[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-124]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 24, 2010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-171 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the
GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Liz Drummond, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 24, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request from the Department of the
Navy........................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 24, 2010..................................... 47
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' A Representative From
California, Ranking Member, Committee On Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps....... 8
Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy........................... 4
Roughead, Adm. Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Conway, Gen. James T......................................... 99
Mabus, Hon. Ray.............................................. 55
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 53
Roughead, Adm. Gary.......................................... 75
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 121
Mr. Skelton.................................................. 121
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Akin..................................................... 126
Mr. Hunter................................................... 131
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 130
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................ 130
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 125
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 125
Mr. Wilson................................................... 128
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services
Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010
budget request for the United States Navy and Marine Corps.
Appearing before the committee the Honorable Ray Mabus,
Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval
Operations [CNO]; and General James T. Conway, Commandant,
United States Marine Corps.
Now, Mr. Secretary, we note that this is your first time
testifying before our full committee, and we welcome you--and
Admiral Roughead.
General Conway, thank you for your continued service, and
thank you for the service of those that serve with you, and
under you.
Today the United States Navy has 194 ships under way. Of
those 143 are deployed. These numbers equate to over 53,000
sailors deployed in support of the Navy's missions worldwide.
To support combat operations, the Navy has 15,600 individual
augmentees deployed in the CENTCOM [United States Central
Command] area of responsibility.
The United States Marine Corps is almost 30,000 Marines
deployed. A little over 15,000 Marines are on the ground in
Afghanistan. Many of those are currently engaged in hostile
combat in and around the town of Marjah in the Helmand
Province.
I am sure I speak for all members of our Committee when I
say that our thoughts and prayers are with all the deployed
sailors and Marines, with their families, and with particular
concern for those Marines who are currently engaged in the
combat operations.
And I have said this before, but it bears repeating. Our
sea services are this nation's fast response force. The Navy
power base is maneuvered from the sea. Marine Corps is and
should remain an amphibious assault force and a crisis aversion
force.
Current operations over the last seven years have stressed
our Marine Corps, and fashioned them to more the medium-heavy
ground combat force. And I am a bit concerned about that.
We remain committed to provide our sailors and Marines with
equipment they need to accomplish the task before them. There
are challenges. The Navy must recapitalize the main battle
fleet to numbers which can support the COCOM's [Unified
Combatant Command's] requirements. The 30-year Shipbuilding
Plan submitted with the budget request only partially
accomplishes this task. I will repeat that, only partially
accomplishes this task. From that plan it appears the costs
associated with replacing the Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine is so high that efforts to restore numbers in the
surface force and the attack submarine force may have to be
sacrificed to pay for the national strategic deterrence mission
of the ballistic missile submarine.
Shipbuilding plans don't address the requirement of a 38-
ship force of amphibious assault ships. At best the
shipbuilding plan provides a force of amphibious ships in the
low 30s. And it seems to me that might be an unacceptable risk.
And I am sure that our Committee will carefully review this
proposed Navy shipbuilding plan.
I am very concerned about the looming strike fighter
shortfall in Navy aviation. In short, I don't understand why
the F/A-18 Strike Fighter program has not been extended. By any
analysis, more Navy and Marine Corps fighters will be needed to
meet validated inventory requirements by the middle of the
decade. Delays in the Joint Strike Fighter Program only
exacerbate the problem of a near-term strike fighter shortfall.
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to be challenged in
maintenance and recapitalization. I am pleased to see an
increase in the Navy's request for operation and maintenance
funds. I note that in Admiral Roughead's response to the
ranking member's request for the Navy unfunded priority list,
the CNO lists spare parts and deferred maintenance as his three
most vital shortfalls.
Year over year deferred maintenance seems to pile up. If we
cannot seem to find the funding to maintain our ships and our
planes and our equipment, I am deeply concerned about the
additional cost of replacing them prior to the end of their
expected life service.
Deployments have always been a part and parcel to sea
service. That happens every day. Sea services have always lived
in a reality of deployment. Reset, retraining, redeployment.
And I have been very concerned that the average Navy deployment
cycle has gradually increased from a traditional 6-month
deployment with an 18-month maintenance and retraining period
to deployments averaging 8 months with comparable reduction in
the maintenance and retraining period.
The stress on the force, frankly, is increasing. I would
like to address the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa. It
is essential that we preserve the unique strategic relationship
that exists between Japan and our country. At the same time it
is imperative that we reduce our force structure in Okinawa and
retain the strategic capabilities associated with the third
Marine Expeditionary Force.
While I understand the desire of the new government of
Japan to review the current basing agreements, we need to move
forward with the overall realignment that includes a
replacement facility and the Guam relocation.
In the end we need to ensure that the Marine Corps and the
supporting communities are in a better position.
We need to get this move right. We can't go back and undo a
mistake.
And now I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, the
gentleman from California, Buck McKeon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, good
morning. Welcome.
In particular, General, with your forthcoming retirement, I
guess this is your last posture hearing. I am sure you have
been looking forward to this with mixed emotion.
We look forward to all of your testimony here today. And
really appreciate your service and what you do for the country,
and your leadership.
The President's Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget for the
Department of the Navy requests $179.1 billion for
discretionary and war funding. According to the Defense
Department, this represents an increase of $5.2 billion over
fiscal year 2010 enacted levels.
From what I gather in the press, the three of you deserve a
significant amount of credit for your advocacy for Navy and
Marine Corps personnel and programs.
However, I am concerned that the Department's [of Defense]
efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR [Quadrennial
Defense Review] and the out-year budget is shortsighted, and
puts the Department on the wrong path for the next 20 years.
While the QDR states that U.S. forces must be able to
deter, defend against and defeat aggression in anti-access
environments, neither the Department of the Navy's fiscal year
2011 budget request, nor the long-term shipbuilding or aviation
plans appear to make significant long-term investments in the
capabilities that would be required to achieve that goal.
We have previously received testimony that the QDR and the
fiscal year 2011 budget proposed a number of new initiatives
designed to provide robust capabilities for tomorrow's force,
such as a new SSBN [Nuclear-Powered Submersible Ship with
Ballistic Capability] submarine, the F-35 ballistic missile
defense, the Virginia-class attack submarine.
While I agree that investments in these areas are
necessary, they are neither sufficient, nor do they tell the
full story.
For example, the decision to fund the new SSBN submarine
from within the Navy's shipbuilding procurement account could
decimate the shipbuilding program in the out-years because the
new SSBN will cost at least $7 billion, or close to half of the
Navy's recent ship construction budgets. The F-35 program
continues to experience developmental delays that only
exacerbate the Navy and Marine Corps' strike fighters'
shortfall. Yet the QDR and the budget request do nothing to
rectify this situation.
We are building two Virginia-class attack subs per year
starting in fiscal year 2011. Yet the shipbuilding plan we just
received has our force falling to 39 by 2030, leaving our
combatant commanders worse off than they are now.
The proposed regional missile defense architecture relies
on the Navy's surface combatants. Nevertheless, the
shipbuilding plan proposes a smaller surface combatant fleet
than the last plan did. I need not go on. I am hopeful that you
can provide further insights for this committee to help us
understand how the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget reflect
a comprehensive approach to providing the capabilities the Navy
and Marine Corps will need in the future.
Lastly, the President has asked Congress to consider a
major personnel policy change that could affect readiness.
Therefore, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, I will be
requesting your views on whether the current law prohibiting
the service of openly gay men and women should be repealed, and
on the suggestion that a moratorium on implementing current law
be put into effect while the Department of Defense studies and
reviews the issue.
I am disappointed that the decision has been made not to
let the service chiefs testify before the military personnel
subcommittee's hearings on ``don't ask, don't tell.'' That
decision limits the ability of members to fully understand and
explore the concerns of the service chiefs about a repeal of
current law. I would hope that we could continue that
discussion.
Once again, I thank you for being here today. I look
forward to your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that my full
opening statement be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection it will be.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. McKeon. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, members
of this committee, it is a real pleasure to be here today
before the House Armed Services Committee. The CNO, the
Commandant, and I are grateful for the commitment that the
members of this committee have shown to our men and women in
uniform in the Navy and the Marine Corps. We are exceptionally
proud to be here today representing our sailors, Marines,
civilians, and their families.
The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable
expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of global
operations across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today, as the
Chairman noted, 40 percent of our forces are deployed and over
half the fleet is at sea.
In Helmand province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000 Marines
are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency, and engagement
operations, including the effort to clear the Taliban
stronghold of Marjah.
They are supported there by naval aircraft flying close air
support from Eisenhower [USS Dwight D. Eisenhower], and from
our forward-deployed expeditionary aviation assets. A total of
more than 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and across the broader Middle East, and another
9,000 sailors and Marines are embarked on our ships at sea.
Off the coast of Africa, ships are protecting international
commerce off Somalia, and ships are operating as partnership
stations with our regional allies. Off the coast of South
America more ships are stemming the flow of illegal narcotics
into the United States. Our ballistic missile defense forces
are ready to defend against any threat to international peace
in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim.
Our forward-deployed forces continue their role as a
strategic buffer and deterrent against rogue regimes and
potential competitors alike. And in Haiti, nine ships and 1,900
Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit continue to
provide humanitarian aid, disaster relief and medical
assistance.
The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and
everywhere the nation's interests are at stake. Our global
presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us
to rapidly respond to any crisis that borders a sea. I believe
that the President's fiscal year 2011 budget for the Department
of the Navy is a carefully considered request that gives us the
resources we need to conduct effective operations and to meet
all the missions we have been assigned.
Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with the
findings of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in today's
wars, preventing conflict, preparing for future wars, and
preserving the force.
With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue
to maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a
strong American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for
rapid global response.
Across the 5 years we have requested the funds to build an
average of 10 ships a year, including one carrier, one big-deck
amphib, 10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 Littoral Combat
Ships.
We will leverage the technologies captured from the
canceled CGX [Next Generation Cruiser] program, and truncated
DDG-1000 [Zumwalt-Class Destroyer] program, into what will
become the Flight III Burke-class DDGs. These technologies
include SPY-3 [AN/SPY-3 radar] and the air and missile defense
radar.
Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase
the size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In
our shipbuilding program I believe we have made the most cost-
effective decisions to achieve the most capable force. One that
achieves equal flexibility to confront missions across the
spectrum of conflict, from the technically complex, like
ballistic missile defense and integrated air defense, to low-
intensity humanitarian response and regional engagement.
In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000
aircraft across the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program],
including both fixed and rotary wing. Over the next year, the
Navy and Marine Corps will continue to move ahead with changes
to our acquisition process in compliance with the Weapons
System Acquisition Reform Act. We are aggressively developing
our acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget
becomes standard for the Navy and Marine Corps.
I am grateful for the support of this committee for the
decision to recompete the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] program
when it failed to meet program standards. I can assure you that
we will not hesitate to recompete or cancel other programs
whenever substandard performance demands change.
Change is also required to address the way in which the
Navy and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is
an issue of national security, and it is essential to
maintaining our strategic advantage, our warfighting readiness,
and our tactical edge.
By 2020, I have committed the Navy to generate half of all
the energy we use from alternative sources. This is an
ambitious goal. Nothing has ever been accomplished without
taking some bold steps. Forty years ago I stood watch on the
deck of the USS Little Rock as a very young junior officer.
Today, I have the solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf
of our Navy and Marine Corps in a time of war and national
challenge.
I am honored by the trust the President and the Congress
have placed in me, and fully recognize the solemn obligation I
have to those who defend us. I, along with the CNO and the
Commandant, look forward to hearing your thoughts and answering
your questions that you have concerning our budget requests,
our programs, our policies. I also look forward to working
closely with you as we move forward to sustain the Navy and
Marine Corps as the most formidable expeditionary fighting
force in the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you, and we think you
are off to a great start.
Admiral Roughead, please.
STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Skelton,
Congressman McKeon, members of the committee, it is indeed my
honor to before you again representing the more than 600,000
sailors and Navy civilians.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 65,000 of them are
deployed, 12,000 on land in the Central Command Area of
Operations, and 56 percent of our fleet is underway, carrying
out our maritime strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review.
They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building
partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently
patrolling under the sea in every ocean, and providing
ballistic missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, Western Pacific,
and Eastern Mediterranean, with pride and determination.
They are even deployed on the first Littoral Combat Ship
two years ahead of schedule. And in the first week of that
ship's deployment, she seized over a quarter of a ton of
cocaine in the Caribbean. As our sailors and Navy civilians who
make all things possible, and thanks to your support, we made
important progress in building tomorrow's Navy, remaining ready
to fight today and supporting our sailors and Navy civilians
and families last year.
This year's budget submission will take us even further. As
the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have
stabilized end strength and the tone of the force remains
positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness
programs and medical and social services for our wounded
warriors. Indeed, for all who serve.
For our fleet as a continuously deployed force, we must
continue to reset in stride, conducting regular maintenance and
training so that our ships and aircraft reach their expected
service lives. This year's budget aligns our baseline budget
for operations and maintenance accordingly, and reflects a
significant shift away from supplemental funding. I strongly
request your support for this important change.
While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to
reach our procurement of more than 313 ships. Last year, we
commissioned 9 ships, and over the next decade our plan
procures an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth
for the near term.
For aviation, I remain committed to bringing new
capabilities online, the Joint Strike Fighter and unmanned
aircraft, and maintaining the readiness of our current Naval
Air Force, all of which give our nation flexibility and
response, unencumbered by overseas basing. Affordability for
all our plans will remain fundamental to our decisions. The
effectiveness of our unmanned systems, ships, and aircraft is a
feature of the systems which connect them.
Last year, I brought information capabilities and resources
under a single Information Dominance Directorate within the
Navy staff, and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th Fleet,
and I see the benefits of that change every day.
I am proud of our Navy's accomplishments last year, and I
am confident we can achieve even more with this year's budget
submission. Our risk continues to trend toward significant, and
achieving the right balance, within and across, my priorities
remains critical to mitigating it. But I remain optimistic
because of the outstanding sailors and Navy civilians and the
spirit of our nation.
We have seen more challenging times and emerged prosperous,
secure, and free. I ask you to support our 2011 budget request,
and thank you for all you do to make the United States Navy a
global force for good, today and into the future.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in
the Appendix on page 75.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very, very much.
General Conway, there is a lot of hard work left between
now and the time we bid farewell to you. Carry on in the
future. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to report to you on the posture of your Marine
Corps. My pledge, as it has been over the years, is to provide
you today a candid and honest assessment.
Having recently returned from a trip to theatre, I am
pleased to report to you on the magnificent performance of
Marines and sailors in combat. If you count a full-year
enlistment as a generation of Marines, we are now experiencing
our third generation of great young patriots since our nation
was provoked on 9/11.
The first generation broke trail, leading the strikes into
Afghanistan and Iraq. Our second generation quelled the once-
volatile province of Anbar. Today there are less than 175
Marines in Iraq, but our third generation has more than 15,000
serving in Afghanistan.
The Marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy,
but with the Afghan security forces, they are once again
proving they are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold
of Helmand. Let me assure you from what SAR [Sergeant] Major
and I have witnessed firsthand, the highest morale in the Corps
resides in those units posted in Afghanistan.
My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot
of the Corps and describes our near-term focus, our long-term
priorities, and our vision of the future. That vision matches
closely the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. The
Secretary of Defense seeks to create a U.S. military more
closely focused on hybrid threats, yet capable of responding to
a major contingency. That combination essentially describes the
Marine Corps that we have built today.
A Corps that we call a two-fisted fighter, able to perform
equally well in a counterinsurgency, or in a high-intensity
combined arms fight. Our resource expenditures, moreover,
reflect our dual or swing capacity. That is to say that 100
percent of Marine Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid
conflict or in a major fight.
Equivalent procurement is indeed our primary concern as we
look at the fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our
requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan, and our
resolve to reestablish our maritime pre-positions quadrants,
have driven equipment stocks to an all-time low in our
operating forces at home station.
The ability to properly train for a deployment, and
certainly the ability to respond to an unexpected contingency
is at significant risk, based on this increasing shortfall.
