[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-164]
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 5, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania DUNCAN HUNTER, California
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, May 5, 2010, Developments in Security and Stability in
Afghanistan.................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, May 5, 2010........................................... 43
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 2010
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Flournoy, Hon. Michele P., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 4
Paxton, Lt. Gen. John M., Jr., USMC, Director for Operations, J-
3, Joint Chiefs of Staff....................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Flournoy, Hon. Michele P., joint with Lt. Gen. John M.
Paxton, Jr................................................. 52
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 49
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 5, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Our committee meets today to
receive testimony on developments in security and stability in
the country of Afghanistan. Witnesses, old friends, and thank
you for coming back: The Honorable Michele Flournoy, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; Lieutenant General John
Paxton, the Director for Operations on the Joint Staff. And we
appreciate your coming back so soon with us.
Six months ago our President announced the results of a
comprehensive review of our policy in Afghanistan, which for
many years had essentially been nonexistent. During this
announcement he endorsed a new counterinsurgency [COIN]
strategy centered on increasing U.S. forces by 30,000 troops,
adding U.S. civilian experts, and focusing on protecting the
population of Afghanistan from the Taliban and their terrorist
allies. I endorsed this strategy then, and I do so now. As I
have said many times, while this new strategy cannot guarantee
success in Afghanistan, it is most likely to end with an
Afghanistan that can prevent the return of the Taliban and
their Al Qaeda terrorist allies.
Six months into the new policy, it is appropriate for
Congress to consider how things are going. About 21,000 of the
30,000 troops have arrived in that country, and many have been
involved in the recent successful military operation around
Marja. Others will soon begin restoring security in Kandahar,
an operation that is likely to be crucial to our overall
success in that country.
We have seen other clear signs of success in our fight
against terrorists. The President's new strategy helped lead to
the capture of the Taliban's second in command, the former
Taliban finance minister, and two so-called shadow governors of
Afghan provinces, the most significant captures of Afghan
Taliban leaders since the start of the war in Afghanistan.
Now, while I am pleased with the recent successes in
Afghanistan, I anticipate others, many concerns remain.
Although we successfully cleared Marja, the Taliban still
appears to be able to infiltrate the town and threaten and kill
those who cooperate with American and Afghan security forces.
This may not be unanticipated. It takes time to build the
confidence of a local population. But I worry that some of this
may point to the weakness of the local government which cannot
easily deliver the services and cannot deliver the governance
needed to help convince the residents of Marja to join the
right side.
Now, while we have increased forces in Afghanistan, our
allies have also begun to send additional troops. To date, they
have added about 50 percent of the 9,000 new troops they
pledged after President Obama's December speech. But serious
concerns remain about our ability to train the Afghan security
forces, who will have to assume the burden of providing
security and combating terrorism in Afghanistan without more
international trainers. I am pleased that Secretary Gates has
decided to send additional U.S. military personnel to fill this
gap, but this is a short-term solution and is not a long-term
fix.
This concern relates to another. In a recent meeting, NATO
[the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] endorsed a process to
transition the lead force security to, in some districts, from
U.S. and allied troops to Afghan National Security Forces
[ANSF]. I think all of us would like to know more about this
process as well as its implications.
What progress do we have to see in a district before we can
transition to Afghan lead? And what does this mean for
international troops in that district? Are we talking about
progress among the Afghan security forces, or must the district
also need a competent and honest government?
Finally, a quick word of congratulations and one of
caution. The Department of Defense [DOD] recently delivered a
very good and on-time report on progress toward security and
stability in Afghanistan. Thank you for that. Unfortunately, a
similar, somewhat higher-level metrics report filed by the
National Security Council [NSC] was very disappointing. It is
my hope that future reports more closely resemble the 1230
report and provide real information. Congress cannot judge
progress from glorified press releases.
Again, thank you for coming before us today. I suspect this
will not be the last hearing on Afghanistan this committee will
hold this year. I appreciate you working with us to ensure that
Congress can conduct its constitutional and appropriate
oversight activities. We are very pleased with your work and
very pleased with your appearance.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. And now for my good friend, the ranking
member, the gentleman from California, Buck McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this very important hearing on Afghanistan.
I would also like to welcome back Under Secretary of
Defense Michele Flournoy and Lieutenant General John Paxton. I
look forward to your testimonies.
We are a nation at war. The attempted terrorist attack in
New York City's Times Square serves as the most recent reminder
that we face dangerous enemies who threaten the safety and
security of our country. The extraordinary men and women of our
military and their families need no reminding of this threat.
They know all too well the sacrifices and dedication it takes
to keep this fight off our shores.
A lot has happened since the President stood before the
American people and made the case for his Afghanistan-Pakistan
strategy. Over half of the 30,000 forces authorized by the
President have arrived in country and are conducting operations
in southern Afghanistan. They are operating with some
constraints, both political and operational, and this is where
I would like to focus the remainder of my comments and
questions.
In my view, this body, no matter on which side of the aisle
you reside, and this committee in particular, has the moral
responsibility to ensure that this war is not fought with a
minimalist mindset or with an eye toward the Washington
political clock.
Nearly 18 months ago, Admiral Mike Mullen told this
committee, and I quote, ``In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In
Iraq, we do what we must.''
When it comes to resourcing our efforts in Afghanistan, I
remain concerned that we are not doing everything that we must
in order to ensure that General McChrystal and his commanders
on the battlefield have the time, space, and resources they
need to succeed.
Let me be clear. I have the utmost confidence that General
McChrystal and his troops will get the job done. My concern is
that the minimalist approach being advocated from some in
Washington raises the risk and increases casualties. The 30,000
troop cap put in place by this Administration is sending the
wrong signal to our commanders and forcing military planners to
make difficult trade-off decisions between combat troops and
key enablers. I am particularly concerned that we are
underresourcing force protection capabilities.
It is my understanding that there continues to be a serious
indirect fire threat to U.S. and coalition forward-operating
bases [FOBs] in Afghanistan, yet the current force protection
systems that protect FOBs in Iraq are not deployed to protect
FOBs in Afghanistan. This is disconcerting, especially given
the fact that we have evidence that such capabilities have
saved hundreds of lives in Iraq.
Today I would like our witnesses to explain what
modifications have been made to the original Joint Urgent
Operational Need [JUON] for sense, warn, and response
capability in Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF] and why these
changes were made. Why are we addressing this particular force
protection shortfall differently in Afghanistan than in Iraq?
Specifically, why are we deploying contractors instead of
military personnel? It is my understanding that if we had used
military personnel like we did in Iraq, this capability would
already be over in Afghanistan protecting lives.
While I have focused on the impact of the troop cap on the
fielding of certain key enablers, this cap becomes more
problematic when you consider that some of our NATO allies are
not meeting their commitments, and others will be withdrawing
their forces from southern Afghanistan.
Further, as Admiral Mullen's comments suggest, there was a
time when many thought of the two wars as a struggle for
resources resulting in the haves and have-nots. Iraq was the
haves, and Afghanistan was the have-nots. My suspicion is that
the mentality of the have-nots may be impacting how commanders
are employing the resources that they do have in Afghanistan.
For example, in Iraq, there was a capability called Task Force
ODIN--Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize. This task force
was responsible for killing or capturing over 3,000 insurgents
as they were trying to put in IEDs, basically turning the IED
emplacer into a suicide mission.
In Afghanistan, they are standing up a similar Task Force
ODIN capability; however, it is my understanding that this
capability is being used differently than it was in Iraq.
Instead of being used to specifically go after IED emplacers,
it is being incorporated into the big picture ISR requirement.
I am unclear if this is a tactical decision or the result of
the signaling from Washington to operate under the ceilings you
have been given.
Lastly, I have raised concerns that the emphasis in our
strategy appears to be on ending the conflict rather than
winning. I wish the President would use words like ``victory''
rather than ``transition'' and ``redeployment.''
This morning I hope to get a better understanding on what
transition actually means. How do you explain the transition to
the Afghans, to the enemy, and to our forces on the ground?
Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included
for the record where I address other concerns and questions.
The Chairman. Certainly. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Secretary Flournoy, please.
STATEMENTS OF MICHELE P. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Flournoy. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon,
distinguished members of the committee, it is good to see you
all again. Thank you for inviting us here to testify on our
ongoing efforts in Afghanistan.
As you know, the Administration's core goal in the region
is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and ensure the
elimination of Al Qaeda safe havens. A critical component of
our strategy is a stable Afghanistan with the governance and
capacity to ensure that Afghanistan can no longer be a safe
haven for Al Qaeda and insurgents.
The U.S. and Afghanistan also have shared interests that
extend far beyond combating violent extremism, and we are
working to develop an enduring partnership that will serve both
our nations for many years to come.
When I last testified before you on Afghanistan, we faced a
pretty bleak situation. Early coalition gains had eroded, the
Taliban was reascendant, and Afghan confidence in the coalition
was in decline. President Obama ordered an immediate strategy
review when he came into office and added 38,000 troops in the
spring of 2009. After General McChrystal's assessment last
summer and further review, the President decided to deploy an
additional 30,000 troops in December of last year. Today over
half of these forces have already deployed, and almost all of
them will be in place by the end of August. More than 9,000
international troops have also been pledged. ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] is now focused on
protecting the Afghan population and partnering with the Afghan
National Security Forces [ANSF] to build their capacity to
conduct and lead security operations.
The civilian surge is also moving forward. We now have
three times as many U.S. Government civilians in Kabul as we
had a year ago and over four times as many civilians outside of
Kabul.
The evidence suggests that our shift in approach is
beginning to produce results. The insurgency is losing
momentum. And though real challenges and risks remain, we see a
number of positive trends. Let me highlight a few.
As you know, we are executing our strategy in close
cooperation with the Afghan Government, with our coalition
allies and other partners in the region, particularly Pakistan.
Our consultations with partners have led to a much greater
sense of unity of effort and a common strategy. Also, changes
in coalition tactics have substantially reduced the percentage
of Afghan civilian casualties caused by coalition actions to
about 20 percent. This has, in turn, produced significant
positive shifts in Afghan attitudes towards both ISAF and
Afghan forces.
Building the capacity of the Afghan National Security
Forces remains a significant challenge, but there are signs of
progress. Currently the Afghan National Army [ANA] strength is
well above our April target, and the Afghan National Police
[ANP] are well on their way to achieving their growth goals for
this fiscal year.
That said, we continue to face challenges associated with
recruiting, training, retention, and attrition in the ANSF,
particularly the police. ISAF has intensified its partnering
with the ANSF at all levels, from the ministry down to local
units, but shortages of trainers and mentors persist. The
Afghan Government has undertaken a number of initiatives to
address these issues, including raising the salaries of ANSF,
equalizing pay disparities between the army and police,
improving the quality of life and training for police, and
beginning to address corruption. There is, however, much more
work to be done to develop commensurate rule-of-law structures.
More broadly, our emphasis on using development assistance
to support sustainable governance similarly appears to be
paying off. In cleared areas such as the Arghandab Valley in
Regional Command South [RC-South], the conditions for
implementing governance and development programs at the
district level are being created, and we are seeing
international and Afghan actors, both military and civilian,
working together to effectively empower and legitimize the
Afghan Government at the local level.
Despite challenges like corruption, polls suggest that a
majority of Afghans, about 59 percent, believe their government
is headed in the right direction. We have also seen some
positive steps taken by the Karzai government at the national
level. For instance, President Karzai recently issued interim
guidance for the execution of reintegration programs. He will
issue final guidance after the Consultative Peace Jirga later
this month, and we expect to be able to support the Afghan
Reintegration Program Authority by releasing funds authorized
by this committee and the Congress in the fiscal year 2010 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act].
President Karzai and members of his cabinet, as you know,
will be visiting Washington next week and will highlight the
continuing support among Afghans for our involvement there and
the Afghan appreciation for the sacrifices being made by U.S.
troops and civilians. During President Karzai's visit we also
expect to discuss the nature of our long-term strategic
partnership between the U.S. and Afghanistan, including longer-
term economic development, security cooperation, and
cooperation in areas such as law enforcement, judicial reform,
and educational programs.
As you know, our military operations in Helmand continue,
and we are also engaged in planning and shaping efforts for
future efforts in Kandahar. I will leave the specifics of that
to Lieutenant General Paxton, but I do want to emphasize that
for ISAF and for our Afghan partners, the Helmand operation was
our first large-scale effort to fundamentally change how we are
doing business together. In Helmand, protecting the population
has been our top priority along with ensuring that our military
operations pave the way for Afghan-led governance and
development activities.
Preparation for the Helmand operation included
extraordinary levels of civil-military planning and engagement
with Afghan partners at every level, and we feel that the
collaborative operational planning process was critical to
giving Afghans a sense of ownership and investment in the
success of our joint efforts.
I don't want to suggest that achieving success in
Afghanistan will be simple or easy. Far from it. Kandahar, for
example, will present challenges that are fundamentally
different from those that we have recently encountered in
Helmand. Inevitably we will face challenges, possibly setbacks,
even as we achieve successes. We need to recognize that things
may even get harder before they get better. We are challenging
our adversaries in new ways, and the insurgents are intelligent
and adaptable. They will find new ways to respond. And to
maintain our momentum, we will need to continuously refine and
adapt our own tactics. But at this point I am cautiously
optimistic. I believe that we are developing the conditions
that are necessary, though not yet sufficient, for success.
