[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-138]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 17, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Requests from the U.S. Central
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010........................................ 47
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 12
Olson, Adm. Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 10
Petraeus, Gen. David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 54
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J........................................ 133
Olson, Adm. Eric T........................................... 115
Petraeus, Gen. David H....................................... 58
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 157
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 157
Mr. Spratt................................................... 157
Mr. Taylor................................................... 157
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brady.................................................... 161
Mr. Ellsworth................................................ 162
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................ 161
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 17, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning.
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony from the commanders of the United States Central
Command [CENTCOM], the United States Special Operations Command
[SOCOM], and the United States Transportation Command
[TRANSCOM] on the posture of their respective commands.
I was just speaking with our new staff director, Paul
Arcangeli, and I remarked to him, and he agreed with me, that
we are truly blessed with outstanding military leaders today,
and in front of us we have such outstanding leaders in our
country: General David Petraeus, commander of the United States
Central Command; Admiral Eric Olson, commander, United States
Special Operations Command; and General Duncan McNabb,
commander, United States Transportation Command. And we welcome
you and thank you for being with us.
Your three commands face a series of interrelated and
serious challenges in the immediate future. In Iraq, the United
States is set to redeploy almost 50,000 troops and their
equipment by the end of August. Originally, we expected this
reduction to take place after the formation of a new Iraqi
government to allow us to help ensure stability. The Iraqi
elections, however, were delayed by months, so now our
reduction in force levels will take place while the new
government is being formed, a period that could see, we hope
not, outbreaks of violence. This will stress all three
commands.
General Petraeus, you and General Odierno will have to deal
with the potential instability caused by the formation of the
new government and the reduction of the United States force
levels simultaneously.
Admiral Olson, your forces in-country will be faced with a
reduction in support from the general purpose forces, and
General McNabb, TRANSCOM with CENTCOM, will be carrying out one
of the largest moves in military personnel and equipment in
decades.
To complicate matters, this reduction in force in Iraq,
which is stressful enough on its own, is coming at the same
time we are increasing force levels in Afghanistan. I have long
supported increasing our commitment in the war in Afghanistan,
but as you know, General McNabb, better than anyone, shipping
30,000 troops and their equipment into that country, while
supporting the 68,000 troops already there, is extremely
challenging. And the task faced by those troops, which include
a substantial number of special operations forces, is in itself
daunting.
As we discovered in the initial invasion of Afghanistan
after September the 11th, 2001, pushing the Taliban and their
Al Qaeda allies out was the easy part. Building security forces
and governments that can keep them out is much harder. I
supported them and continue to support a fully-resourced
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan because I believe it
is the only option likely to be successful.
But we should not kid ourselves that it will be easy or
inexpensive. It will require the three of your commands--all
three of you--to continue to cooperate closely.
Looking back, I believe that we made our job in Afghanistan
harder because we got involved in Iraq. So the question for the
future, General Petraeus, is when we have learned to do more
than one thing at a time. We have a long list of tasks ahead.
We need to keep our eye on Afghanistan without losing
visibility of the future relationship we would like to build in
the other country, Iraq.
We also need help in Yemen and other countries dealing with
their allocated problems, and we must counter Iranian influence
and attempts to develop the capability to build nuclear
weaponry.
Can we succeed in all of these areas while still keeping
our eye on Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson, you also have challenging tasks in the near-
term. How do you plan to deal with your incredibly high tempo?
My understanding is that 86 percent of your deployed force is
deployed to the Central Command area of operations [AOR]. While
CENTCOM is certainly the current focus of ongoing operations in
the fight against Al Qaeda and its allies, we have to ask if
this is making us vulnerable in other ways or in other places.
Are we missing out on opportunities with our special forces
to partner with and train and mentor in other countries across
the globe because of these high demands within the United
States Central Command area?
General McNabb, your largest challenge seems to lie in the
immediate future. I hope you can identify those for us today,
including what tradeoffs may be required. Will meeting the
demands in the Central Command lessen support for other combat
and commands or our ability to respond to emergencies as they
come to pass?
I also hope that you will discuss with us the results of
the recently completed mobility capability requirements study
and how we will meet the challenges identified in that
particular study. We must be able to sustain the wars of today,
while still making sure that we are prepared for the threats of
tomorrow, whatever they may be.
I have pointed out from time to time that since 1977, our
country has been engaged in 12 conflicts through all those
years, and we hope the future is not a repetition, but we must
be prepared.
Thank you, each of you, for your fantastic service. We look
forward to your testimony today.
I turn now to my good friend, the ranking member, the
gentleman from California, Buck McKeon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we continue our series of posture hearings with
commanders from U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. SOCOM and U.S. TRANSCOM. I
would like to welcome General Petraeus, Admiral Olson, and
General McNabb and thank each of your for your leadership, your
service, and I second the comments of our chairman about the
fortune that--our good fortune to have you here at this time.
Let me begin with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Four months
ago, the president outlined a new strategy and recommitted the
United States to defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Based on
recommendations from the senior leadership, including you
gentlemen, he authorized the deployment of 30,000 additional
U.S. forces. A portion of those forces have arrived and others
are preparing to deploy over the coming months.
Like most Republicans, I support the president's decision
to surge in Afghanistan. I believe that with additional forces,
combined with giving General McChrystal the time, space, and
resources he needs, we can and will win this conflict. We must
defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This means taking all
necessary steps to ensure Al Qaeda does not have a sanctuary in
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
General Petraeus, as you have stated publicly, Operation
Moshtarak is just the initial operation of what will be a 12-
to 18-month campaign. I believe that we have most of the inputs
right in terms of the leadership, organization, and strategy
for Afghanistan. I am not sure we have the level of resources
exactly right yet.
I support the additional 30,000 U.S. forces and the
civilian surge, but I question if it is enough and if the
commanders on the ground have the flexibility to assess and ask
for more, whether it be additional combat troops or certain
enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
[ISR], medical evacuation [medevac], and force protection
capabilities.
These enablers were already under-resourced prior to the
surge. Today, I hope you will address this issue head-on and
convince me that our commanders are not capped at 30,000.
Moving west in the CENTCOM AOR, I want to briefly comment
on Iraq. While we continue to await the results of the March
7th national elections, one thing is clear. The new Iraqi
government may not form until roughly the same time that the
U.S. combat forces exit Iraq. This certainly was not the
original plan.
The seating of the government was to take place prior to
substantial draw-down of our forces. Thus, I remain concerned
that the security situation in Iraq is fragile, and fear that
mixing two drivers of instability---the president's
redeployment timeline and the seating of the new Iraqi
government--could pose a risk to our troops and their mission.
Two other challenges in the CENTCOM AOR that have come into
focus of late are Yemen and Iran. While the Christmas Day
bomber revealed to the American public the threat posed by Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, CENTCOM has been focused on
Yemen for quite some time.
My formula for Yemen is simple: The U.S. should be in the
business of helping Yemen secure its territory and fight AQAP
[Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula]. It should not be in the
business of asking Yemen to take on more security challenges by
taking into their country Gitmo detainees.
Finally, for the CENTCOM AOR, a word on Iran. While there
may be disagreement as to whether Tehran seeks a nuclear
weapon, it seems indisputable that they are on the cusp of
obtaining the capability to build one. This should be a red
line.
We hear a lot about diplomatic engagement and economic
sanctions. Yet, Tehran's behavior remains unchanged. It seems
to me that Tehran poses a military threat that requires
military planning. I would like our witnesses to comment on how
the military is positioning itself to deal with the range of
challenges posed by Iran.
Let me say a few words on SOCOM. SOCOM has been heavily
engaged worldwide, but especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Admiral Olson, your forces will remain engaged long after the
conventional forces draw down in those countries, making
effective training, resourcing, and support for SOCOM all the
more critical.
I am very concerned about how SOCOM, a command that often
must rely on critical support and enablers from outside the
command will sustain its operations in an effective manner when
the conventional footprint withers.
Let me conclude by addressing TRANSCOM. General McNabb, I
would like to congratulate TRANSCOM for their miraculous job in
responding to the earthquake in Haiti. There is only so much we
can plan for in this unpredictable world, and your organization
has displayed an incredible amount of flexibility and
responsiveness. Thank you for all that you have done.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included in
the--for the record, where I address other issues facing
combatant commands testifying today.
Once again, I thank you all for being here and I look
forward to your testimonies.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman, and your statement
will be spread upon the record, without objection.
General Petraeus, we welcome you, and we ask you to
proceed, please.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Petraeus. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman McKeon, members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide an update on the situation in the U.S.
Central Command area of responsibility.
And let me say that it is a privilege to do this with my
close partners and friends Admiral Olson and General McNabb. We
all do, indeed, as you have noted, work very closely together.
U.S. CENTCOM is, as members of this committee know very
well, now in its ninth consecutive year of combat operations.
It oversees the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
assistance to Pakistan, as well as a theater-wide campaign
against Al Qaeda.
Today, I will briefly discuss our ongoing missions as well
as some of the dynamics that shape activities in the CENTCOM
AOR.
First, Afghanistan: As President Obama observed in
announcing his new policy, it is in our vital national interest
to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.
As he noted, these forces will provide the resources that
we need to seize the initiative while building the Afghan
capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our
forces out of Afghanistan.
Clearly, the challenges in Afghanistan are considerable,
but success there is, as General McChrystal has observed, both
important and achievable.
Our goals in Afghanistan and in that region are clear. They
are to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist
allies, and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent
reestablishment of transnational extremist sanctuaries like the
ones Al Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11.
To accomplish this task, we are working with our ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] and Afghan partners
to improve security for the Afghan people, to wrest the
initiative from the Taliban and other insurgent elements, to
develop the Afghan security forces, and to support
establishment of Afghan governance that is seen as legitimate
in the eyes of the people.
We spent much of the past year working, as Congressman
McKeon noted, to get the inputs right in Afghanistan,
establishing the structures and organizations needed to carry
out a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency [COIN]
campaign, putting our best leaders in charge of those
organizations, developing the right concepts to guide our
operations, and providing the authorities and deploying the
resources needed to achieve unity of effort and to implement
the concepts that have been developed.
These resources include the forces deployed in 2009 and the
30,000 additional U.S. forces currently deploying, 9,000 more
forces from partner nations, additional civilian experts, and
funding to enable our operations, and the training and
equipping of 100,000 Afghan security force members over the
next year and a half.
With the inputs largely in place, we are now starting to
see the first of the outputs. Indeed, the recent offensive in
central Helmand province represented the first operation of the
overall civil-military campaign plan developed by ISAF and its
civilian partners together with Afghan civilian and security
force leaders.
Central to progress in Afghanistan will be developing the
Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF], an effort made possible
by your sustained support of the Afghan Security Forces Fund
[ASFF].
Expansion of Afghanistan's security forces is now under way
in earnest in the wake of the Afghan and international
community decision to authorize an additional 100,000 Afghan
security force members between now and the fall of 2011.
This effort is facilitated considerably by the recent
establishment of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
Training Mission-Afghanistan, led by Lieutenant General Bill
Caldwell. And ISAF member nations are now working hard to field
the additional trainers, mentors, partner elements, and
transition teams to enable the considerably augmented
partnering, training, and recruiting that are essential to the
way ahead in this important arena.
The civil-military campaign on which we have embarked in
Afghanistan will unfold over the next 18 months. And, as many
of us have observed, the going is likely to get harder before
it gets easier. 2010 will, in fact, be a difficult year--a year
that will see progress in the reversal of the Taliban momentum
in important areas, but also a year in which there will be
tough fighting and periodic setbacks.
Pakistan: We have seen important change in Pakistan over
the past year. During that time, the Pakistani people,
political leaders, and clerics united in recognizing that the
most pressing threat to their country's very existence was that
posed by certain internal extremist groups, in particular, the
Pakistani Taliban.
Pakistani citizens saw the Taliban's barbaric activities,
indiscriminate violence and repressive practices in the North-
West Frontier Province [NWFP] and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas [FATA], and they realized that the Taliban wanted
to take Pakistan backward several centuries, not forward.
With the support of Pakistan's people and leaders, the
Pakistani military has carried out impressive counterinsurgency
operations over the past ten months. The army and the Frontier
Corps have, during that time, cleared the Taliban from Swat
district, which I visited three weeks ago, and from other areas
of the North-West Frontier Province as well.
Now, they are holding, building, and beginning to
transition in those areas.
We recognize the need for considerable assistance to
Pakistan as they continue their operations, and we will
continue to work with Congress in seeking ways to support
Pakistan's military.
Our task, as Secretary Gates has observed, has to be to
show that we are going to be a steadfast partner, that we are
not going to do to Pakistan what we have done before, such as
after Charlie Wilson's war, when we provided a substantial
amount of assistance, and then left precipitously, leaving
Pakistan to deal with a situation we had helped create.
It is, therefore, important that we provide a sustained,
substantial commitment, and that is what we are endeavoring to
do, with your support. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill does that by
providing $1.5 billion per year for each of the next 5 years.
The provision of coalition support funding [CSF], foreign
military financing [FMF], the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Fund
[PCF] and other forms of security assistance provide further
critical help for Pakistan's security forces.
Altogether, this funding and our assistance demonstrate
America's desire to strengthen this important strategic
partnership and help our Pakistani colleagues.
Iraq: In the three years since the conduct of the surge,
security in Iraq has, of course, improved significantly.
Numbers of attacks, violent civilian deaths and high-profile
attacks are all down by well over 90 percent from their highs
in 2006 and 2007.
With the improvements in security has also come progress in
a variety of other areas. The conduct of the elections on 7
March, during which an impressive turnout of Iraqi voters
defied Al Qaeda attempts to intimidate them, provided the
latest example of Iraq's progress.
As always, however, the progress is still fragile and it
could still be reversed. Iraq still faces innumerable
challenges. And they will be evident during what will likely be
a difficult process as the newly elected Council of
Representatives selects the next prime minister, president, and
speaker of the council, and seeks agreement on other key
decisions as well.
Our task in Iraq is to continue to help the Iraqi security
forces [ISF], in part through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund
[ISFF] as we continue to draw down our forces in a responsible
manner.
This task has been guided, of course, by the policy
announced by President Obama about a year ago. Since that
announcement, we have reduced our forces in Iraq by well over
30,000 to some 97,000. And we are on track to reduce that
number to 50,000 by the end of August, at which time we will
also complete a change in mission that marks that transition of
our forces from a combat role to one of advising and assisting
Iraqi security forces.
