[Senate Hearing 111-700]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-700
ASSESSING THE STRENGTH OF HEZBOLLAH
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Benjamin, Hon. Daniel, Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 11
Joint prepared statement with Hon. Jeffrey Feltman........... 6
Casey, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., dean and executive professor, George Bush
School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX............................................ 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Feltman, Hon. Jeffrey, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........... 4
Joint prepared statement with Ambassador Daniel Benjamin..... 6
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
James E. Risch............................................. 48
Norton, Augustus Richard, professor of anthropology and
international relations, Department of International Relations,
Boston University, Boston, MA.................................. 34
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
James E. Risch............................................. 53
Pletka, Danielle, vice president, foreign and defense policy
studies, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC......... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 31
(iii)
ASSESSING THE STRENGTH OF HEZBOLLAH
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TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman, Corker, and
Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. We will get started.
Thank you very much, everyone, for being here. We are
trying to start relatively close to on time. I think we are
right on time.
We are grateful for your presence here, especially the
members of both panels. I told the panelists before we began
that we are going to try to keep each panel within that 1-hour-
per-panel timeframe if we can do that, and I think we should be
able to.
But today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian
Affairs meets to examine the grave implications of Hezbollah's
mounting political and military strength in Lebanon. Many
experts say that Lebanon, with its deep sectarian struggles, is
a bellwether for the political-religious balance of power in
the Middle East.
Hezbollah's activities have a direct impact on broader
United States interests in the region, including inspiring
militancy, threatening regional stability, and complicating
prospects for a peace settlement between Israel and the
Palestinians. Finally, we will consider policy options for the
United States and others to strengthen the Lebanese Government
so that it can fully control its territory.
As we meet here today, Hezbollah is stronger than it has
ever been, politically and, of course, militarily, and its
growing strength poses a direct threat to stability in the
region. Against the backdrop of rising tensions in the region,
it is critically important that this committee and the
subcommittee conduct a thorough examination of these issues.
During Prime Minister Hariri's visit to Washington last
month, President Obama reaffirmed the United States commitment
to strengthening Lebanon's sovereignty and independence.
Lebanon is a key front line for pro-Western moderates who are
battling advocates of the Syria-Iran resistance model.
Lebanon's southern frontier is one of the most volatile borders
in the Middle East. This tense area can easily devolve into
conflict, sparked by a perceived or real provocation or by
Hezbollah's avowed retaliation for the 2008 assassination of
its intelligence chief.
From the inception of Hezbollah--from the very beginning in
the 1980s to the present--the elimination of the state of
Israel has been one of the organization's primary goals. At the
same time, Iran continues to transfer weapons to Hezbollah in
violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. And
Hezbollah continues and gives the Iranian regime a dangerous
proxy that seriously threatens United States interests as well
as, of course, Israel's existence. Last November, Israel
intercepted a ship carrying hundreds of tons of Iranian weapons
intended for Hezbollah.
Thus, among the most pressing concerns is Hezbollah's
refusal to disarm, as called for in the 1989 Taif Accord that
ended the Lebanese civil war and more recently in U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 1559 and, again, 1701. The substantial
demilitarization, if not the complete disarmament, of Hezbollah
is required to transform Lebanon from a perpetually war-torn
society and geopolitical pawn into a durable 21st century
state. As long as Hezbollah is armed, the group can dominate
Lebanon through threat of force.
Just 4 years after its 34-day war with Israel, Hezbollah's
military capabilities today are more robust than ever. With the
help of Iran and Syria, its arsenal has become more
sophisticated and more lethal. During the 2006 conflict,
Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 rockets--4,000 rockets--
into Israel, killing 44 Israeli citizens. Furthermore, it
retains military superiority to Lebanon's armed forces. In
April, Defense Secretary Gates said Hezbollah had, and I quote,
``far more rockets and missiles than most governments in the
world.''
We must never forget that Hezbollah and its affiliates have
planned or have been linked to numerous attacks against the
United States, Israel, and other Western targets, including the
bombings in 1983 of the United States Embassy in Beirut and the
U.S. Marine barracks, which together killed 200 Marines and 58
other Americans. There are reports that Hezbollah was involved
in training Shia militias in Iraq which carried out attacks
against United States forces.
Hezbollah's political authority in Lebanon also has risen.
Under Secretary General Nasrallah's leadership, Hezbollah has
become a significant part of Lebanon's political fabric.
Unfortunately, Nasrallah has inspired many in the Arab world to
regard Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance movement, which
propagates militancy.
Last November, 5 months after Lebanon's parliamentary
elections and subsequent intense political infighting, Prime
Minister Hariri agreed to share power with Hezbollah and its
allies. Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah won a significant
political victory by acquiring a veto power in the government
because it acquired control over a ``blocking third'' number of
Cabinet positions. Additionally, the Parliament passed a bill
that effectively allows Hezbollah to keep its weapons.
Its relative political strength and formidable arsenal
makes Lebanon's political future uncertain. The nature of the
role that Hezbollah will play in that future and in Lebanon's
security arrangements are the focus of intense public debate in
the country. Most, I should say, Lebanese want a normalized
Lebanon, freed from the role of being a client state and
relieved of the threat of a formidable private militia.
That said, there are significant pockets of support for
Hezbollah in parts of Lebanese society, which sends a strong
message of hostility to Israel. That unyielding hostility to
Israel suggests that irreconcilable differences could emerge
within Lebanon's leadership, particularly if the resolution of
outstanding Lebanese or Syrian disputes with Israel over
specific territories improves the prospects for bilateral peace
agreements.
The United States must continue to play an active role in
strengthening the domestic societal and security elements of
the Lebanese Government. We look forward to hearing whether our
witnesses believe that United States aid to Lebanon, including
the administration's $136 million request for foreign
assistance in the fiscal year 2011 budget, is sufficient to
bolster the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the
Internal Security Forces.
Since fiscal year 2006, the United States has invested over
$690 million in these programs. If Lebanon is to complete its
long transition to a tolerant political system, the system it
was before its civil war, the elected government and security
forces will have to supplant Hezbollah as the prevailing source
of security in the country. As we provide direct aid to
Lebanon, we must ensure that United States arms are secure and
do not make their way into Hezbollah's arsenal.
With the shift of power inside Lebanon toward Hezbollah, it
is important, and more important than ever, that we decide what
our redlines are in terms of United States military equipment.
At the same time, the United States must fully explore what we
are up against in Lebanon by examining the roles of Syria and
Iran in strengthening Hezbollah.
We are grateful today and we are honored to be joined by
two distinguished panels to help us assess these issues and
evaluate policy options. On the first panel, we welcome
Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, and Daniel Benjamin, Counterterrorism
Coordinator at the Department of State.
Our second panel, we welcome three witnesses from the
private sector. First, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who recently
retired from the Department of State after 39 years--he doesn't
look like it was that long--of public service, serving as
Ambassador in five countries in the Middle East, including
Lebanon and Syria, and I should also mention Iraq. That is
where one of the first times I had a chance to meet him. He is
now dean and executive professor of the George Bush School of
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
Second, Dr. Augustus Richard Norton, professor of
international relations and anthropology at Boston University,
is here with us as well. He is an expert on Lebanon's Shia
community and, as well, Hezbollah.
And finally, Danielle Pletka. She is a vice president of
foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise
Institute and is an analyst on the region's complex politics
and also a former Senate Foreign Relations staffer. Am I
correct? That is correct. OK. Welcome back.
So we thank our witnesses, and we look forward to their
insights. And I at this time would like to turn to Senator
Corker, if he has any opening comments?
Senator Corker. I am far more interested in our witnesses,
and thank you for being here. Thank you for your service, too.
Senator Casey. And I want to thank Senator Corker for being
with us. We will have others joining us as the hearing
proceeds.
We will turn now to the opening statements from our
witnesses. I encourage you to keep your remarks we always say
brief and succinct. We have a gavel. We try not to use it. But
we don't want to go too long.
You should know, and the range we are talking about is 5 to
7 minutes, but your whole statement will be made part of the
record. So you don't have to read all of it, and if it is
particularly long, we don't want you to read all of it because
of those time constraints. We will get to explore some of the
issues you may not be able to cover in your opening by way of
questions.
So, Ambassador Feltman, would you like to begin?
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFFREY FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Feltman. Chairman Casey, Senator Corker, thanks
for inviting Ambassador Benjamin and me to testify today on
this important topic.
Hezbollah is an issue that I have been following closely,
particularly since I was confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to
Lebanon in summer of 2004, a position I held until late January
2008. The joint testimony that we wish to submit for the record
goes into some detail regarding the threats that Hezbollah
poses for Israel, for Lebanon, for the region, for our
interests, and it also discusses a number of steps that the
United States is taking to counter these threats.
But I would like to use my opening statement to cite a
couple of specific examples of Hezbollah's behavior that I
witnessed when I was Ambassador to Beirut. I think that these
examples will demonstrate both the pernicious role of Hezbollah
inside Lebanon, but also the fact that Hezbollah is neither
infallible nor invincible.
The first example is one that you cited, Mr. Chairman,
Hezbollah's 2006 war with Israel. That war broke out in July
2006 when Hezbollah assailants crossed the U.N.-delineated
border between Lebanon and Israel, killing five Israeli
soldiers and kidnapping two. Now, this was not the first time
that Hezbollah had attempted to do something like this. In
November 2005, the previous year, Hezbollah had a similar plot
that Israel, in fact, foiled.
But it is worth remembering that just 3 weeks before this
July 2006 war was kicked off, Hamas had done something similar
in Gaza. Hamas operatives had crossed into Israel, captured the
soldier, Gilad Shalit, who they continue to hold, and Israel
reacted very strongly.
I, as Ambassador, went to Lebanese political leaders inside
the government, outside the government, across the political
spectrum, and I said, my gosh, look at Israel's reaction to
what Hamas did. Imagine if Hezbollah had succeeded back in
November, a few months earlier, in kidnapping those soldiers it
tried to do. Imagine what would have happened to Lebanon. All
the Lebanese political leaders who I saw, despite their
political leanings, agreed with me. It would have been a
catastrophe for Lebanon.
Nevertheless, a few weeks later, Hezbollah did launch a
raid, less than a month after Shalit had been captured, and
dragged Lebanon into a bloody conflict in which many civilians
lost their lives, infrastructure destroyed, et cetera. Now,
afterward, Hezbollah claimed that that 2006 war was ``divine
victory.'' But I doubt that many Lebanese would agree.
In fact, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah later
had to issue a begrudging sort of apology on national
television. He disingenuously stated that had he anticipated
Israel's reaction, he would not have ordered the kidnapping.
Moreover, as a direct result of that war in 2006, Hezbollah
lost its direct line of attack against Israel.
Before the war, Hezbollah routinely launched rocket, mortar
attacks across the blue line into Israel or into Shebaa Farms
sort of as a show of strength, a show of control. But today, by
contrast, south Lebanon hosts more than 11,000 UNIFIL troops,
plus thousands of Lebanese Armed Forces.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended that
conflict in 2006, continues to enjoy popular and political
support in Lebanon. So what does this mean? What it means is
that Hezbollah cannot easily renew its patterns of attacks
across the blue line into Israel. If it did so, it would do so
at considerable political cost inside Lebanon.
And so, for nearly 4 years now, not a single civilian on
either side of the blue line has been killed through active
military or hostile acts. Now, without minimizing the real
dangers that Hezbollah poses, I note that southern Lebanon and
northern Israel have not had such stability and security in
decades.
Second example I will cite briefly is Hezbollah's
intentional crippling of Lebanese constitutional institutions
in the 2006-2008 period. As you know, as a result of the 2005
Lebanese elections, a new Lebanese Government was formed with a
proindependence majority and a mandate in support of Lebanese
sovereignty. Hezbollah, in fact, joined that national unity
government.
Yet a little more than a year later, in November 2006,
Hezbollah, dragging its allies with it, cited a procedural
pretext to withdraw from that government. Hezbollah expected
the government to collapse. It didn't.
So what did they do next? They launched a massive sit-in,
starting in December 2006, again expecting the Cabinet to
resign. It did not.
They then blocked the Lebanese Parliament from meeting.
They blocked an election of a Lebanese President, all expecting
people to blink. They didn't.
Ultimately, in May 2008, to counter Cabinet decisions it
saw as threatening, Hezbollah had to do what Hassan Nasrallah
had sworn Hezbollah would never do, which is turn its arms
against the Lebanese people, the very people Hezbollah claimed
to be defending. In essence, Hezbollah used force to assert a
right to veto any government decision against its interests
while refusing any public accountability or oversight of its
own interests.
It is a sad reality, but there are real political costs to
Hezbollah force behavior. The Lebanese people have not
forgotten the 2006 war, nor the events of 2008 in May.
If you measure how Hezbollah and especially its allies have
fared in elections at all levels, you see erosions and
limitations. I am talking about municipal elections, syndicate
elections, student elections, and even parliamentary elections.
Erosion particularly in the political strength of Hezbollah's
primary Christian ally and limitations to the attractiveness of
Hezbollah's message to Lebanese more broadly.
The Obama administration is firmly committed to supporting
the Lebanese people and the strength of Lebanon's democratic
institution, including Lebanon's legitimate security forces
that you mentioned, Chairman, the LAF, and the ISF. Our
diplomatic engagement with Syria or any other party will not
come at Lebanon's expense.
We will continue to support Israel's right to defend
itself, and we will continue to take measures to inhibit and
counter Hezbollah's strength and capabilities. We will continue
energetically in pursuing a comprehensive peace in the region
because accomplishing this is in our own vital national
interest, as well as in the interest of the region and the
world.
I want to thank the committee for its support of this
important work, including your vote to send Ambassador Robert
Ford's nomination to the full Senate for confirmation. And I
thank the committee again for holding this hearing.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman and
Ambassador Benjamin follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Ambassador Daniel
Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Chairman Casey, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today to discuss Hezbollah. We share
this committee's deep concerns about the threats posed by this
terrorist group, its activities, and the support and direction it
receives from outside actors. We look forward to discussing Hezbollah's
position within Lebanon, its destabilizing role in the country and the
wider region, and our ongoing efforts to promote the sovereignty and
independence of the state of Lebanon, as well as peace and stability in
the broader Middle East.
Hezbollah's persistence as a well-armed terrorist group within
Lebanon, as well as its robust relationships with Iran and Syria, and
the transfer of increasingly sophisticated missiles and rockets to
Hezbollah, threaten the interests of the United States, Lebanon, and
our partners in the region, especially Israel. Our ongoing efforts to
counter those threats include cutting off terrorism financing and
interdicting illicit arms shipments, as well as bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic efforts aimed at ending those arms transfers
and supporting the legitimate Government of Lebanon. We have warned
Syria directly about the potential consequences of these destabilizing
actions. Most importantly, we are working to achieve a comprehensive
peace in the region, centered on a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. To be successful, this comprehensive peace needs
to include a solution to the problem of Hezbollah's weapons and
hostility. A comprehensive peace by definition must also include
Lebanon and Syria as full partners.
A THREAT TO LEBANON'S INTERESTS
Lebanon is a state with a vibrant civil society; however, its
people also have a history of relying on sectarian and community
leaders. Over the years, this tradition of political decentralization
has inhibited the rise of strong state institutions and a truly
unifying sense of national citizenship. Hezbollah has exploited this
environment and managed to attract popular support among segments of
the population that have felt traditionally neglected by a weak state
or particularly vulnerable to threats from within and outside the
country.
Hezbollah attempts to portray itself as a natural part of Lebanon's
political system and a defender of Lebanese interests. But its actions
demonstrate otherwise. Hezbollah has demonstrated repeatedly its
unwillingness to adhere to the rule of law and submit to the Government
of Lebanon's legitimate authority. The group's maintenance of a large
and potent militia; its repeated use of force, including against
Lebanese civilians and civilians of other nationalities; its ongoing
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701;
and its refusal to comply with the disarmament called for in both the
Taif Accord and UNSCR 1559, render it a dangerous and destabilizing
player in Lebanon and in the region. Hezbollah continues to pursue its
interests and those of its chief outside sponsor, Iran, by manipulating
the Lebanese political system to protect its own power. Hezbollah
refuses any public oversight or accountability of its activities, which
have plunged Lebanon into war in the past and could do so again, while
at the same time Hezbollah demands the right to veto decisions taken by
the Lebanese Government.
Hezbollah remains the most technically capable terrorist group in
the world and a continued security threat to the United States.
Hezbollah is responsible for some of the deadliest terrorist attacks
against Americans in history, and the United States has designated it
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997. While we recognize that
Hezbollah is not directly targeting the United States and U.S.
interests today, we are aware that could change if tensions increase
with Iran over that country's nuclear program. The administration has
also reiterated that it will not deal with or have any contact with the
terrorist organization.
There has been much debate over the political identity of
Hezbollah, as well as the prospects for Hezbollah to become a
legitimate political party within Lebanon. Following Lebanon's bloody
civil war, other militias disbanded or were integrated into Lebanon's
legitimate defense force, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). However,
despite the group's rhetoric and political campaigning, there remains
today no meaningful distinction between the military and political
wings of Hezbollah, as Hezbollah's own leaders regularly acknowledge
publicly.
Should Hezbollah truly desire to join the ranks of Lebanon's other
political groups in its democratic system, its path would be clear: it
would fully disarm, like all other militias, renounce terrorism and
political intimidation, and acknowledge the authority of the Government
of Lebanon (GOL) and that government's right, like other governments,
to a monopoly on the use of force. Under those circumstances we could
reconsider the group's status. Make no mistake, these are significant
hurdles and we have seen no indication to date that Hezbollah is ready
to take these steps. The fact that Hezbollah is not willing to take
these steps reveals its real motivations: since we have no doubt that
Hezbollah could remain a powerful political voice inside Lebanon even
without maintaining arms that violate Security Council Resolutions and
endanger Lebanon, its refusal to forswear violence and pursue its
interests through political means demonstrates that its agenda is not
purely Lebanese.
As we noted above, unlike other Lebanese groups that currently seek
to play a productive role in Lebanon's political system, Hezbollah is
the lone militia that refused to disarm following the signing of the
Taif Accord, which marked the end of Lebanon's tragic civil war. Even
following the ``Cedar Revolution'' of 2005, when the Lebanese people
turned out in droves to reassert Lebanon's full independence and
sovereignty, culminating in the withdrawal of Syrian forces, Hezbollah
has remained in open defiance of the legitimate authority of the
Lebanese Government, even when it has been part of the same government.
In March 2005, as other Lebanese were preparing for the massive March
14 Cedar Revolution in reaction to the shocking murder of Rafiq Hariri,
Hezbollah actually hosted a counterdemonstration, in defiance of
Lebanese public opinion, to thank and show its appreciation for Iran
and Syria. Hezbollah's arsenal of illegal weapons poses a clear and
present danger to the security of Lebanon and the region. Its actions
belie the ``resistance'' rhetoric that it is fond of repeating.
One need only look to the disastrous 2006 conflict, precipitated by
Hezbollah's kidnapping of Israeli soldiers from across the Blue Line in
indisputably Israeli territory, to see that its arms and aggressive
action are a source and motivator for violence in the immediate region.
Hezbollah's maintenance of arms caches in Southern Lebanon, in clear
violation of UNSCRs 1701 and 1559, demonstrates that Hezbollah seeks to
project its military power in destabilizing fashion. In the 2006 case,
Hezbollah, without consultation or approval of even its electoral
allies, unilaterally chose to take actions that dragged the country
into an agonizing and destructive conflict. Hezbollah's actions
highlighted the impotence of the words of its primary Christian ally,
Michel Aoun, who struggled to justify his controversial February 2006
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Hezbollah by saying that, with
this MOU, Hezbollah accepted limits to its use of its arms.
Even more striking than the external conflict instigated by
Hezbollah are the events of May 2008. In trying to mask its Iranian
agenda, Hezbollah had regularly insisted that its arms would never be
used against the Lebanese people. Yet in May 2008, Hezbollah did
exactly that, attacking Lebanese citizens--the very people it claims to
protect--in order to protest decisions of the Lebanese Government with
which it disagreed. Using force to settle domestic political disputes
clearly distorts and perverts Lebanon's democracy.
