[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-140]
FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS FOR OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 17, 2010
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-835 WASHINGTON : 2010
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SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Elizabeth Drummond, Staff Assistant
------
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JEFF MILLER, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts JOE WILSON, South Carolina
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland ROB BISHOP, Utah
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Jesse D. Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010, Force Protection Equipment Programs
for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan......................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010........................................ 39
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010
FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS FOR OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee......... 3
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking
Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee....................... 3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Air
and Land Forces Subcommittee................................... 4
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 1
WITNESSES
Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M., USMC, Commander, Marine Corps
Systems Command................................................ 6
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 7
Oates, Lt. Gen. Michael L., USA, Director, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).................. 4
Spoehr, Maj. Gen. Thomas W., USA, Director, Force Development,
U.S. Army; and Brig. Gen. Peter N. Fuller, USA, Program
Executive Officer, Soldier, Commanding General, Soldier Systems
Center, U.S. Army.............................................. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M................................. 66
D'Agostino, Davi M........................................... 84
Oates, Lt. Gen. Michael L.................................... 47
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 43
Spoehr, Maj. Gen. Thomas W., joint with Brig. Gen. Peter N.
Fuller..................................................... 53
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS FOR OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
Subcommittee meeting jointly with Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Wednesday,
March 17, 2010.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:29 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Gene Taylor
(chairman of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today, the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee
joins the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee in open session to
receive testimony on force protection equipment for Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with particular
focus on armored vehicles, personnel body armor and counter-IED
[improvised explosive device] initiatives.
We welcome our witnesses for today.
Representing the Army to discuss Army force protection
systems are Major General Thomas Spoehr, director of force
development, Army G-8; and Brigadier General Peter Fuller,
program executive officer, soldier and commanding general,
Soldier Systems Center.
Representing the Marine Corps to discuss Marine Corps force
protection and the MRAP [mine resistant ambush protected] joint
vehicle program is Brigadier General Michael Brogan, commander
of Marine Corps Systems Command, and the program executive
officer for the MRAP Joint Program Office.
Representing the Joint IED Defeat Organization is the new
director of JIEDDO [Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization], Lieutenant General Michael Oates.
Representing the Government Accountability Office [GAO] is
Ms. Davi D'Agostino, director, Defense Capabilities and
Management. Ms. D'Agostino appears to discuss the release of
the GAO's latest report on intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance issues, based on site visits to Iraq and
Afghanistan and prepared for the House Armed Services
Committee.
Today's joint hearing continues the committee's ongoing
oversight activities regarding the full spectrum of force
protection matters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our last formal
activity regarding force protection was a classified briefing
in December of 2009.
We meet today to receive updates on these critical, life-
saving programs and to provide an opportunity for the families
of our fighting men and women to hear what the Army, Marine
Corps and the DOD [Department of Defense] leadership are doing
to protect their loved ones against the threats that their
soldiers and Marines face abroad.
Today's hearing is expected to cover and provide updates on
a wide rate of programs to include: the mine-resistant family
of vehicles, to include the lighter and smaller MRAP all-
terrain vehicle; individual protective equipment, such as
lighter-weight body armor; the Army's new battle dress uniform;
equipment used to detect snipers; counter radio controlled IED
electronic warfare jammers; the continued challenge of getting
adequate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets;
and improvements in weapons and tactics for our operational
forces.
At this time last year, the MRAP all-terrain vehicle was
still under source selection. No vehicles had been produced
beyond small numbers of test assets, and no vehicles had been
fielded to Afghanistan. In just one year, over 4,700 MATVs
[MRAP all-terrain vehicles] have been produced, over 1,400 have
been delivered to Afghanistan, and over 900 have been fielded
to operational units. Their current producer is averaging 1,000
vehicles per month.
I want to publicly thank General Brogan and his entire team
for the service they have provided to our nation in
spearheading the MRAP and MATV effort. And as I have publicly
mentioned before, I do not think there has ever been an
acquisition program in the history of our nation that has
fielded as fast and with such immediate and dramatic results.
Your team's efforts have saved lives, General, and I want
to thank you on behalf of the American people. There are young
people alive today, because of what you have done, what you and
your team have done.
There are still major challenges ahead for us with respect
to long-term sustainment of these vehicles, both in the field,
here and overseas, as well as improving these vehicles through
capability insertions.
I am aware the MRAP Joint Program Office is currently
pursuing several capability insertions and vehicle
modifications to include installing independent suspensions on
legacy vehicles, heavier and more capable door hinges on the
MATVs. And I expect to receive updates on these today.
A critical component to force protection is adequate
training. That means having the ability to realistically train
on the equipment the warfighter will actually use in combat
ranging from individual equipment to jammers and armored
vehicles.
For example, more than half of the accidents involving
MRAPs since November 2007 have been rollovers. I realize that
some of these rollovers were attributed to poor roads and
infrastructure, but I do believe some of the rollovers might
have been prevented through better training.
General Brogan, you stated in formal response to these
subcommittees that--I am quoting--``the better trained the
driver; the less likely they are to conduct a maneuver that
will hazard the vehicle.''
I understand that one of the lessons learned from the
original, legacy MRAP program was to concurrently field
vehicles to address both operational and training requirements,
and that we are applying that lesson in the MATV program.
I am still concerned over the limited number of legacy MRAP
vehicles available to the Army for training, and hope to gain a
better understanding of the Army's plan for addressing these
vehicle shortfalls.
Clearly, the MATV is a good news story and demonstrates
that we are capable of applying lessons learned. However, we
cannot become complacent.
In the last year, Afghanistan has experienced a near
doubling of IED events, and U.S. casualties have continued to
increase.
General Oates, in your testimony you state--and I am
quoting--``over the past three years in Afghanistan, casualty
rates of our warfighters have increased by roughly 50
percent.''
This concerns me, and I look forward to hearing from you on
how your organization is addressing this trend.
Before going to the witnesses' opening remarks, I would
like to recognize my friend--okay, well, I will not be
recognizing my friend from Washington state, Congressman Smith.
I will, however, recognize my ranking member and my friend from
Missouri, Mr. Akin, for any comments he may make.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would also thank
you for scheduling this important hearing today. Because you
have hit a lot of the highlights, I am going to be brief.
I would also like to thank our GAO and Army witnesses for
being here today.
And, of course, General Brogan, you are not a stranger to
this committee, and we are delighted to have you back. Thank
you for being here.
And also, General Oates, I believe this is your first time
testifying in front of this committee. Welcome. This is an
important subject. The testimony you are about to provide will
assist us in determining how best to proceed with providing the
necessary congressional oversight of these programs.
Again, I want to thank all of you for your service to our
country, and thank you for being here.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Akin.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Air and
Land Forces Subcommittee, the Honorable Roscoe Bartlett.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I will be very brief, so we can
get to the testimony and questions. Thank you very much for
your service to your country. Thank you for being here today. I
look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
The Chair now recognizes the new chairman of the Air and
Land Forces Subcommittee, the Honorable Adam Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for running
a little bit behind schedule.
Welcome to you all.
If there is no objection, I would ask that my full
statement be included in the record, and then I will follow Mr.
Bartlett's lead. And I look forward to your testimony, and will
ask questions at the appropriate time. And I appreciate the
very important issues that we are here to discuss today, and
the work that you all are doing on them.
And with that, I will yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Without objection, all the witnesses' prepared testimony
will be included in the record.
General Oates, thank you for your service and taking the
time to be with us today. Please proceed with your remarks.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MICHAEL L. OATES, USA, DIRECTOR, JOINT
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)
General Oates. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today and testify.
The IED remains the single greatest threat to life and limb
of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include the civilian
employees that are present. And so, the protection of those
forces is a priority for the organization I know lead, the
Joint IED Defeat Organization.
I have provided a written statement, sir, and I will stand
by. I am anxious to answer your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Oates can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. THOMAS W. SPOEHR, USA, DIRECTOR, FORCE
DEVELOPMENT, U.S. ARMY; AND BRIG. GEN. PETER N. FULLER, USA,
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SOLDIER, COMMANDING GENERAL, SOLDIER
SYSTEMS CENTER, U.S. ARMY
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. THOMAS W. SPOEHR
General Spoehr. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Akin, Ranking Member Bartlett, and other distinguished
members of the committee, on behalf of the Army, Brigadier
General Peter Fuller and I are honored to be here today to
provide updates on Army force protection efforts.
Let me preface my remarks by thanking the members of both
committees for their leadership and continued support of the
Army. We share a common purpose and commitment to develop in
field the best equipment available to our soldiers, Army
civilians and contractors serving in Operation Enduring Freedom
and Iraqi Freedom.
The brave men and women serving today represent the best of
our society, and they continue to perform magnificently against
a determined enemy in a complex and dangerous operational
environment.
After more than 8 years of continuous combat, we recognize
the importance of keeping our deployed forces at the highest
level of readiness and providing them the best capabilities
available. Protection of our soldiers and critical warfighting
assets remains the Army's highest priority.
In response to the continued threat of improvised explosive
devices, suicide bombers, other non-traditional threats, as
well as the more conventional threats, such as small arms fire,
the Army has pursued numerous initiatives to enhance the
mobility, lethality and survivability of our soldiers and the
formations in which they serve.
These initiatives are captured in complementary and
reinforcing layers of protection, which include continuous
improvements to individual soldier protection, new and enhanced
armored and wheel-tracked vehicles, new active and passive
based defense capabilities, improved battlefield situational
awareness with better intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance platforms, as well as advances in biometrics and
robotics.
In addition, the Army has taken steps to lighten the
soldier's load by fielding freight carriers, light-weight
machine guns and tripods.
While we have made significant improvements in our force
protection posture, we know we must continue to provide
improved solutions for two significant reasons.
First, technology is always changing. Advancements are
always being made. And we owe it to our soldiers to continue to
invest in promising technologies that will give them a decisive
edge in combat.
Second, the weapons, tactics and motivation of our
adversaries continues to adapt, and we must be more versatile,
adaptable and unpredictable than the enemies we face.
Therefore, the Army's ongoing commitment to provide our
soldiers with the best equipment in the world is just that--
ongoing.