As we draw down our forces in Iraq and increase our efforts
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other
developments in the CENTCOM AOR. I want to highlight
developments in two countries--Yemen and Iran.
In Yemen, we have seen an increase in the prominence of Al
Qaeda, as it exploits the country's security, economic and
social challenges. The threat to Yemen, to the region, and,
indeed, to the U.S. homeland posed by what is now called Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], has been demonstrated by
suicide bombers trying to carry out attacks in Yemen's capital,
by the attempt to assassinate the Assistant Minister of
Interior of Saudi Arabia, and by the attempted bombing of the
U.S. airliner on Christmas Day.
In fact, a number of us have been increasingly concerned
over the past 2\1/2\ years by the developments we have observed
in Yemen.
And last April, I approved a plan developed in concert with
our ambassador in Yemen, U.S. intelligence agencies and the
State Department to expand our assistance to key security
elements in Yemen.
With Yemeni President Salih's approval, we began executing
that plan last summer, and this helps strengthens the
capabilities demonstrated by the Yemeni operations that were
carried out against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in mid-
December and that have been executed periodically since then.
And with your support, we are working toward expanded,
sustained levels of assistance in Yemen.
Iran poses the major state-level threat to regional
stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Despite numerous U.N. [United
Nations] Security Council resolutions and extensive diplomatic
efforts by the P-Five-plus-One [Permanent Five plus One] and
the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], the Iranian
regime continues its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran is assessed
by many analysts to be engaged in pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability, the advent of which would destabilize the region
and likely spur a regional arms race.
The Iranian regime also continues to arm, fund, train,
equip, and direct proxy extremist elements in Iraq, Lebanon,
and Gaza, and, to a lesser degree, in Afghanistan.
The Iranian regime's internal activities are also
troubling, as its violent suppression of opposition groups and
demonstrations in the wake of last year's hijacked elections
has made a mockery of the human rights of the Iranian people
and fomented further unrest.
These internal developments have also resulted in greater
reliance than ever on Iran's security services to sustain the
regime's grip on power.
Having discussed the developments in those countries, I
would now like to explain the importance of two key enablers in
our ongoing mission and to raise on additional issue.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program, or CERP,
continues to be a vital tool for our commanders in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Small CERP projects are often the most responsive and
effective means to address a local community's needs, and where
security is challenged, CERP often provides the only tool to
address pressing requirements.
In the past year, we have taken a number of actions to
ensure that we observe the original intent for CERP, and also
to ensure adequate oversight for use of this important tool.
I have, for example, withheld approval for projects over
$1.0 million at my level, and there has been only one such
project since late last September.
In the past year, we have asked the Army Audit Agency to
conduct audits of the CERP programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. We
have established guidelines for the number of projects each
CERP team should oversee, and we have coordinated with the
military services to ensure adequate training and preparation
of those who will perform functions connected with CERP in
theater, while we have also established procedures to reduce
cash on the battlefield.
In the past year, CENTCOM has pursued several initiatives
to improve our capabilities in the information domain, and we
have coordinated closely with the State Department's Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Judith McHale, in pursuing
these actions.
This past year we made significant headway in improving our
capability to counter adversary information operations,
including establishing a full-fledged Joint Information
Operations [IO] Task Force in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, we still have a long way to go and we
desperately need to build the capabilities of a regional IO
task force to complement the operations of the task force that
has done such impressive work in Iraq and the one that is now
beginning to do same in Afghanistan.
In the broader CENTCOM AOR, Operation Earnest Voice [OEV]
is the critical program of record that resources our efforts to
synchronize our IO activities to counter extremist ideology and
propaganda and to ensure that credible voices in the region are
heard.
OEV provides CENTCOM with direct communications
capabilities to reach regional audiences through traditional
media, as well as via website and regional public affairs
blogging.
In each of these efforts, we follow the admonition we
practiced in Iraq, that of trying to be first with the truth.
Full and enduring funding of OEV and other DOD [Department of
Defense] information operations will, in coordination with the
State Department, enable us to do just that, and in so doing to
communicate critical messages and to counter the propaganda of
our adversaries.
Cyberspace has become an extension of the battlefield, and
we cannot allow it to be uncontested enemy territory. Indeed,
in the years ahead extremist activities in cyberspace will
undoubtedly pose increasing threats to our military and our
Nation as a whole.
DOD and other elements of our government are, of course,
working to come to grips with this emerging threat. Clearly,
this is an area in which we need to develop additional
policies, build capabilities, and ensure adequate resources. I
suspect, in fact, that legislation will be required over time
as well.
Within DOD, the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command
proposed by Secretary Gates represents an essential step in the
right direction.
This initiative is very important because extremist
elements are very active in cyberspace. They recruit there,
they proselytize there, they coordinate attacks there, and they
share tactics and techniques there.
We have to ask ourselves if this is something that we
should allow to continue. And if not, then we have to determine
how to prevent or disrupt it without impinging on free speech.
There are currently over 210,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines, and Coast Guardsmen serving in the Central Command
area of responsibility. Day after day on the ground, in the air
and at sea these courageous and committed troopers perform
difficult missions against tough enemies under the most
challenging of conditions.
Together with our many civilian and coalition partners,
they have constituted the central element in our effort to
promote security, stability, and prosperity in the region.
These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers
stationed around the world constitute the most experienced,
most capable military in our Nation's history. They and their
families have made tremendous sacrifices, and nothing means
more to these great Americans than the sense that those back
home appreciate their service to our country.
In view of that, and on behalf of all those serving in the
CENTCOM AOR, I want to take this opportunity to thank the
American people for their extraordinary support of our men and
women in uniform. And I also want to take this opportunity to
thank the members of this committee and of Congress overall for
your unwavering support and abiding concern for our troopers
and their families.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus can be found in
the Appendix on page 58.]
The Chairman. General, we thank you so much for your
comments and your report today.
Admiral Olson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman
Skelton, Congressman McKeon, other distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear again before
this body to highlight the posture of the United States Special
Operations Command. And it is a pleasure to join my colleagues
and friends, General Petraeus and General McNabb, this morning
at this important hearing.
Your continued support and oversight of United States
Special Operations Command and its assigned forces has ensured
that our Nation has the broad special operations capabilities
that it needs and expects.
With your permission, I will submit my written posture for
the statement and open with a briefer set of remarks.
The Chairman. It will be received, without objection.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir.
Through United States Special Operations Command's service
component commands--those being the Army Special Operations
Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval
Special Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command--United States Special Operations Command
organizes, equips, trains, and provides fully capable special
operations forces to serve under the operational control of
regional combatant commanders around the world.
And as you noted, Chairman Skelton, by a wide margin, our
force is heavily committed to supporting operations in the
Central Command area of responsibility under the operational
command of General Petraeus.
On an average day, though, over 12,000 members of the
special operations forces are present in over 75 countries.
They conduct a wide variety of activities, ranging from civil
military operations like local infrastructure development in
benign environments, to training counterpart units off and on
the battlefields, to conducting counterterrorist operations
under extremely demanding and sensitive conditions, and dozens
of other activities in hundreds of locations.
The indirect and direct actions conducted by special
operations forces are intended to support each other in
contributing to environments where security and stability can
be further developed and sustained by local organizations and
forces. In fact, nearly every mission performed by special
operations forces is in support of an indigenous partner force.
As you know, special operations forces do what other
military forces are not doctrinally organized, trained, or
equipped to do. The powerful effects of special operations
forces in the areas where they are properly employed are often
recognized as game-changers, and our force operates very
effectively in small numbers, in remote regions, often with a
low profile and under austere conditions.
The deployment rate of special operations forces is high,
and although the demand is outpacing the supply, I remain firm
in limiting our requests for manpower growth to the range of
three to five percent per year. And if approved, the
president's fiscal year 2011 budget request would growth
special operations forces personnel by about 4.5 percent.
The overall baseline budget would grow by about 5.7
percent, to just over $6.3 billion, with most of the increase
in the operations and maintenance accounts. And significantly,
the overseas contingency operation [OCO] funds, those that
cover the immediate costs of war, would increase by $460.0
million compared to 2010, bringing that account to about $3.5
billion, for a total fiscal year 2011 U.S. Special Operations
Command budget of just over $9.8 billion.
This is sufficient to cover our current level of special
operations-peculiar activities, as long as we are able to
depend on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps for
service-common items and support.
The budget and acquisition authorities held by the
commander of Special Operations Command are similar to the
military departments', although not on the same scale. They are
essential to meeting the emergent needs of an innovative force
with a unique mission set, and this applies equally to United
States Special Operations Command's research and development
[R&D] authorities, which enable rapid application of science
and technology to meet urgent operational needs.
In my role as the commander responsible for the readiness
of the special operations force, I give high priority to
training and education programs, and to influencing where I can
the career development of special operations personnel.
Along with the pure operational skills that enable success
in very complex and demanding operational environments,
language skills, and subregional expertise remain primary focus
areas.
The special operations community, of course, includes the
families of our servicemen and women. And caring for our
injured and wounded and for the families of those killed in
action is among our most solemn responsibilities.
We are proud of our many successes in returning wounded
warriors to their teams and of our lifelong commitment to those
who are unable to do so.
You and all Americans can be fiercely proud of the special
operations forces. They are fit, focused, supremely capable,
and incredibly courageous. They do have impact well beyond
their relatively small numbers. And I am deeply honored by this
opportunity to represent them to you today.
I stand ready for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in
the Appendix on page 115.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much. General McNabb,
please.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McNabb. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon and
distinguished members of the committee, it is my distinct
privilege to be with you today.
I am especially honored to be here with General Petraeus
and Admiral Olson, two of our Nation's greatest leaders and
warriors and friends that I absolutely respect and admire.
Throughout 2009, the United States Transportation Command
faced tremendous operational, logistic, and geopolitical
challenges. And we asked for and received unparalleled
performance from our global enterprise.
We are charged with synchronizing and delivering an
unmatched strategic global transportation and distribution
capability and producing logistic superiority for our Nation
where and when needed by the combatant commanders we support.
And we have done that.
Our total force partnership of active-duty, reserve
components, civilian, contractor, and commercial industry
colleagues answered every call and improved with every
challenge.
It is our people who get it done. It is the 145,000
professionals working around the world, day in and day out,
producing one of this Nation's greatest asymmetrical advantages
and enabling combatant commanders such as General Petraeus and
Admiral Olson to succeed anywhere in the world by providing
them unmatched strategic life and end-to-end global
distribution.
In support of CENTCOM and working with our ambassadors, the
State Department and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of
Defense], it was our logistics professionals, working hand-in-
glove with General Petraeus and his staff, that created the
northern distribution network to complement the southern supply
lines coming from Pakistan.
In one year's time, through productive relationships with
Northern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, over
8,400 containers of cargo have moved by commercial air, ship,
truck and railroads, and the amount continues to climb.
It is our joint assessment teams, requested by General
Petraeus and General McChrystal, finding ways to increase the
flow of supplies through existing air and surface hubs and
establish new intermodal and inter-air sites like Shaikh-Isa
Air Base in Bahrain and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan.
It is our total force air crews dramatically increasing the
amount of air drops to our war fighters in Afghanistan, finding
innovative ways to deliver over 29 million pounds of supplies
to forces in remote areas, getting our forces what they need,
while also getting convoys off dangerous roads and saving
lives.
Through the persistence of our people and working with
CENTCOM and all of ``Log Nation'' [Logistics Nation], we are
meeting the president's direction to surge forces to the OIF
[Operation Iraqi Freedom] theater at the fastest possible pace
on General Pace's plan, while meeting the needs of all of our
other war fighters.
Our pace was just as swift in Haiti. The earthquake created
a chasm of isolation for the Haitian people. Our people spanned
the divide to lift spirits and save lives.
Supporting General Fraser and U.S. SOUTHCOM [United States
Southern Command], it was our air and sea port assessment teams
and joint port opening units on the ground at Port-au-Prince
within 48 hours after the earthquake, surveying the damage, and
building the air and sea bridges of humanitarian supplies and
personnel that helped save a country and its people.
It was our air crews, our maintainers, and aerial porters
who flew over 2,000 sorties, moved 28,000 people, including 404
adoptees, and delivered almost 13,000 tons of critical supplies
and material by air.
It was our medical crews, critical care teams and our
global patient movement center which transported and helped
save 341 critically injured Haitians by getting them to the
care they needed to save life or limb.
It was our merchant mariners and our commercial and
military partners that provided over 400,000 tons of life-
saving cargo, over 2.7 million meals and over 5 million liters
of water to Haitians in need. And we are not done yet.
It is this logistics team, working from home and abroad,
that gives our combatant commanders and our Nation the
unrivaled ability to move. Their actions serve as an example of
our Nation's strength and an outward demonstration of our
compassion and our hope.
I am extremely proud and amazed by the men and women of the
United States Transportation Command. Chairman Skelton, your
support and the support of this committee has been instrumental
in providing the resources our team needs to win, and I thank
you.
I am grateful to you and the committee for inviting me to
appear before you today. I ask that my written statement be
submitted for the record, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McNabb can be found in
the Appendix on page 133.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General. And your statement will
be spread upon the record without objection.
Thank each of your for your excellent testimony and your
excellent service. We could not be prouder.
General Petraeus, when a Missourian I represent walks up to
me and says, ``How are you doing in Afghanistan,'' what should
my answer be?
General Petraeus. I think you should say that we are
beginning to make progress, having, as I mentioned, taken the
bulk of last year to get the inputs right, to deploy
substantial numbers of increased forces, get the right
organizations, the right people, the right concepts.
And we are now seeing the first of the outputs. The
operation in central Helmand province around Marjah and Nad Ali
and so forth is the first of those outputs in what will be a
campaign that stretches over the course of the next 12 to 18
months.
So I would say that you can say that we are beginning to
make progress there.
The Chairman. Are you encouraged, General?
General Petraeus. I am, sir. Again, we worked very hard
last year to get the pieces in places. Those pieces are now in
place or deploying. In fact, Transportation Nation and
Logistics Nation, two of the great tribes of the Department of
Defense, have done extraordinary work. We are now about 10,000
of the 30,000 of this final deployment of forces ordered by the
president.
And with those all in place, now we are starting to see the
kind of progress that we need to make, indeed, to wrest the
initiative from the Taliban, to support the development of
Afghan security forces and then to help our partners as they
develop governance that can be seen as legitimate in the eyes
of the people.