Despite the devastating effects of its 2006 war with Israel and the
2008 domestic conflict in Lebanon, which Hezbollah initiated, Hezbollah
remains today one of the best armed and most dangerous militias in the
world. Its capabilities exceed those of the legitimate Lebanese
security services and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). UNSCR 1701 called for the establishment of a weapons-free
zone in South Lebanon that UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
are actively working to implement. However, we believe that, in
addition to its increased activities outside of UNIFIL's area of
operations, Hezbollah continues to maintain weapons caches in the south
and is actively seeking additional armaments.
Hezbollah also claims publicly to have reconstituted and improved
its arsenal since the 2006 war. As Lebanon has no domestic arms
industry, this would have undoubtedly been accomplished by means of
smuggling activity via Syria and Iran. In 2008 alone, Iran provided
hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah and trained thousands of
Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran. Iran continues to assist Hezbollah
in rearming, violating Security Council Resolution 1701. Iran also has
been found to be in violation of UNSCR 1747, which prohibits it from
exporting arms and related materiel. In 2009, U.N. Member States
reported to the U.N.'s Iran Sanctions Committee three instances in
which Iran was found to be transferring arms or related materiel to
Syria, a regional hub for Iranian support to terrorist groups, such as
Hezbollah. A number of media reports also have noted that Hezbollah
continues using weapons depots in Syria to store its arms before
transferring them into Lebanon. While Hezbollah no longer maintains an
overt militia presence in southern Lebanon--the absence of an overt
militia presence being a direct product of Security Council Resolution
1701--it has strengthened its militia infrastructure immediately north
of the Litani River and in the Biqa' Valley since 2006.
While Iran continues to provide a significant portion of
Hezbollah's funding, Hezbollah has also broadened its sources of
financial support in recent years. Hezbollah is now heavily involved in
a wide range of criminal activity, including the drug trade and
smuggling. It also receives funds from both legitimate and illicit
businesses that its members operate, from NGOs under its control, and
from donations from its supporters throughout the world. Hezbollah also
has established its own commercial and communications networks outside
the Lebanese legal system that in essence rob the Lebanese treasury of
the tax revenues that would come via legitimate licensing,
registration, and tax reporting.
A THREAT TO THE REGION'S INTERESTS
Hezbollah's destabilizing actions also have a global reach. The
recent conviction of a Hezbollah cell in Egypt for spying, plotting
attacks on resorts frequented by tourists, and arms smuggling
illustrates Hezbollah's growing regional reach and ambitions. In Iraq,
we are also aware of Hezbollah providing training and other support to
Shia militant groups. As of early 2007, an Iran-based individual by the
name of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis formed a militia group, employing
instructors from Hezbollah to prepare this group and certain Jaysh al-
Mahdi Special Groups for attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq.
Hezbollah's web also extends to Europe and diplomatic missions
abroad, where Hezbollah planned to attack the Israeli Embassy in Baku.
While this attack was foiled, and the perpetrators are now imprisoned
in Azerbaijan, these actions illustrate the group's continued disregard
for the rule of law, both inside Lebanon and outside its borders.
We must also recognize that the ever evolving technology of war is
making it harder to guarantee our partners' security. Despite efforts
at containment, rockets with better guidance systems, longer range, and
more destructive power are spreading across the region, with many in
the hands of nonstate actors accountable to no one. Reports that Syria
transferred SCUD-class missiles to Hezbollah are deeply troubling;
these destabilizing developments increase the risks of miscalculation
and the possibility of hostilities.
On May 25 this year, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, gave a
speech proclaiming for the first time that Hezbollah will target
Israeli and Israel-bound military and commercial vessels if Israel
initiates offensive action against Lebanese ports or undertakes a naval
blockade of Lebanon in a future conflict. Hezbollah also has made a
number of threats and claims recently about the expanding range of its
arsenal, with Nasrallah stating that Hezbollah has the capability to
hit Ben Gurion airport.
The Obama administration is committed to ensuring Israel's security
and helping Israel to defend itself. The United States and Israel
cooperate closely on security issues. On an ongoing basis, both
countries participate in joint military planning, combined exercises
and training, and collaborate on military research and weapons
development.
The United States also cooperates extensively with Israel on
ballistic missile defense to ensure Israel is protected against missile
threats. We are working with Israel to further develop the Arrow
Weapons System, the David's Sling system to defend against short-range
rocket and missile threats, and the X-Band radar to provide early
warning and interceptor integration capabilities. Additionally, our
biannual military exercise ``Juniper Cobra'' is the largest joint-
military exercise on missile defense. The Obama administration also
committed to provide $205 million in additional funding to help Israel
field the Iron Dome short-range missile defense system.
AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE
Time and again, we have seen that Hezbollah's weapons and Syria's
support for its role as an independent armed force in Lebanon are a
threat, both to Lebanon and Israel, as well as a major obstacle to
achieving peace in the region.
Hezbollah exploits the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict to bolster its
own interests and influence. The group claims to maintain arms in order
to defend Lebanon from Israeli ``aggression'' and derives much of its
popularity from its image as a ``resistance'' group. In truth,
Hezbollah is actively using the conflict with Israel in order to gain
regional popularity and justify its vast arsenal, acting as a point of
leverage in the region for Iran. One of Hezbollah's rhetorical points
regards Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory. The U.N. Secretary
General has cited in his reports on UNSCRs 1559 and 1701 that these
overflights are a violation of UNSCR 1701, a resolution which we are
all committed to seeing fully implemented. Yet there is an unmistakable
connection between these overflights and Hezbollah's blatant and
ongoing efforts to evade the arms embargo that is the essence of UNSCR
1701; Hezbollah's activities create the very conditions that Hezbollah
then uses as a pretext to justify its own destabilizing behavior,
putting Lebanon at severe risk.
The Obama administration's efforts to defuse tensions and to
achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East--defined as peace
between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and all its
neighbor states--would, if successful, deal a significant blow to
Hezbollah and its sponsor in Tehran.
Comprehensive regional peace has a special meaning in the context
of Lebanon, where, for decades, the absence of peace has facilitated
the operation of many organizations whose interests are not Lebanese.
In the 1980s, Hezbollah took root with the vital assistance of Iranian
money, training, weaponry and political support. Although Israel's
withdrawal from Lebanese territory in 2000--withdrawal certified as
complete by the United Nations--should have put an end to Hezbollah's
claims to be resisting foreign occupation, Hezbollah has been able to
manipulate weaknesses in Lebanon's domestic political structures to
preserve the pretense of resistance. While the United States believes
firmly that, in compliance with the territorial obligations of UNSCR
1701, Israel must withdraw its forces from northern Ghajjar, reoccupied
during the 2006 conflict, the primary stumbling block to peace and
stability between Israel and Lebanon is Hezbollah's arsenal and proven
willingness to use it.
We understand clearly that a comprehensive peace cannot come at the
expense of Lebanese interests, and we understand fully the sensitivity
of the issue of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who yearn for, and
deserve, a viable state of Palestine that they can call home. But
Hezbollah's arms and defiance of the international community take us
further away from, not closer to, the comprehensive peace that is
envisioned in the groundbreaking Arab Peace Initiative, supported
unanimously by the Arab League and announced in Beirut in 2002. By
contrast, Iran and Hezbollah have a very different vision and show no
signs of accepting Israel's right to exist.
THE PATH FORWARD
Hezbollah's insistence on remaining armed, aggressive, and
unaccountable threatens important American interests and goals--
especially our interests in Middle East peace and regional security, in
containing the spread of destabilizing weapons and terror financing,
and in a strong, democratic, and independent state of Lebanon.
The United States is committed to strengthening the Government of
Lebanon and its institutions. Our support to the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) and Internal Security Force (ISF) is part of an international
commitment to help bolster Lebanon's legitimate security services at
the request of the Lebanese Government. Since 2006, we have committed
more than $600 million to the LAF and ISF out of a conviction that the
Lebanese army and police should provide protection for Lebanon's
people. As demonstrated through their successful domestic
counterterrorism operations, the operational improvements in the LAF
and ISF as a result of U.S. military and security assistance have been
significant thus far and have great potential for growth. The Lebanese
state must be prepared, in terms of its institutions and capabilities,
for that day when comprehensive peace is achieved; our assistance to
the LAF and ISF needs to be seen in terms of that long-term investment.
Moreover, the United States provides assistance and support in Lebanon
that work to create alternatives to extremism, reduce Hezbollah's
appeal to Lebanon's youth, and empower people through greater respect
for their rights and greater access to opportunity. Through USAID and
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), we have contributed more
than $500 million to this effort since 2006. These robust assistance
programs represent one facet of our unwavering support for the Lebanese
people and a strong, sovereign, stable, and democratic Lebanon. Since
2006, our total assistance to Lebanon has now exceeded $1 billion. If
we let down the millions of Lebanese who yearn for a state that
represents the aspirations of all Lebanese, we would create the
conditions by which Hezbollah can, by filling a vacuum, grow even
stronger.
The United States cooperates directly with international partners
to constrict Hezbollah's range of action and impede its ability receive
and transfer funds. Hezbollah's network of financial support knows no
borders, with active operations in many places around the globe,
including Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. In
addition to the Department of State's designation of Hezbollah as an
FTO, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) has used Executive Order 13224, which was issued soon after the
September 2001 attacks to bolster the U.S. Government's capability to
target terrorists' financial networks, to target Hezbollah's global
financial support system. A wide range of individuals and entities that
are controlled by or affiliated with Hezbollah have been designated
under the EO. Financial institutions around the world pay close
attention to these designations. The entities that OFAC has targeted
include banks and financial front companies operating in Lebanon and
elsewhere, such as Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company; Hezbollah-
linked NGOs including The Goodwill Charitable Organization, a
fundraising office established indirectly by the Martyrs Foundation in
Lebanon; Hezbollah's construction company, Jihad al-Bina; and
individuals like Abd Al Menem Qubaysi, a Hezbollah supporter based in
West Africa; Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, two Venezuela-based
supporters of Hezbollah; and the Barakat network of 10 individuals in
the tri-border region of Latin America.
The United States has also taken action against Iranian entities
that are involved in funding and supporting Hezbollah. Perhaps most
importantly, in 2007 the U.S. Government designated Iran's Quds Force,
the terrorist wing of Tehran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which
has provided extensive support, equipment and training for Hezbollah.
The year prior, the United States designated one of the largest Iranian
state-owned banks, Bank Saderat, for transferring funds to Hezbollah
and Palestinian rejectionist groups. From 2001-2006, for example, Bank
Saderat was used by the Iranian Government to provide at least $50
million to Hezbollah. Hezbollah has used Bank Saderat to transfer
funds, sometimes in the millions of dollars, to support the activities
of other terrorist organizations, such as Hamas in Gaza.
From his earliest days in office, President Obama has put the
difficult work of pursuing a comprehensive peace in the region at the
top of his administration's agenda. The status quo strengthens
rejectionists like Hezbollah who claim peace is impossible, and it
weakens those who would accept coexistence. All of our regional
challenges--confronting the threat posed by Iran, combating violent
extremism, promoting human rights and economic opportunity--become
harder if the rejectionists grow in power and influence.
Leading our efforts, Senator George Mitchell has been working
diligently with the parties to build the atmosphere that can produce a
negotiated resolution to the conflict. We are encouraging Israel to
continue building momentum toward a comprehensive peace by respecting
the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, stopping
settlement activity, and addressing the humanitarian needs in Gaza. We
are encouraging the Palestinians to do their part by continuing to
ensure security, reform their institutions of governance, and end
incitement. Regional states who must be concerned about the
destabilizing impact of extremist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas must
do more to bolster the efforts of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under
President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. The PA's institution-
building plans deserve and require continued financial support, and the
United States will continue to be a substantial donor. It is also in
the interest of Arab States to advance the Arab Peace Initiative with
actions, not just rhetoric.
Our goal of a comprehensive peace also requires that we work to
resolve the conflicts between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon.
Through diplomacy and through Special Envoy Mitchell's efforts, we are
actively seeking to restart peace negotiations between Israel and
Syria, and to bring Syria to play a more positive role in the region.
We are determined to try to build a constructive relationship with
Syria, one in which Syria and the United States can be partners in
support of that comprehensive peace. Given the differences between
Syria and the United States, this will not be an easy or quick process.
But, in light of our national interests in a comprehensive regional
peace, we are working with the Syrians in a step-by-step process that
we hope will build trust and create momentum.
We thank members of this committee for expeditiously voting
Ambassador Ford out of committee, as we now await his confirmation by
the full Senate. In addition to recent visits to Syria by
administration officials, including Undersecretary of State Burns in
February, restoring our Ambassador to Damascus will enable the
administration to deliver strong, unfiltered messages readily,
consistently, and directly to the highest levels of the Syrian
Government. The Obama administration has made clear that our diplomatic
relations with Syria will never come at the expense of Lebanon, Israel,
Iraq, or any of our other partners in the region, and our
communications will continue to emphasize the need for Syria to end its
support for Hezbollah.
CONCLUSION
The United States continues to take the threats posed by Hezbollah
to the United States, to Lebanon, to Israel, and the region at large,
with the utmost seriousness. We are mounting considerable diplomatic,
as well as counterterrorism, and assistance efforts aimed at minimizing
the threat and influence of Hezbollah in the region, and promoting
peace, stability, and prosperity across the Middle East.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Benjamin.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Benjamin. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch,
members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for invitation
to appear here today to discuss Hezbollah.
We share this committee's deep concern about the threats
posed by this very dangerous terrorist group, its activities,
and the support and direction it receives from outside actors.
Hezbollah remains the most technically capable terrorist group
in the world, and it is responsible for some of the deadliest
terrorist attacks against Americans in history.
Hezbollah's persistence as a well-armed terrorist group
within Lebanon, its robust relationships with Iran and Syria,
and their transfer of increasingly sophisticated missiles and
rockets to Hezbollah threaten the interests of the United
States, Lebanon, and our partners in the region, especially
Israel.
While we recognize that Hezbollah is not directly targeting
the United States today, we are aware that that could change,
especially if tensions increase with Iran over that country's
nuclear program.
On May 25, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, gave a
speech proclaiming for the first time that Hezbollah will
target Israeli and Israel-bound military and commercial vessels
if Israel initiates offensive action against Lebanese ports or
undertakes a naval blockade of Lebanon in a future conflict.
Hezbollah has also made a number of claims recently about the
expanding range of its arsenal, with Nasrallah stating that
Hezbollah has the capability to hit Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel
Aviv. Hezbollah claims to have reconstituted and improved its
arsenal since the 2006 war.
In early April, we reiterated our grave concerns and alarm
to the Syrian Government over reports that they provided Scud
missiles to Hezbollah. Transferring weapons to Hezbollah,
especially longer range missiles, poses a serious threat to
Lebanon's neighbors, especially Israel. Such an action would
have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the region, and we
have warned the Syrian Government directly about the potential
consequences of these actions.
We are also taking concrete steps to defend against the
threat of Hezbollah's missiles. As President Obama and
Secretary Clinton have said, our support of Israel's defense
remains steadfast, particularly when it comes to protecting
Israeli territory from rocket and ballistic missile technology
threats.
We will continue to cooperate closely with Israel on
antimissile programs, such as the Arrow program and David's
Sling. The administration has also committed to providing
Israel funding for the Israeli Iron Dome short-range ballistic
missile interceptor. Our efforts will help ensure that Israel
maintains the capability to defend against and mitigate these
threats.
Iran continues to assist Hezbollah in rearming, in
violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Iran has
provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support to
Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah fighters at
camps in Iran. Iran is also in violation of UNSCR 1747, which
prohibits it from exporting arms and related materiel.
In 2009, U.N. Member States reported to the U.N.'s Iran
Sanctions Committee three instances in which Iran was found to
be transferring arms or related materiel to Syria, a regional
hub for Iranian support to terrorist groups, including
Hezbollah. While Hezbollah no longer maintains an overt militia
presence in southern Lebanon, a result of Security Council
Resolution 1701, it has strengthened its military
infrastructure immediately north of the Litani River and in the
Bekaa Valley since 2006.
Taking all of this into account, I do want to underscore
our long-term goal in Lebanon, which Secretary Feltman has
referred to, when it comes to mitigating the threat Hezbollah
poses--establishing competent and accountable security forces
that are responsible for monitoring and securing all of
Lebanon's borders and, thus, undercutting Hezbollah's flawed
justification that it maintains its arsenal to defend Lebanon.
Hezbollah's destabilizing actions have a global reach.
The recent conviction of a Hezbollah cell in Egypt for
spying, plotting attacks on resorts frequented by tourists, and
arms smuggling illustrates the group's growing ambitions. In
Iraq, we are aware of Hezbollah providing training and other
support to Shia militant groups that carry out attacks against
coalition forces.
Hezbollah's web also extends to Europe and the Caucasus.
For example, Hezbollah planned to attack the Israeli Embassy in
Baku. While this attack was foiled and the perpetrators are now
in an Azerbaijani prison, these actions illustrate the group's
continued disregard for the rule of law, both inside and
outside Lebanon.
We continue to urge all of our European partners, including
the EU, to take further action against Hezbollah, to cease
contact with the group and enact sanctions. We reject the
argument that there is a difference between the group's
military and political wings.
In the Western Hemisphere, Hezbollah has tapped into Muslim
communities to raise funds. In June 2004, the United States
Treasury Department designated Assad Ahmed Barakat, a
Paraguayan, as a specially designated global terrorist under
Executive Order 13224.
In December 2006, Treasury designated nine individuals and
two business establishments as working in the Barakat financial
network. In June 2008, the USG froze the United States assets
of two Venezuelans for providing financial and other support to
Hezbollah. We do note, however, that we have no credible
information to indicate that Hezbollah has an operational
presence in Latin America.
In addition to our efforts with Israel and the Lebanon
security forces, we have taken numerous steps to erode
Hezbollah's capabilities. Along with the State Department's
designation of Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization,
which dates to 1997, the Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control has used Executive Order 13224 to
bolster the U.S. Government's capability to target terrorists'
financial networks.
A wide range of entities controlled by or affiliated with
Hezbollah have been designated under the Executive order,
including banks and financial front companies; Hezbollah-linked
NGOs; Hezbollah's construction company, Jihad al-Bina; and
specific individuals.
The United States has also taken action against Iranian
entities that are involved in funding and supporting Hezbollah.
In 2007, the United States Government designated, under
Executive Order 13224, Iran's Quds force, a wing of Tehran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has provided extensive
support, equipment, and training to Hezbollah.
In 2007, the United States designated one of the largest
Iranian state-owned banks, Bank Saderat, for transferring funds
to Hezbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups. Hezbollah has
used Bank Saderat to transfer funds, sometimes in the millions
of dollars, to support the activities of other terrorist
organizations such as Hamas in Gaza.
The United States continues to take the threats posed by
Hezbollah to it, Lebanon, and Israel, as well as the region at
large, with the utmost seriousness. We are minimizing the
threat and the influence of Hezbollah in the region by mounting
considerable diplomatic as well as counterterrorism capacity-
building and assistance efforts.
Let me just say again how pleased I am that you are holding
this hearing, and I very much look forward to your questions.
Senator Casey. Thank both of you.
I will start with Ambassador Benjamin on some of the
military aspects of this. In terms of firepower, comparing
where they were, where Hezbollah was in the summer of 2006 in
relationship to today, can you give us a sense of both the
nature of the fire power, the rearming that they have done and,
second, the reach capability?
And I think one thing that people in this country that we
all lose sight of is what a small area in 2006 those rockets
hit, such a small geographic area. I want you to give us a
sense of that geography after the firepower analysis.
Ambassador Benjamin. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Hezbollah itself has said that it has some 40,000 rockets
and missiles now, which I believe is significantly more than it
had at the time that hostilities began in 2006. It has, of
course, made these claims that I spoke about in my statement
regarding hitting Ben-Gurion Airport.
Beyond that, Senator, I would have to say that we would
need to talk about specific technical capabilities in a more
classified setting. But I would also mention what Secretary
Feltman referred to, which is the fact that Hezbollah is not
right on the blue line in the way it was before, at least not
with an overt militia presence.
And so, in that regard, its threat has been somewhat
diminished. But nonetheless, this enormous arsenal that it
speaks of is quite remarkable and, as you noted in your
statement, far exceeds the kind of arsenal that most--the vast
majority of countries in the world possess.
Senator Casey. And I realize that a good bit of this you
would have to speak of, or speak about, in a classified
setting.
Tell us, if you can, what your sense is of the reach, as we
know it from the public record, or have they made statements
about the--you referred to Ben-Gurion Airport. What kind of a
distance is that? I mean in a rough sense.