We are always mindful that the soldiers in the field are
the ones that bear the burden of battle. The Army remains fully
committed to provide unwavering support for our soldiers, by
giving them the best protective equipment and capabilities
available to successfully confront current and emerging
threats.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify before
your subcommittees today on this important issue. Thank you for
your steadfast support of the American soldier. General Fuller
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of General Spoehr and General
Fuller can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Brigadier General Fuller.
General Fuller. Thank you, sir. I have no prepared remarks.
I am prepared to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Taylor. I hope you guys do not think you are getting
off this light. [Laughter.]
The Chair now recognizes a true American--you are all true
American heroes--but another true American hero, Brigadier
General Brogan.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL M. BROGAN, USMC, COMMANDER,
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND
General Brogan. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Members Akin and Bartlett, distinguished members of the
subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to be with you
this afternoon, and to answer questions concerning Marine Corps
force protection programs and the Joint Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle program.
I appreciate, sir, that you are going to enter the written
statement for the record.
Your support these last many years in providing necessary
funding to equip our Marines and the joint force to meet the
challenges of irregular warfare has been tremendous.
We work together on a daily basis with our counterparts in
JIEDDO and the various program executives offices in the Army
to field just this type of equipment.
Throughout this conflict, we have fielded numerous
generations of gear, and have had the opportunity to
iteratively improve it. That goes for individual body armor
plates, from the small arms protective insert, to the enhanced
small arms protective insert and the side SAPI plate; in flame-
resistant gear, from Nomex suits normally worn by combat
vehicle crewmen, to now having fire-retardant uniforms that
include antimicrobial, antibacterial, anti-vector properties.
I very much appreciate your kind remarks regarding the MRAP
program. As Paul Mann, the program manager, frequently states,
it is a team sport.
The leadership of the Congress in providing funding, and to
the support of the Secretary of Defense, the services, the
defense agencies and our industrial partners at all levels--
prime, sub, vendor and suppliers--has made that program
possible.
Because of that, we have been able to rapidly field these
vehicles and have a marked impact on the survivability of our
joint warfighters.
I would only ask that we recognize this is an open hearing.
And though the topic is very important, some of the matters in
force protection would go into classified areas. We do not want
to broach that. We also, sir, would not like to discuss
specific capabilities or limitations of the equipment in an
open session.
This nation has fielded the best-equipped, best-protected
force in its history, largely due to the support of the
Congress.
And finally, sir, on a personal note, this is likely my
last appearance in front of these committees as the commander
of Marine Corps Systems Command. I very much appreciate the
access that you have provided me and the patience you have
afforded me, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Brogan can be found in
the Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Davi D'Agostino. I hope that
is correct.
STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. D'Agostino. You did a great job. Thank you.
Chairman Taylor, Chairman Smith, members of the
subcommittees, thank you for having me here today to discuss
GAO's January 2010 report on DOD's intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance, or ISR, processing, exploitation and
dissemination or sharing capabilities.
There has been a dramatic increase, as you know, in demand
for ISR systems to collect intelligence in Iraq and
Afghanistan, to a point where DOD now has more than 6,800
unmanned aircraft systems alone.
ISR is also seen as the first line of defense for U.S. and
allied forces against insurgent attacks and roadside bombs. But
to be useful to the warfighter, after intelligence is
collected, it must be analyzed and shared with all those who
need it in a timely manner.
The presentation board beside me shows the intelligence
data processing cycle. And you should have a sheet in your
briefing book that shows that, too, up close.
This processing cycle is commonly described in five
interconnected phases. At the front end you have, first,
planning and direction, and second, collection. At the back end
you have, third, processing and exploitation; fourth,
dissemination; and fifth, evaluation and feedback.
My testimony today focuses on phases three and four of the
cycle, or the back end of the cycle, that transforms the
collected data into useable intelligence for the force.
Today I will discuss, first, the challenges DOD faces in
processing, exploiting and disseminating the information
collected by ISR systems, and the extent to which DOD has
developed the capabilities needed to share the information. We
have reported on DOD's challenges with ISR integration,
requirements and tasking of collection assets.
For this report, we spent 16 months obtaining and analyzing
documentation from the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, all four military services, the ISR Task Force,
Joint Forces Command, Central Command, the National Security
Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We also
traveled to several locations in Iraq and the United States to
observe the processing of ISR data firsthand.
We found that the military services and defense agencies
face longstanding challenges with processing, exploiting and
disseminating the ISR data they collect.
First, the dramatic increase in collection has not been
accompanied by an increase in processing capabilities, and
these capabilities are now overwhelmed. As General Deptula, the
Air Force's ISR chief, recently stated, in the not too distant
future, the department will be swimming in sensors, and it
needs to ensure that we do not end up drowning in data.
Second, transmitting ISR data requires high-capacity
bandwidth for communications, which can be extremely limited in
theater.
Third, analyst shortages, including linguists, hamper DOD's
ability to exploit all the ISR information being collected. For
example, Central Command officials told us they exploit less
than one-half of the signals intercepts collected from the
Predator.
DOD has begun some initiatives to try to deal with these
issues, but it is too soon to tell whether or not the efforts
will result in measurable improvements.
DOD is also trying to improve the sharing of intelligence
information through a family of interoperable systems called
the Distributed Common Ground Surface System, or DCGS. DOD has
directed the services to transition to DCGS, but each service
is at a different stage in doing so.
Further, to facilitate the sharing of ISR data on this
system, DOD developed common information standards and
protocols. A key problem for all of this is that the legacy ISR
systems, the older systems, do not automatically tag data for
sharing with certain key information, like location and time.
And the services are also not prioritizing the data that should
be tagged.
The services have expressed concern to us that DOD has not
developed overarching guidance or a concept of operation that
provides them needed direction and priorities for sharing
intelligence information. As a result, we recommended in our
report that DOD develop such guidance, and that the services
then develop plans with timelines, and prioritize and identify
the types of ISR data they will share consistent with the
overarching guidance. DOD agreed with our recommendations.
And while my testimony has been focused on the back end of
the intelligence cycle, our prior work for this committee has
shown that there are also problems on the front end. In
theater, collection taskings are fragmented, and visibility
into how ISR systems are being used, both within and across
domains, is lacking. And all of these challenges combine to
increase the risk that the operational commanders on the ground
may not be receiving mission-critical ISR information, which
can also create the perception that additional collection
assets are needed to fill gaps.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittees, this concludes
my oral summary. I would be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. D'Agostino can be found in
the Appendix on page 84.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Oates, I will start with you on the JIEDDO process.
When this originally came up, certainly, in our response to the
problems that we had in Iraq, it was, you know, multifaceted
and an evolving threat in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan, as
well. And JIEDDO was stood up to try to grab every corner of
that and do everything we could to respond to that threat. And
there are many, many different pieces of it.
There have been some concerns on behalf of the committee
and others about the way that money has come together, how well
organized and well structured JIEDDO is, because there is a
bunch of different ideas floating around out there. It is
everything from, you know, individual, certainly--you know,
body protection for our troops. It is the vehicles that they
are in, you know, a variety of different other countermeasures
that we have employed.
And I think there have been some concerns in terms of
keeping track of the money and whether or not it is being well
spent and well organized. I know you have made statements that
that is a priority of yours, to make sure that you get that
organized and structured.
I was wondering if you could just take a moment to sort of
walk us through how that has improved and, you know, improve
our confidence that the money and the resources are going to
their absolute best use in terms of defeating the threat.
General Oates. Thank you, Congressman. It is an interest of
mine in two areas. One is full accountability. I do know that
we are the stewards of the government's money, and I want to
make sure that that is not opaque to anyone, especially the
Congress.
The second is transparency with our other partners. That
would include the services, the other combatant commanders, as
well.
Let me first start at the process. There are a great number
of good ideas. Those are generally filtered by the combatant
commander, and, as you know, comes forward with a Joint Urgent
Operational Needs Statement [JUONS]. That is screened by the
combatant commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And not all
of those come to JIEDDO.
We are generally the first stop, if it is a largely IED-
related issue, or there is a requirement to respond very
quickly. So, in our budgeting, we actually set aside about 20
percent of our budget every year for that emerging enemy
technique or capability gap that appears that we did not
anticipate.
I receive my priorities from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Defense. And he has just shifted
mine recently, on becoming the director, to the Afghanistan
surge. And so, we have appropriately assigned our funding
towards meeting the capability gaps and JUONS that have come
out of Central Command.
Mr. Smith. How do you measure the effectiveness of what you
do? And it is hard, I know, because we are certainly not going
to stop the IED threat no matter how we do it. But how do you
measure whether or not a given idea and a given amount of money
spent on that idea actually worked or it did not?
General Oates. Sir, let me take that in just a second. I
want to conclude by reminding you that we do provide monthly
reports, if not more frequent, to the oversight committees to
ensure there is absolutely transparency on the spending of our
money. And I am very confident that we can account for it.
This is a very difficult challenge, establishing measures
of effectiveness against dollars spent in this particular
realm, so there are some objective tenets that we use. We
actually look at the total number of IEDs, those that are
effective, how many and what type of IEDs render a resultant
casualty or killed. And we can draw some analogies to money
that we put into force protection, how much more energy is
required by the enemy to inflict a casualty, for instance.
There are subjective tests, largely in the area of
training. And we rely on our troop commanders and their non-
commissioned officers, in particular, to inform us about what
training is required and what might be effective.
And most recently, in my short time as the director, I had
a chance to see some, what you would call good ideas,
developmental ideas in simulated air training, which we know
intuitively from having been in the fight now for a number of
years, will bring dividends, save our soldiers and deny the
enemy access to our soldiers.
But this is a major challenge, is trying to establish
concrete, objective measures of effectiveness against the money
that is spent, sir.
Mr. Smith. Have you found that the challenges are
significantly different in Afghanistan than in Iraq? Or is it
pretty much the same battle?
General Oates. Sir, the battle writ large against the IED
is fairly similar, but the methods employed and the type of IED
is very different, as is the terrain in Afghanistan. I would be
happy to elaborate if you would like me to.
