe give us some additional information on that
initiative?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir. We are doing a structural
analysis on the F-16, primarily looking at the Block 40 through
52--the newer F-16s--to extend those as far as we can. Those
are also the aircraft that have received what's called the
Common Configuration Implementation Program that upgrades
displays, puts in Link 16 Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, and
basically communalizes the avionics architecture across those
blocks of aircraft.
The F-16, in particular, is susceptible to bulkhead crack
issues, typically at the back landing gear and aft into the
engine mounts. That's been an issue with F-16s throughout the
life of the fleet. We have a small number of aircraft right now
that are in repair to fix what we know to be problems there, as
well as into additional inspections to make sure that they're
airworthy. But, I'm not anticipating, at this point, an
additional major structural upgrade.
Admiral Architzel. Senator, it's essential that we manage
the fleet of aircraft we have today, that we get the most
utilization we can out of them, as we begin to ramp up and
bring forward the JSF. That program takes on the call of not
just managing the fleet of aircraft, but also extending the
life of the legacy aircraft we have today. In managing the
fleet of aircraft, we go about looking at things we can do to
operationally affect that force. The Navy and Marine Corps,
both Services are committed to TACAIR integration, to share
that burden for things like productive ratios of aircraft, to
the beddown plans for the Marine Corps or, in the case of the
Navy, in terms of fleet response plan. About accelerating E/F
squadron changeovers from legacy Hornets to E/Fs, there will be
approximately five squadrons total; it varies between
accelerating existing plans to transition to E/F, and also
taking attrition birds, which were aircraft bought when the E/
Fs were bought for attrition, which we would transition
squadrons earlier to build that capability in those areas.
It's also about actively managing, by bureau number, the
fatigue life of every legacy Hornet. We have the ability to do
that, and we're doing that now, as well as managing the flight
hours for each one of those aircraft.
We also have significant work underway to increase our
depot efficiencies to get things through, like planned
maintenance availabilities or high flight-hour inspections, so
that we can return those aircraft that we do have in the
pipeline--which is maintenance or upkeep--back to the fleet and
taskable assets.
That is the managing-the-fleet-of-aircraft side. Then, on
the the extending-the-service-life side, we have legacy
Hornets, a 6,000-hour jet, which, when we brought it on, we
knew we could actually, with inspections and with knowing how
we flew the aircraft, get that out to 8,000 hours. From 8,000
hours, we're looking now at a series of aircraft to see if we
can do what's called high flight-hour inspection, which would
give us 600 additional hours on the airplane. That allowed us
to take what was a strike fighter shortfall, with the numbers
mentioned before and get to around a 177 fighter shortfall in
the 2017-2018 timeframe.
We could then apply additional resources to look how we
would further mitigate that shortfall. One of those big
mitigators would be to actually do a service-life extension
program (SLEP) of a limited number of legacy Hornets. That
range would be somewhere between 150 and 280; it would depend
on what we have. That would allow us to continue to draw down
that shortfall, should we need to do it.
These steps are taken across the board by the Navy and the
Marine Corps. The commitment is real. We're going to manage
this inventory as we go forward, keeping in mind we want
absolutely to have the ramp sustainment on the JSF so that we
can bring those planes on and then not have to have further
reliance on legacy assets as we go forward.
One final piece I'll mention on the E/F is, we are working
diligently under our service life assessment program to see
about taking the E/F to 9,000 hours. That's a funded program
for the assessment of that. We believe that's a very doable
objective.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Let me just say, briefly, that Senator Thune's question is
an important one, and your answers are important, too. There
has been broad support for the JSF program here in Congress,
but the TACAIR shortfalls that the Services are projecting are
very unsettling. As you've acknowledged, yourself, in the moves
that you're making--and I think you'll hear this much more from
Congress, as you already have--there will be pressure to
sustain the fourth generation of aircracft, and improve it
because the fifth generation is coming on more slowly and more
expensively than we hoped for. I understand you're both
committed, and the Services are committed, to the fifth
generation, but based on the reality that we're facing now, of
time delays and increased cost and the very unsettling TACAIR
shortfall, which does represent warfighting risk, then I think
we have to work with you to do a combination of fourth and
fifth generation to keep us where we want to be.
I'm going to just leave it at that for now, and I'll come
back to it.
Senator Burris, you're next.
Thank you.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to welcome our distinguished panel. I'm pleased
with the leadership that you've shown over the past years, and
I want to continue to support you in your continued leadership
for our great country.
Gentlemen, I'm a strong supporter of the Federal contract
competition; and, as such, I supported continued funding of the
F136 engine last year. This is a fixed-price contract with
long-term savings for DOD and the American taxpayers, not to
mention its positive effect in TACAIR readiness. What I want to
see are savings for the American taxpayers, and competition is
the only way to effectively garner such savings. When
contractors compete, the taxpayers win. So, we want to make
sure that that's a factor.
How are you phasing in the support of infrastructure as a
new JSF program without the detriment to the legacy aircraft
that it will replace?
Admiral, you want to take a shot first, and then the
General?
Admiral Architzel. Senator, with the reference to the
alternate engine, the Secretary has been unequivocal on the
position with respect to the alternate engine. The Department
of the Navy stands in full support of that position on not
having the requirement for the alternate engine. Spending more
dollars today on procurement on a second engine for JSF is
unnecessary and would divert precious funds, as we've already
talked about, from pressing DOD needs.
Since 2007, DOD has recommended termination of the
alternate engine program, and if we were to continue that
program, estimates are, it would require approximately $2.9
billion up to 2017, to $2.5 billion in the next 5 years. That
also would require us to get to the issue; while, in general,
the Department of the Navy favors competition, where
appropriate, the question would be whether the offset of the
procurement investment required to reach that point where we
could compete that--and the estimate would be around 2017, best
case, before we could--would there be a payback to the
procurement offset, which is significant, at a time when we
really need these precious procurement dollars?
We also want to emphasize that we need to improve the
performance on the 135 engine, and that has been undertaken
with the JAT, which got the assurances and came back and
reported feeling there will be assurances to that effect. So,
to your point, understanding the desire for competition, we
accept and realize there are points when we want to have
competition, as well. But, in this case, we believe that the
position is not favorable for us to pursue with a second
engine.
General Shackelford?
Senator Burris. Yes, General?
General Shackelford. Senator Burris, the Air Force supports
the Department's position on the alternate engine for the F-35.
Based on the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE)
analysis, the program itself has rated its breakeven point, in
terms of tipping the scale to go past what's remaining as what
we've invested, at about $2.9 billion on either side. The
assumptions that go into cost reductions based on competition
have changed over time; the change from 2014 to 2017, in terms
of when that engine might become competitive, assumptions on
the engine entering the production with basically the same cost
as the F135, and the same learning curve, are both questionable
assumptions.
We believe, as we look out into the future, that the market
for two engines will exist, just in the Air Force. We would be
the only recipient of F-35s that would actually have both
engines. Smaller fleets would drive single-engine
configurations for both our foreign partners, as well as, we
believe, the Navy and Marine Corps. The Air Force, buying the
bulk of the airplanes, would wind up with, potentially, both,
which drive additional support costs, training costs, spares
costs, and whatnot. So our assessment is that, given the
priorities for dollars in today's budget, we're better off
spending the money, from an F-35-engine perspective, to
continue to refine the F135 engine, and press on with that as
the single engine for the F-35 fleet.
Senator Burris. Gentlemen, the alternative plans to
compensate for delays in the JSF program have been an added
cost. What is the projected added cost of alternative plans to
compensate for the 24-month delay that we're talking about now?
There's an added cost to it.
General Shackelford. Senator, are you referring to the
added cost in the F-35 program itself?
Senator Burris. That's correct.
General Shackelford. Yes, sir. By flattening the ramp,
which we did as part of the restructure of the program, we have
taken $2.8 billion out of the production funding inside the
program's funding line and placed that onto the development
program. So, the dollars themselves are neutral, in terms of
affecting other programs. They only come out of the F-35
program, and they are a trade between production dollars and
development dollars.
Senator Burris. So, there are no added dollars. You're just
switching dollars.
General Shackelford. This is switching dollars in the
projected funding line of the F-35 program, yes, sir.
Senator Burris. Will there be a second round, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Lieberman. I expect there will, Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had to step out for a quick meeting, but I appreciate the
opportunity to stay in order and continue on with the
questioning.
The F135, I know it's over budget by about $3 billion, and
I believe it's behind schedule. In looking at the F136 program,
it's on budget and it's on time and there's a potential to
offer a fixed-price contract. I know I'm new here, but even
before I got here, I was concerned, being in the military,
about pricing and costs. How do I justify, to the people back
home in Massachusetts, the fact that we're supporting a program
that's over budget and not on time, versus a plan that's a
local engine that needs a billion dollars to be finished, is on
budget, and offers a fixed price? How do I justify supporting
one program over the other? What do I tell them?
Admiral Architzel. To your first point about the 135
engine, part of the restructuring of the program was done to
look at the 135 with a JAT made up of senior experts, to go and
look at the progress on that manufacturer to produce that
engine and could they achieve stated cost-reduction goals? The
report back from that JAT was that they could achieve that.
First point.
Senator Brown. When do they think that'll happen?
Admiral Architzel. As we progress forward on the 135 engine
development and procurement service. There's set goals for the
engine to achieve, in terms of learning curve and coming down
on cost per engine, and those goals were assessed as achievable
by the JAT that went up and evaluated that.
In terms of a second engine procurement, it is
approximately 3 to 4 years behind where the 135 is today. The
additional $2.9 billion over the span from now until 2017 is a
significant amount of money, $2.5 billion in the next 5 years,
which could be invested in other investment procurement or
other areas needed to be funded.
Senator Brown. But, you're using the original baseline
numbers, correct?
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir, those are the numbers that
were reported from CAPE to us, and also from the estimates from
the engine.
Senator Brown. I've always been a strong believer that
competition is good. When you're dealing with such a program
with so many dollars, my concern, with the overruns and the
delays, is that it's always good to have competition to keep
people focused and moving in the proper direction.
So, for the record, Mr. Chairman, I want to state that I do
have those concerns, and I'm doing everything and anything I
can to find out more and more information as to why there are
delays and why competition isn't good. I have to be honest with
you, I haven't found a good reason yet.
I'd like to shift gears, if I may, regarding the CH-53
Echos and Deltas. They've flown beyond their programming date
since 2001, due to their continued deployments. That said, the
Heavy Lift Replacement Program ran into scheduling delays in
2009. If you could just give us an update as to whether you're
confidant that the 53 Kilo is back on track and will it be
capable of replacing the legacy aircraft, starting in 2018.
General Trautman. Thank you, Senator Brown.
You're exactly accurate with regard to the aged CH-53
Delta, which is now into its fourth decade and still going
head-to-tail into Afghanistan, and previously into Iraq. We've
been getting marvelous service out of that particular airplane.
CH-53 Echo is a newer airplane. That has service life that will
enable us to bridge to the CH-53 Kilo. We need the Kilo. The
Kilo is going to be a lifter that will carry 27,000 pounds at
110 nautical miles, which really fits into our concepts of
operations today, but even more so in the future, as our
equipment gets heavier and our need for standoff and deep
operations increases in the next decade.
The 53 Kilo program is technically sound. We've worked
through some challenges over the past 2 years, with regard to
some center-of-gravity issues that we had initially, some staff
management issues that we had initially, and I'm pleased to say
that, in this budget submit, the program is adequately funded
to move forward at a pace that makes us confident that we can
bridge to that airplane towards the end of the next decade.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one more question?
Senator Lieberman. Yes, Senator Brown. The timekeeper will
inform you when your time is up.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
The Hueys are currently being replaced by the Yankees, and
the Whiskey Cobras will soon give way to the AH-1 Zulu. How is
production and fielding of the Yankee coming along, and where
do we stand with the Zulu program? General?
General Trautman. Senator, the H-1 upgrade program is a
poster-child for troubled early years, just like many of our
programs are, to include the JSF. But, I'm pleased to say that
we've given birth to an extremely capable airplane in the UH-1
Yankee. We declared initial operational capability (IOC) of the
Yankee in August 2008. We immediately sent it out in a marine
expeditionary unit deployment for 7 months to western Pacific
and that detachment did superbly; did so well, in fact, that
even before we declared material support date with the Yankee,
we deployed a full squadron into Afghanistan in November 2009.
That airplane has made a huge difference in Afghanistan.
The Yankee is far, far more capable than UH-1 November that
it replaces. We've used it in a variety of mission sets in
Afghanistan. It's the first time we've had the Yankee serving
side-by-side with the MV-22 and, I'll tell you, we're
incredibly pleased with the span of capability sets that the
Yankee and the MV-22 give to the aviation combat element
commander there in Afghanistan.
The good news about Bell is that they've delivered an
average of 57 days ahead of schedule for the last 18 airplanes.
Their manufacturing and production process has righted
themselves a remarkable way over the past 2 years. The quality
coming off the line is near perfect. We entered into
operational tests in the AH-1 Zulu, which will be the Yankee's
partner, 2 weeks ago, and we have high confidence that they'll
finish operational tests and reach a full-rate production
decision in the Zulu by the end of this calendar year.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is now up.
If there is a second round, I just had one more final question.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Brown.
We'll now go to Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a few questions. I hate to have to keep banging on
the 35. But, let me go back, first, to make sure I understand
something.
When you said, ``$2.8 billion out of the production will
move, then, to the development,'' you're doing two things. Make
sure I'm clear on this. One is, you're reducing down the future
production, unless you get additional dollars. Am I right about
that?
Admiral Architzel. I'm sorry?
Senator Begich. The question that you answered to Senator
Burris; you had talked about how you're moving $2.8 billion in
production dollars and you're shifting it to development
dollars in the same program.
Admiral Architzel. No, the $2.8 billion is what it would
take to finish the research and development. To develop the
engine would be another $2.9 billion.
Senator Begich. But, you've shifted that from----
Admiral Architzel. No, if we were to have to fund those,
that money would go there, that would not be able to be put for
other DOD needs or procurement areas. So, it's dollars spent on
a program that we don't believe we need.
General Shackelford. Senator, I think you're after the
production dollars moving over to develop not for the engine,
but for, how are we paying for the additional development cost
of engineering and manufacturing development.
Senator Begich. Right.
General Shackelford. By flattening out the production ramp
rate----
Senator Begich. Let me make sure, because I like to keep
things very simple. Flattening the production rate means----
General Shackelford. The progression of numbers of aircraft
that are purchased each year.
Senator Begich. Right. Less per year.
General Shackelford. A flatter increase, fewer aircraft, in
addition to the previous year. For instance, in last year's
budget was 30 F-35s. This year is 42. That number would
continue to increase on an approximately 1.5-to-1 ratio each
year.
Admiral Architzel. Senator, if I could, the numbers are
about the same, one was about development of the alternate
engine and the second was about flattening of the production of
the JSF so that we could then use that for additional system
development and demonstration (SDD) phase costs we have to
incur. The number happened to be about the same. I was
addressing what it would take research and development to
continue and finish the development of the alternate engine.
This is on the ramp.
Senator Begich. I'm on the F-35.
Admiral Architzel. Okay. Thanks.
Senator Begich. No problem.
I remember last meeting, I think it was maybe 6 months ago,
when I was in this room and we had a conversation about the F-
35, and it was indicated that there was trouble on the costing
of it at that point, but it was not clear. One thing I had
there which was a very helpful tool; I don't see it here. Maybe
it was submitted. I don't see it in your testimony. But, I want
to make sure I understand. The main goal is--and correct me if
I'm wrong here--the F-35s replace legacy aircraft over time,
but make sure we have capabilities, in essence. Is that a fair
statement? I'm trying to keep it simple.
General Shackelford. Yes.
Senator Begich. I don't want all the long discussion about
it, but that's basically what we're trying to do. But, I have
yet to see, in very simple terms now, where you are on
schedule--because you're behind--costs more money, which means
somewhere, something has given, because, based on what I keep
seeing about the deficit, the money isn't there, over the long
haul.
The third thing is, and I like to see things as very
simple, where the facts are in what we have today, what we're
going to have tomorrow, what we're going to have next year, the
year after that, in capabilities. Do you have such a document
you can share with us? I don't want a 40-page report. It was a
very interesting chart. It showed exactly what production was
going to be, how much was it going to be tested, when things
might come online, and then, at the same time, what you're
retiring, because that's a big piece of this equation, because
you have, built into your budget, savings on retirements of
some of the aircraft. You have modernization that's going on.
So, how does that fit? Do you have such a chart that shows it
over the 5 and 10 years?
Admiral Architzel. We can certainly show you the production
of the 135 as it goes forward.
Senator Begich. I want it all together.
Admiral Architzel. Okay. We could take that and produce
that for you, sir.
Senator Begich. Because the 35 is, over time, trying to
replace certain types of aircraft, so we have great
capabilities, but not diminishing our capabilities. Correct?
Admiral Architzel. That's correct, sir.
Senator Begich. Okay. What I've learned in the Armed
Services Committee is everything's in silos. What I want to see
is the whole show in a very simple document. Because the last
document I saw showed that you had already slipped. I think, as
Senator Brown pointed out, months, as well as very costly. What
I'm trying to figure out, as we move down the line, how do we
keep on the track a very expensive program, and I know there's
variations in estimates, but I'm going to use mine: it's
doubled in the cost per unit. It could go up more. To be very
frank with you, I'm not as new as Senator Brown, but I'm new,
and my confidence level on the ability to perform on this
aircraft is low, in the cost end. Maybe it will be a great
aircraft when it is all completed, but it is very expensive in
a time when we have very little money. So, help me produce a
flowchart that shows, over the next 10 years, or 20, not the
next year, not the next 2, over a long haul. At the end of each
year, what are we going to have as capabilities? What's in
test? What's being retired? What does it look like in costing
for that program, which includes the modernization of certain
ones, the production of certain ones? Can that be done?
Admiral Architzel. We can certainly produce that for you,
Senator.
Senator Begich. Do you not do that now?
Admiral Architzel. No, we have that. I just would put it
all in one document for you, the flowchart. I'm saying we can
produce that.
Senator Begich. Okay.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Admiral Architzel. But, the progress on the program, to go
where we want to be with the JSF, the restructuring of the
program also came with emphasis to the program we want to see
or achieve those very goals you're laying out. How do we
incentivize the contractor to actually make those goals?
There's two things that are also embedded in a restructuring
program, which is to take the award fee, a fee that we can
take, and then incentivize that to goals and attainable things.
What do we need to achieve in 2010? What do we need to achieve
in 2011? If you attain those things, then you will be rewarded
for that, and if you're not attaining those, then we would look
to what would happen. Tying that to also, every time you have
something affecting the 135, we have to be closely coupled to
what we're doing on the legacy side, to make sure we don't end
up aggravating our JSF inventory.
Senator Begich. My time is up. Luckily, she dropped it just
in time to give me another question. [Laughter.]
I took advantage of that moment.
If you could do that on the chart, that would be
appropriate.
The struggle I have, always, with DOD is the silo
movements. As the F-35 gets developed, what I want to make sure
is, when you make that decision that production is delayed, who
then makes the decision on the rest of the aircraft to make
sure you're not retiring it as quickly, or you're doing
something with it? I want to just understand that, because if I
don't have that basis, we're going to bang on your head here
for another hour, probably; we'll ask lots of tough questions,
then we'll all go away. What I like to see is the whole
picture, then how those decisions are made, because what I find
is, I will spend half of my time in the Senate, because I sit
in these kind of meetings, and then individual meetings with
generals about their programs, but they all seem to be not
fully linked up, in my opinion. That's my view. Maybe in the
Pentagon it's all linked up in some magic box. But, I'll tell
you, I don't get that picture, so I'm trying to get that
picture, and I need you to help me.
Admiral Architzel. Senator, we can do that.
To have Admiral Philman comment, I think would be helpful
at this point. When we're talking about acquisition and
delivering on new aircraft, and we're talking about the legacy
and the JSF inventory, the CNO in his role to provide and equip
the services we have, takes his existing operations and
maintenance money, also is budgeting to the fact that we want
to maintain those legacies, so that is married directly as
things happen on the procurement side, they are going to have a
direct impact over there. I'd like the N88 to comment on that
for you, sir.
Admiral Philman. Yes, sir, glad to.
Senator, we take a holistic view of the whole inventory of
our aircraft, along with our Marine Corps brethren who serve
with us on the aircraft carriers. So, the F-35, which we are
looking forward to, with all the capability it will bring to
the battlespace, advanced sensors, advanced communications and
connectivity, and the true stealth, to go very deep, early into
the fight. We need that. But, until we get there, we will
continue to work with our Es and Fs, and then modernize and
sustain our legacy F-18 Hornets. So, we looked at that every
day, about what aircraft are being retired, which aircraft can
be extended, and how we manage, almost by each number aircraft
down to the squadron level, how we can extend the life of those
things.
It's called the Service Life Management Program, in which
the young commanders understand the remaining life on those
airplanes, what kind of missions they can fly, and which ones
are better suited for separate missions.
I'll give you an example. As a young fighter pilot, I would
go out and do high-performance maneuvering as soon as I got
into the area. Then we would do some low G or more moderate
maneuvering later on. As it turns out, we can get the same
training if we reverse those things. We do moderate maneuvering
when the aircraft's heavy with fuel, and then, as we get later
in the flight, we do more dynamic maneuvering.
Those kinds of things are looked at across the board, the
numbers of airplanes that exist, the numbers of airplanes we
need to modify through high flight-hour inspections, or
potentially SLEP those airplanes, but as well as the airplanes
that we're going to potentially purchase in the future, and
what that mix is on the aircraft carrier and on the other
places we deploy around the world.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me expand there.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Begich.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks for your service. Thanks for your
leadership.
Admiral Architzel, we've heard reports about the F-35, in
testing, breaking cables on the carrier. What kind of report
can you give us on that?
Admiral Architzel. I'm sorry, sir. The F-35 breaking----
Senator Chambliss. Cables on the carriers.
Admiral Architzel. Sir, I have no knowledge of that report
or anything. We have not begun to do any real testing. Where
we're at today on the sea variant is confirming the static
conditions, the static design of that airplane, which has gone
very well in areas where we've actually uncovered some things.
Places to restore static margin and fatigue margin have been
put in place. That's the recent keel web correction. That has
actually been implemented on the CF-5, and will be actually
backfitted into 3. Three is actually in, so you can actually go
and see that modification in place, and it will be production-
modified as we go forward.
Senator Chambliss. All right. If what I've asked you about
is a rumor, and I hope it is, I'd like to put it to bed. Could
you just follow up in writing on that and just do whatever
needs to be done and give me a response on that?
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir, I will tell you that's
definitely a rumor but I will follow up, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The report that F-35 is breaking arresting cables during test is a
rumor. There have been no incidents of F-35 breaking arresting cables
during test.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Admiral Philman. Senator, if I could?
Senator Chambliss. Yes, sir.
Admiral Philman. I believe you're referring to the stresses
on the keel beam of the aircraft, not the arrested landing, but
the catapult. That was determined through modeling, that the
transfer of stresses from the catapult stroke on the aircraft
carrier would potentially cause some cracking in the main beam
of the aircraft. That was determined and learned very early.
Just one aircraft is delivered, and that's actually a test
model. So, that fix has already been implemented. Any further
aircraft that will be delivered will have that repair already
installed, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Thank you.
Admiral Architzel. Those are the kinds of things, Senator,
that we are finding when you have the keel web structure we're
talking about. There are other examples that we found in our
static testing, which has gone forward very well, on all three
variants, but it's the kind of thing you'd expect to find now,
and then be able to make adjustments to it.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
Admiral, I want to go back to your numbers on this gap.
Let's talk about how we're going to fill that. I'm concerned
about two issues there. Number one, obviously, is the gap
itself. My understanding is, in 2008, the Navy projected an
optimistic shortfall of 125 strike fighters by 2017. But now,
subsequent reports project that may grow to 243 by 2018; 129
for the Navy and 114 for the Marine Corps. That, coupled with
the fact that today the Navy, particularly from the very
important carrier-based operations, have no first-day
capability in any theater where the enemy has sophisticated
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). We know that if we send those
airplanes in there, we're going to have significant loss. So,
if you will, address that shortfall for me; tell me how you're
going to fill that shortfall.
Admiral Architzel. Senator Chambliss, the Navy had looked
at their shortfall numbers, and had reached the numbers you
articulated. As we came into the most recent, which was the
restructured ramp of the JSF, that put the number back up on
the order of what you had there for 243.
I mentioned all the levers that we're looking at doing
across the Navy and Marine Corps to manage that inventory.
We're committed to managing that inventory. Things like
bringing on additional E/F squadrons, productive ratios,
changing primary mission authorization on some squadrons that
are expeditionary, and also looking how we manage, as Admiral
Philman said, bureau number by bureau number, both in terms of
fatigue life, as well as flying hours, to know we can manage
that inventory. We're also looking to do things like high
flight-hour inspections, which will give us additional hours on
the legacy Hornets we have.
Ultimately, when it comes down to it, we can inspect our
way so far, to a point where we believe we can get to about
177. Then we're going to need to do some SLEPs, which is a POM-
12 issue fund we'll come forward with, to know how many of
those aircraft we would have to SLEP to get them to 10,000
hours. To bring our manageable number down in the peak years
you mentioned, of 2017 to 2018, of about 100 or less of an
inventory management. Even with that number, we believe we can
reduce that number some more by further efficiencies, whether
it be in the depot or other areas we can comment to.
I would ask General Trautman or Admiral Philman to comment.
Senator Chambliss. Before you comment, General, you haven't
mentioned filling it with additional F/A-18s. Is there any
proposal to do that?
General, please.
General Trautman. Senator, I think the current plan is to
buy another 124 F-18 E/Fs, which will buy out the proposed
operational requirement (POR) of 515. It's important to
understand how many airplanes we're talking about here: 635
legacy Hornets, 515 E/Fs, 680 JSFs, and 150 AV-8s. The Nation
has spent a lot of money on TACAIR for the Department of the
Navy. I think it's incumbent upon us to manage these assets to
the best of our ability, and that's what you're hearing when
you're hearing us talk about managing these assets. We're
trying to do it in a way that gets us to the vitally-needed
fifth-generation strike fighter, the JSF, while also taking
care of the key issues that face us in the warfighting venues
that we may encounter over the next decade.
The reason that these numbers fluctuate so much, sir, is
because the model is very susceptible to the kinds of
assumptions that you put in the front end. You can manipulate
the front end almost any way that you want to manipulate it in
order to have the number come out to any specific number that
you want. It's almost impossible to predict 8 years from now,
how many shortfall airplanes we're going to have, even if the
ramp on JSFs stay precisely as we think it's going to occur
today, and that's doubtful. Lockheed's been incentivized to
beat the ramp that's laid out now, and they think that they can
give us more tails between now and 2018.
I'll just give you one more example and then I'll close. In
fiscal year 2009, the model predicted we would attrite 15
legacy Hornets. We attrited three legacy Hornets. So, right
there we made a plus-12 on the kinds of numbers that had come
in to you in previous sessions and with the numbers that you
talked about. Believe me, we've spent a lot of time on this
over the past several months; and the best that we can do is
what Admiral Architzel said, which is, in about 2018, we'll
have a shortfall of about 100 jets, given the management levers
that we intend to apply, and we can take that even lower by
finding some depot efficiencies. I'm incredibly confident that
if we can keep the JSF on track, the Department of the Navy can
manage their TACAIR inventory successfully.
Admiral Architzel. Senator Chambliss, if I could, one
point. The 124 aircraft that General Trautman mentioned, he
indicated E/Fs. Actually, that's a combination of E/Fs and
Growlers. That's the electronic attack variant. At the time, we
had approximately 89 aircraft in 2009 that we were going to
look to continue to finish out with. We ended up with 9
additional E/Fs and 26 additional EA-18Gs, which is electronic
variant. That put our number up to 124, as mentioned, to finish
the procurement in 2013, sir.
General Trautman. Admiral Architzel is exactly right. I did
make an error on the 124, but the POR is 515 Super Hornets, and
that's where we're headed.
Admiral Architzel. That's true.
Senator Chambliss. I hope that your optimistic view about
the F-35 comes to fruition; but with the problems we've seen to
date, and the IOC date keeps slipping. General Trautman, I
think you've tested your variant on the F-35, and I don't know
what kind of confidence you have in that variant right now, but
that's probably going to continue to be an issue.
What does concern me is that we're talking about spending
tax dollars on a fighter that is second or third generation.
I'm not sure that's the best expenditure of our money. As we
move forward with this, I hope you're correct that that
optimistic view of the F-35 ramp production is going to be
there for us.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too, want to reiterate my thanks for your service and
your leadership. Thank you very much.
Recently, the Air Force announced plans to transfer 12 C-
130 aircraft from various Air National Guard units to an Air
Force Reserve unit in Arkansas. This allocation, I understand,
is intended to avoid the cost of purchasing new aircraft, while
replacing the older aircraft in an aging fleet. However, the
plan was not developed in conjunction with the Adjutants
General, and its effect is, I think, to commandeer the aircraft
from the Air National Guard without consulting the affected
State Governors.
General Shackelford, has the Air Force taken the Air
National Guard's homeland security roles and responsibilities
into account as part of this decision to reallocate the Air
Guard assets? Does the Air Force have a modernization plan that
does not sacrifice readiness in one component of the total
force in order to achieve readiness in another unit?
General Shackelford. Senator, if I may, I'd like to defer
that to my colleague here.
Senator Hagan. Sure. Thank you.
General Shackelford. It's right down his lane.
General Weida. Senator, thank you for asking that question.
First of all, the Mobility Capabilities Review Study that
came out certainly tells us that we have some overmatch in the
C-130 fleet.
As to the specific issue that you raise, within a week or
so we'll have an Air Force position on where to go forward with
that. We're taking that issue very seriously. We have it on
board, and, if you will, I'll take that for record and give
that to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Air Force Reserve Component formal training unit (FTU) plan,
coordinated with the appropriate TAGs, temporarily transfers 18 C-130H
aircraft within the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve
Command to Little Rock AFB in support of the C-130 FTU. This plan
alleviates the aircraft shortfall present with the necessary retirement
of Active Duty C-130E model aircraft currently operating in the FTU.
New C-130J aircraft, purchased to recapitalize the older C-130 fleet,
cannot be used for legacy C-130H FTU training due to significant
aircraft differences. With 77 percent of the current C-130H force
structure residing in the Air Reserve component (ARC), the ARC has the
only available capacity to assume the mission of building and
sustaining a qualified C-130H crew force.
Fiscal year 2011 PC C-130 force structure reductions are based on
excess capacity identified in MCRS-16, and the Air Force will
accelerate planned retirements of the oldest C-130s (E model, average
age--46 years) and retire a portion of the next oldest model (H1 Model,
average age--36 years) to avoid increasing sustainment and
modernization cost. The Air Force has a two-pronged approach for
modernizing our mobility C-130 fleet; C-130J procurement to
recapitalize the oldest C-130 E and H model aircraft and the
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) to modernize newer C-130Hs.
The AMP program currently modifies all 207 ARC mobility C-
130Hs plus 14 Active Duty C-130Hs. As the C-130H fleet
modernizes, legacy C-130 FTU training requirements will decrease
over time and ANG aircraft will transfer back to the home
State.
Homeland security and disaster assistance requests will be met
utilizing the Global Force Management process to ensure the combatant
commander receives the most effective airlift platform supporting the
needs of the State (Title 32) and Geographic Combatant Commander (Title
10). ANG homeland security missions will be minimally impacted as
States may negotiate State-to-State agreements to augment airlift
capabilities as has been done in the past.
Senator Hagan. North Carolina is obviously one of the
States that is affected. I'm not sure I understand what you
mean by overmatch.
General Weida. Capability areas that we have today in
excess of the requirement for our warfighting needs.