Congress has promised to resource us for a reset in
constitution, but increasingly, we cannot wait for the guns to
fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask
for your help in this critical area.
Our military construction accounts in the fiscal year 2011
budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain the promise
we have made to our Marines that they will have quality living
spaces at home between deployments. One need only visit some of
our major bases and stations to realize that we waited too long
to begin this effort.
Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue
a heavy emphasis on education of our officers and staff NCOs
[Non Commissioned Officers]. A strong reservoir of strategic
and operational thinkers is a must on sophisticated joint and
combined battlefields. Therefore, a quality Marine Corps
University with facilities to match our already world-class
student body, faculty, and curriculum is a major priority. We
trust we will receive your full support in our MILCON [Military
Construction] investments that will repay huge dividends in the
years to come.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own
surprise that our Corps of Marines and their families have
remained so resilient over these nine years of conflict. They
have been incredibly determined, loyal, and courageous in an
effort to see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the
credit goes to you in the Congress for providing them with the
finest in equipment, warrior care, quality of life for our
families, and compensation.
The number one question in the minds of our troops is
always: Is the country behind us? The members of Congress have
answered that question in spades, both by your apportionment of
the nation's precious resources, but also through personal
efforts to visit troops in theatre, and those who are wounded
at Bethesda and Walter Reed.
As a result of all the above, and the natural tendency for
Marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and
retention are at all-time highs. I predict that for the second
year in a row we will close out reenlistment opportunities for
first-term and career force Marines at the halfway point of the
fiscal year. Clearly, such a phenomenon would not be possible
if Marines and their families were not happy in the service of
their country.
One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic
extremists will be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a
second land army and gladly rejoin our Navy brothers aboard
amphibious ships in order to project America's global presence,
demonstrate American good will, and if need be, protect
America's vital interests.
Until that day comes, however, your Corps will continue, as
we say, to do windows. That is, we will continue to take aboard
the indomitable youth of America and make them Marines with the
absolute conviction that as a result they will one day be
better citizens. We will be trained and as equally prepared to
rout Taliban fighters in Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered
Haitians outside Port-au-Prince. With your continued support
and that of our loyal countrymen, we will do whatever the
nation asks us to do and do it exceedingly well.
Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in
the Appendix on page 99.]
The Chairman. General, thank you very much. I think that
all of us, and I know I speak for all the members of the
committee, when I say we are immensely proud of the young men
and young women who wear your uniforms, we are immensely proud
and thankful for their families and the reflection of the high
state of morale of which you gentlemen spoke.
I have been blessed to be in the Congress several years,
and I remember very well President Ronald Reagan aiming for a
600-ship Navy. That was a very worthy goal at the time. Today,
we haven't even reached his halfway mark on that goal. We don't
even have 300 ships out there.
The oceans haven't gotten any smaller. Technology has
gotten a lot better and one of the arguments is we don't need
as many ships. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we have
enough presence to make a difference, much less an ability to
fight. How do you, Mr. Secretary, speed up your suggested
building and numbers rate? We need to know.
Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, we have today, as you
pointed out, 285 ships in our battle fleet and more than half
of them are underway today. We are very cognizant of the fact
that our force structure requirement of 2005 said that 313
ships are a floor and it is a floor that both the CNO and I
recognize and need to build to get to that level.
We think that the 5-year shipbuilding plan and the longer
30-year shipbuilding plan that we have submitted on this
budget, which builds an average of 10 ships a year, 50 ships
over this 5-year period, drives us toward that goal. By 2020,
we will have reached the goal of more than 313 ships in the
Navy.
We think it is important to note as you did that these
ships that we are building today are incredibly capable,
incredibly technologically advanced and crewed by the best
sailors and Marines that we have ever had, but at some point
quantity becomes a quality all its own. And as you pointed out,
the oceans haven't gotten any smaller and we do need to make
sure that we are driving to increase the size of our fleet. And
we believe that the budget that we have submitted to you and
the shipbuilding plan that we have submitted to you do both of
those things.
The Chairman. One of the problems that we faced a few years
ago and it was a surprise to my friend, Mr. Taylor, the
Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, and as well to me, the
retirement list of ships wasn't even made known to us
officially. Of course, that was long before anyone sitting at
the table here had any say on it.
But a good part of it is the possibility of reviewing the
retirement list and maybe we can get some more work out of some
of these ships and help with the numbers. And as you have so
correctly noted, quantity has a quality of its very own. I
charge you with carefully deciding what ships should be with,
should be on the retirement list.
General, let me ask you the fact that so many Marines
today, the whole generation of Marines actually, find
themselves fighting as Army soldiers in a desert? What will
that do to the Marine culture of future years?
General Conway. Sir, as I said in the opening statement, we
consider ourselves a multicapable force and therefore available
to do whatever the nation would ask us to do. And, of course,
as you note correctly, over the past 8 or 9 years, we have been
asked to serve as a second land army alongside our brothers in
the United States Army. Our gear has begun to, has accomplished
the protection that is required and in the process has gotten
heavier.
We are a long way from salt sea air and our comfort zones
as a naval force and yet, I would argue that we are doing it
pretty well. That is not to say we want to continue to do it
when the need is gone. We see the great value that we offer to
the nation. We see our niche within the organization of the
armed forces being just what you described in your opening
statement and that is a naval force capable of extending
America's presence and protecting our vital interests overseas.
We have distinctly in our plans thought processes that will
shed us of some of this heavier equipment, examine in detail
what the amphibious lift, what the STRATCOM [United States
Strategic Command] aviation lift would look like for rapid
deployment and that is the Marine Corps we intend to be in the
future.
The Chairman. Admiral Roughead, what worries you the most
as you sit there this morning?
Admiral Roughead. What worries me the most, Mr. Chairman,
as I look to the future as is insuring, as you pointed out in
your statement, that as we get into what I consider to be the
midterm of our shipbuilding plan that we have taken a good look
at the costs associated with the replacement for the Ohio-class
submarine and then the numbers of ships that were procured in
significant numbers by class in the 80s as they reached the end
of their service lives and the recapitalization that will be
required for that.
But that is beyond the scope of this budget that we have
submitted, but as I look to the future and think about the
issues my successors will deal with, that is what I think
about.
The Chairman. Can we take that decision on the new Ohio-
class submarine down the road in favor of additional numbers of
ships, other types of ships? Because you don't really need it
until 10, 12, 15 years out.
Admiral Roughead. No, sir. I think we have to be moving on
that ship right now. The reason being is that that submarine
will--the last submarine of the Ohio-class replacement--will
come off of its last patrol in 2080. And the need to put in the
types of systems and capabilities to take that ship out to that
period of time requires significant thought and development and
now is the time to start.
It is absolutely consistent with where we have been with
the Ohio class and I believe now is the time to be moving on
that and I appreciate the support for that.
The Chairman. You understand our concern about ship
numbers, do you not?
Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I deal with the
demands that we have coming in on a daily basis and I do
believe that what we have done in the last couple of years to
get some direction and stability in what I consider to be a
workhorse of the fleet, the Arleigh Burke class, getting that
line restarted is absolutely critical to field any capabilities
we need getting to the downselect on Littoral Combat Ship is
going to allow us to build those in the most affordable way.
So I believe that this program that we have put together
addresses the numbers in the best way.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Roughead and
General Conway, in your personal view, should the current law
prohibiting the service of openly gay men and women be repealed
and what is your personal view with regard to the suggestion
that a moratorium on implementing the current law be put into
effect while the Department of Defense studies and reviews the
issue taking place?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. McKeon, my personal view is what is
in the best interest of the United States Navy. And that is to
go forward with the assessment that has been called for by the
Secretary of Defense to allow us to assess the force that we
have today. There are a lot of bits of information and surveys
that have taken place, but there has never really been an
assessment of the force that serves. And equally important to
that force is the opinions of the families who support that
force.
That needs to be done because only with that information
can we talk about the force that we have, not someone else's,
not another country's--about the United States Navy in my case.
So we need to proceed down that path. With regard to a
moratorium, I believe that it would be extremely confusing to
the force and I do not recommend that.
Thank you.
General Conway. Sir, our commander in chief has spoken and
the Secretary of Defense has devised a way through a working
group to examine the data, I think, in a way that has never
been done and I support his efforts and we will contribute to
that effort as it goes down range. However, I would encourage
your work, mine and that of the working group to be focused on
a central issue and that is the readiness of the armed forces
of the United States to fight this nation's wars.
That is what our armed forces are intended to do. That is
what they have been built to do under the current construct and
I would argue that we have done a pretty good job bringing that
to pass. So my concern would be if somehow that central purpose
and focus were to become secondary to the discussion because
that is what your armed forces is all about.
Mr. McKeon. And the moratorium?
General Conway. Sir, in terms of the moratorium, I agree
with the CNO. Our commanders out in the field are trying to
execute the guidance to the absolute best of their abilities.
There is an expression we have, keep it simple. I would
encourage you either to change the law or not, but in the
process half measures, I think, will only be confusing in the
end.
Mr. McKeon. Thanks very much. Admiral, as I alluded to in
my opening statement, I remain concerned that the QDR's focus
on today's wars is precluding the department from making the
investments that are required for our long-term national
security interests. Let me provide a specific example.
The committee has been briefed that the far-term planning
period in the long-range shipbuilding plan is characterized
from 2031 to 2040. It is characterized by the emergence of a
near-peer competitor. While one may debate whether a near-peer
competitor could emerge sooner than that, it is reasonable to
assume that the threat of a peer competitor, particularly one
with significant anti-access capabilities, would increase the
Navy's reliance on large surface combatants, attack and guided
missile submarines and amphibious ships.
Unfortunately, our force structure assumes the greatest
risk in these exact platforms during this period. Large surface
combatant force levels decrease from a high of 96 to a
sustained low of 60 in the 60s and 70s. Attack submarines
decrease from a high of 55 to 39 with sustained low levels in
the low 40s during that period. Cruise missile submarines,
which also provide significant capabilities for special forces,
disappear entirely. Amphibious ships sustained lows in the--of
29 and 30--10 percent below the limit of acceptable risk for
these forces, and over 30 percent below the current
requirement.
In your professional assessment are you confident that this
force could deter or defeat at low to moderate risk a near-peer
competitor with access capability? And if not, please
characterize the risk that you see to our national security?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. And
as I look at the force that we have laid out--the force that
exists today, and particularly the force that is addressed by
the budget that is being submitted--I do believe that even
though there is much talk and discussion about focusing on the
wars that we are in--I will tell you that the United States
Navy is all in, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, and in that
critical area.
But at the same time I think it is noteworthy that we have
increased our submarine production to two submarines a year.
And the Virginia class is out--deployed. It is a terrific
submarine. We are moving forward, as I said, with the ballistic
missile defense--or the ballistic missile submarine. The
advances and the investments that we are making with regard to
ballistic missile defense in our surface combatants is exactly
the type of capability that we are going to need in integrated
air and missile defense. Not just for ballistic missiles, but
against the cruise missile threat.
Taking some of the technologies that we will prove in the
DDG-1000. Coupling that with the direction that we are going
with our ballistic missile force, and the Arleigh Burke class,
and in our cruisers, I believe we will then be able to better
inform the next surface combatant that will address those
challenges that are out there in the future.
In aviation we have to get to the Joint Strike Fighter. It
is an incredible capability. And in this budget, I am extremely
pleased with what we have been able to do with unmanned
systems. Particularly the demonstration that we are moving
forward with the unmanned carrier airborne system. That is also
going to inform us about that time period that you are talking
about there. That is going to be extremely important to us. And
we need to be able to continue that demonstration project.
And in the area of cyber that is not so much hardware, but
the reorganization that we have made this past year in the
Navy, and the stand-up of the 10th fleet, allows us to get into
that battle space if you will. And that battle space is going
to become equally important as that which is kinetic.
So I do believe that we are laying in the right types of
capabilities that we are going to need for the future.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you. Understanding that technological
advances will benefit both our forces, and those of a potential
peer competitor in the interim, would you be in a better
position with those--with this proposed force structure than
you are today if you had more cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines in the force?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. McKeon, we are ramping up our
ballistic missile defense capability, not just in the building
of the new DDG-51 restarts, but also going back in. And the
beauty of the weapons system that we currently have is that it
allows us to modify the current ships so that they are BMD
[Ballistic Missile Defense]-capable. We are also adding to our
missile inventory in that regard.
With respect to submarines, we are meeting all of the
critical requirements that the COCOMs have levied on us. And I
see the benefit of what our submarines are doing every day
around the world. I have the privilege of being debriefed by
the young commanders as they come back in. And our submarine
force is meeting the critical requirements of the COCOMs, and
doing it exceedingly well.
Mr. McKeon. Well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I
think the three of you have done an outstanding job, given the
limits of the top line for the Navy and the Marines. I am just
concerned that the top line isn't what we need. And so I think,
as the Secretary said earlier to us, that our numbers look good
for the few years ahead. But in the out-years it is a fantasy.
Not you, Secretary, Secretary Gates.
And I think that that is a concern that we all need to be
really aware of. I think that there are probably areas where we
can save money. But even in our best efforts, I think we are
still not getting all that we need to protect us in--out into
the future. So thank you again for all that you are doing, and
I appreciate it.
Yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Before I call Mr. Ortiz--Admiral, as we speak today, how
many sailors do you have in either Iraq or Afghanistan doing
Army type of work?
Admiral Roughead. Right now, Mr. Chairman, we have 12,000
sailors on the ground in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And around
6,000 of them are doing things that are not necessarily within
what we would consider our core or adaptive core capabilities.
The Chairman. In other words, they are doing Army work?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. They are working as--in support
of our ground forces. They are doing extraordinary work I might
add. And we benefit from that experience as well. Because that
time that they spend in the fight, on the ground with other
services--when they come back into the Navy, they bring
perspectives, they bring leadership experiences. And
observations on ways of doing things that they otherwise
wouldn't have.
And I am also very pleased that they promote at a higher
rate than those who have not had this experience.
The Chairman. Thank you. And we now go to the 5-minute
rule.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, I want
to thank you all for the great service that you have given to
our country. And thank you so much for joining us today. I just
have a few questions for all of you on the subject of wind
farms, and military readiness.
My district in South Texas trains half of the Navy and
Marine Corps pilots in the country. And you can imagine that I
am so proud of these young men and women. And I want to make
sure that I do everything within my power to provide them the
best training facilities in the country.
Now multiple wind farms have emerged in my district--and
God knows we need all the energy we can get--in very close
proximity to my two Naval air training bases. These wind farms
are impacting the use of radar throughout the district, and
forcing changes in training routes. And interfering with air
defense radars. And this is what I hear.
And I understand that this same issue is also impacting
other Naval installations. My concern is not with the
development of the wind farm energy. But rather the negative
impact that these wind farms have on our military readiness.
Now I wonder what is the Navy doing to ensure that these wind
farms do not impact radar or military training?
And I just want to know, because we have different
agencies. And I see where some departments are granting grants
for wind energy, solar energy. And I just wonder if the
agencies are talking to one another to see that whatever they
do does not impact on the training that we have. Not only in my
facilities in South Texas, but in other facilities throughout
where we conduct training.
And maybe all of you can respond, and give me some insight
to my question?
Secretary Mabus. Thank you, sir. We are proud of
Kingsville, and we do think that they train the best pilots in
the world there. We are very aware of the wind farm issue
around Kingsville. And of the other issues that may impact
training from various directions with various other government
agencies. And we are keeping a close eye on the wind farms
around Kingsville. Thus far it is our belief that it, they have
not interfered with the core training, the essential training
that is necessary for the pilots.
If proposals were made to construct wind farms that did, we
would of course want to take some action to make sure that that
did not happen. We work closely with other agencies to make
sure that military readiness, national defense capabilities,
are not impacted. And that they understand how our needs would
be affected.
Mr. Ortiz. General, would you like to add to----
General Conway. Sir, we have several training aviation
bases in Arizona, and California in addition to our training
basis that we share with the Navy in Texas. And our concern
actually is more with low-flying helicopters, and the potential
danger that some of these wind farms could have if the pilots
aren't well aware of their presence.
