[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
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THE CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 30, 2010
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
ADAM SMITH, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JIM COOPER, Tennessee THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Jeff Cullen, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, November 30, 2010, The Crisis in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo: Implications for U.S. National Security.......... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, November 30, 2010....................................... 29
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2010
THE CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats
and Capabilities............................................... 1
WITNESSES
Dagne, Ted, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research
Service........................................................ 3
Komorowski, Adam, Regional Head of Operations, Africa Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) International............................. 7
Prendergast, John, Former Director of African Affairs, National
Security Council............................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dagne, Ted................................................... 38
Komorowski, Adam............................................. 54
Miller, Hon. Jeff............................................ 34
Prendergast, John............................................ 44
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 30, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Ms. Sanchez. The subcommittee will now come to order.
Good afternoon. We meet today to discuss the ongoing crisis
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and examine the related
implications for U.S. national security.
Within Africa the Democratic Republic of Congo has always
held strategic importance, due to its large size and central
location, as well, of course, all its natural resources. For
decades the Congo has experienced varying degrees of political
instability and violence, and it is estimated that more than 5
million people have died there due to preventable disease and
war-related causes. The violence is additionally troubling
because of the high degree of gender-based and sexual violence,
which appears to have become frighteningly commonplace there.
In the midst of this violence the Congo has been the site
of one of the largest and most expensive United Nations [U.N.]
peacekeeping missions in the world. Changes in this U.N.
mission are on the horizon, and the Congolese government
recently asked for a gradual withdrawal of the U.N.
peacekeeping force that is there.
Nearly 1,500 U.N. peacekeeping troops have been withdrawn
since May of this year. And since the Congo will also host
presidential and legislative elections in November of 2011, I
think that the time is right for the U.S. and others to
consider how these changes would impact security and stability
in the region and to prepare accordingly.
With its porous borders, its weak institutions and its
close proximity to East African countries, such as Uganda and
Sudan, transnational terrorist threats should not be ruled out
when we seek to understand U.S. national security concerns
associated with the Congo and with the Great Lakes region. This
point is critical to our subcommittee, which deals with
terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities. And
although few transnational terrorist threats have been directly
linked to the Congo, Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have had a
presence in neighboring East Africa for almost 20 years. And
the recent attacks in Kampala, Uganda, this past July remind us
of how linked these issues have become.
The Department of Defense [DOD] has been active in Africa
and within the Congo and neighboring countries. Through our
U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM], the United States has worked to
improve the capacity of the Congolese military, and it has
sought to develop an army that is accountable to the Congolese
people. More specifically, our Special Operations Forces have
been focused on training, teaching and mentoring the Congolese
army and have worked to create a model battalion that can in
turn train and professionalize the rest of the Congolese Army.
So I am pleased that one of the major goals and components
of U.S. training and assistance has been to improve the human
rights practices of that Congolese army. And with this in mind,
I am really thrilled about the hearing today.
Unfortunately, I won't be able to stay the entire time. I
have asked Mr. Smith when I leave to take over, and I know this
is a topic that he is incredibly interested in also.
So I thank the witnesses for being before us.
And Mr. Conaway, from the Republican side, hello.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And the ranking member has an outstanding opening statement
to put in the record. I would, rather than prove to you that my
third grade teacher taught me to read aloud, I will ask
unanimous consent to introduce it into the record and get right
to the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Ms. Sanchez. So be it. Great.
So we will move forward. And today we have three witnesses
before us.
Let me make sure that I have your names correct, gentlemen.
We are fortunate to have a panel of three experts. First,
we will hear from Mr. Ted Dagne, an expert in African Affairs
at the Congressional Research Service. Then we will hear from
John Prendergast, the former director of African affairs at the
National Security Council and co-founder of the non-
governmental organization The Enough Project that seeks to
raise awareness and develop policy solutions that prevent
genocide and crimes against humanity in the Congo and in the
region. And, lastly, we are joined by Adam Komorowski of the
Mines Advisory Group [MAG], an international NGO [Non-
Governmental Organization] that works to limit the spread of
illicit weapons used by illegally armed groups in the region.
Thank you for appearing before the subcommittee and
discussing this critically important topic. And I believe we
will adhere to the 5-minute rule, which means you can tell us
whatever you want, summarize your statements within 5 minutes
apiece, and then we will go to questions. And we will be under
the 5-minute rule for the members of the committee also.
So we will start with Mr. Dagne, please.
STATEMENT OF TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Dagne. Chairwoman Sanchez, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before your committee.
I have a longer statement for the record. I will simply
summarize my statement focused on the rebel groups and their
activities and if there are any linkages to international or
original terrorist organizations.
But to give you an overview briefly of the Congo, the Congo
has been in political humanitarian turmoil for the past, not
decade, for the past at least four decades. This is in large
part due I think to neglect and to the government's inability,
successive governments' inability to govern in a democratic
way.
When I talk about neglect, it is basically the main source,
the root cause of the problem. For many Congolese governments
over the years and political leaders Kinshasa was for them the
country, not Goma, not Kisangani, no other places. But the
other important thing to point out is that the government in
power often provides the benefits to those who are close to
them and not to the people.
To give you an example, back in the mid 1990s, 1996, I went
to Goma, the place where the two major wars started, with a
congressional delegation. That was the first liberated town in
1996. And I met Laurent Kabila, who would become president a
year later. And I asked him, he was in a mansion, lush green
lawns, gold-plated sofas, you name it. Outside, no electricity,
not a single paved road, and people dependent on food aid.
I asked him, I said, ``aren't you concerned that you live
in this mansion while your people outside are still
suffering?''
His response was, ``I am their leader; when I become
president, things will change.'' Things did not change. There
was more war, poverty and suffering for the Congolese people.
I don't want to give you, you know, this picture of a Congo
in a total chaos. I think you find, over the past at least
seven, eight years, some relative stability in other parts of
Congo, and the political conditions have improved
significantly, but not for eastern Congo.
You had an agreement in 2003 whereby the major rebel groups
were incorporated into the political process. You had elections
that were held in 2006, and the next one is expected in 2011, a
year from now.
But I think what is important to point out is that the
Congo crisis wasn't simply a crisis for the Congolese, but it
was for the entire region. In fact, in the 90s, we used to
refer to it as Africa's Third World War because you had over
half a dozen African countries involved in the Congolese
conflict on one side or the other.
Over the past several years, things have changed and
relationships between the Congolese government and that of
their neighbors. Rwanda, once considered enemy number one by
Congo, they are now allies. And in fact, in 2009, they
conducted a joint military offensive against some of the rebel
groups internally.
But the most important thing to point out is that the
Congolese problem is tied to the existence of rebel groups, or
we call them negative groups, who do not really have a
political agenda, but some of them basically embrace the idea
of terrorizing the civilian population. The main targets have
been civilian population. I will go through some of them, some
of the main groups.
The first one I would say is the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda [FDLR]. It is a Rwandese rebel group. The
leadership of the FDLR consist of those who belong to what we
used to refer to as the Interahamwe militia, the militia that
carried out the genocide in 1994, and the former Rwandese army
leadership. They have been in operation in eastern Congo for
over a decade and a half. Their main objective is to terrorize
the civilian population, particularly the Tutsi, and also to
hopefully overthrow the government of Rwanda, their main
operation from Congo.
The other group is the National Congress for the Defense of
the People [CNDP]. This is a Congolese group with some Rwandese
involved. This group has also been operational in eastern Congo
for several years. Their main objective, they claim, was to
defend the Tutsi against the FDLR. In 2009, the joint offensive
by the Rwandese and Congolese government was targeting the FDLR
and the CNDP.
The leader of the CNDP, Laurent Nkunda, was once an ally of
the Rwandese government. Shortly after the military offensive
began, he ran to the border with Rwanda expecting that he would
be welcomed, and instead, he was arrested, and he still is
under house arrest in Rwanda.
The CNDP no longer exists as a cohesive group. A number of
their fighters have been integrated into the Congolese army and
a number of others have basically functioned independently of
the organization.
