[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-163]
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY AND
FUNDING
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 29, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 29, 2010, Security and Stability in Pakistan:
Developments in U.S. Policy and Funding........................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 29, 2010......................................... 31
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 2010
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY AND
FUNDING
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Flournoy, Hon. Michele, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 4
Paxton, Lt. Gen. John M., Jr., USMC, Director of Operations, J-3,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................................... 6
Shapiro, Hon. Andrew J., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State........... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Flournoy, Hon. Michele, jointly with Lt. Gen. John M. Paxton,
Jr......................................................... 42
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 38
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 35
Shapiro, Hon. Andrew J....................................... 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY AND
FUNDING
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 29, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning.
This morning we have with us the Honorable Michele
Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, at the
Department of Defense; Lieutenant General John M. Paxton, Jr.,
Director for Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the
Honorable Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-
Military Affairs for the Department of State.
We welcome you and thank you for being with us.
Before we begin, let me remind members that this is open,
so today's discussion should be solely involving unclassified
matters and not matters of national security classification.
Pakistan's continuing security challenges have serious
implications for our national and homeland security, for our
efforts in Afghanistan, as well as for security in that region.
In fact, there is no security relationship in the world today
more important than the relationship between the United States
military and the military of Pakistan. This relationship has
experienced its ups and downs over the years, but today as we
speak, it is solid and it must remain so if we are to serve the
interests of both nations.
The relationship is founded on the fact that our national
interests are aligned in fundamental ways. It is also sustained
by the personal and professional relationship between the two
nations' officer corps, and not least by the mutual support we
provide each other in the fight against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban.
This committee has authorized a large share of the funding
for the support we provide to Pakistan, and we are deeply
interested in the logistical and operational support they in
turn provide to our country.
I am pleased that the Administration's strategy for
Pakistan is already showing signs of success, success due in
large part to the increase in Pakistani operations, which have
been largely successful.
I applaud the recent detention of senior Taliban leaders
inside Pakistan, the increased cross-border collaboration
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the growing popular
support for our shared counterterrorism activities.
However, there is still a long way to go and, frankly, a
lot of hard work. ``Hold'' and ``build'' capabilities are
integral to counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan but they
are not yet developed. Pakistan must have the civilian capacity
needed for long-term security and stability in the country.
Moreover, there is a need for greater international
contributions to Pakistan.
The Administration's recent report to Congress on metrics
for Pakistan, frankly, was a disappointment. While the
Administration has developed good metrics and we are assured
that you are tracking them, very little of this information has
actually been provided to us in Congress. I trust that this
deficiency will be corrected very quickly.
The information we are missing is important, because the
Administration has requested significant resources from
Congress and the American people to continue efforts to support
the country of Pakistan. The administration's fiscal year 2011
request includes an additional $1.6 billion for the CSF
[Coalition Support Funds] and $1.2 billion for the State
Department's Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund. In
addition to examining the justifications for these amounts, the
committee remains interested in determining what the future is
for the CSF as they wind down Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Again, we thank you so much for being with us today. We
look forward to your testimony.
To Under Secretary Michele Flournoy, she has become a good
friend, and you have been here a good number of times sharing
your wisdom with us. We are especially pleased to have you once
again.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding today's hearing on Pakistan.
This morning's discussion gives us an opportunity to focus
on our policy toward Pakistan and the types of tools that have
been critical to expanding our partnership with Pakistani
Security Forces.
I would also like to welcome our witnesses. I look forward
to your testimonies and to candid dialogue.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a brief moment and
highlight some key issues and submit my formal statement for
the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. McKeon. Almost 1 year ago today, this committee held a
similar hearing focused on Pakistan. While much has evolved
over the last 365 days, three things have remained the same:
First, it remains in our national interest to defeat Al
Qaeda and its extremist allies and ensure that they will have
no safe havens from which to attack the American people.
Second, Pakistan continues to be engaged in a tough fight
against a complex insurgency.
Third, Pakistan is an essential partner to the United
States, both in the near and long term, and we must remain
committed to building trust between our two Nations.
While all of these factors were important to informing our
overall approach to Pakistan and how we resource that effort, I
would like to focus on the security environment in Pakistan. It
is my view that the traditional peacetime framework for
security assistance is inappropriate and no longer works.
Despite Pakistan's increased military operations, Pakistan is a
nation that is more appropriately comparable to a combat zone,
such as found in Afghanistan, and should be treated as such.
That is why I supported the Administration's original
request for a new authority and funding stream which resembled
our train and equip efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Last year, Under Secretary Flournoy testified to this
committee that the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund,
or PCCF, will align authorities and funding to develop
Pakistan's capability in current counterinsurgency operations
with DOD's [Department of Defense] responsibility to implement
the security portion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy,
including our own current operations. I agreed then and I agree
now.
Unfortunately, the next day Secretary Gates and Secretary
Clinton ignored their own strategy and decided that the PCCF
authority will reside in the State Department. It remains to be
seen how the State Department will manage the PCCF authority
and if it has the right culture and capacity to adequately
respond to the wartime needs in Pakistan.
In my mind, I still question the rationale to move PCCF to
State when DOD has proven its ability to execute similar
programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. I also think it is fair to
question if Congress will appropriate this year's money without
strings attached and in a manner consistent with wartime
contingencies.
Mr. Chairman, I think our committee should continue to
closely monitor the execution of PCCF and ensure the CENTCOM
[U.S. Central Command] Commander, through the Office of Defense
Representative for Pakistan, maintains the speed and
flexibility needed to take advantage of emerging and urgent
opportunities with the Pakistan military.
Pakistani Security Forces have increased their operational
tempo and are improving their capacity to conduct
counterinsurgency operations against insurgent networks on its
side of the border. It is in both our nations' strategic
interest to see this momentum continue.
However, as you all know, clearing is only one phase of an
effective counterinsurgency strategy. As we have learned in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the ``hold'' and ``build'' phases are
equally important. I would like our witnesses to comment on the
recent notification to Congress to use economic support funds
to provide quick impact, small-scale assistance to benefit the
local population. It seems to me that such funds are critical
to building upon last year's military gains.
Lastly, I think Congress should also consider Coalition
Support Funds under this wartime paradigm. Let me be clear. It
is our congressional prerogative to conduct oversight and
scrutinize funding, including CSF or any other funds in that
matter. But we must balance accountability with supporting
Pakistan's ability to adapt and respond to the fluid and
dynamic security situation on the ground.
I hope to hear from our witnesses today why the CSF is
critical to Pakistan's will and ability to conduct military
operations and how we are working with the Government of
Pakistan to ensure that such reimbursing efforts directly
support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.
Again, thank you for being here. I look forward to your
testimony and discussion. Thank you. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
Ms. Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense, you are on.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Flournoy. Mr. Chairman and Congressman McKeon,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting this panel here today to testify on the growing U.S.-
Pakistan strategic partnership. The Administration's core goal
in this region remains consistent: to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat Al Qaeda and ensure elimination of Al Qaeda's safe
havens in the region. Pakistan is a critical ally in these
efforts, and the U.S. and Pakistan also have shared interests
that extend far beyond countering violent extremism.
President Obama has charged us with building an effective
partnership, one that advances U.S. interests while
demonstrating to Pakistan that we will remain a strong
supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity over the long
term. To build such an enduring partnership, we must strike the
right balance between civilian and military cooperation.
On the security side, our programs are designed to
strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target violent extremist
groups that threaten both of our countries, the region, and the
world. We have reiterated our long-term commitment to Pakistan
through senior-level engagement by DOD leadership. We have
increased the amount and the responsiveness of our security
assistance. And in Pakistan itself, the Office of Defense
Representative Pakistan, ODRP, has also deepened our day-to-day
relations with our Pakistani defense colleagues. The close
coordination between ODRP and Pakistani Security Forces
represents a good working model for monitoring assistance and
ensuring accountability.
While it is certainly too early to fully evaluate the
success of our approach, we believe that our efforts to
demonstrate the strong and enduring U.S. commitment to Pakistan
are bearing fruit. Over the last year, the Government of
Pakistan has demonstrated a significantly increased commitment
to combating violent extremist organizations that use its
territory.
When I testified on the subject last March, violent
extremists were entrenched along Pakistan's western border and
expanding their influence into the settled areas of Pakistan.
Devastating attacks on cities from Islamabad to Lahore led to a
public outcry and a galvanizing of Pakistani political will to
combat these violent extremist organizations.
