[Senate Hearing 111-615]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-615
HAITI RECONSTRUCTION: SMART PLANNING MOVING FORWARD
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS,
AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 3
MacCormack, Charles, president and CEO, Save the Children,
Westport, CT................................................... 19
Prepared statement............................................... 21
Maguire, Robert, associate professor of International Affairs,
Trinity Washington University, and chair of the Haiti Working
Group of the U.S. Institute of Peace........................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis
Group, Washington, DC.......................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
International Housing Coalition (IHC), Washington, DC, prepared
statement...................................................... 33
Article from Newsweek, ``After Reconstruction'' by Andrew
Natsios, January 22, 2010...................................... 34
(iii)
HAITI RECONSTRUCTION: SMART PLANNING MOVING FORWARD
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Development and
Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and
International Environmental Protection,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:25 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. This hearing, come to order.
Let me, first, apologize to our witnesses and to the public
who's here. We have a vote that's going on as we speak, and
there were two votes, actually, so I'm sure many of you have
been here before and understand the nature of that--so instead
of interrupting the hearing, we're just starting a little
later, so we appreciate your forbearance. And I know that the
ranking member will be here shortly.
So, let me start with a statement. We're here today to look
at the extraordinary reconstruction challenges in the months
ahead for Haiti and to put forward ideas that should be part of
a broader discussion, moving forward.
Of course, first of all, let me say that our thoughts and
prayers are with the people of Haiti, to all who have lost
family and loved ones in this tragedy, including to some who
have lost loved ones, from the United States, and even from my
State.
The United States and Haiti are historically tied together
in important ways, ties that have become clear in the aftermath
of the earthquake's devastation. The response for aid and
assistance has reverberated in towns and cities across the
United States. I can speak to the response in my home State of
New Jersey, which has the fourth-largest Haitian population in
the country. In Essex or Union County, I'm hard-pressed to find
a Haitian-American that doesn't know someone who is lost in
this catastrophe.
Today, we meet as the initial response is transitioning to
a more sustained one. But, even as we transition, we continue
to work in an acute environment, where life or death hangs in
the balance for those who remain critically injured. We
continue to battle logistical constraints to get assistance to
those in need, and we have only begun the operation to recover
the remains of tens of thousands who perished under the rubble.
So, recognizing the immediate needs that still exist, we
meet today to look forward, to pay particular attention to
decisions that are being made today, tomorrow, and next week
and beyond, and how those decisions will impact the long-term
recovery operation in Haiti. In particular, we will discuss
issues that should be resolved with the March donors meeting at
the United Nations in New York.
Immediately following the earthquake, President Obama
appointed Dr. Shah, the Administrator of USAID, to lead the
response. I'm pleased that President Obama chose to have a
civilian lead this effort, and, in--particularly that he chose
USAID.
In terms of disaster response, the United States, through
the USAID Department and its Disaster Assistance Response
Teams, actually have very strong systems in place to respond to
disasters overseas. The DAR Team is often the first team on the
ground to help assess needs and call in support, but clearly
the scale and scope of the earthquake in Haiti has overwhelmed
everyone. But, the United States did not wait to act. So, we
appreciate Dr. Shah's ongoing work on this, and we look forward
to his testimony to this committee at some point in the near
future.
We've all seen the outpouring of support for Haiti from
countries around the region and around the world. From large
corporate donations to private individuals who texted $10 from
their cell phones, this has truly been a broad-based response.
With a broad response come big resources. And with big
resources comes big ideas. And with big ideas comes pressure to
spend those resources and make those ideas a reality. Soon
concrete will be poured, bricks will be laid, schools will be
built, and land rights will take on a new urgency. As we know,
decisions that are made after any disaster, decisions that are
being made even today in Haiti, have a tendency to gel. So,
before all the needs assessments are done, before the long-term
plans are complete, before decisions that are made on the fly
end up being the basis for policy, moving forward, we need to
make sure that these decisions are taken by choice rather than
by chance. For example, who will sift through and prioritize
the wellspring of ideas that well-meaning governments,
international agencies, and private organizations have for the
future of Haiti? And, of course, the importance of Haiti, its
government, and its people to be an intricate part of this. I
think we all agree with President Clinton when he says we
should help Haiti build back better. But, how do we organize
our response to do this? How will reforestation or city
planning be prioritized against water or roads? How can we
prevent a new earthquake-resistant school from being built
right next door to another new earthquake-resistant school? Few
in this process are bad actors; we all want the best for the
Haitian people. But, we should not underestimate the pressures
from donors, governments, and private organizations to show
results back at home, wherever ``back home'' happens to be for
them.
Of course, the Haitians should be in the lead. But, the
question remains, Who plays the supporting role, and how do we
organize our efforts? How should the United States and the rest
of the international community work with the United Nations?
How do we balance a separation between military and civilian
efforts, but, at the same time, make sure they are well
coordinated? What is the role of the Organization of American
States, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank,
and other regional organizations? And while we all recognize,
again, that Haitians should be in the lead, we also recognize
that the institutions and leadership in Haiti, fragile before
the earthquake, are maybe even more fragile today.
Now, with government structures so devastated and the
immediate needs so acute, the international community may be
tempted to do for them instead of doing it with them. Such
tradeoffs will not be easy, but the long-term goal is Haitian
ownership of both the challenge and the solutions. This is the
foreign policy interests of the United States and in the
greater humanitarian interests of all of us who have been
affected by this tragedy.
We have three expert witnesses with us today to offer their
views. First, we have Robert Maguire, the director of programs
and international affairs at Trinity Washington University;
Mark Schneider, who is a senior vice president at the
International Crisis Group; and Charles MacCormack, president
and CEO of Save the Children.
I want to thank you all for your participation today. We
look forward to a frank and provocative discussion, as well as
a productive one.
Before I turn to you for your testimony, let me recognize
the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator
Corker, for any remarks he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I hope,
always, if there's ever a delay after a vote, you always start
without me, and I thank you for doing that today without--so
that I don't feel badly being late and keeping our witnesses
here.
Thank you for your testimony. I'm going to listen to each
of you, and not make any opening comments. I am catching a
flight shortly thereafter, so, after you finish making your
testimony, I probably will leave. We have some questions that
we'll probably give you, if it's OK, for the record. But, I
thank you very much for being here, for your efforts, and
certainly for your testimony.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
And with that, let me recognize each of you for 5 minutes
or so. I'd ask you to summarize the essence of your written
testimony. Your full written testimony will be included in the
record.
And we will begin with you, Mr. Maguire.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAGUIRE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TRINITY WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, AND CHAIR
OF THE HAITI WORKING GROUP OF THE U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Maguire. Thank you. And thank you for inviting me to
testify today. I appreciate this opportunity to share my
thoughts.
My testimony is called ``Reconstruct to Rebalance Haiti.''
And I should say that, in the five decades that I've traveled
to Haiti, I've seen the country become terribly out of balance.
Much of this revolves around the unnatural growth of Haiti's
cities, especially what Haitians call the Republic of Port-au-
Prince, and a parallel ferocious neglect of the rest of Haiti,
particularly its rural economy and people. I have outlined the
progression and results of this in my written testimony.
Because of unmitigated off-the-land migration with poor
people piling on top of each other on steep hillsides and in
dangerous ravines, river flood plains, and coastal mudflats,
seeking opportunities that were mostly a mirage, Port-au-Prince
had become a disaster waiting to happen. Those who perished on
January 12 were mostly poor people crowded on marginal land and
into substandard housing devastated by the quake.
The vast majority of the thousands who died in the floods
in Gonaives in 2004 and 2008 were poor people crowded on
alluvial costal mudflats in the river flood plains.
Haiti had lost its balance in social and economic equity
and in the ability of the state to care for its citizens. By
2007, 68 percent of the total national income went to the
wealthiest 20 percent of the population, Haitian state
institutions had virtually collapsed under the weight of bad
governance since the Duvalier era.
International balance was off, too. In recent times, donors
have chosen mostly to bypass even democratically elected
governments and funnel aid funds through foreign-based NGOs and
enact projects drawn up outside of Haiti and that lasted only
as long as the money did. By the 1990s, Haitians were
derisively calling their country a Republic of NGOs, and by
2008, none other than the president of the World Bank lamented
the cacophony of feel-good flag-draped projects that had proven
a vastly inadequate substitute for a coherent national
development strategy.
Now is an opportunity to help Haitians restore balance to
their country. I have five recommendations, based upon my
experience in Haiti and years of discussions and conversations
with Haitian counterparts.
One, encourage decentralization by welcoming dislocated
persons. At least 500,000 people have now fled Port-au-Prince,
returning to towns and villages from which they had migrated
and where they have family. This flight can be a silver lining
in today's very dark cloud, but we must catch up with and get
ahead of this movement. If conditions in the countryside,
already poor, are not improved, the displaced will ultimately
return to Port-au-Prince to replicate the dangerous dynamics of
earlier decades.
To catch up and reverse this migration, we should support
the idea proffered by the Haitian Government in Montreal last
week: reinforce 200 decentralized communities. And these
communities' welcome centers can offer multiple services,
including relief in the short term, with education and health
facilities attached.
The reverse migration we are seeing today offers a golden
opportunity to rebalance the education and health system of
Haiti and to help the rural economy grow. In that regard, the
centers can coordinate investment and employment opportunities,
as well as state services, including robust agronomic
assistance to farmers.
No. 2, support the creation of a national civic service
corps. The institutional piece of this decentralization can be
a national civic service corps. Since 2007, Haitian authorities
have been working on the prospect of creating such an entity.
Now's the time for it to take off.
A 700,000-strong corps will rapidly harness untapped labor
in rural and urban settings to rebuild Haiti's infrastructure,
undertake environmental rehabilitation, increase productivity,
and restore dignity and pride through meaningful work. It will
also form a natural disaster response mechanism. If this all
sounds familiar, it should. This thinking parallels the
thinking that went into the creation of such New Deal programs
as the WPA and the CCC.
No. 3, strengthen Haitian state institutions through
accompaniment, cooperation, and partnership. At the hearing on
Haiti last week, witnesses spoke of the need to rebuild the
Haitian state from the bottom up and of working with Haitian
officials, not pushing them aside. I agree wholeheartedly. This
is an opportunity to strengthen Haiti's public institutions.
The capacity of the Haitian state has deteriorated
progressively over the past 50 years. We've seen that in past
weeks with the already weak state that can hardly respond to
this calamity.
It's easier to kick someone in the teeth when he or she is
already on the mat. Rather than swinging our foot at the
Government of Haiti, however, we should offer our hand. This is
the time of the government's greatest need. Over the past 4
years, Preval has won praise internationally, and among most in
Haiti, over improved management of the affairs of the state. We
were looking for a new paradigm at the donor's conference of
partnership. Let's stay that course. Generations of bad
government and zero-sum political culture are not turned around
overnight.
No. 4 of my five, get money into the hands of poor people.
Two recommendations. Let's stimulate Haiti's bottom-up
capitalism to rebuild the country through small loans to
entrepreneurs, especially those who produce something,
including farmers. The government studies indicate that a 10-
percent increase in man hours on farms will create 40,000 jobs.
Implement a conditional cash transfer program for Haiti. These
programs transfer cash to poor, conditioned upon their children
attending schools and clinics. Mexico and Brazil have succeeded
in assisting millions of poor families improve standards of
living, while sending their children to schools and clinics.
Importantly, CCT programs provide the government with the
challenge and opportunity of being a positive presence in the
lives of citizens. This is essential in Haiti as a means of
enabling the government to demonstrate, therefore, that there
are tangible fruits of democratic governance. You vote, you get
something back for it.
The last recommendation is to seek out and support
institutions, businesses, leaders who work toward greater
inclusion, lesser inequality, and enact socially responsible
investment strategies.
So, what about hope and its potential benefits? Beyond
doubt, factory jobs should be a part of Haiti's future. Three
important points must be kept in mind, however, if this job
creation strategy is to be a plus in helping Haiti to rebalance
and build back better.
First, universal free education and rural investment must
robustly parallel factory investments. Decentralized
agrobusiness possibilities, and the jobs and infusion of cash
they bring to the Haitian economy, cannot be ignored.
Second, assembly plants cannot be concentrated in Port-au-
Prince. Haiti has at least a dozen coastal cities with already
functioning, albeit rudimentary, infrastructures where ports
can be built. Decentralization into these towns and cities will
rebalance prospects for economic growth and infrastructure
development to all of Haiti.
And third, investors, owners, and managers must be mindful
of the fact that Haitian workers are more than plentiful cheap
labor. As Secretary of State Clinton said at the April donor's
conference, ``Talent is universal, opportunity is not.'' A key
to Haiti's renaissance is to improve the opportunity
environment for all. Haiti's diaspora offers bountiful evidence
of what can be achieved when opportunities are twinned with
talent.
In conclusion, if there is a silver lining in the deep,
dark cloud of Haiti's recent catastrophe, it is that this may
offer all of us--Haitians, friends of Haiti, and those whose
connection with Haiti may simply be as a bureaucrat or an
investor--an opportunity to learn from mistakes and take steps
that will rebalance the country. If rebalanced, Haiti can move
forward unequivocally toward less poverty and inequity,
diminished social and economic exclusion, and greater human
dignity, a rehabilitated environment, stronger public
institutions, and a national infrastructure for economic growth
and investment.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maguire follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Maguire, Ph.D., Director of Programs in
International Affairs, Trinity Washington University, Washington, DC
Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
My first visit to Haiti was in 1974. My first full day in Haiti was
the day that Haiti's National Soccer Team scored the incredible goal
against Italy in the World Cup. That may not mean much to Americans,
but to Haitians it means everything. I have come to take this
coincidence as a sign that there was bound to be some kind of
unbreakable bond between Haiti and me. And that came to pass.