If I could follow on, virtually everything we do in the
Department, we try and take a total-force perspective--Active,
Guard, Reserve, and, for that matter, civilian. In the Air
Force, we have a process called our Total Force Initiative
process, of which we have 142, currently, that our Chief of
Staff tracks. We'll give you a specific answer on this issue.
As a matter of fact, the last couple of days, we have talked
about that in the Department.
Senator Hagan. I think several of us have sent letters, but
it's certainly something that's of concern, I'm sure, to the
States that are affected by this.
General Weida. I understand, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. DOD has devoted significant resources, I
know, to the development of the fifth-generation strike
aircraft that are intended to operate in environments with
significant and advanced air defense systems. However, most of
the flight hours during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom have been in environments without those kinds of
antiaircraft capabilities, where the performance
characteristics of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft aren't
necessarily required. Are any of the Department's unmanned
aviation programs, such as the RQ-4, the MQ-8, the MQ-9, or the
unmanned combat air systems, being developed with the goal of
providing a lethal, precise, persistent, and responsive
platform that has the ability to perform armed reconnaissance
strike in close air support in a manner that could reduce the
reliance on the fifth-generation aircraft in these
semipermissive environments?
Admiral Architzel. Senator Hagan, I think it's an excellent
question, and it is one that the Department of Navy is pursuing
actively. On the requirement side, if I could, I'll turn to
Admiral Philman to address this.
Senator Hagan. Thanks.
Admiral Philman. Yes, ma'am. We take very seriously how we
can get the most capability to the warfighter with the least
amount of usage. We don't want a high-end aircraft doing
something that we could be doing with something smaller or less
expensive, certainly.
We are looking at all those aircraft, vertical aircraft, as
well as long-dwell broad maritime sensor bands, which is a
variant of Global Hawk for long-dwell sensing over the ocean as
well as being a low-hanging satellite to maintain connectivity
with the carrier strike groups and other strategic systems.
Related to our P-8, our maritime patrol aircraft. So, the
program has fewer of those aircraft, with the expectation that
the long-staring surveillance will be done by an uninhabited
aircraft, then, when the real work needs to be done by humans,
can be brought in with the P-8. That's one example.
The Navy Unmanned Combat Air System you mentioned is a
demonstration to prove that we can do unmanned aircraft off the
aircraft carrier. That demonstration will prove itself by 2013,
with launches and recoveries aboard the aircraft carrier, as
well as airborne refueling. But, that is a shape; it's not a
real program yet. What we learn from that will be transferred
into other systems that we could use from the aircraft carrier
or ashore that will do just those things.
Everything is to be a multiuse system. Is it a striking
airplane with some ISR, or is it mainly a surveillance system
that could also have some striking capability? So, we'll look
very closely at that. We do procure with some forethought.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Also, on April 2, 2010, a press release from the U.S. Fleet
Forces Command announced that various delays have pushed the
outlying landing field's timeline to the point that it will now
coincide with the commencement of the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) process for home basing of the F-35C Navy JSF.
Admiral Architzel, when do you anticipate collecting the
sufficient testing data from the F-35C in order to conduct the
EIS process?
Admiral Architzel. Senator Hagan, let me begin, then I'll
turn it back over to Admiral Philman. We've already begun
collecting the environmental data through our testing, both at
Fort Worth, and the STOVL aircraft at Pax River. That will feed
into the models that will ultimately populate the plan.
I'd like Admiral Philman to talk more about the EIS.
Senator Hagan. Admiral, let me ask one other question while
you're answering this one, too.
Is consideration being given to home-basing the F-35C
squadrons in a manner that differs from the current
concentration of the F/A-18s in order to address the training
capacity limitations at Fentress and obviate the need to
establish additional landing fields to support the squadrons
based at Oceana and the Chambers field?
Admiral Philman. Ma'am, as was mentioned, we're still
gathering the data so we can make a determination on what the
impact to the environment will be, in every combination of
existing bases, as well as some others that aren't
traditionally master jet bases.
That study is still going on within the Department of the
Navy, so that we can bed down our aircraft in the most
efficient way, capturing the training ranges, the existing
infrastructure, and the logistics that can be most efficiently
used.
Regarding the outlying field, if you bring more airplanes
or we have to do the carrier landings, we will have to give
that some consideration. The Fentress airfield does not meet
our complete need in the type of landings that it requires us
to do. It's not completely representative of the aircraft
carrier landing environment. So, either at Oceana or at another
place, there will probably be an additional field needed. That
has not yet been determined, but the requirement does exist,
ma'am.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Kaufman, good morning. We have a really outstanding
turnout this morning, which, I think, testifies to the interest
in, and concern about, our TACAIR programs.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. As a brand new member, being here for 2
weeks, I just want to follow up on Senator Hagan's comment to
General Weida. I know you're studying this shift to the C-130s
right now. I know you understand better than anyone how
important that is to our homeland security and what a big
portion of our total lift is involved in the Air National
Guard. I just wanted to encourage you to take a hard look at
that, and talk it over with the Air National Guard folks, which
I know you'll do. I look forward to that.
General Weida. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Kaufman. I want to thank you all for your service.
It's hard to come up with new words to express how impressed I
am with our armed services today, and what a great job they're
doing. I just got back from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq,
and I want to tell you I wish every American could go over
there and just spend a day with anything from the lowest
ranking officer to the top and just watch what they do--the
quality of their work, the courage, the way they follow
through, the high morale, and the ability to do their job, just
in so many ways. So, as a new member of this committee, I just
want to tell you, I'm proud to be on this committee and I'm
very, very proud of our armed services.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Kaufman. Thanks for what
you said. I know every member of the committee agrees with
that. I appreciate your saying it.
We'll do a second round. Let's try to keep it within 5
minutes, if we can, this time.
I just want to make a statement. There have been a few
references to the F136 alternate engine being a fixed-price
contract. My own understanding of this is that the F135 and
F136 are both developmental cost-plus programs now. Although, I
gather GE has offered to make it a fixed-price contract, and I
gather that Pratt Whitney has essentially done the same, as we
go after the developmental stage. Am I right?
General Shackelford.
General Shackelford. Senator, those type of development
programs invariably, in the past, have started out as cost-plus
contracts.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Shackelford. As soon as we have confidence in the
design baseline and the productability of the engines, we move
as quickly as we can to fixed-price.
Senator Lieberman. Got it. That's what we can expect to
happen here.
General Shackelford. That's where we are.
Senator Lieberman. Let me focus in on one aspect of time
delay for the JSF, and that is the potential delays in the
estimated dates for IOC. I thought I'd ask General Trautman,
General Weida, and Admiral Philman on this one. If each of you
would define what IOC means for your Service. When, under the
new plan, do you think your Services will achieve IOC?
General Trautman?
General Trautman. Senator, I'll go first, since our IOC is
projected to occur first, in December 2012, 2 years and 9
months from now. We realize we have a lot of work to do between
now and December 2012. We're not naive about what it will take
to stand up an IOC of our first squadron.
First and foremost is that our industry partner is going to
have to deliver, going to have to come to the fore and deliver
the airplanes on time and create the sorties that generate the
test points that are demanded of us.
But, as we perceive December 2012 now, we think we'll have
a squadron of 10 aircraft in the Block 2B configuration, as
described in the JSF operational requirements document. That
will give us a STOVL-capable airplane, very low observable
capability, which will enable us to go places that none of our
airplanes can go today, longer range that the Super Hornet, and
with fused computing power and sensors on board that will
enable us to operate across the range of military operations,
either from sea or from an expeditionary environment.
Now, that's not the final configuration of the Marine Corps
F-35B. We intend to do the block upgrades and software right
alongside our Navy and Air Force partners as they move into
Block 3A, Block 3B, and Block 3C. So, by the time we get to
2014, which is our first planned deployment of F-35B, we'll
have a Block 3C airplane, if the program stays on track as
currently laid out.
People wonder, why did the Marine Corps' IOC not change
when we had the restructuring of the program?
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Trautman. The answer to that is that everything
that we need for our initial operational squadron was procured
in 2008, 2009, and 2010. That includes 5 test airplanes, 15
airplanes for our fleet-readiness squadron, which just stood up
last week, and our 10 planes for our initial squadron. What the
restructure did do, it slowed down the ramp of our subsequent
squadrons beyond that first squadron. For example, our second
squadron will now stand up 6 months later than it originally
projected. So, that's where the impact of the restructure hits
the Marine Corps.
If we reach December 2012 and we have not accommodated all
of the things that we need with regard to training, aircraft
capability, logistics support, and shipboard compatibility, we
will not declare IOC. We will wait until we attain those
objectives.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I think I'll focus in on my
followup question, too, because I'm concerned--and I know you
know others are--about risks of declaring that you have IOC
before the JSF has received all of the capabilities intended. I
want you to come back and respond to that concern, that by
accepting the JSF in the Block 2B configuration, as compared to
the Navy and the Air Force, which we're going to wait for the
Block 3 configuration, are you assuming that they hit the Block
2B capabilities by December 2012, are you accepting a risk that
really is forced on you by this process that hasn't worked well
and by the fact you want these planes?
General Trautman. We do want these planes. But, it's the
opposite of accepting risk. We're replacing an AV-8 squadron
with a far, far more capable platform. The F-35B, at the Block
2B configuration, will be able to carry two AIM-120 missiles
and either two 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions or two
500-pound laser-guided bombs initially. Then it will grow from
there, with external stores becoming capable in the subsequent
months. This airplane will be so far more capable than the AV-8
squadron that it replaces that it's an easy decision for the
Commandant to make, with regard to standing up this squadron.
We have to have all the testing done. If the testing isn't
done, if we haven't validated that all risk is mitigated, we're
not going to do something foolhardy, obviously.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. You've answered my question. I was
going to ask the question, which you might say is in the
extreme, which is whether you're confident that combatant
commanders would essentially accept the JSF in the Block 2B
configuration. I take it what you're saying is, it's not up to
Block 3, but there's no question that they would be happy to
have those plane flying.
General Trautman. It will be the only very low observable
airplane that can come off any ship for several subsequent
years.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Trautman. The reason we want to do it is precisely
the kind of combatant commander need that may prevail
subsequent to that standup.
Senator Lieberman. My time is actually up, so I'm going to
ask Admiral Philman and General Weida, if you could give a real
quick answer to the question of IOC.
Admiral Philman. Yes, sir. For the U.S. Navy with the F-
35C, which is a tailhook variant, in December 2016, with the
requisite number of aircraft, 10 for the squadron, the Block 3
capability delivered and that capability was then tested and
vetted and is ready for deployment.
Senator Lieberman. General?
General Weida. Sir, for the Air Force, IOC criteria is
spelled out very specifically in Operational Requirements
Document (ORD), Change 3, dated August 19, 2008. It's the Major
Command, Commander of Air Combat Command, that sets that, and
there's a very specific criteria. The large pieces are Block 3
initial operating test and evaluation complete, 12 to 24 jets
capable of conducting anti-access, offensive counter-air SEAD-
and-DEAD mission, pilots' maintenance support, logistics,
equipment, trained and ready, and mission ready.
As far as a date, our best estimate right now, based on all
that we know, is first quarter of 2016 for IOC. But, again, it
is the Commander of Air Combat Command taking all into account.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Thank you.
Admiral Architzel. Senator Lieberman, if I could, sir. One
additional comment, only from the aspect of, how are we going
to assume for General Trautman, for example, the confidence
that he has? One area we had concern, across all variants, was
our development of the software and coming on board with that.
Part of the restructured program was actually to add an
additional software integration line which reduced some of the
risk on our software upgrade as we go forward. In addition, we
added that goal in support of looking at this for software
Block 2.0 to measure the company against that performance in
fiscal year 2011, which would also add to supporting the IOC
for the Marine Corps to have that Block 2 capability.
Today, we're flying Block 0.5, and we are testing Block 1.
We are coding Block 2, and we're developing Block 3. That's
where we are across the board on these software developments.
Addressing that very issue is what's been done, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. That's helpful, because it is the
software, less than the goal in the software, that was my
concern.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
think the great turnout among Senators at the subcommittee this
morning is the inspiring leadership of the chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Thune. General Shackelford, the recently released
2010 NPR calls for keeping in place the Nation's so-called
nuclear triad, which is comprised of bomber aircraft,
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and nuclear-armed
submarines. Against that backdrop, what is the Air Force's
strategy for developing long-range strike capability? What role
in that strategy will a next-generation bomber play, in your
view?
General Shackelford. Senator, if I may, I'll defer to
General Weida.
Senator Thune. General?
General Weida. Sir, first and foremost, I will tell you
that your Air Force has been part of the team looking at both
the NPR and its development and has also been integral to the
team that has been part of the negotiating of the new START;
and so, all along, looking at the Air Force equities to ensure
that for two out of the three legs of the triad, we felt we
were in a good position to go forward.
To start with, a new START as it pertains to the next-
generation long-range strike platform; first of all, the treaty
is only a 10-year treaty, with a 5-year extension. The new
bomber will be outside that treaty, so it will probably be
covered by a different set of circumstances. But, in either
case, we'll take a whole family-of-systems look at that new
long-range strike platform, with our other legacy assets, when
we make force-structure decisions.
Senator Thune. What does that family of systems mean, with
regard to the follow-on bomber?
General Weida. Great question, sir, and thank you for
asking it. For QDR-10, the Secretary of Defense asked us to go
back and look at this so-called family of systems, and most
people think and focus on just the long-range strike platform
itself. But, this capability is in a threat scenario, that
anti-access, very difficult threat scenario. As we looked at it
very carefully during the QDR, in order to be successful in
that environment requires a whole set of capabilities, long-
range strike being one, some kind of early warning platform,
some kind of ISR platform, some kind of standoff missile, and
conventional prompt global-strike capability rolled into that
concept. Although we have done a lot of previous studies on
just the long-range strike platform, this study is a little
broader look at how we attack this anti-access problem
holistically.
The other thing that I would add, since I have my Navy
colleagues here at the table, is, we were also tasked, out of
QDR-10, to come up with what we call the air-sea battle
concept, to work with our Navy compatriots in that very
difficult scenario, and come up with a way we would operate
more efficiently to get together as a joint team.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Thune. Let me ask you, with regard to the START,
because my understanding is, right now we have 44 nuclear-
capable B-52 bombers, 16 nuclear-capable B-2 bombers, 450 ICBMs
based on land, and 336 based on submarines. That gives the
United States a total of 846 launchers, and the Treaty permits
800 launchers, but says that only 700 may be deployed. If you
add up the ICBM and submarine-based missiles, you have 786
right there. Tell me, if the number of deployed launchers is
700, might there be a tendency to rely more on the most
responsive and survivable-type launchers, and less on B-2s and
B-52s? How does this impact the triad? Explain to me, if you
could, the distinction between deployed- and nondeployed-type
launchers.
General Weida. Yes, sir. I'd start out answering that
question by saying that, all along, during negotiation of the
new START, that the Services worked very closely with the
negotiating team so that we looked at all options, as it would
pertain to force structure and the required capability that the
Commander of Strategic Command would ask from the Air Force. As
different numbers were proposed and eventually agreed upon, we
were part of that team, and we felt comfortable that, going
forward, we could maintain our strategic deterrent posture with
our nuclear forces and focusing, for the Air Force, on two out
of three of those legs.
Now that we finally have an agreement, we'll further refine
that to look at the exact force-structure implications that we
need to fit in within the 700 deployed strategic vehicles, and
then the larger number--800--of nondeployed strategic vehicles.
The difference between the two just is how they're postured and
ready to go, whether they are mated with weapons or not, and
their location and condition.
There are a range of possible courses of actions to get to
that final force structure between the three legs of the triad.
We're not at that point yet. In the next weeks and months,
we'll work very closely with General Chilton, the Commander of
Strategic Command, because he has the overall responsibility to
set the requirement and do the warfighting analysis to see
exactly what we need.
Senator Thune. You don't see the triad being in any
jeopardy?
General Weida. From the Air Force perspective, no, sir.
Senator Thune. That's comforting, from the Air Force
perspective, but I'm not sure.
I think that's all. I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune. Thanks for
raising that important question.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I've been sitting, listening to all this great
testimony, and I just want to be a little pessimistic here.
Because, as I hear all of the excellent testimony, I'm just a
little bit concerned about the delays that are involved in the
production of the F-35. I hear the testimony on the IOC, that
it's going to be put in place on this timetable and on this
schedule. I just wondered if we don't have something here that
we're asking software or the technology to be so sophisticated
that we get to the end of the line and all of this cannot be
integrated to replace those other three legacy aircraft that
we're talking about. I'm just wondering, what is the backup
plan in case we get to the point where the software won't
really do what the engineers or all of the planners have
anticipated and we run into a problem of trying to scale back
or adjust and make adjustments? Have any backup plans been
taken into consideration during all of this planning and the
delays that we're running into and what venture to say is going
to be some cost overruns involved here. Any thought given to
that? Admiral, you probably want to take a shot at it; and,
General Shackelford, you may want to take a shot at this. But,
listening to the testimony, this is just a gut reaction that
I'm getting, and want to make sure that we have something in
our backup plan, if the F-35 runs into all these other
technical difficulties; this is not going to integrate with
that and this software piece won't meet in with that, because
we're trying to ask this plane to do quite a few things,
whether it's (a), (b), or (c). They're going to have to do all
of these various functions. I don't want to wish anybody bad
luck, but I just wonder. Have you got any backup on that?
Admiral, would you like to take a shot at this?
Admiral Architzel. Senator Burris, I thank you for that
question, and I understand the concern you're raising and
appreciate it. We have taken the strides to restructure the
program to address a lot of areas within it that have been not
performing to expectations. However, there are many, many
assets of the program that we have not discussed that are going
along extremely well. In the area of seeing how we're matching
to our model expectations, in terms of growth, and in terms of
developing the systems that will go forward in the future to
get us that fifth-generation fighter across the board, as well
as the progress on this aircraft, in terms of getting the
flight vehicle itself to the point where we're confident in it
being able to sustain and go forward. By that, I mean the
greatest risk, in my mind, would be to the flight vehicle. We
have seen significant progress and very good, excellent
progress, in terms of static-load testing on all three
variants. I believe we will continue to see the progress on the
mission side, as we go forward.
We do need to get the aircraft into test, no question about
it. We need to get into the tests so we can expand the envelope
so we can then get into bringing on the software development I
mentioned, which was to get additional line that could take an
expanded software integration line that would allow us to get
to this Block incremental release of software, so we can show
that capability to you. That all has to happen. We're going to
proceed on the restructured plan to do that.
To your point about a fallback plan, sir, I would just say
that we need to maintain our legacy capabilities, through
modernization and obsolescence, to make sure that we have that
capability to fall back on. I would turn it to General
Shackelford.
Senator Burris. So, you're going to keep our legacy planes
operative.
Admiral Architzel. We absolutely will ensure we have a
combat-ready force as we go forward, with full expectation that
we need that fifth-generation capability, but we are going to
ensure we maintain the forces that we need today for the
Department of the Navy, sir.
Senator Burris. General?
General Shackelford. Senator, within the F-35 program, you
could generally think of two areas that we need to come to a
good understanding. One is the structural capability of the
airframe. The other one is the avionics, or the software, as
you refer to. We're well along the path of confirming that the
structures for all three variants are sound. We have high
confidence at this point that we don't have a fundamental flaw
in the structure of the airplane itself. We would expect to get
that confidence early in the program.
The software comes over time. In order to mitigate the
complexity of this software, the program is built around an
unprecedented level of software integration laboratories,
including a flying test bed that integrates all of those
systems together on a flying platform. Granted, it's not in the
aircraft, but it's wired true to form for distance, cable
lengths, positions of antennas, and whatnot, to what will be in
the actual aircraft. As we progress through the software
coding, software maturation, through the laboratory
infrastructure, through the flying test bed, and finally on to
the aircraft itself, it's a matter of verifying the capability
by the time we actually get it on the aircraft.
Senator Burris. Pardon me, General. My time has expired.
But, you said it's going to have to be tested. Is the test
period factored into our schedule?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir, by all means. In addition,
we have a strong focus on what's called mission systems flight
testing, which is the testing of that software.
General Trautman. Senator, do I have time to add one point
to your question?
Senator Burris. Sure.
General Trautman. What's lost in the discussion about the
cost growth of the program over the past couple of years is the
fact that, after rigorous analysis, everyone who has looked at
this program has found no technical, manufacturing, or
performance issues associated with these jets. That's a level
of confidence that in every other program that I've ever been
involved in, we did not have. The STOVL variant of the JSF has
been flying since June of last year. Since November of last
year, we've had three STOVL variants at Patuxent River. They've
been generating sorties since January 1. They've generated test
points ahead of the plan. We hovered the airplane, we did a
short-takeoff roll of 700 feet last month. We just rolled off
the flightline the first mission systems STOVL airplane that's
built from the ground up with all mission systems incorporated.
So, there's a lot of optimism on the technical side of this
airplane, as we have to press the manufacturer to control costs
and meet the production delivery schedules.
Senator Burris. You hope they don't cut corners?
General Shackelford. Absolutely. You're right.
There are good quality-assurance measures in place to
ensure that doesn't occur.
Senator Burris. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Burris. We appreciate
it.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Thank you for your willingness to put together something
very visual for me, a chart showing the whole schedule, but let
me ask you one or two quick questions.
You talked about incentives for the contractor, to make
sure they meet the schedule and the quality that you're looking
for. Can you describe what those might be?
Admiral Architzel. Senator Begich, yes, I'd be happy to,
sir. For example, in fiscal year 2010 we said we wanted to see
the STOVL vertical landing. By the way, that's been
accomplished at Pax River. Next was to see the first carrier
variant (CV) flight by May, or no later than June. That's on
track to go forward with that CV-1 variant. There are 11 test
aircraft delivered to Pax River and Edwards, on track to
produce that, as well, sir. But, the 1.0 software, which we
need to be able to train and fly at Eglin as we go forward; to
have 400 test flights accomplished during the course of 2010.
We're on a glide slope today of somewhere around 180 already
this year, which puts us on that glide slope to meet that
requirement. Additional LRIP deliveries to Eglin, at least
three for fiscal year 2010. When we go to Eglin, to be able to
bring on the Automic Logistic Information System (ALIS) at that
time, as well.
There are similar metrics within fiscal year 2011. Some of
those involve initial STOVL developmental testing on the L-
class ships; land-based catapult and arresting-gear launches at
Lakehurst, which is our land-based facility for aircraft launch
and recovery equipment; Block 2 software release; completion of
the static testing is ongoing on all three variants.
Senator Begich. If I can interrupt you, Admiral.
Each stage that you've identified, is it that there's an
incentive built in for them to meet that, or that's their
requirements, in the scope of the contact, that they must meet
this, and if they don't, there's a penalty?
General Shackelford. Senator, we, as part of the
restructure, withheld what would become $614 million of
available award fee under the previous contracts.
Senator Begich. $614 million?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir. Those dollars are being
realigned into performance incentives, of which there are 23
items that take place over the remainder of the development
contract, that are tied to receipt of those dollars.
Senator Begich. Let me make sure I understand that. Within
the contract, you have about a $614 million incentive bonus
built in for certain achievements metrics that they meet.
When they bid on this, or when they came in for the
contract, was that part of the equation at the front end?
General Shackelford. No, sir.
Senator Begich. That leads me to the next question, if I
could just hold you there, and then you can elaborate from
here.
Assuming they said, ``Here's what we're going to do. Here's
the scope of services we're going to provide. Here's the
timetable we'll provide them.'' Assuming the contractor laid
out some of that in early stages, they probably had some
timeliness, and if they didn't meet those timelines, put the
bonus aside for a second, were there penalties that would
reduce the contract? In other words if I'm bidding to provide
you this glass of water today, and you say, ``provide it,'' and
I say, ``I'm going to provide that for $1, a year from now,''
and, later in the contract, there's a bonus if I provide it in
9 months, I get a little bonus for it, but if I don't provide
it in a year, you still pay me. Is there a deduction?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Okay.
General Shackelford. The previous contract was structured
as an award-fee contract, which is, by nature, subjective; fee
is another word for profit.
Senator Begich. Right.
General Shackelford. That's based on a scale of performance
that is more subjective in nature, as opposed to the specific
performance incentives that we're talking about now.
Senator Begich. Go ahead.
General Shackelford. As you came to the end of each award-
fee period, which would typically be 6 months or a year long,
there would be a potential for some maximum fee, and they would
receive a percentage of that, based on the subjective
assessment of their performance.
Senator Begich. Yes.
General Shackelford. Now there'll be specific events, that
are under negotiation right now with Lockheed as part of the
restructure, that if they don't achieve those events within a
timeline that they negotiate as part of the restructure, they
don't get any funding.
Senator Begich. Is it fair to say that it's not; I know the
word I used was incentive. It was really, ``Here's the scope.
If you don't make it, we're not paying you this money.''
Admiral Architzel. That's right.
Senator Begich. Is that a better way to say it? It is an
incentive, but it really is part of the overall contract.
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir. It's tied to achievable
milestones, I just enumerated some of them, but there could be
many more that could be outlined within there. Then the
contractor performs to that. If he does, he's eligible to earn
fee. If he doesn't, he's not eligible to earn that fee.
Senator Begich. So, the restructuring created a different
kind of scheduling of the resources you had available to
provide to the contractor. You just scoped it out over a period
of time, but with these milestones they have to meet, and if
they don't meet them, that chunk of money isn't paid to them.
General Shackelford. That's correct.
Senator Begich. Or you end up in some negotiations with
them, but the idea is that this is a way to hold their feet to
the fire in production of the levels you need to get to.
Admiral Architzel. Right.
Senator Begich. For example, the 2012, which is the
earliest date. Is that a fair statement?
Admiral Architzel. Another way to look at it would be a
cost-plus environment, we are looking, when we can, to
transition to fixed-price contracts.
Senator Begich. Which we love. &
Admiral Architzel. But, we have to look for the proper time
to execute that. That's part of this, as well, moving from a
cost-plus to a fixed-price environment.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much for that
explanation.
Thanks.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Begich.
I have a few more questions, actually both for General
Shackelford.
General, last year, you testified to this subcommittee that
paying for the F136 alternate engine program from within the
JSF program could force you to buy fewer JSF aircraft over the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). At that time, you said,
``Over the 5-year period--it would be 53.'' In other words,
continuing the F136 program could actually exacerbate the
strike fighter shortfall in the Navy in the near term and could
have adverse affects on the Air Force inventory posture, as
well. I wanted to ask you whether those projections are the
same or whether you've in any way updated your estimate about
how many JSF aircraft would fall out of the production plan
over the FYDP if we continue the F136 alternate engine program?
General Shackelford. Senator, a year ago, as we were
looking forward to the potential to fund the remainder of the
development program on the F136--our fear was that having those
dollars taken out of the F-35 program funding line, to fund
that engine, would come at the expense of production assets.
Given the dollar figure a year ago, which escapes me at the
moment, that equated to 53 aircraft to go pay for that across
the different variants.
We have not looked specifically at a production offset
number to compare to that 53. We can take that for the record
and estimate that, if you would like.
Senator Lieberman. I'd appreciate it if you would. Thank
you.
[The information referred to follows:]
At the time I testified last spring, the program office had
estimated that 53 aircraft would have to be forsaken to fund the
alternate engine program. Since that time, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has estimated
that it would take $2.9 billion to complete alternate engine
development and put the alternate engine program in a competitive
position for production. CAPE did not estimate how many aircraft would
have to be forsaken to fund the alternate engine since the Department
has not intention of foregoing aircraft in favor of the alternate
engine program.
Senator Lieberman. Second brief question about the Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). I've been
a big supporter of JSTARS, and it's really a workhorse program
of the Air Force which the other Services, particularly the
Army, depend on a lot. I know that the Air Force is planning to
conduct an analysis of alternatives (AOA) on the best ways of
achieving moving target indicator (MTI) capability. I wanted to
ask you this morning, General, when will the Service be able to
provide this committee with the results of that AOA regarding
MTI capability?
General Shackelford. Sir, that AOA is just getting underway
now and runs out until approximately the middle of next year. I
would estimate we might have something preliminary to say about
it next spring when we come back here.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Finally, in that regard, will the Air Force continue the
JSTARS re-engineering programs and the Multi-Platform Radar
Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) development in the
meantime, while you're completing the AOA?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir, we are planning and
executing the completion of the development program of JSTARS
re-engineering, as well as buying a total of four ship sets
under the present budgets. As we look at MP-RTIP, we're
continuing with MP-RTIP development for the Global Hawk
platform. The drawback to both of those sensors--the size of
the Global Hawk platform, as well as the frequency and
capability for geolocation of the APY-7 that's in the JSTARS--
are what are at question under this AOA to meet today's need
for dismount detection and tracking.
Senator Lieberman. Good enough. Thank you. I'll follow
those developments with some interest and look forward to
working with you on them.
Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Just a couple of quick questions, Mr.
Chairman.
This is to Admiral Architzel. You talk about milestones to
make sure the JSF program in on track. I guess the question I
have is, what specific milestones should we, as Members of
Congress, expect in this next year in order for us to know that
the program is on track and that it's going to be successful?
What should be our expectation, as Members of Congress, this
year?
Admiral Architzel. Senator Thune, I appreciate the
question. I would look for some very key things that are in
fiscal year 2010, which is, we should see the CV variant first
flight no later than June. We have put additional test assets,
or we will, into the SDD program. We need to start seeing
progress; continued movement in the actual flight test to
gather the data we need to gather, in terms of flight tests. We
really are at the very beginning of that. We need to see that
those assets show up at both Patuxent River, which they are, in
the STOVL category today, and also at Edwards. I would look to
that, and when those aircraft arrive. I'd look at the measures
that say we do the software development that's going to allow
us to be moving towards Eglin for advanced training in an
envelope that allow the pilots to be able to train when they
get to Eglin in the future. Those are some very key things.
Also, with the ramp for the LRIP, that we want to see in the
aircraft, going forward. There's some very discernible things
this year that we can see that we should be looking for, and in
that aspect, I would say that we're on path for the development
of the aircraft, that we have the test program moving along in
the profile we need it to be on, that you see the maintenance
training for the maintainers that's going forward, that will
have to be there to support both, especially at Eglin AFB.
Senator Thune. Yes.
General Shackelford or General Weida, could you give me,
coming back to START for a minute, an example of a nondeployed
launch vehicle? I asked General Cartwright, last summer, what
was the bare minimum number of launch vehicles that we needed
in order to not get below a level that would be harmful. At
that time, I think the answer was 800. Now, there's a
distinction made in the START, that was signed by us and the
Russians, for 700 deployed and 800 nondeployed. Give me an
example of a nondeployed launcher and how that sort of
distinction was made and the two different numbers arrived at.
General Shackelford. I think the best thing, sir, that I
could offer you is, the treaty guys for the Air Force work for
me. I think it will be best if we just come and give you a
briefing or take, for the record, a specific question and lay
that out for you, because there's a specific example for each
type of asset. If you'll allow, I'll do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty provides three central
limits: 1,550 for deployed warheads; 700 for deployed intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers; and 800 for deployed and
nondeployed ICMS launchers, deployed and nondeployed SLBM launchers,
and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers. These limits are based on a
rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in
support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Limits provide flexibility
for parties to organize their force structure and provide for
maintenance and testing.
Examples for nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers include test
launchers, training launchers, and launchers at space launch
facilities. Additionally, when ICBMs or SLBMs are removed from the
launchers for any reason--for example, for maintenance--then both the
missile and launcher become nondeployed for purposed of the treaty.
Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, by definition, become
nondeployed when they are located at a repair facility or production
facility, or if they need the treaty's definition of a test heavy
bomber.
Senator Thune. All right.
One final question, and that is, how does the potential
nuclear JSF fit within the new launcher limits in the START?
General Weida. Sir, that does not apply, as far as I know.