In the last year, Pakistani Security Forces have taken
unprecedented military action, recapturing significant
territory from insurgent groups. Their actions have disrupted
Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the border regions. And their
perseverance in the face of significant casualties, nearly
4,000 in 2009 alone, testify to their commitment to the fight.
But even with the momentum of recent operational successes,
Pakistan still faces a Herculean task. The threat of militant
violence against the Pakistani state continues. The human cost
of that violence and the instability that it has engendered is
incalculable; and the financial strain is taking an enormous
toll on Pakistan's economy.
The United States faces three significant hurdles in our
efforts to assist Pakistan: capacity, threat perceptions, and
mistrust of the United States.
When it comes to capacity, Pakistan's Security Forces have
improved their ability to clear territory, but this progress
remains fragile. Pakistan must also have the capabilities to
translate tactical successes into permanent elimination of
militant and terrorist safe havens. In particular, we must help
Pakistan build the capacity of its civilian agencies to more
rapidly move development and government resources into areas
that have been cleared by the military.
Another challenge relates to Pakistan's threat perceptions.
Although extremist attacks have led to the repositioning of
substantial Pakistani forces, Pakistan's strategic concerns
about India remain preeminent. We must continue to reassure
Pakistan that as it combats the terrorist threat, it is not
exposing itself to increased risk along its eastern border.
A final hurdle frankly relates to the legacy of mistrust
between the United States and Pakistan. Past U.S. sanctions,
Pakistani concerns about the growing U.S.-India relationship,
its skepticism about U.S. staying power in the region, have
made it a wary partner. Similarly, reports of Pakistan's
tolerance and support for some violent extremist groups have
created skepticism on the U.S. side. This is a partnership that
is absolutely vital to our national interests, but it is also
complex; and the need for candid dialogue and mutual
reassurance remains very strong. And I believe we have made
substantial progress in this regard over the last year.
We do believe we are on the right path. U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation in the form of material assistance, training
assistance, operational coordination, and reimbursement for
their operational costs have been critical enablers to
Pakistani progress against insurgents and has helped to build
trust. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, or PCF, has proven
to be particularly effective in expanding Pakistan's
counterinsurgency capabilities.
The flexibility of this funding has allowed DOD to take
advantage of emerging opportunities to equip, train, and
coordinate with Pakistani Security Forces. It allowed, for
example, the overhaul of a dozen Mi-17 helicopters which were
used extensively in the counterinsurgency campaign in the Swat
Valley. In addition, courses in intelligence analysis, civil
military operations, and the law of armed conflict have helped
prepare Pakistani military and Frontier Scouts for
counterinsurgency operations. DOD has also supported enhanced
coordination both with Pakistan and across the border.
In using PCF, we have helped to establish several
intelligence fusion centers. Overall, this close coordination
and this training relationship has proven an effective antidote
to mistrust. In addition, Coalition Support Funds have allowed
us to reimburse Pakistan for their logistical, military, and
other support to our overseas contingency operations,
particularly support to Afghanistan operations. And prompt
payment of CSF claims, while ensuring careful assessment, is
absolutely critical to sustaining Pakistan's willingness to
continue to conduct combat operations.
Finally, we strongly agree with our State Department
colleagues about the importance of a multiyear security
assistance package for Pakistan, one that includes substantial
and predictable levels of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF
is the foundation of our long-term bilateral military-to-
military relationship and such a multiyear package would
further strengthen our long-term relationship with Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, our partnership with
Pakistan is fraught with challenges but it remains vital to our
overall goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al
Qaeda, and enhancing stability in a critical region.
I want to thank you all once again for the committee's
support for these endeavors and for the opportunity to testify
today. We look forward to further discussion and to working
closely with you in the future. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and
General Paxton can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. We thank you so much.
General Paxton, welcome, and we appreciate your testimony.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, J-3, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Paxton. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
the opportunity. Congressman McKeon, and other distinguished
members of the committee. Let me begin by thanking you for your
continued support for our men and women in uniform and across
the globe. I am honored to have the opportunity to appear
before the committee this morning to report on Pakistan and the
vital military and security assistance we provide the Armed
Forces in our common fight against violent extremism.
I would like to start by reiterating Under Secretary
Flournoy's point that a stable and secure Pakistan is of vital
strategic importance to the United States. Their fight against
violent extremism is directly aligned with our goals and
interests in the region. We must see Pakistan's efforts to
combat violent extremism as our own, and we must remain
steadfast in our commitment to developing their abilities to
wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign.
Thus far, our military and security assistance has indeed
been instrumental in enhancing their effectiveness and success
and that of the ongoing efforts of the Pakistani Security
Forces.
As events of the past several years have made painfully
clear, the Pakistani state and society are under direct threat
from Al Qaeda, from Pashtun jihadi groups such as Pakistani
Taliban, as well as several Sunni Deobandi and Salafi jihadi
groups operating in the country. These violent networks pose
danger not just to Pakistan or to South and Central Asia, but
to the entire globe, including our U.S. homeland.
Given this reality, it is imperative that the United States
encourage and support the Pakistani Government, military, and
people in their fight against military extremists operating
inside their own borders.
Pakistan's traditional defense posture is, and always has
been, geared to conventional military conflict with India and
not to counterinsurgency. Consequently, prior to Pakistani
Taliban's audacious foray into the Swat Valley approximately 1
year ago, Pakistani leadership was reluctant to acknowledge
such groups as serious threats to their state security.
In the past, Pakistan approach to dealing with violent
extremists, relied primarily on limited and often inconclusive
military operations as well as tenuous cease-fire agreements,
all of which collapsed immediately. Pakistan's approach to
military networks changed when these militants began directing
their violence inwards against the Pakistani state, people, and
society.
Over the past year, through concerted military campaigns in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, and in the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), now the Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa, previously known as the NWFP, Pakistan has
demonstrated increased resolve in its efforts against the
Pakistani Taliban and other Al Qaeda-allied movements.
Months of intense operations in the FATA's Peshawar agency
have greatly diminished the presence of the Pakistani Taliban
and subsequently disrupted and displaced the Al Qaeda in the
process as well. Late last month, military-launched operations
in Orakzai Agency, which, while ongoing, resulted in modest yet
positive territorial gains.
All of these gains highlight the Pakistani military's
recent success in clearing territory formerly under the de
facto militant control, which is a direct consequence of the
equipping and training provided through the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Fund, or PCF, and other funding authorities
such as the Coalition Support Funds all of which has been
positively enabled by this committee and Congress.
The security and military assistance we provide has notably
improved the efficacy of Pakistan's ongoing counterinsurgency
campaign both in the FATA and in KPK [Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa].
However, as Under Secretary Flournoy noted, simply clearing
these areas of these militants is insufficient, and this
progress would be undermined if the Pakistani Security Forces
are unable to hold and gradually build in these areas.
The Office of the Defense Representative of Pakistan, or
ODRP, has recently noted the trickling in and return of
militants in previously cleared areas. This risk underscores
the importance of providing assistance that continues to enable
the Pakistanis to move permanently to dismantle extremist
networks and eliminate their safe havens.
Permanent control of these territories will require the
development of an effective civilian governance capability,
institutions, and personnel. Establishing and developing this
capacity will certainly be a key challenge Pakistan will face
in its efforts to hold and build within these areas.
The local populace must see and believe that the government
presence will be enduring and positive. However, this longer-
term objective can only be achieved if the Pakistani Security
Forces are actually capable of ensuring the civilian security
in the area. Accomplishing this goal will necessitate that
military and paramilitary forces are trained and equipped not
only to maintain security, but, in the interim, to also meet
the immediate humanitarian and civilian needs of the local
populations. Our continued support through PCF and CSF is
helping to guarantee that all of this happens.
Continued military and security assistance to Pakistan's
counterinsurgency efforts will be instrumental to their success
in dismantling and defeating the extremists within their
country's borders. Our technical, financial, and material
assistance has already enabled Pakistan to address this
challenge far more aggressively than ever in the past.
Deepening our ties and relationships with Pakistan will
enable their government and security forces to continue
pursuing objectives that are in the vital interest of both of
our Nations.
Mr. Chairman, committee members, thank you again for
inviting us and for the opportunity for being with you this
morning. Under Secretary Flournoy and I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. General, thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of General Paxton and
Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. Mr. Shapiro.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW J. SHAPIRO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Shapiro. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on how the State Department's security assistance
programs contribute to our partnership with the Government of
Pakistan and the security of the region.