My most recent visit ended on January 10, 2010, two days before the
earthquake. In between, I have visited Haiti more than 100 times, as a
U.S. Government official working with the Inter-American Foundation and
the Department of State; as a scholar and researcher, and as a friend
of Haiti and its people. I have traveled throughout that beautiful, if
benighted, land. I have met and broken bread with Haitians of all walks
of life. I have stayed at the now-destroyed Montana Hotel. I had dinner
there 5 days before the quake, chatting with waiters and barmen I had
befriended over the years. I speak Creole. I have lost friends and
colleagues in the tragedy. I am anxious to share my views and ideas
with you.
In the deep darkness of the cloud cast over Haiti by the terrible
tragedy of January 12 there is an opportunity for the country and its
people to score another incredible goal, not so much by reconstructing
or rebuilding, but by restoring a balance to achieve a nation with less
poverty and inequity, improved social and economic inclusion, greater
human dignity, a rehabilitated environment, stronger public
institutions, and a national infrastructure for economic growth and
investment. And, if that goal is to be scored, relationships between
Haitians and outsiders also will have to be rebalanced toward
partnership and respect of the value and aspirations of all Haiti's
people.
a country out of balance
In the five decades that I have traveled to Haiti, I have seen the
country become terribly out of balance. Much of this revolves around
the unnatural growth of Haiti's cities, especially in what Haitians
call ``the Republic of Port-au-Prince.'' In the late 1970s, Haiti's
rural to urban demographic ratio was 80 percent to 20 percent. Today it
is 55 percent to 45 percent. The earlier ratio reflected what had been
chiefly an agrarian society since independence. The population of Port-
au-Prince in the late 1970s was a little over 500,000--already too many
people to be adequately supported by the city's physical
infrastructure. By then Haitians from the countryside had already begun
trickling into the capital city, as a result Dictator Francois ``Papa
Doc'' Duvalier's (1957-1972) quest to centralize his grip on power.
Under Papa Doc, a ferocious neglect beyond PAP took place, as ports in
secondary cities languished, asphalted roads disintegrated and, in some
cases, were actually ripped up, and swatches of the countryside were
systematically deforested under the guise of national security or by
way of timber extraction monopolies granted to Duvalier's cronies.
Small farmers were ignored as state-supported agronomists sought office
jobs in the capital.
The only state institutions present in the countryside were army
and paramilitary (Tonton Makout) posts and tax offices--which enforced
what rural dwellers told me was a `squeeze--suck' (pese--souse) system
of state predation. With wealth, work, and what passed for an education
and health infrastructure increasingly concentrated in Port-au-Prince
(PAP), it was no wonder that poor rural Haitians had begun to trickle
off the land into coastal slums with names like ``Boston'' and ``Cite
Simon'' (named after Papa Doc's wife), and onto unoccupied hillsides
and ravines within and surrounding the city.
The trickle turned into a flood in the early 1980s when the
rapacious regime of Jean-Claude ``Baby Doc'' Duvalier (1972-1986)
yielded to Haiti's international ``partners''--governments,
international financial institutions, and private investors--who had
set their sights on transforming Haiti into the ``Taiwan of the
Caribbean.'' Political stability under the dictatorship combined with
ample cheap labor and location near the United States formed a
triumvirate that shored up this idea, and the ``Tawanization'' of Haiti
proceeded, creating by the mid-1980s somewhere between 60K and 100K
jobs in assembly factories, all located within PAP. Fueled by a
parallel neglect of Haiti's rural economy and people, the prospect of a
job in a factory altered the off-the-land trickle into a flood, as
desperate families crowded the capital in search of work and the
amenities--education, especially--that the city offered. Between 1982
and 2008, Port-au-Prince grew from 763,000 to between 2.5 and 3
million, with an estimated 75,000 newcomers flooding the city each
year.\1\
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\1\ Robert Maguire, ``Haiti After the Donors' Conference: A Way
Forward,'' United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, Special
Report 232, September 2009.
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As immigrants piled up in slums, on deforested and unstable
hillsides, and in urban ravines, the opportunity offered by the city
became a mirage. Following the ouster of Duvalier in 1986 when, as
Haitians say, ``the muzzle had fallen'' (babouket la tonbe) and freedom
of speech and assembly returned, factory jobs began to dry up as
nervous investors sought quieter, more stable locations. By the 1990s,
only a fraction of those jobs remained. Yet the poor continued to flow
into the city.
Papa Doc's centralization, combined, under the rule of Baby Doc,
with the urban-centric/Taiwanization policies of key donor countries
(including the U.S.) and international banks had a devastating impact
on Haiti. Enacted by a government and business elite who saw these
policies as a golden opportunity to make money, the internationally
driven Tawanization of Haiti neglected what Francis Fukuyama has
pointed out as the key to Taiwan's own success: a necessary investment
in universal education and agrarian improvement before investing in
factories.\2\ Haiti's people were viewed internationally and by local
elites strictly as pliant and ample cheap labor. Education might make
them ornery. Avoid it. Why invest in agriculture when cheaper food--
heavily subsidized imported flour and rice--could feed Haiti's growing
urban masses? In the late 1970s Haiti did not need to import food.
Today, it imports some 55 percent of its foodstuff, including 360,000
metric tons of rice annually from the United States.\3\
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\2\ Francis Fukuyama, ``Poverty, Inequality and Democracy: The
Latin American Experience,'' Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (October
2008).
\3\ Op.cit, Maguire, ``Haiti After the Donor's Conference.''
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The folly of these policies was seen in early 2008, during the
global crisis of rapid and uncontrolled commodity price increase, when
that rice, still readily available, was no longer cheap and the urban
poor took to eating mud cookies to survive. Another spinoff of these
fallacious policies of the 1980s was political instability. Poor
Haitians took to the streets in early 2008 to protest ``lavi che'' (the
high cost of living), with the result being the ouster of the
government headed by Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis who,
coincidentally, had just won praise from the United States and the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for the creation of a
national poverty reduction and economic growth strategy that would
serve as a blueprint for developing all of Haiti, and reversing the
long history of rural neglect.
Rural neglect combined with migration to cities, moreover, placed
considerable pressure on those still in the countryside to provide the
wood and charcoal the burgeoning urban population required. Here was a
recipe for desperately poor people to further ravish the environment.
Today, 25 of Haiti's 30 watersheds are practically devoid of vegetative
cover.
Port-au-Prince, and other cities, particularly Gonaives, had become
disasters waiting to happen as a result of these developments. The vast
majority of the 200,000 who perished on January 12 were poor people
crowded on marginal land and into substandard housing devastated by the
quake. The vast majority of the thousands who died in the floods in
Gonaives in 2004 and 2008 were poor people crowded on alluvial coastal
mud flats and in river flood plains. For Haiti's poor, their country
has become a dangerous place and a dead end. Is it surprising that
Haitians seek any opportunity to look for life (cheche lavi) elsewhere?
As one peasant told me in the 1990s, ``we have only two choices: die
slow or die fast. That's why we take the chance of taking the boats (to
go to Miami)'' (pwan kante).
Haiti had lost its balance in other ways, particularly in social
and economic equity, and in the ability of the state to care for its
citizens. By 2007, 78 percent of all Haitians--urban and rural--
survived on $2 a day or less, while 68 percent of the total national
income went to the wealthiest 20 percent of the population.\4\ During
the 29-year Duvalier dictatorship, Haitian state institutions virtually
collapsed under the weight of bad governance. Following the 1986 ouster
of Baby Doc, who, ironically, was lorded with foreign funds that went
principally to Swiss bank accounts, donors were loathe to work with
successor governments--including those democratically elected. Instead,
they chose to funnel hundreds of millions annually through foreign-
based NGOs that enacted ``projects'' drawn up in Washington, New York,
Ottawa, etc., and that lasted only as long as the money did. Haitians,
by the early 1990s, were derisively calling their country a ``Republic
of NGOs'' and by 2008, none other than the President of the World Bank,
Robert Zoellick, lamented the cacophony of ``feel good, flag-draped
projects'' that had proven a vastly inadequate substitute for a
coherent national development strategy.\5\
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\4\ Maureen Taft-Morales, ``Haiti: Current Conditions and
Congressional Concerns,'' Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, May 5, 2009.
\5\ Robert Zoellick, ``Securing Development'' (remarks at the
United States Institute of Peace conference titled ``Passing the
Baton,'' Washington, DC, January 8, 2009.
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Without doubt, Haiti was seriously out of balance before the
earthquake and Port-au-Prince was a disaster waiting to happen. Many
had feared that it would come by way of a hurricane; rather the earth
shook. Now, let us see how we might make a positive contribution in
restoring balance to Haiti so that when, inevitably, the country is
struck by another natural disaster--be it seismic or meteorological--it
is less vulnerable and better able to confront and cope with the
disaster.
rebalancing to ``build back better''
Allow me to stress two points: We must be fully cognizant of past
mistakes, such as those outlined above; and the key to ``building Haiti
back better'' is to work toward a more balanced nation with less
poverty and inequities, less social and economic exclusion, greater
human dignity, and a commitment of Haitians and non-Haitians toward
these essential humanistic goals. With this, Haiti can also achieve and
sustain a rehabilitated natural environment, stronger public
institutions, a national infrastructure for growth and investment, and
relationships between Haitians and outsiders that are based on
partnership, mutual respect, and respect of the value and aspirations
of all Haiti's people.
What follows are ideas and recommendations based on not only my
experience in Haiti, but on endless discussions/conversations with
Haitian interlocutors. In this regard, I should add that the principal
reason for my visit to Port-au-Prince in early January was to deliver
an address on prospects for rebalancing Haiti. That presentation was
made to an audience of 50 or so Haitian civil servants and policy
analysts--some of whom I fear are no longer with us--who gathered in
Port-au-Prince at a Haitian think tank. My ideas were received by them
with great, and at times animated, interest.
1. Welcoming dislocated persons: A de facto decentralization
Since the quake, some 250,000 Port-au-Prince residents have fled
the city, returning to towns and villages from which they had migrated
or where they have family. An estimated 55,000 have shown up in Hinche
in Haiti's Central Plateau; the population of Petite Riviere de
l'Artibonite has swelled from 37,000 to 62,000; St. Marc's 60,000, has
swollen to 100,000.\6\ The flight of Haitians away from a city that now
represents death, destruction, and loss might become a silver lining in
today's very dark cloud. If that is to be the case, however, we--both
the Government of Haiti and its international partners--must catch up
with and get ahead of this movement. Already underdeveloped rural
infrastructures and the resources of already impoverished rural
families are being stretched. The provision of basic services to these
displaced populations is an urgent priority. If conditions in the
countryside are not improved, the displaced will ultimately return to
Port-au-Prince, to replicate the dangerous dynamics of earlier decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Trenton Daniel, ``Thousands Flee Capital To Start Anew,'' Miami
Herald, January 23, 2010; Mitchell Landsberg, ``The Displaced Flow Into
a Small Haitian Town,'' Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2010; data from
MINISTAH headquarters in Hinche.
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To catch up and get ahead of this reverse migration, we should
support an idea proffered by the Government of Haiti in Montreal last
week: the reinforcement of 200 decentralized communities. As soon as
possible, ``Welcome Centers'' might be stood up in towns and villages.
They can be temporary, to be made permanent later. They can serve as
decentralized ``growth poles'' that offer multiple services, including
relief in the short term, with health and education facilities
attached. Let us not forget that Haiti has lost many of its schools and
among those fleeing the devastated city are tens of thousands of
students. Twenty five percent of Haitian rural districts do not have
schools. And schools that exist outside Port-au-Prince are usually
seriously deficient. The reverse migration we are seeing today offers a
golden opportunity to rebalance the education and health system of
Haiti.
The centers can coordinate investment and employment opportunities,
as well as state services including robust agronomic assistance to
farmers. Haiti's planting season is almost here and now more than ever
the country needs a bountiful harvest. Displaced people working as paid
labor can reinforce Haiti's farmers. Infrastructure needs to be
rebuilt--or built for the first time--including schools, health
clinics, community centers, roads, bridges and drainage canals.
Hillsides need rehabilitation, particularly with vegetative cover and
perhaps even stone terraces. Providing work for not just the displaced,
but to those they are joining in towns and villages throughout Haiti,
will go a long way toward rebalancing Haitian economy and society, and
toward repairing a social fabric ripped to shreds by decades of neglect
and subsequent migration. This is an opportunity that must be seized.
2. Support the creation of a National Civic Service Corps
Since 2007, various Haitian Government officials and others have
been working quietly on the prospect of creating a Haitian National
Civic Service Corps. Citizen civic service is mandated in Article 52-3
of the Haitian Constitution and, even before the quake, the idea of a
civic service corps to mobilize unemployed and disaffected youth seemed
attractive. Now is the time for this idea to take off. As I have
recently written, a 700,000-strong national civic service corps will
rapidly harness untapped labor in both rural and urban settings,
especially among Haiti's large youthful population, to rebuild Haiti's
public infrastructure required for economic growth and environmental
rehabilitation and protection; increase productivity, particularly of
farm products; restore dignity and pride through meaningful work; and
give Haitian men and women a stake in their country's future. It will
also form the basis of a natural disaster response mechanism.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Robert Maguire and Robert Muggah, ``A New Deal-Style Corps
Could Rebuild Haiti,'' Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2010.