The other group is the Allied Democratic Forces, ADF. That
is a Ugandan Muslim group operational near the border with
Uganda. They don't have a lot of military power, but one must
point out that the ADF had been engaged in terrorist activities
as early as the mid-1990s in Uganda. They have carried out a
number of bombings in Kampala and other places in 1998.
ADF is also the one organization that has a link now with
al-Shabaab, the Somali group that carried out the attack in
Kampala. In June, the Congolese forces launched an offensive
against the ADF, and they were able to obtain documentation and
equipment that linked them directly to al-Shabaab. That
relationship still exists, and a number of ADF operatives are
currently in custody suspected of the attack, the Kampala
attack, in July of this year.
The other group is the Mai Mai militia. It is a loosely
grouped set of militia. No political objectives, basically
carrying out attacks against civilian U.N. peacekeepers or
anyone they think that they can get money, food or whatever
benefits that they can get out of it.
The Lord's Resistance Army, another Rwandan group, is also
operational in Congo. But the LRA [Lord's Resistance Army] is
also very much operational in the Central African Republic and
in parts of South Sudan. It has been weakened over the past 5
years but remains a threat to the civilian population. No
linkage with international terrorist organizations at this
point.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Dagne, you are about 3 minutes over.
Mr. Dagne. I am done. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. I am sure we can come back to your
report and ask you specific questions with respect to it.
Our next speaker, Mr. Prendergast, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, FORMER DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks very much, Chairwoman Sanchez, and
the members of the subcommittee.
Like Mr. Dagne, I will submit my written testimony for the
record and make an oral statement.
I just returned from the Congo, from the eastern Congo, 48
hours ago. My team and I interviewed a number of women and
girls who recounted their tales of horror involving mass rape
and other terrible atrocities. Mass rape has become the
signature crime against humanity in this war. It is a war that
is driven primarily by the exploitation of minerals, as you
said in your opening statement, and they are minerals that
power our cell phones and our laptops that we all use every
day.
Now, unlike most of the conflicts that I have worked on for
the last 25 years in Africa, this one we have a direct
connection, a direct responsibility, because of our demand for
these minerals in the products that we use every day. So,
because of that direct link, we therefore have a potential
influence and a potential opportunity to help bring that war to
an end if we change that relationship between consumers and
producers on the ground there.
I don't want to give you a laundry list of things that the
United States should do. This isn't Afghanistan. This isn't
Iraq. We have very limited resources at this juncture in our
history.
So I want to focus on two things that I think, with U.S.
leadership and a small investment, that we could actually help
catalyze real change on the ground in the Congo and bring an
end to some of the most horrific violence that we have ever
seen on the face of the earth against women and girls.
These two things are mineral certification and Security
Sector Reform, SSR. Let's start with the latter one, with SSR.
The Congolese army, and Ted, Mr. Dagne, was talking a bit
about that, the Congolese army is the biggest--one of the
biggest sources of instability on the ground in human rights
violations in the country. So if we try to work around the army
in whatever we do as a government in our investments, we will
have no impact. We need to take the challenge of reforming that
army head-on.
And we should start with a major investment in
professionalization and training of the army in coordination
with other governments. In particular, we have this incredible
comparative advantage, I think, in military justice, and
AFRICOM could play a credible role in building that military
justice system. We have got to bring this state of impunity
that soldiers have on the ground in Congo to an end in some
way, shape or form. And you can begin to do that through the
infusion of resources and support and training for the justice
system within the army.
Until the army, I think, gets reformed, we are going to see
this violence, particularly sexual violence, remain at epidemic
levels.
Now, this isn't a novel idea. We have tried little bits and
pieces of army reform over the last decade. So what's
different? The critical difference, I think, is that we are
finally making efforts internationally to expose and undermine
the mafia networks that control the mineral smuggling
industries that end up exporting these minerals into the
products that we use.
Now, the military in the Congo is knee-deep in these mafia
networks, and until we address, therefore, until we address the
economic roots of the conflict, of violence, of state
dysfunction, we have no chance of building legitimate
government institutions, like a reformed military and police.
Now, the good news is that the U.S. Congress has taken the
lead in addressing these economic roots. For the first time in
Congo's history, we actually have efforts under way to try to
address that relationship of how we extract Congo's rich
natural resource base.
Section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform Bill Act deals--
dealt directly with the link between the violence in the Congo
and our electronics products and other things we use every day.
The next steps, now that that bill has passed and President
Obama has signed it, are to ensure that the SEC [Securities and
Exchange Commission] regulations that are implement--that will
demonstrate or that will modify how that bill is implemented,
those SEC regulations have to be strong. And Members of
Congress have a great role to play in ensuring that that is the
case.
And for the U.S., particularly led by Secretary Clinton,
who visited Congo and has repeatedly talked about the
importance of it to her as an issue for her, for her
leadership, is for the U.S. to take the lead in creating an
internationally negotiated certification, mineral
certification, scheme, which will involve the industry, involve
governments and civil society organizations, just like the
blood diamonds.
You know, ten years ago, when governments internationally
worked together with the diamond industry and created a system
to weed out blood diamonds, that gave people in Sierra Leone a
chance and Liberia and Angola a chance, those wars were over in
two years, all three of them.
This is the same thing. If we deal with those economic
roots, we have a chance then to work on all the kinds of things
that this committee has a direct role to play and,
particularly, army reform.
So these are the two keys: Deal with the economic roots of
violence and build a legitimate security sector in Congo, so
that the army becomes a protector, not a predator, to the
people in the Congo. If the U.S. does these two things, I would
argue, the odds for peace in the Congo increase dramatically.
It is not an exaggeration to say that millions of Congolese
lives hang in the balance in terms of what we do or don't do in
the Congo.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast.
I am going to turn this over now to my very able colleague,
Mr. Smith.
But I have just a quick question. Mr. Prendergast, when you
mentioned mafia network, were you using mafia as an adjective
or as a noun?
Mr. Prendergast. That is a great question. I think it is
more of an adjective describing the nature of the illicit
violent extractive networks that are part and parcel of getting
those minerals out through the region into the international
marketplace.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Great. That is what I thought. But I
just wanted to make sure you weren't going after the Sicilians.
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you. Thanks for that clarification.
Mr. Smith. Sorry, Mr. Komorowski. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADAM KOMOROWSKI, REGIONAL HEAD OF OPERATIONS,
AFRICA MINES ADVISORY GROUP (MAG) INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Komorowski. Thank you very much.
As per the previous speakers, I will provide you with a
brief summary of my submitted written testimony.
Thank you very much for inviting me to address the
subcommittee on behalf of the Mines Advisory Group on issues
relating to the conflict landscape of the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
In the testimony, I am going to cover a number of
operational issues and draw on the six years of experience and
learning that we have gathered from our work on the ground.
As mentioned before, DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
has expansive porous borders. To put that into context, it
shares a total of 10,730 kilometers of border with nine
countries, many of which are experiencing or have experienced
significant instability.
Across the country and in the east of Congo in particular,
ongoing conflicts and tribal allegiances mean that official
political borders with other countries can become very blurred.
Conflicts regularly flare up in border areas, with easy access
to arms exacerbating and, in many cases, fueling violence.
Armed groups, as, again, already referenced, from
neighboring countries, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda
continue to operate out to the largely ungoverned spaces in
eastern Congo. The trafficking and easy availability of small
arms and light weapons substantially contributes to the
continued instability and the armament of these groups.
Furthermore, a recent UNDP [United Nations Development
Program] report estimates that there are approximately 300,000
weapons in civilian hands in eastern Congo. However, the
quantity of arms currently in the hands of armed rebel groups
operating in this region is unknown. Both the U.N. Group of
Experts on Congo and UNDP found that a significant number of
these weapons originally came from military stockpiles due to
thefts and seizures by armed groups, diversion of arms by
military officers, and desertion and demobilization of military
personnel.
Since 2007, with the support of donors, including the
Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement,
MAG has been involved in extensive weapons and ammunition
destruction activities. Over this period, we have destroyed 718
tons of ammunition and more than 107,000 small arms and light
weapons.
We believe that a cautious and pragmatic approach to
working with the army is absolutely essential to making
progress on the critical issues of weapons management and
disposal. MAG works in close collaboration with the FARDC
[Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo], taking
a consistent line of pragmatic engagements. And this strategic
decision has paid dividends to date in terms of the success of
our conventional weapons management and disposal program.