Ambassador Benjamin. I know the geography of Israel well,
but I am not that great at measuring miles or kilometers in my
brain. But I would imagine that it is--Jeff, you probably know
this better than I do--120 miles?
Ambassador Feltman. That is about right.
Ambassador Benjamin. Yes. From the northern border to the
airport. So, obviously, not a tremendous distance.
Senator Casey. You said 120?
Ambassador Benjamin. That was my guess, yes.
Senator Casey. And I realize these are estimates. I just
want to give people a sense of the--a little bit of a sense of
the geography.
Second, and I will get to some other questions in the
second round, but as it relates to the question of how Lebanon
can manage this kind of internal challenge that they have,
where are they as it relates to the question of arming or not
really arming, it is more training of their own armed forces?
Where are they in the progression of that, if either of you can
speak to that?
Ambassador Benjamin. Let me speak briefly on the issue of
the Internal Security Forces, and then I will ask Secretary
Feltman perhaps to speak to the LAF.
As you know, Senator, we have been engaging with the
Internal Security Forces through the antiterrorism assistance
training and through other programs to improve their
capabilities. And when we did an assessment recently on their
capabilities, we found that they had improved significantly and
that this is a very positive story.
Having said that, I don't want to create any illusion that
this is a force that is going to rid the country of Hezbollah
any time very soon. But nonetheless, it has played a
significant role, as you know, for example, in the case of the
Nahr al-Bared refugee camp and continues to play an
increasingly important role in domestic security.
Ambassador Feltman. And Chairman, the assistance program
with the ISF and the assistance program with the LAF, while
administered with different pots of money and by different
people on our side, are linked. Because the LAF has
traditionally done a lot of police work, and so by building up
the ISF, the capability of the ISF, it allows the LAF----
Senator Casey. Why don't you spell out those acronyms so
that----
Ambassador Feltman. ISF is the Internal Security Forces. It
is the police.
Senator Casey. Right.
Ambassador Feltman. National police. Gendarmerie-type
system, police system. The LAF are the Lebanese Armed Forces,
which are the traditional army elements. And the LAF, over the
years, had taken on police work, given weaknesses within the
ISF. So by building up the ISF, as Ambassador Benjamin was
describing, the LAF is able to concentrate more on core
missions such as counterterrorism, securing the country, things
like that.
We have--you referred to some of the figures yourself, that
since 2006, we have provided to the LAF, the Lebanese Armed
Forces, about $630 million in training, equipment, and so
forth. This includes basic equipment, such as vehicles,
communications gear, weapons, ammunition. It also includes some
heavy weaponry like tanks and artillery to the LAF.
I would note in this regard that the LAF has maintained an
exemplary end-use record. They have 100 percent compliance with
end-use monitoring, with the requirements on which we put the
LAF equipment. We have a comprehensive training program to
reshape and professionalize the LAF, also working with the LAF
to develop a long-term strategy based on quantifiable
milestones.
The thing that is important to remember about the LAF is
this is the national institution in which all Lebanese have
sort of bestowed their national aspirations. I think we all
know from watching Lebanon over the years that there is a weak
state structure in general, that there have been divisions
that, in some cases, turned violent such as during the civil
war with loyalties for political leaders or community leaders,
what you might even describe as feudal-type leaders.
But the LAF is the one institution that has transcended
those differences. It is essentially a symbol for the Lebanese
state that the Lebanese people would all like to have. So there
is not only the security motivation behind support to the
Lebanese Armed Forces, there is more of a national state-
building aspect to this as well.
In terms of measuring success, I will give you an odd
measure right now. There has been an attack, particularly on
the assistance to the ISF, by Hezbollah, Hezbollah's allies,
Hezbollah-associated media, basically coming out in strong
force saying what is this? What is the United States doing with
the ISF? This is all something very, very nefarious. When all
it is, is we are doing is building a credible national police
force.
But if Hezbollah media, Hezbollah political organs are so
threatened by what we are doing with the ISF, I have to say
what we are doing must be pretty good in helping contribute to
the national police force.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like your opinions or views on the following. We
all know that the state of Israel has been firm in its
determination to defend itself and, as such, will act when
provoked to take military action. And I think alongside that
and parallel to it, all of us and I think a number of people on
this committee have seen the intelligence reports about the
buildup of arms to Hezbollah, and we are not disclosing
anything because this has all been--a lot of it has been
reported in the media. So I think it is a fact that everyone
can accept that there is substantial buildup of arms with
Hezbollah since the 2006 war.
Israel in the past has, before they have taken action,
usually verbalized or articulated its concern regarding a given
situation. And lately, we have been hearing Israel verbalize
that it has growing concerns about the buildup of arms
immediately on its northern border. What is your opinion or
your thoughts, each of you, on the likelihood of Israel taking
action, given the buildup and given the fact that the buildup
continues?
You know, the world listens and watches these things and
then, when Israel takes action, wrings its hands about what
they have done when there were usually pretty decent warning
signs that there was something going to happen. And I am
starting to get a feeling that there is growing concern
reaching some type of critical mass regarding the buildup of
these arms. I would like your thoughts on that.
Ambassador Feltman. Senator Risch, let me make a couple of
comments. And of course, the first one is the United States
stands with Israel's right to defend itself. It is a principle
of our foreign and security policy.
We are, in fact, working with the Israelis to enhance their
security capabilities against the type of threat that Hezbollah
missiles pose, and we appreciate the support of the Senate, of
this committee, for example, for the assistance to help Israel
with its Iron Dome capability, where Israel is planning to
deploy 12 new countermissile batteries under its Iron Dome. So
the first principle is we support Israel's right to defend
itself.
Second thing is Israel, as you know, is going to make its
own decisions based on its own sovereign interests, its own
risk calculation. They don't turn to us or look to us for
agreement, approval, or anything. They are going to make their
decision.
Senator Risch. So where do you think they are right now?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, I will tell you where we are.
Where we are I feel on more comfortable ground. We have been
passing the message to the Syrians, to the people in Lebanon
about the real risks that continued transfer of sophisticated
weaponry to Hezbollah puts Lebanon and the region beyond.
And I know that Senator Corker was just in Damascus
himself. I suspect your message was similar to ours about these
risks because we are using all channels that we can in order to
get the message out about how dangerous the situation is of
these continued transfers of weaponry to Hezbollah. So that is
where we are.
Senator Risch. But you know some members of this committee
have done exactly that. We met with the Lebanese here within
the last couple few weeks and delivered that message. I have to
tell you, from a personal standpoint, that I was not--they get
it. They understand it. But I was not comforted with the
response I got as far as what they thought they could do about
it.
Thus, the question about what are the Israelis going to do
about it.
Ambassador Feltman. On the dilemma you pose is one that we
have to think about a lot, which is that there are forces
affecting Lebanon that are bigger than Lebanon, that are bigger
than the Lebanese to manage by themselves. And it seems to me
that the best thing that we can do, as the United States, is to
try to calm the neighborhood that, frankly, the neighborhood in
which Lebanon gets routinely mugged.
And this is one reason why we are committed to getting to a
comprehensive peace, a peace that includes Syria, a peace that
will address these questions once and for all. The question we
have before us now is how do we manage the situation in the
meantime, between that comprehensive peace that Syria says it
wants, that would solve the issues of these arms transfers once
and for all, and now?
And I don't have much insights into what the Israelis are
thinking, but I know that they are concerned. They raise their
concerns with us.
Senator Risch. Dan.
Ambassador Benjamin. Senator Risch, I don't have much to
add to what Secretary Feltman said. We have been hearing the
same things you have heard. I am going to be in Israel next
week and look forward to discussing exactly these issues with
the Israelis. It is clearly a situation of significant tension
and of great concern to us.
And we have, as Secretary Feltman said, been warning
everyone in the region. I was in Damascus in March. We have
been warning everyone about the dangers of miscalculation and
the dangers associated with the transfer of sophisticated
technologies and weaponry, and I would be happy to report back
to you when I am back.
Senator Risch. I want to thank both of you for that
analysis.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing. I think it is very timely and appreciate
both of your being here to testify.
Ambassador Feltman, you talked about the experience over
the last several years that the Lebanese people rejecting
Hezbollah on a number of occasions when there were efforts to
really grandstand by Hezbollah in Lebanon. So where do you
think--is Hezbollah popular now among the Lebanese people, and
are there particular sects in Lebanon that support Hezbollah
more than others?
And if so, where does Hezbollah get its popularity? Is it
from intimidation, or is it from groups that truly believe in
the message that Hezbollah seems to be delivering?
Ambassador Feltman. Senator, thanks for the question,
giving me the opportunity to offer my insights based on what I
saw when I was Ambassador there for 3\1/2\ years.
First of all, Hezbollah does have genuine grassroots
popular support, without question. We may not like it, but we
can't deny it that Hezbollah has been able to tap into the
Lebanese political system, a divided Lebanese political system
based on community loyalty and also provide some social
services to a neglected part of the population. Iranian-funded
social services we could say, but they have been very effective
in doing this.
But the point I was trying to make is there are limits.
This is not a question where suddenly Hezbollah's ideology is
going to be welcomed across Lebanese society, across all of
Lebanon. So Hassan Nasrallah seems to be a true believer, a
true believer in the Khomeini-style Iranian revolutionary
rhetoric. That seems to be what Hassan Nasrallah--what
motivates him.
I think all of us know a lot of Lebanese, and you know that
that is not a way that you would characterize all the Lebanese.
It is an extremely sophisticated, cosmopolitan population with
traditional ties across the region, across the world. And an
Iranian-style, revolutionary, Shia-based ideology is not going
to have universal appeal in Lebanon.
So what you have is you have strong support for Hezbollah
based in the Shia community, particularly based in the
neglected parts of the Shia population. And then you have
political alliances that are based on perceived mutual
interests, and you have political accommodation that is based
on the reality that Hezbollah is powerful, has a militia, is
backed by Syria, is backed by Iran.
But when you look at the election results for the municipal
elections, for syndicate elections, for student elections, and
even for parliamentary elections last year, you do see these
limitations. You see erosion in the support of the allies that
stood with Hezbollah, the allies that thought Hezbollah was
their--the non-Shia allies that thought that Hezbollah was
going to be their ticket to power. You see erosion in this.
And it is what I think should inspire us that no matter how
hard the task is in Lebanon to keep engaged, to maintain our
support for Lebanon state institutions, to provide alternatives
to the vision that Hezbollah has painted because it is not a
natural vision that all Lebanese are going to subscribe to.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I think that is a good
analysis. I appreciate that.
I was, I am sure, among many people here who were very
pleased to see the strength of the Hariri election last year
and the new government be formed and do recognize that the
government faces real challenges in dealing with Hezbollah. Are
there more or are there ways in which the government could
better undermine Hezbollah's arguments to the public and
encourage them to abandon violence and to really move in ways
that are more productive to the future of Lebanon?
Ambassador Feltman. I think that to the extent that the
state can deliver services, if the state can create economic
growth. And in fact, Lebanon is having something like 8 percent
economic growth last year, and they are predicting to have 4 to
8 percent this year. To the extent that these sorts of factors
continue, you maintain an alternative vision to the vision that
Hezbollah is painting.
Now Hezbollah is in the government. They were in the
government by invitation. The Lebanese are looking for
consensus, a national unity government that can try to
transcend some of the differences that have been so dangerous
to Lebanon in the past.
So I don't see the government itself as saying we are going
to adopt policies that are confronting Hezbollah. That is not
the question. The question is can the government provide the
type of services that build a national allegiance to the state
that transcends all of these boundaries?
You know, Hassan Nasrallah probably would be willing to
fight to the last Lebanese, fight Israel, fight for Iran, for
the last Lebanese. But I am not sure that every Lebanese would
be willing to fight for Khomeini-style revolution to the last
Lebanese. And so, the state can embody the aspirations of the
Lebanese for their nation with proper support, working to build
national institutions, such as the police and such as the army.
But again, I go back to something I said to Ranking Member
Risch in that I think our responsibility is, first of all, to
show support for nonsectarian national institutions like the
army, but also to work to calm the region, the region whose
forces have so affected Lebanon so many times in a very
negative way.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I have other questions, but I
am about out of time.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony and service. And
Secretary Feltman, as you mentioned, I was in Beirut and
Damascus this last week and certainly support the right of
Israel to defend itself strongly, like most Americans do, and
certainly denounce any kind of terrorist activity that any
organization might provide.
I will say that on the ground in Lebanon one would get a
very different picture as it relates to how people view
Hezbollah. Among business people in Lebanon, which basically
generally don't pay a bit of attention to the Lebanese
Government because of the lack of ability of the Lebanese
Government to really do much that is very effective, they don't
really view Hezbollah as a threat. And it is amazing to see the
support that people have there on the ground for what they do
in their eyes--I am just repeating them, not my own position--
but in their eyes to really defend Israeli aggression.
And just it is a huge disconnect between what you are
saying here and what I think one might pick up on the ground. I
wonder if you wanted to expand on that at all?
Ambassador Feltman. At a political level, Lebanon is deeply
divided, and that is reflected time and time again. And so, I
am not surprised when the business class, is a class I know
well from the 3\1/2\ years that I spent there, makes their
accommodations with this reality of a divided political class
and the reality of a region that hasn't always been friendly to
Lebanon. In fact, usually hasn't been friendly to Lebanon.
The Lebanese are very talented in their entrepreneurial and
business abilities. They are able to work in this. So I am not
surprised to see accommodation by the business community to
these divisions, and I am also not----
Senator Corker. I think it is more than accommodation. I
think they are glad that they are there, do not consider them
to be a nuisance, and actually consider them to be the only
real defense against their perceived possibility of Israeli
aggression. So I think it is more than accommodation.
Ambassador Feltman. And I also am not surprised if they see
the need for Lebanon to have a deterrent. Look how many times
Lebanon has ended up in some kind of war over the years.
But it is not--that support that you heard, Senator, isn't
being reflected in syndicate elections, in union elections, in
student elections----
Senator Corker. I am talking about strictly as a defense
mechanism. I agree with you on the political side. But as a
defense mechanism, I think it is viewed very differently than
is being outlined today by many on the ground.
Ambassador Feltman. But there is something interesting,
which the time when I was in Lebanon I tried to point out to
some of my friends and contacts, which is at one level
Hezbollah is creating the conditions that then serve to create
the threat that then give Hezbollah the justification for its
arms.
Let me use one example, the Israeli overflights. I know
very well how much the Lebanese are bothered. They feel their
national sovereignty is insulted. They are in some cases
worried about the Israeli overflights. And these are things
that the U.N. Security Council has heard from a number of U.N.
representatives are a violation of various Security Council
resolutions.
But it would be a heck of a lot easier for us, as friends
of Israel, as supporters of Israel's right to defend itself, to
make the case to Israel you need to stop those overflights if
there weren't arms smuggling. There is a direct linkage between
the arms smuggling, the arms transfers that Hezbollah is
engaged in and those Israeli overflights.
So Hezbollah uses the overflights to say, look, you need
us. You need us to defend Lebanon against these overflights.
But they are creating the very conditions by which those
overflights occur.
Senator Corker. Yes. It is interesting. On the ground,
again, I think right before the municipal elections in the
south, there were those overflights. And some of the Lebanese
have a totally different point of view as to why those
overflights take place, which I won't speak about at this
moment.
Let me ask you the relationship between Syria and Lebanon
obviously is very important as it relates to Hezbollah and as
it relates to just relations overall. It looks to me like
Hariri has made a couple of trips in recently to see Assad. And
even though his father had been killed, I guess that is in the
past, and there have been suspects in Syria about that, it
looks like that is warming tremendously. And I wonder if that
relationship warming over time might change the dynamic that
exists with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon?
Ambassador Feltman. I mean, our position, Senator, is that
Lebanon and Syria should have a positive relationship, that
there should be good relations between Syria and Lebanon. That
when Syria and Lebanon have had bad relations that it has been
bad for Lebanon.
But it is a relationship that needs to be built on mutual
respect, that needs to be based on the idea you don't interfere
in the sovereignty of the other country. So to the extent that
Prime Minister Hariri or President Suleiman are developing that
type of relationship with their Syrian counterparts, we would
welcome it.
There is family, history, trade, all sorts of ties between
Syria and Lebanon. It is natural they should have a good
relationship. The trouble that has happened too many times in
the past, though, is that that relationship has been very much
dominated by one side interfering in the other. So, to the
extent that they are building a new type of relationship, that
is great.
Senator Corker. And again, just to ask some contrarian
types of questions, I know that Ambassador Crocker is going to
testify afterward. I am not sure I am going to be here for
that. I noticed one of the four things that he recommends--in
addition to one of the things you mentioned, having an
Ambassador to Syria. He recommended that we engage Hezbollah.
And of course, maybe it is easy for him to say now that he
is retired, to be able to say that kind of thing. But I
wondered what your reaction might be to that?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, our policy is for not
engaging with Hezbollah for all the reasons you know. And I
don't anticipate that policy changing. Hezbollah, to the extent
that Hezbollah would evolve into a normal part of the political
fabric in Lebanon, and Hezbollah would, in fact, win
significant political support even without its arms.
To the extent that they would play by the rules, act like a
normal political force in Lebanon, I think that we could
probably rethink our own policy. But for the current situation,
as long as Hezbollah is maintaining militia, is undertaking
activities in the region and beyond that basically are
terrorist activities, we are not engaging with them.
Senator Corker. Well, I thank you both for your service,
and Mr. Benjamin, I am sorry we didn't have any questions. But
maybe here a little bit later.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Corker.
I know we have a little more time in this panel, maybe 5
minutes. I am trying to stick to our 1 hour, and I won't
dominate the remaining time because I know that others may have
questions. But I wanted to raise one question I think I would
be delinquent if I didn't ask about this. I meant to ask
earlier, and it could be for either, but I wanted to get your
reaction.
This is a Reuters story of May 18, and I will just read the
first--I don't want to take it out of context. So I will read
the lead of the story. It says, and I am quoting, ``The Obama
administration is looking for ways to build up `moderate
elements' within the Lebanese Hezbollah guerrilla movement and
to diminish the influence of hard-liners, a top White House
official said on Tuesday. John Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, met with
Lebanese leaders during a recent visit.''
And it goes on from there. I think it--I haven't seen much
analysis of that. I wanted to get your sense of what the intent
of that statement was and what, if anything, is being done to
effectuate that, if that is the policy of this administration?
Ambassador Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Brennan, who spent a
career in the intelligence community, may have made an analytic
statement about what is going on in Lebanese politics. But I
think that this story itself distorts the sense of his remarks,
and I would just say that the policy has not changed regarding
Hezbollah or contacts with Hezbollah. We do not distinguish
between a political wing and a military wing. We do not, to
echo what Secretary Feltman said a moment ago, think that there
is any room right now for engagement with Hezbollah.
And I would just add to what he said before and to Senator
Corker's question that I think it would be enormously damaging
to our broader counterterrorism policy if we were to change
course on Hezbollah in a way that we have not changed with
Hamas or any number of other groups that do not play by the
rules, that embrace violence against innocents as a matter of
course, and that pose a threat to key regional allies. I just
think that this would be very, very damaging to what it is we
are trying to achieve in counterterrorism.
Senator Casey. And Ambassador Feltman, do you have anything
to add to that? I would hope that that is reiterated and
repeated.
Well, one final question before we wrap up and I turn to
our colleagues for their final questions for this panel. The
budget question, the $136 million. I guess there are a couple
of questions there. No. 1, how do you assess that in terms of
the impact? How will it be spent, No. 1?
No. 2 is the question or the concern, I should say, about
whether or not we are confident that those dollars can't find
their way unwittingly or unintentionally, but find their way
into somehow helping Hezbollah? What is your sense of that, or
what can you tell us to assure us that that is not the case?
Ambassador Feltman. Let me say a couple of things. First,
as I mentioned earlier, the LAF has a perfect record. The
Lebanese Armed Forces have a perfect record of accountability
for the equipment that we have provided, which includes
agreement on use, end-use monitoring, physical inventories.
They have an exemplary record.
In terms of our assistance program more broadly, when we
are talking about ESF, NADR funds, some DRL funds, et cetera,
we have a lot of steps in place to make sure that we are
complying with U.S. law as well as U.S. policy in terms of
guarding against the use of funds, materials, et cetera,
benefiting Hezbollah or other prescribed organizations.
