[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-173]
JAPAN: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 27, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona DUNCAN HUNTER, California
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GLENN NYE, Virginia MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MARK CRITZ, Pennsylvania
LEONARD BOSWELL, Iowa
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, July 27, 2010, Japan: Recent Security Developments...... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, July 27, 2010........................................... 35
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TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2010
JAPAN: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Campbell, Hon. Kurt M., Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State............ 6
Gregson, Hon. Wallace C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense. 4
Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Energy, Installations, and Environment......................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Campbell, Hon. Kurt M........................................ 51
Gregson, Hon. Wallace C...................................... 41
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 38
Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne................................. 58
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 67
Mr. Taylor................................................... 67
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
JAPAN: RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 27, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services
Committee meets to receive testimony on recent security
developments in Japan. Our witnesses today, the Honorable Chip
Gregson, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs, the Honorable Kurt Campbell, the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, and the Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Energy, Installations and
Environment. And we welcome you and thank you for being with
us.
There is little doubt that the alliance between our country
and Japan represents a cornerstone for peace and stability in
the Asia-Pacific region, because I am convinced that the Asia-
Pacific region will be increasingly central to the concern of
America's national interests. And in this century, I believe it
is essential that the U.S.-Japan alliance continue to grow
based on shared interests and shared values.
U.S.-Japan alliance has clearly been undergoing a period of
transition in recent years, which has not come without
complications. Rhetoric and occasional disagreements aside,
though, our two nations clearly remain partners. Japan has
obligated $900 million to provide assistance to Afghan national
security forces, part of a $5 billion package of aid to
Afghanistan. Japan has also pledged $1 billion to support
international assistance efforts in Pakistan. Japan has
supported South Korea and the United States in the dispute over
the sinking of the Cheonan.
The Japanese have also been instrumental in Six-Party
negotiations with North Korea. And finally, Japan has worked
diligently to address many longstanding grievances with its
East Asian neighbors. Clearly, one of the most apparent issues
of concern between our nations has been stationed U.S. forces
on Okinawa. I strongly support the Marine Corps presence in
Okinawa, one that the U.S. has long maintained and over time,
some U.S. bases have become significantly encroached. This
encroachment has led to significant issues regarding the burden
of the facilities on the civilian population.
Accordingly, the U.S. and Japan entered into an agreement
in 2006 to relocate 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and to
construct a new base in Northeast Okinawa far from major
population centers. Both sides will make significant financial
contributions to the effort. When the current ruling party in
Japan recently assumed control, however, they expressed concern
about the nature of the agreement and initially sought to
modify the 2006 roadmap. After significant discussions by the
Administration with Japan, I am pleased that they have recently
reaffirmed the roadmap.
Let me be clear. It is essential that the U.S. retain the
ability to project forces in the East Asian theater to ensure
regional stability and prosperity. U.S. forces on Okinawa are
central to this capability. Japan also benefits substantially
from this partnership. They are able to devote less than 1
percent of their gross domestic product toward their national
defense. Given the benefits of both nations, I see little need
for major changes to the current Status of Forces Agreement.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security. If both nations stay true
to their national interests, I believe we can look forward to
at least another 50 years of such mutual cooperation. Before I
turn to my good friend, our ranking member, the gentleman from
California, Buck McKeon for any comments he might care to make,
let me mention my disappointment at the failure of the
Department of Defense and the Department of State to submit
witness testimony for this hearing in a timely manner.
Arrangements for this hearing were made many weeks in advance,
and I cannot imagine how it came to pass that we did not
receive testimony until just yesterday. Mr. McKeon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our
witnesses. We appreciate your being here this morning. Mr.
Chairman, this is a very timely and important hearing
considering the most recent saber rattling from North Korea and
the continued equivocation from the Government of Japan
concerning the ultimate location of the Marine airfield on
Okinawa. Much of today's hearing will focus on the multitude of
unresolved issues concerning the realignment of the Marine
forces in the Pacific, particularly the move of approximately
8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam, and
associated moves on Okinawa itself.
Make no mistake, these are important questions, but what is
more important, however, is the reason we are undertaking this
upheaval. The United States has long been focused on Europe. In
recent years, our attention has naturally shifted to the Middle
East and South Asia in our continual fight to stamp out Al
Qaeda and its allies. We cannot, for a moment, forget, however,
how critical the Pacific and the Pacific Rim countries are to
our national security. While we have friends along the Pacific
Rim, Japan among them, they are fewer and scattered over a vast
ocean. The threats are ominous, with China rapidly increasing
in both military and economic power. Even worse, North Korea, a
failing state led by an unstable dictator possessing nuclear
weapons, has just threatened military action if we even conduct
military exercises with the South Koreans. Against this
backdrop, Japan is a friend, but a friend who relies on our
military power to protect them.
In exchange, the Government of Japan provides military
bases as well as some funding to establish and operate these
bases. In my view, Japan is getting quite a bargain. And
sometimes fails to recognize the great benefit the United
States provides, provides them with our conventional forces and
nuclear shield. Even so, we have agreed to reduce our footprint
in Japan by moving a substantial number of Marines to Guam with
Japanese financial assistance. We have agreed to this move in
order to assure our ability to station the III Marine
Expeditionary Force in the western Pacific and ensure our
strategic-ready, forward-deployed land force is able to deploy
at a moment's notice where needed.
With elements of this corps-sized land force split among
small bases in Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa, each island thousands
of miles from the others, we need to resolve the remaining
questions and get on with executing this plan. Last year the
Chairman and I, accompanied by several other members, traveled
to all three locations. Space on each island is limited. The
training needs of the military are often difficult to reconcile
with the needs of the local populace.
Nonetheless, our Marines are there for the national
security of Americans, Japanese and South Koreans alike. With
American lives on the line, the least the Japanese can do is
provide credible installations for our forces. While much
progress has been made since our February 2009 trip, far too
much is still unresolved. I was dismayed to read in the press
that the new Prime Minister of Japan may delay the decision on
the new Marine airfield on Okinawa until November. We
understand the issue is politically sensitive on Okinawa, but
the resolution of that issue is the key to the whole puzzle.
Furthermore, we still do not have a U.S. Government plan for
developing the infrastructure of Guam. Guam and her people are
patriotic, welcoming and generous, but they do not have the
resources to build the roads, power plants, water and
wastewater infrastructure necessary to support such a large
influx of people.
Despite repeated emphasis by this committee, there is no
plan other than the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] will
assign responsibility and provide funding to concerned agencies
in the fiscal year 2012 budget. The idea of putting OMB in
charge is not only not reassuring, it is frightening. I look
forward to hearing the witnesses' perspective on these matters
and yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
The Chairman. General Gregson, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. WALLACE C. GREGSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gregson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the privilege of
appearing before you today to discuss recent security
developments with Japan. As the Chairman mentioned, this is the
50th anniversary of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security. It is a unique alliance relationship built on common
interests, shared values and complementary contributions that
bind together two very different nations. Within this alliance,
there are other unique relationships with Okinawa prefecture,
for example, which is much in the news recently. The Japanese
election last fall called for a thorough revalidation of our
alliance structure and its operation.
The conclusion is that the essential purpose and structure
of the alliance remains vital. Our relationship with Japan
includes a number of bilateral security activities beyond
management of our bases. The U.S.-Japan missile defense
cooperation is now a central element in our defense
relationship. Japan's investments in four BMD [Ballistic
Missile Defense]-capable Aegis destroyers, upgrades of its
Patriot battalion PAC [Patriot Advanced Capability]-3
capability and installation of an X-Band radar aid in that
missile defense.
Cooperation is growing in humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief. Japanese Self-Defense Forces deployed
alongside American partners to address humanitarian challenges,
such as the 2004 tsunami response and providing relief to
Haiti.
We consult on strategic issues. Throughout the past 18
months, we collaborated with our Japanese counterparts on the
Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], the Nuclear Posture Review
[NPR], and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review [BMDR]. We will
discuss extended deterrents and we are planning space and
cyberspace discussions. We are working closely with Japan on
their development of their National Defense Program Guidelines.
Japan is strengthening security ties with countries in the
region. The current trilateral ties among the United States,
Japan and South Korea are unprecedented. Internationally, Japan
is a valuable partner in Afghanistan and maritime security
operations. Japan's cooperation helped construct the Afghan
Ring Road and pay the salaries of the Afghan National Police.
Japan's $5 billion pledge supporting civil sector efforts will
support building civilian capacity, reintegration of militants,
demilitarization and economic development, all critical
components of our Afghan strategy. Japan's Maritime Self-
Defense Force remains active in counterpiracy operations off
the Horn of Africa.
