[Senate Hearing 111-944]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-944
CONTRACTS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 15, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
Margaret Daum, Staff Director
Alan Kahn, Counsel
Molly Wilkinson, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator McCaskill............................................ 1
Senator Brown................................................ 4
Senator Kaufman.............................................. 5
Prepared statement:
Senator McCaskill............................................ 41
Senator Brown................................................ 43
WITNESSES
Thursday, April 15, 2010
Hon. Gordon S. Heddell, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 7
Evelyn R. Klemstine, Assistant Inspector General For Audits, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 8
Hon. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 10
David S. Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense For Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense............................ 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Heddell, Hon. Gordon S.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Johnson, Hon. David T.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 67
Klemstine, Evelyn R.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Sedney, David S.:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 74
APPENDIX
Questions and responses submitted for the Record from:
Mr. Heddell.................................................. 78
Ms. Klemstine................................................ 83
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 86
Mr. Sedney................................................... 94
Contractor Past Performance Evaluation submitted by Chairman
McCaskill...................................................... 101
Audit information submitted by Chairman McCaskill................ 104
CONTRACTS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING
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THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire
McCaskill, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators McCaskill, Kaufman, Brown, and Coburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL
Senator McCaskill. This Subcommittee on Contracting
Oversight will come to order today.
First, I obviously want to greet the new Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee. Senator Scott Brown from the State of
Massachusetts has joined this Subcommittee as its Ranking
Member. I do not know what this says about the Subcommittee or
me, but I have now gone through three ranking members in less
than a year. I hope you hold up better than the last two.
Senator Brown. I will stay as long as you have me, Madam
Chairman. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. No. I had a great working relationship
with both Senator Collins, who was temporarily filling the role
as things were getting sorted out and elections that really had
not quite been decided yet, and then Senator Bennett did a
great job for a period of time.
But we have had a chance to visit, and I think we will work
together well, and I look forward to it, so welcome to the
Subcommittee.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. Why are we here? Well, typically I try
to start with self-effacing humor about how dry contracts are
and how typically no one cares about this subject matter longer
than the brief moment of outrage when they read a brief quote
in a paper somewhere about some trouble that has happened in
contracting. Honestly this is a little different.
We are now much more educated as a Nation about fighting
counterinsurgency. We have learned hard lessons about fighting
counterinsurgency. Lives have been lost. Families across this
great Nation grieve as I speak for members of their families
that have been killed fighting counterinsurgencies.
One thing we have learned is that it has become crystal
clear that to successfully fight counterinsurgencies you have
to be strategic and effective at making sure there is local
rule of law. Why is that important? Well, that is important
because counterinsurgency thrives on being able to substitute
their rule of law for that of a legitimate government.
The Taliban has done so well in Afghanistan because they
were providing police protection to impoverished communities
many times through fear, many times through retribution. But
the Taliban, it was a sheriff. And when the Taliban was not the
sheriff there was rampant corruption and even when the Taliban
was the sheriff there was rampant corruption.
We learned all of these lessons in Iraq as we tried to move
into the country to get rid of a despot, a bad guy, that was
destabilizing the region; and we learned the hard way that if
we did not focus on establishing a rule of law, on not just
going after the bad guys but leaving a military and a police
presence that could stabilize the way of life that most people
on this planet want. They want to be able to take their kids to
school, feed their families, and not worry that they are going
to be killed on the way to work.
So that is why this hearing is so important. Training the
police in Afghanistan is part of our military mission. It is as
important as anything else that we are doing in that Nation
right now. It is as important as training the military. It is
as important as hunting down the terrorists and killing them.
So what happened in that regard? And it is an unbelievably
incompetent story of contracting. For 8 years we have been
supposedly training the police in Afghanistan. Here is what we
have done. We have flushed $6 billion. $6 billion.
Now, am I exaggerating? Let me quote the general in charge
of training the police in Afghanistan. This is what General
Caldwell said, ``It is inconceivable but in fact for 8 years we
were not training the police.'' He went on to say that
essentially we were giving them uniforms.
No one had control of these contracts. No one agency. This
has been a game of pass off. The ultimate recipe for disaster
is not having one single agency with a clear line of authority
in charge able to make sure the mission is accomplished with
efficiency, effectiveness, and that money is not walking away.
None of that happened for 8 years.
I will give you one anecdote. Early this year the Italians
showed up. This has been an international, very unorganized but
nonetheless an international effort. The Italians showed up.
And the Afghan volunteers that had volunteered to be on these
police departments were posting horrible scores on the shooting
range. They were the gang that could not shoot straight. And
there was this wringing of hands, what are we going to do about
these Afghan police officers that we are training that cannot
hit the side of a barn.
The first part of this year the Italian paramilitary came
in and began looking at the problem. Are you ready for what the
problem was? Nobody had checked the sites of the AK-47s and the
M-16s they were shooting. They were out of line.
So we were paying somebody to teach these people how to
shoot these weapons and nobody that we were paying had bothered
to check the sites as to whether or not they were in line. So
these guys were using the sites that were not even in line with
where they were shooting.
That is one example but I think it is pretty illustrative.
These contractors, for whatever reason, did not have anybody
who was saying, have you checked the sites when the scores were
coming back bad year after year after year. Their scores have
dramatically improved.
Do not get me wrong. There are major challenges here. These
people are showing up to become police officers without being
able to read or write. Most of them have only seen a role model
of a police officer that is not the role model we are looking
for. We are asking them to change many things about their
culture and the way they operate. This is a hard job. And do
not get me wrong. I get it. It is a hard job, all the more
reason that we need a line of accountability.
We have an audit that is going to be the subject of the
hearing to a large extent today. I want to make sure, as we
talk about this, that we know that there are in fact reasons
why people should be angry today. This new joint Inspectors
General (IG) report that just came out in February, and we are
going to talk about it extensively during the hearing, talks
about the problem of this division of responsibility between
the Defense Department and the State Department and how badly
this has gone in terms of accountability and authority.
Now, if this frankly was the first time that we had heard
this, then maybe we should not have a full-blown hearing. We
have identified the problem. Now you can get to work. Here is
the rest of the story:
L2005--Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that Department of State had not developed a plan for
when, how, or what costs the training or equipping of the ANP
would be accomplished.
L2006--the Department of State (DOS) and Defense
Inspectors General found management of the DynCorp contract to
be problematic and required more effective coordination between
the Department of State and CSTC-A, and I start talking in
acronyms. That means I have been here too long. That is
essentially the division of the military that is in charge of
overseeing these contracts.
L2008--GAO found State and Defense still had not
developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and
sustaining the ANP force, and the Department of Defense (DOD)
IG reported that CSTC-A, the military department in charge, had
not developed training programs.
How about contracting officers? In the Department of State,
we found in this 2010 report that contracting officers were not
providing adequate surveillance. Guess what? In 2005, they said
that, and in 2006, they said that. SIGAR who frankly has not
completed enough reports that are meaningful in terms of the
oversight capacity of our government, they even found in 2009
there was a problem.
Curriculum. The current report says there is a problem with
curriculum. Guess what? In 2006, they said the same thing. In
2006, the State Department and the DOD IG reported obstacles to
establishing a fully professional Afghan National Police
including literate recruits, a history of low pay, pervasive
corruption, on and on and on.
In other words this is the third or fourth time that people
who check into our government has said hello, it is not
working. You are not doing a good job.
This does not compute. Essential to our mission, men and
women dying for the cause, and we cannot get basic contract
oversight of this function under control.
So this is going to be a tough one and there are going to
be some tough questions because there is no excuse for this to
go any further. There is no excuse.
I welcome all of your testimony. I apologize for the delay
in the hearing. We got caught up in--I will not go into it
because I do not want this to be a partisan exercise.
Unfortunately we got caught up in some stuff that we could not
have the hearing the last time. And, Ms. Klemstine, that is why
you are here today. One up the food chain was going to be here
the last time but was unable to come today. So thank you for
being here today. I welcome all of you. At this point I would
like to turn the hearing over for an opening statement to
Senator Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank
you for your nice welcome and the conversations we have had to
lead up to this hearing. And I thought what you said was well
said and I am not going to duplicate a lot of it but I will say
as somebody who has been serving in the military for 30 years,
presently holds the rank of a lieutenant colonel, and is
familiar with contracting, being the head attorney for defense
services in Massachusetts, these are things that I take very
seriously.
And having recently come back from Afghanistan and seeing
the nature of the challenge and the enormity of the challenge
and the fact that I am just flabbergasted as a new member, but
as an ordinary citizen prior to this as to the amount of money
we are spending over there and seeing the clear lack of
progress.
What does that mean? To me it means obviously dollars that
cannot be spent here in the United States for services and
other things that we come to know and expect.
It also more importantly comes down to lives. As the
Chairman said about having our men and women going to a foreign
country, fighting to protect the rights of a citizenry that
sometimes appreciates us, sometimes does not, but with a police
force that would be fully stood up and raring to go would take
the pressure off of us to not only be a clearing force but now
be a security force.
One of the things that I noted, as big as the problem is,
when we first got into that country, Madam Chairman, the
enormity of the problem is so big, it almost quite frankly
feels like when I first got here I looked at the problems, the
offices, the logistics, the hiring, it is just so big. By the
time we left I actually had a real understanding of the plan
that General McChrystal was trying to implement when it comes
to winning the minds and hearts of the Afghan citizens and also
trying to implement a plan with the army and the police force
to take the pressure off of our soldiers, our MPs in
particular, for going in and securing an area.
Then when I read the Newsweek article and then when I have
done my own due diligence and the research and read the reports
I am like I do not get it. We are not talking about a couple of
hundred million dollars. We are talking about $6 billion.
When I saw the police force, with all due respect, I mean I
know we have young cadet corps that are more squared away. I
know we are in a new chapter here. I know I am new here, Madam
Chairman, but we have to have someone stop, take
responsibility, have communication lines develop between the
entities and the agencies and just solve the problem because I
am not sure everyone here testifying and people listening know
that we are in a financial mess, and it is not getting any
better.
And for us to ask the American taxpayers and the taxpayers
in my State to continue to contribute to an effort where there
are wasted dollars, they do not buy it. I am somebody who
believes in the value of a dollar. I want to know when my money
goes somewhere that it is going to be spent properly. It is
going to be fully accountable and that we are going to get a
good value for our dollar.
Madam Chairman, based on your earlier statements, as I
said, I am not going to repeat. I am very interested in getting
to the bottom of who is responsible--identifying that and say,
great, who is going to be responsible now? How are we going to
solve this problem? How are we going to make sure that the tax
dollars that we send overseas are going to be used effectively
so we can bring our men and women home quicker? And we can
stand up that force so they can protect themselves and allow
their produce and their natural resources to be harvested so
they can become self-sufficient and we get back to doing the
people's business here in the United States.
So, Madam Chairman, I will turn it back to you. I thank you
for your welcoming remarks and I look forward to participating.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Senator Coburn, it is great to see you. Would you like to
wait for questions?