We finally--and I would argue for the first time--we
finally have the right mission, the right strategy, the right
leadership team in place, and we have marshaled both the
international and Afghan resources, civilian and military, to
support this mission. Afghanistan is our number one priority.
General McChrystal knows that he can ask for what he needs. The
President has given the Secretary of Defense the flexibility to
provide for additional forces, particularly for force
protection as needed.
As we move forward, we will continue to refine our
approach, and I believe we will continue to make progress.
I want to thank this committee for the support you have
provided to our troops and to this mission thus far. I would
urge you to continue that support in considering our current
budget requests that are before you. And I know that General
Paxton will address operational matters in greater detail, and
we look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and
General Paxton can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]
The Chairman. General Paxton.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC,
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J-3, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Paxton. Good morning, Chairman Skelton, Ranking
Member McKeon and distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you again for your time today.
This morning I would like to briefly provide an overview of
military ops [operations] in Afghanistan. As Secretary Flournoy
pointed out, we are starting to see conditions that we believe
are necessary for success in Afghanistan. Among the most
important of these conditions is having the right leadership
and strategy in place.
In 2009, after assuming command of ISAF, General McChrystal
conducted an assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. He
developed a campaign plan that was designed to provide a secure
environment that would enable an improved governance and
development within Afghanistan. At the heart of that campaign
plan are four requirements: to protect the Afghan people, to
enable Afghan security forces, to neutralize malign influences,
and to support the extension of governance. General McChrystal
has gone to great lengths to ensure that all of our operations
in Afghanistan are directly tied to achieving these aims.
The central tenet of our campaign strategy is to protect
the populace. We are fulfilling this tenet by prioritizing our
efforts to provide security and to extend governance in high-
density population areas where the insurgent groups currently
operate, and by reducing civilian casualties. The reduction of
civilian casualties is another key component of our efforts to
protect the people in Afghanistan. General McChrystal has
repeatedly emphasized this point at every opportunity. In fact,
our own force protection is closely related to gaining the
respect and support of the Afghan people.
IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] remain our number one
killer in Afghanistan, accounting for 60 percent of our total
casualties. In some areas over 80 percent of our IED
discoveries have been a direct result of tips from local
nationals. We are convinced these tips are a result of the
relationships that we are building on a daily basis with the
local population and the protection that we are providing.
Clearly, the support of the people of Afghanistan is essential
and relates directly to our own safety.
Regional Command-South is currently where the main effort
of operations is in Afghanistan. We are expanding security
zones, enhancing freedom of movement, and increasing the
confidence of our Afghan National Security Forces and partners
by the growth of our embedded partnering concept.
The real prize in the south is the key city of Kandahar and
its environs. Kandahar City is of huge importance nationally
and is the capital of the south. It has the rich culture and
history, and is the key economic and trading hub, and is of
great importance to the Taliban movement, which originated
right in Kandahar. The insurgents have a degree of freedom, as
recent suicide bombings have demonstrated, and the local police
lack sufficient forces to prevent insurgent activity, while
government also lacks the capacity, credibility, and resources
to operate effectively. The people of Kandahar are caught in
the middle of this confrontation, and they demand better
security, economic development, and a government that is in
touch with and responsive to their needs.
Our operation in Kandahar is named Hamkari, which in Dari
means cooperation. It has been planned and will be conducted
with our Afghan partners in the lead for operations. The focus
of Hamkari is on providing Kandahar with credible and effective
governance that gives the population hope for the future. More
effective government will deliver security, basic services,
development, and employment. If these ends are achieved, the
people of Kandahar will reject the insurgency and support the
government.
The plans for Hamkari were approved by the President of
Afghanistan on 4 April when he visited the city. In time it
will deliver the security that the people of Kandahar desire
and will drive the insurgents from the city and the outlying
districts by steadily restricting their freedom to operate. A
more capable, representative and responsive government will be
able to bring the economic development and rule of law that the
area so badly needs.
Hamkari is not about highly kinetic military operations. It
is about applying the combined resources of the Afghan National
Army, the Afghan National Police, and ISAF in support of the
governor to improve security both in the city and in the
populated environs. Hamkari will bring the government and the
people closer together to make for a better future for
Kandahar.
Our recent clearing operations by the Afghan National
Security Forces, the Marines, and the British in Marja and Nad
Ali, Operation Moshtarak, were, in fact, shaping operations for
this upcoming event and the operations in and around Kandahar.
There are several significant differences between Hamkari
and the Operation Moshtarak in Marja. For a start, the physical
size and the size of the population are much greater in
Kandahar than they were in Marja. In Marja and Nad Ali, ISAF
forces relied heavily on kinetic operations to clear the
insurgents from the populated area. In Kandahar, as General
McChrystal has recently indicated, and I quote, there won't be
a D-Day that is climactic. Instead there will be a rising tide
of security for the local population.
Our current assessment is the positive trends in a number
of areas such as ANSF growth and improved security, governance,
and development in central Helmand are a result of recent
operations and indicate that our campaign is on track and
moving in the right direction. Previously declining security
trends in some areas of the country have been arrested, while
trends elsewhere have been starting to advance in a positive
direction. Current trends remain tenuous until more permanent
and effective governance is established in the areas being
secured. Enduring stability is dependent on Government of
Afghanistan's ability to deliver credible local governance and
essential services and to expand economic opportunities for its
people.
Real progress will be confirmed only when the Afghan people
believe that lasting security and stability has been
established in their areas, and this will take time. People's
perceptions typically change more slowly and lag behind many of
the actions that are actually improving the conditions on the
ground.
As I conclude my remarks, I would, as did Secretary
Flournoy, caution everyone that in spite of recent successes in
central Helmand, we shouldn't underestimate the challenges that
lie before us or that underplay the need for resolve in the
days ahead because we continue to fight an intelligent and
adaptable enemy.
I thank you for your time this morning, and, more
importantly, I thank you for your continued support of our
troops, their families and our mission. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of General Paxton and
Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much and again we appreciate
your being with us and your excellent assessment.
Both of you, come with me in your mind's eye, my hometown
of Lexington, and early in the morning go to a local coffee
shop, and there are seven or eight of my gentlemen friends
sitting around drinking coffee and talking about football games
and the baseball games that are coming up, and I introduce you.
Most of them are veterans of Vietnam or Korea. And one of them
turns to you and says, are we achieving success in Afghanistan?
Another one turns to you and says, when do we declare victory
in Afghanistan? And I step back, and I let you answer the
questions.
Madam Secretary, two questions.
Secretary Flournoy. Chairman Skelton, I believe we are
achieving success. We are on the right road for the first time
in a long time in Afghanistan. So that is the assessment of
General McChrystal that we hear weekly in our conversations
with him. It is the assessment of our U.S. Government team on
the ground.
Are we done yet? Absolutely not. Are there more challenges
to be dealt with? Yes. But we are on the right path, and things
are starting to move in the right direction.
In terms of how we define victory, I think that victory is
a----
The Chairman. I didn't say define it. The question was----
Secretary Flournoy. I am sorry, when is victory.
The Chairman. My friend didn't ask you to define it. He
asked are we achieving it?
Secretary Flournoy. I think when is victory is based on
achieving certain conditions, and that, to me, is making sure
that Afghanistan, the Government of Afghanistan, has the
capacity to exert its sovereignty over its territory, to deny
Al Qaeda and its associates safe haven in the country, and to
maintain stability so that it can continue to develop on the
way forward. That is the core--that relates to our core goal
that we have defined for ourselves in this mission.
The Chairman. General, two questions.
General Paxton. Sir, in terms of success, I, too, believe
that we are achieving success on the ground. The definition of
success--well, rather than the definition, the indicators of
success, it is true that the levels of violence are up right
now in some areas, both the attacks have been up and the IEDs
in particular are up. But as I noted earlier, what we are
seeing is in some cases up to 80 percent of the local
population letting us know where the IEDs [improvised explosive
devices] are, and that contributed to a reduction in the number
of casualties and increased operational efficiency in
Moshtarak, in Nad Ali and in Marja. And it is our expectation
that as we have better partnering, more partnering, more
Afghans in the lead in the planning and the execution, that we
will see those trends continue as we move into Kandahar.
In terms of victory, I believe that the indicators for
victory are--there is a lag between the execution and the
indication, and it is indeed very dependent on the
demonstration of both capacity and credibility of the Afghan
people, the security forces and the governance to actually lead
and provide security and provide opportunities for the people.
But the more that the polls indicate, as they currently do,
that they believe in the Afghan National Security Forces, and
they believe in ISAF, and that they believe our current
operations are generating the potential for a better life for
them, then we are on the right road, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my opening comments I stated that Admiral Mullen told
this committee, in Afghanistan we do what we can, in Iraq we do
what we must, 18 months ago. Actually that statement was made
December of 2007, so I want to correct that for the record.
As I stated earlier, I am concerned that the 30,000 troop
cap for Afghanistan forcing difficult decisions to be made when
it comes to finding certain key enablers, including force
protection measures for our forward-operating bases. Do we have
a troop cap in Afghanistan?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would tell you we do not have a
troop cap; 30,000 is the number of forces the President has
approved. It is not a cap per se.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. That is based on the assessment
on the ground, and the assessment is always subject to review
both by General McChrystal and back here in Washington. And the
30K that people commonly refer to is just one component, sir,
because we have an additional 9- to 10,000 of NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces, and then we have what is
now en route to 134 Afghan National Army [ANA] and up to 170-
some Afghan National Police [ANP]. So you have to look at the
composite mix of all of those security forces, and we are
trying to strike the right balance between U.S., coalition
force and local/national, sir.
Mr. McKeon. So you feel there is no cap, and General
McChrystal can call on all the resources he felt he needed?
General Paxton. Indeed he has, sir. He has come back to ask
for more and ask for different, and it is a constant series of
assessments that I personally get involved with on a weekly
basis to take a look at the flow of forces and what should go
next and what should go in addition to.
Mr. McKeon. Let me talk a little bit about the enablers in
Iraq versus Afghanistan. Can you answer the following: Are we
addressing force protection on our FOBs [forward operating
bases] differently in Afghanistan than Iraq? And if yes, why
are we deploying contractors instead of military personnel?
General Paxton. Sir, our analysis and assessment of force
protection is no different regardless of the theater. And you
strike the balance between the threat of direct fire, indirect
fire, aviation missile, and you take a look about the
appropriate indications and warnings you would need to identify
where that threat would come from.
I would tell you that as we look to increase our footprint
and our boots-on-the-ground presence in Afghanistan, we also
look to bring in all what we commonly call the enablers that
you need to have to provide that force protection. So
additional military police, additional combat engineers,
additional route clearance, and part and parcel of that package
thanks to the good efforts of this committee and the funding
has been our elevated line of sight, which is our persistent
ground surveillance, some of it on camera and on elevating
telescopic poles from the vehicles, some of it tethered
balloons, some of it manned, some of it unmanned. So all of our
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] Task Force
capabilities indeed provide us the eyes and ears that we need
to sense the environs there.
And if you look at the source of the fires and the
casualties, the indirect fire in Afghanistan is not what it was
in Iraq. It is the IEDs that is the largest component first,
and then the small-arms fire and things like rocket-propelled
grenades second. So it is not the indirect fire. But the
assessment process in Iraq and Afghanistan are identical, sir.
Mr. McKeon. General, why are we not employing Task Force
ODIN [Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize] in Afghanistan the
same way we did in Iraq? Or are you saying we did? When I look
at the breakdown of ISR for Army direct support assets alone,
specifically Hunter, Shadow and the ERMP [Extended Range Multi-
Purpose UAVs] in Iraq, they have approximately 80 UAVs
[unmanned aerial vehicles] in Iraq; they have about 50 in
Afghanistan.
General Paxton. Again, sir, I think the capabilities that
we bring and the way that we employ the capabilities are the
same in Afghanistan as they are in Iraq. We have our ISR Task
Force here, which is pushing all those assets forward, again
manned and unmanned. We have our Task Force Paladin, which is
like Task Force Troy, which is our IED over there, and we are
looking to get both full-motion video and then manned and
unmanned aerial vehicles up there so that we can detect
movement of the enemy and movement of perhaps sympathetic local
nationals that may be either scouting for them or putting in
IEDs. So I think our capability is there.
And as I mentioned a minute ago, some of this is just the
lag. As we increase our footprint on the ground, then we are
surging with them and bringing behind extra eyes and ears that
will do the exact same things in Afghanistan that ODIN did in
Iraq.
Mr. McKeon. Do we have more of these UAVs currently in Iraq
than in Afghanistan?
General Paxton. If I could take that for the record and get
back with you, sir, because we are drawing down, obviously, in
Iraq. We are trying to keep a sufficient amount there to cover
what will become our six Advise and Assist Brigades that stay
behind. And there is a difference in the geometry of the
battlefield.