Japan also provides forces to U.N. missions in Nepal, the
Sudan, Haiti and the Golan Heights. For the past 6 years or
more, Japan and the United States made historic progress in
revalidating, modernizing and realigning our alliance, presence
and capabilities in Japan and the region. A series of
progressively more detailed agreements since early 2005 created
the foundation for the most complex changes in the operation of
our alliance since the signing of the treaty in 1960.
Focus on relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
has, for certain, been intense. Lost in that focus is that most
of the 2005-2006 plans for realignment are moving forward with
little controversy. We are collocating air and missile defense
command to Yokota Air Base, bringing permanent Japanese
presence for the first time on to a base that houses our U.S.
forces, Japan headquarters. The headquarters of the Ground
Self-Defense Forces Central Readiness Force will be moved on to
Camp Zama to be collocated with the transformed U.S. Army
command and control structure. We will relocate Carrier Air
Wing Five currently at Atsugi Naval Air Station to Marine Corps
Air Station Iwakuni, reducing the impact of our presence in a
very densely populated community.
In September of 2008, the USS George Washington arrived in
Japan sparking little opposition. We are expanding
opportunities for bilateral training and operations in Guam,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas and in the Compact
States, as well as within Japan, making our presence at the
same time more politically sustainable. The sinking of the
Cheonan and the deployment of a large PLA [People's Liberation
Army] Navy Surface Action Group through waters near Okinawa
reminded Japan and the region of the vital deterrent role
played by U.S. forces in Okinawa and across Japan.
The joint statement issued May 28th by Secretary Gates and
Secretary Clinton and her Japanese counterparts designates the
location of the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] in Camp
Schwab area and tasks a bilateral experts group to develop a
specific plan by the end of August. That effort is well
underway and we expect the group to complete its efforts on
schedule. Of course, the FRF at Camp Schwab is a single
component of a larger plan to consolidate the U.S. presence on
Okinawa and move our forces away from the densely populated
southern portion of the island. The full Okinawa realignment
package will allow us to reposition approximately 8,000 Marines
from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of the
urbanized land south of Kadena Air Base. This will ensure a
much more sustainable and enduring presence for U.S. forces on
Okinawa and also enhance the alliance's operational needs and
capabilities. Most importantly to the Okinawans, it directly
affects their noise, safety and environmental concerns.
At the same time, the American community on Okinawa, both
uniformed and civilian, continues to expand our efforts to be
productive members of that community. Okinawa has been shaped
by powerful historic and geographic factors making military
matters the dominant theme. It was annexed by Japan in 1879. In
1945, Okinawa suffered from the ``rain of steel'' in the last
bitter battle of a very bitter war. One-third to one-half of
the civilians alive before the battle perished, caught between
the contending forces. The year 1972 brought reversion to
Japan. Throughout, this island community has held unrealized
economic and educational potential.
The Obuchi Fellowship created on the occasion of the
Clinton-Obuchi Summit in 2000 provides important opportunities
for Okinawan students to study in the United States. The
Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology was conceived and
announced in 2000. It is now formally open and is a quality
institution. The U.S. universities in Okinawa have continued to
expand their local scholarships. The American Chamber of
Commerce is making major contributions to English language
education in the secondary schools. Many service members and
their spouses teach English in the grade schools, establishing
enduring cross-cultural relationships in the process. Our
Ambassador to Japan has worked hard to ensure that Okinawa will
be a part of our broader bilateral initiatives to promote
science, renewable energy and entrepreneurship.
Okinawa offers great opportunities for U.S.-Japanese
investment and cooperation. The Government of Prime Minister
Kan has recently made clear its commitment to the U.S.-Japan
alliance and to our presence on Okinawa. President Obama said
that this anniversary year represents an important opportunity
to step back and reflect on what we have achieved, celebrate
our friendship but also find ways to renew this alliance to
refresh it for the 21st century. We are doing exactly that.
Thank you, and I await your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gregson can be found
in the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Ortiz. [Presiding.] Secretary Campbell.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Secretary Campbell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
I thank all the members of the committee. It is an honor to be
here today. Let me submit, if I may, my full statement for the
record. And I also want to take a moment to thank my dear
friend and colleague, Chip Gregson, for the honor to be able to
work with him over these many years. I would also like to thank
the comment made by the ranking member, Congressman McKeon. I
think the point he underscored about the drama that is playing
out in the Asia-Pacific region is something we should not
forget. I spent a lot of time in Asia, traveled, talked with a
lot of friends and there are continuing concerns about American
preoccupation, that we are focused rightly on urgent challenges
in South Asia and the Middle East. But the truth is there is a
drama playing out in the Asia-Pacific region, and we need to
demonstrate at all times to our friends and potential foes that
the United States remains completely committed to the Asia-
Pacific region during this incredibly dynamic period in which
global politics, global economics is increasingly shifting to
the Asia-Pacific arena. With that as context, let me just say
one of the things that has been underscored to us over the
course of the last several years, is that the very foundation
of our ability to operate in the Asia-Pacific region, in
addition to the foundation for peace and stability and the
ability for us to project power outside of the Asia-Pacific
region resides in a strong, enduring partnership between the
United States and Japan.
As General Gregson has already stated, we are this year
celebrating our 50th anniversary, the signing of the Treaty of
Mutual Security between the United States and Japan. It has
been essential to both of our countries, but not just Japan and
the United States. It has been the central feature that has led
to the most dramatic period of economic dynamism in the history
of the world over the course of the last 30 years in the Asia-
Pacific region. And the U.S.-Japan security partnership can
take substantial credit for that and it has served our
interests, it has served the interests of Japan and other
countries in the region very substantially.
I think one of the things that has been critical has been
that the alliance and the relationship has had very strong
bipartisan support over a range of administrations and also
between both parties in Congress. I think there is a deep and
profound recognition that this relationship serves the
interests of the United States, and indeed of our allies in the
region. When President Obama came to power, he sought to
underscore this essential reality. His first meeting with a
foreign leader was with the Japanese Prime Minister, Prime
Minister Aso, who has been subsequently replaced twice now, and
also Secretary Clinton's first trip abroad included a first
stop in Japan.
Our consultations on a range of security and political
issues over the course of the last 10 months, in particular,
have been extraordinarily deep and detailed since the new
Japanese Government has come into power. One of the things that
we have been working on as General Gregson again has
underscored, is the mechanisms of our alliance, how to secure
and stabilize our forward-deployed forces in Okinawa. I also
share the views of the members about how critical this forward
deployment is of our Marine forces in Okinawa and the steps
that are needed to secure that going forward.
We have also worked very closely with Japan since the
tragic sinking of the South Korean frigate, the Cheonan, by the
brutal, provocative act on the part of the North Koreans. We
have worked closely with the Japanese at every stage on
extending OPCON [Operational Control] into the future with
Korea on our maritime exercises that are now going on. Those
exercises that you are seeing now at sea, most of those forces,
most of those naval forces deploy from Japanese bases. We are
grateful for that support going forward. We have also worked
closely with Japanese friends on a dialogue about how best to
engage a rising power in the Pacific. In China, we share a
mutual interest in trying to assure that a rising China plays a
strong and responsible role in the Asia-Pacific region. We are
working closely to coordinate in Southeast Asia, trying to
engage a very challenging and brutal regime in Burma. We have
worked to deal with some of the political and security
challenges in Thailand and a range of other countries.
As the Chairman stated before he left, Japan has been one
of the strongest supporters of our out-of-area engagements.
Right now, Japan is number two in terms of monies committed in
Afghanistan and they have also been behind the United States,
extraordinarily gracious and generous in our activities in
Pakistan as well. They worked with us in arenas such as piracy,
and they have been very substantially engaged in new security
challenges like climate change and other transnational issues.
I would say that the alliance has become deeper, more
entrenched, recent opinion polls in Japan reflect--and Japan is
one of the most polled populations in the world. One of the
things we have seen in recent months is that the percentage of
Japanese citizens that support the United States and the U.S.-
Japan alliance are stronger today than in history, almost 80
percent of the Japanese population supports the United States
in our alliance. That is something that we have worked hard for
and we are grateful for and we want to keep that strong support
and respect going forward.
This fall, when we celebrate the 50th anniversary formally,
it will be an opportunity for us to look back and to celebrate
and to reflect on our achievements, but we can't rest on our
laurels. We have to think about going forward. This alliance is
critical for the United States going forward. It bears
repeating. It is truly our foundation and it gives us stability
to be able to do the kinds of things that we seek to as a
nation in the Asia-Pacific region. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I look forward to taking your questions going
forward.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Campbell can be found
in the Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Pfannenstiel.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman McKeon, distinguished members of committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to report to you on the status of our
planning efforts for the realignment of forces on Guam. And
thank you for your continued support of our troops. Last week I
had the opportunity to visit Guam and meet with several of the
island's leaders and members of the community to discuss our
Final Environmental Impact Statement, which is now available
for public review. I was joined by Counsel on Environmental
Quality Chair, Nancy Sutley, Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, Tony Babauta, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Dorothy Robyn, and representatives of other Federal agencies
such as the U.S. EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] and USDA
[United States Department of Agriculture].