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If this all sounds familiar, it should: The idea of a Haitian
National Civic Service Corps parallels the same thinking that went into
the creation of such New Deal programs as the Works Progress
Administration (WPA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). We have
seen what these programs did to help the United States and its people
stand up during a difficult time.
In the aftermath of the storms that devastated Haiti in 2008,
Haitian President Preval asked not for charity, but for a helping hand
to allow Haitians to rebuild their country. Today he is making a
similar point. Here is more symmetry between the Haiti and the United
States. As Harry Hopkins, the legendary administrator of the Works
Progress Administration, pointed out: ``most people would rather work
than take handouts. A paycheck from work didn't feel like charity, with
the shame that it conferred. It was better if the work actually built
something. Then workers could retain their old skills or develop new
ones, and add improvements to the public infrastructure like roads and
parks and playgrounds.'' \8\ Let's help Haiti restore its balance by
supporting a national civic service corps that can accomplish the same
for Haiti and its people as our New Deal programs did in the United
States decades ago.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Nick Taylor, ``American Made: The Enduring Legacy of the WPA,''
(New York: Bantam Books, 2008), p.99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To reiterate, as was the case with our New Deal, Haiti's civic
service corps must be a ``cash-for-work'' initiative. Cash for work
will inject serious liquidity into the Haitian economy and stimulate
recovery from the bottom up. Already there are various entities
employing Haitians in a variety of cash-for-work programs. This Monday,
for example, the UNDP announced that it has enrolled 32,000 in a cash-
for-work rubble removing program; a number expected to double by
tomorrow.\9\ Coordination of existing efforts within an envisaged
national program will be essential to maximizing how Haiti can be built
back better--by its own people, with everyone wearing the same uniform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ UNDP, ``Fast Fact of the Week,'' accessed on February 2, 2010
at undp.washington@
undp.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A special commission, similar to those established by President
Preval in 2007 to engage Haitians from diverse sectors to study and
make recommendations on key issues confronting his government, might be
established to oversee this coordination. (Other special commissions
could be mounted to tackle other topics or needs and as a means of
expanding the Haitian Government's human resource circle.) Such a
commission could be enlarged to include representatives of key donors.
A central figure like Harry Hopkins will have to lead the endeavor.
Perhaps such a figure could emerge from Haiti's vaunted private sector.
In any case, let's avoid a repetition of the cacophony of feel good,
flag-draped projects.
3. Strengthen Haitian state institutions through accompaniment,
cooperation and partnership
At the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Haiti held last
week, witnesses spoke of the need to rebuild the Haitian state from the
bottom up, and of working with Haitian officials--not pushing them
aside. I agree with these points whole-heartedly. This is not the time
to impose governance on Haiti--that is a 19th century idea unfit for
the 21st century. This is an opportunity to help strengthen Haiti's
public institutions, not to replace them.
As pointed out above, the capacity of the Haitian state, never
strong to begin with, has deteriorated progressively over the past 50
years. In recent years that was due in part to international policies
that circumvented state institutions in favor of private ones--both
within Haiti and from beyond, and left the resource-strapped government
virtually absent in the lives of its citizens. In the aftermath of the
quake, we see starkly the results of the decimation of the Haiti state.
The already weak state has been further set back by the death of civil
servants and the loss of state facilities and physical resources. In
this context, the government of President Rene Preval and Prime
Minister Jean Max Bellerive has taken much criticism for its response--
or lack thereof--in the past few weeks.
It is easy to kick someone in the teeth when he or she is already
on the mat. Rather than swinging our foot, however, we should offer our
hand. This is the time of the Haitian Government's greatest need.
Achieving cooperation and partnership, as pointed out by Canadian Prime
Minister Harper at the recently held Montreal Conference, is the
biggest concern.\10\ Over the past 4 years, the Preval government has
won praise internationally--and among most in Haiti--over its improved
management of the affairs of the state. Political conflict, though
still extant, has diminished considerably. Haiti's terribly polarized
society is a little less polarized today. Moderation and greater
inclusion--not demagoguery and a winner-takes-all attitude--have worked
their way into the ethos of the Haitian political culture. Partnership
to strengthen the Haitian state was on the horizon following the ``new
paradigm for partnership'' agreed to at the April 2009 Donors
Conference.\11\ Let's stay that course. Generations of bad governance
and a zero sum political culture are not turned around overnight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ CTV.ca News Staff, ``Foreign Ministers Vow To Be `partners'
with Haiti,'' accessed on January 30, 2010, at www.http://
ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/20100125/Haiti_confer-
ence_100125/2010.
\11\ Government of Haiti, ``Vers un Nouveau Paradigme de
Cooperation,'' April 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quietly, but steadily in the post-quake period, the Haitian
Government has been picking itself up by its bootstraps beyond the
photo-ops and glare of the cameras to reassemble, and then to reassert,
itself.\12\ Still, given the magnitude of this catastrophe, the
government is overmatched. Any government would be. This is not the
time to cast aspersions. It is the time to work in partnership and to
accompany Haitian leaders through their time of loss and sorrow, into a
more balanced and better future.
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\12\ Jacqueline Charles, ``Haiti President Rene Preval Quietly
Focuses on Managing Country,'' Miami Herald, February 2, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Get money into the hands of poor people
In 1999, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto estimated that there
was $5.2 billion in ``dead capital'' in Haiti, shared among 82 percent
of the population. Of this sum, $3.2 billion was located in rural
Haiti. This amount dwarfed by four times the total assets of Haiti's
123 largest formal enterprises.\13\ This capital, principally in the
hands of poor people in the form of property, land, and goods, is
considered ``dead'' because it cannot be used to leverage further
capital for investment and growth. To free it up, clear titling would
be required along with a reduction of redtape and corruption, and a
brand new attitude toward Haiti's most vibrant form of capitalism--its
informal economy--and the poor entrepreneurs who make it work.
Doubtless, you have seen post-quake stories of how Haiti's grassroots
entrepreneurs began rebounding within days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Hernando de Soto, ``The Mystery of Capital'' (New York: Basic
Books, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key to Haiti's recovery--and, yes, to its rebalancing--is to get
capital into the hands of grassroots entrepreneurs--be they still in
Port-au-Prince or elsewhere in the country. Formalizing dead capital--
which will be a long, tedious and conflictive path, but one that
perhaps can be facilitated now through such steps as the issuance of
provisional land and property titles that subsequently are fully
formalized--is but one way of getting liquid assets into poor people's
hands. Others, more expeditious, include:
More small loans (microcredit) to entrepreneurs,
particularly those who produce something, including farmers.
Farmers with capital will not just produce more food, but will
increase employment. Government studies indicate that a 10
percent increase in man-hours on farms will create 40,000 new
jobs.\14\ One strong candidate to improve microcredit
throughout Haiti is an organization called FONKOZE. With more
than 33 branches countrywide, it serves some 175,000 members,
mostly among those who make--or made prior to their engagement
with microcredit--$2 a day or less. FONKOZE also facilitates
the efficient and lower cost decentralizing of the flow of
funds sent to Haiti from family abroad.
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\14\ Government of Haiti, ``Rapport d'evaluation des besoins apres
desastre Cyclones Fay, Gustav, Hanna et Ike,'' November 2008.
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Haiti must now benefit from a conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program. Brilliantly popular in such places as Mexico and
Brazil, CCT programs serve as a means of transferring cash to
the poorest of the poor, conditioned upon the children of poor
families attending quality schools and fully operational
clinics. Mexico's program is largely rural; Brazil's more
urban-oriented. In both cases, they have succeeded in assisting
millions of poor families improve living standards while
sending their children to schools and clinics. As such, CCTs
have invested in future human resources. Such a program in
Haiti could accomplish these goals, but only if Haiti's
educational and health systems are extended into rural areas
(helping to rebalance) and upgraded in existing locations
(helping to rebuild). Importantly, CCT programs provide the
government with the challenge/opportunity of being a positive
presence in the lives of citizens. In Haiti, this is essential
as a means of enabling the government to move from being
largely absent to being positively present in the lives of
citizens, and to demonstrate therefore that there are tangible
fruits of democratic governance.
5. Seek-out and support institutions, businesses, and leaders who work
toward greater inclusion, less inequality, and enact socially
responsible strategies for investing in Haiti
One cannot discuss the future of Haiti without considering the
prospect of external investment to create factory jobs, particularly in
view of the HOPE II legislation and its potential benefits. Beyond any
doubt, factory jobs should be a part of Haiti's future. Already, some
of the assembly plants in Port-au-Prince are back in operation, to the
satisfaction of both owners and workers.\15\ In this regard, support
should be given to the ``Renewing Hope for Haitian Trade and Investment
Act for 2010'' introduced by Senators Wyden and Nelson. But, as this
legislation is considered, three important points must be kept in mind
if this job creation strategy is to be a plus in helping Haiti to
rebalance, ``build back better'' and avoid mistakes of the past.
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\15\ Jim Wyss and Jacqueline Charles, ``Workers Flock to Clothing
Factories as Industrial Park Reopens,'' Miami Herald, January 27, 2010.
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First, the fiasco of the 1980s ``Taiwanization'' period must not be
repeated. Universal free education and rural investment are important,
and though they will not precede assembly investment, they must
robustly parallel it and eventually get ahead of it. Investment in
Haiti should not ignore decentralized agribusiness possibilities and
the economic growth and development it can bring through jobs and the
infusion of cash into the Haitian economy.
Second, assembly plants cannot be concentrated largely in Port-au-
Prince. If nothing else, the shattered infrastructure of the city
should serve as an incentive for decentralization. Haiti has at least a
dozen coastal cities that either already have a functioning, albeit
usually rudimentary, infrastructure or where a port and support
infrastructure can be built--perhaps at a lower costs than Port-au-
Prince. Decentralization to coastal cities and towns offers Haiti and
investors an opportunity to undo the damage begun 50 years ago by Papa
Doc's insidious centralization in Port-au-Prince and to rebalance the
prospects for economic growth and infrastructure development (including
electricity) to all of Haiti.
Third, investors, owners and managers must be mindful of the fact
that Haitian workers are more than plentiful cheap labor. As Secretary
of State Clinton said at the April Donors' Conference, ``talent is
universal; opportunity is not.'' \16\ A key to Haiti's renaissance is
to improve the opportunity environment for all of its people. Haiti's
diaspora offers bountiful evidence of what can be achieved when
opportunities are twinned with talent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Hillary Rodham Clinton, ``Remarks at the Haiti Donors
Conference,'' April 14, 2009, accessed on February 2 at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121674.htm.
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Jeffry Sachs has equated factory jobs in Bangladesh with the first
rung on a ladder toward greater opportunity and development.\17\ In
Haiti, however, the ladder for most factory workers, in view of their
survival wages juxtaposed with a constantly increasing cost of living
and the absence of any public social safety net, has a single rung.
Haiti's opportunity environment will be improved considerably:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Jeffry Sachs, ``The End to Poverty: Economic Possibilities for
Our Times,'' (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
If investors, owners, and mangers recognize that Haiti's
workers have legitimate aspirations to improve their lives, and
their honest days' work should be means for that, and;
If investors, owners and managers follow that recognition
with actions that demonstrate socially responsible investing
and public-private partnerships that improve workers status and
conditions, and;
If the Haitian state has the strength and resources to
become and remain a positive presence in workers lives by
providing services to them and their children, particularly in
education, health, and safety from gangs and other criminal
elements whose activities are often financed by narcotics
trafficking.
If there is a silver lining in the deep dark cloud of Haiti's
recent catastrophe, it is that this offers all of us--Haitians,
``friends of Haiti'' and those whose connection with Haiti may simply
be as a bureaucrat or investor--an opportunity to learn from mistakes
made in the relatively recent past and take steps that will rebalance
that country so that it will move forward unequivocally toward less
poverty and inequity, diminished social and economic exclusion, greater
human dignity, a rehabilitated environment, stronger public
institutions, and a national infrastructure for economic growth and
investment.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider.
STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker,
particularly for holding these hearings on Haiti after much of
its capital and other cities were destroyed. And I think it's
important to recognize that this is the worst natural disaster
that's ever occurred in the Western Hemisphere, in terms of the
number of lives lost. And in terms of percentage of population,
I suspect, in the end, it may well be one of the worst
worldwide.
Let me join the chairman in expressing, on behalf of the
Crisis Group, our deep condolences for those who lost their
lives in Haiti. I've been going back and forth to Haiti since
1978, and all I can say is that there are many faces that I
will miss when I go back again.
And let me also express the same sympathy for members of
the international community, particularly the United Nations,
which was hit so hard by the earthquake. It lost its chief,
Hedi Annabi. Ironically, just before Christmas, I met with Hedi
and the other members of his staff to analyze what 2010 would
bring to Haiti.
The important questions that you raised at the outset, in
terms of planning and managing and implementing the
reconstruction, have to be a primary focus for decisionmakers
throughout the world. This, it seems to me, is a time to
examine the lessons learned from past efforts at
reconstruction, both with respect to natural disaster, as you
mentioned, the tsunami in Asia as well as Hurricane Mitch here
in Central America, as well as post-conflict experiences with
reconstruction. It seems to me that we know, now, victims never
believe that relief is coming as fast as it's needed. And
they're right. Transition from relief to reconstruction is
rarely smooth. Maintaining international engagement beyond the
relief phase and assuring that international coordination
occurs effectively are constant struggles.
And one of the most important--and it's been mentioned in
the discussion already--is seeing as a goal the strengthening
of the host government at the end of the reconstruction
process. And we frequently don't achieve that.