The Chairman. Admiral Olson, what is your greatest
challenge as you lead your forces?
Admiral Olson. Sir, as we lead the forces, it is ensuring
that they are in the right places doing the right things at the
right times, given that the force needs to be optimized and we
need to employ as efficiently, effectively, as possible.
And so it is continuous monitorship of what it is they are
doing in support of our operational commander so that we can
provide the best advice and counsel to those operational
commanders regarding the use of the force.
In terms of equipping, sustaining, and training the force,
our challenge is always ensuring that we are coordinating
properly with each of the military services. For the major
equipment items, it becomes then our responsibility to modify
for the peculiar special operations missions and working with
each of the services to ensure that the recruiting, the
retention programs are satisfactory so that we can retain the
great force that we have.
The Chairman. General McNabb, as you lead your command,
what is your greatest challenge?
General McNabb. Mr. Chairman, when you think about us
coming out of Iraq, as you mentioned, going down to the 50,000
folks by 31 August, at the same time we are plussing up
Afghanistan, having some disasters like in Haiti and in Chile,
it is the synchronizing of all of the efforts to make sure that
we support all of the combatant commanders and all of the needs
that need to be done, which is what you mentioned, is how do we
go about doing that?
Afghanistan is, in particular, a very tough place to get
into, landlocked, highest mountains in the world surrounding,
and some very interesting neighbors.
And we constantly strive to make sure that we create
options and flexibility that allow us to deal with the unknown
and give General Petraeus the options that he and General
McChrystal need to make sure that our forces not only get in
there but they have everything that they need to win.
So our big part is to make sure that we build those
additional options because we know things will happen that we
have got to be able to either catch up or bring something else
as the conditions on the ground change.
And I just--one of my promises to General Petraeus is to
make sure that he never has to worry that we will get the stuff
in.
There is a lot of ways that we do that. We work not only on
our military side but our commercial side. And we work very
closely to make intermodal solutions that go from commercial to
military and make sure that we match our resources with the
state on the ground.
In the case of Afghanistan, there are some very tough
airfields to get into, and we make sure that we match the right
platforms to the right airfields so that we maximize throughput
to get General Petraeus and keep on the timeline that he needs.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I stated earlier, I am concerned that there may be a
30,000 troop cap for Afghanistan, and it is forcing difficult
decisions to be made when it comes to fielding certain key
enablers.
This cap becomes more disconcerting when you consider that
some of our NATO allies will be withdrawing forces from
southern Afghanistan in the coming year due to their internal
domestic policies.
General Petraeus, what is the impact of the 30,000 troop
cap on CENTCOM's currently validated joint urgent operational
needs statements, as it pertains to force protection, medical
evacuation, and other key enablers?
Has CENTCOM modified any validated JUONS [Joint Urgent
Operational Needs Statement] in order to stay below this cap?
How is CENTCOM working with General McChrystal to ensure
that he has everything he needs to execute the mission?
And while you are thinking of your response, knowing that
key enablers such as ISR, medevac, and force protection were
under-resourced before the surge, would it have been more
prudent to have excluded such key enablers from the 30,000
troop cap?
Why is it not in our best interest to ensure that our
combat forces have all the necessary tools at their disposal?
General Petraeus. Well, obviously we want to make sure that
our forces do, in fact, have all the necessary tools. And I
think it is important to recall, Congressman, that we started
at the end of 2008 with about 30,000, 31,000 U.S. forces on the
ground. Through a combination of decisions, some that continued
into 2009 from President Bush, and then early decisions made by
President Obama, then the subsequent decision for the 30,000,
we will have grown from that 30,000 to about 98,000 by the fall
of this year.
So we have a very substantial increase, and we have worked
very hard to make sure that in all of those forces--again, not
just the 30,000, but starting all the way back in the spring,
early 2009, that we included in those forces key elements, for
example, medevac aircraft. We had, I think it was one medevac
company, aero-medevac company on the ground at the start of
that. We have gone to three, and we are going to add two more.
So again, we are making sure that we have the forces that we
need, the enablers, the critical enablers.
The only case in which I know of an operational need where
we have modified that is in the case where we have used
contractors in instances where we have high-demand, low-density
elements, and we can thicken the force. Now, that is something
we have done across the board, but we have also done it in one
area that I know of in the sense-and-warn device manning where
we can do it with contractors rather than with military.
And as to the reassurance, if you will, at the end of this,
first of all, we obviously should be good citizens and so forth
and work within, again, I think the commitment that has been
made. But the secretary of defense was very clear during the
decision-making process to have some flex that was authorized
for him. And indeed, he got that.
And as you probably know, it is a flex of some ten percent
or so, and it is specifically for the areas that you have
talked about. It is for the critical enablers, force
protection, medevac, counter-improvised explosive device [IED],
so that if an emerging need arises, that General McChrystal can
come to me, I can go to the secretary with a request for force,
and we don't have to do anything further with that. So I--we
feel pretty comfortable with that situation.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
In your testimony, you state the inability of the Yemeni
government to effectively secure and exercise control over all
its territory offers AQAP a safe haven in which to plan,
organize, and support terrorist operations. This network poses
a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, as evidenced by recent
plots, including the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on
Christmas Day 2009.
As CENTCOM commander, would you oppose transferring Gitmo
[US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay] detainees to places like Yemen,
where the government is unable to secure and exercise control
over its territories, and where Al Qaeda affiliates enjoy a
safe haven?
General Petraeus. Congressman, it will always depend, I
think, on the ability of the country actually to control that
territory which is its correction facilities. And there has
been, indeed, an effort to both encourage Yemen and to assist
Yemen in the development of corrections facilities, keeping in
mind that as you will recall some several years ago, there was
an important prison break from Yemen in which a number of
individuals who are now part of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula were released.
And I can assure you that the policymakers are very keenly
attuned to that, and ensuring that there is not a risk as a
result of that. And so that has been--in fact, I think that is
why, among reasons, that there have not been detainees released
to Yemen I think in quite some time, frankly.
Mr. McKeon. So that is a yes, that you don't think that we
should be releasing them to countries that really can't control
the territory?
General Petraeus. Sir, it is not about controlling their
territory. It is about controlling their prisons. And if they
can't control a prison, then--but that is a different issue
with Yemen than it is controlling their territory. There are
clearly tribal areas that they don't control, but that doesn't
mean that it is beyond their capability to control their
detention facilities. In fact, as you saw in the press
recently, there is an individual who was detained by them who
is an Al Qaeda member, and attempted break, and in fact they
prevented that from happening, so again--or retained him. So
that is the critical determination, if you will.
Mr. McKeon. And that is probably--I think that is--we are
in agreement on that. I wouldn't expect necessarily to control
their whole territory, but if they can't control the prisons or
make sure that they can control the detainees that we return.
General Petraeus. That is the key. And that, I can tell
you, having been on the periphery of these discussions, is very
much a focus of the policymakers.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you all for your testimony and for your
superb service to our country.
As I understand it from a budgetary standpoint, this
request for fiscal year 2011 includes $113.0 billion for the
security of Afghanistan, excluding Iraq. Out of that amount,
$14.2 billion will go to train and equip the Afghan national
forces.
My question is, what is the optimum size? What force are we
building towards? And after we draw down our forces, is it
realistic to think that they can support forces of this
magnitude without substantial subsidies from us and our allies?
And what can we expect from our allies? Will they help shoulder
the burden of maintaining these forces there for some time to
come?
General Petraeus.
General Petraeus. Congressman, right now, we are building
toward a target--a total of Afghan national security forces of
army, police, border police, and some other categories, that is
305,600. The ultimate number is yet to be determined, and
clearly we have to see both how the security situation
develops, how the expansion of those forces develops because,
indeed, this is very challenging to add 100,000 total between
now and about 18 months from now. This is October 11, 305,000.
And sometime as we approach that period, again taking into
account a lot of different factors, will be determined what the
ultimate desirable end-strength is, and obviously cost is one
of those factors, given that this is a country that doesn't
have anywhere remotely near the resources of, say, Iraq,
although the potential there is extraordinary in terms of its
mineral wealth and some other blessings that it has, but they
have to be extracted and gotten to market.
So that is what we are headed to right now. There is a keen
recognition that, again, international donors, the U.S. will
undoubtedly be prominent among them, will have to help sustain
that force as we reduce our forces.
I would point out, though, that it is a lot cheaper to have
a very substantial number of Afghan forces than it is to have a
much smaller number of U.S. forces deployed in Afghanistan if
you can get to the point where those Afghan forces can indeed
transition and take tasks from our forces. So there is actually
a fairly compelling business case for doing that, even
recognizing that we will undoubtedly be the ones probably most
helping to sustain them.
But I would note that there are some other very important
partners, Japan foremost among them, who are providing
substantial resources as well, and there are a lot of countries
that have an interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not
again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists.
Mr. Spratt. Can you give us cost range? I couldn't agree
with you more about having their forces as opposed to our
forces being responsible for the security of their own country.
But can you give us a likely cost range for that cost?
General Petraeus. Sir, if I could provide that for the
record, again, just to make sure that we have that precise. But
as we have gone through, for example, looking at how much it
cost for this additional 30,000 forces, and then we have looked
at how much we are going to spend for the 305,000 Afghan
national security forces, again it is a heck of a lot cheaper
to do them than to do a subset, a very much smaller number of
U.S. forces, but we will get that for the record for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 157.]
Mr. Spratt. One last question, still on the budget. The
president's budget post-2011 includes a plug--there is not an
actual number, but there is a reservation of $50.0 billion each
year for the next 4 years after 2011. I know that that is just
a plug. It is not a scientifically derived number or anything
like that. But the president's budget, was that number
included--takes the deficit from $1.556 trillion down to $706.0
billion in 4 years. We cut the deficit in half, which I think
is a worthy goal.
But is it realistic to assume that in the out years, say
2013, 2014, we can have a supplemental cost for this
engagement, this type of security commitment, down to $50.0
billion?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think hard--frankly, quite hard to
tell right now. We obviously are going to be down very, very
substantially in Iraq. You know the policy to begin the
transition of some tasks in July of 2011, and to begin what the
president has termed a responsible--a beginning of a
responsible drawdown of our forces. But trying to project out
to that time I think would be hazardous right now.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
General Petraeus, I am increasingly asked a question for
which I do not have a good answer. I hope that you can help. I
know that yours is not to reason why; yours is but to do and
die, but I hope that anyhow you can help me with an answer to
this question.
The question starts out by noting this is--the war in
Afghanistan is an enormously asymmetric war--an old artillery
shell and a few dollars worth of electronics for the IED, and
we spend billions of dollars, I think that the MRAP [mine
resistant ambush protected vehicle] program alone was something
like $40.0 billion--probably the most asymmetric war in the
history of the world.
And then the questioner goes on to note that even if we are
successful in Afghanistan, where no one else has been
successful--Alexander the Great failed, the British empire
failed twice, the Soviet empire failed--and even if we are able
to do what no one else has ever done, the questioner notes that
we will have accomplished little because the bad guys will
simply go into Pakistan.
And then, if we spend how many more billion dollars and how
many more billion dollars and how many more dead kids over
there, and clear them out of Pakistan, they will simply go to
Yemen and Somalia.
And the question, you say we cannot provide them safe
sanctuary. Why are we involved in this hugely asymmetric war
where what we want to accomplish is not doable, because, even
if we are successful there, they simply go across the border to
Pakistan. How many more years? How many more billion dollars?
How many more dead of our young people? If we drive them out of
there, they go to Yemen and Somalia.
If we can't deny them safe sanctuary, why are we there,
they ask me.
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, Congressman, with
respect, I think that others have actually succeeded in
Afghanistan. I think that if you go back and look at the record
of British activities there, they did get defeated on occasion,
but they also, then, would figure out a formula that would
enable decades of peace, of an arrangement that allowed
security and stability in that country.
Alexander the Great went so far as to marry an Afghan
woman, I think, to solidify the agreement that ultimately
allowed him to extricate his forces and to retain, again,
achieve stability in his wake.
But, if I could, I think that the lesson of the fight
against extremism--against transnational extremism, not a fight
limited just to the Central Command area of responsibility, but
certainly one that is concentrated there, is that you have to
put pressure on the transnational extremists wherever they are,
that you cannot do whack-a-mole.
I think you are correct to say that it is a substantial
task, but if all we do is to deal with the challenges in
Afghanistan and prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a
sanctuary, as it was. Al Qaeda, of course, planned the 9/11
attacks in Kandahar when the Taliban was in charge of
Afghanistan.
The initial training of the attackers was conducted in Al
Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, before they went
to Germany and then, ultimately, to U.S. flight schools.
So, yes, we have to succeed in that, but we, then, also
have to help our Pakistani partners, noting that they are the
ones doing the fighting on the ground, and to, through a
sustained, substantial commitment for them, and a reassurance
that we are going to be their strategic partners that helps and
enables them to deal with this extremist threat that their
people have come to see as the most pressing threat to their
very existence, as they know it.
So, again, you have got to go--but, again, we also have to
help Yemen. And we are doing that. Now, again, right now, Yemen
is contributing enormously, obviously, in the effort. And that
is something we have, again, got to sustain. We want to do it
almost as a preventive counterinsurgency effort, rather than
end up where we have to do a true counterinsurgency campaign.
But so that is how I would craft that, with respect, sir.
And it might be that my Special Operations comrade would
have some thoughts on that as well, given that his forces are
engaged in this worldwide.
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would only add the point that--
confirm that there are Special Operations forces engaged in
some relatively low-level training relationships across many of
the countries to which our adversaries may move when they are
ultimately forced out of Afghanistan.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all three of you, for your service to this great
country and all the sacrifices you make to serve us. Thank you
so much.
General Petraeus, and all three of you, I have a few
questions for you on equipment needs in Afghanistan.
General Petraeus, Iraq and Afghanistan present two wholly
different terrains and environments. Is the equipment in Iraq
the right type of equipment to continue the fight in
Afghanistan?
And not only am I worried about our equipment. What about
the equipment from our coalition forces? Are they up to par to
continue the mission? What do we do after we downsize in Iraq?
Will we be able to use some of that equipment?
Maybe you can enlighten the committee on my question.
General Petraeus. Thanks, Congressman. It is a great
question as well.
The fact is that some of the equipment we use in Iraq is
fine for Afghanistan--some helicopters, certain of the vehicles
and so forth--but some is not.