We took this trip together so that we could demonstrate
firsthand to the people in Guam how critical it is for the
Administration to get this effort right. It is this desire to
get it right that brought agency leaders together to develop
our Final EIS [Environmental Impact Statement]. Under CEQ
[Council on Environmental Quality] Chair Sutley's leadership,
we have successfully used the interagency process to address
issues raised by resource agencies and the public on our Draft
Environmental Impact Statement. Working together, we have
satisfactorily resolved the most significant issues and have
reached consensus in the Final EIS regarding how to handle
these concerns.
For example, we have decided in our Final EIS to defer our
decision on the placement of the transient CVN [Nuclear-powered
Aircraft Carrier] pier until we conduct additional Marine
resources analysis. In addition, we have put forward a process
for ensuring that the impacts of induced population growth do
not overwhelm the island. Our Final EIS also identifies sources
for nearly a billion dollars in improvements to Guam's utility
systems, ports and roadways which will both prepare the island
for the build-up and support its long-term growth. We are
continuing to stay within the capacity--we are committing to
staying within the capacity constraints of Guam's
infrastructure, and will coordinate closely with Guam's
leaders, Federal and Guam agencies and other parties to do so.
As a result of this successful interagency coordination, we
are confident we can sign a Record of Decision [ROD] and begin
construction projects within this fiscal year. Central to the
successful execution of this program is our ability to
coordinate with key stakeholders on Guam and across the Federal
Government. As discussed with Guam's leaders, our planning
efforts do not end after the Record of Decision. We understand
there is still more to be done. However, working together with
Guam's leaders, we can ensure that conditions on and off the
base will be comparable and we believe we can satisfactorily
resolve issues such as land acquisition.
As you can see, we have made great progress in our planning
and are now ready to execute. Working with our agency
counterparts and Guam's leadership, we are confident we can
execute the program in a manner that achieves long-term mutual
success. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today and for your continued support of this program. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Pfannenstiel can be
found in the Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much for your testimony this
morning. And it is good to see you, Madam Secretary. We have
had a great relationship with Japan. We enjoy their friendship
and then, of course, we talk about the balance of power and
having a forward presence. And I think that is very, very
important. But Secretary Pfannenstiel, Secretary Gregson and
Secretary Campbell, we want to say thank you for joining us
this morning and explaining the efforts to move Marines to the
strategic island of Guam and the ongoing developments with the
Japanese Government.
Madam Secretary Pfannenstiel, I have had the opportunity to
travel to Guam several times, but most recently with Chairman
Skelton to visit the beautiful island and it is nice. I wish I
could stay there a few weeks and enjoy a vacation there. And to
discuss, of course, the strategic importance of the movement of
forces from Okinawa to Guam, I believe that the movement of
forces is definitely the right thing to do. I did notice in
your testimony that you recommended a whole-of-government
approach be adopted to address community infrastructure
limitations that exist in Guam today. Yet this is--from my own
personal experience--I see no indication of this support from
the other resource agencies when I look at the budget request.
In fact, the only request from the Administration was from the
Department of Defense to support a Department of Transportation
requirement at the Port of Guam.
What tangible steps has the executive branch taken to
address the whole-of-government approach? And where are the
budget requests from the various resources agencies to support
the Marine Corps training bases requirement? I think this is
very, very important. This is something we are going to see
later on. Maybe you can enlighten us a little bit.
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Yes, thank you, Mr. Ortiz. We are
working with the other agencies, the other resources agencies,
other Federal agencies, to look at the whole of Guam, to look
at the needs across the infrastructure, across the business
community, and we have done so in a couple ways. First, we
worked very specifically with the resources agencies in
developing the Final Environmental Impact Statement. And we
aligned our interest and our program so that we not only
overcame the concerns with the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement in such a way that the resources agencies were
supportive of where we ended up. But we also are looking
towards going beyond what is just the minimum necessary.
There is a group called the Economic Adjustment Committee
that is working within the Department of Defense looking across
Guam at the economic impact, not just the environmental impacts
associated with the buildup and looking at what level of
funding might be needed and where it might be available. So
that is work that is ongoing.
Mr. Ortiz. I wonder if anybody else, Secretary Gregson or
Campbell, would like to add or maybe respond to my question?
Have you seen any other agencies that is going to--coming up
with a budget request because we haven't seen one yet?
Secretary Gregson. I can pass a more detailed report back
for the record later, but I am aware that the Department of
Agriculture helped contribute to the resources necessary to
rehabilitate the port facilities, and we are in discussion with
the Department of Transportation for other resources.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 67.]
In addition, part of the Japanese money that is pledged for
the buildup in Guam is some $740-some million dollars for
utilities and on a most urgent need basis, the first projects
that will be undertaken with those resources are rehabilitation
of the Northern District wastewater treatment plant and the
Agana wastewater treatment plant. These are judged the most
critical infrastructure improvements needed to support the
temporary workforce that is going to be doing the base
construction.
Secretary Pfannenstiel. I could add, in addition, that we
have been working with the Department of Energy on some
possible renewable energy investments on Guam, either for a
pilot program or, in fact, to replace some of their existing
generation.
Mr. Ortiz. Another thing that worries me is when you have
an increase in population because of the Marines coming in
there. What are we going to do about hospitals and health care?
And then at the same time you did mention transportation, but
do you think they are going to come across, they are going to
be able to provide those services that are very essential?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. We have been, and we will continue
to look at the roads and the roadways for Defense Access Road
funding as necessary. And we have money in the fiscal year 2010
and proposal fiscal year 2011 budget for that. As for the
health care problems of the increased population, the workers
who will be coming to the island from off-island, the way that
health care will be taken care of is through the contractors
who bring them there. That is part of the requirements of the
contractors is that they provide health care for the workers.
As for the Marines coming, we have dollars programmed for
the hospital improvement for the base. So that will also be
part of the program that we have going forward.
Mr. Ortiz. So when we talk about the health needs of the
people coming in to work, the money will come in through the
contract that we give them, and they will get a portion of that
money on the contract to pay for the health care?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Yes, the contractors are required
to provide health care for their workers. And they will have to
do that through the contracts that they sign.
Mr. Ortiz. I have other questions, but I will wait. I would
like for my other colleagues. I yield to my good friend, Mr.
McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gregson,
Secretary Campbell, as you know, this committee has been in
full support of the Defense Policy Review Initiative and the
move of the 8,000 Marines and their families to Okinawa. While
we have had questions about training opportunities for those
Marines and the adequacy of the new Marine airfield at Camp
Schwab, we have not wavered. At this point, we have seen one
Japanese Prime Minister from the newly elected Government delay
his decision on the airfield and ultimately resign over the
siting of the Futenma replacement facility. And now the new
Prime Minister is reportedly engaged in a similar delay. Is the
so-called expert group still making progress on a mutually
agreeable solution to the FRF that protects the equities of the
Marine Corps? What is the way ahead if we cannot agree on the
FRF?
Secretary Gregson. The experts group is, in fact, meeting
as we speak. This is about the third or the fourth in a series
of meetings and more are scheduled. Yes, they are making
progress. A going-in condition is that all of the requirements
necessary for the operation and the functioning of the airfield
be met. The subsequent discussions can involve details of the
method of construction, the exact configuration of the airfield
and the other infrastructure needed.
But let me stress, Mr. McKeon, in response to one of the
thrusts of your questions, that a going-in condition that is
necessary to be present throughout any other considerations is
that all of the operational requirements be met. And we have
every expectation that we will have results on schedule by the
end of August.
Secretary Campbell. Let me just add one thing if I could,
Congressman, to that. One of the first things that the new
Prime Minister, Prime Minister Kan, underscored when he took
office as the Prime Minister late in the spring was that he
would stand by the agreement between the United States and
Japan, and he thought that that was, indeed, the foundation for
our partnership going forward. And so we actually have
substantial confidence in both the public and private
reassurances that we received from the Japanese Government.
It is also the case that there are a number of very
challenging political issues that are going on domestically in
Japan and we have sought simultaneously to be understanding
about those political dynamics, but also to be quite clear and
firm about what our needs and expectations are going forward.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you. The reason we have installations in
Japan and negotiated this latest agreement is to assure the
forward presence of our forces in a strategically important
area of the world. The two principal threats in the Pacific
region today are North Korea and China, though the threat posed
by each is very different. Given the reluctance of this new
Japanese Government to fully embrace the agreement to realign
forces on Okinawa, can we be confident the Japanese will allow
use of our bases should North Korea provoke a crisis requiring
a military response? No less important given the dire state of
the Japanese economy, the importance of China as a trading
partner and the recent quadrupling of Chinese investment in
Japan, are we confident that the Japanese Government would
allow us to use our bases to undertake an action that the
Chinese disapproved of?
