[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-120]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 3, 2010
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Andrew Hunter, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 3, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request from the Department of
Defense........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 3, 2010...................................... 75
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 4
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 6
Mullen, Adm. Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs.... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gates, Hon. Robert M......................................... 91
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 82
Mullen, Adm. Michael G....................................... 103
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 79
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Gail H. McGinn letter, with attachments, to Dr. Snyder....... 143
January 20, 2010 letter and attachment from Mr. McKeon to
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen......................... 125
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 163
Ms. Giffords................................................. 164
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 165
Mr. Kline.................................................... 163
Mr. Sestak................................................... 163
Mr. Taylor................................................... 163
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 178
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 181
Ms. Giffords................................................. 183
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 190
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 181
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 183
Ms. Pingree.................................................. 190
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 175
Mr. Smith.................................................... 169
Mr. Taylor................................................... 169
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 186
Mr. Wilson................................................... 176
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 3, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Let me start by welcoming
today's witnesses back to the House Armed Services Committee,
particularly in our renovated hearing room. This is a maiden
voyage in this renovated room, and I think it will serve all of
us, and the public better to see how laws are discussed in our
committee.
We thank both of you for your distinguished decades of
service to our Nation. I know that along with it comes no small
measure of personal sacrifice for both of you as well as your
families. And I as well as all the members of the committee
wish to extend our thanks to those who support you as well.
We convene today to receive testimony not only on Fiscal
Year (FY) 2011 budget request for the Department of Defense
(DOD), but also to hear your perspectives on the recently
delivered report on the Quadrennial Defense Review, also known
as the QDR. Preparing both of these documents is an enormous
undertaking. And while neither is a perfect document, both are
weighty and serious efforts--both in absolute terms compared to
prior efforts. They are remarkably well coordinated with each
other.
In my view the remarkable thing about both documents,
however, is the deep commitment they reflect on the part of the
Department and the Administration to preserving the national
security of the United States. At a time of tremendous economic
difficulty, unprecedented deficits, and spending freezes in
other parts of the budget, the QDR demonstrates the clear need
for, and the Department's budget reflects real growth in,
defense spending.
The budget request request is for $708 billion in Fiscal
Year 2011, including $159 billion for contingency operations
costs in Fiscal Year 2011, and an additional $33 billion for
our Afghanistan operations in Fiscal Year 2010.
Now while we have our disagreements about some of the
details of the budget, I strongly support the Administration
decision to request these increases for defense. Let there be
no confusion as this committee considers the budget request. We
will redouble our efforts to identify and eliminate wasteful
spending. This may mean cutting funds for particular programs
or making further changes in how we do business as we did last
year in the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. And
I compliment and thank the committee for its excellent work in
that regard.
However at a time when we are fighting two wars, combating
al Qaeda, and working to provide relief to people struck by
tragedy such as the recent devastation in Haiti, the
Department's request for significant resources is amply
justified.
The critical thing about both the budget and the QDR is
that they put the troops first. You set absolute the right
priority by focusing on service members and their families. The
budget includes a military pay raise, a large housing allowance
increase, no increases in health care fees, and numerous
initiatives to help military families.
Second, you lay out in the QDR and in this budget how we
are going to fight and win both today's wars and future
conflicts. Future conflicts we do not yet foresee. And I might
add as a footnote that the Library of Congress gathered for me
a list of 12 military conflicts in which we have engaged since
I have been in Congress--since 1977.
Third, you have taken the fight directly to al Qaeda by
deploying 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in December,
and redoubling our efforts in Pakistan. Since President Obama
came into office we have essentially tripled our forces in
Afghanistan. These troops have directly engaged--engaging al
Qaeda and the Taliban--that is those who attacked us on 9/11.
And while I am pleased the President's budget request again
acknowledges the importance of providing for full concurrent
receipt of military retired pay and the Department of Veterans
Affairs Disability Compensation for veterans who retired
because of disabilities with less than 20 years of service, I
was greatly disappointed that the budget request did not
include the specific pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) offsets that are
required to cover the cost.
This committee has a deep commitment to this issue, and our
veterans. But we simply cannot enact it unless the
Administration identifies and advocates for specific offsets.
That didn't happen last year. And we were standing there
holding the bag, because there was no place to get the offsets.
With the Army and Marine Corps both fully engaged in
contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with thousands
of airmen and sailors serving in support of Central Command it
is fitting that the budget request increases the Department's
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts by 9.4 percent or
$19.4 billion. This increase is much needed.
Repeated deployments with limited dwell time continue to
reduce the ability of our forces to train across the full
spectrum of conflict, increasing the risk when our military has
to quickly respond to emerging contingencies. The committee
also recognizes the need to be prepared across the full
spectrum making increased O&M resources all the more important.
This readiness deficit has been a long standing worry for our
committee.
We are encouraged by the Department's planning objective to
achieve 2 years at home station for the active component for
every 1 year deployed, and by the increases in several service
training budgets. However I am concerned that so much of the
funding for reconstructing the Army and Marine Corps remains in
the overseas contingency operations (OCO) portion of the
budget, and has not yet transitioned to the base budget itself.
We are glad to see that the budget request for Fiscal Year
2011 includes $23 million to implement the required transition
for the 225,000 National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
employees out of that system and back to personnel systems that
are fair and work. Fiscal year 2011 budget request will ensure
that no NSPS employee experiences a loss of or a decrease in
pay.
In the area of global posture I know that we will be having
intense discussions about the requirements for the Army force
structure in Europe, about the Navy carrier home-porting, and
the realignment of Marines in the Pacific. These, of course,
are critical issues.
Any discussion of modernization accounts must begin with
the F-35 program--the largest acquisition program in history.
The success of which is essential to our joint force as well as
to our allies. I applaud the Secretary for following the letter
and the spirit of Section 101 of the Weapons System Acquisition
Reform Act of 2009 by funding the program to the more realistic
cost estimate of the Joint Estimating Team (JET). We do
ourselves no favors if we attempt to manage problems by denying
them. While the decision led to the deferral of some aircraft
production possibly including some of the aircraft authorized
in last year's bill, it is a prudent course.
Let me address the question of the F-136 so-called
alternate engine. This committee has maintained the view for
more than a decade that having competing engine production
lines for the F-35 program is the best way to control overall
program costs, manage risk over the life of the program, and
ensure engine performance and sustainability.
When 95 percent of the Department's fighters will be F-35
variants by 2035, this is not a question of pork. It is a
sincere concern for the success of the F-35 program, and for
the benefits of competition. As we have previously discussed,
the Congress and the Department have to operate from a common
set of facts. This committee looks forward to receiving the
analysis that you have promised on this program.
I hope today's discussion can explore questions of force
structure. These questions are embedded in the strategic
thinking of the QDR from the number of ships to potential
shortfalls in our strike fighter inventory, to the future of
the bomber program. There are critical issues confronting this
Nation's defense. And this committee will spend today and the
coming weeks focused on where we are headed on critical force
structure issues, and of course we welcome your thoughts today.
Let me wrap up my remarks by again applauding our witnesses
for tackling the tough national security challenges facing this
Nation head on. You have done so in the decision to deploy more
troops to Afghanistan in December. And the decision to redouble
our commitment to finding and defeating al Qaeda in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as well as around the world.
And the decision to continue to grow defense spending last
year, this year, and across the future years defense programs.
As always, you have this committee's gratitude to both of
you for your service as well as our deep gratitude to the men
and women that you represent--those who service us in uniform.
We are very proud of them as well as the civilian workforce,
and of course very, very proud of their families.
It has been mentioned that tomorrow this committee will
hold another major hearing. We will take testimony on the QDR,
the Quadrennial Defense Review, which outlines the Department
of Defense position on a wide range of critical security
related topics, and provides a--sort of a blueprint of the
Department. And we look forward to that hearing as well as
today.
Thank you again for your service, and we appreciate your
being with us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 79.]
Now I turn to my friend the gentleman from California,
Ranking Member Mr. McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my entire
statement be submitted for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 82.]
Mr. McKeon. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen good morning.
Welcome back to our committee. Thank you for your service. Our
country is blessed to have leaders like you. And we thank you
for all your hard work, and all that you do for the men and
women in uniform. We look forward to your testimony here today.
The President's Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget requests
$708 billion for discretionary and war funding. According to
the Defense Department this represents an increase of 3.4
percent from the previous year, or 1.8 percent real growth
after inflation. This is clearly not the cut to the defense
budget that many anticipated. And I credit you and Admiral
Mullen for ensuring that this budget request provides for our
military men and women, and fully funds the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Mr. Secretary for some time now you have been pushing for
balance in the Defense Department in an effort to focus the
Pentagon on prevailing in today's conflicts. In your
introduction to the 2011 Quadrennial Defense Review you write
that your efforts to re-balance the Department in 2010
continued in the Fiscal Year 2011 budget, and were
institutionalized in this QDR and out-year budget plan.
While we all commend you for your laser focus on the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe your efforts to make balance
a fixture in the QDR and the out-year budget is too focused on
the short term, and puts the Department on the wrong path for
the next 20 years. Choosing to win in Iraq and Afghanistan
should not mean our country must choose to assume additional
risk in the conventional national defense challenges of today
and tomorrow.
Last April, we received a glimpse of the cost of balance
when you announced over $50 billion in cuts to the defense
programs. This year the impact is more subtle, but I fear more
severe. In my view, the QDR understates the requirements to
deter and defeat challenges from state actors, and it
overestimates the capabilities of the force the Department
would build.
This QDR does an excellent job of delineating the threat
posed by those with anti-access capabilities, notably China,
but does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in
funding, capability, and force structure.
If this is really a vision for the defense program for the
next 20 years as the statute requires, then why does the QDR
lay out a force structure for the next 5 years, not to mention
one that looks a lot like today's force. The QDR is supposed to
shape the Department for 2029, not describe the Pentagon in
2009.
I look forward to hearing from you and Admiral Mullen
today, and Under Secretary Flournoy tomorrow, about the
assumptions underlying the QDR's decisions. Further, I am
anxious for the QDR's independent panel to begin its work, and
provide the Congress with an alternative viewpoint on how the
Pentagon should posture itself for the next 20 years.
Let me conclude by addressing two controversial policy
initiatives that the President has raised in recent weeks,
repealing the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy and moving United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Gitmo) detainees to
the United States. With respect to Don't Ask Don't Tell, I also
look forward to you addressing the President's State of the
Union call to repeal Don't Ask Don't Tell.
Before the President or special interests force a change in
the policy or law, Congress deserves to see from the services
concrete, in-depth evidence that readiness concerns require a
change, and that such a change would not degrade wartime
military readiness in any measurable significant way. Many of
us on this committee have serious concerns with putting our men
and women in uniform through such a divisive debate while they
are fighting two wars.
As far as the future of Gitmo, the Administration requested
a $350 million transfer fund to finance all aspects of detainee
operations at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo, Cuba, or
the Thompson Correctional Center, in Thompson, Illinois.
In my view, such a flexible transfer authority reflects the
overall problem with this Administration's detainee policy.
There is no clear policy on how we will handle the detainees
held at Gitmo.
Mr. Secretary, let me make my view clear. I do not support
authorizing funds for a facility which would hold Gitmo
detainees in the United States. Once again, thank you for being
here today, and I look forward to your testimony and the
question and answer session.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Before I ask our witnesses to give their
remarks, let me speak very, very briefly about the unexpected
occurrences as reflected by conflicts since 1977. Unexpected.
Operation Desert One, 1979. Lebanon, 1982. Grenada, 1983.
Libya, 1986. Panama, 1989. Operation Desert Storm, 1990.
Somalia, 1992. Haiti, 1994. Balkans, Bosnia, 1995. Balkans,
Kosovo, 1999. Afghanistan, which began 2001. Iraq, which began
2003. And it gives us a birds-eye sketch of the unexpected.
That is why we need the full spectrum of capability and that is
what we asked you to testify to today.
For our committee we will take a lunch break around 12:15,
probably along with a few votes we will have at that time. And
we will reconvene after 45 minutes, and the hearing will
continue until 3:00 this afternoon.
So with that, Secretary Gates, we welcome you. Admiral
Mullen, we thank you.
Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the President's budget requests for Fiscal Year 2011.
I first want to thank you for your support of the men and
women of the United States military these many years. These
troops are part of an extraordinary generation of young
Americans who have answered their country's call. They have
fought our wars, protected our interests and allies around the
globe, and as we have seen recently in Haiti, they have also
demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of
incomprehensible loss.
I have a brief opening statement to provide an overview of
the budget requests. My submitted statement includes many more
details that I know are of interest to the committee. The
budget requests being presented today include $549 billion for
the base budget, a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or a
1.8 percent real increase after adjusting for inflation,
reflecting the Administration's commitment to modest, steady,
and sustainable real growth in defense spending.
We are also requesting $159 billion in FY 2011 to support
overseas contingency operations, primarily in Afghanistan and
Iraq, plus $33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to
support the added financial costs of the President's new
approach in Afghanistan.
The base budget request reflects these major institutional
priorities. First, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation's
commitment to care for the all-volunteer force, our greatest
strategic asset. Second, rebalancing America's defense posture
by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current
conflicts, while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in
the future.
And third, continuing the Department's continuing
commitment to reform how we do business, especially in the area
of acquisitions. Finally, the commitments made in the programs
funded in the OCO and supplemental request demonstrate the
Administration's determination to support our troops and
commanders in combat, so they can accomplish their critical
missions and come home safely.
The budget continues the Department's policy of shifting
money to the base budget for enduring programs that directly
support our war fighters and their families, whether on the
battlefield recovering from wounds, or on the home front, to
ensure they have steady, long term funding and institutional
support.
The base budget request was accompanied by and informed by
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which establishes
strategic priorities and identifies key areas for needed
investment. The 2010 QDR and FY 2011 budget build upon the
substantial changes the President made in the FY 2010 budget
request to allocate defense dollars more wisely and reform the
Department's processes.
The FY 2010 budget proposal cut, curtailed, or ended a
number of programs that were either performing poorly, or in
excess of real world needs. Conversely, future-oriented
programs where the U.S. was relatively under-invested, were
accelerated or received more funding.
The FY 2011 budget submissions in QDR are suffused with two
major themes. The first is continued reform, fundamentally
changing the way this Department does business. The priorities
we set, the programs we fund, the weapons we buy, and how we
buy them. Building on the reforms of last year's budget, the FY
2011 request took additional steps aimed at programs that were
excess or performing poorly.
They include terminating the Navy EP-X intelligence
aircraft, ending the third generation infrared surveillance
program, canceling the next generation CG-X cruiser,
terminating the Net-enabled Command and Control Program, ending
the defense integrated military human resources system due to
cost overruns and performance concerns.
Completing the C-17 program, and closing the production
line, as multiple studies in recent years show that the Air
Force already has more of these aircraft than it needs. And
ending the alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF), as whatever benefits may accrue are more than offset by
excess costs, complexity, and associated risks.
I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue
building the C-17 and proceed with an alternate engine for the
F-35. So let me be very clear. I will strongly recommend that
the President veto any legislation that sustains the
unnecessary continuation of these two programs.
The budget and reviews are also shaped by a bracing dose of
realism. Realism with regard to risk, realism with regard to
resources. We have, in a sober and clear-eyed way, assessed
risks, set priorities, made trade-offs, and identified
requirements based on plausible real-world threats, scenarios,
and potential adversaries.
Just one example. For years, U.S. defense planning and
requirements were based on preparing to fight two major
conventional wars at the same time, a force-sizing construct
that persisted long after it was overtaken by events. The
Department's leadership now recognizes that we must prepare for
a much broader range of security challenges on the horizon.
They range from the use of sophisticated new technologies
to deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air,
space, and cyberspace, to the threat posed by non-state groups
delivering more cunning and destructive means to attack and
terrorize. Scenarios that transcend the familiar contingencies
that dominated U.S. planning after the Cold War.
We have learned from painful experience that the wars we
fight--apropos of the chairman's recitation of the conflicts
since the mid-1970s--that the wars we fight are seldom the wars
that we plan. As a result, the United States needs a broad
portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility
across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. This strategic
reality shaped the QDR's analysis and subsequent conclusions
which directly informed the program decisions contained in the
budget.
Before closing, I would like to offer two thoughts to
consider when assessing the U.S. investment in national
defense. First, the requests submitted this week total more
than $700 billion, a massive number to be sure. But at 4.7
percent of gross national product, it represents a
significantly smaller portion of national wealth going to
defense than was spent during most of America's previous major
wars. And the base budget represents 3.5 percent of GDP.
Second, as you recently read, the President recently
exempted the defense budget from spending freezes being applied
to other parts of the government. It is important to remember,
however, that as I mentioned earlier, this Department undertook
a painstaking review of our priorities last year, and as a
result, cut or curtailed a number of major programs. These
programs, had they been pursued to completion, would have cost
the American taxpayer about $330 billion.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of
this committee again for all that you have done to support our
troops and their families, in light of the unprecedented
demands that have been placed on them.
I believe the choices made and the priorities set in these
budget requests reflect America's commitment to see that our
forces have the tools they need to prevail in the wars we are
in, while making the investments necessary to prepare for
threats on or beyond the horizon.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in
the Appendix on page 91.]
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEF
OF STAFFS
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished
members of this committee, thank you for the chance to appear
before you and discuss the state of our military, as well as
the President's Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget submission. I
also thank you all for the extraordinary support you provide
each and every day to our men and women in uniform, as well as
their families.
That they are well-equipped, well-trained, well-paid, and
enjoy the finest medical care anywhere in the world is a
testament in no small part to your dedication and stewardship.
I have seen many of you in the war zone, in hospitals, and at
bases all over this country.
So have our troops. They know you care, just as critically,
they know their fellow citizens care. All they want right now
is guidance on the mission before them, and the tools to
accomplish it. That is why I am here today, to speak on their
behalf about the guidance they are getting from this
Department, and to secure your continued support for the tools
we want to give them.
Secretary Gates has already walked you through the major
components of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
President's Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget submission, both of
which, when combined with the new Ballistic Missile Defense
Review and our Overseas Contingency Operations fund request,
build upon the reform effort of last year, and represent as
comprehensive a look at the state of our military as I have
seen in my more than 40 years of service.
I will not endeavor to repeat his excellent summation, and
I would ask that you accept without further comment, my
endorsement of the findings contained in each of these
documents. Let me leave you rather with three overarching
things to consider as you prepare to discuss these issues today
and as you prepare to debate this budget request in the near
future.
First, there is a real sense of urgency. We have well over
200,000 troops deployed in harm's way right now and that number
includes only those in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom. Another 150,000 or so are meeting our security
commitments elsewhere around the globe. And many of those
missions are no less dangerous and certainly no less
significant.
I am sure you have stayed abreast of our relief efforts in
Haiti where more than 20,000 of your soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines and coast guardsmen are pitching in feverishly to help
alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people. It is truly an
interagency and international mission and these troops are
blending in beautifully doing what is required where and when
it is required to support the government of Haiti, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
United Nations mission there.
We also continue to do what is required to win the wars we
fight. And the one that needs fighting the most right now is in
Afghanistan. You have seen the reports and you know the
situation. The Taliban have a growing influence in most of
Afghanistan's provinces and the border area between that
country and Pakistan remains the epicenter of global terrorism.
You no doubt followed with great interest the development
of the President's strategy to deal with this threat, a
strategy in my view that rightly makes the Afghan people the
center of gravity and the defeat of al Qaeda a primary goal.
We have already moved nearly 4,500 troops to Afghanistan
and expect that about 18,000 of the President's December 1st
commitment will be there by late spring. The remainder of the
30,000 will arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and
early fall making a major contribution to reversing Taliban
momentum in 2010.
Indeed, by the middle of this year, Afghanistan will
surpass Iraq for the first time since 2003 as a location with
the most deployed American forces. Right now, the Taliban
believe they are winning. Eighteen months from now if we have
executed our strategy, we will know that they aren't and they
will know that they can't.
Getting there will demand discipline and hard work. It will
require ever more cooperation with Pakistan, and it will most
assuredly demand more sacrifice and more bloodshed, but the
stakes are far too high for failure. That is why we are asking
you to fully fund our Fiscal Year 2010 supplemental and the
Fiscal Year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations requests.
It is why we want a six percent increase for Special
Operations Command and it is why we need your support to
develop and field a next generation ground combat vehicle, to
allow us to grow two more Army combat aviation brigades and to
continue rotary wing production, including nearly $3 billion
for the V-22 Osprey program.
In keeping with the Secretary's strong emphasis on
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), an
emphasis more than justified by our long experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we are asking for more capability in unmanned
aircraft and ground based collection systems including nearly
$3 billion to double the procurement rate of the MQ-9 Reaper by
Fiscal Year 2012.
Our future security is greatly imperiled if we do not win
the wars we are in. As the QDR makes clear, the outcome of
today's conflicts will shape the global security environment
for decades to come. I am very comfortable that we can and will
finish well in Iraq, remaining on pace despite a state of
recent violence, to draw down American forces to roughly
50,000, ending our combat mission there and transitioning to an
advise and assist role, but without your continued support, we
will not be able to show the meaningful progress in Afghanistan
that the commander in chief has ordered, the American people
expect, and the Afghan people so desperately need.
This is no mission of mercy. This is a place from which we
were attacked in 2001. The place from which al Qaeda still
plots and plans. The security of a great nation, ours and
theirs, rests not on sentiment or good intentions, but on what
ought to be a cold and unfeeling appraisal of self-interest and
an equally cold and unfeeling pursuit of the tools to protect
that interest, ours and theirs.
That leads me to the second thing I would like you to
consider, proper balance. Winning our current wars means
investment in our hard-won irregular warfare expertise, a core
competency that should be institutionalized and supported in
coming years. And we are certainly moving in that direction,
but we must also maintain conventional advantages.
We still face traditional threats from regional powers who
possess robust regular and in some cases nuclear capabilities.
These cannot be ignored. The freedom to conduct operations in
support of joint, allied and coalition efforts, assuring access
and projecting combat power, can only be preserved through
enduring war fighting competencies.
In the air, this means sufficient strike aircraft and
munitions capable of assuring air superiority. At sea, it means
having enough ships and enough sailors to stay engaged globally
and keep the sea lanes open. On the ground, it means
accelerating the modernization of our combat brigades and
regiments. On the whole, it means never having to fight a fair
fight.
Thus, the President's budget request will buy us another 42
F-35s. It will maintain a healthy bomber industrial base and it
will fund development of a prompt global strike system as well
as efforts to upgrade our B-2s and B-52s. For ship
construction, the spending plan totals some $16 billion
procuring 10 new ships in 2011, including two Arleigh Burke
destroyers, two Virginia Class submarines, two Littoral Combat
Ships (LCS) and a brand new amphibious assault ship.
It puts the Navy on track to maintain aircraft carrier
production on a 5-year build cycle resulting in a long-term
force structure of 10 carriers by 2040. Our budget request also
seeks $10 billion for ballistic missile defense programs
including $8.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
And it devotes ample resources to improving our cyber defense
capabilities.
Again, it is about balance, it is about deterring and
winning the big and the small wars, the conventional and the
unconventional. Two challenges, one military. But where balance
is probably most needed is in the programs and policies
concerning our most important resource, our people.
And that is my final point. This QDR and this budget builds
upon superb support you and this Department have provided our
troops and their families for much of the last 8 years.
Stretched and strained by nearly constant combat, many of them
on their fifth, sixth and even seventh deployments, our men and
women are without question and almost inexplicably the most
resilient and battle-ready force in our history.
On the one hand, we keep turning away potential recruits so
good is our retention and so attractive our career
opportunities. On the other hand, we keep seeing an alarming
rise in suicides, marital problems, prescription drug
addictions and mental health problems. Deborah and I meet
regularly with young troops and their spouses and though proud
of the difference they know they are making, they too are
tired.
Quite frankly, many of them are worried about their
futures, their livelihoods, their children. And so you will see
in this budget nearly $9 billion for family support and
advocacy programs. You will see childcare and youth programs
increase by $87 million over last year and you will see a boost
in warfare and family services to include counseling to the
tune of $37 million.
Military spouse employment will get a $2 million-plus up
and we will increase the budget to $2.2 billion for wounded,
ill and injured members. In fact, the healthcare funding level
for Fiscal Year 2011 is projected to provide high quality care
for 9.5 million eligible beneficiaries.
Lastly, we are pushing to dramatically increase the number
of mental health professionals on staff and advance our
research on traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress.
We know the strain of frequent deployments causes many
problems, but we don't know yet fully, nor understand fully how
or to what extent. So even as we work hard to increase dwell
time, time at home, aided in part by the additional temporary
end strength you approved last year for the Army, we will work
equally hard to decrease the stress of modern military service.
Indeed, I believe over time when these wars are behind us,
we will need to look closely at the competing fiscal pressures
that will dominate discussions of proper end strength and
weapon systems. A force well suited for long-term challenges
and not necessarily married to any current force planning
construct will be vital to our national security.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you again
for your time and for the longstanding support of this
committee for the men and women of the United States Armed
Forces. They and their families are the best I have ever seen.
On their behalf, I stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in
the Appendix on page 103.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you so very much. At the
witness table Under Secretary Bob Hale, the Comptroller, is
also in attendance, and I understand he will remain available
for questions as they will arise.
I was going to ask one question to begin with. We have
excellent attendance today, and we will be under the five
minute rule. Let me ask each of you, and as I mentioned before,
since I have been in Congress we have engaged in 12 military
operations and almost none of them did we see coming.
Both of you have emphasized that we must win today's wars
and, of course, we must, but we must also be prepared for the
unexpected contingencies that, sure as God made little green
apples, will come to pass.
How does your strategy as embodied by the QDR as well as
your budget prepare the Department to do both of these things,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that we clearly
are improving the capabilities and resources that we have for
the kind of fights we have been in since the Vietnam War, a
broad array of conflicts, requiring a broad array of
capabilities.
The mantra that I have used is the one that I used in my
opening statement. We must acquire the greatest--the most
versatile possible set of capabilities for the broadest
possible range of conflict because I believe one of the lessons
of Desert One and of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is that it is
unlikely for another power to come at us head-on. They will
come at us asymmetrically coming at us where we are vulnerable,
not where we are strong.
But we have put into this budget capability such as the
growth in capabilities of the Special Operations Command and
forces is now in the base, but we are moving that into the base
budget out of the supplementals and the Overseas Contingency
Operations funds; also helicopters, ISR, the full range of
capabilities that are needed to deal with the kind of fights we
are in today, the kind of fights we have been in for the last
35 years and I believe the most likely kind of fights that we
are going to face in the future.
But by the same token, I would take the strongest possible
issue with those who say we are neglecting the potential future
fight or the capabilities needed to take on high-end
adversaries. The reality is in this budget, half the
procurement budget is going for systems that are purely
associated with modernization of conventional capabilities.
About 7 percent for, if you will, the fights we are in and
about 43 percent for dual purpose capabilities, C-17s and other
capabilities that will be used no matter what kind of fight we
are in, but just let me run through the list in about 30
seconds here of what we have in this budget in terms of
conventional modernization capabilities.
We have an initiative for long-range strike, an initiative
for conventional prompt global strike, a new generation bomber,
a new SSBN, the F-35, the MQ-9, ballistic missile defense, the
Virginia Class attack submarines, new Army ground combat
vehicle, upgrades to the B-2 and the B-52 and a number of
initiatives on cyber.
And I would just use one statistic before turning the
microphone over to Admiral Mullen and that is even with the
restructured F-35 program, in 2020, the United States will have
20 times more fifth generation aircraft than the Chinese and
about 13 to 15 times more than the Russians and the gap only
gets bigger after that.
So I think there is a broad balance in this budget and it
takes into account what I think is its underlying premise,
which is the most versatile possible array of capabilities for
the widest possible range of conflict.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. I strongly share those sentiments. And let
me just talk to a couple of aspects of that.
In both the QDR and in the budget the emphasis is on
winning today's wars. But that doesn't mean it is just the--
what we have for today that will be--that it will only be used
today. I think a significant amount of our investments, which
is as the secretary has laid out, will be well placed for the
future. That the kind of ISR capabilities that we have. The
rotary wing capabilities, the investment in special forces will
play significantly in the future. And if you just lay out the
12 kinds of unexpected conflicts as you did earlier, chairman,
those kinds of capabilities--there is a versatility in those,
that many of these capabilities would play very strongly in the
future.
Secondly, I have been working in the Pentagon a long time.
And if there are thoughts that we have somehow moved out of the
conventional world. That is just not the case. As indicated by
the investment profile, this is a hard place to move the
pendulum. And we continue to move it to get the right balance.
By no means has the pendulum swung too far at this point.
And then the third point I would make is the most important
investment we can make to assure and ensure our security from a
future standpoint is in our people. They are our--and their
families. They are our most critical strategic asset. And in
the uncertainty that you have described, and we have seen just
in these last 8 years, they are the ones that will truly make a
difference for the future.
Now that is not an unbounded pot. There is a significant
amount of money invested in our military, families and
civilians in this budget. It is roughly 50 percent of the
budget. And we have to make sure we have that right for the
future. But that is what will make a difference now, and it
will clearly make a difference in the future.
The Chairman. Admiral Mullen, thank you.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary and
Admiral. I mentioned in my opening statement Don't Ask Don't
Tell and Gitmo. With respect to Don't Ask Don't Tell, first I
would like to echo the concerns raised by my counterpart on the
Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday.
You made clear in your testimony that the military stands
ready to implement a repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell. Yet this
position in support of repeal comes before your service chiefs
have had the opportunity to conduct an in-depth review of the
impact a repeal would have on military readiness. It seems that
your path places the cart before the horse.
On that point I wrote to both of you outlining a series of
issues and questions that must be answered before any objective
decision can be made by the President, the Department of
Defense, and this Congress about repealing or amending the
current law. I ask that that letter and the attachment which
set out a list of major shortcomings in the 1993 RAND studies
be entered in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 125.]
Mr. McKeon. I would also ask when this committee should
expect a response from the Department to that letter.
Secretary Gates. Let me check into it, Mr. McKeon. We will
get back to you with an answer to that question tomorrow.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much. From Istanbul?
Secretary Gates. Do you want me to----
Mr. McKeon. From Istanbul?
Secretary Gates. I am sorry.
Mr. McKeon. From Istanbul?
Admiral Mullen. He has reach.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you. On the transfer of the Gitmo
detainees. Giving the rising recidivism rate--around 20 percent
of former Gitmo detainees returning to the fight--are you re-
evaluating the Defense Department's Gitmo transfer policy?
Secretary Gates. Well the President has made the decision
to close Guantanamo as you know. But at the same time
recognizing reality, and particularly after the Christmas
bombing attempt, he has suspended the returns of the Yemenis
from Guantanamo to the Arabian Peninsula. And while his
decision has not changed, we are clearly looking at the next
steps.
We as you indicated in the opening statement, we have money
in the budget for detainee operations which includes funding
for our part of the prison in Illinois. I think that is about
$150 million for that prison. And that clearly is the intent of
the President at this point.
Mr. McKeon. A hundred and fifty million--when we had the
briefing before the holiday break, they added up several costs,
and I think it was more like $500 million.
Secretary Gates. Yes. That is just our part, Mr. McKeon.
There is a Justice Department element, and a Homeland Security
piece of that, too.
Mr. McKeon. Right. Do you agree with the policy that
prohibits transfer of Gitmo detainees to countries that are (1)
on the state sponsored terrorism list, (2) have active al Qaeda
cells within their borders, and (3) have confirmed cases of
former Gitmo detainees that have returned to the fight?