Some folks would believe that as you draw down the boots on
the ground, you can draw down all the extra enablers, and that
may not be the case. I think, as General Odierno and General
Petraeus have articulated, that you still need extra eyes and
ears out there because you don't have the physical presence on
the ground. So we are trying to strike the balance between how
quickly we can draw down in Iraq and how much we have built up
in Afghanistan. Some of it is transitional forces from one
theater to the other. In other cases, we need them in both. So
we are procuring more, as I said, thanks to the efforts of the
committee here, to go out and buy more full-motion video and
Electro Optical and IR [Infrared] [EO/IR] and different things
like that, sir.
Mr. McKeon. It just seems to me in Iraq, where we have
pulled the troops out of the cities, and there are more in
reserve positions--right now we are in Afghanistan, we are on
the offense. It seemed like to me, now--I am not a military
expert such as General Petraeus, General McChrystal, yourself,
but I would like to see those numbers because it seems to me
that more of those enablers, in my humble opinion, should be
where we are on the offense and where we have more troops
actually in the line of fire right now.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. And I take that for the record,
certainly get you the numbers, sir, and then the actual
discussion of how many and where they go we could certainly do
in closed session if you would like to do that, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Flournoy and
General Paxton. Thank you so much for being here and providing
your thoughts on security and stability of Afghanistan.
A few days ago it was announced that the United States
would be sending an additional 850 soldiers and marines to
train the local security forces in Afghanistan for
approximately 90 to 120 days. These trainers are seen as a
stopgap, yet there is still a shortage of trainers conducting
this critical mission.
If the way ahead in Afghanistan is to have capable local
security forces, what is needed to fill this critical shortage
of trainers? I think this is one of the big problems that we
have. And how are our allies contributing to fill these
critical shortages? And how will this shortage of trainers
affect the handover to local forces? Maybe you can enlighten us
a little bit on that.
Secretary Flournoy. I think the institutional trainers for
the Afghan National Security Forces, and then having mentoring
teams, what we call OMLTs [Operational Mentor and Liaison
Teams], for the ANA and POMLTs [Police Operational Mentor and
Liaison Teams] for the ANP out in the field to continue that
training and leadership development as they actually operate,
that really is the sort of long pole in the tent of our future
success. This is absolutely critical to building capacity.
We have--as we seek to grow the ANSF [Afghan National
Security Forces] and improve its quality, the requirements for
those training, that training capacity has gone up. We have
been pushing our allies to step up with us to meet those new
requirements, and many of them are doing so. It remains a work
in progress. We have not--we have made progress towards that
goal. General Paxton may have some of the specific numbers. But
we are not all the way there yet.
The deployment of U.S. forces as a bridge is simply to try
to meet some of the near-term requirements as we continue to
recruit our NATO allies to step up with additional trainers,
but we don't want to lose time, so we wanted to go ahead and
plug the near-term gap, get General Caldwell, who is the head
of NTM-A [NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan] and CSTC-A
[Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan], some
additional resources to continue the momentum in these very
important efforts.
I don't know if you want to add any comments, General.
General Paxton. Thank you, ma'am.
Yes, sir. Obviously the training of the police and the
Afghan National Army are critical functions--not just critical
enablers, but critical functions--that we have to accomplish.
So General Caldwell is over there with a NATO training mission,
formerly CSTC-A, and we have sent additional U.S. forces over
to assist him, almost two brigade combat teams' worth, to do
training for the army and the police.
NATO has contributions. They have had almost 3- to 4,000
more since the President's announcement in December. But we
would like to get additional NATO contributions there, and if
some of the NATO members perhaps relook at their combat
footprint, we are looking to see if they can change those into
trainers and enablers.
So what we have done and what your comment reflects, sir,
is the fact that in the short term we still have a pressing
need for trainers, and we are waiting for long term solutions.
So we have sent an Army battalion and three increments of
Marines over there to fill that gap in the short term, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. I know that sometime back we had a high ratio of
AWOLs [Absent Without Leave]. Has that gone down some? Are we
still having those same problems we had before where they just
wouldn't come in?
General Paxton. Sir, there has been a marked change since
December in terms of both their absenteeism, which has gone
down, and then their reenlistment and retention rate, which has
gone up. So it is not only in the short term in terms of
showing up for duty, but it is in the long term in terms of
their commitment. Some of this is due to success on the ground;
some of it is due to change in their pay structure. But we
believe these are both good news stories, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. It is encouraging to see that we are beginning
to get tips from the local citizens as to where to locate some
of the IEDs and stuff. What about the training camps? Do we
have any knowledge? Are we getting any tips on the training
camps? Because we see that, just like the other day, a
naturalized citizen from the United States goes down there to
train. Is that hard to detect the training camp where they are
conducting some of this training, the enemy?
General Paxton. I don't have some of the tactical specifics
at my fingertips, sir, but obviously it is--I mean, these are
safe havens and sanctuaries, and sometimes they are indeed
difficult to find. The more that you build confidence in the
local populace, and the more that they tell you routes that you
have freedom of movement on or areas where you should not go,
or they help you detect IEDs, eventually you get to the point
where you can say, well, who lives in this neighborhood? And
they will take you to other areas, sir. So we watch it very
closely, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett, please.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I want to return for a moment to the chairman's coffee shop
and to other coffee shops across the country where two other
questions are being asked. The first is why is not this
Afghanistan war the ultimate exercise in futility? Because even
if we do what no one else has ever done, from Alexander the
Great, the British Empire, the Soviet Empire, even if we could
accomplish what none of them have ever accomplished, it won't
make any difference, they say, because the bad guys will simply
go into Pakistan. And then if we spend I don't know how many
more billions of dollars and how many more dead kids and
wounded kids to drive them out of there, they will go to
Somalia and Yemen.
They say it is quite clear that we cannot deny them
sanctuary. So why is this not the ultimate exercise in
futility?
It is noted that frequently the citizens there choose the
harsh rule of the Taliban compared to the corrupt rule of the
Karzai government, and our very presence there recruits the
enemy. There were essentially no Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI] before
we went there. Then there were a lot of Al Qaeda there after we
were there. I asked the State Department, were they imported?
Were they de novo? They said that most of them were, in fact,
de novo. So our presence there creates the enemy.
The second question is why are we following Osama bin
Laden's playbook? This is a hugely asymmetric war, Mohammed
with a rusty artillery shell and a few dollars' worth of
electronics. And just one of our responses to that has cost us
$40 billion. That is MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles]. That is just one platform in response to that. Osama
Bin Laden is on the record as saying that they will continue
this guerrilla kind of war until they bleed us dry.
So these two questions, please. Why is this not the
ultimate exercise in futility? And why are we following Osama
bin Laden's playbook?
Secretary Flournoy. Congressman, in response to the first
question, I would draw a very sharp distinction between the
historical experience of many in Afghanistan who were there to
conquer versus our mission in Afghanistan, which is to enable
the development of Afghan capacity to exert sovereignty over
their own territory.
I think your point about Pakistan has informed the fact
that we have taken a regional strategy. We need to pressure Al
Qaeda and its associates and deny them safe haven on both sides
of the border, and that is exactly what our strategy is
designed to do.
Support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is quite weak, very
little popular support, and that creates great opportunity for
us to help develop Afghan institutions and capacity that are a
viable alternative for the population.
And in terms of Osama bin Laden, again, I would just say
that we don't have the option of allowing Al Qaeda to have
freedom of movement and sanctuary given the threat that they
pose to our homeland and to our vital interests abroad. And I
think that if you look at the totality of our campaign on both
sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border and globally, we are having
tremendous success in putting pressure on this network, and
disrupting their operations, and denying their ability to
launch spectacular attacks.
So I think that we have to take a global perspective, and I
think the strategy is actually bearing a great deal of fruit at
this point.
Mr. Bartlett. The questioner notes that in Iraq we actually
increased the number of the enemy. Our very presence there did
that, admitted to by the State Department. And assuming success
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they will simply go to Somalia and
Yemen. It is clear that we cannot deny them sanctuary.
So the question still remains why is this not the ultimate
exercise in futility, assuming success?
Secretary Flournoy. Again, sir, I think the facts suggest
that we are debilitating the network. We are putting pressure
on the network on a global basis, and that denying them
sanctuary is critical to preventing their ability to attack our
homeland and attack our interests and our forces and our allies
abroad.
Mr. Bartlett. The second question, why are we following
Osama bin Laden's playbook in this hugely asymmetric war?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would differ with you. I don't
believe we are following his playbook. Actually his playbook
isn't working so well in terms of advancing Al Qaeda's aims
right now.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield my
time to Mr. Murphy and claim his later.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy is recognized.
Mr. Murphy of New York. Thank you.
I wanted to look a little bit for direction of where this
is all headed. So I was over in Kandahar two months ago on the
ground talking to some of the people that were there, very
impressed with our efforts and what we are trying to do to
stabilize the area and to provide security there. But one of
the things that really jumped out at me is where does it go
from there?
I have no doubt that our soldiers can provide security,
they can get out on the streets, and they can drive Taliban
away, but where is the next step? And one that really stuck out
to me, some of the locals said to me, we don't have any
reliable electricity, we don't have an economy, we can't run
our businesses. I can have you meet with 20 local businessmen
who can't run their factories because there is no electricity.
And dug a little deeper, what they told me is there are two
megawatts of power for the whole city of Kandahar. Our base
needs 10 to 15 megawatts of power and has it to run every day.
So we are trying to provide security, and we are also at night
kind of lighting up this boardwalk of Broadway lights, and the
people are saying, ``We can't get any power, but you guys have
it over there.''
Where is the next step? So we provide the security, but
then what happens to let people start to function in that
environment to allow us to get away and to go next? And
specifically do we have a plan for electricity and for the
local economy there?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would like to come back for the
record with a more detailed answer on the specifics of
electrical power generation for Kandahar.
My understanding, though, is that is part of the larger
plan for that area. I think the real shift we have seen coming
out of the strategy review and putting additional civilian
resources on the ground alongside our soldiers is that we have
had much more integrated civil-military planning where we, in
designing our counterinsurgency [COIN] campaign for an area, we
are actually harnessing the development piece to support the
establishment of more credible and capable Afghan Government
governance at the local and provincial level.
My understanding is there is--that this is a recognized
need, that it is part of the longer-term plan for that area,
but I would like to get back to you on the specific details, if
I may.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
General Paxton. And, sir, I will join with the Secretary
and get back with you on specifics.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
General Paxton. What there is, as some of you know, Kajaki
dam, which is in southern Afghanistan.
Mr. Murphy of New York. It will be three years before the
power from that is going to impact this is what I was told.
General Paxton. I understand, sir, but that is part of the
long-term plan. As you get the security in the area better and
the governance up, then we can develop areas like Kajaki.
Mr. Murphy of New York. So is it three years before we
think the governance is coming? I mean, before there is
electricity to have an economy, it is hard to imagine that the
people are going to start saying, ``Well, this government is
really working for us.'' So does it mean it is our
responsibility for that long?
General Paxton. We have already moved some generator
capacity into the area, but it is a slow process of actual
development, and this is what I owe you, the specifics of the
time line between when we get the generators in, when the
infrastructure is place, and when the power starts to deliver.
Mr. Murphy of New York. I use this more as a specific to
illustrate where I wanted to get to, a bigger point, which was
what I also heard from all the Afghan ministers was that we
have a catch-22. They can't get the credibility to build
popular support behind their government until they can deliver
for people. We aren't comfortable letting them deliver any of
the development work until they stop having the corruption
problems they have because we say, ``We will not give you the
money to do development because we think you will steal it;''
and they say to us, ``That is great, but if you guys are here
with your military providing security and your development
folks doing the development, why would anyone turn to us?'' And
what I heard on the ground is that the order of operations to
where you turn for help in Kandahar was: one, to NATO; two, to
your local warlords; three, to the Taliban; and, four, to the
Afghan Government.
So what I wanted to understand is how are we going to make
that transition? How are we going to get to the point where the
Afghan Government is one on that list and at least two, if not
three or four?
Secretary Flournoy. Two points I would make, sir. They are
very important issues you are raising. One is to make sure that
the PRTs' [Provincial Reconstruction Teams'] priorities in an
area are more tightly integrated into the overall civil-
military campaign plan for that area. And I think in Kandahar
that integration process is starting to happen more than it has
in the past. So I think you are going to see a realignment of
some of our development efforts to more closely support the
security in governance objectives.
Mr. Murphy of New York. Are we starting to give more of the
development money to the Afghan Government in the Kandahar
region?
Secretary Flournoy. That is the second point. The second
point is that we are working ministry by ministry to develop
internal capacity so that they can receive, account for, track,
and be accountable for flowing money through the ministry. So
we have set ourselves a series of progressive goals to flow
more and more assistance through the key Afghan ministries, but
that requires certifying them to be able to handle that in an
accountable way. And we are in the process of doing that. I
think we have done two or three, and we will do another two or
three in the coming months.
Mr. Murphy of New York. My time has expired. But if we
could get the metrics for how that certification, slash, the
progress works, I am really interested in that because it gets
to the corruption, and it gets to how we get ourselves out of
being the ones doing the nation-building and letting the
Afghans build their own nation.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And, Madam Secretary and General Paxton, thank you for
being here today.