Secretary Gregson. We are absolutely confident we would be
able to use Japanese bases in response to a North Korean
threat. The recent Cheonan incident did nothing to diminish
Japanese concern about the North Korean threat. Looking back
over time, the Japanese have suffered at the hands of North
Korea with having their citizens kidnapped, and with incursions
into their territory.
There is a monument in Japan that is very frequently
visited of a North Korean infiltration vessel that was sunk a
few years ago by the Maritime Safety Agency in Japanese
territorial waters attempting an infiltration. I have no doubt
that they are fully aware of the threat from North Korea and
fully supportive of all of the provisions of our treaty to
support operations, should they be necessary in Korea. On
China, China is a valuable trading partner for Japan, just as
China is a valuable trading partner for us. I think the
attitude is similar, that we seek a cooperative, constructive
relationship with China for all the right reasons, but we
remain concerned about many other aspects. China's
extraordinary military build-up, various actions that China has
taken without as we judge satisfactory explanation. So I would
judge their approach to this as similar to ours.
At the same time, they have--and Secretary Campbell can
expand on this--at the same time, they have disputes--wrong
word--they have items of concern with China over mineral rights
in the East China Sea and through and on various territorial
claims. So the attitude there is one of, I think, proper
concern.
Secretary Campbell. Congressman, I would simply say that,
first of all, I agree with General Gregson about the confidence
that we have in our partnership on the security side with Japan
and the confidence we would have in a crisis. I think one of
the things that the new Government has asked for in Japan is a
closer consultation on issues associated with the potential use
of force. I think it is fair to say that sometimes previous
governments in Japan have been very comfortable to leave those
decisions largely to the United States. And they have not been
deeply engaged in some of the very quiet consultations. The new
Government that has come to power, the DPJ [Democratic Party of
Japan], wants to play a closer and deeper role with the United
States on some of these consultations and we have to adjust and
adapt to that. We have been seeking to do so as we go forward.
I would simply say on the China front, it is true that Japan
and China have had substantial tensions on and off over the
course of the last many years.
And I think one of the things we have seen in the recent
period is the Japanese Government has sought to build a better
relationship with China. And some have suggested that this
potentially comes at the expense of the U.S.-Japan security
relationship. We don't think that is the case. We think that
our relationship will remain very strong, and we do have an
interest in Tokyo and Beijing improving relations, establishing
more trust and trying to get beyond a history that, in some
respects, has been quite challenging.
So overall in terms of our assurances and commitments, we
feel quite well served by the security partnership and we think
it will endure as sort of the guiding framework for how we do
business in the Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortiz. The chair recognizes Mr. Snyder from Arkansas.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Skelton is not
here, but both Mr. Skelton and Mr. McKeon have been pushing in
a bipartisan manner to get the supplemental done, and I saw it
on the suspension calendar today, and hopefully we will get
that work completed this week. I don't have much time. We are
now on the clock. So I need you all not to do expansive
answers, but quick answers because I have four questions. The
first one to you, Secretary Gregson.
The Japanese are about to complete their first foreign
military base outside of Japan since World War II in Djibouti.
It seems to me that it is a win-win situation. It is a win for
the international community because the Japanese know how to
patrol coastlines and the full focus of this base is piracy,
and it seems like a win for the Japanese people in that it is
consistent with the constitutional restrictions on waging wars
since it is clearly targeting piracy, do you agree with that
analysis?
Secretary Gregson. Yes.
Dr. Snyder. Secretary Campbell, what does it mean in terms
of continuity of policy and the challenge for the Japanese
Government and the Japanese people to have four prime ministers
in two years? It is their form of government and every form has
its own inadequacies. But four prime ministers in two years,
what kind of challenges has that presented for them in defense
policy?
Secretary Campbell. I will try to be very quick with it.
Thank you very much. Very good questions. Look, it is important
for us not to comment publicly on domestic dynamics of a close
ally. I think we can say, however, that rapid turnover in prime
ministers and ministers makes it very difficult to establish
the kinds of relationships and the confidence that is necessary
in government. Government is about institutions, but it is also
about individuals. It is hard to build up that kind of
understanding about how people will operate in certain
circumstances. So it does raise some concerns for us. And that
is why we often ask what is the stability of this person or
that or this institution. We would very much like to see some
continuity in Japanese politics, not just for the U.S.-Japan
security relationship, but also for the important work that
needs to be done on the economic and other sides inside Japan.
Dr. Snyder. Secretary Campbell, any comment you want to
make on this issue of trying to resolve the unresolved
territorial disputes over islands? I think the specific one--
and I cannot pronounce the names--I think in the Japanese it is
the Senkaku Islands. Any comment about that in view of
Secretary Clinton's comments a few days ago?
Secretary Campbell. I would refer you to the comment, very
clearly worded statement that Secretary Clinton has underscored
at the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional
Forum in Vietnam. I should just simply say that the United
States stands very strongly behind our security assurances and
guarantees to our allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr. Snyder. In terms of the development of the area, it is
fair to say that as long as there are territorial disputes, the
development of those areas is held back. Is that a fair
statement?
Secretary Campbell. Certainly in the South China Sea, that
has been one of the challenges. What Secretary Clinton tried to
lay out in Vietnam is a very clear U.S. statement that
maintains and underscores our traditional desire to maintain
freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas. We also believe
that the appropriate and legal opportunities for economic
commerce and extraction of mineral resources is important. And
we seek that those operations can be conducted without fear of
political or other kinds of pressure.
Dr. Snyder. And my last question to you, Secretary
Campbell. And this is an Arkansas-based question, because of
the great service of Senator Fulbright with regard to the
Fulbright scholarships. Of course, there are other programs,
the Mansfield program. Do we have an adequate number of
exchanges at the student level between Japan and the United
States, or would we benefit from more? How do you see those
numbers today?
Secretary Campbell. Let me just underscore, these are
excellent questions, and it is a source of very real concern to
me that the number of Japanese students that come to the United
States over the course of the last few years to study has
fallen off a cliff and the number of Americans that are going
to Japan to study in the JET [Japan Exchange and Teaching]
program and other programs have also gone down.
Dr. Snyder. Why is that?
Secretary Campbell. I think there are a variety of reasons.
I think there have been some economic issues on both sides. I
think there are some other areas of interest. But it is
absolutely clear, given how strong the partnership is between
our two countries that we need to recommit ourselves to
programs like Fulbright, like the JET [Japan Exchange and
Teaching] program. We need continuing support from the Japanese
Government's other foundations to ensure that our young people
are building strong ties with our most durable and strongest
Democratic partner in Asia.
Secretary Gregson. I would like to very briefly and
heartily endorse those comments.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a follow-up question?
Is the problem funding from the--is there something we need to
be doing or is it a lack of interest?
Secretary Campbell. No. Funding issues are quite
substantial on both sides in this environment, yes.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. My next question is do they have problems
getting visas to come? The reason I ask is because we had a
group of businessmen who want to come and invest here in the
United States, it took them six, seven months to get a visa. I
am just wondering if the students go through the same problem?
Secretary Campbell. I would say, again, thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman. I had the honor of working in the Pentagon
for many, many years. It is my first opportunity to work at the
State Department. The thing that has surprised me the most in
my work to date is how often, how regular I hear from foreign
friends, particularly friends in Asia, how difficult it is for
businessmen, students, even people in the government to travel
to the United States through visas and other problems. And we
try very hard to work on these problems but it has been much
more challenging than I had anticipated.
Mr. Ortiz. Anything you can do to help out because we know
there is a lot of young students going to other countries, even
though they would like to come to the United States, but it is
so hard for them to get a student visa to come to the United
States. Now, the chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland,
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Campbell,
you mentioned very positive polling in Japan relative to their
relationship with the United States. I wonder if you can
discuss with us just a bit the similar polling in Okinawa,
because that is where the current problems are focused.
If you will, differentiate between generic support for
Japanese-American relations and specific support for what we
want to do in Okinawa.
Secretary Campbell. I will answer the question generally,
Congressman, and then I will ask General Gregson to expand upon
that. I think it would be fair to say that there is generic
much higher support for the overall aspects of the U.S.-Japan
alliance and the United States in terms of Japanese polling.
And there probably is less strong support but still quite
strong in Japan for certain aspects of the situation on
Okinawa. That being said, I think there is also a recognition
that at a fundamental level, the maintenance of a strong
security relationship between the United States and Japan, of
which I would argue, and I think many in Japan recognize that
the ability to sustain a Marine presence in Okinawa is central,
overcomes some of the issues that have traditionally caused
problems in terms of the kind of public attitudes and public
polling.