As Secretary Clinton said last month, it is clear that our
partnership with Pakistan and progress on the ground are key to
the security of the United States. The Secretary's visit to
Pakistan last fall and the successful March 24 and March 25
U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue meeting have helped to place
our partnership on a significantly stronger foundation.
In this regard, I want to talk about the important role
that State Department-managed security assistance programs play
in Pakistan.
Our security assistance efforts complement the substantial
assistance being provided to Pakistan's civilian authorities
and organizations, consistent with the Enhanced Partnership
with Pakistan Act and the President's pledge of a long-term
partnership with Pakistan.
The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages assistance
for Pakistan through three accounts: Foreign Military
Financing, FMF; International Military Education and Training,
IMET; and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, PCCF.
Effective management and execution of these programs is a major
priority for the Bureau. In fact, I just visited Pakistan in
March to discuss in greater depth the security assistance
programs that we manage there.
FMF is the foundation of a long-term U.S.-Pakistan security
relationship. It supports the transformation and modernization
of Pakistan's military through equipment upgrades and
acquisitions. In addition to developing Pakistan's long-term
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities, FMF
enhances the ability of Pakistan's military to meet its
legitimate defense needs and play a greater role in improving
regional security.
The IMET program is crucial to U.S. efforts to deepen the
U.S.-Pakistani partnership. IMET helps to enhance the
professionalism and development of Pakistan's future military
leaders. IMET is central to our efforts to allow Pakistani
military officers to interact with members of the U.S. military
and build personal relationships.
The Administration has requested $1.2 billion in fiscal
year 2011 for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund in
order to accelerate the development of Pakistan's capacity to
secure its borders, deny safe haven to extremists, fight
insurgents, and provide security for its population.
Fiscal year 2011 will be the first year the State
Department assumes full management of PCCF. We take this
responsibility very seriously and are confident that we have
the capability and capacity to successfully execute PCCF.
Moreover, State and DOD share the goal of a seamless transition
for PCCF that has no discernible impact on U.S. implementers
and Pakistani forces in the field.
PCCF funds will continue to build the capability of
Pakistan's Security Forces directly engaged in combat
operations to clear and to hold terrain in contested areas.
Supporting a better trained and equipped security force is
critical to our complementary efforts to work with Pakistan's
civilian government to implement our $7.5 billion five-year
civilian assistance strategy, which includes efforts to help
Pakistan provide basic services in areas vulnerable to
extremists.
My Defense Department colleagues and I are committed to
continuing to work with your committee, other DOD oversight
committees, and our own State Department oversight committees,
and to keep you fully informed of developments on this critical
program.
While PCCF will help enable Pakistan's Security Forces to
clear and hold terrain, the security situation in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas is likely to complicate build-
transfer efforts for some time. Therefore, the State Department
is planning to transfer $10 million in economic support funds
to DOD to enable U.S. military personnel to provide rapid
humanitarian and community stabilization projects to help hold
conflict-affected areas. This will help fill a short-term
assistance gap in areas where clearing operations are ongoing
and there are acute civilian assistance needs which civilians
cannot currently access.
In addition, we are working with Pakistan to find ways to
afford civilians safe access to forward areas.
As I mentioned, we are also making a long-term commitment
of nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan which is targeted at
helping the Pakistani people overcome the political, economic,
and security challenges that threaten Pakistan's stability.
With the $7.5 billion in civilian assistance authorized in
the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, we are moving
towards the effective balance between civilian and military
assistance required to help Pakistan reach a more secure and
prosperous future.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these
important programs and initiatives with you. I look forward to
taking your questions.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Shapiro can be found
in the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Mr. Shapiro, you mentioned the IMET program
which is, as you know, the program that allows officers as well
as others to come to our country to learn about things
military; in particular, the war colleges which this committee
has been very active in reviewing from time to time.
There was a time when our relations with Pakistan for all
intents and purposes were cut off, at least the military. And
the IMET program suffered. And during that period of time--I
think it was eight years, I think I'm right--during that time,
a whole generation of Pakistani officers did not have the
opportunity to come to this country and make associates and
friends.
How has that affected today's operations with the Pakistan
military?
Secretary Shapiro. I will start off by saying clearly we
agree that the IMET program is critically important and that
that gap was unfortunate because we did miss out on the
opportunity to develop those relationships with Pakistani
military leaders. However, we are engaging once again. We have
IMET. Our IMET program is--we spend more on IMET with Pakistan
than nearly any other country, because of the importance that
we place on it. And we are seeing the results of that with a
new generation of military officers which are able to benefit
from that training.
The Chairman. I understand all of that, but you are not
answering my question.
My question is: How did that gap of seven or eight years
affect our military relationships with Pakistan?
Secretary Shapiro. Clearly, there was some cost. But that
is one of the reasons why it is so important for us to develop
a relationship that is based on a partnership, going forward,
to demonstrate that we are there for the long haul because of
that history.
The Chairman. Do you have some comments?
Secretary Flournoy. If I could just add what we find now is
we have actually a number of senior Pakistani military officers
who came through IMET before the ban, who remember their time
in the United States, know their U.S. colleagues, et cetera. We
have the youngest generation who has come through in recent
years since we have been rebuilding the program.
But in the middle, in the sort of field-grade officer
ranks, we really did lose a generation or an opportunity to
build those kinds of relationships and that essential
familiarity and trust. And we are now scrambling to try to find
other ways to engage them and to rebuild that. But it did have
quite an impact in terms of the basic relationships between the
two militaries, and we will spend a long time recovering from
that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand there are two reports on Pakistan that were
due to our committee yesterday. One is an interagency progress
report, and the second is a Department of Defense report
regarding possible alternatives to the Pakistan Coalition
Support Funds. My question is, when will they be delivered?
Secretary Flournoy. I knew you were going to ask about
that.
The Chairman. Do you have them with you?
Secretary Flournoy. I don't have them with me. But the one
on CSF and alternatives just got to my office. I will sign it
out first thing when I get back----
The Chairman. What about the other one?
Secretary Flournoy. The second one is, something that as
you mentioned, it was supposed to be signed out by the
President. We are seeking to have the President delegate that
authority to sign, for the Secretary of Defense to sign----
The Chairman. Is it complete?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes. That is the issue; we have to get
the delegation of authority to sign. We aim to have those to
you, certainly the first one by the end of this week; and
hopefully the second one, if not early next week. So we are
working very hard to get those to you.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. We look forward to
receiving them.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on
the Chairman's question on IMET.
Apparently that gap when they weren't sending people to
work with our people at that school has caused some, as you
mentioned, some problems going forward, and we will have to
work to fill in that gap. So it sounds to me that you are
saying IMET is very important in our military operations.
Secretary Flournoy. Absolutely. It is absolutely critical.
Mr. McKeon. I am sure that is something that we will be
addressing again as we go through the markup of our bill this
year.
Under Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton, during the
last year, the people and leaders of Pakistan have been
increasingly drawn to see militant and extremist groups as a
serious threat to their internal security. We have also seen
Pakistani Security Forces step up in their operations against
the insurgency with increased urgency and skill.
What has changed since our last hearing on Pakistan? What
role has CSF and PCF played? And how do Pakistan's efforts tie
into our broader strategic goals in the region, both in the
near and long term?
Secretary Flournoy. I think several things have changed in
the last year. The most important is the threat in Pakistan
went from being one that was sort of in the border regions to
one that came home to Pakistanis who live in the major cities
of Pakistan, with direct attacks on Lahore, Islamabad,
Peshawar, et cetera. And the threat came home to the Pakistani
people. And I think it galvanized their political will to see
this not just as Pakistan assisting the U.S. in its fight, but
Pakistan having its own security challenge that they had a
vital interest in dealing with. And so we have seen a huge
shift in political will that has translated into a much greater
level of military commitment to the fight.
The OPTEMPO [operational tempo] is quite high. They have
taken casualties and have not been deterred from continuing in
the face of those casualties. The sacrifice has been quite
substantial on their part. And we have also seen them--I think
another thing that is changing, that is less tangible, is their
assessment of our commitment to them and to the region, our
staying power; because that fundamentally affects their
calculus in how they are going to play the cards in their hand,
if you will.
And I think the fact that we have been extremely responsive
with PCF, and now PCCF, to meet their immediate operational
needs, the fact that we have followed through to reimburse them
since 2001 with over $7 billion of CSF for their operational
support to us, and the fact that we have engaged them in a
strategic dialogue that is going beyond fighting violent
extremism to addressing their more fundamental energy needs--
water, strategic perspective on the region--they, I believe,
are starting to believe that we are actually committed to their
security and the security of the region, and that is
translating into greater willingness to work with us.