And I would like to start my points and also my questions
by reading an e-mail I got recently from a retired general that
I have tremendous respect for:
The only real shot we have at any sort of success is to
spend years strengthening the Afghan Army and Police; work out
with Pakistan a way to attack on both sides of the border--in
parentheses, ``Very tough to do''; get rid of corruption in the
government--again parentheses, ``Good luck on that front''; do
something about an economy based on poppy growing--``Not going
to happen in the Congressman's lifetime''; and do all in our
power not to drive the Taliban into the arms of local
population.
It was a fairly long e-mail that I am not at liberty to say
his name, but I e-mailed him because I am very concerned about
rules of engagement [ROE].
And I had had a conversation with the father of this marine
who was killed, John Bernard. And ``Caution Killed My Son:
Marine Families Blast Suicidal Tactics in Afghanistan.'' And
then I go back to another article in Marine Times: ``Left to
Die, They Called for Help. Negligent Army leadership refused
and abandoned them on the battlefield.''
I realize that you are trying to win the confidence and the
support of the Afghan people, but I go back to Mr. Bartlett's
points and really to the coffee shop that the chairman talked
about. I hear this frequently back home in the Third District
of North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base, the
home of Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. And people are
wondering truthfully if you don't have an end point, this is
beginning to sound like the previous Administration and Iraq.
You brief the Congress--and I am not being critical of you.
I want you to fully understand that. You brief the Congress,
and, well, you know, we are cautiously optimistic, we are going
down this road and that road, and, you know, it seems like we
are making progress. I am sure we are making some progress; I
don't doubt that. But I will tell you that reading this article
in Newsweek, ``Scandal in Afghanistan: The Exclusive Story of
How We Have Wasted $6 Billion''--$6 billion--``on a Corrupt and
Abusive Police Force that May Cost Us the War.''
I really want to try to figure out whoever is sitting in
these chairs a year, two years, three years, four years, and we
still are spending billions and trillions in a 14th-century
country with corruption that we cannot control, and we have
got--some of our people in Congress get indicted over here, so
I don't know how we are going to do it in a country where we
can't even speak their language hardly.
So the point is at what point will you say to this
Congress, do you believe you can say, ``We are at the point
that we have won the end point of what we are trying to
achieve''? Because, Madam Secretary, I feel for this
Administration as well. I made that point. This is something
they inherited, and we have to fight terrorism around the
world. But sticking 100,000 of our troops over in Afghanistan
and telling them, if they fire at you from the left, you shoot
back; if they fire at you from the right, you don't shoot, that
is not fair to these kids, it is not fair to their parents and
their wives and their husbands.
I guess that is a question.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I am going to let General Paxton
address the particulars of the rules of engagement because I
think he is more qualified to do that.
But let me first take on your concern, which I think is
understandable and real, about the challenges of capacity-
building and also corruption.
Afghanistan is a country that has been in and out of war
for 30 years. In that kind of environment, corruption tends to
take root in the society at large. It is a problem for other
countries in the region as well. I think we are seeing renewed
commitment to dealing with this problem on the Afghan side.
They have recently established a major crimes task force and
indicted key officials, the mayor of Kabul, a minister, a
police general, trying to signal no one is going to be above
the rule of law. We are at the beginning of a process, but,
again, we are moving in the right direction.
We are trying to change the incentive structures that have
motivated corruption in the past. You are right. It used to be
that police did not make a living wage. So police would make
their living wage by fleecing the local population. We have
changed the pay and benefits, working with the Afghan
Government, so they don't have to be corrupt in order to make a
living wage. Things like that are very, very important.
We are working with the Afghan ministries on long-term
economic development, things like--they are very rich in
strategic minerals and resources, very rich in agriculture--
helping them to develop sustainable, long-term sources of
income for the nation. Those are the longer-term parts of the
project. But on the specific question of ROEs, I would like to
defer to General Paxton if the chairman would indulge us with
time.
The Chairman. Please proceed. We have to move along, but go
ahead.
General Paxton. Thank you, sir.
Congressman Jones, there is absolutely nothing in the
tactical directive that prohibits or limits any servicemember,
marine, soldier, from appropriate self-defense. What is in the
directive is the conscious application of close air support and
indirect fire to make sure that if it is not a fleeting target
or something that poses imminent self-defense, that you have
done due diligence in terms of assessing collateral damage,
whether it is for infrastructure, for children, for
noncombatants. But there is nothing in there that prohibits
either the commander or the individual soldier from doing what
he needs to do on the ground, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder, please.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here once again. You are regulars
here in the last few days.
I want to talk about resources. Secretary Flournoy, you had
talked about that earlier. I remember sometime in the last year
or so, General Jack Keane testified, now retired, that when he
was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, at the end of 2002,
resources began being moved out of Afghanistan in anticipation
of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. His recollection, it was
that early.
Then we began hearing almost privately, I remember the
Commandant--I am a former marine--at the Marine Corps breakfast
made the comment that we have a policy of clear, hold, and
build, but we only have enough troops to clear. We don't have
enough troops to hold and build. Secretary Gates during the
Bush Administration made some comments at private meetings that
he was concerned about the troop strength.
Mr. McKeon has already referred to the December 2007
statement by Admiral Mullen. My concern is that the continued
discussion as if we are still in that mindset. The ranking
member's opening statement refers to a have-nots mentality. Is
there a have-nots mentality that would be permeating our
military commanders' thinking that they don't have adequate
resources?
Secretary Flournoy. That is certainly not my impression. I
think General McChrystal's assessment was to tell us what he
thought he needed to be the priority mission and to get the
mission right. And I think when you look at the U.S. forces
that have been put in, the NATO forces that are being
committed, the Afghan forces that are being grown, he believes
he has what he needs to do the mission.
And I think one of the things that my boss Secretary Gates
has always said is we have to make sure that we balance our
approach here, that on the one hand you want to make sure you
have enough forces in Afghanistan to ensure that you don't fail
in the mission. On the other hand, you don't want to go
overboard and come to be seen as a force of occupation.
Secretary Flournoy. So we have listened to General
McChrystal very carefully, and what he told Congress in
December and what he continues to say is that he believes he is
getting the resources to carry out his mission at this point.
I don't know if you have anything to add.
General Paxton. And again, part of the assessment there
trying to figure out what you need both by people and
resources, when you need it, and then where you need it, and
the constant risk assessment.
I think most members in uniform, if you ask them, ``how
much do you need,'' the answer would always be ``more,''
because the more you have, the less risk you have to assume.
But we try to constantly assess how many people we have and
what types of capability we have, and then does that
sufficiently mitigate the risk, and is it a most likely or a
most dangerous course of action that you are going to mitigate
against.
And then secondly, sir, as we look to increase the
capability and the capacity of the Afghan forces to make sure
that, as they shoulder more of the burden, then we can
requisite, stand down, and do perhaps less. We teach them, we
show them, we lead them, and then we turn over to them.
Dr. Snyder. And I appreciate your sentiment today. The
nature of war is such that I hope if that were to change 6
months, a year, 18 months, 2 years from now, that you thought
that you did not have the resources you needed, I hope that you
would express the same level of candor.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Turner, please.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for being here today. I have two
questions, one concerning the troop cap and one concerning drug
trafficking.
The first question, General Paxton, is directed at you, and
it is building on Mr. McKeon's statement and other questions
that other Members have had during this hearing. People are
very concerned about our ability to be successful as we are
looking at the constraints that you are operating under. So my
question is, what enablers are the NATO allies and the Afghan
Security Forces relying on for the United States to provide?
And how has the troop cap of 30,000 impacted our ability to
support the U.S.-allied forces and the Afghans? As ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] coalition adds I
believe what is 4,500 out of perhaps 9,000 troops pledged in
conjunction with the U.S. surge, and as Afghan Security Forces
grow, how are we ensuring our troops, the allies, and the
Afghans all have access to the enablers that they need?
General Paxton. Thank you, sir.
We have looked very closely at the enablers. No surprise
that when the U.S. comes, not only do we bring the
preponderance of the forces, but we bring the preponderance of
the enablers. So we have more aviation, be it for lift or for
Medevac [medical evacuation]. We have more engineers for route
clearance. So you look, when you go to our NATO allies and the
coalition forces, for them to bring a requisite share of those
capabilities if they are able.
Secretary Gates just spoke in Istanbul several weeks ago
and offered that we would take a look at our obligations, which
this committee rightfully told us to take a look at in Iraq
several years ago, to make sure that by resourcing allied and
coalition partners, we don't necessarily jeopardize U.S. forces
first.
But we are at the point now with the production of MRAPs
and our equipping on the ground that we can take a look at
those capabilities that we could either share with partners, or
we could offer to sell to them, or we could put in the FMS
[Foreign Military Sales] program.
There is an increased capacity and willingness on the part
of allies to fund for themselves, to source for themselves, and
then we also have the capability of sharing with them in areas
where we are partnered together, sir.
Mr. Turner. Everyone continues to be concerned about how
those resources come out of the total resources that are
applied, and whether or not we have sufficient response to meet
our needs.
Turning to the drug trade. In a December 21, 2006, remark
to the Atlantic Council, General Jones stated that ``the
Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem.''
General Jones suggested that the solution has to be broad. It
is not one thing. There is no recipe for this. It is not just
eradication, not crop substitution. It is a lot of things that
can be combined to begin to wean the economy.
More specifically, he called for: one, a judicial system
that is functional; two, police reform; three, involvement of
the Afghan Government; four, extending the reach of the Afghan
Government to Pakistan.
I know that when we look at the issue of the drug trade, we
have to be concerned about how do we address the issue of the
money, the cash that flows through the drug trade, the
transportation routes for drugs themselves, the labs that are
producing the drugs, the fields themselves where we need to
look for an economic shift. Part of the problem has been a lack
of an assessment of a complete to-do list, and then execution
of that to-do list.
According to recent report by the National Security Council
[NSC], a new U.S. Government counternarcotics strategy for
Afghanistan has been approved. It is my understanding that the
Hill has not yet been briefed on this new strategy, and that we
don't have that here for our staff. I am very concerned about
this. What can you tell us about this new strategy?
And I would like to hold up this chart. This is a CRS
[Congressional Research Service] report chart that shows the
Afghan drug trade. As you can see, the last four years--and if
you fold it in half, you can see what the normal production of
narcotics have been in Afghanistan. The last four years have
been their own surge, their narcotics surge. And that is
really, I believe, the root of what we have been facing in
Afghanistan. As we try to address the issues of Afghanistan but
don't address this drug trade, we are going to continue to fund
and fuel our adversaries.
What can you add to that discussion, please?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we did refine our counternarcotics
strategy as part of the review we conducted late last year, and
I am happy to invite our interagency partners to come up and
brief this committee if you have not been adequately briefed.
Narcotics is a key funding stream for the insurgency. We
have established a threat finance cell that looks at the nexus
of narcotics and the insurgency to go after that. We have also
helped train Afghan forces that are specifically focused on
drug interdiction. We have crop-substitution programs under way
to try to transition farmers to licit crops. We are focusing
infrastructure development to make sure that once farmers grow
licit crops, they can actually get them to market and so forth.
I think in areas where this has come to together, in RC
[Regional Command] East, for example, you have seen a drop in
poppy production. RC South is the new area of focus where we
will be putting all of those elements in place to seek to make
the same kind of progress there. But we would be happy to come
back up and brief you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Flournoy, you, in answering Mr. Skelton's
question, had a definition of victory as the point in which
Afghanistan has the capacity to exert sovereignty and deny
Taliban safe haven, which really seems to, in my mind,
prioritize the need to get functioning security forces.
The New York Times yesterday quoted a Pentagon report which
said that the most significant challenge to fielding qualified
Afghan Security Forces is the shortage of institutional
trainers. I know Mr. Ortiz touched on this earlier, but, again,
the story listed the fact that NATO and the U.S. agreed to
5,200 trainers last January. There is 2,700 there today. All
but 300 are U.S. And obviously Secretary Gates, I know, has
been working hard to try and extract the bodies that were
committed. But at the same time, we are flowing 30,000 new
forces. And clearly, this is so important to have the trainers
there. I mean, at some point it seems that we should just do it
and stop sort of waiting for that commitment to materialize.
And I just--well, why don't you comment?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, the decision to deploy the
additional U.S. forces as a bridge mechanism is to plug the
immediate gap of what is needed now. We want to continue to
incentivize our partners to step up with additional training
contributions, but we--this is a priority, and we will plug
those gaps.
The other thing that really makes a difference here is the
shift in General McChrystal's strategy to put an emphasis on
partnering, so that every ANA unit, every Afghan Police unit
has an ISAF or U.S. partner that is training--continuing the
training in the field, mentoring, doing the leadership
development. And so there is the institutional training piece,
which is critical with this partnering, is where you are really
going to further develop your force and its competency to
really take leadership over time. So that is an area of focus,
and we are putting about as much energy as can possibly be put
on this, on closing this gap, sir.