Senator Coburn. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Let me introduce the witnesses. First, Gordon Heddell has
served as Inspector General for the Department of Defense since
July--I am sorry. I did not see you, Senator Kaufman. You are
so far away. We need to get you closer.
Thank you, Senator Kaufman, for being here. Would you like
to make a statement before we begin?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAUFMAN
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I just want to say how much I support what both of you have
said. This is so incredibly important. The No. 1 priority is
our troops in harm's way in Afghanistan and one of the really
very top problems we have regardless of the waste which, as
Senator Brown pointed out, is unacceptable under any
circumstances. This is key.
Getting the police squared away is one of the really key
things we need so, as Senator Brown said, we can come home and
leave them to do their own security. There is nothing we are
working on here--that is the reason I am here today--there is
nothing we are working on that is more important than this
right here.
How can we hold? We got to shape, we got to clear, we have
to hold so that we can build, and the police are an important
part of that. Right now, with the police, we are getting it
squared away. It is not just a waste of money. They have been a
negative. You talk about the rule of law. The rule of law in
most of these areas is because the police are so corrupt. The
people they are supposed to go to, to get the rule of law, are
the things they are trying to stay away from.
So I cannot think of a more important hearing going on on
the Hill today than this one right here.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
Gordon Heddell has served as the Inspector General for the
Department of Defense since July 2009. He served as Acting
Inspector from 2008 to 2009. Prior to joining the Department of
Defense in the Inspector General's office, Mr. Heddell served
as the Inspector General at the Department of Labor.
Evelyn Klemstine is the Assistant Inspector General for
Audits for the State Department. Ms. Klemstine previously
served as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits at NASA
and as the Program Director for the International Programs
Division at the Defense Department, Office of Inspector
General.
David Johnson has served as the Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
at the State Department since October 2007. In addition to
numerous other distinguished posts with the Federal Government,
Mr. Johnson served as Afghan coordinator for the United States
from May 2002 to July 2003.
David Samuel Sedney is Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and
Pacific Security Affairs. Previously Mr. Sedney served as
Deputy Chief of Mission, Charge de Affairs and Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.
It is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in all
witnesses that appear before us. So if you do not mind, I would
ask you to stand.
Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before
this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
Thank you all very much.
We will be using a timing system today. We would ask that
your oral testimony be no more than 5 minutes. Your written
testimony will be printed in the record in its entirety.
Mr. Heddell, we would ask you to begin.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. GORDON S. HEDDELL,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Heddell. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Brown, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the joint audit that was performed by
the Inspectors General of the Departments of Defense and State.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell appears in the Appendix
on page 48.
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This audit examined the Administration and contract
oversight of the State Department program to provide training
to the Afghan National Police. This audit was conducted at the
request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Defense.
As you know, the training and development of the Afghan
National Police to provide security in countering the
insurgency in Afghanistan is a key element of the U.S.
strategy. As such, it is critical that the Afghan police be
trained to support the counterinsurgency mission along with
community policing skills. Effective contract oversight is
crucial to achieving these goals.
Prior inspection and assessment reports by this office, as
you noted, the Chairman, have noted that adequate staffing of
key contracting positions is absolutely essential for immediate
and effective oversight. It has become very apparent that the
insurgents in Afghanistan are increasingly targeting the Afghan
police and that average annual death rates among these police
officers have been steadily increasing.
As a result, contract requirements regarding training need
to be modified to address this growing insurgency. This
requires close interaction between the contractor and what is
now known as NATO Training Mission/Combined Security Transition
Command Afghanistan.
The current contract arrangement simply does not facilitate
this close interaction because the Department of Defense is
required first to coordinate all contract changes with the
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, at times a very cumbersome process.
Furthermore, in August 2009, the Chief of Mission in
Afghanistan reported that the lack of a single unified chain of
command sometimes created confusion and delays in enhancing the
police training program. Accordingly, the Chief of Mission and
the commander of the International Security Assistance Forces
recommended the transfer of contractual authority to the
Department of Defense for the training of the Afghan police.
To bring about the recommended transfer of responsibility,
the Department of State planned to allow its current police
training task order to expire and the Department of Defense
planned to add police training to an existing contract.
However, a March 15 decision by the Government
Accountability Office sustained a DynCorp protest of the
planned action. In light of this decision, the State Department
plans to make adjustments to improve the existing police
training program, to include more direct involvement by the
military in training the Afghan police and moving the
contracting authority from Washington, DC to Kabul.
Furthermore, inadequacies in the Administration and
oversight of the contract compound the challenges that exist in
providing the required training to the Afghan police. These
challenges include weaknesses in quality assurance, review of
their invoices, support for the billing and making of payments,
defense contract audit agency involvement or lack of
involvement, maintenance of contract files and accountability
of government property. My written statement provides
additional information on these deficiencies.
Our audit also questions the fact that the State Department
still holds about $80 million in expired Department of Defense
funds and that this needs to be resolved. The deficiencies
identified in the Administration and oversight of the contract
illustrate the larger challenges that are caused by the lack of
sufficient contract personnel, geographic distance and the
wartime environment all complicating this important matter.
My office will closely follow the efforts of the Department
of Defense to oversee the future contract to train the Afghan
police and to appropriately use the funds provided by Congress
for that purpose.
I look forward to continuing our strong working
relationship with this Subcommittee and with all oversight
organizations engaged in the important work that is being
carried out in Afghanistan and in Southwest Asia generally.
And this concludes my statement.
Senator McCaskill. Ms. Klemstine.
TESTIMONY OF EVELYN R. KLEMSTINE,\1\ ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Klemstine. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking
Member Brown, for the opportunity to present our joint audit on
the national police training program contract in Afghanistan
with the Department of Defense Inspector General.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Klemstine appears in the Appendix
on page 63.
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Deputy Inspector General Geisel sends his regards but he is
in Baghdad this week.
We conducted this joint audit in response to a
congressional request with an objective determining the ability
of the Afghan National Police (ANP), training program to
address Afghan security needs. We also reviewed contract
management activities and the status of Afghan Security Forces
(ASF), funds provided by DOD to the State Department.
In 2006, when the security environment in Afghanistan was
more stable, DOD decided to use the State Department's existing
Civilian Police program (CIVPOL), contract to implement the ANP
training program. The contractor, DynCorp International, was
awarded two task orders valued in excess of $1 billion.
These two task orders directed DynCorp to provide
personnel, life support, and communications for the training
program. The State Department was responsible for procuring
services, overseeing the contract, and managing and reporting
on funds transferred from DOD.
We found under the CIVPOL contract DOD did not have the
authority to direct the contractor thereby restricting DOD's
ability to rapidly modify ANP training to respond to the rising
insurgency and the changing security situation in Afghanistan.
While the State Department was focused on training the ANP
to be an effective police force after security in Afghanistan
had been stabilized, DOD was focused on the survival and
tactical training of the ANP to counter the growing insurgency.
In addition, while the foundation has been laid for an
effective women's police training program, there has been
inadequate progress in training a sufficient number of Afghan
women. The lack of trained women's police corps members has
limited the effectiveness of law enforcement in Afghanistan.
We recommended correcting these deficiencies by clearly
defining ANP training program requirements, increasing the
training facility capacity for women police members and
enhancing efforts to recruit women training instructors.
In response to the draft report, management provided a
detailed description of the requirements for the training
program and agreed to provide additional resources for training
policewomen.
In overseeing CIVPOL contract, we found the State
Department contracting officials did not assign sufficient
numbers of contract oversight personnel to the ANP task orders
and did not prepare a quality assurance surveillance plan to
ensure that the contractor met the performance requirements of
the statement of work.
In addition, those contracting personnel who were assigned
to monitor the task orders did not provide adequate oversight
to ensure that all goods and services were received.
Specifically the following internal control weaknesses were
identified. One, government furnished property was not
adequately accounted for. Two, contract files were incomplete
and not always available. Three, deliverables were not always
matched to receiving reports, and four, procedures for
reviewing contractor invoices to determine whether costs were
proper were not followed.
As a result of these internal control weaknesses, State
Department personnel could not ensure that funds allocated by
DOD for the program were expended in accordance with DOD
requirements.
We recommended that the number of contract personnel
responsible for contract oversight be increased, that a
complete inventory of government property be performed, that
the contract officers maintain complete and accessible contract
files, and that goods and services be matched against invoices.
In addition, we recommended that the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA), perform an audit to determine whether all
expenditures were allowable, allocable, and reasonable, and
request reimbursement from DynCorp for any payments DCAA
determines to be improper.
In response to the draft report, management generally
agreed to increase the number of oversight personnel going
forward and strengthen internal controls and undertake an
audit.
In addition to identifying various internal control
weaknesses, we also requested contract invoices and other
supporting documents for $217 million in ASF funds already
expended.
Unfortunately, the State Department financial managers did
not provide detailed transaction data until after the draft
report was issued. As a result, we could not determine whether
the Department had expended the funds in accordance with
congressional intent.
However, we did ascertain that $80 million in funds
transferred from DOD remained unexpended well after the end of
the availability period established by appropriations law. We
recommended that the State Department determine the status of
ASF funds and that any excess funds, to include the $80 million
in expired funds, be returned.
In March 2009, the President announced a comprehensive new
strategy for Afghanistan which included an emphasis on training
and increasing the size of Afghan security forces.
The State Department and DOD are committed to providing a
stable and secure environment for all Afghan citizens. This
requires that we effectively train and mentor Afghan forces,
monitor our contracts effectively, and ensure that taxpayers'
money is spent appropriately.
Finally I would like to note that this audit was conducted
in 6 months. Given the scope of work which took place in the
United States and six locations in Afghanistan, the short time
for the successful completion is a tribute to the
professionalism of the audit co-directors Mark Ives from DOD IG
and Jim Pollard from the State Department OIG and their teams.
Once again I thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Senator
Brown, for the opportunity to appear today and I am ready to
answer your questions.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much and thank you to the
staffs. That is quite an accomplishment, 6 months for this
audit. I know a little bit about that. That is amazing.
Congratulations to your teams.
Mr. Johnson.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member
Brown, and Senator Kaufman. We appreciate the opportunity to
appear before the Senate Subcommittee today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix
on page 67.
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The topic of today's hearing, Contracts for Afghan National
Police Training, is both urgent and it is important. As we all
know, President Obama aims our military to begin transitioning
out of Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. That is premised on
the expectation that Afghan security forces can provide
security for the Afghan people to support their self-
governance.
Since 2003, the State Department has provided a variety of
training and assistance to the Afghan National Police. Since
2005, our training programs have supported the United States
military in its responsibility to develop the overarching
Afghan national security forces which includes both the army
and civilian police.
As you know, Madam Chairman, from your Subcommittee's
oversight record, building civilian capacity in a conflict zone
like Afghanistan where civil institutions had been largely
destroyed over 20 years of conflict is incredibly challenging.
The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) undertake these assignments
to advance our broader national security and foreign policy
objectives. Our expertise in law enforcement and criminal
justice programs is widely recognized.