General Paxton. Sir, I certainly support both points that
Under Secretary Flournoy made.
I think there is a third piece at the front end that has
changed significantly in the last year, and that is the success
of the allied and coalition operations in Afghanistan. I think
we should never lose sight of the fact that the border is
certainly porous and the increased success of the ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] and the coalition
forces as well as the stepping up of the Afghan Security Forces
has put pressure on those militant groups, and many of them
have not only fled physically across the border, but have taken
and tried to increase the OPTEMPO in their base camps, and
perhaps have either gotten frustrated with the pressure or
perhaps a little bit more brazen. And that was part of the
assessment from the Pakistani side, that they were under threat
there because it was very visible to them that the safe havens
and the sanctuaries were actually originating inside their
border and they had to do something about them.
And then the second follow-on piece, I think, is because of
our resolve and commitment, they felt that they could take some
calculated strategic risks and move forces that had been
aligned and allied against India and the conventional threat,
and they had to move them up in the FATA and the Northwest
Frontier provinces.
So our presence, their presence, the pressure on the
militant groups, all serve to kind of galvanize them; and then
consequently, some of their initial operations met with success
on the ground. And then our continued resolve and staying
power, I think all of those put together have given them a
sense of both capacity and will, sir.
Mr. McKeon. Has India pulled some of their troops from
their border?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. I think probably on the
intelligence side, we would want to answer that in closed
session. But there is, and we have made overtures, obviously,
that trying to diminish the feeling of threat there will have
mutual benefits and a lessening of tensions within the region.
And I think we have good partners and allies on both sides of
the India-Pakistan equation, sir.
Mr. McKeon. Good. How would you assess the current security
environment in Pakistan? If we had to plot it on a spectrum,
would it fall under or closer to the heading of a nation at war
or a nation at peace? How does the country see itself?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I think that when you talk to
Pakistani interlocutors, they feel that they have a serious
threat on their hands with regard to the violent extremists.
That said, I think there is a growing sense of confidence that
they are dealing more and more effectively with them.
The military successes that General Paxton mentioned in the
tribal areas, but also our counterterrorism cooperation,
particularly against Al Qaeda, in the settled areas and
throughout Pakistan has been quite successful. And we have had
a number of high-value arrests through our cooperation and so
forth.
So they definitely feel under threat, but I think they are
also growing in confidence in their ability to meet that threat
and, importantly, as I said, in our commitment to them to
address the more fundamental and long-term conditions that
would underwrite greater stability in Pakistan.
General Paxton. And I would agree, sir.
I don't think the dynamic is as distinct as a nation at
war, a nation at peace. It is probably more of a nation under
threat or a nation under siege, and they realize that they have
to respond now; that they have both the opportunity and the
obligation; and that failure to do so now, things could
conceivably get worse and get worse quickly.
Mr. McKeon. What role does the ODRP play in executing the
PCF program? If monies were to be delayed in the coming year,
what would be the impact on the ability of ODRP in assisting
the development of Pakistani counterinsurgency capabilities?
What would be the impact of such delays on the ability of
Pakistani Security Forces to conduct their own
counterinsurgency operations?
Secretary Flournoy. With the transition from the DOD PCF
authority to the State Department PCCF authority, DOD, and
particularly ODRP and CENTCOM, continue to play a lead role in
helping to define the requirements of what are the capabilities
that the Pakistani military need, obviously working with the
Pakistanis to do that, but also in the execution of the program
on the ground. So the money comes back to a number of DOD
entities, DSCA [Defense Security Cooperation Agency], the
services, et cetera, to actually execute the programs on the
ground.
So far, so good in terms of how this is working for the
year that we are in, the fiscal year that we are in. I think we
don't anticipate delays. If they were to occur, we believe they
would be very consequential. This is PCF; PCCF actively
supports the Pakistani military, the Frontier Scouts, those
entities that are directly in the fight day to day, and our
ability to remain responsive and steady is absolutely critical
to their success on the ground.
Secretary Shapiro. And I would just add that we are working
assiduously with DOD to ensure that there is no impact on the
ground for the transfer of PCCF to the State Department. And we
are putting together a team at the State Department which will
manage PCCF and has already engaged closely with the ODRP on
the ground as well as CENTCOM and Joint Staff and OSD [Office
of the Secretary of Defense] policy to ensure that there is no
gap.
And we have already invited and are planning to make a
formal request to have someone from DOD join us at State
Department for the implementation program.
Mr. McKeon. The concern I have on the delay is I don't see
a budget being passed. And my real concern is about
appropriation bills being passed this year from what we see.
Would that cause a delay?
Secretary Shapiro. Well, you know, we still have the fiscal
year 2010 monies to complete spending. And obviously, you know,
we need money to be able to implement the PCCF program. But we
are continuing to work with DOD on the completion of the fiscal
year 2010 spend plan but clearly there would be an impact if
there was a lack of funds to continue to provide to the
Pakistan.
Mr. McKeon. What about a CR?
General Paxton. Sir, if I may, the uniqueness of the budget
as it exists is the fiscal year 2009 monies are one-year
monies; the fiscal year 2010 are two-year monies. So that is
beneficial to us on the obligation and spend rate. It also is
very timely in the transfer of responsibilities and authorities
from DOD to State, and I think it also highlights, as much as
the committee is able to do, the value of multiyear funding,
sir.
Secretary Shapiro. And we would seek and ask Congress to
fully fund PCCF ahead of the budget.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Shapiro, let me pick up on that point.
Because you sent us a budget for 2011, which has met with a 50
percent cut in the rate of increase you are seeking in the
Senate in its markup of the budget resolution a week ago. And
it raises a question whether or not in the quest for
complementarity as opposed to competition in the transfer of
responsibilities, the Department of State is getting its fair
share of funding to undertake and support the new mission that
you are undertaking. You sort of pussyfoot around that issue
here in your written statement as well as in your oral
statement, and I think the State Department needs to state
emphatically what its needs are.
And one of the reasons your budget is difficult to deal
with is that so much of it is not based on spending. It is
supplemental spending, the previous year money that came in
supplementals that you would like to see put in the baseline,
but most of it is ad hoc and nonrecurring. And we need to have,
I think, a new hand dealt to deal fairly with what your needs
are in light of the responsibility, the additional
responsibilities you are taking on. Would you comment on that?
Secretary Shapiro. Obviously we are supportive of the
Administration's budget request, disappointed by the cut, but
we are hopeful that as the full Congress considers the budget,
that those funds will be restored.
Mr. Spratt. Look, half the argument is in the presentation
of it. And if you look at your budget, base year to base year,
there is a 15.6 percent increase at the same time the President
is asking for a freeze in non-security funding. Very difficult
for most Members in both parties to underwrite a 16-percent
increase in the State Department budget at a time when non-
State, non-military things are being frozen. You have got to
make the case.
Secretary Shapiro. And I think the Administration has been
arguing that the State Department spending is critical to our
national security; that our success in Afghanistan and in
Pakistan and elsewhere, it is critical to have the State
Department funds.
Mr. Spratt. My question to you is: Are you taking on
additional funds with the additional responsibilities
commensurate with what your needs are going to be?
Secretary Shapiro. I mean, we have asked for additional
funds to meet these needs that we think are critically
important in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. And it is a
critical part of the Administration's policy to fully fund
civilian efforts, which I think we would all agree are going to
be critical to our success.
Mr. Spratt. We need an outline that shows us how your
additional funding compares to your additional
responsibilities. I think that would help your case.
According to the staff memo that we have, there are
substantial subsidies that have been paid to Pakistan--and to
Afghanistan, of course--but Pakistan in particular. I believe
the number given us by staff was about $16 billion between 2002
and 2009, probably $20 billion between 2002 and 2010, this
year.
That is a substantial sum of money in a sense, but
substantial and particular in regard to what the Pakistanis are
putting up in the same period of time. They are spending about
$4 billion a year, which is not at a great sum of money. It is
2.6 percent of their GDP [Gross Domestic Product].
How long can we sustain these payments? Will we need to
sustain these subsidies to the Pakistani Army? Are these long-
term subvention that we should be looking at and figuring into
the future needs; or are they ad hoc, likely to go away once we
have achieved our mission?
Secretary Flournoy. I think that the PCF and PCCF monies
are really focused on the near-to-midterm, and the need for
those will evolve with the fight, the sort of current fight. I
think some funding streams like IMET, like FMF, really need a
longer-term perspective where we are building a longer-term
security relationship or rebuilding a relationship with
Pakistan.