It is a dual-capable aircraft, but it's not a strategic nuclear
weapon. I'll take that for the record, and come back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Only those bombers with a range greater than 8,000 kilometers or
equipped for long-range nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missiles meet the
treaty definition of ``heavy bomber,'' which are subject to the
provisions of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) does not meet either of these criteria.
Therefore, the JSF does not count against the limits of the New START
treaty, and the requirement to include dual capable aircraft
capabilities in the JSF are not impacted by this treaty.
Senator Thune. Okay. Thank you.
I think that's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for your leadership, and for your
great service to our country. Thank you for being here today.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Thune.
My staffer, Creighton Greene, just reminded me that next
Thursday--it hasn't actually been noticed yet--we have a full
Armed Services Committee hearing on the NPR. I'm sure some of
these questions will come up at that time.
I want to thank the witnesses, obviously for your service,
but for your testimony this morning. This has been a very
informative, productive hearing. I appreciate your direct
responses to the questions. As I said earlier, there's
obviously a lot of support for the JSF program in the Senate,
and particularly on this committee, and there's a lot of
concern about the delays and the cost increases, and we
appreciate all you're trying to do to close the gap,
particularly in the light of the TACAIR shortfall that we're
projecting for the Services.
So, I thank you very much.
We look forward to legislating in a way that's constructive
this year.
If you have no further statements, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
joint strike fighter affordability
1. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford,
the Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) that reviewed the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program last year observed that,
``Affordability is no longer embraced as a core pillar'' for this
program. Taken at face value, this statement is of course quite
stunning. Why should Congress, or the Department of Defense (DOD) for
that matter, continue to support a program that has lost the
affordability goal upon which it was sold as the solution to
modernizing all three components of our tactical fighter force
structure?
Admiral Architzel. A core JSF program pillar is affordability. The
context of the IMRT discussion was prior to the recent F-35 program
restructure and a change in program management. The IMRT helped shape
DOD's decisions with regard to the overall program restructure. I can
assure you that understanding and controlling all developmental,
production, and support costs is a priority for the Department of the
Navy, and we will continue to pursue all methods at our disposal
towards making the F-35 air system affordable. F-35 is a core
capability required by the joint warfighter and the Department of the
Navy fully supports both the F-35B and F-35C variants for deterrence
and strike from the sea, and we request continued congressional support
for this vital program.
General Shackelford. Affordability does remain a key pillar of the
Department, and we remain convinced that close partnership and clear
accountability are required with the JSF contractors. We are pursuing a
number of items to retain affordability including production
improvements, outsourcing to both foreign and domestic low-cost
sources, a new wing manufacture line and a new engine final assembly
line that will decrease span and touch time, and normal learning curve
improvements.
2. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford,
what specific actions has DOD taken, or will take, to restore
affordability as a core pillar of the JSF program?
Admiral Architzel. The Department of the Navy is working closely
with independent cost estimating teams from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) and other groups to balance program office and
contractor estimates, which are typically more success oriented. Our
objective is to continuously focus on F-35 cost drivers and take the
necessary managerial action to lower cost and make the program more
affordable. The Department is working collaboratively with the Air
Force to pursue the use of fixed-price contracts for F-35 aircraft
production; invest in targeted cost reduction initiatives (e.g. F135
engine to reduce propulsion unit production costs); challenge F-35
contractors on their assumptions/current cost estimates to find
development and production cost savings; use concurrency as a strategy
for affordability without increasing risk; and challenge our technical
teams to investigate and bring forth cost avoidance opportunities via
redesign and life-cycle support strategy changes.
The Department has also strengthened the Navy's Center for Cost
Analysis by increasing its role and visibility within the Department.
We have made the cost leadership position a Deputy Assistant Secretary
reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Management and Comptroller and we are adding more professional
expertise and oversight to enable more accurate cost estimates early in
a program's development, life-cycle support, and upgrade phases.
General Shackelford. Affordability does remain a key pillar of the
Department, and we remain convinced that close partnership and clear
accountability are required with the JSF contractors. We are pursuing a
number of items to retain affordability including production
improvements, outsourcing to both foreign and domestic low-cost
sources, a new wing manufacture line and a new engine final assembly
line that will decrease span and touch time, and normal learning curve
improvements.
Additionally, we are restructuring $614 million in system
development and demonstration (SDD) award fees, revising the SDD
contract structure, and revising the low-rate initial production (LRIP)
contract to reward measurable progress against significant schedule
events and ensure event-based fees are paid only if the events are
accomplished in time to support the restructured schedule. Finally, we
are pursuing fixed-price type contracts as soon as is feasible to
remove cost uncertainty from the program.
3. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford, is
this lack of focus a major reason for the forthcoming Nunn-McCurdy
breach on this program?
Admiral Architzel. The results of the formal F-35 Nunn-McCurdy root
cause investigation and analysis are not yet fully known. After
completion of the formal F-35 Nunn-McCurdy process, receipt of the
findings from the five statutorily mandated Integrated Product Teams,
the results will be presented to Congress by the OSD in accordance with
the prescribed Nunn-McCurdy timelines. Currently, DOD is investigating
all potential causes for the F-35 Nunn-McCurdy breach, including
potential cost control and program affordability lapses, as well all
other potential issues that drove the program to this critical breach.
General Shackelford. Contributing factors to the JSF Nunn-McCurdy
breach include increased material costs, particularly titanium,
underestimation of labor and overhead rates, significant production
delays of test aircraft, and decreased commonality among the three
variants. In addition, the Office of Performance Assessments and Root
Cause Analysis will conduct a root cause analysis of the F-35 program.
The root cause analysis will consider the underlying causes for
shortcomings in cost, schedule, and performance including the potential
role of unrealistic performance expectations; unrealistic baseline
estimates for cost and schedule; immature technologies or excessive
manufacturing or integration risk; unanticipated design, engineering,
manufacturing, or integration issues arising during program
performance; changes in procurement quantities; inadequate program
funding or funding instability; poor performance by government or
contractor personnel responsible for program management; or any other
matters.
4. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford,
how soon will we know how much the JSF program has breached its
baseline estimates?
Admiral Architzel. In accordance with Section 2433 of United States
Code Title 10, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force reported on March
25, 2010 that the F-35 program exceeded the Nunn-McCurdy critical unit
cost breach threshold by more than 50 percent for program acquisition
unit cost (PAUC) and average procurement unit cost (APUC) over the
original baseline estimate.
In April 2010, the Office of the Secretary of the Defense submitted
the F-35 Selected Availability Report (SAR). Details of the breach
within the SAR are as follows:
1. Compared to the original APB, the F-35 Program PAUC and APUC
increased 57.15 percent and 57.24 percent, respectively.
2. The F-35 increases are partially due to historical increases
previously reported in the December 2003 SAR (26.2 percent and 21.7
percent for PAUC and APUC, respectively, including programmatic
changes), in the December 2005 SAR (32.8 percent and 31.3 percent for
PAUC and APUC, respectively, including programmatic changes), and in
the December 2007 SAR (38.38 percent and 38.01 percent for PAUC and
APUC, respectively, including programmatic changes).
3. Consistent with Nunn-McCurdy recertification requirements, a
complete independent cost estimate is in process. DOD expects this
analysis will result in increases to the stated PAUC and APUC
estimates.
General Shackelford. The F-35 December 2009 Selected Acquisition
Report, which was submitted to Congress on April 2, 2010, states the
PAUC and the APUC breached the Milestone B cost estimates by
approximately 57 percent.
joint strike fighter initial operating capability dates
5. Senator Lieberman. General Trautman, Admiral Philman, and
General Weida, there has been much discussion about the potential
delays in the estimated dates for initial operating capability (IOC).
Would each of you define what IOC means for your Service, and when,
under the new plan, your Service will achieve IOC?
General Trautman. The Marine Corps JSF December 2012 IOC is based
on the need for a very low observable STOVL-capable airplane, which
will enable us to go places that none of our airplanes can go today
either from the sea or from an expeditionary environment. Everything
that we need for our initial operational squadron was procured in 2008,
2009, and 2010. If we reach December 2012 and we have not accommodated
all of the things that we need with regard to training, aircraft
capability, logistics support, shipboard compatibility, we will not
declare initial operational capability (IOC); we will wait until we
attain those objectives. In general terms the Marine Corps IOC is
defined as 1 squadron of 10 F-35B aircraft with required spares, ground
support equipment, tools, technical publications, and a functional
Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS) including peripherals. The
squadron is manned with trained and certified personnel capable of
conducting autonomous operations. F-35B aircraft in a Block 2B software
configuration with the requisite performance envelope, mission systems,
sensors, and weapon clearances with the qualifications and
certifications required for deploying on F-35B compatible ships and to
austere expeditionary sites. The squadron as equipped and trained will
have the ability to execute full range of TACAIR directed mission sets.
Admiral Philman. The definition of the Marine Corps F-35B IOC
(December 2012) is as follows:
1. One squadron of 10 F-35B aircraft with required spares, ground
support equipment, tools, technical publications, and a functional
Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS) including peripherals.
2. A squadron manned with trained and certified personnel capable
of conducting autonomous operations.
3. F-35 aircraft in a Block 2B software configuration with the
requisite performance envelope, mission systems, sensors, and weapon
clearances documented in Lockheed Martin 6.1 program schedule and JPO
V15 test schedule.
4. Home base supporting infrastructure and facilities ready and
capable of supporting and sustaining operations.
5. Qualifications and certifications required for deploying on F-
35B compatible ships and to austere expeditionary sites.
6. Ability to execute full range of TACAIR directed mission sets.
7. Joint Program Office and F-35 contractor procedures, processes,
and infrastructure capable of sustaining operations of the IOC
squadron.
The definition of Navy F-35C IOC (early calendar year 2016) is as
follows:
1. Sufficient aircraft quantities (10 PAA).
2. Completion of operational test (all mission capabilities).
3. Delivery of all necessary mission planning capability with
trainers, spares, support equipment, and publications (ALIS).
4. Trained aircrew, maintainers, and support personnel.
5. Capability to conduct all operational requirements document
(ORD) missions, to include air interdiction (AI); offense counter-air
(OCA); defensive counter-air (DCA); close air support (CAS);
suppression of enemy air defenses/destruction of enemy air defenses
(SEAD/DEAD) in a denied, near-peer environment; and combat search and
rescue (CSAR).
6. Joint Program Office and F-35 contractor procedures, processes,
and infrastructure capable of sustaining operations of the IOC
squadron.
General Weida. The Air Force's definition for IOC for our planned
fleet of F-35As is found in the August 2008 JSF ORD Change 3. In the
ORD Change 3, IOC for the Air Force is defined as ``being attained when
the MAJCOM/CC determines the unit is operationally war ready. IOC
planning factors will include sufficient assets to meet the unit DOC
[designed operational capability statement], facilities/infrastructure,
operations and maintenance trained/equipped personnel, ALIS support for
peace time/combat operations, completion of an independent assessment,
a verified OFP and verified tech orders and manuals. IOC declaration
will be at the discretion of ACC/CC.''
What this means is that the Air Force will be able to declare IOC
with the F-35As after completion of the program's Block 3 upgrade
initial operational test and evaluation, which validates required
warfighting capabilities. It's estimated, based on the currently
predicted completion timeframe of the Block 3 IOT&E, the Air Force will
have its first opportunity to declare IOC with the operational fleet of
F-35As in second quarter calendar year 2016.
6. Senator Lieberman. General Trautman, Admiral Philman, and
General Weida, what are the risks of declaring IOC before the aircraft
may have received all of the capabilities intended? I am particularly
concerned in this regard with the Marine Corps' intent to accept the
JSF in its Block 2B configuration, when the Air Force and Navy plan to
wait for the Block 3 configuration.
General Trautman. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a multi-
mission support capable Block 2B aircraft as defined in the JSF ORD
change 3. With the recent program restructuring, IOC is projected to be
December 2012 for the Marine Corps. This is based on operational
requirements and the associated metrics that encompass capabilities,
equipment, training, and support. We will track and measure the
progress of the program to meet the Marine Corps requirements between
now and December 2012 and ensure the Marine Corps has all the elements
required for operational use of the F-35B. An IOC declaration will be
dependent upon meeting these requirements.
The F-35B Block 2B is far superior to any aircraft in the Marine
Corps inventory. With VLO survivability, a powerful integrated sensor
suite, fused information displays, interoperable joint connectivity, a
precision weapon capability, and self protect anti-air weapons it is a
total package of capabilities that will revolutionize our expeditionary
Marine air-ground combat power in all threat environments while
enabling joint interoperability and reducing the reliance on supporting
aircraft, tankers, and electronic warfare jammers. It is important to
note that subsequent to IOC these aircraft will continue to be upgraded
as the Block 3A, B, and C capabilities are released for operational
use. The same capabilities that will be resident in the F-35A and F-35C
aircraft when the Air Force and Navy reach IOC.
Admiral Philman. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a multi-mission
support capable Block 2B aircraft as defined in the F-35 ORD (Change
3). With the recent program restructuring, the Marine Corps F-35B IOC
is still planned for December 2012. This is based on operational
requirements and the associated metrics that encompass capabilities,
equipment, training, and support. The Department will track and measure
the progress of the program to meet the Marine Corps requirements
between now and December 2012 and ensure the Marine Corps has all the
elements required for operational use of the F-35B. An IOC declaration
will be dependent upon meeting these requirements.
The F-35B Block 2B is far superior to any aircraft in the Marine
Corps inventory. With low observable survivability, an integrated
sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable joint
connectivity, a precision weapon capability, and self protect anti-air
weapon it is a total package of capabilities that will revolutionize
our expeditionary Marine air-ground combat power in all threat
environments.
It is also important to note that following the Marine Corps IOC,
initial F-35 aircraft will continue to be upgraded as the Block 3A,
Block 3B, and Block 3C capabilities are released for operational use.
These Block 3 capabilities will also be resident within the Air Force
F-35A and Navy F-35C aircraft when the Air Force and Navy reach their
IOC dates.
General Weida. As you stated, the Air Force intends to declare IOC
after the F-35A's Block 3 capabilities have been validated through
completion of initial operational test and evaluation. This will ensure
the Air Force will have F-35As with the mission essential capabilities
outlined in the August 2008 JSF ORD Change 3. These capabilities enable
the Air Force to conduct the spectrum of F-35 missions.
department of the navy tactical aircraft shortfall
7. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel, over the past couple of
years, we have heard that the potential strike fighter shortfall could
be 125 aircraft, or 243 aircraft, or, according to the latest analysis
of the various steps the Navy could take, anywhere between about 40 and
almost 200. Please describe what changes you have made to get the 243-
aircraft shortfall assumed last year down to roughly 150 aircraft
assumed most likely this year.
Admiral Architzel. The latest fiscal year 2011 President's budget
Department of the Navy inventory shortfall is 177 aircraft toward the
end of the decade. This can be reduced to about 100 aircraft by
application of several mitigation options including some service life
extension program (SLEP). All options are on the table to manage the
shortfall and projections will continue to evolve as analysis is
updated.
The Department's TACAIR inventory management initiatives are
targeted at preserving the service life of our existing legacy strike
fighter aircraft (F/A-18 A-D). The Navy will reduce the number of
aircraft available in its squadrons during non-deployed phases to the
minimum required. The Department of the Navy expeditionary squadrons
and those supporting the unit deployment program (UDP) will be reduced
from 12 aircraft to 10 aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis.
The Navy can accelerate the transition of five legacy F/A-18C
squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and can also transition two
additional F/A-18C squadrons using F/A-18 E/F attrition aircraft, based
on available funding. The use of these attrition aircraft expends the
service life of the F/A-18 E/F aircraft earlier than programmed. These
measures reduce the operational demand on legacy F/A-18s, making more
aircraft available for induction into life extension events.
The Department of the Navy is also evaluating depot level
efficiency to maximize throughput and return legacy strike fighter
aircraft to the fleet. Collectively, these measures can extend the
service life of the legacy aircraft and contribute to reducing the
impact of the projected shortfall.
8. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel, what are the risk factors
that could make those numbers higher?
Admiral Architzel. The timely delivery of the F-35B and F-35C
remains critical to our future strike fighter capacity. The Department
of the Navy has the necessary tactical aircraft capacity in the near
term to support our Nation's strategic demands. However, ongoing
assessments forecast a decrease in our strike fighter capacity during
JSF transition, unless further measures are implemented to extend the
life of our existing inventory.
Other risk factors would be a sharp increase in our operational
demand of these aircraft or the ability to continue sustainment of the
existing inventory.
In addition to management initiatives currently in place, we plan
on addressing this inventory shortfall through additional aggressive
and precise management strategies. The management initiatives being
implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements today,
while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and capability
requirements.
9. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel, please describe the costs
associated with the various levers that the Navy has described as
options for mitigating the shortfall.
Admiral Architzel. The costs involved in implementing the inventory
management ``levers'' include surging training capacity for aircrew,
procuring support and ancillary equipment to outfit transition
squadrons. These costs will be submitted during the POM-12 budget
development process. These initiatives prudently balance operational
risks and requirements today, while seeking to fulfill future projected
capacity and capability requirements.
10. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel, have you updated last
year's estimates of what it would take to perform a SLEP on the F/A-18
C/D aircraft? If so, what are those estimates?
Admiral Architzel. The SLEP requirement is being finalized.
Based on SLEP'ing 280 aircraft to 10,000 hours, the cost would be
an estimated $15.5 million average per airframe.
$15.5 million average per airframe SLEP (10,000 FH)
$13.8 million (APN) SLEP & CBR+
Kits & Installs
$1.7 million (OMN) HFH
FRC Activity
11. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel, is there specific
analysis that has led the Navy to conclude that a squadron of 10
aircraft will be as capable as 12 aircraft? If so, why has DOD decided
to make this change now?
Admiral Architzel. Any reduction in squadron size will be subject
to Global Force management demand. A closely monitored reduction in
squadron size from 12 F/A-18 A-D aircraft to 10 is a prudent balance of
operational risk and inventory requirements. A reduction in squadron
size eases demand on the legacy Hornet inventory, preserves service
life for a longer period, and frees up more aircraft for induction into
life extending events. This decision also considers that carrier based
F/A-18C squadrons have been deploying with 10 aircraft for a number of
years.
The management initiatives being implemented prudently balance
operational risks and requirements today, while seeking to fulfill
future projected capacity and capability requirements.
rethinking requirements
12. Senator Lieberman. General Weida, there are continuing
questions about whether the Air Force has planned for the proper mix of
long-range and short-range strike forces within its inventory, given
likely ranges at which aircraft would have to operate in certain
contingencies. I am thinking here of the Western Pacific, where our air
bases and aircraft carriers in the region could be held at risk, and
our aircraft forced to operate at significantly greater range than
previously assumed.
At the same time, it seems that there are some missions for which
the JSF is overmatched. Specifically, I am wondering whether the JSF
would be a fitting platform to deliver munitions in such a permissive
environment as Afghanistan, today, where there is almost no threat.
At a time when we are facing potentially huge cost increases in the
F-35, these considerations give rise to the possibility that, like the
Navy, the Air Force should be considering a mix of 5th generation
aircraft like the F-35 and some portion of the fleet that would be
perfectly capable of operating in wartime scenarios after the first
couple of days, like the F-16 or F-15. It also raises the possibility
that both the Air Force and the Navy should reassess whether they are
now planning for the right balance of short-range and long-range strike
aircraft. What studies or analytical efforts within the Air Force are
being conducted to look at the proper mix of newer and legacy aircraft,
and short-range versus long-range aviation strike platforms?
General Weida. The Air Force has been conducting force structure
analyses continuously for many years and currently has ongoing mission
and campaign level studies to examine force structure composition.
These studies are conducted by Air Combat Command, the Headquarters Air
Force, and by independent Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDC) to ensure that any institutional bias is eliminated.
The goal is to assure that changes to strategies, scenarios, threats,
acquisition programs, and fiscal constraints are considered when
developing a force that has the best available mix of legacy platforms,
5th generation fighters, and bombers. Given very real budget
constraints, the Air Force is working diligently to ensure the current
long-range force plan has the proper mix and size to accomplish the
National Military Strategy at moderate risk. Our analytic foundation is
continuously being updated using the latest scenarios, threat
assessments, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR)/Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) guidance to inform
fiscal year 2012 budget development.
13. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Architzel and General Shackelford,
under the auspices of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements, should we be
evaluating such alternatives as a mix of legacy and newer aircraft and
a mix of short- and long-range aviation in deciding whether there are
alternatives to the current acquisition program which will provide
equal or greater military capability at less cost?
Admiral Architzel. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy review process we
are required to evaluate alternatives and determine if any of the
alternatives will provide acceptable capability at less cost.
General Shackelford. The Air Force has been conducting force
structure analyses continuously for many years and currently has
ongoing mission and campaign level studies to examine force structure
composition. These studies are conducted by Air Combat Command, the
Headquarters Air Force, and by independent FFRDCs to ensure that any
institutional bias is eliminated. The goal is to assure that changes to
strategies, scenarios, threats, acquisition programs, and fiscal
constraints are considered when developing a force that has the best
available mix of legacy platforms, 5th generation fighters, and
bombers. Given very real budget constraints, the Air Force is working
diligently to ensure the current long-range force plan has the proper
mix and size to accomplish the National Military Strategy at moderate
risk. Our analytic foundation is continuously being updated using the
latest scenarios, threat assessments, QDR, and NPR/START guidance to
inform fiscal year 2012 budget development.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
tactical aircraft shortfall
14. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, the Navy identified a tactical air shortfall of 243
fighter aircraft during last year's fiscal year 2010 budget hearing.
Over the last year, the Navy has bounced back and forth over the size
of the shortfall. The Navy briefed in March 2009 that the shortfall was
312 aircraft but later changed to 146 aircraft in May 2009. Secretary
Gates told Congress in February 2010 that the shortfall was 100
aircraft. Then, in March, Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics Ash Carter and other DOD witnesses admitted they did not
know what the number was for the projected shortfall. Now, at the April
13 hearing, we again hear it could be a manageable 100 aircraft in
2018, which is about 77 fewer than what was forecast for the fiscal
year 2011 budget process. You testified that this number would be
achieved in part through the SLEP. I am concerned about how wildly the
shortfall estimates have jumped around over the last year. I am also
concerned that even a 100-plane shortfall is considered acceptable to
the Navy. Why is the goal for the shortfall not zero?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. The
latest fiscal year 2011 President's budget Department of the Navy
inventory shortfall is projected to be 177 aircraft toward the end of
the decade. This can be reduced to about 100 aircraft by application of
several mitigation options including some SLEP. Optimization of depot
throughput is being studied as an additional mitigation method. This is
a forecasted shortfall of a very dynamic and complex problem that is
almost 10 years away, but requires continuous refinement. Regular
revalidation of assumptions driving the analysis and close monitoring
of inventory health allows the Department of the Navy to avoid making
large investment decisions prematurely. As SLEP matures, cost estimates
become more refined and other variables affecting the shortfall come
into focus, the Department of the Navy will continue to review all
mitigation options to reduce the long-term shortfall.
Whatever management initiatives are implemented, the Department of
the Navy intends for them to prudently balance operational risks and
requirements today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity
and capability requirements.
15. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, what level of risk is the Navy willing to accept by
having a shortfall of 100?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman.
Management initiatives being implemented by the Department of the Navy
prudently balance operational risks and requirements today, while
seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and capability
requirements. They also allow the Department of the Navy to closely
monitor progress toward reducing the shortfall and enable adjustments
to the plan before making unnecessary and premature investment or force
structure decisions.
16. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, please explain how the new delays in the F-35 program
will affect the shortfall total.
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. The
latest fiscal year 2011 President's budget Department of the Navy
inventory shortfall projection is 177 aircraft toward the end of the
decade. This shortfall estimate includes the latest reductions in the
F-35 program delivery ramp. The Department of the Navy remains
committed to the JSF program and the timely delivery of the F-35B and
F-35C remains critical to our future strike fighter capacity. The
Department of the Navy has the necessary tactical aircraft capacity in
the near-term to support our Nation's strategic demands. However,
ongoing assessments forecast a potential decrease in our strike fighter
capacity during JSF transition, unless further mitigation measures are
implemented. In addition to management initiatives currently in place,
we plan on addressing this potential capacity decrease through
additional aggressive and precise management strategies.
17. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, I understand that the Navy is considering a number of
mitigating actions to overcome the shortfall to include changing
squadron size from 12 to 10 aircraft. What are the mitigating actions
proposed by the Navy to overcome the shortfall?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. Any
reductions in squadron size will be subject to Global Force management
demand. The Department's TACAIR inventory management initiatives are
targeted at preserving the service life of our existing legacy strike
fighter aircraft (F/A-18A-D). The Navy will reduce the number of
aircraft available in its squadrons during non-deployed phases to the
minimum required. The Department of the Navy expeditionary squadrons
and those supporting the UDP will be reduced from 12 aircraft to 10
aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis. The Navy is accelerating
the transition of five legacy F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super
Hornets. The Navy is also evaluating the transition of two additional
F/A-18C squadrons using F/A-18E/F attrition aircraft in the POM-12
budget process. The use of attrition aircraft expends the service life
of the F/A-18E/F aircraft earlier than programmed. These measures
reduce the operational demand on legacy F/A-18s, making more aircraft
available for induction into life extension events. The Department of
the Navy is also evaluating depot level efficiency to maximize
throughput and return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the fleet.
Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of the legacy
aircraft and make the projected shortfall manageable.
18. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, have any of these mitigating actions been budgeted for
in this year's budget or in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. The Service Life Assessment
Program (SLAP) for legacy Hornets has been funded and is complete. The
center barrel replacement (CBR) program is funded and ongoing. It
increases the wing root fatigue life of some older legacy Hornets. The
SLEP to extend the service life of legacy F/A-18 aircraft to 10,000
hours is primarily a POM-12 budget development issue.
General Trautman. The Department of the Navy long-term shortfall
reduction strategies will be addressed in the fiscal year 2012
President's budget development. Currently, items under review are the
F/A-18 A-D SLEP and opportunities for optimizing depot turn around
times. We continue to explore other mitigation alternatives.
19. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, do you expect that a reduction in the squadron size in
Marine Corps tactical air units will increase the risks associated with
operational capability as a result of warfighting requirements not
changing?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. Any reductions in squadron
size will be subject to Global Force management demand.
General Trautman. Any reductions in squadron size will be subject
to Global Force management demand. A closely monitored reduction in
squadron size from 12 F/A-18 A-D aircraft to 10 is a prudent balance of
operational risk and inventory requirements. The Department's TACAIR
inventory management initiatives are targeted at preserving the
service life of our existing legacy strike fighter aircraft
(F/A-18 A-D). The Department of the Navy expeditionary squadrons and
those supporting the UDP will be reduced from 12 aircraft to 10
aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis. These measures, in
combination with other internal management measures and SLEP of some
aircraft, will extend the service life of the legacy aircraft and make
the projected shortfall manageable. This decision also considers that
carrier based F/A-18C squadrons have been deploying with 10 aircraft
for a number of years.
20. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, will the additional risk mean that the operational
commanders have less than the required strike fighters to execute their
mission?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. Any
reductions in squadron size will be subject to Global Force management.
These inventory management initiatives will be implemented on an as
required basis, prudently balancing the warfighting needs of the COCOMs
with future projected capacity and capability requirements.
21. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, when do you anticipate that a decision will be reached
on the Navy's discussions for a multiyear procurement (MYP)?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. The Navy
is actively pursuing the F/A-18 series multiyear as authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 and
Defense Department Appropriations Act of 2010. The Secretary of Defense
must certify to Congress that all multiyear programs have met statutory
requirements.
The Navy is currently working with the OSD to submit all required
documentation and budget exhibits to provide the Secretary of Defense
the necessary information he will require to certify the F/A-18 series
multiyear and then notify Congress. Legislative relief on specific MYP
documentation deadlines is still being worked with the appropriate
committees.
22. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, is SLEP funded in future spending?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. Although
the initial elements of SLEP CBR and high-flight hour (HFH)
inspections) are currently funded, the phase of SLEP to take the
aircraft to 10,000 flight hours remains a POM-12 budget development
issue.
23. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, how much will it cost to add 1,400 hours to older F/A-
18 Super Hornets?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. The F/A-
18 E/F SLAP is currently funded and underway. The F/A-18 E/F has a
different airframe from the F/A-18 A-D fleet, and requires a separate
service life assessment. The E/F has a design life of 6,000 hours.
There is currently no program and no cost estimate at this time for
adding flight hours to F/A-18 E/Fs.
24. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, I am aware that cost benefit analyses were done in the
past about how many aircraft should enter a SLEP and whether it becomes
more cost efficient to buy new F/A-18s. Please detail past analyses and
what their conclusions were.
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. The Department of the Navy
has not chartered or commissioned any cost benefit analysis regarding
how many aircraft should enter a SLEP or whether it is more cost
effective to buy new F/A-18s.
General Trautman. Marine Corps defers to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (DASN) (Air) for appropriate response.
25. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, what has changed in recent SLEP cost-benefit analyses?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. There have been no changes
to the SLEP technical baseline elements used in the cost analysis
conducted by AIR-4.2, the cost estimating branch of the Naval Air
Systems Command. The Department of the Navy has not conducted a cost-
benefit analysis of the F/A-18 SLEP program.
General Trautman. Marine Corps defers to DASN (Air) for appropriate
response.
26. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, are the same numbers of F/A-18s expected to enter a
SLEP as previously determined?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. SLEP is not currently funded
in PB11. Several analyses have been completed to support the POM-12
development. The number of aircraft identified to enter SLEP will be
determined as part of the POM-12 budget development process. Regardless
of the funding profile selected in POM-12, the Department of the Navy
will have the opportunity to adjust SLEP quantities, based on updated
inventory information, in POM-14 because the funding profiles for SLEP
of 150 and 280 are nearly identical from fiscal year 2012 through
fiscal year 2014.
General Trautman. The phase of F/A-18 A-D SLEP to take the aircraft
to 10,000 flight hours, remains a POM-12 budget development issue and
is not currently funded in PB11. Several analyses have been completed
to support the POM-12 development. The number of aircraft identified to
enter SLEP will be determined as part of the POM-12 budget development
process.
27. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, what is the current cost to SLEP each aircraft?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. The exact
cost to SLEP each aircraft is not definitively known until the aircraft
is inducted for service. However, the current average cost per aircraft
is estimated from AIR-4.2 at:
$15.5 million average per airframe SLEP (10,000 FH)
$13.8 million (APN) SLEP & CBR+
Kits and Installs
$1.7 million (OMN) HFH
FRC Activity
28. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, how many flight hours are added to each aircraft that
go through a SLEP?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. The F/A-
18 A-D legacy airframe life limit is 8,000 flight hours. HFH
inspections will provide an additional 600-hour service extension to a
portion of the legacy fleet that receives them. Many of these aircraft
would be candidates to be extended another approximately 1,400 flight
hours, to 10,000 flight hours, through the SLEP.
29. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, what is the cost per flight hour gained, under current
projections, for putting F/A-18 through a SLEP?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. The Director, Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has been tasked to conduct an
independent analysis of all strike fighter shortfall supply and demand
initiatives in order to gain a better understanding of their cost
effectiveness and risk. That analysis will address the total ownership
cost of extending the life of legacy F/A-18s, including SLEP, and is
expected to be completed in time to support the submission of the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request.
General Trautman. SLEP cost/available flight hours: Based on an
average cost estimate of $15.5 million to extend an aircraft 2,000
flight hours (600 flight hours for HFH inspection to 8,600 flight
hours, and then SLEP to a total of 10,000 flight hours), average cost
per flight hour is $7,750.
30. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, what is the cost per flight hour to purchase a new F/
A-18?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. The Director, CAPE has been
tasked to conduct an independent analysis of all strike fighter
shortfall supply and demand initiatives in order to gain a better
understanding of their cost effectiveness and risk. That analysis will
address the total ownership cost of purchasing new F/A-18 E/Fs, and is
expected to be completed in time to support the submission of the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request.
General Trautman. Procurement cost/available flight hours: Based on
an average fly away procurement cost of $62.55 million under a single
year procurement (currently the program of record) and assuming a
design life of 6,000 hours, the average cost per flight hour to procure
a new F/A-18F would be $10,420 per hour. Under the proposed MYP III
procurement strategy, the procurement cost per flight hour would be
$9,330 per hour, based on an average fly away procurement cost of $56
million.
31. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, what are the core differences in capability between a
new F/A-18E/F and a SLEP'd aircraft?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. F/A-18 E/
F provides a 40 percent increase in combat radius, 50 percent increase
in endurance, 25 percent greater weapons payload, three times more
ordnance bring-back, and is five times more survivable than F/A-18A/C
models. F/A-18 E/F spirals ensure relevancy against emerging and future
threats. A Block II Super Hornet includes upgraded avionics and
sensors, some of which cannot be retrofitted to a Legacy Hornet, most
notably the APG-79, AESA Radar.
Capability upgrades are not part of the basic F/A-18 A-D SLEP
effort--this only extends the service life of the airframe. Capability
upgrades are an independent cost associated with extending the service
life of the Legacy Hornet.
32. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and
Admiral Philman, are any changes projected to the number of aircraft
available in Navy F/A-18 training squadrons? If so, what changes and
what will their impact be?
Admiral Architzel, General Trautman, and Admiral Philman. Through
implementation of inventory management initiatives and service life
extension of aircraft, training aircraft inventories will be maintained
at appropriate levels.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
joint strike fighter support infrastructure
33. Senator Burris. Admiral Architzel, General Shackelford, General
Trautman, Admiral Philman, and General Weida, how are you phasing in a
support infrastructure for the new JSF program without detriment to the
legacy aircraft that it will replace?
Admiral Architzel, Admiral Philman, and General Trautman. The
Department of the Navy has management initiatives in-place to retain
our readiness posture of legacy platforms while we conduct the
transition to the JSF. We are actively managing the transition of the
F-35 while we maintain legacy platform support to meet Department of
the Navy warfighting/operational needs. The Marine Corps has a
longstanding F-35B Transition Task Force and the Navy has an F-35C
Lightning II Integration Team. Both teams are under senior leadership
oversight and are fully accountable for the successful integration of
F-35B/F-35C into the fleets; F-35 life-cycle management (including all
seams issues); and interoperability with legacy support systems. In
parallel, the Department is maintaining the necessary logistic
infrastructure for legacy systems via existing aircraft program office
systems/processes under Program Executive Officer leadership. These
teams are responsible for coordination of all in-service aircraft
readiness activities (afloat and ashore) to maintain the overall
aircraft material conditions in the most affordable manner. All teams
will remain in place until applicable aircraft are removed from active
service.
General Shackelford and General Weida. The U.S. Air Force support
infrastructure is being maintained for the legacy fleet that the F-35
is replacing at every base. The Air Combat Command will maintain
trained airman for the legacy fleet until the last legacy aircraft
departs the base. Supply and parts will be maintained as long as there
is a flying mission at that base. Training will also be maintained for
aircrew and maintainers alike. The Air Combat Command will not put at
risk any of our valued assets as we transition a base from legacy to
5th generation aircraft.
strike fighter shortfall
34. Senator Burris. General Shackelford and General Weida, is the
Air Force going to consider keeping the F-22 line open for additional
procurement to fill a possible fighter gap created by a delay in the
JSF delivery?
General Shackelford and General Weida. There are no plans
to reopen the F-22 production line. The Air Force is proceeding with
sustainment-only shutdown planning activities and expects the final F-
22 to deliver with Lot 10 in March/April 2012. The Air Force position
remains in line with the Department's and executive branch's position
to end F-22 production after Lot 10.
35. Senator Burris. Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman, is the
Navy considering keeping their F-18 Super Hornet line open to fill a
possible fighter gap created by a delay in the JSF delivery?
Admiral Architzel and Admiral Philman. The Department of the Navy
will continue to review all mitigation options to reduce the long-term
shortfall.
36. Senator Burris. General Trautman, if the JSF remains behind
schedule, or experiences further delays, does the Marine Corps have a
backup plan to JSF procurement?
General Trautman. The Marine Corps' commitment to the JSF program
is steadfast. The development schedule remains on track with some risk
to completing the test schedule on time. The additional funding
budgeted in fiscal year 2010 and PB-11 will help address those risks,
and the Corps will review the progress again in preparation for POM-12.
The test aircraft are exhibiting unmatched reliability for this stage
of testing. The first vertical landing was accomplished on March 18th
and exceeded expectations. Though testing is later than anticipated we
are starting to see the completion of test points faster than expected.
Static and durability testing of ground test aircraft are providing
excellent results and the engine performance is providing thrust
required to safely conduct flight test. Because of these
accomplishments the Corps will forgo the F-18E/F and continue our
investment in true a Fifth Generation aircraft.
37. Senator Burris. Admiral Architzel, General Shackelford, General
Trautman, Admiral Philman, and General Weida, with the fighter gap
looming and a backlog of inventory growing, how are you training the
pilots and maintenance crews on this equipment?
Admiral Architzel, Admiral Philman, and General Trautman. The Navy
continues to analyze training capacity requirements and invest in
training centers of excellence to meet demand.
General Shackelford and General Weida. For pilot training, the Air
Force is aware of the challenges associated with transition from legacy
fighters to fifth generation fighters and is working to address them.
Aircraft delivery dates and rates affect program execution and as such,
the Air Force is developing a range of options to address evolving
schedules. Pilots who will eventually man F-35 aircraft are currently
filling validated pilot requirements, either flying or non-flying. In
anticipation of the first deliveries of F-35s to Eglin AFB, the Air
Force already has pilots in place for immediate training and will have
pilots ready for future deliveries.
The Navy continues to analyze training capacity requirements and
invest in training centers of excellence to meet demand.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
fighter gap
38. Senator Chambliss. General Shackelford and General Weida, you
note in your written statement regarding the Air Force's fighter gap
that several things have changed since April 2008 when the Air Force
indicated they had a gap of 800 fighters. First, the Air Force has
simply agreed to accept more risk. As an aside, I would note that that
does not affect the size of the gap at all--it simply is an
acknowledgement that you are going to accept that you have one. Second,
you note that the F-35 procurement rate was officially increased from
48 to 80 per year. On your second point, I've seen several stories over
the past few months about the F-35 costing more and being delayed
longer than previously indicated. For that reason, I am hesitant to
take much comfort in the increased production rate you mention since it
hasn't happened yet, and no one can tell us for sure when it is
actually going to happen and to what extent. Do you have any comments?
General Shackelford and General Weida. The acceptance of additional
risk in fighter force structure was conducted in light of OSD guidance
directing that the Air Force increase risk for less relevant force
application capabilities. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget
reflects a complete review of the Air Force fighter force structure
requirement. We do not have a gap of 800 fighter aircraft. After
conducting a thorough examination of the current and future strategic
environment, and using high fidelity campaign modeling, the Air Force
revised its fighter requirement to approximately 1,200 Primary Mission
Aircraft Inventory and approximately 2,000 Total Aircraft Inventory.
Today we have 1,221 Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory and 2,074 Total
Aircraft Inventory.
As to your concerns on the F-35 program's ability to meet its
planned production rate, the Air Force remains confident that the
production delays experienced early in this program have been
aggressively and adequately addressed by the program office and the
primary contractor, Lockheed Martin. The current assessment is that the
program is turning the corner in achieving planned production rates. As
you may be aware, the program recently restructured production ramp
rates to meet the OSD/CAPE directed ramp rates of a 50 percent yearly
increase in production across the FYDP, with full rate production level
of 80 F-35As per year starting in 2016. OSD/CAPE directed this
production ramp rate based on the recommendations of the 2009
Independent Management Review Team (IMRT). In addition, the IMRT is
actively participating in the current Nunn-McCurdy review of the
program to assess if this production rate is achievable. The IMRT will
also conduct a more in-depth second review of the program starting this
summer to measure program progress towards achieving this rate. Based
on these independent assessments, the Air Force is confident we will
maintain clear and unbiased oversight of the production ramp rate of
this program, and will be able to address any issues quickly and
effectively throughout the development and initial fielding of this
critical warfighting program.
foreign military sales
39. Senator Chambliss. General Shackelford, the Senate has been
discussing the issue of F-22 foreign military sales for several years
now. While still prohibiting the sale of F-22 to a foreign government,
the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Act provided authority for
DOD to ``conduct or participate in studies, research, design, and other
activities to define a future export version of the F-22A that protects
classified and sensitive information, technologies, and U.S.
warfighting capabilities.'' What can you tell me about the actions DOD
plans to take with respect to this new authority?
General Shackelford. The Air Force has provided inputs into the OSD
F-22 foreign military sales (FMS) report required by sections 1250 (a)
(b) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. OSD will submit the final report
to Congress once staffing is complete. Section 1250(c) directed an
additional report on the impact of F-22 FMS on the U.S. aerospace and
aviation industries. This study is being conducted by RAND in
conjunction with a similar House Armed Services Comittee-directed
report to update a 2003 study on the military aircraft industrial base.
40. Senator Chambliss. General Shackelford, we've talked around
this issue for several years, and I understand the issues related to F-
22 export in relation to the sensitivity of the technology and the
current legal prohibition, but let me ask you, in your personal
opinion, if the Air Force determined that developing an exportable
version of the F-22 that properly protected sensitive technology were
possible, and if a trustworthy ally with whom the United States
partners with regularly were to express an interest in buying such an
exportable version and was willing to pay to develop and purchase it,
would it make sense for the United States to consider developing an
exportable version of the F-22 and selling it to that ally?
General Shackelford. The Obey Amendment presently prohibits the
sale and export of the F-22. Were that restriction lifted, subject to
applicable provisions of the 2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (HR 3326) and
the 2010 NDAA, as well as sections of accompanying Joint Explanatory
Statement and/or Conference Report and a trusted ally willing to fund
the design, development, and production of an exportable F-22 that
protected U.S. technology, then it would be feasible to export the F-22
to the benefit of the industrial base. Although, current congressional
language permits the Department to conduct or participate in studies,
research, design and other activities to define and develop a future
export version of the F-22A that protects classified and sensitive
information, technologies and U.S. warfighting capabilities, the Air
Force currently has no plans to do so.
41. Senator Chambliss. General Shackelford, I understand that the
Air Force has indicated the F-35 may be available to foreign
governments for $50 million apiece. I note that the Selected
Acquisition Report that DOD delivered to Congress on April 1 states
that the program average unit cost for the F-35 is now $133.59 million
and the average unit procurement cost is now $113 million. Some
estimates of these costs go as high as $158 million and $136 million
respectively. Please provide your best estimate at this time of the
price at which the United States will sell F-35s to foreign partners.
General Shackelford. The price of an aircraft that will be
purchased by either a foreign partner or the United States will vary
based on when those aircraft are purchased. The average unit costs
quoted in the F-35 December 2009 Selected Acquisition Report are
averages based on a total U.S. buy of 2,443 aircraft and 730 aircraft
for the 8 partners. The costs of the aircraft in the early LRIP lots
will be higher than the average while aircraft purchased later in the
program will cost less than the average.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY MODERNIZATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Hagan,
Begich, Kaufman, Inhofe, and Thune.
Majority staff member present: William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Paul C. Hutton IV,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Michael Harney,
assistant to Senator Hagan; David Ramseur, assistant to Senator
Begich; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Mark
Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant
to Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator
Thune; and Scott M. Clendaniel, assistant to Senator Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Lieberman. The Subcommittee on Airland will come to
order with noting the presence of my friend from Oklahoma,
Senator Inhofe, and being informed that the Ranking Member,
Senator Thune, is outside the door.
Senator Inhofe. 14th Street Bridge. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. When I first arrived at the Senate in
much looser times I was told that if I could tell the cloakroom
that I could see the Capitol dome they would hold the vote open
for me. [Laughter.]
But I didn't have to tell them how far I was from the
Capitol. [Laughter.]
Anyway, this hearing is on the very important question of
Army modernization. After nearly 9 years of war in Iraq and
Afghanistan I must say I continue to marvel at the
extraordinary performance of America's Army. Today the Army is
battle tested, battle proven, and battle hardened by years of
combat in the harshest and most uncertain conditions. The
members of our Army have performed with remarkable
professionalism, courage, and I would say, idealism.
We find that from the leaders, the soldiers, and from their
families. I asked the two leaders of the Army that are with us
today whenever you have a chance to please convey our gratitude
to all those people who are serving for us. Our Nation is
deeply grateful.
The subject of today's hearing, Army modernization, merits
particular attention because of the many initiatives begun last
year to reorient and restructure the Army's acquisition
policies. I'm just paused for the moment to note a kind of
irony which is and we'll focus on this as the hearing goes on.
There's not been much stability about Army modernization
programs over the last several years that I've been on the
committee which is regrettable.
Yet, I must say, the Army works. The Army succeeds as I
said in my opening remarks. This doesn't mean we should not try
to achieve more stability and progress in Army modernization.
But it's quite remarkable how our troops have managed to do as
well as they have, really extraordinarily well.
The fiscal year 2011 Army budget continues implementation
of the major program changes directed by the Secretary of
Defense to restructure the Future Combat System (FCS) program;
limit the Army's brigade growth to 45 instead of 48 combat
brigades; start a new ground combat vehicle (GCV) program; and
integrate our 12,000 mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP)
vehicles that have been procured into the Army's force
structure.
These changes necessarily have an incomplete nature in last
year's budget request are, I would say, further clarified in
the Army's fiscal year 2011 request that is before our
subcommittee now. This hearing therefore is an opportunity for
our witnesses to bring the subcommittee up-to-date and to
describe how risks facing the Army's modernization program have
been addressed in the budget for the next fiscal year.
This year's Army budget request is also guided by the
findings and recommendations of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) that places significant additional emphasis on
improving the capabilities of currently fielded technologies to
deal with the wars we are in now and at the same time search
for next generation capabilities to meet the demands of an
uncertain future.
I do want to note two encouraging management initiatives on
the part of the Army.
The first, last February Secretary McHugh ordered a year-
long comprehensive capability portfolio review to validate the
operational value of requirements for new weapons and
importantly to inform what he recognizes will be tough
decisions the Army will have to make in fiscal years 2012 to
2017 long-range budget plans. That review has already started
under the supervision of the Under Secretary of the Army, Joe
Westfahl, and the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter
Chiarelli. Initial indications are that this review process is
aggressive, objective, realistic, and demanding and for that I
am grateful.
Additionally, General Casey announced in January that the
Army plans to use this year to reform the process used to
develop requirements for future capabilities. Consistent with
the Secretary's capability portfolio reviews these reforms
could include a more systematic and disciplined consideration
of potential operational value through cost benefit analysis as
well as earlier and direct involvement of the Army's most
senior leadership in the requirements process. Both of these
steps are consistent with our recently enacted Weapons System
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. For this I also commend
the Army.
But these initiatives foreshadow that additional changes
may be on their way for Army's requirements, priorities, and
modernization strategy. Although the Army's fiscal year 2011
budget request includes both continuity and change it remains
to be seen if the Army will successfully use this year's
request as an opportunity to apply the lessons of the last
decade that establishes and maintains control of a stable,
achievable, and affordable modernization strategy. Those are
some of the overall topics we have to consider.
I welcome our witnesses who are here today.
Lieutenant General Robert P. Lennox is Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Army (G-8) responsible for broad staff oversight
and recommendations regarding Army current and future
requirements, priorities, and resource allocation.
Lieutenant General William N. Phillips is the Principal
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology and Director of the
Acquisition Career Management. As his title indicates he is
responsible for staff oversight and recommendations for the
planning and execution of research, development, and
acquisition programs necessary to meet the Army's current and
next generation requirements.
Although Generals Lennox and Phillips are new to their
positions this year they both have exceptional records of
service and leadership to the Army and our country. I note also
that this is their first appearance before our Airland
Subcommittee. I don't know that we have a medal to award you in
return for this, but we thank you for being here.
We're also joined today by two witnesses who represent
agencies that have closely watched the planning and execution
of Army modernization for many years. They will provide the
subcommittee with their assessments of Army modernization
management, review the main lessons learned over the last
decade, and suggest which lessons are relevant and applicable
to the Army's current modernization strategy and its next
ground vehicle program. In that regard, we welcome particularly
Michael J. Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management at the Government Accountability Office (GAO);
joined by David W. Duma, Principal Deputy Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) at the Department of Defense (DOD).
This year's hearing is a little bit different from ones
we've had before as we have not previously included the Army's
witnesses together on the same panel with the GAO and DOT&E. So
this will be a remarkable adventure and experience. But
obviously we hope that this arrangement will allow us a good
direct exchange of views that will help better inform the
members of this subcommittee as we do our work on the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011.
Senator Thune, thank you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned,
today's testimony will inform the subcommittee's thinking as we
prepare to mark up the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. I want to
echo what you said and join you in welcoming our witnesses.
General Lennox and General Phillips, thank you for
appearing before the subcommittee to explain the Army's
modernization efforts and for your many years of distinguished
service.
Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Duma, your views as independent
auditors and testers will be extremely valuable. We look
forward to hearing them.
The need to continuously modernize the Army is self
evident. But in practice the modernization can be very
difficult. We are in a period of unrelenting technological
change, shifting operational requirements and we face an
adaptive enemy.
The Army's challenge is with maintaining a technological
edge over any adversary while providing a force equipped to
meet almost any conceivable threat. This is complex and
important work, and we thank you for it.
The Army revised its modernization strategy in 2009 as
currently developing and testing technologies that it hopes
will provide soldiers with improved capabilities. Two important
activities will influence modernization.
The first directed by General Casey is a critical look at
the way the Army generates requirements. The time requirements
to value is a must, and I'm happy to see this development.
Second, is a broad review of Army technology area
portfolios led by the Vice Chief, General Chiarelli.
Both of these activities are ongoing. While they may have a
greater impact on future budgets than on this one, I believe
they point the Army in the right direction. The committee is
interested to know what affect these activities may have on
some $3 billion requested for Army modernization in fiscal year
2011.
In practical terms the Army modernizes by upgrading its
legacy systems while simultaneously developing and fielding new
technologies. The Army's written testimony makes clear the need
to do both and the combination helps to balance capability and
affordability. Over the coming year the committee will pay
close attention to the development of new systems like the
suite of technologies designed for infantry and the GCV as well
as to programs that upgrade Stryker, Paladin, and others.
Recent testing of some developmental systems has revealed
worrisome shortfalls in performance and reliability. The
witnesses will be asked to recommend courses of action to
mitigate these issues. Additionally, questions of affordability
haunt any weapons acquisition, and Army modernization programs
are no different.
The Nation is served poorly when capable systems are priced
off the battlefield and the committee is keen to know how the
Army plans to reduce development procurement costs. The success
or failure of our efforts to modernize and transform the force
of the future rests on decisions proposed and implemented
today. There is concern among members of the committee which
you will hear regarding the recent history of Army
modernization efforts.
The challenge of delivering capability amidst technological
change and shifting requirements is indeed a difficult one. We
are eager to understand the Army's vision for the future and
the strategy to achieve it. I should emphasize here that while
this hearing may be focused on weapon systems and on the
acquisition process the center of gravity has and will always
be the soldiers themselves.
Our thanks and gratitude extends to all servicemembers at
home or abroad and to the families that support them.
So Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this
hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimony.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thune, and thanks to
Senator Inhofe and Senator Kaufman for being here. We'll call
now on General Lennox.
STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT P. LENNOX, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMY (G-8)
General Lennox. Good afternoon, Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Thune, and distinguished members of the Airland Subcommittee.
Thanks for your warm welcome for General Phillips and I and for
the entire panel in fact. Very kind of you.
Together General Phillips and I today are pleased to
represent the Army leadership and members of the acquisition
workforce and the more than 1 million courageous men and women
who have been serving this Nation at war for the last 9 years
as you mentioned, sir. We're proud and honored to have been
able to provide them with world class weapon systems and
equipment that's enabled their mission success during that time
period. We thank you and members of this subcommittee for your
steadfast support and for the shared commitment to that very
same goal.
This afternoon I'd like to discuss how the Army
modernization strategy plans to meet this continuing objective.
I'd like to open by talking about the Army modernization
strategy and using some of the programs in the fiscal year 2011
budget to illustrate that. The Chief of Staff of the Army has
recently approved an Army modernization strategy whose ends
include developing and fielding an affordable and interoperable
mix of the best equipment available to allow our soldiers and
units to succeed in today's fight but also to win tomorrow's
full spectrum operations. We plan to do that, sir, by following
three lines of operation.
The first is buying new capabilities that address current
capability gaps. For example, you'll hear us talk about today
the brigade combat team (BCT) modernization strategy. That's
one of our key efforts. I'll come back to that in a minute and
talk about it.
One of the key things to come out of the QDR is the
importance of aviation. The formation of a 12th combat aviation
brigade out of the assets that we currently have today, and
then the funding of a 13th combat aviation brigade would be
part of our fiscal year 2011 proposal.
Today's warfight tells of the importance of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Army is looking to invest
heavily in the extended range, multipurpose aircraft, the Sky
Warrior, and in the Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to
enable our BCTs for the future.
Finally, in this first line of effort we are continuing to
equip our Reserve component forces. In fact, since September
2008 to September of this year, we'll have increased equipment
on hand in the Reserve component by 11 percent and the
modernization of those forces by 12 percent.
Our second line of effort really focuses on being good
stewards of the equipment we have now and a path forward to
improve them and keep them relevant for the future. An example
of that is the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter that has been
used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. As most of you know,
it is an older aircraft. We are investing now in both cockpit
upgrades and sensor and safety measures to keep that aircraft a
contributing member of the fleet until 2025.
We also have efforts to lighten the soldiers load.
Improvements to the outer tactical vest to lower the weight,
fielding plate carriers that are lighter in weight, but give
the soldiers in Eastern Afghanistan in particular, better
ability to climb the hills and deal with the altitude.
We're finally divesting our oldest equipment. Last
December, we finally divested the last UH1 Huey helicopter, a
vintage performer from Vietnam. The last one went out of the
Active Force and Active units in December. Within 2 years,
we'll divest the last M35, a 2\1/2\ ton truck, currently known
as the deuce-and-a-half. That will be out of the inventory by
the end of fiscal year 2011.
The last aspect of our modernization strategy is to field
in accordance with Army priorities and the Army force
generation cycle. In the past, we used to have two tiered
units. So if you were in the Active component you were equipped
and armed better than the Reserve component was.
Today, and in this published and approved doctrine that
went back to last October, the Army recognizes that Reserve
components are doing the same kinds of missions as the Active
component. Every unit now is equipped for the mission they're
facing. If you're deploying overseas you're equipped the same
if you're Active or Reserve. If you have a homeland defense
mission you're equipped for that homeland defense mission, and
we take that very, very seriously.
Finally, if I could speak for a minute about the BCT
modernization strategy. It has four elements, and it's probably
the most important part of our modernization strategy.
Those elements include things like incorporating the MRAP
vehicles and the MRAP all-terrain vehicles into our fleet. We
have a plan to do that, and that's been approved by the
Secretary of Defense.
The next step and one of the most important is incremental
improvements to our network. We find that the network is a key
capability. At a seminar yesterday with multiple brigade
commanders they echoed the importance of improvements to the
network, getting the network down to commanders on the move,
getting wide band capability down to the individual soldiers
and talked repeatedly about how much of a difference that
makes. If we can get the network to work amazing things will
happen as a result they assured me again yesterday.
The third part is the GCV. We think we need this to provide
a versatile range of capabilities that include things like
force protection that we currently don't have, off road
mobility, urban operational mobility, and the space, weight,
and power to deal with the network and other things that we
have to load onto vehicles today and the plan for the GCVs to
field that in 7 years. We're comfortable explaining the way
ahead in that approach.
The very last part of the BCT modernization is the fielding
of capability packages to our infantry BCTs. As you mentioned,
Senator, these are the FCS technological spin-outs. They were
tested last year in the second of a four-stage test.
They were shown to have a number of challenges both in size
and weight. Meantime between failure you'll find that we agree
with the findings that came from DOT&E and GAO in this regard
that there is plenty of work to be done. Where we probably
disagree is the way ahead.
We think that there's probably very little risk in
proceeding ahead of time. We think this way primarily because
we've demonstrated in the past that if a system or capability
doesn't meet with our soldiers' need we have willingly taken
that off the table. Examples include the class 4 UAV and the
Multifunction Utility/Logistics Equipment automated robotic
vehicle didn't meet the Army's needs in a cost benefit way and
we've taken them off.
We pledge to you that we'll do the same thing. If equipment
is not ready to put in the hands of soldiers, we won't put it
in the hands of soldiers.
In closing, in support of Army modernization, the Army
submitted a research, development, and acquisition budget
request of $31.7 billion for fiscal year 2011. We believe that
this budget appropriately allocates resources between bridging
advanced technologies to our soldiers for the warfight today
and to develop new technologies and new capabilities to bring
the required capabilities of our soldiers in the future.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, and members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of our soldiers and their families we
greatly appreciate the tremendous support that we receive from
this Congress and the American people. We don't take that for
granted. In order to successfully implement the plans we've
shared with you today we urge this same continued support in
the future. Providing all of America's sons and daughters who
serve in our Army the most capable equipment for the battles
they are fighting today and are likely to face in the future
are the responsibility that the Army takes seriously and is
committed to accomplishing.
Thank you for your time.
[The joint prepared statement of General Lennox and General
Phillips follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by LTG Robert P. Lennox, USA, and LTG William
N. Phillips, USA
introduction
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Thune, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee on Airland, we thank you for this opportunity to discuss
Army Modernization Programs in the fiscal year 2011 budget request. We
are pleased to represent Army leadership, members of the Army
acquisition workforce, and the more than 1 million courageous men and
women in uniform who have deployed to combat over the last 8 years and
who have relied on us to provide them with world-class weapon systems
and equipment for mission success. We thank the members of this
committee for your steadfast support and shared commitment to this
goal.
We will open today's statement by providing an overview of the Army
modernization strategy, using current program initiatives to illustrate
our plan. We will then elaborate on specific systems on which you have
asked us to focus, and our testimony will conclude with a discussion of
the requirements process.
why the army needs to modernize
The 2010 Army Modernization Strategy is consistent with DOD's High
Priority Performance Goals in the President's fiscal year 2011 Budget's
Analytic Perspectives volume, and follows the guidance of the Secretary
of the Army and Chief of Staff, who have provided us with imperatives
and goals to address the two major challenges facing the Army:
Restoring Balance to our Force and Setting Conditions for the Future.
Two of the imperatives for restoring balance confer upon us the
obligation to modernize our equipment base to ensure victory on today's
and tomorrow's battlefields.
Preparing our soldiers for success in the current
conflict directs us to identify rapidly and fill those
capability gaps identified as critical to the warfighters
currently engaged in operations. In this sense, modernization
is mandated in support of winning the current fight and
directing new capabilities be brought to the current
battlefield to close specific capability gaps. Examples of
modernization in this sense include:
Increasing the quantity and capabilities of
our aviation fleet in response to the increasing
reliance on those assets in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
fiscal year 2011, we plan to begin the investment that
will lead to the stand up of the 13th Combat Aviation
Brigade (CAB), and;
Accelerating Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) programs due to the significant
contributions they are making to counterinsurgency
fights. We intend to accelerate the Extended-Range
Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) to
capitalize on the power of combining full motion video
and signals intelligence, as well as manned-unmanned
teaming.
Transforming to meet the demands of the 21st century
requires us to resist focusing completely on the type of
warfare we face today--counterinsurgency--and hedge against
other potential types of missions awaiting our soldiers in the
future. In this sense, modernization is critical in preparing
our Army for any mission we might be called upon to do,
investing in and developing the required capabilities, and
fielding these capabilities to our soldiers through a
comprehensive, feasible, and affordable plan. Some examples of
modernization in this regard include:
The development of the Army Integrated Air and
Missile Defense system. This program will enhance the
capability of our ground-based Air and Missile Defense
units. Enabling us to conduct beyond line-of-sight
engagements, allowing us to protect a greater number of
defended assets, changing our employment techniques/
doctrine by enabling point versus area defense, while
improving capability against a wide range of threats.
This will be developed as an integral part of the joint
air and missile defense architecture, and;
The upgrade of the Army's self-propelled
artillery fleet, the Paladin, through the Paladin
Integrated Management program. This program will
increase the capability of the system by replacing the
automotive and suspension components with Bradley-like
components, which are in common with many of the other
combat vehicles in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)
formation.
In parallel with these Restoring Balance imperatives, Setting
Conditions for the Future provides reinforcing guidance in answering
the two fundamental questions of why and how the Army needs to
modernize.
Setting Conditions for the Future requires all elements of the Army
to be synchronized--organizing, manning, training, and equipping.
However, there are some specific elements of that goal that influences
Army Modernization. Specifically, as the Army Chief of Staff has said,
we want an Army that is, `` . . . a versatile mix . . . of networked
organizations . . . equipped and ready [for] full spectrum operations
to hedge against unexpected contingencies.''
To achieve this goal, our Modernization strategy must provide a
balanced set of capabilities, ensuring that the most important
capability gaps are closed as fast as possible, so an adversary cannot
circumvent our relative strengths to exploit a relative weakness.
how the army will modernize
The Army will accomplish our modernization goals by focusing on
three major lines of effort:
The first major line of effort is developing and fielding new
capabilities to meet identified capability gaps through traditional and
rapid acquisition processes. To maintain our advantage over current,
emerging, and future threats, the Army must provide our soldiers with
the equipment they need. The Army must accurately identify capability
gaps and consequently develop viable solutions for the soldier and
incrementally field enduring capabilities across the force.
The primary element of this line of effort is the implementation of
the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization Plan, which was approved by
the Secretary of Defense in November of 2009. This plan enables
incremental improvements to the network, integrates Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) into formations, incrementally fields
capability packages to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and develops a
new manned Ground Combat Vehicle. We will discuss this plan in greater
detail later in this statement.
Other elements of this first line of effort include leveraging
breakthroughs from the Army's Science and Technology Program and
shortening the time between identification of a requirement and
delivery of the solution, by optimizing and supporting the Capabilities
Development Rapid Transition (CDRT) process.
The second major line of effort in the Army's Modernization
Strategy is the continuous modernization of equipment to meet current
and future capability needs through upgrade, replacement,
recapitalization, refurbishment, and technology insertions. This effort
focuses on how we intend to keep Army equipment relevant and capable
for the foreseeable future.
The most important element of this line of effort is the
development and continuous refinement of a comprehensive investment
strategy that integrates affordable portfolio strategies for selected
fleets of equipment. These portfolios include Fighting Vehicles;
Aircraft; Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV); Battle Command (BC) and
Networks; and ISR. Integrated Portfolio Strategies will provide a long-
term plan for the management of fleets and resources to achieve Army
goals and objectives over time.
Important elements of this second line of effort also include
developing processes to make fleet sustainment decisions routinely
based on cost benefit analysis and capitalizing on technology base
initiatives.
The third major line of effort in our Modernization Strategy is
meeting the needs of our force through Army priorities and Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN), the Army's rotational readiness model. This
effort allows us to determine the objective levels of modernization
within our fleets of equipment, revealing the optimal amount of
modernization needed, when it will be needed and by whom.