Secretary Gates. Well, I would say that I certainly would
have a problem returning them to countries that are on the
terrorism watch list. If you take countries where there has
been a recidivist problem that would include both Saudi Arabia
and Afghanistan. I don't think I am prepared to draw that kind
of a limit. And we, after all, we don't even know if we have an
al Qaeda cell here in the United States.
So you know Somalia, Yemen, for sure. North Africa, and
different places. So I think that--I frankly think that is
probably too restrictive. Having a cell doesn't mean that the
government isn't concerned about terrorists, and isn't acting
aggressively against those terrorists. We find ourselves in
that same position.
Mr. McKeon. Last week Mayor Bloomberg made it clear that he
was opposed to holding the trial to prosecute the September
11th mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) in a Manhattan
courthouse. Do you believe that KSM and the 9/11 co-
conspirators should be tried in a federal criminal court rather
than a military commission?
Secretary Gates. I am comfortable deferring to the Attorney
General in terms of the proper jurisdiction for those who have
engaged in terrorist acts. I think it is important that we have
available to us both the civilian courts, and the military
commissions. I remind you, we had a lot of problems with
terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s in this country. And they all
went--when we would catch a terrorist they all went through the
federal courts. We had no alternative at that time. We are
actually in a more robust position at this point.
Mr. McKeon. We did do a lot of work on that in the last
reauthorization improving the military commissions. Why would
this choice of trial forum--that is, the civil courts. Given
that you are the chief civilian authority for military
commissions, why would you not prefer to have them done in the
military commission?
Secretary Gates. Well, the attorney general did consult
with me about the five 9/11 bombers. And where he was headed
with his decision. And as I indicated a minute ago, I deferred
to him on the judgment where he thought that prosecution was
best carried out.
Mr. McKeon. Did he consult with you before the FBI
interrogated the Christmas Day bomber, and before they were
given their Miranda rights?
Secretary Gates. No.
Mr. McKeon. What impact did giving the Miranda rights have
on our ability to collect intelligence if anyone we gave those
rights to--Abdulmutallab--I am having trouble learning how to
say these all--words--a known al Qaeda operative only 50
minutes after beginning the interrogations?
Secretary Gates. Well I think that--I mean, I don't know,
because I haven't read the interrogation reports. I have been
told that valuable information was obtained from him prior to
that time. I think we have protocols in place now for a high
level interrogation group that is comprised of experienced FBI
and intelligence community interrogation experts that will be
available for future such cases.
And the reality is under existing law if a person who has
attempted a terrorist act, or is an alleged terrorist, is
deemed a threat to the national security, there is the
authority in the law to delay Mirandizing so that a full
interrogation can take place.
Mr. McKeon. I think the concern that I have heard expressed
by many is that when he was caught, and was being questioned
during that first 50 minutes, as on the 9/11 attacks, there
could have been other planes in the air with other people
trying to blow them up at the same time. And I don't know that
50 minutes--I am not an expert, but I have heard from experts
that maybe 50 minutes wasn't quite enough to get all the
information that could have been very necessary at that time.
Secretary Gates. I would just say that, you know, the
President asked for a review of several aspects of this. And I
think it is fair to say that there were some useful lessons
learned from that experience.
Mr. McKeon. So in your personal opinion, should al Qaeda
detainees in the U.S. be given Miranda rights?
Secretary Gates. I think that if a person is identified as
an al Qaeda operative, or has attempted a terrorist act, that
the authorities that are available in existing law, and this
high level interrogation group that has been assembled should
be brought to bear with that individual. And that gives them
the flexibility not to Mirandize as long as they believe they
can get useful intelligence about impending attacks.
Mr. McKeon. Was Abdulmutallab considered to be al Qaeda
during that 50 minutes, or was that found out later?
Secretary Gates. I am just not sure.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. We are now
under the five minute rule.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you all for your testimony, and for the
service you render to our country every day. I was in
Afghanistan last week, and impressed with the team you have got
in place. But also impressed--as I always am--with how daunting
the challenge is if we want to accomplish what we do there.
Let me ask you something that may seem a bit mundane, but
is important to getting the budget to reflect reality as well
as possible. That is the practice of putting a plug in the out-
years for what it is likely to cost. As I understand we have
provided so far $130 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan, and to
some extent, Pakistan. It would add $30 billion to that, and
take it up to $160. That will be next year's level
approximately.
But in the years thereafter in the budget you submitted in
the QDR there is a plug--$50 billion--which I don't think is a
realistic plug. Fifty billion dollars is a big come down from
$160 billion in a 1-year period of time. How do you plan to
fill that plug, and to give us realistic likely expenditures
for sustaining this effort in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
increasingly Pakistan?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Spratt, I think that the most accurate
answer to your question is that I don't think a $50 billion
plug for the next couple of years reflects reality either. That
is basically the direction that we have been given by OMB. But
clearly as we have done with both FY 2010 and FY 2011 through
the preparation of the overseas contingency operations budgets,
we can closer to the time when combat is taking place, and we
know how many troops will be available, or will be in the
theater and so on, we can give a realistic estimate.
While I believe for example for FY 2012 $50 billion is too
low. By the same token, I could not give you a figure today or
put a figure in the budget that I would have confidence would
come close to being what the real number will be that is
closer. So I acknowledge that the $50 billion plug is
inadequate, but beyond FY 2011 it is just difficult to know
what the right number would be.
Mr. Spratt. Given the difficulties we are experiencing
right now in Iraq, do you expect that that period for
withdrawal or draw down could be stretched out?
Secretary Gates. Based on recent conversations the Chairman
and I have both had with General Odierno, we do not expect
that. No.
Mr. Spratt. Turning to a different subject--the F-35. You
just went yourself personally to see what is happening with
that program. Would you care to tell us--give us an update on
this problem?
Secretary Gates. Well I think if I had to put it in a
sentence I would say that the program office was too optimistic
in their estimates. The reality is the program has not
experienced problems unlike those with developmental combat
aircraft in the past. The reality is it is a good airplane. It
is meeting the performance parameters.
We clearly--part of the restructuring program is to put
more money into test aircraft and a greater investment in
software to limit the slip to about 13 months for the program.
This means we will also be buying fewer aircraft in advance of
testing, but we think that we have a good program, as the
Chairman indicated in his opening statement.
The funding now, we have funded this plane in recent years
based on the estimates of the joint program office, partly due
to the law that was passed here in the Congress, but partly due
to our own Under Secretary Ash Carter.
We now have funded this program on the basis of the Joint
Estimating Team, the independent estimate of what the funding
will be. So we believe that the funding we have in this budget
in the out-years is a much more realistic profile of the
funding for the aircraft.
Mr. Spratt. One of the news accounts indicated that you
visited the plant in August and thought the F-35 was in better
shape than you learned it to be in December. Is that an
accurate statement? And if so, do you think there needs to be
an improvement in variance analysis in the management reporting
system so we can keep a much better, more timely real-time
connection with what is happening with weapons systems in
development?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that what happened was that
Under Secretary Carter--we not only had the JET estimate from
last fall, but we also had a second JET estimate. Under
Secretary Carter personally invested about two weeks of time,
full time, going into every aspect of the JSF program, and
getting into the contracts, getting into conversations with the
contractor, program office, and various others.
And it was basically his decision to restructure this
program, or to recommend the restructuring of the program, and
that decision was really only made within the last 2 or 3
weeks. And I think it was the right decision, and obviously I
took the personnel action I did.
I think we have the processes in place now to monitor the
performance of this program. And frankly, one of the reasons
why we are getting a new program manager is to make sure that
those kinds of things don't happen again.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much, sir.
Secretary Gates. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both for your selfless service.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that they were going to come
at us where we are vulnerable, not strong. I would suggest that
one of our greatest vulnerabilities is our susceptibility to
Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) attack. Many of our weapons
platforms are not hardened at all, and those that are hardened
may not be hardened enough, if indeed the threat is 100 to 200
kilovolts per meters, as the Russian generals told the EMP
commission that we may have little hardening.
I suspect that after a robust EMP laydown, we would have
little fighting capability remaining. You mentioned the
political interest that is driving the congressional interest
in the joint strike fighter engine. If there is an interest in
my district I have the honor of representing, I don't know of
that interest. But yet, I am a strong supporter of this
alternate engine, because I think it is the right thing to do.
Just a couple observations that a non-initiate might make
looking at our advance planning. First, there are a couple of
inconsistencies. We have unmanned planes and unmanned
submarines, yet we still have people in ships and tanks. And if
you look at the mission of the Predator and the tank, the
Predator in the sky gets information and blows up things, and
that is pretty much what the tank does. And one might ask why
do we still have people in tanks?
I know why we have people in ships. It is not because you
need them there to drive the ship, because there is nothing on
the ship you couldn't do 10,000 miles away. Certainly easier to
drive than a Predator aircraft. We have them there for damage
control. It is because we have too few and too large platforms.
You just can't afford to lose one, so we put people on for
damage control.
Which leads the non-initiate to make another observation.
And that is that these too large and too few naval assets are a
real vulnerability. Indeed, I am not sure we need to have that
vulnerability. A study that was done by Art Cebrowski, one of
three naval architecture studies, advocated a navy of 600 to
800 ships that would cost no more than our present 200 to 300
ships.
Half the cost of keeping a ship at sea is the people on the
ship. You got half the people off the ship, you could buy 50
percent more ships. With the same budget, if you got all the
people off ships, you could double the amount of money that
we--or the amount of ships that we have out there.
And then, an observation about our deep strike bombers.
Stealth is not invisible, it is just smaller. And with the
Chinese ability to take out a satellite, one wonders a little
about the survivability of these deep strike bombers.
Would you comment?
Secretary Gates. Go ahead.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. Do you want to hear about the ships or the
people?
Admiral Mullen. No, no. I think the unmanneds--at least
where I am, Mr. Bartlett--is the unmanned piece, it has got to
be a balance. We are never going to get to a point where there
aren't people, first of all.
Secondly, and importantly----
Mr. Bartlett. There aren't any people on Predators, sir.
Admiral Mullen. Well, before--and Predators are an
important part, but they are not going to win it by themselves,
nor will other unmanned vehicles and systems do that, at least
as far as I can see into the future. That is just how I see
things right now.
With respect to the tanks, in particular what is
instructive to me is when I visit with my friends from other
countries who are in counter-insurgency fights, and when I talk
to Generals Petraeus and McChrystal and Odierno, they will
single out the importance of tanks in counter-insurgency and
how many lives they have saved. So again, I think it is balance
there.
As far as ships are concerned, I think you know me well
enough to know that we have worked for years to try to get
people off of ships for the exact reason that you have
described. And I think Admiral Roughead is clearly there as
well in terms of future initiatives and systems, which don't
take as many people.
I am very aware of Cebrowski's study. It was very
theoretical and if I were going to take LCS specifically, which
was supposed to come in at a couple hundred million dollars,
and is now pushing $500-to-$600 million per copy, I would use
it as an example of a relatively small, relatively very fast
and light ship, per se, and it would--with a much reduced crew
give some significant capability. And without reliving that
history it is very hard to create some kind of sustaining
capability, which is where I am, and which the Cebrowski study
didn't support, from my perspective.
So I think we continue to proceed on this. And I take your
point on stealth. We all understand that. All of it says to me
is we have got to have a balance here. And we are not going to
go unmanned overnight, nor should we, given the challenges that
we have and the risks that are out there.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ortiz, the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being with us today and I appreciate both of you detailing the
Department's priorities. But you know, really many of the units
that are not deployed face significant readiness shortfalls in
equipment, personnel and training. Assuming that the drawdown
in Iraq takes place on schedule, how much would readiness
improve for non-deployed Army units in Fiscal Year 2011?
And the reason that I ask this question is because I have
had a chance to travel. We came back from Italy, and then we
went to Germany and we visited some local units. How much will
that improve, for non-deployed units in the Army especially?
Admiral Mullen. What General Casey lays out with the
buildup in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq, it is probably
the end of 2011 before he will be at dwell time of 2 to 1.
Twice as long at home as I am deployed. That is what we look
at. The Marine Corps will be there much nearer the end of 2010.
And both the Commandant and the Chief of Staff of the Army
talk to those--that dwell time--as a time where they can really
start training to the broader spectrum of capability. And right
now, they are still obviously very focused on training to the
wars that we are in. I don't--I haven't seen for a long time
any significant degradation in readiness for the units that are
being tasked and trained and getting ready to fight these wars.
There are still differences on some equipment requirements,
those kinds of things. But nothing substantial, or nothing
major, across the board. And that is from my visits in-country
here, as well as in-theater and discussions with the chiefs.
So I think it is roughly about a year from now for the
Marine Corps and a year out before we start to build that. But
primary for me in that is that the individuals and their
families get to reset and get to--and build more resilience
before the next deployment, in addition to putting the
equipment and training piece of it.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Ortiz, just as the Chairman has
addressed the personnel side of it, let me address the
equipment side. There is right now for Iraq roughly a $19
billion bill for reset. That bill will probably be down to
about $14 billion by the end of this fiscal year, and about $6
billion by the end of 2011 for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
We think that the reset then will not--will take about 2
more years after that to be complete. So the full reset in
terms of equipment would be for those forces in Iraq, roughly
2013. The bill for Afghanistan for reset is estimated at about
$15 billion, and it will remain at $15 billion until we start
drawing down in Afghanistan, and then you will see the same
kind of glide path that I just described for Iraq.
Mr. Ortiz. A few moments ago I think that it was Admiral
Mullen described the different platforms and equipment and
airplanes and carriers that we are trying to build for the
future now. How long do you anticipate it will take to build
some of these weapons and some of these platforms that we are
working on now?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I mean, I will pick a couple. JSF,
which certainly is in my view at a time in a major program
where there are oftentimes struggles, not just in aviation
programs, as the Secretary points out, but we get to this point
when we are moving into testing and production and there is
going to be some bumps along the road.
I am not excusing them, it is just a really hard, difficult
part of the program. But the Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) for the first training squadron for 2011 is still on
track, the IOC for the Marine Corps' first squadron of 2012 is
on track. For the Air Force the 2013 is on track, and the Navy
in 2014.
So we are at a point in time in the program that to me this
is typical, and we need to work hard to make sure we stay on
this track. For the Predator, the unmanned vehicle, they have
actually come on line at an extraordinary pace. Because of the
urgency of war, oftentimes it generates that kind of both focus
and capability, and that has really been since 2003, where we
really didn't understand--we for the most part, didn't
understand what ISR requirements were.
We knew what ISR was, but how much, what kind, et cetera.
And what the Predator gives us, as any unmanned vehicle does,
it gives us the persistence that you can't have oftentimes with
manned vehicles.
So there are differences, but we are in the heart of
building many of these systems right now, and I think they will
start to deliver here in the next few years.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. My time is up.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Secretary
Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your leadership for our
Nation in leading our wonderful men and women in uniform. I had
the pleasure of visiting Walter Reed yesterday and saw the real
heroes, and they are very special young men and women.
Admiral Mullen, a couple weeks ago--maybe a week ago--I got
a press call from Jacksonville, North Carolina, the home of
Camp Lejeune, and they had a--the question was about Don't Ask
Don't Tell and wanted to know my position.
And I shared it with them. I told them that in the 15 years
I have been in Congress I have met many, many wonderful men and
women in uniform, all services. And I felt like I had a good
feel for how they felt. I realize that yesterday you said this
was a personal feeling.
And I want to say I respect you for your personal feelings.
But as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, somewhat along the line of
what Mr. Buchanan--excuse me, Mr. McKeon was asking, maybe in a
letter. But I would like to ask you today, do you know the
feelings of the service chiefs as to how they feel on a repeal
of Don't Ask Don't Tell?
Admiral Mullen. Very specifically, Mr. Jones, it isn't a
feeling on my part it is a belief. And I was very clear in the
construct that Secretary Gates laid out in terms of going
through the review over the better part of this year----
Mr. Jones. Right.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. That I do not know what the
impact will be, and I do not know what the implementation
requirements will be. And I need to understand that. There is
very little objective data on this. It is filled, as you know,
with emotion and strongly held opinions and beliefs, and that
is the work we have to do over the course of this year.
And I also spoke very clearly to the need to understand
that, in terms of what the senior military leadership's
principle concern is, which is the readiness and military
effectiveness of the force. I don't speak for the chiefs in
that regard. They will have an opportunity to do that. I have
discussed this with them at considerable length. I would sum up
their view to say that they need to understand that impact, as
well, should this policy change--if and when this policy
changes, which can only change with a law change, which happens
here.
Mr. Jones. Certainly. I just want to make sure that I
understand the process and your answer. There are times that
you sit down with the service chiefs, I am sure whether we are
talking about Afghanistan, Iraq or any other situation
involving our military, that you do have discussions.
I am not asking you if you would say that a general of the
Marine Corps or the Army, or whatever, feels this way or that
way, but you have had these kinds of discussions with the
service chiefs and you do know--I would hope that you as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I hope that you would know their
feelings, even though I am not going to ask you to share those
feelings with the committee at this time, but you do know how
they feel about this issue and----
Admiral Mullen. We have had several discussions on this
over--actually over many months and again, they will testify
shortly, and certainly I would expect them to speak to it.
Mr. Jones. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to--
because I want to wait until the next round possibly, but
Admiral, I would like to on the next round, if there is another
round, I would like to talk more in depth about the psychiatric
needs of our military. There are some real serious problems,
and I know that you have done everything you can to reach out
to try to bring more people who are trained as psychiatrists or
psychologists, but this is an issue that I think I need the
five minutes on the next round to pursue with you.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will wait until the next
round. I yield back my 59 seconds.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlemen. Before I call on Mr.
Taylor, Mr. Secretary, there are classified materials that were
supposed to come with the QDR. Will they be forthcoming?
Secretary Gates. Let me look into that. I am not sure, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. We would certainly appreciate that, and get
back to us, please. Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both--
all three of you gentlemen for your service to our Nation.
Secretary Gates, when I saw the 82nd being deployed to
Haiti, having been through something like that in my own
district, it really struck me going back to Admiral Mullen's
talk about the need to get as many of our troopers home for
dwell time as they can, that I would really hope that you would
explore every opportunity to fill that mission with volunteers
from the individual augmentees from the Guard and Reserve.
I have got to believe given our Nation's economic situation
and the willingness of the guardsmen and reservists to serve
that you can fill that mission with people who want to be there
and free these combat units up to have the dwell time at home
that they deserve.
Second thing is, and as this kind of following up on that,
I had to, along with Chairman Spratt, the opportunity to visit
some troopers from the 82nd down at Kandahar province. One of
them was on his third deployment, another on the second and
they both--and they struck me as being extremely sincere and
really unwilling to tell me this because on one hand, they
wanted to be good troopers. On the other hand, they felt like
they had to get it off their chest.
They were extremely concerned about the rules of
engagement. The trooper on his third tour said that, you know,
here we are in Kandahar. This is basically the first year of
this conflict here, and I am experiencing rules of engagement
in my first year of this conflict here that we were in, in the
fourth year in Iraq. As things got better in Iraq, we tightened
up the rules of engagement.
He was particularly disturbed at the idea of using the
Afghan National Police to search houses. And again, this isn't
me talking. I am relaying a message that I told that young
trooper I would. Interestingly enough, both of them mentioned
that after this hitch, they were getting out, and I think to a
large extent because of their concerns of the rules of
engagement.
Now, I understand what General McChrystal is trying to do,
that if you unnecessarily kill an Afghan, you have got that
entire clan against you for the rest of their lives, but I
would hope that you would keep this in mind, there has got to
be a better way.
And interestingly enough, his suggestion was he had no
problem with using the Afghan National Army to search these
houses if you had to have an Afghan face on that search, but he
had zero confidence that the Afghan National Police in that
area were doing their job when it came to searching these
houses for bomb-making materials.
Secondly, we talked about reset. There was recently outside
of Balad an amnesty day. A Colonel from home had told people
turn in things that aren't on the books, no questions asked. He
had a two-mile long line of vehicles that showed up outside his
gate the next day for amnesty; generators, fire trucks,
ambulances, SUVs, everything under the sun, all those things
the taxpayers paid for that somehow made their way to Iraq. I
don't have a problem with that, but what I really want to see
our Department make is every effort to get those things home.
Either get them back in your inventory, or if you deem them
something you don't need given the budget constraints of our
cities and states and counties, get someone in the Guard or
Reserve who used to be in local government. Let them walk
through and see if that generator has value back home, if that
fire truck has value back home, if that sport utility vehicle
(SUV) has value back home. Get the words of the state surplus
agencies and let them decide whether or not they are willing to
pay the cost to transport it back home.
Taxpayers paid for these things. We shouldn't let them go
to waste and, above all, at the end of the day if you do it
that way, if by some chance something shows up in the black
market in Baghdad, then we have at least given the 50 states
and the territories an opportunity to purchase it first if they
are willing to pay the cost of getting it home.
And, again, the taxpayers paid for it. I know in the case
of the Guard and Reserve they have got billions of dollars of
shortfalls on equipment, and I just think this is a heck of a
lot better than possibly leaving these things behind.
Lastly, on your Army new vehicle, I would highly recommend,
as somebody who gave this gentleman fits for the past four
years, General Brogan for that task. He has done a remarkable
job of getting mine resistant vehicles tested, fielded and
delivered to Iraq and Afghanistan. It is my understanding his
tour with the Marines is almost over.
So whether it is in uniform or out of uniform, I would
certainly hope that you would consider him for that job of
developing that next generation vehicle based on the great job
he has done in his present capacity.
And lastly, in my 19 seconds, Admiral Mullen, someone came
to my town meeting Monday night with their 13-year-old son and
pointed to him and said, ``The United States Naval Ship Comfort
saved this young man's life in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.'' You sent that ship to Pascagoula, Mississippi. Thank
you very much for doing that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. Gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been asking a
question for two years, and I was told I was going to get the
answer when the Quadrennial Defense Review came out.
Unfortunately, I am still sitting here, and I have still got
the same question.
So I am going to lay out a list of, I think, what I believe
are facts and, then I am trying to ask, these things don't seem
to add up. Here are the facts.
First of all, the Navy's estimate of its fighter shortfall
was 243 planes, the most recent one, over 5 years. That would
be 48 planes a year.
Second thing is you are talking about having 10 aircraft
carriers, and I would submit that they work better if you put
airplanes on them.
Third point, you acknowledge that you need to keep the F-18
line through 2013. Next point, JSF is badly behind schedule.
You have had 16 of 168 flight tests that were planned for 2009,
and I am not getting into the JSF and the condition of that
other than the fact that it is slipping.
Your own statement, Secretary Gates, shows you said, choose
a 75 percent solution over the 99 percent solution. If you have
got something that works well and doesn't cost as much, let's
look at that.
And then I just heard that we are talking about reform the
requisition process that has to be based on realism. Well,
regardless to how many aircraft you think we need, because that
number seems to be about as slippery as an eel, if you have got
about five years to possibly purchase them, we have several
times now put multiyears in the budget encouraging you to look
at that.
And if you look at what the last number of the shortfall
was, if you take 10 percent of 243, that is about what you
would save, that is 24 aircraft that my taxpayers are going to
get 24 more aircraft by getting that 10 percent discount. If
you buy at the lower rate that you have suggested for this year
at 34 aircraft, or whatever it is, you got--it is still 17
aircraft, is what you make by going multiyear.
So what doesn't add up to me, first of all, I don't think
it--I don't have any kind of sense that there is a real number
that you are willing to stand up to as exactly what the
shortfall is. But second of all, even that, if you are going to
buy some, why not get them at a 10 percent discount? That is my
question.
Secretary Gates. Well, as you suggest, we have orders
outstanding for--and funding for--asking for--either have or
asking funding for 59 F/A-18s, 23 Es and Fs and 36 Gs. The
question of multiyear funding has come up before. We have
looked at it and according to the analysis that is available to
me, with multiyear funding at the numbers we are looking at,
the savings is about six and a half percent.
And because of the long-term financial commitment
associated with multiyear funding, we have a threshold of 10
percent. And so it is pretty well below the 10 percent
threshold. I would say there have been--the shortfall in naval
aircraft is a number that has, as you suggest accurately, has
been moving around.
The last figure that I saw in preparation for these
hearings is a shortfall of about a hundred aircraft in 2018,
and there are a number of strategies that people have in mind
for mitigating that shortfall. So I think that is responsive.
Mr. Akin. So the strategies would mean we are just not
going to fly them as many hours, I suppose, cut back on
training, or something like that? I mean, strategies----
Secretary Gates. No, the----
Mr. Akin [continuing]. Don't change the lift of an
airframe.
Secretary Gates. No, the mitigating strategies involve
aligning air wing readiness with carrier readiness. It involves
reducing the size of the Marine Corps' F/A-18C squadrons that
involved using F/A-18E and F attrition reserve aircraft.
So there are a number of things that we have.
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I would like to add, Mr.
Akin, to this is the whole--the investment in this budget in
the EA-18 Growlers is a huge deal and a very positive step
because we have been without a national expeditionary deployed
ashore future because the Marine airplanes are going away here
in the next few years, and that is a huge investment on the
part of this Department, and it is one that is much needed.
And the multiyear piece, those typically don't deliver
unless you have got them out over many years. And the question
obviously, I think, for the F/A-18 is when is the line going to
end? And part of this is matching up. Certainly there are
international buys that I am sure you are aware of that are
being sought and try to also strategically match that up as
well.
It is a great airplane. It has been a great airplane. We
know that, but the JSF is the right answer for the future from
a war-fighting perspective, from my perspective.
Mr. Akin. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentleman,
for being here. Our Nation is blessed to have you in the
service that you provide to the country. It is particularly
good, Secretary Gates, to see you here today without any sign
of visible trauma from an encounter with ice or snow. I think
the last time you were here you were --this time a year ago,
you had, kind of, splints, braces from falls on ice.
Mr. Secretary, I want to bring up a bit of a sore point. On
January 27, 2009, when you testified here, I asked about the
issue of burrowing and you didn't have a response at that time,
but you said you would get back to me for the record. We did
get a response back. Coincidentally, it was exactly one year to
the day later, January 27, 2010. So it took one full calendar
year to get a response signed not by you, but by Gail McGinn,
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans, performing the
duty of the Under Secretary of Defense for personal readiness,
and I found the response unsatisfactory.
Were you aware that it had taken a year for you to get back
a written response to the question, and did you see this letter
before it was sent last week?
Secretary Gates. The answer to both questions is no. And
not getting a response for a year is inexcusable.
Dr. Snyder. That is what I think, too. But thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this response and the
attachments made a part of the record if we might, by unanimous
consent.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 143.]
Dr. Snyder. And if there--I know there has been some press
interest in the topic over the last year. If any press person
would like a copy of these materials, I would be glad to get
them.
Before he left office, Secretary Pete Geren formally
evaluated whether the two men that were shot in Little Rock in
front of the recruiting station qualified for the Purple Heart.
One was killed, and one was wounded. They were both in uniform
at the time on active duty at the recruiting station. The
conclusion was that they were not--that the alleged perpetrator
was considered I believe the phrase is, ``A lone wolf,'' or
something like that. I would--which is--all we ask is that
anyone in any kind of a war at anywhere in the country or world
be evaluated properly.
I was reminded of this yesterday when Secretary Panetta--or
I am sorry, Director Panetta--responded to a question about
what he saw as a--threats of al Qaeda, and he specifically
referred to one of his three threats as being loners.
And I don't want to ask a response today. But if we now
consider loners to be part of the national security threat from
groups like al Qaeda, it may be time to evaluate our policy
with regard to Purple Hearts specifically if we have--in fact
think that people can get motivated--the alleged perpetrator of
Little Rock in fact traveled to Yemen. No indications he had
any connection with formal terrorist groups. But it may be that
we need to evaluate that policy if in fact we consider part of
the al Qaeda threat to be their ability to motivate the so-
called loners. And I would just leave that as an unanswered
question today.
A point--I want to respond a bit to the ranking member's
comment about Don't Ask Don't Tell, that the military somehow
can't have a divisive debate. Somehow the idea that men and
women in uniform cannot participate in great public policy
debates--I remember my time in Vietnam. We debated while we
were in Vietnam whether we thought we should be in Vietnam.
I mean, I know for a fact that this debate went on in March
of 2003 when our troops went into Iraq. The debate continues.
People don't lose their ability to debate policy issues because
they are in the military at a time of war. So I think that that
is a red herring that is an argument that somehow men and women
in uniform can't handle tough policy----
Mr. McKeon. The gentleman yields?
Dr. Snyder. You have unlimited time, Mr. McKeon. I only
have five minutes. I am sure the chairman will give you time at
the conclusion here.
The only point I would want to make, and I would extend as
an invitation to anyone here, Republican or Democrat, who has
doubts about changing this policy. If you have not sat down
with somebody who is currently on active duty--I don't mean
somebody who has gotten out, or been busted out, or quit, but
somebody who is currently on active duty--I would be glad to
arrange a telephone call to protect them.
But yesterday the Secretary--or Admiral Mullen testified
that people have to lie about who they are. They don't just
have to lie about who they are. They have to lie about
everything in their life. They can't come back from a weekend.
They can't talk about family illness. They can't talk about
their partner's mother dying without having to choose their
words carefully.
So if you are thinking about a policy that is bad for
morale and divisive, think about the impact on these literally
thousands of men and women in uniform serving on active duty
today that have to choose every word carefully. They can't
confide in their brothers and sisters in uniform of what--about
what is going on in their personal life whether it is about a
miscarriage, a child, a death, a split up.
They have to lie about everything. That is what is divisive
about this policy. And if anyone would like to take me up on
that offer, I would be glad to try to arrange that kind of a
phone call so you could actually talk to somebody who is in
uniform today on active duty.
Appreciate you all's service.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am concerned about the divisiveness of the debate. But I
am more concerned about the chance of something moving forward
without a debate. That is my biggest concern. And I would be
happy to talk to you about it. And I will be happy to take you
up on your offer.
Dr. Snyder. I am not afraid of the debate. I don't think
anyone's afraid--the debate is going to be here. So I am glad
to hear that you are not afraid of the debate. It needs--there
is going to be a debate. There is going to be a----
Mr. McKeon. Reclaiming my time. I am not afraid of the
debate either. What I don't want is that the members of the
service be precluded or excluded from the debate. Thank you.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, could I say something?
The Chairman. Who is it?
Secretary Gates. This is me. Down here.
The Chairman. Oh, yes. [Laughter.]
Certainly.
Secretary Gates. I have the rare, if not unique experience
of having led three huge public institutions--the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), in the American intelligence
community; the sixth largest university in the country; and now
the Department of Defense. In each of those I have led and
managed change. And I have done it smart. And I have done it
stupid.
Happily I think the stupid was early. But stupid was trying
to impose a policy from the top without any regard for the
views of the people who were going to be affected, or the
people who would have to effect the policy change.
One of the purposes of the review that I have under--have
directed be undertaken by General Hamm, and by Jeh Johnson, is
precisely so we can understand not just the views and concerns
of the chiefs, but of our military people and their families.
And the impact on unit cohesion, on morale, on retention, so we
understand what these things are so we get some facts into this
debate. Or at least some data that we think is reliable and
objective.
We are going to expand the RAND Corporation (RAND) study as
you suggested in your letter to cover a broader range of issues
than they did in 1993. But the role of a leader it seems to me
is to set the goal. But if you want lasting and effective
change, you had better bring the people who are going to be
affected by it into the discussion. And get their views, and at
a minimum it will help you mitigate whatever negative
consequences there are.