I think a lot of the--and I will defer to my State
Department colleague on this--but a lot of the investment that
we are making on the civilian side is in areas like energy,
infrastructure, and so forth is actually designed to bolster
the Pakistani economy so that it can generate more of its own
support over time.
But I think honestly this is a critical area of national
interest, and I think we need to have a fairly long-term
perspective that this is going to be an assistance priority for
the United States for a number of years going forward.
Mr. Spratt. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
For each of these hearings, our professional staff prepares
for us background material, and I would like to read a
statement from that background material and ask you for your
comments.
``Since 2003, the Army has conducted unprecedented
counterterrorism operations in the tribal region, although such
operations have frequently failed to subdue militants,
alienated local residents, resulted in civilian casualties, and
alleged human rights abuses and created hundreds of thousands
of internally displaced persons.''
And then in a footnote it says, ``This month's Human Rights
Watch reported that it had documented as many as 300
extrajudicial killings by the Pakistani military during and
after the operation in the Swat Valley.
Now if what we are trying to do is win the hearts and minds
of these people in these areas, this is hardly calculated to do
that.
In terms of Pakistan's internal security interest and our
long-term interest, isn't this treatment about as bad as the
disease?
Secretary Flournoy. Let me just say on the allegations of
human rights abuses, we take those extremely seriously. We are
engaging our counterparts in Pakistan on these allegations. We
are ensuring that for DOD's part anyway--and I am sure the same
is true is for State--but that we are all ensuring that we are
living by both the letter and the spirit of U.S. law in terms
of making sure everybody receives assistance, goes through the
Leahy vetting process, people receive human rights training and
so forth. But we are taking these allegations very seriously
and we are discussing them with our Pakistani counterparts.
I would say on details of that, I would be more comfortable
discussing those in a closed session with you, sir, if you want
to follow up.
On the IDP question, the internally displaced people, there
were a large number of IDPs--or there have been. One of the
things that has actually gone relatively well in this campaign
is a fairly rapid resettlement of those people back to their
home villages, and I think the numbers actually bear that out.
That continues to be a work in progress, but a lot of
assistance has gone in that direction to help the Pakistanis
minimize the displacement that has resulted from the campaign.
Mr. Bartlett. It seems to me that in trying to solve one
problem, we may be creating a different but maybe bigger
problem, and I appreciate your concern.
Let me read another footnote from this same report. This is
kind of unsettling to me: Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is
reportedly--we don't even know who controls it apparently--is
reportedly under the control of Pakistan's Strategic Plan
Division, which is part of the country's nuclear command and
control mechanism and is led by General Khalid Kidwai.
How much do we know about these people if in fact they are
the ones controlling it, and what is their disposition toward
the global aspirations of Islamists who are probably right of
center?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, again, in an open session, what I
can say is that we believe that Pakistan has a very solid
command and control system for their nuclear weapons. We have
engaged with them in discussions on these issues.
Mr. Bartlett. But Madam, if we don't know who is
controlling them then how do we know they are under good
control?
Secretary Flournoy. I do not believe that statement is
accurate sir.
Mr. Bartlett. You don't believe that statement is accurate?
Secretary Flournoy. No. I believe that we have a good
understanding of their command and control system, that there
are clear lines of command and control, and they have made a
great deal of investment in the security of their nuclear
arsenal.
Mr. Bartlett. Do we know what their disposition is toward
the global aspirations of radical Islam?
Secretary Flournoy. ``They,'' meaning?
Mr. Bartlett. Those who are in control of these nuclear
weapons. We know that the person who created them had no
problem in dispersing this capability pretty widely. What about
those who are controlling them now?
Secretary Flournoy. Again, I think this is--the Pakistani
state, both in the civilian leadership and the military
leadership, is dominated by people with a very secular
orientation and with a very strong commitment to their
responsibilities as a possessor of nuclear weapons. I would say
again, this is something that if you would like to explore
further, I would suggest having a closed discussion.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. Mr.
Ortiz, the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Flournoy,
General Paxton, Secretary Shapiro, thank you so much for
joining us this morning and providing your insight into
securing stability in Pakistan. You know, with our military
relying on key supply routes in and out of Afghanistan and
Pakistan, through Pakistan, what are we doing to ensure that
these routes are secure and to allow for critical supplies to
make it to our warfighters? And what is the status of the
cross-border collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
And what are the challenges that we still face?
I know we are using these routes, but we want to be sure
that our soldiers get the supplies that they need and the
weapons that they need and whatever they need. But what are we
doing to be sure that as things are changing and the playing
field changes, what are we doing to protect those routes and
protect our soldiers and make sure they get the equipment?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. Your question is of vital concern
not only within the Department of Defense but particularly to
the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Transportation Command. And
the contracts that we negotiate, either for access to our
uniformed military, or contracting out for civilian providers,
are each written and enforced to adequately assess and
guarantee the security of our equipment and goods as it moves
on the LOCs, or the lines of communication.
In specific and to your question, sir, I would state that I
believe that the loss and pilferage rate moving through those
lines of communications is only between 1 and 2 percent, which
is actually equivalent to or perhaps a little bit less than it
is on the average elsewhere around the world. So we have a good
track record for the security of the equipment and gear that is
getting there right now.
Our concern is that they operate, obviously, a different
sense of time, distance, different sense of importance than we
do, so I think that the current concern is that we have both
multi-modal and multiple routes so that we can build up, not
huge stockpiles in what we used to refer to as the ``iron
mountain,'' but we have an adequate flow of our equipment
between what is positioned State-side, or other areas in the
region; what is in either Afghanistan or Pakistan and what is
on the lines of communications, just so there is a constant
movement; so that if we do have a disruption, either for
security or passports and visas or whatever it is, that we have
adequate to maintain the fight without putting troops at risk,
sir.
Mr. Ortiz. When you mentioned about contracting out to
civilians now, who are they? Are they American civilians? Are
they Pakistanian, are they Afghanistanian? And do you feel
comfortable with who you hire? It is a matter of trust, because
we have seen that there have been several inside jobs where
several of our soldiers have been killed.
General Paxton. It is a source of concern. There is a
vetting process. There is both an enforcement process when we
write the contracts, and then how we guarantee that the terms
of the contract are enforced, whether we do it ourselves or
whether we work through a second or third party, through the
Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, or an
independent contractor there. And it is no different than those
things that we have done in either Afghanistan or Iraq, and it
is subject--we put it in terms of reference there. It is
subject to our supervision and assessment on the metrics there,
about how much does flow, gets there on time, gets there
without being vandalized or lost.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, if I could just add, since 2001,
the Pakistani military has made keeping these lines open and
securing the flow of goods through them a major priority. And
this is one of the core functions of our Coalition Support Fund
reimbursement is to reimburse them for that critical support
that they are providing to keep our supply lines to Afghanistan
open.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. My time is about up. Thank
you so much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks, please.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
General, I always want to say a special thank you to those
that carry stars on their uniform. It is an indication of a
life lived essentially for the sake of freedom and others, and
I appreciate your service.
General Paxton. Thank you.
Mr. Franks. I guess I want to start by taking up, to some
extent, where Congressman Bartlett left off. I will try to stay
away from any areas that would even approach a classified
nature. But I know, as you are very concerned, as well as all
of us, that weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons
falling into terrorists' hands are among our greatest fears,
our greatest concerns. And my question revolves around, who is
in charge of Pakistan's military and foreign policy? There is
some debate whether that is Islamabad or the military.
In a Washington Post op-ed on Tuesday, Ahmed Rashid wrote
that Pakistan's military has virtually been taken out of
control of foreign policy, and strategic decision-making has
been taken from the civilian government. And I guess that
question seems critical to me, given the fact that, you know,
even General Musharraf, in coming into power some years ago,
essentially came into power with some fairly radical backing.
And even though he did a lot to work with us, a lot of that
mechanism still remains in the military. And of course, the
concern would be that someone in control of nuclear capability
might be compromised.
And so I guess my overall question is, is it possible to
discern a trend on the issue as to whether the military or
Islamabad is controlling foreign policy in that regard?
And I will direct the question to you, General, and also to
Under Secretary Flournoy.
General Paxton. Thank you, sir.