The mantra, which still bears repeating, is that one must
help Haiti build back better to leave it less vulnerable to the
next disaster. The Crisis Group's last report was ``Saving the
Environment, Preventing Instability and Conflict,'' and it
dealt with several of these issues. And it also saw Haiti's
vulnerability, not merely in terms of the physical
vulnerability, but also in terms of the vulnerability of its
institutions, given two centuries of bad government, highly
centralized economic and political power structures, and less
than benign foreign interventions.
And one point that I would emphasize is that, contrary to
those who say nothing ever works in Haiti, aid does not work at
all, the fact is, over the last 4 years, we have seen progress.
With the United Nations peacekeeping force in Haiti and with
the decisions of the Preval administration, in terms of
reforms, we really were seeing progress in several areas.
Police, justice, prison reforms had begun. Lots of problems,
but there was a beginning.
Politically, you had the full Parliament. Relatively few
times in the past decade and a half did you have both of the
major sectors of the Haitian Government functioning. You had,
as a result of HOPE and HOPE-II, an increase of jobs to
somewhere like 25 or 30,000 over the last 2 years. And I should
add, between 2004 and 2009, Haiti's GDP rose from about $4
billion to $7 billion. Things can happen positively in Haiti.
The tragedy, of course, is that it was hit first by four
hurricanes in 2008, and now by this earthquake.
And in terms of responding to it, it seems to me that you
have to think in long terms. The first phase is a decade. It's
not 2 years or 5 years. And the second phase is a generation.
And we have to be prepared to stay with Haiti for at least that
time period.
Now, I would say we also don't start from zero. The
Haitians did prepare, with full consensus in the country, a
poverty reduction strategy. It was agreed to by the donors.
Then they prepared a post-hurricane plan, which was agreed to
by the donors, that was aimed, last year, as you remember,
after the meeting to achieve 150,000 jobs in 2 years. And it
seems to me, now, that those plans have to be the basis,
adjusted for the magnitude of the earthquake, of moving forward
to help Haiti be less vulnerable physically and politically at
the end.
And here, there are certain principles, five of them.
First, there has to be a Haitian social compact for
reconstruction that incorporates across the Haitian social
classes and political classes. It has to aim at achieving a
consensus about where to go and who's going to participate.
Second, it has to aim at building a modern Haitian state.
It's clear that strengthening Haitians' institutions has to be
a fundamental goal of reconstruction. And I mean modern
institutions, logistics, information systems, communication
systems, and management systems. And here, I would agree that
it seems to me that the Haitian diaspora has a role to play in
that process.
Third, as you've already heard, ensuring economic and
political decentralization is fundamental. Taking advantage of
the 480,000 IDPs who have fled the city, going back to their
communities, the reconstruction plan, in a sense, has to start
there, because you can start there; you don't have to remove
rubble, you can begin to implement reconstruction plans in
those departments now. There are eight functioning ports in
Haiti around the country. There is the capacity to build
regional development poles around them. As part of the
reconstruction plan agreed to last year, there was going to be
an industrial park built in Cap Haitien. The Royal Caribbean
Cruise Company is expanding its pier and other assets in
Labadee. All of those things, it seems to me, can be done now.
Fourth, obviously there has to be an environmental-
protection disaster-preparedness lens for every reconstruction
process or project in terms of where they're going to be
located rather than in terms of the construction standards.
Finally, it has to be long-term, massive, coordinated
assistance from the U.S. Government and the international
community. I've made some suggestions in the written testimony,
with respect
to how to coordinate, and I'd be happy to deal with that in the
questions.
Priority areas. If you don't have security, it is going to
be very difficult to do anything. And so, I would strongly urge
that, as we look forward, we look at what's being done in order
to ensure security and move forward on the reforms with respect
to the rule of law, police, justice, and prisons.
And I would add that having the U.N. peacekeeping mission
there for a significant period of time, going forward, is
absolutely essential.
You've already seen problems, in Cite Soleil, from some of
the criminals that escaped when the national penitentiary
collapsed.
The second area to focus on is education. Haiti has never
had a free public education system. Without education, I don't
see how long-term development can take place. And I think there
are ways that that can be done.
Third, agriculture. We have to shift from a situation where
Haiti is importing 70 percent of its rice to a situation that
goes back 30 years, when it produced most of its own rice for
its consumption internally.
Fourth, energy. Energy requirements, and particularly
changing from using charcoal, which undermines every effort at
reforestation, as your major cooking fuel. Your major fuel for
small business is charcoal-burning. That needs to be changed.
And it's been changed in several places around the world, by
the World Bank subsidizing the shift.
And finally, I would say, with respect to the diaspora, the
diaspora can be a fundamental part of this effort. And I also
would suggest that we think about both AmeriCorps and the old
CCC as mechanisms now for employing many of the people who have
lost their homes as well as their jobs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, let me express my
appreciation for the opportunity to offer testimony today on the
immediate and long-term consequences of the earthquake in Haiti--for
its people, its democracy, and its neighbors.
First, I want to express my condolences to the people of Haiti for
the enormous loss of human life--far more victims than in any other
natural disaster in the history of this hemisphere--ever. We already
know that some 150,000 people were killed, 200,000 were injured and 1
million more lost their homes. After all the collapsed buildings are
finally removed, this earthquake may be among the three or four worst
disasters ever recorded anywhere on earth in terms of loss of life and
injury.
For many of us, there are faces and names we recall with a deep
sense of loss. I first went to Haiti in 1978 with then-Ambassador
Andrew Young to raise concerns about human rights abuses under the
Duvalier dictatorship. With PAHO/WHO, USAID, Peace Corps, and now the
Crisis Group, I have worked with Haitians desperately trying to achieve
a better future for their families.
Second, let me express my deep sadness at the deaths of men and
women from the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) including its
leaders Hedi Annabi, Luis da Costa, and Gerardo LeChevallier, along
with Philippe Dewez from the IDB, and all of the others who were
working with the government of President Rene Preval to improve
conditions in Haiti.
Finally, let me express my own enormous pride in the generous
response of citizens from this and other countries--the volunteer
doctors, nurses, NGOs and search and rescue teams, as well as the rapid
and robust response from the Obama administration, particularly USAID,
State and the U.S. military, but also from Canada, Brazil, Mexico,
Cuba, and others in this hemisphere, and France, the EU, Spain, China,
and other countries outside the hemisphere.
Mr. Chairman, the important questions that you posed with respect
to planning, managing and implementing Haiti's reconstruction have been
the subject of much discussion in Port-au-Prince, at the Montreal
donors preparatory session last week, at the World Economic Forum in
Davos, at the U.N., the EU, and the OAS. Many have looked at examples
from the past--the tsunami in Southeast Asia, Hurricane Mitch in
Central America, post conflict reconstruction measures in Kosovo, El
Salvador, and Liberia. Each of those experiences offers lessons about
relief and reconstruction, which have already helped improve the relief
measures in Haiti. For just one example, Mitch taught USAID's OFDA that
prepositioning basic supplies in Florida and the Caribbean could
alleviate the need for lengthy procurement procedures, and that
preapproved agreements with the Southern Command could speed
transportation logistics.
All of those cases had several things in common:
The victims never felt that relief was coming as fast as they
needed it;
The transition from relief to reconstruction was neither
smooth nor untroubled;
Maintaining international engagement and international
coordination was a constant struggle; and
The challenge of ensuring that the host government was
strengthened rather than weakened was not fully met.
Given the magnitude of Haiti's destruction, the fragility of its
institutions before the quake and the depth of its poverty, overcoming
these challenges to effective reconstruction will pose an even more
daunting challenge to Haiti and to the international community.
Mr. Chairman, the International Crisis Group has issued 15 reports
about Haiti over the past 5 years. The most recent, ``Saving the
Environment, Preventing Instability and Conflict'' (April 2009) was
unfortunately all too prescient in identifying the additional risks to
stability and complications in urban planning, construction, and
infrastructure design posed by Haiti's historical disregard for the
environment and vulnerability to natural disasters.
There is a mantra now that we must help Haiti to build back better,
to ensure that recovery and reconstruction leave Haiti less vulnerable
to the consequences of natural disasters. That should be done. But it
is also impossible to completely eliminate Haiti's vulnerability given
its incredibly hazardous geologic and geographic location precariously
positioned along a ghastly seismic faultline, in the annual hurricane
path from Africa, and caught between the small plane and fast boat
cocaine routes from Colombia and Venezuela.
However, Haiti's vulnerability also stems from its failure to
overcome two centuries of bad governments, inequitable and centralized
political and economic power structures in Port-au-Prince, and not-
always-benign foreign interventions. Many point to the billions in aid
that Haiti received over the last five decades and say it was all for
naught, that there is no hope today.
I argue the contrary. In June, I met with several government
representatives, including President Preval, and the former and current
Prime Minister. In December, I held discussions with the late Hedi
Annabi and others from the U.N., IDB, WB and the representatives from
President Clinton's envoy office to assess progress and examine the
challenges for 2010. There were concerns, of course, but there also was
a degree of optimism:
--Reforms were taking hold within the civilian police; in fact a 2009
poll showed over 70 percent of the population approved of their
performance, a far cry from the past.
--The first glimmers of judicial reform in 50 years were seen with the
opening of an academy to train judges, and passage of key laws to
set merit-based standards and salaries for judges and to establish
a monitoring commission to vet existing judges and provide
professional assessment of their performance.
--The first class of trained corrections officers had graduated and a
plan to build new and restructure older jails was underway.
--The HOPE II legislation had boosted employment by close to 25,000 and
recruitment by former President Clinton had brought investors to
Haiti. The transition from showy pledges to actual capital
investment projects underway, including on a $55 m. Royal Caribbean
Cruise expansion of the Labadee resort and a new industrial park on
the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, thanks to a $25 m. commitment from
George Soros, a member of Crisis Group board of trustees.
--Haiti had a fully functioning legislature, which after risking
stability by ousting a competent Prime Minister, Michele Pierre
Louis, at least demonstrated a marked readiness to act by approving
the new Prime, Minister, Jean-Max Bellerives, his slate of
ministers and their program in record time, when the same process
last spring took months.
--Haiti's budget for the current fiscal year--contrary to that of the
United States--was actually passed on time; the previous budget had
not been approved until 8 months into the fiscal year.
--In October, the United Nations extended its mandate for another year
and Latin American nations swiftly reaffirmed its leadership,
contributing some 4,000 of MINUSTAH's 7,000 formal military
members.
--For 3 years, the Preval administration had met its fiscal targets,
reduced inflation, and maintained a stable monetary structure.
Despite the devastation caused by four consecutive storms in 2008
and the global economic crisis, Haiti was one of two countries in
the region to post positive economic growth (2.4 percent) in 2009.
The progress prompted the IMF and World Bank to endorse the
cancellation of $1.2 billion of Haiti's multilateral debt, more
than half. The earthquake not only justifies--but truly demands--
that the last half of Haiti's debt be written off.
Despite myriad problems--some self-inflicted--the Preval
administration advanced these reforms in concert with MINUSTAH. The
administration sought to engage the business community, opposing
parties and civil society in developing a common vision of the future.
Preval had named five ad hoc commissions, including some of his
opponents and independent scholars, to identify and develop
recommendations on critical issues, including the politically
contentious issue of constitutional reform.
With the leadership of the current Prime Minister Jean-Max
Bellerives, who was then Minister of Planning, the Preval
administration had also partnered with local communities and multiple
sectors with the support of the World Bank and U.N. to formulate a
national consensus for poverty reduction. The result was a Haitian
National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which was also endorsed by
donors. After the 2008 hurricanes, the strategy was developed to
include a job creation plan with a primary focus on jobs in rural
agriculture, decentralized tourism, and the factory apparel industry.
Donors gave their blessing to that program last April.
Those plans and strategies give Haiti a huge advantage today
because they can serve as a foundation for reconstruction. In addition,
some of the ideas that could not be put forward before the earthquake
now can and must be considered for Haiti to transform its future.
Starting with the premise that the first phase of Haiti's
reconstruction will require a decade, and the second, a generation, I
offer these suggestions for five principles of successful
reconstruction that could transform Haiti's political institutions and
economic options.
Forge a new Haitian Social Compact for reconstruction. A
unified Haiti under its currently elected government--not any
superimposed protectorate--has to be in the lead on Haiti's
recovery if the effort is to be successful. Haiti's history has
been defined by a small economic elite who dominated economic
and political power until the 1990s, opposed tax levels needed
to finance adequate state services and, in many cases, eluded
their personal tax obligations as well. For Haiti's recovery to
succeed, the elite must share in the sacrifice, especially
since they will inevitably benefit from any success. Changing
that equation will require the kind of inclusion that created
the PRSP and drove a successful national advocacy campaign for
Hope and HOPE II. Reconstruction has to be led by Haiti's
elected government and represent all of Haiti and have the
participation of the private sector. The full engagement of
Haitian civil society--like the process that underpinned the
PRSP--also must be generated. Communal leaders like those in
NDI's Initiative committees are also potential allies in this
process. Upcoming parliamentary elections have been postponed.
The social compact hopefully will find a way, endorsed by all,
to agree to hold the Presidential, parliamentary, and local
elections together next November, if humanly possible, with the
constitutionally mandated Parliament remaining in office until
the newly elected members take office next January.
Build a modern Haitian state. Haitian Government has always
been starved for resources and its ministries have never been
able to keep up with growing public needs. The reconstruction
of Haiti must be aimed at transforming the country in a way
that leaves a modern functioning state able to sustain public
services and guarantee the rule of law. Modern communications,
information technology and management systems have bypassed
government ministries to some degree and denied them the
capacity to actually deliver fundamental services to regional
departments and municipalities. Modern data information,
communications systems, and planning and evaluation capacity
were all lacking in the ministries before their buildings were
destroyed. Rebuilding those ministries on modern terms is
essential to avoid Haiti becoming a failed state.