In particular, the MRAPs that were so important in
providing protection for our forces in Iraq, many of them are
too large--the different types are too large for the roads in
Afghanistan, which are, obviously, much less developed than are
the roads in Iraq.
And, in fact, that is why, of course, the Department came
to you for the funding for the so-called M-ATV [MRAP All-
Terrain Vehicle], the all-terrain MRAP vehicle. And, in fact,
the requirement as it exists right now in Afghanistan is for
some 14,500 MRAPs--the MRAP family of vehicles, 6,500 of those
are the smaller of the original MRAPs and 8,000-plus are the
new all-terrain vehicle MRAPs.
And, again, we are very appreciative of the rapid response
by Congress and also by industry because they have expanded
their production of the all-terrain MRAPs substantially.
So that is a case in which what worked in Iraq doesn't work
in Afghanistan. And as we recognized that, rapidly we changed.
Now, the fact is that some of our coalition partners have
adequate--again, to continue with MRAPs, have MRAP-like
vehicles, vehicles with V-shaped hulls and good protection.
Some do not.
And we are working to help relatively small numbers,
frankly, and from the smaller countries, but we are working to
help them also so that we can extend that force protection to
them. And we have plans to do that, and we are proposing those
to the secretary because he just returned from a NATO
ministerial in which that was a key topic.
And then, are we able to transport some from Iraq to
Afghanistan? Absolutely. We do a business case. We have a
prioritization for--first it goes to the units in Iraq if they
need it. In some cases, it will go to Iraqi security forces if
the business case is not such that it is cheaper to take it out
of Iraq, refurbish it, say in Kuwait, fly or sail it over to
Pakistan and then Afghanistan.
And, again, Transportation Command obviously plays an
enormous role in all of this and has opened up a number of
different routes, as General McNabb mentioned, in coordination
with our State Department colleagues, with the logisticians
from CENTCOM and so forth.
So that is also ongoing as well. And, again, there is a
process that determines the prioritization, and there is a
business calculation, literally, on whether it makes sense from
a business perspective to transport it there or just have it
made new here and transport it out there.
Mr. Ortiz. And I just have one last question for General
McNabb. I know that you move so much equipment, not only to
Afghanistan but moving equipment back from Iraq. Do you have
sufficient personnel and sufficient equipment to do your job,
or do you need--what do you need that maybe we can help you
with?
General McNabb. Congressman, thanks for your question. It
kind of goes along the lines of what I said at the beginning is
the support of this committee has been huge on allowing us to
adjust to the difference, for instance, not only in Iraq, but
in Afghanistan.
Given Afghanistan's--the terrain in Afghanistan, give you
the example of C-130E model, could carry 6,000 pounds around
Afghanistan. An H model could carry 24,000 pounds. A J model
could carry 40,000 pounds.
So the portion that you have been able to help us
recapitalize our H models and make sure we get the J models set
has really allowed us to have the flexibility to deal with
moving stuff around that theater in support of General
McChrystal and General Petraeus.
Defensive systems, obviously a very different kind of war,
very dangerous. Given our crews, the defensive systems they can
do. Many of you all, in fact I think all of you have flown in
on our airplanes where you have done in-random approaches. Our
crews have night vision goggles. They have the right cockpits.
They have the right situation awareness to do that safely,
things that I can't hardly believe that our young folks do.
And when I go fly with them--and every once in a while I
do--those young captains will say, ``Come on over here, son.
Let me show you how we fly in this war.'' They are just
tremendous.
But it is those kinds of things that allow us to modify our
equipment and make sure that it is applicable.
Obviously, the C-17 has played huge in its ability to get
into small airfields and take advantage of limited ramp space.
And our job was to mix and match as we do that.
On the--and I will tell you, on the side, your--in fact
yours and Congressman Taylor's and the whole committee's
constant support of our sealift, both our U.S. flag fleet--they
have done superbly in meeting the needs that we have had.
For the reset coming out of Iraq right now, they are taking
care of all of that movement. I don't have to activate a
vessel, because they have got this.
Merchant mariners are doing superbly. And they have been
able to, over this eight years of war, really adjust the way
they do things and the way we work with them to make sure that
we can handle these surges.
The same thing on our U.S. air fleet. Their ability to
handle the increased flow of folks. In many cases, we can't
take the forces directly into, for instance, into Afghanistan.
So we will take them to Manas, transload them onto C-17s and
130s, and take them in for that last portion. But they have
been superb on stepping up to any challenges we had.
Both last year's surge and this year's surge, they said we
have given them plenty of notice, and they make sure that they
are ready to handle whatever we can give them. And we mix our
commercial with our military to make sure that we are taking
full advantage of both.
Obviously, it is much cheaper for us to use commercial
where we can and add that strength to that U.S. flag. Both air
and sea fleet has been superb. And your support of that has
really made a big difference.
Mr. Ortiz. Again, thank you for your service. We are proud
of the work you have done. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We thank the gentleman.
There are three votes pending on the House floor. If our
witnesses will indulge, we will go vote and return.
And the next witness should be Mr. Jones.
[Recess.]
Mrs. Davis. [Presiding.] We are going to resume again. I
want to thank everyone for their patience.
Call on Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Madam Chairman, thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
General Petraeus, in a March 14, 2010, article in The
Washington Post entitled ``At Afghanistan Outpost Marines Go
Rogue or Leading the Fight Against Counterinsurgency,'' the
question of where Marines are being deployed in Afghanistan and
the counterinsurgency--excuse me--tactics that those Marines
are employing appears to be a sticking point to the commanding
general of United States forces in Afghanistan.
Aside from being played in the newspaper, which I am very
disappointed that it was in the newspaper, this is obviously a
point of contention in your headquarters. Could you please give
us your views on this issue?
General Petraeus. Congressman, I think the Marines have
been deployed to the right places for the right reasons and are
carrying out admirable operations. It is as simple as that.
Mr. Jones. May I ask your opinion of the fact--you can't
stop the press, that I realize, but may I ask you, would you
had rather not seen this type of article in the newspaper?
General Petraeus. I would rather not have seen it, to be
sure.
Mr. Jones. Okay. Thank you.
Now I have a second point that I want to bring to your
attention, and that has to do with rules of engagement [ROE] or
what is called tactical directives.
In Marine Times of November the 2nd of 2009, ``Caution
Killed My Son, Marine Families Blast Suicidal Tactics in
Afghanistan.'' And then, in a later time, March 1 of 2010,
``Left to Die, They Call for Help, Negligence''--
``Negligent''--excuse me--``Army Leadership Refuse and Abandon
Them on the Battlefield.''
Last night I had a couple of hours of conversation with the
father of this Marine who was killed, and his comment was to me
that if we are going to, in this strategy that we are using--
and I cannot judge, you are the professional, the three of you,
and I respect you for being the professionals--but I am
beginning to hear more and more concerns from parents.
I have Camp Lejeune in my district, Cherry Point Marine Air
Station, a lot of retired Marines, and I am beginning to hear
from these families that they do not understand why in certain
situations that you are caught in a situation where you call
for help and it doesn't come, or you call for helicopter cover
where they have seen Taliban going into a cave, and then they
are told when the helos get there that, ``We cannot fire into
the cave because we can't see them.''
Would you say that these rules of engagement, that we are
in a situation where maybe at some point in time it needs to be
reconsidered, because I cannot continue to speak to a parent
whose son was killed and they believe that the tactics was part
of the reason that he was killed.
General Petraeus. Well, there are really two different
issues, if I could separate them for you, Congressman.
Mr. Jones. Please.
General Petraeus. One is the speed of response. That is a
totally different issue. And whether it is response by close
air support, which I think was the case in this particular
situation and was investigated and I think is still ongoing,
and so I am not going to get into the specifics of it, but we
are committed to responding to the needs of our troopers as
rapidly as possible, whether it is with close air support
[CAS], indirect fire, attack helicopters or medical evaluation.
And I personally track, we have metrics that we see on
that. I actually take some of those to the Secretary of
Defense, which gives you some sense of the scrutiny that he is
giving to the issue. And by the way, one of these was on
medical evacuation. That is what helped make the case for the
additional medevac companies, which he very clearly recognized
was needed and gave the order to provide, in fact.
So that is a separate issue. That has to be provided.
There is another issue, and that is the issue of the
tactical directive issued first by General McKiernan and then
refined by General McChrystal. This was issued because the loss
of innocent civilian life in the course of military operations
was threatening to undermine the very strategy, the very policy
that we are endeavoring to carry out in Afghanistan.
And after an enormous amount of, again, very careful
analysis and review and so forth, this directive was published.
Now, right up front in it, it says that no one is ever
denied the right to self-defense, and nor will we ever hesitate
if someone is pinned down by fire in responding to ensure that
those troopers never feel as if they are fighting with their
hands tied behind their back.
Having said that, there are tactical situations in which,
if you are not pinned down and decisively engaged and can break
contact because you don't know precisely who is in the house
from which there may be fire on you, where you hesitate in
dropping a bomb or reconsider because there may be innocent
civilians. And we have had a number of cases in which that has
happened, and there are cases recently, in fact, again, and we
have to reduce these cases. But we will not do it by risking
the lives of our soldiers.
And so that is the balance that we have to strike. This is
not uncommon to us. We went through this in Iraq as well. And
there are cases where you literally back out of a fight rather
than continue to prosecute it, long as you can do that, if you
are not sure exactly who might be on the receiving end of a
500-pound bomb or attack helicopter, Hellfires, or something
like that.
So that is what we are trying to achieve.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, General.
Thank the chairman.
Mrs. Davis. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your service, your long years
of service. And we so much appreciate you and your troops.
I have a question for each of you, if I can get them in, in
my five minutes.
First of all, General Petraeus, one thing I want to say is
one of your troops in the region is one of my employees, Army
Reserve Captain Devon Cockrell is on his second mobilization.
The first one was in 2003 and 2004 for 17 months, and this one
he is getting toward the end of his second year. And as happens
when you know somebody, they become the symbol for----
General Petraeus. Right.
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. Your 220,000 troops. And we wish
him and his wife and three little girls well, as we do all the
troops and families that are under your command.
General Petraeus, I wanted to give you a chance to talk
about two nations that are not in your area of concern, but
relate to the operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that
is Turkey and Armenia. Turkey has been a long-term ally,
Armenia is helping. Would you--any comments you might want to
make on the strength of the relationship between Turkey and the
United States, Armenia and the United States, and the
significance of the efforts by the leadership of those
countries--two protocols to normalize relationships between the
two of them?
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, if you would convey
my thanks as the combatant commander to the captain and to his
family.
Second, the country with which I have worked most closely,
noting again that it is obviously in the European Command
[EUCOM] area of responsibility, but I worked with Turkey when I
was the Multi-National Force-Iraq [MNF-I] commander, made
several trips up there, have done that actually as the Central
Command commander as well.
They have forces deployed in Afghanistan. In fact, they are
operating with considerable skill, very impressive, in the
Kabul district. In fact, that is their area of responsibility
there.
I think General McNabb probably should talk about the
importance of Incirlik and some of the different bases that we
use there.
We have quite a close intelligence relationship with them.
As you know, the PKK, an extremist organization which has
caused loss of innocent civilian life, killed Turkish security
force members and so forth, has operated from that mountainous
region in the border between Iraq and Turkey, and so there has
been a degree of collaboration there as well.
So overall--and then of course there is, understandably,
Turkish involvement in a relationship with Iraq which, again,
all of us sought to work together, as we did to promote the
relationship of Iraq with its other neighbors as well. They
have substantial investment. I think it is probably now in the
order of $10.0 billion in northern Iraq alone.
So, again, there were--there is a lot of intersection
between the activities that we have pursued in Iraq and that we
now have in the greater area of responsibility in Central
Command overall.
And, again, I might ask General McNabb to talk about the
basing and how important that is to us.
General McNabb. Yes, Congressman, Incirlik is a really
pivotal base for us, both for the resupply of Iraq and for the
resupply of Afghanistan. In fact, it is in the neighborhood of
46 percent of our air sustainment goes through Incirlik. We
have C-17s bedded down there, as well as some 135s. It is right
along the route to Afghanistan. And Turkey has been tremendous
in allowing us to use that base for the movement of cargo and
refueling aircraft through there.
Dr. Snyder. I am going to interrupt you, if I might.
General Petraeus, any comment about the protocols between
Armenia and Turkey?
General Petraeus. It is not something that I----
Dr. Snyder. All right.
General Petraeus [continuing]. I have any----
Dr. Snyder. Admiral Olson, it is my understanding that we
have 55 different bases or commands that have some kind of
training course or school on special ops. Is it concerning that
we have 55 different teaching institutions of some kind? Are we
sure that everybody is learning the same thing or do we have
problems with it having different courses, different course
work, different doctrines? What is the status of that?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would have to confirm the number 55
for you. That is the first time I have heard that number.
But in concept, each of our component commanders--Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations commanders--
assumes responsibility for training his force to a standard
that meets his need. From our headquarters, we monitor that
standard, we support what it is they are doing with their
training bases.
There is a partnership with each of the services in terms
of sharing training capabilities. We rely on big Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine Corps, for much of the readiness of our
force.
And then we do Special Operations' peculiar training on top
of that. But in concept, we--I--do not favor identical training
for all elements of the force. I think it is essential in the
spirit of jointness that each of our components train in the
way that it best can, within its culture, within its
leadership, within its peculiar equipment. Maritime equipment
doesn't necessarily fit in a mountaineering kind of
environment.
So there are very peculiar training needs that we need to
be flexible enough to adjust to.
I am not defending the precise number of 55, but I think in
concept we have got to understand that a breadth of training
and great flexibility in how we provide it is important.
Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. General McNabb, I did not get to my C-130,
but----
Mrs. Davis. No. We are going to have to go on.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your
extraordinary service, and for the unbelievable, fantastic
service of the forces under your commands.
General Petraeus, I want to kind of pick up, if I can, a
little bit where Dr. Snyder was when he was talking about his
staff or his constituent who was serving in--this week, in
fact, tomorrow, my son leaves to go back under your command in
Afghanistan, his third combat tour. And he is proud to do it,
and I am proud of him.
But, thinking of him and all of our sons and daughters that
are serving, particularly in your command, I want to make sure
that they have everything that they need. And so, we are going
to look at the budget and try to provide that.
We want to make sure they have every chance to succeed. And
I am just a little bit reluctant to do this, but I am going to
quote the same article that my friend, Mr. Jones, was quoting.