General Paxton. And the training is holistic, too. So we
are looking to train the ministries as well as the police and
the armed forces. And within the police, we are looking at
local police, the end cop. So it is across the board.
We recognize that, in addition to the training in general
and the training across the board in specific, there is a
unique requirement to train leadership. So one of the things we
want to do as we get both U.S. forces and allied and NATO and
coalition forces trainers there is to concentrate on NCO
[noncommissioned officer] training and officer training, too,
sir.
Mr. Courtney. Do you question or challenge the Times
numbers in terms of, again, the commitment that was made and
where we are today?
General Paxton. I don't have those specific numbers. As I
answered for Congressman Reyes, though, we know that there is a
gap there, sir, between what was pledged and what has shown up.
And that is why the bridging solution is in there. The 850 that
was alluded to in either the Post or the Times article on
Monday is indeed part of an Army battalion and then an
increment of marines that are going over there that the Chief
of Staff of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
have said these are available and ready, and these can help as
a bridging solution. And some of those already have a backfill
mechanism, so that if by the end of their normal tenure, be it
three months, four months, six months, if we don't have
sufficient allied contributions, we can backfill again. We
don't want to do that. We would like to get solutions from the
NATO allies, but we can do that, sir.
Mr. Courtney. And I guess I understand your point that we
want to extract those commitments that are made, that a deal is
a deal. But on the other hand, I mean, the President's goal of
2011 as sort of a turnaround point, and somebody who was over
last week visiting Connecticut National Guardsmen who were hit
by an IED Easter Sunday morning, you know, waiting for our NATO
allies is just--time is the enemy. And I guess if the training
piece is so critical to getting to that point that you defined
as sort of success, it just seems that we should just do it. We
should just move.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we will come back to you with a
more full explanation, but we are--the gaps of what General
Caldwell needs now, we are moving to address those now, and the
rest will follow over time. But we agree, this is the priority,
and we are working in ways to address it in ways as quickly as
possible.
The Chairman. Before I call on Mr. Kline, let me address
the potential Achilles heel that we have to overcome before we
can use the word ``success'' or the word ``victory.'' And each
of these is a serious potential Achilles heel. Pick out, if you
would, the one or two of the list I give you that are the most
serious.
First, the corruption within the Afghanistan Government.
Next, bad governance of the Afghan Government. Next, bad
military strategy in fighting. Next, the Afghanistan Security
Forces collapsing. Next, Pakistan refusing to help fight the Al
Qaeda and the Taliban. Next, the lack of resources to the
fighters. Next, the lack of resolve with our military and our
allies. Next, logistics routes being shut down. And, last, the
regional countries acting to undermine the Afghan Government
and support the Taliban.
Which of those concerns you the most? Which could lead to
defeat in allowing us to use the word either ``success'' or
``victory''?
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, when I look at that long list, I
think that actually we have the right military strategy in
place; that the development of the ANSF is challenging, but is
moving in the right direction; that we are seeing Pakistan step
up to the fight; that we are putting the right level of
resourcing against the problem and so forth. So I think the
ones that really will be the greatest challenges longer term
are the involvement of regional--other regional stakeholders
and ensuring that they do not interfere in or undermine
Afghanistan's progress towards security and stability. And I
think overcoming decades of war to establish strong and good
governance at all levels in Afghanistan, not just at the
national level, but at the local level where most Afghans
actually experience their government.
The Chairman. General.
General Paxton. Mr. Chairman, I wrote down the nine of
them, and I highlighted the same two that Secretary Flournoy
did. They are all critical, they are all important, they all
sometimes can appear tenuous. But we have both the capability
and capacity ourselves, the United States, certainly with our
NATO and allied partners, and then growing in capacity and
capability with the Afghan--both GIRoA, the Government of
Afghanistan, and the Afghan Security Forces. I think we are
well on our way to tackling five or six of those.
So my biggest concern would be those that we have the, for
lack of a better term, the longest flash to bang, the longest
lead time before we see measures of success. So how they
demonstrate good governance within the Government of
Afghanistan, and then how we get cooperation and support from
regional actors and neighboring nations are the two that
concern me the most, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for joining us again so quickly after your
last visit.
I must say that I was surprised and pleased to hear from
both of you in response to Mr. McKeon's questions about a cap,
a troop cap, that there is no troop cap. So I take it to mean
from that that if General McChrystal, General Petraeus need
another 5,000 or 10,000 U.S. forces, that that is fine. That is
something you would take up. There is no cap. If they need
them, they get them. So I am very pleased to hear that. And
that relates to a couple of other questions that I have.
One, if--for the record, General, I think this comes from
your shop. We understand that there are three force packages
that are deploying to Afghanistan, and they contain combat
forces and enablers. And if you could get for us a breakdown in
those packages of combat forces and enablers. And, sir, I hate
to do this to you, but we are going to mark up the NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] next week. So if you could
get that for us this week, for the record--I assume you have
them already--we would like to see that.
And then, in light of the troop requirement, do we already
have a plan--either one of you--a plan in place to backfill the
Dutch and Canadian forces that are leaving in 2010 and 2011?
And if you have a ready answer for that, I will take it now. If
not, I will be happy to take it for the record.
Because I want to get to another issue, again related, I
believe, to the requirement for forces. It was raised by, I
think, the ranking member and perhaps some others, and that is
the Joint Urgent Operational Need [JUON] that came from CENTCOM
[United States Central Command] originally back in 2009 for
sense, warn, and response capability. And I want to focus on
that and not force protection in the large.
There was this urgent need that was identified back in July
of 2009, and we worked our way up until March of this year when
General Petraeus told this committee that they were exploring
the use of contractors to meet some of the requirements
contained in this JUON.
And so my question is, has that JUON been modified? And, if
so, why? And is it true that we are looking at contractors
because we either don't have U.S. forces, or a decision has
been made not to use them?
And I will tell you why I am really concerned about this is
that if we were to use the model that we had in Iraq, we would
already have soldiers with a lot of that capability in place in
our FOBs. We have got U.S. forces over there in these FOBs. And
I have a personal familiarity with that. My son happens to be
not only in one of those FOBs, but commanding one of them. We
ought to be providing them with the security that they deserve.
So the question is, are we looking at contractors? And, if
so, do we have a contract in place? And if not, why not?
Because we are possibly not providing the force protection that
we ought to be doing.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. I will start with the JUON, sir,
and then I will see if we have time, if it permits, to go back
to your other questions on the Dutch and the Canadians.
The JUONs is a process. It is obviously requirements-based,
and General Petraeus did submit it, and it is under review
right now.
Mr. Kline. General, this is an urgent need. That is the
acronym; it is an urgent need. And I would think that that
would--force protection would indeed qualify as an urgent need.
So I am a little bit concerned that this is a process that is
dragging out. And, according to our understanding, that is what
I am getting at, are we still--I hate to use the word
``dithering,'' but are we still wringing our hands over whether
or not we are going to use contractors or U.S. forces? And are
we not getting the contract in place?
General Paxton. And with that then, sir, I will take it for
the record to find out exactly the status of the requirement
and in the thought process behind who is best equipped, whether
it is military or civilian, to actually work with the sense and
the shoot system, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Kline. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Kissell, please.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary and General, for being here
today.
Following up a little bit on some of the questions we had
before, and I want to go back a little bit in time. Over a year
ago General Fields, Commander SIGAR, Special Inspection General
for Afghan Reconstruction, was here and talked to us basically
about that we are making a lot of the same mistakes in
Afghanistan that we made in Iraq in terms of not working with
local people and not building what the people needed, projects
that were not being properly supervised, so forth and so on.
And I invited the general to come to my office for an update,
and he reiterated a lot of the same problems. I invited the
general back later on, and he said we had made some progress.
And the general's quarterly report came out last week.
I am wondering if you all had looked at that. And where do
we stand in terms of where the Special Inspector General says
we now are interacting with the Afghan population?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would say that one of the things
we found coming into office was that development efforts in
Afghanistan were not fully harnessed to an overall strategy.
There was a lot of good effort going in, but a lot of different
countries contributing in a lot of different ways based on
their own national goals for Afghanistan. But it wasn't all
pulled together in a strategy.
I think one of the real changes that we have seen under
General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry and with the
civilian surge is an integration to try to ensure that all of
our development efforts of the international community are
actually fully synchronized with and in support of the
governance and security objectives of the counterinsurgency
campaign.
And so that is something that has been happening over the
last several months. And I think that there are areas where--
particularly in the south and the east--where that is coming
together in a much more integrated fashion. But given where we
started, that is still a work in progress. But we are very much
trying to respond to some of the insights and lessons learned
that were in the SIGAR report.
Mr. Kissell. Well, I think that the comment you made
earlier that most Afghans interact with local government--and
this is where the report just seemed to show that we weren't
paying attention; that we were building roads that could not be
maintained, that we had energy projects that they either
neither had the diesel fuel for, could not afford it, or could
not maintain it. And there were several--I think it was like 19
out of the 36 governors who were saying that we were not asking
them their opinion before we did things. So we do need to watch
that because that is, in my mind, a great measure how we will
have success with the Afghan people as we go. And I will be
contacting the inspector general and asking him his opinion.
And I would like to follow up with what Mr. Himes said in
terms of if we need to be providing more security for our FOBs,
then that should not be something we are discussing, it should
be something we are doing.
With that I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, first of all, Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton,
thank you so much for your service to our country.
General Paxton, would you agree or argue that the center of
gravity for the Taliban is its ability to control the civilian
population overtly, or covertly through a shadow government,
and exact revenues from them?
General Paxton. I would agree with that, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Then in looking at the operation that we are
going to do next in Kandahar, which is the basis of the Taliban
in terms of that is where they originated from, if we were able
to deny them that, the ability to exercise governance over the
Taliban people either through a shadow government or covertly,
what does that do in terms of--I mean, from an overall
perspective in terms of this war in Afghanistan and bringing it
to a close?
General Paxton. The first step, obviously, it denies them--
just so you have a physical freedom of movement. It denies them
the emotional, the intellectual, the governance freedom of
movement. So if they have a populace that they can't reach, or
a populace who does not believe their message, or a populace
who is unwilling to follow them, then the fertile ground that
they seek to either control physically or to institute some
terror, either high-profile attacks, murder and intimidation,
unquestioning sharia law, so that they have lost that
opportunity there. So what that does is give both us in the
short-term and, more importantly, the Government of Afghanistan
in the long-term operating room and breathing space so they can
build loyalty, fidelity; they can get schools going, health
clinics; they can give them the evidence of social services and
infrastructure that the people of Afghanistan need.
Mr. Coffman. I was in Afghanistan in November and met with
General McChrystal at that time, and asked him prior to the
President making his announcement as to a timetable that we
would, in fact, begin to be able to draw down our forces in
2011 was the objective of the President, and that I asked
General McChrystal if he got the troops that he requested, when
could we expect to draw down our forces? And he said 2013. Keep
in mind that--and I asked him, he was referencing the 40,000 at
that point. Now, he got 30,000 and, I understand, 9,000 from
our coalition partners.
First of all, could you respond as to what the net is in
terms of coalition partners since some are withdrawing? And,
number two, to what extent do those coalition partners that
will exist going forward have caveats that keep them from
participating in certainly kinetic operations?
General Paxton. At this time, Mr. Coffman, we have 46
troop-contributing nations in Afghanistan, including the United
States. It is almost a 50/50 split. I think it is 22, 23, and
1, the number that are caveat-free, that can do anything. And
some of them, while certainly restrictive, are not preemptive.
That doesn't preclude them from what they can do. So I know the
commanders on the ground take a very close look about how they
assign battle space and how they assign missions to get the
maximum use of each of the troop-contributing nations when they
get there.
I would have to take a look at the master plan to see, in
the aftermath of Kandahar, as we stay there in the days ahead,
where the laydown of forces may be. And I can get that to you,
if you need that, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Paxton. I appreciate that.
Secretary Flournoy, I was listening to your statement in
defining the mission as it exists now under this
Administration. And I think at one point in time you said it is
about keeping Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. And then you
qualified that further in terms of Al Qaeda and their
associates.
What is the end-state? Is the end-state potentially--since
you did mention the Taliban, is it a coalition government that
would incorporate the Taliban or elements of the Taliban?
Secretary Flournoy. I think that the key, from our
interests' perspective, is to deny any safe haven for Al Qaeda
and its associates. I think that, in any situation, a COIN
strategy, the military dimension takes you so far, and at some
point there is a political set of outcomes that are reached. We
saw this in Iraq.
I think we are, the Afghanistan--we are working with the
Afghan Government to try to get a better understanding of the
process that they will ultimately lead on both reintegration
and reconciliation. I think it is very important to set a set
of criteria for who will get reintegrated back into Afghan
society and how, and whether it is disavowing Al Qaeda, laying
down their arms, abiding by the Constitution, those are the
kinds of criteria that the Afghan Government will need to
articulate as they get to the point of defining what an
acceptable political end-state looks like. And we will
certainly be in deep conversation with them about that.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary Flournoy, I hate to beat a dead horse, but since
several of my colleagues have repeatedly referenced a supposed
30,000 troop cap, can you give us a one-word answer: Has the
Administration imposed a troop cap in Afghanistan?