I will also say that under General Gregson's leadership and
others, that the United States Government and Japan have taken
enormous steps to try to not only ease the burdens but create
greater opportunities and build deeper partnership between
Americans and the Okinawan people. General Gregson talked about
the Obuchi fellowships. We need to do more, but overall, I
think the attitudes have improved substantially in the last
decade or so.
Secretary Gregson. Thank you for the question, Mr.
Bartlett. Sometimes anecdotes, although dangerous, are
illustrative. In 2000, I moved to Okinawa. One of my first
requirements, or one of my first duties was to represent the
Department of Defense at the rollout of the Obuchi Fellowship
as a result of the Obuchi-Clinton Summit. I was stunned by the
gratitude of the Okinawans my age, the parents, that the United
States saw fit to provide this scholarship for Okinawan
students to study in the United States. They have a huge regard
for education.
As I mentioned in my oral remarks, Okinawa's particular
history, Okinawa's particular vital strategic location has
conspired to make the conversation about Okinawa primarily
about military matters. The door is wide open, and Ambassador
Roos, our Ambassador to Japan, is running through it to create
cooperative U.S.-Japan bilateral programs to bring needed
educational, entrepreneurial development to Okinawa and this is
entirely proper and will do nothing except build on the already
strong relations between the American community and the
Okinawan community.
There are items of concern between the two communities, but
I can assure you that the relationship and the cooperation
between the Americans on Okinawa and the Japanese citizens
living on Okinawa vastly exceeds its reputation in the media.
It is warm, it is friendly, it is supportive. Like the U.S.
does, every place that we are stationed, we need to take better
care of the population that surrounds our bases there, and we
need to have better and stronger bonds with them. The Obuchi
Fellowship, the educational programs that Mr. Ortiz mentioned,
these types of things are most valued by the Okinawans, most
valued by the Japanese and most valued by our Asian friends all
over. This is not a one-way thing. Bringing these students to
America enriches our schools, is in our interest.
I second Secretary Campbell's comments about doing whatever
we need to do to ease the visa application process for students
from these countries to study in the United States and to
establish exchange programs where our students can study in
their country.
Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, folks,
for being here today.
Madam Secretary, you said in your remarks the importance in
what we are doing for the Administration to get it right, as we
proceed. Are we getting it right?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Yes, sir, I believe that we are. I
think that working together with the Federal agencies but with
the Government of Guam on what their needs are and how this can
work for them. I think that the Draft EIS that came out was
weak in several areas, and I think that by bringing together
the people from the Federal agencies who are involved in this
but also going out to Guam as we have done several times now to
meet with the Government of Guam, the agencies in Guam, to talk
to the people, see what the needs are, I think that the plan
that is being brought together now will work for the people of
Guam.
Mr. Kissell. And this will happen on a timely basis, is the
time that we need for it to happen?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Yes, sir. We have agreed that the
program going forward will be paced according to the
infrastructure capabilities of Guam. Therefore, if we are able
to move faster than we have projected, if the infrastructure
allows us to move faster with the construction, we will do so.
If we need to slow down parts of it, we will do that. But we
will pace our--both the construction and the movement of forces
to the capabilities of the island.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you.
Secretary Campbell, you talked about that the concerns of
some of the people in the Pacific-Asian part of the world, that
the United States may, as you said, rightfully so, be focused
in other areas, but there are a lot of things taking place
there that should be of interest to us.
Is there anything in particular that you feel has taken
place that we are not paying enough attention to in terms of a
way that it will become an issue sooner or later down the road?
Secretary Campbell. Let me try to answer the question this
way, if I could, Congressman. I think if you ask most
Americans, and in fact most people in the executive branch,
what is the most challenging issues that we are facing right
now, most people will say, look, really, it is in the Middle
East, it is in Afghanistan, it is in Iraq, issues that are
deeply difficult, challenging, nation-building, issues
associated with proliferation, questions associated with
dealing with Al Qaeda and other radical groups.
If you look back on this period in 20 or 30 years, I think
what we might find is the historians will view this period is
that the bigger drama is actually what is playing out in the
Asia-Pacific region, a dramatic rise in economic and political
and strategic capabilities of which the United States has been
involved but perhaps we have been involved in other areas
geographically more.
I think my overall general concern would be that the key
institutions of our Government--the executive branch, the
legislative branch and, in fact, others--need to recognize--and
I think, generally, we do--that the Asia-Pacific region has an
enormous amount of drama playing out and that the scarcest
resources in our Government is really the time and attention of
our senior-most people.
And I would just simply underscore for you, look at the
number of hearings that are held up on Capitol Hill and explore
how many are done on the Asia-Pacific region in comparison
with, for instance, the critical issues that we are facing
elsewhere. So that is one of the reasons I think this sort of
hearing is so welcome and it is so appropriate.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I have got two questions related to our forces in
Okinawa and the difficulties that we are confronting there.
And I think the first question is to the strategic
importance of how having those forces there and couldn't we
accomplish the same in terms of our presence in the Asian-
Pacific theater as--doing joint maneuvers, bringing our forces
over periodically, and particularly when conditions warrant in
terms of concerns about the stability of the region, and then
putting forces in play, as opposed to having a permanent
presence?
And the second question is related to that, and that is
that if, in fact, in a worst-case scenario, given the trend
line in terms of Japanese politics that seems to be
increasingly opposed to having our permanent presence in
Okinawa, what is the alternative in terms of placing those
forces on U.S. soil? We are obviously looking at 8,000 now in
Guam. We would still, I understand, have 10,000 in Okinawa if
that is the appropriate number. Are there facilities that could
absorb that population in Hawaii and in California say at Camp
Pendleton in California?
Secretary Gregson. Thank you for the questions. I think
they are quite apt.
Our forward presence, our forward stationing makes a
political statement long before it makes a military statement;
and the basing arrangements that we share with Japan provide a
profound political and strategic anchor for our positions
there.
As to the position of Okinawa, Okinawa has been blessed or
cursed, depending on the point of view, with being in a
tremendously strategic location. Having our forces on Okinawa
allows us to react to many things very quickly.
Short of war, the many activities that go on from Okinawa
in the areas of disaster response indicate one of the many
values of having forces forward. The first 24 hours in response
to fire, flood, volcano, tsunami, forest fire, whatever, have
proven to be exceptionally valuable; and our ability to project
force quickly and bring aid to those who are in dire straits as
a result of some natural or potentially manmade incident make a
profound statement on our commitment and our capabilities to
both friends and others alike in Asia.
So I would state that our position, our forward presence in
the Pacific is important. I think the importance is growing. I
would argue that we need more, not less, in the future, given
the way things are developing.
Besides Northeast Asia we also need to worry about
Southeast Asia and, increasingly, South Asia and the Indian
Ocean area. All of these things are considerations within the
realignment.
Within Okinawa, the particular situation on Okinawa, the
battle started April 1, 1945; it ended about June 23. Most of
our forces were in the southern part of the island by the time
it ended, so most of our bases grew up in the southern part of
the island.
Since that time, Okinawa has had tremendous growth. Most of
the population lives in the southern third of the island. As
part of the realignment, we are not only moving part of the
Marines to Guam but we are closing all or portions of the base
or all of the bases south of Kadena Air Force base, meaning we
get the military presence away from the most crowded, urbanized
area of Okinawa and into an area that is much more conducive to
our operations and much more conducive to the further
development of the economy, the businesses in Okinawa.
The movement to Guam repositions not just Americans but it
repositions alliance forces. We will be providing on Guam for
the continuous presence of Japanese air and ground units and
naval units for training, bilateral training, with the United
States. Secretary Gates has said that our facilities in Guam
and other nearby areas in the Pacific, the Commonwealth and the
Compact Islands, will be increasingly bilateral in nature,
enabling us to do extraordinarily sophisticated training with
our allies and friends in areas that are relatively
unencumbered by urban sprawl and the other things that make
training in other places much more difficult.
I see this as not only a positive development on the
political and the strategic side but eventually this will
contribute greatly on the operational side, enabling our
alliance forces to operate much more effectively and much more
efficiently together.
Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, if I could, the second question
as to relocation of our forces, if he can answer that, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Sure. Go ahead and answer that question.
Secretary Gregson. As far as our ability to remain base-
forward?
Mr. Coffman. As an alternative to relocate those forces on
U.S. soil.
Secretary Gregson. Relocating to U.S. soil would put us
days away from most confrontations. I think between Hawaii,
Guam, and Japan and the sustainment base in the United States,
we achieve the ability to best balance force generation, force
development with forward positions, forward-deployed forces
ready to react immediately.