The very last paragraph, General Nicholson is quoted as saying,
``The clock is ticking. The drawdown will begin next year. We
still have a lot to do, and we don't have a lot of time to do
it.''
And so I think the concern that I have and others have is
that we don't want to be in the business of letting that clock
push us to doing something we ought not to be doing or doing
something too hastily. Could you just address that for just a
minute?
General Petraeus. I could. I think, again, useful to paint
the context that that derives from.
The president at West Point was sending two clear messages.
One was a message of increased commitment--the additional
troops, civilians, funding Afghan security force support. And
then a message of urgency. And that is what July 2011 was
connected to.
And that message was not just for domestic public opinion.
That message was directed in some cases at leaders in the
region, leaders in Kabul, leaders, perhaps, in uniform and so
forth.
And, interestingly, that has had an effect. We do think
that we see a lot greater engagement by certain leaders in
certain activities there because there is an awareness that
this is not going to go on forever.
Now, having said that, that speech was very carefully
articulated to say that in 2011--July 2011--we will begin a
process of transitioning, conditions-based, and begin a process
of withdrawing in a responsible manner. And I think those are
very key adjectives or adverbs, whatever it is there.
Mr. Kline. And I agree. I just am a little bit concerned
that in amongst our own forces, that if they are feeling an
urgency--I mean, that is a big command responsibility that you
and General McChrystal and others have to make sure that this
is translated into the kind of operations we want to conduct.
General Petraeus. Right. And in the region, I might add, as
well. Because we have made--we have worked hard to try to make
sure that leaders in the region don't think that that is an
indication that come July 2011, we are going to race for the
exits and turn off the light. That is not going to be the case.
But it is very important to reassure some of those regional
leaders as well, because if there was an expectation that we
were going to do that, they would, obviously, act differently.
Mr. Kline. Yes, thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Mister----
Mr. Kline. I am sorry. I still have a minute and 34
seconds, I hope, Madam Chair.
I am going to try to get in one more quick question. And,
again, I want to go back to you, General Petraeus, because we
just had elections in Iraq. And the results were a little bit
different than what I thought they might be. And we have had
some rising influence of Muqtada al-Sadr and others.
Can you just--I have a minute and 13 seconds--can you
address----
General Petraeus. I would be happy to.
First of all, the--I think the surprise is that you have
running almost neck-and-neck right now, with 24 percent of the
vote each, and still to be sorted out--it is only 80 percent or
so has been counted--still to be sorted out how that translates
into Council of Representative seats.
But you have Prime Minister Maliki and former Prime
Minister Allawi. Maliki's coalition being predominantly Shia,
but it has some cross-sectarian, not as religiously affiliated
as the other major Shia coalition of which the Sadr movement is
a part.
And that movement has only gotten about 17 percent. And the
Sadr movement is one of the two major, but not necessarily, and
there are several others in there as well.
So I am not completely sure I share the assessment that I
saw in a news account today that this shows that the Sadr
movement--the Sadr movement may be more prominent in that
coalition, but that coalition, once again, as it did in January
2009 provincial elections, has not done that well in the
overall national election.
So you have Prime Minister Maliki and then you have Prime
Minister Allawi, a Shia, former prime minister, with--leading a
largely Sunni but, again, cross-sectarian alliance and quite
and avowedly secular alliance.
And then you have the Kurdish bloc with over 20-some
percent as well, as I recall.
Now, that indicates some real interesting dynamics. Keep in
mind that the individual parties that make up a coalition are
not bound to stay with the coalition, too. So the----
Mr. Kline. So we are in for some exciting times here.
General Petraeus. It is going to be quite interesting. I
think there could be some--some high drama in the Iraqi
political scene or in Iraqacy, as we call it.
Mr. Kline. I hope it stays to peaceful drama.
I yield back.
Mrs. Davis. Okay, Mr. Kline, thank you.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And thank all of you gentlemen for your service.
And particularly, since I have Admiral Olson and General
Petraeus here, there has been a lot of talk of rules of
engagement. On a recent visit down to Kandahar, like all of us
get to do, I got to visit with some kids from home.
One was on his third deployment. Another one was on his
second deployment. But what I found interesting is that both of
them told me they thought they were going to make a career of
the Army, but both of them told me they were getting out after
this deployment, over frustration over the rules of engagement.
One of them, the guy on his third tour, had an observation
that he felt like the rules of engagement were as strict in
Afghanistan now as they were after four or five years in Iraq.
Iraq, obviously, they choked them down as time went on.
General Petraeus. Right.
Mr. Taylor. And particularly he expressed absolutely no
confidence in teaming with the Afghan police. He thought going
on a search with them was just absolutely a waste of their
time, did nothing but endanger their lives, and didn't
accomplish much.
So, seeing as how, since the publishing of the book, ``Lone
Survivor,'' there has been a lot of talk over rules of
engagement. I am just curious, do rules of engagement come
solely from uniformed military personnel?
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. No one----
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. No one wearing civilian clothes is involved in
making the rules of engagement?
General Petraeus. That is correct. Now, don't get me wrong.
There is interface with Afghan leaders. I mean, that is one of
the challenges that we have. Again, you have got to operate in
the context where you are fighting, just as I had to with Prime
Minister Maliki.
You know, there were times where I sat down and said, in a
sense, will the traffic bear this operation tonight? And
would--if it didn't, if my diplomatic wing man, the great Ryan
Crocker, said no, then we would rethink that.
So, again, you do have to operate in the context. But these
rules are absolutely developed by uniform ranks. I mean, that
is how we do this.
There is a point at which they are approved, obviously, in
the chain of command. But it is above my level. And they
haven't had--there has been no direction. This has been bottom-
up, not top-down.
Mr. Taylor. I guess my follow-up question is has anyone in-
theater been charged--or how often has it happened that someone
has been charged with violating the rules of engagement?
General Petraeus. Let me answer that for the record, if I
could? There are certainly cases in which disciplinary action
has been taken. Now, whether you would say that that is a--
because of a rule of action or because of some other form of
lack of performance, I think would--is what we will need to
determine.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 157.]
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Admiral Olson, the case involving the three East Coast Navy
SEALs [SEa, Air, Land Teams]. For the record, were the charges
filed by the detainee? Were they filed by other uniformed
military personnel? Were they filed by other Navy SEALs?
Again, there has been a lot of--you know, the folks on talk
radio have obviously gotten people excited about this issue. I
would welcome whatever you can tell us, given the
circumstances, about the incident.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. I am reluctant to talk about it.
It is not in my area of responsibility. And it--although I
can----
Mr. Taylor. I guess the first question is, who actually
filed the charges? Do you know that?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I----
Mr. Taylor. Was it someone in uniform or was it the
detainee?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I will take that for the record. I have
received mixed information on that myself. I----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 157.]
Mr. Taylor. General Petraeus, would you know, sir?
General Petraeus. I don't think it is--a detainee can't
file charges the last I checked. I mean, anytime that--and we
probably ought to go into a closed session and explain what is
really happened on this case, because it is, A, an ongoing
case----
Admiral Olson. It is.
General Petraeus [continuing]. And, B, again, I think
probably we ought to arrange for a briefing for you.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. General, for the record, since it, again,
has been widely publicized, I guess the questions would be who
actually filed the charges, uniformed or nonuniformed? Did the
SEALs elect to go the court-martial route as opposed to
nonjudicial punishment? That is my understanding, that it was
their decision. And when are the cases pending?
And, again, I received, I have an extremely pro-military
district and I get a heck of a lot of mail on this issue. And I
would like to be able to give folks a decent answer.
But, again, thank all of you for what you are doing.
General McNabb, I am sorry I didn't bother you today. But I
think I have done more than an adequate job of bothering you
over the past couple years. And thank you for what you do to
keep the troops supplied.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, General Petraeus, there has been certainly
media reports and I think a relatively recent GAO [Government
Accountability Office] report concerning problems in terms of
financial management of--I think you mentioned the CERP money.
I am not sure if that--there are categories above that, but--
and just dealing with cash in Iraq.
And I wonder if you could respond to that in terms of--and
be a little bit more specific as to what actions have occurred
to tighten up that process.
And also, I wonder if you could also talk about should the
United States--at what level should we be engaged at this time
in terms of redevelopment in Iraq? Should the taxpayers be
engaged? It seems like we are also still engaged in some
infrastructure development in Iraq.
General Petraeus. Well, we are finishing up the
infrastructure development that was funded by the original Iraq
Reconstruction Act, and we continue to do small projects.
I think the average project that we do now in Iraq is
somewhere in the tens of thousands of dollars range with CERP,
just to give you an example how that has come down very
steadily over the years. And as you know, we turned back a
substantial amount of money from CERP last year, and we will
likely do that again this year. And that is okay, because again
that is an O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding that the
services can very much use.
And so we are not going to have an end-of-year spending
drill or anything else like that. We are going to spend the
taxpayer's dollars responsibly.
Now, with respect to should we continue, I think we should
continue with some levels of funding in Iraq because I think we
have continued substantial interests there, and we have
invested an extraordinary amount to get to this point. And I
think that continuing some level, but again at quite a
substantially reduced level, is actually important to continue
to help with the Iraqi security force development, as an
example, which is key, of course, to us being able to go home
and hand off the task to them. We have done that successfully
so far. We need to continue to do that.
With respect to really just if you say a general category
of management and so forth, there is no question but that our
forces and contracting elements and other agencies have learned
an extraordinary amount about this. Some of it the hard way,
and some of that, indeed, is of course what was reported in the
press the other day. But we have tried to be a learning
organization.
Years ago, we instituted the Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan [JCC-I/A], and over time have done a
substantial amount to provide better oversight, literally just
more contractors, and again even now initiatives such as trying
to literally reduce the amount of cash on the battlefield--try
to go cashless, try to do electronic funds transfers and so
forth where you can. And again, that has some challenges in
places like Afghanistan, as you would appreciate.
To give you one item, if I could, the Army had no flag
officers in the contracting ranks at all, I think it was two or
three years ago--in fact, when we were trying to get a flag
officer for the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan,
even though it had the predominance of the force. And as a
result of its examination of how the contracting force had
really eroded--atrophied in many respects--at a time when
contracts were going like this, it has taken a number of
different steps to get it going like that again. In fact, I
think there are now three flag officers that are growing, and
this will provide much better, again, leadership, management
oversight and so forth.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. If you could respond to the committee in
writing, I would really appreciate it, and address the issue of
what--the nature of the projects that we are funding.
General Petraeus. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Coffman. Because I do have a concern that the taxpayers
of the United States should not be funding infrastructure
development in Iraq today.
General Petraeus. Right.
Mr. Coffman. Having served in Iraq myself, I am well
familiar with CERP projects and the need at the small unit
level----
General Petraeus. Right.
Mr. Coffman [continuing]. Battalion and below to be engaged
in those projects with the local population.
General Petraeus. Right.
Mr. Coffman. I have a final question for both of you, and
that is, I have a concern that we have been--it seems that
post-Vietnam, we went in with a light footprint, Angola, in
Afghanistan initially, in supporting indigenous factions that
shared our security concerns. And now with Iraq and
Afghanistan, we are in a very heavy footprint. And I would hope
going forward that we revert back to a light--a lighter
footprint, relying on Special Operations Command for those
issues where we are confronting non-state actors. If maybe you
could respond to that.
General Petraeus. I would be happy to respond to it because
I think a light footprint is a great solution where all you
need is a light footprint. But the truth is that we tried a
light footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan and, with respect, it
didn't work. It was wrong.
We have been able to do a lighter footprint in some cases.
I think the Philippines are a great example of that, touch
wood, Yemen. There are some other areas where we have small
numbers of forces, where we can almost do in a sense preventive
counterinsurgency, if you will, rather than ending up in a
full-blown counterinsurgency, with a whole-of-government's
approach from the get-go.
And again, I think arguably in Kosovo that may have been,
although you can interpret that different ways, but so again, I
think this is a case of it is art not science, and I think you
have to be careful. The penalty for going too light can be
substantial. The penalty for going too heavy can be
substantial. And that is why they pay folks to make tough
decisions.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
I am sorry. Admiral Olson, did you want to respond?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Time is up, but I am going to go ahead and let
you----
Mr. Coffman. Madam Chairman, I show that I have a minute
and five seconds left. Oh, I am going the other way.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Olson. I would simply say that the small footprint
and the way that Special Operations forces do this around the
world in support of the regional combatant commanders. General
Petraeus called it ``preventive counterinsurgency.'' We refer
to it as moving ahead of the sound of guns in order to prevent
that sound from occurring later.
But once the sound of guns has occurred, it is a whole
different thing and you need to respond with what you need to
respond with, and the operational commanders need to make that
determination, as General Petraeus laid it out. But the small
footprint is better before the fight starts.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you again, gentlemen, for being before our
committee.
Admiral Olson, I want to pick upon something that Mr.
Skelton spoke about in his opening statement, and that is the
whole issue of 86 percent of our special operations forces are
in U.S. Central Command. It is the same percentage that you
gave us last year, so I would like to know, can you provide a
specific breakdown of where of the special operations forces
between Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan? So that would be my
first question.
Admiral Olson. Congresswoman Sanchez, thank you. I would
like to take that for the record for the sake of accuracy so
that I do give you good numbers.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 157.]
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Admiral Olson. But I will tell you, it is roughly 10,000
people in the CENTCOM area of operations, and it is roughly 60-
40 or 55-45 split, with now the slightly heavier portion in
Afghanistan versus Iraq.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
And with the high percentage of SOFs in the U.S. Central
Command, how is that affecting our operations elsewhere
throughout the world? I mean, if you are drawing and you are
pulling them all in one direction, what is that doing to the
rest of the things that we are worried about out there?
Admiral Olson. Yes, ma'am. Clearly, we are in fewer places
with a smaller number of forces for shorter periods of time
than we historically have, and that has impacted on our ability
to establish some of the close relationships with counterparts
in other regions. Along the way, our ability to speak some
languages has atrophied because we are simply not there with
the same intensity that either they want us there or we have
been able to be there in the past.