You ask a broader question, which is basically are the
levels of what we are asking for appropriate for the task? And
I will say that one always has to balance policy priorities
with resources, but I think that we are doing a pretty good
job. There was a joint--United States-Lebanon joint military
commission here back in February during the blizzard. Deputy
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Murr was able to have
meetings with his counterparts at DOD, and there was basically
agreement for assuming appropriations, a $200 million 2-year
program to build up the LAF's special forces on
counterterrorism.
The LAF has proven its political willingness to go after
elements of Sunni extremism, Sunni terrorism in Lebanon, and so
we have agreed to help build up their special operations forces
on that counterterrorism, which I think is appropriate and will
be welcomed across all of Lebanon. But we are not the only
players in town. It is worth remembering that there is also
other support coming in for Lebanon's independent
institutions--Saudi, UAE, Jordanian, French. So we are using
our assistance I think wisely but are mindful of the fact that
others have resources they can bring as well.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Unless Senator Shaheen, Senator Corker, or Senator Risch.
Senator Shaheen. I have a question.
Senator Casey. OK. Sure.
Senator Shaheen. I think this may be for you, Mr. Benjamin.
Do we--and I don't know if this is public information or not.
But do we have estimates about the current size of Hezbollah,
both in Lebanon and in terms of the numbers of operatives they
are supporting around the world?
Ambassador Benjamin. I think we have estimates for the
number of actual men under arms in Lebanon, and it is in the
several thousands. In terms of operatives around the world, I
don't think we have any numbers that we could discuss in this
setting. I think that we also would have to distinguish between
those who are engaged in fundraising activities and those who
are actual terrorists, those who would be prepared to carry out
violent actions.
And additionally, when we are talking about Lebanon, we
would have to come up with some discussion, some assessment of
how many people are actually involved in the organization,
involved in their social services provision and the like. So I
think it is a fairly complicated picture, but in terms of those
who are under arms in Lebanon--5,000, 4,000 is the standard? Am
I correct, Jeff?
Ambassador Feltman. I would guess higher, but I don't know.
Ambassador Benjamin. You would guess higher.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, I think I am really asking about
those who we think are involved in terrorist activities
directly.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes, I don't think that we could give
you an estimate in this setting on global activities if you
were to take into account Iraq, for example, people training in
Iran and the like. But we would be happy to follow up with you
on that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Well, thanks very much to both of you. We
appreciate your time and testimony. If we have further
questions for the record, we will submit them to you, and we
are grateful for your testimony. And we will move to our second
panel.
Just for purposes of review, for the second panel, we will
try to keep statements to 5 to 7 minutes. Your entire
statements, of course, will be made part of the record. And I
think we will probably start with--we will start with
Ambassador Crocker, if that is OK? And we will just go right to
left.
So we will begin the second panel. As I said before, we
would try to keep each to an hour. We are doing pretty well so
far.
And Ambassador Crocker, could we start with you, if you
don't mind? We are grateful for each of you taking the time to
be here. I know that all of you had to travel, one way or the
other, some from as far away as Boston and Texas, I guess.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, DEAN AND EXECUTIVE
PROFESSOR, GEORGE BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE,
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE STATION, TX
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
I have had the honor many times in the past to appear
before this committee as a member of various administrations.
Now I am honestly able to say it is also a pleasure.
[Laughter.]
We are here today to discuss Hezbollah, its strength, its
supporters, and the challenges it poses to vital U.S. interests
in the region. While our focus today is on the Middle East, it
is worth recalling that Hezbollah is a global network with
capabilities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
For more than a quarter of a century, Hezbollah and its
sponsors have targeted the United States and its allies. I have
been a witness to much of it. I was present in Lebanon when
Hezbollah was created in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli
invasion. I was there during the bombings of the Embassy and
the Marine Barracks the following year.
I was back in Lebanon as Ambassador when Hezbollah entered
Parliament in the 1992 elections following the assassination of
Abbas Musawi earlier that year. I was Ambassador to Syria when
a triumphant Hezbollah emerged ascendant in south Lebanon in
2000, and I was present, physically present, when Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah led a delegation to Damascus to confer
legitimacy on Bashar al-Assad in the wake of his father's death
that same summer. And it is worth recalling that episode when
we look back at the recent meeting that Bashar al-Assad hosted
in Damascus of Ahmadinejad of Iran and Hassan Nasrallah. As
Ambassador to Iraq, I saw the evidence of Hezbollah's
involvement in the training of Shia extremists under Iranian
sponsorship.
Hezbollah is both an indigenous Lebanese organization and a
proxy for Syria and Iran. Iran has always seen itself as a
regional power, capable of projecting force beyond its borders.
The shah did so with conventional forces, his army in the
Arabian Peninsula in the early 1970s at the same time his navy
seized three islands from the United Arab Emirates.
The creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, just 3 years after
the revolution in Tehran, allowed the Islamic Republic to
continue to project power in Iranian imperial tradition, albeit
by unconventional rather than conventional means. For Syria,
the establishment of an ideologically motivated terrorist
organization provided an instrument whereby Damascus could
continue its campaign in Lebanon against Israel and the United
States following the utter rout of its conventional forces in
1982.
And for both Iran and Syria, it was another important
element in a strategic partnership forged in the wake of Saddam
Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980 when Syria became the only
Arab State to side with Tehran. That strategic partnership is
alive and well today not only in Lebanon. We saw it at work in
Iraq during the period I was there, with Iran arming and
training Shia militias in coordination with Hezbollah while
Syria supported al-Qaeda and Sunni insurgents.
In essence, they were following the Lebanon game plan of
the 1980s. It almost succeeded, but the surge and the
determination of the Iraqis themselves confounded the effort,
at least for the time being.
And the partnership in Lebanon with Hezbollah continues.
Weapons of increasing sophistication and lethality originate
from Iran and are delivered through Syria, as they have been
for two and a half decades.
But it would not be correct to see Hezbollah only as a
puppet manipulated through Tehran and Damascus. The
organization is strongly rooted in Lebanon's own Shia Arab
history. Over the years, Hezbollah has expanded its
capabilities and reach at every level, as you noted,
politically, socially, and militarily.
The 2006 conflict with Israel I think demonstrated that the
threat posed by Hezbollah cannot be eliminated by military
means alone. The recent improvement in Syrian-Saudi relations
have strengthened the hand of Damascus in Lebanon and of
Hezbollah as recent pressures on Prime Minister Hariri
indicate. But neither Hezbollah nor its backers have a
completely free hand, and there are opportunities as well as
challenges.
I have four suggestions. First, work to strengthen the
Lebanese state and especially the Lebanese Armed Forces. The
Lebanese Armed Forces emerged from the turmoil of the civil war
as an increasingly capable and professional force.
We need to be realistic. I do not think the Lebanese Armed
Forces will take on Hezbollah militarily, now or in the future,
but a strong and capable Lebanese Armed Forces could, over
time, change the thinking of Hezbollah's core constituency. If
the LAF is broadly seen by Lebanese Shia, including supporters
of Hezbollah, as a competent and impartial force, the current
strong support for an extra-legal militia may shift.
A corollary, and this is my second point, is a concerted
Lebanese government effort, with foreign assistance, to improve
economic and social conditions in Shia areas. Shia mistrust of
the state is rooted in generations of alienation fostered by a
sense of economic marginalization and neglect. Much of
Hezbollah's strength is the product of the state's weakness.
Taken together, these two initiatives could bring about a
recalculation by the Shia of the relative costs and benefits of
an ongoing state of military confrontation with Israel. At
present, the benefits are perceived as far outweighing the
costs. And I certainly had the same impression, Senator Corker,
from my contacts in Lebanon as you derived from your visit. It
goes beyond the Shia community.
My third point is the one you mentioned. We should talk to
Hezbollah. One thing I learned in my time in Iraq is that
engagement can be extremely valuable in ending an insurgency.
Sometimes persuasion and negotiation change minds. But in any
case, we would learn far more about the organization than we
know now--personalities, differences, points of weakness.
Simply put, we cannot mess with our adversary's mind if we are
not talking to him.
This does not need to be styled as a dramatic change in
policy, simply a matter of fact engagement with those who hold
official positions as Members of Parliament or the Cabinet.
Hezbollah is a part of the Lebanese political landscape, and I
think we should deal with it, again not with a view of finding
the moderates or the pragmatists. I am not sure there are any.
But as we were able to do in Iraq, we can find differences and
divisions that can be exploited.
For the same reasons, we should step up our engagement with
Syria. Sending an ambassador, in my view, is not a concession.
It improves our access, expands our understanding, allows us to
identify potential weaknesses and differences including between
Damascus and Tehran. In short, it would be to our advantage,
not theirs.
I know Robert Ford well, and he is the ideal individual for
a job I once held. He is fluent in Arabic. And with more than 3
years in Iraq since 2003, he is no stranger to tough
assignments and tough people.
Mr. Chairman, these are not magic bullets. Those don't
exist. But over time, such efforts can make a difference. Syria
and Iran have demonstrated a capacity for strategic patience
and a long game in Lebanon, playing a weak hand to advantage.
It is important that we make and sustain long-term commitments
of our own and that we engage with adversaries as well as
allies.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, Dean and Executive
Professor, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas
A&M University, College Station, TX
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Hezbollah, its
strength, its supporters, and the challenges it poses to vital U.S.
interests in the region. These are critical issues for our country, and
the committee is to be commended for raising them. While our focus
today is on the Middle East, it is worth recalling that Hezbollah is a
global network that also has capabilities in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
For more than a quarter of a century, Hezbollah and its sponsors
have targeted the United States and its allies. I have been a witness
to much of it. I was present in Lebanon when Hezbollah was created in
the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion. I was there during the
bombings of the Embassy and the Marine Barracks the following year. I
was back in Lebanon as Ambassador when Hezbollah entered Parliament in
the 1992 elections following the assassination of Abbas Musawi earlier
that year. I was Ambassador to Syria when a triumphant Hezbollah
emerged ascendant in South Lebanon in 2000, and I was present when
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah led a delegation to Damascus to
confer legitimacy on Bashar al-Asad in the wake of his father's death
that same summer. And as Ambassador to Iraq, I saw the evidence of
Hezbollah's involvement in the training of Shia extremists under
Iranian sponsorship.
Hezbollah is both an indigenous Lebanese organization and a proxy
for Syria and Iran. It draws heavily for its legitimacy on deeply
rooted themes of resistance and martyrdom in Shia Islam, what scholars
such as Dr. Rola al-Hosseini call the Karbala Paradigm. This refers to
the death of the Imam Hossein and his followers at the hands of an
Umayyad army near the Iraqi city of Karbala in Islam's first century.
For the Shia, it is the defining event in their history. In Hezbollah's
contemporary narrative, we and Israel are cast in the role of the
Umayyads--it is a compelling image for the lower class youth who are
the core of Hezbollah's support.
For Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has been a valuable proxy. Iran has
always seen itself as a regional power, capable of projecting power
beyond its borders. The Shah did so with conventional forces. His army
was deployed in the Arabian Peninsula in the 1970s, and his navy seized
three islands from the United Arab Emirates at the same time. The
creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, just 3 years after the revolution in
Tehran, allowed the Islamic Republic to continue to project power in
Iranian imperial tradition albeit by unconventional rather than
conventional means.
For Syria, the establishment of an ideologically motivated
terrorist organization provided an instrument whereby Damascus could
continue its campaign in Lebanon against Israel and the United States
following the utter rout of its conventional forces at the hands of the
Israelis in 1982. And for both Iran and Syria, it was another important
element in a strategic partnership forged in the wake of Saddam
Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980 when Syria became the only Arab
State to side with Tehran.
That strategic partnership is alive and well today. We saw it at
work in Iraq during the period I was there, with Iran arming and
training Shia militias in coordination with Hezbollah while Syria
supported al-Qaeda and Sunni insurgents. In essence, they were
following the Lebanon game plan of the 1980s. It almost succeeded, but
the surge and the determination of the Iraqis themselves confounded the
effort, at least for the time being. And the partnership in Lebanon
with Hezbollah continues. Weapons of increasing sophistication and
lethality originate from Iran, and are delivered through Syria as they
have been for two and a half decades.
But it would not be correct to see Hezbollah as a puppet
manipulated through Tehran and Damascus. The organization is strongly
rooted in Lebanon's own Shia Arab history. It is worth recalling that
South Lebanon (known as Jabal Amel) flourished as a center of
scholarship and culture in the Middle Ages. After the establishment of
the Safavid Empire at the beginning of the 16th century, Iran's first
Shia dynasty, the ulama of Jabal Amel advised the new rulers on the
structure and principles of a Shia state. Hezbollah styles itself as
the heir to that tradition.
Over the years, Hezbollah has expanded its capabilities and reach
at every level--politically, socially, and militarily. The 2006
conflict with Israel demonstrated that the threat posed by Hezbollah
cannot be eliminated by military means. The recent improvement in
Syrian-Saudi relations have strengthened the hand of Damascus in
Lebanon, and strengthened Hezbollah as recent pressures on Prime
Minister Hariri indicate. But neither Hezbollah nor its backers have a
free hand, and there are opportunities as well as challenges. As we
consider our options, I suggest we move in the following directions.
Work to strengthen the Lebanese state, and especially the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The LAF has emerged from the
turmoil of the civil war as an increasingly capable and
professional force. I do not think it is realistic to expect
the LAF to take on Hezbollah militarily, now or in the future.
But a strong and engaged Lebanese army could over time change
the thinking of Hezbollah's constituency. If the LAF is broadly
seen by Lebanese Shia, including supporters of Hezbollah, as a
competent and impartial force, the current strong support for
an extra-legal militia may shift.
A corollary is a concerted Lebanese Government effort, with
foreign assistance, to improve economic and social conditions
in Shia areas. Shia mistrust of the state is rooted in
generations of alienation fostered by a sense of economic
marginalization and neglect. Much of Hezbollah's strength is
the product of the state's weakness. Taken together, these two
initiatives could bring about a recalculation by the Shia of
the relative costs and benefits of an ongoing state of military
confrontation with Israel. At present, the benefits are
perceived as far outweighing the costs.
We should talk to Hezbollah. One thing I learned in Iraq is
that engagement can be extremely valuable in ending an
insurgency. Sometimes persuasion and negotiation change minds.
But in any case we would learn far more about the organization
than we know now--personalities, differences, points of
weakness. We cannot mess with our adversary's mind if we are
not talking to him. This does not need to be styled as a
dramatic change in policy; simply a matter of fact engagement
with those who hold official positions as Members of Parliament
or the Cabinet. Hezbollah is a part of the Lebanese political
landscape, and we should deal with it directly.
For the same reasons, we should step up our engagement with
Syria. Sending an ambassador is not a concession. It improves
our access, expands our understanding, allows us to identify
potential weaknesses and differences including between Damascus
and Tehran--in short it would be to our advantage, not theirs.
I know Robert Ford well, and he is the ideal individual for a
job I once held. He is fluent in Arabic, and with more than 3
years in Iraq since 2003, no stranger to tough assignments and
tough people.
Mr. Chairman, these are not magic bullets. There are none in this
campaign. But over time, such efforts can make a difference. Syria and
Iran have demonstrated a capacity for strategic patience and a long
game in Lebanon, transforming a weak hand to a strong one. It is
important that we sustain long term commitments of our own.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Ambassador Crocker.
Ms. Pletka.
STATEMENT OF DANIELLE PLETKA, VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND
DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Pletka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
At the outset, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, let me say
that I spent more than a decade--I am loath to admit that--
working on the subject of today's hearing as a staff member for
this committee, and I am a little bit more accustomed to
sitting behind you than I am sitting in front of you.
But I am very grateful for this invitation to testify today
not just because it feels like a homecoming for me, but more
importantly, because I know from personal experience the
important role that this committee can play in addressing this
and so many other vital issues.
Despite a heightened awareness of terrorism and terrorist
groups since 9/11, American policy toward Lebanon, Syria, and
Hezbollah remains, I believe, confused--a mass of mixed signals
and inconsistent approaches.
Despite more than $1.6 billion--and we have mentioned some
of the component parts of that aid, but we haven't added it all
up--more than $1.6 billion in economic and military assistance
to Lebanon since FY06, that includes next year's request--both
the Obama administration and the previous administration have
very little to show for their efforts in the Levant.
In the wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Hariri in 2005--a murder, by the way, we haven't
stated this explicitly, but certainly Hezbollah is suspected to
have been involved in that by the United Nations tribunal
investigating that murder--the international community took a
relatively hard line against Syria and its proxies. And the
resulting end to the Syrian military domination of Lebanon gave
many of us hope that Lebanon was at last on track to regain the
independence it lost in 1976.
In the years that followed, there were a lot of troublesome
developments that should only have fueled our commitment to
helping Lebanon protect itself from Syrian and Iranian
predations. The 2006 war that we have talked about and, worst
still, Hezbollah's performance in that conflict revealed what
some in Israel and the United States had dismissed as a ragtag
group of terrorists was, in fact, a sophisticated, well-
trained, and as we have mentioned, very well-armed fighting
machine.
The subsequent passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1701 and its call for, and I quote, ``no weapons without the
consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other
than that of the Government of Lebanon'' appeared to be a
silver lining to the summer war, much as the aftermath of the
Hariri murder led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops. But the
resolution has been all but ignored.
Iran and Syria continued to rearm Hezbollah, and Hezbollah
is now significantly better armed than it was in 2006. As you
mentioned, as Secretary Gates has said, Hezbollah has far more
rockets--and I am quoting here--``more rockets and missiles
than most governments in the world.'' I provided you with an
estimated list of some of their weaponry based on open sources,
and it is impressive, indeed.
Let me just list a couple of things for you that are
developments that we have reported on our Iran Tracker Web site
at AEI in the last 6 months alone. The Times of London reported
that Israeli and American officials believe Syria transferred
two Scud missiles to Lebanon, where they are suspected to be in
an underground storage facility in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah
sources told a Kuwaiti paper that the group now has the
capability to launch 15 tons of explosives at Israel every day
in the case of another war.
Arms seized from a cargo plane in Bangkok late last year
were destined for Hezbollah and Hamas. And Thai authorities
said that the plane, with weapons that were sourced in North
Korea, was carrying 35 tons of weaponry, including rockets and
RPGs.
Reports in May suggested that Syria supplied Hezbollah with
M600 missiles. That would allow Hezbollah to hit Tel Aviv from
southern Lebanon. That is, by the way, about 60 miles, not even
120.
In January, which was an extraordinarily busy month for
that relationship, Hezbollah placed long-range rockets deep
into Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. The Israeli Navy seized an
Iranian ship en route to Syria, carrying weapons destined for
Hezbollah from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Kuwaiti papers
reported a United States official saying Hezbollah operatives
were training on SA2 antiaircraft missile batteries in Syria,
and U.N. peacekeepers uncovered 660 pounds of explosive devices
near the border with Israel.
It is a pretty amazing list just from the last few months
alone. In short, Hezbollah is effectively a state within a
state in Lebanon, with an ever growing and ever more
sophisticated long-range arsenal. It is untrammeled by the
Lebanese Government to which it belongs and answerable to no
one in that nation, but rather to the dictatorships in Damascus
and in Tehran.
Sadly, hopes that Lebanese leaders answerable to the
Lebanese people--and not to foreign powers--would regain
control have not been realized. And there was no more poignant
symbol of that failure than the fact that as Lebanese Prime
Minister Saad Hariri was meeting with our own President Obama
and his team, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman appeared on
Hezbollah's Al Manar television station, praising Hezbollah and
reportedly, and I quote, ``calling on all Lebanese to embrace
and protect Hezbollah's arms.''
According to the Pentagon, Hezbollah receives up to $200
million in subsidies from Iran each year, in addition to its
weaponry. They also raise money here in the United States, and
there have been several arrests of Hezbollah fundraisers and
supporters here, including an arrest in Ohio last week.
Hezbollah also receives training from the elite Quds Force
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and, in turn, provides
training to a variety of groups at its bases in Lebanon. The
Pentagon reported in April that ``Lebanese Hezbollah has
trained Iraqi insurgents in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, providing
them with the training, tactics, technology to conduct
kidnappings, small unit tactical operations, and employ
sophisticated improvised explosive devices--IEDs--incorporating
lessons learned from operations in southern Lebanon.''
That was all a quotation from the Pentagon report. In
short, Hezbollah is capable of waging war on its own behalf,
has a wide network around the world, has operational alliances
with other terrorist groups, and affords Iran the opportunity
to open a second front in any conflict. And it is able to do
all of that behind the facade of ``national resistance'' in
Lebanon.