That is the purpose of this review. That is why we have to
do it thoroughly, and that is the way you get change in large
public institutions where you have long-term professionals who
care a very great deal about their culture, and about what they
do. And I think that is the purpose of this review that we have
underway.
We have set the goal. The decision will be the Congress'
decision. I think that is vitally important in part because it
will enable us, should the Congress change the policy, to be
able to tell our men and women in uniform this is the view of
the elected representatives of the United States of America.
So I think this review period is absolutely essential in
terms of us understanding what we are doing, figuring out what
the concerns are and the issues are. Helping us figure out how
to mitigate them so that if the Congress does vote to change
this policy, we have an understanding of how to go about
implementing in a way that minimizes whatever negative
consequences there are.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank you.
Mr. Forbes, the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I want to shift
the debate back to money and economics.
And Admiral, some facts that we know. We have got about a
$3 billion shortfall in our shipyards. You are more aware of
those needs and the importance of that than probably anybody in
this room. We also know we have a strike fighter shortfall,
whether that is 240 planes or 100 planes. But if you look at
240 we are talking about roughly $18 billion. So let's just
take a third of that and say $6 billion.
We also know that the shipbuilding plan that was submitted
with the budget really brings us down from the floor of 313
that many of us thought was too low to begin with to 300. The
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) thinks we are more in a
line to be 270. And we know that the Chinese are now at 290
with their ships. And bottom line we are talking about needing
another $2 to $3 billion a year if we wanted to ramp that up.
And there is a provision in the QDR to carry a carrier to
Mayport which would cost $600 million to $1 billion. Now the
cop out is always to say we need to get balance. But we can't
do balance. We can't build a half a ship. We can't build a half
a facility at Mayport. Of those four things, can you just
prioritize those for me if you had to do one through four if we
had that $2 or $3 billion that we had to allocate? Give me a
one, two, three, four prioritization of those items that I just
recounted to you.
Admiral Mullen. And I think you know this, Mr. Forbes, been
on record and would only reemphasize what I have said over
several years. I think this strategic dispersion issue for our
major assets--specifically a carrier in Mayport--is critical.
I certainly share your concern about investments in some of
our large capital assets as you have indicated. And the $16
billion that is in the shipbuilding budget this year is very
important. But we have looked at--you, and I, and many others
in the last decade--a requirement of certainly a minimum of 10
ships a year.
And the floor where I was when I was Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) of 313 ships of various--of a variety as the
floor. And I was concerned and certainly remain concerned that
we continue to chip away at that. And we won't have the Navy
that we need in terms of overall size. So capital investment
there is absolutely critical. Equally critical----
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, if you can--just cause my time is
running out. I realize all of these are critical. But we have
to come down sometime to just allocating limited--can you
prioritize them for me. If you had to pick the top one to the
lowest one, what would you put as the priority?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, no. I can't. I mean----
Mr. Forbes. You can't?
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Cause I think they are all
very important actually.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. And on the move to Mayport you said that
you think the strategic dispersal risk is huge. But can you
tell me what percentage of risk you have been told that would
be?
Admiral Mullen. We have had long discussions about this
over years. We have got carriers spread out on the West Coast.
Inside the Navy this debate has taken place over many years,
and has come down time and time again on not putting all our
eggs in one basket. And that means not all carriers in Norfolk.
Mr. Forbes. Do you know the percentage of risk factor that
was given to you by the strategic dispersal plan?
Admiral Mullen. I think the risk actually should an event
occur is very high.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. But that was different than the admiral
that did the plan who said it was very low. Is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. I actually don't know.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, thank you for submitting a
shipbuilding plan this year. However, in the shipbuilding plan
that you gave, and the certification that you submitted as the
statute requires, you are aware that OMB disagrees with you?
They think that if we continue on the plan with the dollars
that you have, that we would be down to more like 270 ships as
opposed to 300 ships.
Also we know that your shipbuilding report says that we can
only expect $15.9 billion per year. But if you look at the out-
years of that plan, we would need about $17.9. We know we have
had cost overruns that raise the price up, not down. We know
that there are limited federal priorities in terms of monies
that we are going to have.
Based on those factors, how can we make the certification
that the shipbuilding plan submitted is going to--that this
budget is going to equal that shipbuilding plan and carry it
out?
Secretary Gates. Well, as you and I discussed the last time
we talked about the 30-year shipbuilding plan, I would tell you
that I think the near term estimates on the part of the plan
have a significant degree of accuracy. I think the middle range
in years is based on analysis and studies. And we don't really
know for sure.
And the out-years toward the end of the 2030s is mainly a
fantasy, because nobody knows. So I would say that--and we have
told the Navy that we probably need to get them to $16 or $17
billion a year in the middle years, and later years of this
decade in order to try and get to where they need to be.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your extraordinary service to this
country. I wanted to ask one or two personnel questions
initially. As you stated--and I know this is very sincere
coming from you. The most critical strategic asset that we have
is our people. And over the last 11 years we have made a great
effort to increase the military compensation to compete with
the private sector. And yet this year the President's budget
request really moves away from that practice by not enhancing
the pay raise with the 0.5 percent that we have experienced.
What is going to happen is that we are not able to close
that gap as we would really like. It is getting there. But it
still would have about a 2.4 percent gap. We started 11 years
ago at about a 13.5 percent gap. So we are so close. We have
additional high stress on our troops. Why not continue to move
that gap along to close that gap this year?
Secretary Gates. Well, let me start, and then maybe the
Chairman will have anything to add. The 1.4 percent is driven
by the employment cost index.
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Secretary Gates. So it is basically by law. And the reality
is every year we come up here, you know, and I confess to a
tactical error. The first year I was in this job we submitted
2.5 percent, and the Congress gave us 3 percent. And so I said,
okay, 3 percent. So I submitted 3 percent the next year, and we
got 3.5 percent.
And the reality is this has a cumulative effect that, as
the Chairman talked about earlier, at a certain point--I mean,
nobody cares more about our troops than we do, and we, as you
say, we have put a lot of money into the budget for the troops.
There are, as the Chairman pointed out--the Chairman of the
committee pointed out early on, there are a number of increases
in this budget in terms of housing and various family programs
and so on. We are starting a renewal of the DOD schools, to
rebuild those. So there is a lot in this budget for our
families.
But the pay increases, along with health care, frankly, are
beginning to eat us alive. And, frankly, if you look at--you
know, I think we have to be realistic about this--if you look
at the economy today and the unemployment rate, that the pay
for our troops at all levels is very competitive.
Admiral Mullen. I mean, I would just re-emphasize that. And
you know I said in my opening statement that this committee has
been extraordinarily supportive of our men and women for the
last eight years. It actually goes back much further than that,
and that the overall compensation package has gotten better
since the mid-1990s, when that gap was clearly there, and that
we have to--we have to continue to get this right across a
broad range of capabilities.
If I were one, and as was pointed out, we fully funded
health care this time, but the health care premiums haven't
gone up since 1995. We cannot do this for free. I mean it
just--this all comes out of the same pot. And health care, the
total health bill, in this budget is $50 billion. It is going
to go to $64 billion shortly. In 2001 it was 19. We, like, you
know, many other people in the country, we got to get control
of that, because that is where I buy my weapons, that is how I
pay for my--it is the same pot of money.
Mrs. Davis. Yes, I----
Admiral Mullen. So we have got to keep the people thing
right. And there has been a tremendous investment there.
Mrs. Davis. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. And so I am in favor----
Mrs. Davis. I certainly--and I understand the trade-offs. I
think all the members do. I think that we may see some pressure
to do that again, and--and I just was interested in, you know,
some of your rationale for that.
If I may, very quickly, the other issues that are of
critical importance are family support issues. And clearly,
there is a lot that has been done. I applaud you for the focus
on mental health.
But we hear continually from families that they need some
help, especially with special-needs children. And we in our
last authorization had a family support--setting up a
department for special-needs children. That is not in the FY
2011 budget, and I want to ask you if you could respond to that
and if we can continue to talk about this issue.
Secretary Gates. All I can say, I will have to look into
whether----
Mr. Hale. You just look into it. I think that came too late
to get in the budget, but my understanding is the intent is to
set up the office. There was no appropriation for it, but we
will reprogram to try to meet that need.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. We hear continually from families
regarding that. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Hale, thank you
for being here. Thank you for your service.
I want to start with a brief statement on an issue that we
have talked about before, and then I have a couple of
questions. I have had serious concerns for some time about the
fighter gap issue and how it will negatively impact our
Nation's national and homeland defense, particularly as it
pertains to the Air National Guard.
As you know, beginning in 2015, 80 percent of the Air
National Guard fighter fleet begins to run out of flying hours.
Without aircraft, the Air National Guard will be unable to
continue to perform the air sovereignty alert mission and
unable to support the Air Force in overseas operations, which I
think they have been doing magnificently--and very cost
effectively, I might add.
Many units will lose flying missions altogether and may
lose highly skilled pilots and technicians, which simply cannot
be replaced.
Although I am supportive of the F-35 program, given the
recent developments with F-35 being at least two years behind
schedule in testing and projected cost overruns resulting in
reduced procurement of F-35 in the early years, I am very
concerned that even with the concurrent and proportional
fielding of F-35 into the Air National Guard, there will simply
not be enough aircraft in time to save the Air National Guard
fighter fleet.
In last year's defense authorization bill, myself and
Representative Giffords requested a study of interim buy of 4.5
generation fighters to address the Air National Guard fighter
gap issue. Although the final report has not been forwarded to
our offices yet, preliminary indications are that the
industrial base could in very short order and for less money
begin production of the 4.5 generation fighter for domestic
issue--for domestic use.
I know you have opposed such a solution in the past, but
would not the 4.5 generation fighter meet several of your
criteria for the FY 2011 budget, including emphasizing proven
technologies, incorporating combat experience, avoiding the
expensive solution that we have to face otherwise, and the need
for balance, a mixture of 4th-, 4.5- and 5th-generation
fighters, Secretary Gates or Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. I understand the issue, sir, and I know
that the Air Guard and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force are
very focused on trying to get this balance right. And I think
for us it has certainly been an issue of affordability.
I talked about the JSF program before and, obviously, the
transition, the time that we are in right now, I recognize the
challenges that we have. And while we might be able to buy more
airplanes, it is going to--that money has got to come from
somewhere and, obviously, in the priorities that we have laid
out, we chose not to do that.
Secondly, having been through the re-capitalization of my
own service, particularly in aviation a few years ago, the
reality is if the Air Force is going to recapitalize, it is
going to have to decommission a lot of airplanes, older
airplanes. That is just a fact.
Now, that creates challenges and tension inside the Air
Force between the Air Force and the Guard, the active side of
the Guard, and we are at a point where we are working our way
through that.
We still think we have time to work our way through that to
meet what we think the requirements will be in the 2015-2016
timeframe that I talk about--at least that is the feedback I
get from both the head of the Guard as well as the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force.
Secretary Gates. I would just add the other reality is that
as you look at fifth generation fighters with their advanced
sensing capabilities and stealth, that we just need to come to
grips with reality that it doesn't make any sense to replace
legacy aircraft on a one-to-one basis.
Now, some of the Guard units are shifting their mission,
and some of the Air Guard units are providing the pilot
training and the exercise with the pilotless or remotely
piloted vehicles. And I know there are several Guard units that
have made the switch and mission.
So as the Chairman says, this is something we are just
going to have to work our way through as we are in this
transition period. But I think, just as a matter of principle,
folks need to understand that there is not a requirement or a
need to replace legacy aircraft on a one-to-one basis.
I will just give you one example, if I might. It would
take--you can do--in terms of persistent presence over a 24-
hour period, you can do with eight Reapers what it would take
36 F-16s to do. And they carry the same armament. So we need to
think in terms of not only the fighters, but also the remotely
piloted vehicles as we think about the Air Force in the middle
years of the 21st century.
Mr. LoBiondo. I had a follow up, but my time is over. Thank
you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
We will call on Mr. Larsen, and then we will break. We have
five votes, one 15-minute vote and four 5-minute votes. This
will take approximately 45 minutes. We will use that time to
have lunch, and at the end of the votes, which will be
approximately 45 minutes, we will resume. And, hopefully, the
witnesses can get a bite to eat between now and then. We are
now recessed until the call back after Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to play a little rapid fire, fill in the blank,
so there are a couple of questions here that are unrelated
subject by subject.
But first, for Secretary Gates, with regards to the U.S.
Air Force KC-X program, we have so many Requests for Proposals
(RFP) coming up fairly soon. There has been discussions about
perhaps only a single offer. What would be the DOD's approach
if there is only a single response to the RFP for the KC-X?
Secretary Gates. Well, obviously, we would like to have a
competition for it, and we hope that both companies will agree
to participate. But we will move forward. We have to have new
tankers.
Mr. Larsen. Chairman Mullen, with regards to the
expeditionary squadrons for Growler, the Prowler replacement, I
understand there are some amount of money to recapitalize
existing Prowlers perhaps as a bridge to standing up
expeditionary squadrons of Growlers. Is that the case in the
budget?
Admiral Mullen. What I didn't say earlier, and I will say
very quickly is the Navy and the Marine Corps have really
worked hard to mitigate this strike fighter shortfall, and I
give them a lot of credit for that. And they have, from the 245
or whatever the number was down to a very low number. And they
are happy with that.
Secondly, there is an investment here to retain the EA-6B
squadrons as a bridge, as you would describe it, but also to be
able to get to these EA-18Gs. Admiral Roughead has also made
the decision that the first squadron is actually not going to
be carrier-based. It is going to go with the fighters into
Afghanistan.
Mr. Larsen. Oh, okay, yes. So, but the--just for me to
clarify, then, has the--has the decision been made, though, to
stand up separate expeditionary squadrons of Growlers, four----
Admiral Mullen. Four squadrons.
Mr. Larsen. And they will provide the expeditionary effort.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. And that is the plan.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thanks.
Back to Secretary Gates, the QDR outlines the need for
security assistance reform, and there are some comments in your
testimony and the Chairman's testimony on it. And I think it
says that we will develop new and innovative approaches to
reforming security sector assistance, but the budget request
doesn't yet include authority or provisions such as the Section
1206 to be able to train and equip.
Can you talk a little bit about what you want to see happen
with the global train and equip, the 1206 and the 1207
programs, and whether or not we are going to see a specific
legislative proposal that looks at reforming those?
Secretary Gates. I don't know the answer to the last
question. 1206, we have asked for an increase from $350 million
to $500 million. This is really important money for our
combatant commanders. It is the kind of assistance we have been
providing, for example, to Yemen for their counterterrorism
training and equipment and so on.
We have undertaken an initiative within the executive
branch to talk about new ways of doing this. We are clearly in
a new world in terms of trying to figure out how do we get to a
place before it becomes a crisis and, using both civilian and
military capabilities, engage in building those countries' own
capabilities.
How we go about that has only begun to be discussed by the
executive branch. I sent a paper around that made a suggestion
about how to do this, modeled on the pooled concept that is
used in Great Britain, where we and State both would have
access to resources. The key here is agility and flexibility.
And as whatever we do, that is what we have to build into this
process going forward.
Mr. Larsen. So to date, we are still looking at 1206 and
1207 and presumably 1208. Is that----
Secretary Gates. And the decision--you know, last year we
talked about 1207----
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. And we outlined a process of
transition of that program to the State Department. The
Administration decided to accelerate that process, so 1207 is
now in the State Department.
Mr. Larsen. In the State Department. But it still--
presumably, over the next year we will be hearing from you all
about what reform--a reform might look like.
Secretary Gates. I certainly hope so.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. All right. So instead of phase zero,
maybe phase minus one, so as you have said before--before the
bad stuff happens.
Secretary Gates. Exactly.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks a lot.
The Chairman. We will stand in recess approximately 45
minutes.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. We will be resuming, and we will now call on
Mr. Bishop, the gentleman from Utah, we are under the five
minute rule.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
appreciate you being here. There is much in your proposals for
which--I am over here, right here, yes--much in your proposals
that I appreciate what you have done.
I know we have some difference in priorities, as we had
last year. Those are an honest difference of opinion. And to be
honest, in hindsight, I am still right. But beyond that----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bishop. You made a couple of unilateral decisions last
year with Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI). And we reduced our
ground-based defense process. We have yet actually to commit to
a long-range program of sustaining Minuteman Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) III through the year 2030.
But especially when you are talking about the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, you said, not a forever
decision, which I took to mean that there may be some time in
the future where the Department decides to go ahead and produce
additional ground-based interceptors in response to the ever-
changing threat picture that goes on--that is, unless we don't
have an industrial and technical capability to do that in some
point in the future. And to be honest, there is in my mind some
serious doubts, especially with some drastic changes that have
taken place in recent days.
The Administration's silly decision to terminate the
Constellation program without any kind of alternative program.
And the rationale that I look at is more vendetta than common
sense. It not only puts us in a second-rate situation, but it
condemns thousands of jobs, good jobs that are dealing with
math and engineering. And to be honest, this truly is about
rocket science in some particular way.
Now, Mr. Secretary, you have some good people working under
you. And one of your Assistant Secretaries did write back in
September that, ``I feel the industrial base issues are
completely legitimate, because having the best defense
industrial and technological base in the world is not a
birthright.'' It is not about jobs, it is about certain kinds
of jobs, very rare kinds of skills that are not easily
replicated in the commercial world, and if allowed to erode
would be difficult to rebuild.
Now, I am concerned, because I think recent decisions that
have been made, especially dealing with solid rocket motors,
are putting us on the verge of having the experience that we
need in the future walking out the doors in search of other
employment, or simply filing unemployment benefits. Because we
simply cannot turn the spigot on and off. And if, in the
future, we need to increase that, we have to have the
capability and may not have the luxury of time to reconstitute
this capability.
So, the question I have for you is, in the decision that
was made, did anyone in the Obama Administration, or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), or in
OMB, may they--I understand you can say anything you want to
about somebody that is negative, as long as you say, ``bless
their heart'' attached to it, so OMB, bless their heart--did
any of those consult with you or the Department of Defense on
the potential impact for defense industrial bases, with NASA's
termination of the Constellation program and the Ares rockets
program?
Secretary Gates. Not that I recall.
But I would just say in response to a comment you made
early on, I said these decisions on the Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBI) and on Fort Greely aren't forever. And, in
fact, we are going to complete the 2006 buy of 47 GBIs. This
budget contains five more over the next several years. And we
will complete the second missile field.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that. But my
concern is, we need to have an industrial base. And sometimes,
especially with the subcontractors, there is a very limited
amount of that base.
The decision that NASA--that is made dealing with NASA's
going forward in the future--does have impacts on what you can
do in the Department of Defense.
So, I would hope you would agree that this could be
potentially a very serious problem. I am concerned if you no
longer have the industrial base to create the motors that are
necessary for these programs.
And I hope you would see--I hope you would admit that there
is some kind of interaction. And don't you think you should
have been consulted in some way as to the impact this will have
on the Department of Defense?
Secretary Gates. Well, the Department may have been
consulted, Mr. Bishop. I wasn't. And I will find out if we were
consulted.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I hope you would agree that this is a
significant issue that should--and a serious enough issue--you
should have been impacted about--or it should have been
discussed and should have been consulted about this particular
potential.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. I thank you. With that, Mr.--you also mentioned
in a follow up to what Mr. Akin said--and if I can do this very
quickly--that last year the Navy--in 2008 said the Navy would
face by the year 2008, 125 aircraft shortfall in 2020, last
year it was up to 243--because of the cost of the extension of
those to come up to 10,000, was not a cost-benefit analysis
that was equitable.
Do you have funding in this program budget to cover
extensions for the F-15, F-16 and F-18, for their service life
extensions programs?
I am sorry. I ran out of time. And if you want to defer
that, I will do it in writing, or somebody else can pick up the
question, if you don't have time to do it.
Secretary Gates. Sure. We will answer it for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 163.]
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I am very pleased to see in your proposed
budget the elimination of--eventually, by 2015--elimination
altogether of the disabled veterans tax, referred to by some as
concurrent receipt. And we have got to find offsets for $5.1
billion worth of costs associated with that.
And, Mr. Chairman, I certainly hope that we are going to
work closely with Ways and Means and the Administration. It
seems to me we ought to be able to find $5.1 billion over a 10-
year period of time, as large as our mandatory spending is. We
ought to be able to do that and get this done once and for all.
But I----
The Chairman. If the gentleman will yield, and I will not
take it out of your time. Last year, in this committee, we were
able to find from other committees enough concurrent receipt
for one year. Now, that is mandatory spending. It is not out of
discretionary funds.
And the Administration did not send over any--then or now--
send over any offset from mandatory funds. And consequently, we
are at a loss. And I was quite concerned. I think other members
of this committee were, too. So, I urged the Administration to
send us over offsets, so we can be honest with these folks.
Mr. Marshall. Well, Mr. Chairman, I applaud the efforts
that you made last year to find the offsets we needed to do
right by all these folks who have been treated so badly for so
long.
This is a tax. It is a tax on disabled veterans. And it is
inexcusable, frankly, given priorities that we have.
So, the Administration just needs to somehow find--help us
find offsets. With all the mandatory spending we are going to
do over a 10-year period of time, we can't find $5.1 billion?
It makes no sense to me.
But thank you for that, Mr. Secretary, trying to finally
resolve this issue.
You mentioned at least the possibility that two of the
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are now in Europe might be
coming home. And there are at least three bases that might wind
up receiving them.
Let me put a plug in for Fort Stewart, or at least for
keeping in mind one factor in trying to make that decision
should be the impact on the local community that has partnered
with DOD and the Army to prepare for the receipt of BCT. If it
is New York City, that is a drop in the bucket. They are going
to be able to absorb whatever investment that they have made.
And that investment will be useful to them.
The kind of investment that a small rural community makes
to receive 10,000 or 15,000 people is relatively extraordinary.
And that seems to me to be a factor that should weigh very
heavily in favor of a place like Fort Stewart, where the local
community really is very small, and the investment will not be
absorbed. It will simply be lost.
You are currently, I think, studying the possibility of
small nuclear power plants at military installations around the
United States. The EMP weapon is one reason we should be
interested in this, that these are hardened facilities that
produce power. Then perhaps we can get power out quickly after
an EMP strike.
And a final thing I would like to just ask some questions
about. There is a real disconnect, Mr. Secretary, between you
and the committee with regard to the second engine. You already
know that. You announced in your opening statement that you
would recommend that the President veto any bill that
contemplates inclusion of the second engine.
Here we are wondering, where is that coming from? We
haven't seen a fiscal analysis that would support such a strong
statement from you about how wasteful this is. In fact, in
2007, DOD itself produced something that concluded that you
really couldn't tell--you know, on the pure cost question--you
couldn't really tell whether this was going to be more
expensive or less expensive. And people widely concede that it
does lessen risk having two available engines, and that the
operational benefit associated with lessening the risk is
something that is fairly significant. That is what we are
hearing here.
And we don't--you know, we have a new Secretary, and the
Secretary simply announces that this is wasteful. But we don't
really see it from what we receive and what we are getting from
staff. If you could help us with that.
Secretary Gates. Sure. And this will be the second year in
a row that the Administration has taken this position. And I
would just say, you know, from our standpoint, the Congress has
added $1.8 billion for this program. We see it costing us
another $2.9 billion over the next 5 years.
And this is the only place in the world where a competition
ends up with everybody winning at the end.
The reality is, the most optimistic analyses and models
that we have run show that there is little advantage to the
taxpayer of having a second engine. The truth is, almost none
of the customers will buy two engines. If there is a European
engine or a Rolls-Royce/General Electric (GE) engine, the
Europeans are probably going to buy--our European partners are
probably going to buy that one. The Marine Corps and the Navy
have both said they are only going to take one airplane,
because of the limited logistics, space available on ships.
So, the only piece of this that could be competed would be
the Air Force part of it. And so, you end up having two engines
for the Air Force.
Look, the key is getting the F-135 engine program. It is
doing well. It is completed 13,000 hours of testing out of
14,700. The F-136 has completed 50 hours of testing. There is
no reason to believe that the second engine won't encounter the
same development problems the first one has.
I will go on, but we can give you the analysis and provide
you details on why we continue----
Mr. Marshall. That would be great. But we keep getting
cited to the 2007 analysis by DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement
Group, which suggested that there really wasn't a cost
difference between the two. And then, there are many people who
think that there are operational advantages to having two
engines.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Turner
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
Admiral, thank you for being here.
I have two questions for you, Mr. Secretary. The first
relates to your earlier statement. You said, nobody cares more
about our troops than we do. And I believe that you mean that.
There are, at times, disputes as to what does it mean to care
for them. And this issue that I am going to raise is one of
those disputes.
Unbelievably, throughout our country there are family law
courts that are taking custody away from our service members,
based upon their deployment. With our chairman's support, and
three committees of the House, this House has passed four
times, unanimously, legislation which would protect those
custody rights. It says simply that a family law court cannot
take custody away from a service member based solely upon their
service.
I sent you a letter signed by, unbelievably, every member
of this committee.
When I raised this issue with you last year, and the fact
that DOD has been opposed to this legislation, you told me at
that time that you were unaware of DOD's opposition. You
committed that your staff would work with me as the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was approaching, so that
perhaps we could come up with compromise legislation.
Your staff met with me, and these are basically their
responses. They said, first, it doesn't really happen. I gave
them a number of news accounts explaining that, of course, it
does happen.
Secondly, they said that custody historically is not a
matter of federal law. I provided them with a copy of the 65
pages in the federal code that relate to Indian tribes and the
instructions to state courts on how to deal with custody with
respect to Indian tribes--65 pages.
They said, then, it was state rights. You do not have one
state that is objecting to our legislation. And, of course, I
pointed out that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is, in
itself each element, a violation of state rights, because it
relates to state court matters.
Your staff offered no text changes. And when I inquired as
to whether there were any dire consequences to the troops, to
kids, or if it was unfair to the ex-spouses, no information was
provided to us of any dire consequences to anyone if this
legislation would pass.
Now, again, sir, we have a national military. For that we
need a national standard. Our legislation only applies
limitedly to the issue of custody based upon the service
deployment and the threat of deployment.
Now, sir, I wrote you on July 22nd and August 26th, asking
to meet with you about this, to talk about your opposition. You
responded on September 25th with one of the items, saying,
first, I plan to personally contact the governors of each of
the states that have yet to pass legislation addressing the
special consideration of child custody.
Well, my first question for you today, sir, is, I would
believe that you are a very busy man. But certainly, a
secretary that has time to contact every governor in this
matter ought to have 30 minutes to sit down for you and I to
have a conversation about this.
So, my first question is, will you meet with me to discuss
the issue of the threat to the child custody of our service
members?
Secretary Gates. Sure, I will meet with you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I think it would be beneficial. I do think that the current
opposition at DOD is misplaced.
Secondly, I am the ranking member of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, and I have a question concerning the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) strategic concept. Later
this spring, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will
provide recommendations for a NATO strategic concept to the
NATO Secretary General, and next fall the Secretary General
will provide his recommendations to NATO member-states for
consideration at the Lisbon Summit.
Secretary Gates, do you believe that NATO should be
maintained as a nuclear alliance, based upon your assessment
and your dialogue with fellow NATO defense ministers, do our
nuclear deterrence capabilities in Europe still constitute
reassurance to our allies?
Secretary Gates. I believe they do.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. There is a great deal of discussion
that is going on as to whether or not that presence should
remain, so I take it that your answer to my first part of the
question is you believe it should be maintained as a nuclear
alliance, yes?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your testimony
today and your testimony yesterday regarding repealing Don't
Ask Don't Tell. I am sure you heard the news just hours ago
that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin
Powell also echoed and supported your decision.
Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday it is not a question of
if, it is a matter of how we repeal Don't Ask Don't Tell. And I
am skeptical that the implementation review needs to take one
year. When we passed in the Congress Don't Ask Don't Tell back
in 1993, it took 90 days for it to be implemented.
And I just want to make sure that you know review can't be
an excuse for a delay. I also understand it is a two-track
process, basically. It is us in the Congress doing our job to
overturn the law that we passed almost 17 years ago. And
secondly, the other track is the fact that the experts--the
military leadership--needs to figure out a way to implement
this non-discriminatory policy.
If we do that via the vehicle that we talked about, the
National Defense Authorization Act, I have only been in
Congress for three years, but I understand every fiscal year
when we pass it, it usually takes about eight months. So back
in Fiscal Year 2009 we passed it on October 14, 2008 Fiscal
Year 2010, we passed it last October 28th of 2009, and we will
probably pass this fiscal year's budget--or I am sorry, 2011
budget, this October in 2010.
So while we in Congress do our job, you know, you will have
ample time, at least in my opinion, to figure out how we should
implement this to make sure that we are being careful. I think
you would agree that that is ample time, meaning by the time we
pass and it gets in effect, whether 2011 or mid-2011, you will
have time to complete the study and figure out how exactly we
are going to do this. Would that be accurate, Mr. Secretary and
Mr. Chairman?
Secretary Gates. Well, what I said yesterday was that I
expected our work to be done before the end of the calendar
year. The reality is there are a lot of assertions associated
with this about what people believe and what they don't
believe, and what attitudes and what they aren't. And as the
Chairman said yesterday, we just don't know the facts. And so
it is, for us, it is a dual purpose review.
One is to get the--to have a dialogue with our people in
uniform and their families about this change, identify problems
and issues associated with its implementation, and figure out
ways to mitigate those concerns.
These kinds of major changes frankly, if done too quickly,
have counterproductive consequences. And we need--the
Department of Defense is the biggest, most complex,
organization in the world. Our military culture is one of our
greatest strengths, but it is also a strong culture.
And so, we need to work with people, we need to get their
input into how to go about this. And I just think this is not
an excuse for delay, this is in fact a way to do this right in
a way that it works. And that we mitigate or minimize negative
consequences. I think rushing into it, mandating it by fiat
with a very short time line would be a serious mistake.
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I would add is one of my--I
talked about it earlier today and yesterday about the issue of
military effectiveness and readiness, and that is a huge
concern. I would hope that there would be responsible
leadership on both sides of this issue.
And that we not do what we actually, from my perspective,
having been in the fleet, did in the earlier debate, which was
put the military in the middle of this. Because, we can't
afford that now, because of the stress of two wars and all
those things that have been laid out. That doesn't mean that it
can't be accommodated, if it is done in a reasonable fashion.
And the other thing from my perspective, this is a
responsibility for--should it change--for the military to lead,
and so there is an impact of this review. There is an
implementation part of this, and they are linked. And so, young
officers in positions that--like you held formerly--have to
figure out how to lead this in the future as well.
And I think saying it will take a discrete timeline is
probably not known right now, in terms of it will take a month
or two for somebody to figure that out. So, we haven't done
this kind of review before. We don't know the impact on the
force, and that is what we have got to--that is really what we
have to do over the course of this year.
Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I think that us in the Congress,
we want to make sure that we are partnering with you, to
implement this in the right way, so that we are taking care of
our war fighters, and we also obviously believe in the
principles that our country stands for. And I do appreciate
your testimony yesterday and again today. And we look forward
to partnering with you to make sure we do this exactly in a
diligent fashion.
Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here.
I have just two highly unrelated questions, but I think
that both strike to an important point. And frankly, that is in
responsiveness on the part of the Department.
One, Mr. Secretary, we have been talking to your staff
about the issue of Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence
(PDMRA). I don't know who thinks of these things for names, but
PDMRA is an important program put in place back in January of
2007 to address those units who were mobilized for periods
beyond what they were supposed to be.