Ms. Sanchez. And do you see the drawdown of the
conventional forces coming out of Iraq over this year--do you
see that as also a drawdown of our special forces who are
sitting in Iraq? Or do you see that even a greater extent of
leaving the more leaner, faster-moving Arab-speaking type of
people that you might have? Or do you see us pulling them out
of Iraq and then sending them off to Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. Well, we are terming it a reemphasis in
Afghanistan without a de-emphasis in Iraq, expecting our
Special Operations force level in Iraq to remain about constant
even as the general purpose force drawdown occurs.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
I would also like to discuss yesterday's New York Times
article. In particular, General Petraeus, realizing that there
are still ongoing investigations with respect to the Department
and that some things are difficult to talk about, can you
comment on the validity of yesterday's New York Times article?
General Petraeus. Which article are you referring to?
Ms. Sanchez. The one on the special forces and how they are
coming under McChrystal's operational perspective because of
problems with the higher casualty rate of civilians.
General Petraeus. Absolutely. Yes. It is not because of
that, and I am the one who directed the shift of operational
control as well as what was tactical control to Com-U.S. Forces
Afghanistan, as we also have done recently for U.S. Air Force
provincial reconstruction teams [PRTs] and for U.S. Marine
forces and for some other elements there as well--the Army
forces having already been under his operational control as
well as his tactical control.
Ms. Sanchez. So the article sort of insinuates that the
reason that they are coming under McChrystal is because there
have been high civilian casualties, and in particular they are
from the special force--the special operating teams. Are you
trying to tell me that because you ordered this, you really
didn't order it on that basis? You ordered it more on the
ability to have the skill-set needed in particular areas in
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. No, neither of those, Congresswoman. What
I am--the reason it was done was to help General McChrystal
achieve greater unity of effort among all of his forces. And
again, that is why this applied to more than just Special
Operations forces. It also included Marine forces, certain Air
Force forces, and it already had included--we had earlier done
the Army forces.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. If it is possible for the record or if
it has to be more under more of a confidential situation, I
would like to see a memo or whatever----
General Petraeus. It has nothing to do with classification.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. Under some of that movement and
why it is happening.
General Petraeus. There is nothing classified about it.
This is to achieve greater unity of effort. That is why I
directed it. It is something that we discussed for a number of
months way before this whatever incident, again, was referred
to in that article. We have talked about it for years,
candidly. It is something we discussed when I was in Iraq as
well, and it is something that I also then took to the
secretary before doing it.
Ms. Sanchez. And lastly, Admiral, I had asked you several
weeks ago when we met what do you see in the future as some of
the greatest threats and where we need to be placing our
special ops. Can you tell me if there is anything that is
changed or anything that we should worry as a committee with
respect to where our forces might be?
Admiral Olson. From the Special Operations perspective and
our responsibility to track violent extremist threat across the
regional combatant commands of the world, our focus is on the
under-governed, ungoverned regions of the world. It is the
places where there are vast expanses, easy access, the ability
to develop and project power from those regions.
Admiral Olson. So that does include Yemen, as we see growth
in an Al Qaeda presence there. It gives us concerns about
Somalia and further west, particularly in the pan-Sahel trans-
Saharan regions.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
And, gentlemen, thank you. I always have a little
commercial in the beginning that I know one doesn't reach the
rank of admiral or four-star general without having a complete
and total lifetime dedication to the cause of freedom. And I
want you to know I just speak on behalf of a great deal of
people suggesting how much we are honor and appreciate your
grand service.
I would like, indulge me here, I would like to try to sort
of express a concern and then I will change gears here at the
end and ask a question, I promise.
One of the great concerns I have, as has been in the
committee, is that Iran would achieve a nuclear weapons
capability. Certainly agree with General Petraeus that that
means that there would be an arms race in the Middle East and
just a number of other things that I believe could wipe the
table clean of other issues, given the potentiality of weapons
falling into the hands of terrorists at some point in the
future and all of the things that go with that.
And it is my concern that this Administration--not
expressing anything on your part--but this Administration may
have come to an unstated conclusion or position that Iran is
going to gain nuclear capability and that our strategy should
be to contain that when that happens. And I just feel like that
is a fundamentally wrong conclusion to come to, that it means
that we should do everything we possibly can to prevent Iran
from gaining that capability, again, for some of the stated
reasons that I mentioned.
And, General Petraeus, in the Senate Armed Services
Committee, I think you made a general statement that you didn't
think Iran would become a nuclear power or nuclear-armed nation
in 2010. It so happens that I agree with you, and I just want
to make sure that that doesn't represent a perspective on your
part that we should be letting up in any way, and I don't think
it does--give you certainly the opportunity to----
General Petraeus. Not at all. And, in fact--I mean, for
anybody wants to get into the issue of Iran's path, if you
will, its efforts in the nuclear arena, then I think very much
you should ask for a closed session with the intelligence
community to lay that out. But, I mean, that was just really
to----
Mr. Franks. Sure.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Just say that.
Now, I am not aware of such a conclusion as you talked
about, by the way, to just--to allow----
Mr. Franks. No, I don't suggest you are. That is a
conclusion on my part, that there is an unstated feeling on the
part of this Administration that Iran will gain a nuclear
capability, and I think that is a very dangerous conclusion to
come to. And I wanted to make sure that I said ahead of time
that I don't think that that reflects any perspective on any of
your part, because perhaps you know better than anyone the
implication of a nuclear Iran.
General Petraeus. And, again, I am not aware of a
conclusion being made in the policy level either.
Mr. Franks. I understand. Yes, sir.
Well, again, I hope that to be true, because I feel like
that there are calculations that are made in the world at this
point that are beginning to take into consideration the
potential, you know, hegemony that Iran would gain if they--if
they were able to become a nuclear-armed nation.
So with that, I just wanted to express that concern. And I
want to give anyone else a chance to do it, too.
Before I run out of time, I would like to go ahead and put
one other question on the table and then you can deal with them
en masse if you want to.
You have had a brilliant success in Marjah, and I think now
that the plan--the general plan is to move forward in Kandahar
with an even larger effort in Afghanistan, as I understand, and
that there are at least some stated concerns that you may not
have quite the number of forces that you believe is necessary
to maintain peace in Marjah, that, you know, that to hold that
territory is more--sometimes more personnel intensive than to
take it. And I am concerned that, you know, our potential
friends in the area might wonder if we are going to have the
commitment to hold not only Marjah, but other areas that we
secure. And do you have any concerns that you feel like this
committee should be aware of?
General Petraeus. I do not.
One of the concepts when I talked about getting the right
structures, people, concepts, and resources, one of the key
concepts there is in counterinsurgency guidance, and it has to
do with not clearing if you are not going to hold. We have
tried that in the past. You know what the results are.
Occasionally there is some reason to disrupt somebody, but you
need to recognize all you are doing is disrupting and leaving.
In this case, there was a commitment to clear and to hold,
and that commitment remains strong. And, I mean, this is why we
are deploying still. We are about 10,000 of 30,000 in, and we
have another 20,000 forces headed on the way in.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
And thank you, all of you, for being here, and especially
for the leadership you have provided the country.
I wanted to follow up a little bit, well, with my
colleague, and just the size of the request really that you
have made in trying to move forward and provide a greater
increase for the Afghan security forces.
I wonder if you could explain a little bit more--and
perhaps you did this earlier, and I am sorry, I might not have
been here--why you need the almost 50 percent increase in the
levels appropriated for fiscal year 2010 and the $11.6 billion
for fiscal year 2011.
Is there a point at which--I think people are ask--I know,
whether this is really a possibility, whether they have the
ability, capacity to gear up in that way?
General Petraeus. Well, again, a critical important--
critically important part of our overall effort involves
developing host nation forces so that indeed we can, as the
president has articulated, starting in July 2011, begin the
process of transitioning some tasks, conditions-based, to
Afghan security forces.
And a very substantial amount of analysis went into how
many forces and so forth. The agreement at this point is for
the expansion up of another roughly hundred thousand that will
take them to about 305.6 thousand total soldiers, police,
border police, and some other categories.
We think it is crucially important when you do the
counterinsurgency math, if you will, everything we know about
this tells us that those forces will be needed and that we need
them to be as capable as we can possibly help them be. And that
is the reason for that.
As I did mention earlier, when we can hand off tasks to
them, it is obviously a lot cheaper to have a very substantial
number of Afghan forces rather than to have even a smaller
number of our forces. And, you know, you know the numbers that
it took to deploy 30,000 additional forces----
Mrs. Davis. I think, General, what I am wondering, and I
know I have been asked this quite a bit out in my district, is
whether or not there is really a threshold and a point at which
we feel that we are not actually being successful in the time
frame that we actually field in order to see the changes that
are required.
General Petraeus. Well, that is certainly not something
that we see right now. Again, we do forthright, honest
assessments. And what we saw in Marjah, for example, was a
performance by Afghan forces that was, frankly, mixed. There
were some quite good Afghan forces. There were some of our
commanders who sing the praises of their Afghan counterparts.
And then there were some others that were not as good. And
there is no one singing those praises.
The same is true of various forms of local and national
Afghan governance. This is why President Karzai, of course,
announced his anti-corruption initiative, why he just relieved
another governor and so forth.
So, again, this is hard----
Mrs. Davis. Yes. This is tough. I understand. And I know
that there was a report----
General Petraeus. And you went through it with us in Iraq
as well, as I know you recall.
Mrs. Davis. There was a report as well recently that the
police training isn't going as we would like, and it seems
like----
General Petraeus. We are overhauling it.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. Every time----
General Petraeus. We are overhauling the police training.
We didn't have the concepts right----
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. I have been there and asked----
General Petraeus. No, we didn't have the concepts right.
Mrs. Davis. Still working on that. Okay.
General Petraeus. Again, that is--we have taken a year to
get the right inputs, and among those is the concept for how we
train the Afghan national security forces, the organization
needed to do it. You know, we had--in Iraq we had a three-star,
as you will recall.
Mrs. Davis. Yes.
General Petraeus. In Afghanistan we had a two-star. It
helps to have that additional structure, the additional----
Mrs. Davis. If I may turn, just quickly, to the recent
Washington Post article on the fact that while some situations
have improved for women in Afghanistan, there is a lot of
concern about women being certainly on the--continuing to be on
the margin. And the discussions with the Taliban have a great
impact on the feeling that they would like very much to be able
to be at the table, you know, in the sense of having more
input.
Do you anticipate, do you see that as a possibility? What
role, if any, do you think we should be playing?
General Petraeus. Well, I see Afghan women certainly as
playing a role, albeit one that does vary depending on where
you are in the country. And you have been there, you know that
in the cities, there are certain cities where women are very
evident, very obvious, and very much contributed and involved
in all that goes on in society. But when you get into some of
the more rural areas, where there is a more conservative form
of religion that is practiced, that is not the norm.
And so, again, this is also certainly a mix. I have
actually talked about this with President Karzai. He is
actually quite proud of some of the accomplishments in this
regard. And as I mentioned to you before the session, the
Women's Day celebrations recently were really quite remarkable.
I mean, you are absolutely correct that there is an enormous
desire there in that half of the population that is female to
contribute more to their country.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Wittman, please.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, Admiral Olson, General McNabb, thank you
for joining us today and thank you so much for your service to
our Nation.
Wanted to begin with you, General Petraeus. We have read
recently, as the election results come in from Iraq, about what
is happening with the dynamic of those folks that are elected
to serve, and it appears as though supporters of Muqtada al-
Sadr are gaining some momentum, at least as those----
General Petraeus. I am not sure I would share that
actually. As I mentioned a second ago, the two primary
coalitions actually do not include the Sadrists. They are the
Maliki coalition, 24 percent of the vote, the former Prime
Minister Allawi coalition. That is a very secular coalition.
This is a--more secular than the coalition that is--that has
the Sadrists as part of it.
They have only got, I think, it is somewhere, last count,
around 17 percent of the votes, so they are decidedly behind
and also behind the Kurdish coalition.
And they are one of only--they are only one of several
parties in that particular coalition which has the Supreme
Council of Hakim and then also the former Prime Minister
Jaafari element, Chalabi, and some others.
They may be more prominent in that coalition. That may be
correct. And that is the more--the least secular and perhaps
arguably most connected to Iran coalition. But I wouldn't say
that they are more prominent in Iraq as a whole, other than the
discipline they showed as part of a party as part of that
coalition.
Mr. Wittman. Well, in that context, what role, then, do you
think, or what influence do you think, then, Muqtada al-Sadr
has going forward, as the results of these elections come in,
with the government that will be formed?
Do you think his role will be as it was, maybe, in the
past?
It seems like he has been, you know, sort of, under the
radar here, at least recently. And I didn't know if this
election signaled a little bit different path?
General Petraeus. He has emerged. He has been more
prominent. His party, his coalition did not do well in the
January 2009. Again, that was that same coalition, and was
largely defeated by Maliki's coalition in the January 2009
provincial elections.
Again, his is a loyal, in a sense disciplined element.
There are still some militia remnants that are attached to it
by other names. And he has a very prominent name, obviously.
The Sadr name carries an enormous amount of weight in Iraq, in
society and even in Iraqi politics.
So he is an important figure and he has been a bit more
visible after the years of study and so forth that he has
undertaken. And, really, it is going to--we will have to see
whether or not his party breaks from this coalition and ends up
going with one of the other two leading coalitions which likely
will be the lead dog in this effort to form a coalition that
can elect--get enough votes in the Council of Representatives
to elect a prime minister and president and so forth.
Mr. Wittman. Okay, very good.
I want to shift gears, a little bit now, to Afghanistan and
talk, a little bit, about where we are going to be in the
future. Obviously, we know we have got a timeline for
withdrawal. And of course that is based on looking at where we
are in the efforts there in Afghanistan.
Let me ask this. You know, one of the elements of that, we
know, in this counterinsurgency plan is making sure that the
training of the Afghan national security forces is on track and
that we are actually accomplishing the things that we need to,
to make sure that they can maintain security, just as you said,
once we go in and are able to establish that security.
Can you tell me, a little bit, about how that training
program is evolving?
And are we really on the correct glide path to achieve an
effective size for the national security force by 2012, which
is, you know, on track with the time frame for withdrawal?
General Petraeus. I think it is probably too early to tell.
There has been greater recruiting and retention in the army and
now in the police as well. But that is really only the last
couple of months, and that was the result of probably two
factors.
One is a pay raise and some targeted bonuses and some other
sensible actions, which--all of which, by the way, we tend to
do as well.
And then the other is really a greater sense of ownership,
we think, by Afghan leaders, in part because they recognize
that there is a timeline. There is a date for the beginning
of---not for the withdrawal but for the beginning of--a
transition, for the beginning of a responsible withdrawal.