What that means for Lebanon is continued erosion of the
state, subjugation to foreign interests, a loss of independent
will and democracy, and most importantly from my rather
parochial American perspective, a huge threat to ourselves and
to our allies.
We have pursued a policy over the last few years of
engagement and of bolstering the Lebanese state we had hoped at
the expense of Hezbollah, including arms sales topping half a
billion dollars. But it is not entirely clear what those arms
or that aid have bought. If we had hoped it would buy the
disarmament of Hezbollah, we were wrong. If we hoped it would
buy independence from Syria or Iran or an end to terrorist
training camps--camps whose teachings, by the way, have
resulted in the death of American soldiers--we were wrong.
The Obama administration has pursued a determined policy of
engagement with Lebanon's overlords in Damascus. Others have
said that this is the right policy--thank you, Ryan--affording
the United States an opportunity to talk directly to the
Syrians about our concerns. I would counter that we have talked
to the Syrians repeatedly, through both our Embassy in Damascus
and via regular visits from high-level administration
officials, and it has not yet paid off. Indeed, Damascus
continues to pursue policies that are anathema to our
interests, and some suspect that the Assad regime is even
continuing to develop its own nuclear weapons program.
Rumors abound lately that the Obama administration is
considering the wisdom of reaching out directly to Hezbollah. I
am glad to have heard the administration officials directly
contradicting that and contradicting what John Brennan, the
White House's top counterterrorism official, suggested was an
important way to ``build up the more moderate elements'' within
Hezbollah, after he termed Hezbollah ``a very interesting
organization.'' I think those were regrettable statements.
But the fact is that these mixed signals from Washington
are dangerous, and we should have little doubt that we are
perceived in the region as weak and as confused and as
vacillating not just by our friends, but also by our enemies.
The time has come, unfortunately--because I have enormous
respect and affection for the people of Lebanon--has come to
reassess our relationship with Lebanon and the challenges posed
by Hezbollah. I don't believe we will be served by greater
rapprochement with Damascus or with their terrorist proxies.
Finally, at a certain moment it is going to be necessary
for us to ask whether United States taxpayer dollars going to
Lebanon are helping our friends or subsidizing our enemies. If
the support to Lebanon's Army is not going to secure Lebanon's
borders, and it's not going to rid Lebanon of terrorist groups,
one might reasonably ask what it is going for.
That's a question Congress has asked in years past, when
Lebanon was a center of kidnapping, hijacking, and murder. And
thanks to Hezbollah, it is time for us to ask that again.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]
Prepared Statement of Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign and
Defense Policy Studies, The American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, at the outset, let me say
that I spent more than a decade working on the subject of today's
hearing as a staff member of this committee; I'm a bit more accustomed
to sitting in the chair behind you than the one in front of you. I am
grateful for your invitation to testify today--because this feels like
a homecoming, and more importantly, because I know from personal
experience the important role this committee can play in addressing
this vital issue.
Despite a heightened awareness of terrorism and terrorist groups
since 9/11, American policy toward Lebanon, Syria, and Hezbollah
remains confused--a mass of mixed signals and inconsistent approaches.
Despite more than $1.6 billion in economic and military assistance to
Lebanon since FY06 (including requests for FY 2011), despite a
concerted effort to reach out to the Assad regime in Damascus, and
despite a willingness to overlook the increasingly dominant military
and political role played by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Obama
administration has little to show for its efforts in the Levant.
In the wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri in 2005--a murder in which Hezbollah was reportedly
involved--the international community took a relatively hard-line
against Syria and its proxies. The resulting end to the Syrian military
domination of Lebanon gave many of us hope that Lebanon was at last on
track to regain the independence lost in 1976. Certainly, it seemed
that Washington, at least, would no longer tolerate the exploitation of
the Lebanese people by both Tehran and Damascus.
In the years that followed, there were troublesome developments
that should only have fueled our commitment to helping Lebanon protect
itself from Syrian and Iranian predations. In 2006, Hezbollah crossed
Lebanon's southern border with Israel and kidnapped two Israeli
soldiers, sparking a war between Israel and Hezbollah that resulted in
substantial loss of life, including among Lebanese civilians. How was
it possible that one armed group could, without consultation or
compunction, drag a nominally democratic nation into war?
Worse still, Hezbollah's performance in that conflict revealed that
what some in Israel and the United States had dismissed as a ragtag
group of terrorists was a sophisticated, well-trained, and very well-
armed fighting machine.
The subsequent passage of U.N. Security Council resolution 1701 and
its call for ``no weapons without the consent of the Government of
Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon''
appeared to be another silver lining to the summer war--much as the
aftermath of the Hariri murder led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops.
But the resolution has been all but ignored in the face of repeated and
flagrant violations.
And there were more frightening signs: revelations that Syria was
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability; a series of assassinations of
anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon; the collapse of the March 14
movement; Hezbollah's 2008 armed takeover of Beirut, and the subsequent
capitulation of March 14 to Hezbollah's demands for a veto over
government decisions.
During this political turmoil, Iran and Syria continued to rearm
Hezbollah. Transfers, which were slow in the immediate aftermath of the
2006 war, ramped up quickly, and Hezbollah is now significantly better
armed than it was in 2006, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates
``Syrian and Iran are providing Hezbollah with rockets and missiles of
ever-increasing capability [and] we're at appoint now, where Hezbollah
has far more rockets and missiles than most government in the world.''
Consider the developments reported on AEI's Iran Tracker site from this
year alone (citations and sources can be found on the site):
The Times of London reports that Israeli and American
officials believe Syria transferred two Scud missiles into
Lebanon, where they are suspected to be in an underground
storage facility in the Beqa'a Valley. (Israel reportedly
planned to attack one of the Syrian trucks transferring weapons
to Hezbollah as it crossed the Lebanese border, but held back
on American request. American officials are still hoping that
Syria can be convinced to stop supplying Hezbollah with weapons
without military intervention. According to the report,
satellite imagery shows one of the secret arms facilities in
Adra, Syria, where Hezbollah militants have living facilities
and trucks to transport the missiles to Lebanon.)
Hezbollah sources told the Kuwaiti paper Al Rai that the
group had the capability to launch 15 tons of explosives at
Israel every day in the case of another war between the two
sides, going on to claim that Hezbollah possesses a wide range
of missiles with a heavy payload, including the 1-ton Zilzal
missile and half-ton Fateh 110 and M600 missiles.
The Israeli Foreign Minister said that the arms seized from
a cargo plane in Bangkok in December 2009 were destined for
Hezbollah and Hamas. Thai authorities said that the plane, with
weapons believed to have originated in North Korea, was
carrying 35 tons of weaponry including rockets and RPGs.
Reports in early May suggest that sometime in the last year,
Syria supplied Hezbollah with M600 missile. (The M600 is the
Syrian version of the advanced Iranian Fateh-110 missile. The
missile's range would allow Hezbollah to hit Tel Aviv from
southern Lebanon.)
In January, a busy month, the Washington Post reported that
Hezbollah placed long-range rockets deep into Lebanon and the
Beqa'a Valley; Hezbollah terrorists fired an antitank rocket at
an IDF bulldozer that was clearing a minefield along the
Israeli-Lebanese border, killing a soldier; and the Israeli
navy seized an Iranian ship en route to Syria carrying weapons
destined for Hezbollah from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez;
the Kuwaiti papers reported a U.S. official saying that
Hezbollah operatives trained in Syria on SA2 antiaircraft
missile batteries; and finally U.N. peacekeepers uncovered 660
pounds of explosive devices near the border with Israel (this
happened in December, but was reported in January).
All these details and more can be found on the Iran Tracker site--
www.irantracker.org. But stop for a moment and ponder that fact that
this is only news from 2010.
In short, Hezbollah is effectively a state within a state in
Lebanon, with an ever growing and ever more sophisticated long range
arsenal. It is untrammeled by the Lebanese Government to which it
belongs and answerable to no one in that nation, but rather to the
dictatorships in Damascus and Tehran. Sadly, hopes that Lebanese
leaders answerable to the Lebanese people--and not to foreign powers--
would regain control have not been realized. There is no more poignant
symbol of that failure than the fact that as Lebanese Prime Minister
Saad Hariri was meeting with our own President Obama and his team,
Lebanese President Michel Suleiman appeared on Hezbollah's television
station, al-Manar, praising Hezbollah and ``calling on all Lebanese to
embrace and protect [Hezbollah's] arms.''
According to the Pentagon, Hezbollah receives up to $200 million in
subsidies from Iran each year, in addition to weaponry. Other reports
suggest they may receive even more. The group also raises money in the
United States, including through criminal activities, and there have
been several arrests of Hezbollah fundraisers and supporters in the
United States, including one in Ohio last week.
Hezbollah receives training from the elite Quds Force of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and in turn provides training to a
variety of terrorist groups at its bases in Lebanon. The Pentagon
reported in April that ``Lebanese Hezbollah has trained Iraqi
insurgents in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, providing them with the
training, tactics, and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit
tactical operations and employ sophisticated improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), incorporating lessons learned from operations in
southern Lebanon.''
In short, Hezbollah is capable of waging war on its own behalf, has
a wide network around the world, growing particularly in Latin America,
has forged operational alliances with a variety of other terrorist
groups, including Sunni groups and affords Iran the opportunity to open
a second front in any conflict. And it is able to do all of this behind
the facade of ``national resistance'' in Lebanon, playing the role at
once of defender of Lebanese sovereignty, of terrorist training group
and of political powerhouse with two seats in the Hariri Cabinet and a
veto over national decisionmaking.
What this means for Lebanon is the continued erosion of the state,
its subjugation to foreign interests, a loss of independent will and
democracy and a potent threat to American allies and American
interests. In the years since the Hezbollah-Israel war, the United
States has pursued a policy aimed at bolstering the Lebanese state at
the expense of Hezbollah. That includes arms sales that top half a
billion dollars and substantial aid. It is not entirely clear what
either those arms or that aid have bought. If we had hoped it would buy
the disarmament of Hezbollah, we were wrong. If we hoped it would buy
independence from Syria or Iran or an end to terrorist training camps--
camps whose teachings have resulted in the death of American soldiers--
we were wrong.
The Obama administration has pursued a determined policy of
engagement with Lebanon's overlords in Damascus. Others have said that
this is the right policy, affording the United States an opportunity to
talk directly to the Syrians about our concerns. I would counter that
we have talked to the Syrians repeatedly, through both our Embassy in
Damascus and via regular visits from high level administration
officials. And that hasn't paid off. Indeed, Damascus continues to
pursue policies anathema to our interests, and some suspect the Assad
regime is continuing to develop nuclear weapons.
Rumors abound lately that the Obama administration is considering
the wisdom of reaching out directly to Hezbollah to establish a
dialogue. Recently, John Brennan, the White House's top
counterterrorism official, suggested the United States needed to find a
way to ``build up the more moderate elements'' within Hezbollah, which
he termed ``a very interesting organization.''
His statements stand in stark contrast to those of other
administration officials, including former DNI Denny Blair, who earlier
this year refused to rule out a possible Hezbollah attack on the United
States.
These mixed signals from Washington are dangerous, and we should
have little doubt that we are perceived in the region as weak--by our
friends as well as our enemies.
The time has come to reassess our relationship with Lebanon and the
challenge posed by Hezbollah. I do not believe we will be served by
greater rapprochement with Damascus or with their terrorist proxies.
Finally, at a certain moment it will be necessary for us to ask
whether U.S. taxpayer dollars going to Lebanon are helping our friends,
or subsidizing our enemies. If the support to Lebanon's army is not
going to secure Lebanon's borders, and it's not going to rid Lebanon of
terrorist groups, one might reasonably ask what it is going for. That's
a question Congress has asked in years past, when Lebanon was a center
of kidnapping, hijacking and murder. Thanks to Hezbollah, it is time to
ask again.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Dr. Norton.
STATEMENT OF AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON, PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA
Dr. Norton. Thank you very much, Senator Casey, and
distinguished members of the committee.
I am going to take your advice to heart to deliver an
abbreviated statement, particularly pruning comments that would
be redundant of some of the other speakers.
I would like to begin by noting that my first on-the-ground
exposure to Lebanon was 30 years ago, when I served for 14
months in southern Lebanon as an unarmed United Nations
military observer on secondment from the U.S. Army. Only a bit
more than a year before, the shah of Iran had been toppled from
power. Hezbollah, the subject of today's hearing, did not
exist.
Indeed, the PLO was then the dominant military power from
Beirut to the Israeli border, and Israeli-PLO clashes were
routine occurrences. This was 1980. Within Lebanon, a civil war
had been underway for 5 years, and it would be another decade
before the internal conflict came to an end.
As the leader of a small team of well-qualified observers,
I enjoyed regular contacts with members of the Lebanese Shia
community, including the leaders of a political movement known
as Amal that I wrote about in a book in the 1980s. Many of the
Lebanese Shia leaders in those early days, while inspired by
the recent revolution in Iran, were little interested in
importing Iranian models into Lebanon. They yearned for an end
to the violence that often took a heavy toll in Shia property
and lives.
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with grand plans to destroy
the PLO and install a friendly Lebanese Government that would
become the second Arab State after Egypt to sign a peace treaty
with Israel. The Israeli invasion did, in fact, occasion great
hope in the country that the civil war would finally be ended,
especially since the PLO military apparatus was decimated. The
dominant Shia group at the time, Amal, certainly shared the
hope that a violent chapter in Lebanon's history was finished.
In Washington, you will recall the Reagan administration
seized upon the Israeli invasion as a strategic opportunity
and, along with European allies, launched the multinational
force to help stabilize security in and around Beirut.
Meantime, while Israel incrementally retrenched its forces, it
established an occupation zone in southern Lebanon, the Shia
heartland. That zone was not surrendered until the year 2000.
Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon for roughly two
decades would contribute to the radicalization of the Shia and
undermine more moderate voices and, therefore, was
counterproductive.
With Iranian tutelage, a cadre of Lebanese Shias rejected
Amal's relatively conciliatory stance vis-a-vis Israel and
sought to reproduce Iran's revolutionary model in Lebanon. By
the mid-1980s, they would coalesce into Hezbollah. A number of
them participated in the hallmark acts of violence and
terrorism that we are all familiar with from the horrendous
1980s.
Mr. Chairman, I begin with these recollections because I
believe they are relevant to understanding the topic at hand,
namely, the strength of Hezbollah in 2010 and its ability to
sustain impressive popular support in Lebanon.
How did a relatively small group of revolution-oriented
conspirators become arguably the most powerful and popular
organization in Lebanon? I offer five key explanations, in
addition, obviously, to significant Iranian subsidy and
support.
No. 1, the resistance to Israeli occupation. While
Hezbollah was not the only group challenging Israel's presence,
it was by far the most successful and earned great credit for
that.
Two, institution-building. Recent decades have witnessed a
proliferation of social, cultural, and economic organizations
serving the Shia community. Hezbollah's are among the most
efficiently run and most admired. Lebanese opponents to
Hezbollah have acknowledged that it is really the only fully
institutionalized political party in Lebanon.
Third, the worldview that it offers. Hezbollah promotes an
ideology that stresses the importance of resistance, not just
to foreign occupiers--and of course, it emphasizes Israel and
the United States in particular in that context--but resistance
to injustice, corruption, and poverty. And that worldview has
gained a significant footing in the Lebanese Shia community,
which comprises roughly one-third of the total population of
Lebanon.
Fourth, piety. Hezbollah advocates an expansive view of
piety that stresses commitment, engagement, community
participation, and individual responsibility. While this
conception of piety is hardly unique to Hezbollah, or to Shia
Islam for that matter, it is an important element in the
organization's message to its followers.
Fifth, pragmatism. At key junctures in its history,
Hezbollah has changed course, notably in 1992 when it put aside
its condemnation of Lebanese politics as ``corrupt to the
core'' in order to participate in elections and in the
political process.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, when Israel unilaterally
withdrew from its self-declared ``security zone'' in May 2000,
it did so noting that this was a unilateral decision on the
part of Israel. It was not being done under pressure.
Nonetheless, Hezbollah was widely credited and celebrated in
Lebanon for playing the leading role in forcing Israel to exit.
The fact is that Hezbollah did prove a very potent foe to
the Israeli Army in Lebanon and to its allies. It is widely
believed in Lebanon that Israel would still be occupying a
large chunk of the country were it not for the antioccupation
resistance.
Hezbollah's main rival, Amal--which it has fought at
various times over the course of the last decades--continues to
enjoy support in segments of the Shia community, Amal has lost
many of its supporters to Hezbollah. Much of the growing Shia
middle class--and there is a significant middle class that has
emerged over the last three or four decades--most of the
growing middle class in particular grew disappointed with
Amal's inefficiency, its corruption, and its inability to be
other than a large patronage network, which is not to say that
they have necessarily joined Hezbollah, but they tend to
support it.
When I revisit many of villages and towns in the Bekaa
Valley in south Lebanon that I first encountered decades ago,
today I see impressive evidence of flourishing economies--new
homes, good cars, competent public services, and a variety of
institutions that did not exist before, such as modern clinics
and decent schools. Many of these communities benefit from
wealth earned in Africa, where Lebanese Shias play active roles
as traders and entrepreneurs.
In addition, a variety of religious foundations linked to
revered Shia clerics--Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Najaf, Iraq, for
example; Lebanon's own Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah--
offer a range of services as well. In other words, Hezbollah is
not the only player in the provision of services. There are
many others that provide services. But Hezbollah services are
important and are a partial explanation for the level of
support it enjoys. But the fact is that there are other threads
of support.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, when Israel did withdraw in
2000, with Syrian support and encouragement, Hezbollah insisted
on keeping its arms. So long as Israel remained in Lebanon,
Damascus could claim that the key to a secure northern border
for Israel was in a peace agreement with Syria. The Israeli
exit undermined Syria's leverage.
Hezbollah argued that the Israeli withdrawal was incomplete
since Israel continued to occupy a segment of Lebanese
territory in the Golan Heights. More important, the group
argued that unless Israel was deterred from returning to
Lebanon, it would exploit Lebanon's weakness. This is not an
argument that persuaded all Lebanese or all Shias, for that
matter. But it did persuade many.
As the afterglow of the celebrations ebbed, Hezbollah's
rationale for keeping its weapons was increasingly challenged
in Lebanon, particularly after the assassination of former
Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005 and the exit of Syrian
forces a few months hence.
So prior to the 2006 war, there were many, many voices
being raised: ``Why do they still have these weapons''? And in
fact those voices are still being raised today. However, and I
will close on this point, the effect of the 2006 war was to, in
effect, validate the narrative of Hezbollah for the Shia
community. In other words, the need for a deterrent vis-a-vis
Israel.
I have sat in Lebanese villages in south Lebanon and
listened to informal debates, and these are places I have been
going for many years. People are very comfortable with me
listening to what they are saying and so on. And I have heard
people debate precisely this question about defense and
deterrence.
And what they frequently say, apropos of Ambassador
Crocker's comment, is that they love the Lebanese Army. It is a
national institution. They revere it, but it is too weak. And
given their history of conflict, given the invasions and the
incursions and the punitive raids that they have experienced,
particularly in southern Lebanon, there is a very strong
argument in their minds for Hezbollah's role as a deterrent
force.
Unless Hezbollah can be defeated completely, which is to
say in military parlance defeated in detail, it is very likely
that a new war, which many Lebanese expect to happen, that a
new war will further validate Hezbollah's model of deterrence.
Which is to say that, in my view, it is not likely that another
war, if it comes, is going to result in the elimination of
Hezbollah.
To the contrary, in many ways, it will strengthen its
argument and its base of support precisely because defeating an
enemy like Hezbollah cannot be done by dropping bombs. It
cannot be done by indirect fire, but it requires face-to-face,
eyeball-to-eyeball combat. And in that context, the Israeli
army gives up many, many of its advantages.
So I think we are really in a kind of conundrum. This is an
organization that raises significant challenges for the United
States, for the security of Israel. Yet it is very firmly
entrenched in a segment of Lebanese society which is not
insignificant, and given its role in providing what it deems a
deterrent force for Lebanon, its role is likely to continue to
be validated over the course of time, particularly if there is
more conflict.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Norton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Augustus Richard Norton, Professor of
International Relations and Anthropology, Boston University, and
Visiting Professor in the Politics of the Middle East, Oxford
University
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today about Hezbollah, a group that has
become a powerful player in Lebanese politics, a formidable militia
force capable of posing a serious challenge to Israel's vaunted
military, and a group that is both a beneficiary of Iranian largesse
and an accomplice to Iran's ambition for regional hegemony in the
Middle East.