For example, the Minnesota National Guard was mobilized and
sent to Iraq. They were there for 16 months for a total of a
22-month mobilization period. Nationally, there are over 23,000
National Guard members, over 10 percent of them from Minnesota,
who qualify for this PDMRA payment.
In some cases, it is thousands of dollars. Nobody has
received a dime, not a single dime. And so, the question is
when can these soldiers expect to receive these PDMRA payments?
Admiral Mullen. I am going to need to take that one for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 163.]
Mr. Kline. Okay, please do, and please get back to us
quickly. I will tell you that this is a gigantic issue in
Minnesota, because we have such a large Guard. They have been
deployed multiple times. Some of them are--they are just now
coming back, the Red Bulls, from Iraq. Right now they are in
the process. And some of them are expecting to be deployed
again in 2011. And they have been told now for years that they
have this money coming to them, and nothing is there.
Admiral Mullen. Fine. And I would just--actually, I don't
know about the payment piece, but I was just with them, and
they have been spectacular. And what they have done in Basra,
they have really become the model for this Advise and Assist
Brigade. And General Nash and his troops are, as you know,
incredibly proud of what they have done, and they really have
been magnificent.
Mr. Kline. Well, thank you. Rick Nash is one of my heroes,
as are those men and women in the Guard. Not just the Minnesota
Guard, but as you know, the Red Bulls stretches beyond that.
But really this issue needs to be addressed, Mr. Secretary, it
really does. Because they have been told month after month
after month they have earned this, it is coming. And we haven't
even seen the implementing instructions coming out of the
Secretary's office. And it is in law we need to do it.
The other issue is, and we have talked about this before,
Mr. Secretary, and that is the issue of the charter for the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). We put in the last NDAA,
language requiring that that charter be prepared and let us see
it. And so far, there is no charter. So the question is, do you
know what the status of that is, and when we might expect to
see such a thing? That is a major organization with huge
acquisition responsibilities and a horribly antiquated charter,
and we just ought to get it done.
Secretary Gates. My impression is that a new charter has
been drafted, but is in interagency coordination. But let me
check on the status of it, and we will get back to you.
Mr. Kline. Well, I would appreciate it.
Secretary Gates. I would like to have an answer to you on
both of these questions by early next week.
Mr. Kline. I would really appreciate that. And you know,
Mr. Secretary, Admiral. You know how this works. You have got
some hard-charging major there who has drafted this thing. And
I will tell you, the charter has been drafted repeatedly over
these many years, where we haven't had one.
And it gets into a staffing sequence, and we all know what
that means, as it gets moved up and across and back down and
everything. And you can staff one of these things until after I
am long retired, and frankly, both of you are long retired. And
somebody, maybe my son or something like that, or like Duncan
D., will be in here, somebody's son will be asking have we
finished staffing the NRO charter? So please, I would
appreciate that if we could get it next week.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Kline, nobody is more familiar with
that problem than I am.
Mr. Kline. Mr. Secretary, I actually knew that. And I knew
you would be responding. But it is, it is critical that we get
this done. It is so important.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Ms. Shea-Porter, the gentlelady from New Hampshire.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you, and thank you both for being
here.
I continue to be concerned about the open air pits, which
have been linked to chronic disease and illnesses among service
members. Last year, my amendment to the NDAA prohibited open
burn pits, but you were allowed, Mr. Secretary, if you saw--to
get an exemption--if you saw no other alternatives.
Could you please tell me where are on those right now?
Secretary Gates. My recollection is--and I will have to get
you a more up-to-date report--my recollection is that a number
of the burn pits have in fact been shut down. And they have put
new regulations in place in terms of using them. But in terms
of where we are in shutting them all down, I am just not
certain. I don't know, Chairman, if you know.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay.
Secretary Gates. But we will get an update for you.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Secretary Gates. But I know that some have been--some of
the larger ones have been shut down.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you, and I appreciate that.
I also wanted to ask you about the community defense
initiatives. General McChrystal was involved in that, and I
support that. He said that you know it would be a good way to
get the Afghans involved in their defense. And I think it would
provide a lighter footprint for us.
But now, I understand that Ambassador Eikenberry has
blocked some of the funding for that. And so, I would like to
ask you about that as well? Is that part of our counter-
terrorism strategy, or is it not?
Admiral Mullen. I think it still is. I am not aware that
Ambassador Eikenberry had done that, and I can take a look at
it and get you a more thorough answer specifically. The whole
focus at that level is an important part of the overall
approach as well.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Secretary Gates. I think that the--you know, my view is
that the ultimate solution in Afghanistan is a variety of
security elements. Local tribesmen, local community defense
groups, police, the army, and so on. And particularly at the
provincial and sub-provincial level, re-empowering the tribal
elders, and so on.
The worry that everybody shares and the source of caution
is the last thing we want to do is re-create or re-empower
warlords. And so, if there is a reservation on the ground, it
is the worry that in one place or another, that the risk of
doing that is high.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Well, do you think that the Afghan
councils in the communities are strong enough?
Secretary Gates. I think if--my guess is that it probably
varies very much from locality to locality. And it may be that
the way to approach this is on a case-by-case basis in terms of
whether the local governance is strong enough to have one of
these community defense organizations without running the risk
of warlordism.
Ms. Shea-Porter. But you do think it is possible to do
that? Because we know that the central government is weak, to
be kind about it. And we also know that this is part of our
whole overall strategy. I mean, how important would you rate
that strategy?
Secretary Gates. I think it is important.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Important enough to----
Secretary Gates. And I think this needs to be part of our
toolkit. But I also am prepared to acknowledge that it is
really up to the Ambassador and General McChrystal and their
colleagues to decide where this works and where it won't.
Admiral Mullen. I would only add, ma'am, that in the
operations that General McChrystal directs, it is very much
integrated with the Afghan security forces, the army and the
police, as well as on infrastructure or a--the part of the
hold-and-build, to be able to build beyond that, right down to
the local level.
So that is--it is being integrated into operations as we
speak. And it is also informing the government in Kabul, which
certainly has a lot of work to do as well.
Ms. Shea-Porter. But it does seem to be a pretty big
difference right now between the military and between the
Ambassador. So I would appreciate it if you could get back to
me on that as well.
Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
Mr. Rogers from Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
say I had never been more proud of the chairman of this
committee than I was in December of last year when Deputy
Secretary Lynn spoke to us about Guantanamo Bay. And the
chairman opened up the hearing by telling him, ``This committee
and this Congress is not going to give you a penny to buy a
prison in Illinois to bring detainees to this country.''
And I can tell you he was speaking for all of us when he
said that. So that $150 million that you got in your budget as
far as I am concerned you can go ahead and strike it. I want
you to know I think that this is asinine to talk about bringing
a 100 detainees to this country, and spending $500 million to
do it when we are in a time of these incredible deficits--10
percent unemployment. It is just reckless spending that we
can't afford.
So I hope you will take that leave from the chairman of
this committee and go ahead and strike that amount. I did want
to speak a little bit--you told Mr. McKeon that you felt the
arrest of the Christmas Day bomber, and turning him over to the
private criminal authority--not the private--the criminal
authorities. You would leave whether that is--the judgment as
to whether or not that was a good decision to Attorney General
Holder. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. With your background as CIA Director, and
leading the Defense Department--very competently in both jobs--
do you really believe in 50 minutes we got the information we
needed from that Christmas Day bomber?
Secretary Gates. Well, as I said earlier, I think that
there have been some lessons learned. I know we got some--I
know we got a lot of information during that period. I believe
that going forward we now have the protocols in place, and that
kind of multi-agency interrogation--experienced interrogation
team that also knows that if there is a national security
threat they can delay Mirandizing somebody.
I think we now have got the protocols in place that going
forward we will be able to fully exploit anybody that gets
caught like that.
Mr. Rogers. Again my question though is after 50 minutes he
was turned over to the criminal prosecution, and was given a
lawyer. And I am a recovering attorney. His lawyer is not going
to let him talk any more. So do you believe that we got all the
information we needed to get from him in 50 minutes?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
I wanted to ask you about the 1230 report measuring the
progress in Afghanistan that was due last September. When will
we see that?
Secretary Gates. I will just have to check. I am not sure.
Mr. Rogers. Great. And also with regard to metrics. When
will we receive an update on how we are doing on benchmarks and
goals in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. We got this question in the Senate
yesterday. And, frankly, I thought that they had been shared
with the committees. They had been worked in the interagency.
And so I will need to find out what happened to that because
frankly I thought they were already up here.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. I would like to get that. And then finally
General McChrystal as I understand asked for a little more than
30,000 troops--of our troops, and he got 30, and that is good.
But is he capped at that? If he needs an additional 5,000 or
10,000 troops in Afghanistan in the next 16-17 months, is he
going to have the flexibility to get those?
Admiral Mullen. General McChrystal worked his way, as we
all did, through the strategy. And the overall approach is--
satisfied with the resources that have been made available to
him. And he is a NATO commander. So it is not just U.S.
forces----
Mr. Rogers. Right. I understand that.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. As I--and there are 43 plus
countries contributing over there, which is significant in
terms of commitment. And we are hopeful that there are an
additional 7,000 to 10,000 troops have come from NATO, and
working that pretty hard as well. So General McChrystal thinks
he has the--sorry the resources he needs to match the strategy
that he is executing.
There are very few commanders quite frankly that I have
ever met--myself included--that don't want more.
Mr. Rogers. Right. Well, and that----
Admiral Mullen. And that is okay. Now we have matched that
up.
Secretary Gates. I would just also add that in his
decisions the President gave me the authority to add up to
within a range of about 10 percent if I identified critically
needed enablers, counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED),
ISR, and so on. And so I do have some flexibility.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank the
witnesses for their endurance here today.
I wanted to focus on the shipbuilding plan for a minute.
This year's budget and the shipbuilding plan follows on last
year's start up investment in the follow-on class to the Ohio--
the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) program. There is
roughly about $700 million in this year's budget. Last year
there was close to $500 million that was approved by the
Congress.
Certainly an indication, as the Secretary said earlier,
that we are not just standing still in terms of our weapons
procurement in the future. In the shipbuilding plan it actually
had some language that was--sounded urgent. There was no leeway
in this plan to allow a later start or any delay in the
procurement plan.
So I just kind of throw you an alley-oop pass here. Can you
explain to the committee why the replacement is a priority for
the Department of Defense this year?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I actually--I think that you have
summed it up. There isn't a lot of room. We put the money in
last year in this recognizing that the kind of long-lead that
it takes to develop this kind of new capability. And that we
have an expectation that it will replace those submarines that
are out there now just in time.
Though it is years away, but it is very long-lead to
initiate this investment--the development piece of it. And then
to replace those submarines. Even in the face of--and we are
going through Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
negotiations with the Russians. And even in the face of that,
this part of the triad--the submarine part of the triad is--
everybody believes is an incredibly important and critical part
of that triad.
So the investment is right.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Courtney, I would also add that we
also have in this budget a little over $1 billion for the
national nuclear security agency to begin work on a new Navy
nuclear reactor.
Mr. Courtney. And, again, the plan really matches up with
what the admiral just said. What it also shows though is that
over the mid-range that it really--that once the SSBN program
really hits its stride, it is going to pick up a lot of space
in terms of the shipbuilding budget.
We had a hearing at our subcommittee a couple of weeks ago
where there were some experts who were actually suggesting that
because it is such an essential part of our nuclear deterrence,
that really--and it will take up so much space in the
shipbuilding program, that consideration ought to be given to
sort of funding it in a separate account similar to the way
missile defense has presently got its own place in the federal
budget.
Because, again, there is just going to be another zero-sum
gain in terms of a lot of other shipbuilding programs. Once--as
I said, the SSBN hits its full construction phase. I wonder if
you had any comments about that sort of suggestion as a way of
protecting----
Admiral Mullen. Not a new idea. Everybody would like to
have their own isolated account that gets fully funded every
year. And this is a strategic asset. So I don't say that
lightly. It is not the first time that has come up. And it is
an extraordinary percentage of the shipbuilding budget. And it
is just funding one line. So I think there--over time there
clearly will be competition for those dollars. So isolating
them as per suggested certainly is one solution.
But it goes back to an earlier discussion about the overall
investment in that account particularly as we now are at two
submarines a year for Virginia, and then as this--which we will
do for the foreseeable future. And as we look at the SSBN bill
that is going to be--I don't know what the percentage is, but
half of the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) budget or
something like that which calls for--and again I think that has
got to grow over time in a pretty tough environment.
Secretary Gates. I would just add there is a longer term
issue here. For the period during from now until 2015 I believe
that we can live within the numbers that we have been given and
that are forecast for us without sacrificing force structure.
But beyond that time the Defense Department cannot sustain the
current force structure without real growth on an annual basis
of somewhere between 2 and 3 percent.
Mr. Courtney. And another I think important change that we
have to pursue here is about being smarter in terms of the way
we buy the systems. The weapons procurement reform bill that we
passed last year, it seemed that, you know, we were trying to
move towards, you know, a design and then build process where
we are not sort of mixing up the two at the same time which is
wasteful. And it--and I would just say that the SSBN investment
that this budget has in terms of making sure that we as you
said get this thing done right so that when the time comes to
start building, that we can maybe even bring some of the costs
of the vessels down once we hit that stage of the process.
Admiral Mullen. My only comment on that would be that I
would take what in particular Virginia class submarine program
has done. They are actually at two-a-year quite frankly in
great part because they were so disciplined, and were able to
create savings in that program. We have got to do that in the
submarine--in the SSBN program, and other major programs as
well.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. Excuse me, Mr.
Wittman, then Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for your
service to our Nation.
Mr. Secretary, as you know I have been working with my
Virginia colleagues to ensure that key strategic decisions are
answered. And that we are really spending our resources
properly specifically with regard to moving a carrier to
Mayport. And we have asked repeatedly from your Department
about issues and information related to cost and strategic
necessity. And we appreciate you giving us that information
back.
According to an article yesterday in the Jacksonville press
Senator Nelson is quoted as saying, ``The Secretary of Defense
looked me in the eyes two and a half months ago, and said, `You
don't have anything to worry about.' '' Furthermore the leaked
copy of the QDR we saw in December didn't specifically mention
Mayport. But the final version of the QDR we see that Mayport
is specifically mentioned as a home-porting for another
carrier.
Mr. Secretary, can you verify Senator Nelson's comments in
the press yesterday, and can you give us an idea about why
there was a last minute change in the content of the QDR?
Secretary Gates. Well first of all I don't remember those
exact words, but I have known for some period of time since we
were early into the budget process the priority that the Navy
attaches to the strategic dispersion. And the continued
priority that they attach to having a carrier at Mayport. And I
pressed them very hard in the meetings. You know, you have
limited resources. Is this how you want to spend your money? Do
you think this is more important than other things--other Navy
needs?
And both the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman--the
CNO said, ``Yes.'' So I have no reason to doubt that I gave
Senator Nelson that kind of assurance based on the Navy's own
assessment of their priorities. I was unaware that the draft of
the QDR on that issue had changed between an earlier draft in
December and the final draft.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Admiral Mullen, you had spoken earlier about the strategic
dispersal plan, and Mr. Secretary you had spoken earlier about
realism with risk in resources. And I think that is absolutely
applicable in this particular situation. When you talk about
strategic dispersal plan the only two areas that I have heard
strategic dispersal talked about is in the Congressional
Research Service report, and in the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS).
Can you tell me is there a specific quantification of risk
in either of those two documents?
Admiral Mullen. I just--actually I don't know. I will
repeat what I said earlier. I think the stakes are so
exceptionally high because of the criticality of these capital
ships. And that if we--and then in getting it wrong it costs us
an extraordinary amount. I also certainly understand the
investment issue.
I mean at the same time it is oftentimes from my
perspective too easy to just play off one investment versus
another. This is a total capability, total portfolio, and it is
part of the strategic view of where we have to--where I believe
we have to place our assets. And for lots of reasons I think
that that dispersion is important. It has been so in the past
on the West Coast. Even on the East Coast. Kennedy was down
there as you know, non-nuclear.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. And it is now, as well.
Mr. Wittman. Another question. If we truly are going to
represent realism with risk in resources, shouldn't we have
some tangible quantification of the risk associated with
carriers being based where they are there in Norfolk, and then
looking at that particular risk? And then the cost associated
with moving those carriers down there. If we do want to
represent that realism, it seems like to me we ought to have
that grounding, and an objective measure of risk.
Admiral Mullen. I spend a lot of time on risk. And two
thoughts. One is quantification is very difficult. That said, I
would be happy to go see what work has been done and see
where--see where we are, and where we could be. And oftentimes
the risk assessments that I get involved in strategically,
there is a judgment factor that is there, and it goes back to
what we talked about earlier which is predictability or
unpredictability about the future and all those kinds of
things.
And I am one that has rarely thought that we should put all
our eggs in one basket, and that is a risk factor for me. So I
will go back and see if there is a way to do that. I am not
extremely positive that I can give you a number specifically.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for your testimony and your presence here and your service to
our Nation.
If I could, I would like to turn my attention to ballistic
missile defense issues. As the chair of the Strategic Forces
subcommittee, this is something I would say we are following
very closely right now, and the President's new phased adaptive
approach to missile defense has significant force structure
implications and have these been quantified yet, number one?
And number two, in 2007, the Joint Capability Mix Study to
approve by DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council concluded
that combatant commanders required at least twice as many SM-3
and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as
were planned at the time. And my question is does the
President's budget fund procurement of a new SM-3 and THAAD
interceptors to meet predicted inventory levels to support this
new approach?
Secretary Gates. To answer the second part of your question
first, the answer is yes, there is a substantial plus up in the
budget of both THAAD missiles and batteries and the purchase of
SM-3 missiles and development of a land-based SM-3 that could
be deployed to Europe or elsewhere.
So there is the--just specifically, it adds a battery of
ground components, it adds 67 THAAD interceptors, it delivers
the THAAD batteries numbers 2 and 3 and 32 interceptors for
those. So this is an area where we have, I think, significantly
plussed up the budget. And as I commented earlier, at the same
time, we have over $1.3 billion in this budget to continue the
further development of the ground based interceptors as well
including both the two-stage and three-stage and finishing the
second missile field at Fort Greely.
I am sorry, what was the first part of the question?
Mr. Langevin. The first question was the President's new
phase adapted approach to missile defense had significant force
structure implications and have these yet been quantified?
Secretary Gates. I don't know that they have been
quantified.
Admiral Mullen. Clearly the initial phase of this is--a lot
of it is sea-based and depending on where this goes--and it is
a threat-based regionally focused approach, which I--quite
frankly, I applaud because I think that has been a very
reasonable approach as do I think the decision to put SM-3s--to
land base them because I think that has lots of possibilities.
I think the longer-term force structure issue though, it
will be in ships, and a concern I have had for many years is do
you turn these into virtual SSBNs where they can--you know,
this is all they do and I don't support that. I think these
Aegis ships have multi-missions and we have to keep that in
mind.
And I also think we need to upgrade the ships that we have
to this capability before--which is a lot less expensive than
buying, you know, many more Aegis ships. And that is the--I
think, the debate that we are going through right now. And it
obviously depends on our concept of operations as to what the
force structure implications there would be as well as on the
ground side and where we would need them--where we would want
to have them both either forward-based or be able to move them
based on some kind of conflict.
Secretary Gates. We have funding for conversion of 23 ships
to Aegis capability and this budget adds three more.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Let me turn quickly now, if I
could, to an issue of cyber security, something that I have
been very involved with and follow very closely with--in
addition to my work here, I also sit on the House Intelligence
Committee. We just had Director Blair with us this morning and
one of the first things that he identified in his threat
assessments was the fact that cyber security is probably one of
the number one threats faced in the Nation right now.
Let me ask you, what system should the government view as
within the national security framework and what is the status
of the establishment of the sub-unified command under Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and do you have updated organizational
structures from the services and defense agencies to respond to
Cyber Command?
Secretary Gates. Yes. Both the Navy and the Air Force have
stood up their own versions of a Cyber Command. The Army is in
the process of doing that. We are ready to proceed with the
establishment of the four-star Cyber Command, the sub-unified
command under STRATCOM. We are awaiting the confirmation of its
first director by the Senate.
And we--the QDR, I think, makes very clear that we regard
the cyber problem in cyberspace as a huge priority going
forward, and there are substantial resources in the budget for
cyber both for people and capabilities.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thanks
for being here. Admiral Mullen, thank you, sir. My little
brother is on his, I think, sixth months out of one year in
Taji right now, 1st Stryker Brigade, and he appreciates
everything you do and so does his wife and two little girls and
his unborn son here that they have had while he has been in the
Army. I appreciate everything that you do. And Mr. Secretary,
thank you, sir, for everything that you do.
The thing that concerns me, and I am only going to touch on
this to prep us--this statement is the Senate Armed Services
Committee has now had a full hour hearing with the full
committee on Don't Ask Don't Tell. In this committee here or in
that Senate committee, we have yet to have a full committee
hearing on IEDs, the number one cause of death and casualties
over in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Last year, we had 322 killed because of roadside bombs,
1,818 maimed and wounded. This year, just in January, 32 killed
in action (KIA) and 137 wounded. I understand that there are a
lot of budget issues, there are a lot of social issues that you
have to work through, but I would like to make it so that our
priority isn't the social issues in the military.
The budget issues are important, but I think when you have
18- and 19-year-olds and my little brother and my friends and
family and many of us here have the exact same out there
fighting, I think our priorities should be with winning.
JIEDDO, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, has gotten over
$17.2 billion since its inception. It has got a staff of 4,800
people.
And what I would like to know, Mr. Secretary and Admiral,
is, do you think that they are living up to the standards that
we set for them when they were created and do you think that
they are doing what they should be doing? And I commend you,
Mr. Secretary, you have the ISR Task Force, IED Task Force. I
met with Dr. Carter, General Paxton. They have been very
helpful, and I know that this is one of your number one
priorities.
So what are we doing right now because, Mr. Secretary, you
are in that chain of command coming down from President Obama
to where you can mobilize the industrial base and you can
mobilize our military technology people and our military and
you can give orders to say we are going to stop IEDs and here
is how we are going to do it. We are going to have 24 hour
surveillance, we are going to have persistent surveillance.
So sir, that is--is my question--is JIEDDO living up to
what it should be doing with the amount of money that it's been
given and what more can we do to protect our men and women that
are out there fighting every day?
Secretary Gates. I think JIEDDO is doing what they have
been asked to do and I think they are doing a good job of it,
but JIEDDO is not the answer to the problem alone. And as you
have suggested, ISR capabilities are very important. We have
basically maxed out the production capability. We are pushing
everything we can into that area.
I met with Dr. Carter and General Paxton last week. There
are a portfolio of capabilities that I told them to proceed
with buying, including significantly increased number of
aerostats that can provide persistent coverage, a variety of
other sensors that can be used to have persistent coverage in
the vicinity of our forward operating bases and so on.
And I have told them not to worry about the money and not
to worry about the numbers, but to just get them out there as
fast as possible and they are proceeding to do that. There are
a lot of other aspects of this.
One is, unlike Iraq, the primary substance for IEDs in
Afghanistan is ammonium nitrate. It is illegal in Afghanistan.
And so we are now forming task forces--General McChrystal is
forming task forces to try and break the smuggling that works
for ammonium nitrate. One of our mine resistant ambush
protected vehicles (MRAP) that was blown in half, there was
1,500 pounds of this stuff.
And so that is another threat. We need to get more labs
into Afghanistan. We had a lot of labs to deal with, the IED
forensics in Iraq and we have not been quick enough to get
those labs up and running in Afghanistan. And so the purpose of
appointing Dr. Carter and General Paxton to look at this is
that there are a number of different elements of the Pentagon
who are working the IED effort and I think each of them in
their own way is doing a good job.
The trouble is I don't think that effort has been
sufficiently integrated across all of these different lines of
effort. And one of the things that I have asked them to do is
when their task force stands down, what do we do to make sure
there is somebody applying a blow torch to this issue in the E-
ring to make sure that these different parts are talking to
each other and that the equipment is flowing to General
McChrystal as quickly as possible.
The other concept that they have come up with that I think
has a lot of merit is basically a warehouse approach to counter
IED equipment at the battalion level so that a whole array of
equipment is available to the different teams that go out so
that they can pick and choose the equipment that is most
appropriate to the kind of terrain they are going to be on that
day.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on
Don't Ask Don't Tell, thank you for the effort you and the
Admiral have done.
I have a question, and I liked your explanation of how to
change an institution as far as a massive change comes about.
At the same time, I thought the Chairman said very well the
other day, this is a matter of integrity. You are asking
someone to live a lie as well as an institution is abiding that
or words to that effect.
We are able to turn on a dime and fix protocols right away
as you just mentioned because we didn't do them well for that
terrorist on that aircraft. So I wondered if this is a matter
of principle, equality, can't we turn more rapidly rather than
wait a year to have to do a study on implementing?
If not, would you support the President issuing an
executive order under stop--what do they call it--stop-loss so
that we don't have these individuals that will soon be
permitted to stay be pushed out?
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, Congress passed the
stop loss law a decade before it passed Don't Ask Don't Tell,
and it is the view of the General Counsel at the Department of
Defense that the President would not have the authority to do
that under an executive order.
Mr. Sestak. Under stop loss?
Secretary Gates. Under stop loss. I said we would deliver--
--
Mr. Sestak. If we did, we----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. I said we would complete this
review before the end of the calendar year. I don't know how
long it is going to take. All I know is I want it to be
thorough, and I want to have the opportunity to have the kind
of dialogue with our men and women in uniform and their
families to assess the facts in this situation. We are going to
redo the RAND study of 1993 with a much expanded charter as Mr.
McKeon has asked for.
And I think it is we are not delaying this but it is
important to do it right, and I----
Mr. Sestak. Yes, sir, I wasn't trying to insinuate that
anyone was delaying it. Just we tend to have a military that is
very ready to do things and it just seemed to be--and I really
thought you spoke well of it as a matter of integrity.
If I could just--because I only have a moment, my second
question has to do with when General Pace testified here, and
he may have been along-side you, sir, that we could not meet
our warfare commitments with the Army for, like, 5027, South
Korea, but that the Air Force and the Navy and the others could
back that up, and with acceptable risk. And I think you even
may have testified that way, Mr. Chairman.
With a drawdown in Iraq and with the amount that we are
putting in Afghanistan, which I support, when will we be able
to meet that and other commitments that we once did, prior to
the conflict in Iraq beginning, so that we do have an Army that
is able to meet its other commitments in terms of readiness to
do so without asking the other units, services to fill in?
Secretary Gates. Let me respond, then, quickly, the
Chairman-I think what we have testified to, including General
Pace, was that we could not get the Army units required for
South Korea into South Korea on the timeline required by the
plan. That is not to say they wouldn't get there. It is just
that they wouldn't get in there as quickly because of the
commitments that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan. And so it is
certainly initially we would be----
Mr. Sestak. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Especially dependent on the
Navy and the Air Force.
Admiral Mullen. And I would only add that as we look at the
timeline that you just described, end of 2011, Army is out of--
we are out of Iraq. It is the beginning of reset, really, for
the Army in terms of equipment and actually training. And there
is a full spectrum training both in the Army and the Marine
Corps that just has not been----
Mr. Sestak. Haven't been doing.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Have not been doing that, so--
--
Mr. Sestak. It is still we are seeing a number of years.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Ideally, probably a year or
two before we are well into that, to be able to do it on
something that--on a timeline we choose. We don't always get
that choice.
Mr. Sestak. One last question? Actually there are two, but
I have run out of time. Pakistan--you mentioned the benchmarks
that you thought had come up, and I think we got a draft of
them, actually, in September.
Were these--I honestly feel the increase in troops has
almost more to do with Pakistan, and it is really the linchpin
of success for us over there, not--more so than Afghanistan,
and whether al Qaeda is eradicated by them with our assistance.
Are the benchmarks also, which I didn't see in the draft
that came across for Pakistan and the success that we can
measure or the failure or the cost for that, as that is so
critical a part of it also----
Secretary Gates. Let me check and get you an answer for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 163.]
Mr. Sestak. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for five minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for all that you do for the country.
Admiral Mullen, if it is all right, I will address you
first, sir. You indicated in your submitted testimony on page
14 that you were growing concerned about the defense industrial
base, particularly in shipbuilding and space. And, of course, I
share those concerns.
I am concerned that the ship requirements haven't changed
since 2006. And while there has been significant growth in the
demand and emphasis for Aegis ships to support Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) missions, in fact the QDR doesn't reflect
an increase in Navy ships to reflect the increased mission
requirements.
The ballistic missile defense review acknowledges a range
of ballistic missile threats with growing capabilities and
inventory, so there is obviously a need for the U.S. to invest
in robust missile defenses. But the budget doesn't seem to
indicate that.
And I am just wondering in terms of investing in our
architecture that supports BMD, are you concerned that we are
overburdening the Aegis ships with the addition of BMD missions
without providing any additional resources for infrastructure
to support the growing mission?
And with the addition of BMD missions added to the Aegis
ships, how many more ships do you think might be needed?
Admiral Mullen. As I said, I think earlier that I think it
is important we upgrade the ships that we have. I think we have
84 Aegis ships. I may get that wrong by a number or two, but
making as many of them missile defense capable as possible. At
the level that we are upgrading, the 23, going to three more is
a key piece. And that is the fleet that we have right now.
I think it is to be determined how big the fleet should be
with respect to additional ships that meet this requirement,
which I talked about earlier. And I am, as I said earlier,
long-term concerned about the industrial base, have been
concerned about the industrial base in shipbuilding and in
space, and that we need to certainly incorporate that into our
thinking as to how we invest, because without a decent
industrial base, we can't move forward on the systems that we
need.
I think we will know a lot more about the missile defense
piece in particular, and we have invested some $8.5 billion a
year in MDA this year, bought the Standard missiles, bought the
THAAD missiles and batteries, so there has been a significant
investment. I look to a future where that would continue.
Mr. Franks. Well, I was somewhat pleasantly surprised that
there was an increase in the missile defense budget, and I am
glad to see that.
Mr. Secretary, according to the Wall Street Journal, an
article published yesterday, the U.S. and Russia have reached
an agreement in principle on START. The delivery systems would
fall sharply to between 700 and 800 each. However, today the
U.S. deploys about 880 launchers when ghost or phantom systems
are taken off the books. And this is a pretty significant
reduction to our current nuclear deterrence.
Where will these 10 to 25 percent cuts in the current
nuclear triad be made?
Secretary Gates. Let me just open and then ask the Chairman
to respond. First of all, the agreement--there is not a
concluded agreement yet. There are still several areas not yet
agreed, so the agreement is still--has not been finished.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Secretary, before I let you--I would be
glad to hear Admiral Mullen's response, but before I let you
go, can you provide this committee with an assurance that the
Administration will not seek a side agreement with Russia
outside of START that would limit our missile defense
capabilities?
Secretary Gates. There will be no agreement of any kind
that limits our missile defense capabilities.
Mr. Franks. Good enough. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Mullen. I would only add that in the negotiations
in which I have participated and worked very closely with the
Secretary and the chiefs, one of--and STRATCOM, General
Chilton--to look to how we would conclude this, and overall the
entire architecture is taken into consideration. Again, we are
not entirely through this, but we recognize the significance
and the importance of the triad and needing to sustain that.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I will just throw
one more question.
You know, Russia now relies on its overwhelming inventory
of tactical nuclear weapons. The Strategic Commission estimates
the Russia has approximately 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons,
while the U.S. has probably less than 500.