With respect to the overall programs, we have to increase
the capacity for training substantially. NATO asked for the
numbers of trainers that General McChrystal and General
Caldwell and the NATO training mission in Afghanistan commander
requested and got only half of those. So we are going to have
to figure out where those other trainers are going to come
from.
And also, General Caldwell has made some very sound
changes, frankly very much in line with the kinds of learning
that we did in Iraq over time, as well.
Just one example: you know, we should recruit, train, and
then assign police, not recruit, assign, and then try to get
them back to training. Again, that was a flawed approach, and
we have got to--we have to take the time to do that. And there
are also a host of other initiatives to increase the capacity
and capability of the training and equipping effort and
therefore translate into greater capacity and capability for
the Afghan security.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, first, let me say hi to Colonel Seaton, back here. He
was my----
General Petraeus. He is quite a----
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. Battalion C.O. [commanding
officer], 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Years ago.
Mr. Hunter. So great to see you here. And good luck with
them. Good luck with them. It is a long, hard slog.
[Laughter.]
And, you know, to all of you, thanks for your service.
General McNabb, as Dr. Carter was actually singing your big
praises yesterday, talking about the way that we are
increasing, getting the MRAPs over and a lot of the things we
have done to make different lanes, kind of, come together to
get stuff over there quicker, things that are needed really--
that are very important right now.
So thanks for everything that you are doing.
The first thing that I would like to talk about is, one,
just echoing Mr. Taylor's asking about the ROE because I
understand what the tactical directive. And I understand, at
the level that we are at and that you all are at as four-stars,
what you say and what you implement at your level and what gets
executed by a captain or approved by a lieutenant colonel or
major are two totally different things.
And talking to Navy SEALs, talking to different task forces
in the Army who fall under both of you gentlemen sitting there,
different task forces that I can't even talk about here,
mention by name, they feel like there is a disconnect between
what was supposed to happen with that tactical directive and
what they are actually allowed to do, when it comes to night
raids; when it comes to them getting air support; when it comes
to--when I was in Afghanistan in 2007, if you got in--troops in
contact, you owned all the air no matter what. It didn't matter
if you were advancing or you were retreating; you owned all the
air.
It isn't like that anymore. I mean, that--that is a fact,
that that has changed. And it might not be written that way,
but no----
General Petraeus. If troops in contact is declared,
Congressman, they own the air.
Mr. Hunter. No, but--right, I understand that they own it,
but let me----
General Petraeus. It is very clear. Once a troop is in
contact is declared, they own the air.
Mr. Hunter. Right, but let me tell you. A company commander
is not going to lose his job over dropping bombs and
accidentally--accidentally killing civilians, and he is scared
to drop those bombs.
That is what is happening right now. That is that
disconnect between an O-3 level and a four-star general level,
is that he is going to lose his job as a company commander if
he drops those bombs.
I think that is the disconnect going on right now. He is
allowed to have the air; he is told he has the air. Those
troops have that support, but he knows, if he kills civilians,
he is going to be immediately under investigation. And I think
that is a disconnect. I am not even asking you about----
General Petraeus. We have always investigated killings of
civilians, Congressman, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any time you
have anything like that happen, that is----
But we will underwrite--we will underwrite the actions of
our tactical level commanders when they are in circumstances
where they are decisively engaged and they must employ close
air support or any form of indirect fire or attack helicopters
or what have you.
Now, we have got to reinforce our efforts to make sure that
everyone understands the intent of the tactical directive. And
I will agree with you that--on that very much. One reason we
have given OPCON [operational control] of all these different
forces to General McChrystal is to ensure that there is
absolute clarity on who it is that is in charge and who is
indeed giving these orders.
So I agree with you in that sense. I think it is crucially
important that, again, the intent of the tactical directive be
understood, which, as I mentioned up front, there is never
anyone who is denied the right of self-defense. And if they are
in trouble, we are going to provide the forces to ensure they
get out of trouble.
But there do have to be considerations where you are not in
desperate trouble to make sure that, again, innocent civilians
aren't killed in the course of action--and I know you
understand that, having served down-rank in that kind of
situation.
Mr. Hunter. I understand. I have one last question, a
totally different thing. But just please be aware that there is
a disconnect----
General Petraeus. I am, got it.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. As a lieutenant compared to a
four-star----
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. There is disconnect in the way
that things are implemented, right?
The second one is, I was able to talk to General Paxton
yesterday, Jay Paxton, and Dr. Carter. And I asked them this.
Do we own any roads in Afghanistan?
When Operation ODIN [Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize]
started in Iraq, about six months after that, when it came to
IEDs going off, we could say that we owned some road. We could
say, hey, we own 50 kilometers here. We know the enemy are not
going to put in IEDs on these 50 roads because we are watching
it persistently with a revisit rate of 2 hours, and we know
that it takes longer than that to plant an IED; we own these
roads.
There was no answer for that about Afghanistan. We don't
know if we own any roads. So I am asking you, can we say that
we own IED-free 20 kilometers in Afghanistan? Thirty
kilometers?
General Petraeus. Well, I am sure there are stretches
that--where we have that--you know, I was the commander in
Iraq, of course.
Mr. Hunter. Right.
General Petraeus. And I am not sure I would have said that
we owned roads, per se, in the same fashion that you said that.
Again, I spent four years there. And I think I would be careful
how we characterized how we felt ownership of various roads.
And if you did not have an unblinking eye on a road, not a
revisit rate of two hours, these guys could--they dropped it
out of a vehicle, as you recall.
Mr. Hunter. They also----
General Petraeus. So again----
Mr. Hunter. They also dug them in with back hoes over a
period of six hours, right?
General Petraeus. That is different. That is a deep bury.
But, again, you could drop an IED, and these guys were very
good at that.
So, again, I would just be very careful how we characterize
that.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you----
General Petraeus. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me ask, before I go to the
next member, General McNabb, what percentage of the materiel is
flown into either Iraq or Afghanistan by air?
General McNabb. Mr. Chairman, we take in about 20 percent
of the materiel by air into Afghanistan because it is
landlocked. And we take all sensitive equipment, and anything
that is high-value, we take in by air.
M-ATVs is a good example. We take that in by air because we
have got to get it there to the troops as quickly as possible
because lives are at risk.
The Chairman. The other 80 percent is under the maritime
security program, by ship?
General McNabb. Sir, it either comes in from the northern
distribution network, which, as you mentioned, is by surface,
by ship and then by train and rail and then by trucks, or it
comes in by ships into Karachi and then comes up the Pakistan
LOC [Line of Communication].
So about 50 percent up the Pak LOC, about 30 percent---25
percent to 30 percent--coming from the northern distribution
network. And right now, we are in the middle of trying to get
more to go up to the northern distribution network, the
commercial-type stuff that we can take through there to free up
room on the Pak LOC to bring up the military equipment for the
surge.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your long, distinguished
service to our country. We appreciate that.
Mr. Conaway. Iran has appeared to have--not just their
nuclear weapons, but they appear to be adding to their arsenals
and capabilities across a pretty broad spectrum.
Do you see that as a prelude to some sort of an offensive
move that they might decide is in their best interest, assuming
we make the sanctions tough enough where life in Iran gets
really bad and the regime wants to try to use an offensive of
some sort in order to distract its people? Are you concerned
about that at all?
Well, I know you are concerned about it, but how concerned?
General Petraeus. Well, there is a number of things that we
are concerned about with respect to Iran and a number of other
countries in the region, as you know, Congressman.
But I--what I would--I don't think I would characterize it
quite as broadly as say that they are getting a ``offensive
capability,'' in the sense that we would think of, of a
conventional, say ground or air offensive.
The truth is their air forces are really not that good at
all, in part because of sanctions. In fact, there are some very
small countries in the Arabian Peninsula that have better air
forces than does Iran, but their missile forces have been built
up quite substantially. Their air defense forces have been
built up.
There are a variety of asymmetric types of threats that
they present, everything from suicide boats to the use of proxy
elements.
So, in fact, I think, as a broad characterization, what
they have been building is more of an asymmetric capability,
rather than a conventional offensive capability, as we know it.
Mr. Conaway. I guess I was thinking about the cruise
missile-like thing that they just----
General Petraeus. Yes. Again, that would be part of that
category of missile threats that they have built up
substantially and also have transferred some of that, of
course, to Lebanese Hezbollah and to others in the region.
Mr. Conaway. Yes. Your testimony, General Petraeus, page
12, you talk about cross-cutting challenges to security and
stability, list about 11 different deals. Are those in rank
order of your concern? And, if not, what would be the--say the
top three concerns that you have got in terms of this cross-
cutting----
General Petraeus. In fact, let me just ask someone if----
Mr. Conaway. Well, the first one is ``insufficient progress
toward a comprehensive Middle East peace,'' is the first.
General Petraeus. Yes. Again, I don't know that I would
rank order these as such----
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
General Petraeus. But that is certainly something that
forms the strategic context in which we operate. Again, there
is just a bunch of dynamics out there that we thought it would
be useful for the members to know, that, again, shape this
context within which we operate.
Mr. Conaway. Just for the record, would you--and for me to
back and rank order those, as to where you think the----
General Petraeus. I would be happy to do it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 157.]
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Kind of all into the----
General Petraeus. Sure.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Scheme?
A report out of Afghanistan, I think in January, by a
General Flynn, talked about a distinction between a distinction
between intelligence being used to target, which was very
extensive and is working really well, fortunately, versus a
broader intelligence array of information provided to our folks
on the ground that would allow them to win the hearts and
minds, for lack of a better phrase.
He cited a couple of good examples in there how it has
worked--a couple of Marine units, I think, that have shown
successes---dramatic drops in IEDs being planted, about real---
almost as if the Afghanis have taken on the--in their areas of
operation--the role of protecting themselves.
Visit with us a little bit about how that might be extended
across a broader area. Are you getting the intelligence that
you need?
General Petraeus. Well, if I could, again, put this in
context. When we conducted the strategic assessment part of
taking command of Central Command, we did this, and got that
back in a couple months.
And one of the revelations that came back--we had an awful
lot of folks that had served a fair amount of time in Iraq, a
number in the intelligence community. And they came back and
said, ``Boss, there is not anywhere near the same capability
nor the same capacity nor depth of understanding that was
developed in Iraq with respect to Afghanistan.''
And so, at local levels, and that is really what General
Flynn is getting at. This is about the human terrain,
understanding in a really granular fashion the dynamics of a
particular village, valley, tribal area, and so forth.
And so, he is exactly right, and our assessment came back
and said, ``We have got to do a lot to help build this up.''
And that--by the way, one of the initiatives was to send Major
General Flynn to Afghanistan to tackle some of this as the
leader of the intelligence community there.
It was also forming the Af-Pak [Afghanistan-Pakistan]
Center of Excellence at U.S. Central Command's Joint
Intelligence Center. It is the Af-Pak Hands program that SOCOM-
CENTCOM joint staff and those downrange participate in. And it
is literally just beefing up, substantially, all of the
different intelligence elements at the different levels.
And then, of course, just the sheer density of forces
results. As he noted, there was a point about platoon leaders
and others. That, in itself, gives you more knowledge, if you
capture it, and part of the challenge is to capture this so we
are not just refighting this year after year, as we rotate
units and leaders.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, General. Appreciate your being
here.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Texas.
Before I ask Mr. Wilson, General McNabb, let me ask you a
very basic question. Would you discuss and tell us the route of
the northern distribution network and also the route of any
seagoing supplies to either Iraq or Afghanistan, please?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. It is a network, and so there are
a number of routes. Up in the north, it goes through Riga in
Latvia. And it will come down through Russia to join up through
Kazakhstan into Uzbekistan.
We also have a Caucasus route that goes through the Black
Sea and goes through the port of Poti to Baku and then up to
Aktau and, again, through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, joining
that rail line to join up there.
Most recently, at General Petraeus' request, we actually
have a linkup from Turkey up to that same line, going through
the Caucasus, coming across. And, in fact, one of our carriers
is--has volunteered that they would come in to one of the ports
in Turkey and bring it up through Turkey, so that is another
addition to the network.
And, most recently, we have got interest in coming in from
Vladivostok, across Siberia, again coming down through
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
To the Pak bloc, the Pakistan, it all comes through
Karachi. Our carriers have done a superb job of, again, mixing
and matching and making sure that they have lots of options,
again, to support General Petraeus.
The good part there is there is competition between all of
these routes, and actually it has brought prices down because
it is a network. Because we don't want to depend on one, we
basically have said it is a network. And what we have found is
all those countries have said that it is in their interest to
have peace and stability in Afghanistan, and they have been
very helpful across the board.
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Generals, Admiral, thank you for being here today. I
particularly appreciate your service. I am the proud father of
two sons who have served in Iraq--one Army, one Navy--and I
just know of your leadership, and I am very, very grateful.
Additionally, I am very grateful my former National Guard
unit, the 218th, a mechanized infantry brigade of the South
Carolina National Guard, led by Major General Bob Livingston,
served for a year in Afghanistan. And all of you were so
helpful. And the people of South Carolina are so proud of their
success in working with the people of Afghanistan.
And, General McNabb, I have to point out that we are a
joint service family. My nephew has just completed his service
in the Air Force in Iraq. And so, thank all of you.
Additionally, I want to thank you for coordinating our
allies. I had breakfast this morning with the Defense Minister,
Jaroslav Baska, of Slovakia. And the people of Slovakia are so
proud of their service in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the Defense
Minister was pointing out that they are adding to their
commitment to ISAF.
And we appreciate countries, the new members of NATO, such
as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania.
As we are into the hearing today, something that I find
interesting, the new media really has made it possible for the
American people to know so much more about what is going on.
And, General Petraeus, a question was submitted via the
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] Republican Facebook, from
Jaysen--J-a-y-s-e-n of Los Angeles. And the question is, is the
civilian surge in Afghanistan having the desired effect? And
what additional civilian agency originations--USAID [United
States Agency for International Development], State,
Agriculture, Justice--are needed?
General Petraeus. Well, Congressman, Jaysen's asked a great
question. The civilian surge, if you will, to parallel the
military surge is certainly ongoing. I think it is--it has
almost tripled the number of civilians that were there, again
if you go back, say, to the end of 2008.
Each of the components that he has mentioned and a few
others--State, AID, Agriculture, I would add DOJ [Department of
Justice], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], virtually all
of the different elements engaged in the executive branch play
a part in this.