Pakistan, since the elections, is working through the
civilian control of the military and, I wouldn't say--certainly
a fledgling democracy, but a democracy that had been out of
practice for some years when Musharraf cemented the power
there. But I think, based on both civilian-to-civilian and
military-to-military relationships, there is a respect for the
obligations and the responsibilities on both sides of the
aisle, whether it is a uniform or a suit. And I think that
General Kayani is mindful of the obligation to control the
nuclear stockpile and where it may be, but also responsive to
where President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani may go as the
government continues to manifest itself.
Mr. Franks. And you share Secretary Flournoy's general
conclusion that those nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal are
at least secure within civilian hands or civilian government to
control?
General Paxton. Yeah. And again, without going into closed
session here, I mean, we are working under the expectation and
from our contacts that they have an adequate internal, you
know--we might not have perfect visibility, they have an
adequate internal assessment of what they have and where it is,
sir.
Mr. Franks. Secretary Flournoy.
Secretary Flournoy. I would certainly recognize and
acknowledge that Pakistan's military has been a very strong
institution historically and remains a strong institution
today.
That said, it is also an institution that desires and
accepts civilian control and wants civilian leadership. One of
the things that was very striking, as we held our strategic
dialogue with Pakistan just a month or two ago, was the
strength of the civilian ministers who came to the table and
played a leading role in that dialogue, from the foreign
minister, to the finance minister, to others in the cabinet.
And they were fully engaged with their civilian counterparts on
our side. And so I think, if you asked for a trend, we are
moving in the right direction.
Mr. Franks. Moving in the right direction.
Well, thank you. Let me ask one last question, General
Paxton. As far as your professional duties on the strategic
importance of the tribal districts along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, I know that there is a great effort to clear
these areas, but is Afghanistan even winnable without Pakistan?
Can it be made safe from terrorist attacks if we cannot clear
these areas? What is your perspective?
General Paxton. Yes, sir. I mean, obviously, we are using
the same counterinsurgency model that met with a great deal of
success in Iraq, but it is the shape, the clear, the hold, the
build and then ultimately the transfer. And we have to be
always mindful that you will not go in and clear an area unless
you have every intention of holding it. And then when you hold
it, you want to build it and transfer it. And you have to just
make the assessment up front, am I going to transfer it to a
local tribe? Am I going to transfer it to the provincial
government? Or am I going to transfer it to a national
government?
And we have to do our mission analysis to make sure we go
in with reasonable expectations about what the threat is in the
area and what the ultimate end state of the area either should
be or what the tribes and the people in the area can support.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Ms. Flournoy, I am curious. About three weeks
ago the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army was in town and
met with a number of us. I believe his name is General Kayani.
And he expressed his frustration with our State Department
getting helicopters to him. And I think my question to him was,
are you looking for a lift; are you looking for attack? And his
answer was, both.
Now, I realize there is a lot more than just delivering the
helicopter; that you have to train the pilot, that you have to
put together the logistics training. But I am curious, what is
being done to address that, and what is your timeline for
addressing that?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we have worked very hard on the
helicopter issue. I have personally put hours and hours of my
time into this. The first thing that we focused on was
refurbishing their Mi-17 fleet, which was quite aged, needed a
lot of spare parts, overhaul work. We have done that.
Mr. Taylor. Well, let's go to that point, Ms. Flournoy.
Let's start with that. We have over 10 percent unemployment in
this country. What is the logic of refurbishing a Russian-made
helicopter when we make helicopters, the world's best
helicopters, in this country?
Secretary Flournoy. The logic there is they have them
today. They know how to fly them. In a matter of weeks, we can
get them airborne again to support them in the current fight.
As a longer-term helicopter solution, we are working with
the Pakistanis to look at a U.S. buy using FMF and so forth.
And so that is something they may transition to.
But in the near term, for the current fight, we had to get
what they had up and flying, and that is where we focused our
initial effort.
Mr. Taylor. So what is the long-term plan to get Black
Hawks or something like that to them?
Secretary Flournoy. This is something we are in discussion
with them with regard to a 5-year defense plan that we are
working with them to develop and a multi-year approach to
security assistance in FMF. They haven't made a decision yet on
that, but it is something we are actively discussing with them,
and I think they are very open to, frankly.
Mr. Taylor. Well, my opinion is based on when the Marines,
shortly after the fall of the Iron Curtain, thought they were
getting a bargain on some iron ships made in the Soviet Bloc
and modifying them and thought they were getting a bargain with
the modifications; it ended up taking longer. We spent more
money than purchasing an American-made product. I would
certainly hope we would learn from our mistakes with that.
And secondly is, I am not so sure that a 5-year plan does
the Paks a whole lot of good. I think they need help right now.
And I realize it takes a while to train a pilot. It takes a
while to put together the logistics training. But I would hope
that we would have something better than a 5-year plan in mind.
And I would hope that you would get back to me on what that
plan is.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we are happy to do that once we
have the details worked out with the Pakistanis.
Mr. Taylor. Lastly, General, since you touched on it, I do
remain concerned. I do think that one of the vulnerabilities
that we have in Afghanistan is that 21-day transit through
Pakistan to get almost everything the troops need.
I am curious, has there been any sort of an uptick on
attacks on--and I realize it is private contractors transiting
through Pakistan, but also realize I think well over 100
drivers have been killed so far just transiting Pakistan. What
has been the trend as far as the security on those convoys? Is
it getting better? Is it getting worse? I realize that you have
opened some routes through the former Soviet republics that are
coming from the north. But I have got to believe that the vast
majority of the things that make it to Afghanistan still flow
through Pakistan. So what are the trends as far as in security?
General Paxton. Sir, if you don't mind, I certainly would
like to take it for the record and get you back some accurate
statistics. I believe that the trend has been relatively
consistent. We haven't seen any major upticks either going
through the south, through Chaman, or through either the
Northern Distribution Network or the Khyber area. We have had
modest increases sometimes, whether it is a bridge blown out or
a convoy attacked, but I don't think substantively in recent
times we have had a big increase at all.
Mr. Taylor. But you will get back to me on that?
General Paxton. I will get back with you, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Within a week or so?
General Paxton. Absolutely, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman, please.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shapiro, we are putting--U.S. tax dollars are
flowing into Pakistan, and I guess this is Secretary Flournoy,
too, to support the military buildup there, and particularly
counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan military. Yet the
Pakistan military still seems to be very focused in terms of
its capability against India. And it is building up its
conventional capability and maintaining its conventional
capability and not necessarily diverting enough resources of
its own for a counterinsurgency fight. What are the initiatives
of this Administration in terms of diffusing the tensions
between India and Pakistan so that they can reorient their
military to really what is their greatest threat, and that is
Islamic fundamentalism within their own country?
Secretary Shapiro. Well, obviously, we are very supportive
of efforts by India and Pakistan to reduce tensions. There was
a recent meeting between the two governments, and we want to
continue to encourage those types of efforts. On our security
assistance, as we mentioned, we have been focusing a lot of
resources through PCF and PCCF toward the counterinsurgency
fight, so our resources are being used to help them in the
counterinsurgency fight that they have. And then our FMF is
designed to build----
Mr. Coffman. Let me step back. What I want to know is, is
there a significant initiative by this Administration?
Obviously, there is one in the Israeli-Palestinian question,
unwelcomed by the Israelis, but is there one on the India-
Pakistan question in terms of there ought to be a major
initiative to diffuse those tensions so that we don't have to
subsidize their military, that their military simply reorients
itself based on what I would see as the greatest threat, which
is an internal problem? But they have to have a resolution of
the India-Pakistan problem in order to divert those resources.
So what initiative, if there is one, by this Administration, or
is there not one?
Secretary Shapiro. Well, I have with me Ambassador
Holbrooke's deputy, Paul Jones, who I think would be well
positioned to answer sort of on a regional perspective. And so
with your indulgence, I could ask him to come up and address
that question.
Mr. Coffman. Please.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Coffman, thank you very much. In answer to your
question, Mr. Coffman, it is certainly a very high priority for
the President, for Secretary Clinton, for this Administration,
to be as supportive as we can in reducing tensions between
India and Pakistan. We recognize that, in order to be most
supportive, we have to do what both countries would like in
terms of support. So we encourage, engage where we can. What we
have seen is an interest on both sides. And just recently, in
fact just today, there was a meeting between Prime Minister
Singh and Prime Minister Gilani in which they announced the
beginning of a dialogue process at that level of foreign
ministers, which had been interrupted after the Mumbai attacks.
So I would say it is something we are very focused on. It
is a very complex situation, and the United States I think can,
it is very clear that our support is best done in a quiet
fashion and just encouraging the process and offering the
support to the parties that we can.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Another question.