And that is the sort of extraordinary effort that we are
taking at this point to make sure that wind farms that we might
put on our own bases--and we have some at the Marine Corps
Logistics Base, Barstow. But others in the vicinity of some of
our training bases are well noted on our aviation maps. And the
pilots in low light or low-visibility conditions are certainly
aware of their presence.
Mr. Ortiz. Admiral.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We pay particular attention to
all of our training space. Not just the air training space that
affects the bases in Texas, but all around the country. And our
local commanders pay particular attention to it. Here in
Washington we do. And when we get a sense that there could be
some encroachment, engage with the appropriate agencies, and
communities. Because in many cases the communities are seeking
this sort of development as well--to try to come to a solution
that allows us to accommodate the important training needs that
we have, and the needs of the communities. So we do pay very
close attention to it.
Mr. Ortiz. Again thank you so much for your service, and
thank you for joining us today.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett, please.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your service.
Admiral, I guess what you see depends on where you sit. My
understanding is that the Navy is able to respond to little
more than 40 percent of the requests of the combatant
commanders for submarines. So I guess critical depends upon
where you sit. I think that the new Chinese anti-ship missile
may be a huge game changer. I see little recognition of that in
the QDR, in the budget, or in your testimony today.
Admiral, you mentioned that you were aggressively pursuing
unmanned aircraft in the Navy. And yet we are not aggressively
pursuing unmanned ships in the Navy. I know why. It is because
we have too few ships. They are too valuable. We have people on
ships not because we need them there to sail the ships, but
because we need them there for damage control.
We need to be moving to a very much larger Navy with very
much smaller platforms so that we can move away from manned
platforms. Half the cost of keeping the ships at sea as you
know, sir, is the personnel. Which means if you get rid of half
the personnel, you can have 50 percent more ships. If you get
rid of all the personnel, you have 100 percent more ships.
We are going to be attacked where we are the weakest. I
know that during the Clinton years we largely waived EMP
[Electromagnetic Pulse] hardening on most of our new platforms.
To what extent are you EMP-hardened? How much fighting
capability would remain if you had an EMP lay down of 100
kilovolts per meter, which is but half of what the Russian
generals told the EMP Commission the Soviets had developed, and
the Russians had available?
Admiral, I am very pleased to note your emphasis on--focus
on energy. I hope that means that you are aggressively
supporting the increased nuclearization of our major platforms.
Seems to me kind of silly to have a carrier that is fueled for
30 years, and it is supported by ships that are fueled for a
few days.
These are my observations, my comments, my questions. Could
you respond? Thank you.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The--first off on the meeting
of the 40 percent of the requirements. As I mentioned, the
meeting of the critical requirements as a former fleet
commander--I was the one that had to fulfill those needs. And I
am very comfortable with the fact that the critical
requirements are being met for our submarine force.
The survivability relative to electromagnetic pulses is--it
is indeed a consideration and something that as we put our
network architectures together is working through that
survivability is very key to us. With regard to your specific
question about the strength of the pulse and the effect on our
systems, it--with that detail of question, Mr. Bartlett, I
would like to be able to take that one for the record if I
could and get back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 121.]
Admiral Roughead. As we look at ships of the future and
what that force must be in previous testimony and in
discussions, I have said I do not have an aversion to nuclear
power, but I think that there are more factors involved than
simply the cost of the fuel itself. It is the construction
cost. It is the maintenance cost. It is the cost of the people.
And I believe all of that needs to be taken into the equation
as we look at alternative energy systems for our force of the
future.
With regard to the unmanned systems, the one area that I
would also add where we are moving forward on is an underwater
unmanned systems which I think are extraordinarily important to
our future and which they themselves have some unique power
requirements and we are working on that. But all of that is on
my scope and I look forward to working on them in the coming
months and years.
Mr. Bartlett. You will address the other two questions in
writing, my question about the Chinese anti-ship missile and
why you still have people on ships?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The one of the reasons that we
have people on ships is that we have not gotten to the full
automation that we need, but I think the LCS is a perfect
example of what we are doing to bring people off of ships.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of
you including my former governor and attorney general,
Secretary Navy Mabus--Secretary of the Navy Mabus for being
here. I thank all of you for what you do.
General Conway, let me start by saying that today's
Washington Post had a very disturbing photograph on the front
of a mine resistant vehicle that had been attacked in
Afghanistan. I would like to take the occasion to say that it
is my hunch that had that been an up-armored Humvee [High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], every Marine in that
vehicle probably would have died. It is my hunch that because
of that vehicle, probably every Marine in that vehicle lived.
And I want to commend your General Brogan for the job he
has done in putting that program together on what seems to be
now an afterthought, fairly short notice and the outstanding
job he has done and I would hope that he would be properly
recognized for that.
Secretary Mabus, you had the distinction, if my memory is
right, of being the youngest attorney general and the youngest
governor in Mississippi. I want to give you a third distinction
and that is the fleet only grew on your watch. The bleeding
started about 1990 best of my knowledge. Last year for the
first time, we actually grew the fleet. We went from 285, which
is too small, to 287, which is too small, and the irony is that
you and many other CNOs have come before this committee and
said we need a 313-ship Navy, but your budget request would
actually shrink about three ships. That is unacceptable.
If administratively you can't get us towards 313, then we
are going to have to do it legislatively. Now, one of the ways
we can do this is we are going to commission 7 ships this year,
but you are asking for permission to decommission 10. That
doesn't get you there. That is going the wrong way. So I want
to--I have had this conversation with our Chairman and I--and I
just want to put you on notice as my friend and someone who I
want to work with.
Decommissioning 10 ships this year is unacceptable. It is
going to be my intention with the support of our Chairman to
introduce to have in this year's bill that we are going to have
legislatively a three-to-two ratio. For every three ships that
are commissioned by the Navy, you will be giving commissions to
decommission two. That is going to get us finally on the right
track towards 313. Again, if it's not done administratively we
are going to have to do it legislatively.
One of the proposals that Captain Ebbs has wisely asked the
Navy to look into will be a SLEP [Selected Life Extension
Program]-program certified fixed engine for your frigates--for
about $3 billion, we can keep those approximately 25 frigates
in the fleet for another 5 years. Now, that would be my first
preference. If you have a better preference to grow the fleet,
I want to hear your ideas, but I think that is certainly
something we need to look into particularly for the missions
you mentioned off of Latin America, for chasing pirates off of
Somalia.
That frigate is more than adequate. If we need to spend
some money to get another 5 years out of those hulls, then
let's do it and let's start planning on doing it.
What I want you to look into now is, you know, we keep
making mistakes. One of the concerns of the F-35, and I am
totally in support of, the CNO's plan to get the F-35 into the
fleet. The question that is being asked as far as the thermal
footprint of the F-35, on the ships we are constructing today,
are we planning ahead for the delivery of that vessel so that
the thermal footprint as far as the backlash shield on the
carrier and the deck, the large big deck amphibs--that this
plane is going to fly off of, are we taking the steps today to
build them to handle that thermal footprint for when that plane
is delivered a few years in the future.
Secretary Mabus. And to my friend, Gene Taylor, who I
served with in other capacities, in terms of the last question
that you asked, the thermal footprint, we are taking the steps
both with the blast deflector on the carriers whether it will
need to be strengthened at all, but if it does, that is a very
straightforward fix for that blast deflector. We are beginning
tests on the USS Wasp, a big deck amphib, in terms of the STOVL
[Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing] version and the thermal
footprint coming down from that for the Marine version.
So yes, we are beginning to take steps to make sure that
when the Joint Strike Fighter joins the fleet that the fleet is
absolutely ready and capable of handling it.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, in the 8 seconds I have, take a
look at the 10 ships you asked to decommission, narrow that
down to two because we need to stop the bleeding this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. Gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of
you in the panel here this morning. I had a couple of quick
questions. I hope they are quick. The first would be Admiral
Roughead and also General Conway. We have had some trouble with
welding and--particularly welding, I guess, on some LPDs
[Amphibious Transport Dock Ships] and part of that it turns out
is a workforce problem where we don't have enough welders
sometimes with the timing of when we build ships.
So my question is I understand that there could well be a
serious workforce problem at the shipyards out in San Diego and
we currently have three LPDs scheduled for 2011, 2013 and 2015.
My first question is would you be open-minded at least if it
saves money and if it averts some of that work--it puts the
work in a more consistent way across the yard to consider 2011,
2012 and 2013--excuse me, the MLPs [Marine Landing Platform].
Did I say LPDs? The MLPs which were the Marine landing platform
ships.
If we were to consider 2011, 2012, 2013 as opposed to 2011,
2013, 2015, are you open-minded to at least looking at that if
it saves money?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you for the question, sir, and I
would say that the shipbuilding plan that we have in place is
one that balances many factors to include how that money is
spread over time and what the needs of the Navy are and the
development of that. As you know, the MLP is also a new class
of ship and acceleration there may not be possible. So I think
as we look at that, we have to be very mindful and very careful
of how that balance can be affected.
Mr. Akin. Certainly. And obviously there is a lot of factor
that goes into that. My second question is my understanding is
that your intent is to meet the March 1st goal in terms of the
Joint Strike Fighter situation to get the discount on buying F/
A-18s at a lower price.
First of all, is it correct that you do intend to file that
paperwork on March 1 to allow us to get a discount on the price
of the planes?
Secretary Mabus. We received the letter of intent from the
contractor on Monday. We know that the deadline is March 1st.
We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense who
would have to make that notification to meet that--to meet that
deadline.
Mr. Akin. So the supplier did give us that 10 percent
number that we had talked about then?
Secretary Mabus. Yes.
Mr. Akin. Okay. And so your intent then is to meet that
deadline as far as you know?
Secretary Mabus. As we are working hard to meet that
deadline given the very limited time we have got to do it, and
we are working very hard with the staff of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to do that.
Mr. Akin. Good. Thank you. Third question is, and this is
something that I have been beating this drum for a couple of
years, and--but I am confused and I finally started to figure
out why I am a little confused in this subject.
In March of 2008, the department briefed the committee that
the shortfall of fighters was 188. In January of 2009, we were
told it was 243. In March of 2009, we were told the shortfall
was 312. As if by magic 2 months later of 2009, we are told the
shortfall was 146. The beginning of this month, the Secretary
of Defense testified the shortfall was 100 aircraft. Last week,
the committee was told the shortfall was 177. And then 5 days
later, my staff was told the shortfall was 100.
So that is why I have been a little confused about this. We
have gotten some different numbers. None of the numbers said
zero and all of them said we do have a fighter shortfall. So I
guess my next question would be in order to deal with that
problem, would you consider purchasing more aircraft? Is that
at least one option on the table, yes or no?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Akin, we have been working the strike
fighter management very, very carefully and particularly in the
case of Navy, we have made some adjustments to squadrons. So we
have been bringing our number down and we will continue to look
at how we manage our strike fighter force into the future. It
in no way should detract from the imperative to get to Joint
Strike Fighter and the foremost in my mind is----
Mr. Akin. Excuse me, sir. I--my clock has only got 5
seconds.
Admiral Roughead. Okay.
Mr. Akin. So the quick question is would you consider
purchasing additional aircraft as one possibility to deal with
that problem?
Admiral Roughead. My focus right now, sir, is on looking at
the SLEP program for our A's and D's [F/A-18 A and D models].
That is where I am going to be spending most of my time looking
at.
Mr. Akin. But you didn't answer my question.
The Chairman. Admiral, would you like to answer his
question so we can go onto the next one--questioner?
Admiral Roughead. As we go into POM [Program Objective
Memorandum] 12, sir, we are going to look at how to best manage
the strike fighter fleet. We have some procurements of 18s [F/
A-18s] laid into this budget, but I also believe it is
important that we look at the other levers as well.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder, please.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, you
talk about standing on the USS Little Rock and General Conway
was born in Arkansas. Admiral Roughead, if you told me you ever
served on the USS Razorback, which is a retired submarine
sitting in the Arkansas River, my Arkansas trifecta will be
complete. But General Conway, a quick question and you can give
us a quick answer as you want.
Are you satisfied that the rules of engagement in
Afghanistan are satisfactory given the difficult challenge our
men and women have there?
General Conway. Yes, sir, I am. I ask that question every
time I go which is about once every 4 months. My commanders are
comfortable with it. We are pretty good at it and because it is
who we are with our air ground team and they understand the
rationale behind. So they support it.
Dr. Snyder. Good. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, the topic has
come up about ``don't ask, don't tell'' and I had a
conversation yesterday with an officer who is currently serving
on active duty who is a lesbian who says, ``Okay. We appreciate
they are doing the study. How the hell am I going to be able to
participate in that study?''
How will somebody who is currently gay or lesbian serving
in the military be able to share their views on the impact on
readiness, anything else intel, without being outed under the
current policy?
Secretary Mabus. It is at least my understanding that as
this study is being shaped by general counsel, the Department
of Defense, Jay Johnson, and the head of the U.S. Army, Europe,
General Ham, that they are going to try to have mechanisms for
anonymous input so that there would not be the jeopardy of
violating ``don't ask, don't tell'' to simply respond to the
survey. As I said, it is early in the process of developing
this survey. But when--but Jay Johnson, the General Counsel of
Defense, said that they are trying to structure it in that way.
Dr. Snyder. Yesterday I asked General Schwartz, and you may
have heard about this. I assume, Secretary Mabus, that you and
the Admiral and General are familiar with this split of
authority we currently have between the circuits regarding
``don't ask, don't tell'' between the Witt case in the Ninth
Circuit, and the Cook case in the First Circuit. And so when
the question is asked, ``Should there be a moratorium?'' we
have this--you all have a challenge that has been laid on you
in the fact that the law has changed in the Ninth Circuit.
How are you all currently responding to the fact that the
Ninth Circuit has conferred Constitutional protections of what
they are calling intermediate scrutiny under the due process
requirements? How are you all responding to that in how do you
process cases in the Ninth Circuit?
Secretary Mabus. Again it is my understanding, Congressman,
that we are--and we do understand the split of decisions
between the two circuits right now. That we are proceeding to
follow the law as written across the Navy and the Marine Corps
as the--I believe that----
Dr. Snyder. So you are going to ignore the Ninth Circuit
opinion?
Secretary Mabus. No, sir. But I believe that that opinion
is being appealed.
Dr. Snyder. No, it is not.
Secretary Mabus. Try to recognize----
Dr. Snyder. It is not being appealed.
Secretary Mabus. Then I am incorrect.
Dr. Snyder. It is not being appealed. And that is the
challenge. I am not harassing you all about this. I think this
is a--this is one of the problems we are going to have when we
say we can study this for a year, and put this off.
We have a--we now have people that have Constitutional
protection in the Ninth Circuit at some level that we expect
you to respond to. The problem is when the admiral sends them
to Little Rock, or General Conway sends them to the East Coast,
they lose that protection. And I am not sure how this gets
worked out. I suggested yesterday one way to do it would be to
make the venue for all these cases be in the Ninth Circuit.
Then you have some consistency.
But you--General Conway, I think you appropriately said
there is some confusion. That there would be a moratorium. You
already have confusion. There is already legal confusion that
you all didn't bring on yourselves. It is being laid on you.
But I think you are going to need to figure that out, and
fairly quickly. Cause it is currently the law in the Ninth
Circuit. And it is not being appealed.
So I think this will be an ongoing discussion. By the way,
the--recognizing the venue of the Ninth Circuit might deal with
some of Senator Levin's concerns. I haven't talked to him about
it. But it may be a way of getting at some of this transition.
I wanted to ask have you all--the Andy Krepinevich Group
put out this study called ``Why AirSea Battle?'' and talks
about Iran, and China, and where we look at things going in the
future. Admiral Roughead, have--are you familiar with that--his
report?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I am. And it is being reflected
in the air-sea battle that the Navy, the Air Force, and the
Marine Corps--the air-sea battle study that we are conducting--
--
Dr. Snyder. Its currently undergoing?
Admiral Roughead. Right. Right.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Who is next? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General, and Mr. Secretary, and Admiral, we thank you
for being here. You are all good men. And we appreciate your
service to our country. But even good men can take positions
some time that can be detrimental to I think the well-being of
the country. And I was a little taken aback, Mr. Secretary, by
your statement that the shipbuilding plan that was sent over is
going to respond to the Chairman's concern about the number of
ships that we have in the Navy.