Mr. Smith. You can, if you want. Actually, I would love it
if your staff could just give a statement on that. I have taken
up quite a bit of time. I do have a couple of other questions,
but I will wait until the next go-around, to give some of my
colleagues a chance.
But I would be interested if your staff could provide some
information on how they see the threat different and the
response different as it is shifting more to Afghanistan.
Obviously, it is still a problem in Iraq, but it is certainly a
growing threat in Afghanistan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
And just for everyone's information, I made the decision,
for Chairman Smith and the two ranking members, we will not
have a 5-minute rule. But I would remind you that we are
expected to have votes sometime around 3:15.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General Oates, my understanding is there were
some people that were critical about resources and what we were
doing with your organization. You had a chance, as I understand
it, to kind of read over that.
You have been a user of the services. Now you are charged
with trying to provide the same services you were using in the
past.
Are there some structural things that you have wanted to
change about how you approach the problem, or anything? Or is
it just kind of an ongoing management situation? Or what has
been your perspective moving from user to first in charge?
General Oates. Thank you, sir.
I have been a tactical customer of JIEDDO now for about 6
years. Over three tours in Iraq, I did not always know where
the capability and benefits were coming from. I have a clear
vision of that now.
And I would like to take this opportunity to thank the
Congress for what it has done for my soldiers, both in the
101st and the 10th Mountain Division.
Now, from my perspective as the director of JIEDDO, one of
my key concerns is ensuring that we provide a good response to
the Congress about these particular lines of operation, whether
they are adequately funded, whether we need to make any
changes.
And defeating the device, largely focused on some
technology developments and detect, attacking the network is an
area that really is difficult to establish measures of
effectiveness, going back to the chairman's question, and train
the force, which in my experience has been the greatest return
on investment, and an area where, as the chairman alluded
earlier with the MRAP, providing quality training for soldiers
in all three of those domains--defeating the device, attacking
the network and, in fact, training in this environment--will
return great dividends.
I am not prepared at this point to give you a very specific
answer on whether adjustments need to be made. We are
adequately funded at this point, sir. The funding has been
provided by the Congress that is allowing us to meet these very
urgent capability gap requirements that have come out of
Afghanistan. And we believe that we can handle them at this
point.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
And then, the second question over to the loop, or the
intelligence data processing cycle, and being able to process
all of the--we are picking up so many--our sensors are so good.
Have you seen an approach of what has to be done to process
the data? Or do you have any suggestions along that line? Or
what is our plan to be able to process as well as to collect?
Ms. D'Agostino. Yes, one of the challenges I think they
have had is the problem of tagging this data automatically. If
it is not automatically tagged, either on board the system or
at the ground stations, it has to be done somehow--maybe by
hand or by some kind of adaptor or with a computer.
So, it would take time away from the soldier's main
mission. So, it creates a difficult problem.
And if it is not tagged, then it is not discoverable by
other people. Even if it is put up onto a DSIG, it is not
discoverable without being tagged.
So, I think that is probably the most pivotal problem that
they face in being able to share----
Mr. Akin. I did not understand a word you just said--tagged
and discoverable. And those are not my normal vocabulary.
Ms. D'Agostino. Okay. It is like when you take a picture
with your digital camera, it has a date on it. And when you
load it onto your computer, you can find your digital photos by
date. If it does not have any tag on it, there is no way to
find it for you.
So, this is part of the problem with----
Mr. Akin. So, it is a classification, how to identify
information.
Ms. D'Agostino. Right. It is how to locate it. It is like
giving it a name. And without the names, there is no way for
somebody to discover it and then use it. So, that is----
Mr. Akin. So, how do we name it, then?
Ms. D'Agostino. Well, there are requirements that the data
be tagged. But the problem is, some of the older systems do not
have the capability to automatically do that. And therefore,
some unknown amount of the data that we are collecting right
now in theater cannot be shared in its form that it comes off
the platform.
Mr. Akin. I would think that you would want a date and a
location, would you not? Would those two be the main things
that you are looking for?
Ms. D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Akin. Because if somebody does an IED, you want to run
time backwards----
Ms. D'Agostino. And the time----
Mr. Akin [continuing]. Two days and see who has been there.
Ms. D'Agostino. There are these standards and protocols,
and also rules that have been made about the kind of tagged
data that you put on when you tag it. General Brogan is going,
``yes, yes.''
But it is important to get that onto the data, so that
other people can find it and use it, and benefit from it.
Mr. Akin. So, it is a classification kind of thing.
General Brogan, you want to comment?
General Brogan. It is not really a classification in the
sense of confidential, secret, top secret. It is more of
identification by date, time and location, sir.
Mr. Akin. And that allows you, then, if something occurs,
you can go back and take a look at what you might have seen?
License plates or----
General Brogan. Well, it makes it database searchable. And
so, particularly if you are looking at the same area in
multiple scans, you can look for differences. You know, were
there disturbances that were not there previously, to help
identify the locations of the IEDs, sir.
Mr. Akin. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
We would now recognize the ranking member of Air and Land,
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I have two questions. The first is for General Fuller and
General Brogan. The second is for General Fuller.
General Fuller and General Brogan, I continue to be very
concerned about the short-term and long-term effects on our
soldiers and Marines in regards to the total weight of the
individual equipment that they are carrying in Afghanistan. As
you know, in Vietnam the average weight was 30 to 40 pounds.
Today they are carrying 90 to 100 pounds, and sometimes even
more than that.
Obviously, body armor is a major part of that weight
increase. And I understand that we have modular and--designs
that can help with this issue. And certainly, every pound that
we can reduce this weight count.
But in the mid to long term, what are we doing to
incentivize industry to lower this weight?
For example, what would it take, assuming an ESAPI level of
protection to reduce the weight of body armor by, say, 50
percent in less than 5 years? Have we even asked industry
something along these lines?
And General Fuller, as you know, the Army and the
Department of Defense have recently started a new round of body
armor testing to help establish a standard testing protocol
with a specific focus on statistical analysis and statistical
confidence levels.
We briefly discussed this in my office a couple of weeks
ago. Can you explain this testing, give us an update on the
progress of the testing, and explain what you hope to achieve
with the results?
Thank you.
General Brogan. Sir, you are absolutely right. The weight
is significant. The long-term impact is currently unknown. We
have not seen a marked increase in injuries to our Marines
during training or during their combat operations, but we do
not know the long-term impact.
The answer to the question, we do communicate with industry
in a number of forums in all of my public comments. Every 2
years we hold an advanced planning brief for industry, where
all of those who do business with the United States Marine
Corps, and academia, as well as government labs are there. And
we lay out for them what our priorities are.
The commandant and the commanding general of the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command have all indicated that
reducing the weight is important.
I believe the most significant thing we need, though, sir,
is a materials breakthrough. We have nothing better than the
ceramic plates that we are currently using with the attendant
weight that goes with them. We need a materials science
advance.
And to that end, the commandant, in his guidance for the
planning of POM [Program Objective Memorandum] 2012 has
directed that our S&T funding be fenced. If we have bills to
pay corporately throughout the institution, we are not
permitted to reach into those science and technology accounts
to get the money. Much of that money is not run by my command;
it is handled by the Office of Naval Research, or the Naval
Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.
But that is an area where we could certainly use some help
from our industrial partners.
Mr. Bartlett. We were advocating, as you know, for a
specific line for R&D for this. We believe that the potential
for markedly reducing this weight is there, if industry is
sufficiently incentivized. We believe that including the
acquisition of this and the research on this, along with
underwear and uniforms and helmets, and so forth, is probably
not the best way to get the best technology out there.
General Fuller, my first question?
General Fuller. Yes, sir. As General Brogan said, weight is
a concern we have with our soldiers. And when we think about
our soldier, we try not to treat him like they are a Christmas
tree and we just hang things on them. Body armor is one of
those elements that we are putting on our soldiers, and we are
looking at how do we lighten that load.
We have lightened the load when we fielded them the new,
improved outer tactical vest. It was three pounds lighter. And
as General Brogan said, not only are we trying to lighten their
load, but we are redistributing how that weight was worn by the
soldier. So, now it is coming off all on their shoulders down
to their hips where you can distribute and carry that weight
better.
We have also looked at, on the soft body armor side, a new
plate carrier, which we are now fielding into Afghanistan.
Between a fold-up, improved outer tactical vest and our
plate carriers, an eight pound delta. That eight pounds is what
our soldiers are looking for.
In terms of the hard body armor that you were talking
about, as General Brogan said, you really need a new
technology. We are just tweaking the edges of that technology
right now to refine it, to try to lighten some of that weight.
But until we have that new breakthrough in science and
technology, I do not believe our R&D efforts, or even the
independent research and development efforts of our
contractors, is going to give us that breakthrough that we need
to get that lighter weight onto our soldiers. But we treat them
as a total system.
You heard General Spoehr talk about we are also providing
our soldiers with improved lethality. And that lethality is now
lighter. We are giving them a lighter machine gun, because you
want to give them the total package--their survivability
package, their lethality package and also their operating
environment.
When we talked, you asked the other question specific to
what we call our phase two testing.
Sir, as you are aware, Congress directed that we conduct
additional testing on our ESAPI, our enhanced small arms and
protective inserts, and our XSAPI, which is the next generation
of our protective inserts. We conducted that testing with GAO
oversight, and also DOT&E [Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense] oversight. And
when we completed that testing, we realized, we have been
working on--our testing protocol has been one of over-match.
We take our products and we test them through a round that
is heavier, harder and faster than any round found in the
battlefield. And we realized what we were doing is taking that
capability and giving it great capability, but we do not have
the statistical confidence that we have of the best body armor.
We know that it is the best, because of what we hear from our
soldiers and through the over-match testing.
So, we are transitioning our testing. We are transitioning
from over-matched to a statistical confidence basis.
And we are really pleased to report that we have conducted
one phase of that testing, where we have taken real plates from
our soldiers down-range, wearing them. We took them off--we
gave them other ones--but we took them off their backs, brought
them back, and we have shot at those plates with real threat
rounds at a high statistical confidence interval. And we have
outstanding performance with those plates.
We are taking another set of plates, doing the same thing.
And these are going to be brand-new coming off of production
line.