Supporting elements to this line of effort also include updating
the 2009 Army Equipping Strategy, that incorporates lessons learned
from combat, including inputs from the field, and taking into account
the change to the strategic and fiscal landscapes. Finally,
establishing Theater Provided Equipment in Afghanistan will allow us to
provide the forces deployed there with the best available equipment,
while at the same time reducing the cost and risk involved in the
repetitive transportation of unit equipment to and from Afghanistan.
the cornerstone of army modernization--the brigade combat team
modernization strategy
In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates provided
guidance and directed the Army to ``accelerate the initial increment of
the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat
brigades'' and noted the lack of a clear role for MRAP in the current
vehicle programs. The Army was further directed to ``cancel the vehicle
component of the current Future Combat System (FCS) program, reevaluate
the requirements, technology, and approach--and then re-launch the
Army's vehicle modernization program . . . .'' The Army saw this as an
opportunity and has shaped the Army's new approach to BCT
Modernization.
Following the Secretary of Defense's April 2009 decisions, the Army
directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to
develop recommendations to modernize our BCTs incrementally and to
determine the operational requirements for a new Ground Combat Vehicle.
In response, TRADOC established Task Force 120 (TF 120) which evaluated
the Army's short- and long-term modernization requirements to ensure
proposed solutions mitigated the Army's highest risk capability gaps.
TF 120 delivered its recommendations to senior Army leaders in early
September 2009, which focused on capability packages, Ground Combat
Vehicle operational requirements, and BCT network integrated
architecture. These recommendations form the basis for the incremental
modernization of all the Army's BCTs.
Subsequently, in November 2009, the Secretary of Defense approved
the Army's BCT Modernization Plan which:
Enables incremental improvements to the Army BC
Network;
Incorporates MRAP vehicles into the force;
Accelerates the fielding of Capability Packages to all
BCTs by 2025;
Develops a new manned Ground Combat Vehicle within 7
years.
Battle Command Network Improvements
The Army BC Network will improve our situational awareness and
collaborative planning capabilities by sharing essential information
from an integrated platform or a disconnected soldier to their command
post. Network modernization utilizes two primary transport programs
which will incrementally move the Army to a single and expanding Army
BC Network: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) and Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS). WIN-T is the backbone for the Army's
transport modernization strategy and will be fielded in three
increments. increment 1 provides reach-back capabilities to Battalion
Command Posts and fielding is almost completed. Increment two provides
an initial on-the-move transport capability including real-time imagery
to BCT and Battalion Commanders and Beyond Line-of-Sight services to
the BCT Company level and is scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal
year 2012. Increment three expands on-the-move capabilities and adds an
aerial tier vastly improving network reach, redundancy, and management.
Incorporating Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
The success of the MRAP family of vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrates the critical need for integration of these types of
capabilities in all of the Army formations and as a part of the overall
manned ground vehicle strategy for the future. The Army will establish
20 sets of MRAPs tailored to BCTs and available for their employment
while in the available phase of the ARFORGEN cycle, and ensure MRAPs
are available for home station training and in the institutional
training base. In select enabler units (sustainment brigades, medical,
route clearance, and explosive ordinance units) MRAPs will take the
place of some organic vehicles. The Army will also maintain MRAPs,
including the newest variant the MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle, in
operational float and war reserve stocks.
Accelerating the Fielding of Capability Packages to All BCTs
Capability Packages are specifically designed to fill gaps and
mitigate risk, align with the Program Objective Memorandum, and deliver
new capabilities in 2-year increments in support of ARFORGEN. The
Capability Package concept recommends BCT modernization priorities,
addresses current and expected BCT high-risk capability gaps, and is
fielded and funded over specific 2-year timeframes as complete packages
or sub-packages based on soldier needs, technological advances, and
available resources. The Army's BCT Modernization plan accelerates the
fielding of Capability Packages to 29 BCTs through fiscal year 2016 and
to all BCTs by fiscal year 2025.
The capabilities scheduled for delivery to the first BCT in fiscal
year 2011-2012 are in the final test and evaluation phases, but we
acknowledge the process has identified several shortfalls and some
reliability issues. We are cognizant of the risks going forward, but
also aware of the importance of fielding integrated networked systems
to the current warfighter. The program managers along with industry
partners are working to correct these issues and integrate fixes for
the second round of testing in 2010 and the final round of testing,
called the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, in 2011. The Army,
along with OSD, will closely monitor progress toward correcting these
problems and continue to assess the program at reviews later this year
to ensure these systems meet warfighter needs.
These capabilities will provide commanders with an increased ISR
capability in the Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned
Ground Sensors, and Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, and integrated
network capabilities that link the soldier to headquarters in Network
Integration Kits.
Future Capability Packages will address identified capability gaps
across the force, leveraging mature technologies and resources to the
soldier. TRADOC's Capability Package development process, beginning
with the annual capability needs analysis, ensures the timely
identification, analysis, selection, and prioritization of viable
solutions for inclusion in incremental capability packages. Future
Capability Packages may include upgrades to capabilities scheduled for
fielding in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, such as a common
controller for all unmanned vehicles, both air and ground, as well as a
new variant of an unmanned ground vehicle, which will provide
additional force protection capabilities. A continuous review of
capability needs and an incremental delivery approach of solutions will
ensure our units and soldiers are equipped with the most advanced
technologies our Nation's resources can provide to meet current
operational requirements.
Developing a New Manned Ground Combat Vehicle
To inform the Ground Combat Vehicle operational requirements
development effort, the Army sponsored a Ground Combat Vehicle Blue
Ribbon Panel which received input from Joint-Service partners, retired
general officers, think tank analysts, representatives from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Army soldiers, and leaders with a wide
range of operational experience. Additional input from commanders and
soldiers with recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan was
critical in identifying characteristics and features needed in the new
Ground Combat Vehicle.
The new platform will provide a versatile range of capabilities,
including the under-belly protection offered by MRAP, the off-road
mobility and side protection of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the
urban and operational mobility of the Stryker. It will include
precision lethality to enable decisive results while maintaining
overmatch against like systems, and integrate the network to maintain
situational awareness in urban and other operations. While the new
vehicle will provide sufficient space and electrical power to accept
the network, it will also have growth potential to ensure the ability
to integrate upgrades and new technologies. The Ground Combat Vehicle's
development approach enables production of the first vehicle by fiscal
year 2017, while establishing a basis from which to adapt. Capabilities
incorporated in subsequent increments will be based on changes in the
operational environment and enabled by maturation of emerging
technologies.
programmatic updates
As requested by the committee, we are providing specific updates on
several programs. Each of these programs contribute to the intent of
Army Modernization--to develop and field an affordable mix of the best
equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in both
today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations. Materiel
modernization provides new and improved capabilities to soldiers that
enable them to accomplish their missions and maintain overmatch against
the enemy.
The Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
completed the fiscal year 2009 Limited User Test (LUT) in September
2009, and completed a successful Milestone C Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) decision at the December 2009 Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) meeting. The Defense Acquisition Executive approved the
initial LRIP procurement of one BCT set of Increment 1 systems. Follow-
on DAB In-Progress Reviews are planned for later this year to assess
continued development progress, supporting the procurement of second
and third BCT sets. Additional technical and operational testing is
planned for 2010 to support the December 2010 DAB decision. Technical
Testing begins in May 2010 and culminates in a September 2010 LUT. The
Army awarded the LRIP contract for the initial Brigade on February 24,
2010. Increment 1 systems included in the LRIP contract are: The
Network Integration Kit, Class I Unmanned Arial System, Small Unmanned
Ground Vehicle, Urban-Unattended Ground Sensors, and Tactical-
Unattended Ground Sensors. The NLOS-LS completed the flight LUT in
February 2010. The results of this LUT indicate additional work is
needed on the NLOS-LS missile. An evaluation of the NLOS-LS acquisition
options is ongoing with a Path Forward decision expected in the third
quarter 2010.
The Ground Combat Vehicle is the Army's next-generation Infantry
Fighting Vehicle, combining lessons learned from the survivability of
the MRAP vehicle, the tactical mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
and the operational mobility of the Stryker. The Army released a
Request for Proposals (RFP) on February 25, 2010, for the Technology
Development phase of the Ground Combat Vehicle effort. The first combat
vehicle designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) environment, the Ground Combat Vehicle will have
enhanced mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both
urban and off-road environments. It will be designed to host the Army's
network. It will have the capacity available to accept future upgrades
incrementally as technologies mature and threats change. Because of the
pace of change and the operational environment, the Army is pursuing a
Ground Combat Vehicle program timeline that provides the first
production vehicles in 7 years.
The UH-60 Black Hawk is the work horse of Army Aviation. The
current UH-60 fleet is comprised of 1,833 aircraft, including 921 UH-
60As (produced between 1978 and 1989), 718 UH-60L/Ks (produced since
1989), and 194 new UH/HH-60Ms. The Black Hawk helicopter is in its 33rd
year of production. To date, the Army has employed seven multi-year,
multi-service production contracts. The current contract extends from
fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011 and includes Navy H-60 aircraft,
as well as Foreign Military Sales aircraft. The Army is negotiating a
follow on multiservice contract this year.
The ongoing UH-60A to UH-60L recapitalization program extends the
service life of the Black Hawk program, while providing the improved
capability and safety margin of the UH-60L. The Army plans to induct 48
aircraft in fiscal year 2010 and 240 aircraft between fiscal year 2011
and fiscal year 2016. The UH-60M program incorporates a digitized
cockpit for improved combat situational awareness, lift, range, and
handling characteristics for enhanced maneuverability and safety. These
improvements also extend the service life of the aircraft. The Army
plans to improve the safety of the UH-60M platform with a Preplanned
Product Improvement technology. Additionally, the Army is pursuing an
Improved Turbine Engine Program, currently in Science and Technology,
that will be common across the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache
fleets.
Stryker has planned procurement of 3,953 vehicles with 3,149 having
been accepted as of January 31, 2010. These vehicles support eight
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, with the eighth SBCT being fielded in
fiscal year 2011 at Fort Bliss, TX; a Stryker Theater Provided
Equipment set supporting the Afghanistan theater; a strategic pool of
ready-to-fight systems; Institutional Training Base; Test Articles; a
Depot Repair Cycle Float Pool managed by the U.S. Army Materiel
Command; and other operational requirements. Stryker vehicles have
operated more than 24 million miles in combat while maintaining well
above required operational readiness rates. The Stryker program
received a Full Rate Production decision on 8 of 10 configuration
variants, including the Infantry Carrier Vehicle, Reconnaissance
Vehicle, Commander Vehicle, Mortar Carrier Vehicle, Fire Support
Vehicle, Anti-tank Guided Missile Vehicle, Engineer Squad Vehicle, and
Medical Evacuation Vehicle. The remaining variants--the Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle and the Mobile Gun
System--are in Limited Rate Production.
The Army has continually improved the survivability of the Stryker
vehicle to meet evolving threats. The most current enhancement being
evaluated is a Double V hull integrated into the current vehicle
platform that could potentially provide MRAP-level protection against
Improvised Explosive Devices. A directed requirement has been approved
and the Army will build and test a limited number of prototype Stryker
vehicles integrating the Double V hull design. Pending independent
assessment, a further decision will be made whether to incorporate this
design onto Stryker vehicles supporting our operations in Afghanistan.
As mentioned above, the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) is in
Limited Rate Production with a Full Rate Production decision expected
in April 2011. MGS is designed to provide direct supporting fires to
assault infantry in order to destroy or suppress hardened enemy
bunkers, machine gun positions and sniper positions in urban,
restricted and open, rolling terrain with its 105mm ``shoot on the
move'' turreted gun and autoloader system. The MGS is an essential
component of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team and provides the organic
combined arms lethality and enhanced operational flexibility necessary
in today's fact paced threat environment.
With regard to existing vehicle upgrades, the Army's combat
platform modernization program is focused on standardizing 31 HBCT sets
with 2 variants of the Abrams tank and Bradley Infantry Fighting
Vehicle, 2 of the Army's highest priority combat vehicle
recapitalization programs. This modernization will provide 26
operational HBCT equivalents and 5 strategic HBCT equivalents. At
present, the Army has nearly completed fielding modularized HBCTs,
which gives every brigade a common structure. The short-term
modernization goal is to populate these brigades with only two variants
of the Abrams and the Bradley--the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 is being paired
with its partner, the Bradley M2A3, and the Abrams M1A1AIM SA is being
teamed with the Bradley M2A2ODS SA. The modular HBCT force structure
will be equipped with the two variant Abrams and Bradley fleet by the
end of 2013. This modernization plan aligns compatible combat platforms
with common modular formations.
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a Department of Defense
(DOD) initiative to develop a family of software-programmable tactical
radios that provide mobile, interoperable, and networked voice, data,
and video communications at the tactical edge of the battlefield. JTRS
development is 85 percent complete. For the Army, JTRS will provide a
tactical radio communications network for Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams by providing the tactical networking transport
capability through scalable and modular networked communications. It
will also provide the current force a mobile, ad hoc networking
capability using new advanced waveforms--Soldier Radio Waveform and
Wideband Networking Waveform. The majority of the radios in the Ground
Mobile Radio (GMR) Program and the Handheld, Man-pack and Small Form
Fit (HMS) Program will be procured for the Army.
The GMR will provide the Army a multi-channel (up to four channels)
operation, allowing full functionality of each legacy radio it
replaces. In addition, GMR will include an integrated global
positioning system (GPS) capability based on the Selective Availability
Anti-Spoofing Module-based GPS receiver with a Precise Time and Time
Interval output. Today, GMR production representative systems are being
manufactured which will participate in E-IBCT LUT. The GMR will enter
LRIP in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
The HMS will provide a scalable and modular Software Communications
Architecture compliant networked radio frequency communication
capability to meet Army Handheld, Man-pack (Mounted & Dismounted) and
Embedded Radio requirements. The program will deliver a Handheld (two
Channel) radio, a Man-pack (two Channel) radio, and various Small Form
Fit radios for various ground sensors, unattended vehicles, and
unmanned air vehicles. The HMS will enter LRIP this year and begin
delivering to our soldiers in fiscal year 2011.
the requirements process and reform initiatives
The Army has developed and refined a dynamic, flexible process to
review, validate, resource, and acquire critical warfighting
capabilities rapidly to meet operational needs while minimizing risk
through due diligence. This accelerated process complements the
standard, more deliberate Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System that is generally used for requirements
determination. It capitalizes on ``real time'' feedback from commanders
in the field and, through its improved responsiveness, has
significantly enhanced operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army prides itself as a learning organization and continues to
make a concerted effort to codify the positive refinements in its
processes that we have made during the prolonged conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In keeping with this trend, this accelerated process for
validation of operational needs has been documented in the latest
update of Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination,
published on December 28, 2009.
Operational Needs Statement and Joint Urgent Needs Statements
The Chief of Staff of the Army's vision to ``build a versatile mix
of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational
cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full
spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies at a
sustainable tempo for our All-Volunteer Force'' is supported by an
accelerated requirements review and decision process used for
evaluating and fulfilling operational needs statements (ONS) and joint
urgent operational need statements (JUONS). This accelerated process
provides a high degree of tailorability and increased versatility to
our efforts to provide materiel capabilities for deployed and deploying
commanders and units.
Following mission analysis based on battlefield experiences,
operational commanders use the ONS and JUONS process to identify
materiel shortfalls in their current organizations that, if remedied,
could correct a deficiency or improve a capability that enhances
mission accomplishment. The ONS is particularly useful to support Army
units that are assigned ``nonstandard'' missions for which they are not
normally equipped.
The ONS and JUONS requests can be made for either nonstandard
capabilities that can be procured from commercially available items or
for quantities of standard Army equipment that exceed the
organization's authorization. Additionally, the ONS provides a
mechanism for commanders to request new capabilities that do not
currently exist within the Army.
Army commanders submit ONS through the chain of command to the Army
Staff for review and approval, while JUONS are submitted through the
chain of command to the Joint Staff for approval. Since the beginning
of the current conflicts, 98 percent of urgent operational needs
identified by Army commanders have been submitted using ONS, while 2
percent have been submitted using the JUONS. The majority of ONS
received from Army commanders are for increases in standard Army
capabilities or equipment while the majority of JUONS are for new
capabilities or equipment that do not exist in current Army materiel
inventories. In 2009, commanders requested more than 6,000 separate
types of equipment through approximately 2,500 ONS. The rapid fielding
of MRAPS to Iraq and Afghanistan is an example of capabilities provided
rapidly through a JUONS. The increase in basis of issue for night
vision goggles and the provision of hand held radios to deployed units
are examples of capabilities fielded rapidly through ONS.
Accelerated Requirements
In addition to streamlining the process for identifying operational
needs rapidly, the Army has established procedures to deliver
capabilities rapidly to units deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq by
modifying the requirements validation, funding, and acquisition
processes associated with these urgent needs. As you may suspect, the
Army is forced to accept a slightly higher degree of risk regarding
system integration when performing these activities in parallel. To
mitigate and manage the risk, we have developed and use a senior leader
decisionmaking forum known as the Army Requirements and Resourcing
Board (AR2B) to inform our actions through this process. The AR2B
synchronizes the assessment, validation, resourcing, and sourcing of
urgent capabilities within the Department. The AR2B coordinates weekly
with theater to prioritize efforts and to insure capabilities being
developed meet evolving theater operational needs. The flexibility
granted from Congress concerning reprogramming of funds has been
instrumental to the success of this forum.
The Army is tackling unique integration challenges responding to
urgent needs identified by commanders in Afghanistan. The relatively
primitive infrastructure of Afghanistan and the restricted lines of
communication through which materiel must flow into the theater is
causing us to pay greater attention in synchronizing the delivery of
capabilities, logistics, training, and manning considerations of
accelerated acquisition programs than we had in the past when dealing
with requests originating out of Iraq. For example, in Iraq where we
had the advantage of an established infrastructure, the Army was able
to rapidly field and integrate into the force more than thirty variants
of the MRAPs. A priority of Afghanistan is reducing the number of
logistics requirements by having as few variants as possible. For this
reason, the staff is being more deliberate in its decisionmaking to
ensure that fielded capabilities are supportable.
Transition of Rapidly Acquired Capability
To capitalize fully on the accelerated process, the Army developed
institutional processes designed to integrate proven wartime
capabilities into the Army's standard materiel management system. This
work is accomplished through the Army Centers for Lesson Learned and
through the CDRT process. The Army uses unit commander feedback and
TRADOC assessments to develop recommendations on whether a wartime
capability should be transitioned to an enduring Army capability.
Examples of capabilities recommended as enduring capabilities through
the CDRT process include the Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) System
and the Green Laser Dazzler. The TIGR system improves situational
awareness and facilitates collaboration at the company level by
enabling the collection and dissemination of fine-grained intelligence
on people, places, and insurgent activity. The Green Laser Dazzler is a
non-lethal weapon used to create temporary vision impairment to stop
someone from advancing.
Reform Initiatives for the Deliberate Process
From a requirements point of view, and consistent with DOD's High
Priority Performance Goals in the President's fiscal year 2011 Budget's
Analytic Perspectives volume, the Army is implementing the Weapon
Systems Reform Act of 2009 through the management of more comprehensive
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs),
and Capability Portfolio Reviews (CPRs). The Army is working closely
with OSD--Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop AoA
guidance, with special emphasis on costs and benefits, and to review
AoA products. The Army is conducting CSBs regularly to review
requirements and to determine the status of programs. The Army senior
leadership is conducting Army-wide, all-component, CPRs to review
requirements and priorities holistically and make recommendations to
revalidate, modify or drop requirements. The objective is to ensure
that funds are programmed, budgeted, and executed against validated
requirements that are cost and risk-informed.
The Army has demonstrated great flexibility in adjusting its
requirements review and development processes to be more effective in
the contemporary operating environment. After several years of
refinement, the Army has a process that reviews, validates, resources,
and acquires critical warfighting capabilities rapidly to meet
commanders operational needs while maintaining the good stewardship
expected of our institution. We have been able to find the balance in
making institutional processes more responsive while minimizing
operational risk through due diligence. Lastly, the Army is also
ensuring that the investment in materiel for the current conflicts is
leveraged and incorporated into its long-term equipping strategy.
in closing
In support of Army Modernization, the Army has submitted a
research, development, and acquisition budget request of $31.7 billion
for fiscal year 2011. We believe that this budget allocates resources
appropriately between bringing advanced technologies to our soldiers
currently in the fight and developing new technologies to bring the
required capabilities to our soldiers in the future. As such, we meet
our leadership's intent of concurrently preparing our soldiers for
success in the current conflict and transforming to meet the demands of
the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, and members of the committee, on
behalf of our soldiers, we greatly appreciate the tremendous support we
receive from this Congress and the American people. We urge you to
provide full, timely, and predictable funding to implement the plans we
have shared with you today successfully. The Army is modernizing,
seeking to restore balance while setting conditions for the future. Our
goal is to balance current and future requirements and risks to make
certain that we can defend the Nation--today and tomorrow.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, General. Well said.
General Phillips, welcome.
STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM N. PHILLIPS, USA, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION,
LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, AND DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER
MANAGEMENT
General Phillips. Sir, thank you. Chairman Lieberman,
Senator Thune, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I
do not have an opening statement. But I just have some quick
thoughts for you, and I'll echo what General Lennox has said.
First of all, it's an honor for me to be here with this
distinguished panel. Sir, on behalf of all our soldiers and
their families, I want to thank you for the great work that
this committee, and quite frankly, the American taxpayer does
to provide our Army and our Armed Forces world-class equipment
for our soldiers.
I just came back from a tour in Iraq. I watched our
soldiers operate on the field of battle with great distinction
and excellence. I would borrow the words that you just said,
with great professionalism and extraordinary courage. So I
thank you and this committee for what you do for our soldiers.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General. That was very kind of
you to say.
Michael Sullivan, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thune, members of the subcommittee. It's my pleasure to be here
with you today to discuss the current status of the Army's
modernization efforts since the Secretary of Defense's decision
to restructure the FCS program back in April. My testimony will
focus on current challenges and opportunities for the Army in
moving forward with its acquisition plans including its current
contracting activity, our views on the status of the initial
BCT increments, and our views on the GCV development effort.
For the time being the Army is continuing development of
the initial BCT equipment and the supporting network under the
modified FCS development contract. It has also awarded a
contract to procure long lead items for the BCT equipment
procurement and has issued a modification to that contract to
begin low rate production.
With regard to the status of the development program for
the initial increment, recent testing revealed significant
reliability problems during a recent series of tests designed
to prove capabilities in the field. Systems proved unable to
perform as accepted and fell far short of current reliability
thresholds. Five of the systems are currently being redesigned
and will undergo further testing over the coming months.
In light of these issues, as General Lennox stated, we are
concerned that the Army's production decision that was approved
by the Department may be too risky at this time. The Army is
proceeding with procurement despite having acknowledged that
systems are in some cases immature, still not reliable, and
cannot perform as required in the field. The decision to move
into production with this risk is a variance with DOD's
acquisition policy and best practices that emphasize knowledge
based and incremental product development and production.
As a result, we recommended that the Army correct all of
the maturity and reliability issues with that initial increment
that testing has or will identify before the Department
approves any additional production lots after this one and
before any of these systems are fielded. The Army did agree
with that recommendation as the General stated.
We also looked at the GCV development program, and our
views on that are slightly more optimistic at this point. It's
very early in that program. I think the key to success on that
program at this point will be to keep agreed upon requirements
in line with the resources that are available. That being time,
of course, 7 years to deliver money and technologies that are
available today.
The Department made a material development decision this
February. The Army is planning to award multiple contracts to
begin technology development September 2010. It's proposing the
use of competitive prototyping during technology development
which is something we like to see.
We think that reduces risk, and we think that will
emphasize mature technologies. It's also planning a preliminary
design review that will validate contractor readiness to begin
product development sometime in fiscal year 2013.
So we think they're taking their time at the right time to
ensure that the requirements can be delivered with mature
technologies. Current plans are to deliver the initial GCV in
late fiscal year 2017, which is a fairly quick developmental
period. But if done properly and they keep an eye on the
requirements and level those with the available technologies,
it probably is doable.
Mr. Chairman, as you can see the current post-FCS
modernization environment is mixed and still taking form. It's
important to note that when added up ongoing development and
procurement funding for the BCT increments and development
funding for the GCV represents about $24 billion in the Army's
planned budget from 2011 to 2015. With that amount of money on
the line it's critical to get things right at this time.
That is why we also recommended in our report that was
issued in March that the Army report to Congress by the end of
this fiscal year the full details of its new modernization
acquisition strategy including plans for program management and
contracting. Again, the Army agreed with that recommendation
and said they would deliver that.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. I'd be happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Michael J. Sullivan
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the Department of
the Army's ground force modernization efforts as it moves away from the
now-canceled Future Combat System (FCS) program. My statement today is
based on the work we conducted over the last year in response to a
request from the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, House Committee
on Armed Services. This statement focuses on the Army's post-FCS
acquisition plans. In particular, it emphasizes the December 2009
decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the
Brigade Combat Team Modernization. Our recent report on the Army's
ground force modernization efforts provides additional information on
the Army's efforts.\1\
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\1\ Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Acquisitions:
Opportunities Exist to Position Army's Ground Force Modernization
Efforts for Success, GAO-10-406 (Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2010).
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This statement is based on work we conducted from March 2009
through March 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
Since it started development in 2003, FCS has been at the center of
the Army's efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more
capable combat force. The FCS concept involved replacing existing
combat systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles and
systems linked by an advanced information network. The Army anticipated
that the FCS systems, along with the soldier and enabling complementary
systems, would work together in a system of systems wherein the whole
provided greater capability than the sum of the individual parts. The
Army expected to develop this equipment in 10 years, procure it over 13
years, and field it to 15 FCS-unique brigades--about one-third of the
Active Force at that time. The Army also had planned to spin out
selected FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces throughout
the system development and demonstration phase.
As we reported in 2009,\2\ the FCS program was immature and unable
to meet the Department of Defense's (DOD) own standards for technology
and design from the start. Although adjustments were made, such as
adding time and reducing requirements, vehicle weights and software
code grew, key network systems were delayed, and technologies took
longer to mature than anticipated (see fig. 1). By 2009, after an
investment of 6 years and an estimated $18 billion, the viability of
the FCS concept was still unknown. As such, we concluded that the
maturity of the development efforts was insufficient and the program
could not be developed and produced within existing resources.
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\2\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army's
Combat Systems for the Future, GAO-09-288 (Washington, DC: Mar. 12,
2009).
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In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense proposed a significant
restructuring of the FCS program to lower risk and address more near-
term combat needs. The Secretary noted significant concerns that the
FCS program's vehicle designs--where greater information awareness was
expected to compensate for less armor, resulting in lower weight and
higher fuel efficiency--did not adequately reflect the lessons of
counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As such, the Secretary recommended:
accelerating fielding of ready-to-go systems and
capabilities to all combat brigades;
canceling the vehicle component of the FCS program,
reevaluating the requirements, technology, and approach, and
relaunching the Army's vehicle modernization program; and
addressing fee structure and other concerns with
current FCS contracting arrangements.
In June 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics issued an acquisition decision memorandum that
canceled the FCS acquisition program, terminated manned ground vehicle
development efforts, and laid out plans for follow-on Army Brigade
Combat Team Modernization efforts. DOD directed the Army to transition
to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated
acquisition programs, including one to develop ground combat vehicles
(GCV).
Subsequently, the Army has been defining its ground force
modernization efforts per the Secretary's decisions and the June 2009
acquisition decision memorandum. Although the details are not yet
complete, the Army took several actions through the end of calendar
year 2009. It stopped all development work on the FCS manned ground
vehicles--including the non-line-of-sight cannon--in the summer of 2009
and recently terminated development of the Class IV unmanned aerial
vehicle and the countermine and transport variants of the Multifunction
Utility/Logistics and Equipment unmanned ground vehicle. For the time
being, the Army is continuing selected development work under the
existing FCS development contract, primarily residual FCS system and
network development. In October 2009, the Army negotiated a
modification to the existing contract that clarified the development
work needed for the brigade modernization efforts.
the army has started a series of development and fielding efforts
The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall
modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense's
decisions to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is
transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a
shorter-term approach that biennially develops and fields new
increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an
approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial
increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial
and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions, and
preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to
define and develop follow-on increments and develop a new GCV. The Army
also plans to integrate network capabilities across its brigade
structure and to develop and field upgrades to other existing ground
force equipment.
The first program, Increment 1, is a continuation of
previous FCS-related efforts to spin out emerging capabilities
and technologies to current forces. Of the Army's post-FCS
modernization initiatives, Increment 1, which includes such FCS
remnants as unmanned air and ground systems, unattended ground
sensors, the non-line-of-sight launch system, and a network
integration kit, is the furthest along in the acquisition
development cycle (see fig. 2). The network integration kit
includes, among other things, the integrated computer system,
an initial version of the system-of-systems common operating
environment, early models of the Joint Tactical Radio System,
and a range extension relay.\3\ In December 2009, the Army
requested and DOD approved, with a number of restrictions, the
low-rate initial production of Increment 1 systems that are
expected to be fielded in the fiscal year 2011-2012 capability
package.\4\ The Army will be continuing Increment 1 development
over the next 2 years while low-rate initial production
proceeds. The projected development and production cost to
equip nine brigades with the Increment 1 network and systems,
supported by an independent cost estimate, would be about $3.5
billion.
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\3\ The system-of-systems common operating environment is the
operating environment that serves as middleware between operating
systems and software applications.
\4\ The Army had developed a concept of continual modernization of
ready-to-go capabilities through biennial deliveries of what are called
capability packages.
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For the second acquisition program, Increment 2 of
brigade modernization, the Army has preliminary plans to mature
Increment 1 capabilities--potentially demonstrating full FCS
threshold requirements--as well as contributing further
developments of the system-of-systems common operating
environment and battle command software, and demonstrating and
fielding additional capabilities. For example, these may
include the Armed Robotic Vehicle Assault (Light)--an unmanned
ground vehicle configured for security and assault support
missions--and the Common Controller, which will provide the
dismounted soldier a handheld device capable of controlling,
connecting, and providing data transfer from unmanned vehicles
and ground sensors. Army officials indicated that they are
currently working to define the content, cost, and schedule for
Increment 2 with a low-rate initial production decision planned
for fiscal year 2013 and a Defense Acquisition Board review
expected later in fiscal year 2010.
The third acquisition program would develop a new GCV.
The Army reviewed current fighting vehicles across the force
structure to determine whether to sustain, improve, divest, or
pursue new vehicles based on operational value, capability
shortfalls, and resource availability. Per DOD direction, the
Army also collaborated with the Marine Corps to identify
capability gaps related to fighting vehicles. For development
of a new GCV, the Army's preliminary plans indicate the use of
an open architecture design to enable incremental improvements
in modular armor; network architecture; and subcomponent size,
weight, power, and cooling. DOD and the Army met in February
2010 to make a materiel development decision on the GCV, and
the Army was subsequently authorized to release a request for
proposals for GCV technology development.\5\ Over the next
several months, the Army will be conducting an analysis of
alternatives to assess potential materiel solutions for the
GCV. The Army expects to follow the analysis with a Milestone A
decision review on whether to begin technology development in
September 2010.\6\ After Milestone A, Army officials are
proposing the use of competitive prototyping with multiple
contractors--the number of which will depend on available
funding--during the technology development phase, which will
feature the use of mature technologies and the fabrication and
testing of prototype subsystems. In the technology development
phase, the contractors will be expected to fabricate and
evaluate several subsystem prototypes, including an automotive
test rig and a mine blast test asset. The contractors will also
be expected to develop a near-critical design review level
design for their integrated vehicle and, in the process, inform
the GCV concept development document. That document is expected
to be finalized at the Milestone A decision point. Competitive
prototypes will be fabricated and tested during the engineering
and manufacturing development phase. A preliminary design
review would be used to validate contractor readiness to enter
detailed design at Milestone B in fiscal year 2013. The Army's
preliminary plans indicate that the first production vehicles
could be delivered in late fiscal year 2017, about 7 years from
Milestone A.