Certainly now the Pakistan military seems to be very
engaged in fighting the Pakistan Taliban. Have we seen any
evidence now that they are also willing to prosecute any
activities against the Afghan Taliban on their side of the
border?
General Paxton.
General Paxton. Yes, sir. We believe with a fair degree of
certainty that a lot of the extremists are a syndicated
network. And they have loose ties; they have marriages of
convenience, whether it is the Haqqani network, Commander
Nazir, the Taliban, the TTP [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan]. So
that when you see evidence of the Pakistan security forces,
whether it is the PAKMIL [Pakistan military], the Frontier
Corps, when they are stepping up to take action against
insurgents and militants locally, they are focusing obviously
on the near-term target, who is creating the problem or
creating the risk for them. But it is an increased evidence
that they are willing to take on the entire syndicated network
because they know there is movement between all of them, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being here.
Secretary Flournoy, maybe you can help settle this little
factual point. But in the ranking member's opening statement,
he said that Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton had reversed
themselves with regard to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capabilities Fund. My recollection was that in fact there was
pushback from the Congress, specifically the House
Appropriations Committee wanted to make that move, and that the
Administration leadership responded, well, here is a way to do
it, but it was not their preference. In fact, there was no
reversal by Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. In fact, it
was a response to the Congress saying, we are going to do this,
what would be the best way to do it? What is your recollection?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, I think Secretary Gates was very
supportive of the idea of migrating the authority to State. And
the question was how to do that without having any negative
impact on performance and effectiveness. And so we set up a
transition process that we would have sort of the first year be
kind of to State, but a passthrough directly to DOD to sort of
give us time to set up the appropriate mechanisms at State;
that this year would be fully a State authority, that DOD
executes per State direction and so forth.
So I think that is where we are now. So far, so good. It is
working well. We have not seen any delays in terms of
execution. And as Assistant Secretary Shapiro mentioned, we are
working very hard to ensure State has the capacity to do proper
oversight of our execution of the program.
Dr. Snyder. Any comments, Secretary Shapiro?
Secretary Shapiro. Yes. We have been working very closely
together with DOD and indeed are very grateful for Secretary
Gates' support for the State Department taking the oversight
role of PCCF. And we are doing everything that we can to make
sure that this program is administered properly. It is directly
from the Secretary one of my top priorities, and we will not
fail in the administration of the program.
Dr. Snyder. Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to go back to the
discussion about the helicopters because I didn't understand
your exchange with Mr. Taylor. In your written statement, you
say an urgent need for helicopters still remains. And I mean,
they are at war. It is a huge amount of territory. The
Pakistani military needs to be able to move troops around
quickly, probably at multiple sites simultaneously. So I will
take you at your word that an urgent need for helicopters still
remains.
Would you outline for me the specific roadblocks? I don't
understand where the roadblocks are. At a time of war, you said
you have been working on this. Well, they are at war; they are
losing folks. You acknowledge it is urgent. Where are the
specific roadblocks to them getting the helicopters I think you
all wanted to help them with?
Secretary Flournoy. There are two types of--their principal
kind of workhorses are Mi-17s, which are a Russian-made system,
and the Bell 412s, which are American made. In both cases, we
are trying to provide spare parts, support for maintenance,
overhaul, et cetera, to keep what they have in the air and
flying at very high rates. In the case of the Mi-17, the
parts--the helicopter is made by a company that is under
sanction. So that has required us to seek a congressional--or,
I am sorry, yes, a waiver to actually work to buy from the
company, provide parts, provide support. But we have used a
national security waiver to do that because we think it is so
critical. On the Bells, obviously, that is something that we
have had more ability to control directly, and I think we are
moving forward in that area.
But longer term, they need some replacement helicopters.
They need a new breed, if you will. And so we are right now in
discussion with them to understand exactly what their
requirements are, what they can afford, how many they need and
so forth. And for that mid to longer term replacement program,
we will be looking to use FMF to support that over the coming
years.
Dr. Snyder. General Paxton, will your counterpart of the
Pakistani military, how will they respond to what Secretary
Flournoy just said? If your commander is on the ground, do they
respond to the urgent need? I am not putting her on the spot,
as I think we have got some bureaucratic thing, but how do they
see the situation?
General Paxton. Sir, everyone in the military wants more
and wants faster. The constant dynamic we have is to educate
them about, what is your requirement, to tell us what the
capability is that we are going to provide, and then how can we
best sustain it? And it goes to the discussion we had earlier
about the value sometimes to getting the maintenance tail on a
long-term program.
The Chairman. The gentleman from California.
Mr. McKeon. Just a point of clarification if I might. Mr.
Snyder likes to always correct my statements. And it is just a
little thing that we have, but I unfortunately was out of the
room this time. I would like to ask one question of Secretary
Flournoy. The original proposal that was presented to us on the
PCCF was that it would come under the Defense Department, is
that correct?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, the original proposal was that,
and that was before we had reached--had further interagency
discussions and worked out a transition plan that we were all
happy with.
Mr. McKeon. And that would be that he also requested for
fiscal year 2010?
Secretary Flournoy. That was the transition plan that
Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton ultimately recommended.
Mr. McKeon. He may have had that plan somewhere to
ultimately transfer, but the request was----
Secretary Flournoy. Yes.
Mr. McKeon [continuing]. For within the Department of
Defense?
Secretary Flournoy. The original request was, yes, correct.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman, please.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Paxton, Secretary Flournoy and Secretary Shapiro,
thank you so much for joining us today. I had an opportunity
just recently a couple weeks ago to travel to Afghanistan and
Pakistan and had an opportunity to meet with General
McChrystal, with President Zadari, President Karzai and also
Prime Minister Gilani. A great trip. I left there reinvigorated
concerning our efforts in both countries.
Still challenges left. I think there are still things out
there that we have to accomplish. But I got a good sense from
our men and women on the ground there that things are going in
the right direction and that we are making positive strides,
and also with the leaders there and their governments that they
are appreciative of our efforts there and they see the value of
our efforts, so that is always an important part of that
effort.
When I was in Pakistan, we met with General Kayani, had a
long meeting with him, and asked him specifically about where
he saw the current efforts, where he saw the needs. And we were
there with Admiral LeFever, who heads our operations there with
our support. And we asked him also within the same context. And
both of them say that we are gaining a significant amount of
momentum in the fight against the Taliban. And both of them
emphasized our long-term success is going to be tied to
maintaining that momentum.
And we were there meeting with General Tariq Khan with the
Frontier Scouts and our folks there that are training them, a
new training facility, things going in the right direction.
Give me your thoughts about where we are going from your
standpoint in maintaining that momentum. I know we are going to
build some new training facilities there. But give me your
thoughts about how we maintain that momentum, and then how do
we make sure that we watch that momentum extend past the FATA
and the Northwest Frontier Province?
Secretary Flournoy. I think a key part of this is
continuing to broaden and deepen the equipping and training and
assisting relationship, as you noted. I think it is also as the
Pakistan military and the Frontier Scouts have success in
clearing areas that we help provide the broader Pakistani
government with the resources they need to actually hold them
and build governance capacity and the ability to provide basic
services to the affected populations. This ESF [economic
support funds] account that Assistant Secretary Shapiro
described where $10 million is going to be provided for DOD
forces to work with PAKMIL to execute hold-build assistance
that is a start.
I think one of the conversations the State Department will
be having with its committees, we would like to have with this
committee, is what additional work, what additional assistance
can we provide in the hold-build area, and what kind of, what
should that authority look like? And we are still
conceptualizing that as an Administration, trying to figure out
the best vehicles to use to ensure that it is flexible, but
also that it can go to the right user. In some cases, it may be
the military. In other cases, it will be a civilian agency on
the ground.
Mr. Wittman. General Paxton.
General Paxton. Sir, if I may. I certainly agree with
Secretary Flournoy and the whole-of-government approach and the
closeness between State and Defense. The other thing, as I
alluded to earlier, is not to ever lose site of the other side
of the border. So there is a tri-part relationship here. And
just as we build enduring relationships and comfort level with
Pakistan, we want to do it with Afghanistan, and then we want
the two of them to do it. So our efforts on border control
points and joint coordination centers and intelligence fusion
cells is all good and kind of diminishes the perception of the
threat there, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Great.
Secretary Shapiro.
Secretary Shapiro. I think Paul Jones is in the best
position to talk about our efforts at economic development in
hold-build.