We coordinate with the military in several ways; at a
strategic level, through national norm setting and training,
cooperation in regards to the safe management of ammunition and
arms depots, coordination of ammunition and arms destruction,
and support to security sector reform.
The military is acutely aware that it does not have the
capacity to adequately manage its ammunition and arms
stockpiles. They understand the risk that poorly managed
stockpiles can pose to their own security, as well as to the
security of the civilian population. In recent years, the
military has experienced several explosive incidents in their
ammunition stockpiles which has resulted in hundreds of
casualties.
MAG also coordinates closely with the relevant Department
of Defense actors in the Congo, including relevant U.S. Embassy
personnel and AFRICOM, and we are currently exploring
opportunities to work further in conjunction with U.S.
deployments in regard to explosive ordnance disposal training
of military personnel.
We facilitate and support the Department of Defense's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency missions wherever possible
across all of our programs. And we believe that the long-term
presence we have established and the strong relations with
local, national and regional bodies and authorities provides us
with often unique access and opportunities for constructive and
collaborative work.
The example of Camp Ngashi in northwest Congo is a good
example of the threat posed by poorly managed stockpiles. In
June 2007, a military ammunitions stockpile exploded. The
initial explosion caused a huge fire which burned intensely for
at least six hours, setting off numerous subsequent large
explosions. The facility housed large- and small-scale weapons,
small-arms ammunition, different caliber mortars and rockets up
to high explosive aerial bombs. Ammunition was also ejected up
to three and a half kilometers outside of the camp. As a
consequence, three people were killed, around 100 injured, and
over 200 families displaced. Unexploded ordnance scattered
across the densely populated town, seriously damaging schools,
government and military facilities. MAG emergency response
teams were then dispatched to the area and tasked with
unexploded ordnance clearance, which took many further months.
Now, whilst the movement of arms across borders remains a
critical concern, there is substantial research concluding that
the majority of arms used by armed groups come from military
stockpiles. A recent report concluded that unless the Congolese
security forces significantly improve the effectiveness of
their stockpile management, the extent to which the current
arms embargo, which places no restrictions on arms acquisitions
by the FARDC, can maintain peace and stability in the region
will be limited. As such, securing and marking existing FARDC
armed stockpiles is as critical as is securing borders.
Based on our current operations, MAG is convinced that the
destruction of surplus arms, building a successful arms
management capacity and the necessary infrastructure in
armories, and the marking of operational arms with a unique
country code are central to curbing the illicit sale and
trafficking of weapons in the Congo.
In closing, I would like to thank the committee for its
time and the opportunity to present on our range of activities
and approaches to dealing with the unique challenges that this
vast and unstable country presents. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Komorowski can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Thank you all for your testimony.
I appreciate it, and I appreciate this committee and the
chairwoman agreeing to have this hearing.
I think one of the biggest issues that we are trying to
address here is to draw attention to the situation in the
eastern Congo. It does not get the publicity that some others
do. But as you gentlemen have very ably explained, it is a
huge, huge problem. It is probably the largest humanitarian
crisis in the world, given the suffering that has happened
there and continues to happen there. And yet it is not
something that is regularly discussed in Congress, much less in
the United States.
So what we are trying to do in the subcommittee in part is
draw attention to the problem and then find ways that we in
Congress and we in the U.S. can help to alleviate it. And I
think that is sort of the--it is sort of a bad news/good news.
Certainly you look at what has happened there in the last, you
know, four decades, you look at the violence in the area--I led
a delegation that stopped in Goma last year, and the violence
against women is I think the thing that stands out as the most
appalling, the rapes that are just accepted as a matter of
course. It is an overwhelmingly devastating thing to witness
and to see. But beyond that, you have all the violent gangs
roaming around, as Mr. Dagne explained. And it is a situation
that cries out for attention.
The good news is there are a lot of people over there who
are making a positive difference. I met with Heal Africa as one
of the NGOs that is working specifically on changing the
culture of rape. And that is really what it is. It is beyond
just the fact that there are some, you know, gangs roaming
around doing this. It is far too accepted by the general
population. And trying to change that and give the support to
the women necessary to change that culture is a very positive
thing.
And there are a lot of other NGOs that are actively
involved there. I have done work with the Eastern Congo
Initiative [ECI], which is focusing specifically on this region
and has laid out some pretty clear goals, two of which Mr.
Prendergast focused on. One is the conflict minerals issue;
second, being helped with security and governance but then also
continuing to provide our support for the elections that are
coming up to make sure they are done in a stable way and, you
know, make sure that we stay active in that region and get
involved by making sure that we maintain a regular envoy from
our State Department to the region, is the fourth goal that
they state. I think if we stay involved in that, we can truly
make a difference here. We can save lives, and we can turn this
region around.
Because the other thing that really struck me about this
region, it is a beautiful place. It is rich in natural
resources. Certainly the minerals you mentioned, but also
agriculture, the Great Lakes region is there. This is an area
that has massive potential for a very, very positive outcome
for the people of that region and for the world if we can just
help them realize it.
And then I do believe we have an interest beyond just the
humanitarian crisis. Certainly, the conflict minerals issue,
given the fact that we do purchase those items. But this
subcommittee's particular jurisdiction is on counterterrorism.
And the instability in a region opens the door for radical
extremist groups. And as Ms. Sanchez mentioned in her opening
statement, they are certainly recruiting in that area, even if
they have not been that active.
If this region explodes into instability, it is bad for
global stability and bad for United States national security
interests. So that is why we are trying to pay attention to the
region.
I want to ask specifically, Mr. Komorowski, to follow up on
the issue of the unsecured ammo dumps, what is being done and
what should be being done to help turn that situation around
and get better security on ammunitions?
Mr. Komorowski. Okay. Thank you for the question.
We as an organization have our efforts, and we are very
grateful for the support of the Office of Weapons Movement and
Abatement to do that. Fundamentally it is about engaging at
different levels. The perspective that I like to present and
that is key to our organization is an operational one. So we
work directly in Kinshasa with the FARDC, with a number of
high-ranking representatives, both to look at the depots that
they have there, and we also have teams that then work across
the provinces, both doing destruction and also doing essential
armory reconstruction work, as well as basic training----
Mr. Smith. Can I ask--sorry to interrupt, is this a problem
where you have got depots that have just wound up being, you
know, abandoned, neglected, or is this a situation where they
are ones that the Congo is trying to maintain, they just don't
have sufficient security around it, or it sounds like both?
But.
Mr. Komorowski. Exactly, it is a mixture of both. The
definition sometimes of an armory or a cache or a stockpile,
sometimes it is literally four walls, no roof, and then full to
the brim of various kinds of ammunition; mortars, rockets,
grenades, occasionally, and we do discover them, MANPADS [Man-
portable Air-defense Systems] as well.
Mr. Smith. Just left there by the government or, in some
cases, left there by rebel groups?
Mr. Komorowski. Frequently by rebel groups. And actually
they are often resupply points. And as mentioned, a number of
the groups, earlier today, such as the LRA, we have come across
a number of what we are told by the community--we work very
closely with the community to try and get a good insight into
the legacy, into the history, of what we are finding there. And
often they are our greatest source of information, directing us
to where we can find these sources of ammunition, unsecured
weapons, and so forth.
But there is also, and it is recognized a lot within the
reporting, not just that which we provide as an organization,
by a lot of advocacy groups that are active on the ground, that
the insecurity of existing military stockpiles is a key problem
as well. Small Arms Survey recognized in their yearbook, not
for 2010 but 2009, the diversion from stocks, from official
stocks, often police, often army, is one of the key providers,
some of the fuel to the ongoing fire. So the nature of them is
very diverse. We work in our own way as an organization with
the resources we have.
To come back to another point of the question, what should
be done? I think it is, as Mr. Prendergast mentioned, security
sector reform. This is a component of that. So it is about the
wider modalities of that as well. What we are doing is a part
of the puzzle. Obviously, we believe that it should be done
with greater coordination and with greater breadth. But it is
only a part of the picture. It does require the broader
elements of security sector reform if it is going to have a
long and lasting successful legacy.