Ensure economic and political decentralization. Ending
centralization of virtually all economic investment in the
capital is essential to reducing extreme poverty in its rural
departments, and to rebuilding Port-au-Prince. A growing
percentage of the capital's population, now estimated at close
to 400,000, has returned to families in their original villages
and towns, a third going to the Artibonite, originally the
heart of Haiti's rice farming. Now may be the first time that
Haiti's constitutional call for decentralization can actually
be attempted. If regional economic development poles can be
generated around the country--for instance by implementing HOPE
II in a way that encourages the construction of industrial
sites in other departments with access to ports, such as Cape
Haitien in the North, Port-de-Paix in the North West and St.
Marc in the Artibonite--it will also help to stem the flow of
migrants to Port-au-Prince. That also will give the capital a
better chance for more rational reconstruction and avoid a
replication of the slum communities of the past.
Use environmental protection and disaster preparedness
standards for all reconstruction projects. Haiti has gone from
a country with 80 percent forest cover centuries ago, to about
20 percent in the 1940s, to 2 percent today. Its hillsides are
mudslides waiting to happen. Every reconstruction project
should be judged in part by whether it advances environmental
protection, and every construction project should be judged on
whether it incorporates both hurricane and earthquake
resistance elements.
Guarantee massive, coordinated assistance. The United States
and international response must be bigger and better
coordinated than ever before. The United States has already
committed nearly $400 million to relief, and hopefully it will
show leadership in formally committing to a decade-long
reconstruction and development plan at the upcoming March
pledging conference at the U.N. While the detailed assessment
of damage and reconstruction costs have yet to be completed,
early estimates suggest the damage could go well beyond $10
billion. A broad group of NGOs--including the International
Crisis Group--has recommended an early emergency supplemental
of $3 billion as essential to Haiti's recovery. The sooner it
is approved, the more likely other countries and institutions
will seek a matching commitment. To put this in some
perspective, in this hemisphere, the United States has pledged
between 30-65 percent of the reconstruction aid totals
following natural disasters like Hurricane Mitch or peace
accords in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
For that effort to be successful, each key U.S. agency,
particularly USAID, State, and DOD, must designate full-time
Haiti Reconstruction Coordinators. Ideally, the President
should name a single Haiti Reconstruction Coordinator to serve
as an overall U.S. government policy czar for Haiti
reconstruction and empower him or her with the necessary
authority to ensure an all-of-government response. That would
ensure a greater degree of overall strategic coordination,
guarantee interagency coherence and reduce potentially
counterproductive delays.
However, the United States also must commit by example to a
similar international coordinating reconstruction effort. There
is already a U.N. peacekeeping mission on the ground. Even
before the earthquake, the Secretary General's Special
Representative was unable to ensure that independent U.N.
agencies, within their competence, responded to the priorities
defined by the Security Council. That needed to be changed
earlier. Now it is absolutely essential. The UNSRSG also should
be the interlocutor with the Government of Haiti with respect
to security, rule of law, and political reform and coordinate
all international reconstruction assistance. In other areas, he
or she should still cochair along with the Haitian Prime
Minister or the designee of the President and the Prime
Minister, a technical and financial reconstruction committee,
that will have the authority to review projects deemed contrary
to the major objectives of the U.N. mandate and the goals of
the Haiti reconstruction and transformation plan. Obviously the
World Bank, IDB, U.S., EU, and others would sit on the
committee with the SRSG and the Haiti government. The committee
should be the mechanism of international coordination and
oversee progress toward implementing the reconstruction plan
and hopefully pressure each other to make good on donor
pledges.
In addition, a critical Haitian governmentwide procurement
mechanism should be considered, in partnership with the
international community, to oversee large-scale infrastructure
projects proposed by Haiti for its transformation--from
planning to procurement to construction to completion.
Inclusion of measures of transparency and accountability in
that agency will be vital not only for donor satisfaction but
to avoid inevitable suspicion from Haitian constituencies as
well.
Let me suggest five priority areas where many of those principles
should be applied.
First, for reconstruction to succeed, both security and the rule of
law are required. Reconstruction planning must incorporate a clear and
critical path toward the completion of police, justice, and prison
reforms that were initiated before the earthquake, and deploy them
across the country.
Fortunately the presence of the U.N. peacekeeping mission--and
temporary U.S. military forces--guarantees the physical stability of
the state. The past has shown us that gangs in Port-au-Prince are
capable of quickly reorganizing. It appears that is what is happening
now in Cite Soleil and other areas, where there are reports that
criminals--many from among the 5,000 prisoners who escaped the crumbled
penitentiary--are resuming their criminal armed activities. The U.N.
peacekeeping mission has been authorized for a reinforcement of 2,000
more troops and 1,500 more police. They will need more police, to be
sure, well beyond 2011, while police stations are rebuilt and equipped
and the training of new police continues. To put it in perspective--
about 1,000 of the 4,000 police who worked in Port-au-Prince have not
shown up for work or are believed to have died, although the large
majority, despite their own losses in many cases, are back on the
streets.
The United States can also respond to President Preval's pleas for
help in fighting drug trafficking by boosting the interdiction
capability of the Haitian Coast Guard and the Haiti National Police
(HNP) on an on-going basis. The United States could also second more
Haitian-American police, prosecutors and judges to the U.N. to assist
Haiti in building its own justice infrastructure.
Second, for reconstruction to succeed, Haiti must be supported in
building a nationwide system of free public elementary and secondary
education--not just in Port-au-Prince but across every department.
Before the quake, nearly 40 percent of Haiti's children were not in
school. Of those in school, an estimated 80 percent were in private
schools, most of which were unregulated, offered poor quality
education, and charged exorbitant fees. The Haitian diaspora can offer
unique support, particularly with teacher training. Creole-speaking
former Peace Corps volunteers can play a role, and the Peace Corps
already is gathering a skills-data base to link into the reconstruction
effort. Supplemental funding to fund this effort should be provided.
This is also an opportunity to offer Haiti's young people a chance
to participate in their country's own recovery. The concepts of
AmeriCorps and the Civilian Conservation Corps should be introduced to
produce jobs for the unemployed that contribute to Haiti's
reconstruction.
Third, renewing Haitian agriculture may be the best way to keep the
migrants from Port-au-Prince in their communities of refugee. They must
have access to credit and fertilizer, assistance with marketing and
perhaps even guaranteed prices for their first harvest. If that occurs,
the capacity of Haitian farmers to once again be the major source of
food for the population, as it was before the 1970s, would be enhanced,
particularly with respect to rice. Before the 1970s, Haiti produced
nearly all of its rice. Once tariffs were removed, its farmers could
not compete with subsidized and large-scale rice farmers in the United
States and they nearly disappeared, as 70 percent of Haiti's rice is
now imported. Haiti has shown that it has the potential to meet modern
marketing demands with mango and coffee crops. When agriculture is
linked to environmental protection with protection of watersheds,
terracing, and reforestation, there is a win-win outcome.
Fourth, meeting Haiti's energy requirement will be essential in any
reconstruction environment and now may be the moment when an historic
shift away from charcoal--as fuel for cooking and for small business
energy generation--can be achieved. It would not only remove the
constant threat to the nation's remaining forest cover, including in
its national parks, but also enable reforestation to have some chance
for success. This will require Haitian leadership with international
technical and financial support in a single, unified program that
subsidizes impoverished Haitians in making the transfer. This is
essential along with continued reform of Haiti's electric utility, EDH.
Finally, the Haitian Social Compact should clearly engage the
Haitian diaspora in the reconstruction effort. This could include
providing avenues for remittances for development, with matching
contributions by donors for community projects. In addition, the same
concept of direct transfer of resources from a diaspora Haitian-
American or Haitian-Canadian to a family member--which now surpasses
official development assistance--should be used as a model for
accelerating the use of conditional cash transfers to the poor, with
the sole condition being that their children are immunized and attend
school. Using the Brazilian, Mexican, and other models, an income
supplement can reach impoverished Haitian families when they need it
the most.
Helping Haiti recovery from this natural disaster constitutes an
obligation for every nation of this hemisphere and beyond. It is not
only the right thing to do in helping neighbours, it is the only thing
to do.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. MacCormack.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES MacCORMACK, PRESIDENT AND CEO, SAVE THE
CHILDREN, WESTPORT, CT
Mr. MacCormack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Corker.
I've been twice to Haiti since the earthquake. First, I
went with U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and U.N.
officials, and then with the CEO of Citicorp, both of whom were
going for memorial services for their key employees. I've been
doing this kind of work for a long time. What is really unique
about the situation in Haiti is how the policy community, the
relief community, the management community have been equally as
devastated as the population as a whole. So, that is going to
make the building-back challenge that much greater. We have to
realize that the government, the U.S. Embassy, the USAID
mission, the U.N., and the NGOs have all lost their own people,
and their own facilities.
Having said that, I would emphasize four principles that
are interrelated and, I think, key.
The first is that this is going to be a 5- or 10-year
process. And I realize, here in the Congress, you can't
necessarily commit for that period of time, but a framework
would be key, because the priorities that you mentioned,
Senator Menendez, are all key, but they can't all be done in 6
months or 1 year. They've got to be sequenced over a 10-year
period. When we talk about rebuilding--or building--the Haitian
Government and the education system, that's going to be a 10-
year process.
Save the Children has been in Haiti for 30 years. We've
been in Indonesia for 30 years. We were in Aceh, after the
tsunami, with a 5-year plan. We have a 5-year plan for Haiti
now, and a 10-year framework for that.
So, the only way to move forward is within a long-term
framework; otherwise, we'll be back again in 3 or 4 years,
after the next set of hurricanes, and people will be wondering,
Where did we go wrong?
And that's a second point. That is, to make sure that there
are adequate resources to get the job done, not just from the
United States, but from around the world, and that it is in the
frame of a public-private partnership. The American people have
already given $500 million of their own hard-earned cash for
Haiti. Individual citizens around the rest of the world have
also given a half-billion. So, that's a billion dollars of
private philanthropy that's already been committed to Haiti.
I mentioned CitiCorp. The private sector is going to have
to have a framework to be involved in helping to move Haiti
forward. We can't create a situation where endless subsidies
are the only way to maintain a health and education and
infrastructure system.
So, there has to be adequate resources, but we have to have
incentives for the private sector and for philanthropy to be
involved for the longer haul.
That's the third issue, which is, put Haitians to work, and
back to work. In Aceh, we employ between 1,000 and 2,000
Acehnese. It was the poorest province in Indonesia before the
tsunami. There were rebel groups, the GAM, in the hillsides,
because there was no employment for them. They now have
adequate employment and an economy that's self-sustaining. That
can happen in Haiti, but we've got to, again, through CCC kinds
of operations, through policy incentives and tax incentives and
so on, so forth, put Haitian employment at the fore of the
strategy. It's tempting to go in with outside help and large-
scale technology, but put the Haitian people to work. And the
diaspora has been mentioned consistently, all kinds of talent
and education, but there have to be incentives for these
individuals to return and get involved, which they would like
to do.
Finally, the organization is going to have to be a team
sport. Not the U.N., not the Government of Haiti, not the NGOs,
not the United States Government alone, can do this. There's
going to have to be some kind of joint operation that brings
together these different parties--the Government of Haiti, the
U.N. system, the bilaterals, particularly the United States
Government and the nongovernmental organizations, such as Save
the Children, CARE, and others--that work together to build a
better future for Haiti.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. MacCormack follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles MacCormack, President and CEO,
Save the Children, Westport, CT
Mr. Chairman, Save the Children welcomes this hearing by the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Haiti. It raises important issues
that deserve full discussion because the choices will affect lives and
the future of a nation.
I have traveled to Port-au-Prince twice since the January 12
earthquake and saw firsthand its catastrophic impact. The devastation
of the capital, with its highly centralized government infrastructure
and institutions, is reverberating across the entire country. No part
of Haiti is unaffected, as thousands of displaced families and children
leave the earthquake zone, and as insufficient government services and
infrastructure falter or collapse.
Children are always among the most vulnerable during emergencies.
Sadly, the damage wrought by this earthquake only compounds the
challenges that Haiti's children and families already faced each day.
Their needs are enormous: medical care, food and water, shelter, basic
supplies, protection and education. The threat of disease and illness
is constant and cases of tetanus and suspected cases of measles have
already been reported. Children are separated from their families, and
are at risk for abuse and exploitation, as well as psychosocial
distress. While the Haitian people are extremely resilient and have
exhibited much patience, their challenges are daunting.
The earthquake caused severe damage, but also created the need for
visionary thinking toward recovery and reconstruction so Haiti can
start a new chapter and proceed on a new path forward. Save the
Children hopes to work with Haitians to turn that page, based on our
experience and expertise from over three decades in the country working
in a complex environment characterized by frequent humanitarian crises.
We have launched in Haiti one of our largest international responses
ever. Save the Children is now engaged both in an immediate response to
a disaster of unprecedented scale as well as in development of a bold
and ambitious vision that is both long term and comprehensive,
incorporating principles of supporting Haitians ``building back better
for children'' at every step.