My first on-the-ground exposure to Lebanon was 30 years ago when I
served for 14 months in southern Lebanon as an unarmed United Nations
military observer (on secondment from the U.S. Army). Only a bit more
than year before, the Shah of Iran had been toppled from power.
Hezbollah, the subject of today's hearing, did not exist. Indeed, the
PLO was then the dominant military power from Beirut to the Israeli
border, and Israeli-PLO clashes were routine occurrences. This was
1980. Within Lebanon a civil war had been underway for 5 years, and it
would be another decade before the internal conflict came to an end. As
the leader of a small team of well-qualified observers, I enjoyed
regular contacts with members of the Lebanese Shi'i Muslim community,
including the leaders of a political movement known as Amal.
The Shi'i Muslims are the largest single community in Lebanon,
probably accounting for a third or more of the total population, and
they primarily live in and around Beirut, in the Bekaa Valley and in
South Lebanon. Historically, this is an underprivileged community. I
recall vividly the dreadful conditions that defined many Shi'i
villages, legacies of decades of neglect by the central government
exacerbated by the ravages of recent fighting.
Many of the Lebanese Shi'i leaders in those early days, while
inspired by the revolution in Iran, were little interested in importing
Iranian models into Lebanon. They yearned for an end to the violence
that often took a heavy toll in Shi'i lives and property. In 1982,
Israel invaded with grand plans to destroy the PLO and install a
friendly Lebanese Government that would become the second Arab State to
sign a peace treaty with Israel. The Israeli invasion occasioned great
hope in Lebanon that the civil war would be finally be ended,
especially since the PLO military apparatus was decimated. The dominant
Shi'i group at the time, Amal, certainly shared the hope that a violent
chapter in Lebanon's history was finished.
In Washington, the Reagan administration seized upon the Israeli
invasion as a strategic opportunity, and along with European allies
launched the Multinational Force to help stabilize security in an
around Beirut. Meantime, while Israel incrementally retrenched its
forces, it established an occupation zone in southern Lebanon, the
Shi'i heartland. That zone was not surrendered until 2000. Israel's
occupation would contribute to the radicalization of the Shi'a and
undermine more moderate voices, and was therefore counterproductive.
An even more horrific chapter was, in fact, only beginning in
Lebanon. Iran and Syria were important characters in that chapter, and
those that followed. When recalling the horrendous decade of the 1980s
in Lebanon, images of the ruins of the U.S. Embassy, the decimation of
the Marine barracks and its hundreds of sleeping occupants, and the
cruel captivity suffered by scores innocent hostages, some held for
many years, leap to mind.
With Iranian tutelage, a cadre of Lebanese Shi'is rejected Amal's
relatively conciliatory stance and sought to reproduce Iran's
revolutionary model in Lebanon. By the mid-1980s, they would coalesce
into Hezbollah. A number of them participated in the hallmarks acts of
violence and terrorism referred to above.
In 1982, Syria permitted Iran to establish a foothold in Lebanon
for a contingent of Revolutionary Guards. It should be noted, however,
that Syria for many years was deeply suspicious of Hezbollah and there
were several serious clashes between the Syrian army and Hezbollah
militants. In fact, Syria lent much support to Amal, for which
Hezbollah was the main rival. Particularly while President Hafez al-
Asad was alive (died: 2000), Syria often assiduously balanced the
political gains of Hezbollah and Amal.
Mr. Chairman, I begin with these recollections because I believe
they are relevant to understanding the topic at hand, namely the
strength of Hezbollah in 2010, and its ability to sustain impressive
popular support in Lebanon.
How did a relatively small group of revolution-oriented
conspirators become arguably the most powerful and popular organization
in Lebanon? I offer five key explanations:
Resistance to Israeli occupation: While Hezbollah was by no
means the only group challenging Israel's presence; it was by
far the most successful.
Institution-building: Recent decades have witnessed a
proliferation of social, cultural, and economic organizations
serving the Shi'i community, Hezbollah's are among the most
efficiently run and most admired. Lebanese opponents to
Hezbollah have acknowledged that it is really the only fully
institutionalized political party in the country.
Worldview: Hezbollah promotes an ideology that stresses the
importance of resistance, not just to foreign occupiers--and to
Israel and the United States in particular--but resistance to
injustice, corruption, and poverty.
Piety: Hezbollah advocates an expansive view of piety that
stresses commitment, engagement, community participation and
individual responsibility. While this conception of piety is
hardly unique to Hezbollah or to Shi'i Islam for that matter,
it is an important element in the organization's message to its
followers.
Pragmatism: At key junctures in its history, Hezbollah has
changed course, notably in 1992 when it put aside its
condemnation of Lebanese politics as ``corrupt to the core'' in
order to participate in elections and in the political process.
When Israel unilaterally withdrew from its self-declared ``Security
Zone'' (which accounted for roughly 10 percent of Lebanon's territory),
in May 2000, Hezbollah was widely credited and celebrated in Lebanon
for playing the leading role in forcing Israel to exit. Israel denies
that it withdrew under pressure. The fact is that Hezbollah proved an
increasingly potent foe. It is widely believed in Lebanon that Israel
would still be occupying a large chunk of the country were it not for
the antioccupation resistance.
While Hezbollah's main rival, Amal, continues to enjoy support in
segments of the Shi'i community, it has lost many of its supporters to
Hezbollah. Much of the growing Shi'i middle class, in particular, grew
disappointed with Amal's inefficiency, corruption, and its inability to
be other than a large patronage network, which is not to say that they
have necessarily joined Hezbollah.
When I revisit many of villages and towns in South Lebanon that I
first encountered decades ago, I see impressive evidence of a
flourishing economy: new homes, good cars, competent public services,
and a variety of institutions that did not exist before, such as modern
clinics and decent schools. Many of these communities benefit from
wealth earned in Africa, where Lebanese Shi'is play active roles as
traders and entrepreneurs. In addition, a variety of religious
foundations linked to revered Shi'i clerics, such as Ayatollah Ali
Sistani, based in Najaf, Iraq, and Lebanon's own Ayatollah Muhammad
Hussein Fadlallah, offer a range of services. Support for Hezbollah is
by no means universal, but it is widespread in these towns and
villages. Yet, we should remember that loyalties and affiliations run
in many different directions.
Whether they live in the Bekaa valley, the South or in al-dahiya
the bustling, predominantly Shi'i suburbs of Beirut, families are
typically linked to relatives in the other regions by marriage,
nativity, or economics. The migration from the Bekaa and the South to
al-dahiya is a relatively recent phenomenon, in that the surge from the
countryside to the city began in the middle of the 20th century. So,
not only is Lebanon a small country to begin with, but people living in
the various regions typically have extensive networks of ties to the
other regions. This is one reason why violence in one area quickly
elicits a reaction in other settings. It is also why the Israeli
occupation inspired so much resistance.
With Syrian support and encouragement, Hezbollah insisted on
keeping its arms despite Israel's exit in 2000. So long as Israel
remained in Lebanon, Damascus could argue that the key to a secure
northern border for Israel was in a peace agreement with Syria. The
Israeli exit undermined Syria's leverage. Hezbollah argued that the
Israeli withdrawal was incomplete since Israel continued to occupy a
segment of Lebanese territory in the Golan Heights. More important, the
group argued that unless Israel was deterred from returning to Lebanon,
it would exploit Lebanon's weakness. This is not an argument that
persuaded all Lebanese, or all Shi'is for that matter.
As the afterglow of the celebrations ebbed, Hezbollah's rationale
for keeping its weapons was increasingly challenged, particularly after
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February
2005, and the exit of Syrian forces a few months hence.
It bears emphasizing that the Israel-Lebanon border area was quiet
from 2000 to 2006 by historical standards. In 1999, the last full year
of Israeli occupation, there were over 1,500 military operations in
southern Lebanon, according to the Israeli researcher Daniel Sobelman.
In contrast, for the next 6 years, there were only a few dozen in
total. Israeli military casualties averaged one-to-two soldiers
annually, and there were only two civilian deaths attributable to
Israeli or Hezbollahi fire. Notwithstanding commentary to the contrary,
rockets were not routinely flying across the border into Israel.
This period of relative quiet ended in July 2006, when Hezbollah
captured two Israeli soldiers in a raid across the border into Israel.
They had been trying to do so for months, in order to use the captives
as bargaining chips to gain the release of Lebanese prisoners held by
Israel, including one Lebanese convicted for his role in a deadly 1979
terrorist attack in northern Israel. As the Hezbollah leader Hasan
Nasrallah later acknowledged, he and his cohort failed to anticipate
the fierce Israeli response that would follow. The result was a
destructive war that lasted 33 days.
Israeli generals overestimated the effectiveness of air strikes,
and expected a relatively short campaign with the goal of crippling
Hezbollah. Hezbollah proved a far more tenacious adversary than Israel
anticipated. The war ended up displacing half a million Israelis and
close to a million Lebanese. In addition to painful military losses on
each side, 43 Israeli and more than 1,000 Lebanese civilians were
killed. The material damage in Lebanon was severe, and included 78
destroyed or badly damaged bridges, as well as 15,000 homes badly
damaged or destroyed.
Across the Arab world the war elicited widespread support for
Hezbollah, although that support has since faded. More to the point of
this hearing, the war prompted two opposing results in Lebanon: For
some Lebanese Christians (who account for no more than one-third of the
total population), and particularly for non-Shi'i Muslims, especially
the Sunnis, Hezbollah's role in starting the war evinced animosity and
anger, and underlined the need to disarm it and check its power. Local
Sunni-Shi'i tensions erupted in several deadly clashes, but thankfully
cooler heads prevailed, including within Hezbollah.
These concerns intensified in May 2008, when Hezbollah and its
allies took up arms against fellow Lebanese to thwart a government
decision that would shut down its private fiber-optic communications
network.
The Lebanese victims of the 2006 war were overwhelmingly Shi'i
Muslims, just as the areas targeted were predominantly Shi'i areas. The
Beirut suburbs, Hezbollah's epicenter, were continually bombed and the
line between civilian and military targets blurred quickly. At one
point the Israeli Chief of Staff was quoted as directing that for every
Hezbollah rocket striking Haifa, a 1-story building in al-dahiya would
be destroyed. The result was that most Shi'a viewed the war as one
conceived to target their community. This validated the Hezbollah
resistance narrative, and the argument that unless Israel was deterred,
it would invade Lebanon at will.
I have sat in on informal debates about Hezbollah security role in
Lebanese Shi'i villages. These were not academic debates, the real life
concerns. The Lebanese Army is widely revered in Lebanon, probably
because it is one of the few truly national institutions. Even so, the
Army is not viewed as a credible force that is capable to defend
Lebanon against Israel. Therefore, deferring to Hezbollah is seen as a
necessary and realistic option, even by Shi'is who are ideologically
distant from Hezbollah.
Meanwhile Sunni-Shi'i tensions linger. These tensions were manifest
in last June's elections when Sunni voters were mobilized en masse to
support the Future Movement and vote against slates connected with
Hezbollah. I saw this myself when I observed the 2009 elections in the
Bekaa valley city of Zahle, and in some of the predominantly Sunni
villages in the surrounding areas. Participation rates were very high,
and the candidates sympathetic with Hezbollah received only 10 or 15
percent of the total votes.
However, Lebanese politics are by definition consensus politics.
The idea that one sect or party can control or dominate the political
system is far from the mark. Thus, when a new government was finally
formed in Beirut, last fall, Hezbollah and its allies ended up with
one-third of the ministerial posts and with the ability to block any
decision that threatened to undermine the group's military power. The
ministerial statement that announced the new government explicitly
acknowledged Hezbollah's role in defending Lebanon. The declaration
referred to ``the right of Lebanon through its people, Army and the
Resistance to liberate the Shebaa Farms, the Kfar Shuba Hills and the
northern part of the village of Ghajar as well as to defend Lebanon and
its territorial waters in the face of any enemy by all available and
legal means.''
Since 2006, there has been an uncommon solidarity within the Shi'i
community and Hezbollah has been the beneficiary. I argue that the
solidarity of the Shi'i community is an aberration, it is an artifact
of the recent war, as well as the fear that another war looms. This is
a war that Hezbollah claims it does not seek, but that Israel is
expected to launch. Preparations for that war are underway on both
sides.
During the late 1990s, while the Israeli occupation continued,
Hezbollah's full-time military cadre numbered about 500 and was
supplemented through a reserve system (in some ways similar to
Israel's). By 2006, that number had doubled. Today, the standing
military force is measured in the thousands. There is no way for a
civilian researcher to reliably estimate the size of Hezbollah's
arsenal, but by the group's own estimates its store of arms is far more
robust and more sophisticated than it was in 2006.
Despite the fears of war, the Israeli-Lebanese border has been very
quiet since the 2006 war. UNIFIL, bolstered under Security Council
Resolution 1701, has provided an effective buffer. While it has stopped
Hezbollah from publically displaying weapons in the border region, it
has not, however, impeded Hezbollah's ability to rearm.
Unless Hezbollah can be decisively defeated by Israel--defeated in
detail, in military parlance--the effect of another war would be to
bolster Hezbollah, and to once again validate its narrative. For a
variety of reasons, I believe that it is unlikely that Israel is
capable of decisively defeating Hezbollah's hardened forces. The level
of civilian casualties, probably on both sides, would be dreadful, and
would prompt a fierce backlash in the Muslim world. Equally important,
Israeli soldiers would have to go toe to toe with Hezbollah fighters
who know the difficult terrain of Lebanon intimately and have a strong
incentive to protect the homefront. The Israeli Army's comparative
advantages, especially technical sophistication, largely disappear in
close combat.
Mr. Chairman, I have tried to explain the solidarity that currently
exists within the Lebanese Shi'i community to the benefit of Hezbollah.
Yet, there are a variety of divisions with the community as well. These
include secular and clerical opponents of Hezbollah, and, of course,
the longstanding rivalry with Amal. In addition, there are strong
feelings in some quarters that Hezbollah is too closely aligned with
Iran, and that the community's interests are better served through Arab
as opposed to Persian ties. We see variants of these views in Iraq.
These latent divisions will remain submerged as long as so many Shi'a
feel that their community faces an existential threat. One key to
reducing Hezbollah's mass appeal may be to reduce the threat of war,
rather than heighten it. So long as the threat prevails, Hezbollah will
be a prime beneficiary.
Senator Casey. Doctor, thank you very much.
We will go to our questions now. And I do want to note for
the record, Ms. Pletka, you had mentioned in your statement. I
am glad you made reference to this recent news. I guess it
was--I can never tell where the dates are on some of these
things. But recently, the news--this is a CNN report--an Ohio
couple was arrested in Toledo for allegedly plotting to send
money to the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Federal authorities said there was a Federal complaint filed,
and it goes on from there. I won't read the story for the
record, but it is a timely reminder of the reach of Hezbollah.
I guess one of the questions I wanted to ask, and in
hearings like this, we don't mind a little intrapanel debate. I
know that Ambassador Crocker and Ms. Pletka were seemingly
having the beginnings of a debate. We will save some time for
that.
But one of the questions hanging over this discussion,
obviously, is something that each of you, in one way or
another, referred to, and we all did in some way, some more
pointedly than others, not the only question obviously, but one
of the central questions is no matter what our Government does,
no matter what our policy is, no matter how much money we
spend, no matter how determined we are as it relates to the
challenge posed by Hezbollah, if we don't have a partner, we
don't have a willing partner in the Lebanese Government to not
only have the right policy to deal with this challenge, but
also to build up their own government, their own society, their
own internal and army security forces, we are not going to be
very successful.
And I guess the question I have is that it seems that no
matter what leader you point to, and I know Prime Minister
Hariri is trying very hard. He is at the beginning of a--
somewhat at the beginning of a new administration, had a recent
visit to Syria that got a lot of attention and we hope will
bear fruit.
But in some way or another, there is a sense that each
leader in Lebanon has been co-opted to a certain extent, at
least that is part of the perception. And given that fact, or
at least that assertion, and given the political roots, I am
using my own formulation, political roots that Hezbollah has
implanted in the society, how can we play--or what is the best
way for us to play a constructive role here? Instead of, I
mean, obviously, we are going to be continuing to send aid, and
we should. And we should track the dollars, make sure it is
spent the right way and do all of the due diligence required.
But is there something missing in our policy because of the
reality that we see in Lebanon itself? Ambassador Crocker, do
you want to take a shot at that?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think what we require most in Lebanon is consistency.
Simply to take the decision that our best option in Lebanon,
and I certainly don't see a better one, is sustained support
for the Lebanese Government generally and the Lebanese Armed
Forces in particular and to stick with it, making it clear to
the Lebanese, the government, the military, and the population
that we are a long-term partner. To make it clear in Syria and
in Iran that we are not going to cede this field to them.
I would make the same recommendation, incidentally, with
respect to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. One of our greatest
challenges is overcoming our own strategic impatience and
deciding this isn't working so let us try something else. That
is what our allies have come to fear and our adversaries have
come to count on in a variety of theaters, but we are talking
today about Lebanon.
So it is that consistency, a sustained message that we are
there to support Lebanon. While it is true that some Lebanese
have been co-opted, it is also true that probably more have
been threatened and, indeed, assassinated. There is a lot of
courage on the part of the Lebanese who are on a very difficult
track and a very difficult position, and I think our
understanding there is also important.
So that would be my primary recommendation. Again, if there
are magic bullets, I can't think of them. I think it is
sustained engagement.
And in the interest of doing my best to liven up this
panel, I would note that Ms. Pletka and I had a discussion
almost 20 years ago when I was the Ambassador to Lebanon and
she was a member of the committee staff at age of 13 in which I
lobbied with a singular lack of success for the committee's
support in rebuilding a training and supply relationship with
the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Senator Casey. Was this debate on the record? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Crocker. No, it wasn't. That was back when she
had the luxury of being a staffer and could have these closed
room sessions.
Senator Casey. This is news, though. You just made some
news here.
Ms. Pletka. No, we didn't.
Senator Casey. I wanted to just follow up on that. I want
to have each of our witnesses address this question. But just
on the question of having a more sustained engagement and some
manifestation or demonstration of that.
We recently had an interesting debate the last couple of
years, which resulted in a new initiative for the Government of
Pakistan. And of course, despite all of the hard work that went
into that in the House and Senate and we were sending a message
that we wanted to help on things other than military, when the
news kind of landed in South Asia, there was some opposition in
the Pakistani society. And some of that was political. We can
discount some of it because people are playing domestic
politics there.
But it was a positive signal, I thought, to send that we
were serious about the relationship. We wanted to help on
things that weren't just military, wasn't just going to be a
short-term relationship. It wasn't going to be just
transactional or ad hoc or however you would describe it.
Do you think in this instance there is a need for something
if not a replica of that, but something other than this effort
that we have highlighted, whether it was $139 million this year
or hundreds of millions over the last couple of years? Do you
think something that demonstrative or that significant is
required, or do you think there are other ways to effectuate
that, that relationship or that sustained engagement?
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, that is a great point.
Again, I commend this committee for the legislation it did pass
with respect to Pakistan. I think that was a very positive
signal, particularly given the backdrop of our uneven
relationship with Pakistan.
And I, for one, would favor a similar approach to Lebanon
that says we are in this for the long haul. If we were to take
that approach, I would hope that we would not overly condition
it because, again, it can actually have a negative rather than
a positive effect. I think it is recognizing the region for
what it is, Lebanon for what it is--a weak state with much
stronger neighbors--and accept that this will take a long time,
but commit to being in it for the long haul. I think it is a
great idea.
Senator Casey. Ms. Pletka? On the same broader question.
Ms. Pletka. What Ryan didn't admit is that--and I was only
12 then, by the way, not 13--he didn't admit that I was
bludgeoned ultimately and my boss then was bludgeoned into
supporting IMET, military education and training, for the
Lebanese Armed Forces a mere year later, and great results
there.
I think that your question is an important one, but if I
could just step back a second and ask an important question
back at the committee and at those who support Lebanon and the
relationship. What do we seek? What are we looking for out of
this?