Secretary Flournoy. No, we have not imposed a troop cap.
What President Obama did in December was to approve 30,000
troops, additional troops, for Afghanistan and a degree of
flexibility for the Secretary of Defense to authorize further
troops in support of force protection.
Mr. Heinrich. And has General McChrystal requested
additional troops?
Secretary Flournoy. There have been a couple of cases, such
as the----
General Paxton. In general, he has not, sir, because we are
in the process of flowing all three of those force packages.
And the obligation would be that he would take a look at how
they met the mission on the ground before he came back. Within
that, we have made some adjustments both in terms of combat
forces and trainers on the ground. So we have made some modest
adjustments in the number.
Mr. Heinrich. And do you think that General McChrystal
would continue to feel free to request those kinds of
adjustments if he feels necessary?
General Paxton. Absolutely.
Mr. Heinrich. Do you think the Secretary of Defense, the
President, or anyone else has ever ordered General McChrystal
not to make those kinds of requests?
General Paxton. No, sir.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you.
I want to shift real quickly to one more thing before I
yield back the rest of my time. On the training issue, with the
stopgap measures that were mentioned in the New York Times
article, how do you mitigate the loss of lessons learned in the
handover between the stopgap folks who are plugging the hole
now and the long-term training force to make sure that we
continue to ramp up and build that progress in a way so that we
don't lose those important lessons?
Secretary Flournoy. Part of it is they are all teaching to
the same curriculum. Part of it is ensuring overlaps so that
there is actually a handoff from one group to the next. But it
is really the establishment of NTM-A and CSTC-A and with
General Caldwell as sort of the keeper of the knowledge, if you
will, for the training efforts. I think there is going to be a
lot of continuity on his staff and on the people who are
training the trainers, if you will.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both of you for your service, Madam Secretary,
and, General, thank you.
And, General, I had the great honor last August to visit
with the Marines at Camp Leatherneck, Camp Bastion, and it was
really inspiring since I represent Parris Island Marine Corps
Station, to see the dedication of our marines. I particularly
appreciate what both of you are doing, because I am the co-
chair of the Afghan Caucus. I have visited the country nine
times. I have great respect for President Karzai, for the
Defense Minister Abdul Wardak. I have faith in Ambassador
Eikenberry and certainly General McChrystal and General
Petraeus. I feel like we have got an extraordinary team of
people there.
Firsthand, my former National Guard unit, the 218th
Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the South Carolina National
Guard, served for a year in Afghanistan, led by General Bob
Livingston. And I visited with the troops from South Carolina
every three months, and I found out that there was an
extraordinary relationship between the American forces and the
people of Afghanistan to the point where they identified each
other as brothers, American and Afghan brothers. So I am
hopeful. Perfect, no, but very hopeful.
With that, the ever-changing situation, what is the status
of cross-border collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
And have there been significant changes in the past year?
General Paxton. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
We were here with the committee last week to talk a little
bit about Pakistan, sir. And there have been positive
engagements and positive changes on both sides of the border
within the last year, and this includes a master laydown for
some border coordination centers (BCCs), some BCCs and JCCs
[Joint Coordination Centers]. And we have been able to work
with both the PAKMIL [Pakistan Military] on their side of the
border as well as with the Afghan National Security Forces in
terms of manning and equipping those stations. Two of them are
fully operational/capable at this time, and we are looking at
the location and the manning of the others. So all of that
demonstrates a degree of trust, a degree of transparency, and a
degree of equal procedures, if you will, so that it mitigates
and lessens the tension on the border. So that is a good
indication and a very positive one within the last year, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And I am really hopeful. In my visits to
Islamabad and other parts of Pakistan, to me it is so clear
that it is mutually beneficial, the security of both countries.
It has already been expressed, concern, but in regard to
training security forces, Secretary Gates last week or recently
announced 850 additional trainers as a stopgap measure to fill
vacancies. A problem has been our NATO allies fulfilling their
obligations. And I was very happy working with Congressman
Solomon Ortiz, who is the co-chair of the Romania Caucus, to
find out last week from the Ambassador of Romania that they are
now increasing their participation from 1,200 troops to 1,800
troops. So there are some positive stories that really should
be told. And I know on a visit to Bulgaria, the people of
Bulgaria are very proud of their participation and recognition.
But what is being done to increase participation from our
NATO allies?
Secretary Flournoy. The Secretary has raised this at his
ministerial, Secretary Clinton at hers. We have had numerous
visits, calls, et cetera. And the truth is the majority of our
NATO allies are stepping up. Since the strategy review was
concluded in December, they are offering above and beyond what
they had already offered. They are offering more trainers.
The challenge is that the gap is still there, and so we are
all asking one another to step up even further. So we will
continue that process. But I think credit you are right to
give. A number of countries have stepped up substantially with
institutional trainers, with OMLTs and with POMLTs since we
have asked.
Mr. Wilson. And it was encouraging. Last week I had the
opportunity to meet with the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, and
they are so proud of the American bases that are now in their
country. And they did point out, General, that they would be
very happy at such training bases such as Novo Selo to provide
for advanced training for personnel prior to being deployed.
And they have got the capability, they have got the bases, and
they have got citizen support within the community.
But again, thank you again both of you for your service and
what you are doing by defeating the terrorists overseas. Thank
you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ms. Flournoy and General, for being with us.
For what it is worth, I have also met Mr. Karzai. And for
what it is worth, my reaction was just the opposite. And if I
had been present when he threatened to go over to the Taliban,
my response would have been, ``Don't let the screen door hit
you in the rear end,'' for what it is worth.
Having said that, Ms. Flournoy, I am reading a book by a
Russian infantry officer called The Bear Went Over the
Mountain. It is mostly about tactics, but what is disturbing
about it, it seems to be the same ambushes in the same places
going over about a 10- or 12-year period. And they talk about
training up an Afghan Army, they talk about training up an
Afghan National Police. And we know that four years after they
left, the puppet government they set up was gone.
Now, I appreciate the general. I mean, he got to be a
general by being a can-do guy: I am going to make the best of
my situation. I am going to make it work. And I appreciate you
going to work in the Department of Defense. But what
realistically makes you think the outcome is going to be any
different this time?
Secretary Flournoy. What makes me think the outcome will be
different is the fundamental objective of the mission and focus
of the mission is different. Institutions built under hostile
occupation don't tend to have longevity and credibility with
the population. Institutions that are built with the support of
the population----
Mr. Taylor. Ma'am.
Secretary Flournoy [continuing]. Have a lot more chance of
succeeding over time, and that is what we are trying to do with
this ANSF.
Mr. Taylor. And I appreciate you saying that. I have not
lived in Afghanistan. Rory Stewart did, and he told me after
living there for years and walking across Afghanistan that the
Afghans mockingly refer to Karzai as the ``America Bull''
because once you get outside the city, he has absolutely no
influence. So how would you respond to that? And that is coming
from someone who has lived in Afghanistan.
Secretary Flournoy. Again, I think that, at most, Afghans
experience governance at the local level, and building up the
credibility and capacity of the local institutions, the
district level and so forth, is where--is going to influence
the judgment of the Afghan people. And I think that the
progress we have seen at that level and, frankly, in an
increasingly competent national government in terms of the
cabinet that President Karzai has put together, that is
changing attitudes. I mean, this poll that says 59 percent
believe that the government is actually heading in the right
direction. I don't think you have ever had a poll in
Afghanistan say that before. And that is in response to changes
that they are experiencing on the ground.
Are we there yet? Absolutely not. Are we at least starting
to go in the right direction? Yes.
Mr. Taylor. And how would you respond to an equal
perception by a majority of the Afghans who think that Karzai's
brother is the biggest narcotics dealer in Afghanistan?
Secretary Flournoy. I don't want to focus on individuals.
Mr. Taylor. That is the President's brother. That is why I
think we should focus on an individual.
Secretary Flournoy. I think it is very important to look at
the governance at all levels and the progress that is being
made across all----
Mr. Taylor. Well, that is the President's family, ma'am. If
the President of a country can't tell his brother to get out of
the narcotics trade, if someone the United States military is
renting property from, if we can't turn around and as a
condition of our lease on that property say, and, by the way,
you are going to get out of the narcotics trade, where does it
begin?
Secretary Flournoy. You know, sir, I don't feel like I am--
it is appropriate for me or, quite frankly, I am not the person
qualified to evaluate specific individuals or cases. But what I
can say----
Mr. Taylor. Ma'am, if you are not, who is?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, let me tell you what I have seen.
When I just came back from the Arghandab, I have seen a place
that had no Afghan governance whatsoever for years. And in the
last six months, after some very difficult fighting on the part
of international and Afghan forces, we have enabled a district
governor who is clean to be put in place, who is working with
local tribal leaders, who is working with the international
community to funnel aid to projects that are getting--for
benefiting the population, getting their buy-in, and for the
first time creating a district governor center that is the go-
to place for the Afghan population. That is the model we are
trying to replicate. The fact that it is possible in the
Arghandab, which has been called the ``heart of darkness'' by
many authors writing about Afghanistan--the fact that is
possible there means that it is possible elsewhere in that
country. And that is what we are trying to achieve.
Mr. Taylor. Madam, how long do you think President Karzai
would live without the American military protecting him?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I am not in a position to
speculate on that.
Mr. Taylor. Well, don't you think that puts us in a
position to at least dictate some terms of our engagement, like
narcotics, like honesty in government?
Secretary Flournoy. I am sorry.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in the interest
of maintaining this enjoyment and fun that you are having, I
will go ahead and ask a question.
Walking across the street the day that the health care vote
was going on, somebody stopped me and said, aren't you offended
that the President, during this momentous occasion, is watching
the basketball game? And I said, no, I am not offended by
whatever the President is doing this afternoon. What I am
offended, though, more is the fact that we have had a fight
going on in Afghanistan for six months that the Marines have
been in hammer and tong, and not one word about the wonderful
success that those men and women have been doing coming out of
the White House. Now, a lot of talk from Gates and others, but
nothing out of the White House.
That offends me, because I couldn't care less what he
spends his Sunday afternoon doing, but it does offend me that
the White House has failed to recognize the hard work that you
have just referenced, Ms. Flournoy. So hopefully, on the go-
forward basis we will get a little more attention to the
successes that are coming out of there.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I just want to say for the record
I don't believe that is accurate. It may not have gotten
adequate press coverage, but the President has certainly not
been silent.
Mr. Conaway. Well, I look forward to him making sure he
gets out what he wants to get out, Ms. Flournoy. We can have
that tussle, if you would like. That wasn't my intent.
And I am blanking on the general's name. Back in January,
we got a report from a general that said that the focus on
intelligence in Afghanistan was overbalanced toward finding bad
guys and dealing with bad guys, and that it needed to be more
of a balanced approach so that our company and squad and
commanders on the ground knew who the players were and who the
good guys were, who the bad guys were, what the crops were, all
the kinds of stuff that you would normally need in order for us
to do the full-spectrum job that the fight in Afghanistan
involves. Killing bad guys is front of the list, absolutely.
General Paxton, your assessment as to rebalancing. Was that
the case? Or we added new resources to the system so that those
company commanders do know what is going on them around them
with respect to the economy, with respect to everything else
that it is nonkinetic in reflection of that report from
January?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. A COIN fight, when you are doing
the shape, clear, hold build, it has to be enemy-focused. It is
population-focused in terms of the strategy, but the tactics
have to be focused on who you think the bad guys are, where you
think the bad guys are, what you know about them. So it is a
constant drive for more intelligence. And we have tried to
strike that balance between intelligence assets, whether it is
ISR that is overhead or whether it is elevated line of sight,
between what is available at the strategic level, what is
available at the operational level, and what is available at
the tactical level. And I have a good feeling that the flow of
forces and the flow of capability is adequately meeting the
needs or is projected to meet what we think will be current
gaps in the needs.
One of the additional responsibilities I have for the
Secretary is to sit on the Senior Integration Group, what used
to be called the Counter-IED Task Force. So Dr. Carter and I
are taking a look about the equipping side and to make sure
that we have adequate technologies, capabilities, requisite
training so that we can identify IED materials, as well as safe
havens or border-crossing sites where they may come from. So we
are paying attention to that, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Well, I guess the focus wasn't so much as on
the--and, again, the kinetic side is what they are there for.
But by the same token, if you are trying to understand what
will make sure that the local folks see us as more of a
solution as opposed to just the policemen, making sure that
those ground-level commanders have as much information as they
need. And I blanked on the general's name, and I apologize for
that, but it did seem to be a little broader than just who the
IED guys were and focused on the bad guys as opposed to
information that the commanders need to know, that digging a
well over there would be really important versus paving a road,
or that these are the folks within the community who are the
opinion leaders and working with them makes sense versus
others. I mean, that kind of intelligence that is broader than
just there are three bad guys over there, they have been there
for an hour and a half, they have done all the stuff, go shoot
them. But the issue, if it is in counterinsurgency, you have
got--I think it is broader than just killing bad guys.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. But I think the development of
our human intelligence and the way we train our small-unit
leaders, we are spending adequate time on that at the National
Training Center in Fort Irwin, at Mojave Viper in Twentynine
Palms, at home station training at Fort Campbell and Camp
Lejeune.