So, what we are doing is, I tell everybody we are stepping
up our game. We have always had quality product. But we are not
going from bad to good in any of this. We are going from good
to great.
And we want to ensure to the American public and to
Congress and anybody else, we have the best body armor. And now
we are doing it through a statistical method, so you can
demonstrate it with high confidence that it is quality product.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Chairman, I would just like the record to
show, and I would like our witnesses to confirm this. There
have been some questions about a specific protocol in the
testing procedures.
My understanding is that none of that has in any way
permitted any defective armor to get out to the troops, that
these were some protocol differences that did not in any way
impact the quality of the armor that our young men and women
wear.
The XSAPI is not yet fielded? Is that correct? It is there
to be used if needed?
General Fuller. Yes, sir. The XSAPI product is currently
listed as contingency stocks. It is available if the threat
materializes in the theater. And we are watching through
different intelligence sources very carefully if that threat
materializes in theater, and it has not.
It is a heavier plate. The reason we are not fielding it
now, the threat is not there, and we do not want the soldiers
to bear the weight of a heavier plate. It is approximately a
half-pound heavier for each plate to have them have that
capability, when the plates that we have right now are doing
the job, as you said.
We might have had some process issues. We never had any
challenge with our product. It is quality product.
Mr. Bartlett. Our fathers and mothers can be assured that
these differences in testing procedures in no way had any
impact on the quality of the protection that got out to the
field to our young men and women. That is a correct statement?
General Fuller. Yes, sir. That is an absolute correct
statement.
Mr. Bartlett. I just want to make sure the record shows
that, because I want to remove any concern that in any way, any
armor that was less than what we thought it was got out to our
young men and women.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the chairman of the
Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Ortiz, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for joining us today and for your
service.
I note that you were touching on the testing of the
technical vest. But we are buying from two different sources.
Am I correct?
General Fuller. In two different sources, you mean between
the Marine Corps and the Army, sir?
Mr. Ortiz. Correct.
General Fuller. We have the same product, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. It is the same product, but different----
General Fuller. Different colors, just as we have different
color of uniforms on today.
On the plates? Well, when we talk about body armor, sir,
there are two components. The soft body armor, the same
ballistic package is inside, different color, and how we might
attach them. On the hard plates, the Army procures the hard
body armor plates for all the services, so the Marines are
getting the exact same plates that the Army or the Air Force or
the Navy is getting.
We have currently, we have three vendors building the ESAPI
plates. And the Army is no longer in the procurement business
for plates. We have transitioned that for ESAPI plates over to
DLA, the Defense Logistics Agency. And they are procuring it
for a sustainment of all services.
Mr. Ortiz. And the prices are the same for different
services?
General Fuller. For the hard plates, yes, sir, because it
is off of our contract, and they just buy the same thing.
Mr. Ortiz. I spent some time lately, last year, visiting
with the troops who were getting ready to deploy. And one of
the things that the Army was very concerned with was the color
of the camouflage uniform that they wear. They would much
rather have like the Marines had.
Are you gentlemen sharing information with one another to
see what would be the best uniform for training? Not the
training, but the goal, they could move--are being shot at.
Now, have you decided on, the Army at least, on the
uniform? Are you going to continue to have the same camouflage
uniforms that you are utilizing today?
General Fuller. The first part I would like to answer on,
sir, is the Marines and the Army, General Brogan and myself
work very closely together. Our teams are working very closely
on sharing information as to what we are working on. Matter of
fact, the Marines were in our office yesterday looking at our
new capabilities and inquiring as to what we are doing and how
we are doing it.
We are doing the same thing with Special Operations
Command. So, the three commands that are operating and
generating new capability all the time, we are sharing all that
data.
Specific to the uniform, the Army has made a decision,
based on a new methodology that we have developed that we are
sharing with the Marines and the other services, that we
believe we need a different color uniform for Afghanistan
specifically. And we are in the process of generating that
uniform. We are calling it the MultiCam uniform.
And when you talk about our uniform, our Army combat
uniform, I consider it to be two parts. One is the chassis--how
it is designed, how we wear things such as the Velcro and
things like that--and the other is the color.
When we field this new uniform to our troops in
Afghanistan, not only are we going to change the chassis, we
get soldier feedback. We are constantly getting input from the
soldiers, understanding what are the challenges with our
uniform. So we are making some chassis changes, and we are
making a color change specific to Afghanistan. And that is
going to be the MultiCam uniform that will be fielded starting
in July, sir.
Now, we did consider, in that process, the Marine Corps
uniforms. And actually, we had 57 different uniform options
that we considered. And where we see the Army operating in
Afghanistan, we believe that this uniform would work the best
in all of the environments in Afghanistan.
Mr. Ortiz. How soon before you get them?
General Fuller. We will start seeing the first uniforms
available in the July time period, sir, and we will start
fielding them to the units deploying in August, with major
brigades going over in August.
And then we are working carefully with the theater to
provide that same capability to the soldiers that are in the
theater, but we are working through with the theater to ensure
we do not fill up their lines of communications with the
uniforms when they are also supporting a surge of troops. So,
we are working on this whole effort real time, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. One of the things that they were concerned with
was that the issues were not sufficient, because they wore out
quicker. And then, if they needed another set, they had to pay
for them.
Are you aware of that?
General Fuller. Sir, I am aware of that. As a matter of
fact, I received your letter concerning that.
Two items. One, the uniforms that we issue to our soldiers
that are used in a combat zone are fire-resistant uniforms.
They do not wear the same as our regular uniform that you would
see. They look exactly the same in terms of the chassis and the
color. They just are different material for fire resistance, so
they wear differently.
What we do is provide our soldiers with four of these
uniforms before they deployed. And as they wear out those
uniforms, they can go into the supply system and get reissued
uniforms in theater. So the soldier does not have to pay for
uniforms when they are in the theater, if they tear them, rip
them, or whatever they may do to them.
Mr. Ortiz. You have to hear this, because it was one of the
main concerns when I spent time with them in Italy.
Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Brogan. Sir, I would only add that, there are fire-
resistant uniforms, organizational equipment. It is issued to
the Marines in theater. And then, they wear it out over there,
they do not have to buy that uniform. They do not wear the
flame-resistant uniforms when they are back at home station in
garrison.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Hunter, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
The first thing, General Fuller, I just wanted to make you
aware of something in case you--do you know what the counter
bomber is, the ECM [Electronic Counter Measure] device called
counter bomber?
General Fuller. Not directly. No, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Low-level radar, has some video. The Marines
are using it right now. Air Force is using it over there. The
Army has 12 here in a warehouse that it has yet to deploy.
General Brogan, do you know what I am talking about here?
General Brogan. I am familiar with it, sir. And I will tell
you that it has met with mixed results from the user in
theater. They are dissatisfied with its performance--too many
false alarms. And so, we are not----
Mr. Hunter. Is it better than nothing? Or is----
General Brogan. It may or may not be.
Mr. Hunter. Okay.
General Brogan. Best handled probably offline, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Got it. Going with that, the only reason
I bring this up is not because it is a great device or a bad
one. It is that the Army has got 12 sitting back here.
So, they are in a warehouse, and it is kind of--this goes
along with other things, too, where there are situations where
we have stuff and we do not--the Army buys it. Different
services buy it. You know, it could be anybody. And then it
sits here as opposed to being deployed. There is no plan right
now from the Army where they want to put them, so they are just
sitting here.
This is one of those things that has been fast-tracked, has
been purchased, has been fast-track testing, and now it is just
sitting here in a warehouse. There are 12 of them.
Just so you know, they are here. There are 12 in the U.S.
in a warehouse that have not been deployed yet. And just to see
what, you know, if the Army is going to use them at all, or try
to use them, or try to upgrade them, or whatever. So, that is
the first thing.
Second, I want to get down to one more thing just to touch
base with you. As everybody looks at a new carbine to replace
the M-4 or replace the upper receiver, or do something with it,
if we need anything done with it, if at all, if it is down to
we do want to upgrade it.
Right now there are only three competitors in our small
arms industrial base that are listed that can be--that are
viable options to make the new carbine. There are three of
them. One makes the Ma Duce .50-cal machine guns, so they are
out. And then the other two left are the ones that make the M-4
now, and a foreign company, a Belgian company.
So, my question is, the Secretary of Defense has the
ability right now to waive this rule and bring other companies
in, like the three or four other American small arms
manufacturers that we have, into this competition. And my
question is, have you encouraged him to do so, or will you?
General Fuller. Sir, I understand what you are talking
about. When we look at both the improved carbine competition,
that it would be upcoming, and also improving our M-4 in a
parallel path. We are looking at ensuring we have a full and
open competition, meaning all vendors can come forward.
Recognizing that the current language would preclude
potential full and open, we are working through that process
right now. I cannot say that we have asked--we have not asked
the Secretary of Defense for a waiver at this time. But we are
considering that process and how we are going to do that.
Mr. Hunter. Great. Okay.
And my last question is for General Oates--something we do
not talk about too often. We will talk about IEDs and what is
going on with those.
I was able to talk with Dr. Ash Carter and General Paxton,
who lead up the IED Task Force. It is a party of two, and that
is good, I think, because they were talking about they were
able to get more MRAPs over there, to do some things to bring
people's different lanes together, and just get things going
over faster. And they have Secretary Gates' ear all the time.
I asked them something yesterday. They did not have an
answer. I asked General Petraeus this morning--did not have an
answer. And it is this. Do we own any road in Afghanistan?
Do we own it? Do we own 20 kilometers? Do we own five
kilometers? Can we say that we have persistent coverage of any
road at all, any certain amount where we have ISR, whether it
is manned or unmanned, watching that road?
General Oates. Sir, from this distance away from the
warfight, I would not hazard a guess whether we actually own
the road, any stretch of it 24 hours a day.
I do know that there is adequate ISR coverage and force to
dominate portions of the road when they operate on them. But I,
quite frankly, have not looked at how many kilometers that is.
My first visit to Afghanistan was a couple of weeks ago,
and I was struck by the difference in Afghanistan versus Iraq
in terms of how much unpaved road there is and the extreme
peril of operating, especially in the east and the north--
extreme fall-offs on either side and a twice as large country
from Iraq.