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\5\ A materiel development decision is a review that is the formal
entry point into the acquisition process and is mandatory for all
programs. After the materiel development decision, the Milestone
Decision Authority may approve entry into the acquisition management
system at any point consistent with phase-specific entrance criteria
and statutory requirements.
\6\ Milestone A is the point at which a program enters the
technology development phase; Milestone B is entry into the engineering
and manufacturing development phase; and Milestone C is entry into the
production and deployment phase.
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The Army is planning to incrementally develop and
field an information network to all of its brigades in a
decentralized fashion, that is, not as a separate acquisition
program. The Army has defined a preliminary network strategy
and is in the process of defining what the end state of the
network will need to be, as well as how it may build up that
network over an undefined period of time. In the near term, the
Army is working to establish a common network foundation to
build on and to define a common network architecture based on
what is currently available and expected to become available in
the near future. Current communications, command and control,
and networking acquisition programs will continue and will be
expected to build upon the current network foundation and
architecture over time. Networking capabilities will be
expected to meet specific standards and interface requirements.
According to Army officials, the ongoing incremental network
and software development activities and requirements will be
dispersed to these acquisition programs, where they will be
considered for further development and possible fielding. The
only original FCS network development activities that the Army
plans to continue under the FCS development contract are those
supporting the network integration kit for Increment 1 and
whatever additional networking capabilities may be needed for
Increment 2. DOD expects the Army to present its network
development plans later in 2010. (See table 1.)
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As shown in table 1, the Army is proposing to make substantial
investments in its post-FCS acquisition initiatives. For fiscal year
2011, the Army is proposing research and development funding of about
$2.5 billion and procurement funding of about $683 million. For the
following 4 years (fiscal years 2012-2015), the Army plans additional
research and development investments of about $10.4 billion and
procurement investments of about $10.7 billion.
Recent Army Contract Actions Related to Its Post-FCS Efforts
For the time being, the Army is continuing selected development
work--primarily that related to Increment 1, Increment 2, and network
development--under the existing FCS development contract. In October
2009, the Army negotiated a modification to the existing contract that
clarified the development work needed for the brigade modernization
efforts. The Army previously awarded a contract for long lead item
procurement for Increment 1. A modification to that contract was
recently issued to begin low-rate initial production of the Increment 1
systems. The Army has also recently released a request for proposals
for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development
effort.
Contractor proposals for GCV are expected to include plans,
solutions, or both for, among other things, survivability (hit
avoidance system, armor, and vehicle layout) and mobility (propulsion
and power generation and cooling). According to the request for
proposals, the proposals can utilize prior Army investment in armor
recipes, but the contractors will not get an inherent advantage for
doing so. Each solution will be based on its own merits. Contractor
proposals are to be submitted in April 2010 and contract awards, for
cost-plus type contracts, are to be awarded after the Milestone A
decision in September 2010.
acquisition direction and fcs lessons learned offer opportunities to
promote successful outcomes, but decision to proceed with initial
production is premature
The challenge facing both DOD and the Army is to set these ground
force modernization efforts on the best footing possible by buying the
right capabilities at the best value. In many ways, DOD and the Army
have set modernization efforts on a positive course, and they have an
opportunity to reduce risks by adhering to the body of acquisition
legislation and policy reforms--which incorporate knowledge-based best
practices we identified in our previous work--that have been introduced
since FCS started in 2003. The new legislation and policy reforms
emphasize a knowledge-based acquisition approach, a cumulative process
in which certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before
proceeding. In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time.
Additionally, DOD and the Army can further reduce risks by considering
lessons learned from problems that emerged during the FCS development
effort. Initial indications are that the Army is moving in that
direction. However, in the first major acquisition decision for the
Army's post-FCS initiatives, DOD and the Army--because they want to
support the warfighter quickly--are proceeding with low-rate initial
production of one brigade set of Increment 1 systems despite having
acknowledged that the systems are immature and unreliable and cannot
perform as required.
New Acquisition Reforms Point Way to Lower Risk
The body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms
introduced since FCS started in 2003 incorporates nearly all of the
knowledge-based practices we identified in our previous work (see table
2). For example, DOD acquisition policy includes controls to ensure
that programs have demonstrated a certain level of technology maturity,
design stability, and production maturity before proceeding into the
next phase of the acquisition process. As such, if the Army proceeds
with preliminary plans for new acquisition programs, then adherence to
the acquisition direction in each of its new acquisition efforts
provides an opportunity to improve the odds for successful outcomes,
reduce risks for follow-on Army ground force modernization efforts, and
deliver needed equipment more quickly and at lower costs. Conversely,
acquisition efforts that proceed with less technology, design, and
manufacturing knowledge than best practices suggest face a higher risk
of cost increases and schedule delays.
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As shown in table 2, the cumulative building of knowledge consists
of information that should be gathered at three critical points over
the course of a program:
Knowledge point 1 (at the program launch or Milestone B decision):
Establishing a business case that balances requirements with resources.
At this point, a match must be made between the customer's needs and
the developer's available resources--technology, engineering,
knowledge, time, and funding. A high level of technology maturity,
demonstrated via a prototype in its intended environment, indicates
whether resources and requirements match. Also, the developer completes
a preliminary design of the product that shows that the design is
feasible and that requirements are predictable and doable.
Knowledge point 2 (at the critical design review between design
integration and demonstration): Gaining design knowledge and reducing
integration risk. At this point, the product design is stable because
it has been demonstrated to meet the customer's requirements as well as
cost, schedule, and reliability targets. The best practice is to
achieve design stability at the system-level critical design review,
usually held midway through system development. Completion of at least
90 percent of engineering drawings at this point provides tangible
evidence that the product's design is stable, and a prototype
demonstration shows that the design is capable of meeting performance
requirements.
Knowledge point 3 (at production commitment or the Milestone C
decision): Achieving predictable production. This point is achieved
when it has been demonstrated that the developer can manufacture the
product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. The best practice
is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes are in
statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and
capable of consistently producing parts within the product's quality
tolerances and standards--at the start of production.
The Army did not position the FCS program for success because it
did not establish a knowledge-based acquisition approach--a strategy
consistent with DOD policy and best acquisition practices--to develop
FCS. The Army started the FCS program in 2003 before defining what the
systems were going to be required to do and how they were going to
interact. It moved ahead without determining whether the FCS concept
could be developed in accordance with a sound business case.
Specifically, at the FCS program's start, the Army had not established
firm requirements, mature technologies, a realistic cost estimate, or
an acquisition strategy wherein knowledge drives schedule. By 2009, the
Army still had not shown that emerging FCS system designs could meet
requirements, that critical technologies were at minimally acceptable
maturity levels, and that the acquisition strategy was executable
within estimated resources.
With one notable exception, there are initial indications that DOD
and the Army are moving forward to implement the acquisition policy
reforms as they proceed with ground force modernization, including the
Secretary of Defense's statement about the ground vehicle modernization
program--to ``get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.''
In addition, DOD anticipates that the GCV program will comply with DOD
acquisition policy in terms of utilizing competitive system or
subsystem prototypes. According to a DOD official, a meeting was
recently held to consider a materiel development decision for the GCV,
and the Army is proposing to conduct a preliminary design review on GCV
before its planned Milestone B decision point. Additionally, a
configuration steering board is planned for later in 2010 to address
reliability and military utility of infantry brigade systems.
Army's Decision to Proceed with Low-Rate Initial Production for
Increment 1 Increases Risk
In the first major acquisition decision for the Army's post-FCS
initiatives, DOD and the Army--because they want to support the
warfighter quickly--are proceeding with low-rate initial production of
Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that systems are
immature, are unreliable, and cannot perform as required. In December
2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics approved low-rate initial production of Increment 1 equipment
for one infantry brigade but noted that there is an aggressive risk
reduction plan to grow and demonstrate the network maturity and
reliability to support continued Increment 1 production and fielding.
In the associated acquisition decision memorandum, the Under Secretary
acknowledged the risks of pursuing Increment 1 production, including
early network immaturity; lack of a clear operational perspective of
the early network's value; and large reliability shortfalls of the
network, systems, and sensors. The Under Secretary also said that he
was aware of the importance of fielding systems to the current
warfighter and that the flexibility to deploy components as available
would allow DOD to ``best support'' the Secretary of Defense's
direction to ``win the wars we are in.'' Because of that, the Under
Secretary specified that a number of actions be taken over the next
year or more and directed the Army to work toward having all components
for the program fielded as soon as possible and to deploy components of
the program as they are ready. However, the Under Secretary did not
specify the improvements that the Army needed to make or that those
improvements are a prerequisite for the Under Secretary approving
additional production lots of Increment 1.
The approval for low-rate initial production is at variance with
DOD policy and Army expectations. DOD's current acquisition policy
requires that systems be demonstrated in their intended environments
using the selected production-representative articles before the
production decision occurs. However, the testing that formed the basis
for the Increment 1 production decision included surrogates and non-
production-representative systems, including the communications radios.
As we have previously noted,\7\ testing with surrogates and non-
production-representative systems is problematic because it does not
conclusively show how well the systems can address current force
capability gaps. Furthermore, Increment 1 systems--which are slated for
a fiscal year 2011-2012 fielding--do not yet meet the Army's
expectations that new capabilities would be tested and their
performance validated before being deployed in a capability package. As
noted in 2009 test results, system performance and reliability during
testing was marginal at best. For example, the demonstrated reliability
of the Class I unmanned aerial vehicle was about 5 hours between
failure, compared to a requirement for 23 hours between failure. The
Army asserts that Increment 1 systems' maturity will improve rapidly
but admits that it will be a ``steep climb'' and not a low-risk effort.
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\7\ GAO-09-288.
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While the Under Secretary took current warfighter needs into
account in his decision to approve Increment 1 low-rate initial
production, it is questionable whether the equipment can meet one of
the main principles underpinning knowledge-based acquisition--whether
the warfighter needs can best be met with the chosen concept. Test
reports from late 2009 showed conclusively that the systems had limited
performance, and that this reduced the test unit's ability to assess
and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with
employment of the equipment. The Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation recently reported that none of the Increment 1 systems have
demonstrated an adequate level of performance to be fielded to units
and employed in combat. Specifically, the report noted that reliability
is poor and falls short of the level expected of an acquisition system
at this stage of development. Shortfalls in meeting reliability
requirements may adversely affect Increment 1's overall operational
effectiveness and suitability and may increase life-cycle costs. In
addition, in its 2009 assessment of the increment's limited user test--
the last test before the production decision was made--the Army's Test
and Evaluation Command indicated that the Increment 1 systems would be
challenged to meet warfighter needs. It concluded that, with the
exception of the non-line-of-sight launch system, which had not yet
undergone flight testing, all the systems were considered operationally
effective and survivable, but with limitations, because they were
immature and had entered the test as pre-production-representative
systems, pre-engineering design models, or both. Additionally, the
command noted that these same systems were not operationally suitable
because they did not meet required reliability expectations.
In recent testimony before a House subcommittee, the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation stated that flight testing of the non-
line-of-sight launch system was conducted in January and February 2010.
In that testing, two of six missiles fired achieved target hits and
four missed their targets. The Army informed the Director that Failure
Review Board investigations of the flight failures are underway.
concluding remarks
Army and DOD officials made a very difficult decision when they
canceled what was the centerpiece of Army modernization--the FCS
program. As they transition away from the FCS concept, both the Army
and DOD have an opportunity to improve the likely outcomes for the
Army's ground force modernization initiatives by adhering closely to
recently enacted acquisition reforms and by seeking to avoid the
numerous acquisition pitfalls that plagued FCS. As DOD and the Army
proceed with these significant financial investments, they should keep
in mind the Secretary of Defense's admonition about the new ground
vehicle modernization program: ``get the acquisition right, even at the
cost of delay.'' Based on the preliminary plans, we see a number of
good features, such as the Army's decision to pursue an incremental
acquisition approach for its post-FCS efforts. However, it is vitally
important that each of those incremental efforts adheres to knowledge-
based acquisition principles and strikes a balance between what is
needed, how fast it can be fielded, and how much it will cost.
Moreover, the acquisition community needs to be held accountable for
expected results, and DOD and the Army must not be willing to accept
whatever results are delivered regardless of military utility.
We are concerned that in their desire for speedy delivery of
emerging equipment to our warfighters in the field, DOD and the Army
did not strike the right balance in prematurely approving low-rate
initial production of Increment 1 of brigade modernization. Although
the Army argues that it needs to field these capabilities as soon as
possible, none of these systems have been designated as urgent and it
is not helpful to provide early capability to the warfighter if those
capabilities are not technically mature and reliable. If the Army moves
forward too fast with immature Increment 1 designs, then that could
cause additional delays as the Army and its contractors concurrently
address technology, design, and production issues. Production and
fielding is not the appropriate phase of acquisition to be working on
such basic design issues.
In our recent report, we made recommendations intended to reduce
the risk of proceeding into production with immature technologies.\8\
In that regard, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense mandate
that the Army correct the identified maturity and reliability issues
with the Increment 1 network and systems prior to approving any
additional lots of the Increment 1 network and systems for production.
Specifically, the Army should ensure that the network and the
individual systems have been independently assessed as fully mature,
meet reliability goals, and have been demonstrated to perform as
expected using production-representative prototypes. We also
recommended that the Secretary of the Army should not allow fielding of
the Increment 1 network or any of the Increment 1 systems until the
identified maturity and reliability issues have been corrected.
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\8\ GAO-10-406.
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In response, DOD concurred with our recommendations and stated that
the need to correct those issues has been communicated to the Army. DOD
also asserted that Increment 1 systems will be tested in their
production configuration, and performance will be independently
assessed against capability requirements prior to DOD approving
production of any additional lots of Increment 1 systems. The Army has
many Increment 1 development and testing activities planned for the
coming months and we intend to monitor their progress closely. DOD also
stated that Increment 1 systems would not be fielded until performance
is sufficient to satisfy the warfighter's capability requirements. It
is essential that: (1) Increment 1 network and systems clearly
demonstrate their ability to fully satisfy the needs of the warfighter;
and (2) DOD and the Army not be willing to accept whatever acquisition
results are delivered regardless of their military utility. Again, we
intend to follow the Army and DOD's activities and actions in the
coming months.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may
have.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Sullivan. I
appreciate the ongoing dialogue you have with the Army.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Duma, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DAVID W. DUMA, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Duma. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to provide the DOT&E assessment of the early
infantry BCT increment 1 and Army modernization programs. My
written testimony has been submitted for the record so my
opening remarks will be brief.
Regarding the increment 1 of the early infantry brigade
combat team (EIBCT), the DOT&E operational assessment of the
EIBCT performance is based upon the results of a September 2009
limited user test (LUT) and the non-line of sight (NLOS) launch
system flight LUT conducted in February 2010. That assessment
also used data from developmental testing wherever appropriate.
Each of the EIBCT systems requires further development prior to
conducting the initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E)
or making a fielding decision.
All of the systems have notable performance deficiencies
and the operational reliability for each of the systems falls
significantly below the stated requirements. The Army is
addressing the reliability problems, and will test the system
improvements in the LUT to be conducted in September 2010 and
again in the IOT&E scheduled for 2011.
Regarding the Stryker double-V hull, the Army is
investigating using a double-V hull design in the Stryker.
Testing of prototype vehicles must be adequate to assure
vehicles built with the double-V hull provide improved
protection to the soldiers. We are working with the Army to
determine the numbers and types of prototypes required for
testing. This testing will inform decisionmakers prior to a
production decision.
Regarding the Stryker mobile gun system, we have reviewed
the Army's update to Congress on the status of actions taken to
mitigate the Stryker mobile gun system deficiencies. We assess
the following remaining deficiencies as being the highest
priority for correction.
First, improving the mission equipment package reliability;
second, developing the long-term solution for rocket propelled
grenade and anti-tank guided missile protection; and third,
increasing the gun pod protection level.
Regarding the GCV of the Army BCT modernization, the Army's
GCV is in the earliest stages of acquisition. In preparation
for a milestone A decision later this year our office is
working closely with the Army to develop a test and evaluation
strategy for that program. Our office will be involved in the
test and evaluation of any future capability increments to the
Army BCT modernization. Once the Army defines the acquisition
strategies the test and evaluation program will be tailored to
support those acquisition programs.
Regarding two specific radios of the joint tactical radio
system (JTRS), the ground mobile radio (GMR), and the handheld
man pack and small form fit (HMS) radio, both the JTRS, GMR,
and HMS radios are schedule driven programs working to complete
system development prior to operational tests scheduled to
start in November 2010. Readiness for operational testing is
dependent upon the completion of user requirements, the
development of supporting wave forms, and the success of
developmental testing.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, this completes my opening remarks. I'll be happy
to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duma follows:]
Prepared Statement by David W. Duma
Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide the DOT&E
assessments of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
Increment 1, the Stryker Double-V Hull Upgrade and Mobile Gun System,
the Ground Combat Vehicle, the UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter, and the
Ground Mobile Radio and Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Factor variants
of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program.
assessment of e-ibct test results
The DOT&E operational assessment of the Early Infantry Brigade (E-
IBCT) Increment 1 performance is based upon the results of the E-IBCT
Limited User Test (LUT 09) conducted in August-September 2009 and the
Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) Flight LUT conducted in
January-February 2010. That assessment is supplemented with data from
developmental testing, as appropriate.
Each of the E-IBCT systems requires further development prior to
conducting an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) in fiscal
year 2011 or fielding. All of the systems have notable performance
deficiencies. The demonstrated operational reliability for each of the
systems falls significantly below requirements.
LUT 09 was the first operational test of the E-IBCT systems. It was
conducted at Fort Bliss, TX, and consisted of an infantry company and
scout platoon equipped with E-IBCT systems executing full spectrum
operations against a threat force composed of conventional mechanized
forces and paramilitary forces with civilians present on the
battlefield. The force-on-force test consisted of 4 96-hour scenarios
with the test unit executing 14 offensive, defensive, and stability
missions. Operations were conducted both day and night. Live firing of
the NLOS-LS was conducted during the NLOS-LS Flight LUT at White Sands
Missile Range, NM, in January-February 2010.
Many of the systems tested in LUT 09 were not in the same
configuration as the systems intended for purchase. The Small Unmanned
Ground Vehicle used a production radio, the remaining five systems used
pre-production radios and waveforms. Numerous changes to be implemented
in the E-IBCT systems to be produced (as compared to those tested in
LUT 09) had been identified prior to LUT 09. The program manager has
informed DOT&E that additional changes will be made to address the
reliability problems discovered during the LUT. The first opportunity
to test the effects of these changes and any others made to address
performance problems identified in LUT 09 will be the E-IBCT LUT to be
conducted in August-September 2010 (LUT 10). The E-IBCT systems have
not been tested against electronic warfare or computer network attack
threats. E-IBCT operations in an electronic warfare and computer
network attack environments will be assessed in LUT 10.
The DOT&E key findings with respect to the performance of the
individual E-IBCT systems are summarized below.
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) requires further
developmental and operational flight tests to demonstrate improvement
in missile reliability and the performance of the missile's infrared
(IR) seeker. The demonstrated missile reliability is 61 percent, below
the 85 percent requirement. Missiles using the IR seeker in
developmental and LUT flight tests hit 5 of 11 targets. The program
needs to conduct additional testing and allocate adequate time to
demonstrate performance and implement fixes to improve reliability. The
NLOS-LS Container Launch Unit (CLU) met its reliability requirement
during LUT 09, demonstrating a 259-hour mean time between system abort
versus a 125-hour requirement. However, during the February 10 Flight
LUT, problems with the NLOS-LS navigation system caused six of the
seven total system aborts that occurred during testing, resulting in a
mean time between system abort of 12 hours. This was the first test
using a new software version for the NLOS-LS navigation system.
Soldiers received numerous fault codes from the navigation system when
they initialized the CLU. Failure review is ongoing. In our view, the
effectiveness of fixes to the navigation system and other failure modes
should be tested in the E-IBCT LUT 10 conducted later this year.
NLOS-LS is making progress in some performance areas. Missiles
using the laser-designate mode demonstrated success in operational and
developmental testing, hitting five of seven targets. The missile
warhead can kill armored vehicles when it hits vulnerable areas. In LUT
09, the NLOS-LS Container Launch Unit was interoperable with the fire
support network and was effective in processing electronic fire
commands. During LUT 09, the test unit effectively engaged armored
targets with the NLOS-LS in simulated fire missions. When simulated and
evaluated to be successful, NLOS-LS had a significant impact on the
battle by destroying threat armored vehicles.
The NLOS-LS Flight LUT was the first operational flight test of the
system. Soldiers from the Army Evaluation Task Force Fires Battalion
fired six missions at operationally representative threat targets.
Forward observers their tactical sensors and target designators
acquired actual threat tanks, armored combat vehicles, and a commercial
truck. The tanks and armored combat vehicles had realistic threat
countermeasures. The Precision Attack Munition and the Container Launch
Unit (CLU) were production representative. During the Flight LUT, two
of six missiles fired achieved target hits and four missed their
targets. Two of the missiles impacted 14 or more kilometers short of
the target. The cause of one miss is known: the CLU misinterpreted
temperature data sent by the Advanced Field Artillery Data System. This
caused the missile to safe the warhead and ignore the laser
designation, thereby missing the target. The Army has identified
potential causes for two other misses involving the motor in the
precision attack munitions and a circuit board failure.
The Army has informed DOT&E that the program is completing Failure
Review Board investigations of the developmental and operational flight
failures. We recommend the Army conduct additional developmental and
operational flight testing once all of the necessary corrective
measures have been identified and applied.
Network Integration Kit
In LUT 09, the Network Integration Kit (NIK) demonstrated a
capability to receive sensor data from the Tactical Unattended Ground
Sensor and Urban Unattended Ground Sensor Gateways and to interoperate
with the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below battle command
network by passing messages and still images. The NIK operated with
pre-production pre-Engineering Development Model Joint Tactical Radio
System Ground Mobile Radios which are not certified to pass classified
traffic. The NIK did not meet its reliability requirement,
demonstrating a 33-hour mean time between system abort versus a
requirement of 112 hours. The NIK had a lengthy boot up time of 30-35
minutes versus a 10 minute requirement for a warm start reboot. The
capability of the NIK to pass classified data using low probability of
intercept waveforms will be evaluated in LUT 10.
Class I Block 0 Unmanned Aircraft System
The Class 1 UAS meets most of its air vehicle flight and sensor
performance requirements. This system was heavily used by the test unit
to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tasks.
However, the UAS was not employed as the back-packable company-level
and platoon-level asset envisioned by the user. Due to poor system
reliability, the unit consolidated these systems under centralized
battalion-level control to achieve system redundancy. The UAS does not
have the range or endurance necessary to conduct missions within a
larger battalion area of operations. An assessment cannot be made of
the effectiveness of the UAS employed in the platoon/company role for
which it is designed.
The Class 1 UAS is not reliable, demonstrating a mean time between
system abort of 1.5 hours versus a 23-hour user threshold requirement.
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle Block 1 (SUGV)
During LUT 09, the SUGV demonstrated a capability for remote
investigation of potential threats. The test unit successfully
demonstrated the capability to transmit still images from the SUGV to
the Network Integration Kit via an Unattended Ground Sensor Gateway.
The SUGV sensor performs satisfactorily in daylight, providing images
that can identify personnel at 100 meters, achieving the user
requirement. The SUGV does not meet the user requirement for
recognizing personnel at night. The most significant SUGV operational
deficiency is the limited communications range between the operator and
the SUGV. The SUGV user requirement calls for a 1,000 meter line-of-
sight tele-operation range. This range allows the operator to employ
the robot at a safe distance while conducting reconnaissance of
potentially hazardous locations. During LUT 09, much shorter ranges
were achieved. Typical tele-operation ranges were 125-150 meters in
open terrain and 50-75 meters in and around buildings. These short
tele-operation ranges exposed SUGV operators to hostile fire. Several
operators were evaluated as killed during the LUT.
During LUT 09, the SUGV demonstrated a 5.2-hour mean time between
system abort versus a requirement of 42 hours.
Urban Unattended Ground Sensor
The Urban Unattended Ground Sensor (U-UGS) demonstrated little
contribution to unit situational awareness, providing limited
actionable intelligence. Images were often blurry or blank and not
readable. During LUT 09, the Local Display and Control Device was not
used by the unit, although it is essential to providing local unit
leaders U-UGS alerts and images. The U-UGS has demonstrated a
capability to transmit images to the NIK via a gateway device. The U-
UGS is not reliable, demonstrating a mean time between system abort of
25 hours versus a requirement of 105 hours.
Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor
The Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor (T-UGS) provided little
contribution to unit situational awareness. During LUT 09, it provided
no actionable intelligence to the test unit, with half of its photo
images blank or blurry. The T-UGS demonstrated a capability to transmit
images to the NIK. The T-UGS is not reliable, demonstrating a mean time
between system abort of 52 hours versus a requirement of 127 hours.
Reliability
The Army Test and Evaluation Command calculated reliability growth
potentials for the NIK, U-UGS, T-UGS, SUGV and Class 1 UAS that are all
below the reliability thresholds associated with each system. Thus, the
reliability desired for these systems is not achievable by IOT&E
without an extensive design-for-reliability effort by the Army.
stryker double-v hull
Recently, the Army leadership decided to investigate using the
Double-V Hull design developed under the Stryker Modernization effort
for vehicles to be deployed to Afghanistan. Testing of prototype
vehicles must be adequate to assure vehicles built with the Double-V
Hull provide improved protection to soldiers relative to existing
vehicles. We are working with the Army to determine the numbers and
types of prototypes required for testing and to develop a test plan
that the Director will approve.
Operational and Live Fire Testing for the Stryker Double-V hull
design will focus on evaluating crew survivability throughout the
expected threat spectrum. Testing will also assess whether vehicle
mobility is adequate. This testing will inform decisionmakers prior to
a production decision.
stryker mobile gun system
Overall the program has mitigated, by either material fixes or
changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), 10 of the 23
deficiencies identified in the 2008 Secretary of Defense Report to
Congress.
We have reviewed the Army's semi-annual report to Congress updating
the status of actions taken by the Army to mitigate Stryker Mobile Gun
System (MGS) deficiencies. Based on that review, we assess the
following remaining deficiencies as being the highest priority for
correction:
Mission Equipment Package (MEP) Reliability--The MEP
demonstrated 53 Mean Rounds Between System Abort (MRBSA) during
the October 2007 Initial Operational Test (IOT) versus the
requirement of 81 rounds. To validate the effectiveness of
actions taken to improve MEP reliability, the Army must conduct
an operational gunnery event using qualified crews firing a
sufficient number of rounds.
Develop Long-Term Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) and
Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Solution--There has been no
change to the DOT&E assessment that the proposed Stryker
Reactive Armor Tile (SRAT II) configuration for the MGS is in
early development and the effectiveness of the SRAT II has yet
to be demonstrated. While the Army approved the plan for the
area of the vehicle to be covered by SRAT II in December 2009,
the integration of SRAT II on the MGS has not yet occurred.
Once the Army defines how SRAT II will be applied to the MGS,
the Army must conduct live fire testing to demonstrate the
tile's effectiveness in defeating RPGs and ATGMs.
Increase Gun Pod Protection Level--The Army has
eliminated the requirement that the MGS be transportable on the
C-130. Given the relief from this weight constraint, DOT&E
reiterates the recommendation that the Army increase gun pod
protection. The existing gun pod can be easily disabled, and
when that occurs the MGS is not operationally effective.
DOT&E will approve the Operational Test Plan for MEP Reliability
and a Live Fire Test and Evaluation Plan for RPG protection. All full-
up system-level survivability tests should be completed and test
results documented prior to the full-rate production decision.
ground combat vehicle and army brigade combat team modernization
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is currently in the very
earliest stages of acquisition. In preparation for a Milestone A
decision anticipated for September of this year, our office is working
closely with the Army to develop a Test and Evaluation Strategy for the
GCV program. At this point, the initial concept for GCV operational
testing consists of a Limited User Test (LUT) prior to MS C and an
Initial Operational Test (IOT) prior to the Full Rate Production
decision. The LUT would be conducted by a mechanized infantry company
with one platoon each of the two competing GCV prototypes and one
platoon of current force Bradley Fighting Vehicles. This test structure
would provide performance data to inform the source selection decision
as well as providing the basis for a performance comparison between the
GCV and the current Bradley, which the GCV is intended to replace. The
IOT would be conducted with a full mechanized infantry company
consisting of production representative GCV's.
With regards to Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization, our office
will be involved in test and evaluation of any future capability
increments to the Army Brigade Combat Team, once the Army defines the
associated acquisition strategies. Our level of involvement will be
similar to our involvement with the testing of E-IBCT Increment 1.
uh-60 blackhawk helicopter
The UH-60M Baseline aircraft completed its Initial Operational Test
(IOT) in November 2006. The IOT was a 6-week, 216 hour test conducted
by 4th Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment utilizing 5 production
aircraft. The test demonstrated the aircraft was operationally
effective, suitable, and survivable. In May 2007, DOT&E reported its
test results, and in June 2007 the aircraft was approved for full rate
production. Reports from units receiving the UH-60M Baseline confirm
DOT&E's assessment. The UH-60M Upgrade was planned as a follow-on to
the UH-60M Baseline. In January 2010, the Defense Acquisition Executive
approved the Army's request to continue UH-60M Baseline production and
not pursue production of the UH-60M Upgrade configuration. DOT&E will
continue to monitor and report on the UH-60 program.
assessment of the joint tactical radio system (jtrs) ground mobile
radio (gmr) and handheld, manpack, small form factor (hms) test plans
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack and Small
Form Fit (HMS) and Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) are schedule-driven
programs working to complete system development prior to operational
tests scheduled for November 2010. Readiness for and successful
completion of these operational tests are dependent upon the success of
developmental testing, development of supporting waveforms and network
management tools, and the completion of user requirements such as radio
network architectures and plans for network management.
The JTRS HMS program completed the Rifleman Radio Limited User Test
(LUT) in April 2009. This test highlighted deficiencies in reliability,
battery life, range and an immature Concept of Operations. The Rifleman
Radio reliability, battery life, and transmission range were each no
better than 50 percent of the user requirements. The Concept of
Operations did not provide sufficient radio discipline during combat.
The program will conduct a series of tests from April through June 2010
to verify correction of deficiencies. The results of these tests will
support a Milestone C review in August 2010. The program is scheduled
to conduct the Rifleman Radio Initial Operational Test (IOT) in
November 2010, in conjunction with the JTRS HMS Manpack LUT.
The JTRS HMS program is executing Manpack radio developmental
testing leading to the Manpack LUT in November 2010. This LUT will be
conducted in conjunction with the Rifleman Radio IOT. Completion of
planning for these tests awaits JTRS HMS Manpack user requirements.
The JTRS GMR program is experiencing an 8-month delay in
developmental testing due to late delivery of hardware and software.
Because the schedule for conducting the GMR LUT in November 2010 has
remained unchanged despite the delay in development, this shift in
schedule has reduced the time available to develop corrective actions
for deficiencies discovered during developmental testing prior to
conducting the LUT.
The JTRS GMR LUT is dependent upon the delivery of a functional
Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) and network management tools. WNW
version 3.1 demonstrated low throughput and poor message completion
rates during the April 2009 WNW 30-Node Test. The JTRS Network
Enterprise Domain (NED) has conducted production qualification testing
on JTRS WNW version 4.0.1 and has made this version available for
integration into GMR. The National Security Agency identified security
issues with WNW 4.0.1 and will reassess an updated WNW 4.0.2 for
corrections.
The JTRS GMR is a critical component of the NIK and provides
transfer of data, imagery and voice communications within the E-IBCT.
Delays in the GMR program could affect plans for fielding the E-IBCT.