We have a tendency, and I think all of us have a tendency
because of our great affection and respect for the people of
Lebanon and for our love of that country and our desire to see
it independent, we have a tendency to talk about Lebanon in a
sentimental fashion without talking about some of the hard-
nosed ambitions that we would normally have associated with our
assistance programs. We are not giving $1.6 billion in
assistance to a country because we really love them and they
are pretty great.
We are giving that assistance because we seek to build a
relationship which serves our interests, and our interests are
served by seeing Lebanon independent. Ryan is exactly right
that we have an inconsistency of messages that we send, and I
would suggest that we have once again reversed and decided to,
in the vernacular, throw Lebanon under the bus in pursuit of a
better relationship with Syria, thinking that that will serve
our larger ambitions.
But if we are seeking from Lebanon to see some curtailment
of the threat that Hezbollah poses, the most potent terrorist
organization next to al-Qaeda and perhaps better organized and
better armed than al-Qaeda, if we are seeking to see them
reined in, if we are seeking to see them not pose a threat, not
pose the possibility of a conflict yet again this summer, which
could embroil the entire region, then I don't think we are
being very satisfied, OK?
That is a tough question, and I think it deserves a tough
answer. And the truth is that we haven't given one today. Yes,
it is hard for Prime Minister Hariri. Yes, President Suleiman
is in a rough position. Yes, Hezbollah has support.
But if Hezbollah is a terrorist organization on the
American list for an enormously long time, responsible for the
death of American citizens, started a war 4 years ago, and
could well start one again, then perhaps we need to say a
little bit more than, isn't it kind of tough and really hard
for the Lebanese Armed Forces to do what is necessary. They
haven't done it, not after 16, 17 years of IMET and more than
$1.6 billion. So that is my broader perspective on this
question.
Senator Casey. So you would argue they have been too
accommodating in a sense?
Ms. Pletka. I think that the Lebanese Government has been--
I think that in a perfect world they would not want to do this.
I don't think that anybody likes going and bowing at the feet
of Bashar al-Assad. I don't think they like it. I don't think
they want to.
Senator Casey. Let me ask you just a real practical kind of
this year budget question. What do we do? Do you not send $139
million? Do you condition it? Do you change the focus of it?
What would you--I mean, if you were able to write the script,
what would you do?
Ms. Pletka. If I were able to write the script, I would
absolutely condition it. I think this is not just a question,
though, of writing things down in legislation, although that is
the sine qua non of progress. People from the State Department
always hate conditional legislation. I know that, but I would
absolutely condition it.
But I also think that aggressive oversight is enormously
important. What we need to see is actually what is happening on
the ground. We are not building up the Lebanese Armed Forces
for the eventual possibility that maybe one day they could
serve as an alternative to Hezbollah. The members of this
committee were talking about a war this summer, right? That is
not an eventual ``could, would'' scenario.
So I think that that is enormously important, and I would
absolutely condition it. But I would backstop it with very
strong support for the Lebanese Government in standing up to
Syria and to Iran and, when necessary, to terrorism within from
Hezbollah.
Senator Casey. Dr. Norton, the same question?
Dr. Norton. Yes, I would like to come at it a little bit
differently, Senator Casey. First of all, I want to begin by
saying that Lebanese politics is an extremely messy process. I
mean, this is a country which puts the ``C'' in consensus. You
cannot imagine a government in the real world of Lebanon in
which you have the domination of a single party or even a small
group of parties.
It is a messy, consensual process. And to expect in that
context for the government to take a clear, unmitigated stance
is, frankly, unrealistic.
Here is the point that needs to be made: The current
solidarity of the Shia community in Lebanon is an aberration.
It is an aberration. It is a function of recent history. It is
a function of a war and conflict and suffering.
When you look at that Shia community, you see all kinds of
different tendencies. You see different loyalties to different
religious authorities--Sistani, Fadlallah, Shirazi, and so on.
You see lots of different religious orientations. You see the
old Amal-Hezbollah tensions. You see various secular forces in
the Shia community.
If you want to undermine the base of Hezbollah, which is
really the thrust of today's hearing, it seems to me, then what
you need to do is create conditions in Lebanon in which people
feel more secure, and in that context, building up the army I
think is a good thing. Building up the Internal Security
Force--ISF--is a good thing.
And as a government, it seems to me, the United States
should be working very hard to make sure that we do not have
another replay of a summer war that leaves a very unsatisfying
result and perhaps even strengthens Hezbollah as an outcome. So
it seems to me those two things are very, very important.
Strengthening the internal infrastructure, yes, and also
tamping down the possibility of war.
And I should say that when you look back at the history,
for example, 2000 to 2006, notwithstanding one of the comments
of one of your colleagues, that was a very quiet period of
time. There was one Israeli civilian killed. There was one
Lebanese civilian killed. There were a total of nine Israeli
soldiers killed, far less than the preceding period of 20
years.
And in fact, the year before the Israelis withdrew in 2000,
there were 1,560 military operations in south Lebanon. So the
point is that there is a possibility of ``rules of the game''
being observed and the border region continuing to be quiet,
and it has been quiet, of course, since the 2006 war.
There needs to be a real focus to make sure that we don't
have a replay of the summer war. That would be a disaster not
just on the human level, but for U.S. foreign policy interests,
in my view.
Senator Casey. I wanted to--I do think, though, when we
think of what transpired in 2006, some 4,000 rockets into
Israel is a disturbing indication of what was taking place
there. And Ms. Pletka, you mentioned--I am trying to recall the
source--in your testimony that I guess it was a Hezbollah
source telling a journalist about the potential daily fire
power? What was that number?
Ms. Pletka. That was--it was Hezbollah sources in an
interview with a Kuwaiti paper, Al Rai, which frequently
reports on this, saying that the group had the capability to
launch 15 tons of explosives at Israel every day in the case of
another war.
By the way, Senator, I would only correct there was a
soldier killed on the border, an Israeli soldier killed by a
Hezbollah antitank rocket earlier this year. So the border
hasn't been quiet, and I don't think that those 600 tons of
buried weaponry that UNIFIL found was intention of any further
quietude on the part of Hezbollah either.
Senator Casey. And let me go back to a point that each of
you have made in one way or the other, or at least referred to
it, and it is an important area of review. And that is apart
from the obvious and I think a compelling threat that Hezbollah
poses militarily and apart from the building up of the security
forces, this whole other set of questions that are nonmilitary
in nature, which is what is happening on the ground in an
economic or societal sense with the Lebanese people?
I mean, I asked in the session we had with Prime Minister
Hariri. I had come into the meeting late, and they had covered
a lot of the other questions. But one thing I asked him was
about his own economy. He kind of walked through the state of
play there.
But I guess I would ask you what can you tell us about--
because I am trying to remember who now referred earlier to the
growth rate, and there are some good indicators there. But what
do you think has to happen to give people a better sense of
economic security that obviously plays a role in whether
someone can be radicalized or not or can be susceptible to any
kind of approach that Hezbollah would make to citizens? Is
there an economic need there, or is there a hole in the
economy, or is there a job or growth challenge that we haven't
really talked about yet?
Anyone who wants to start.
Ms. Pletka. I would love to start. I think that as
Professor Norton said rightly and as Ambassador Crocker said,
Hezbollah has successfully exploited a hole in Lebanon. The
Shia have been a traditionally underprivileged, maltreated, and
ignored group, largely concentrated in southern Lebanon. The
group that previously was their political representative, Amal,
is enormously corrupt, and didn't do anything for them. The
Council of the South, which is meant to provide money to them,
very rarely did anything effective.
But here is the problem: We provide aid, and we actually
focus some of our aid on the south. But Hezbollah is able to
step in with money that they receive from Iran and elsewhere,
and they are able to buy loyalty. They are able to buy
projects. In the wake of the 2006 war, they committed to
rebuild houses almost immediately. Governments don't--normal
governments like ours don't work quite that efficiently.
One of the things that would be really nice to see is an
end to Iranian money sloshing around inside Lebanon. If the
Republican Party--let us just pick a party, since there are no
Republicans here--was receiving tens of millions of dollars in
support from a foreign country, which it was then taking to
use, to pass around for walking around money, it would be a
giant scandal. And yet this money is sloshing around inside
Lebanon to benefit one particular party, which they spread
around to buy loyalty.
If that changed inside Lebanon, I think a lot of the
dynamics would change, too. And we need to also press the
government--the legitimate government--to actually take care of
their population in need.
Senator Casey. The best estimate now, a couple hundred
million from Iran every year? Is that the----
Ms. Pletka. It is probably more than that. I don't think
anybody knows directly because some of it comes via banks and
some of it comes via suitcases. But it is at least $200 million
just in cash. That doesn't count the value of the weaponry.
Senator Casey. Ambassador Crocker.
Ambassador Crocker. I would absolutely endorse Ms. Pletka's
last point. Lebanon is something of a democracy. Constituent
views count. And right now, unfortunately, the substantial
majority of Shia support Hezbollah, both as a source of Arab
pride, standing up to America and Israel, but also because they
provide the benefits, thanks to Iranian largesse.
The Lebanese Government could do more, and I think we
should press it to do more to overcome some of these
inequities. Ambassador Feltman spoke of something like 8
percent annual GDP growth. Well, that is not happening in
places like Bourj el-Barajneh in the southern suburbs, and the
contrasts are absolutely striking to go from the rebuilt
commercial center of Beirut or the Maronite neighborhoods of
Ashrafia a few short miles into the southern suburbs, and you
have gone half the world away.
And it feeds this narrative of the Shia as the deprived and
the dispossessed, and that is a narrative that is generations
old, as I noted in my statement. You have got to change that
narrative, I think, before you can, over the long term, change
the dynamic that supports Hezbollah within Lebanon.
And if there is a way to get after the money, as Dani
suggests, or if there are more ways to think creatively about
getting after the money, that would definitely be worth
pursuing.
Senator Casey. Do you think that has been--that problem has
been exacerbated substantially since you were serving there? Or
is there any way to compare the two time periods?
Ambassador Crocker. And I don't--I haven't been in Lebanon
for some years now, but my sense is that the differences have
been exacerbated, that the extraordinary growth in the non-Shia
parts of Lebanon, in Beirut itself and to the north, since the
early 1990s has, once again, made Beirut look like the Geneva
of the Middle East.
The development of the southern suburbs and the south,
while there has been some, has been far, far less. So I think
the disparities now loom even larger than they did back in the
days of the civil war itself.
Senator Casey. Dr. Norton, you had something?
Dr. Norton. Well, first of all, I would emphasize the fact
that Lebanon is a wonderful country, great place to visit. As I
frequently tell my students, it is not, however, someplace
where you want to be poor. There is no safety net.
And the government has never been particularly
conscientious about providing a safety net. And if you are in
need, then you have to depend on family or institutions or
religious groups or whoever else is willing to help you. And
that has not changed, and in my opinion, it may not change.
And I must also underline, I know we are talking largely
about the Shia community. But, Senator Casey, I would also
invite you, if you visit Lebanon, to visit north Lebanon, which
is largely a Sunni area, north of Tripoli. If you want to see
utter poverty and literally hundreds, thousands of young,
sullen men sitting around because they don't have work,
available to be mobilized by this or that group. You have got a
real problem on your hands. So it is not just the Shia
community.
And I would say, and I tried to hint at this in my
statement, that in many ways, the Shia community has done
pretty well over the last decades. There has been an awful lot
of money coming in from Africa, private money. There is a
developing and growing middle class. It doesn't look like
downtown Beirut, but it is coming.
And some of these villages that I knew three decades ago
that didn't have water or electricity and so on, you go to them
now, you find banks, and you find functioning services and even
municipal swimming pools and so on. So things are coming along,
but there certainly are great pockets of poverty.
But it is a formidable challenge to get the Lebanese
Government engaged on dealing with those segments of the
population--Christian, Muslim, whatever they may be--that are
really in need. That really hasn't been a strong suit of any
Lebanese Government in my recollection.
Senator Casey. Well, thank you very much.
I know we have to conclude. I wanted to keep within our 1-
hour promise and especially for those who are traveling. But we
are grateful for your testimony. We learned a lot.
We will use the hearing as a way to consider policy in this
area. If you have anything additional that you want to submit
for the record, we will leave the record open for a couple of
days at least.
Thank you very much, and that concludes our hearing.
[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman to Questions Submitted
by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Even though Hezbollah's coalition lost parliamentary
elections, they have now asserted effective control over major
decisions within the new Lebanese Government. Lebanon's President
Suleiman has expressed his support for Hezbollah, saying all the
Lebanese are united behind the resistance and no one in Lebanon,
especially the government, will harm the resistance's status. Hezbollah
continues to amass greater quantities and qualities of offensive
weapons, including in areas under the UNIFIL mandate. Hezbollah now has
over 40,000 missiles and possibly now Scud missiles which can reach
virtually anywhere in Israel. We have provided substantial assistance
to the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the past
and the President requested $100 million in military assistance and $30
million in security assistance for Lebanon for FY 2011.
Given the central role Hezbollah plays in the Lebanese
Government--the complete failure of the Lebanese Army to disarm
internal militias; and the overall political stance taken by
the Lebanese leadership vis-a-vis Hezbollah, an organization
the United States categorizes as a terrorist entity--how do we
manage our relations with the Government of Lebanon and not
deal with Hezbollah? With the role Hezbollah plays throughout
the government, what assurances can you give us that we aren't
dealing with a terrorist organization? At what point, does the
influence of Hezbollah taint the legitimacy of the overall
government?
Answer. Our policy on Hezbollah remains unchanged. Hezbollah, in
its entirety, is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and we
have no contact with the group or any of its members. This policy will
not change until this militant group disarms, renounces violence, and
adheres to the authority of the Lebanese state.
As we've done in the past, in the two ministries run by a Hezbollah
minister, we are able to pursue U.S. interests successfully by
interacting with lower level civil servants at those ministries, while
maintaining our no contact policy with Hezbollah officials.
Moreover, the United States uses vetting procedures, end-use
monitoring of defense articles, and other controls to mitigate the risk
that Hezbollah may receive direct or indirect benefits from U.S.
assistance. In fact, our support to Lebanon's security services is
designed to strengthen the authority of the Lebanese state as the sole
decisionmaker on Lebanon's national security. In conjunction, our
economic and development assistance helps Lebanon develop credible and
transparent institutions, strengthen the role of civil society, support
the independence and efficiency of the judicial system, and increase
economic opportunities. Over the long term, these efforts provide
credible alternatives to extremist groups, as we continue our support
for the creation of a sovereign, independent, and stable Lebanon.
We believe that the Lebanese people deserve the opportunity to
chart their own political course free from internal conflict and
external interference, and that a strong, sovereign Lebanon will yield
a more stable Middle East. The composition of the government is an
issue for the Lebanese alone to decide. We will continue working with
those partners in Lebanon who share our objectives of combating
terrorism, implementing U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680,
and 1701, and expanding the state's authority over all of Lebanon's
territory. Our strong support for Lebanon's state institutions is
designed to support these goals.
Question. How will U.S. aid to Lebanon be affected in light of
Hezbollah's growing role in the government? How do we provide Lebanon
with assistance and ensure that it doesn't benefit or strengthen
Hezbollah?
Answer. Our assistance is designed to strengthen Lebanon's
independence and sovereignty by increasing the government's capacity to
provide for the security and socioeconomic needs of its citizens. It is
critically important that we continue this process to ensure the long-
term stability of Lebanon and the region. Throughout this process, our
vetting procedures, end-use monitoring of defense articles, and other
controls mitigate the risk that Hezbollah may receive direct or
indirect benefits from U.S. assistance.
Question. The FY 2010 appropriations bill included tight
congressional oversight on the use of military assistance funds to
Lebanon, making funds available only to professionalize the LAF,
strengthen border security, interdict arms shipments, and combat
terrorism. Will the administration hold itself to the same guidelines
and reporting requirements?
Answer. We will adhere to congressional reporting requirements.
Question. How would you assess the progress of the LAF's training
and performance?
Answer. Our security assistance promotes the extension of Lebanese
Government control throughout the country--especially in the south,
along the border, and in Palestinian refugee camps--in accordance with
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701. Our engagement
enhances the professionalism of Lebanese security forces, builds ties
to Lebanon's political leadership, and reinforces civilian control of
the military; we have seen concrete improvements in these areas. For
example, the LAF has demonstrated on multiple occasions its cooperation
with UNIFIL to respond, investigate and prevent incidents on the border
with Israel, calming tensions.
The LAF is an active participant in U.S. service courses, and in
FY09, over 130 students attended Officer Basic and Advanced courses,
including Infantry, Field Artillery, and Armor classes. With the help
of the United States, approximately 150 students to date have completed
counterterrorism (CT)--relevant courses, such as Urban Operations and
Long Range Marksmanship. The CT training helps the LAF cooperate with
the United States in the fight against international terrorism by
providing education and training to bolster the LAF's ability to
detect, monitor, interdict, and disrupt terrorist activities. Over 200
LAF officers have attended Combating Terrorism Seminars, in which the
key themes are defining threats, assessing national responses,
strategies, and best practices for combating terrorism, and strategies
for enhancing regional and national cooperation. The LAF also is
working with CENTCOM to develop a long-term strategic plan.
We also must continue our efforts to prepare Lebanon's Internal
Security Forces to successfully accomplish their mandate--to help build
safe, secure communities and extend the rule of law to each of them.
Without a strong ISF and LAF, Lebanon's existence as an independent and
democratic state will be jeopardized, increasing the risk of
instability in Lebanon and the region. That is a risk we cannot take.
Question. You have stated that there has been ``no seriousness in
implementing'' Security Council Resolution 1701 which requires
Hezbollah's disarming and sought to end weapons smuggling to Lebanon.
Can the United States do anything to better enforce Resolution 1701? Do
you still have faith in UNIFIL to carry out its mandate? What could be
done to strengthen that mandate when UNIFIL's reauthorization comes
before the United Nations?
Answer. Achieving full implementation of U.N. Security Council
resolution 1701-- including its call for Lebanon to establish a
weapons-free zone in the south, secure its borders, and ensure that all
weapons in Lebanon remain under the control of the Lebanese state and
UNIFIL--remains a top priority for the United States. More must be done
to implement this resolution and we will continue to urge further steps
by Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. It is crucial that those states with
ties to armed groups in Lebanon end their illegal supply of weapons and
other material support, which continue to pose a danger to both Lebanon
and the region.
President Sleiman and Prime Minister Hariri consistently reiterated
their commitment to Resolution 1701, a commitment enshrined in the
government's ministerial statement, and we look forward to continuing
to work with them toward this goal. Specifically, we are urging Lebanon
to take more assertive steps to combat weapons smuggling, enforce the
weapons-free zone in the south, and begin the process of militia
disarmament by implementing the 2006 and 2008 decisions of the National
Dialogue to disarm Palestinian groups outside Lebanon's refugee camps.
Our security assistance and commitment to building strategic
relationships with the Lebanese Army and police will continue to
support these efforts, as has our financial support to UNIFIL. We have
confidence in UNIFIL and its commander, Maj. Gen. Asarta Cuevas, who
succeeded Maj. Gen. Claudio Graziano of Italy in January 2010. He has
extensive and wide-ranging experience, including significant command
expertise and prior experience with United Nations peacekeeping.
UNIFIL, under its current Chapter VI mandate, remains the best
available option to assist the LAF in taking steps toward keeping
southern Lebanon free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets, and
weapons. Ultimately, it also presents the best platform for the parties
to move toward a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution that
includes the complete disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including
Hezbollah.
Question. We contributed $67.5 million to USAID's programs in
Lebanon in 2009. USAID invested these funds in a range of areas that
Lebanon has identified as priorities including support for increasing
democratic practices and promotion of the rule of law; strengthening
civil society and education. These funds are part of a U.S. effort to
strengthen the Lebanese Government in the face of Hezbollah. However,
with Hezbollah taking on a greater role within the government and now
with the recent reports of Syria transferring Scud missiles to
Hezbollah, I wonder whether this assistance can have the desired
effect.
Are there willing partners that will take assistance from
the U.S. Government? Do they have to conceal the United States
as a source of their funding? Are we able to ensure the
oversight through site visits and other inspections to ensure
U.S. assistance is being used appropriately?
Answer. There are many individuals, groups, and communities willing
to partner with us the United States Government in Lebanon.