Our goal is to provide emergency assistance to save lives,
alleviate suffering and support the recovery of 800,000 people
including 470,000 children. This effort is focused on the entire
country. There are no unaffected areas, so we all need to develop
solutions both for those in the earthquake zone as well as those
elsewhere, such as enhancing secondary city habitability and improving
rural agricultural zones. We are working together with the Government
of Haiti and other international and local organizations to assess and
respond to the needs of children without parental care and to identify,
register, and reunite separated children with their families. We have
also accepted the United Nations request to help coordinate efforts to
reunite separated children and colead the international response on
education. In addition, we are delivering medical supplies to
hospitals, distributing food, opening mobile health clinics and
creating child-friendly spaces for children.
Our vision is a Haiti where all children realize their rights every
day to a basic education, a healthy life, freedom from abuse and
benefit from the support of families who recognize the fundamental
needs of their children. In order to make lasting, positive change in
the lives of children, Save the Children calls on the U.S. Government
to sustain robust support for meeting Haiti's immediate and long-term
development needs in cooperation with the Haitian Government and a wide
variety of partners, including local civil society and children
themselves.
During all stages from early recovery through reconstruction, the
international community and Haitian authorities must demonstrate a
serious commitment to disaster risk reduction in all spheres of
activity. Hurricane season is just around the corner and we know these
kinds of investments up front can avoid much greater costs incurred
later through humanitarian responses.
Haiti's rebuilding will require substantial investment. The
international community must fulfill the United Nations flash appeal
for $576 million, and then sustain significant investments for the next
10 years. We need to ensure the international community stays the
course and that, unlike in past humanitarian crises, attention does not
erode as other challenges arise. The government of President Preval has
shown for the past 2 years that it is a government that the
international community can work with--we must make our commitments
longterm, predictable, and transparent.
In 2008 Congress passed HOPE II (the Haitian Hemispheric
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act), which
extended trade preferences to Haiti for 10 years. As others have
recommended, Congress should consider broadening these preferences to
include even more of Haiti's exports. Finally, instead of issuing new
loans to the Haitian Government, post-earthquake assistance should be
in the form of grants. Outstanding bilateral and multilateral debt of
nearly $1 billion should be cancelled. Future funds must go to rebuild
Haiti and ensure its children have a future to look forward to.
Haiti's rebuilding will take time. The recent ministerial planning
conference in Montreal should the first step of a 10-year commitment by
the international community to walk with Haitians toward a new future
and to meet their immediate and long-term development needs in
cooperation with a wide variety of partners, including local civil
society and the government of Haiti. Save the Children has been in
Haiti for over 30 years. Today when we start working with a community,
we want to make a commitment to them--to work with them for 10 years
and build their capacity during that time to take over from us. We work
with the government, with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and with the community. We can only make such a commitment with support
from our private donors because few institutional donors have a 10-year
timeline. But Haiti needs such a long-term commitment from all of us.
Enhanced coordination is also necessary. We all need to do better
at coordinating our efforts, especially given the thinly stretched
capacity of the Haitian Government. Even before the earthquake,
coordination among the major donors, NGOs and others was more a case of
information-sharing than thoughtful division of labor. With more to
accomplish and more actors engaged, the importance of strategic
coordination cannot be understated.
To do our part, Save the Children is playing a leading role in the
U.N. cluster system, which seeks to coordinate the international
humanitarian response by sector. Previous experience suggests, however,
that in working alongside and through the U.N. system, the United
States should empower one concerned agency to oversee the overall
response. President Obama wisely empowered Dr. Rajiv Shah, the new
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
to oversee the U.S. relief response in Haiti. USAID should be empowered
as well to lead the U.S. development effort, so that the dozens of U.S.
agencies engaged with Haiti respond in a coordinated and cohesive way
to support Haiti's long-term development needs.
Some are questioning whether longer term aid will be well spent
given the political instability and corruption that were wide spread
prior to the earthquake. The answer, of course, depends on the Haitian
people, but the U.S. Government can do its part to move in the right
direction. As the largest donor to Haiti in the past, the effectiveness
of the U.S. Government programs impacts the entire development
enterprise in Haiti. Just a few donors, the United States, Canada,
France, the EC and the World Bank, contributed over 90 percent of the
official development assistance in 2006 and 2007 with the United States
and Canada alone providing almost half. Better and more strategic
coordination amongst the international community is both possible and
necessary.
Working with the Haitian Government and civil society, the United
States can make significant progress toward more effective
reconstruction and development. The United States, with NGO partners
and other donors, should intensify its commitment to building the
capacity and systems of the Haitian Government and Haitian civil
society to lead and manage their own development.
Rebuilding infrastructure is important; building institutions, as
former USAID Administrator Natsios argued in a recent essay, is of even
greater importance. In Haiti, Save the Children will continue to work
with Haitian institutions and build Haitian systems. For instance,
prior to the earthquake we were supporting 250 schools in Haiti--
government, religious and private schools. Schools supported by the
government are apparently the strongest, but the government did not,
and certainly now does not, have the capacity to spend even the few
funds that the international community provides to it. As schools
reopen, we will continue to support school health and nutrition, and
teacher training at these schools, and work with these schools to go
through the government certification process which ensures that the
schools are aligned with government protocols. The United States and
international partners must strengthen both government institutions to
oversee and provide education, and the private and nonprofit Haitian
institutions to link with this system.
Drawing on Save the Children's previous experience, including
lessons learned by the 2004-05 tsunami response in Southeast Asia, we
know that Haiti's effective long-term development will require putting
Haitians at the center of their own development and recognizing the
critical role of women and youth in the decisionmaking process. In this
regard, we believe the administration and Congress should consider the
following:
Invest in participatory initiatives that engage women and
children in the decisionmaking, implementation and monitoring
of reconstruction and development initiatives;
Focus on rebuilding Haitian institutions and systems.
Infrastructure matters a great deal, but promoting human
development by equipping Haitians to deliver quality education,
health care and other services themselves matters even more;
Explore models for attracting back the Haitian diaspora into
the government at reasonable salaries, as Liberia and
Afghanistan have done with some success;
View the Haitian Government's recently completed development
plan as the primary plan for Haiti's reconstruction and
development;
Strengthen USAID with more staff to properly plan, engage,
leverage with others and monitor our assistance. Currently
there too few staff and they spending 30 percent of their time
on reports and planning documents for Washington DC.
Business as usual is not enough for Haiti. The international
community, the United States and the NGOs must sharply expand our focus
on human development, both skills and institutions. Governments, NGOs,
foundations and other stakeholders must help build the capacity of
Haiti's civil society, private sector, and national government from the
very local to the national level to enable Haitians to lead their
country into a brighter future.
Senator Corker. I really----
Senator Menendez. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. I'm looking at the clock, and I've got to
bolt out of here. And I apologize. But, I want to thank each of
you for your testimony and what you do on a daily basis, both
you and your organizations.
And Stacy Oliver, behind me, will follow up with some
questions, and we'll have communications, I'm sure, with your
staff.
But, I want to thank you. I know all of us have--I'm sure
Senator Menendez, but--have spent time in Haiti, and met with
Preval recently, and saw that there was progress being made.
But, we all realize tremendous devastation of managerial
infrastructure there. And I do think that, for years, we have
worked around--we have worked around governments in the past.
Again, I realize there was a glimmer of hope over these last
several years, but I do think that what has happened is going
to cause us to need to respond in a way that certainly
respects--and realize it's a sovereign country, but, at the
same time, we're probably going to need to be a little tick
stronger in helping make--this is an opportunity, with all the
devastation and sorrow and unbelievable agony that's occurred,
it is an opportunity for us to work even more closely with
them. And I know that your organizations will be involved, and
your efforts will be involved, and I thank you very much for
your testimony.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
Let me ask a few questions. I appreciate all of your
testimony. I think it was insightful. I clearly hear the long
term. And that's one of my concerns. I know there is a passion
right now, by average people in this country, our government,
and other governments throughout the world, but I've also seen
this play before in different parts of the world, where that
passion ultimately subsides and the challenge--the long-term
challenge is forgotten.
So, I think a lot of what gets done right now is going to
be critically important to laying the foundation as to whether
we can keep the commitment that is necessary.
So, we're going to be looking at a multidonor trust fund.
And given the scope of the disaster and the extremely complex
reconstruction effort, in all of its dimensions, several of
which you've mentioned here in your collective testimony, you
know, there are clearly there, we're talking about billions of
dollars, over time, which will be required to finance it. And
some have suggested that those reconstruction funds be managed
via a multidonor trust fund.
Keeping in mind the need to ensure that the Haitian
Government takes the lead in crafting--I strongly believe that
its own reconstruction plan, maybe working off the ones, Mark,
that you mentioned, that are already in place as a result of
the hurricane--accountability is going to be a key concern of
donors. And based on previous experiences and lessons learned,
such as in the tsunami, what would be the best mechanisms for
coordinating and managing the billions of dollars that will be
pledged by donors and spent for this effort? How--and I open
this up to any one of you who want to answer this--how should--
particularly, Mr. MacCormack, with your experience--how should
NGO efforts fit into such a coordination mechanism? And how
would local NGOs and civil society make sure that their voices
are heard? And should we be encouraging this at the U.N.
meeting in March in New York?
So, why don't we start with you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Let me try. I would start where you just
left off. You have at this point, about a 12,000-member United
Nations peacekeeping mission there with the responsibility,
under the Security Council mandate, of ensuring security
stability. And that's the basis for reconstruction.
I would argue that the Secretary General's Special
Representative should be the major international interlocutor
with the Government of Haiti in ensuring that the security and
political stability issues are dealt with effectively. I think,
at the same time that this should be the core of your overall
coordination of reconstruction. That's different from
management of a multidonor fund. But, I do think that the
United Nations is the right place to have the central
coordination. And then, within that, you would have, as you
say, a specific multidonor fund that would be managed with a
cochair. My view would be to have a cochair from the United
Nations and the Haitian Government's representative, probably
the Prime Minster or the Minister of Planning, or a
reconstruction chair. And then on it--a board of directors--
would be your major donors and representatives of the Haitian
society in order to ensure accountability.
There will be lots of people challenging the way those
funds are spent, alleging misuse, et cetera. And I think the
only way that you can do it is to have that be very transparent
at the outset. And I think that, in that process, each sector
would have its own plan for reconstruction, and that plan would
be developed with Haitians first and then with the
participation of local and international NGOs in the donor
community.
Remember not all, but most of the NGOs depend on donor
finance to carry out their activities. And it seems to me that
you want to ensure that they're carrying out those activities
under a coordinated plan that begins with the Haitian
Government and the Haitian people. And I think you can achieve
that by taking the plans that have already been put together
and then reaching agreement on a long-term reconstruction plan
that meets some of the issues that we've talked about.
But, I would put, first, the United Nations coordination,
and then I would have a multidonor fund under that, with a
broad representation. And for the U.S. Government, I think you
also need to have a single all-of-government coordinator for
Haiti reconstruction, and then have each of the major agencies
have their own full-time Haitian reconstruction coordinator.
And if I could, Mr. Chairman, about the ``long term,''
we've done--you've done, on the Hill, several different long-
term authorization bills; the Freedom Support Act, the
Afghanistan Support Act, the Nunn-Lugar bill, which was 10
years; the others were 4 to 6 years. It seems to me that you
could have a long-term authorization for Haitian reconstruction
and transformation that would provide a framework for moving
forward, and then, within that, have an emergency supplemental
that would start things off. And, as you say, I would argue
that the emergency supplemental--and several groups have sent a
letter--with respect for $3 billion. My suspicion is that the
estimate of needs is going to be well over $10 billion. And I
would say that, in the past, the United States has generally
provided between 30 and 60 percent of the grant assistance in
those reconstruction plans for Hurricane Mitch, et cetera.
Senator Menendez. Mr. MacCormack, any views?
Mr. MacCormack. I would second Mark Schneider's principles.
I think there needs to be a senior U.N. envoy on the ground. I
think there needs to be a senior U.S. envoy on the ground. We
have President Preval. And I think there needs to be an NGO
consortium. We're all talking to each other--Red Cross, CARE,
Save the Children, World Vision--as we speak. And out of that
group can come a chair. And those four individuals should be
working together. The reality is that the funds and the
capacity and the responsibilities are distributed amongst these
four different parties. There's no way of changing that.
So, right now, by and large, they are each fairly modestly
represented, in terms of leadership. I think the leadership
needs to be elevated, there needs to be a clear individual who
speaks for the coalitions underneath each one of them.
Mr. Maguire. Yes, Mr. Chair. I second the idea that we need
to have a point person and collaboration and coordination. I
would--I was certainly heartened yesterday when I saw that
President Clinton would be having an expanded role in that
regard. He is trusted in Haiti, and he's trusted outside of
Haiti.
It has struck me, in my years of working in Haiti, that I
often wonder how government officials in Haiti ever get any
work done outside of the meetings they have with the various
delegations coming in, and the reporting procedures they have
to the different agencies that are different. And now we've got
a government that's even weaker than before, at this moment.
So, I think we also have to keep in mind the fact that
streamlined procedures that have the Haitian authorities only
writing one report, not having to deal with multidelegations,
so that they can do their work, is a very important factor to
consider, as well. And again, that's why I would think that
President Clinton would be a very good kind of funnel to focus
all of that through.
On the Haiti side, I wanted to mention one thing that has
struck me that President Preval has done over the past 4 years
that we might want to think about and discuss a little more
with him. He has established a number of what he calls
``Presidential commissions'' to look at key issues in Haiti--
judicial reform, constitutional reform, making Haiti more
competitive internationally, and so on. And these commissions
have actually been rather remarkable, in the sense that, not
only have they come up with tangible and concrete
recommendations, including for revising or amending the
constitution, but they've done so by bringing people of all
Haitian walks of life together, even some people who are in
opposition political parties, to work on these commissions.