And I am concerned for two reasons. One is that the number
of ships that we have in the Navy. And I am concerned for two
reasons. One is that OMB [Office of Management and Budget]
disagrees with your numbers. As you know they say it is on
course to be at 270 ships as opposed to your projections. And
when Secretary Gates sat exactly where you are sitting, he said
that that shipbuilding plan was a ``fantasy.''
When I look, Admiral Roughead, at your concern that what
keeps you up at night is your worry about having the resources
to have the ships that we need down the road. And then I look
at your specific decision on Mayport, which is going to spend
$1 billion with all the other needs we have. This is the
strategic dispersal plan, which I understand is the basis upon
which at least the chairman of the Joint Chiefs said was the
basis upon his decision to think a carrier should be shifted to
Mayport. Have you read this plan? The strategic dispersal plan?
Admiral Roughead. There have been several strategic
dispersal plans over the year, sir. And I don't know which one
that----
Mr. Forbes. This is the one that I understand was the one
written by Admiral Robert Thomas. Have you ever read his
strategic dispersal plan, which is the one that is always
circulated as the basis for relocating the carriers?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We are looking at strategic
dispersal.
Mr. Forbes. Have you read his plan?
Admiral Roughead. I would have to look at that copy, sir,
to see if I have seen it.
Mr. Forbes. Have you ever read a copy by Admiral Thomas?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I mean, we work on strategic
dispersal, and determining where the best places for the fleet
should be.
Mr. Forbes. Are you familiar with Admiral Thomas?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I am.
Mr. Forbes. Do you have respect for Admiral Thomas, and his
decisionmaking capabilities?
Admiral Roughead. He is a very good officer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Have you ever asked him the risk assessment
that he placed on anything happening that would necessitate a
shift to Mayport?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. In fact Admiral Thomas works--
worked for me. So when we were----
Mr. Forbes. And did he tell you that that was a very slight
risk?
Admiral Roughead. The strategic dispersal plan is based on
the consequences of what could happen in the Tidewater area
should there be a manmade or natural disaster.
Mr. Forbes. And it was a comparison specifically between
that and Mayport. And did he ever tell you as he told me that
the risk of that was very, very slight. In fact, less than 10
percent.
Admiral Roughead. And what risk is that, sir?
Mr. Forbes. The risk that you would have a disaster that
would create a problem that would have necessitated the move of
the carrier to----
Admiral Roughead. I think that we may be talking about two
different types of risk--one natural, one manmade.
Mr. Forbes. Let me focus, then, on the natural disaster
risk.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Because in that program it states that there is
no advantage between Norfolk and Florida. And yet if you look,
Florida since 1900 has had 225 hurricanes. Norfolk 7. If you
look at that channel going out of Norfolk, it is a mile wide
whereas in Florida only one carrier sunk there would stop all
the ships in it.
But this is what I want to get to. Recently you have
submitted a list of unfunded priorities to Congress. These are
requirements your commanders say they need to fulfill their
mission. General Conway has submitted a similar list. There are
some huge things in there. Engines that we can't do. Planes
that we can't get. Ship maintenance that we can't get. The cost
of moving that carrier to Mayport would cover every single one
of the requirements unfunded on your list, and on General
Conway's.
So my question to you is this. Which is more important?
Moving the carrier to Florida, or doing all the items on the
unfunded priority list that you have submitted, and that
General Conway has submitted? Second one is, how do you agree
with Admiral Thomas' strategic dispersal plan, but disagree
with his risk assessment? And then thirdly, how do you explain
by any objective, legitimate analysis that there isn't a
benefit to Norfolk over Jacksonville, or over Florida when you
look at natural disaster situations?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I will take the first one last,
because I think you are comparing Norfolk to Florida. I think
it is important as you look at storm tracks to compare Norfolk
to the Jacksonville area. And they are very, very similar. In
fact, as a--yes, sir?
Mr. Forbes. Just ask you to look at the charts of the two.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I have looked at them many
times. And Mayport fares quite well in that regard.
The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, again for being before us. I have various areas I
want to ask you about. Just for note, I received today a copy
of the letter, Secretary, that you sent to my senator, Dianne
Feinstein, with respect to our Marine Base, Camp Pendleton. And
one of the problems that we have in Orange County, which is
moving traffic. Oh, and of course the--we have this toll road
that we are trying to figure out how to build, et cetera.
So I would like to in the near future have a discussion
with you. We don't have to do it here today--about this and
what we might do to maybe still try to find a solution with you
all.
I just want to say that on ``don't ask, don't tell''--
obviously; Mr. Snyder piggybacking on many of his remarks--is a
big issue for us. And in California in particular being in that
Ninth Circuit court. And just want to note that it is my
understanding that, for example, out of all--I do a lot of work
with our NATO allies, and out in the European theater as you--
many of you know. And just would like to note that I believe in
speaking to most of my colleagues from other parliaments out
there, that only Turkey and the United States as members of
NATO are the only ones who have limited policies, or an actual
ban on having gays in the military.
So I think it is incredibly important that we address this
sooner than later. And the parliamentarians out there--our
colleagues--said that the--when they--when some of them went to
implement this the quicker they went with it, the easier it was
to get to it. So just from that standpoint--and I have said
this to Mrs. Davis, our personnel subcommittee chairwoman, that
I would like to see this addressed this year rather than sit
around waiting for some more dialogue.
I want to talk a little bit to something really positive
that we heard the other day from the Secretary when the
Department of Defense took a very commendable step to ban the
prohibition of women from serving on our Navy submarines. I
think it is very forward-looking. I think it is time to do
that. We still sometimes even have a discussion about whether
women should be in the military on this committee. Thank God we
haven't had to vote on that for the last 5 or 7 years.
And we all know that one of the reasons is that there is so
much talent in that 50 percent of potential work force. My
question to you, Mr. Secretary, is--that I understand that this
is just the beginning, and there is a lot of work to get
through in order to make this happen. I would like you to
address what are the challenges that you are going to foresee--
that you foresee with respect to this. And how might this
Congress help you to move forward that issue of doing that.
And before you answer that, let me just pose another
question out to our commandant. And then I will be quiet. And
hopefully you guys can answer this. And that would be with
respect--commandant to the U.S. Marines undertaking the
operation Marjah there in Afghanistan in the last few days. I
am interested to know the role that the Afghan national army
played in that.
How many of their troops were involved? And what you think
the assessment is there? In particular, I think given to, and I
believe it was General Petraeus who said, ``We might be at this
at least for 12 to 18 months, and that may fly in the face of
the 18-month limit that Mr. Obama discussed with respect to
Afghanistan.'' So if, Mr. Secretary, you could answer that
first question. And then, General, get your thoughts together
to answer the other?
Secretary Mabus. We learned a lot of lessons integrating
female sailors onto our surface ships that we can apply to
integrating women into the submarine fleet. For starters, the
two platforms that women would be going to first. The SSBNs,
and the SSGNs [Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarines] don't
require any modifications to their--to their hull structure--to
their compartments or berthing or anything.
The challenges that were faced, and faced very successfully
when women were integrated onto our surface fleet were things
like making sure that we had a critical mass of women on a ship
so that women were not too small a group. To make sure that we
had a senior--a more senior woman officer at first. A
department head to be a mentor to the younger women coming in
for their first tour at sea.
And also to make sure that we reach out to the submarine
force, and to the families to make sure that any concerns that
they have are addressed. And we think that they will be. And
that this will be a very successful integration.
General Conway. Ma'am, with regard to the Afghan national
army and police, roughly 4,000 is the answer in terms of
numbers. They have a good fighting spirit. They are not nearly
as sophisticated as we are at company and battalion level. But
in terms of actual small unit tactics, they mix it up pretty
good. We think that Marjah will be a contested area for as long
as we are there, or until the Taliban pack it up. It is a drug
center. It is an area where they have had a long-term presence.
In some ways they have families there. So although we intend to
secure the area and put the Afghan police in eventually to help
control it, the nature of an insurgency is that they could well
be back in small numbers attempting to contest the area. So I
think General Petraeus is probably right.
The Chairman. Before I call on the gentleman from South
Carolina, General, where are we on Guam?
General Conway. Sir, at this point I think it is fair to
say that we are awaiting the determination of the Japanese
government in terms of how they see their part of this. In the
meantime, it is fair to say we continue to look at what Guam
means. Again, you nailed it in your opening statement in terms
of the strategic importance, we believe, of armed forces in the
Pacific, and of course particularly Marines.
One thing that has changed somewhat since the original
agreements is that we have grown the force by some 27,000
additional Marines, and 3,000 or 4,000 of those would be
assigned to the Pacific. So we are trying to balance the
numbers in our own thought process with regard to established
agreements.
So at this point, it is between governments and we very
much await the next determination by the Japanese government in
terms of how they think we should go forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I actually
appreciate your bringing up Guam before we could begin, because
I visited, and I know how strategically located it is. Also,
the people of Guam should be appreciated. They are so
patriotic. The highest percentage of National Guard membership
of any state or territory of the United States is Guam. And
what wonderful people.
And General, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for being
here today. I was very grateful to grow up in Charleston, South
Carolina. And I grew up in the shadow of the Navy base, and so
I have a great appreciation of your service and Navy and Marine
personnel, and we are grateful to have the Nuclear Power School
in the community. It is a great opportunity for young people.
I am honored now to represent Parris Island Marine Corps
Station, Beaufort, Beaufort Naval Hospital. And then, I am
particularly grateful I have a son, active duty Navy, and he is
following in the tradition of his late grandfather and uncle,
who were dedicated Marines.
So Mr. Secretary, I am concerned about the current plans
for wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September,
2011--it is, or 2011.
It is not in the same level of support currently furnished
by the Army at Walter Reed. Wounded warriors who move to the
new medical center will experience a significant degradation of
services and support and I believe that is unacceptable.
As an example, I understand that there will be a shortfall
of 150 barrack spaces when the new medical center opens for the
wounded warriors who are currently in the warrior transition
barracks at Walter Reed.
What assurances can you give that all of the wounded
warrior support now provided at Walter Reed, including first
priority for barracks space on the Bethesda campus, will be
available when the new medical center opens in September, 2011?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, there is no more important
thing that we do than to care for those who have borne the
burden of battle and who return as wounded warriors. All three
of us on a very regular basis visit Bethesda, visit our wounded
warriors that are returning.
And we are very focused in the Department of the Navy, and
I think it is fair to say in the Department of Defense, to
making sure that as the transition occurs, as Walter Reed moves
to the Bethesda campus, that no wounded warrior fall between
the cracks. That there is no degradation of care. That there is
absolutely world-class care, as you in Congress and we in the
Department know that there have to be.
You can be assured that our attention is focused very
directly on this. And not just on putting Walter Reed and
Bethesda together, but also on the myriad of other things that
wounded warriors require from our Wounded Warrior Regiment with
the Marines, our Safe Harbor Battalion with the Navy, with
their non-medical care, with making sure that they are
transitioned either back to the fleet, back to their Marine
brethren, or into their community, is seamless.
We are trying to work with the VA [Veteran's
Administration] to make sure that there is no gap there. And
finally, one thing that I am particularly proud of, we just did
a wounded warrior hiring conference to make sure that as
wounded warriors recover, and as they transition out back to
the civilian workforce, that they have a job waiting for them
when they get there.
Mr. Wilson. And Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on
just what you have cited. And even if it took up all my time,
the issue is that important. But particularly on barrack space,
that needs to be addressed, so I hope that as you pursue the
other issues relative to this and the wounded warrior program,
I wish the American people could see what has been done on
behalf of the young people who have lost arms, legs. It is
extraordinary the efforts that have been made, and very
heartwarming. But I am very, very concerned about the barracks
space, so I hope that will be an emphasis that you have.
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
General Conway. Sir, if I can complement the Secretary's
answer for just a moment, and perhaps allay some of your
concerns. We certainly need barracks space, especially for our
Marines, and I would argue potentially sailors, who come for
initial treatment for their families, for themselves, and for
people who are assigned back to Bethesda for follow-on
treatment.
But our intent with our casualty care is as soon as
possible, to get them out closer to home station, closer to
their homes if it is a recovery period. And we do not want to
have them at Walter Reed-Bethesda for any longer a period of
time than is absolutely necessary. So I think that will
mitigate some of your concern in this regard.
Mr. Wilson. Excellent. Thank you very much.
General Conway. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly
Secretary Mabus, and Admiral Roughead, and General Conway,
thank you so much for your extraordinary service to our
country, and for worrying I think every day about the men and
women who serve. I know you show a great deal of compassion for
the mission that they are performing and how they are
performing it.
I wanted to actually ask several of the questions that have
already been asked, but have sort of a brief follow-up to a few
of those. On the MLP, I am wondering, once you have a better
sense of how it is going to work together, if there is any
opportunity to bring that schedule together so that there is
more predictability on the part of those who are trying to
build those for us? Is there any chance of trying to do that,
rather than spreading it out once we get underway?
Secretary Mabus. Well, as the CNO said, it is a new hull
form----
Mrs. Davis. I missed your response, but I wanted to follow
up.
Secretary Mabus [continuing]. And one of things that we
looked at was the health of our industrial base. And trying to
ensure that there was a base of work spread out over the 5
years so that our shipbuilding yards would be able to maintain
that critical workforce, that critical infrastructure that we
need so much.
And that was one of the factors, although not the
determining factor, but one of the factors that went into
putting those ships in 2011, 2013, and 2015.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. I think they would probably suggest that
it is better for them to bring them together in terms of their
workforce, but perhaps that could be explored further at
another time.
And women on submarines, is there any role for Congress to
play at this point? Is there anything that you need from us?
Secretary Mabus. I think we are well along. The Secretary
of Defense has done the notification to Congress that is
required by law that we are beginning to proceed down the
track. And I think that the support of Congress on this is
crucial, but I think that we have all the levers that we need
to move expeditiously to do this.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Nothing in the reauthorization language?
You are set?
Admiral Roughead. There is a 30-day wait period, ma'am, so
any impediment to that would not be helpful. So----
Mrs. Davis. All right. Thank you.
Admiral Roughead. And it is a good plan, I can assure you
of that. And the submarine force is prepared to execute.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I wanted to turn--very briefly, you
may be aware there is a DOD-wide program called My Spouse
Career Advancement Account that has recently been frozen. I
know just from several weeks ago even speaking with many of the
spouses, they count on this. I mean, this has really been so
important to them.
And could you enlighten us a little bit as to whether or
not there is a possibility that, even though it has been frozen
for now, that those spouses who are in the program can continue
with their education? And do you think that there is, again, a
role for Congress in weighing in on this right now?
Secretary Mabus. After the question was asked yesterday,
looked into this last evening. The information that I received,
because this is a DOD-wide program, is that the site was frozen
for software concerns for some other types of concerns on
there. But that the people who were receiving the payments
could expect to continue to receive those payments. That was
the information I got, as I said, last night from DOD.
Mrs. Davis. Oh, are you saying that people in the program
will continue? What about just trying to apply now? Or is the
program itself going to be discontinued for some time?
Secretary Mabus. That is an answer I cannot give you. I
don't know.
General Conway. Ma'am, if I can help. I also researched it
and it is my understanding that this is a temporary halt to the
program, not a close-out of the program, pending the problems
that the Secretary spoke of.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. What might be important is communicating
as best we can, obviously, to the number of people that are
very concerned about this out in the community. And I think we
all agree on, this is an important quality-of-life issue for
our service men and women, and some way of clarifying that is
very important right now.
Secretary Mabus. The only thing I would like to add right
now is that I completely agree with the importance of this
program, with what you said.
Mrs. Davis. Yes, thank you. The QDR points out the need to
increase key enabling agents--assets, I am sorry--for the
Special Operations Forces, including logistics, communications,
intelligence, and other critical capabilities. And the Naval
Special Warfare Command depends on the Navy, of course, for
certain enablers.
Yet at the same time that they are looking to the Navy for
that, the Navy's end strength is coming down, as we know. And I
am wanting to know whether there is an issue here in terms of
being able to have out of that pool of specialists, some of our
special warfare people that would be in the future?