I think----
Mr. Hunter. But less road than Iraq, less ASRs [Alternate
Supply Routes], less MSRs [Major Supply Routes]. You only have
one quarter of the ring road from RC-South [Regional Command-
South] to Nangarhar you have got to cover.
General Oates. I would agree with you--obviously, less
paved road. But I could not give you an answer on how much we
actually control day to day, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from
Maryland, Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Massachusetts, excuse me.
Mr. Taylor. I am sorry, Massachusetts. My apologies.
Ms. Tsongas. I only say that, because I know General Fuller
is from Massachusetts, as well, and we are proud of it.
First, I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being
here. I appreciate all the time and effort you have not only
put into this hearing, but that you have put into providing our
service members with the best force protection equipment
available. Your efforts truly save lives, and I thank you for
that.
General Fuller, as I said, it is nice to see you again. I
want to commend you and all of our witnesses on the fine work
that has been done throughout the past 8 years to improve
soldiers' survivability on the battlefield due to improvements
in body armor.
The services have come a long way to ensure each and every
soldier, sailor, airman and Marine has the individual
protection equipment that they need.
But there is still far to go, and I still have some
concerns about how the Department of Defense is going to meet
the requirements of reduced weight, operationally tailored body
armor. My primary concern is in the fact that the Department of
Defense failed to establish separate procurement in RDT&E
[research, development, test and evaluation] budget line items
for body armor, as was mandated in last year's National Defense
Authorization Act.
And this failure leads to the perception, in spite of what
you all have been saying here today, that Department of
Defense, the Army and the Marine Corps are not committed to
body armor as an investment item. In fact, body armor
procurement has traditionally been funded through supplemental
and overseas contingency operations [OCO] funding, and this
year is no different.
The Army is requesting $327 million for body armor in OCO,
while there is no discernible amount requested in the base.
What is going to happen when there is no more OCO funding
and the services can longer count on the supplemental funds to
procure the central protective equipment?
The lack of commitment to move body armor procurement
funding into the base is compounded by the fact that the Army
reported in a hearing we held last week on acquisition and
modernization that its fiscal year 2011 base budget request for
modernization of body armor programs is zero dollars.
By requesting body armor funding solely in the overseas
contingency operations fund, and by putting practically no
dollars against research and development for body armor, my
concern is that services are setting themselves up for a future
situation where once again our soldiers are deployed for combat
operations with inadequate and outdated body armor.
So, now, here are my questions, and I am going to ask
several.
First, General Fuller and General Brogan, what is the long-
term investment strategy for providing Army procurement and
RDT&E? And I know, as we have heard today, the department is
creating one standard for body armor testing and evaluation,
and I appreciate your efforts. But what is the Army and the
Marine Corps and the other services doing to create the same
synergy of effort when it comes to procurement and research and
development of body armor?
If you could, please describe the process you use to
communicate body armor requirements and performance
specifications to industry.
General Fuller. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate your question.
As we have talked about before, it is a complex issue when
we talk about our soldier protection.
We are looking in the Army as to what should be in a
portfolio associated with our soldier protection. And when we
talk about that, we look at how do we protect the total soldier
from their head to toe. And we are looking at the bomb suits,
the concealable body armor, our hard and soft ballistic armor
that we were talking about previously, even our fire-resistant
uniforms and our ballistic underwear.
We are working with, in the Army and the department, to
address the language that was in the--address this year's
language identifying we needed to have a research and
development and a procurement line. And at this time, we do not
have it. I recognize that. We are trying to define what should
be in that line, what components, and then, how much should be
there.
In terms of why we are not looking at buying additional
product in the future, from a procurement perspective, our
requirements right now in the Army is approximately 966,000
improved outer tactical vests. And we are reaching the end of
that procurement. And in terms of our hard ESAPI plates, we
have procured over 2 million of the ESAPI plates, and we have
on contract 240,000 of our XSAPI that I talked about as
contingency stocks.
So, I believe our soldiers are covered. But I do recognize
we need to think, where are we going to go in the future when
we want to have a new capability, and how do we fund for that
when currently we are funding everything through OCO.
Ms. Tsongas. General Brogan.
General Brogan. Yes, ma'am. We actually communicate the
performance specifications to industry. We do that through
requests for information--can you provide this capability--
requests for quotations, which is how much would it be, what in
your production capacities, that sort of information.
And then, when there is an actual decision to buy, it is a
request for procurement. Tell us in a proposal how much it
would be, what your production capacity would be, the rates,
delivery schedules, and things like that. So, those are the
performance specifications.
With respect to purchasing, you are absolutely correct. We
have purchased a large amount of this equipment with the
overseas contingency operation funding, and the supplementals
prior to that.
As General Fuller has said, we now have in our possession
the required quantities. However, the soft body armor wears out
roughly every 3 years. It has not met the investment threshold
to be funded through a procurement line. We have funded that
through an operations and maintenance line.
And as I mentioned, we have iterated. We started the
conflict with the outer tactical vest. Based on feedback from
the user in theater, we went to the modular tactical vest,
which addressed a number of the deficiencies. And now, we have
designed in the U.S. government improved modular tactical vest.
And we have given that specification to industry to build to
print.
So, we own the technical data package for that, and
industry is making it to our specifications.
Aligned with that is the plate carrier, the smaller vest
that does not have the extra soft armor. That reduces the
weight being carried by the Marine in theater. We also own that
design. It is interoperable, so the accoutrements that go with
the improved module tactical vest can be moved back and forth
between the plate carrier and the IMTV.
I mentioned, to an earlier question, how we communicate
generally with industry, and that our 6-1s, 6-2, research and
development lines are handled by the Office of Naval Research
and by the Naval Research Laboratory.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The preponderance of our casualties are in Afghanistan now.
And I believe that the preponderance of those are due to IED
roadside bombs.
Recently in Afghanistan, it is my understanding that the
government there outlawed ammonium nitrate, and that ammonium
nitrate is a primary ingredient in Afghanistan for the making
of IEDs, unlike, I think, in Iraq, where it was old munitions,
mortar artillery rounds were a primary source for the IEDs
there.
What impact--and I understand that north of 90 percent of
the ammonium nitrate in Afghanistan was used for the making,
actually, of IEDs--what impact does this outlawing, or this ban
on ammonium nitrate in Afghanistan, if I am correct in that,
have in a reduction of IED capability?
General Oates. Sir, thanks. That is a great question.
As a point of clarification, ammonium nitrate actually has
some beneficial uses in Afghanistan and every other country for
road preparation and mining, to some degree. But President
Karzai did--at some insistence on our part--ban ammonium
nitrate.
I believe, and I think the command currently assesses, that
will have an impact, a favorable impact, on the availability of
this fertilizer to be used as an explosive device.
We also have a challenge with potassium chlorate, which is
used to make matches. It comes out of facilities in Pakistan,
as well, for perfectly legitimate reasons, but can be converted
to explosive capability.
So, the short answer to your question is, the enemy has
shown us in Iraq, and is showing us in Afghanistan, that they
are adaptive. Were we to go take away all the ammonium nitrate,
they would shift somewhere else.
And so, while it is a good step, and it will have good
benefits for protecting our soldiers, airmen, Marines, it is
not going to close out their options, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Have we seen any effect that can be traced
back to this decision at this time, in terms of any kind of
slow-down or reduction in IED-making capability?
General Oates. Sir, it is a little early. I do not want to
misspeak, but I think this ban has been in place for a little
bit over a month maybe.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
General Oates. And so, I think it is a little premature.
However, there are indications from our intelligence sources
that it will have an impact. How much so, we will have to
gauge.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Very well. Thank you.
In terms of individual force protection equipment, where
are we at in terms of the next generation of helmet?
General Brogan. The enhanced combat helmet that you
mentioned, sir, started as a joint effort between the United
States Army and the United States Marine Corps. They did the
first round of research and development, testing. There was
certainly potential in a new, composite material that we looked
at.
We took on, then, the next step of actually putting out the
request for proposals to industry and awarding a number of
development contracts for test items.
When we got those test items in and tested them, they did
not perform as we had hoped and anticipated. We provided the
results of those tests back to our industry partners, so that
they could make the modifications to their designs. And we
would expect to begin to start receiving the next set of test
items early this summer, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Very well.
Let us see. Could someone go over with me? I know that in
the ISR area that we have been flooded with data. And I think
that the primary problem seems to be it is too much information
coming in, and an inability to sort it in real time in order to
have an effect on the battlefield.
Can you tell me what improvements there are in terms of
managing the information coming in from various ISR platforms?
Ms. D'Agostino. I can speak to two initiatives that were
discussed with us during the course of our work for the Air and
Land Subcommittee. One is the National Security Agency, is
finding innovative ways to find more linguists to help in
translating and dealing with the signals intelligence data that
is being collected.
And again, you know, these are initiatives that we are
unable to measure how, you know, how much impact they have.
In addition, the Air Force has announced plans to add 2,500
analysts to their corps, to be able to process more, and
exploit and disseminate more of the data coming off the ISR
systems.
So, these are two that we mention in our report and that
were raised to us. So, people are trying to deal with it, as,
you know, breaking the back of the back end of the cycle with
all of this flooding of data.
But again, you know, it is too early to tell how effective
these efforts are going to be.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Smith [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen, and thank you for being
here today. And I would like to note that, while the apparent
position to me being near the end of the line and asking
questions, I do want to allocate--you know, note that I have a
whole row allocated to me here. [Laughter.]
So, do not let that kind of show you where I am in
importance.
Mr. Smith. The room is a little big. [Laughter.]
But we are very happy back in Rayburn when we get back
there.
Mr. Kissell. Yes, you kind of lose track of who is behind
you when you are down here.
Mr. Smith. I did not even see you down there for a couple
of minutes. [Laughter.]
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have a question. And it is kind of hard to--and
General Fuller, I think maybe this question would go to you.
This is a question I normally might run through channels. And I
am not advocating a particular vendor here.
But we had a--being that so much of our conversation has
been about body armor and about can we move ahead to a new
technology, a new generation--I had a gentleman come to my
office a while back that was on the cutting edge of science at
one end of an idea, and using some of the oldest technology
known to mankind at the other.