Building on the recommendations for improvement from the
oversight community and from this Subcommittee, we hope soon
also to be recognized for our agility and proficiency in
contract management and oversight.
Where our OIG colleagues have identified that we have
fallen short is in how we have adapted our contract oversight
to challenges of operating in theaters of war where military
operations and complex security requirements limit our on-the-
ground staffing and our staff's ability to travel to the sites
where training takes place.
As stewards of increasingly more taxpayer dollars for
critical national security and foreign policy objectives, we
must effectively adapt to this battlefield environment so that
we craft procedures and methods that allow our contract
management and oversight activities to be fully carried out.
The report discussed here today identifies a number of
recommendations with which we fully agree and are working to
address. For example, INL's current oversight team has already
been enhanced. Our team now consists of 33 staff, 12 program
officers in Afghanistan and Washington, seven in-country
contracting officers' representatives (ICORs) now provide
oversight in Afghanistan while the contracting officer's
representative and 13 of his staff address contract oversight
and Administration in Washington.
The increased ICOR staffing enables us to strengthen our
asset management and inventory reviews processes. More ICORs
are in various stages of the hiring process and will be in
Afghanistan beginning in May. By September we will have 22.
We will implement fully standardized contract management
operating procedures and guidelines by June 30 of this year.
Standing operating procedures and a Web-based contracting
officers representative file fully accessible to staff
worldwide around the clock will be in place by the end of May.
Along with more frequent reviews, this will further strengthen
our internal controls.
We have engaged DCAA to audit our Afghanistan task order
with two audits in process and they are preparing to audit the
task orders that are the subject of the OIG report. To date,
INL has rejected 17 percent of police training invoices for
Afghanistan resulting in 16.3 million in the denied claims.
Many of INL's police training accomplishments are not
easily represented in a chart. Capacity building is a long-term
process even in stable post-conflict areas but Afghanistan
which continues to face an active insurgency is a special case.
For example, our police training programs are designed to
empower Afghan civilians, many of whom lack basic literacy with
the core skills needed to mobilize as police officers and
respond to the direction of their local commanders.
Embedded in a Washington Post story on February 27, was an
Afghan police training success story. While the news sadly
communicated the grim tale of yet another suicide bombing
attack, the report indicated that after multiple bomb
detonations police officers assembled at the scene rather than
retreating and remained until they had covered their fallen
colleagues, a scenario which would likely have been different
only 2 years ago.
This is one instance but it is descriptive not only of the
challenging environment in which Afghan National Police operate
but of the kinds of actions and operations their training has
made them capable of undertaking.
Madam Chairman, the Department takes very seriously the
need to safeguard the public's trust in managing programs and
contracts that support our national security objectives around
the world. It is after all through these programs that our
partners worldwide develop the bedrock of civil society, a
safe, secure place where people can live free from fear.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss INL's contract
oversight. I will do my best to address your questions.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Sedney.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID S. SEDNEY,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC
SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaskill,
Senator Brown, and Senator Kaufman. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today with my interagency colleagues.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney appears in the Appendix on
page 74.
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As you know, the President's strategic review of
Afghanistan and Pakistan recommend that heightened efforts to
increase the quantity and quality of Afghan national security
forces as part of a strategy to enable the eventual transfer of
responsibility for security to the Afghan government. This is
not an exit strategy. It is a transfer strategy.
Improving the capacity of the Afghan National Police is
particularly important as police are the primary link to the
Afghan government for many Afghans particularly in rural areas.
Moreover, the Afghan police are on the front lines of the
fight against the Taliban and its affiliates. The Afghan
National Police are situated in areas where no coalition or
Afghan national army forces are and are often the target of
much greater attacks. Casualty rates are higher in the Afghan
National Police than in the army. It is two to three times more
dangerous to be a policeman today in Afghanistan than to be a
soldier in the Afghan national army.
The effort to train the Afghan National Police as you
pointed out, Chairman McCaskill, has been under resourced,
under prioritized, and under carried out. One of the priorities
of this Administration when it came in was to refocus our
efforts with the renewed leadership, with greater resources,
but more importantly than the number of resources, more
targeted and more effective resources aiming at building the
quality of the entire Afghan national security forces in an
integrated effort with the Afghan national army and in a
combined civil/military campaign plan that will enable us to
carry out the transition that I described.
As part of this revision, we, along with our NATO
colleagues, have transitioned to the NATO training mission
Afghanistan which General Caldwell, who you mentioned in your
opening statement, is now the commander of, of course dual-
hatted also as the commander of CSTC-A. The NATO International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and our non-NATO partners have
made progress towards growing the end strength and quality of
ANP.
In December 2009, the ANP achieved its end strength goal of
96,800. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring
Board, the international board charged with ensuring the
international and Afghan ministerial plans aligned with the
goals of the Afghan government agreed with the Afghan
government's plan supported by ISAF and the U.S. Government
increased the size of the ANP to 109,000 by October 31, 2010,
and to 234,000 by October 31, 2011.
The increase in 2010 will consist of approximately 5,000
Afghan border police, 5,000 Afghan national civil order police
which is the mobile gendarme force that is equipped to act as a
light infantry role throughout the country, and 2,000 Afghan
uniformed police as well as other specialized police and
enablers.
At the end of March 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Interior
reported that the total ANP will be equal to 102,138, slightly
above the February goal of 99,261.
However, increases in the size of ANP forces must come with
a commitment for improvement in the quality of the force.
Initiatives to improve the quality of the force include
improvements in the training infrastructure, increased pay
equal to that of the Afghan national army, better equipment,
expanded literacy training, and embedded partnering and
mentoring.
In addition, we are working hand in glove with the
Department of State to build rule of law structures and
processes to support that ANP. As part of our effort to improve
the police training process, the ambassador and the commander
of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, as my colleagues earlier
mentioned, recommended in an August 2009 cable that management
of the Defense-funded, State-managed police training contract
should be shifted from the Department of State to the
Department of Defense. The Department of State and the
Department of Defense subsequently approved this
recommendation.
Due to the operational need to quickly award a new contract
and the respective organizations subject matter expertise and
experience utilizing the respected subject organizations
expertise and experience in support of Afghanistan operations,
the commander of CSTC-A selected the counter narcoterrorism and
technology program office through the U.S. Army space and
missile defense command of the Army strategic forces command to
oversee the development of an appropriate acquisition strategy
for the ANP program.
The strategy called for procuring the required services
through the issuance of a task order under existing multiple
award indefinite delivery, indefinite quality contracts with
CNTPO. The task orders for the training of ANP and ANP programs
logistics requirements were to be competed among five holders
of an existing MAIDIQ contract.
However, before orders could be issued, on March 15, the
Government Accountability Office, as the Inspector General
earlier mentioned, sustained the protest by DynCorp
International. The GAO determined that the task orders for the
ANP program were outside the scope of the MAIDIQ contracts.
As a result, the ANP training effort will not be awarded
under that contract. DynCorp will continue performance under
the current State Department contract which has been extended
to July of this year while the Department of Defense in
conjunction with the Department of State weighs options to
ensure the ANP program requirements are met in an expeditious
manner in consideration of this development and in compliance
with the GAO recommendations.
It is important that any contractor DOD selects be
responsible and perform within the strict rules, regulations,
performance expectations, and acceptable ethical and business
practices that we demand.
Please be assured that we take seriously any allegation
that a contractor fails to meet these expectations and
requirements. The selection of DOD contractors responsible and
capable to meet our requirements to assist in training and
development of the Afghan National Police is no exception.
I hope you find this information helpful. Thank you and I
look forward to your questions.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Just to make sure I am respectful of my colleagues, if
staff would run the clock for 7 minutes for each member. We
will take as many turns as we need to get all the questions
out. I have a tendency to go on and I want to make sure I do
not go on too long without being respectful of Senator Kaufman
and Senator Brown's time.
So let me start with you, Mr. Sedney. What really happened
here is the commanders over there decided that when they were
telling DynCorp they needed this, DynCorp was telling their
folks, well, be careful just because the military is telling
you to do it does not mean we are going to get paid for it
because the State Department is making those calls.
So somebody finally figured out that it would be a good
idea to have the people in charge of military mission be in
charge of the contracting over an essential leg of a three-
legged stool as it relates to that mission in Afghanistan.
Is that a fair characterization?
Mr. Sedney. Yes, along with the Inspector General's report,
the lack of unity of command in the police training effort.
Clearly it was inhibiting what we were trying to do and I would
repeat what was said earlier. The shift in environment where
the security situation was getting worse and the police were
being called upon to do more and different things than
envisioned originally when the decision was made to utilize the
State Department contract made clear that we needed that
flexibility and that ability to have that unity of command.
There were multiple examples from the small to the large of
where that lack of unity of command was inhibiting what we were
able to do, and that is why our new commander and our new
ambassador out there made this decision to recommend what I
mentioned before in that cable that they sent on August 11.
Senator McCaskill. I certainly spent a lot of time when I
was in Afghanistan with the ambassador and with General
McChrystal and with General Caldwell. I completely agree that
was the right thing to do but it is important to note that
happened in August 2009, and we have no contract and we are not
even close to having a contract.
So I need to know today what is the plan? How are we going
to get contractors committed and over there with jurisdiction
and the supervision of the Department of Defense and the
military to train Afghan police officers?
Mr. Sedney. We do not have a final answer for you on that,
Chairman McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. That is unacceptable.
Mr. Sedney. However, I can tell you what we have done in
the months since the GAO decision and where we are working to
go to.
Senator McCaskill. Let me make sure the record is clear
here. The complaint was filed in December. This is a really
important part of the mission. There is a chance anybody who
knows anything about these contracts and anything about
complaints, and believe me if anybody knows about this it is
the Pentagon, about challenges to contracting, they know that
GAO has an important role to play.
At the moment that the complaint was filed, all hands on
deck should have been looking at this at the Pentagon to say
what is plan ``B''. If this objection is upheld by the GAO,
what is plan ``B''?
The President had already announced that this strategy was
just until July 2011. The clock is ticking. So we know in
December of last year that there could be a problem with
transitioning this contract under the military control and you
are telling me today, what, December, January, February, March,
April, you are telling me 5 months later you do not know what
you are going to do.
Mr. Sedney. No, Chairman McCaskill, I am not telling you
that we do not know what we are going to do. I am saying we
have not decided the final form of what we are going to do. But
as I said, if I could lay out where we are, what we are moving
towards.
Senator McCaskill. OK. What I want to hear is a decision
has been made and we are going to get on it. That is what I
want to hear but I am open to listening to what you want to
say.
Mr. Sedney. You are correct that once the contract protest
was filed, we should have been and we were aware that we needed
to start making alternate plans. Those alternate plans had to
of course cover a wide range of possibilities of the
contracting, and as I understand it, I am not a contract
lawyer, but as I understand it, I was advised that there are
some things that we had to be careful to do that in terms of
preparation could not go beyond actions that could then lead to
further protests so we have to be careful what we did legally.