USAID/Lebanon follows required agency directive--ADS 320, which
provides policy and directives regarding ``Branding and Marking.'' All
missions must adhere
to the procedures for branding and marking USAID-funded programs,
projects, activities, public communications, and commodities, in order
to identify them as assistance ``from the American people.'' There are
exceptions in the ADS when it is determined that branding would not in
the best interest of the USG. Such a determination is made on a case-
by-case basis. USAID/Lebanon has seen an increased ability over the
past number of years in being able to brand and mark our programming in
areas where previously it was difficult to do so.
USAID has full oversight of all of programs implemented in Lebanon
and provides the appropriate level of inspection and site visits of
activities implemented with USG economic assistance funding. USAID as
well as Foreign Service National staff employed by the mission visit
project activities and must report on site visits in accordance with
audit and other requirements.
Question. What is the policy of USAID in working with a government
whose members include representatives of a terrorist organization? Can
you ensure that these funds do not benefit Hezbollah in any way? What
safeguards are in place to ensure this?
Answer. USAID follows USG contact policy regarding Hezbollah.
Should there be a need to work with a ministry whose minister is a
Hezbollah member, USAID staff only engage that ministry at a lower,
working level, maintaining our no contact policy with Hezbollah
officials. Currently the Ministry of Agriculture is led by a Hezbollah-
affiliated minister, and USAID has successfully developed our new
programs to avoid any need to interact with this minister. To ensure
that USAID is not funding any Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO),
USAID utilizes a variety of vetting and certification procedures, such
as: mandatory anticertification clauses within all assistance
agreements, including grantees; checking all of our partner
organizations against the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
public database and other relevant sources to determine that the
recipient does not have ties to terrorist groups; requiring all
nongovernmental recipients of assistance to sign antiterrorism
certifications by which they certify that U.S. assistance will not be
used to provide support or resources to terrorists; and requiring
recipients to implement monitoring and oversight procedures to
safeguard against U.S.-provided assistance being diverted to support
terrorist activities.
Question. How much does USAID plan to spend in Lebanon next year?
What specific projects do you expect to fund?
Answer. USAID's program in Lebanon for FY09 was $67.5 million and
in FY10 will be $109 million. The FY 2011 request is $109 million.
Within the new USAID 2009-2013 strategy, USAID seeks to ``educate the
youth and provide employment opportunities, so that Lebanese have an
alternative to the lure of negative actors in Lebanon.'' USAID funds
programs that target governing institutions and civil society
organizations to be more responsive to Lebanese citizens by supporting
the rule of law and providing technical support for the judiciary,
supporting basic education for public schools, providing higher
education scholarships, and training participants in transparency and
accountability through grants. USAID also provides microfinance
programs, private sector competitiveness programs, and supports
environmental initiatives, such as reforestation and improvements in
the water supply and sanitation infrastructure. A central component of
these programs is USAID's focus on youth and reconciliation.
Question. What is the goal of USAID projects in Lebanon? Have USAID
programs strengthened the forces of moderation in Lebanon?
Answer. A strong, stable, and secure Lebanon is critical to U.S.
interests in the Middle East, including our pursuit of a comprehensive
regional peace and efforts to constrain Iranian influence in the
region. In line with these objectives, USAID's programs support
Lebanon's efforts to rebuild its sovereignty, develop democratic
principles, and expand economic viability of the country. Under its
Lebanon strategy, USAID is working to offer the Lebanese an alternative
to the lure of negative actors, especially critical for at-risk
populations such as youth and the unemployed. Over the long term, these
efforts provide credible alternatives to extremist groups, such as
Hezbollah. It is clear that both existing and future programs are
strengthening the forces of moderation in Lebanon. The ability of these
programs to expand into areas previously impenetrable is a clear
indicator that we are meeting and exceeding our expectations to
accomplish this goal. We continue to see increased support for USAID
programs throughout Lebanon, including vulnerable areas in the North,
Bekaa and the South. These programs are designed to adapt to the
unpredictability of the political and security environment and to
address the underlying causes of conflict, such as poor education
standards and lack of employment after completion of education and poor
governance.
Question. It is now widely reported and understood that Syria
recently transferred more advanced missiles and weaponry to Hezbollah
and, according to Israeli reports, Hezbollah crews may be training on
Scud launchers in Syria. The missiles being discussed have a longer
range and greater accuracy than those previously held by Hezbollah and
would put the entire State of Israel in range. This provocative action
by Syria raises very serious questions about President Assad's true
intentions in the region and could force military conflict in the short
term.
What can you tell us about what the Syrians actually
transferred to Hezbollah and when?
Answer. We have information confirming that Syria has transferred
ballistic missiles to Hezbollah. This is a sensitive issue, and we
would be happy to discuss any details beyond that in an appropriate
venue.
Question. Do you believe such arms transfers could take place
without the approval or consent of the Lebanese Government? What are
Lebanon's responsibilities when it comes to stopping the flow of arms
to Hezbollah?
Answer. Hezbollah has made no secret of its efforts to rearm since
2006, as noted by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah who said, ``For
those who are still calling for disarming the resistance, I tell them
this rhetoric is . . . useless.'' Hezbollah's efforts to rearm
contravene a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions and the Taif
accord, which brought an end to Lebanon's brutal civil war. Hezbollah
continues and will continue to present a danger to Lebanon and the
region's stability until it lays down its arms. All parties, whether in
or neighboring Lebanon, must adhere to their obligations under the
terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701--particularly the arms
embargo--and continue to fully support the efforts of the Lebanese
Government to implement these provisions, and of UNIFIL to support it.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that Syria acts to
stop the flow of arms to Hezbollah? Has the administration laid out the
consequences to Syria if they continue this destabilizing behavior?
Answer. This is a sensitive issue, and we would be happy to provide
additional details in an appropriate venue.
Question. Syria has had a chemical weapons program for many years
and according to the Director of National Intelligence, has the
capability to deliver chemical agents by plane, ballistic missile, and
artillery rockets. Do we know whether Syria has transferred chemical
weapons to Lebanon?
Answer. We are not aware of any state that has provided chemical
weapons to a terrorist group. The Syrian Government knows that
transferring a chemical weapon to Hezbollah would be a serious breach
of its obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540.
Question. Given the range of the Scud missile and other armaments
in Hezbollah's arsenal, does UNIFIL's mandate need to be extended to
all of Lebanon to deal with these long-range weapons?
Answer. UNIFIL continues to play a crucial role in maintaining
stability and preventing further Hezbollah attacks from southern
Lebanon, such as those that sparked the 2006 war in Lebanon between
Hezbollah and Israel. With a Chapter VI mandate, UNIFIL actively
assists the LAF in taking steps toward keeping southern Lebanon free of
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government
of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area. Based on ongoing
assessments by the U.N., we believe that UNIFIL has the tools needed to
implement its mandate. In fact, we are pleased that UNIFIL has grown
more assertive in response to recent incidents in its area of
operations.
While there is much more work to do before we can say that we have
fully implemented Resolution 1701, it remains the best available
blueprint for the parties to move from the current cessation of
hostilities toward a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution. As
we saw during the devastating 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah's
successful disarmament cannot be brought about through military means
and ultimately, will require a political decision by the Lebanese
people themselves in favor of full disarmament of Hezbollah. This is
most likely to happen in the context of the comprehensive regional
peace we seek to achieve. As we work toward this goal, we also are
continuing our efforts to support the Lebanese Government's development
of an effective border control regime and the development of Lebanon's
legitimate security services, the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal
Security Forces.
Question. How would you assess UNIFIL's performance since the last
Lebanon war in stopping the flow of Syrian arms to Lebanon? It seems
that they completely failed to stop the smuggling of rather large Scud
missiles; it makes one wonder what else might Syria be sending into
Lebanon?
Answer. With a Chapter VI mandate, UNIFIL actively assists the LAF
in taking steps toward keeping southern Lebanon free of armed
personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of
Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area. UNFIL has grown more
assertive in response to incidents in its area of operations. For
example, last December a UNIFIL patrol spotted men engaged in
suspicious activity. UNFIL investigated and discovered 250 kg of
explosives. The September 11, 2009, rocket firing into Israel from
southern Lebanon was limited by prompt action by UNIFIL troops and the
LAF. Fortunately, the rocket caused no casualties. UNFIL continues to
play a crucial role in preventing violence along the Blue Line and
attacks from southern Lebanon, such as those that sparked the 2006 war
in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel. UNFIL has made steady progress
to visibly mark the Blue Line. Sixty-nine points have been agreed on by
the parties, with 40 markers already installed, and 23 markers under
construction. UNFIL is providing engineering assets to assist the
Lebanese Armed Forces in building a road parallel to the Blue Line,
which will assist with patrolling and allow security forces to react
more rapidly to incidents.
Due to the efforts of UNIFIL and the LAF, since 2006, the Blue Line
has been stable and significantly quieter than in previous years. This
is no small accomplishment. During this period, UNIFIL has registered a
number of notable successes. First, UNIFIL has kept the peace by
working closely with the LAF to fill the space in South Lebanon to
prevent others, in particular, Palestinian rejectionist groups and
Salafist offshoots, from having free reign to fire rockets toward
Israel. In the handful of instances where we saw small missiles
launched, UNIFIL moved quickly to respond and investigate, while
continuing its efforts to work with the LAF to prevent additional
incidents. UNIFIL continues to play a critical role in calming
tensions, improving communication, and preventing escalation in the
wake of incidents such as rocket firings, arrests of people crossing
the border, or heated demonstrations on the border. Second, through the
tripartite mechanism, UNIFIL continues to pursue serious negotiations
over Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar. These negotiations, if successful,
ultimately will show that diplomatic engagement can accomplish more
than armed resistance. Finally, UNIFIL has made measurable progress in
demarcating the Blue Line, a key component in maintaining stability
south of the Litani.
We are able to provide additional information in an appropriate
venue.
Question. The Cedar Revolution saw an end to Syria's occupation of
Lebanon but, despite the exchange of ambassadors, Syria still meddles
in Lebanese internal affairs. High-level Syrian officials have been
implicated and there is suspicion that the Syrian intelligence service
was directly involved in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri. Additionally, Syria continues to facilitate the
smuggling of weapons across the border to Hezbollah, which is in direct
violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.
Have relations improved between Syria and Lebanon since the
exchange of ambassadors?
Answer. We are pleased to see both Lebanon and Syria working to
normalize their bilateral relations. We expect that Lebanon and Syria,
as neighboring countries with strong familial and historic bonds, will
have close ties; however, this relationship must be on equal footing.
While the exchange of ambassadors last year was an important first
step, much work remains to be done, especially in terms of border
security as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1701. During
President Sleiman's June 2010 visit to Damascus, President Asad agreed
to call on technical committees to continue gathering information with
a view toward delineating the border as soon as possible.
Question. What is the state of the relationship today and what role
does Syria now play inside Lebanon?
Answer. Lebanon held successful parliamentary elections in June
2009. These elections clearly demonstrated that the people of Lebanon
continue to support those principles that guided the Cedar Revolution
and Lebanon's march to independence in 2005. After roughly 5 months of
negotiations, the Cabinet was formed in December. The municipal
elections in May were another step forward. These were important steps,
but Lebanon has much to overcome after decades of civil war and
occupation. Our robust assistance to Lebanon, over $1 billion since
2006, is working to support this process by strengthening key state
institutions improving their ability to meet the needs of Lebanon's
citizens.
Syrian support for Hezbollah continues to be a major issue. More
broadly, we continue to emphasize to Syria that any arms transfers to
Hezbollah are a major problem. We believe that Syria's arming of
Hezbollah presents a significant threat to regional stability. As Syria
and Lebanon continue working to normalize their bilateral ties, Syria's
full implementation of the arms embargo, as called for in UNSCR 1701 is
essential. The United States supports the Government of Lebanon and its
efforts to assert its complete authority throughout the entire country.
We note the numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, including
Resolutions 1559 and 1680, and other international calls for the
disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah.
______
Responses of Augustus Richard Norton to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch
Question 1. You've previously stated that is actually becoming a
moderate organization which has moved away from their activities in
Iraq. With that in mind, what do you make of their networks in East
Africa, as well as their attempt to commit terrorist acts in Azerbaijan
and other countries?
Given's and Iran's activities in Egypt, East Africa, and the
Gulf of Aden, how do you read Hasan Nasrallah's recent threat
to strike at Israel's Red Sea port?
How do you explain that Sayyid ali al Amine, the Shia Mufti
for south Lebanon, its major stronghold, is so critical of the
terrorist organization?
Question 2. You've argued that was ``Lebanonized.'' How do you
explain Nasrallah's continued explicit declaration that he was a
follower of the velayat-e faqih doctrine, which holds Iran's Supreme
Guide to be a final and only arbiter on all matters related to Jihad,
for example? Just the other day, at the memorial ceremony of the death
of Ayatollah Khomeini, Nasrallah declared that there was a need to
continue Khomeini's mission of spreading the ideas and values of the
Islamic Revolution in the Arab and Islamic States. How do we reconcile
these statements with ``Lebanonization''?
Answers. I have characterized Hezbollah as a Janus-faced
organization that combines a militant commitment to armed
``resistance'' while also participating in Lebanese sectarian political
system. I have not described Hezbollah as a ``moderate'' group. In
fact, I have described its involvement in terrorism, as well as its use
of political violence. These perspectives may be found in my recent
book (``Hezbollah: A Short History,'' Princeton University Press, 2009)
and in a variety of other publications and presentations (for instance,
see my 1999 Council on Foreign Relations occasional paper, ``Hizballah
of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics.'')
Hezbollah's Janus-faced posture reflects the group's evolution
since it was founded under Iranian tutelage in the early 1980s,
following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Two Israeli Prime
Ministers, the late Yitzhak Rabin and the Ehud Barak, have reflected on
the fact that it was Israel's invasion and occupation of Lebanon that
provided a rationale for Hezbollah. This is important to note because
it was precisely Hezbollah's skill in fighting the Israeli Army and
Israel's proxy militia forces that helped the group gain credibility in
Lebanon.
Over nearly three decades, the group has gained a much broader
political base in Lebanon. This is for a number of reasons, including
Hezbollah's success in creating an array of effective social and
economic institutions. As Senator Corker noted in his comments during
the subcommittee hearings on June 8, there are a number of Lebanese,
Shi'a in particular, who share Hezbollah's worldview, and fully support
Hezbollah's argument that in the absence of a strong Lebanese Army they
must depend on Hezbollah to deter Israel. My own research confirms that
the 2006 war convinced many Lebanese Shi'a who had not been active
supporters of Hezbollah that the group cared more about their needs
than the Lebanese Government did.
Among the cadre of young militants who founded Hezbollah a common
denominator was a commitment to the doctrine of the ``Rule of the
Jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih in Arabic, or velayat-e faqih in
Persian), the idea that highly qualified cleric should be the ultimate
authority in an Islamic state. Therefore, their loyalty was directed to
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Indeed, Hezbollah was explicitly committed
to the establishment of a system of Islamic rule in Lebanon. To this
day, Hezbollah officially considers the Ayatollah `Ali Khamene'i (the
successor to Khomeini) as their ultimate authority.
Yet, Hezbollah has to confront two realities in Lebanon: One is
that there are 18 officially recognized sectarian groups in Lebanon and
no single group constitutes a majority (the Shi'a comprise about one-
third of the total population). Therefore, the feasibility of ever
establishing an Islamic state in the country is very slim. This is a
reality that has been publically acknowledged by key Hezbollah
officials, including Hasan Nasrallah.
The second reality is that although Hezbollah enjoys broad support
among Lebanese Shi'a, most Shi'a have no interest in living in an
Islamic state modeled on Iran. This is quite obvious to anyone who has
spent any time on-the-ground in Lebanon. In fact, while many Lebanese
Shi'a support Hezbollah, most do not follow Ayatollah Khameine'i for
religious guidance. The two most respected religious authorities for
Lebanese Shi'a are Ayatollah `Ali Sistani, based in al-Najaf, Iran, and
Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, based in the southern suburbs of
Beirut. Fadlallah, it should be noted, expressed early skepticism of
transforming Lebanon into an Islamic state, and also openly challenged
the religious credentials of `Ali Khameine'i to provide religious
guidance to Shi'i Muslims. (Fadlallah died on July 4, 2010. Since he
was viewed as an open-minded and liberal thinker on a variety of
topics, particularly women's issues, it is unlikely that followers will
shift their loyalty to Khamene'i or even Sistani.)
In my testimony, I emphasized that the solidarity of the Lebanese
Shi'i community is an artifact of the events of the past few years, and
especially the 2006 war, which is widely understood by the Lebanese
Shi'a as an attack on their community and its institutions. I also made
the point that another war is likely to harden this communal
solidarity, not weaken it.
In the 2009 Parliamentary elections, Hezbollah's Lebanese
opponents, particularly in the Sunni Muslim community, were keenly
effective in mobilizing anti-Hezbollah voters. I saw this myself in the
city of Zahle and in the surrounding villages, where Sunni voters
ensured that none of Hezbollah's electoral allies won any of the seven
parliamentary seats that were at stake. There is no doubt that the
Hezbollah-led incursion into West Beirut, in May 2008, hardened
sentiments against Hezbollah, especially among the Sunnis. Nonetheless,
among Shi'i voters, Hezbollah continued to attract impressive support.
I underlined that there are competing voices in the Shi'i
community, but in the present environment those voices are subdued.
Over the course of Hezbollah's political life, it sometimes fought
bloody battles with its rival, Amal. In addition, there are certainly
secular groups and individuals that would like to minimize the role of
religion in public life. I know secular Shi'i Muslims in Lebanon
(including some who live in the southern suburbs of Beirut, which is
Hezbollah's stronghold) who are deeply contemptuous of Hezbollah and
who resent the group's influence. Some senior religious authorities
have sided with Amal rather than Hezbollah, and others have adopted a
more independent stance. Senator Risch asks specifically about al-
Sayyid `Ali al'Amin, the former mufti in Tyre. There is no question
that al-Amin has a small constituency, but he is in position to
challenge Hezbollah, and he is not likely to be able to do so in the
foreseeable future.
In my comments before the subcommittee I tried to emphasize that
diverse voices are far more likely to emerge in an environment of
reduced tension. So long as the threat of another war with Israel is
visible on the horizon, Hezbollah's argument for its indispensability
as a armed force is going to carry weight. (Of course, this also means
that there is an incentive for Hezbollah to spark tension
periodically.) I also expressed my skepticism of the Israeli military's
capability to defeat Hezbollah, especially if wholesale destruction and
slaughter in Lebanon is to be avoided.
Since the 1990s, Hezbollah's orientation to fighting Lebanon has
revealed a logic of calculated escalation and deterrence that is
familiar to strategic theorists. In effect, what has developed are
``rules of the game'' that are understood by Hezbollah and by its
adversaries. These have been best analyzed by the Israeli scholar
Daniel Sobelman. In effect, what emerges is a system (formalized in
1993 and 1996) that promises retaliation if the opponent crosses ``red
lines.'' I understand Nasrallah's recent comments about attacking
Israeli vessels in the Red Sea in that context.
The existence of these ``rules'' does not preclude miscalculation,
which was dramatically illustrated in 2006 when Hasan Nasrallah and his
colleagues miscalculated the Israeli response to the their cross-border
raid to capture Israeli soldiers.
As for the role of Hezbollah's activities outside of Lebanon,
notably in Iraq or Azerbaijan, a succinct answer is appropriate. In
Iraq, the evidence clearly shows that Hezbollah elements have
periodically collaborated with the IGRC in Iran-based training of
insurgents, as well as equipping insurgents some Shi'i insurgents with
deadly munitions. I am not in a position to evaluate whether those
activities continue.
Detailed information on the 2008 incident in Azerbaijan is not
available to my knowledge. There are some facts about the case that
strike me as curious, especially the claim, by the Azerbaijan
government that Hezbollah terrorists were working in cooperation with
al-Qaeda, which I tend to doubt. It is certainly credible that the
failed bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Baku was plotted as
retaliation for the assassination of Imad Mughniyah.
I withhold judgment for now on the arrests and trials in Egypt. The
Egyptian security courts are known for dispensing arbitrary justice,
and Egyptian Government claims should be approached cautiously.
President Mubarak was apparently incensed by the rhetorical
provocations of Hasan Nasrallah during and after the 2006 war, and I
see the trials as payback, Egyptian-style.
I thank Senator Risch for the opportunity to address his questions,
as well as to further elaborate on the issues that I addressed in my
testimony.
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