The Army's ability to execute the overall JTRS test schedule
leading to the three scheduled operational tests (Rifleman Radio IOT,
Manpack LUT, and GMR LUT) in November 2010 is of great concern due to a
lack of time to address corrective actions, the dependence upon
supporting waveform and network management success, and the need to
complete user requirements.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Duma. We'll have
7-minute rounds of questions. Let me begin with a look back and
a broader look question for the four of you.
As I mentioned briefly in my opening statement, as you look
back over the last period of time the Army's largest
modernization programs have not really been successful and
stable. In some ways you have to, over the years, watch the
bouncing ball. We went from digitization to Force 21 to the
Army after next to the interim force to the objective force to
FCS and modularity.
Well, it wasn't all lost. Some things were gained from some
of those investment programs. As I said before, we have an
extraordinary Army in the field. But still I don't think it's
the desired course.
So I want to ask each of you to answer basically two
questions.
First, what do you think have been the greatest sources of
instability for the Army modernization programs over the years?
Second, essentially have we learned the lessons? Are the
current efforts underway sufficient to stabilize Army
modernization? Maybe we'll give you the first shot at that,
General Lennox.
General Lennox. Senator Lieberman, thanks. There have been
an awful lot of failed efforts in the past. My experience
really goes back to the most recent one, so I'll speak from
that if you don't mind. It's the FCS.
Senator Lieberman. Great.
General Lennox. I think what we did in that and one of the
challenges we faced in that was we overreached. We thought that
we'd rely on systems and technologies that would develop over a
certain period of time. They didn't. Their technology levels
were relatively low and I think we were counting on a series
of, not miracles, but important things to happen,
technologically, in order for that system to develop and
develop on time.
Senator Lieberman. So that's important. Excuse me for
interrupting. But are you talking about technological
overreach, not financial overreach, for instance?
General Lennox. I'm probably not experienced enough to talk
about it in these terms, sir.
Senator Lieberman. No, but the terms you're talking about
may be the decisive terms, so.
General Lennox. I think with how we're addressing that
though, in particular with the GCV is we're looking
specifically at technologies that are much more mature.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Lennox. Looking at much more of an incremental
rather than revolutionary kind of approach as we deal with the
GCV, for example.
Senator Lieberman. In other words, technologies that are
mature out in the commercial marketplace.
General Lennox. In many ways, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. General Phillips, do you want to add to
that?
General Phillips. Sir, I have just a couple of comments.
The one program that comes to mind for me is Comanche.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Phillips. What we did on the Comanche program, I
think we've learned valid lessons from that. The Army
essentially put much of its resourcing and strategy and the
growth of requirements into Comanche. Then we realized that
somewhere around 2003-2004 we made the Comanche decision and
decided to reinvest into Army aviation. I think the results of
that program today have borne great fruit for the Army and also
for Army aviators and soldiers both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We've also learned the lessons from looking at how we grow
requirements. I believe the Reno study is one of those recent
ones that has been of great value to the Army. The capability
portfolio reviews that you and Senator Thune have mentioned
have also helped us get our hands around requirements and more
to come on that.
I'll turn to contracting and acquisition reform real quick.
Some other members of the panel talk about GCV and acquisition
reform. We've heard the lessons of Congress and we are
implementing acquisition reforms within GCV and other programs
as well and also focusing on contracting and fixing contracting
within the Army as a result of the Gansler Study.
Sir, I guess that would leave it with we've heard what you
and others have said. We've taken those hard lessons and we're
working hard to apply them.
Senator Lieberman. So go back to Comanche. I appreciate
what you said about the resources that were going to be given
to Comanche being used in other ways that have been effective.
Was that a budget overreach or was that also a technological
overreach?
General Phillips. Sir, from my knowledge on the program at
that point about 2003 we had about $14 billion, just over in
the Comanche program.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Phillips. If you looked at Apache, Black Hawk,
Kiowa, and other systems, those programs didn't really have the
funding that they needed to make sure those programs were
modernized in a way that the Army could benefit from that. So
the Army, in my opinion, made the right decision. They took the
$14 billion and they put it back into those programs to include
about $2 billion into Army survivability equipment which went
directly into aircraft flying in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army looked at its requirements, holistically, and I
think made the right decision on the Comanche program to
reinvest in Army aviation.
Sir, I hope that answers your question.
Senator Lieberman. It does.
Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Duma, from your perspective being outside
the Army, how do you explain the instability in the Army
modernization programs and do you think we've learned some
lessons from it now?
Mr. Sullivan. I think General Phillips pointed out one
lesson we learned was when they terminated Comanche and used it
to upgrade existing systems. I think that was a good use of
funds. My perspective on the Comanche is it was a technological
overreach.
It was a program that started in the late 1980s and was
finally terminated in the mid-2000s as a result of not being
able to achieve the requirements they had set. Some of the
mission equipment package that they were trying to get on the
Comanche was just not achievable given the space, power,
cooling, and weight. There were a lot of contradictory
requirements there.
Senator Lieberman. From your perspective how are those, I
call them mistakes made, is it kind of too much optimism at the
outset? Reaching for too much?
Mr. Sullivan. I think what we have found consistently over
15 years of looking at these programs and I would say this now,
there does seem to be some reason for optimism with the
acquisition reforms that are in place.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. There seems to be a more serious effort in
the Pentagon today to try to achieve these. I think everybody
is feeling the budget crunches these days. But to get back to
it, I think it is optimistic. You know there's an optimistic
tone when you want to set requirements for a weapons system.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. That goes back to almost an unhealthy
competition that goes on to begin weapon systems because in
order to get a weapon system started, you have to be the best.
It has to be better than anything else that's going. It has to
be cheaper than anything else so you tend to come in with very
low, optimistic cost estimates based on very little knowledge
since it has to do so much you usually have to tie requirements
to technologies that, in some cases, haven't even been invented
yet.
So, yes, it's due to very optimistic requirements at the
outset that require technologies that haven't been invented. I
think part of that goes to all this talk about portfolios. The
overall portfolio across all three Services for major weapon
system acquisitions is today not managed very well.
I think the Secretary of Defense made some big leadership
decisions and got some attention last year. I think a lot of
the focus that you've talked about and the generals have talked
about these portfolio management exercises that are going on
now are crucial to getting that under control.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Mr. Duma, my time is up, but I'd like to hear an answer
anyway.
Mr. Duma. I think that the programs that you've described
were large and complex so when it came under a technological
problem it rippled through the program. That showed up not only
in the technological challenge but in a schedule slip and a
cost overrun. So I think technology readiness drives cost and
schedule.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Duma. I also think that once that happens the programs
get into a reactive mode and the requirements change as a
result of real world facts of where they are and they become
reactive and not carrying out a planned out event.
Senator Lieberman. Ok, those are helpful answers. My time
is up, but I'm going to come back and ask you about Secretary
Gates' 80 percent solution idea which seems to respond to some
of what all four of you said that we should be satisfied with
an 80 percent solution to a weapons system requirement rather
than continuing the chase, what I think he called exquisite
technologies that are costly, and going back to you, General
Lennox, immature.
Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, if there's no objection I'd
like to yield my place in the order to Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman. I'd like to object, but I can't take his
place. [Laughter.]
Go ahead.
Senator Inhofe. I have three very brief questions. Thank
you very much, Senator Thune.
First of all, we've heard from a lot of different sources,
I'd ask the two generals this, that there's a disagreement
between DOD and the Army about the Army's GCV. Reuters
specifically said ``U.S. Army Pentagon at odds over new
vehicle.'' Can you share with us what the disagreement is?
General Phillips. Sir, I'll answer that. I'm not aware of
any disagreement. Dr. O'Neil, who is brand new as the Army
Acquisition Executive has been here for a month or so, and I
both met with Dr. Carter. I just met with him last week and met
with Frank Kendall, his right hand, talking about GCV and the
way ahead.
I think we're in sync with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD). We have had the review back in February where
they approved through the milestone decision A to go forward
with the program.
Senator Inhofe. That's fine. You don't need to explain. I
just thought there was something you were going to share with
us there.
Second, I thought the question that Senator Lieberman was
going to ask when he started off talking about the platforms,
the armored gun system, the Comanche, then the Crusader, and
then FCS, and I've been through this. I can remember so well,
and certainly this is not a partisan thing because it was
President Bush that axed the Crusader system, right? Actually
we were in mark-up when that happened. I didn't know anything
about it, and I thought that was very bad.
Then there was the FCS, and we went through that. General
Shinseki was kind of a driver there, and that was terminated.
By the way, I heard you use two characterizations, Mr.
Sullivan. You said restructuring the FCS and modernizing FCS. I
haven't heard that before. I think that was terminated.
The question I'd ask any of you who want to answer is, why
do you think that the GCV won't meet the same fate? What is
different about this, because we don't want that to happen.
General Lennox. Senator, I'll try first. I think that the
different approach is the fact that the technological readiness
levels of what we think the GCV will look like is much more
mature than the manned ground vehicle and some of the other
things we and the other panel members have talked about. So I
think we're farther along technologically so we won't run into
surprises or as many surprises that would cost overruns and
delays.
I think additionally the approach that the acquisition team
is taking--I'll let General Phillips talk more specifically
about it but the prototyping, the multiple vendors involved, I
think that will keep us both innovative and on the right track.
So I'll pass this over to General Phillips.
General Phillips. Sir, just a couple comments I would add
to that.
Number one, we have learned from FCS and we've taken a
number of FCS technologies and we've offered that them to
industry. We're not asking the industry to really go off and
invent something. In the case of armor solutions that we might
put on a GCV we're offering what the Army and our research
scientists have already developed to be able to put into that
solution.
Sir, we've listened to acquisition reform as well. You've
heard the panel talk about the strategy going forward for the
GCV. It's in line with weapons system acquisition reform. I
think it gives the Army the greatest opportunity to execute
this program and deliver in 2017.
Senator Inhofe. Ok. I didn't mean that critically when I
said that. It was just an observation because I hadn't heard
that characterization before.
The last thing I wanted to ask about is having to do with
something that we're all familiar with or those of us who spend
some time in the field and in some of the depots and that has
to do with the vehicles left behind, the reset program. I know
it's created some home station training problems. I think
there's $10.8 billion in this budget. I think it was around $8
billion last year.
Do you think that's adequate?
Number two, do you want to say anything at all about the
reset problems that are out there?
General Lennox. First of all, I think the funding that we
have is adequate for the reset program. The depots and our Army
Materiel Commander have done a remarkable job at meeting the
demand to reset vehicles as they come back from combat. I think
we're in a period of time here where we're going to be
challenged.
Quite frankly I think it has to do with the ramp-up in
Afghanistan while we're waiting for things to ramp down in
Iraq. So they'll be a little bit of a period of time that we'll
probably have a bubble at some of our depots and some of the
capability getting the equipment through. I think that will
have a short-term impact on home station training, for example.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, and thank you, Senator
Thune.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Thanks for
your questions.
Next is Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
couple of questions.
I'm not sure you can answer this, but I want to put it on
the record and if you can answer it that would be great. I sent
a letter to Secretary Gates back on March 8. It was regarding
the adding of two combat aviation brigades and the status of
that. What is going to happen?
That's going to be made up of some assets inside Alaska as
well as the lower 48 States, obviously that concerns me a great
deal of what will happen with those assets. How will Alaska be
treated with the two combat aviation brigades and what impact
that will have on Alaska? Can you give me any update on what's
happening or not happening?
Then to be very, very parochial, what are you doing to
Alaska?
General Lennox. Those are great concerns, Senator. We
acknowledge that. The final decision hasn't been made
specifically about the 12th combat aviation brigade, where the
flag will be. But believe me the concerns of the soldiers and
the needs in Alaska are a big part of that decision.
We have to make sure that we have the right kind of
aviation there to conduct training to respond to the Governor
and the Homeland Defense needs in the State. I think when the
final decision is made, you'll see that those concerns were
addressed.
Senator Begich. I appreciate that. I know there are some
impacts and we recognize the restructuring that's going on and
the efforts. But you know better than I do the important
strategic component of the position of where Alaska is and some
of its assets especially up in the Fairbanks region, Fort
Wainwright area.
As you move forward, we want to be kept well in tune to
what's going on, but also the timetable is, to us, important to
understand that. But it seems every time I hear about this
there's always no decision yet which to be very frank, makes me
nervous. Because then someday I might be in some meeting and
the decision is made, and I don't know about it, so if you
could keep us well informed.
I understand through your own documents and work that the
importance has been laid out of the strategic location of
Alaska with these units. I just want to make sure that's all
part of the equation when finally decided.
General Lennox. Senator, I can assure you that that is
absolutely part of the equation, that and the fact that we have
to get the soldiers there that are deploying trained and ready
and integrated with aviation. It's all part of the factors.
Senator Begich. Excellent. We really haven't talked about
this yet, on the industrial base of what we're doing and what
we're not doing in certain components to support the military
mission. Last year, Congress provided to the Secretary of
Defense the authority to expand a small arms production
industrial base.
Can you give me just any update of what's happening, and
what's not happening there? My issue is that it's for
everything from small arms to large facilities. As we're
constantly restructuring and we have financial constraints,
what are we doing to make sure the industrial base is still
strong enough to support that which we need to do in a
competitive nature?
Can you respond to this? Specifically on the small arms
end, if you want to expand and be broader that's fine with me.
General Lennox. I'll start, Senator. In the area in
particular for us and force a critical concern the way ahead.
I'm sure you're familiar with the fact that we're taking a two-
prong approach to addressing the M-4.
Senator Begich. Right.
General Lennox. That's both incrementally improving the
capability we have today and then we're going to compete a new
requirement for a carbine in the future. As with almost every
other area we do, the industrial base is a concern, especially
in these kind of key capabilities. So I think that will be a
factor in the decision.
General Phillips. Sir, I agree. I would only add a couple
of things. A healthy industrial base within the United States
is incredibly important because without that I don't think we
would be able to provide that world class equipment to our
soldiers that are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan in
particular.
General Lennox just hit the nail on the head. The M-4 and
the industrial bases for small arms are incredibly important. I
would add munitions to that as well.
Senator Begich. That's a good point.
General Phillips. Because without the munitions and the
industrial base that supports that we wouldn't have the
ammunition that our soldiers and servicemembers need in the
field. We're going to work hard to sustain and to keep that
capability for our Nation and for our servicemembers.
Senator Begich. Will there be an opportunity, I don't know
if it's through your office or even from GAO, is there some
process that you'll be able to report back to this subcommittee
on where you are and if you're having success to maintain that?
Because again this is something you just can't turn on a dime
and turn it back on. If it's starting to degrade or diminish it
becomes a bigger problem down the road.
Is there a process you have implemented or will you
implement to keep us informed on how you're moving forward?
Maybe I just asked for that process, I'm not sure.
General Phillips. Yes, sir. I would answer like this. We
team with the Defense Contract Management Agency who sustains
or has the ability to look at the industrial base.
Senator Begich. Ok.
General Phillips. To come back to DOD, because they serve
under DOD and then eventually, I would assume, report to
Congress on the health of that industrial base. Working through
our Defense Contract Management Agency partners, I think we
could, as we see gaps in the industrial base, come back and
make sure that Congress and DOD are aware of that.
Senator Begich. That would be great. I appreciate that.
Does GAO do any kind of analysis on industrial base? I'm just
curious.
Mr. Sullivan. We have some teams that look at things like
that. We don't have any one looking at this particular thing,
but it's something we can talk to your staff about.
Senator Begich. Ok, that would be great. Thank you. Thank
you very much.
Thank you very much for your ability to comment on these
questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the Army
is developing a suite of systems for the infantry including a
robot, a UAV, digital radios, and wireless sensors that are
collectively called increment 1. Mr. Duma, in your written
testimony you state that the liability desired for increment 1
is not achievable by the time of the operational test without
an extensive redesign. I'd be interested in knowing, General
Lennox and General Phillips, do you agree or disagree with this
assessment?
General Lennox. Senator Thune, we've looked at this
extensively too. First of all we agree completely with the
assessment that's been done. This is an assessment of the test
that the Army had set up last September. We put the equipment
in the hands of some soldiers hopeful to find these kinds of
things: Can they shake out? Do they meet requirements? In this
case, many of them failed and they failed in a variety of
different ways.
The minute that test was over the PM started to work on a
path that had improved the systems. I'll let General Phillips
talk to you about some of those specifics. But we're starting
to see the improvements show up.
For example, during last year's test, we used a pre-
engineering design model radio, the GMR. Now the engineering
design model radio is being fielded to soldiers at Fort Bliss.
There were problems with the robot. You throw it through a
window and the robot would break. The robot has now been
replaced with titanium in certain parts of it. It's much more
durable.
I think what we're asking for is the patience to test this
again. It's in the hands of soldiers. They're the ones that
will tell us whether or not this works or not.
When we talked to the brigade commander, he said we would
take two of the systems today. If we're going to war today,
we'd take the Class 1 UAV, the hovering vertical UAV and we'd
take that small robot. The other ones, we'd like to see some
more work done.
I think what we're asking for is the patience to let us
keep that in the hands of soldiers. Keep working along our time
and the trust and confidence that we won't do the wrong thing
if it doesn't measure up; just like the other systems that
didn't measure up. We won't put any soldiers in jeopardy by
putting this in their hands.
We think the risk of putting soldiers in jeopardy is very,
very low by continuing this process.
Senator Thune. General Phillips, do you see the Army
redesigning any of the systems in that increment?
General Phillips. Sir, that's certainly the potential. But
I'd like to just reiterate, sir. We totally agree with GAO and
DOT&E. We've taken the results of the limited user test in
September 2009 and learned from those lessons. We have 100
percent of the reliability issues that came out of that Limited
User Test (LUT) and we're implementing them in fixes.
I would just add that about 10 days ago I went out to Fort
Bliss with the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, General
Chiarelli. He and I sat and watched soldiers using the systems.
The Class 1 UAV in particular we saw one soldier that had flown
over 100 flight hours with the Class 1 system and said he would
take it in the theater today.
So, sir, I would simply say the Army has taken this very
seriously. I'll reiterate what General Casey said, ``We're not
going to field one system that is not effective for our
soldiers in theater. If it doesn't meet the mission, sir, we're
not going to field it. It means that we go out and find
something different, then we'll go out and seek the right
solution to give our soldiers the right capabilities.''
So, sir, I agree with your question.
Senator Thune. Mr. Sullivan, in your written testimony you
indicated that increment 1 may not meet the most important
justification for its acquisition. You seem to doubt that it
will meet warfighter needs. I would ask you if you could
elaborate on some of those concerns.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, I think one of the things that we look
at is they just went through acquisition reform and
reestablished a lot of really good policies for establishing a
business case for the warfighter which really includes that
that's at a time when you go and you meet with your customer.
You say, ``how many do you need and when do you need them?''
That usually happens at milestone B before you start
development.
It's a solid business case that's based on knowledge. Where
the Army is right now on increment 1 is they're at milestone C
which is really entering in the production much later than when
that business case should be set. What you have now is a
loosening of the policy, so to speak, to say the business case
is this. We have a certain amount of money. We're far along on
some of these, not on all. But we will deliver you what we can
get to you.
The business case was we're going to deliver all these
things within a certain period of time. If the warfighter
understands that all those things aren't going to be delivered,
I guess that's ok. But it wasn't the deal that was made
originally according to policy.
So I guess our take on it right now is they're not
following the tenants of their basic policies on increment 1
specifically at this point.
Senator Thune. Do either one of you gentlemen want to
respond to that?
General Phillips. Sir, I would simply say that once again
we're not going to field something that's not ready. If one of
those increments, like the unmanned ground sensors, isn't ready
then we're not going to ask to take that and field that to our
soldiers. We're going to look for the right solutions.
Sir, I would also add that we just started the third year
of a 4-year test. We've done limited user tests last year. We
learned a lot from that. GAO and DOT&E have helped us
understand that better.
We're implementing those fixes. The technical test is
ongoing right now out at Fort Bliss. We will do another limited
user test in the August/September timeframe. We will learn from
that as we drive toward another milestone decision to buy more
of these increments.
So, we're still going through the test-fix-test scenario to
make sure that we can get these systems right to include the
network that General Lennox described as being so important to
the sensors and for situational awareness. Again, we're not
going to field something that's not ready.
Senator Thune. One element of the Army modernization is the
NLOS launch system referred to informally as rockets-in-a-box.
The Army briefing document suggests the cost of each of these
launch systems during low rate, initial production (LRIP) will
be about $466,000. General Phillips and General Lennox, could
you have concerns about the affordability of this system?
General Lennox. Senator, the short answer is: yes. It's
very expensive. It's part of our capability portfolio reviews
right now. We're looking at it in light of the limited user
test where it failed to hit four times out of six.
So we're taking it very seriously. We're looking at the
cost and benefit of it right now.
Senator Thune. Is the Army considering other technologies
as alternatives to that? There are some other ones, I'm told,
Excalibur artillery rounds, guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System rockets that also deliver precision munitions. Are those
things that would be alternatives or options?
General Lennox. That's exactly the purpose of the portfolio
review, sir. We're going through and saying, ``What gap does
this fill?'' Then we're looking at the cost of it and looking
at the benefit for soldiers. That's exactly the process we're
going through.
Senator Thune. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it was
General Phillips in your opening statement, in response to a
question, you mentioned that we needed a healthy industrial
base as well as a healthy munitions base. I think those are
extremely important and not only for our Nation, but certainly
for our servicemembers. So I appreciate those comments.
We are also discussing how in April of last year Secretary
Gates directed the Army to cancel the vehicle component of the
FCS program, reevaluate the requirements for technology and
approach, and then relaunch the Army's vehicle modernization
program. General Phillips, I was wondering as part of the
Army's next-generation infantry fighting vehicle development,
has consideration been given to the inclusion of fuel-
efficient, hybrid-engine technology in an effort to reduce the
petroleum demands when we're operating in these other
environments?
General Phillips. Yes, ma'am, great question. That is a key
concern for that program, but also for the Army as a whole.
When you look at Afghanistan and Iraq and the fuel requirements
that it takes to support our Armed Forces and in this vehicle
in particular we have a key performance parameter (KPP) that is
associated with energy efficiency.
So how can we drive efficiency inside the vehicle to get
the greatest mileage per ton for the fuel that it will use?
We're asking industry to take a look at that and propose
innovative solutions to drive fuel efficiency inside the
program.
Ma'am, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) has a
similar requirement, not a KPP, but it has a requirement for
fuel efficiency. It's called tons per mile. For that system in
particular, which is still going through technology
development, we are working with industry partners, to be able
to put energy efficiency inside that vehicle, because I think
that's going to be important to the Army in the future.
With our Army Materiel Command partners, General Dunwoody,
underneath materiel enterprise, we do look at our industrial
base very strongly. That should have been a part of my answer
earlier as well.
Senator Hagan. When you were talking about the KPP and the
vehicle, what's been done so far? Are you seeing any progress
at this point? Is anything out there that needs to be tested?
General Phillips. Ma'am, under GCV we have not gotten any
feedback from industry. The request for proposal is still on
the street. We expect industry to come back to us at the end of
this month with some of those answers.
The source selection process for the JLTV, it's really a
good news story. The threshold requirement is 60 tons per mile.
That sounds like a strange requirement, but that's tons per
mile depending on how big the vehicle might be. Industry has
shown already with variance we can achieve beyond even the
objective requirement around 76 tons per mile.
So we think that we have an opportunity to increase the
energy efficiency of our vehicles.
Senator Hagan. Along those same lines when we're talking
about energy efficiency, how about mobile alternative power
systems? As the Army moves forward with its modernization
program it's apparent that the proliferation of electronic
equipment that you've been talking about, communication
systems, and robotic platforms increases the Army's reliance
upon deployable power systems. My question is what research and
development programs and initiatives are included as part of
the Army's modernization program that will address an
increasing reliance upon petroleum fuel supplies?
General Lennox. We're looking at each other to see who
could do a better job at answering that, Senator.
Senator Hagan. You got it.
General Lennox. I'm not sure either of us will be that
good. We may have to take this for the record, if my answer
doesn't apply. It's very critical and we're looking at it in a
number of different ways.
For the GCV, for example, it's very, very important that we
build the capability for growth. It seems like we never get
less power or we never end up with extra power on a vehicle. We
always seem to grow and expand to absorb all the capability of
that vehicle and then more. We're in that condition of a number
of different vehicles.
We're also looking at systems that can reduce the demand on
the vehicle using a network integration kit that we have it
four-plus now in a very preliminary fashion. But later on,
hopefully that will help us reduce routers and reduce
interfaces and things like that. So with industry's help we
might be able to reduce the demand on the given vehicle today.
Now I don't think that gets to your answer on the mobile
capabilities unless you have something?
General Phillips. Ma'am, I just have one other area to add
and that would be in soldiers. When we look at soldiers and
what weight they carry is important. For mobile power and
batteries that our soldiers are carrying on the equipment and
the systems, we are looking for industry.
I know we're looking at that. I don't have any specific
answers for you today. We'll get back with you. But we're
looking at ways to reduce the amount of pounds that soldiers
carry and a piece of that is batteries to power the systems on
the soldier.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Managing energy supply and demand is critical to sustaining Army
readiness. Recognizing this challenge, the Army's science and
technology community is actively researching a broad range of
technologies to improve energy efficiencies, reduce energy demand, and
provide alternative or renewable energy sources. Our goal is to reduce
the risks associated with energy supply and demand while maintaining
needed operational capabilities.
Ongoing efforts include the development of light-weight structural
materials, armor, and composites. These efforts not only reduce the
overall vehicle weight, but they also result in better fuel efficiency
and allow for more technologies to be incorporated. These incorporated
technologies can include high efficiency energy storage, efficient
motors, exportable power, reliable power, and thermal management system
for ultimate application in hybrid vehicles. The Army is also
evaluating a number of currently fielded engines for their ability to
perform in an operational environment while using alternative fuels.
While these fuels alone are not expected to increase the vehicles fuel
efficiency, their widespread use could reduce the Army's overall
dependence on petroleum.
Additionally, the Army currently has applied research programs
leveraging fuel cell technology for both ground vehicle and soldier
applications. Fuel cell research programs in ground vehicle
applications include JP-8 reformation for a hydrogen rich fuel source
and fuel cell component development and integration. Research in fuel
cell technology for soldier power includes systems based on proton
exchange membranes, solid oxide, direct methanol, and reformed methanol
technologies.
The Army is investing in promising basic research in a number of
fundamental technology areas that may result in increased fuel
efficiencies. This research is in areas such as the conversion of
cellulosic materials into hydrocarbons, understanding the chemical
kinetics of hydrocarbon combustion, spray and combustion diagnostics,
and new hydrocarbon spray methodologies. These basic research
investments have the potential to enable the use of alternative fuels
and ultimately improve gas mileage.
In addition to work related to fuel efficiency, the Army also has
investments in both solar power and battery technologies. Solar
technology investments include work on solar array efficiency (to get
increased power output) and light weight and flexible materials to
build solar arrays that are easier for soldiers to carry. Battery
research is focused on new chemistries, materials, and designs to
extend operational temperature ranges, improve recharge rates, and
increase the number of recharge cycles.
Senator Hagan. I just got back from Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan while we were over there. They certainly do carry
quite a bit.
The Stryker vehicle has a planned procurement of nearly
4,000 vehicles with, I understand, probably about 80 percent of
those vehicles having been delivered by January of this year.
Reports indicate that the newly designed double-V hull being
integrated into the current vehicle platform has the potential
to provide MRAP-level protection against the improvised
explosive devices.
General Phillips, can the existing fleet of Stryker
vehicles be retrofitted with the double-V hull? If you think
that's a good idea, what's the projected cost associated with
refurbishing the fleet? Are there plans underway to execute
this upgrade?
While I was in Afghanistan we actually had the opportunity
to go in a Stryker, go to a forward-operating base and actually
go out with the soldiers. It was very interesting for me.
General Phillips. Ma'am, great question. I would start to
answer this way. There's been 12 rotations of Stryker to Iraq
and Afghanistan and they put over 24,000 miles on those
vehicles. It is an extraordinary capability that helps our
soldiers in their BCT.
I hope I answer your question correctly. We cannot take the
current Stryker vehicle and retrofit it with a double-V hull.
It is a brand new hull.
As we build this vehicle, it will come off the production
line from our industry partner as a brand new hull. Then we can
put the equipment back on it, much of that will be currently in
existence. We're optimistic about what that hull might do to
provide added protection for our soldiers. But before we invest
in the production dollars in a significant way, we want to make
sure that we work with our DOT&E partners and our test
community to understand what level of protection it does
provide.
Our initial simulation and some shots that we've done
already with the basic hull gives us a certain level of
confidence that it will protect us up to an MRAP-like
capability. But the test that we will conduct with U.S. Army
Test and Evaluation Command, our test community, and DOT&E will
inform us that it does provide this level of protection up to
MRAP, potentially higher, potentially lower. We'll be very
disciplined as we make that decision, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. My time is up. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Hagan. Good
questions. We'll do a second round of 5 minutes each as the
members want to stay.
Mr. Sullivan, I want to draw you out a little bit on your
feelings about the increased risk that you believe result from
the Army's decision to go with the LRIP of the EIBCT, increment
1 at this point. Talk a little bit more about what your
specific concerns are. Then I'm going to ask the Army to
respond.
Mr. Sullivan. The concerns that we look at have to do with
following the rules. One of them is, when you have a business
case that establishes a set delivery time and number of
quantities of things to deliver and you're spending money that
has been budgeted to do that, $682 million will be budgeted
this year.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. To accomplish increment 1, you're basically
spending money on all of these things you may not be able to
deliver. If the warfighter needs the capability and that has
been established then that's the deal more or less. This is a
case where these are spin-outs.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. From a program that had a lot going on. I
don't know how much the warfighter has weighed in since they
terminated FCS and started this up. But that's the thing, the
warfighter is expecting increment 1 brigade equipment that is
the six or seven things that they've outlined here and they may
not get them. So there's risk there.
Senator Lieberman. Is the concern you have about the fact
that we're putting a lot of money in, and the systems are not
going to be able to be delivered on time, ready on time, or are
not going to be able to be purchasable on time, or is it that
they are going to arrive and they're not going to be up to what
the warfighter needs?
Mr. Sullivan. I think both of those things.
Senator Lieberman. Both.
Mr. Sullivan. I think there's risk. There's risk that
you're losing the bang for the buck.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. You're investing a set amount of money, and
you may not get what you asked for in the end. Therefore, it
becomes more expensive. The reliability testing that they did
most recently showed that some of these may not be deliverable.
I don't know. There's still too much risk in knowing
whether they'll ever be deliverable. I think that they've now
done a technology readiness assessment on the components in
increment 1 that the program had set at somewhere around a TRL-
6 or -7 which means ready to go.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. The science and technology community went in
and looked at that and they reset some of those technology
maturities at TRL-4 which means still being invented.
Senator Lieberman. So what would you do if you were
Secretary of the Army today with this program?
Mr. Sullivan. I would probably establish a business case
based on the knowledge of what I could deliver today.
I would ask the warfighter if that were acceptable; if
there's an urgent need.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. If we can deliver it, we'll get it to you.
Senator Lieberman. So in other words, you'd acquire fewer
now because you don't have that full confidence.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. I think right now you could set a
business case for what you know you'll be able to deliver and
spend money on that.
Senator Lieberman. General Phillips or General Lennox, why
don't you respond?
General Phillips. Sir, I'll start first and then let
General Lennox weigh in. I want to assure you and the
subcommittee that we are following the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR). It's a FAR-based contract.
The oversight of the EIBCTs is from the Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Dr. Carter.
He has provided us the authority today for one brigade set.
That's what we're buying to make sure that we can do the
testing and determine what the reliability standards are.