Admiral Roughead. As far as the Special Warfare, our SEALs
[Navy Sea, Air and Land teams], we have a great plan there.
There are many demands for people, and we are looking at how we
can best resource that now.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
And Mr. Conaway, the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief, thank you for
being here. Mr. Secretary. Commandant, it is great to see you
again.
That was a great day in Fredericksburg, Texas, when you and
your bride came down for the ribbon-cutting on the new wing of
the Nimitz Museum. And with some training and hard work and
dedication on his part, Mike Hagee might be able to MC
something a little better than--next time.
My issue is going to be a little bit more mundane. It is
not nearly as glamorous as some of the other stuff, but it
stretches across everything you do. And that is, the commitment
by the three of you to audit the financial statements of the
respective entities that you are responsible for.
Mr. Secretary, you made the statement a while ago about
bold steps required for the alternative energy. I appreciate
the same bold steps for the Department of the Navy to be clean,
unqualified, audited, financial statements and everything that
entails. Internal controls, all the other systems that we have
in place. And that the business transpiration agency has the
dubious distinction of having responsibility but no authority
to make things happen across a lot of lines.
I want to brag on the Marine Corps. Commandant, you have
said you will get it done, and I hope there is a way to hand
off that same commitment to the 35th commandant of the Marine
Corps, because it doesn't happen, period, without the three of
you gentlemen saying make it happen.
Now, I understand you got a zillion other things that might
look more important, but the benefits are indisputable of being
able to have good data, quick data. As I told the Air Force
yesterday, if we ask you guys a question that stumps you, some
person on the back bench will get into a panic mode to try to
cobble together some answer out there with systems that may
involve 50 different systems that are not integrated, they are
not doing the things they do.
So simple heading out, or at least an answer for the
record, is that--is that commitment to get the Navy
Department--Department of the Navy--audited, and the Marine
Corps audited way up on your list of things that you need to
get done?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, my first elected job was
state auditor of Mississippi.
Mr. Conaway. Oh, fantastic.
Secretary Mabus. I understand the value of good audits in
government. And I do want to echo what you said about the
Marine Corps. We are way down the line on getting a fully
auditable statement for the Marine Corps. And we are moving in
that direction for the Navy.
And in fact, we have got a Deputy Under Secretary of the
Navy for Business Transformation that that is one of the prime
jobs that that individual is accountable for. And I do check on
that on a very regular basis.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. CNO, I don't know if you have got a dog
in that fight, but any push you could help to get the----
Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, sir, because I think your
comments are right on the money.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
General Conway. Sir, you know the term ``wind dummy''? We
have volunteered to be the wind dummy on this one with some
trepidation, but it is absolutely the right thing to do and we
are proceeding apace.
Mr. Conaway. Well, thanks. I mean, if the good citizens of
District 11 keep sending me up here, I want to keep niggling
you guys about this because I do think it is important. So with
that, Mr. Chairman, thank you all for your long service to our
country. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank
you for being here, General Conway and Admiral Roughead. Thank
you both for your service to our nation.
I would like to turn my attention, if I could, to Ballistic
Missile Defense issues right now. And as the long-range
shipbuilding plan lays out, the President's new Phased,
Adaptive Approach to providing missile defense to Europe will
have a significant impact on the Navy's resources obviously in
the years to come. How does the Navy plan to support its
growing missile defense requirements while fulfilling its
current missions including anti-ballistic missile ship defense?
Admiral Roughead. The way that we will deploy it, sir, is
in consonance with what the combatant commanders have
requested. We have been performing the mission on the Western
Pacific now for a few years and the demands have also been
added into the Arabian Gulf and into the Mediterranean.
So in our plan, we are taking the number of Ballistic
Missile Defense ships in this FYDP from 21 to 38. We are
increasing the number of missiles which is as important to be
able to not have to be changing missiles around. But the fact
that our ships are multimission ships allow them to do much
more than missile defense and that is all managed by our Navy
commanders in the regions where those ships are operating.
So I am very, very pleased that not only are we building
some more missile defense ships, but we are providing the back-
fits and we are increasing the missile inventory. And we have
also been spending quite a bit of effort and time and the
coordination between commanders in different regions and I
believe we have advanced our missile defense capability quite a
bit.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything
to add?
Secretary Mabus. Just to emphasize what the CNO said. These
are very capable ships in a number of missions and while we are
retrofitting and building new missile defense ships, we are not
losing sight of the other duties that they perform. And also,
that in this budget we have asked for funds to fit a good many
of our existing destroyers and cruisers, DDGs [Guided Missile
Destroyers] and CGs [Guided Missile Cruisers], with the Aegis
BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] capability and in order to
reach the end strength of those ships that we need to respond
to all the demands.
Mr. Lamborn. Let me ask that in a further point on anti-
ballistic, anti-ship ballistic missiles. Have you had the
opportunity to review the recent study on different
possibilities for defending against anti-ship ballistic
missiles? And as a following to that, what are the various
technological and at what platform solutions to this challenge?
Secretary Mabus. We are very focused on anti-ship ballistic
and cruise missiles. And one of the things that the CNO has
said earlier in his testimony is that we are looking at
technologies from other ships, particularly the truncated DDG-
1000, as we are going forward with the next generation of DDG-
51s to get sensor systems, radar systems.
In the new DDG-51s, the SPY-3, coming off the DDG-1000, the
air and missile defense radar so that we get a full picture of
the battle space of both from anti-air and anti-ballistic
missile and anti-cruise missile ships and an integrated hull on
each ship and in a group of ships for integrated air and
missile defense.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Admiral Roughead, on the DDG-1000,
last year the administration decided to continue funding the
DDG-1000 program for three ships. How is this program
progressing and with regards to--with regards to both the hull
and the mission systems equipment?
Admiral Roughead. The program is progressing on track with
regard to the development of the systems and also, it--the DDG-
1000 is under construction. So the issue will be one of the
Nunn-McCurdy breach as a result of the truncation and the
departments working its way through the appropriate steps that
have to be taken relative to that.
Mr. Lamborn. On that, let me ask you. It is my
understanding that the Navy is pursuing a fixed price contract
for the second and third DDG-1000. Is this accurate and what
does that mean for controlling overall program costs?
Admiral Roughead. My hopes are is that it will maintain the
cost where it needs to be and we are pursuing those contracts.
Mr. Lamborn. A big firm fixed price?
Admiral Roughead. I would like to get back to you on that
one, sir.
The Chairman. We have three votes. However, let's go as far
as we can and we will break for those votes and then return.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
General Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for joining
us today. We appreciate your hard work and efforts. I wanted to
direct a question to Admiral Roughead just as a follow-up from
Congressman Forbes' question.
In looking at the analysis that was done, the risk
analysis, about placing a home port facility there in Mayport
and we had talked earlier with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, about how much of a quantifiable risk
assessment was done and then looking at that in that being very
spongy as far as the--as a hard number on the risks that we are
trying to mitigate with putting a carrier down there and then
with the unfunded programs list that is out now that has about
$530 million of unfunded needs there on that list, what that
leads me to is to follow up on his question.
And that is obviously your decisions revolve around ranking
where your needs are. And can you tell me in relation to the
unfunded needs list, would you say the unfunded needs are
ranked higher or lower than the need to mitigate a risk to
place a home port facility there in Mayport?
Admiral Roughead. Well, I would say, sir, that the fact
that when we built our budget and took it to the levels where
it was, and as you know, our budget is a balance of many
different needs that we have, that when I made the proposal on
this year's budget, that--what we funded with regard to O&M
[Operations and Maintenance] and the risk that we were taking
was where I thought it was prudent to be and included in the
budget are the preliminary steps for the home port in Mayport.
So given the fact that the steps needed to build the port
in Mayport were in our budget and those are the unfunded
programs. Then the Mayport project has a higher priority for
me.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. I am trying to get from you where in the
scheme of things though if you--obviously there are limited
resources there and I know that you have--and we are still
trying to figure out exactly where it is some of the planning
dollars that go into beginning the process there at the
location in Mayport, but also the unfunded needs list, you
know, has, obviously, shipbuilding needs there, weapons
procurement, ship maintenance and all of those things concern
us because there are needs out there.
What I am trying to figure is that within the finite
universe of resources, if we are talking about a billion
dollars to upgrade the port there in Mayport versus the $530
million in the unfunded needs list, would you say that the $1
billion needed in the years to come, and again, looking at your
unfunded needs was that goes out in the same future, would you
say that the $1 billion necessary to build the facility at
Mayport is a higher or lower priority than the $530 million on
the unfunded needs list?
Admiral Roughead. Well, first, sir, the Mayport is not a
billion dollar project. It is not a billion dollar project. It
is just slightly over half of that.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Admiral Roughead. But what Mayport is, it is not a new
carrier port. Mayport has been an aircraft carrier port since
1952 and that dispersion has given us some strategic
flexibility on the East Coast. What we are doing is we are
bringing that port as a carrier port to be able to service our
carrier fleet which is now all nuclear. So for me, that
strategic flexibility is important. That is why I made the
recommendation to the Secretary to go forward with that and
then that was affirmed. And so that money in the plan to
enhance the carrier port of Mayport is a priority.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Well, in the decisionmaking, obviously
you are looking at what risks you would be mitigating by having
a duplicative facility there in Mayport. And I guess my
question is with the lack of quantifiable risk assessment that
is going on there, is that risk high enough to substantiate
that being put in front of the--if you say $600 billion or $600
million versus the $530 million of the unfunded needs, tell me
is there still--do you believe is the risk still high enough
for having to move a carrier there that you would put the
Mayport facility before the unfunded?
Admiral Roughead. Sir, I believe that the risk of having
all of our eggs in one basket for our aircraft carriers in the
Tidewater area, and I don't dispute the value of--but having
all of our eggs in one basket there when we have not done that
on the East Coast or on the West Coast is not in the best
interest of the Navy or the nation.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. We have time for one
more member, the gentlelady from Guam, 5 minutes.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and
Admiral and General, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciated meeting with you recently to
discuss the military buildup on Guam and working with my office
and the government of Guam to make sure that we get this
buildup done right as our Chairman, Mr. Skelton, has stated
over and over again. However, there remains significant hurdles
to the military buildup. The recent news that the Port of Guam
was denied a Recovery Act Grant funding from the Department of
Transportation was deeply disappointing. Simply put, without
funding for the port, the buildup cannot occur.
Mr. Secretary, while I appreciate your leadership in DOD to
support the port's grant, we need to know what the Navy is
doing to address Guam's civilian infrastructure needs. Is the
Navy working with the Department of Interior, the White House
and OMB to develop a strategy to address the funding of
civilian infrastructure requirements?
Yesterday, I was at a meeting from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. with
the Department of Interior and various federal agencies to
discuss the buildup. We concluded with this, number one, we
need a funding plan for this buildup. And secondly, we need one
coordinator to handle this buildup so the DOD doesn't point to
the various federal agencies for funding and the federal
agencies go right back and say, ``Well, this is DOD's
responsibility.'' We are caught in the middle.
I think it is important to note the EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency] and their comments on the draft EIS
[Environmental Impact Statement] also stated that the lack of
information on infrastructure funding is one major reason for
their low scoring of the document. Also, many of the civilian
impacts are exasperated by the 2014 completion date. When does
the Department of Navy believe it can complete construction?
Given the government of Japan's indecision, isn't this the
right time to extend the timeline to reflect reality?
Secretary Mabus. I enjoyed our meeting as well,
Congresswoman, and as far as the grant to Apra Harbor, you
know, from the Department of Transportation following the
meeting and following my trip to Guam to look at Apra Harbor
and other things, I met twice with the Secretary of
Transportation to urge him to give that grant to Guam and to
Apra Harbor to fulfill that.
In the Department of the Navy and, I think, in the
Department of Defense, we support a government-wide approach to
the Guam buildup. It is a very important move for us as it is
for the people of Guam to echo what General Conway said. The
strategic value of Guam and of moving Marines to Guam is
crucial. We have in terms of our processes elevated Guam inside
the Department of the Navy with the Guam Executive Council
which meets on a very regular basis to make sure the decisions
move quickly.
The Department of Defense has set up the Guam Oversight
Council along with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to do the
same thing. We do need, I believe, to make sure that there is a
whole of government approach to this very important issue
because it is crucial for the Navy, and the Marine Corps to--
for the strategic dispersal of our forces, and for the buildup
on Guam that we do this right as the Chairman----
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
Secretary Mabus [continuing]. Said in his statement.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Secretary, my time is running out. But is
there some way to recoup these funds for our port? Without the
port development, the buildup just cannot continue.
Secretary Mabus. My understanding is there may be other
funds like this in the future that Guam can compete for. And
once again, I will urge the Department of Transportation to
fund that port in Guam, and to fund that particular grant that
Guam has applied for, and I believe has made a very good case
for.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is my greatest
concern right now. We just had news of that a couple weeks ago,
and it was a real blow to our people. Because you know, we had
made plans for this. And as I said, if this doesn't go on--and,
of course, the Japan decision also is important to us. But I
would appreciate anything you could do to help us in this area.
Secretary Mabus. Yes, Ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Secretary, is there any need or indication on where the
Japanese government, is timewise?
Ms. Bordallo. May.
Secretary Mabus. In terms of their re-look at this issue,
my understanding is that a decision is forthcoming by May.
Ms. Bordallo. May.
The Chairman. By May?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. We will return. We have three votes. We
will return and resume.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Who is next? We will resume. And thank you,
gentlemen, for waiting for us.
Mr. Courtney, 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
all the witnesses for their great testimony this morning. I
also want to recognize that all three participated in a funeral
last week at Westmont Presbyterian Church to say good-bye to
just a great friend, and a great American, Jack Murtha.
General Conway, I want to particularly publicly thank you
for the tremendous eulogy. Powerful words that painted a
picture that I just think the whole country really needed to
hear about his contribution to the people who wear the uniform.
So bravo. It was just a splendid job.
And again I would just say that his presence is actually
felt in this budget today. The advance procurement in 2007,
which Chairman Skelton and Chairman Taylor, along with Mr.
Murtha fought for to get a Congressional plus-up for the
Virginia-class program today is bearing fruit with the two-a-
year 2011 shipbuilding plan. And that would not have happened
without his intervention.
This place moves pretty fast in terms of, you know, the
process resuming, you know, after some of the folks here leave,
and pass on. But I think it is important again just to
recognize for a moment the contribution he made to the Navy,
and to this important program.
Earlier, Mr. Chairman, asked Admiral Roughead the question
about whether or not the SSBN program could maybe be sort of
put off. Because it does present financial challenges down the
road as you pointed out. And you responded. But I want to
actually give you a chance to maybe expand a little bit in
terms of why that is a priority for the country right now. You
know, a question which I always ask you, because people ask why
submarines, and again if you could maybe enlarge on your
earlier answer I would appreciate it.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you. And now is the time
to go forward with the replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarine. As I have looked at this, and studied it,
and considered several of the options as to how best to go
forward.
Given the fact that we will be taking this class of
submarine out to 2080, we have to ensure that the technology
that we put into that ship, that its survivability, its
reliability, its operational availability enable it to operate
not just for that length of time, but in the environments where
others are going to try to negate that advantage that we have
with our ballistic missile submarine fleet.
So now is the time to begin that process. Now is the time
to work closely with our friends in the U.K. to ensure that we
go forward, and bring that submarine in on time. If we delay, I
think you rush, you suboptimize. And at the end of the day you
very well could end up spending more money on it than you
otherwise would if you didn't have a good, thoughtful design.
Mr. Courtney. And this year's budget, again, there is money
for the design aspect of it, which again is consistent with the
procurement reform bill that we passed last year, which is to
avoid design-build happening at the same time. But to really
sort of think things through.
I guess what I would want to ask just in terms of--you
know, hopefully this is not wishful thinking. But I mean if we
do think ahead, and use the best talent possible, and look at
successful programs like Virginia class and other shipbuilding,
I mean, do you think that there is a possibility that we could,
you know, potentially get a point where the $6 billion to $7
billion projected cost--I mean, we might be able to do a little
better than that down the road.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think we should look at every
way that we can legitimately take cost out, but yet maintain
that capability that we are going to need for the next seven
decades. So I will be relentless in looking for those
opportunities. But I emphasize that it has to legitimately be
taken out. It can't simply be well we will build it cheaper,
and then you compromise on a lot of other things.