While the U.S. reduces both its strategic and tactical
nuclear forces, it seems that Russia continues to have the
carte blanche to increase its inventory of tactical nuclear
weapons. How does the Administration and the Pentagon plan to
address this issue?
And I will address it to you, Mr. Secretary, and then you
can pass it to Admiral Mullen, if you choose.
Secretary Gates. Go ahead.
Admiral Mullen. Certainly, I am very aware of that concern,
the negotiations that we are in right now at START follow the
strategic weapons. But I assure you that that concern has been
raised.
My own view is that is that conclusion of this agreement
opens the door to additional opportunities specifically with
Russia and quite, as was asked earlier in--asked about earlier
in Europe, and I would hope that including this, then, allows
us to proceed ahead in a way that addresses some of those other
concerns to include the number of tactical nuclear weapons that
Russia has.
Secretary Gates. And I would just----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Secretary Gates. I would just add that this is one of the
reasons that I answered the question I did earlier about my
view that the NATO alliance needs to retain a nuclear
capability.
Mr. Franks. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder [presiding]. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Nye, for five minutes.
Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you for being here.
Appreciate your dedication to our country's national security.
The QDR is a 20-year, long-term, forward-looking planning
document. Following up on Mr. Wittman's questions regarding the
home-porting question, and I agree with Mr. Wittman's
assessment that it appears that the QDR, the one single
sentence in the QDR that has to do with home-porting East Coast
carriers was added in a very, very late draft.
Just noting that, Mr. Secretary, you said today that in
your discussions with the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO,
they had told you that that project was a priority for them,
even when you asked them to compare with some other things. Can
you tell us what other things did you ask them to compare it to
that they would rank lower than this in priority?
Secretary Gates. No, I didn't ask them to specify. I just
said, ``Compared to your other priorities, where does this
fit?''
Mr. Nye. Okay. Noting that there is a sentence in the QDR
identifying this is a project of interest to the Navy, can you
help me understand why there is no request for the 2011 budget
for MILCON to further the project?
Mr. Hale. There is $239 million of MILCON in the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), and I believe planning money, $2
million fiscal year 2011, and that would be military
construction (MILCON) and beyond fiscal year 2015 as well, as
well as some other costs--Permanent Change of Station (PCS), et
cetera--but there is money in the FYDP.
Mr. Nye. But can you clarify why there is no money for
MILCON in the 2011 budget?
Mr. Hale. Well, I believe there is $2 million for planning
and design funding. That is the figures I have gotten.
Admiral Mullen. My take on that is that has been a part of
this overall decision, if you will, in terms of when this would
be done, what budget it would be done, et cetera. The Navy has
been working this for years, and that the money now is
allocated against the plan to do this.
The only other thing I would add about the change from the
draft document to the final document, best of my knowledge--I
kind of walk my way from north to south--there is only one
other port on the East Coast of this country that could
accommodate another carrier. So I don't necessarily see that
the change in the document is that significant, because Mayport
has been it and is it and just identifies it, so----
Secretary Gates. And I would just point out you are going
to have, I think, Under Secretary Flournoy and company up here
to brief on the QDR.
My guess is that the change took place, because in the
final weeks of the QDR is when it was being coordinated with
the services and the combatant commanders. We wanted their
input very much, and so that may have reflected service input
and the coordination process.
Mr. Nye. I guess my question is along these lines. If it is
a priority, as you have said, Mr. Secretary, I am having a hard
time understanding why the process has been allowed to continue
to slide as it has and why there is no--why no request for
going ahead with MILCON this year.
Secretary Gates. Well, you got to plan it before you can
build it.
Mr. Nye. Admiral Mullen, I just want to follow up,
actually, on a comment that you had made to Mr. Wittman as
well. And I just wanted to make sure I understand what you
meant. And just to clarify, you said that judgment is a
factor--an individual's judgment is, of course, a factor in any
risk assessment. I just wanted to make sure you didn't mean by
that to suggest that it would replace an analytical study of
risk.
Admiral Mullen. No, I think I have spent a lot of time on
how we assess the risk. And there are analytics which can
support it, and it is not individual judgment, it is
professional judgment, and oftentimes the result of a lot of
very senior people with experience in this business that make
the judgment. But it is not going to come out to a specific
number.
Mr. Nye. Okay. And that--again, that is, I think, an
analytical study is something that we have been asking for, for
some time to help us judge. As the Congress, we got to make
some decisions about how we are going to spend defense dollars
in conjunction with your recommendations. But we are talking
about approximately a billion dollars in investment, and that
is a lot of money, especially considering the situation that
our country faces right now.
And just one last follow up, Admiral Mullen. Can you just
tell me understand why an individual's judgment could, of
course, be applied to any risk analysis? Why wouldn't that
apply to in terms of strategic dispersal, strategic bomber
fleet, or our East Coast nuclear missile submarines, or indeed
a number of the assets that we have there----
Admiral Mullen. I think it applies in many, many areas. I
mean this is one specific focus area, obviously, because of the
high level of interest, but it is the kind--and I get paid to
make those kind of judgment calls and risk calls throughout my
life as a military leader and a have--and do here as well, as
do others.
Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. Snyder [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman, for five minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you so much
for your service to this country.
My first question is related to the QDR, and that is the
future of the United States Marine Corps and whether or not we
will have forced entry capability in terms of amphibious
warfare. And if so we are going to retain that capability, then
are--what about the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)? So
can you all, like, just comment on that concern?
Admiral Mullen. When you say the future of the Marine
Corps, I think of an awful lot of things. Certainly, where the
Marine Corps is right now, and I think General Conway says this
as well, it is far too heavy from where the Marine Corps both
started and wants to be in the future.
Most of us believe that it has to have some kind of
forcible entry capability. That usually gets into how much
amphibious lift do you have, and I believe we have it about
right. And the other piece is the EFV.
Now, I mean I have been alongside EFV for a number of
years. It is a program that has also exploded in costs. We have
asked it to do a lot. The requirements have grown, and it has
certainly come under visibility many times in terms of whether
we should keep it as we make this trade. Certainly, having some
kind of capability to move marines ashore, as EFV does, I
think, in the future is important. What is the vehicle? EFV is
it right now, and it is in the program. But I also think there
are limits about how much money we can spend there.
General Conway wants to get to a point, you know, post-
Afghanistan, if you will, where the Marine Corps is a lot
lighter. It has gotten a lot heavier. So there is a lot of work
to do about what the future of the Marine Corps looks like
specifically, not just tied to one vehicle or one ship type.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Admiral Mullen. And I just want to
stress that I do believe that the Marine Corps obviously needs
a replacement for its current amphibious vehicle if we are to
maintain that amphibious warfare capability in terms of an
imposed landing.
A concern of mine in terms of Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD)--and that is--going to another subject--and
that is that it seems to me that with the proper treatment, I
think a lot of it is reversible. But yet we seem to be
discharging a fairly significant number of military personnel
with PTSD with no--and this goes on, I guess, beyond the
Department of Defense. But in terms of the Veterans
Administration--with no real capability or no ability for
treatment, that it is not being funded.
And so, it is certainly not fair to those of us that
serve--those who serve this country and certainly, it is
ultimately not fair to the taxpayers of the United States. And
so, I wonder if you could comment on where we are in terms of
PTSD and are we making advances.
Secretary Gates. Yes, we both probably should take a crack
at this. First of all, the Veterans' Administration (VA) has
put a lot of money into this. And they have hired a lot of
mental health care providers. And I give VA a lot of credit.
They have made enormous progress, I would say, in the last 18
months or so. And General Shinseki, Secretary Shinseki has
really attached a very high priority to this, as did his
predecessor.
We have, I think, roughly a billion dollars in the budget
specifically allocated to PTSD and traumatic brain injury. I
think we all take this very seriously. I would say that the two
problems we face are not enough mental health care providers.
And it is not for lack of trying to hire them. We are out there
scouring the country. We have a national shortage, if you will.
And we are looking at ways to improve that.
And then the other problem that we have is still the issue
of stigma, despite the leadership of the services and service
leaders. And I would say commanders at all levels and the fact
that the leadership of the Army and the Marine Corps in
particular get this. But there is still this strong culture.
And getting these young men and women to acknowledge they have
a problem and seek treatment is still an obstacle in front of
us.
Admiral Mullen. Huge problem--we are on our way, but we
have got a long way to go. And it actually extends. We have
seen it extend to families, quite frankly. And the stigma
issue--I sat with a soldier the other day who was wounded 2005,
I think, 2006 who just finally raised his hand. He is still
active duty. He finally raised his hand. And he said, ``I need
help.'' And it took him that long to do that. And that is the
stigma issue.
And we would like to figure out a way where that can be
addressed a whole lot earlier. The fact of the matter is the
sooner you address it, the less likely the longer term impacts
are out there to occur.
So that has been the real problem. But the stigma issue
is--continues to be one that we just--that is a hurdle we have
not gotten close to getting over.
Dr. Snyder [presiding]. Mr. Heinrich for five minutes.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, Under
Secretary Hale. I want to--I really appreciate your service and
your willingness to make some really tough choices this year.
As you know, our military involvement in places like Iraq
and Afghanistan has placed a premium on close air support
missions. And I wanted to ask that in recognition of this, it
states in the QDR that the Air Force will field light mobility
and light attack aircraft in general purpose force units in
order to increase their ability to work effectively with the
wider range of partner air forces.
Can either of you talk a little bit about the need for this
sort of aircraft and what you foresee as the future of light
attack armed reconnaissance in the U.S. military?
Admiral Mullen. I think, if we are talking about the same
thing here, we really are talking about aircraft which better
match up with some of our coalition partners, specifically. It
is interesting. I was in a--had a conversation the other day
as--this QDR gets reviewed by an awful lot of countries. It is
not just here inside the Department or on Capitol Hill. But
other countries look to the United States about where it is
going.
And there are discussions--and I won't name the country,
but a discussion in that country about how it moves ahead and
how can it complement what we are doing as opposed to compete
with us or match us sort of capability to capability. And this
is an ally. This is not an enemy or a potential enemy.
So I think it is more focused on trying to match up with
other countries with less capable, so to speak, but still
capable enough kinds of aircraft, which is where this
particular aircraft I think you are talking about is going, I
think if I have that right.
Secretary Gates. Yes, and I think this is really more about
training them on them and then helping them buy them for their
own forces because they are easier to maintain, simpler to fly
and just not as complex and as--well, as complex as the
aircraft we fly.
Mr. Heinrich. Got you. Secretary Gates, I think last year
you announced that the DOD was canceling the--the Combat Search
and Rescue-X (CSAR-X) program, the Air Force's CSAR-X program
and that the Department would--I think the quote was--look at
whether there is a requirement for a specialized search and
rescue aircraft along the lines of what the Air Force had in
mind and whether it would be a joint capability or not. Can you
talk a little bit about what determinations have been made at
this point and where we are going with that capability into the
future?
Secretary Gates. I will have to get you an answer for the
record. But my impression--and maybe the Chairman or Mr. Hale
can correct me. But my impression is that the Air Force has
opted to buy some additional helicopters for their own search
and rescue.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 165.]
Admiral Mullen. Well, there has been some additional
investment in HH-60s, specifically, for search and rescue. And
then I think the question for the record is--the plan was to
look at this longer term to see where we would go from a joint
perspective. And we are not there yet.
Mr. Heinrich. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Platts from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to thank all three of our witnesses for
your great leadership and service to our Nation. We are blessed
by what you are doing and the men and women in uniform
certainly are by your leadership.
A couple of quick comments--first, I want to associate
myself with the comments of Mr. Rogers from Alabama on the
issue of Gitmo. Given the financial strains facing our country,
the thought of spending $400 million, $500 million on
establishing a new prison when we have one that the military is
operating with great efficiency and security just seems pretty
illogical to me.
And back home I always just--common sense test just doesn't
get passed with that proposal. So I hope that money will be
available to some of the other needs that you have outlined in
your budget.
I just returned last night from Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Congressional Delegation (CODEL) Lynch. Congressman Lynch led a
great bipartisan team--very insightful. Come back, as always--
this was my sixth trip to Afghanistan, inspired by what our men
and women in uniform are doing.
We got down to a Forward Operating Base (FOB) Spin Boldak.
And a 19-year-old Army soldier driving the Stryker that I was
in as we got out to Chaman Gate to see the logistics challenge
there of all of the materials. You can't be anything but
inspired. And so, grateful for these heroic Americans.
A couple observations--one is came back with great
confidence in our team we have there. Our time with Ambassador
Eikenberry--his insights, having been a commander on the ground
there and now on the diplomatic side, just exceptional. And we
didn't get to see General McChrystal, who wasn't in theater.
But General Bill Caldwell--and if there is something that
came across crystal clear of our successes in Afghanistan, it
is the efforts of General Caldwell and the training of the
Afghanistan Security Forces. And delighted we have somebody of
his great caliber in that role. I think that is one of the
linchpins to the success that we are going to achieve, is what
he is doing.
The one thing I wanted to mention is acquisition is a--
reform is a big part of what you talked about in both your
testimonies and how we need to do a lot better. And, you know,
I often think that sometimes on the ground we learn what works
and then translate it to a bigger picture.
And Major General McDonald, who we met with--I won't use
his title--and the military is famous for their acronyms--but
the ICJLPSB, Interagency Combined Joint Logistics Procurement
Support Board. But when we met with them and all that sit on
this organization they put together for acquisitions and how
they are truly trouble-shooting and getting what the military
needs on the ground and for the best price for American
taxpayers--all of us came away extremely impressed.
And that is the short diagram of what they are doing. I
would just say that back home here at the Pentagon we may want
to talk to General McDonald about the success he is having in
the field coordinating acquisition and apply it to the bigger
picture throughout DOD.
A specific request that we promised to pass on when we
return--our ambassador to Romania--we stopped in Bucharest on
the way. And very enlightening how supportive they are to our
military efforts, including in Afghanistan and broader issues
in the European theater.
The specific issue that we promised to pass on was the
issue of the Romanian forces who are patrolling Highway One in
Afghanistan and a standing request that is working its way
through the channels on some of the initial MRAPs that for what
they are doing on the highway, not the All Terrain Vehicle
(ATV) versions and the newer versions for Afghanistan, but some
that we are pulling out of Iraq. They are looking for a dozen,
15 or so. And as we came to understand and appreciate their
commitment to this joint effort, something that we promised to
pass on to the leadership when we returned home from that trip.
Appreciate the efforts in trying to work with our Romanian
partners and their needs.
Secretary Gates. When this hearing is over, I leave for
Istanbul for a NATO Defense ministers meeting. And one of the
initiatives that I am going to announce there is we have taken
a look at what more we can do to share what we have learned and
our counter-IED capabilities with our partners in Afghanistan.
And I will be telling the other 27 Defense ministers that
this is important for us. And within the framework, obviously,
of the law, there is more we can do to help them. And we will.
Mr. Platts. Wonderful, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen. And the only other thing that I would add
is I was with my Romanian counterpart last week in Brussels.
And we talked about the MRAP issue many times. We are doing as
much as we can to get them what they need, significant that
they now want to actually buy them that--and at the same time,
our priorities have been get them to our forces first and then
they are----
Mr. Platts. Understood.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Who really need them. And I
think we will get there.
Mr. Platts. The Ambassador had just returned from
presenting a bronze star for us to two soldiers, Romanian
soldiers that had given their lives--to the widows of the
soldiers that had given their lives.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks for your
leadership for our Nation.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Before I call on the gentlelady from Guam, I don't believe
it has been touched on yet. Let's talk about the DDG-1000
program, if we may. It was truncated last year, if you will
recall, at three vessels. And we received notice yesterday that
due to the termination of the remaining four vessels of the
DDG-1000 we will suffer a cost growth--have to either terminate
or recertify.
Do you know where we are on that whole program? And I
understand that there is a possibility of DDG-51s being
reconfigured and taking its place. Can you tell me or tell this
committee where we are on that? Because I know that is going to
be a major issue.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, as of walking into this
hearing, my assumption was that the program we announced last
year of three DDG-1000s was on track, that we were doing all
three of them. Of the information that you cite from yesterday
I haven't heard. So I will have to check.
The Chairman. Admiral, do you know anything about that?
Admiral Mullen. I think--well, to some degree, I shouldn't
do this. But I think what you are looking at are termination
costs, given the termination of the program and whether you
build three or a hundred of something, that at the end of the
program you have to pay this. And so, it sounds like it is
coming in from that perspective. I honestly don't know.
I know that the CNO is looking at possibly the DDG-51 hull
for the future. This program also has the cruiser cancellation.
The issue being, you know, what is going to--what is the ship
that is going to bear the radar for the future, a big piece of
which will be missile defense.
So that is about all I know right now.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I have just been reminded
that the issue that has come up is--and that has raised
concerns is that the program is going to breach Nunn-McCurdy.
But it is going to breach, not because of performance issues,
but because of the reduction in the buy.
And as far as I know, our plan is to continue to go forward
with it.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
I asked the question, because I am sure that will come up
in at least one of our subcommittees.
The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you for your testimony today.
I would like to begin, of course, with the Guam military
buildup. I arrived yesterday afternoon after spending several
days on Guam. In fact, I held five town meetings to allow my
constituents an opportunity to discuss and share their concerns
about the draft EIS.
While I believe that many remain supportive of the overall
goals of the military buildup, they are extremely concerned
about certain aspects of it and its impact on Guam's culture
and environment. I am working with all of the local leaders to
form a consensus on the way forward with the draft EIS, and
make sure that there is one message from the people of Guam.
Now, I believe that this consensus will force DOD to look
very closely at some of the assumptions in the draft EIS. As I
have stated, and as Chairman Skelton has reiterated time and
time again, we must get this buildup done right.
However, the current draft EIS does not accomplish that
goal in totality. I need to make it clear that I will oppose
any effort by the DOD to utilize the power of eminent domain to
acquire private or Government of Guam land. In fact, I would
encourage the Department to look harder at keeping the military
within its existing footprint on Guam.
I also encourage the Department to look at other
alternatives for the transit carrier berthing in Apra harbor,
to further mitigate coral and critical habitat loss. And I
understand the Department's position on the Futenma Replacement
Facility (FRF) has evolved, and the U.S. is willing to wait
until May for a final decision from the new government in
Japan.
I also understand that, if alternatives are proposed for
the FRF, that the U.S. would be willing to make changes to the
Guam International Agreement to accommodate the government of
Japan's counter proposal.
So, first, my question is, what has led to this evolution
in strategy regarding the Government of Guam? And also, are you
willing to seriously consider counter proposals that I and
other Government of Guam officials will propose in our official
comments on the draft EIS, and act on them?
If we are willing to give Japan extra time, I hope that we
can give Guam the same courtesy.
So, I guess, Secretary Gates, this would be a question for
you.
Secretary Gates. Well, I met with the governor a year or so
ago, and told him that I thought it was important for us to
have transparency, and also for us to take into account the
views of the people of Guam. And so, I stand by those comments.
I would just say that, while, with respect to Futenma, that
we are willing to be patient. We have a new government in
Tokyo. The security alliance with Japan just--we just observed
the 50th anniversary a couple of weeks ago, so the alliance is
important to us. But we negotiated a long time on this, and we
have no counter proposals from Japan. And so, we are willing to
give this some time to see how things play out in Tokyo.
I don't know if you want to----
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. The only thing, ma'am, and I think you know
this probably as well or better than anybody else, how critical
Guam is to us, and the relationship with those who live there--
unbelievably strong supporters, not just local citizens, but so
many who serve in our military, and that Guam plays now, and
will continue to play, a pivotal role in the strategic latch-up
in that part of the world.
And I would just emphasize or add to what the Secretary
said in terms of transparency and understanding, and as we move
through these. These are major moves we want to get right,
because they are going to be out there for a long time.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
And one other question. It is on a separate matter. It is
for either Secretary Gates or Admiral Mullen.
As you may be aware, Congressman Fleming and I have
established the Long Range Strike Caucus, to focus on the long-
range strike capabilities. And I note with concern, Secretary
Gates, in your statement yesterday before the Senate, that the
IOC for this platform will be delayed nearly a decade.
The bomber is valuable for strike missions. And I would
like to know from you, what is the timeline for completing this
study? And what factors and assumptions are being considered as
this study is being conducted?
I just have that feeling that this initiative is going to
fall victim to the typical Guam syndrome--I mean, or the
Washington syndrome--of too many studies and too little action.
Secretary Gates. Well, what both the QDR and the budget
provide for is a family of long-range strike initiatives. And
the things that we are looking at, there are some pretty
substantial questions. I mean, should it be stand-off or
attack? Should it be manned or remotely piloted? So, there are
some fairly fundamental issues.
We have money in the budget, as we have mentioned earlier,
for both B-2 and B-52 modernization. And so, we are looking at
something that will be in our inventory until 2060 or 2070. And
so, and based on the life of the B-52, it may be there until
2100.
But all kidding aside, I think that the key is trying to
figure out what the right technologies are for the future. We
have put money--we worked with this committee in particular to
put money in the budget to sustain the technology base in
industry, in terms of materials and so on, so that we will
still have those choices.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks for being here. Your patience and
endurance is admirable to wade through six hours of this deal.
Mr. Secretary, the Department of Defense is unauditable.
Now, that may sound like a strange question or comment to make.
I can't imagine you were briefed on this idea coming in, but it
has got to be at least as important as Don't Ask Don't Tell.
Six hundred and thirty-six billion dollars that we spend
every year, and we don't know that we spend it correctly. The
only way that is going to happen--and there is a law on the
books right now that says, by 2017, the Department of Defense
and all of its variety of agencies have to be clean audits. But
that doesn't happen unless we get tone from the top, unless the
top guy, you, look at Mr. Hale and say, Mr. Hale, we have
really got to add this to all the other things that you have
got going on that are important. But you can't make--I can't
make--good decisions on bad data. And the data that you are
getting is coming from a myriad of systems and programs that
have been cobbled together over 50 years.
I have worked and had conversations with the folks over at
the Office of Business Transformation. They have got the
responsibility to get it done, and the authority, to simply
cajole everybody in your system to get it done.
And so, the broad comment is--and I don't expect any
answers, other than that you see this as an important issue. I
tried to get the timeframe shortened from 2017 to 2013, and it
blew up the other side of this building. The Senate came
unwrapped over that for some reason.
But this is important. And decisions, better decisions are
made with better data. And the data you are getting right now
is, as I said, unauditable.
I do--would like one comment. I have been told--and I
haven't confirmed this independently--I have been told that the
Marine Corps has said they are going to get it done sooner than
later. So, there are some individual branches and individual
entities within the system that are making progress. But
without your commitment to push on it, it won't get done.
So, your thoughts.
Secretary Gates. As the former chairman of a number of
corporate audit committees, I feel pretty strongly about this.
And the fact is, that for certainly the last several years,
there has been a program underway to be able to produce clean
audits. My impression has been that there has been steady
progress, and that there are a growing number of units that are
able to do that.
But let me ask Mr. Hale to give you a 30-second update on
where that process stands.
Mr. Hale. Well, can I start by saying that one of the key
things, which is, are we spending the money the way Congress
tells us, have been auditable and are auditable--so-called
appropriations received. The Inspector General (IG) reviewed it
several years ago.
So, I think you can be assured we are spending the money in
the manner in which we are directed by law. What we can't do is
the transaction-based and various other requirements that are
needed, if you are going to pass a private sector audit test.
What I did when I came into this job is realize, frankly,
we were spending a lot of time and money trying to clean up
data and audit it in areas where the data wasn't very useful to
management. So, we refocused it on the budgetary information,
which we use every day to manage the Department of Defense.
And you are right. The Marine Corps has asserted audit
readiness for its so-called statement of budgetary resources
for fiscal 2010. And they will be a major test. The Army Corps
of Engineers has a clean audit on all of its statements. And we
are working with the other military departments.
But the systems are old, and it will take a while to get
this.
Mr. Conaway. Exactly, but the tone comes from the top, and
emphasis comes from the top and from Congress. And I am the one
guy who serves on both the Intelligence Committee and the Armed
Services Committee, and is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA).
And so, this is going to be a continuing----
Mr. Hale. It is on our--we have a list with OMB of our 10
top priorities for business improvement. It is on it.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. A couple of nits and gnats.
The written testimony says that we are going to buy an F-
35, a Joint Strike Fighter, with OCO money--overseas
contingency operations money.
Secretary Gates. Yes, there is----
Mr. Conaway. Is there any----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. One F-35 to replace an F-15
that we lost.
Mr. Conaway. So, the F-35 is going to go into the fight?
Secretary Gates. Well, what we have done, actually, for the
last several years is, when we have lost an aircraft, for
example, and when the line for that particular aircraft----
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Is closed, we then move to
the next most modern aircraft.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
We have got 111 C-5s?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. The test--the previous couple of years is that
50 of them, some odd 50 of them can't get off the ground, never
will get off the ground again.
Not getting into the C-17 fight, I don't have any C-5s in
my district. I don't have any C-17s in my district. But it
seems to me that letting us know what it costs us year in and
year out to maintain the tail numbers of the C-5s, that--and
the 111--that those are resources that could go somewhere else.
And I know we have got champions on my side of the aisle
and the other side of the aisle to keep all 111 C-5s on the
books. But it seems to me that we ought to at least know the
wasted resources that that costs us to maintain that.
Secretary Gates. We will provide you with that information.
But I will tell you, as I told you last year and the year
before, and as the Admiral just described a few minutes earlier
in this hearing, the Air Force cannot recapitalize unless it
retires some older aircraft. We have sought from the Congress
the authority to retire some C-5s, and have not received that
authority. And we would really like to get it.
Mr. Conaway. Well, if you will give us the amount of money
it would--could be redeployed somewhere else by retiring the
planes that will never leave the ground again, it would be very
helpful to support that argument.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Giffords.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates,
Admiral Mullen and Secretary Hale, thank you so much for your
service.
I have got a couple of questions. Following up on aircraft,
I know at long last we now have some numbers from the
Department that indicate that we are going to lower the
requirement for manned fighter aircraft by 206 airplanes. And
overall, I believe this represents a reduction of 536 aircraft
from 2 years ago. I am talking about strike fighters, of
course.
So, we are looking at maybe a shortfall between 217 and
224, and that these retirements are not offset by the Joint
Strike Fighter.
So, I am concerned. Congressman LoBiondo and I have worked
on this for a couple of years. And obviously, there is a lot of
pressure on the budget, but I was just hoping to get your
perspective on this gap that we are facing.
Secretary Gates. Sure. Between--we have roughly 2,240 or
2,245 combat aircraft now. That number is projected to drop to
1,864 in 2020. That is a drop of 377.
On the other hand, unmanned aircraft such as the Reaper
will increase from 204 now, to 543. So, if you count all the
aircraft and the remotely-piloted aircraft, you actually end up
with a difference between 2,440 now and 2,400, 2,407 in 2020.
And it goes back to the point that I made earlier. Given
the increased capabilities of planes like the F-22 and F-35,
with advanced sensing and stealth, and so on, there is really
no reason to replace them on a one-for-one basis. And as the
Chairman said earlier, and as we just discussed, unless the Air
Force can retire some of these third generation and even fourth
generation legacy aircraft, they will not have the money to
recapitalize.
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I would add to that, ma'am,
is I don't know of a major program that we decommissioned and
we replaced it with the same number. And I may be wrong, but in
aircraft, ships, missiles, my experience is that because of the
higher-end capability, the technology investment required, the
cost, that we just have not replaced them one-for-one, and we
haven't needed to do that.
Ms. Giffords. Well, thank you. This is an ongoing
discussion, and of course there are concerns here. And unmanned
aircraft are very capable, but, obviously, they can't replace
manned aircraft. I mean, they are just different. They serve
different purposes.
I want to shift gears to an area that I know both of you
are working on, and that is the dependency that we have on
foreign countries for our energy.
And, of course, the world's largest user of energy is
actually the Air Force. In the United States, the largest user
of energy is the Department of Defense. And the Department has
taken tremendous steps to reduce the amount of energy being
used by the Department of Defense.
I am curious about comments on your short-term and your
long-term energy reduction goals, also whether or not the
energy saving performance contracts are proving to be
worthwhile and what Congress can do to help streamline some of
these projects.
My frustration is we spend over $400 billion every year to
buy energy from mostly hostile foreign nations. And it puts us,
from a national defense standpoint, really in a very precarious
situation. And this Congress is very committed to making sure
that we can make America's energy in America, and you are on
the front lines of that. So I was just hoping to get some
comments on those questions.
Secretary Gates. I think to give you an adequate answer, we
would probably better do that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 164.]
Ms. Giffords. Okay.
Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Well, I would agree with that for an in-
depth answer. I know the Air Force has led the Department. I
know Secretary Mabus in the Navy has now made this a priority
for the Navy. The Navy was invested, but behind with respect to
that.
And it is a priority in the Department. And certainly I
share--we all share the concerns that you expressed in terms of
where we get it, not just now but in the future.
Ms. Giffords. Well, it is interesting. You look at, for
example, Nellis Air Force Base, and how much of their energy is
now coming from solar. Luke Air Force Base is on target to
actually enlarge their installation. Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base probably double that.
So it is interesting from a facility standpoint the
progress that has been made, but from the operational
standpoint, when you look at biofuel and the ability to again
not have these long--there is a frightening snapshot photograph
that is the--it is the caravan for, you know, the oil re-
supplier, you know, petroleum re-supply that, you know, kills
hundreds of our soldiers every year. And you all are the
forefront of that.
And I see some of that reflected in the budget. We worked
here in the House to nominate--or to put together a director of
operational energy, and we are hoping that the Senate confirms
that, to be able to help free up your work.
So, thank you. I look forward to working with you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, thank you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen for
being here. I know that it has been a long day for you, but I
just thank you for the generosity of your time in answering our
questions.
As you know, I represent Fairchild Air Force Base, and the
tanker and the replacement of the tankers has been on the
forefront of my priority list since I arrived in Congress. And
for one reason or another, we have seen a number of delays in
the process.
The KC-135 represents a central piece of war plans to
support the United States and its allies around the world. And
now, Northrop Grumman's chief operating officer has threatened
to not bid unless significant changes are made to the tanker
requirement.
And I think I join with others in just sharing a concern
about the potential of further delaying the tanker competition
and stretching the limits of these 50-year-old aircraft.
I want to see a new tanker parked on the ramps of Fairchild
Air Force Base sooner, rather than later.
So I wanted just to ask how you are going to respond to
this kind of pressure and change the warfighters' tanker
requirements to meet the demands of the competitors.
Secretary Gates. We have received a lot of comments,
including from here on Capitol Hill, on the RFP. I think that
the final RFP will be issued in a fairly short period of time,
and our hope is, I think, a selection in the summer.
Yes, a selection in the summer.
We hope very much that there will be a real competition. We
hope very much that both competitors stay in the competition.
But should that not prove to be the case, we will--we have to
move forward, for all the reasons you cite. It has been delayed
too long. We need to get this thing started.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Good. Good to hear.
And, Admiral Mullen, I just want to applaud you for your
support of military families. And I know the Administration has
really taken a new--provided a new emphasis on supporting our
military families, and the Department of Defense, likewise.
We are seeing the impact of multiple deployments on our
military families. And I am hearing from families across the
country about mental health issues.
What are we going to do to increase access and utilization
of mental health services for our military families?
Admiral Mullen. Well, again, it has been a priority for
this Department for several years. We have more than tripled
the number of mental health care providers in recent years, but
we are still far short of what we need.