On March 9, 2010, we received a joint message from our
military and civilians in the field, and this was a result of
work that we had leading up to that, pointing out some of the
areas that we need to work on, and what were some of the
alternate ways forward.
Since the GAO decision, my department, myself, Assistant
Secretary Johnson, his department, have met. The current
DynCorp contract is an extension of a contract which had
expired and that extension runs until July of this year.
We determined we had several possible ways forward at the
current time. We could, in conjunction with the GAO report
which very strongly came out in recommending that we do a full,
fair, and open competition of the contract, while we could have
appealed that decision or contested that decision and asked for
reexamination of that decision, we decided not to because even
if we felt that our position was right and the GAO decision was
wrong, further contesting of that decision would just lead to a
longer period of time with uncertainty.
So we are going to go ahead in full conformance with the
GAO recommendation of a full and open competition.
A full and open competition of that contract requires that
we have the requirements put in place, that we follow all the
steps of the contracting process, and the Department of Defense
is moving forward in an expeditious manner, in a speedy manner,
as fast as we can go, but this is not a process that in and of
itself is ever fast as I am sure you know, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. I do know. I will make a bold
prediction. DynCorp will be extended again and DynCorp will be
there doing this until a decision is made as to what extent our
level is going to change in terms of our commitment in
Afghanistan sometime next year.
The lesson that probably needs to be learned here is that
shortcutting the process through existing task orders and
contracts is what generally speaking the Pentagon likes to do.
The military has very little patience with the process of
full and open competition. It is a process that has a number of
required steps. But they are there for good reason. If there is
anyplace that I think the American people have figured out that
we have got to have some help on full and fair and open
competition, it is the hiring of security forces and the
training of security forces because I mean I do not know how
many other companies in America are as well known as
Blackwater, and it is not for good reasons.
So circumventing that full and fair, in hindsight, I just
want to say that the moment the decision was made to try to
move it out of the State Department, it seems to me that full
and fair open competition would have been the most efficient
way to move forward rather than trying to shoehorn this into
something else in order to take a shortcut. It turns out that
the shortcut was not so short.
My time is up for this round, and I will turn it over to
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am going to
actually, as a courtesy, extend my time to Senator Kaufman. He
has a few questions, and then if I could reserve and come back
that would be great.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you very much. I want to associate
myself with the Chairman's remarks.
Look, I have been to Afghanistan three times in the year
and a half I have been a Senator. I have sat through 70
briefings in preparation before and after leaving on those
trips.
I had no idea we spent $6 billion. I have not had a single
person in any one of those briefings refer to the Afghan
National Police as anything except a big problem. Not a problem
to get them well, a problem just the way they sit. They are
purveyors of corruption from one end of Afghanistan to the
other to, as the Chairman so well put it, the rule of law.
If we are going to build, clear, hold, and build, we have
to have the rule of law. No rule of law. The police are the
ones who man the barricades and on the highway stop people.
Just read the stories about what went on in Marjah and why the
people were so upset with us because of the former government.
The other thing I want to say, look, the four of you are
doing a great job. I mean I really applaud you for what you are
doing. This is incredibly difficult. So what I am saying is not
referring to you. You happen to be, unfortunately, the
messengers sent to sit here at the table.
But I think what the Chairman says is compelling. If we do
not do something, we are in dire shape over there. I mean that
is not a deep, dark secret. The key to it is we cannot go into
places and clear and hold, we cannot hold if we do not have the
police to do it and we surely cannot build and we surely cannot
transfer.
So we have to come up with something in the next 6 or 8
months. As the Chairman said, this is not a decision, we are
talking about June, starting to draw down troops. We are
talking about making a decision this December on whether we are
going to win or not.
And I will tell you what. At the top of my list, not the
No. 1 thing, but the No. 2 thing is where do we stand with the
Afghan National Police? The attrition rates were out a bit.
They are getting out of control.
So really what I would like you to do if you could, and I
know I have sat here and listened to you mention the
deteriorating condition, lack of unity of command, and some of
the things that have been said but this is catastrophic.
This was not something that you can just go around the
edges. It is a deteriorating condition so we have no police.
And we knew what the literacy of the police are. But they are
saying the same things now after $6 billion. We have this
incredible problem with the literacy of the police.
So, what I would like, if each of you would kind of--and I
know you are under constraint. What are the one or two things
that you really believe you could spend $6 billion on, and end
up with practically no where--what are the two or three things?
I got the unity of command and I got deteriorated
conditions. What are the one or two things that we can do, and
what is the one thing you think could best help us reach the
point the Chairman said, so that we can move ahead and actually
have progress on the ground so we can reach this 134,000
trained troops?
I will start with Mr. Heddell.
Mr. Heddell. I will say, just for starters, just about
everything that could go wrong here has gone wrong. And looking
back to November 2006, it was relatively clear to my office,
Senator Kaufman, that the training that was being provided was
already inadequate. The needs of the Afghan police training
were already out of date, so to speak, and it was pretty
apparent that there was not enough management on the ground in-
country overseeing the contract.
You are asking for a couple of things here. But I spent 28
years in Federal law enforcement so I cannot come up with two
things because there is at least 10 things and they all need to
be addressed.
The fact is, aside from the need to increase the size of
the total Afghan National Police force just to address the
counterinsurgency and to protect civilian population, they need
to start at the very beginning.
Recruiting is a tremendous challenge over there, finding
the right people for this kind of work, and then retaining
them, paying them what they need to be paid to live and then
training them on the force. Of course we talked about the
dangers and the fact that the death rate for Afghan National
Police officers, by our records, has gone up four or five times
what it was.
Senator Kaufman. The total now is 129, in my briefing.
Mr. Heddell. The average death rate per month for Afghan
National Police officer in the last 4 years, we think, has gone
up from 24 a month to about 125.
Senator Kaufman. OK.
Mr. Heddell. Those figures are approximate, but they are
dramatic. The fact of the matter is we need to change the
training curriculum to be able to address the
counterinsurgency. We need to be able to teach survivability
over there. They need to know that they can go out on the
street, do their work and survive.
They need tactical skills aside from the basic community
policing skills that any police official would need to have. We
need better trainers. The example that Madam Chairman gave with
the Carabinieri Italians, I mean what a simple but yet an
unbelievable situation that they had not sighted the weapons.
Most of all, Senator Kaufman, they need leadership. They
need police officers who can lead. If there is one single thing
they probably need more than anything else, it is that.
And the second thing, if I had to give you two items, would
be find a way to dismiss so many corrupt police officials in-
country. I met, last November, with Minister Wardak, the
Minister of Defense, and he talked for almost an hour and most
of it was about the corruption.
Corruption undermines everything that we are trying to
achieve in that country and particularly with respect to police
officials.
Senator Kaufman. My point is you know there is an old
definition of insanity in doing the same thing over again and
expecting different results. And what the Chairman said is what
are we going to do in that 6 months, and the folks in there
that have been doing this, I mean you say there are not enough
contract oversight.
Part of this has to be what were the contractors doing?
What you laid out was a problem we knew in 2001. Everything you
said you did not have to have a Ph.D. to figure out that those
were the 10 or 12 things that we had to do.
We are now here 9 years later, and we are exactly at the
same spot. You basically laid out the questions I have. And,
Wardak and Minister of the Interior Atmar, they say all the
right things, but what they say is there is no training going
on.
I am saying briefing after briefing after briefing was this
is just where the police are. What I am trying to do is get at
the answer to the Chairman's question. I guess, what the
problem is, you pretty well laid it out.
Does anybody have any ideas what to do in the next 6 months
so that when we come up for review in 7 months, we have a
realistic opinion of where the police are and how we can move
forward?
Mr. Heddell. If we have to wait for a contract, a new
contract, we are not going to do very much. The Department of
Defense is working with the Department of State, I know that,
to make an interim fix. The fact of the matter is it needs to
be fixed right now. And I can tell you you do not train a
police officer in a year. It takes 2, 3, and 4 years to get
there.
Senator Kaufman. But here is the thing, and I agree with
you about that and people talk about us going out in June and
we cannot go out in June. We do not have enough time.
We do not have to have all the answers but we have to make
progress. We have to be able to say we are moving in the right
direction. We got to be at some point like in December where we
do not have a list of the 12 things you said that are wrong,
which I totally agree with everyone of the them, that there is
maybe six on the list. We are making progress on two of them.
Mr. Sedney. I would hate to think we have to wait to get a
contract on-board to start training police officials to
survive.
Senator Kaufman. Can someone else give a suggestion? What
is it that we should do? I get back to the question the
Chairman raised. What can we do so that we do not have to wait,
so we come in December, we will have a good idea of whether we
really can actually train police and get them out there on the
job. Isn't that the question?
Ms. Klemstine. If I could.
Senator McCaskill. I think Mr. Sedney wants to also but go
ahead both of you briefly or all three of you go ahead and then
we will go to Senator Brown.
Ms. Klemstine. Briefly I would say that I would put them
into three areas. The first thing that we really need to do is
we need to adequately define our requirements. Every contract
starts on the requirements side.
My past experience on the contract side has shown that the
requirements are never well defined. We have to do that. Then
we have to have adequate performance measures by which to
reevaluate the contractors. Without any accountability, it does
not make any difference. That was one of the things that the
joint report pointed out that there was not performance
measurements in this contract to hold the contractor
accountable for what needs to be done.
And then the third area we need to do is an adequate job of
overseeing the contract. But in terms of overseeing the
contract, things will have to be a little bit different than
what we institutionally know as contract oversight just because
we are in a war-type zone.
So we have to develop standard operating procedures and
adequate ways to do these type of contract oversight in areas
of contingency operations.
Mr. Johnson. I think I would agree on a couple of the
points and make one further. The basic measures that would
improve the recruitment and retention direct, more direct pay,
direct pay for all, better and longer training programs focused
on literacy.
But with due respect to General Caldwell, we have trained
many people in Afghanistan. Under his leadership, we trained
3,000. Under General Formica, we have trained almost 16,000.
Under General Cohen, we have trained almost 30,000. Under
General Durbin, we trained almost 66,000.
So there has been a great number of people trained, and the
end strength now is about 100,000. But we have not been able to
retain them the way we need to. As the DOD inspector general
mentioned, it takes a longer time than a 6- or 8-week training
program to get the kind of police officer that you need. So
retention is a key part of this.
I would also join the Ms. Klemstine. A clear statement of
work so that we can move out on new training whether it is
under the contract that we manage or if we are able to move it
over to DOD more rapidly, to do it that way.
But those sorts of things would allow us to proceed as
rapidly as possible. Thank you.
Mr. Sedney. I would offer that there are a lot of things
that are happening now and have been happening over the past
year that are moving us very much in the right direction.
We do not have to start from today to do things right and
do things better. We already have started and already have done
things better. There are continuing changes and improvements
underway.
Senator McCaskill, you mentioned recruitment. Recruitment
for the Afghan National Police has been sharply improving over
the last several months due to a series of improvements
including a recruiting training command, a more focused effort
on recruitment and improved pay for the Afghan National Police.