But we owe it to you. We owe it to the taxpayer to make
sure that every ship that we buy, that we are taking cost out
of it in every possible way.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Mr. Secretary, you wanted to
comment at all on that?
Secretary Mabus. One of the things we tried to do with the
30-year shipbuilding plan was to be absolutely realistic in
terms of what ships would cost. Realistic in terms historically
of what Congress has appropriated for ships. But also to show
the impact that putting the new SSBN in our core budget would
have on the rest of the fleet. And to be realistic about that
so that decisions could be made at the appropriate time in
terms of how we fund our fleet, and how we fund this
replacement.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you. I mean obviously this
is going to be an issue for decades for committees like this.
But I fully support the effort again to invest in, you know,
the planning, and designing, because I think that will pay off
long term.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We have two members that haven't asked
questions yet. But let me ask Admiral Roughead--I was at a
shipbuilding port not too long ago. And I saw a ship being
built for the United States Coast Guard. I think it is called
the National Security Cutter. And I was just wondering why that
particular ship that we don't have to redesign or reconfigure
won't do for the Navy? I have seen no request for anything like
it or for that particular ship itself.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And we have looked at a variety
of options for the type of capabilities we need to meet our--
the needs of the maritime strategy. And the Coast Guard and the
National Security Cutter, that ship is optimized for their
missions. And as we look at what we have to do, and as a Navy,
and as a Navy that has to have versatility and agility built
into our ships.
Because I think it is important that our ships be able to
provide for a range of missions, and not simply be focused on
one. I would say maybe perhaps the exception to that is the
ballistic missile submarine because of what its mission is.
But we have to provide for a range of capabilities. For us,
speed becomes important. And that led us to the LCS. I, since
becoming CNO, I have looked at the speed requirements again,
and I have reassured myself that we are in the right place. But
what we are building now meets the requirements that we have to
deliver the type of navy the nation needs to be able to operate
in the places where we expect to have to operate in the future.
The Chairman. May I ask, Admiral, for the record, ask some
bright shipbuilder over the Navy Systems Command to give us the
pros and cons of that particular ship, including the cost?
Would you do that for our record?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 121.]
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will.
The Chairman. No rush, 2 or 3 weeks, whatever.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will do that.
The Chairman. And it is easy to do, but that would--I
really had to scratch my head when I saw that ship. You know,
why can't we have the plans and we wouldn't have to start from
scratch there.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will do that.
The Chairman. Would you do that then? Thank you so much.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
again for your service to our country.
General Conway, what do you see as the primary force
protection challenges in Afghanistan right now? And does the
Marine Corps have everything it needs in Afghanistan?
General Conway. Yes, sir, I think it is fair to say that we
do have everything that we need. That of course has been my
number one priority since I have been in this job, is to make
sure those troops, especially at the point of the spear, have
everything they need.
That said, we push industry for more. And by that, I am
talking about personal protective equipment in particular that
is more lightweight and would not be as burdensome as some of
the pictures you have probably seen coming out of Marjah, 80 to
100 pounds on the backs of some our Marines carrying their
sustainment load and the things they need to work 24/7.
We need a helmet that will stop 762 [7.62mm ammunition].
Right now, the biggest threat in Marjah is not necessarily the
IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] for our killed in action,
it is the sniper that can take a long-range shot and can
penetrate our protective equipment, particularly the helmet. So
we continue to pound the table on that with hopes that one day
we will have that piece of gear in hand.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. General Conway, are you confident
that the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] will provide
adequate protection against IED threats? How has the program
been modified to counter this threat?
General Conway. Sir, it is an interesting question, because
just in the last couple of days we have completed blast tests
with the EFV as compared to an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicle], an RG33, which is actually the mid-level
CAT-2 MRAP. I was very pleasantly surprised at how well it
progressed. I mean, about the same for underbody explosions,
and for underwheel or undertrack explosions, but actually the
EFV was markedly better against direct fire and indirect fire.
I will get you a copy of that study. And by the way, I
would asterisk it by saying, because the report did, this is
before we apply modular armor that we would want to incorporate
if we were in an IED-rich environment.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Conway. General Conway, was
the decision to delay the EFV's low-rate production in fiscal
year 2014 to 2015 based on technology development concerns, or
was it budget-driven?
General Conway. Congressman, I would say it was probably a
combination of both. We have seven new vehicles that are paid
for and are going to be arriving in the test beds throughout
the spring and summer. There are some KPs--knowledge points--
that we have to go through with those vehicles to determine
what our full-rate production needs to be, to determine if they
are going to be passed, the reliability concerns that they have
had in the past.
And I think in fairness, the Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of Defense wanted us to have some of the answers to
those issues before we got into a full rate of buy-in
procurement.
Mr. Coffman. General Conway, how do you plan to integrate
the MATV [MRAP All Terrain Vehicle] and the MRAP vehicles into
your current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet management program?
General Conway. Well, sir, we see a future value in, again,
the smallest of the MRAPs, the CAT-1s, and now the MATVs, which
is in some ways a replacement for the up-armored Hummer. With
regard to our combat engineers, our road clearance depths,
perhaps some other small units. But as was answered earlier, in
some ways it goes against two years, as a fast and relatively
light expeditionary force.
So we are going to preserve them, keep them available, so
if we get into another static environment like this in the
future, that we will have those vehicles available. But again,
a small percentage of them will be incorporated I think into
the TOE [Table of Equipment] of some of our support battalions.
Mr. Coffman. General Conway, in looking at the shipbuilding
plan, do you have any concerns about the forced entry
requirement in terms of amphibious capability?
General Conway. Sir, the CNO, under the observance of the
Secretary of the Navy, have agreed that 38 is the requirement.
We have said that we must be willing to accept risk down to
about 33 ships. And if you look at the 30-year shipbuilding
plan, it will sort of run highs and lows between that 30 and I
think we get as high as 36 in the out-years.
But we also need other parts of the fleet to be equally
strong. You know, we want those surface craft out there that
give us the force protection shield. We want the support of the
aircraft carriers if we need their aviation strike capacity.
And we want the subs out at distance screening the whole of the
effort. So we need a strong and balanced fleet I think. More
amphibs is always better, but we understand the fiscal
pressures that we are dealing with today.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
It looks like our last questioner is the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Nye.
Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to
thank you all for being here and for your service to our
country.
And I want to start by saying I just returned from a trip
to Afghanistan, and I am particularly impressed with the
continued dedication of our men and women in uniform out there.
Not limited to, but particularly including the Marines and
sailors who we may not expect to see in the desert, but often
do. They are doing terrific work and I really appreciate what
they are doing. I hope you will pass our thanks on to those
folks. We know we have given them a tough mission.
We have difficult decisions to make here as well, and I
don't think anyone would suggest that any of you have an easy
job. Just looking at an article from Inside the Navy recently,
Secretary Mabus, you were quoted.
``Looking ahead at some of the potential future budget
constraints that we might face in the coming years, having said
expected future resource streams will severely constrain our
choices, and that reducing Navy and Marine Corps programs to
within available resources may require difficult and
undesirable choices.''
I couldn't agree with you more. It is a tough position that
we are in, having to make some decisions in a constrained
environment. You were also quoted as saying, ``We need to be
prepared to rethink old assumptions and re-evaluate past
practices.'' Again, I agree with that.
We have to make tough decisions based on scarce resources.
We have heard a number of issues raised by many members of this
committee about how we are going to spend our resources and our
military dollars. And of course, we would all like to make sure
that they are spent in the most efficient and effective way
possible.
I will tell you, and I am sure it is going to be no
surprise to you to hear me say that I was disappointed to see
in the final QDR language a sentence recommending moving a
carrier to Mayport, Florida, and investing a substantial amount
of money in building that home port, which would be the fifth
U.S. nuclear carrier home port.
We have talked about it before, that is why I don't think
you are going to be surprised to hear from me about it today.
But I will tell you, I was disappointed in a number of things,
and one was in what I see as a lack of transparency in the
decisionmaking process that led up to that. I will give you a
couple of examples of why that troubles me.
And we talked with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen about
it in the past couple of weeks. We heard from Secretary Gates
that he essentially affirmed a statement that Senator Nelson
said that he had told him about a little over 2 months prior to
the QDR being issued that--and I want to make sure that I get
the wording right--but he said I think that they had nothing to
worry about.
We saw some drafts of the QDR come out around December that
suggested that the optimal solution would be a backup port in
Mayport, rather than a full home port. And then, different
language come out in the final version a few weeks later.
I asked Admiral Mullen about it in his testimony, and he
said essentially that it was a judgment call. We have asked
over the past year for some more strategic analysis of the
risks that we are trying to mitigate in Norfolk, and I am
unsatisfied with the fact that I don't think we have really
received that now.
Under Secretary Flournoy said essentially they had been
given two viable options to assess and choose between. Having a
backup port or having a full fifth nuclear carrier home port in
Mayport. And apparently, according to the QDR language, a
decision was made to go with the one that costs a lot of money.
Now, we can argue about the costs, somewhere between half a
billion and a billion. We think it is going to be on the upper
end of that. As I mentioned now, I was disappointed with the
transparency of the process, or lack thereof.
But I have asked for a GAO [Government Accountability
Office] study to be conducted, which has started to lay out on
the table all of the potential costs included in this type of
decision, so we can make that tough decision about how we are
going to allocate those defense dollars.
But Admiral Roughead, I just wanted to ask you one
question. Admiral Mullen said in his testimony when I asked him
about this, about the strategic dispersal issue. And I think
you used the words today, ``eggs in one basket kind of idea.''
And I asked Admiral Mullen if that type of thinking or
philosophy would apply to every military asset or base that we
have got, not simply nuclear home port for carriers, but every
other base, including SSBNs put in Georgia, and other things
like strategic bombers.
And he said essentially that, yes, it does apply to
anything that we are going to have to evaluate like that. Would
you agree with Admiral Mullen on that?
Admiral Roughead. I would agree that we have to take a good
look at where we have the redundancies that are important. And
you cite the case of a strategic ballistic submarine. Their
home port is in Georgia. But I can take that ship to Groton,
Connecticut, and maintain it there. I can take that ship to
Norfolk, Virginia, and maintain it there. So I have three
options, even for ballistic missile submarines.
The aircraft carrier on the east coast of the United States
is the only ship that I have that I do not have another option
to put into to do either routine or emergent maintenance.
Mr. Nye. Another option on the East Coast, although there
are three others on the West Coast, just to make sure we are
clear on that.
I think I am out of time. I will submit additional
questions for the record. But I appreciate we are going to
continue working going forward on this to find the right use of
our defense dollars. And appreciate the work you have put into
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You bet.
Mr. Sestak. Mr. Secretary, CNO, I want to first thank you
very much for how well you have handled that Petty Officer
Roach case on accountability of some sailor that had been
accused of being gay, later was discharged, and you held those
accountable for their mistreatment. And I very much appreciate
it. If anyone doesn't think that the service doesn't care about
accountability, they should know what you both did. Thank you
very much.
But I do have a question, Mr. Secretary, and it may I
understand from my staff had been asked before. As in that
incident we had been asking someone to live a lie, to quote the
Chairman. It had to do against the greatest ideals that we have
in the service, that is, of integrity, which you stood up and
followed.
I personally don't understand the year it takes to study
the implementation. We can ask the Marine Corps to fly in off
of amphibs into Pakistan--or into Afghanistan--in 30 days and
they can put the operation together and make it happen. This is
something that has to do with our principles, our ideals.
Why, except for your concern potentially about the legality
of it, if really does take a year to implement, we cannot at
least put out an executive order under stop-loss in order to
prevent these good men and women, particularly in a time of war
when we need them, from being discharged?
Besides the legality question that the Defense Department
may have, because there is obviously various opinion. If that
was not something, would you be opposed to it, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, the legality argument on that
seems to me to be the primary one. And to an earlier question,
the CNO said that the confusion that would be inherent in
something like that I think is an important consideration.
Mr. Sestak. But besides that, would you be opposed if it
was determined to be legal?
Secretary Mabus. I do think that--my understanding that the
way the President, as our Commander in Chief, requested
Congress to change the law, to repeal the law. But also, at the
same time, he asked the Department of Defense to take a careful
look at how to implement this law so that--how to implement it
should Congress decide to change it so that it would be
implemented in a very smooth, very professional, very
consistent----
Mr. Sestak. Only because of time then--and I don't mean to
be rude interjecting--your support of then of that does take
that long? But I mean you don't have an opinion then if the
legality was turned out to be okay. You still feel it needs
that type--that length of implementation?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sestak. A study? Thank you. I just was curious. I have
seen the military do things so quickly, and so well. And just--
it kind of passes me by. But I appreciate your comment.
Commandant, the Army has testified over the past years, and
the Chairman agreed with this last month that it cannot meet
its other war plans elsewhere like 2057 for South Korea--
because of Army readiness, and because of the lack of training
in combined arms for example.
Is the Marine Corps in a similar state? If so, and--because
I have one last question for the CNO--and if so, how long would
it take it to be back to where it could respond to that breadth
of war plans that we have, because of Iraq.
General Conway. Check. We are in the same place. We have
been focused on counterinsurgency now for a number of years,
and our forces are very good at that. But in the process we
sacrifice sort of our combined arms kind of skill levels. We
are encouraged that if we can stay below 20,000 in Afghanistan
we are going to extend our home station time to about 14 months
after a 7-month deployment.
And we are going to use a chunk of that time to get back to
combined arms. To get back to amphibious types of exercises
with the Navy----
Mr. Sestak. What length of time do you think it would take
if you had to guess if we stay below 20,000?
General Conway. Sir, I don't think it would be one for one.
You know, we have been away from it now for six years or so. I
don't think we will be back in six years. I think we have got
to develop that expertise, and get it embedded. So I am
guessing probably the better part of a decade----
Mr. Sestak. Before we can meet the breadth of war plans
again?
General Conway. Well, we can meet the war plans now----
Mr. Sestak. On a different timeline?
General Conway. To be as good as we were in 2002 I think--
--
Mr. Sestak. Okay.
General Conway [continuing]. Is probably going to take 8 to
10 years.
Mr. Sestak. And since I am a sophomore I have to be quick,
because Mr. Skelton will cut me right off. But--very quickly.
There has always been this question about 315 ships. Do you
really think as we look at how technology--particularly
knowledge is so important in warfare, that when using the long
metric of numbers of ships as far as trying to determine our
prowess in the future?
Admiral Roughead. I do not believe we are wrong in looking
at the numbers of ships. I think it is how we apply those
ships, and the range of missions, and geographic areas where we
are expected to be. And you do get to a numbers point as far as
being in many places doing different things in large ocean
areas. And that is where the number generates.
I think there are many who say, you know, we are bigger
than the next 13 Navies. But the fact of the matter is that our
Navy really has existed not for a cataclysmic sea battle all
the time. But rather for that presence, and the security, and
the stability that it provides.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Before I call on Mr. Franks, I would urge and ask Mr.
Secretary would you please provide the committee a copy of the
ongoing force structure assessment when it is complete. We
would certainly appreciate that----
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [continuing]. Very, very much. I am sitting
here thinking listening to your testimony how blessed we are to
have leaders such as you heading the services that you do, and
do so ably, and so well--people who wear the uniform and work
for you--I hope that you will carry our appreciation back to
them. And General Conway we wish you Godspeed. And we are going
to work you hard between now and the time we say farewell to
you. Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for your excellent
testimony. And welcome Secretary Mabus. We expect a lot of hard
work out of you.
With that, Mr. Franks, and Mr. Taylor will assume the
chair.
Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you. Let me just echo the chairman's
remarks related to your service. General Conway, I guess I
would single you out here a little bit, you know? General
MacArthur once said that, ``Old soldiers don't die, they just
fade away.''