If what he said was true, it would seemingly be a huge step
forward in the possibility of reducing weight and increasing
the strength of protection to our people. And he has been
working with, you know, Department of Defense, and just
seemingly getting more and more frustrated as he went.
I am going to ask my military E.A. [Executive Assistant],
Captain Tim Meadows over here, to get with whoever you would
like for him to get with. I would like to have a report back
from you all. Is this a possibility? Is what he is talking
about realistic? Is it a step forward, a giant step forward as
he is talking about?
I am not pushing this vendor. I am just wanting some
feedback as to--because if it is, then let us pursue it. If it
is not, then I can just say, I am sorry, this is not what we
are looking for. But there are some things here that got me
somewhat curious about what he is offering.
And General Oates, in the scheme of--and Mr. Bartlett said
it today, that, you know, the proportion amount of money we
spend in fighting IEDs and protecting our soldiers versus the
cost of IEDs. And then also, we have got to keep doing that. We
have got to protect our soldiers.
But are we catching up, or are they getting further ahead?
General Oates. Sir, it is a great question. I actually
think Iraq might be informative here.
If we go back and look at what has transpired in Iraq and
the funding that has come forward to protect our soldiers, but
also allow us to understand the networks that were engaging us,
begin to attack them directly, understand the devices and
defeat a great number of them, the trend lines are fairly
clear. And we can get back to you on the record on the
specifics over the years.
But in aggregate, it took the enemy more IEDs to attack us
to achieve the same results. And those are all positive trend
lines, to now, where Iraq does not begin to resemble this year,
as it did the first time I was there in 2003, and several more
times after that.
I do believe that, if we look at the investment provided to
the services and to JIEDDO, that would directly translate to
protecting our soldiers and helping us attack the networks over
there, the results are clear. The difficulty is tying
individual dollars to, you know, what will 10 more dollars get
you in terms of effects against the IED. That one is very
tough.
And we are going to try and do better, to the chairman's
question, and try and play back what we believe the reasonable
measures of effectiveness are. But I think Iraq is informative
of great success we have had in this area.
Mr. Kissell. And I do not want to indicate at all that this
is a monetary issue. We have got to protect our soldiers. I am
just wondering, you know, are all the technological things we
are doing, all the efforts we are making, are they getting
further ahead, or are we catching up in terms of protecting our
soldiers?
And I do want to also follow up with what Congressman
Hunter said about sharing the technologies, and making sure
that if we have something sitting somewhere because somebody
has chosen not to use it at that point in time, that we are not
just ignoring the fact that somebody else might have need for
it, because there have been a couple of situations brought to
our attention that we followed up on that that happened. And we
want to make sure all our assets are being used.
And I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor [presiding]. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Wittman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, panel members, so much for joining us today.
I appreciate you taking times out of your busy schedule. And
thank you for your service to our nation.
General Spoehr, I wanted to ask, at last year's joint
forces protection hearing, I asked General Lennox about what
the Army was doing to upgrade our small arms capability,
specifically in the M-9 pistol and M-4 carbine. In regards to
the M-9, at that point I cited the findings of a 2006 Center
for Naval Analysis study of our soldiers and Marines in
Afghanistan--and also Iraq--who had engaged the enemy with
their weapons in combat.
And in that study, 48 percent of the respondents were
dissatisfied with the M-9 pistol, with 26 percent requesting a
larger caliber weapon, and 20 percent saying the M-9 should be
replaced.
I note that the fiscal year 2011 DOD budget includes new
start authority for a handgun to replace the M-9, and that the
requirement may already be JROC approved.
I was wondering if you could tell us what progress the Army
has made towards replacing the M-9 with a more powerful, modern
and feature-rich sidearm. And when can the committee expect an
RFP [request for proposal] for the new handgun? And what is the
Army's timeline for fielding the new weapon?
General Spoehr. Thank you, sir. As you say, there has been
a new Joint Requirements Oversight Council requirement for a
pistol approved. It was actually submitted by the Air Force,
who felt the need for a new pistol. So, that requirement was
approved.
We are still examining the requirements in the Army for a
new pistol. We are aware of the study you mentioned and the
soldiers' feedback on the pistol.
In light of their feedback, we have done a couple of key
improvements for the pistol. We have given them improved
magazine. And General Fuller's people are going to put new hand
grips, modular hand grips, to kind of accommodate the variety
of people's hand sizes for the pistol, because we think that is
a fair amount of the dissatisfaction with that weapon.
We are going to look at the Air Force's requirements
document. They have done a lot of work to get it to this point.
If we think, and if we believe that that requirement meets the
Army's requirement, I think you will--you know, we could
proceed with a program. But no decision has been made yet, sir.
Mr. Wittman. I know there has been some talk about the
caliber of the handgun and its stopping power, and people being
a little concerned about the small caliber that they currently
have. So, I am assuming that is going to be one of the array of
issues that you will address in looking at a replacement for
the M-9?
General Spoehr. Yes, sir. And as you are aware, stopping
power is caliber. But there is also a component of ammunition.
And you have probably heard in recent press reports about
something called ``green ammunition,'' which we are going to be
fielding soon for the M-4 carbine--much more stopping power,
much more, we believe, lethality.
We think that same technology has applicability over to the
M-9 pistol. So, as we get done probably with fielding green
ammo for the carbine, we are going to be looking at importing
some of that same technology over to the pistol, where it may
make up for any lethality gaps that they currently have.
Mr. Wittman. Do you believe some of the concerns with the
M-4 as far as its range or capability will be taken up with
this green ammunition? In other words, are the main objections
to the weapon basically its stopping power? Or are there other
aspects of the M-4 that are creating challenges for our men and
women in----
General Spoehr. Sir, most of the concerns we hear about the
M-4 have to do with its reliability and how many rounds between
stoppages--mean rounds between stoppages.
The carbine as it is now is demonstrating performance well
beyond its specifications. It was only required to do 600
rounds between stoppages, and it is demonstrating around 3,600.
We are looking at improving the carbine, giving it a
heavier barrel, some other improvements. There have been over
60 improvements made to the M-4 carbine. But we do not get a
lot of complaints, frankly, about the M-4 carbine. It has met
with fairly widespread success.
I would defer to General Fuller, if you have anything you
want to add.
General Fuller. Thank you, sir.
In light of your question, what would we think about when
we talk about our M-4 and other weapons is, it is a
combination. It is the weapon. It is the ammunition. It is the
optics. It is the training. And then, equally important, it is
how it interfaces with the soldier.
And as General Brogan and I work through not hanging things
onto soldiers, we need to ensure that what we do for body
armor, for example, does not adversely impact a soldier's
ability to get a good sight picture on their weapon.
In light of what General Spoehr was talking about, we are
looking at improvements to our M-4. But we believe we have
made, actually, a very recent one that is going to have
significant impact in the field.
Where we are doing all the additional testing, we saw that
the magazine did not reliably feed the ammunition straight up
into the upper receiver. And we have now fielded a new
magazine. We have pushed that into the theater. It is now part
of our rapid fielding initiative, and we are rapidly getting
that capability out there.
But we also are getting ready to release a RFP, a request
for a proposal, that will give us the ability to give the
soldiers that heavier barrel, so they can have an increased,
sustained rate of fire. The Army is asking us to look at giving
them back the fully automatic mode in that M-4. We are also
looking at changing some of the bolt in the upper receiver
components. And we are looking at all these different options.
At the same time we are working on the M-4, we are looking
at a new carbine. Is there something better out there than what
we currently have? But we believe the M-4 is a very good--
provides a very good capability to our soldiers. But it is a
combination.
And I think the green ammunition is going to give back a
lot of that lethality that the soldiers were asking about,
where did it go. Well, it went because we gave you a much
shorter barrel, a round that was designed on a longer barrel,
and a lot of other technical components, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank all the panel, particularly
Lieutenant General Oates. I think you, with your combat
experience in Iraq, you bring--you all bring a lot to this
conversation, but in particular, your experience.
General Oates, our nation's ability to deliver vehicles
that have mine resistance has been a challenge. The Humvee was
a great vehicle until the enemy discovered it had a
vulnerability to explosions from beneath it, which resulted in
the fielding of the mine resistant vehicle.
The Stryker is a great vehicle. But unfortunately, now that
the bar has been raised with the introduction of the mine
resistant vehicle, the Stryker appears to be more vulnerable to
that problem.
What steps are you taking to address that? What does this
committee need to do to help you?
And above all, what are the lessons that we have learned in
the development of the MRAP? Again, I always will commend
General Brogan on a great job that he did, but it is just a sad
fact that from the time we made up our minds that we were going
to buy 18,000 MRAPs till they were fielded, people needlessly
died in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So, what steps are we taking for a more survivable Stryker?
What did we learn from the MRAP program, so that we can field
it quicker than we did, and even though General Brogan did a
phenomenal job of fielding the MRAP?
General Oates. Sir, I thank you very much.
As you know, this is an extremely complex set of
interdependent variables on a vehicle. Afghanistan, what we
have learned is, due to the absence of improved roads, that
there is another significant ingredient to survivability of
vehicles, and that is the enemy's placement of the IED and, in
some cases, the inability to go off-road.
But the Stryker is a very, very survivable vehicle, in my
opinion. I have been in it and been in combat with it.
In Afghanistan it has a unique capability, because it can
go off-road, and it is very quiet. And so, it can seek to avoid
obvious emplacements of IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices].
So, just taking that independent variable, you could
conclude the Stryker is more survivable, given that the MRAP is
largely confined to the road, whereas the enemy has a very
clear attack axis.
We have studied the process of the MRAP in JIEDDO [Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization] and looked at
the evolution and understanding of the V-shape and U-shape
hulls. And we are working with the MRAP Task Force underneath
the senior integration group to see what new technologies there
may be out there that we have not yet explored, and how we
might offer some assistance to the MRAP Task Force and what we
discover in our own technological reviews.
But to date, my major concern is trying to help the forces
that are in Afghanistan detect these under-body explosions
where they are located, and seek to defeat them before we drive
over them. That is my primary focus right now.