Mr. Smith. I am out of time. I have more questions, but I
will come back to them after we get to the other members.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning--this
afternoon.
Mr. Prendergast, can you give me some sense of the scope of
minerals production? In other words, it would probably be a
different percentage for each of the discrete minerals, but how
big a part of the world's supply of these minerals is the
Congo, and just to help me understand the scope of what they
are doing?
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you for asking.
There are four particular minerals that come from eastern
Congo that bleed into the world supply that end up in all these
electronics products we are talking about. Gold is one of them.
And then there are what we call the three Ts: tin, tantalum,
and tungsten. Tin, my guess is around 10 or 15 percent of the
world supply, Congo. Tantalum is the big one. Because Australia
withdrew its exports from the market last year, began to stop
exporting, because they could not compete with the slave wages
and this kind of criminal network that produces the tantalum,
that exports the tantalum from Congo, the share of global, the
Congo's share of global supply skyrocketed somewhere in the
neighborhood of well over 50 percent. And then in terms of
Tungsten, it is probably another 10 or 15 percent.
So, in other words, there are lots of other suppliers, but
Congo, because it is so cheap, remains a favorite for the
refiners in Asia for buying these things.
Mr. Conaway. Any sense for what the gross revenues for the
bad guys represent?
Mr. Prendergast. It is so opaque. We have done some
assessments and started to look. I mean, the Congolese senate,
for example, did a significant report. They estimated it $2
billion a year. I think that is an overstatement. Hundreds of
millions of dollars accruing to the armed groups is a safe
estimate, but it is a wild guess, because there really is
almost no trade that goes on in the legitimate market.
Mr. Conaway. Ted, maybe you have got a sense of this. The
culture of rape or the weapon of choice of rape must result in
conceptions. What is the experience of those children once they
are born? Are they readily accepted into the mothers' families
or what--you know, we are going to be--you know, those started
15, 20 years ago. They are going to be reaching young adulthood
and that kind of thing. What has been the experience of the
children that result from those rapes? Or is it a big number?
Mr. Dagne. In the case of Congo, it is really very
difficult at this juncture to give you really an accurate
assessment of, you know, this generation of kids, you know,
growing up; are they accepted or rejected? But I can tell you,
in the region, and some of whom have carried out this rape and
attack, some of them came from Rwanda. During the genocide, a
number of the Tutsi were raped deliberately by the Hutus. And
there were tens and thousands of kids born. And I met a number
of them. And what is amazing is that--not only that society
accepted them, but senior government officials themselves
adopted deliberately those kids.
Mr. Conaway. OK.
Mr. Dagne. So, culturally, it is not like, you know, you
are born because of rape, and therefore, you are not accepted.
I haven't seen that.
Mr. Conaway. Good. OK.
In 2008, AFRICOM helped plan and lead Operation Lightning
Thunder, which was a multi-country attack on, I guess, the
Lord's Resistance Army. Can you give me some sense of did that
work? Did it help, Mr. Prendergast, to professionalize in some
small way the Congolese military as they work alongside
AFRICOM's folks? And could it be expanded, or should it be
expanded to go after some of these other targeted groups?
Mr. Prendergast. It did not work. There was clearly some
advance notice. Joseph Kony got out in time. The leadership of
the LRA remains untouched since then.
President Obama has just released his plan, as a result of
the congressional bill that was passed this year on the Lord's
Resistance Army. The bill is insufficient. It is inadequate to
deal with the serious security threat that LRA poses to people
of Southern Sudan, Central African Republic and the Congo.
And so our view is that there needs to be, as we look at
this plan that the President has put forward, and particularly
as Congress in its oversight capacity looks at it, particularly
this committee looks at it, we need to really take a very hard
look at how it is implemented so that resources are provided to
give a fighting chance to the militaries in the region that are
on the front lines of trying to contain this significant
threat, because up until now, what we have provided has been
grossly insufficient and incommensurate to the damage done to
civilian populations.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
I have a second round as well, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your holding this hearing.
A couple of years ago, the National Geographic had on its
cover a picture of poached and murdered gorillas. And
incidentally, in the article, they mentioned that 5 million
human beings had been killed in the Congo. That was not the
cover story. And I am all for gorillas, but, you know, for
Americans not to understand that this has been the bloodiest
conflict on earth is horrifying. Because as Samantha Power
pointed out in her book, you know, genocides happen more
frequently than we like to admit.
I think the frustration that I feel is, what can you do to
solve it? If you read a book like Dambisa Moyo's ``Dead Aid,''
she pretty much condemns pretty much all government-to-
government aid. And maybe she is wrong. Maybe she has an overly
pessimistic viewpoint, but we have seen a lot of the
kleptocracy. And I think Mr. Dagne points out his visit with
Kabila in 1996, the gold-plated sofas and Jacuzzis, and you
know, little of that help trickles down to the average people.
Unfortunate. With Mr. Smith, I have been to Goma. It is
unimaginable the conditions that must exist out in the jungle.
So I think what we are searching for here are constructive
paths to take. You know, this humanitarian operation by MONUSCO
[United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo] may have done more to harm
the U.N.'s reputation than any other undertaking it has ever
involved in. This is their largest single commitment, and you
know, it is problems galore. So how do we solve this problem?
How do we even know simple things like who we are talking
to? You know, recently in Afghanistan, we thought we were
apparently dealing with the top-ranking member of the Taliban.
It turned out to be an imposter. How do we even know elemental
things like that?
And when it comes to identifying and shutting off or
appropriately regulating coltan or these other minerals it is--
are the Chinese better at figuring out how to secure supplies,
because the last time we were there, I think we heard that they
had engaged in some sort of long-term contract arrangement and
promised to build a road. You know, what is going on here? What
could guide us as policymakers to make a constructive
difference? The ball is in your court. Anybody?
Mr. Prendergast.
Mr. Prendergast. I think there is a huge opportunity here
now. I mean, if--we could throw billions of dollars at this
problem, we could throw tens of thousands of peacekeeping
troops, it wouldn't make a difference in a place as large as
Congo with the history of the crisis there.
What has to be done is to change the incentive structure
that exists there now. The current incentive is for violent,
illegal extraction of minerals. If you have the biggest guns
and you are willing to use terrible atrocities as your primary
military tactic, you can secure either access to mining or the
smuggling routes and tax the smuggling routes along the way and
smuggle these minerals out of there; that is how you make money
in the Congo today. That is what fuels the war. And the end
markets are us. So that is the inescapable conclusion.
So what has to happen if anything is really going to change
there is you have got to flip the incentive structure. If the
world demand for these minerals says, okay, we are only going
to buy minerals that are peacefully and legally mined, then it
creates a different incentive structure for the people on the
ground. I don't see how else we can alter that physical
dynamic, because we simply don't have the resources or the
troops internationally to make the kind of security--to change
the security equation on the ground in the same way that our
ability to affect how people make money, how that gravy train
gets serviced, as we can if we push for these SEC regulations
to be strong and we push for a real certification scheme like
we did with the blood diamonds.
Mr. Cooper. How long do we wait before we know whether that
has had an effect or not?
Mr. Prendergast. It is in our hands really. I mean, the SEC
is going to promulgate its regulations in the next couple of
months. It has already shaken up the industry. It has shaken up
the armed groups. People are trying to figure out--I mean, I
just literally came from there. Everyone is affected by it.
They are trying to figure out what the SEC is going to do.
Every minerals trader, every military official that I talk to
knows exactly what is going on in Washington.
In 150 years, go back to King Leopold, go back to Mobutu
Sese Seko. Nobody ever tried to deal with how the world was
relating to Congo in terms of our extraction of one of the
richest natural resource bases in the world. And we wonder why
this country is completely and totally in crisis for the last
century and a half. It is because of the relationship.
Now Congress has made this first step. We have got to back
it up; the executive branch has to back it up with real
leadership internationally.
Mr. Cooper. So this is a celebratory hearing because we
solved the problem if we have proper enforcement?
Mr. Prendergast. We have identified the problem for the
first time, and Congress has taken the first step in moving
towards what could be possibly a catalytic approach to
addressing the solution. I really actually think, in 25 years
of visiting, working and living in the Congo, I think this is
the first time anyone has taken it seriously, and I applaud
this Congress for doing so.