And I know that Marines have a completely different
perspective. Old Marines don't die. They just charge in a new
direction. And I want you to know that we are very, very
grateful for your service. We talk about freedom in this place,
and we know that it is people like you that--that carry it with
you everywhere you go. And you have given your life to the
cause.
And I want you to know that I believe my children, and the
children of this country even though they may not remember
everything about you will live in a safer place, and walking
the light of liberty, because you were once commandant of the
Marine Corps. And thank you very much.
With that, Secretary Mabus, you know how politicians are?
They have to hit other politicians. And I don't--do you think
that you have a clear unimpeded latitude to speak in complete--
in candor about the--in public about the short- and long-term
resource needs of the Department of Navy?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Franks. Okay. So I guess I have to--you know, I am
stuck here. I have to ask given that the fleet is the smallest
that it has been in several decades, and given the growing cost
of shipbuilding we seem unlikely to reach Admiral Roughead's
313-ship fleet any time soon? I mean, every year for the past
15 years the shipbuilding accounts have been several billion
dollars short of what is needed. And we primarily underestimate
the cost of each new vessel. That kind of goes with it, I
guess.
We face a fighter gap based on of course the Navy testimony
of upwards of 250 aircraft by 2018. And that is about one half
of our carrier-based aircraft. And there is a widening gap in
the Marine Corps reset funding that could approach $30 billion.
I mean these are pretty short--serious shortfalls in my
judgment.
And of course on the threat side of the equation, the
Chinese have launched 16 new submarines, and from 2005 and
2007. And they have announced that they will design and build a
new class of destroyers that are also working on--that they are
also working on the first of likely several carriers. Which in
my opinion is it seems that China has developed, and is
enhancing its--area-denial capability based on their aggressive
submarine acquisition program, and their acquisition of
several--and development of several different anti-ship cruise
missiles.
And, I mean, they are just projecting power in a lot of
different directions. And I think it seems that they are
deliberately basing that on our assessed vulnerabilities. At
least it appears to me that way. So my point is--and there is a
question in here somewhere--the best means of assuring peace in
the western Pacific in my judgment is maintaining a sufficient
military power in the region to deter aggression. It is not a
new concept.
But the QDR was eerily silent on China. And based on your
recent comments--and Australia--I mean, it sounds like we maybe
have a different perspective of that concern. So with all that
said, do you think and believe that the Navy is programming
sufficient funds both in fiscal year 2011, and across the
future years to fully address China's military expansion?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. I do. And to talk just very
briefly about a few of the things that you said. We try to be
very realistic in this budget, and in this 30-year shipbuilding
plan about the cost of each of our vessels. Because frankly it
doesn't do us any good to come in low, and then continually to
ask for more money. If we are going to get the size of fleet
that we need, we have to be realistic about what they are going
to cost.
We are also taking some pretty aggressive actions to drive
down the cost of ships. The downselect of the OCS is the thing
that springs to mind. In terms of our capability in the
Pacific, and particularly the western Pacific, we are very
mindful of what is happening. The Chinese capabilities and the
things that they are doing--they haven't been nearly as
transparent about as we would like. But we do understand the
types of ships they are building. We understand the types of
anti-access missiles, both ballistic missiles, and cruise
missiles that they are fielding. And we understand what they
are doing with their fleet.
We have great confidence that the ships that we have today,
and the ships that we are building for the future, and our
total force concept will meet whatever challenge--and I won't
just limit it to the Chinese. That whatever challenge we face
in the Pacific, we feel that--that the fleet can meet it, and
that the Navy and Marine Corps team will be there to hedge and
deter in a very effective way.
Mr. Franks. All right. Well, thank you all. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] Yes. Thanks to the gentleman.
The Chair will recognize the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General Conway, on possibly your last presentation here
before the Armed Services Committee, I want to thank you for
your service. And in the last year I have had the extraordinary
opportunity to visit with your Marines at Camp Leatherneck. I
was so impressed. And then a great honor that I cherish. My
wife and I being the--reviewing at Parris Island in November.
You should be so grateful for the young people that you are
providing opportunity.
And Admiral Roughead, I always want to thank you for your
service at the Naval academy, and then commanding the USS Port
Royal, which is named after a port in South Carolina. And thank
you for your service, and hospitality.
I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
And I would like to take this opportunity to thank all
three of you gentlemen for your service to our nation.
Commandant, we are going to miss you. I know you are going to
do great things no matter what you do after uniform. But we
certainly value every day that you have served us.
Secretary Mabus, we are very, very, lucky that you gave up
your private sector probably cushy job for this, but we--again,
we are lucky to have you.
And Admiral Roughead, we always value you as the only--I
believe the only commander of both the Atlantic and the Pacific
fleets to have served the United States Navy. A very rare, and
well-deserved distinction.
Secretary Mabus, before you leave I would like to hand
deliver to you a letter that--from myself, Senator Cochran, and
Senator Wicker. A similar letter was delivered to Northrop
Grumman last week. And it basically says that the Congress has
authorized and appropriated five ships--already authorized,
already appropriated. And yet for whatever reason Northrop and
the Navy have not come to terms--gotten those ships started.
The admiral has made an excellent case that he needs a
bigger fleet. The Congress has already responded to that--
appropriating the money. We need to get going. And so I don't
know if it is Northrop's delay. I don't know if it is the
Navy's delay. But there is a delay that needs to be addressed
that I am going to ask you to take a look at that.
But again thank all of you for your service. And with that,
this meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
February 24, 2010
=======================================================================
?
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 24, 2010
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.068
?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 24, 2010
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON
Admiral Roughead. The National Security Cutter (NSC) was designed
to conduct an offshore patrol mission that is very different from Navy
missions, and the NSC does not meet Navy requirements for speed, draft,
survivability, and manpower requirements. The Navy is building the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to meet its Joint Staff-validated
warfighting requirements. NSC would require significant and costly
design changes to meet LCS capability requirements, which would likely
result in the end cost of a modified NSC exceeding that of LCS. A more
detailed comparison of LCS and NSC characteristics follows.
In speed, LCS has a sprint speed of more than 40 knots; NSC sprint
speed is 28 knots. In draft, LCS draft is approximately 13 feet to
engage threats in the Littorals; the NSC draft is 22.5 feet,
restricting its access in shallow waters. The inability of NSC to meet
speed and draft requirements fundamentally limit the areas where the
NSC can effectively operate. In survivability, LCS is built to Naval
Vessel Rules and provides Level 1 survivability, which provides for
shock hardening, protection against chemical, biological, radiological
attack, and damage control/firefighting capability against destructive
fires. NSC does not provide Level I survivability as it was not
designed to operate in the same threat environment as LCS. In manpower
requirements, LCS has a core crew of 40 personnel with 35 personnel
comprising the mission package detachment and aviation detachment; the
size of NSC crew is 110, 35 more than LCS at full mission capability.
Additionally, LCS is designed to employ modular mission packages that
address specific naval capability gaps in mine countermeasures, surface
warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. NSC does not have the space or
ability to employ these mission packages. [See page 37.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Admiral Roughead. Navy expects all recent ship classes to survive a
100 kilovolts per meter (kV/m) event with some degradation to mission
possible. Regarding your specific question about remaining warfighting
capability after an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) laydown of 100 kV/m,
the answer is classified and I will provide it to you via separate
correspondence. [See page 17.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 24, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no
funds could be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced
procurement of surface combatants to be constructed after FY11 until
multiple conditions had been met:* Submission of an acquisition
strategy for surface combatants approved by USD AT&L and briefed to and
approved by the JROC;* Verification by an independent review panel that
the Navy considered numerous factors including modeling and simulation,
operational availability, life cycle costs including manning, cost and
schedule ramifications of accommodating new sensors and weapons to
counter future threats; and* Conclusions of a joint review by SECNAV
and Director MDA defining additional requirements for investment in
Aegis BMD beyond the number of ships planned to be equipped for this
mission in the FY 2010 budget submittal. Further, the FY10 NDAA
required an update to the Navy's Open Architecture report to Congress
upon submittal of the FY12 budget to reflect the Navy's combat systems
acquisition plans for surface combatants. It also mandated submission
of an update to the 2006 Naval Surface Fires Support report to Congress
identifying capability shortfalls. Finally, the language directed the
Navy to develop a plan to incorporate new technologies from DDG-1000
and other surface combatant programs into ships constructed after 2011
to avoid redundant development, implement open architecture and foster
competition. To date, the Navy has not satisfied these requirements.
The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no funds could
be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced procurement of
surface combatants to be constructed after FY11 until several
conditions had been met, including verification by an independent
review panel that the Navy considered numerous factors as part of
establishing their shipbuilding plan and considered new technologies
from more recent ship classes than the DDG-51.
Such an independent assessment of needs and options seems
particularly germane to our hearing today. Both the FY11 President's
budget and 30-year shipbuilding plan you submitted this year is heavily
based on DDG-51, one would assume this is a result of the
aforementioned analyses, strategies and reviews. When would you expect
the Navy to submit the results of this independent assessment that
supports the plan you've submitted?
Admiral Roughead. On February 6, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy
submitted to the congressional defense committees a plan for
implementing the language contained in Section 125 of Fiscal Year (FY)
2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Public Law 111-84.
In addition, the Navy has completed the following actions:
Completed the development of the Technology Roadmap for
Surface Combatants and Fleet Modernization February 2010 in accordance
with Section 125(d) of the FY 2010 NDAA.
The update to the Naval Surface Fire Support Report to
Congress was delivered on March 11, 2010.
As reported in the Navy's implementation plan report to Congress,
an independent panel, jointly established by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) and the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and
Resources (OPNAV N8) reviewed the Navy's future guided missile
destroyer hull and radar study of 2009. This independent panel was
comprised of senior subject matter experts with extensive background in
policy, acquisition, research and development, radar and ship design,
combat systems integration, budget and cost analysis. Results of the
Navy study, along with the independent review panel's report, have been
briefed to the congressional defense committees' staff; members of the
House Armed Services Committee received a brief on March 11, 2010. The
full Navy study and independent review panel report will be provided
this Spring.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. General Conway, you serve as the DOD Executive
Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons. The 2009 Marine Corps S&T Strategic Plan
identifies a number of capabilities required to address irregular
warfare needs in the future including interim force capabilities. Yet
the budget for these is stale at about $100 million per year and
several promising programs aren't making their way from R&D into the
field. What needs to happen to encourage wide-spread adoption of these
capabilities across all services? Would legislation empowering your
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Office be useful to you? For example, does the
office need to become a joint program office?
General Conway. The DOD NLW Executive Agent has an ongoing
independent assessment by the Center for Naval Analysis that is
researching this question and that is nearing conclusion. Additional
time is needed by the DOD NLWEA to review the CNA report, assess its
findings and make a recommendation on the way forward.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN
Mr. Akin. I have been briefed that the Navy requires a 5-to-1 ratio
of non-deployed to deployed ships in order to support its surface
combatant mission. Given the added requirement for afloat BMD, how many
more BMD-capable ships will the Navy need in order to support this
mission without negatively impacting the safety and support of the
Carrier Strike Group?
Admiral Roughead. In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), we adjusted the Aegis BMD Program of Record (POR) to increase
the total number of funded Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP from
21 to 38, of which 27 will be deployable in FY15. Increasing the
inventory of Surface Combatants with BMD capability gives the Navy
greater flexibility to meet Combatant Commander surge and contingency
operations requirements, and to provide an organic BMD capability to
our CSGs.
Mr. Akin. In your testimony you mentioned using SLEP as a primary
mitigation strategy for the Strike Fighter Shortfall problem, yet I
have been briefed by the Navy that Fleet OPTEMPO is the primary
limiting factor for how many jets can undergo SLEP per year. If the
Navy has already optimized the number of jets it is able to SLEP
annually, how will this measure be able to do in the future what it is
apparently unable to do now?
Admiral Roughead. According to the current planning schedule, the
SLEP window of opportunity for F/A-18A-D does not occur until FY 2012,
when modifications to our F/A-18A-D aircraft begin. The Navy is
developing a FY 2012 budget request that will include SLEP
requirements.
SLEP is only one aspect of the Navy's TACAIR inventory management
initiatives targeted at preserving the service life of our existing
legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A-18A-D). The Navy will reduce the
number of aircraft available in our squadrons during non-deployed
phases to the minimum required. Navy expeditionary squadrons and those
supporting the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) will be reduced from 12
aircraft to 10 aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis. These
measures reduce the operational demand on legacy F/A-18s, making more
aircraft available for induction into life extension events. The Navy
is also evaluating depot level efficiency to maximize throughput and
return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet. Collectively, these
measures will extend the service life of the legacy aircraft and make
the projected inventory decrease manageable. The management initiatives
being implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements
today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and
capability requirements.
Mr. Akin. The JSF continues to be plagued by delays. Most recently,
it was reported that the IOC date for the Air Force will slide roughly
two years to late CY 2015. In the past year the JSF completed only
roughly 10% of its planned test flights. Given that the Navy has
traditionally been the service with the most stringent OP/EVAL
requirements prior to IOC, and given that the Navy is scheduled to
receive the carrier variant of the JSF last, how will these delays
effect the Navy's IOC date?
Admiral Roughead. Based on the SECDEF approved F-35 program
restructure and delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F-35C
IOC has been changed to 2016.
The Navy IOC is based on three items: sufficient aircraft
quantities, desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements
Document missions, and completion of operational test of delivered
capability. The Navy's intent is to stand up squadrons as aircraft
become available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested
and delivered.
Mr. Akin. Will the Navy accept an inordinate risk by abandoning its
long-held standards for thorough test and evaluation in order to IOC
the JSF in accordance with a predetermined timeframe, or will the Navy
proceed with its customary diligence, thereby exacerbating the Strike
Fighter Gap?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy will not abandon its long-held
standards. Based on the program and test schedule restructure and
delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F-35C IOC has been
revised to be in 2016 based on three items: sufficient aircraft
quantities; desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements
Document missions; and completion of operational test of delivered
capability.
F-35 test program risks will be mitigated through the continuation
of a test program assessment and the support and advice of the OSD
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. An Integrated Test Review
Team composed of experts in Developmental Test and Operational Test
continues to mature test program plans to ensure program technical
maturity is aligned with IOC dates; operational assessments are
optimized; new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test
schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data
enables the planned operational test periods.
To mitigate aircraft assets required during testing, the program is
adding one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program to expand
developmental testing capacity; utilization of three Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) aircraft in support of development testing; and
addition of another software development/test capability.
The Navy, in conjunction with OSD and the USAF, is pursuing every
opportunity to increase efficiency of test and accelerate delivery of
required capability to maximize our strike fighter inventory. We will
stand up squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when
sufficient capability is tested and delivered.
Mr. Akin. I have been briefed that the Marine Corps intends to IOC
the JSF on time, regardless of where the F-35 stands with respect to
test and evaluation. Given the overwhelming delays in test for the F-
35, this could potentially require the Marine Corps to IOC a weapons
system long before it is fully tested. Is it wise to take assets and
resources away from our ongoing operational requirements in order to
prematurely force the introduction of an aircraft that is not even
optimized for the fight we are currently in today?
General Conway. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a multi-mission
capable Block 2B aircraft as described in the JSF Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) CN-3. A USMC IOC is projected to be 2012
for the F-35B which is based on operational requirements and the
associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training,
and support that will measure the progress of the program to meet the
USMC requirements between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine
Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use of the F-
35B are ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these
requirements.
No assets or resources are being taken away from operational
requirements to IOC. The USMC transition to the F-35B is structured and
scheduled to meet operational requirements throughout the process
without degradation.
Mr. Akin. Your Harrier squadrons currently have 16 aircraft each.
One of the ``Management Levers'' the DoN has briefed to me as a means
of mitigating Strike Fighter Shortfalls is to reduce the number of
aircraft in expeditionary F/A-18 squadrons by 2. Yet, they have also
informed me that this ``management lever'' is not possible given
existing operational requirements. Knowing that the Marine Corps
requires its existing number of jets in order to support its current
share of sorties, it seems reasonable to assume that the Marine Corps
likewise requires its existing compliment of Harriers as well. Will you
be replacing Harrier Squadrons with an equivalent number of F-35's? If
not, how will this impact current operational demand?