Mr. Conaway. But downrange, they have got the tools they
need then to exploit that training?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. I am convinced that they do, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Kratovil, please.
Mr. Kratovil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As typical, I have
just received note I have got votes in just a minute.
But, Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here and
for your service.
I want to go--a lot of the questions you have been
receiving have been very specific. I want to go to a couple
broader questions. Would you agree that our primary goal in
Afghanistan is defeating Al Qaeda? Start with that.
Secretary Flournoy. Defeating Al Qaeda and its associates.
Yes.
Mr. Kratovil. And how does the strategy that we are doing
in Afghanistan that we are doing right now facilitate our goal
of not just defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but
worldwide?
Secretary Flournoy. Afghanistan and Pakistan, that border
region, has been the sort of locus of--sort of heartland, if
you will, of Al Qaeda for many years. And so I think denying
them sanctuary and safe haven there, disrupting them there has
a powerful impact on the global network. We are also trying to
make sure that the Afghans and the Pakistanis have their own
capability to do that denial in the future.
Mr. Kratovil. Would they not simply--assuming that happens,
and we create stability there, would they not simply seek
another safe haven, Yemen, other places? What prevents that?
Secretary Flournoy. I think some of them may. But I think
the truth is the combination of ethnic, tribal, other ties to
this particular region makes it their preferred home, if you
will. And other places will not be as hospitable to as many or
to as robust a network.
Mr. Kratovil. If they did seek safe haven elsewhere, would
you believe that the strategy that we are taking in Afghanistan
would be an appropriate one in that location as well? In other
words, is that a sustainable approach?
Secretary Flournoy. I don't think that--I think that each
environment has to be dealt with in its own terms. And to the
extent we are dealing with the network in other places, we will
tailor that effort to the local conditions that are allowing a
group to gain a foothold.
Mr. Kratovil. There have been a number of questions on the
allies. Obviously, the President's request for troops assumed a
certain level of commitment from our allies. Where are we in
terms of achieving that number? And what impact does our
failure to achieve that number or limitations placed on the
allies in terms of what they can do affect our ability to
succeed?
Secretary Flournoy. I think our allies have stepped up
tremendously, and I think that with allied support we are
very--we are meeting General McChrystal's requirements. I think
that going into the future we will need to work with them to
sustain the mix of capabilities that we need as the operation
continues to unfold.
Mr. Kratovil. Did the request for the 30,000 troops assume
that the 10,000 additional troops from allies, that the use of
those troops would be limited?
Secretary Flournoy. Limiting in what sense?
Mr. Kratovil. In terms of where they go, in terms of what
they do, in terms of whether they are in safe areas of the
country or not.
Secretary Flournoy. Again, I think that ISAF has made use
of allied forces extremely well. I think our focus and
concentration has been on the south and the east. Many of our
allies have focused on the west and the north, with a couple of
them also coming south with us and east.
But I think that General McChrystal has been able to take
into account the various strengths and caveats of some forces
to be able to handle that. I don't know if you----
General Paxton. Sir, any time you do your assessment, you
try and minimize the assumptions because you realize that an
assumption that you don't have ground tooth on, if it unravels,
then your plan could go. So when General McChrystal submitted
the assessment last August, and when the assessment was
reviewed and analyzed here in the Washington area for several
months there, it was based on the facts on the ground, which
was the troop-contributing nations, who they were, where they
were, what their capabilities were, what their caveats were,
and then what a reasonable expectation was, whether they are
going to bring in a replacement force, or whether at that
time--whether they looked to scale up or scale down. So that is
why the assessment itself is open-ended, because those dynamics
could always change with the contributing nations.
Mr. Kratovil. Where are we in terms of numbers of allied
troops in relation to the 10,000 that we assumed?
General Paxton. I believe, as I said earlier, we have 9,000
that have been pledged since December and a little over--I know
pledged a little over 4,000 actually on the ground right now,
sir.
Mr. Kratovil. Does that take into consideration the troops
that are likely to withdraw, the allied troops that are likely
to withdraw?
General Paxton. And I will have to take that for the record
because we know which ones we anticipate will withdraw. They
will come back and tell us whether they are to going to
replace----
Mr. Kratovil. Let me rephrase my question. There are 10,000
troops that were assumed. Of that we have 4,000 on the ground;
is that right?
General Paxton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Kratovil. And we don't know whether or not that assumes
the troops that are about to withdraw.
General Paxton. No. It did as of December when we made the
plan, that is correct, sir.
The Chairman. The gentlewoman Mrs. Davis, please.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you to both of you for being here once
again.
And I wanted to just go back to a concept that I think we
have all been working hard on, and I really want to commend the
Administration on what we see as a much greater interagency
collaboration in this effort. We suffered through a number of
years when we really felt that we weren't able to bring that
together, and that is happening, and I appreciate that greatly.
However, I think that there has also been a number of reports
that would suggest that we are not doing nearly as good a job
as we could on capitalizing on popular grievances against the
Taliban, and for that to occur, we need to have enough
resources really devoted to the political and economic
conditions, and I know that you all have certainly recognized
that. We look at the report of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan [SIGAR], and that would suggest that we are
falling short in that area.
And so I am wondering, and in light of last week's
discussion as well, until the military and nonmilitary
resources that are being utilized here--you said probably a
good balance in Pakistan, 50 percent perhaps--what guarantees
can we have that we actually, I would think, need to go beyond
that in terms of nonmilitary in Afghanistan now in order to be
able to capitalize on those popular grievances? Where are we as
you look at that issue and the way that you described it last
week?
Secretary Flournoy. I do think that their civilian surge
has certainly brought more interagency capacity to Afghanistan,
and I think the embassy had requested additional growth going
into next year to fill out and push down that capacity from the
provincial level to the district levels, particularly in the
critical districts where we think that will have the greatest
impact. So I think that those requirements continue to be
refined, and they are going up. And we are going to resource--I
believe our State Department colleagues and others will be
seeking support from Congress to resource those additional
requirements.
Mrs. Davis. Can you be more specific in terms of where you
think those resources should actually go?
Secretary Flournoy. I think a lot of them will be going to
district support teams to--again, to empower governance at that
district level, which is the sort of critical interface with a
lot of the local tribal structures in villages, to harness
development assistance in support of that, particularly funding
for things like OTI [Office of Transition Initiatives] coming
out of AID [United States Agency for International
Development], Agriculture [United States Department of
Agriculture]. Rule of law is an area where there has been a
vacuum, and the Taliban has stepped in. Rule-of-law programs at
the local level are very important to competing with them and
displacing them.
Mrs. Davis. In those efforts is it fair to acknowledge that
those efforts are not necessarily the kind of bottom-up efforts
that people are asking for that would suggest that we had a
pretty good understanding of the people of Afghanistan today?
Secretary Flournoy. I think what we are doing in each
district, each critical district, is really starting with a
needs assessment. What do the people need and want? What do
they view as important? What do they prioritize? What do they
expect? And what will be most meaningful to them? And that is
the foundation for a lot of the realignment of our assistance.
Mrs. Davis. Some of the articles that are coming out now
that are suggesting that after eight years we are really not
even beginning to do that yet, would you challenge that and
feel that, in fact, we are, and are there some examples that
you could give?
Secretary Flournoy. I would, and particularly in the
critical districts that we have identified as key population
centers, key to production, key to lines of communication and
so forth, in those areas we really are pursuing a much more
needs-based, integrated approach. It may be something that
hasn't happened in the past, but that is definitely where we
have been heading in the last year.
General Paxton. And I would just echo what the Secretary
said, that a lot of the, whether it is the DSTs [District
Support Team], the OMLTs, the PRTs, although they may be a
shell in a nucleus, they are tailored, and they are tailored to
a needs-based or requirements-driven solution.
Mrs. Davis. I have just a few seconds.
General, when the chairman mentioned the Achilles heels,
and you cited two examples that would be--really that are the
most difficult, demonstration of good government and the
cooperation regionally, could you take a stab at a timeline for
when some of those things you think might--there might be real
evidence that that was occurring?
General Paxton. In terms of projecting a timeline, I
couldn't, ma'am, but I will say we have had positive
indications in the last year, for example, in Pakistan that
there is an increased degree of cooperation both with the U.S.
and with the nations in the area. So I think it is constantly
evolving, and we have had some good-news stories.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Before I call on Mr. McKeon, speaking about a
good-news story, the--and, Madam Secretary, you mentioned
agriculture a few moments ago. Part of the good-news story is
the National Guard troops that are assisting in teaching better
agriculture processes to the Afghan farmers. Of course, there
is a little parochialism in my comment because a good number of
them have been Missouri National Guard troops who are farmers,
and that is what they do. I think it has been highly
successful.
My question is what are we doing right in Afghanistan that
we did not do right in Iraq?
Madam Secretary?
Secretary Flournoy. That is a really hard question because
a lot of what we are doing right in Afghanistan, I think, was
informed by both mistakes and what we eventually did right in
Iraq, as different as the two countries are.
I think in Afghanistan, given the nature of the society, we
are doing a lot more bottom up, a lot more building at the
local district and moving up to provincial level and
appreciating the importance of incorporating traditional
societal structures, the tribes, ethnic groups and so forth,
and seeking inclusivity, seeking balance that will ultimately
determine the sustainability of the gains that we make. So I
think that bottom-up focus, the appreciation for the
demographics, the cultural landscape is a really key emphasis
in Afghanistan going forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General.
General Paxton. Mr. Chairman, I think the other thing that
we are doing correctly is that we have captured the lessons
learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and we are doing better at
what we call ``left seat, right seat'' in terms of turnover on
stations, so that you get a chance to have key leader
engagements with those individuals that will be significant to
coming up with immediate and practical solutions in the area.
And I think we have modified our training continuum at our
bases and stations here to reflect the situation on the ground
as well as the recent success stories.
The Chairman. I thank the witnesses.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Early on in my statement and then in my questions, I asked
about the 30,000 cap, and you have both assured me that there
is no cap. The reason I talked about it and asked questions
about it is that is the way it has been reported in the press,
that--and the way Secretary Gates has talked about it, that the
President did approve 30,000, and that the Secretary had
flexibility of about 10 percent that he could work with on
that.
I would like to go back over a little history, as I
remember it, in the last couple of years. The President became
President in January of 2009, and he approved in I believe it
was March an additional 20,000 troops, and came out with his
strategy and replaced the commanding general, put in General
McChrystal and gave him time to come up with an implementation
of that strategy. He presented that in August. It went up
through the chain of command. We first saw about it--saw it in
The Washington Post, and we have been given that. We never did
see the numbers that were attached to it that he came out with
later. There has been lots of talk about it, that he had
requested from 40,000 up to--I saw reports up to 100,000.
The President, after the 90 days, approved the 30,000 surge
that would be sent to Afghanistan as soon as they could be
sent, and then they would return--they would begin the drawdown
in July of 2011, I believe, and be pulled out by December of
2011. Was that--there was no--in December of 2010, there would
be a review, and that drawdown of those 30,000 troops would
begin in July of 2011.
Am I correct in those statements?
Secretary Flournoy. What I would say a little bit
differently is July 2011 is the end of the 30,000 surge, if you
will, an inflection point where we will begin a conditions-
based process of looking to transition provinces that are ready
to Afghan lead, with the associated implications in terms of
the potential changes of mission, potential changes in force
allocation and some drawdown associated with that.
I think the responsible drawdown model that you have seen
in Iraq is going to very much inform the approach that you are
likely to see in Afghanistan. The President has not put a
timetable on that except to say that by July 2011, we will
begin the process, and that date was informed by our judgment
of conditions across the numerous provinces that some would be
ready by then.
Mr. McKeon. Let me also comment on as one of the things I
remember about that is when I met with General McChrystal, he
said that he felt 30,000 would be sufficient, even though, this
is my words now, he had requested more based on all the reports
we had seen. He said 30,000 would be sufficient, but that the
mission had been changed, I think, was downsized.
Now, this 1230 report suggests that there are a total of
121 districts of interest, but the Joint Command, ISAF Joint
Command, feels that their only resource is to conduct
operations in 48 of those districts.
Can you discuss this, and what resources are we short?
Secretary Flournoy. First of all, sir, we did--I think
General McChrystal had the view that you can't focus everywhere
all the time. You have to have priorities. You have to focus in
key areas with your campaign.
Mr. McKeon. When he did his assessment in August, I think
he was basing that on the strategy that the President had given
him in March.
Secretary Flournoy. Right.
Mr. McKeon. And then that is when--I think when he was
given the number 30,000, he had to downsize that.
Secretary Flournoy. I don't think that is quite right. I
think there has always been an intention to determine where to
focus in the country that will have the greatest impact on the
country as a whole, and I think----
Mr. McKeon. If he had received 40- or 50,000 troops, he
could have probably focused on more of the country.
Secretary Flournoy. Do you want to jump in on this?