The recruitment is also up because we recognize the issue
of leadership that everyone has mentioned. General McChrystal
in his campaign strategy has focused on a key measure to
improve performance and leadership in both the Afghan Nation
army and Afghan National Police and that is through intensive
partnering with the Afghan National Police by U.S. forces and
coalition forces, throughout all of Afghanistan.
Implementing that partnering is ongoing now. There are
already police units that are being partnered. Units such as
the Afghan national civil order police which had never been
partnered before is going to be partnered now by elements of a
special forces under ISAF.
That partnering will help provide a bridge for the
leadership.
Senator McCaskill. Is that the same thing as ANCOP?
Mr. Sedney. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. That is the new name for ANCOP?
Mr. Sedney. Afghan National Civil Order Police. The acronym
is ANCOP. I try to avoid acronyms.
Senator McCaskill. OK. I have never heard it called
anything other than ANCOP which, for the record, ANCOP is the
special police force that roams the country. They are not
assigned to a province. They are not assigned to a
jurisdiction. They are the elite police force. They were
designed to be the elite police force.
Mr. Sedney. Their performance has been very high. They have
also suffered from the highest attrition, attrition meaning
people who either leave before their contracts, attrition
meaning people who leave before their contracts are up and the
lowest retention meaning the fewest number of people who sign
on for a repeat contracts.
That is due for a number of reasons. One of them is high
operational tempo. Another is lack of leadership which is
mentoring and partnership. Another is because many of them are
recruited by higher paying private security firms to provide
private security services in Afghanistan which is a separate
program.
But let me go back to what is going right, Senator Kaufman.
On Sunday and Monday of this week, I was in Afghanistan with
General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrook for their review of
the concept drill, in other words an intensive look with the
Afghans and our civilian and military leadership on our
combined civil and military efforts in Afghanistan.
The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Atmar, and Minister
Mongol, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, both participated
in that. The Afghan police and the performance of the Afghan
police was a major subject of discussion during that.
Minister Atmar pointed out that not only had we trained
many police, as Assistant Secretary Johnson pointed out, there
are many police who are performing well. He also admitted there
are many police that are not performing well.
Whether it is a Newsweek article or another forum where you
focus on the problems, Minister Atmar asked us, and I am going
to comply with his request, to highlight that there are also
thousands, and in his words, tens of thousands of Afghan
National Police who are doing a good job, who are not corrupt,
who are being killed at the rate of 125 or 129 a month, and
they are staying on the job. They are not fleeing the job. Some
do but many more do not.
They are committed to their country, and they often do not
have the right resources, they do not have the right training,
whether it is ineffective sights, ineffective equipment,
whether they are using unarmored vehicles instead of armored
vehicles in areas where IEDs are the biggest killers of people.
So these are people on the Afghan side who are working hard
to defeat an enemy that has been growing in strength.
The message I took away, and I have spent several years
living and working in Afghanistan as well as visited there
about 10 times over the last year, is that General McChrystal's
strategy of blunting the rise and the improvement that the
Taliban had is succeeding.
The next step of course is to reverse that. Every step of
the way the Afghan National Police is central to that. So we
are building a better police force. We are training a better
police force.
The partnership is helping us to put in place a police
force that is going to perform better. We have a better story
today than when you Senator and you Senator were there in the
last several months and it will be better next month.
Will it be dramatically improved everyday, no. But it will
be significantly improved on a month to month basis. I feel
very highly confident of that.
In terms of the contract, the work that Assistant Secretary
Johnson and I have done over the last several weeks, we want to
make sure that we do not make any of those mistakes that you
referred to, Senator McCaskill, in terms of the contracting
process because more mistakes will lead to an even longer gap
before we have a permanent contract.
We do also need to find a way to bridge to a permanent
contract. I agree with your prediction that the most likely, we
both agree that the most likely outcome will be an extension. I
hope I did not say anything a lawyer will find problematic with
that.
Senator McCaskill. Just say I made you answer the question.
Mr. Sedney. Thank you, Senator.
But we have also communicated to the State Department new
requirements. I agree with Inspector General Klemstine that we
need to be clear about requirements. These new requirements
that will address the problems that were laid out by Mr.
Heddell on the areas that we need different kinds of
performance in the police contract and we are working now to
see how we can have that contract, how we can accomplish those
goals through a possible extension of existing contract.
There might be some other options but we will continue to
work through that. We expect to have a resolution within the
next 2 weeks. I hope even sooner in terms of that extension or
our other possibility.
But as we are doing that, we are continuing to train. We
are adding trainers for the police in other ways. The police
contract is not the only way we are training. We have brought
an additional coalition of military trainers. Other countries
have put in more trainers. There are more both third country
military trainers and third country police trainers that are
already in Afghanistan than there were before as part of an
effort through NATO and through our partner nations to increase
training.
For example, the Germans in the north who had been focusing
their efforts on deployed military are now transitioning to
trainers and a greater focus on training in the north and that
is happening in many other areas as well.
So while we focus, and I agree with you, Senator McCaskill,
in your criticisms of the process. We have made mistakes. We
are going to fix them. But there are many things that are going
right, Senator Kaufman. I would be happy to go on at greater
length.
I apologize for taking up your time.
Senator McCaskill. I am just self-conscious about getting
to Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you. Madam Chairman, and through you
to the witnesses.
I had a whole host of questions but in just listening I
wanted to shift gears and then I will come back to my original
line of questions. One of the things that I am just getting
through the conversation is that the contract transition and
the 5-month delay in awarding the contract quite frankly is
putting our troops at risk.
I am flabbergasted sometimes at the slow pace of government
at a time when we need quick reaction and quick action on
moving forward. So whatever tools and resources you need to get
the job done, I would encourage somebody in your respective
departments to start to get moving because my sense being in
the military and also recently visiting is that we have a
serious problem. We have to stop pointing the finger and going
back and forth and just get the job done.
With regard to who do we hold ultimately accountable, I am
a little confused still. I know we have a contract. I have been
reading. I understand it. I get it but my concern is now we are
extending a contract that has not worked. People who have
received $6 billion.
There has been very little training and now we are looking
to extend it because we do not have the ability to enter into
another contract because we used something that we felt would
get it done quicker when in fact it delayed us so we are more
time behind the eight ball.
But I am hopeful that when you do the new contract there is
going to be a way to hold the trainers responsible for
delivering what they said they were going to deliver because as
somebody who is just so fed up with overspending and over
budgeting, at what point do we hold contractors, people that we
hire to do a job, responsible for doing that job and getting
our money's worth?
That is something I would like to ultimately leave for just
someone to ultimately speak about.
I will start with you, Mr. Sedney. You did say in the
beginning you will need greater resources and you have not
received the trainers. You need more trainers.
I know in speaking to the appropriate authorities in
Afghanistan, the United States is the only country that has
provided the requested amount of trainers. The other countries
have not supplied the appropriate trainers.
Who in the food chain is responsible for trying to get the
other countries to provide the appropriate amount of trainers?
Mr. Sedney. Senator, first of all, let me say in response
to the first part of what you said. I agree with you entirely
and I can tell you I share your impatience and I can pledge you
my greatest efforts to make both the quickest and the most
effective response because sometimes speed works against
effectiveness.
On the issue of trainers that you raised, the U.S. forces,
the U.S. military has provided the requested trainers under the
NATO request because this is a NATO mission. We have a number
of countries that have responded well to the combined joint
statement of requirements----
Senator Brown. But they have not fulfilled their
obligation.
Mr. Sedney. There are a number of countries we continue to
work with and the overall number of unfilled spaces under the
NATO combined joint statement of requirements is in the several
hundreds, well over 400 when I checked this morning.
That certainly will be a major area of discussion with our
colleagues both at NATO and also in the upcoming NATO
ministerial in Estonia.
At the same time as we are looking for other countries to
step forward within the NATO context, we have also had a number
of discussions and am not going to name the countries for
reasons of the diplomatic confidentiality but a number of
countries which have not yet been involved in Afghanistan have
shown interest in contributing trainers.
We are working aggressively with them because they see the
challenge that instability and extremism in Afghanistan poses
to their own national security. So we are not being limited by
the past. We are actually looking into new and different areas,
and again I would be able to do that in a more confidential
setting because I do not want to put countries on the spot
while we are in the middle of diplomatic negotiations.
But I believe there are a number of areas of hope there. At
the same time I want to stress what I said in response to
Senator Kaufman, we are training police. The coalition and we,
the United States, are training police and moving forward. This
is an area where we are going to succeed.
Senator Brown. Thank you very much and I appreciate that.
And I know who is helping and who is not and I would encourage
the Administration to strongly encourage them to do what they
said they would do.
We all know about the $6 billion that has been spent and
fewer than 12 percent of the country's police are capable of
operating on their own.
We know about the lack of respect that the police get in
Afghanistan based on their corruption and lack of training,
etc. So considering all those problems, I guess I would defer
this question to the IGs. Considering all these problems which
have been apparent for a while who ultimately is responsible in
saying how do we not fall into this rut again.
Mr. Heddell. I will be glad to try, Senator Brown.
Two areas, one is simply the training of police officers
and doing it in the right way with the right trainers, with the
right curriculum. The second part of that is managing and
oversighting a contract worth billions of dollars.
In both categories, if we are going to do it and we are
going to do it obviously, we have to do it right. Under each of
those categories, there are things that we need to do.
I mean, under the management oversight of the contract, for
instance, we need to have oversight and management in-country
looking at the contracting officer representatives on the
ground in-country.
With regard to the contract itself, we have to have
performance measures. We have to specifically say what we
expect that contractor to do. Then we have to measure that
contractor's performance.
With regard to property, DynCorp spent millions and
millions of dollars on property and we did not do inventories.
We did not know what we had or what we did not have many times.
Senator Brown. Right. Well, there is no property
management. There is no accountability. There are no hand
receipts. There is nothing.
Mr. Heddell. That is correct.
Senator Brown. How does that happen?
Mr. Heddell. Because there were no managers on the ground.
Senator Brown. What are they getting paid for? Why is that?
When they are getting paid to do a job, there has got to be a
chain of command. There has got to be a natural flow chart.
Here is the boss. Here is the subordinate. Where is the break
down? I am missing it.
Mr. Heddell. I can tell you what happened.
Senator Brown. Where is the breakdown?
Mr. Johnson. As I mentioned in the statement that I made,
the oral statement, in adapting the procedures that we had to
working in a wartime environment, we developed what we thought
were effective compromises, sometimes in consultation with our
OIG colleagues, so that for example the contracting officers'
representatives' files were retained in Washington.
It was, therefore, a 24-hour delay, due to the shape of the
globe, before someone on the ground in Kabul would have access
to that material.
They always had access to the material 24 hours later but
it is not the same as being able to have the materials in the
front of you.
We did this because we were working in an environment where
we were seeking to manage our risks, having no more people on
the ground than we thought we had to. I think in retrospect,
having more, taking some risks in the hiring process and having
places doubled-billeted or triple-billeted going through the
clearance process would have made more sense.