Will the rate at which you plan to replace Harriers meet current
operational requirements?
General Conway. The key enabler the AV-8B provides is the ability
to deploy as part of a composite Air Combat Element (ACE) within the
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) as part of our basic Marine Air Ground
Task Force maneuver element. An integrated Tactical Aviation capability
at this level provides the ability to project, protect, and prosecute
combat operations when and wherever required. The F-35B STOVL Joint
Strike Fighter leverages off the AV-8B's proven legacy in this
environment and adds the multi-mission capabilities of the F/A-18
aircraft that will evolve our MEU's into far more superior force in
readiness.
We have seven standing MEU's and the requirement to continue this
force in the future has been repeatedly vetted and validated. Replacing
the AV-8B's with a similar number F-35B's is the plan to maintain the
capabilities to meet our operational requirements. Our procurement
plans support the transition of the Harrier squadrons with the
Lightening II aircraft, same number of aircraft supporting the same
number of MEU's with one noted addition. When a 6 aircraft Detachment
deploys with the ACE as it does today with the Harrier, the remaining
combat capability of the F-35B in the ten aircraft left behind has the
same resident capabilities of our other fourteen 10 aircraft squadrons
that are replacing the Hornets. With this construct of the F-35B
squadrons, seven 16 aircraft squadrons and fourteen 10 aircraft
squadrons, we take our tactical aviation capabilities into a common
single type of aircraft with all the associated synergy and savings
while increasing our MAGTF combat capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Six amphibious ships will be decommissioned within the
next three years, bringing the amphibious force to below 30. This
brings the risk level to above what Navy and Marine Corps defines as
the ``limit of acceptable risk.'' Understanding that the Navy plans to
retain these vessels in the inactive fleet, rather than selling or
dismantling them, what would be the cost of continuing to operate the
vessels? What prevents the Navy from retaining these ships?
Admiral Roughead. The cost of maintaining ships past their design
life is difficult to forecast accurately; however, the table below
provides Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates absent specific ship
studies to determine if extending the service lives of these ships
through the FYDP is feasible.
Navy retires ships from service when changes in mission or threat
environment over the period of a ship's commissioned service, or
deterioration in overall seaworthiness, make the ship no longer viable
or cost-effective for future service. The LHA 1 Class does not meet the
challenges of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) integration. The LPD 4 Class
ships have reached or exceeded their expected service lives of 40
years, and provide limited C5I capability to support USMC current and
future missions.
Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides a projected battle force
that balances the anticipated risk across the FYDP with the security
uncertainties of the future to achieve the best balance of mission
capabilities, resources, and requirements.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfunded Costs FY11-15 ($ Millions/FY11 dollars)
Ship Date of Age in ---------------------------------------------------
Commission FY15 Ops and Maint Manpower* Training** Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USS NASSAU LHA 4 28-Jul-79.... 36....... 289......... 439....... 55......... 783
USS PELELIU LHA 5 3-May-80..... 35....... 322......... 250....... 30......... 602
USS CLEVELAND LPD 7 21-Apr-67.... 48....... 95......... 151....... 19......... 265
USS DUBUQUE LPD 8 1-Sep-67..... 48....... 149......... 151....... 19......... 319
USS DENVER LPD 9 26-Oct-68.... 46....... 176......... 87....... 10......... 273
USS PONCE LPD 15 10-Jul-71.... 44....... 146......... 120....... 14......... 280
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL (FY11-15) 1177......... 1198....... 147......... 2522
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Manpower costs programmed in the year of decommissioning are \1/2\ of a full year requirement; reflects MPN/
RPN/DHAN/R and OMN.
** Training reflects MPN/RPN/DHAN/R for Individuals Account for ships listed.
All values are in $M (FY11).
Mr. Wilson. With the projected fighter shortfall and the further
sliding of the JSF, why is the Navy not planning on purchasing
additional F/A-18EIF aircraft? Though the JSF will show significant
stealth improvements over the E/F, the SuperHornet has significant
improvements in signature improvements over the legacy Hornets. Do you
believe that advances in air defense over the next several years will
lead to such a tactical risk that it is worth taking the strategic risk
of such a substantial force structure gap?
Admiral Roughead. The F/A-18E/F is a highly capable aircraft
designed to meet and defeat today's threats with growth potential for
the future; however, it cannot replace the F-35C. I remain committed to
the JSF program because of the advanced sensor, precision strike,
firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will bring to our Fleet. We are
monitoring the JSF program closely and managing our existing strike
fighter capacity to meet power projection demands until JSF is
delivered. The management initiatives being implemented prudently
balance operational risks and requirements today, while seeking to
fulfill future projected capacity and capability requirements.
Mr. Wilson. The increased operational tempo of the past six years
has led to much talk about strategies for increasing dwell times for
Marines. Many units have been operating on a less than one-to-one
dwell-to-deployed time. This has led to a substantial lack of training
time, and hindered readiness. Have you abandoned the two-to-one dwell-
to-deployed ideal? What strategies are you pursuing to ensure that
Marines will be properly trained for both their primary and contingency
missions?
General Conway.
To date, almost 75 percent of the available Marines have
deployed in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM,
or other operational commitments around the globe.
Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual
deployment tempo on a two-year sliding scale--the number of days
deployed out of the previous 730 days. In the last seven years, we have
seen a twentyfold increase in the individual deployment tempo of
Marines in the active component. In October 2002, the number of Marines
who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a two-year period was
4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 Marines had deployed for at least
120 consecutive days.
Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure unit
operational tempo is the ratio of ``deployment to dwell''--months
deployed to months at home station. We limit the duration of
deployments for units and individual Marines to no more than seven
months for battalions and squadrons. Higher headquarters units deploy
for one year.
Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio in
the active component and a 1:5 ratio in the reserve component. Our
reserve units are currently operating at a ratio that more closely
approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of our active component units,
on average, are nearing the goal of 1:2 (see Table 1).
Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment-to-Dwell Ratios
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAGTF Element Average Ratio (Months Deployed: Months Home Station)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Element 1 : 1.43
Ground Combat Element 1 : 2.08
Aviation Combat Element 1 : 2.11
Logistics Combat Element 1 : 1.79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: As of 18 Nov 2009. The subordinate units most frequently deployed are Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01
(Command Element); Infantry Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons, 1:1.10, and Attack
Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies 1:1.30
(Logistics Combat Element).
Mr. Wilson. Sustained level of combat has led to a large gap
between equipment the Marine Corps needs fixed or replaced and what has
been fixed or replaced. Additionally the Maritime Prepositioning Ships'
inventories have been greatly depleted. Do you have a proposed timeline
for getting the Marine Corps back on track with the equipment they
need? Is there a move to replenish the Maritime Prepositioning
supplies?
General Conway.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
Our Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRONs) will be reset
with the most capable equipment possible. We have begun loading them
with capabilities that support lower spectrum operations while still
maintaining the ability to generate Marine Expeditionary Brigades
(MEBs) capable of conducting major combat operations. As we modernize,
apply lessons learned, and reset our MPSRONs their readiness will
fluctuate. However, our endstate is all three MPSRONs fully reset by
2012 and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) reset
within Marine Corps priorities as assets become available.
The MPSRONs are currently rotating through Maritime Prepositioning
Force Maintenance Cycle-9. MPSRON-1 completed MPF Maintenance Cycle-9
in September 2008 and is currently at 83 percent of its full equipment
set. As has been addressed in previous reports, equipment from MPSRON-1
was required to outfit new units standing up in Fiscal Year 2007 and
Fiscal Year 2008 as part of our end strength increase to 202,000. While
the majority of combat systems are loaded, MPSRON-1 is short a portion
of its motor transport, communications and bulk fuel/water storage
capability. MPSRON-1 is expected to be fully reset at the completion of
its next maintenance cycle in 2011.
Equipment from MPSRON-2 was offloaded to support Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM II. During its rotation through MPF Maintenance Cycle-9,
between August 2008 and July 2009, the readiness of MPSRON-2 was
substantially improved from 49 percent to its current readiness of 77
percent. Upon integration of MPSRON-2's fifth ship, a Large, Medium
Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship in Jan 2011 and completion of its
MPF Maintenance Cycle-10 rotation in fiscal year 2012, MPSRON-2 is
expected to be fully reset.
MPSRON-3 was reset to 100 percent of its equipment set during MPF
Maintenance Cycle-8 in March 2007. MPSRON-3 is rotating through MPF
Maintenance Cycle-9 and currently has three ships of equipment
downloaded at Blount Island Command. Two of MPSRON-3's ships were
employed in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Haiti and provided the
Marine Expeditionary Units and Naval Support Elements with the
additional equipment and supplies necessary to support immediate
relief. The goal is, upon completion of its MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 and
backload of all vessels, in July 2010 MPSRON-3 will return to 100
percent.
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program: Norway
The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program--Norway (MCPP-N) was used
to source equipment in support of operations in Iraqi and Afghanistan,
including the recent force increase. MCPP-N is routinely utilized to
support theater security cooperation activities and exercises in the
AFRICOM and EUCOM areas of responsibility. The Marine Corps continues
to reset MCPP-N in accordance with our operational priorities while
also exploring other locations for geographic prepositioning that will
enable combat and theater security cooperation operations in support of
forward deployed Naval Forces.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Like many, I am concerned about the lack of
number of ships in the Navy. About 100 years ago, Great Britain was a
world super power. It was also during this time that Great Britain
dominated the sea. Are you concerned that if we don't make it a
priority to build ships to maintain our sea dominance that this could
weaken our country's super power standing?
Admiral Roughead. As our security and prosperity are inextricably
linked with those of other nations, a global Fleet is essential to
deterring aggression, assuring our allies, building partnerships, and
protecting our national interests. A Fleet of no less than 313 ships is
necessary to meet those operational requirements. Our 30-Year
shipbuilding plan grows the capacity of our Fleet to 320 ships by 2024,
with the naval capabilities necessary to meet the challenges the nation
faces over the next three decades of the 21st century. On balance, I
believe the force structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding
plan maintains our ability to project power across the spectrum of
challenges we are likely to face throughout the time period of the
report, albeit with prudent risk where appropriate.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Wouldn't you agree that spouses relying on
the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) program to
further their academic goals should have been notified prior to the
temporary stay in order to make the necessary arrangements with their
school?
Admiral Roughead. I do agree that spouses should have been afforded
additional notice in advance of such a significant change in program
policies or procedures. The pause was necessitated by an unforeseen,
unprecedented spike in enrollments, which not only pushed the program
to its budget threshold, but also began to overwhelm the program's
support systems. As a senior leader who recognizes the extraordinary
role military spouses play in the lives and careers of our uniformed
service members, I share the Department's deep regret in reaching the
decision to temporarily suspend the program on such short notice.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. The Administration's Phased, Adaptive Approach to BMD
drives BMD-capable ships to provide effects at three very different
levels of war. First, they must provide theater effects for sea-base
defense. They must also provide regional and cross-regional effects to
areas like CENTCOM and/or PACOM. Finally they must be able to provide
effects for homeland defense (global effects). This is a daunting task.
Is the C3 (command, control, communications) architecture in place to
enable BMD-capable ships to perform all of these functions? What
initiatives are underway to connect the sensors and shooters to provide
a layered missile defense that protects not only our forces abroad but
the Homeland? Is there a cost to other missions when these ships are
conducting their BMD mission? How would you quantify the risk based on
this expanded tasking?
Admiral Roughead. C3 (command, control, communications)
architecture is in place to enable BMD-capable ships to perform all
three levels of war. The Navy contributes to BMD as part of a Joint and
coalition family of systems. As new capabilities are added, the
existing Missile Defense Agency managed C3 architecture is updated to
ensure interoperability and effectiveness. The key C3 interface between
BMD ships and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is in place.
In most Combatant Commands (COCOM), the capability exists but requires
further upgrades and enhancements. The Navy is currently resourcing
Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) with access to the Command and
Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) applications to
increase Command and Control connectivity with the Global BMDS. The
Navy is addressing communication improvements to support seamless BMDS
integration across Theater, Regional and Strategic Communications for
BMD cueing and track management. A majority of this capability, such as
Multi-TADIL-J, exists currently.
Initiatives are being undertaken to connect the sensors and
shooters in a layered missile defense that protects not only our forces
abroad but also the Homeland. The spiral development of C2BMC includes
continuous improvements which will enhance coordination across Navy,
Joint and Coalition sensors, contributing to Homeland Defense and
theater and regional missions.
Mission prioritization is directed at the highest levels of the DOD
and is based on Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. Naval
operations, to include maritime BMD, are led by Maritime Component
Commanders at theater Maritime Operations Centers (MOC), and
effectively employ multi-mission Surface Combatants with BMD capability
to meet CCDR requirements. Regular CCDR sponsored exercises and test
events are used to benchmark and improve coordination among commanders
in theater, cross-regional, and Homeland defense operations. Navy has
also added BMD scenarios to Fleet battle experiments and exercises to
identify and test additional enhancements.
The BMD mission does not represent an increase in overall risk, but
rather a reduction in risk to our deployed forces and interests around
the globe. That said, the Navy has a finite number of surface
combatants to conduct numerous missions. Combatant Commanders balance
theater level requirements, forces and risk in carrying out their
missions, to include BMD.
Mr. Lamborn. Our potential adversaries have shown the capability
and willingness to deny our forces access to satellite communications
either through the use of anti-satellite weapons or communications
jamming. While anti-satellite technology is a very real threat, proven
by China's January 2007 shoot down of one of their aging satellites,
the technology to interfere with satellite communications is simple and
readily available worldwide from any local Radio Shack store. What
specific measures has the U.S. Navy taken to ensure that it can
continue to provide missile defense in a satellite communications
denied environment? I understand if this requires a classified
response, but I encourage you to share what you can with this committee
in both an unclassified and classified response.
Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has a number of mitigation
techniques to counter jamming threats available for use in a Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) degraded environment. Use of frequency hopping,
agile spot beams, and spread spectrum techniques provide low
probability of detection and intercept of our SATCOM. The Department of
the Navy studies SATCOM degraded environment mitigations through our
Range of Warfare Command and Control initiative, better preparing our
forces to meet their operational requirements despite others' efforts
to disrupt them. The Navy is capable of conducting its missions in this
challenging environment, to include missile defense. Through these
efforts, and in cooperation with the joint and interagency community on
the development of other mitigations, like the Joint Aerial Layer
Network, the Navy will be poised to operate in the most challenging
electromagnetic environments now and in the years to come.
If you desire further elaboration on the Navy's mitigation
techniques and initiatives, I can provide a classified response or have
my staff brief you on the issue in more detail.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. Secretary Mabus, as you may know, in the FY10 NDAA
report language was included regarding the Miramar Air Station Trap and
Skeet range. The provision in the NDAA directs the ``Secretary to
submit a report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives when
the PA/SI is complete. The report should include a description of any
mitigation measures needed and timeline to complete, and plans and
timeline to reopen the range.'' It is my understanding that the PA/SI
was completed in December 2009. Can you please tell me what the status
is of your report to both the SASC and HASC as well as when it will be
available for our review?
Secretary Mabus. The Preliminary Assessment report is complete. The
Site Inspection report was recently revised to reflect regulatory
agency comments and was finalized March 18, 2010. Based on the results
of these studies, the Report to Congress required by the House Report
2647 of the FY10 NDAA is currently being prepared and will be provided
to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in the next 60 days.
Copies of the Preliminary Assessment and the Site Inspection reports
will also be made available to the Committees.
Mr. Hunter.. General Conway, it is my understanding that the Marine
Corps has developed a roll-on, roll-off technology that expands the
capability of the KC-130J. The Harvest Hawk program will enable the KC-
130J to fulfill multiple missions individually or simultaneously from
refueling missions, including fire support missions and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. I am encouraged by the
Marine Corps' work with Harvest Hawk and their plan to increase the
capability of the KC-130J aircraft in order to take advantage of the
extended endurance of the KC-130J. What is the status of the Harvest
Hawk developmental effort and when do you expect to be able to field
the capability?
General Conway. Harvest Hawk is currently in developmental test
and is expected to deploy during the summer 2010.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