Secretary Campbell. Congressman Coffman, I can think of few
decisions that we would regret more than pulling back our
forces from the Asia-Pacific region. It is not only that they
are able to respond more quickly militarily and strategically,
but it is also really the political role they play.
Asia is extraordinarily, acutely aware of our forward-
deployed forces. I know that these kind of comparisons are
difficult to make, but it is very much like a neighborhood that
is a little bit uncertain, and if you are seeing a patrol car
there on a very regular basis, it is reassuring. That is the
role that American forces play in the Asian-Pacific region and
will play for years, perhaps decades, to come. I can think of
no more important commitment to maintain than our forward-
deployed capabilities.
Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. Mrs. Davis, the gentlelady from California.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here.
I appreciate the discussion of trying to--I don't know
whether it is refocus, because that is not exactly what you are
saying, except that our attention really shouldn't stray I
think from the relations there. And, clearly, there have been
some bumps in the road over the years, and I think that all of
the people that we work with acknowledge that but are very
strong in their continuing support.
I wondered if you could address--I don't know if this has
even come on your radar necessarily--the issue of the rise in
the Japanese yen and the impacts that can have, not so much in
I think in specific relationships that you have been discussing
but going beyond that in terms of exchanges and even the
opportunity for Americans to travel to Japan now, which I
understand has been literally cut off because of the cost.
Can you address that? Is that something that is of concern?
And is there any way that we might look at this and be aware of
it as a concern? There are pluses and minuses, of course, to
that rise. But I wonder if you could address that.
Secretary Campbell. Can I just say that one of the things
that--one of the operating procedures of every Administration,
Republican and Democrat, now for decades, is that there is
really only one institution of government that speaks about
currency matters, and that is the Department of the Treasury.
My wife happens to be the Under Secretary, so she reminds me of
this on a regular basis. So I think the better part of valor
would be to ask you to direct those questions about any
currency issues between the United States and other currencies
in Asia to appropriate folks inside the Treasury.
Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. I appreciate that, but I think it was brought
to my attention just recently and I was really quite surprised
to hear the difficulty with which we could have exchanges in
the future. So it is something that we might want to think
about.
Could you comment in a little more detail on the Status of
Forces Agreement and the discussions around that as it relates
to our forces there in Japan?
Secretary Gregson. The Status of Forces Agreement is raised
periodically. In the past, upon examination, calls for revision
of the Status of Forces Agreement generally fall away in favor
of improving the implementation of the Status of Forces
Agreement.
Our Status of Forces Agreement with Japan has proven
extraordinarily durable in the past. In my past life, one of my
most valuable officers was somebody called the Foreign
Jurisdiction Officer; and this person would be involved in
working-level negotiations upon any incident that fell within
the purview of the Status of Forces Agreement. No matter how
strictly we write it, something is always going to happen that
is not quite anticipated in the Status of Forces Agreement.
It is currently not one of the items that is a matter of
current discussion with Japan. It may come up again in the
future. If so, we will discuss it in a close, collaborative,
and forthright way with our Japanese colleagues, as we have
before.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that response.
We all have some opportunity I think to have discussions,
whether it is with the Embassy, Japanese Embassy, the
Ambassador, and also certainly among any of the
Parliamentarians from Japan, and I think one of the issues that
does could tend to come up is financial obligations as it
relates to Guam and certainly to Okinawa. And I am just
wondering, is there anything in particular you think that would
be helpful or even hurtful for Congress to convey to our
counterparts when we are in discussions with them? What would
you like us to be talking mostly about?
Secretary Gregson. On the financial contributions within
Japan, we are in host nation support discussions with our
Japanese colleagues now. The current host nation support
agreement which calls for some $1.7 billion per year runs out
in 2011. We are looking for another 5-year agreement.
I would offer that, from our point of view, the $1.7
billion, almost all of which cycles through the military and
comes back to Japan in the forms of salaries for workers aboard
the base, to include, interestingly, emergency services--fire
departments, paramedics, security guards are all local
employees.
It is also cycled back to the Japanese in forms of
construction and services. So this is support to the U.S.
forces, yes, but, again, the vast majority of it is
reinvestment back in Japan.
To the investment in Guam, this agreement was arrived at
over at least 5 years of negotiations. Secretary Campbell and I
were present at the initial incarnation of this from 1996 on,
so one could say that this agreement has been arrived at over
14 years and the financial considerations were very carefully
considered.
And this is also an opportunity investment for Japan. Part
of their money goes directly to the U.S. Treasury, yes, for us
to spend as we see fit, but another large part of the money
goes towards utilities and housing, which the Japanese are
looking at as an investment not only for eventual
recoverability perhaps in the future but also as a way to
highlight and showcase Japanese leading-edge technologies in
the area of, for example, renewable energy generation. This is
also supporting U.S. forces that are sworn to defend Japan.
So it is a bargain in that case, and it is also an
agreement openly arrived at and, at least with the colleagues
that we are talking with and the negotiations we are doing over
Guam and other matters, willingly supported.
I would add that with all the worries about Japan decision
making, Japan re-examining decisions that they have made, every
financial contribution they are obligated to make to date, and
the next one is in the works now, and we are trying to figure
out how to solve the notes and get it in there--there are no
issues blocking it. We are just going through the bureaucracy
to get the transfer of notes done. So all of this is a positive
story.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you and thank you all for being here
today. I am so happy we are discussing our relationship and
partnership with the people of Japan. We are appreciate them so
much.
My family has a special appreciation of Okinawa. My late
brother-in-law received the Navy Cross for helping seize Shuri
Castle there. And I have visited, and it is just--again, the
people of Okinawa, Japan, we greatly appreciate.
But as we are thinking about restructuring at Okinawa to
Guam--and I have been very fortunate to have visited Guam
several times with Congresswoman Bordallo. How extraordinary,
how patriotic the people are, of Guam. They have, of any
American State or territory, the highest percentage of
membership in the National Guard of any State or territory of
the United States. The people are very, very patriotic; and the
strategic location of Guam is so important to maintain and
promote peace in the Pacific.
With that, as we are hopefully going to be relocating
troops and Marines, Secretary Pfannenstiel, does the Marine
Corps support the realignment? And what are the plans for off-
island and off-territory training?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, the Marine Corps does support the movement. I think we
are making sure that the needs of the Marines, both in terms of
housing and facilities and training ranges, are met and that
the facilities that are in Guam are adequate.
In terms of off-island training, there has been some
discussion. The major issues tend to be logistical. If you are
moving the Marines to Guam, trying to train, for example, on
Tinian becomes just a logistical and, to some extent, a very
expensive problem, trying to move people as needed. So the
primary focus and what we are working on right now is to
develop the necessary training bases on Guam.
Mr. Wilson. And for families, too, it has been--I was so
impressed. I have a son serving in the Navy as a doctor, and I
would be thrilled if he and his family were there at Guam.
General Gregson, again, our relationship is so important
with the people of Japan and Japan has a real commitment to
nuclear nonproliferation. Does this complicate its being
included in the U.S. nuclear umbrella?
Secretary Gregson. Thank you for the question.
No. The short answer is no. I don't think it complicates
Japan--the United States commitment to extend a deterrence with
Japan.
I would also note that Japan has been a very active
supporter of the proliferation security initiative and has
actually held some exercises with this in cooperation with the
United States. In the wake of recent North Korean actions, both
last year and this year, we have taken pains to assure Japan of
our commitment to extend the deterrence.
Secretary Campbell. Thank you, Congressman. I would say two
things.
I think it is also the case that particularly the current
Government, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and
others, have very much welcomed efforts by the United States to
diminish the role of nuclear weapons in global politics. So
they, as the only country to have experienced the tragedy of
nuclear use, they appreciate that commitment, recognize that it
is a distant one. But, at the same time, given the neighborhood
and world that we live in today, the desire on the part of
Japan and the United States to underscore that the deterrence
of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan remains robust and
strong is extraordinarily important; and we try to underscore
that in all of our statements and all of our private
consultations with our Japanese friends. So they maintain both
these goals and desires to diminish the role of nuclear weapons
but also to recognize that extended deterrence on the part of
the United States over Japan is an absolutely essential
component of their overarching security needs.
Mr. Wilson. As we conclude, another deterrence is a missile
defense system. And I sincerely hope that we are making every
effort to work with our Japanese allies to develop the most
effective. We are dealing with an irrational situation in North
Korea. I have actually gone and visited Pyongyang with Chairman
Ortiz. And so we need--the best way to preserve peace in
Northeast Asia truly to me is a very effective missile defense
system.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to open this up to the panel. I am curious
what the Japanese Government reaction was to the sinking of the
Cheonan. Has it called for any changes within the Japanese
defense forces? Has it led to any additional concerns? I just
open that up.