It's something that Preval owns, it's something I applaud that
he's done. And I would think that this might be a mechanism, in
two ways. One would be to--from the Haitian Government side, to
establish commissions to look at this extraordinary situation
now, but to broaden those commissions and maybe even make them
a mixed commission, where international actors could actually
sit on, and be members of, the commission. I think that that
might be a worthy idea to try to pursue with the----
Senator Menendez. You, maybe, precipitated my next question
that I had in mind. As all your testimonies talk about looking
at this opportunity--out of tragedy, an opportunity to help
Haiti with its institutions, because, if not, we--and the
Haitian people, most importantly--will have, maybe, lost a
long-term opportunity.
You mentioned these Presidential commissions. I mean, I
wonder, How do we best partner with Haiti to build its own
capacity effectively out of this challenge? And how is that
different than what we've done? Because obviously what we've
done--I mean, I look at a report on a USAID mission in Haiti in
1998, and I read it, and among the things it says is, ``Most of
Haiti's public institutions are too weak, ineffective to
provide the level of partnership needed with USAID or other
donors to promote development. These institutions are
characterized by a lack of trained personnel, no performance, a
base incentive system, no accepted hiring, firing, and
promotion procedures, heavy top-down management, and a decided
lack of direction.''
Now, I don't know what--how much have we progressed from
there? And it seems to me that we have to find a different
paradigm in which we work with the Haitian Government and the
Haitian people on its institution-building capacity and its
ultimate ability to achieve greater governance for its own
people.
Now, these Presidential commissions, which I'm--wasn't
particularly aware of--may be the start of that, but how do we
work with them in a way that's more productive? I'll open it
up.
Mr. Maguire. I'll--let me start off. You know, we--Haiti's
Government has been kind of like--some people have called it a
hollow state; it looks good on the outside, there's not much on
the inside. And I've come to learn that Haiti's civil service
is very demoralized. And one of the reasons it's demoralized, I
think, is because of our development strategy, not just that we
don't support state institutions and provide them with
resources that make them competitive on the market for
personnel, but that a Haitian technician with any sense, even
if he has a government job, is probably going to spend more
time working on the staff of an NGO and make a lot more money
and be more secure, so the government is actually this kind of
phantom entity.
So, I think one of the things I would like to see--and
certainly I'm a big supporter of NGOs. In all my years with the
Inter-American Foundation, I supported Haitian NGOs
exclusively; they can get the job done. But, there needs to be
greater coordination. And I would like to see the NGOs from the
outside responding more to the needs of the Government of Haiti
rather than to the RFPs of the donors, so that, therefore,
perhaps you can find a way of having the talent in the NGOs to
be working side by side with Haitian officials, and you
wouldn't have this discrepancy and the need for Haitian
officials to have to go out and get a second job because their
government doesn't have much money to pay them. And so, it's
just a dynamic I think we have to rethink and look at a little
better.
I recall, about a year and a half ago, there was this short
article in the Haitian press about the new USAID education
program in Haiti. And the article pointed out that the U.S.
Ambassador and the Haitian Education Minister sat down and
signed the papers. But, it also pointed out that, at the
signature ceremony, the Education Minister for Haiti mentioned
to the U.S. Ambassador that, indeed--he reminded her that Haiti
does have an education strategy. And the message there being
that, ``Well, thank you very much for these programs and
projects, but we want to make sure they're more in harmony with
ours.'' So, I think if we can get some of our technical
personnel and NGO personnel more in harmony with the
government, too, that's going to help to strengthen the state
and help it to be able to really shoulder this burden better.
Mr. Schneider. Couple of things. It seems to me that, if
we're serious, we probably need to ensure that all donors
change their strategy. For a variety of political reasons, we
bypassed the Haitian Government, at different stages in the
past, and denied funds going either through the central budget
or through specific ministries. And I think we have to shift,
if we really want to build those government agencies, and, at
the very least, require, if a grant goes to an NGO, that the
NGO is required, by the donor, to follow the Haitian strategy
in that sector; in this case, the reconstruction plan. And,
second, that if it's not going to go through the government
ministry because the government ministry, at that point, may
not be capable, that an increasing portion of the grant go to
the objective of strengthening the government ministry
officials and technicians during the course of the grant, so
that, after the grant period, each ministry is far more capable
of carrying out the function rather than continuing to have it
have to be done by NGOs.
And the second is that, again, in each of these issues, we
need to be saying, how are we strengthening the institution,
not just in Port-au-Prince, but across the departments? And so,
I would urge, as part of the reconstruction strategy, that
institutional strengthening be decentralized from the outset.
And so, if you're going to put people into the Ministry of
Education, they should be going into the Ministry of Education
in Port-au-Prince, but also in Gonaives, in Cap Haitien, in
Port-de-Paix, in order to ensure that the ministries have the
capability to provide services out into the departments.
And finally, it seems to me that we have, for the first
time, because of the magnitude of this tragedy, the ability to
go to the diaspora, with the support of each Haitian minister,
and say, ``We need a mid-level technician with this kind of
experience, and we're going to fund you for 2 years, or for at
least a year, but ideally for several years,'' to play that
role in Haiti and do two things--carry out some of the
functions, but also train a colleague in the Haitian ministry
to replace you at the end of the period.
Senator Menendez. Andrew Natsios has a piece that he put
out that suggests finding qualified Haitian diaspora to go back
for a period of time to help build the institutions and
simultaneously creating a scholarship program here for graduate
students, to help build that capacity.
Mr. Schneider. I should say, we've tried that, and I'm sure
he tried that. And the problem was, in the past, there was
resistance both to bring in higher paid diaspora people and
resistance, from inside the ministries, that they were going to
be, in a sense, overlooked or superseded by these individuals.
And at this stage, there are so many gaps in the ministry that
I think that that problem is no longer there and this kind of
program can be an integral part of each of the sectoral----
Senator Menendez. So, instead of a threat, it would be
welcomed.
Mr. Schneider. Exactly.
Mr. MacCormack. In terms of this question of how we should
relate--best relate to the people and Government of Haiti, it
does seem to me it's got to at least be a two-track system;
there has to be the work with the Government of Haiti, but
there also has to be the bottom-up side of the process and
working with the Haitian people and Haitian nongovernmental
organizations and entities on the ground, in the neighborhoods
and communities of Haiti, where an awful lot of strength really
is. And I do think that's also the role of their international
NGO partners.
But, I would say, we have not been outstanding in our
building of Haitian NGOs, and I would recommend that get built
into the process, to the extent we can do it. The challenge is,
it takes longer. It's easier for Save the Children to deliver
the services, build the schools, train the teachers ourselves,
with our well-trained Haitian staff and our systems and so on,
so forth, than to take the extra time to build a Haitian
institution as well as get the job done. And so, there's a bit
of an accountability tradeoff here, in terms of timeframes.
Ideally, we'd allow AID and others to build this into their
procurements, and so on, so forth, and recognize it may take a
bit longer to do it, in this twofer process of both building
Haitian institutions and getting the job done, than it would if
the international NGO just did it itself, but, in the end, if
we don't do that, we're going to be right back in the same
hollowed-out situation that we find ourselves today.
Senator Menendez. Your comment raises the last question
that I have. Well, not the last question, but the last question
I'll ask. We're still going to pick your brains, moving
forward. You know, and it's the question of long-term thinking.
You know, in the 2004 Asian tsunami, we didn't do long-term
thinking; we rushed, I think it was, 30 million--30,000 metric
tons of food aid, despite the fact that southern India and Sri
Lanka had bumper rice crops. And, as a result, we created a
second crisis, where we artificially depressed commodity prices
and, hence, incomes for local farmers.
Then, in El Salvador in 2001, you know, we had a different
response, where the local USAID mission staff spoke to mayors
and local leaders in affected municipalities to frame the
essence of how their reconstruction would result in that. It
created, you know, a focus on rural incomes and jobs by trying
to improve farmers' access to markets, disseminating lessons
through public institutions, and incomes, jobs, markets, and
institutions that ultimately got reestablished and helped build
the long-term effort there.
So, my question is, as we, right now, have, obviously, an
immediate response, is this--as you know, this subcommittee has
jurisdiction of all of our foreign assistance abroad. I'm
looking at--and I'm sure other members are interested in--are
we including enough long-term thinking here? You've--Mark,
you've been the head of this entity. In the----
Mr. Schneider. I think there are two parts to it. In the
rush to help----
Senator Menendez. Let me get the final part of my----
Mr. Schneider. All right.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. So you can answer it all.
In the rush to help, are we missing lessons from past
disasters, and that sometimes moving--you know, there's such a
desire to be so responsive, as we should be; by the same time,
are we moving so fast that we cause bigger problems and miss
big opportunities?
Mr. Schneider. You phrased the challenge, it seems to me,
which is that the massive desire to move quickly and respond,
both in terms of relief and in terms of rebuilding, at times
undermines the capacity, particularly on institution-building
in the long term. And I guess one of the lessons that we
learned from Hurricane Mitch was that you needed to have some
of the voices from the countries in the process of defining our
own strategy to help them, in terms of reconstruction.
And one of the things that I've urged, and I would continue
to urge, is that we find ways, as the reconstruction plan is
being put together in Haiti and as the donors are attempting to
respond, that the Haitian NGOs, Haitian civil society, Haitian
private sector, be incorporated in that process.
The donor meeting is in March or April in New York, and I
would strongly urge that there be, at the very least, a
premeeting that includes them and gets their ideas for some of
these issues, going forward.
And the second is in terms of specifically what you
mentioned in El Salvador on agriculture and in Aceh. One of the
fundamental failures in Haiti was that many of the policies we
took here undermined Haitian agriculture for the long term. And
right now, it seems to me, we have the opportunity to ask
ourselves, how can the international community and the United
States, particularly in the reconstruction thinking, ensure
that, 10 years from now, Haiti is no longer importing 70
percent of its rice and that the capacity and the potential for
Haitian agriculture has been supported? And I would ask that
question almost in every area, and then look at the question of
what policy changes are needed.
And I think it's possible. It's not easy. There are
obviously political factors involved, but it seems to me that
there's a potential there for achieving long-term
transformation in the Haitian economy and of Haitian society,
and we have a significant role to play in that process.
Mr. MacCormack. As my testimony suggested, there's no
question that there's got to be more long-term thinking about
this, or we'll be right back in the same situation 3 or 5 years
from now, and our publics will be outraged, certainly, that
they gave so much money to Save the Children, CARE, and so on,
and nothing changed.
The question is how to do it. And it does seem to me we
have national security interests in the well-being of Haiti not
being a failed state that are quite pressing, and it is
important to frame it that way, in my opinion.
Haiti is one of our nearest neighbors. You can get up in
the morning here, be in Haiti for lunch, have your meetings,
and be back here for dinner. We cannot afford to have Haiti
being a staging area for drugs and trafficking and so on and so
forth. So, we have interests in the success of Haiti that are
quite pressing.
It's also manageable. There are only 8 million people in
Haiti. This is not 100 million, 200 million, 300 million people
that have to have a change. So, it's affordable. So, I think we
have a sales task, and--all of us--to convince the Congress,
the taxpayers, and others that this is not just one more
emergency in one more faraway place; this is miles away from
our own country. And hopefully, with that kind of framing, we
can get the longer term commitment that we really need to get
sustainable, lasting change in Haiti.
Senator Menendez. You know, one of the things that did
bother me--on September 11--different type of tragedy, but the
American people came together, regardless of their race, their
religion, their political view. It really annoyed me to see--
and I understand it's a democracy--but, political classes in
Haiti taking the opportunity of a tragedy to, you know--I
didn't get the sense it was a legitimate criticism as much as
it was an opportunity to criticize.
So, how is it--and I have no views as to who should be or
not be in power; that's not my issue. My issue is, how do you,
in the mist of such a set of circumstances--do you get buy-in
by, maybe, inviting those other elements in political--the
political universe as well as the civic universe, to be at the
table and be responsible? Because it's very irresponsible just
to criticize--you know, Abe Lincoln used to say, ``He who has
the heart--who has the right to criticize must have the heart
to help.'' It seems to me that there's some mechanism in this
process that needs to be created in which people are brought
in, given the opportunity to be brought in, so that they can be
positive actors instead of just simply negative actors. Is that
possible?
Mr. Schneider. In fact, one good example in Central
America, was where there were four very divergent ways of
responding to the hurricane. In El Salvador, they called
together a National Reconstruction Advisory Council that
brought together private sector, civil society, et cetera, to
talk. After there was agreement with donors about principles,
like the ones we've enunciated, they brought together this
Council to come up with the projects that were then presented
by the government, with the government, for actual funding. And
it seems to me that that is one way, in Haiti, of bringing
things together. Haiti needs to have a new social compact that
involves everyone. And this is one way--in a sense, as you
said--to hold them, give them an opportunity to be responsible
and to play a participatory role in that process. And it is
absolutely essential, and it is very frustrating when you see
the opportunity not taken to come together in a united fashion.
And I will say that President Preval, as Bob said, has, in
the past, done things to engage them, and I would hope that he
would again.
Senator Menendez. Do you have a----
Mr. MacCormack. Several times--sorry. We've consistently
mentioned the Haitian diaspora in the United States and Canada,
and I think keeping a focus on how to mobilize that group is
really, really important here. And I think, a generation ago,
in Spain and Portugal, there were millions of Spaniards and
Portuguese in the European community--what was then the
European community--working. You had had Franco and you had
Salazar, in Spain and Portugal, for a generation, but you had a
group who had left and participated in democracy and
opportunity, and then a framework was created for their return.