The MRAP Task Force is currently looking at the new set of
vehicles, and we are a support role there, sir. And we offer
advice along those roads, but we do not produce the vehicle
platform itself.
So, I may have to defer on this issue to my good friend
down there who does the MRAP business, or understands it better
than I do.
Mr. Taylor. Would anyone like to address what steps are
being taken on the Stryker? It is my understanding that one of
the manufacturers has come up with a double-V-type bottom.
The immediate question that I would have is, I believe it
was General Blum that explained to me that the drivetrain on
the Humvee had the unintended consequence of shaping the
charge, where the force of the blast tended to go in the cab
because of that.
I guess my first question would be, with that double-V, do
you get that same problem with the unintended consequence of
shaping the charge? I guess that would be the apex of where the
two Vs come together.
General Spoehr. Yes, sir. As you mentioned, industry has
come to the Army with a proposal for the Stryker for what we
call the double-V hull. It is really a W. And we were concerned
about the same thing you were, that the apex, wouldn't that
channel all the energy and perhaps even make things worse.
Industry believes not. They have some actual blast tests.
They have done modeling, as well. They say, because that apex
is significantly higher than the floor of the Stryker used to
be, that the exponential difference in height from the IED
makes a huge difference in survivability.
Nevertheless, we are--so, we are going to ask, and we have
asked OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] for permission,
to build prototypes of this vehicle. And as quickly as get
those prototypes, we intend to take them up to Aberdeen and
blow them up, and see for real how this works.
Mr. Taylor. Well, I guess my next question would be, going
back to our responsibilities, do you have the financial
resources--do you have all the financial resources that you
need to expedite this program?
General Spoehr. Sir, right now in fiscal year 2010, we
believe right now we can initiate this effort with no support
needed from Congress. If that changes, if we develop some need,
we will immediately come back to this committee.
Mr. Taylor. General Oates, going back to your observation,
and since you actually mentioned potassium chloride and
ammonium nitrate as being part of the problem, I am curious
how--well, I will make an observation.
The Center for Remote Sensing from satellites happens to be
in south Mississippi. One of the things they pointed out to me
was that from space, looking at extremely slight differences in
temperatures of trees, they can tell me or you which trees in
the forest have pine beetles, which trees in the forest are
stressed for lack of water.
They can tell you the 10 most likely places to catch
bluefin tuna, updated every 90 minutes--a number of things that
are just absolutely remarkable they can tell us from
information coming from space.
I would imagine that both ammonium nitrate and potassium
chloride have to give off vapors. I would imagine they have to
give off heat.
To what extent have you just put out the word to industry,
I need someone to help me find a better way to locate these
substances when they are in concentrations of 10 pounds or
more?
General Oates. Mr. Chairman, it is a great question. And I
would like to take that one offline with you, only because we
actually have some pretty good technology right now that we
believe is going to assist us in detecting these items.
But we are actively looking for additional assistance in
both change detection on the road and the detection of the
actual items. And I would be happy to share with you for the
record on an emerging technology that we intend to put in
theater here very soon.
It actually returns to the point that Congressman Hunter
made. If we can achieve some persistent surveillance on these
roads, it will increase our confidence in understanding where
the enemy is operating and what he is doing with those roads.
To that end, this is one of the top priorities for Central
Command, is the emplacement of additional tethered capability
to survey these roads, much as we used in Iraq. And that is the
first tranche of items that we have funded and we will be
moving forward to Afghanistan.
The technology you are describing, we would be very
interested in, sir. And we have openly and directly with
vendors indicated that we would like to close that gap.
Mr. Taylor. Let me ask you the same question. Do you have--
has this committee and our appropriator counterparts, have they
provided for you all the resources, financial resources you
need to pursue this?
General Oates. Yes, sir. At present, we do not have any
issues. And like my friend here, and based on what you have
told me personally, we would return to you immediately, because
we understand the sense of urgency. If we need additional
resources, I would not hesitate to come ask for them.
Mr. Taylor. Lastly--and I will open this up to the panel--
on almost every visit to theater, when you ask the troops what
is it that you want, what can we get you, almost in every
instance it comes back. They kind of shuffle their feet and
say, gee, if you could just make my body armor lighter.
What sort of resources do you have to pursue that? And
again, is that--was that adequately addressed in the
President's budget request? Do you have the resources you need?
If a manufacturer were to come to you today with a 10 percent
or 20 percent reduction in that weight, would you have the
funds available to see if that product is worth purchasing?
General Fuller. Sir, in light of that question, yes, we
are. As General Brogan said, we really are at the knee of the
curve. We are looking for a new technology to be able to get us
that lighter weight, and in particular to our hard plates.
If it was found, we would buy it. I do not know how much we
would buy, but we would be buying it. But we do not have it out
there right now.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Again, General Fuller, if it was found, do you have the
resources available now? Would you need an additional line item
in the authorization and appropriations bills? I guess that is
what I would like to know.
Do you have the authority to pursue that, if you saw a
product that you liked and thought was worthwhile for the
troops?
And General Brogan, if you would like to address that?
General Brogan. We absolutely have the resources we would
need to go test it, to see if it was, in fact, better. We
entertain frequently industry members who think they have an
idea of what could be a better body armor. Unfortunately, many
of those are PowerPoint. And that is about how deep they are.
Very few people bring us actual product that we can go
shoot and test. But if someone has that, we have the ability
immediately to go to Aberdeen Test Center and shoot those, and
determine if it is good enough.
And then, using our below-threshold reprogramming
authority, and because on them there is a fungible
appropriation, we can very easily move that and begin to buy
it. And then, if we needed significant quantities, we would put
that in the OCO request either at the beginning of the fiscal
year, or, like we have often received, the June additional
money, sir.
Mr. Taylor. General, can I follow up on that? I happen to
come from, as most of the members of this committee, a very
pro-defense community--heck of a lot of National Guardsmen, a
heck of a lot of people who are serving and have served, and
therefore, a heck of a lot of moms and dads who follow this
issue very closely.
So, if someone were to come to you with a better body
armor, are you telling me that you have the financial resources
to not only test it, but to begin acquisition immediately?
General Brogan. We certainly have to test, and we would
have the money to begin production. Probably not to outfit the
entire force, and we would come to you for that. But we do have
the ability to begin production.
I have right now on my desk a letter from the father of a
Marine, who is convinced that NASA [National Aeronautics and
Space Administration] has an armor that we should be using,
just because he knows that in space they armor their
satellites.
I can tell you, I have personally visited the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory in California, and looked at what they
have. And it is not designed to stop bullets. It is designed to
stop small pieces of junk that are flying at high velocity in
space.
And I truly do reach out and try to find a solution, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I think I do not have anything much further,
just to follow up a little bit on the Stryker discussion. We
have several Stryker brigades out of Fort Lewis in my district.
And it has received rave reviews from the soldiers coming back
who have used it, not just in Iraq, but in Afghanistan. And I
think that is an important point to make that you made,
General, that its maneuverability really improves its
survivability.
And also, the soldiers love it, because it gives them a
little bit of control of their own destiny. They are not
counting on a piece of metal below them to save them. They are
counting on their own ability to foresee danger and react to
it. And they very much appreciate that.
I guess the one question I have as we go through on the
double-V--in the state of Washington I always say W-hull, but
whatever. You know, as we test it and go forward, number one,
what we do want to make sure--we want to move as quickly as
possible, but we want to make sure it works.
And I know you know that, but it is going to be
particularly difficult in this instance, because if it does
work, we are going to want to do it quickly. So we have to be
really careful about that.
I have gotten a different answer from a couple of different
people to this question. If it works and we decide we want to
do this, however, is the situation that it is not possible to
retrofit the existing, I think roughly, 2,400 Strykers? That
the way this is designed, it will have to be built on new
Strykers? Is that your understanding? If we decide this works,
we could not go back and put it on the existing fleet?
General Spoehr. Sir, you are correct. It cannot be
retrofitted currently. Now, we have asked the question, you
know, could we hypothetically saw a Stryker and put the top
back on it? That has not been the case so far.
And so, fortunately, there is currently an active
production line from Stryker. So, if this improvement were to
play out, we would ask the manufacturer to cut this improvement
in, and so it would become a part of new Strykers coming off
the line.
Mr. Smith. And they are very confident that they can do
that as they go forward. I understand that.
And then also, you know, just following up the original
point, if we do this it is important to emphasize that the
existing Stryker fleet is still very, very useful. And we
certainly do not want to create the impression, because we have
a new variant, that the old variant is not still very effective
for the warfighter.
We have got 2,400 of them. We want to use them. And from
all reports, they are performing quite well.
Thank you. I do not have anything further. I yield back.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Hunter for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And my little brother is a specialist. He is a Stryker guy
who is over there in Iraq now, so he is Chairman Smith's
constituent, he and his family every now and then in Fort
Lewis. In fact, he is home right now to have his third boy--his
third baby, first boy. He has got a little three-week leave,
and then he goes back for six months over to Iraq. So, I want
to make sure that those Strykers are good to go.
One thing that I want to bring up that I think is
important, and I think it is important that JIEDDO remains a
consistent entity, probably forever, because one thing we have
not talked about is future wars. The enemy knows how to get to
us now. It is IEDs.
So, if you look at the level of IED in Afghanistan, think
of what Iran could do with their level of sophistication. Think
of what China could do, or a country that is not a backwoods
spot like Afghanistan. The enemy knows how to do it now. It is
going to be a threat to us forever, because we have not been
able to actually defeat IEDs.
So, I think this is something that we are going to have to
keep in mind forever. When it comes to warfare, why go line-to-
line with us when you can just IED the hell out of us forever,
whenever we are in someone else's territory?
So, I think this is something that, even when Afghanistan
dies down, it is going to be up to us here, and to you all to
ask for it, for us to maintain this persistence when it comes
to IEDs, because we are going to see it forever. And we are
going to see it in 20 years or 30 years. They are going to say,
hey, look at Afghanistan and Iraq; we know how to do this.
But my last question for General Oates, you wrote here in
your testimony, ``In the last several months Task Force ODIN
has been supplemented with U.S. Air Force Liberty aircraft to
good effect. We are not where we need to be yet on this
capability but are rapidly moving to close this gap.''