General Paxton. Sir, if I may, when the strategy was
developed and the assessment was under way, there were main
efforts, supporting efforts, and economy-of-force efforts, as
there are in any campaign. And your ability to prosecute more
than one main effort or to do a shift from a main effort to a
supporting effort and do it faster is all driven by the boots
on the ground and the amount of forces that you have.
So we have not deviated from General McChrystal's
assessment in terms of where he saw the main effort, and then,
as he moved from what was the supporting effort and brought it
into the main effort, how he thought the campaign would unfold.
So it was focused on the freedom of movement of the Taliban in
the south to start with.
Mr. McKeon. Do we have agreement on one thing? If he had
been given 60,000 additional troops, he could have done more
faster?
General Paxton. It is a reasonable assessment. Any time you
get more--it is not a given, it is not a linear equation, but
when you get more, you can do more.
Secretary Flournoy. The one thing I will say that certainly
influenced the President's decision on this was the force flow.
When he was presented with some of numbers at the higher end of
the range that General McChrystal put on the table, the force
flow meant that all of those forces would not be in place at
one time. And one of the things the President said is, what
approach will get me the greatest number of forces fastest? And
that was very much informed--informed the ultimate decision.
The other thing I would say about the 48 districts, just to
be clear, is that is based on the forces available, U.S.
forces, our coalition forces, and Afghan forces, who are able
to partner. The idea is to focus on 48 this year and then grow
that number next year and so forth. So that again it is trying
to ensure that you have enough both military, Afghan, and
civilian resources to really fully deliver in those districts
over time.
Mr. McKeon. It is the first time I have heard the comment
that you made that all of those 30,000 troops would be there by
July of 2011. I had always assumed----
Secretary Flournoy. Oh, the 30,000 will be by the end of
August, this August. I am sorry, the flow of forces you are
talking about.
Mr. McKeon. By 2010?
Secretary Flournoy. All of the 30,000 that the President
ordered in December, except for one headquarters that
McChrystal doesn't need until the fall, will be there by the
end of August.
Mr. McKeon. This year.
Secretary Flournoy. Yes. This year. That influenced the
President's decision.
General Paxton. Originally it had been a slower arrival,
sir, and that was accelerated given the sequence of Ramadan and
the Afghan elections, and it was to get maximum value there.
And as the Secretary said, there were two significant caveats
when we looked at the assessment. One was the absorption rate
and what you could actually put on the ground in terms of
infrastructure, basing. And the second one, as is always the
case, is the enablers. You can get the troops there to do the
mission, but they may not have the ground mobility or the
engineering support.
Mr. McKeon. I appreciate that. I misunderstood what you
said earlier that they would all be in place by July. I was
thinking you were talking about July 2011.
Secretary Flournoy. I think now a year-long tour takes you
to July.
Mr. McKeon. That is the way I always understood it. I
appreciate that. I just misunderstood.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
If there are no further questions, let me ask, what do you
need from Congress that you are not receiving now?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, as I said in my opening
statement, sir, we appreciate the support of Congress in
general, but in this committee in particular I think the things
that we have before you now, which are both our fiscal year
2011 request and our supplemental request, your support for
those two things would give us the resources we need to fully
implement General McChrystal's plan and resource the mission as
envisioned.
The Chairman. Do you have anything to add, General?
General Paxton. Sir, I thank the committee and Congress for
their support of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, the
training before they go, the equipping and enabling while they
are there, and for those who bear the brunt of the battle and
are injured and wounded when they come back. And as we
mentioned last week in the Pakistan hearing, sir, I thank you
also for the latitude with multiyear money, which gives us more
flexibility. So thank you for that, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
appearance and your testimony.
If there is no further discussion, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
May 5, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 5, 2010
=======================================================================
Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton
Developments in Security and Stability in Afghanistan
May 5, 2010
Today, the committee meets to receive testimony on
developments in security and stability in Afghanistan. Our
witnesses, both old friends of the committee, are: the
Honorable Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, and Lieutenant General John Paxton, the Director for
Operations on the Joint Staff. Welcome, both of you.
Six months ago, President Obama announced the results of a
comprehensive review of our policy in Afghanistan, which for
many years had essentially been non-existent. During this
announcement, he endorsed a new counterinsurgency strategy
centered on increasing U.S. forces by 30,000 troops, adding
U.S. civilian experts, and focusing on protecting the
population of Afghanistan from the Taliban and their terrorist
allies.
I endorsed this strategy then, and I do so now. As I have
said many times, while this new strategy cannot guarantee
success in Afghanistan, it is the most likely to end with an
Afghanistan that can prevent the return of the Taliban and
their Al Qaeda allies.
Six months into the new policy, it is appropriate for
Congress to consider how things are going. About 21,000 of the
30,000 troops have arrived in country, and many have been
involved in the recent successful military operation in Marja.
Others will soon begin restoring security in Kandahar, an
operation that is likely to be crucial to our overall success
in Afghanistan.
We have seen other clear signs of success in our fight
against terrorists. The President's new strategy helped lead to
the capture of the Taliban's second-in-command, a former
Taliban finance minister, and two ``shadow governors'' of
Afghan provinces, the most significant captures of Afghan
Taliban leaders since the start of the war in Afghanistan.
While I am pleased with the recent successes in
Afghanistan, and I anticipate others, many concerns remain.
Although we successfully cleared Marja, the Taliban still
appears to be able to infiltrate the town and threaten and kill
those who cooperate with U.S. and Afghan security forces. This
may not be unanticipated. It takes time to build the confidence
of a local population. But I worry that some of this may point
to the weakness of the local government, which cannot easily
deliver the services and governance needed to help convince the
residents of Marja to join the right side.
While we have increased forces in Afghanistan, our allies
have also begun to send additional troops. To date, they have
added about 50 percent of the 9000 new troops they pledged
after President Obama's December speech. But serious concerns
remain about our ability to train the Afghan security forces
who will have to assume the burden of providing security and
combating terrorism in Afghanistan without more international
trainers. I am pleased that Secretary Gates has decided to send
additional U.S. military personnel to fill this gap, but this
is a short-term solution and not a long-term fix.
This concern relates to another. In a recent meeting, NATO
endorsed a process to transition the lead for security in some
districts from U.S. and allied troops to Afghan National
Security Forces. I think all of us would like to know more
about this process and its implications-what progress do we
have to see in a district before it can transition to Afghan
lead, and what does this mean for the international troops in
that district? Are we talking about progress among the Afghan
security forces or must the district also need a competent and
honest government?
Finally, a quick word of congratulations and one of
caution. The Department of Defense recently delivered a very
good, and for once on-time, ``Report on Progress Toward
Security and Stability in Afghanistan.'' Thank you for that.
Unfortunately, a similar, somewhat higher level metrics report
filed by the National Security Council was very disappointing.
It is my hope that future reports will more closely resemble
the 1230 report and provide real information. Congress cannot
judge progress from glorified press releases.
Again, thank you for coming before us today. I suspect this
will not be the last hearing on Afghanistan this committee
holds this year, and I appreciate you working with us to ensure
that Congress can conduct its Constitutional and appropriate
oversight activities.
Statement of Ranking Member Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Developments in Security and Stability in Afghanistan
May 5, 2010
We are a nation at war. The attempted terrorist attack in
New York City's Times Square serves as the most recent reminder
that we face dangerous enemies who threaten the safety and
security of our country. The extraordinary men and women of our
military, and their families, need no reminding of this threat.
They know all too well the sacrifices and dedication it takes
to keep this fight off our shores. Our troops understand why
they are in Afghanistan: Al Qaeda, operating from safe havens
provided by the repressive Taliban, planned and launched
attacks on our homeland.
A lot has happened since the President stood before the
American people and made the case for his Afghanistan-Pakistan
strategy. Over half of the 30,000 forces authorized by the
President have arrived in country. Our marines and soldiers are
working side-by-side with their Afghan and coalition partners--
facing snipers, improvised explosive devices, and a skeptical
Afghan population--to defeat the Taliban insurgency. They are
operating with some constraints--both political and
operational. This is where I would like to focus the remainder
of my comments and questions.
In my view, this body--no matter on which side of the aisle
you reside--and this committee in particular--has the moral
responsibility to ensure that this war is not fought with a
minimalist mind-set, or with an eye toward the Washington
political clock. I continue to support the President's decision
to surge in Afghanistan. As we are seeing in Helmand, the
additional forces are having an impact and demonstrating that
we can win this conflict.
In 2007, Admiral Mike Mullen told this committee that ``In
Afghanistan, we do what we can, in Iraq, we do what we must.''
When it comes to resourcing our efforts in Afghanistan, I
remain concerned that we are not doing everything we must in
order to ensure that General McChrystal and his commanders on
the battlefield have the time, space and resources they need to
succeed.
Let me be clear, I have the utmost confidence that General
McChrystal and his troops will get the mission done. My concern
is that the minimalist approach being advocated from some in
Washington raises the risk and increases casualties.
The ``30,000 troop cap'' put in place by this
Administration was a decision based on political
considerations--not mission calculus. The unfortunate result is
that it is sending the wrong signal to our commanders and
forcing military planners to make difficult tradeoff decisions
between combat troops and key enablers. I am particularly
concerned that we are underresourcing force protection
capabilities. These lifesaving combat enablers--and others--
were already underresourced prior to the President's troop
surge.
It is my understanding that there continues to be a serious
indirect fire threat to U.S. and coalition Forward Operating
Bases (FOBs) in Afghanistan, yet the current force protection
systems that protect FOBs in Iraq are not deployed to protect
FOBs in Afghanistan. This is disconcerting, especially given
the fact that we have evidence that such capabilities have
saved hundreds of lives in Iraq. In March, I raised similar
concerns to General Petraeus during the CENTCOM posture
hearing.
As I understand it, the timeline looks something like this:
LIn July 2009--CENTCOM validated Joint Urgent
Operational Need (JUON) for Sense, Warn, and Response
capability for Operation Enduring Freedom;
LIn August 2009--the Office of the Secretary of
Defense directed the Army to act on the JUON;
LIn October 2009--Congress approved reprogramming
action in direct support of the JUON; and
LIn March 2010--General Petraeus told this
committee that they were exploring the use of contractors to
meet some of the requirements included in the JUON.
Today, I'd like our witnesses to explain what modifications
have been made to the original JUON and why these changes were
made. Why are we addressing this particular force protection
shortfall differently in Afghanistan than in Iraq?
Specifically, why are we deploying contractors instead of
military personnel? It has been almost a year since the JUON
was validated? Is there even a contract in place yet to field
this capability? It is my understanding that if we would have
used military personnel like we did in Iraq, this capability
would already be over in Afghanistan protecting lives.
While I have focused on the impact of the ``troop cap'' on
the fielding of certain key enablers, this ``cap'' becomes more
problematic when you consider that some of our NATO allies are
not meeting their commitments and others will be withdrawing
their forces from southern Afghanistan. I would like our
witnesses to address the statement made in the 1230 report that
the redeployment of Dutch and Canadian forces in 2010 and 2011
will create demands for additional forces in the near future.
How will we mitigate this 4,700 gap in southern Afghanistan if
there is a ``cap''? Yesterday, it was announced that the U.S.
will be deploying 850 more soldiers as a stopgap measure to
fill vacancies for training security forces. What other gaps
exist?
Further, as Admiral Mullen's comments suggest, there was a
time when many thought of the two wars as a struggle for
resources, resulting in the ``haves'' and ``have nots''--Iraq
was the ``haves'' and Afghanistan was the ``have nots.'' My
suspicion is that the mentality of the ``have nots'' may be
impacting how commanders are employing the resources that they
do have in Afghanistan. For example, in Iraq, there was a
capability called Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify,
Neutralize). This task force was responsible for killing or
capturing over 3,000 insurgents as they were trying to put in
IEDs. Basically, turning the job of emplacing of IEDs into a
suicide mission.
In Afghanistan, they are standing up a similar Task Force
ODIN capability. However, it is my understanding that this
capability is being used differently than it was in Iraq.
Instead of being used specifically to go after IED emplacers,
it is being incorporated into the ``big picture'' ISR
requirement. I would like to hear from our witnesses why we are
not adopting the lessons we learned and employing Task Force
ODIN in Afghanistan in the same way that we used it in Iraq. As
we know, IED attacks are a significant threat to our forces in
Afghanistan, causing the most civilian and military casualties
in Afghanistan. Is the approach in Afghanistan a result of the
tactical decisions being made by the commanders or is it the
result of the issue of the ``have nots'' mentality and
signaling from Washington to operate under the ceilings you've
been given.
Lastly, I have raised concerns that the emphasis in our
strategy appears to be on ending the conflict--rather than
winning. With all of the President's major domestic policy
announcements, speeches and events, he has a pretty
straightforward formula he uses to win over public support.
When it comes to Afghanistan, I wish he would do the same and
would use words like ``victory'' and ``winning'' more rather
than ``transition'' and ``redeployment.'' With that said, it is
not clear to me that this Administration has defined the
conditions or criteria for transition. I hope to get a better
understanding today on what ``transition'' exactly means. How
do you explain the transition to the Afghans, to the enemy, and
to our forces on the ground? What conditions have to exist and
what criteria will be used to conclude that a district is ready
for it to transition to the Afghans for security
responsibility?
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