Mr. Cooper. Do the other witnesses agree with this
optimistic assessment?
Mr. Dagne. I have a slightly different approach to this.
Yes, it may contribute to a certain degree to bring about an
end to the resources that some of the rebels or the commanders
use.
But, at the same time, you have to remember that what is
killing Congolese, is raping Congolese, is not the AK-47, is
not the conflict mineral resources; it is the culture. It is
the ideology that is doing it.
If you take away all the AK-47s, all the ammunitions, they
would still rape people. They would still use the machetes.
They would still have instability.
We have to start to think out of the box and say, how is it
that we can help? At the same time, we can't be the solution to
the problem in the region. The region itself, the country
itself, must work to find a solution. We can help, but we
cannot solve.
Mr. Smith. I think, if I could, I want to get to Mr.
Murphy, but I think my comment would be here, no there is no
one solution here.
But I do think that going after the money that funds the
rebel groups will make an enormous difference. And as you
mentioned, when we went after the, you know, blood diamonds,
conflict diamonds, that had a distinct impact in the region
where that was put in place. You know, the purpose of this
hearing isn't to say that we have the idea and it is going to
automatically solve the problem. We are looking to make
progress. This is one big area where we can make progress.
The bigger area that has been mentioned is reliable
security and governance. And that is where the efforts of many
of the NGOs that are working with the local population, this
has been ungoverned space for a long time in which various
criminal elements and rebel groups have filled the vacuum. So
getting decent security and governance is also a critical step.
But this is not an insignificant move to take some of the
money out of the equation if we do it successfully.
With that, I will turn it over to Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I actually was hoping to dig in a little bit more, Mr.
Prendergast, on some of the parallels with what we saw with the
blood diamonds and some of the differences, whether they are
cultural differences, that we may see in eastern Congo versus
what we saw in Sierra Leone or Liberia or Angola or other
places.
Can you give just us a little more color in terms of what
we need to be doing? What we can do at this point--you talked
about us weighing in the with the SEC, but what should we be
thinking about as that is going on?
And then, Mr. Dagne, if you will comment on maybe some of
the cultural differences that you see between some of the
places where we have seen some success with restricting access
to mineral wealth and conflict and what might be different as
we try to think of solutions in this instance.
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks, Congressman.
I think, you know, that the solution, and I want to second
Congressman Smith's point--I mean, this is just--this is a
catalytic element of an overall set of recommendations. You
mentioned the ECI initiative. There are all kinds of issues
that we have to address in Congo. This is, we think, just one
of the crucial ones that, as a prerequisite, helps to build a
momentum towards helping to solve a lot of the problem.
The key, I think, Congressman Murphy, is certification. And
that is, you look at and try to draw the analogy with the West
African issues related to blood diamonds. When there was a
decision that we would no longer purchase the diamonds that
were actually helping to fuel the terrible violence in Angola,
Sierra Leone, and Liberia, then there was a long process. It
didn't just overnight. We had the United States, Britain and
many other countries work with regional countries and the
companies, particularly De Beers, and civil society groups that
have a vested interest in working on the publicity around the
terrible atrocities recurring, they came up with a
certification scheme that eventually created a way for you to
weed out the bad from the good. And that has now, 10 years
later, led to three countries that are at peace that have, you
know, fairly well-functioning diamond markets that help
contribute to development.
Mr. Murphy. Do we have a partner in eastern Congo who could
be the kind of certifiable producer of any of these minerals,
or is it all so much chaos that you don't even have anybody
that could meet a certification process?
Mr. Prendergast. That is the good news, is that the region
has begun to brace itself for the fact that major change has to
occur. So a regionally led initiative, and I will defer--I bow
to Mr. Dagne's point about you got to defer--because at the end
of the day, if the region isn't buying in, forget it, is this
international certification effort that has begun with the
Great Lake states. So the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, a number of
states have begun a process. The acronym is ICGLR
[International Conference on the Great Lakes Region]. And they
have put together the bare bones, the essentials, of a
certification scheme in principle. Now they need a dance
partner. Now they need the United States and other countries
that are end users of these minerals to come in very strongly
and work with the governments in constructing as airtight a
system as possibly can be created in this very difficult
environment, get the industry to buy in, everyone from Apple to
Hewlett Packard to Dell. All these companies suddenly realize
that they can't continue with business as usual because of the
bill, because of the Wall Street reform bill and the section on
this thing. They want to be involved in this.
So it just requires somebody to take the lead. And we think
that the United States could play that critical role because we
are the biggest, in gross dollar terms, consumers of the end
user--end users of the product--of the minerals that are being
produced there.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Dagne, in terms of some of the parallels we
are talking about with the blood diamonds, are the cultural
issues parallel, and are there some lessons from what we saw
that maybe worked in some of the other places? Or are the
culture issues very different and not very useful in terms of
things to learn about the approach here?
Mr. Dagne. I think what I meant by cultural is not to
suggest that this is strictly a Congolese or Rwandese cultural
issue. I am talking about the culture of violence, the ideology
of violence, which is something new that we are dealing with.
In comparison to the other regions, definitely you had a
cultural violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia and Angola. But
if one goes back and looks at, you know, how did we end those
wars, is it because of the blood diamond, ending the blood? No.
We have to be practical and say, those bloody wars dragged
sometimes for over 20 years, and at the end, it was a
negotiated settlement, whether it is with the MPLA [Movimento
Popular de Libertacao de Angola] and UNITA [Uniao Nacional para
a Independencia Total de Angola] in Angola or Sierra Leone or
for Liberia.
I think, when I suggested, you know, that the conflict
mineral legislation and certification process would help, but I
think if we put our hope in that, you know, we are going to be
disappointed because before the diamonds, before the gold, you
had violence there; even in their absence, you would have
violence.
The other thing also we need to take into consideration is
that the certification process only applies to American
companies. Who is going to prevent China or any other company
from doing business? That will continue.
The other important thing to remember is also, what are the
impacts on the locals, not the rebels, not the, you know,
corrupt commanders, but the millions of Congolese who depend on
these resources for centuries? Do we have an alternative
mechanism for them when the decision that we take could affect
their livelihood, you know? Is there a mechanism in place to
say, okay, here are the alternatives, this is what we are going
to do?
I think the important thing to think about is, you know,
the countries in the region itself, they have been doing a
number of things. We need to be able to coordinate those
activities in order to have a maximum impact. Look at the
decision of Rwanda and Congo just a year and a half ago to
jointly move against the negative forces. They were able to
reduce their, you know, effectiveness significantly and
dislodge them from a number of areas.
Now, if you have a more coordinated effort like this, you
take away all these negative forces, some of whom can be
integrated into society; over 20,000 civilians returned just in
1 year because they were being held hostage by those negative
forces. Then you need to have an infrastructure in place to
govern so that the basic necessities for the people can be
provided, including security.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
And I think we would certainly agree that there needs to be
a more comprehensive solution.
I do think the money drives a fair amount of it. And I
guess what you would try to do is you would try to set up,
through the certification process, a way for legitimate people
to get access to that. It is not the entire issue, but I think
money drives a lot of this. Well, it certainly drives the
criminal activity. But I think also it gives the resources to
the rebel groups out there to sustain them. They have to find
resources.
I mean, this is true of any insurgency. Cutting off the
source of that money is at least a critical first step.
But I totally agree with Mr. Dagne that it is not
sufficient in and of itself.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You mentioned that the--we caught the head of the CNDP and
tried to get back into Rwanda, and since then, that
organization has ceased to be a functioning organization. It
may have splintered. And this committee is terrorism and
unconventional threats. We have got some experience with
cutting the heads off of snakes. Should that be a focus as
well, to go after the leadership of these other negative
groups, as you called them?
Mr. Dagne. I think it is important because of the
leadership of some of these rebel groups, and I think I would
describe them also as terrorist groups. Now, they are not being
described as terrorist groups because they are active in
Africa, but the act that they carry out, according to any legal
definition, is terror against the civilians. And some of the
leadership are here in the United States.