I talked earlier about the whole issue that we need to
address internally to the military and families.
Deborah, who is here today, hears from spouses all the time
about the stress they are under, and it is not Post Traumatic
Stress (PTS), but there are PTS-like symptoms associated with
that. And many of them have said they are worried about raising
their hand for fear that it may impact on their husband or
their wife's career as well. So an awful lot of effort going
after this.
Where I am on this is we have got to start producing a
higher capacity output to address this issue, and it is a very,
very complex issue.
And I would also like to thank you and Mr. Bishop for
standing up the military family caucus, that is a big deal and
it will focus issues and do so in a way that is fed by your
concerns and your reaching out to families to get information
about what is going on, allow us all to continue to press
forward to make it better for them, because they are so
important.
Mr. Hale. May I add, briefly?
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Please.
Mr. Hale. I think an exciting experiment the Army is trying
to screen members who are coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan
for mental health disorders over either the Internet or video
teleconference to make greater use of health professionals.
They tried it in an experiment at Tripler, worked out quite
well. A lot of the younger soldiers really liked it, because
they are so used to working over the Internet.
And it would allow greater use or better utilization of
health professionals.
So I think they plan to expand that. It is a good idea.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Great. Great. Thanks.
And, Admiral Mullen and to your wife, Deborah, I do
appreciate your leadership and your support of providing the
support for our military families that is so desperately
needed.
And, with that, I will yield back.
Admiral Mullen. Ma'am, the only thing I would add on top of
what Mr. Hale said, is there has been more than one result from
what I would call anonymous counseling--in other words, over
the Internet, don't know who the counselor--you don't--and it
is a way to get at the stigma piece. And I would like to see us
expand that in a way so we can reach a larger number.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Well, I think there is some exciting
technology with the--you know, we have done the virtual
recruiters, maybe we can do virtual counselors and, you know,
protect the soldier themselves.
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
We have two members who wish to have a second round. We
will get you out very much near your deadline of 3:00.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Admiral and Secretary Gates for
sticking around so long. I did not give you any opportunity, I
regret to say, to respond to my concerns about the use of rules
of engagement that were raised on my visit to Afghanistan.
And, Mr. Secretary, I have noticed, since the publication
of the book, ``Lone Survivor,'' this is something that comes up
fairly often as I meet with the moms and dads and loved ones of
troops deployed. And it is a very serious question.
I realize where General McChrystal is trying to go, but
when those two troopers brought it to my attention again, their
concerns about the use of the Afghan police in particular.
Another observation was that they were concerned that we have
stopped prohibiting vehicular traffic from transiting along
with our convoys, that they were very concerned about vehicle-
borne IEDs.
And so, again, you know, you are the Secretary of Defense.
And I did ask General McChrystal. I said, ``Did you write the
rules of engagement yourself, or did they come from other
places?'' And I think his answer was it was a combination of
his suggestions and Washington.
So, again, I would ask you to address those concerns.
Secretary Gates. Both of us will take a crack at this.
I am obviously aware of this concern on the part of some of
our soldiers. I heard this directly from a young soldier at
Walter Reed a couple of years--a couple of weeks ago, who told
me that he thought the reason he had been injured was because
of the rules of engagement.
It seems to me that this is an area where I believe that
the commander on the ground has to have the discretion, in
terms of the rules of engagement for the troops and how the
rules of engagement fit with the strategy he is trying to
pursue.
The tactics that have been used by us are changing all the
time. There has been a significant reduction in the use of
dogs, because they are so offensive to the Afghans. There has
been a significant reduction in night raids.
And, frankly, there is--we had a situation--I will give you
an example of where you can make a mistake, and it actually was
with I think one of the Predators. And they saw a group of
people digging a hole in a road. And they were going to target
the Predator on them, because they were convinced they were
doing an IED.
And the guy running the Predator stopped it at the last
minute. People were on the ground, and it was a bunch of kids.
And they were just fooling around; they weren't planting bombs.
Hitting those kids would have been a huge setback for us in
that area.
So I basically--I understand their concern. I have heard
from parents as well about it, and their worry. I understand
it.
But I think that in terms of the overall health of our
force and keeping our kids safe, that being successful in this
campaign is really the priority, and we are obviously going to
do everything we can in the course of that to protect our kids.
But we also have to figure out what the best strategy for
success is.
Admiral Mullen. I would only add that I think your comment
and the comment that was made to you by the soldier you met
with about the police is an accurate comment. And we are all
concerned about that. And that is--the Afghan police are the
long pole in the tent, because in many places they are corrupt.
And while we are willing to follow an Afghan soldier in,
not so for the police. And we are working our way through that.
And I think everybody in the chain of command recognizes that.
My experience along these lines, back to who wrote it, at
least I think I would attribute the initial directive that
General McChrystal put in place to reduce civilian casualties,
which is what this is a part of--a lot about, Washington was
involved in that.
Subsequent to that, I am not aware that we participated at
all in the house piece--you know, his directive with respect to
night raids. That really is his business, and he feels very
strongly. And I would only re-emphasize what the Secretary said
about it is it is important that he do that.
The other thing, in my conversations with soldiers out
there, it has been--those who were in Iraq--and I think I heard
you say that as well--who had tours in Iraq, they have come to
Afghanistan for the first time, and they see the rules of
engagement being so much different.
We worked our way through that in Iraq over time and found
we could do that as we were learning.
In this insurgency, we know what we need to do, and I think
we--and I think we need to do it earlier. We didn't know that
at that time in Iraq, we had to work our way through it.
They have expressed those same concerns about the convoys.
And at the same time--and there are risks associated with that.
I believe that General McChrystal in particular believes, and
we all do, that we are going to get through this more quickly
and in the end suffer fewer casualties. And the risk may be up
on the front end.
What this is all about is how we treat the Afghan people,
how we treat where they live, and how we impact them in terms
of this overall campaign. That is the center of gravity.
And we are protecting--we are--I mean, a priority for us is
certainly to make sure we take care of our people who are
fighting----
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, a quick question for the record,
if you don't mind.
I would be very interested in how many troopers have faced
either judicial or non-judicial punishment in Afghanistan for
violating the rules of engagement. It would give us some sort
of a benchmark of the size of this problem.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 163.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I join the others in thanking you for the time that
you have given us here today, gentlemen.
In my opening remarks, I talked about $350 million in the
budget for either supporting detainee operations in Guantanamo
Bay or any other location. I think you used the term $150
million.
Secretary Gates. That was just for the prison in Illinois.
The $350 million is all detainee operations.
Mr. McKeon. Okay.
Secretary Gates. Including Guantanamo.
Admiral Mullen. The $150 million, as the Secretary said,
for MILCON. There would also be if we opened the Thomson
facility some start-up costs, another perhaps $150 million for
Information Technology (IT), security upgrades. It will be a
very high-security facility if it is opened, so in total it
will probably be around $300 million. And then there is $200
million, as you pointed out, to buy the facility in the
Department of Justice budget.
Mr. McKeon. Great. We are all on the same page then on
that.
Mr. Secretary, is it the Administration's policy to prevent
Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. What steps is the Department taking to meet
this objective?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that, first of all, to give
you any kind of a comprehensive answer to that question, we
probably should do it in a classified session or with a
classified response. But I think we are looking at a full range
of options.
Mr. McKeon. In the State of the Union, the President stated
that if Iran pursues a nuclear weapons capability, there would
be growing consequences. Can you explain what these growing
consequences are? Would that also have to be----
Secretary Gates. No, I think in the near term, it is more
likely to be severe sanctions imposed partly by the U.N.
Security Council and partly by the U.S. and like-minded
countries.
Mr. McKeon. Finally, I understand that the Iran military
power report, section 1245 from last year's--or this year's--
yes, last year's NDAA has missed its deadline and will be
delivered late to the Congress. Can you please ensure that we
get this report as soon as possible?
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Mr. McKeon. These other questions, we will just submit for
the record. You have been here a long time. Thank you very much
for all you are doing.
Secretary Gates. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me thank each of you for your appearance
today, for your outstanding service to your country.
You know, we talk about families, but I am not sure anyone
has said thank you for your families.
Secretary Gates, your charming wife Becky is the sponsor of
the USS Missouri and makes us all proud of that fact that she
is.
And Admiral Mullen, your lovely wife Deb has done so much
with you and for you. I am not supposed to introduce her today,
so I won't, but it is awfully nice to have her with us to share
this moment.
Thank you so much.
And Secretary Hale, we didn't give you too much of a
workout today, but we will save you for next time.
Thank you, and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 3, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 3, 2010
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 3, 2010
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 3, 2010
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Admiral Mullen. There have been no actions taken against anyone for
tactical directive violations or ROE violations. [See page 73.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Secretary Gates. The Department's Fiscal Year 2011-2015 Future
Year's Defense Program budgets for a service life assessment for the F-
18 series aircraft. This engineering assessment will help inform the
Department on the amount of service life that can be extended and the
modification costs. The budget also includes funding for F-15 and F-16
service life modifications designed to ensure the required quantity of
aircraft can meet their service life requirements. Additionally, there
is money for Full Scale Fatigue Testing for the F-15, and F-16 Block
40s/50s.
Under my direction, the Department will continue to assess strike
fighter force structure requirements in preparation for future budgets.
Service life extension is one area that can help address force
structure requirements. Other mitigation options that are under review
include changes to current Concepts of Operations, aligning Carrier Air
Wing readiness with Carrier readiness, and Air Wing composition and
force structure. [See page 37.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE
Admiral Mullen. The Army has a detailed plan for payment to all
National Guard soldiers who are eligible for compensation under PDMRA.
The Army is responsible and has received the Army National Guard's
preliminary list of eligible individuals. The Army began payments on
March 1, 2010 and will continue to diligently process and pay claims
until eligible individuals are appropriately compensated.
Statutory authority was required to retroactively compensate former
Service members for PDMRA days earned from Jan 19, 2007, through the
date each respective Service implemented their respective PDMRA
program. Section 604 of the FY10 NDAA, signed on October 28, 2009,
provided the Secretary concerned with the discretionary authority to
compensate current and former Service members for PDMRA days earned
from Jan 19, 2007 through the date each respective Service implemented
their PDMRA program. However, the House Appropriations Committee
version of the Defense Appropriation Bill contained a provision that
provided non-discretionary authority to pay retroactive compensation
for PDMRA days. Due to the ``discretionary'' and ``non-discretionary''
disparity between the FY10 NDAA and the HAC-D version of the FY10
Defense Appropriations Bill, the Department was precluded from
developing final implementation policy. On December 19, 2009, the FY10
the Defense Appropriations Bill became law. It did NOT include the non-
discretionary retroactive PDMRA compensation authority originally
contained in the HAC-D version of the bill. Following coordination with
the Military Departments and the DoD Comptroller, the DoD
implementation policy was approved on February 1, 2010. [See page 43.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK
Secretary Gates. The core goal of the President's strategy is to
disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan and to prevent their return to both countries. The
President's strategy addresses the challenges the U.S. Government faces
on both sides of the border. The U.S. Government cannot allow al Qaeda
to gain access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001. The
President's strategy recognizes that the security situation in Pakistan
is inextricably linked to that of Afghanistan. In my view, Pakistan's
security, especially along its Western border, cannot be separated from
developments in Afghanistan.
Progress in both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be measured and
assessed by the U.S. Government on a regular basis using a mix of
quantitative and qualitative measures, intended to capture objective
and subjective assessments. The assessment will look at past progress
and start to focus on changes or adjustments that might be necessary
over the following year. A description and assessment of U.S.
Government efforts, including the efforts of the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development,
and the Department of Justice, in achieving the objectives for
Afghanistan and Pakistan are due to Congress in March 2010. [See page
55.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Secretary Gates. Under my direction, the Department has stepped up
near and longer-term effort needed to reduce our high level of energy
consumption, and these efforts are driven first and foremost by mission
considerations. The Department's own analysis confirms what outside
experts have long warned: our military's heavy reliance on fossil fuels
creates significant risks and costs at a tactical as well as a
strategic level. They can be measured in lost dollars, in reduced
mission effectiveness and in U.S. soldiers' lives. I believe that
unleashing warfighters from the tether of fuel and reducing our
installations' dependence on a costly and potentially fragile power
grid will not simply enhance the environment; it will significantly
improve our mission effectiveness.
Executive Order 13514 was issued in October 2009 and is a tool to
help the Department turn these vulnerabilities around. As one
indication, the Department is developing an aggressive target under the
Order for reducing our greenhouse gas emissions, which are due
overwhelmingly to direct energy use. These targets will significantly
shape energy consumption plans and programs both now and in the future.
For the military, these reduced emissions will represent major gains in
energy efficiency in the long run. Operational energy is necessarily
exempt from any regulatory target, since providing immediate support
for the warfighter must remain our highest priority. Nevertheless,
reducing the energy demands of our operational forces is a major focus
of my efforts to cut energy consumption.
Over the last five years, the Department has steadily reduced
energy consumption per square foot at our installations, largely in
response to statutory and regulatory goals. While continuing that very
positive trend, I believe that it is time for the Department to take a
longer term perspective and adapt its approach to installation energy
management from one that is primarily focused on compliance to one
focused on long-term cost avoidance and mission assurance.
The management of energy on our installations is important for two
key reasons. One, facilities energy represents a significant cost. In
2009, DoD spent $3.8 billion to power its facilities--down from $3.96
billion in 2008. That represents about 28 percent of the Department's
total energy costs (that fraction is higher in peacetime, when we are
not consuming large amounts of operational energy).
Two, installation energy management is key to mission assurance.
According to the Defense Science Board, DoD's reliance on a fragile
commercial grid to deliver electricity to its installations places the
continuity of critical missions at serious and growing risk.\1\ Most
installations lack the ability to manage their demand for and supply of
electrical power and are thus vulnerable to intermittent and/or
prolonged power disruption due to natural disasters, cyberattacks and
sheer overload of the grid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``More Fight-Less Fuel,'' Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The changing role of the military's fixed installations accentuates
this concern. Although in the past these installations functioned
largely to train and deploy our combat forces, increasingly they have a
more direct link to combat operations, by providing ``reachback''
support for those operations. For example, The Department operates
Predator drones in Afghanistan from a facility in Nevada and analyzes
battlefield intelligence at data centers in the United States. DoD
installations are also becoming more important as a staging platform
for homeland defense missions. This means that power failure at a
military base here at home could threaten our operations abroad or harm
our homeland defense capability.
The Department has made wide use of third-party financed energy
conservation projects accomplished through vehicles such as Energy
Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) and Utility Energy Services
Contracts (UESCs) which allows DoD to use industry funding to pay for
equipment to reduce life cycle costs of facilities and pay it back from
the accrued savings. ESPCs and UESCs typically generate 15-20% of all
facility energy annual savings that DoD realizes. Use of ESPC and UESC
for 2009 reached an award value over $306 million. DoD annual energy
savings from these contracts are expected to reach nearly 1.2 billion
BTUs, which, although significant, represent slightly more than one
half of one percent (0.5%) of the DoD's annual consumption. From 2003-
2009, third-party financed energy contract awards totaled $1.74B. It is
my belief that the Department can build on this progress by increasing
the use of third-party financed contracts, enabling more cost effective
long-term facilities operation and maintenance with no upfront costs.
Third-party financed contracts are a valuable tool in the ``energy tool
box'' towards reduced energy demand. [See page 69.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Secretary Gates. To meet immediate inventory shortfalls, the Air
Force is replacing operational losses of HH-60G aircraft in its Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) fleet with the current production version, the
next-generation UH-60M aircraft. With some modifications, this aircraft
is suitable for the mission. Also, near-term plans are being developed
to recapitalize the balance of the aging CSAR HH-60G fleet with new
airframes.
The Joint Staff continues to assess the current DoD personnel
recovery capability, including CSAR operations. Initial results
indicate that improved integration of DoD personnel recovery assets can
reduce operational risk though better management of material and
personnel capabilities. The Joint Staff assessment is expected to
result in a joint concept of operations that exploits joint personnel
recovery and CSAR capabilities. [See page 61.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 3, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Mr. Taylor. How many troops have faced either judicial or non-
judicial punishment in Afghanistan for violating the rules of
engagement?
Secretary Gates. There have been no actions taken against anyone
for tactical directive violations or ROE violations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. In your statement prepared for the committee you
indicated that the F136 engine would still require a further investment
of $2.5 billion over the next five years. Please provide the
description, scope of work, by appropriation, by fiscal year, with
government and contractor costs delineated, included in this estimate.
What percent of the F-35 Life Cycle Cost (LCC) does $2.5 billion
represent of the LCC? Please provide the projected cost estimate at the
time of the signing of the System Design and Development (SDD) contract
of the cost of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 1-4 F135 engines, by
lot, for the F-35A aircraft and the actual costs paid for those
engines. Please provide the estimate of the SDD contract cost and
schedule (by fiscal year) for the F135 and F136 engines at the time the
contract was signed for each engine's SDD contract. Please provide the
current estimate of the contract cost for the F135 and F136 SDD
contracts, specified for government and contractor costs (FY09 and
prior, FY10, FY11 FYDP). Please define IOC for F-35A, B, and C. Has
that definition changed since F-35 SDD began? Has the aircraft hardware
and or software delivered configuration changed for the aircraft being
delivered to achieve IOC? How many hardware and software configurations
of aircraft of each model, will make up the IOC aircraft? Please
provide the IOC schedule of the F-35A, B, and C at the time of SDD
contract signing and the current projection for IOC of each aircraft
now.
Secretary Gates. The $2.5B through FY15 includes the cost to:
Complete the development program (i.e., SDD) for the
alternate engine.
Fund an engine ``component improvement program'' (or CIP)
to maintain engine currency.
Perform directed buys of engines from the primary and
second sources to prepare for a competition.
Procure tooling, support equipment, and spares.
$2.5B represents less than 1% of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
life cycle procurement costs and about 3.5% of program costs through
the FYDP.
Please note that the total cost is estimated at $2.9B which
includes the $2.5B referenced above plus the additional funding
required outside the FYDP to prepare the second manufacturer for
competition in 2017.
An estimate of costs is below:
Estimated Resources Required to Fund Joint Strike Fighter Alternate
Engine
(Supports Response to HASC QFR#8/Hearing on February 3, 2010)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8170.101
.epsAssumptions:
Reflect additional resource requirements needed to fund an alternate
engine program above President's 2011 Budget request and FY 2011-15
Future Year's Defense Program, consistent with restructured JSF
program
Competitive procurement of engines begins in FY 2017
Annual competition with award of 60% of buy to winner
Directed buys begin in FY13 to prepare second source for competition
International partner participation consistent with JSF program in FY
2011 President's Budget
Mr. Smith. You make the point in your testimony before the
committee that the F135 baseline F-35 engine has 13,000 test hours. How
many hours of the 13,000 hours are flight test hours? How many hours
are currently planned for the entire flight test program? In February
2009, what was the estimated date of completion of flight testing in
the F-35 development program? What is the estimated completion date
now? Please provide the same information for operational test and
evaluation completion. How many ground test hours have been logged of
the total ground test hours on engines representative of the
configuration of the current production F135 engines? For the F136
engine? How many different configurations are represented in the F135
test and production engines (F135, F136, lift fan and associated turbo-
machinery) produced to date and included in Low Rate Initial
Productions (LRIPs) 1-4? Were and will all production engines currently
under contract be of the same configuration when/as they came/come off
the production line? If not, how many configurations exist?
Secretary Gates. The F135 has 13,223 ground test hours and 199.8
flight test hours. Roughly 723 hours have been on engines in an Initial
Service Release (ISR) representative configuration. The F136 has
approximately 638 hours total System Development and Demonstration
(SDD) ground test run time on all standards of engines in SDD. The F136
has approximately 135 hours total ground run time on three SDD product
standard engines. A revised flight test schedule, including total
planned flight test hours, is currently in work within the Department.
The F135 SDD test program had three configurations: Initial Flight
Release, Final Flight Release and Initial Service Release (ISR). The
F135 Production engines are configured to the ISR standard. The F135
achieved Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL) ISR in February 2010
and short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) ISR is planned for
later this year. LRIP 1, 2 and 3 engines are currently under contract.
Due to program concurrency, these engines will not have a uniform
configuration--only LRIP 3 engines and beyond will be produced in the
ISR configuration. There are no F136 Production Engines under contract
nor was funding requested in the FY 2011 Presidential Budget.
In February 2009, completion of Development test was planned in 2nd
quarter 2013, with Operational Test planned to complete in 4th quarter
2014. In accordance with the February 2010 F-35 Program restructure,
Development Test is extended to March 2015, and Operational Test
completion and Milestone C are planned in April 2016.
Mr. Smith. You spoke in Fort Worth at the F-35 production facility
in August 2009 and were quoted as saying: ``My impression is that most
of the high-risk elements associated with this developmental program
are largely behind us, and I felt a good deal of confidence on the part
of the leadership here that the manufacturing process, that the supply
chain, that the issues associated with all of these have been addressed
or are being addressed.'' In February 2010 you presented a budget that
restructures the JSF program, adding nearly $17 billion in cost and
delaying the production of 122 F-35 aircraft from that projected last
year. The JSF program is scheduled to be the Department's major fighter
program for at least the next 30 years with a projected life cycle cost
of over $1 trillion and representing 95 percent of the manned fighter
force. The cost of the remaining development required for the F136
alternate engine is estimated to be $1 billion--one-tenth of the
projected life cycle cost of the program. Please provide your views on
why the remaining investment is not justified to maintain a competitive
program and hedge risks to readiness.
Secretary Gates. The basis for the Department's decision to not
fund an alternate engine is provided in Secretary Lynn's February 23,
2010 letter to each of the defense committees. A PDF of the letter is
inserted below.
[The information referred to is ``For Official Use Only'' and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Smith. In your prepared statement you indicated the additional
costs [of the F136] are not offset by potential savings generated
through competition and even optimistic analytical models produce
essentially a break-even scenario. Please provide what the DOD analysis
being used by the Department indicates with regard to the financial
cost-benefit analysis of both a F135 program and a F135 and F136
program. Also, please provide the assumptions used in this analysis and
how they differ from the DOD engine study provided to the congressional
defense committees in 2007.
Secretary Gates. The basis for the Department's decision to not
fund an alternate engine is provided in Secretary Lynn's February 23,
2010 letter to each of the defense committees. A PDF of the letter is
inserted below. Please note these letters contain proprietary and
competition sensitive information.
[The information referred to is ``For Official Use Only'' and
retained in the committee files.]
With respect to the estimating assumptions, the following is an
excerpt from a memo from Ms. Christine Fox (Director, Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation) which was included as an attachment in the
aforementioned letter from Mr. Lynn to the committees.
``. . . the CAPE updated two key factors in the 2007 analysis: 1)
the additional appropriations through FY 2010 that had been directed by
Congress for development of the F136 alternative engine, which now
represent `sunk costs'; and, 2) the cost estimates for the primary and
second engine System Design and Development (SDD) programs based on
more recent actual cost information from both engine programs. The CAPE
2010 Quick Update made no other changes to the extensive list of
assumptions used in the 2007 report to Congress, including the
assumption that competition would begin in 2014. In particular, it is
important to note that the 2010 Quick Update does not fully reflect the
recently restructured JSF program resourced in the FY 2011 President's
Budget and the FY 2011-15 FYDP.''
Mr. Smith. What non-financial benefits are seen to potentially
accrue to the Department for having an alternate engine program? Given
that the F-35 is projected to compose 95 percent of the manned-fighter
force by 2035 and is, under DOD plans, intended to be solely dependent
on the F135, how do you rationalize that dependence and risk to
readiness if the cost of providing those benefits, under the
Department's own study, is potentially zero, given ``optimistic
analytical models produce essentially a break-even scenario?''
Secretary Gates. Section 2.5 of the Department's 2007 Report to
Congress on the alternate engine (Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine
Acquisition and Independent Cost Analyses) summarized the non-financial
benefits that could potentially accrue to the Department from an
alternate engine program. Contractor responsiveness is the most
frequently cited potential value of competition.
The basis for the Department's decision to not fund an alternate
engine is provided in Secretary Lynn's February 23, 2010 letter to each
of the defense committees. A PDF of the letter is inserted below.
[The information referred to is ``For Official Use Only'' and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Smith. You make the following point in your statement: ``The
solution to understandable concern over the performance of the Pratt &
Whitney program is not to spend yet more money to add a second engine.
The answer is to get the first engine on track.'' What attributes exist
for required capabilities suitable for a competitive acquisition
strategy. How do the F135-F136 programs, given the investment in each
to date, not meet those attributes?
Secretary Gates. The attributes for required capabilities suitable
for a competitive acquisition strategy are inherent in both the F135
and F136 engine programs. However, the F136 program requires an
additional investment of $2.9 billion to complete development and reach
a competitive posture. I believe it is more cost effective to focus on
managing a single engine program for the F-35 aircraft. I am focused on
controlling F135 costs and ensuring the F135 continues to meet the
performance and operational capabilities required to support the F-35
program.
Mr. Smith. You make the following point in your statement: ``The
alternate engine program is three to four years behind in development
compared to the current program.'' What was the original acquisition
strategy schedule for the F135 and F136 programs? Was it not the case
that was the strategy--to execute a leader-follower development
program, with the F136 following the F135 by 3-4 years?
Secretary Gates. The original acquisition strategy for the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) propulsion program did include a leader-follower
schedule, with the F136 development following the F135 development by
approximately 4 years.
Mr. Smith. You make the following point in your statement: ``The
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is designed to support a wide diversity of
military customers, including the Navy, Marine Corps, and overseas
buyers, many of whom are unable or unwilling to purchase from two
engine manufacturers.'' Why did the U.S. in 2006 agree with all of the
other F-35 international partners, in the nine-nation F-35 MOU, to
require the production of both the F135 and F136? If because of a
different design the F136 provides greater thrust than the F135, are
you saying that that would not affect purchase decisions? How many
engine types were represented on a typical deployed aircraft carrier in
the 1990-2000 period of time and assuming a F135-only F-35 program, how
many engine types will be represented on a typical carrier in the 2020-
2030 period?
Secretary Gates. The U.S. and the international partners signed the
F-35 Production Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) in 2006. The intent of the PSFD MOU was to
establish a nine-nation arrangement for cooperatively producing,
sustaining, and conducting follow-on development of the JSF. The
inclusion of the F135 and F136 in the propulsion areas of the MOU is
consistent with the F-35 Acquisition Strategy which states, ``The
Acquisition Strategy recognizes the possibility of two interchangeable
propulsion systems, the Pratt and Whitney F135 and the General Electric
Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team F136, depending on availability of
funding. Throughout this document, provisions are made for this two
engine strategy. However, if development, procurement, or sustainment
funding is not provided for the F136 program, the F-35 will proceed
with the strategy described, using a single F135 propulsion system.''
The F135 is meeting the current technical and performance design
specifications required by the F-35 program. I do not believe that an
alternate engine is required to meet the performance specifications.
The ``typical'' aircraft carrier during the 1990's deployed with a
mix of F/A-18A/C, F-14, S-3, EA-6B and E-2 aircraft. Each aircraft type
was supported by mostly 1, but in some cases 2, engine models. In the
2020-2030 timeframe, an aircraft carrier will deploy with F/A-18E/F,
EA-18G, F-35, and E-2 aircraft. Each aircraft type would be supported
by a single engine type, assuming an F135-only F-35 program. The
reduction from multiple platforms on a carrier airwing, or ground-based
airwing to a smaller number of more effective platforms is an important
element in the Department's long term goals. Fewer types of more
effective aircraft will help reduce operations and support costs, in
addition to providing increased operational capability.
Mr. Smith. Please provide copies of any industrial base studies/
capability assessments associated with the F135 and/or F136 engines
completed by the military services or defense agencies/organizations
within the last five years.
Secretary Gates. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) and
the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) completed Congressionally-
directed studies in 2007. By direction, both studies assessed
industrial base implications as well as capability comparisons of a
single engine and competitive engine program. Both studies were
provided to the Committee in 2007. OSD's 2007 study drew upon the work
of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to examine industrial
base implications. Since the 2007 report, DCMA continues to review
industrial base aspects of fighter engine programs. In response to a
tasking from the United States Air Force, DCMA authored a May 2008
presentation tilted, ``Fighter Engine Capability Assessment Update.'' A
copy of this presentation is included.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and
can be viewed upon request.]
Mr. Smith. Please provide the FY06 Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), six year budget for the F135 and F136 programs as programmed in
the FY06 F-35 budget request, with the total amount for the F136 and
the amounts specified for government and contractor costs.
Secretary Gates. The FY 2006 President's Budget submission
(February 2005) reflected the following:
FY05 FY06 FY07
F135 SDD prime contractor 786.... 709... 421
F136 SDD prime contractor 207.... 227... 362
While the entire Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E)
budget is shown for the 6-year FYDP in the budget exhibits, the FY06
budget exhibits do not show the entire FY06-FY11 FYDP at the level of
the F135 and F136, and other RDT&E specific planned accomplishments.
That level of detail is only submitted for the budget year (FY05), the
submitted year (FY06), and the following year (FY07).
In February 2005, government costs were not separately identified
for each of the two engine contracts.
Mr. Smith. Please provide the planned and programmed funding, by
fiscal year, for the F136 System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
program when the contract was signed with the F136 contractor, with the
total amount for the F136 and the amounts specified for government and
contractor costs.
Secretary Gates. The F136 SDD contract was signed in August 2005.
The planned and programmed annual funding for the prime contractor as
of August 2005 is detailed below. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program did not track government costs separately for the F135 and F136
programs at that time.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Planned and Programmed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 $102 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 $343 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 $417 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2008 $458 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2009 $393 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2010 $386 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2011 $226 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To Complete $161 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $2,486 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Smith. Please provide the budgets for the F135 and F136 for
FY07-09 as executed and FY10 as projected, with the amounts specified
for government and contractor costs.
Secretary Gates. The requested information is provided below; data
is as of March 2010 ($-M-TY)
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10
F135 Prime contractor 781.. 654.. 507.. 637
F135 OGCs 31.. 33.. 33.. 40
F136 Prime contractor 338.. 464.. 425.. 400
F136 OGCs 6.. 9.. 5.. 28
Mr. Smith. You make the following point in your statement, ``. . .
. split or shared buys of items, particularly from only two sources, do
not historically produce competitive behavior since both vendors are
assured some share of the purchase.'' 1. Could you please provide the
existing procurement programs that resulted from split or shared buys,
e.g., the DDG-51? 2. Why does the Air Force continue to support F100
and F110 U.S. purchases of spares and overseas sales of F100 and F110
engines, long after the reason for the ``Great Engine War'' no longer
existed? 3. Does or has any individual foreign military purchaser of
F100 or F110 engines purchased both F100 and F110 engines? 4. Why does
the Department purchase similar ammunition capabilities from multiple
suppliers? 5. How many and what procurement programs continue to
procure similar capabilities from two or more suppliers? Please specify
the number of suppliers in each case.
Secretary Gates. I appreciate your interest in the background and
current information on split or shared buys within the Department and
have addressed each one of your questions independently to ensure a
clear and concise response.
1. Could you please provide the existing procurement programs that
resulted from split or shared buys, e.g., DDG-51.
The Department does have some examples of major defense acquisition
programs that have resulted from split or shared buys. The Army and the
Air Force do not have any major defense acquisition programs that
procure items from two or more suppliers. The Navy has several such
programs: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the DDG-51, Littoral Combat
Ship, Virginia Class Submarine, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicle.