And they had a huge, huge role in creating this new social
compact in Spain and Portugal.
I think if we can create a framework that incentivizes the
Haitian diaspora in Canada and the United States to return,
which many of them would be willing to do in the right
framework, we could really move this whole thing forward.
Senator Menendez. Final word, Mr. Maguire.
Mr. Maguire. Yes, sir. I would like to stress a couple of
points about this rivalry.
Oftentimes, it's been fueled, actually, by divisions in
Washington, the rivalries in Haiti. We've seen that in the
1990s, we saw it in the early 2000s. I think that the fact that
there is no rivalry on Haiti in Washington right now is a
positive fact, and it will help us to, I think, respond better
to trying to push Haiti to be a little more unified in this.
There's an expression in Creole that comes to my mind. It's
``profit de l'occasion,'' ``take advantage of the
opportunity.'' And somehow or other, I think, with the
government leadership, the government's got to start speaking
out more than it has. That's obvious. I think everyone knows
that. But, rather than people looking at this as how they will
profit individually, either through opportunistic politics or
price gouging or getting contracts, that sort of thing, by
supporting the government, these kind of commissions,
mechanisms that can bring people into the tent rather than have
them outside, I think we can help to defuse some of this
instinct toward taking advantage of the opportunity.
But, I think, as well, we need to look--talking about, you
know, the long-term thinking--in my testimony, I tried to look
at long-term mistakes, mistakes we've been making for the past
five decades that, in part, have pushed Haiti's
underdevelopment along, mistakes that have been made by
Haitians. If we take into account the mistakes, I think that we
can move forward and do things better in this regard.
I'd just--you know, one example. In the 1980s, there was a
big move in Haiti to create assembly plants. It was called the
Taiwanization of Haiti. Haiti was going to become the Taiwan of
the Caribbean. And for a moment, maybe it did, with 60 to 1,000
to 100,000 jobs. But, you know, as I mentioned in my testimony,
you know, Francis Fukuyama has criticized the fact that Latin
America as a whole, and Haiti, particular, did not do what
Taiwan did to become Taiwan, which was invest in people first
through universal education, and invest in agrarian development
so that when you started the factories you'd have support
mechanisms in the country to develop the entire country.
So, if we learn from lessons like that, I think we can go
forward and do this a whole lot better this time.
Senator Menendez. Well, very good.
Thank you very much for a good--Mark, do you feel
compelled?
Mr. Schneider. Yes, I feel compelled, just because the----
Senator Menendez. I've been very liberal, here.
Mr. Schneider. I know you have. I know you have.
[Laughter.]
It's just that, you know, one of the areas where the United
States----
Senator Menendez. Not in the political extreme, either,
obviously. [Laughter.]
Mr. Schneider. One of the places where the United States,
today, can play a significant role is in the area of drug
trafficking. President Preval has been complaining for 4 years
that the United States has not responded in providing him help
on interdicting drug trafficking. At the time, now, where the
Haitian National Police is damaged, it's clear that, at some
point in this process, the drug traffickers are going to again
try and use Haiti as a transit point. It seems to me that that
should be a key part of what we do in helping Haiti. And we're
just about the only ones who can do that.
And the other, in terms of the diaspora, right now, I think
there are only about 15 Haitian-American police as part of the
2,000-member United Nations police force, which is going up to
3,500. I would hope that the United States would include the
funding to bring--and I know they would love to go back and
participate--a significant number of Haitian-American police
into the U.N. police force there.
Senator Menendez. A lot of great ideas here, and we
appreciate it.
We're going to keep the record open for 2 days so that
other members may submit additional questions to you, and
appreciate your earliest response possible. I think you've
given us a lot of food for thought here, and a lot of
opportunities to think about how we work with the
administration and move forward in a way that can ultimately
enhance the lives of the people of Haiti, both now and in the
future.
Thank you for your participation.
With no additional comments, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of International Housing Coalition (IHC),
Washington, DC--February 3, 2010
The International Housing Coalition (IHC) has been monitoring the
situation in Haiti with a particular focus on the impacts of the
disaster on housing and critical residential infrastructure. The
situation is desperate, as we all know, and efforts are now rightly
focused on immediate relief, life-saving medical care, critical food
and water, and security. At the same time, the enormous destruction to
Haiti's housing stock threatens not just the immediate health and well-
being of the population, but the country's long-term social and
economic viability. Experience from around the world shows that post-
disaster rescue efforts quickly morph into recovery and then
reconstruction efforts. This process will happen in Haiti with or
without the support of the international community and a comprehensive
reconstruction plan.
The U.S. Government (USG), along with other parties, has a critical
role to play in making reconstruction resources available quickly.
These resources must be used in a strategic way to steer the
reconstruction process in a positive direction. More than a million
Haitians are homeless and many more are living in unsafe, compromised
structures. Shelter is a precondition for economic development, health,
and security, and the efficiency of investments in other sectors is
reduced when recipients lack safe and secure shelter. U.S. resources
must be used equitably and efficiently to house families and
reestablish communities in ways that enhance their resistance to future
natural disasters.
The IHC makes the following recommendations
Establish a Reconstruction and Development Authority to
oversee and coordinate reconstruction efforts. The USG should
support the immediate creation of a redevelopment authority for
greater Port-au-Prince. The authority would develop a
reconstruction strategy and implementation plan. It would
manage and disburse redevelopment funds for housing and basic
infrastructure (e.g., local roads, storm water drainage, water
reticulation, and sewerage). It would be in a position to pool
funds from the United States and other donor agencies to
maximize impact, coordinate shelter construction with
infrastructure provision, and build linkages between
reconstruction and local investment. Successful housing
reconstruction requires effective public administration and
management, including the promulgation and monitoring of
minimum standards for construction. Areas not suitable for
reconstruction should be identified and mapped quickly, before
informal reconstruction gains traction and residents should be
made fully aware of these restrictions as soon as possible.
Develop a comprehensive shelter strategy. The process of
shelter reconstruction should take place within the framework
of a shelter strategy and plan supported by the donor community
and Government of Haiti which takes into consideration many
factors including local needs and effective demand, available
resources, institutional capabilities within both the public
and private sectors, legal and regulatory issues, environmental
considerations and opportunities for economic development.
Ensure that assistance for shelter is accessible and
provides appropriate incentives to residents of all income
levels to rebuild and improve their homes. Given the scale of
the disaster and the resulting housing deficit, rebuilding must
utilize the full range of local resources and institutions in
addition to internationally provided support. As a practical
matter most housing will be provided by the homeowners
themselves and much of this will involve the incremental
rebuilding of remaining structures or improvement of the
temporary/transitional shelter received in the early days of
the relief effort. Assistance for home reconstruction must
provide effective incentives for families and others to build
using materials and techniques that increase resistance to
future disasters, while still providing opportunities for
small-scale builders, for self-help construction, and for
efforts by community groups and nongovernmental organizations.
Ensure that housing and infrastructure reconstruction
efforts support and enhance local economic development.
Employment generation should be an explicit objective of the
rebuilding process in order to increase household income and
thereby stimulate consumer demand and production.
______
[From Newsweek, Jan. 22, 2010]
After Reconstruction
Rebuilding Haiti means more than just bricks and mortar--
It means building institutions
(By Andrew Natsios)
The mobilization inside the United States--among the military, aid
groups, the public--to help Haiti has been quick and generous.
Hopefully, alongside peacekeepers and other international partners, we
can help the Haitians stabilize their country and reduce human
suffering. But then the work of rebuilding will begin, as the U.S.
helps them to reconstruct their shattered capital and economy. And it
will probably not go well. Not because the destruction was so massive
(that is a surmountable problem), but because Washington policymakers
unfamiliar with development practice still don't understand how to help
the Haitians erect a functioning civil society, private economy, and
competent government. It's not about reconstruction and humanitarian
aid; it's about institutions. And without them, Haiti will remain a
failed state.
In a recent book, ``Violence and Social Orders,'' Nobel Prize-
winning economist Douglass North and John Wallis and Barry Weingast
explain what distinguishes rich countries from poor ones. It's not just
wealth, education, or resources. It's about the density of legitimate
institutions--groups to administer pubic service, keep public order,
ensure the rule of law, and build a market economy. The United States,
as de Tocqueville first noticed on his travels in America during its
youth, is probably more densely packed with institutions per capita
than any society in world history, helping to make it wealthy and so
stable. North and his colleagues argue that institutions challenge and
help governments: they allow societies to negotiate conflicting
interests peaceably, maintain public accountability and transparency,
conduct impersonal market transactions essential for rapid economic
growth, and provide government services to everyone equally. In more
traditional societies, powerful elites limit groups like these that
check their power; and they use the government (and its treasury) to
build patronage networks, restrict economic activity to their own
class, and hand out public services to their own supporters to keep
them loyal. If we could measure it, Haiti probably would have the
lowest number of legitimate institutions of any country in the Western
hemisphere, and maybe the world.
A National Academy of Public Administration report of 2006 on why
foreign aid has failed in Haiti summarized general donor opinion, which
has ``variously characterized Haiti as a nightmare, predator,
collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual
or pariah state.'' One World Bank study of Haitian governance reports
that ``30% of civil service were phantom employees . . . One ministry
had 10,000 employees, only about half of whom were ever at work.'' A
USAID evaluation of the Haitian government institutions reported they
are ``characterized by lack of trained personnel; no performance based
personnel system, no accepted hiring, firing, and promotion procedures;
heavy top down management; and a decided lack of direction.'' In a
word, Haiti was a failed state before the earthquake. The country needs
more than rebuilding.
But the crucial idea in ``Violence and Social Orders''--that once
basic human needs are met, institutions are more important for a
functioning country--is not driving Western aid. Increasingly, the
groups who purvey it have focused on the delivery of services, not the
building of institutions. For its part, Washington takes reconstruction
literally (bricks and mortar alone). It's a truism that ports, roads,
sewage, schools, health clinics, bridges, and clean water are
preconditions to a stable country and expanding economy. But if that's
all we do, Haiti will simply revert to dysfunction, and whatever is
reconstructed will begin to crumble over time without institutions to
ensure maintenance. (Even before the quake, Haiti's public services,
where they existed at all, were perilously close to collapse.)
Unfortunately, institution building is much harder than
reconstruction. Political pressure from Washington since the end of the
Cold War, has demanded speed, visibility, and measurable results in
state-building exercises. But functional institutions will take a
decade or more, their successes will be undramatic, and many will be
difficult to quantify. Aid efforts in Haiti in the past have focused
too much on delivering public services through nongovernmental
organizations and international groups instead of the trying to reform
the Haitian institutions that should be delivering these services. But
simply providing aid funds through Haitian government ministries,
however--the newest international-aid fad--will strengthen the
predatory forces that control them. Paul Collier, in his book the
``Bottom Billion'' says this kind of aid in a failed state will have
the same affect oil revenues do in poor countries--it encourages
looting of the treasury. Only a massive shift of personnel, power, and
resources within Haitian society will break the stranglehold of
predators. How do we do this?
Building new institutions will require competent and honest Haitian
leadership. Haitian President Rene Preval has shown technical skill in
improving governance during the last two years, but he has been
invisible in the post-quake humanitarian-aid effort, which has damaged
him politically. He will need help, and one of the best ways of
generating that help in a country that has had a chronic leadership
deficit is to bring prosperous, educated Haitians on a large scale back
from the diaspora to help him build new Haitian institutions. Haitians
in America and Canada are well known as upwardly mobile,
entrepreneurial, and hardworking. They could be the vanguard of a new
Haitian governing leadership to reform the corrupt and dysfunctional
system.
At the same time, the Unites States should bring emerging Haitian
leaders to American universities and colleges. The most successful
institution-building program ever used by USAID, the U.S. government's
main foreign development arm, was its scholarship program, which
brought 18,000 students a year to American colleges and universities.
Those scholarships have been phased out over time because Washington
regulators demanded rapid and visible results, which education does not
produce. But scholarships engender long-term transformation, because
graduates usually return to their home countries from the United States
as reformers. Bringing promising Haitians to the U.S. for graduate
programs (with safeguards to ensure they return to Haiti afterward) can
complement the return of the Haitian diaspora in building new
institutions.
Another imperative is security, without which the exodus of
educated professionals will continue. Criminal gangs linked to the drug
trade have grown more powerful over the past few years and are behind
the growing violence in Haitian society. Unless this trend is arrested,
any effort to build new institutions will fail. This means that a large
U.N. peacekeeping and police presence with a more aggressive mandate
will be needed to keep order for at least a decade before this
institution-building effort can show results. It will take U.N. and aid
agencies a decade to help the Haitians build the local military and
police forces necessary for a functioning criminal-justice system.
Once those programs are in place, Haiti can begin to lure
investment. Beyond the terrible loss of human life from the earthquake,
the greatest invisible devastation is the destruction of jobs,
businesses, and economic activity. International business and capital
markets do not invest money in failed states, and, without that
investment, job creation, and economic growth (on the scale necessary
to transform Haitian society) are impossible. And without economic
growth, new Haitian institutions will be unsustainable, lacking the
local tax revenue to fund them when aid ends. So even if reconstruction
goes well, Haiti's failed-state status offers the twin economic
challenges of mass unemployment and a poor business climate. And
private capital must flow to new institutions in the private sector; it
cannot all be focused on the Haitian state. USAID ran successful
economic-growth programs for just that purpose in Indonesia, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and El Salvador.
If Western countries want to end the dysfunctional cycle of crisis
and failed Band-Aid development in Haiti, tractors and concrete will
not be enough. Only an institution-based model of reconstruction will
succeed.
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