I am anxious to come before you at some point, and the
Chairman call me down for having so many people on the ground
that I have lost the concept of materiality in auditing.
Senator McCaskill. I will not do that.
Mr. Johnson. I am aiming for it. But that is where we are
trying to head.
We did do some things in order to compensate for that by
making all of the payments for the contract provisional in
nature so that we can claw them back if they need to be and we
have when we found issues that need to be addressed.
As the Inspectors General pointed out, any delay in doing
that, though, represents potential for lost documents, for lost
memory, and reconciling that process over time is not nearly as
efficient and effective as doing it at the time payment is made
even though it does protect the government.
So we are moving as rapidly as we possibly can in the
direction of having more and more people on the ground.
Senator Brown. Thank you. I have run out of time, Madam
Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. Let me first ask about the 2006 audit.
Let me ask who did this before we started contracting this?
Special forces?
Mr. Johnson. When the effort was first made to train police
to do security sector reform, as it is called in diplo-speak,
in Afghanistan in the early part of 2002 there was a division
of labor among members of the G-18.
The United State took responsibility for the Afghan
national army for reasons which I think were intuitive to
everybody in the room.
The Germans who had a latent program that existed before
the Russian invasion and before the Marxist coup that took
place before that wanted to take the police responsibility on.
They did but their approach was a very long-term approach.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Mr. Johnson. And so we step in, the State Department did,
and began a very modest training program in order to try to get
people on the ground as quickly as possible.
But as you may or may not recall, the diplomatic theory at
the time was to have a relatively light foot print. We do not
have ISAF outside of Kabul. We were still operating only
Operation Enduring Freedom efforts outside of that.
This has grown over time as we have seen and this is one of
the issues that I think we need to take into account here. It
is not so much that people did not do what we wanted them to
do. It is that both our objectives and the situation on the
ground has evolved and sometimes in unexpected and marked ways
during this period of time.
Senator McCaskill. Let us just assume. We had this
requirement to train local police during a counterinsurgency in
Iraq. We now have the mission to train police during a
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
I do not think it is beyond anyone's imagination that if we
are fighting a counterinsurgency that that is going to be
something that is going to have to be a core competency of our
military as far as the eye can see.
Would anybody disagree with that? That training local
police in a counterinsurgency is something that should be a
core competency of our military for as far as the eye can see.
Mr. Sedney, would you disagree with that?
Mr. Sedney. I personally would not disagree with that. In
terms of just how we are going to allocate the division of
responsibility in the government for future counterinsurgencies
in terms of training police I believe that is still a matter
that we have not fully come to closure on but I take your point
and I would say I personally agree.
Senator McCaskill. I will tell you this. That is what I
would like to see come out of this hearing. In the volumes of
information that I have consumed on this, there is no question
that the trading back and forth, the fact that after 2006, you
had an audit report that said you needed in-country CORs, and
there were years that you maybe had one on a task force and
they were not really doing any on-site checking because of the
security risks.
I mean it is unacceptable that--you know, I think I have a
couple of documents that by the beginning of 2008, nearly 675
million was obligated without any evidence of an ICOR
functioning in Afghanistan. That comes directly out of the
report.
Prior to June 2009, there was only one in-country
contracting officer's representatives on the main ANP task
order. That is not going to work.
Anybody who is doing contract oversight will tell you that
the kind of presence in-country in this kind of environment is
woefully inadequate.
So if we are going to be operating in the counterinsurgency
as we do this local police training, it seems to me that it is
imperative that somebody step up and say this has got to be a
military COR competency and stop this, well, the State
Department was not doing it. Well, we got to get it back under
the military because the State Department contractors are not
paying attention to us. State cannot really get out in the
contingency because of the security risks.
I mean if you look at this back and forth over the last 4
or 5 years, you can say all you want to how many have been
trained.
But I think if we are honest about how many are currently
operating at an effectiveness level in the country of
Afghanistan, Americans have not gotten a good deal on their
investment.
So I am trying to get someone to come to the table and say
it is time that people at the very top of the State Department
and the very top of the State Department and General Petraeus
acknowledged that this needs to come to defense and it needs to
stay there.
Is it not true that there is a plan already in place to not
only--we are trying to transition it to defense but we cannot
get it done because it was not done right and there is already
planning going on on how to transition it back. Is that not
true?
Mr. Sedney. There certainly is discussion about what will
follow after a transition to Afghan security lead so I am aware
that there are discussions. I am not aware of a plan along the
lines that you discussed but I have to confess I will not be
able to speak for every plan in the Department of Defense. But
I personally am not aware of such a plan, Madam Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. I think there is a chance that we will
be doing police training in counterinsurgency operations in
other places besides Afghanistan. That is something clearly if
you understand the security threats around the world whether it
is Somalia, whether it is Yemen, this is something that is
going to be ongoing. It is my understanding that prior to the
State Department taking this on that this had been a special
forces function, the training, before it went to private
contractors.
Mr. Johnson. That is not my understanding. The special
forces were operating as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
They had many liaison relationships throughout the country as
part of that.
But the police training which began after hostilities were
concluded formally, if you will, was the responsibility first
of our partners and then we began taking on more and more of
that.
If I might say while I have the floor, I think we are going
to find that we need more than one solution to this problem
because there are going to be places in the world where a
defense-led effort will be both more appropriate and more
effective and acceptable, and there are going to be places in
the world where if only for reasons of acceptability from our
partners, having a civilian-led effort is going to be also
needed to be in this mix.
Senator McCaskill. My reference to special forces was
worldwide. It had been special forces prior to the State
Department. You are referring to Afghanistan. There was a time
that the State Department was not involved in this and it was
purely military that did training of local police under these
circumstances.
Mr. Johnson. My earliest recollection of this comes in our
initial effort to assist the training of the police force in
Haiti in the early 1990s and that was a State-Department led
effort. I understand that before that when there were needs
there may have been special forces training programs which bled
over to civilian police but it has not been the civilian lead
at least over the course of the last couple of dozen years.
Senator McCaskill. OK. Did you want to add something, Mr.
Sedney?
Mr. Sedney. No.
Senator McCaskill. No. OK. Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. You are doing great. Keep going.
Senator McCaskill. Why do you not take another round,
Senator Brown, and then I will probably come back for one more.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate it.
This has been very interesting. I wanted to just touch on
the civilian training verses military style paramilitary
training. Although the primary reason for change certainly is
sensible, the Afghan police are suffering inordinate casualties
in the field compared to their counterparts in the army based
on this new emphasis on military style training, I think
precipitated by the several debates between the State
Department and DOD.
The State Department and DOD inspectors' report that we
have been obviously cited the delay in changing the curriculum
to emphasize the paramilitary skills as the problem in the
current DOD-State Department management.
Did this delay stem from the resistance by the State
Department to buy into this change or resistence from DynCorp
or basic bureaucratic problems or for some other reason?
Mr. Johnson. There is no resistance to this on our part. We
will respond to the defined requirements. If it requires
additional or different trainers, that is what we will seek. If
it requires skills that are outside the scope of civilian
trainers, we will inform our military colleagues that we are
not in a position to provide that service.
Senator Brown. Do you wish to comment on that, sir?
Mr. Heddell. Yes. There is actually something I think to be
learned from your question, Senator Brown, in the sense that
the original contract required that there would be this joint
relationship between the Department of State and the Department
of Defense.
And that in order for the Department of Defense to make a
change, for instance, in the training curriculum, it was
required that DOD provide at least 120 days notice before that
change could be effective.
What we found when we interviewed staff from the State
Department, they indicated on average it took 6 months to
actually execute a change.
It brings us to the heart of the issue which is that the
Department of Defense needs in this particular case to be able
to talk directly to the contractor. That was really the heart
of the problem.
The bureaucracy was holding us back and the lack of
contracting management on the ground to effect these changes
and bring about a new curriculum and to do the things that DOD
needed to have done, the structure was not in place to do it.
So what we learned from that is that we should not have
this intermediary where DOD has to go through another entity to
make changes.
And we do not want to build a contract where it takes 120
days to make a rapid change when the insurgency is making rapid
changes every day that we have to adjust to.
Senator Brown. I think that is accurate. I just want to
shift gears just a minute. When we talk about the training, and
I asked these questions in Afghanistan, it has gone from 8
weeks to 6 weeks.
Do we really think that is adequate enough to instill
professionalism and ethics in that police force, into the
trainees, and is that enough time to actually filter out those
trainees to determine if they in fact have the ability to be
professional and ethical?
I think that is probably an IG question.
Mr. Heddell. I would be glad to give you my opinion on
that, Senator Brown. From the standpoint of basic training, no,
6 weeks, in my own opinion, is not enough.
Senator Brown. Especially since you do not have all the
trainers you need as we referenced.
Mr. Heddell. The fact of the matter is that 6 weeks or even
8 weeks or even 16 weeks is not enough for anyone if you do not
have some follow-up because, as I said earlier, it takes years,
not weeks, not months but years to develop a police officer
just to be at the acceptable level.
So I presume that the reason that it went from 8 weeks to 6
weeks is to get more police officers through the training.
But once they get through the training, they need
mentoring. They need advanced training. They need follow up.
There is so much more to it than simply putting through a 6- or
8-week course.
So I do not necessarily think that whether it is 6 or 8
weeks is right or wrong. I think what is important is that
there has to be a long term plan here for development.
Senator Brown. So are we asking for contractors to put too
much of an influence on the quantity of trainees versus actual
quality or ethical responsibilities and professionalism? Do you
think we should maybe go to a different standard of some kind?
Mr. Heddell. Well, I cannot answer the question. It is
probably more for the Department of Defense or Department of
State. But it would appear to me that the way we were doing it
was just not going to work.
Senator Brown. So saying that and referring it over, what
is the solution? How do we change from quantity to quality to
get the value for our dollars?
Mr. Sedney. We are currently working on addressing both and
we are very aware of the challenges that you laid out, Senator
Brown.
To address the specific question of the 6 weeks versus 8
weeks training, yes, we have transitioned to 6 weeks training
in order to be able to make maximum use of the police training
facilities and produce more police.
But those 6 weeks of training are better than the 8 weeks
before. There is not less contact hours. There are more contact
hours in those 6 weeks. It has gone from, we have shortened a
rather long lunch period to a shorter lunch period. The
training is longer days. One day off has now become a day of
training.
So the actual contact hours over 6 weeks is greater than
the 8 weeks.
Senator Brown. Right. I am aware of that.
Mr. Sedney. So it is not a lesser training.
However, I agree with Mr. Heddell. This is not a weeks or
months long process. It is a year's long process. The key here
is not just continued training but also modeling, and that is
where the intensive partnering that General McChrystal has put
in in both the army and the police is so important because in
order to instill those ethics that you talked about, the Afghan
trainees, the Afghan policemen have to see them in operation.
They have to see that they work.
In the past we would train people and put them out into a
corrupt society. No matter how well you train them, whether it
was 8 weeks, 6 weeks, 16 weeks or 60 weeks, if you just stuck
them out with no mentoring and training they were going to
become more corrupt.