2. Why does the Air Force continue to support F100 and F110 U.S.
purchases of spares and overseas sales of F100 and F110 engines, long
after the reason for the ``Great Engine War'' no longer existed?
The Air Force is no longer buying new F100 and F110 spare engines
for the active force, but continues to buy small quantities of spare
engines for the Air National Guard and spare engine components and
modules are routinely purchased to sustain these engines. The Air Force
continues to facilitate the purchase of F100 and F110 engines for
selected Foreign Military Sales (FMS) countries, but only as a
purchasing agent, and the Department will purchase the engines in
accordance with the direction provided by the FMS customer. FMS
countries are free to select and purchase whichever engine they
require. In this case, some countries (e.g. Chile, Greece, Egypt, South
Korea and Israel) elected to buy both engines. The Air Force is
compensated for any workload associated with these contracting actions.
Additionally, FMS countries provide ``pro-rata'' funding to the Air
Force Engine Component Improvement Program to gain access to future Air
Force engine upgrades or modifications.
3. Does or has any individual foreign military purchaser of F100 or
F110 engines purchased both F100 and F110 engines?
A split fleet, for the purposes of this question, means the same
aircraft type flying with a mix of F-100 and F-110 engines. With this
as a starting point, of the approximate 27 countries operating the F-
100 or the F-110 engines, only 5 have or will soon have a true ``split
fleet.'' In one instance, Chile will use both engines due to unusual
circumstances from a split buy of F-16's from separate nations. The 5
countries that will have a split fleet are listed below:
Chile--Operates both engines--because the F-16's they purchased new
had F-110 engines, but they later bought used F-16's from
the Netherlands which are equipped with F-100 engines.
Israel--Operates both engines on F-16's
Egypt--Operates both engines on F-16's
Greece--Operates both engines on F-16's
South Korea--Will operate both engines on F-15K's when it takes
delivery of the latest jets they have on order.
Finally, Saudi Arabia operates F-100 on their F-15C/D models, but
switched their F-15S aircraft to the F-110. These aircraft are
dissimilar and were purchased separately, and therefore I do not
consider this example to be one of a split fleet.
4. Why does the Department purchase similar ammunition capabilities
from multiple suppliers?
As identified in the DoD Directive 5160.65, Single Manager for
Conventional Ammunition (SMCA), It is DoD policy that, ``. . . . DoD
Components shall: (1) Use acquisition strategies that stabilize the
business environment . . . . (3) Justify expanded production capability
for contingency readiness.''
The Department purchases similar ammunition capabilities from
multiple suppliers since having multiple sources reduces risk by
protecting the industrial base against single points of failure.
Additionally, multiple sources enhance surge capability in times of
conflict, when there is a much higher and immediate demand for
ammunition.
5. How many and what procurement programs continue to procure
similar capabilities from two or more suppliers?
The Department does have some examples of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP) that have resulted from split or shared buys. The Army
and the Air Force do not have any MDAPs that procure items from two or
more suppliers. The Navy has several examples, the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, the DDG-51, Littoral Combat Ship, Virginia Class Submarine,
and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. Congress has long recognized that a strategy is needed
to maintain our country's body armor manufacturing capabilities so that
we are prepared and well-equipped if situations call for a surge. In
the FY10 NDAA, Congress specified that individual procurement and
research and development line items be established for body armor in
order to provide increased visibility and oversight within DoD and
Congress. However, it seems DoD has failed to uphold this statutory
requirement for FY11. I consider body armor a soldier's primary
defense, why has the Department not established individual procurement
and research and development line items for body armor. Secretary
Gates, can you provide this committee with the Department's rationale
on this issue?
Secretary Gates. The Department believes that funding body armor in
separate procurement and research and development line items would
limit its flexibility to respond to the warfighters' need for
protection clothing based on the number of forces deployed and the
security conditions on the ground. Funding body armor and other
protection gear in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts
provides the Department with the flexibility to react to dynamic field
situations and changing body armor requirements and technologies on a
real time basis. Today the Department can quickly provide the
warfighters with the state-of-the-art small arms protective inserts
(SAPI) to upgrade their force protection gear. The SAPI plates and
other force protection gear are considered expense items and are part
of the soldier's clothing bag, which is bought with O&M funding.
Budgeting for procurement of body armor (i.e., SAPI plates) as separate
line items may slow the process of providing the warfighter with the
state-of-the-art body armor gear on a real-time basis because
procurement budget requests are put together a year or more in advance
of submitting them to Congress and the actual field requirements in
theater may change significantly from the planned assumptions.
Ms. Sanchez. QDR that was just released states, ``. . . DoD's
information networks have become targets for adversaries who seek to
blunt U.S. military operations''. Unfortunately, these threats have
been ignored for a very long time, and as recent reports have shown,
our country is NOT prepared for any type of cyber attack. Can you
provide this committee with a better sense of how the cyber threats to
DoD and government systems have evolved over the past ten years? What
new threats do you expect to see in the next ten years?
Secretary Gates. In general, cyber threats have evolved with the
technology. As new operating systems, software, devices, or types of
networks have been added to the global infrastructure, new threats to
those systems have often emerged within months. The more prevalent a
system, the greater the likelihood of there being many techniques to
compromise it. In the last five years, the cyber criminal sector in
particular has displayed remarkable technical innovation with an
agility presently exceeding that of network defenders. Criminals are
developing new, difficult-to-counter tools. For example, cyber
criminals are targeting mobile devices such as ``smart phones,'' whose
increasing power and global adoption as an authentication mechanism for
use in financial transactions makes them lucrative targets.
In the next ten years, the threats will become more complex as
technologies that were once separate, begin to merge and become
seamless. Network convergence--the merging of distinct voice and data
technologies to a point where all communications (e.g. voice,
facsimile, video, computers, control of critical infrastructure, and
the Internet) are transported over a single network--will probably come
close to completion in the next five years. This convergence amplifies
the opportunity for disruptive cyber attacks and unforeseen cascading
effects on other parts of the U.S. critical infrastructure. Along with
network convergence, the consolidation of data captured in emails via
Internet search engines, Web 2.0 social networking sites, and via
geographic location of mobile service subscribers increases the
potential for identification and targeting of individuals.
In summary, we face individuals, state and non-state sponsored
cyber actors, terrorist networks, organized criminal groups, rogue
states, and advanced nation states, each of which has its own
combination of access, technical sophistication and intent. As a
result, the United States faces a dangerous combination of known and
unknown vulnerabilities, strong and rapidly expanding adversary
capabilities, and a lack of comprehensive threat awareness. This
situation is exacerbated by the fact that U.S. networks and
infrastructure continue to form the core of cyberspace, making the
scale of our defensive problem greater than that of any other nation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. I am pleased to see that this budget supports care for
our wounded, ill, and injured military members. One of your key
initiatives is to ensure a high standard at facilities caring for
wounded warriors, including first-rate hospitals and the Army's Warrior
Transition Units. However, I am concerned that the current plans for
wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National Military
Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September 2011 is not at
the same level of support currently furnished by the Army at Walter
Reed Army Medical Center. Wounded Warriors who move to the new medical
center will experience a significant degradation of services and
support. This is unacceptable. What assurances can you give me that all
of the wounded warrior support now provided at Walter Reed, including
barracks space on the Bethesda campus, will be available when the new
medical center opens in September 2011?
Secretary Gates. Next to the war itself, casualty care remains the
Department's top priority. The Military Health System (MHS) as well as
the Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) in the National Capital Region
(NCR), where the majority of Wounded Warriors transit even if they do
not receive care, will continue to provide the best healthcare and
recovery services for warfighters and their families. The new Walter
Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), Bethesda, and Fort
Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH) will anchor this effort in the NCR.
Warrior Lodging--The Department's capacity planning for Bethesda
includes 350 Wounded Warriors with a minimum of 150 Non-Medical
Attendants (NMAs) and other family members. In addition, lodging
capacity at WRNMMC, Bethesda will greatly exceed that of WRAMC.
Construction is underway for a 280,000 square foot dedicated warrior
lodging and services complex to support extended outpatient medical
treatment. It will finish in June 2011 and supply 153 double occupancy
suites. The design supports warriors and NMAs in a two bedroom suite
concept that is fully compliant with the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). Further, the Department has included $62.9M in the
President's FY 2011 budget request for another 100 double occupancy
suites.
Warrior Support Services--Between the two wings of suites, a four-
story central support facility will include a dining facility, resident
support center, and administrative functions specifically dedicated to
the command and control of the wounded warrior population. Each Service
will have space set aside to provide service to their specific
population, tailored to meet their mission requirements.
A physical fitness center is also under construction and will be
sized to properly accommodate the space and access requirements of the
WRNMMC, Bethesda Warrior in Transition (WIT) population and allow them
to exercise alongside other Warriors and caregivers. This will support
integration and re-integration of WITs into their community, and the
reestablishment of the warrior/athlete ethos.
Medical Care for Warriors--The most visible core missions of
WRNMMC, Bethesda will continue to be amputee/rehabilitative and
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) care. The quality of medical care for the
wounded warriors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) and
National Naval Medical Center (NNMC), as it exists today, will be
maintained and even enhanced at the WRNMMC, Bethesda.
By September 15, 2011, Bethesda will provide healthcare and
recovery services for WITs and their families that exceed those that
currently exist in the region. As per section 2714(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, the Department
is developing a Comprehensive Master Plan to provide for additional
world-class capabilities at Bethesda.
Mr. Wilson. Over the past 11 years, Congress has done much to close
the gap between military and civilian pay. Closing this gap is critical
to maintaining recruiting and retention programs that are essential to
the health of the all volunteer force, especially while the nation is
currently at war and operations tempo remains high. Given that the
parity with the private sector is only 2.4 percent away from current
levels, why do you believe it is wise to stop the process of reaching
general parity with private sector pay raises at this point?
Secretary Gates. First, I would like to thank the Congress for the
attention it has paid to helping to increase the competitiveness of
military compensation with the private sector. The pay increases of \1/
2\ percent above the ECI over the past decade have helped not only
close the actual pay gap but also the pay gap as perceived by military
members. Recent survey data indicates approximately \3/4\ of members
believe their compensation is as good as or better than their former
high school classmates.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ April 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members, by
DMDC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, the Department believes the pay gap has been closed and the
full compensation package provided to military members compares
favorably with counterparts in the private sector. The numbers of young
men and women joining the military continue to exceed our goals. Our
overall retention numbers are very good. We are on target or ahead of
plan in meeting our retention goals. Although part of this certainly is
attributable to current conditions in the economy, members' continued
willingness to serve and satisfaction with their compensation remain
high.
There are a number of ways to measure comparability between
military and private-sector compensation. From the perspective of the
Department, the ability of our compensation system to attract and
retain a sufficient force with the proper mix of skills and specialties
is the essential measure. Currently, except for some specific skill
areas, the compensation system is providing the force structure the
Department needs. In areas where skills are in high demand in the
private sector, such as nuclear, healthcare, and special operations
fields, we rely on special and incentive pays and bonuses to compete
effectively. Instead of across-the-board pay raises in excess of the
ECI, increases for special and incentive pays and bonuses would provide
more flexibility to the Department to meet specialized recruiting and
retention needs.
The often cited 2.4 percent pay gap compares changes in basic pay
since 1982 to changes in the ECI. The use of basic pay in this
comparison is of limited value, because the significance of the housing
and subsistence allowances has grown. When viewing military
compensation over this same period and including these allowances, the
gap of 2.4 percent actually turns into a surplus of over 9 percent.
Mr. Wilson. Do the equipping and manning strategies for the
National Guard's new operational role also take into consideration the
strategic reserve role the National Guard has historically played? For
example, do National Guard units that are not immediately scheduled for
deployment have sufficient equipment to perform domestic missions and
serve as a strategic reserve, should new global demands unrelated to
the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan emerge? Are there
reserve units dedicated to a strategic reserve role and, if so, how are
they equipped?
Admiral Mullen. Since September 11, 2001, the Army has relied
heavily upon the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve
(USAR) for sustained operations and enduring requirements under partial
mobilization authority. The Army has increasingly considered itself an
operational force that maintains strategic depth. The global demands on
the services require National Guard forces to be equally equipped and
manned to handle strategic and operational roles while performing
federal and state missions.
The statutory and regulatory structure governing employment of the
reserve component has changed little since the Cold-War era when the
Reserve Component was envisioned as a strategic reserve capable of
rounding out operational Active Component (AC) units when required. The
ARNG currently maintains a standing rotational commitment of one
division and five Brigade Combat Teams plus support structure to meet
an annual mobilization requirement of between 55,000 and 60,000
Soldiers. The utilization of the ARNG as an operational force to
augment the operational capability of the AC creates a set of enduring
requirements and demand for resources.
Under the current operational tempo, the ARNG must cross-level
personnel and equipment into mobilizing units at the expense of units
scheduled for subsequent rotations. Because personnel and equipment
shortages exist service-wide, the ARNG must provide internal bill-
payers to meet readiness goals. The initiative to operationalize the
Reserve Component means that the ARNG must build and maintain a high
degree of unit readiness prior to mobilization in order to support
enduring operational requirements. The requirement of a generating
force made up of Table of Distribution and Allowances units is
necessary for the long-term health and balance of the force even though
these particular units do not mobilize as part of the operational
force. ARNG units must also balance accessibility to the AC with the
dual mission requirements of their home states, placing further demand
on scarce and valuable resources.
Within the construct of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), Active
and Reserve Component units in the early phases of ARFORGEN constitute
the nation's strategic depth, available for contingencies other than
the current warfight. Throughout the ARFORGEN cycle, National Guard
units must be prepared to perform domestic missions. The 2009 Army
Equipping Strategy accounts for these requirements.
The Army Equipping Strategy specifically acknowledges the need for
Critical Dual Use equipment, meaning equipment utilized during both
wartime and Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities
(homeland) missions, be filled at 80% or better. The overall Critical
Dual Use on-hand rate (as of SEP 09) stands at 83%; however, due to the
warfight, the available rate is 65%. This Critical Dual Use available
rate includes risk that ARNG units will not be able to complete
homeland missions. It should be noted, however, that ARNG units have
not failed to complete assigned homeland missions in the past as a
result of equipment shortages. This risk is mitigated through the use
of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact program between States.
The ARNG has no units in a specified ``strategic reserve role'';
however, ARNG units in the early phases of the ARFORGEN cycle, and not
immediately identified for deployment, are part of the strategic depth
of the generating force and are available for contingencies. This level
of fill includes risk as the Army Unit Status Reporting system
identifies that a unit at this level does not possess the required
resources to undertake the full wartime or the primary mission for
which it has been organized and designed, but the unit may be directed
to undertake portions of its mission with the resources on hand.
Mission success is possible, but flexibility is severely restricted.
This risk is mitigated as units are provided equipment for training
purposes and follow on deployment, when identified for a contingency
mission.
Certain units of the ARNG, such as Counter Drug units and Civil
Support Teams, are constrained by law to specific missions and are
unavailable for operational missions outside of their statutory
mandates. A base budget informed by enduring requirements enables the
ARNG to achieve the proper balance of operational strength and
generating force capability while providing trained, ready, and
equipped units accessible to the AC for current operations in addition
to emergent contingencies. Resourcing the ARNG as an operational force
creates strategic depth and provides sufficient and necessary
capability to AC commanders in the field.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. Several defense and space program terminations by this
Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having
profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard
to our nation's ability to design, build, and maintain solid rocket
motors. These decisions have already resulted in literally thousands of
highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and
technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with
the resultant loss of decades' worth of expertise to the nation.
I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including
increased costs for raw products and materials. For example, previous
Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), with no solid commitment to a
warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency's decision to terminate
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the
Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any
significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental
decisions include perpetual delays in beginning development for any DoD
follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters.
Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the
Constellation program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets,
collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket
motor production program, and significantly fewer solid rocket motor
production programs in general, within the federal government to
sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical
area.
The Department of Defense's ``Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities
Report to Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive
Summary, makes the following statement: ``Delays in the NASA Ares
program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime
contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base,
specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. If the cited DoD
report was correct in stating that a mere delay in the NASA Ares
program could have a ``significant negative impact'' on the large SRM
prime contractor industrial base, what is the Department of Defense's
position on the impacts that outright cancellation of the NASA Ares
rockets under the Constellation program would have on the shared U.S.
defense and space industrial base as recommended in the President's
FY11 budget proposal to Congress?
Secretary Gates. I believe that the outright cancellation of the
NASA Constellation program will impact all DoD programs that use SRMs
to include strategic and tactical missiles, missile defense systems,
and solid booster programs for our space launch platforms. These
impacts could include cost increases, as component suppliers may have
higher costs structures associated with lower production rates. The
Department believes that regardless of the NASA decision, the large SRM
industrial base must ``right-size'' its significant facility
overcapacity to remain viable, innovative and competitive for future
needs. It is possible that a reduction in excess capacity may, in fact,
ultimately create savings for the Department over the longer-term.
Mr. Bishop. Several defense and space program terminations by this
Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having
profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard
to our nation's ability to design, build, and maintain solid rocket
motors. These decisions have already resulted in literally thousands of
highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and
technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with
the resultant loss of decades' worth of expertise to the nation.
I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including
increased costs for raw products and materials. For example, previous
Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), with no solid commitment to a
warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency's decision to terminate
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the
Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any
significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental
decisions include perpetual delays in beginning development for any DoD
follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters.
Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the
Constellation program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets,
collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket
motor production program, and significantly fewer solid rocket motor
production programs in general, within the federal government to
sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical
area.
The Department of Defense's ``Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities
Report to Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive
Summary, makes the following statement: ``Delays in the NASA Ares
program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime
contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base,
specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. If NASA's FY11
proposal to terminate Constellation and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets is
agreed to by the Congress, what additional risks and negative impacts
will occur to the private SRM industrial base's ability to sustain our
strategic, missile defense, space launch, and tactical missile weapons
systems in future years?
Secretary Gates. I expect the private SRM industrial base for large
SRMs to ``right-size'' an already significantly underutilized and
overcapitalized infrastructure. This is an important opportunity for
industry to better align its industrial capabilities with the current
and future large SRM market demand. I do not expect that the large SRM
industry will ever see the requirements for large SRMs that we
encountered during the industry buildup from the 1960s through the
1980s, or even the 1990s, but I am also well aware that the Department
must ensure it has the design skills and production capabilities
necessary to support both strategic and tactical programs well into the
future. Prime SRM suppliers and their sub-tier suppliers will have to
downsize and/or consolidate their capacity, which is already at all
time low levels of utilization, to adjust to the new market demand
levels. I am committed to working closely with our industrial partners
as we right size this base to meet our future requirements.
Mr. Bishop. Several defense and space program terminations by this
Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having
profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard
to our nation's ability to design, build, and maintain solid rocket
motors. These decisions have already resulted in literally thousands of
highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and
technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with
the resultant loss of decades' worth of expertise to the nation.
I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including
increased costs for raw products and materials. For example, previous
Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), with no solid commitment to a
warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency's decision to terminate
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the
Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any
significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental
decisions include perpetual delays in beginning development for any DoD
follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters.
Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the
Constellation program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets,
collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket
motor production program, and significantly fewer solid rocket motor
production programs in general, within the federal government to
sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical
area.
The Department of Defense's ``Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities
Report to Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive
Summary, makes the following statement: ``Delays in the NASA Ares
program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime
contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base,
specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. If NASA's FY11
proposal to terminate Constellation and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets is
agreed to by the Congress, what impact will that decision have on the
Department of Defense's ability in future years to undertake the
development of new programs that utilize solid rocket motors, such as
any strategic, missile defense, space lift, or tactical missiles
programs?
Secretary Gates. In accordance Section 1078 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84), the
Department is preparing a ``sustainment plan'' for its SRM industrial
base. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics established an interagency task force that has been working
on this important issue since November of last year. The Interagency
Task Force is currently assessing the impacts that the decision to
cancel the NASA Constellation program will have on DoD's ability to
develop new programs that utilize large SRMs. It is clear that the
industrial base must ``right-size'' itself to be more aligned with the
reality of future requirements in order for the base to continue to be
viable, innovative, and competitive.
Mr. Bishop. Several defense and space program terminations by this
Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having
profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard
to our nation's ability to design, build, and maintain solid rocket
motors. These decisions have already resulted in literally thousands of
highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and
technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with
the resultant loss of decades' worth of expertise to the nation. I
anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including
increased costs for raw products and materials. For example, previous
Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), with no solid commitment to a
warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency's decision to terminate
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the
Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any
significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental
decisions include perpetual delays in beginning development for any DoD
follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters.
Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the
Constellation program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets,
collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket
motor production program, and significantly fewer solid rocket motor
production programs in general, within the federal government to
sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical
area. The Department of Defense's ``Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
Capabilities Report to Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the
Executive Summary, makes the following statement: ``Delays in the NASA
Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM
prime contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base,
specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. Did NASA, or the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), specifically consult with the
Department of Defense during formulation of the President's FY11 budget
proposal regarding the impacts that cancellation of the Constellation
program and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets would have on the shared defense
and space industrial base? If so, please describe the extent to which
those consultations took place and which executive-level Administration
officials were involved in those consultations.
Secretary Gates. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
for the White House did ask the Navy what they believed the impact
would be to the SRM industrial base if the Ares programs were
terminated. During the spring of 2009, representatives from OSTP met
with the Industrial Policy office (part of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), met
to discuss the result of the SRM Industrial Capabilities Report to
Congress, signed on April 2, 2009. As part of a government-wide effort,
AT&L/IP also met with OSTP representatives in mid-November to consult
on the congressionally directed SRM Sustainment plan, at which time the
various human flight options NASA was considering were discussed.
Mr. Bishop. Several defense and space program terminations by this
Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having
profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard
to our nation's ability to design, build, and maintain solid rocket
motors. These decisions have already resulted in literally thousands of
highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and
technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with
the resultant loss of decades' worth of expertise to the nation.
I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including
increased costs for raw products and materials. For example, previous
Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), with no solid commitment to a
warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency's decision to terminate
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the
Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any
significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental
decisions include perpetual delays in beginning development for any DoD
follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters.
Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the
Constellation program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets,
collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket
motor production program, and significantly fewer solid rocket motor
production programs in general, within the federal government to
sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical
area.
The Department of Defense's ``Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities
Report to Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive
Summary, makes the following statement: ``Delays in the NASA Ares
program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime
contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base,
specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. Is preservation of
the SRM industrial base a matter of significant concern to the
Department of Defense and, if so, what specific funding or
administrative actions do you propose in FY11 and beyond to maintain
this viable SRM industrial capability?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I believe that the Department requires the
large SRM industrial base to provide the propulsion for its strategic
systems, missile defense programs, and space launch. The Department is
evaluating current research and development and production programs to
determine how the SRM programs must be adjusted to the changing large
SRM critical skills and subtier supplier base. The Department is
committed to sustaining an adequate SRM industrial base to support both
its strategic and tactical needs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. My question is regarding the military humanitarian
mission in Haiti. Can you comment as to whether or not the C-27, Joint
Cargo Aircraft, have been used for the Haiti Humanitarian Relief
Operations and in what capacity? If the aircraft has not been utilized,
can you explain why this tactical asset has not been used to disperse
needed supplies to regions outside the epicenter of Port-au-Prince?
Admiral Mullen. The C-27J is not in use in Haiti because it is
still in the Test and Evaluation stage of development. It is currently
scheduled for Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation in April
2010. Presently three aircraft are in the inventory and the first
operational deployment is tentatively scheduled for spring 2011.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. This submission continues the trend of reducing the
proportion of the budget dedicated to research and development. This
continued erosion limits our ability to maintain technological
superiority over our adversaries. In both the QDR and this budget you
talk about prevailing in today's conflicts while positioning for the
future. What is the department's plan to ensure that we do not mortgage
our future technologically by eroding our investment in basic and
applied research today?
Secretary Gates. Under my leadership, the Department remains
committed to the future by increasing investments in both basic and
applied research. The FY 2011 President's Budget Request for basic
research ($1.999 billion) represents an 11.2 percent increase over the
amount requested in FY 2010 ($1.798 billion). When compared to the FY
2008 DoD request for basic research ($1.428 billion), the FY 2011
request has risen 40 percent over a 3-year period. The FY 2011
President's Budget Request for applied research ($4.476 billion)
represents a 5.4 percent increase over the level requested in FY 2010
($4.247 billion). Combined, the FY 2011 request for basic and applied
research is $6.475 billion, an increase of 7.1 percent over the
combined FY 2010 request for $6.045 billion. It is my view that that
the Department's continuing increased investment in basic and applied
research represents a commitment to preserving the future technological
superiority of our Armed Forces.
Mr. Lamborn. In your budget hearing testimony, you provided an
example to illustrate why a reduction in overall aircraft for the Air
Force from 2200 strike aircraft to 1500 or 1600 is not as severe as it
seems because replacement aircraft are more capable, i.e. it is not a
one to one trade. Your specific example talked to the fact that a MQ-9
Reaper Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) is as capable perhaps as two F-16s
in its ability to provide combat effects over Iraq and Afghanistan
(Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and air-to-ground
strike capabilities). This may be true for today's fight, but your
answer overlooks, like much of the QDR, the longer term threat and
requirements on this force. The MQ-9 Reaper cannot perform nor does it
perform the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission. The F-16
does. How does your equation for force structure and the fighter gap
change when these mission areas gain importance, as they may, in a
future conflict against a peer or near-peer?
Secretary Gates. The Air Force manned fighter/attack inventory will
decrease in size from about 2200 aircraft in FY 2009 to about 1860 in
FY 2020. During this time the capability of the force will dramatically
increase. The number of fifth-generation aircraft will grow from about
140 in FY09 to about 630 in FY20, a 340% increase. This is an order of
magnitude greater than the estimated fleets of any potential adversary.
The Air Force has procured 187 F-22s and plans to procure 1763 F-
35s to provide the capabilities needed for a future peer or near-peer
conflict. The F-35 is scheduled to replace the F-16 in all mission
areas, including the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). With its
stealth features and advanced sensing the F-35 is significantly more
capable than the F-16. Given the magnitude of these improvements we do
not need to replace legacy aircraft strictly on a one for one basis.
Mr. Lamborn. Does the delay in the F-35 fighter program drive the
need for further life extension upgrades on 4th generation fighters? If
so where will the funding come from for these Service Life Extension
Programs (SLEPs) and when can we expect to hear specifics about the
upgrade plan?
Admiral Mullen. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program restructure
is currently not driving service-life extension efforts for legacy
fighters. Rather, the Department continually assesses strike-fighter
force structure requirements in preparation for future budgets, and
service-life extension is one option that can help mitigate future
challenges. Other options to maintain the legacy fighter fleet include
changes to current Concepts of Operations, aligning Carrier Air Wing
readiness with Carrier readiness, and Air Wing composition and force
structure.
The Department's Fiscal Year 2011-2015 Future Years Defense Program
includes funding for several legacy fighter efforts. Specifically, the
Navy budgeted for a service life assessment for the F-18 series
aircraft to help inform the Department on the amount of service life
that can be extended and the modification costs. In addition, the Air
Force has scheduled a fleet-viability review for the F-16C/D that will
be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. Finally, funding is
allocated for Full-Scale Fatigue Testing for both F-15s and F-16s.
Mr. Lamborn. According to your testimony, the President's budget
request includes funding for two new Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs).
The 4th Infantry Division at Ft. Carson is the only Infantry division
without a CAB. Given that, will at least one of these new CABs be
designated for the 4th ID at Ft. Carson?
Admiral Mullen. The Army is studying courses of action for the
final stationing of both CABs you mention in your question. The final
stationing decision for the 13th CAB is tied to the timeline for the
CAB's activation (between Fiscal Years 2015 to 2018) and Fort Carson is
one of the facilities under consideration.
Mr. Lamborn. Testimony at both the budget and QDR hearings
emphasized the Administration's commitment to sustainment of Homeland
Missile Defense initiatives while intensifying the focus on regional
missile defense. The QDR and BMDR report clearly states that the
ballistic threat is expanding rapidly both qualitatively and
quantitatively. Taking both of these facts into account, it is
interesting that the MDA is only procuring 8 new SM-3 interceptors in
FY11, when the industrial base is sized to support 48 per year. Why is
this and are we procuring enough SM-3s to properly resource the new
missile defense strategy in the near and long term?
Admiral Mullen. The Missile Defense Agency procurement plan for SM-
3 missiles is structured to balance competing needs of the theater/
regional Combatant Commander mission for Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) ships and SM-3 missiles, with development and procurement
plans for new versions of the SM-3, continuing Aegis BMD's realistic
test program, and development and installation of upgrades to the Aegis
BMD weapon system.
Fiscal Year 2011 drop in SM-3 production orders represents the
shift in resources from producing SM-3 Block IA missiles to production
of the more capable SM-3 Block IB missiles. As part of this shift and
along with the eight procured missiles, twelve additional SM-3 Block IB
interceptors are being purchased in Fiscal Year 2011 with RDT&E funds
to support testing and evaluation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. The Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence
(PDMRA) program was established to provide benefits to service members
who have been deployed beyond established rotation cycles.
Unfortunately, because of a delay between the announcement of the
program and its implementation, roughly 23,000 Army National Guard
Soldiers nationwide, and roughly 750 Soldiers in Iowa, have not
received the benefits they earned. This is compounded by the fact that
roughly 2,000 Soldiers who are owed PDMRA benefits have already been
re-deployed and many more are preparing for another deployment. The FY
2010 NDAA authorized DOD to provide PDMRA benefits retroactively. I
understand that Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Carr recently signed
memorandum authorizing the Service Secretaries to provide the PDMRA
benefits retroactively. These Soldiers have been waiting for two years
for the benefits that they are due for their service, so I would very
much encourage you to move as expeditiously as possible to get these
benefits paid out. Can you provide me with a timeframe for when the
Service Secretaries will provide these payments to the Soldiers who are
still waiting for them?
Secretary Gates. The Army has a detailed plan for payment to all
National Guard soldiers who are eligible for compensation under PDMRA.
The Army received the Army National Guard's preliminary list of
eligible individuals. The Army will begin payments on March 1, and will
continue to diligently process and pay claims until eligible
individuals are appropriately compensated.
Statutory authority was required to retroactively compensate former
Service members for PDMRA days earned from Jan 19, 2007, through the
date each respective Service implemented their respective PDMRA
program. Section 604 of the FY10 NDAA, signed on October 28, 2009,
provided me the discretionary authority to compensate current and
former Service members for PDMRA days earned from Jan 19, 2007, through
the date each respective Service implemented their PDMRA program. Based
on the FY 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill passed on December 19, 2009,
DoD implementation policy was coordinated and approved on February 1,
2010.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you Secretary Gates
and Chairman Mullen for your service to our country and for appearing
here today. I am confident that this year's budget request represents a
strong commitment by the Administration to our national defense.
However, this year's budget repeats many of the mistakes of last
year's. While this year's budget documents are accompanied by the QDR,
neither adequately explains the continued gap in fighter aircraft nor
does it address in any way whatsoever the recapitalization of Search
and Rescue equipment. These two areas represent a significant oversight
in the short- and long-term force level constructs. Last year, the U.S.