And for what it is worth, I know that Secretary Gates and
Chairman Mullen and I have been among the biggest champions for
actually beefing up those components of our executive branch
because, of course, if they can't do it, then in many cases
individuals in uniform end up doing it.
And that has been the case, as you know, because of
reductions in AID and so forth. An area, by the way, in which
we need to expand as well is this whole information operations
area of public diplomacy, as State puts it. And that is
something, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we are
working very closely with the Under Secretary, Judith McHale,
to do just that.
But the surge is ongoing. There is better partnership than
I think any of us have ever seen, particularly in Regional
Command-East [RC-East] of Afghanistan, where there is literally
a civilian counterpart for the regional commander, Major
General Scaparrotti, and, in fact, it is Dawn Liberi, a long
time she was working for CENTCOM, in fact, phenomenal AID
individual, and then, all the way down at the brigade levels
and so forth, as you work your way down.
That is crucial because, again, this is all about unity of
effort. That is why we have had these changes in command-and-
control arrangements as well. But on the civilian-to-military
side, that is critical also.
And a final note on that, Ambassador Holbrooke and I, in
fact, are going to chair a review of concept drill, back
briefed to us from the respective civilian and military
leadership of the U.S. elements in Afghanistan here in the
course of the next month or so.
Mr. Wilson. Well, again, thank you so much.
And, General McNabb, I am happy to see you. But I
particularly appreciate you brought Major Matt Dack with you.
He was a military fellow in our office, and an extraordinary
reflection on the competence and capabilities of the U.S. Air
Force.
With regard to the tanker bid, do you see an opportunity
for the KC-X to run an airlift or cargo capability?
General McNabb. Sir, absolutely.
I mean, the new tanker is my number one acquisition
priority. Whenever the committee asks what they could do, that
is---I need those new tankers. And it is for a lot of reasons,
but one of them is it is fuel over the fight, but it is multi-
modal, multi-purpose capability that will allow us to have
additional capability to move packs and cargo, especially with
defensive systems going into places that right now we would be
denied in the civil reserve air fleet.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina.
Admiral Olson, the 1208 program--I know it is supposed to
help you engage with partners in different parts of the globe.
Can you describe for us the sort of activities you undertake
for this program for the committee please?
Admiral Olson. Yes, Chairman Skelton. In order to describe
the specific actions themselves, we would have to go into
closed session. But the category of actions that 1208s support
are training and equipping surrogates and partners who are
liable because of their enhanced capabilities to relieve
American service members from having to perform certain
operational activities. It is an authority that--that is, for
which the United States--the Commander, United States Special
Operations Command is the senior recommender in terms of how
1208 funds should be expended.
It is currently a temporary authority. It is currently at
$40.0 million per year, and that is an authority and not an
appropriation. What it does is permit the Commander, Special
Operations Command, to reprioritize from within his own O&M
accounts to fund those activities.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Thank you very much for your testimony, for your fantastic
work, and please go back to your commands knowing that you have
our gratitude and our support.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 17, 2010
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March 17, 2010
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 17, 2010
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT
General Petraeus. The annual programmed cost to maintain the Afghan
National Security Forces at 305,600 is approximately 6.2 billion
dollars. Our aspirational goal of the Afghan National Security Forces
at a combined strength, which includes both the Afghan National Police
and the Afghan National Army, of 400,000 troops has an annual
programmed cost of approximately 10.3 billion dollars. [See page 18.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
General Petraeus. First it should be noted that the tactical
directive issued by General McChrystal, which is what I think we are
really talking about, is command guidance and not a change to the Rules
of Engagement. As such, no U.S. service-members have been charged for
violating the tactical directive. The tactical directive was never
intended as a punitive measure but rather as a positive measure to
focus commanders and troopers on protecting the Afghan people. It's not
a punitive order and was never intended to be. The tactical directive
has been an effective means of reducing civilian casualties, which is
not only a moral imperative but also a key to accomplishing our
mission. [See page 29.]
Admiral Olson. All three Navy SEALs belonged to SEAL Team 10
located in Little Creek, VA. At the time of the incident, they were
augmenting SEAL Team 7 who was on deployment in Iraq and fell under the
jurisdiction of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT).
The three SEALS were offered non-judicial punishment; they all
refused non-judicial punishment and they all demanded trial by court-
martial. It was only after the SEALS demanded trial by court-martial
that the Commander, SOCCENT referred special courts-martial charges.
Commander, SOCCENT is the Convening Authority for all three trials. In
all three cases, the accuser (the person who ``brings'' the charges
under the provisions of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice) was a
member of our uniformed forces.
Region Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic (located in Norfolk, VA)
is providing the Military Trial Counsels/Prosecutors.
Naval Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic (located in Norfolk, VA) is
providing detailed Military Defense Counsels. Additionally, all three
of the accused have retained their own civilian defense attorneys at no
expense to the government.
Trial dates:
U.S. v. Keefe 19-21 Apr 10 (Iraq)
U.S. v. Huertas 23-26 Apr 10 (Iraq)
U.S. v. McCabe 3 May 10 (Norfolk) [See page 29.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Admiral Olson. As of 26 MAR 2010, the percent of total SOF deployed
in CENTCOM AOR was 84.76%. The breakdown for Afghanistan, Iraq and
Pakistan are as follows:
AFG: 5,834
IZ: 4,544
PAK: 139 [See page 32.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
General Petraeus. My written posture statement lists categories of
cross-cutting issues that are major drivers of instability, inter-state
tensions, and conflict in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of
Responsibility (AOR). These factors can serve as root causes of
instability or as obstacles to security. They help describe the
strategic context of the region.
These categories are not listed in order of priority, nor should
they be thought of in this way. Because local conditions across the AOR
are complex and unique, it is more relevant to the prioritization of
our efforts to analyze and compare specific issues within a category of
issues than simply to compare the broad categories. Regarding the issue
of disputed territories, for instance, competing claims by several
Central Asian countries to parts of the Fergana Valley, though
important, do not serve as a catalyst for conflict nearly as much as
the competing claims over Kashmir by Pakistan and India do. In
addition, because these factors present greater challenges to security
wherever they are found in combination, it is more relevant to analyze
the major systems of conflict throughout the AOR, such as in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen, than to analyze specific cross-
cutting issues. As such, we assess the situation in the AOR by
disaggregating the problem set into sub-regional systems. This general
framework allows for the greatest specificity and rigor in analyzing
the threats to U.S. interests and delineating our priorities.
The posture statement clearly lists and describes our priorities in
the section immediately preceding the description of the cross-cutting
issues. Specifically, it is our assessment at CENTCOM that the most
serious threats to U.S. interests lay at the nexus of militant groups,
hostile states, and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we believe
that the greatest potential for these threats is found in the
instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the activities and policies of
the Iranian regime, the situation in Iraq, and the growth of Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. Reinforcing these points, the
statement goes on to describe the insurgencies in Afghanistan and
Pakistan as the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR and the
activities and policies of the Iranian regime as the major state-level
threats to regional stability. The challenges associated with these
sub-regional systems are our priorities at CENTCOM, and we devote the
overwhelming majority of our resources and energy to addressing them.
[See page 43.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 17, 2010
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADY
Mr. Brady. A recent news report stated that SOF units in
Afghanistan were being moved under Gen McCrystal's purview and control
due to civilian casualty numbers that exceeded those of other units.
Who were they previously reporting to? Wouldn't their reporting to a
chain other than that lead by the overall commander lead to a
divergence of effort and effect? My concern is not to witch-hunt the
SOF units or their judgment, but when so much of the success depends on
a continuity of focus providing a better alternative than the Taliban,
how can we not have unity of purpose and command for all of our forces
on the ground? There is certainly a great deal of strain on the SOF
units, and has been since 9/11. We have made great strides in
increasing the numbers of operators to alleviate this pressure. Another
step we can take is to shed some of the missions to the Army's more
streamlined Brigade Combat Teams. What missions can you see the regular
Army/Armed Forces taking, like indigenous troop training, theater
security cooperation, etc?
Admiral Olson. General McChrystal's new policy was a natural
outgrowth of his plans as the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
Commander to unify his command. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF)
deployed to Afghanistan have always operated under the tactical control
of the senior U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, currently USFOR-A
Commander (GEN McCrystal). All U.S. forces deployed to the USCENTCOM
Area of Operation had been under the operational control of the U.S.
Central Command's Special Operations Component or Special Operations
Command Central (SOCCENT). This recent change gives operational control
of all U.S. Marine and select SOF operating in Afghanistan to USFOR-A
Commander. Operational control gives the commander greater authority
and unity of effort among all his forces under his command.
We have been working closely with Joint Staff to ensure the
appropriate force is selected to support the mission. We routinely
validate force requests from Combatant Commands to determine whether
General Purpose Forces (GPF) or special operators are needed to support
the mission. Yes, there are missions that conventional forces could
assist/perform entirely. These missions include those involving basic
skills training and those that do not require specialized training,
language/cultural skills or special equipment. A number of these
missions can and are conducted by GPF, some of these missions include:
Training, Information Operations, and Reconnaissance. Security Force
Assistance (SFA) missions which encompass several host nation building
activities are also conducted by both GPF and SOF. Increasing SFA
capabilities within the Services will significantly help in reducing
the current demand on our special operations forces.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. General McNabb, as you know, I proudly
represent Fairchild Air Force Base, the tanker hub of the west. With
the springtime offensive in Afghanistan, the redeployment from Iraq,
and the humanitarian relief efforts around the world expanding to
include Haiti and Chile, what does the future of the tanker taskings
look like in the short and long term?
General McNabb. Fairchild Air Force Base continues to provide
world-wide air refueling in support of myriad operations, including
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Homeland Defense, and U.S. Pacific
Command requirements, to name a few. In support of OEF, Fairchild flew
357 tanker sorties in CY 2009 and 58 sorties in the first quarter of CY
2010. Given the surge of combat forces in Afghanistan, the potential
exists for increased tanker tasking.
In addition to Central Command operations, Fairchild also provides
support for multiple operations in the Pacific theater. U.S. Pacific
Command covers a vast geographical area of responsibility that requires
extensive air refueling capability for mission success. In CY 2009,
Fairchild flew 157 missions delivering over 3 million pounds of fuel in
support of U.S. Pacific Command. That support increased in the first
quarter of CY 2010 as 57 sorties delivered over 1 million pounds of
fuel.
Fairchild is a major player in the Homeland Defense mission, too.
Fairchild tankers flew 17 Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) sorties in CY
2009 and 42 sorties in the first quarter of CY 2010, providing a total
of 3,433,600 pounds of fuel to support the mission of securing the
skies above the Vancouver Olympic Games. With the exception of the air
refueling requirements supporting the Vancouver Olympics, during
January to March 2010, I anticipate the 2010 ONE requirement to mirror
requirements for 2009.
Priority 1 and 2 missions remain a key component in Fairchild's air
refueling mission. Priority 1 and 2 missions are categorized as
Presidential mission support, operational and strategic mission
support. Fairchild aircrews flew 802 Priority 1 and 2 tanker sorties in
CY 2009 and the first quarter of CY 2010, moving over 24 million pounds
of fuel.
Because of the constant requirement for their services, the
continuing high level of operations, and Fairchild's rock-solid
reliability, Fairchild's mission will remain vital to U.S.
Transportation Command for both the short term and long term. Please
convey my sincere thanks and appreciation to your constituents at
Fairchild Air Force Base.
The overall mission of the KC-135 will also continue to be vital to
U.S. strategic policy as a force extender, for both the short and long
term. Please bear in mind that replacement of our aging tanker fleet
remains my number one acquisition priority. Worldwide, KC-135 Priority
1 and 2 missions delivered over 284 million pounds of fuel and flew
8,476 sorties in CY 2009. The first quarter of CY 2010 shows the KC-135
is close to those worldwide numbers with 1,855 sorties delivering over
54 million pounds of fuel. These U.S. Air Force tankers support all of
our military services, as well as providing air refueling support to
our international partners. They are a potent symbol of America's
ability to reach out anywhere, at anytime.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. How has the delayed KC-X acquisition process
impacted your ability to perform your missions?
General McNabb. While we are meeting current operational
requirements in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, we
are doing so at a higher mobilization rate of Air Force Reserve Command
(AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) KC-135s due to aircraft
availability and reliability rates. Furthermore, decreasing aircraft
availability in the KC-135 fleet impacts our ability to meet full war
plan requirements. This impact will likely increase if the fielding of
the KC-X continues to slip. As with any aging airframe, there is also
an increasing risk of having an unknown structural issue that could
impact the entire KC-135 fleet.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ELLSWORTH
Mr. Ellsworth. In his recent report to Congress on the deployment
of non-lethal weapons, the Secretary of Defense indicated that each
Service is providing escalation of force tools and capabilities
training to its forces prior to their deployment. Unfortunately, the
report offered no information on types of escalation of force equipment
warfighters are being trained for, the duration of that training, or
assessments of how these tools are being used in theater. Can you
please provide for the record, information on the types of non-lethal
weapons/escalation of force tools on which each service is training,
the hours committed to that training, and an assessment of how those
tools are being deployed by each service branch in Afghanistan and
Iraq?
General Petraeus. The specific types of non-lethal weapons/
escalation of force tools, training, and detailed assessment of their
deployment are best answered by the Services as they are the force
providers responsible for providing trained and equipped forces to meet
Combatant Command requirements. In the USCENTCOM AOR, Air Force, Army
and Marines employ non-lethal weapons/tools at Entry Control Points
(ECP), around Forward Operating Bases (FOB), and at air bases. Marines
and Army additionally employ non-lethal weapons and tools during convoy
operations, and at deliberate or hasty checkpoints. All Services use
non-lethal weapons/tools for dismounted patrols, crowd control, general
protection, and for Detention Operations.
These non-lethal weapons/tools include visual aids such as orange
safety vests and cones, portable and hand-held high-intensity light
sets, red flashing lights, traffic paddles, pen flares, and DOD-
approved green dazzling lasers. They also include acoustic hailing
devices with phaselator/voice translators, and several types of non-
lethal munitions to include 12 gauge, 40MM, and compressed air
paintball marking rounds. We generally assess that non-lethal weapons/
tools are effectively deployed to and employed by most units and
troops, and the number of troops employing them is increasing with each
unit rotation. However; there is a requirement for continued
development and training of these weapons/tools to improve their
effectiveness and reliability.
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