Mr. Conaway. So the same kind of a--well, let me ask this,
Mr. Prendergast or others. If we, as we should, deal with the
certification of minerals, what is next? Where do these
negative groups, rebel groups, terrorists, which I agree with
you, Mr. Dagne, what do they do next? I mean, is it--they never
just lay down, because it is far easier to hold a gun on
somebody and make them work for you than it is to work
yourself. And so, if we were able to effectively control that
avenue, is there something else they pivot to that we then have
to start Whack-A-Mole there?
Mr. Prendergast. I think that, you know, the three main
groups that Ted talked about in his testimony, the FDLR, the
ADF and the LRA, the three main sort of foreign insurgent
groups inside on Congolese territory, these three need to be
subject to intensified counterinsurgency operations involving
the governments in the region, involving the peacekeeping
forces in the region.
The efforts so far, again, we have already talked about the
LRA, led by the Ugandan government, has eroded the LRA's
capacities. In other words, they used to be a fairly large, in
the thousands, tens of thousands, over 10,000 fighters; now
they are a band, a criminal band of a few hundred. They still
do terrible damage in the places that they operate, but they
have been eroded significantly by counterinsurgency operations.
Now is the time to finish them off, to really cut that head of
Joseph Kony and to find him and take him out the theater in
some way or another.
With the FDLR, which is the Rwandan militia that came
across the border, as Ted talked about in the history, during
1994, during the genocide, the core capacity has been eroded
dramatically. I mean, in 1994, there were 80,000 to 100,000
armed elements from the Rwandan--who committed--who perpetrated
the Rwandan genocide, were running around the eastern Congo.
Now there's probably 4,000, maybe less. I mean, the numbers are
wild estimates, 3,500 to 4,000.
And their capacity has been eroded dramatically because of
counterinsurgency operations, largely driven by the Rwandan
government, though the humanitarian implications of these
operations has been dramatically negative for the people of the
Congo. Now that there are those 3,000 or 4,000 left, we need to
target those operations, go after the international support
that they have, as Ted said, and really find and hone the
elements of the regional militaries and the peacekeeping forces
to go after those elements to try to bring them down.
Mr. Conaway. Yeah, one of the tools that we use on the
existing terrorist groups is we go after their banking
relationships and those things. These organizations are
sophisticated enough they are using the banking systems to
facilitate cash-flow funds, or would that be an effective tack
as well?
Mr. Prendergast. It is very different I think because of
the mineral smuggling. Because the FDLR has been----
Mr. Conaway. So they are cash basis?
Mr. Prendergast [continuing]. Ensconced in these areas and
they are able to smuggle, particularly gold, through Uganda. I
think that, we just need to figure out how we can get at that
source, because as Congressman Smith said, if we don't arrest
the money issue, you know, we are just going to be whistling
Dixie.
Mr. Conaway. Give me a sense of what--you said Americans
are the bulk of the end users. But as China and India's
economies grow, they will surpass us at some point. Give me a
sense of what the percentage is of manufacturers based in
China, India, and the United States. Can we get a sense of
where that split comes? Because I agree that getting China--
India maybe less so--but getting China to agree to these kind
of sanctions may be a little more difficult.
Mr. Prendergast. A terribly important question. And I just
want to correct something that Ted said; the legislation that
Congress passed was not just for American companies. It was
anybody who wants to import into the United States. Now,
because in the electronics arena, we have the highest end
products in terms of consumers, China is not going to say, Hey,
because we want to maintain some supplier who supplies 10
percent of the tin from Congo, we are not going to export to
the United States anymore? That is not going to happen. They
are already complying. They are trying to figure out how the
smelters based in China and other countries can comply.
So I think as long as we are affecting through the
legislation and implementation, those people that want to
import into the United States and work with our European allies
to create similar legislative frameworks so that we are talking
about a fairly large consumer base that is rejecting the
purchase of minerals that come from violent and illegally
extracted sources, I think we are going to have a chance of
altering the entire marketplace, including India and China.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Can you talk a little bit about the U.N. mission
there? It is not well thought of by the local population in
terms of its efficacy because they don't have a lot of
authority, so their presence there is not thought of as having
been that helpful, based on the people that I talked to when I
was there. On the other hand, you know, there is concern, you
know, if you simply pull them out, again, you are leaving a
vacuum.
How effective has the U.N. been? And, more importantly,
going forward, what is the best course of action in terms of
maintaining the mission or changing it or getting rid of it?
And whoever. Mr. Komorowski, you haven't spoken in a while.
First crack there.
Mr. Komorowski. Thank you. Yeah, it takes more than a
rebranding from MONUC [United Nations Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo] to MONUSCO [United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo] to solve the problem. I absolutely
endorse many of the points you made there.
I think there are a couple of points. There is no doubt
that, to date, the perception--and it is a bit more than
perception--the reality on the ground is that this force varies
in size, but as has already been mentioned, one of the largest,
if not the largest, standing U.N. force in the world to date.
That is still not adequate for the kind of scale of--the
physical geographical sale that we are talking about. But maybe
there is a slightly different problem. It is not so much the
numbers, but it is the focus. It is the targeting and also,
bluntly, the terms of engagement.
Mr. Smith. At the most basic level, what do they do? They
are there. What is their mission? What do they do?
Mr. Komorowski. They are there to provide security for the
civilian population, with varying degrees of success. I will
happily say one point for the record, the many times I have
been there, I have met with many different members of the U.N.
on the ground and of MONUSCO. Often, there is a real issue with
the quality of the composition of the forces on the ground.
They are not coming from some of the nations with the finest
militaries that can provide them, and often so, you are not
looking at individuals on the ground who are particularly
thrilled at their mission status.
We talked earlier about incentives and incentivizing,
whether it be through the mineral supply chain or whether it be
through security sector reform. We haven't touched on DDR
[Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration]. The same
exists, I think, for that force on the ground. They are not
properly equipped to do the job, but I also think it is about
their tasking. And oftentimes, they are not in the right areas,
and frequently as well, their terms of engagement and when they
are going to go. The times where they are most needed, their
remit does not allow them to get sufficiently engaged. I think
that is probably as directly as I would put it.
Mr. Smith. And when does that mission complete? It is for a
set amount of time. When is it up where it would have to either
be renewed or end? Do you happen to know that?
Mr. Komorowski. Not off the top of my head, no.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Dagne.
Mr. Dagne. It was just renewed it in May, so it would have
to be renewed again next year in June.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Prendergast, Mr. Dagne, just quickly,
do you think it should be renewed? What role should the U.N.
play, going forward?
Mr. Dagne. Just to go back to answer your question about
the effectiveness and whether they should be renewed or not, I
think the record has been mixed. It is one of the largest U.N.
peacekeeping missions in the world. Currently, you have over
19,000 armed, uniformed personnel. I think they have done a
number of good things. Their presence provided at least some
relative stability and allow humanitarian delivery, and
provided some protection to the civilians. In their absence, it
would have been worse.
Mr. Smith. OK.
Mr. Dagne. At the same time, they could have done better.
The security sector training that you are talking about is
provided by the U.N. and so forth. I think it is important as
you move forward, you know, is there a need to have such a
large peacekeeping force just to be there or can the mandate be
changed in order to accommodate, I think, the needs on the
ground. I think, in my view, perhaps a review of that is
necessary, and the security council in May significantly
restructured the mandate, and I am pretty sure, I think, come
next year, you know, it has to be reviewed once again.
Mr. Smith. OK. Mr. Prendergast.
Mr. Prendergast. From what I have seen on the ground, you
know, one of the things that is positive is that they help keep
the roads open and for commercial traffic in some places
through their patrolling. That is a positive. It is sort of a
byproduct of their existence and their presence on the ground.
That's not saying much.
I think in individual areas, at the behest of particular
commanders of units that are deployed into different places,
they have done targeted capacity building for the FARDC for the
Congolese army. That is a very helpful thing, and more of that
could happen in terms of professionalization and respect for
human rights of the Congolese army.
Making decisions on the ground, operational decisions to
protect civilians in localized areas, has made a difference.
Most units don't. And therefore, they are spectators for
terrible human rights atrocities. So it is strengthening their
mandate in New York so that you can strengthen the hands of
commanders on the ground who want to do that kind of stuff is
really important.