Joint Forces Command study of Combat Search and Rescue showed that the
Air Force does it better than any other service, consistently, across
the board. In fact, their evaluation showed that the Air Force is
better at nearly all Rescue functions than even the elite Army Special
Operations units. Still, the budget reflects no noticeable attention to
this necessary mission nor does the QDR dedicate one single word to
this question. There are nearly a dozen units in my district alone and
hundreds of thousands of service members around the globe that depend
on this capability every day. On another issue, for several years,
Congressman LoBiondo and I have requested a full and fair assessment of
our fighter requirements and aircraft inventory. After long last, we
finally have a number from the Department that indicates we will lower
the requirement for manned fighter aircraft by 206 planes. Overall,
this represents a reduction of 536 aircraft from two years ago.
According to supporting documents, shortages of Air Force strike
fighters still appear to be likely between 2017 and 2024 and these
retirements are NOT offset by procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter.
We cannot continue to ignore these issues and simply hope they will
resolve themselves. We have learned in the most difficult circumstances
possible that such a strategy never works. This Committee and this
Congress do not have the luxury of planning our nation's defense on a
year-to-year basis. It is the responsibility of this Committee to
balance short-term security with long-term stability and provide for
the continued robust defense of our nation. In many ways, this budget
fails to provide for these systems and the long-term strategy fails to
see the quality in quantity. Last year you commented on the comparative
analysis between our 5th generation fighter capability and that of
China. According to your testimony last year, China will have only
1,700 aircraft in their inventory and zero 5th Generation fighters by
2020. But according to available intel data obtained in the last year,
the PLAAF has 600 attack and bomber aircraft and 1,300 fighters today.
We also know that incursions into our cyber infrastructure have
compromised some of our JSF blueprints and that China is now developing
a 5th Gen fighter. Last week, Russian aeronautics manufacturer Sukhoi
flew their first Gen 5 fighter, which we know will likely be for
export.
Do you stand by your previous testimony on our comparative
numerical advantage over the next 15 years?
With the growing aircraft force among our near-peer competitors,
how do we reconcile decreasing the number of fighters available for
combat?
Secretary Gates. The 2010 QDR assessed Defense Department
capabilities required to provide the President with options across a
wide range of future contingencies through the 2016 timeframe,
including deterring conflict and defeating aggression by adversary
states. The Department has assumed a moderate level of risk in the
near-term with respect to the number of fighters, but it has re-
invested the savings into the capabilities required as a bridge to a
future 5th Generation enabled force. QDR assessments indicate the
programmed force of strike aircraft will be sufficient to defeat the
efforts of our adversaries, including adversaries with advanced anti-
access capabilities. I will re-evaluate the impacts of the recently
announced slip in F-35 initial operational capability and the
implications to our legacy force.
Ms. Giffords. Under current projections, there continues to be a
gap in the Air National Guard, even under the most optimistic
projections. By 2017, the Air Guard will be forced to close 13 Fighter
Wings unless the Department acts now. Last year at this hearing we were
promised a plan for recapitalizing the Air National Guard's fighter
fleet but neither the budget nor the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
appear to contain one. We simply continue to hear that Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) is the answer. Still, your timeline for JSF and your
timeline for aircraft retirements leave a multi-year hole.
How does the Department plan to plug that hole with the required
number of manned fighter aircraft and under the current realities of
the F-35 program?
Secretary Gates. The Department has provided Congress a long-term
plan for fighter forces in the ``Aircraft Investment Plan for Fiscal
Years 2011-2040'', which was submitted with the budget. The DoD has
assumed a moderate level of risk in the near-term with the number of
fighters, but it has re-invested the savings into the capabilities
required as a bridge to the future 5th-Generation enabled force. The
QDR assessment indicated the programmed force for strike aircraft will
be sufficient to defeat the efforts of our adversaries. We will
continue to evaluate the impact of the shift in F-35 production and
determine the implications on the legacy force.
Ms. Giffords. As part of your efforts to rebalance the department
and increase cost effectiveness of the force, have you examined the
relative value of the Reserve Components vice the Active Components?
Secretary Gates. We continue to study the appropriate mix between
the Active and Reserve Forces and associated cost benefits to support
warfighter requirements. The Department applies a Total Force
Integrated process in assessing the benefits that each Component
contributes in support of the fighter community.
Ms. Giffords. What criteria does the Department use to apportion
capabilities and missions between the components?
Secretary Gates. The Department apportions capabilities and
missions based upon President of the United States, Secretary of
Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff guidance promulgated
in documents such as the Unified Command Plan, National Security
Strategy, National Military Strategy, and as refined in the QDR, the
Congressionally mandated Quadrennial Roles and Mission review process,
the Joint Operating and Integration Concepts, the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan and the Guidance for Development of the Force. Also,
there are OSD-led efforts such as the OSD/Capabilities Assessment
Program and Evaluation ``Tactical Air Issue team'' that contribute to
the decisions.
Ms. Giffords. Assuming that Reserve Component forces are cheaper,
is the department prepared to modify its historic fielding plans which
typically replace Active Duty equipment first, with a concurrent and
proportional fielding method?
Secretary Gates. During the past two decades the Air Reserve
Component has transitioned to more of an operational force. The Air
Reserve Component's ability to potentially provide forces at a reduced
operating cost is directly tied to the Active Component's on-going
investment in Air Force-wide equipment, modernization, and training
pipeline. Historically the ratio between Active and Air Reserve
Component aircraft has not exceeded a 60/40 mix. If the Air Reserve
Component grows beyond 40% of the total Air Force, sustainability and
potential cost benefits diminish. At the end of Fiscal Year 2011, the
percentage of Air Reserve Component combat-coded fighter aircraft is
projected to be 42% of the total combat-coded fighter force.
Ms. Giffords. When you cancelled the CSAR program, you testified
that the next year would be spent researching potential alternatives
and verifying the requirement. At Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in my
district, they have long awaited the final selection and delivery of a
new aircraft. Among operators, there is no question of the need for
this system. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency verified what we
already knew--that the Air Force does this mission better than anyone.
What is the plan for the next year and succeeding years to
recapitalize this capability?
Secretary Gates. Concurrent with the cancellation of the CSAR-X
program, the Department and the United States Air Force (USAF) began
two complementary actions. The urgent need to restore the HH-60G
inventory resulted in a funded program in Fiscal Years 2010 through
2012, described further below. Additionally, the USAF's urgent need to
recapitalize its aging HH-60G fleet will be refined in the next year.
The USAF will continue to work with OSD and the Joint Staff to
finalize requirements and develop an acquisition strategy to sustain
Combat Search and Rescue operational capability in support of globally
deployed Airmen and the Joint Team for the long term. DoD will leverage
current analysis and chart a course to a Material Development Decision
(MDD) as soon as possible. The President's Budget Request for FY 2011
includes initial funding estimates in FY 2012 and beyond that will be
used to implement that program.
Ms. Giffords. Were you aware that the current fleet of Pave Hawk
aircraft began to reach the end of their designed service life 7 years
ago?
Secretary Gates. The design service life of the Pave Hawk was known
and part of my consideration during the decision process. That urgent
need resulted in my direction to the Air Force to pursue immediate
replacement of HH-60G operational losses and additional aging HH-60Gs
with rotary wing aircraft based on currently fielded CSAR capabilities.
Ms. Giffords. Are additional aircraft forthcoming?
Secretary Gates. Yes. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-118 includes an Air Force program
start to replace HH-60G Operational Losses and funded the four
aircraft. The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2011 seeks
funding for 6 aircraft in Fiscal Year 2011 (including 3 from OCO
funding) and 5 aircraft in Fiscal Year 2012. These aircraft would
restore the legacy HH-60G fleet to the quantity of 112 aircraft. The
Air Force will procure the current in-production variant, UH-60M, and
modify them with the requisite mission equipment. The long-term
recapitalization of the legacy HH-60G fleet would begin in Fiscal Year
2012, following final requirements definition and acquisition strategy
approval.
Ms. Giffords. I am strongly encouraged by what I have seen from DoD
on energy issues, and I am confident that the Senate will move, if not
swiftly, to confirm the nominee for Director of Operational Energy.
Over the last year, I have been working aggressively with the Committee
and the services on developing an overarching master plan for DoD's
energy usage. I am also pleased by much of what I see in the QDR on
this topic and the great partnerships we have forged between the
Congress and the Department on this consensus issue.
Can you comment on where DoD is in meeting their short- and long-
term energy reduction and renewable energy requirements?
Secretary Gates. Over the last five years, the Department has
steadily reduced energy consumption per square foot at our
installations, largely in response to statutory and regulatory goals.
While continuing that very positive trend, I believe that it is time
for us to take a longer-term perspective and adapt our approach to
installation energy management from one that is primarily focused on
compliance to one focused on long-term cost avoidance and mission
assurance. The Department made substantial headway meeting the energy
efficiency (energy intensity) goals from 2006 through 2008 compared to
the 2003 baseline. While I set a target of 12 percent below the 2003
baseline for 2009, DoD fell short, meeting only a 10 percent energy
intensity reduction from the baseline. Some of the reasons for not
meeting the 2009 target are large mission changes in the Army and use
of millions of square feet of temporary facilities that are energy
inefficient. The Army's increase in energy intensity level was a result
of increased military activities of training, mobilization, deployment,
and global defense posture realignment, in addition to an increase in
troop strength. These factors required the use of a number of energy
inefficient temporary facilities and dual-use buildings to accommodate
personnel in transition. Energy efficiency is a primary component of
DoD's investment strategy. I believe the energy investments made
through the 2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) will
manifest a drop in energy intensity in FY 2010 and FY 2011 as these
ARRA-funded projects become operational.
Renewable energy investments on a large scale have the potential to
impact military training and operations as they require large tracts of
land or include tall structures that encroach upon military ranges and
special use routes on DoD- or Bureau of Land Management-controlled
lands. Under my direction, the Department is making every effort to
review the impacts of renewable energy infrastructure on a case-by-case
basis working to preserve military training areas while being open to
public-private partnership that yield green energy and green jobs and a
measure of energy security for our installations. In 2009, DoD exceeded
the 3 percent requirement for electrical energy from renewable
resources by reaching 3.6 percent.
Ms. Giffords. Does this year's budget demonstrate a significant
investment in growing the renewable energy portfolio within DoD?
Secretary Gates. DoD invests directly in renewable energy through
the Energy Conservation and Investment Program (ECIP). The Fiscal Year
2011 President's Budget included $120 million for ECIP, of which $63
million was designated for renewable energy projects.
Ms. Giffords. Is the top-line real dollar amount an increase from
last year's allocations?
Secretary Gates. The Fiscal Year 2011 President's Budget increased
the amount for ECIP and renewable energy from the 2010 President's
Budget. The Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget included $90 million
for ECIP, of which $53 million was designated for renewable energy
projects. However, the Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations were $174
million for ECIP, of which $74 million will go toward renewable energy
projects.
Ms. Giffords. Have Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs)
proven fruitful in providing significant energy cost savings with
little or no government outlays?
Secretary Gates. The Department made wide use of Energy Savings
Performance Contracts (ESPCs) and Utility Energy Services Contracts
(UESCs), which allow DoD to use industry funding to pay the up-front
costs of energy savings projects. The investment is paid back from
accrued savings. ESPCs and UESCs typically generate 15 to 20 percent of
all facility energy annual savings that DoD realizes. Use of ESPC and
UESC for 2009 reached an award value over $258 million. DoD annual
energy savings from these contracts are expected to reach nearly 1.2
billion BTUs, which, although significant, represent slightly more than
one half of one percent (0.5 percent) of the DoD's annual consumption.
From 2003-2009, third-party financed energy contract awards totaled
$1.74 billion.
Ms. Giffords. What can Congress be doing to improve or streamline
the process for installing large-scale renewable projects and
accelerate their construction?
Secretary Gates. DoD is leveraging current authorities to install
large-scale renewable projects on military installations where
appropriate and compatible with mission. Should Congress propose
additional authorities to streamline the process or accelerate
construction, my staff will evaluate them on a case-by-case basis.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. The FY 2010 NDAA (Sec. 141 BODY ARMOR PROCUREMENT)
clearly articulated that the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that
within each military department procurement account, a separate,
dedicated procurement line item is designated for body armor starting
with the budget for fiscal year 2011. It also articulated the same
requirement for a separate, dedicated program element for research and
development of individual body armor and associated components. The
total body armor program has evolved from a $40 million program in 1999
to over $5 billion through 2009. The establishment of an individual
procurement and RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) line
items would provide increased accountability and transparency in long-
term planning, programming, and investment for the acquisition of body
armor, and would accelerate the amount of investment by industry to
further advancements in survivability and weight reduction. Available
technology has not been able to keep the system within the desired
weight levels without sacrificing performance. It is critically
important that efforts be made to lighten the warfighter's load for
current operations, especially in Afghanistan where most operations are
dismounted in mountainous terrain. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps testified to the same
last year before this committee. Prior to Congress passing law
mandating separate procurement and RDT&E line items for body armor,
body armor was funded from Operation and Maintenance accounts. Separate
line items were mandated because Operations and Maintenance monies can
be moved around as the year progresses and although an initial dollar
amount might be placed against a body armor requirement, that dollar
amount can fluctuate if the military services think the money is needed
elsewhere. Establishing funds that are devoted to body armor programs
via separate, dedicated procurement line items ensures the warfighter
is equipped with the most technologically advanced, lightest, most
effective individual protection gear. Why did the Department of Defense
fail to comply with the statutory requirement to create separate,
dedicated procurement and RDT&E line items in the FY 2011 Defense
budget submission? What is the requested level of funding specifically
for body armor procurement and RDT&E for FY 2011? Will the Department
include separate procurement and RDT&E body armor line items in next
year's budget request?
Secretary Gates. I fully recognize the importance of personal body
armor to our troops deployed in combat operations. Since FY 2004, the
Congress at the request of the Department, has appropriated $3.1
billion for the procurement of small arms protective inserts and
enhanced small arms protective inserts (SAPI) for use by U.S.
personnel. This investment, along with other force protection
initiatives implemented by the Services saved countless lives and
limited casualties.
The Department's reluctance to fund the purchase of personal body
armor protection clothing in the procurement appropriations has as much
to do with the purpose of funding, as it does with its flexibility.
Because the procurement programs are separately funded in their own
budget lines, they lack the flexibility of the Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) appropriations. Since the quantity of body armor that
is needed to outfit forces is to a great extent directly related to the
number of troops deploying, the actual amount of body armor gear needed
is unknown when the procurement budgets are prepared a year or more
before the deployment date.
Because O&M funds are more readily available and have far greater
flexibility in their use, the Services are better able to reallocate
funds within their O&M accounts to ensure that sufficient body armor
gear has been purchased. Furthermore, personal body armor is considered
to be a consumable product, similar to boots and clothing. The personal
body armor used by our forces is actually clothing and jackets that
have specially designed pockets that hold the SAPI plates. Because of
the nature of the SAPI plates and the associated clothing, they are not
durable like hardware, so their replacement cycle may be more frequent
depending on combat operations.
Personal body armor research and technologies are currently funded
in the Services' Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
accounts. However, because these developmental efforts, relative to
major weapon systems are small, the requirement is funded in existing
RDT&E budget lines (example: Soldier System Advanced Development;
Infantry Support Weapons; SOF Soldier Protection and Survival System;
and Marine Corps Ground Combat/Supporting Arms System).
In FY 2011, the Department requested $1.3 billion for personal body
armor in the O&M accounts and $12.9 million in RDT&E.
Ms. Tsongas. I would like to understand if the DoD considers
leveraging proven, affordable, scalable programs as an alternative to
developmental programs that have a high likelihood of experiencing cost
overruns. The Patriot air and missile defense system is currently
fielded in 12 nations, including 5 NATO countries. Since production
began in 1980, over 170 Patriot fire units and over 9,000 missiles have
been delivered. An international industry team of over 4,000 suppliers
and subcontractors support the Patriot air defense system. Modern
production methods have proven effective in maintaining a production
reliability of over 10 times the required specification. Reliability of
Patriot systems deployed world-wide, measured in ``mean-time between-
failure'', remains over twice the required system specification. U.S.
Army operational availability has been consistently over 95 percent.
Complex, multi-year, developmental defense procurements often involve
some cost escalation. Constraining costs via the long-term usage of
proven, scalable programs is a way to continue to serve the needs of
our troops and allied troops without undergoing the process of funding
new programs with significant cost and schedule risk.
Has the Department of Defense considered controlling acquisition
costs through the continued use of proven, scalable technologies that
are already in use by our forces and those of our allies? For example,
the Patriot systems has been fielded by the U.S. and 12 international
partner nations for over 20 years and benefits today from cost savings
gleaned through the on-going investment by its current users.
Continuing to utilize systems like Patriot (and Theater High Altitude
Air Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), etc.) in lieu of
costly, new development programs like the current Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) program would save DoD billions of dollars. And,
should some of the capabilities currently being developed in the MEADS
program be procured in the future, would it be possible to incorporate
elements of the Patriot-based solution to create a merged air and
missile defense system, a ``best of both worlds'' approach? Your
comments on this topic, please?
Secretary Gates. As illustrated by the examples provided in the
question (e.g., Patriot, SM-3 and THAAD), yes, the Department actively
seeks to control acquisition costs through the continued use of proven,
scalable technologies that are already in use by our forces and those
of our allies. However, to keep pace with evolving threats and
operational concepts, it is often necessary to develop new capabilities
to augment those already fielded.
The theater air and missile defense mission area is a good example
of this situation. In December 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive
approved the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) program
for entry into Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development. The
objective of the AIAMD program is to integrate sensors and weapons
(Patriot, SLAMRAAM, Improved Sentinel, and JLENS) and develop a common
battle command across a single, integrated fire control network to
engage the range of Air and Missile Defense (AMD) threats.
To minimize costly new sensor and weapon development, leverage
proven systems, and minimize the number of redundant battle command
systems, existing Army AMD sensor and weapon platforms will be enhanced
with a ``plug and fight'' interface module, which supplies distributed
battle management functionality to enable network-centric operations
for advanced AMD capabilities such as extended sensor coverage and
better intercept capabilities.
I believe this U.S. capability as it matures could be beneficial to
our coalition air and missile defense partners. As such, both as part
of our ongoing MEADS program and separately with other partners, the
Department has opened discussions on how best to achieve a truly
integrated coalition air and missile defense capability, with the AIAMD
Battle Command System capability as the centerpiece. Components from
Patriot, as well as the more capable, more easily sustained, and more
mobile radars and launchers being developed in MEADS, when ready, could
be integrated in the AMD System-of-Systems. Not only will this allow
the U.S. and our partners to save cost in the long term, but it could
ultimately serve as an AMD force multiplier for coalition forces.
Ms. Tsongas. The MEADS program was initiated to provide replacement
for the Patriot Air and Missile System in the U.S. Army, as well as
Patriot, Nike Hercules and Hawk in Germany and Italy. However, the
MEADS development program has not delivered on promised timely and
cost-effective fielding of new air and missile defense capabilities.
Since the program's initiation, the time to field the First Unit
Equipped (FUE) has repeatedly been revised resulting in increased costs
and delays to fielding warfighter capability as follows: in 1996, the
expected RDTE cost was $2B to $3B, with a planned FUE in 2008; in 2002,
the expected RDTE cost was $7B to $9B, with a planned FUE in 2012; in
2008, the expected RDTE cost was $10B, with a planned FUE in 2015; and
in 2008, the GAO reported that the FUE date will slip an additional two
years, to 2017.
In addition, recent GAO reports (GAO-08-467SP & GAO-09-326SP
Assessments of Major Weapon Programs) found that only two of six
critical MEADS technologies were maturing at an adequate pace to meet
program schedule. In order to continue to fight the wars we are in, and
support our troops for the scenarios we will face in the future, we
must make difficult budgetary decisions which sometimes involve the
termination or restructuring of programs which, despite original
intent, are no longer performing, or are now unnecessary. Currently the
Department of Defense has programs that are over-budget and behind
schedule (e.g. JSF, MEADS).
Has the DoD performed a thorough analysis of its program suite,
evaluating performance, requirements and relevance of these programs?
And is it not possible to harvest some cost savings from these programs
in order to pay for other higher priority, near term costs including
ongoing costs in Iraq and Afghanistan, needed increases in shipbuilding
to cover European missile defense, etc?
Secretary Gates. MEADS experienced schedule delays and cost growth
that emerged prior to the program Preliminary Design Review in 2007.
The MEADS partner nations conducted an independent program review,
which documented several technical and management issues that led to
the delays and cost growth. Many of the recommendations of the review,
including restructuring the program and extending the Design and
Development (D&D) phase have either been implemented or are being
considered by the nations.
The MEADS independent review team estimated that the planned 110-
month MEADS D&D program (which began in September 2004) would require
an additional 24 months and increased costs on the order of $1 billion
to complete the design and initial testing.
In response, the MEADS partner nations agreed to pursue a re-
planned MEADS D&D program that extends the 110-month program, reduces
the program risk, and provides additional time to ensure the maturity
of the MEADS design. The Department is conducting a full assessment of
the MEADS program to support the MEADS System Decision Review. This
review includes an assessment of the ongoing MEADS Critical Design
Review (CDR), an evaluation of the costs, and an evaluation of the
status of negations with the MEADS partners on program restructure.
These elements are described below.
The DoD is conducting an assessment of the CDR to determine the
technical maturity and expected performance of the system. The U.S.
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is conducting an
independent cost estimate (ICE) of the re-planned MEADS program to re-
validate the total cost of the program to inform the restructure
effort. This cost estimate is expected by July 2010. The U.S. is also
in negotiations with the partner nations on a U.S.-proposed restructure
of the tri-national governance and technical scope of the existing
program, including seeking partner approval to modify the MEADS program
of record to integrate the Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)
functionality to enhance MEADS BMC4I capabilities. Incorporating IBCS
into the MEADS concept is a necessary change for the program to meet
U.S. air and missile defense requirements and Army operational
concepts, keep pace with emerging threat capabilities, and enhance
coalition operations. DoD is conducting a thorough review of the
current MEADS threat assessments and requirements.
While it is always possible to divert funding from one priority to
another, I must balance the overall program portfolio to meet the range
of valid capability needs. I also place a priority on honoring our
commitments to our cooperative program partners. I believe MEADS is
critical, and the DoD is on a path to ensure the program is affordable
and capable for all MEADS partner nations. In order for me to make
informed decisions, the ongoing assessments and ICE must be completed.
Ms. Tsongas. The 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act was put
in place to provide accountability and ``directly impact the operation
of the Defense Acquisition System and the duties of key officials who
support it'' (DTM 09-027, Implementation of the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009). After thirteen years of development,
the Army's Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program is nine
years behind schedule, and several billions of dollars over-budget.
This program is a prime example of the problems in managing a large,
complex program with technical risk, and the impetus for the 2009
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act.
What does the Department plan to do about this program given the
continuously extending schedule and predictions of yet further cost
overruns topping a billion dollars? Given the changing missile defense
environment, has the Department completed a thorough review of air and
missile defense requirements and validated the requirements attributed
to this program?
Secretary Gates. MEADS experienced schedule delays and cost growth
that emerged prior to the program Preliminary Design Review in 2007.
The MEADS partner nations conducted an independent program review,
which documented several technical and management issues that led to
the delays and cost growth. Many of the recommendations of the review,
including restructuring the program and extending the Design and
Development (D&D) phase have either been implemented or are being
considered by the nations.
The MEADS independent review team estimated that the planned 110-
month MEADS D&D program (which began in September 2004) would require
an additional 24 months and increased costs on the order of $1 billion
to complete the design and initial testing.
In response, the MEADS partner nations agreed to pursue a re-
planned MEADS D&D program that extends the 110-month program, reduces
the program risk, and provides additional time to ensure the maturity
of the MEADS design. The Department is conducting a full assessment of
the MEADS program to support the MEADS System Decision Review. This
review includes an assessment of the ongoing MEADS Critical Design
Review (CDR), an evaluation of the costs, and an evaluation of the
status of negations with the MEADS partners on program restructure.
These elements are described below.
The DoD is conducting an assessment of the CDR to determine the
technical maturity and expected performance of the system. The U.S.
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is conducting an
independent cost estimate (ICE) of the re-planned MEADS program to re-
validate the total cost of the program to inform the restructure
effort. This cost estimate is expected by July 2010. The U.S. is also
in negotiations with the partner nations on a U.S.-proposed restructure
of the tri-national governance and technical scope of the existing
program, including seeking partner approval to modify the MEADS program
of record to integrate the Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)
functionality to enhance MEADS BMC4I capabilities. Incorporating IBCS
into the MEADS concept is a necessary change for the program to meet
U.S. air and missile defense requirements and Army operational
concepts, keep pace with emerging threat capabilities, and enhance
coalition operations. DoD is conducting a thorough review of the
current MEADS threat assessments and requirements.
While it is always possible to divert funding from one priority to
another, I must balance the overall program portfolio to meet the range
of valid capability needs. I also place a priority on honoring our
commitments to our cooperative program partners. I believe MEADS is
critical, and the DoD is on a path to ensure the program is affordable
and capable for all MEADS partner nations. In order for me to make
informed decisions, the ongoing assessments and ICE must be completed.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. PINGREE
Ms. Pingree. Admiral Mullen, when the Department of Defense
announced its strategy to repeal the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, you
stated that, while the Department conducts a yearlong study, it would
make an effort to use existing authority to prevent or delay the
dismissal of openly gay service members. While this yearlong study is
being conducted, do you believe that the Department can prevent the
dismissal of any and all service members who are found to be gay or
lesbian? What criteria will be used to evaluate whether or not an
openly gay or lesbian service member will be dismissed from active duty
service while the Department studies the best way to implement repeal?
Admiral Mullen. In my testimony, I did not address the issue of
pending or future discharges, nor did I state that the Department would
prevent or delay discharges of openly gay service members. The law
requires separation for homosexual conduct, and we must follow the law.
Only the Congress can change the law.
On February 2nd, the Secretary of Defense announced that he had
directed the Department of Defense to quickly review the regulations
used to implement 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 and within 45 days present
recommended changes to those regulations that would, within the
confines of the existing law, enforce the law in a fairer and more
appropriate manner. This review has been completed. The Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Military Services and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has approved revisions to these regulations. The
changes were announced on March 25th, and are now in effect.
The modifications, among other things, raise the level of the
commander authorized to initiate inquiries and separation proceedings
regarding homosexual conduct; revise what constitutes ``credible
information'' and ``reliable persons''; and specify certain categories
of information that cannot be used for purposes of homosexual conduct
discharges.
The Service Chiefs and I support these changes.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Mr. Kissell. During the hearing, and throughout the budget and the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), I applaud your continued commitment
to the health and welfare of our wounded warriors. Today's medical
advancements allow men and women that suffer horrific casualties to
live and to have a functional quality of life. In previous conflicts
many of our service members that survived today would have died. You
have adopted a very aggressive approach to post-traumatic stress and
traumatic brain injury. This aggressive attack only benefits those that
are dutifully serving our nation. Their sacrifices are being honored by
your attention to their needs. However, I recently saw a piece on CBS's
60 Minutes about the Armed Forces Institute on Regenerative Medicine
(AFIRM) and had an opportunity to meet with one of the civilian doctors
conducting research for AFIRM. The advancements being made are
absolutely astounding and in some ways it seems like science fiction.
The 60 Minutes piece chronicled a young Marine whose hand was blown off
in an explosion. The doctors completed a hand transplant and now the
Marine, who at one time would have had to settle for a prosthetic hand
and a limited life, is training to be an electrician. AFIRM also
addresses the dated medical response to burn victims. Doctors are using
burn treatment techniques developed 30 years ago to treat burn victims
from Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has developed a number of
innovative ways to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), mild
TBI, and other wounds, but burn treatment lags behind a considerable
amount. AFIRM's research uncovered innovative ways to bridge the gap
and improve the lives of our wounded warriors suffering from burn
injuries. Although, AFIRM is a DoD program designed to develop
treatment techniques far beyond comprehension some five or ten years
ago, no funding is allocated for clinical trials next year. In fact,
for the remainder of this year, AFIRM can only conduct two more
clinical trials and next year zero clinical trials. After meeting with
one of the physicians in AFIRM, he provided me a list of 13 clinical
trials pending without funding and 21 additional projects ready for
clinical trials. The 21 projects have no funding and are within two
years of readiness. These are unfunded opportunities. I think this will
be a huge help to our wounded warriors, but am unsure why the budget
does not request funds to push the research to trials and out to the
field where it is needed. Please provide an answer as to the future of
AFIRM, funding for the research ready to progress to clinical trials,
and the number of wounded warriors helped by the tremendous efforts of
military and civilian physicians in AFIRM. I would also like to meet
with the Program Director for AFIRM to discuss other developments and
the best way to expedite implementing the techniques.
Secretary Gates. The AFIRM Science and Technology Program is funded
through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among the United States
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), Office of Naval
Research, USAF Surgeon General, Department of Veterans Affairs, and
National Institutes of Health. USAMRMC directs the AFIRM Program. Per
the MOU, funding is agreed among the parties. We anticipate renewal of
the MOU to continue AFIRM beyond 2013, pending agreement by all
parties.
The initial objectives (i.e., covering 2008-2013) for clinical
trials in the AFIRM Program included two hand transplants and one
facial tissue transplant, all included advanced immunosuppressive anti-
rejection therapies. In addition, the Program anticipated funding up to
two clinical trials after investigations in animal models revealed the
highest payoff candidates for clinical demonstration. These animal
model investigations have been much more successful than anticipated,
and the number of AFIRM technologies ready for clinical trials has been
and is expected to be much greater than our original plan projected.
Since unexpected funding for clinical development of additional
AFIRM technologies was required during budget execution years, the
following sources were leveraged: In calendar year 2009, AFIRM clinical
trials were funded with the Defense Health Program (DHP) medical
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds from the
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Overseas Contingency Operations appropriation
($10 million). The $10 million funded six clinical trials of which five
will be partially conducted at the Army's Institute of Surgical
Research, mostly on military patients. This year (FY 2010), RDT&E
funding for trials ($5.8 million) was funded by appropriated funds that
were requested as part of the Department's request for enhancement of
battlefield injuries research. We will be able to fund three clinical
trials with these funds. Finally, for FY 2010 and FY 2011, the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), through the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering's Office of Technology
Transition, funded $17.4 million in clinical trials associated with
AFIRM objectives.
Currently, $2.4 million is programmed under the DHP RDT&E for
regenerative medicine clinical trials in FY 2011. The USAMRMC is
presently preparing its DHP FY 2012-2017 program review that will
identify requirements for funding up to 48 additional trials and
advanced development studies, based on AFIRM progress to date and
reasonable technical success going forward. AFIRM's strategy is to
conduct as many patient trials as possible at DoD medical facilities.
Although the actual number of warfighters being helped with AFIRM
technologies to date is small and limited to ongoing, early clinical
trials to substantiate safety and efficacy, the potential to help much
larger numbers exists. Particularly for wounded warriors, regenerative
medicine will likely have its greatest impact treating traumatic
injuries of the extremities, injuries of the head and neck, and serious
burns. Of the approximately 17,000 battle-injured warfighters medically
evacuated from the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters, such injuries
account for more than 75%. Orthopedic injuries alone account for over
60% of all ``unfit for duty'' Medical Board determinations resulting in
loss from the Services. Serious burns account for approximately 5% of
all evacuations and 77% of those patients experience burns to the face.
Regenerative medicine has the potential to help many of these patients
during their definitive care and/or rehabilitation once these
technologies are proven safe and effective.
Colonel Bob Vandre, the AFIRM Program Director, will make an
appointment to meet with Representative Kissell to discuss other
developments and the best way to expedite implementing the techniques.
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