Mr. Jones. If I may just briefly, sir. We enthusiastically
agree with the importance of the civilian side, the Pakistani
civilian side and the international, particularly U.S., effort
to support that. We have an extensive civilian assistance
program that is active throughout the tribal regions in the
Northwest Frontier Province through USAID [United States Agency
for International Development], through Office of Transition
Initiatives, where we are working very closely to provide
assistance. The World Bank has just set up a trust fund where a
number of other countries can put assistance in. It has got
$110 million into it so far, just for those border regions, in
a way that builds confidence.
What we have identified, as Under Secretary Flournoy was
mentioning, that in some areas where--specific locations where
there has been recent clearing operations and there isn't an
ability for Pakistani or international assistance efforts on
the civilian side to be present there, what we thought is that
the most appropriate use of a portion of the ESF funds is to,
as we have outlined in testimony, to provide that for those who
can have access in that area. And so I think that is a creative
approach unique to this situation that we are very pleased, and
I think it speaks to the civ-mil coordination we have in
Pakistan.
Mr. Wittman. And one final comment. I want to emphatically
support the need for helicopters there in Pakistan. Having
ridden on some 40-year-old Hueys and almost not getting on
board, I emphatically support whatever you need to do to get
some new air platforms there for you.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we hear you. We all shared those
experiences. I will just make one other point. And that is, in
some cases, we may be competing with our own U.S. needs for
helicopters in terms of getting in line for production, so that
is a challenge.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis, please.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of you for being here. I appreciate it.
Could you put in simple terms this balance that you are
talking about of military and non-military assistance? Are we
thinking in terms of percentages? What is it now, and where do
you want to take that in about 3 years from now? I am trying to
get a better handle on what that is and perhaps with--you have
given a number of examples and you have spoken to that, but I
am not sure whether there is a clear understanding of whether
you are all on the same page on that.
Secretary Flournoy. I actually think within the
Administration, there is a very strong shared sense of where we
are trying to go. We have gone from a situation where the bulk
of our aid was on the military side. Now, for fiscal year 2011,
if you look at our proposals, it is close to 50/50. We have
made a substantial commitment on the civilian side. And I am
happy to let Paul speak to this directly. But we are really
trying to fully invest in building capacity on the civilian
side of government, which we think is critical to underwriting
long-term security and stability.
Do you want to add what we are doing on the civilian side.
Mr. Jones. If I may, we have increased dramatically to $1.5
billion a year in civilian assistance on a 5-year commitment,
which I think, in our view, very much mirrors the intention of
a 5-year military commitment as well on the FMF side. We have
dramatically changed the way we provide civilian assistance in
Pakistan. We had been doing a lot, not in coordination with the
government of Pakistan. And what we are doing now is going
through and seeing how closely we can align our assistance and
also work through accountable ministries of the Pakistan
government and provincial administrations in order to get the
assistance through, build capacity to the Pakistani government.
Mrs. Davis. Is that trying to really reach individuals, or
if you want to call them insurgents, in the FATA region,
because there is a difference of opinion about why people there
are fighting or not fighting against their own government?
Mr. Jones. We work very closely in the FATA through the
FATA secretariat, enabling them to provide small project
assistance in communities that are vulnerable and to build
communities' strength against extremism. We found that to be
well received. It needs to be identified with Pakistan for
security reasons, but also to build the capacity and the image
of Pakistan's own capability. So that is a really critical part
of our assistance strategy.
Mrs. Davis. We spoke earlier a little bit about what we
call the shadow war between India and Pakistan, at least it has
been phrased in that way. I am sure you are aware of that
language. And in many ways, India is playing a role also, as
well as Pakistan to a certain extent, in building up capacity
in Afghanistan particularly. And I am wondering, is that
something that we are working on with them and together? Is
that helpful, and how are we doing that road building, other
capacities within Afghanistan and whether or not that is seen
as more tension building in the region, or is seen as helping
the efforts that we have and certainly the dollars that are
flowing into the region to try and help with that capacity?
Mr. Jones. If I may, India has been a major donor in
Afghanistan, and we very much support that. India has made
significant civilian investments in the areas of health, road
building, and transportation. That has been a source of tension
with Pakistan, as historically Afghanistan has been seen as a
source of tension between India and Pakistan. We believe that,
to the extent that all donors can be as transparent as they
can, and we try to encourage the UN [United Nations] leads in
that effort in Afghanistan, and we support it in every way we
can, so everyone can see exactly what is being done, and that
can ensure that it is not misunderstood by some of the
neighbors. It is a complex neighborhood, not only between
obviously Pakistan and India, and it is everyone's benefit to
understand exactly what sort of civilian assistance is being
provided.
Mrs. Davis. And with all that, could you just characterize
how that is having an impact on the insurgency in Afghanistan,
because so much of our effort has been directed to the FATA and
to changing that. And I know that it is not a simple equation.
In fact, I think, General Paxton, you suggested that what we
have learned in Iraq has some applicability to Afghanistan. And
certainly there is some, but there are a number of experts that
would suggest that this is a different animal essentially. Can
you--my time is up, but----
Secretary Flournoy. I think we are seeing--one of the goals
we set for ourselves in Afghanistan was to really shift the
momentum, and we are seeing the earliest signs of that. The
addition of forces in Afghanistan, the focus on a much more
effective approach to counterinsurgency is starting to put
pressure on the Afghanistan side of the border in the south and
the east in particular. At the same time, you have the PAKMIL
operations that are pressing from the other side of the border.
At the same time, you have enhanced counterterrorism
cooperation pressuring the leadership of Al Qaeda. At the same
time, you have people waking up to the fact that the U.S. isn't
leaving this region any time soon. We have made a commitment,
and we are going to stay involved in a very long-term sense.
The nature of that involvement will change over time, but
politically, economically, strategically we are going to stay
invested in this region. And I think all of that is starting to
have a cumulative effect that is creating a lot of rethinking
inside elements of the insurgency on both sides of the border.
And that is exactly the kind of rethinking we want to stimulate
ultimately.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Taylor asked about helicopters, and I am familiar with
the request about Pakistan about helicopters. We are at war,
and I am having a little bit of difficulty in understanding the
lack of urgency. Is there something that I am missing?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, there is absolutely no lack of
urgency. And again, the thing we could do fastest was to get
what they have flying. And we have increased manyfold their
capacity just by getting what they have back in the air and
consistently operating. We are now looking at the issue of
replacement, but frankly, we have been focusing our energies,
first things first, on getting them up and flying with what
they have. And they are now developing a multi-year plan that
we will be bringing to you for replacement. I don't know if you
want to add anything.
Secretary Shapiro. I would just say----
The Chairman. Would you get something to us on that in the
very, very near future?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, we will.
The Chairman. Not just what you are rebuilding, but the
future helicopters for which they ask. Will you do that for us
please?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes.
Secretary Shapiro. And I would just add that we are using
FMF to support procurement of two Bell 412 helicopter
squadrons, $204 million from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year
2011, a $60 million fiscal year 2010 sup [supplemental] request
to the Hill supports this.
The Chairman. I think, Mr. Shapiro, this question should be
asked of you. We had some experts on Pakistan some time ago
that suggested that the real key to success and the greatest
return on our investment is on the police in working with them.
They are not tied to the territory vis-a-vis India. Is there
some thought to helping them more than we are?
Secretary Shapiro. Well, that is a very timely question.
There was--the State Department's INL [International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs] bureau signed an implementation
agreement with Pakistan in February 2010 that allows for
training, infrastructure and equipment for police and aviation
support. And the goal is to expand the number of elite police
to recruit, vet, hire, train, and equip by July 2011 and to
expand the infrastructure training for FATA forces as well. So
we are devoting resources to this, and it is clearly a priority
for us as well.
The Chairman. Could you get us something on that in more
detail? We would certainly appreciate it.
Secretary Shapiro. Sure.
The Chairman. If there are no further questions, we
certainly thank you very much for being with us.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Ms. Flournoy, you have been around long enough
to know that we went through this with the Colombians on Plan
Colombia, their request for Black Hawks. As a part of your
presentation when you get back to us, will you give us how this
is going to compare on the timeline for the delivery of the
Black Hawks to Colombia, the training, the equipping and how we
are doing with Pakistan, I think that would be a very useful
benchmark.
Secretary Flournoy. We will do that, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, ma'am.
Secretary Flournoy. And we would ask you all to support the
$60 million in the supplemental for helicopters for Pakistan.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. We are certainly grateful
for your being with us today and for your excellent testimony,
and we look forward to seeing you again soon.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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