And then, finally, something that has been missing all
along is some kind of special forces capacity to actually
undertake targeted military operations against both foreign-
armed groups and Congolese-armed groups that are the spoilers
for continuing violence and instability.
So looking in the course of the next year for re-upping the
MONUSCO mandate and looking at whether we can recruit a nation
to contribute that kind of capacity, that would actually make,
potentially make a difference in the overall scheme.
Mr. Smith. That is something our committee works on a great
deal. We work with the Special Operations Command here in the
U.S., and also internationally and NATO and other places, and
it is a very specialized skill that not a lot of militaries
possess and is very much in demand at the moment in many, many
places. But certainly, I can see where that would be helpful.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How do I know, or how does the manufacturer know whether
the tantalum in this phone is clean or not? Is it Australian,
is it Congolese, is it clean Congolese? Each diamond is unique,
but a fungible commodity like tantalum or tin or even refined
tantalum or tin, how do you know? You just have to trust the
supplier?
Mr. Smith. Well, I don't. If I could interrupt there, I
don't think technically each diamond is unique, but if you
happen to have a diamond ring right now and were to look at, I
think you would have the same basic problematic question of
telling by looking at it, where it came from. I don't think it
is unique in that sense. I think it is a matter of, you know,
regulating the supply chain aggressively. So correct me if I am
wrong in that, but I don't think there would be any difference
in terms of the difficulties of making sure that this is
adhered to for diamonds than it would be for basic minerals. I
could be wrong on that.
Mr. Prendergast. Already, the industry associations that a
year ago were saying precisely what you were saying,
Congressman, now are working very aggressively to try to comply
with these regulations and talking directly to many of the
groups, many of the companies' senior executives and the people
on the ground who are taking trips to Congo trying to figure
out how to do it. There is much more clarity now, based on the
United Nation's panel of experts' work, based on a lot of
different organizations that have exposed how these supply
chains work. It is not a big mystery. It might be a mystery to
us sitting in Washington, but it is not a mystery to those that
actually take the time to study these supply chain networks.
So we can figure out where stuff comes from. And there are
ways to do that. You just have to set up monitoring,
observation, and tracing mechanisms that the industry can
comply with that will allow us to certify where this stuff
comes, whether it is coming from a mine that does damage to
civilian populations or not.
This is all doable. And the more that it is studied, the
more light that is shined on it, particularly by the U.N. panel
of experts that released yet another report yesterday exposing
in great detail how this supply chain works, we are learning
more and more about how to do this, and the industry groups
are, have shifted from a very unhelpful position to now trying
to figure out how to comply and how to figure out how you would
know what is in any particular electronics component that ends
up in the United States.
Mr. Cooper. Shift to people for a second. How do we know
who the war criminals are? Who was, in fact, a member of the
LRA or the Mai Mai; or who may have been a member but not
committed an atrocity; who is not a member of anything but
committed an atrocity. How do you know?
Mr. Dagne. I think with the LRA, FDLR, and CNDP we do have
good knowledge of who the leaders are, who the commanders are.
And I will be happy to provide those names and the command
structure if you are interested.
Mr. Cooper. But so many of the atrocities are committed by
low-level troops, right?
Mr. Dagne. Of course, you have the rank and file who commit
the atrocity, but who gives the order, who gives the command,
is primarily responsible for it.
Mr. Prendergast. Yeah. I think it is really important to
understand that these aren't just, you know, troops that are
completely out of control, running around raping, pillaging,
and looting. There are very specific war strategies being
pursued by the various armed groups in Congo, whether it is the
government army, whether it is the foreign-armed groups, or
whether it is some of the Congolese militias. There are
particular interests being pursued. And when you give a green
light to your rank and file that you now, as a strategy, as a
tool of war, we are encouraging you to rape in the context of
our attacks on particular civilian populations, that is a war
crime or crime against humanity.
And finally we are getting the ICC to investigate these
linkages. We are seeing now indictments of particular
individuals in Congo where related to the recruitment of child
soldiers forcibly and sexual violence as a war crime. And as
the evidence accumulates, it is going to be harder and harder
for people to argue that this is, you know, a violent, out-of-
control situation. There are command and control issues that
one hopes will be exposed by these indictments and that some of
these people will actually end up spending the rest of their
lives in jail for it.
Mr. Cooper. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. No questions, just a quick comment.
Mr. Dagne, you said earlier that you believe the Congolese
have to come up with their own solutions. And I couldn't agree
more with you. I think the folks in Odessa, Texas, are better
at solving the problems in Odessa, Texas, than anybody in D.C.
It is heartening to hear someone as informed as you are about
these issues make that statement, that we really do have to
look to the Congolese themselves and then help them do it.
In that vein, is there leadership in Congo that can provide
the ideas that we can then help with as opposed to coming up
with our own ideas and trying to put them over--implement them
in the Congo? Are there folks there that we can work with?
Mr. Dagne. There is a government in Congo, was elected,
President Joseph Kabila, and they have position groups, a
functioning parliament, and we have been working with that
government for the past decade. Is it ideal? Is it purely
democratic? No. There is a lot more work that needs to be done.
The point I am making is that in order for us to have an impact
on the ground, we need to work with them, not come with a
solution and say, This is what is best.
Mr. Conaway. Exactly. Where is their list of solutions they
have come up with themselves and said, Here are the things that
we are going to make happen; can you help us with these, as
opposed to us coming with that list and saying, Here's some
good ideas. What do you all think?
I mean, is there that list and does it include this
minerals management programming and everything else, or is
there something else on that list that they themselves believe
is the right way to go at this?
Mr. Dagne. Yeah. I can give you some examples on the
security sector for the Congolese themselves have been asking
in order even to control their own commanders. Not long ago, I
think about 5, 6 months ago, the president himself ordered the
arrest of a senior general because of abuses that his units had
carried out. Even on the conflict diamond issue, the minister
of mining himself came and asked how we can help him. Use of
satellites, for example, to identify bad areas and good areas.
So they do come up and ask from time to time for help. And
I think what is important, like when I said the region, they
had come up, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and established a
structure in order to ensure transparency on the conflict
mineral issue. And that can be strengthened and coordinated.
There have been other activities. For example, a European-based
group that had been taking, you know, satellite photographs of
some of these mines, and basically pushing that into a database
identifying who controls it.
For us to be able to have an effective result, we need to
know on the ground. We don't have that kind of presence. You
know, who is mining it? Who is the rebel commander there? Is it
clean? Is it possible that----
Mr. Conaway. Isn't that something that the Congolese should
be doing for themselves?
Mr. Dagne. Yes. Precisely. That is what I am talking about,
the coordination with the Congolese.
Mr. Conaway. Alright. Let me ask one other thing, and any
of you can answer. The post-conflict diamond era in Sierra
Leone and Liberia and Angola, the rank-and-file human beings
there, is their quality of life any better today or have they
just swapped one set of miseries for a new set of miseries?
Mr. Dagne. I think it is very difficult to say, you know,
that their lives have improved. I can give you a number of
examples from Angola. I was there.
Mr. Smith. If I may, not to interrupt you, but certainly it
has got to help that there aren't armed gangs running around
shooting people. Who, I mean, that is not to say that their
economy has taken off. But I find it hard to believe that if
you--if a civil war is going on in your neighborhood, and then
a civil war is not going on in your neighborhood, I just got to
believe that is a better situation.
Mr. Conaway. Well, maybe the civil war is still going on.
Mr. Dagne. The question that I thought was asked was if
their livelihood has improved, not the security on the ground.
Mr. Conaway. Right. Just one set of miseries for a new set
of miseries.
Mr. Dagne. The day-to-day life of the individual once they
are demobilized.
Mr. Smith. Right. Day-to-day life. And I am sorry to keep
arguing.
Mr. Conaway. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Smith. But the livelihood, certainly I get that. Well,
I have made my statement. Go ahead.
Mr. Dagne. To answer your question, the day-to-day life,
once they are demobilized, for a number of them, they are
either integrated into the regular forces. But have they been
given training ----
Mr. Conaway. I am not talking about the demobilized. I am
just talking about the rank-and-file citizen who is out there
who is the victim of both sides of the civil war that was going
on, that is not now going on, are their lives any better today,
post-conflict diamond controls, than they were before? Or are
they just as miserable now, they just got different miseries?