We haven't gone through an IOT&E yet. We still have that to
do with one more limited user test as we drive toward that
decision point. So I think the Army's position is this is a key
part of our modernization strategy.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Phillips. I would just add that it's important for
the EIBCT and Bill Phillips, speaking from my time being in
acquisition, this is a great opportunity for the Army to really
provide the EIBCT a significant capability over what they have
today.
A network sensor capability that provides soldiers all the
way up to the brigade commander the ability to see the
battlefield, to have true situational awareness and to increase
their combat capability. But, sir, I assure you that I believe
we're following the rules as set out by Dr. Carter, OSD, and
others.
Senator Lieberman. Go ahead, General.
General Lennox. Sir, I just wanted to address the concern
about, have the warfighters asked for this?
When the FCS program was terminated last spring, we asked
the Training and Doctrine Command to do an assessment based on
lessons learned in combat. What kinds of capabilities we ought
to put in these capability packages? They undertook that study
over last summer.
They presented to us in the fall a series of items that
they thought were both beneficial and technologically mature
enough to be spun out to the EIBCTs. That was our basis. But,
the best way I think to determine that these systems are ready
is putting them in hands of soldiers and letting them play with
this kind of equipment, evaluate it, and tell us what works and
what doesn't work in a series of tests and let them help us
make the decision.
As we mentioned earlier, two systems in particular they
said they'd take to war today, the Class 1 UAV and the small
robot. With the improvements they may choose other ones, but I
think we've learned as a result of this process whether or not
these are really valued by soldiers.
Senator Lieberman. That's a really interesting answer
because in a way it's a variant on Secretary Gates' 80 percent
solution. I don't know whether part of the problem here is that
the Army wanted 100 percent and maybe should have settled for
80 percent. But I think you're saying you have confidence,
General Lennox, that these systems are good enough that if you
put them in the field the warfighter will tell the manufacturer
essentially how to make them good enough to meet their needs.
General Lennox. Put them in the field for test purposes,
Senator. Not in combat yet.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Lennox. They're not ready for that.
But allow us to mature them in the hands of soldiers and
find out if they are or not. They'll sink or swim on their own.
Senator Lieberman. Right, thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, if I could, just to follow up on
that.
Senator Lieberman. Please.
Mr. Sullivan. I think that's a good strategy during
development, but they are in procurement with these now.
I think that's the risk that we're talking about is they're
spending dollars to procure the items when they're still trying
to understand the growth of the reliability.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, understood. I know, Mr. Duma, the
DOT&E did not agree that increment 1 provided an increased
operational capability. Am I right?
Mr. Duma. That was very difficult to determine because the
LUT that occurred last September was a company and scout
platoon level LUT. That was a small scale test. The LUT that we
are going to do this September will involve two companies and a
scout platoon so you will see comparisons able to be made on
the distances that are operationally realistic that we could
not look at in the initial LUT.
For instance, the communications distances that we looked
at were small and the soldiers were able to do things with the
equipment that they won't be able to do in the LUT in September
because it's more realistic to what they'll find in theater. So
there are some comparisons that we will be able to make in this
summer's LUT that we were unable to do there. So to say that
shows a measureable improvement over what we have, that was not
available to be determined last year. It will be part of the
assessment this summer.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duma, I want to come back to the Stryker for just a
moment. The industry claims to have already conducted its own
testing on this double-V hull. My question is, did that testing
provide sufficient data, in your judgment, for the Army to make
a decision about production?
Mr. Duma. Certainly not for production. I'm not aware of
what that data looks like personally. However, industry often
does things under research and development in their own
companies and proposes something to the military. That's a
typical way to approach and provide a technological upgrade to
the system.
That's exactly where the Army is right now in my opinion.
There's a theory that this is going to help. That needs to be
verified. That's exactly the case that the Army is in right now
to procure some vehicles with the double-V hull protection and
then to evaluate the performance through Army testing.
Senator Thune. General, do you want to add to that?
General Phillips. We agree. We have not asked for
production. But we have asked for long lead items associated
with production. We've asked for a number of vehicles to go out
to procure in order to do the testing that was just described.
If it does not provide the protection that we think it will
for our soldiers that are going into battle, we don't want to
procure this vehicle. The testing that we'll do in the next
several months will answer that question, sir.
Senator Thune. If that testing is successful, will all the
future Strykers have it?
General Lennox. Senator, our plan is to build one brigade
aimed at Afghanistan. Put that brigade in theater-provided
equipment and then rotate, and have enough equipment for
soldiers to train on back here and then rotate in on that one
brigade set of equipment as of right now. Because as General
Phillips mentioned, this is a complete new build. It's not
something that you retroactively fit to our existing Strykers.
Senator Thune. Right.
General Lennox. It will be something that we're going to
have to make our decision on in the future.
If I could go back to one of the testing comments. Our key
concern is for those soldiers in Afghanistan today and getting
the right amount of testing to make sure we're not harming
soldiers in any way, but at the same time not testing until
every question is answered so that you can get it in the hands
of those soldiers. Our goal is to put it in the hands of the
soldiers that will be rotating in during the summer of 2011.
There's going to have to be some really good planning and
team work here between the testing community to have the
equipment in the hands of soldiers so they can train with it
sufficiently; maybe go through evaluations before they deploy.
Senator Thune. Ok. I think everybody probably on the panel
today is aware that body armor is one of the most closely
watched budget items on Capitol Hill. The Army's interceptor
system has been thoroughly tested and upgraded and has saved
countless lives I think to the credit of the program officer,
Brigadier General Fuller and DOT&E for their good work which
has ensured that the best products have been delivered to our
troops.
The question I have has to do with section 141 of the 2010
NDAA, which requires that body armor be budgeted for in
discreet research and procurement accounts so that Congress can
ensure that sufficient resources are being put toward improving
body armor. That being said, the President's 2011 budget
request contains funding for body armor in a lump sum
operations and maintenance account which effectively limits the
ability of Congress to conduct oversight. Are we reading that
2011 budget material correctly, and could you explain or add
some perspective to that?
General Lennox. Yes, Senator. We took the direction very
clearly that we need to do that. That came out after the Army
had finished their program for 2011. We submitted our program
to OSD in the June/July timeframe last year. The law came out
afterward.
We're taking that very seriously. I think you'll see that
in the submission for 2012.
Senator Thune. Ok. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. My understanding is that the Army has
received, at least from the 1/25 Stryker brigade in Alaska, an
urgent operation need for the Land Warrior or some additional
equipment.
If you could give me an update on what's happening with the
Land Warrior and the Ground Soldier System, where we are in
this transition or not transitioning. We have folks that are
going to be deployed in June who are now nervous a little bit.
So help me understand where we are.
General Lennox. Thank you, Senator. The Land Warrior system
is a program that was killed several years ago.
Senator Begich. Correct.
General Lennox. Because of operational needs statements, we
fielded it with several brigades and the intent really is to
assess it and see how it informs our program of record, the
Ground Soldier System. We have fielded it with a number of
units.
I'll take that for the record, what the status is for the
brigade that's in Alaska right now. I believe it's getting
fielded with a retrofitted set, not a complete brand new one.
Frankly, we've probably bought all the Land Warrior systems
that we need today in order to assess it and give us guidance
for the future as of this time.
Senator Begich. I would like to get, for the record, what's
going to happen. They're planning to deploy in June of this
year. So, if you could get that, that would be fantastic.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army's objective for fielding materiel solutions in support of
Operational Needs Statements is to get the equipment to units in
sufficient time to train first with it a home station before
deployment. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), has not
formally received a Land Warrior Operational Needs Statement from 1/25
Stryker Brigade Combat Team. We understand that the request is
currently being reviewed by U.S. Army Central Command. If approved, it
would then be forwarded to HQDA for validation of the requirement.
Approval of this requirement is projected to occur in approximately 90
days.
Specific units have not yet been identified for the Ground Soldier
System fielding beginning in fiscal year 2012.
Senator Begich. Mr. Chairman, that's all I really have
except one general question. It seems like as we've walked
through today there's been some good discussion on some of the
systems that have gone through testing as well as some that
have had some problems in the testing process. What do you do
in the organizational structure when you have a system that has
had cost overruns or questionable testing that's not working as
well as you thought?
What happens to the people who are managing those programs
that are under your command or whose ever command? I know in
the private sector what would happen, but tell me how it works
in your system?
General Phillips. The first thing that we would do is do
the forensics on the program itself. We would probably bring in
a team to take a look at why that program is in the status that
it is today. We have a number of venues where we continue to
look at programs, Army systems acquisition review councils.
We have milestone decision sessions with OSD Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics and we have configuration steering
boards. Much of that comes out of the WSARA that we do today.
We have capability portfolio reviews that continue to look at
the performance of our programs. It relates to three areas:
cost, schedule, and performance.
We have to do the forensics to figure out what happened
because the individual that's in charge of that program, it may
have been completely out of their control. It may have been
something related to technology that never could have been
developed. So the system was never able to reach its milestone.
So it's difficult to say what would happen to the people
inside the program. They may be managing that program to the
best extent that they possibly could. They were not able to
execute the program.
I would also argue that part of the paradigm that we need
to look at inside the Army is some of the most successful
people that are program managers are those that are managing
the most challenging programs that may have cost, schedule, and
performance issues. I'm going to work on my time in the Army as
a part of acquisition reform. How do we manage that inside our
Army related to those three things--cost, schedule, and
performance--and how are our people inside our programs
executing along that strategy.
I hope that answers your question.
Senator Begich. It does in general. Do you feel if you see
personnel needs, that is, needs in the sense of change, that
the support is there within the system to do that in a rapid
pace?
An example I give only because every time I come to this
room we're dealing with Airland and some other things, and F35s
was Tuesday. That was a dramatic change in personnel in order
to move forward.
I want to hear from you that when it's necessary to make
those changes you can do them and you get the support to do it
because if you don't make those changes it just perpetuates the
problem into the future if it's a personnel issue.
General Phillips. Sir, very good question. I want to say
this before I answer your question. There are extraordinary
people that are managing our programs. Our acquisition
workforce I would put up against anybody in any Service because
they are doing extraordinary work. I've been a part of this
acquisition work since 1985, and I'm proud to lead them.
To answer your question, we have made changes and when it
is quite evident that we have people that aren't executing
their programs, and I won't give examples.
Senator Begich. No, I'm not asking that.
General Phillips. But I've been in the job for 75 days and
we have made a number of changes in personnel related to
program execution. We take that very seriously because that's
our contract with the Army and with our soldiers to deliver
that equipment.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Begich. Thanks for
bringing up the Land Warrior program. I'm proud to say that I
believe it was this subcommittee that brought the program back
from the dead. We really believed in it in a totally bipartisan
basis. I'm glad you're using it and continuing to test its
utility. It's really a remarkable combination of capabilities
for the individual soldier.
Thanks to all of you. It's been a very useful hearing. I
appreciate the dialogue between you in good spirit, maybe you
set an example for the Senators here. You can disagree without
having partisan attacks against one another. [Laughter.]
The record of this hearing shall be held open until
Tuesday, April 20, at 5 p.m., to allow Senators to submit
additional statements or questions for our witnesses.
I would ask our witnesses to respond in as timely a way as
they can, about a month from now maybe a little bit more. I
know that Chairman Levin and Senator McCain intend to go to
full committee markup, so the sooner the better.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I think that Senator Begich,
in a very diplomatic way, was asking if anybody ever gets
fired. [Laughter.]
But thank you all very much for being here today.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
acquisition process
1. Senator Burris. Lieutenant General Lennox, Lieutenant General
Phillips, and Mr. Duma, the Secretary of Defense has stated that the
Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition goal is to ``get the
acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.'' However, the Army has
made a decision to proceed with low-level production of increment 1
systems that are not ready, in the name of getting equipment to the
warfighter quickly. It appears that equipping policy goals and your
acquisition policy goals are not aligned. Have you or do you plan to
revise your policies, regulations, or priorities to better align them
within the Army and with those of DOD?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The Army and DOD policies
concerning equipping and acquisition are aligned and we do not
anticipate revising policies, regulations, or priorities. The Army
recognizes the goals of equipping and acquisition policies and believe
that they are synchronized to provide our soldiers with the best
materiel solution when the systems are ready for fielding. Therefore,
while the Milestone Decision Authority has authorized production of the
increment 1 systems in accordance with the deliberate acquisition
procedures in DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, the Army may field systems that are proven and
verified by testing in concert with Army Test and Evaluation Command.
We pursue a rapid process to identify emerging technologies and systems
and field them quickly to support soldiers engaged in current
operations. We need to stay responsive to the immediate requirements
that continue to emerge from the field. We will continue to identify
those situations where we can accelerate the fielding of certain
systems to give our soldiers every advantage in ongoing operations.
Mr. Duma. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
will continue to adhere to the existing statutory and DOD regulatory
direction in the conduct of our test and evaluation oversight
responsibilities. DOT&E reports objectively and independently to the
Secretary of Defense and Congress its evaluations of the results of
operational and live-fire testing. DOT&E does not set acquisition
policy nor does it evaluate whether decisions made by acquisition or
other officials are aligned with policy.
stryker double-v hull vehicles
2. Senator Burris. Mr. Duma, from your written statement, it looks
as though DOD believes the Stryker Double-V Hull vehicle shows some
promise. You are working with the Army to develop a test plan. When do
you expect the test plan to be complete?
Mr. Duma. The Army presented their concept for testing the Stryker
Double-V Hull on May 3, 2010. In accordance with the Acquisition
Defense Memorandum dated April 6, 2010, the Army Test and Evaluation
Command (ATEC) will submit a completed test plan by June 1, 2010.
3. Senator Burris. Mr. Duma, how long do you anticipate testing
will take?
Mr. Duma. Duration of testing is dependent on the availability and
arrival of production representative prototypes from the contractor.
Based on the schedule presented to DOT&E during the test concept brief,
I anticipate testing on ballistic hulls to begin in July 2010. Testing
on full prototypes is expected to begin in October 2010 and is planned
to be completed by ATEC by May 2011.
4. Senator Burris. Mr. Duma, when will this system be ready for
fielding?
Mr. Duma. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army
determine the readiness for fielding. Depending upon the availability
of the agreed-upon test assets, DOT&E could provide an assessment of
the survivability characteristics of the Stryker Double-V Hull, as well
as the ability of units to accomplish combat missions using the Stryker
Double-V Hull, to the Secretaries as early as June 2011.
managed ground vehicles
5. Senator Burris. Lieutenant General Lennox and Lieutenant General
Phillips, part of the revision of the Future Combat System program
included the cancellation of the planned Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV).
Do you have a plan for recapitalization of combat vehicles that the
cancelled MGVs were intended to replace, such as the M-11 Abrams tank,
M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and M-109 Paladin?
General Lennox and General Phillips. The Army does not currently
have a plan for recapitalization of combat vehicles that the cancelled
MGVs were intended to replace. The M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, as a result of investments during the period fiscal
years 2006-2012, have been recapitalized to the latest configurations,
and will, by fiscal year 2013, have an average fleet age of 3.5 and 4.5
years respectively. The Army is, however, currently evaluating its
Combat Vehicle Fleet requirements as part of the ongoing Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and the Vice Chief of
Staff Army's GCV Portfolio Review. Future decisions on recapitalization
for current systems are dependent on the results of these reviews.
6. Senator Burris. Lieutenant General Lennox and Lieutenant General
Phillips, do these vehicles meet the Army's needs now and in the
foreseeable future?
General Lennox and General Phillips. Existing combat vehicles such
as the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley meet the Army's current warfighting
needs. However, we remain proactive in our analysis and planning to
ensure the Abrams and Bradley continue to provide our soldiers the best
possible lethality and protection against an adaptive enemy in the
Irregular/Hybrid Combat Operations anticipated as the most likely
national security environment for the next decade. In this regard, Army
modernization planning is focused on standardizing the Heavy Brigade
Combat Team (BCT), by end of fiscal year 2013, with the two most modern
variants of the Abrams Tank and the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle.
For the future Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Army is designing a
new GCV. The GCV will provide a versatile range of capabilities,
including the under-belly protection offered by mine resistant ambush
protected vehicle, the off-road mobility and side protection of the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the urban and operational mobility of the
Stryker. The GCV's development approach enables production of the first
vehicle by fiscal year 2017, while establishing a basis from which to
adapt.
The Stryker combat vehicle has performed brilliantly in combat.
Eight of the 10 Stryker variants are in full rate production (FRP) and
the remaining two, the Stryker-Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance Vehicle has completed Milestone C and the Stryker Mobile
Gun System is expected to meet Milestone C FRP in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2011. The Army is executing a Stryker modernization program
as an integrated solution to provide survivability upgrades, synergy-
size, weight, power mitigation, and future technologies integration in
two increments.
The M109A6 Paladin Howitzer is currently being upgraded as part of
the Paladin Integrated Management program. This program provides a low-
risk and affordable life-cycle solution that addresses obsolescence and
ensures long-term sustainment of the system through 2050.
Ultimately our finals plans for manned GCVs will be informed by the
ongoing GCV AoA and the Vice Chief of Staff, Army's GCV Portfolio
Review. Both of these efforts are paramount to scoping and integrating
our current combat vehicle modernization efforts, such as for the
Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and Paladin, with the development and
production of the GCV.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
carbines
7. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, the Army has briefed
Congress on a dual-path strategy of upgrading and enhancing the M4
carbine while also completing a new requirement for the eventual
replacement of the M4. While I am pleased there is a plan, I am
disappointed that so little progress has been made on either the
upgrade or the new weapon. It has been, for example, more than 18
months since then-Secretary Geren directed the development of a new
requirement. My understanding at the time was that the Secretary
directed that the new requirement would be completed in 2009. More
recently, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Chiarelli, briefed that a
new requirement and upgrade contract were both advancing with the
objective of having a competition for the upgrade announced in March
2010. The slow progress and continued missed dates, even those dates
directed by the Army's leadership, concern me because it appears that
the Army bureaucracy is unable or unwilling to improve the most basic
piece of equipment that a soldier in Afghanistan requires--their
individual weapon. Where in the process is the requirement for the M4
upgrades and the new rifle?
General Lennox. Upgrades to the M4 are currently being considered
and staffed for implementation by Army Headquarters.
As far as a new rifle, there is a new requirement for the
Individual Carbine that has successfully completed Army staffing and is
being prepared for joint staffing. The Army cannot move forward in
implementation of a new weapon system until that requirement has fully
completed staffing and is approved. The Army will initiate a full and
open competition once the requirement document is approved.
8. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, which command or
staff section currently has the requirements for action?
General Lennox. The Army G-3 is preparing the Individual Carbine
requirement for joint staffing and is coordinating the staffing of the
planned improvements to the current carbine fleet.
9. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, what is the timeline
for completing both requirements?
General Lennox. Once the Individual Carbine requirement enters
joint staffing, the staffing time is usually 3 to 6 months.
The requirement for improvements to the M4 will be staffed and
initiated much more quickly.
10. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, why can the Army not
keep a schedule for small arms requirements even when the Secretary and
the Vice Chief make the commitments?
General Lennox. Small arms requirements affect every soldier in the
Army. In validating a requirement, there are many different staff
sections that must be included in order to come to a consensus of what
the Army needs to equip soldiers for the next decade or more. The Army
takes great pains to get it ``right.'' In doing so, it often takes
longer than initially anticipated to thoroughly research and
investigate all issues associated with a given small arms requirement.
As such, we are doing our very best to provide a capability to our
soldiers that will carry them well into the next decade and provide
them a distinct advantage over our adversaries.
army ammunition
11. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, our soldiers in
Afghanistan and Iraq are complaining that the current M855 round does
not have the stopping power it they need. According to media reports,
the Army has denied the use of improved 5.56mm ammunition in
Afghanistan because it is waiting for the adoption of the M855A1 green
bullet. This bullet, despite being in development since 1996, has still
not been approved for use due to development problems. From an article
in the Army Times:
``Jason Gillis, a former Army staff sergeant, first witnessed
the M855's shortcomings in 2004 on the streets of Baghdad. He
was a squad leader with 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, on
patrol when a vehicle began speeding toward his unit. After
several warnings, `both of our M249s opened up instantly,
forming a crisscross pattern of tracer that met at the
vehicles' engine compartment and windshield. Within seconds,
riflemen and grenadiers were executing magazine changes while
the vehicle kept rolling and finally stopped 10 meters from my
lead troops,' Gillis recalled in an e-mail to Army Times. He is
now a free-lance writer who often focuses on military small-
arms issues. `Assuming the driver was most likely riddled
beyond recognition, we were all astounded to see the driver
emerge from the vehicle completely unscathed,' Gillis wrote.
`Closer inspection revealed that the M855 ammunition had failed
to effectively penetrate the vehicle's windshield despite the
fact that over 400 rounds were expended at extremely close
range and on target.' Other soldiers say they like the M855
because it is lightweight, but wish it had more punch. `The
idea of being able to carry 210 rounds [basic load] is quickly
overshadowed by the fact that it takes more than one and even
more than two rounds to drop the enemy,' Staff Sgt. Charles
Kouri, 82nd Airborne Division, told Army Times.''
Our Special Operations Forces and Marine Corps are using a newer,
improved round, the Special Operations Science and Technology (SOST)
round. Marines have noted that it is available now and is deadlier than
the current M855 round. From the Army Times:
``Despite the popularity of the SOST, the Army isn't backing
away from its goal to perfect its green M855A1 round. `SOST is
a good round, but SOST is not a lead-free slug,' said Lt. Col.
Tom Henthorn, Chief of the Small Arms Branch at the Soldier
Requirements Division at Fort Benning, GA. The Army will
continue to develop an environmentally friendly 5.56mm, as well
as a lead-free 7.62mm bullet, Henthorn added, `because we care
about the environment.'''
Are environmental concerns an obstacle to the Army fielding the
best round possible for the current fight?
General Lennox. Environmental concerns are not an obstacle to
fielding the best round to our soldiers. While there were unexpected
delays in the M855A1 program, those problems have been resolved. The
SOST round does not meet the Army's requirement for a lead-free slug or
for performance. Our testing indicates that the M855A1 ammunition will
be ready to field this year and will have significant improvements over
the M855 and SOST rounds. At this point, we could not field the SOST
round as an interim solution any faster than we will field M855A1.
12. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, why can't the Army
purchase the SOST round for use now while awaiting the results of the
green ammo testing?
General Lennox. The SOST cartridge does not meet the Army's 5.56mm
ammunition performance requirement against hard targets. The Army will
begin fielding the new M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round cartridge in
June 2010. The Army could not procure and field SOST cartridges prior
to that date, even if it met our requirements due to solicitation and
production ramp-up times required to purchase the SOST round.
13. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, how does the
lethality of the SOST round compare to the lethality of the new M855A1
green round?
General Lennox. Although both the M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round
(EPR) and SOST cartridges provide more consistent performance than the
currently fielded M855 cartridge against soft targets and battlefield
barriers, the M855A1 EPR consistently performs better in testing. The
SOST cartridge does not meet the Army's requirement for penetrating
hard targets. The M855A1 EPR cartridge has better hard target
performance against mild steel and concrete masonry compared to the
currently fielded M855 cartridge.
m4 technical data package
14. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, one of the
impediments that the Army had regarding upgrades to the M4 carbine was
that Colt owned the Technical Data Package (TDP) for the M4 carbine.
However, last summer those rights reverted to the Government, which can
now use the TDP as it sees fit to open up any upgrades to the M4 to
other companies other than Colt. Reports have surfaced that there are
some legal challenges to this reversion of rights. In regards to the
enhanced M4, I'm told that there may be a dispute over the M4 TDP,
previously owned by Colt, now owned by the Army that could cause
significant delays in fielding an improved weapon.
Is there a dispute regarding the M4 TDP? If so, will this dispute
delay procuring and fielding of the M4 carbine modification kits?
General Lennox. Colt's Manufacturing Company never relinquished its
proprietary rights in the M4 Carbine TDP to the Government. After June
30, 2009, the Government obtained the rights to utilize the M4 TDP in a
competition for production of the M4 carbine and M4 unique spares
within the United States and territories, for U.S. military use. The
Army has developed an acquisition strategy to improve the M4, which
will not be impeded by data rights issues involving Colt.
15. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, are there any other
barriers or impediments to full and open competition of an enhanced
carbine?
General Lennox. At this time, the Army can only conduct a limited
competition utilizing an M4 TDP due to the restrictions imposed by 10
U.S.C. 2473, Procurements from Small Arms Production Industrial Base.
This statute restricts competition for critical repair parts to firms
in the small arms production industrial base. The Army, in anticipation
of a robust competition, intends to seek a waiver of this restriction
that would allow full and open competition.
small arms production industrial base report
16. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, the report on the
small arms requirements of the Armed Forces and the Industrial Base of
the United States is required by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2009, which passed October 2008. To date, this report
has not been received by Congress. When can Congress expect this
report?
General Lennox. The report on the DOD's Small Arms Requirements and
the Industrial Base of the United States responding to section 143 of
the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009, was signed by the Secretary of the Army for DOD on March 25,
2010, and transmitted to the defense committees.
m9
17. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, a 2006 Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) study of our soldiers and marines in Afghanistan
and Iraq showed that 48 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied
with the M9 pistol, with 26 percent requesting a larger caliber weapon.
The fiscal year 2011 DOD budget includes new start authority for a
handgun to replace the M9 and that the requirement may already be Joint
Requirements Oversight Council-approved. What progress has the Army
made toward replacing M9 with a more powerful and modern sidearm?
General Lennox. The Army does not currently have a documented
requirement for a new pistol.
18. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, when is the timeline
for procuring a new handgun release for proposal, contract award, and
procurement?
General Lennox. At this time, the Army does not have an approved
requirement for a new handgun and therefore is not planning to issue a
request for proposals.
m249
19. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, the CNA issued a
report stating that more than a third of all soldiers using the M249
squad automatic weapon (SAW) in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan were
dissatisfied with its reliability. Over 30 percent of these soldiers
experienced stoppages with their M249 while engaging the enemy in
combat. What actions has the Army taken since the December 2006 report
to replace or upgrade the M249 SAW?
General Lennox. Early in the war it was recognized that the M249
fleet was old and worn out, creating many of the problems you
mentioned. The Army Materiel Command instituted a Repair-and-Return
program that overhauled 100 percent of deploying unit M249s, and then
upon return from theater, all machine guns, to include the M249, were
returned to Anniston Army Depot under the Small Arms Readiness and
Evaluation Team program to be brought to a high operational standard
before being shipped back to the unit. The combined effect of these
programs has been to provide units with well-maintained weapons and to
eliminate the oldest, most worn-out weapons that were causing units the
most problems. The CNA study you mentioned is only one data point the
Army uses to assess the satisfaction of its weapons with soldiers. More
timely data comes from post combat surveys conducted with each
redeploying unit that assess weapon reliability and soldier
satisfaction. In addition, a team recently deployed to theater to
independently assess weapon reliability. In both cases the reliability
of the M249 was extremely high. In fact, the reliability data from
government testing shows the M249 to be over 33,000 mean rounds between
stoppages, well beyond the requirement of 2,800 rounds. In addition
there have been numerous improvements and upgrades made to the baseline
M249 to increase its effectiveness as well as reliability. Examples are
the addition of a collapsible buttstock, short barrel, 200-round soft
ammo pack, accessory rail kit, improved bipod and light weight charging
handle and top cover, and optics. The Army currently has no requirement
to replace the M249. Also, as part of the Army's effort to lighten
soldiers' load we are evaluating a limited number of MK48s, the Light
Weight Machine Gun, in Operation Enduring Freedom; however, we
recognize that, while lighter, the MK48 does not meet Army reliability
or range requirements.
20. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, is there any planned
replacement for the M249 in the Future Years Defense Program?
General Lennox. No. The Army currently has no requirement to
replace the M249.
body armor
21. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, given that the
weight of body armor directly affects soldiers' agility, what is being
done to give commanders in the field the ability to tailor their
soldiers' level of armor to a specific threat level?
General Lennox. The Army provides soldiers with the Improved Outer
Tactical Vest (IOTV), a modular system that commanders can tailor to
specific threat levels. Additionally, the Army is fielding the Soldier
Plate Carrier System (SPCS), a modular light weight body armor
alternative to the IOTV, to soldiers operating in the mountainous
terrain of Afghanistan.
22. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, are there any body
armor programs in development that allow for scalability or modularity?
General Lennox. Yes, the fielded IOTV is a scalable and modular
body armor system that includes individual components for thorax,
shoulder, and groin protection, allowing soldiers the option to
increase areas of coverage when desired. The IOTV may be worn with or
without the Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) front, back,
and side plates to provide fragment only protection or fragment and
rifle round protection. Additionally, the Army is fielding the SPCS, a
modular light weight body armor alternative to the IOTV, to soldiers
operating in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.
Additional research on emerging threats and injury data is ongoing
to quantify trade-offs between increased protection and soldier
mobility with the goal to improve or develop new modular and scalable
components. This research along with applied research on novel
polymers, fibers, and ceramics will enable the development of materials
and systems with optimum load transfer, energy absorption, and
durability characteristics.
23. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, given the intense
terrain in Afghanistan that our troops are patrolling and the high
weight carried in body armor and other equipment, are you examining
new, lighter-weight body armor systems being offered by industry today?
If so, are you pursuing acquisition of these systems?
General Lennox. Yes, the Army evaluated, through the competitive
bid process, industry ideas for lighter body armor and selected the
SPCS for procurement. The SPCS, a lighter weight body armor system is
currently being fielded to soldiers operating in the mountainous
terrain of Afghanistan.
24. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, do you anticipate
budgeting for the next generation of body armor in the next budget?
General Lennox. We anticipate that research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) funding for personal protective equipment, to
include plates, soft armor, helmets, and eye protection, will compete
for funding in the next budget cycle. The RDT&E funding will be
programmed in separate project codes within the existing Budget
Activity 6.4 and 6.5 lines to support further development of promising
technology emerging from science and technology efforts. Funding within
the applied research areas of novel polymers, fibers, and ceramics will
enable the development of next generation protection for the soldier
utilizing materials and systems with optimum load transfer, energy
absorption, and durability characteristics.
25. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, this committee
understands that all the Services are concerned about weight and are
challenging industry to develop a lightweight solution. Absent
supplemental funding, how will future systems be paid for?
General Lennox. The Army will compete for available base funding if
supplemental funding is not provided for procurement of future body
armor systems. For the development of future body armor systems, the
Army plans to program RDT&E funding in the next budget cycle.
26. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, last year's National
Defense Authorization Act required the Services to include budget lines
for body armor in procurement and for RDT&E. None of the Services did
so. Can you tell me why the Army failed to follow the law?
General Lennox. The Army did not create separate body armor funding
lines in RDT&E and procurement in the fiscal year 2011 budget because
we were awaiting guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) on how to implement the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 language. Previously, body armor has been an
expendable and not an investment item, and therefore purchased with
Operation and Maintenance, Army funding. The Army is exploring options
with OSD for subsequent fiscal years and will implement in accordance
with OSD guidance.
27. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Lennox, how much money has
the Army budgeted for RDT&E of body armor and how have you coordinated
with the other Services on body armor research and development?
General Lennox. The Army budgeted $5.36 million in fiscal year 2010
and $1.1 million in fiscal year 2011 for RDT&E for body armor.
The Army coordinates, on a quarterly basis, with other Services on
body armor RDT&E through the Cross-Service Warfighter Equipment Board
(CS-WEB). The CS-WEB is comprised of the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,
Coast Guard, and U.S. Special Operations Command to coordinate joint
warfighter equipment investments which ensure the most effective
solutions are acquired and fielded by all Services. The forum provides
a dialogue on all aspects of life cycle acquisition management: science
and technology plans; technology transition planning; system design and
development; initial production; procurement strategies; raw ballistic
fiber/material usage forecasts and shortage issues; ballistic testing
protocols; production rates; and operational support concepts. The
group makes recommendations on technology investments in order to
minimize duplication and maximize joint investments.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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