Do you have metrics? I mean, how do you know ODIN's
working? Have IEDs gone down where it has been flying? Have we
been killing guys, or what?
General Oates. Yes, sir. Colonel Don Galli, who commands
3rd Cav, and I go back about 20 years. And I was in Iraq when
ODIN [Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize (U.S. military
task force)] was started. I am a big fan of it.
We did not have Liberty in Iraq. Now there is Liberty in
Afghanistan. And they are roughly half-way through their
intended fielding--I am sorry, about a third of the way through
their intended fielding--of Liberty.
I have actual metrics I can share with you, that I will
take for the record, on the effects we have had with ODIN.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
General Oates. A problem to date is, ODIN has been carrying
the load for the whole country. Now, with about 7 Liberty
aircraft and about 14 more to come, maybe 15 more, I think they
will be able to expand that coverage.
There is a direct, compelling corollary between integrating
air assets like ODIN or Liberty with a maneuver force toward
success on defeating the IED threat.
Mr. Hunter. Let me interrupt you there. Is Liberty
integrating like ODIN does? Or is it being used as the Air
Force uses Predators, using Pred lines based on priorities? Or
is it being used--that sensor-to-shooter ODIN relationship that
made ODIN so effective--is it being used that way?
General Oates. No, sir. ODIN resides inside the combat
aviation brigade. And it is a very tight link with the maneuver
force.
Liberty, though, is following the priorities of the ground
commander. And so, although it does not work directly inside a
U.S. Army combat aviation brigade, it does respond to the
ground commander's priorities.
The way the Air Force and the Army and the Marine Corps
utilize their aviation assets, you know, is somewhat different.
We really look at effects.
I personally believe that the additional assets of Liberty
will generate those effects we are looking for. But the command
and control structure is different. There is no doubt about
that, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Would you recommend that the Army have tactical
control of Liberty, as it is intermixed with ODIN?
General Oates. Sir, I do not dodge many questions, and I am
not dodging this one, but I do believe that is the inherent
authority of the commander in Afghanistan to determine how he
wants to command and control those assets. I will defer to his
judgment.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. How about this? As a division commander
in Iraq, would you have rather had control of the air assets
that are watching your roads and your rail? Or would you rather
have a different service provide that for you?
General Oates. Sir, as a division commander in Iraq, I had
control of the air assets that operated in my area. But I also
received assets based on priorities. So, as a ground maneuver
guy, I have always been more comfortable by culture having an
air-ground team under my direct control.
But when I was the priority effort in Iraq, I received
additional assets. And I think sometimes that that is not quite
understood. I receive actually more assets if I am the
priority. And there again, that goes to the ground commander.
So, I have full faith and confidence the guys over there
know what they are doing. And if they need to make a change--
and incidentally, they have made a change to the command and
control relationships of the engineer route clearance teams,
based on an observation that they should be in direct support,
not in general support. And we can show you a direct corollary
to improve in that regard. But the commanders in country made
that call.
Mr. Hunter. I would love to see those metrics, too.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The gentlewoman from Massachusetts, Ms.
Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
General Brogan and General Fuller, as you can see, the
issue of body armor is a consistent theme here. And I have one
more question before we head out to vote.
Those of you who have testified to the fact that you feel,
as far as procurement goes, you have the right amount of body
armor to support the force. You also said, when asked about
lighter-weight body armor, that the technology just is not
there to reduce the weight of the small arms protective insert.
And so, we find ourselves in a dilemma. Industry is now
saying that, because the services have almost stopped buying
body armor, they no longer have the internally generated funds
to continue development of lighter-weight products. And the
number of firms who supply body armor and its ceramic tile
components is being reduced, due to the lack of procurement.
So, how do we balance this? You are not really buying body
armor, which leads to the industrial base shrinking. There is
no investment from DOD in research and development. And now,
the industrial base is not putting its own money into research
and development, because it does not have any.
You are saying the technology just is not there to reduce
the weight of body armor, but it does not seem like anyone is
actively investing in technology.
So, where do we go from here, given those realities?
General Fuller. Yes, ma'am. You do share the challenge that
we have inside the Department of Defense right now.
Because we had such large procurements, we did have the
industry invest their own IR&D [industry research and
development], recognizing that they had an opportunity to have
a large procurement to balance that investment that they have
made.
What we are trying to do right now is bundle all of our
sustainment contracts together under the Defense Logistics
Agency between the Marines, the Army, Air Force and other
services, to ensure while we are working through this action
of, do we have a research and development line dedicated to
soldier protection items, that we at least maintain that
industrial base.
So, if we wanted to go and contract with them for a
research and development future activities, they will still be
in the business of wanting to do this.
At the same time, we are still working those S&T [science
and technology] endeavors. When we had the question about the
enhanced combat helmet, for example, that technology actually
started in the MRAP and other heavy armor combat vehicles. It
was part of the add-on armor that we were using that new
technology. We are now taking it and trying to conform it into
a new helmet design, and that is where we are having some
challenges. It works great in flat sheets; it does not work as
well when we conform it.
So, those S&T efforts, I think, will continue to move
forward. We still are investing in that arena, and we might see
some future efforts coming out of that.
But I recognize, we do need to look at a dedicated research
and development line. We are going to work with the other
services and the Department of Defense to articulate what
exactly is in that line, and how much is in that line. And
while we are doing it, we are going to try to maintain that
industrial base through bundling all our contracts to keep them
viable.
Ms. Tsongas. General Brogan.
General Brogan. Congresswoman, what I would add is that, at
least one of the vendors that you mentioned is one of the five
largest defense contractors in the United States. It is kind of
difficult for me to believe that they do not have any IR&D.
They may not place it here, because they do not see the largest
return on investment as compared to some of their other
efforts.
As General Fuller said, we do have to have S&T dollars to
look for the breakthrough. It's not, I think, valuable for us
to continue to buy ceramic plates in large excess of what we
need, just to keep the industrial base doing plates. Because,
if we find that breakthrough in technology, we are going to
want to buy that next best thing, and we will have created an
obsolete item that we spent the taxpayers' money on. So, it is
a challenge how to adequately balance it.
I think we need significant communication between us and
industry, as opposed to lobbyists and you all. Them talking
with us would be valuable. And we have provided them in our
public communication for the desires of what it is we need, so
that we can help them target those IR&D funds.
The other not often used research and development tool is
something called a CRADA--a cooperative research and
development activity--where the U.S. government and industry
cooperatively develop a piece of the equipment. And I think we
probably need to explore that in this area.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you both for your testimony.
Mr. Taylor. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman. And I
would remind the gentleman that there are about 6 minutes left
on this vote.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have just one quick question. And that is, sometimes
there is an IED, a blast, where it is not a catastrophic kill
for the vehicle. But because of the over-pressure, it causes
casualties, if I understand it right. Have we been able to make
any gains in terms of force protection relative to the over-
pressure from a blast?
General Brogan. That most likely happens in an up-armored
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle [UAH], where the
survivability capsule is, in fact, perforated. And
unfortunately, as we know, the UAH is often a catastrophic
kill. What we find most often in MRAP is that we keep the blast
over-pressure outside of the survivability capsule.
Now, injuries are the result of acceleration, not blast
over-pressure. So, first, the vehicle is accelerated up into
the air by the force of the blast. That happens very rapidly
and causes compression injuries of the spinal column and of the
lower back.
And then, second, that vehicle impacts the ground, which is
a slower event relatively speaking, similar to an automotive
crash. And we have energy-absorbing seats to try to deal with
that.
The unfortunate thing, and I think what you are getting at,
Mr. Coffman, is traumatic brain injuries. Those are not
normally caused by blast over-pressure. It is that acceleration
event that causes the head to rapidly twist, and so, either
shearing the curves inside the brain, or the brain moves slower
than the skull. The skull stops. The brain then impacts the
skull causing bruising, swelling, or, if it happens to the
central cortex, loss of consciousness.
No helmet is able to protect against that. And because our
occupants of the vehicles need to be able to scan, use the
windows, we cannot tether their head like they would in a
NASCAR. So, what we are looking for are ways to improve the
seating and restraint system to help decouple the acceleration
experienced by the vehicle from that which is delivered to the
occupants.
General Fuller. Sir, also in light of that, the Army is
fielding a helmet sensor. We had a generation alone that we
fielded. And what we are trying to do is measure what is
happening to that individual when they do have any type of
traumatic event, so we can capture that data, provide it back
to the medical community.
So, as General Brogan was talking specifically about the
medical conditions that are happening while you are going
through this traumatic event, we want to be able to provide
that data back to the Army medical community, so they can
assist in understanding what is actually happening. And we are
measuring it through a new helmet sensor that we will have that
will measure what is happening, and then are full axis to the
soldier's head via their helmet when the event is going on.
And we are getting ready to field that capability. We had
an initial capability out there. Now we are getting ready to
field an upgraded one--longer battery life. You do not have to
go up there and touch every helmet to get the data off it. We
can do it remotely.
And it also can measure more axis of movement, really what
your head is really doing inside that helmet--six degrees of
freedom, sir.
Mr. Coffman. I would appreciate it, if you have a written
description of what you just mentioned, I would appreciate if
you could get that to myself and maybe other members of the
committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Bartlett, there are about 4 minutes left,
but I am going to verbally honor Ms. Sandra Day O'Connor. I do
not think I have to----
Mr. Bartlett. I have a very quick comment. I think it is
unlikely that we are going to be purchasing body armor from
some big industry that has the capacity, the capital to invest
in R&D [research and development], which is why we need the
dedicated R&D line, because I think the creativity and
innovation is going to be in small business. And they just do
not have the capital to do that. We need to help.
Mr. Taylor. Gentlemen, I thank each and every one of you
for what you do, for your service in theater, for your service
back here stateside.
I think it has been one of the better hearings that we have
had. I thank you very, very much for being straightforward with
us.
General Brogan, thanks as always for the phenomenal job
of--your life-saving-job--on the MRAP program.
And with that, if there are no further questions, this
subcommittee hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 17, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 17, 2010
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