Secretary Campbell. Congressman, to many friends in Asia,
alas, it did not come as a surprise, given the very provocative
actions we have seen over decades from North Korea. I think
sometimes we forget the takedown of the Korean Airlines, the
brutal attack against the cabinet in which most were killed.
These were all perpetrated by the North Korean Government.
I think it would be fair to say that it has led to much
stronger consultations on the part of the United States and
Japan and South Korea. We met trilaterally last week in Seoul
to underscore the steps we are taking. General Gregson has had
a number of meetings with his counterparts.
I think you will be seeing, particularly in South Korea,
very clear commitments to new procurements in the arena of
anti-submarine warfare and other kinds of military
procurements.
Japan has made similar commitments, and I think you are
going to see a renewed effort at exercises and other training
designed to protect against these kinds of attacks, both from
the blue or from the lurking submarines; and it is also a
reminder of the importance of vigilance just across the
spectrum in the Asian-Pacific arena.
Secretary Gregson. There are historic problems between
Korea and Japan. But I would add, in addition to Secretary
Campbell's remarks, that trilateral cooperation in the security
arena really accelerated after last year's North Korea nuclear
episode and has continued to accelerate and has been given even
more impetus by the sinking of the Cheonan, which served as a
reminder to all of us that that is a very dangerous
neighborhood that we all live in.
Mr. Taylor. General, if I could, there are, as we sadly
know, copycat crimes. You would imagine there would therefore
be copycat terrorism. So if there is a successful act
somewhere, perpetrators get away. Who is tracking the
proliferation of that type of submarine by the North Koreans?
Who are they selling them to? How many are they making? Where
are they going?
Secretary Gregson. We have an extensive effort to track
North Korean arms sales. I would be happy to provide details
for the record.
Mr. Taylor. If you would, please.
Secretary Gregson. Okay.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 67.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last question, if I may, I still have a couple minutes.
Tell me what, if anything, is the Japanese Government doing to
participate in our efforts in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gregson. The Japanese are the second-largest
contributor to our efforts in Afghanistan. Their financial
contributions--their previous financial contributions helped to
rebuild the Afghan Ring Road and to pay the salaries of the
Afghanistan National Police. They pledged an additional $5
billion that will go to support the pillars of our--many of the
pillars of our Afghanistan policy and strategy, the
reintegration, the development, education, a number of things.
We are very happy with Japan's contribution there.
And I would add also that Japan is a contributor to the
maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden in the North
Arabian Sea, and they also provide forces for a number of U.N.
security missions that we support.
Secretary Campbell. The truth is, if I could say,
Congressman, is that Japan has not gotten enough credit for
actually very generous support on a range of issues.
And what is different, if I may say, about this particular
commitment than certain things in the past is sometimes in the
past we have had to go to the Japanese and say, can you support
us in this endeavor or that endeavor? This was a Japanese
initiative. They came to us in the fall and said, we would like
to support you. Here are the things that we can think would
make sense. Do you have any recommendations or suggestions?
We have altered a few of these things, but if all of our
allies stepped up in this way, we would be in a very different
situation than we are today in Afghanistan.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Ortiz. We will go to the lady from Guam, Congresswoman
Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, very much, Mr.
Chairman. This is a very important hearing for me.
Secretary Gregson, Secretary Pfannenstiel, and Secretary
Campbell, thank you for your testimonies.
The realignment of Marines from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam is
a critical part of our relationship with the Japanese. The
realignment of military forces was first signed in 2006 by the
Bush administration and was reaffirmed by Secretary Clinton
when she signed the so-called Guam International Agreement in
February of 2009. Our relationship with the Government of Japan
has significant impacts for Guam.
The realignment of Marines, positioning of a transient
carrier berth, and a placement of a missile defense system will
place a significant burden on my constituents. We must do all
that we can to ensure that we get this done right; and this is
what Mr. Skelton, our Chairman, has said from the very
beginning.
Secretary Pfannenstiel, I appreciated your leadership in
working with Nancy Sutley, Chairwoman of the White House
Council on Environmental Quality; Under Secretary Dorothy
Robyn; and Assistant Secretary Tony Babauta in providing
presentations to local elected leaders and the public on Guam
about the findings in the Final EIS. I just arrived from Guam,
and I was there during all of the meetings.
Your presence on Guam for these presentations highlights
the attention and the support that this Administration has for
getting the build-up done right. However, I have continued to
have significant concerns about the findings in the Final EIS.
We have made significant progress in identifying funds for
infrastructure improvements; and while I applaud the progress
made in using Japanese funds for upgrades to our
infrastructure, this Congress must understand how these funds
will be used and what strings are attached. We made it clear
that we want to understand this new construct before funds are
used according to a reporting requirement in the fiscal year
2010 defense authorization bill.
Further, I will reiterate my skepticism that the Department
of the Navy will be successful in obtaining private or
Government of Guam lands in the Pagat area to develop a
training range for the Marine Corps. While I appreciate the
readiness requirements of the Marines, I believe more creative
options are available to meet these training requirements,
including moving this training range entirely to Tinian or to
areas at Anderson Air Force base or Naval Magazine. I request
that the Department of the Navy work to develop alternative
plans, because I, frankly, remain very skeptical that the
preferred alternative will be achieved, and I am adamantly
opposed to the use of eminent domain to acquire these lands if
local landowners are not willing to sell or lease.
I am very supportive and I have been all along of the
military build-up, but we need, again, to get this done right.
With that said, I would like to ask a few questions.
First to you, Secretary Pfannenstiel, a recent report in
Guam News indicates that the National Historic Preservation
Trust has retained legal counsel and is considering a legal
challenge to the placement of the training range on Pagat cliff
line. Can I assume that the Department will work
collaboratively with the Preservation Trust to better
understand the decision to locate at Pagat?
And, similarly, how will the Record of Decision address the
matter of a training range on Pagat and how the Department
plans to acquire land?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Thank you, Congresswoman. Thank you
for your support of the build-up, your help last week in
communicating with the elected officials and the people of
Guam. It was, as always, a real treat to be there, and I really
appreciated your help in that.
In specific answer to your questions, first, let me take
the one about the National Historic Preservation Trust. I also
just saw a reference to the possibility of legal counsel.
I want to assure you we have been working with the National
Historic Preservation Trust and will continue to do so. As we
discussed last week, we believe that the preservation of the
Pagat Village site as a very special cultural place for Guam is
consistent with the training range. I think that we need to
work very closely with the community in assuring that the
community has the access they need, that there is nothing in
the training range that will damage in any way or interfere
with the use of that site.
I believe, as we discussed last week, that that can be
done. I know it requires some additional work, and we are there
to do that.
As far as how the Record of Decision will deal with the
acquisition of the property, we do have more work to do on the
property needs, the property needs primarily for the training
ranges. I think there are other property needs, but the one
that is of most concern at the moment is for the training
ranges. We are working on that. We need to both define what the
requirements specifically are so that we can examine throughout
whether there are other possibilities. We put in our preferred
alternative. We believe that will still work, and we need to
look at how that will happen.
In terms of acquiring the land, we have not begun
discussions with landowners. We are waiting for the Final EIS
to define that and then for the ROD to come out. But we will
engage in discussions with landowners. We are committed to
purchasing whatever land we need if we do need to purchase
additional land, purchase or lease or exchange if that would
work. So we believe that there are a number of ways we can
achieve what we need to achieve meeting the needs of the people
of Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, since this is so vitally
important, I have one last question.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] We will come back to you very
quickly and give you another 5 minutes. Be right back.
General Gregson, at the end of the realignment, will the
Marine Corps requirements be met and will their capabilities be
enhanced by moving from Okinawa to Guam?
Secretary Gregson. I think I would defer to Marine Corps
representatives to state whether their requirements will be
met. However, it is the Defense Department's goal that we do
meet all of the requirements.
The Chairman. No, no, no. I am asking you in your
professional opinion, General. I will repeat the question.
Secretary Gregson. No, sir. Yes, they will be met.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz, and then we will return to----
Oh, excuse me. Excuse me, Mr. Wilson. Did you have a
question?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
One final question with regard to missile defense. With the
increased capability of range from North Korea, we have all
known that South Korea, that Japan are at risk, possibly
Taiwan. But I am very concerned that, in fact, Hawaii, Alaska
are now within range; and how can we assure the people of
Hawaii that we are proceeding with a missile defense that can
protect the people of that State?
Secretary Gregson. We are doing everything we can to
provide a solid missile defense regime. We are also in
cooperation with our friends in both Korea and Japan on this.
Japan, as we mentioned, has invested in BMD-capable Aegis
destroyers. We recently completed the cooperative development
of the Standard Missile-3 Block II upgrade to those missiles
which will allow the Japanese ships to engage much longer range
than they would have been able to otherwise. We are working
with the Republic of Korea on missile defense.