We have realized that. Now we are working to change that.
We also have developed and are going to be putting more
emphasis on continued and repeat training, as Mr. Heddell
mentioned, because again you have to keep bringing people back
on.
Senator Brown. I am sorry. I do not mean to interrupt. I
understand that. We got fully briefed as to what it is.
I guess at least in my second question, so how much is it
going to cost? I mean what is the number that the American
people are ultimately going to be responsible for next year and
the year after and the year after? What type of dollars are we
talking about to once again to come up with?
Mr. Sedney. I do not know the exact figure for what we have
requested in the supplemental. I will be happy to get that up.
Senator Brown. Do you have a general idea if you do not
have an exact number? Do you have a general number, an
approximate number?
Mr. Sedney. I understand and my staff is always willing to
come up, is going to give me an exact number. I was going to
say about $6 billion.
Senator Brown. For a year?
Mr. Sedney. Yes, $6 billion for this year.
Senator Brown. Just to stand up a police force, it is going
to be $6 billion a year?
Mr. Sedney. The Afghan police and national army is together
about $11.6 billion in fiscal year 2011 request. That is the
Afghan National Police and army together.
Senator Brown. So $11.6 billion is to basically uplift the
police and army in Afghanistan.
Mr. Sedney. And continue to train them, pay them.
Senator Brown. Equip them. The whole nine yards.
Mr. Sedney. Right.
Senator Brown. I will save my remaining questions for
follow up. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. I have several questions I want to get
to so I will try to limit my editorial comments because I know
I am the biggest offender. If you all will try to help me by
keeping your answers brief.
I want to make sure I get a couple of documents in the
record. The first has to do with the State Department's ability
to oversee contractors. Without objection, if there is an
objection just let me know, I want to enter into the record the
contractor past performance evaluation document that deals with
the evaluation of Blackwater in Iraq.\1\
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\1\ The contractor past performance evaluation submitted by
Chairman McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 101.
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This is a dollar value on a contract of $1.2 billion. This
occurred after the killing of 17 Iraqi citizens in Nisor
Square. That is why it is important to remember the time frame
here, that this was around the problems of that.
When you read this document, the question is asked, would
you recommend the contractor be used again, the answer is yes.
It states that, this is the quote that is used in reports,
``incidents cause the program officer to lose confidence in
Blackwater's credibility and management but concludes that new
personnel have improved confidence in the contractor that, it
is expected that next past performance evaluation will be
substantially improved.''
I would like to place that in the record.
Senator Brown. No objection, Madam Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. The second thing I would like to place
in the record is the DCAA DynCorp audit. This audit is an audit
that came out in November of last year. As of last November,
these are some of the findings of the audit of DynCorp. Keep in
mind this is the contractor we are stuck with now. We are going
to have this contractor for the indefinite future since we are
going to a full and fair open competition which means it will
likely be at least a year from now before there would be a new
contract.
These are some of the findings. Inadequate controls to
ensure contract briefs contain adequate information for the
billing department to prepare current, accurate, and complete
those vouchers. Inadequate control to verify pay rates were
authorized and accurate. Failure to prepare adequate budgets
which may result in significant over or understatement of
proposed costs. Failure to notify the government upon awards of
subcontracts.
This is problematic from an auditing standpoint because
this is all the documentation that is necessary, all the
oversight that is necessary to make sure that they are not
walking away with our money and not performing the work.
So I want to make sure that we enter that audit into the
record.\2\
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\2\ The information about the audit submitted by Chairman McCaskill
appears in the Appendix on page 104.
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Tell me where the $80 billion is now, Mr. Johnson, that was
found in the audit. Has it been returned?
Mr. Johnson. It has not been returned. The monies have been
obligated against a task order and the reconciliation is
ongoing on that task order. As soon as that is completed and we
determine how much should be returned, we will do so
immediately.
Senator McCaskill. Could you respond to that, Mr. Heddell
or Ms. Klemstine? Is it true they were obligated? I thought you
found in your audit they were unobligated.
Mr. Heddell. What we found, Madam Chairman, is that the
Department of State improperly kept $80 million that had been
transferred from the Department of Defense even though the
funds had expired.
The money we are talking about was used specifically, was
supposed to be used for Afghan National Police training. It
came in three separate appropriations and each appropriation
had an estimated availability period. And, as of December 2009,
the Department of State was still holding $80 million, and the
availability period for that $80 million on the first one
expired, $56.8 million expired in September 2007, and $23.2
million expired in September 2008.
As of January of this year, that was our understanding.
Senator McCaskill. Do you disagree with that finding, Mr.
Johnson?
Mr. Johnson. I do not disagree that it would have expired
had it not been obligated but it has been obligated and has to
be reconciled against these billings so that we return the
proper amount.
Senator McCaskill. I assume you are saying it was obligated
during the audit period or it was obligated after the audit
period?
Mr. Johnson. It was obligated prior to the audit period.
What the Inspector General is referring to is that had it not
been against a task order which was during the period of time
the money was available to be spent, had it been fully
reconciled, any monies left over should and would have been
returned to the Treasury Department or to DOD depending on the
date at which it became available.
We are doing our best efforts to complete that process so
that we return exactly the right amount.
Senator McCaskill. Mr. Heddell.
Mr. Heddell. Madam Chairman, it was obligated but the money
had expired and it was not expended. The money, as far as we
know, has never been returned to the Treasury Department.
Senator McCaskill. So what you are saying is the obligation
makes no difference if the time period expires and it is not
expended.
Mr. Heddell. That is my understanding.
Senator McCaskill. I think that is something that I would
like to writing an answer with somebody's signature that you
all disagree with that because $80 million is a lot of money.
Mr. Johnson. I would be pleased to provide you with that.
Senator McCaskill. DCAA told the Subcommittee that the
State Department did not engage them to perform real-time
reviews. Why have you not used DCAA for this type of review?
And second, in the audit it was reported that the State
Department had canceled an audit. The contracting officer had
canceled an audit. I would like an explanation on both of
these, why DCAA is not being used for real-time reviews and
second why you would ever cancel an audit.
Mr. Johnson. We are using DCAA and we are very pleased with
their assistance to us.
Senator McCaskill. Great.
Mr. Johnson. We had a point of confusion between us and
them about the request that we hade made of them. We were
ongoing and worked on a request for a transfer of funds to pay
for this audit on two other task orders and those were ongoing.
And for reasons having to do with the way that payment was
processed, one of those requests under one of those task orders
was accidentally canceled. We were unaware of that. When we
became aware of it, we began re-engaging with DCAA on that
specific task order. Those discussions are ongoing. We intend
for them to come and work for us and we intend to pay them for
it.
Senator McCaskill. OK. Since we are going to have a State
Department-run contract on police training in Afghanistan for
the foreseeable future, are your in-country CORs getting out in
the field as we speak? Mr. Johnson, are they conducting regular
site visits to the training sites at this point in time?
Mr. Johnson. They are getting out and they are conducting
regular site visits. I do not think they are there yet because
the numbers are not up to what we want them to be conducting as
regular and frequent site visits as I think we want and I think
as our oversight colleagues would like but we fully intend to
remedy that.
Senator McCaskill. I would certainly like, I mean we will
follow up with some of these questions. We want to be notified
how many you have on the ground every quarter and we want to
know how many site visits are going on, how many of them are
regularly scheduled and how many of them are unannounced.
The unannounced site visits are crucial in a contract like
this. That is when you find people doing things I mean I hate
to bring back bad memories of another hearing. But when you
have craziness going on with the security force at an embassy
which also happened in Afghanistan, those unscheduled site
visits are incredibly important.
Mr. Johnson. In my checkered past I was a bank examiner.
Senator McCaskill. You know about showing up unannounced.
Mr. Johnson. Right.
Senator McCaskill. Let me turn it over to Senator Brown for
a few follow up questions.
Senator Brown. I just want to go on that line of
questioning, Madam Chairman, and then I will go back.
On the $80 million issue we were talking about, is there an
enforcement arm of any kind that says, hey, listen your time
has expired. You have the money. You have not used it. It is
time to come back to the Treasury Department.
Is there any mechanism that you have because I have to be
honest with you, it seems like it is political doublespeak in
terms of you know the money has not been used. It was back in
2007 and 2008. We are in 2010. And then you say, well, it was
not allocated before the audit. Well, if not, then when was it
allocated because it is 2010, and the time expired. Was there
an amendment of some sort that went into effect? Is there an
agreement with the appropriate authorities to extend it out to
another period of time to give you the authority to continue to
retain that?
Mr. Johnson. If I poorly communicated, I am sorry. My
understanding is the monies were obligated against an ongoing
activity. As soon as all the reconciliation of the billings
which took place during that time period, not billings which
will take place later----
Senator Brown. It has been what? Three years now. When does
the reconciliation take place?
Mr. Johnson. It is ongoing. We are running at about a 2-
year delay from conclusion of the task order.
Senator Brown. That is 2009, if we were in 2007. So it is
longer than that obviously. We are in 3 years now, right?
Mr. Johnson. I am not certain but I will work that time
line for you, yes, sir.
Senator Brown. I guess what I am trying to say is you know
I am a firm believer in contracts and dates. As it is the rule
of law, we have a date. We perform. We fulfill. If we do not,
it goes back.
There seems to be a slippery slope here that we are going
down in that you know we allocate money, taxpayer money, hard-
earned taxpayer money for certain purposes. It does not get
used. It should go back to be re-allocated, to be reused.
We could use it right now for unemployment insurance to
find another way to pay for that. I am hopeful, Madam Chairman,
that we can get a reasonable answer, like why was not the
reconciliation done right away, when are we going to have it
done, and when if at all and how much money is actually going
to be actually returned?
I would also like to have that in writing for us to review.
Do you have the ability, sir, to delegate the site visit
responsibilities to the military or any other entity to assist
you until you get up to speed, because I hear you? I
understand. I was there. I get it now. I see how big it is.
But if you are not up to speed and you cannot account, we
are giving billions of dollars to people, is there anything
that I can do, make a recommendation to the President or to the
Majority Leader, anybody who is dealing with this issue to give
you the tools and resources you need to either delegate or get
this job done quicker and more efficiently?
Mr. Johnson. In terms of some issues, for example,
inventories, we have worked with the military to assist us in
those. I think though that there is no substitute to have
contracting office representatives who know the contract, who
are trained to do this type of work there on the ground and
getting out to do those things. That is the aim that we have.
One of my kind colleagues pointed out to me that the monies
that were appropriated for fiscal year 2007, could have been
expended on things through September 2009. So we have a little
while where we need to make sure we paid all our bills before
we give the money back.
Senator Brown. OK. I would appreciate that in writing.
Madam Chairman, I forgot and I am wondering if you will
accept my modified opening statements for the record, if
possible.
Senator McCaskill. Your opening statement will be made part
of the record.
Do you have anything else?
Senator Brown. I do but I will allow you to get back to
your line.
Senator McCaskill. That is OK. Why do you not finish up
because I only have one or two more questions? See if there is
anything else you want to cover.