Mr. Dagne. No, no. I think when you look at the overall
picture, definitely.
Mr. Conaway. They are better off.
Mr. Dagne. For example, just Sudan. Five years ago, they
signed an agreement. For me, when I look at the registration
for primary school for girls, it had tripled. And that's
progress. When I look at, you know, people, you know, going to
school and having access to medical care, that is progress
which they didn't have before. The same thing can be said about
the end of the war in Angola. You know, you see a lot of
construction taking place, schools being built.
Mr. Conaway. So their lives are better?
Mr. Dagne. Yes, their lives are better.
Mr. Conaway. You said first that they weren't, but now you
are saying they are better.
Mr. Dagne. No, I thought you asked about--maybe I heard it
wrong--I thought you asked about those who are demobilized once
they are.
Mr. Conaway. No. No. Just the overall folks who are the
victims of whatever set of atrocities are going on, whether it
is from machetes or AK-47s, are they better? What I am hearing
you say is yes, life in Angola today is better than it was when
diamonds were being mined by the negative groups and sold.
Mr. Dagne. Yeah. Definitely, in every case you end the war,
the focus becomes on reconstruction and development. And that
improves the lives of people.
Mr. Prendergast. There really is no comparison. I mean,
three countries that had some of the highest rates of
displacement in the world; people were living, moving from
place to place escaping these terrible atrocities. And today,
they are largely secure. Yeah, their economic growth rates
aren't off the charts, but it is an extraordinary difference to
not be living in an internally displaced camp or a refugee camp
to be able to go home and try to eke out a living.
Okay, they are a long way from being a roaring economy, but
to have the chance to rebuild your communities and your lives,
that is what is happening in Liberia and Sierra Leone and
Angola today. And those people, and just your point is
reinforced. It is to let's give those countries a chance and
the people themselves to do it themselves. You take away that
layer of conflict and people get on with their lives.
Mr. Komorowski. I think I would echo the two former
speakers. On the subject of Angola, which is another country in
which MAG works, we have worked through a period of time
immediately post-conflict through a resurgence of the conflicts
and to the current day as well. And, certainly, the point Mr.
Prendergast made about the displaced peoples and supporting
initially all of the work with UNHCR [United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees] repatriation, et cetera, the ability
now, I think the key word that is important here is the ability
for communities and authorities at local regional and national
levels to actually do some planning; to actually start looking
at not just the stabilization of the communities, but planning
reconstruction efforts, which we are seeing in the provinces in
which we are working in Angola.
It is a marked difference. And I would pose comparison to
Sudan, DRC, et cetera; other countries which we are working
where the threat and the regional threat and the insecurities
such that those processes are a long way down the line. And
that is a significant difference. And you genuinely see it in
the face of people with whom you are working. You know that
they are aware that they are not living under the imminent
threat of the barrel of a gun as opposed to some of the other
communities we have been mentioning in the likes of Eastern
Congo.
Mr. Smith. Thanks. I just have two final questions, both
for Mr. Komorowski, but you can comment as well. The Department
of Defense, AFRICOM, is not terribly involved in the Eastern
Congo, is my understanding. But in your work in that area, what
sort of relationship do you have with our DOD? And then the
second question is about the Congolese army. We have talked
around it a little bit. They are a significant part of the
problem, both in terms of not being able to provide security in
their country, but then also many members of the Congolese army
actually do occasionally wind up preying on the population and
becoming some of those rebel groups.
Could you walk us through are we making progress on making
the Congolese army better? At least, we do see the number of
times they turn on the population making them better. And then,
like I said at the outset, the question about you, the
involvement of our Department of Defense in terms of helping
with some of the issues we have talked about today.
Mr. Komorowski. Okay. So to take the two points separately.
First of all, the engagement of my organization, Mines Advisory
Group with the Department of Defense and its various agents and
operators. We have a body here also in Washington so we
coordinate very closely with the Office of WRA, Weapons Removal
and Abatement, and so we are made aware when there are going to
be DTRA [Defense Threat Reduction Agency] or AFRICOM missions
and personnel deploying.
So one of the key things we are providing is intelligence,
is a clear understanding from our staff and our operations on
the ground of the picture that is emerging there on a day-to-
day basis. So that is one of the very practical ways in which
we are engaged in working with the DTRA as well. We have, on
occasion, actually been tasked to deliver operations as a
follow-up to assessments that they have made. For example, in
Burundi there was a DTRA assessment, and it became apparent
that there were a number of MANPADS, numbering more than 300--
--
Mr. Smith. I should say, by the way, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency is DTRA, for the uninitiated.
Go ahead.
Mr. Komorowski. Apologies. Yes, thank you. So on the basis
of that Defense Threat Reduction Agency assessment, there was
in excess of 300 MANPADS--man-portable air-defense systems--
that were located. And as a result of MAG's cooperation with
that assessment, we were able to carry out the destruction with
U.S. support as well. So that is one very practical example.
But across the piece, we are essentially tied in and working
with AFRICOM as and when there is a presence on the ground,
mainly through briefings. I don't know if that adequately
answers----
Mr. Smith. It does. That is enormously helpful.
Mr. Komorowski. So to take the second question about
working with the Congolese military, I think it is very
important to make clear from the outset that MAG's engagement
with the military is very much, as I mentioned, within the
province of weapons----
Mr. Smith. If I may, I am not actually talking about your
particular engagement, just as you engage with them, your
assessment of their capabilities. And, as I said, two big
problems: Number one, they are not providing security; number
two, in many instances, they are part of the problem, the
individual members in the Congolese military.
How would you assess those two statements that I have made,
and is getting better? Is it getting worse? Where is that
headed? And that would be for all three of you.
Mr. Komorowski. Sure. I think one of the key problems that
we deal with is the rotation or the movement, the change, the
instability in terms of the structures with which we are
working. So I mentioned in my submission that the building
relationships of trust and an understanding of the role that we
as an organization and other entities bring in is really key.
When those are built and when those individuals are then
moving on, and we see that frequently, it takes the process
back. So building long-term reform with regard to the military
capacity for justice building, et cetera, that is slightly out
of our province. But I think that that turnover is unhelpful in
that respect.
I think the second point, as regards the Congolese military
being part of the problem, again, I think it was mentioned
earlier about at one point, Kinshasa was the perception of
Congo. What we find as well is that the further away you get,
the looser the chain of command. And I think that is one of the
key issues as well in terms of how things are operating the
further away that operations are from central command.
It is not a particularly joined-up strategy or structure we
see on the ground. And that is an issue in terms of how the
tasking works.
Mr. Smith. Gentlemen, do you want to offer your thoughts?
Mr. Prendergast. Only one quick point, which is that for
SSR to have a chance of working, it has got to be a multiyear,
multidonor effort. And we need higher level engagement, because
the kind of basic things, building blocks of army reform in the
Congo, the kind of things you would want to do, reforming just
how people are being paid and ensuring that they are paid;
constructing barracks. When I used to work for an International
Crisis Group, we went around and did a survey of all these
barracks and talked to the soldiers and their families and
stuff and it was worse than a refugee camp. You know, these
guys. And then we are, like, wondering why so much looting goes
on in the vicinity of these camps you know, and its direct.
Their commanding officers are just pillaging these guys. They
are taking everything that comes down the chain.
So there is basic reforms of how people are paid and how
they are trained and how they are then held accountable as
soldiers for their activities.
Mr. Smith. Is it getting any better or, in recent years or
is it just about where it's at? OK. Let the record reflect he
shook his head no.
Mr. Dagne.
Mr. Dagne. I don't think it has improved. I think it has
been terrible over the past 5 years. Even, I think, with the
ongoing security sector reform, I don't expect improvement to
come any time soon as long as those who are carrying these, you
know, attacks are not held accountable. Accountability is just
as important, and we haven't seen much of that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Mr. Conaway?
Well, thank you. That was very, very informative. I really
appreciate the testimony from all three of you, and we will
continue to work on this issue and in that area, and look
forward to working with you. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 30, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 30, 2010
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