This has to be a cooperative effort. No nation can protect
itself as well as it should be without cooperation from other
countries, and that is the direction that we are going with
this.
Mr. Wilson. And I am just so hopeful with people as
technologically proficient as the people in Japan working
together we can protect our American States of Hawaii and
Alaska. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. You know how we can work this out. We have been
one big family for a long time; and I think that the forward
presence is very, very important to me and to our military. But
I am just wondering, does all this realignment, is it supported
by the Marine Corps, this realignment? Do they support it?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Yes, sir, they do. They need to
have their needs met. They need to have their training needs
fully met. And, with that, with housing that is the right
housing, with housing and facilities that work for them, the
training ranges that meet their training needs, yes, they will
support this.
Mr. Ortiz. One of the things that we have seen in the past
few years during these two wars is that before we send our
young men and women into harm's way we need to be sure that
they have the proper training, that they have the proper
equipment. And how long will it take for them to get the
training areas solved before--do we have any idea?
Secretary Gregson. If I could. Thanks to the efforts of the
members of this committee and many other colleagues up here on
the Hill, we have in the United States an absolutely
unparalleled, outstanding training and force generation base.
With the number of installations we have in the continental
United States, Hawaii, and Alaska, it is simply impossible to
recreate that whole capability anyplace other than where it is
now.
But what we will be able to do is, as Secretary Gates has
said, make our training capabilities in the Pacific as
competent as it can be and make it increasingly bilateral in
nature so that we have the ability not only to do training
ourselves but to train with our allies and friends.
We will expand the training areas available to our forces
in the Pacific as much as we can, but these, as we all realize,
get into some complex international negotiations.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
just north of Guam has a covenant with the United States, but
it is treated like a territory. We still have a lease on the
major portion of Tinian Island. The Compact States, the
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republics of the Marshalls
and Palau, have a compact with the United States that obliges
them to make training areas available for the United States. We
plan on taking advantage of that much more than we have in the
past.
To support our forces in Korea as well as forces in Japan
now, we have a mix of training that is done locally and also
the rotation of units from the United States to Japan or to
Korea for a period of duty and then back to the United States
again so that we can take advantage of the force generation
capabilities, the training capabilities that are available here
that may not in their fullest measure be available overseas.
So to the Chairman's previous question about will the
Marines requirements be taken care of, yes. There is a longer
answer that involves all the details about how the Department
of Defense, with the full cooperation of the Department of the
Navy, the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Air Force, and their
associated departments to manage the training and the rotation
of forces overseas. So we have absolutely our best foot forward
in a very difficult and dangerous region, and also before we
put young Americans in harm's way we assure they have the
absolute best training and qualifications that we can get them.
Mr. Ortiz. One last question. If I understand correctly, we
have a new Governor in Okinawa?
Secretary Gregson. No. I forget when the election was. His
name is Governor Nakaima. He is, in my opinion, a very strong
leader. We look forward to working with him.
Mr. Ortiz. He is running for reelection--I was just
corrected. He is running for reelection in November as well.
Secretary Gregson. November 28th is the election date, to
my understanding.
Mr. Ortiz. He is receptive to the idea of what we are
planning on doing?
Secretary Gregson. He is a champion for his constituents.
So, within that limit, he is receptive to the ideas and what we
are doing.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Now back to Ms. Bordallo for another 5 minutes.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Pfannenstiel, I just want to further--you
answered my question by saying things are being worked out.
Well, I was there during the protests, and there was strong
opposition to the Pagat site, and I didn't feel very
comfortable about it. If things can be worked out, fine. It
didn't look very promising to me. But do you have an
alternative? Are you working on some kind of an alternative
site?
Secretary Pfannenstiel. Congresswoman, we are always
looking at available land, trying to determine whether we can
find land that would meet the needs in a very safe manner.
We have examined the use of the site near Pagat to make
sure that it is both safe and in no way will affect the site.
However, we do recognize that there is a community issue, and
we want to be responsive to that.
We started initially by looking at many other sites, and
this was the one that was recommended to us that seemed to meet
all of the criteria that we needed in terms of size and safety
and traffic and accessibility and convenience to both the
Marines and not interfering with the community. If it turns out
this one doesn't work, then we will, of course, continue to
look.
Ms. Bordallo. Look for an alternative. I hope so. Because I
do want it to work. And we knew that when the Final EIS would
come out that this and also the port, the berthing area, there
would be a problem. But this in particular really made the
news, and I was there with the protesters, so I realized that
they are in strong opposition.
I have one more question here. Secretary Gregson or
Secretary Campbell, there have been cuts to the military
construction budget for Guam in the Senate as well as from our
appropriator friends in the House. One item that is cited for
the cuts is the lack of tangible progress on the replacement
Futenma facility in Okinawa. In the past, we have been led to
believe that tangible progress meant the Governor signing a
permit for a new landfill. Has what constitutes tangible
progress shifted?
Furthermore, what impact do the military construction cuts
have on the Guam International Agreement, and do you have any
concerns that these cuts will cause hurdles in implementing
fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funding for Guam?
Secretary Gregson. Thank you for the question. I will defer
to Secretary Pfannenstiel on the executability of the funds in
the proposed budget.
My concern on the cuts is that--well, let me address the
tangible progress first.
With the new Government coming to power in Japan, we
obviously went through a period of re-examination and
revalidation. That re-examination and revalidation is over. The
essential character and the operations of the alliance have
been revalidated.
Most importantly, very senior Japanese leadership has
endorsed the U.S. presence in Japan and specifically in
Okinawa. Minister Kan--Prime Minister Kan has pledged a
solution to the Futenma replacement problem. The May 28th
agreement that was signed at the Secretary of Defense/Secretary
of State level with their counterparts established the location
for the new facility to be Camp Schwab, as it was originally
planned, and mandated an experts' group to work through the
rest of the details. That group is very active. It is meeting
as we speak.
The remaining details to be worked out are details of the
method of construction and the exact configuration of the
facilities that will be constructed and where exactly the
runways will be.
We do not yet have tangible progress. We are confident we
will get there.
And my worry about on the policy side with the proposed
cuts to the budget are that this will induce some doubt within
the Japanese body politic on whether we are committed to our
part of the agreement. So, from that manner, if asked, I would
counsel against those cuts.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. There being no further questions, we
certainly thank the panel for being with us and for your
testimony. We look forward to seeing you again.
The hearing has ended.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 27, 2010
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 27, 2010
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Secretary Gregson. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
through the Federal Highway Administration and the Maritime
Administration (MARAD), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
have begun to address Guam's infrastructure deficiencies and future
needs. USDA has already provided $15 million in grants and $88 million
in pending loans for landfill and utilities improvements.
USDA is poised to provide $50 million in grants and matching loans
to the $50 million the Department of Defense has requested for
improvement to Guam's sole commercial port. These funds would be used
for the planning, design, and construction of projects to improve
facilities, relieve port congestion, and provide greater access to port
facilities, and would be managed by MARAD under the Port of Guam
Improvement Enterprise Program. [See page 10.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Secretary Gregson. Our extensive effort to deter, track, and stop
North Korean arms sales includes working closely with the international
community. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874
prohibits North Korea from transferring all conventional arms; however,
illicit North Korean shipments interdicted since May 2009 suggest that
sanctions have not deterred Pyongyang from attempting such transfers.
Illicit activities represent an important source of North Korean hard
currency--indicating that Pyongyang is unlikely to cease arms export
activity. According to a UN report, there are at least four cases
involving interdicted arms exports from North Korea since the adoption
of UNSCR 1874.
In July 2009, UAE authorities seized containers of the
cargo ship ANL Australia carrying conventional arms cargo from North
Korea to a Middle East customer. According to open source reports, the
seized cargo included 122mm rockets and rocket propelled grenades.
In October 2009, South Korea seized four containers of
North Korean-origin chemical warfare protective suits destined for
Syria.
In December 2009, Thailand seized 35 tons of North
Korean-origin weapons, including 240mm rockets, RPG-7s, and MANPADS,
aboard an IL-76 cargo aircraft ultimately bound for Iran.
In February 2010, South Africa seized North Korea-origin
tanks spare parts onboard a cargo vessel in the port of Durban. The
T54/55 components were bound for the Republic of Congo.
According to a UN panel of experts report, North Korea uses various
methods to circumvent UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 and ship conventional
weapons, including falsifying end user certificates and mislabeling
crates, sending cargo through multiple front companies and
intermediaries, and using air cargo to handle high value and sensitive
arms exports. In addition to shipping complete conventional weapons
systems, North Korea also transports conventional arms in the form of
knock-down kits, which can be transported along with North Korean
technicians to provide a country with a weapons assembly capability. If
desired by the Committee, I would be happy to provide additional
classified information on the export of submarine and submarine
technology by North Korea. [See page 23.]
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