Senator Brown. Just some general questions. As you know,
the Afghan culture is largely tribal and locally based. I
wrestled with this when I was there when I was getting back.
Does it make sense to have a national police force that
basically the tribal leaders do not recognize, they do not
know. Some of the individual citizens do not even recognize the
uniforms. Does it make sense to have a one-size-fits-all
strategy in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sedney. The kind of security force that we should have
in Afghanistan is one that has been discussed and the question
that you raise is an excellent one, Senator Brown, and there
are people who have felt very strongly for all sides of a
question that has many answers.
There are certainly areas of Afghanistan where a national
police force, a uniformed police force, large cities. Kabul has
well in excess of 4 million people there now. For example other
major cities.
In some of the rural areas, Afghan justice is very much in
the hands of traditional justice systems.
One of the problems however is that over the years,
especially as the result of the occupation by the Soviets
during the civil war a lot of those traditional structures have
either been destroyed or been seized by small, powerful,
maligned actors who pervert the local systems so that they do
not work effectively.
So there are a number of activities that are going on
looking at restoring those local activities in a way that is
acceptable to the broad expanse of people while at the same
time building national police in areas where they are most able
to be effective.
The latest polling I saw on that was of rural people in
eastern Afghanistan where 38 percent of the people said they
preferred local gurkhas to national police. Fifty percent of
the people said they preferred national police to local
gurkhas.
So you have a fairly significant split but the people
thought very strongly on both ways.
It is a country in transition, and we are working on all
those areas. But I would say that in terms of the kind of order
that is required in the midst of an insurgency, the police have
played, continue to play a very important role.
In many ways, the acceptability of the police depends upon
their performance. You and Senator Kaufman just mentioned the
areas where there have been problems of the performance of the
police.
Minister Atmar has developed a program called the personal
asset inventory that is designed to combat corruption. He
believes that the increased prosecution of corrupt police
through efforts by the major crimes task force we put in place
are already having significant improvements in that area.
We support Minister Atmar in those efforts and look forward
to continued qualitative improvements in the police force.
Senator Brown. I have a whole host of questions but in the
interest of time I will narrow it down to the top three at this
point. They are not too difficult. Is that OK?
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely. We will take as many
questions as you have for the record and we will keep that open
for a week so that any additional questions we did not get to
today because I have the same problem.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. If we stayed here with all my questions,
it would not be good.
Senator Brown. Would you like to go?
Senator McCaskill. No. Go ahead. You finish up.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
I found it fascinating and so did our team. 500 meters from
our forward operating base there are poppy fields all over the
place. I know the reasons why. I get it.
But is there, and I guess it would be directed to either
one of you. Is there a plan? Are we going to eradicate? Are we
going to allow it? Are we going to transition? Are we going to
give them time lines? Listen, we know you are doing it, we know
why you are doing it. But listen you only have another year to
do it and then we are going to transition you into a different
crop. And if you do not, then we are going to just eradicate
it, because I have to be honest with you, seeing all those
poppies--flying in those choppers for 3 days everywhere we
went--in full bloom, I just thought about how that transitions
into lives in our country and young people and others using
drugs.
Any thoughts?
Mr. Johnson. You are correct in that we have had a rather
expensive and not very effective eradication program in the
past where we attempted to provide the ability of the central
government to have the eradication capability.
Seeing the expense involved and the relative inefficiency,
practically in the areas where you were where poppy growing is
indeed an agribusiness, Ambassador Holbrook has determined that
we should focus instead on seeking an alternative livelihood-
based approach where we find more and more opportunities for
these individuals to grow a legitimate crop.
I think that program is just barely getting underway. It
could have significant impact over the course of the next year
or two.
Outside of the area where you were the area of Afghanistan
is largely poppy free. In Helmand and in Kandahar, it is a
basic business though.
The other issue is we are focusing much more clearly on an
interdiction effort. The Drug Enforcement Administration's
deployment in Afghanistan is the largest on the planet. It is
working very hard in concert with the capabilities that we are
helping to develop, my colleagues and I, of the Afghans to have
their own counter narcotics police.
Those have been quite effective over the course of the last
several months. The seizures are up. But this very much remains
a work in progress.
Senator Brown. Well, it is interesting. The seizures are up
but then the growing is up too in certain regions.
Getting back to policy a little bit I have two more short
questions. How many companies are currently capable of
providing police services such as the ones in the contract? Who
are they and do they have a fair opportunity to compete for the
business?
And then how would re-bidding for the contract of Afghan
police forces impact America's ability to win and perform our
mission the next couple of months, and years, I should say?
Mr. Johnson. The current indefinite quantity, indefinite
delivery contract that we work under for the civilian police
program in the State Department has three participants.
DynCorp is one, Pacific Architects and Engineers is the
second one, now a division of Lockheed Martin, and the third is
Civilian Police International, that I think is a division of L-
3.
We have, just this week, put on the street a request for
proposals that we hope will provide us a much broader number of
companies who are willing and able to provide this service. We
anticipate the program will close in terms of the bids being
due I believe in June and we will have a period of time in the
summer to evaluate.
It is my goal, and I have been working on this for some
time, to broaden that contractor base because I think there are
more companies and more opportunities out there than we have
had in the past.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will defer to
you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Mr. Heddell and Ms. Klemstine, do you think that the State
Department has added enough in-country contracting
representatives with the acronym of ICOR, do you think they
have added enough to provide adequate oversight to this
contract?
Mr. Heddell. Madam Chairman, what I know from January of
this year I would say no. Unless something has occurred in the
last 30 days, I am not aware of it. But I would say no.
Senator McCaskill. Ms. Klemstine.
Ms. Klemstine. I would reiterate that answer being no.
However, I do think that there are plans in place to increase
the number. I think if they get up to that number they will
probably be in pretty good shape at that point.
Senator McCaskill. What is that number?
Ms. Klemstine. I believe it is 33.
Senator McCaskill. In-country?
Ms. Klemstine. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Is that correct, Mr. Johnson?
Mr. Johnson. There are not 33 presently in-country. There
are seven currently in-country. Our aim by September is to get
to 22.
Senator McCaskill. Is 22 enough, Ms. Klemstine?
Ms. Klemstine. I would have to go back and re-evaluate
that. I do not know that off the top of my head.
Senator McCaskill. I think if you are working toward 22, as
soon as we could possibly get the input of your agency that did
the audit whether or not you think that is an adequate number.
I would hate for us to have a goal of 22 and get there and
still know we do not have enough to adequately keep track of
what is happening with this contract.
It is my understanding the people you are hiring to do this
are in fact contractors?
Mr. Johnson. Madam Chairman, the individuals who have
traditionally done this are what are known as personal services
contractors.
I know I could read you from the FAR what that means and
how it is virtually the same as an employee but I also know
that it would not answer the mail for you.
We are in the process of using an opportunity we have under
the law of so called 3,161 employees. We plan to convert as
many of these individuals as possible to that employment status
so that they will be direct employees of U.S. Government.
I have the opportunity in Afghanistan but I do not have it
globally. I will be looking for other ways to provide direct
employees who are performing this service because I recognize
the demand that you made that we have them not just be the
functional equivalent of direct employees but actually be so.
Senator McCaskill. Mr. Sedney, if you all take it back,
does that mean you have the CORs ready and available to oversee
this contract?
I have spent an awful lot of time talking to people in
uniform about contracting representatives over the last 3
years. Would it be your plan to try to utilize the individual
personal service contracts that the State Department is going
to execute over the next 6 month to oversee this contract?
How do you envision the contract oversight working if you
all in fact enter into a contract as opposed to the State
Department?
Mr. Sedney. In terms of the complete and open competition
that we are looking for, the numbers of contracting
representatives will be part of that process. We are in the
process of determining what that will be now.
In terms of what the contracting officer representatives
that Mr. Johnson was talking about having in place, our people
out in the field have helped to contribute to the request for
additional contracting office representatives.
In terms of one of the requests that we are making of the
Department of State if we were to extend the current contractor
with DynCorp beyond that time, additional contracting office
representatives are one of the areas that we have agreed is
important and would like to see move forward.
I do not have the figures on the exact numbers that we
think would be necessary and we can get back to you on that.
Senator McCaskill. I think it is really essential. I will
be shocked. It will be like winning the lottery if we end up
with anybody other than DynCorp through the time period in
which the President has indicated that we are going to have
this increased presence.
In that case, if there is by a chance to transition, it
will be terribly counterproductive if you have CORs in-country
that are there and have made the commitment to be there for all
of a sudden then get pulled back because now we have switched
again.
It would be unconscionable to switch contractors and not
have a CORs force ready to go to oversee that contract because
we could go a year without anybody in-country essentially like
we have had on this contract.
For parts of the time there has been really almost nobody
home. So we have to make sure that happens and I am going to
depend on the two of you to communicate and figure out how to
work that out. And if you need help above you, you need to
speak up if there is going to be an issue because I do not want
the contracting representative COR to go down anytime while we
are making this kind of financial commitment for police
training in Afghanistan.
The last thing I wanted to cover on this subject matter is
that the GDP of Afghanistan is about $13 billion a year.
Sustaining what we are building, it is $11 billion in the
supplemental for the army and the police, sustaining it, not
building it but sustaining is $6 billion a year.
I think it is pretty obvious that Afghanistan is not going
to be able to afford to sustain what we are building for them.
They cannot take over half of their GDP just to do local police
and military.
So that means the American people have probably made some
kind of multi-billion-dollar commitment for many years forward.
Certainly not at the level that we are this year and next year
but certainly billions of dollars which means we are going to
need contractors over there for many years.
I just want to make sure that we get a sense of urgency
about getting it right as quickly as possible because this has
gone on way too long, way too long.
I want to ask a favor before we close the hearing. We will
have questions for the record for all of you. I want to as
always thank the auditors, the Inspector General's offices, for
your great work. It is brave. Your people went in-country and
the services of the auditing community are not valued enough in
our government and I hope you all know the deep respect for
that work.
I also want to thank both of you. This was not an easy
hearing. But this is hard stuff. It is a hard thing we are
trying to do and the contracting in this area has certainly not
been anything that any of us should be proud of.
We are going to have a hearing, Mr. Johnson, in a few
months on the contracting for counter narcotics in South
America.
We gave plenty of notice for documents. We have had
difficulty getting documents out of the State Department. We
were able to do this hearing without a lot of the documents we
requested from the State Department.
But it will be impossible for us to have the oversight
hearing that we need to have on these contracts in South
America without the cooperation of the State Department giving
us the documents.
So I would like to implore on the record today that you
spend some time--I think this is under your silo at the State
Department--if you would work to help us get the documents we
need for that important hearing.
I do not think we have ever had an oversight hearing on the
expensive contracts that we issue on counter narcotics in South
America and I would like it to be a full and complete hearing
and it will not be without your cooperation.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We have gathered
the documents. They are going through the clearance process
now. I will endeavor to push that as quickly as we can.
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.
I want to thank everyone for being here. I especially want
to thank Senator Brown for his participation.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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