[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-122]
THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 4, 2010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, February 4, 2010, The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, February 4, 2010....................................... 35
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2010
THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 5
Fox, Hon. Christine H., Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, U.S. Department of Defense......................... 8
Stanley, Vice Adm. P. Stephen, USN, Director for Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment, J8, The Joint Staff................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., joint with Vice Adm. P. Stephen
Stanley and Hon. Christine H. Fox.......................... 42
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brady.................................................... 58
Ms. Giffords................................................. 59
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 64
Mr. Nye...................................................... 63
Mr. Reyes.................................................... 53
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 53
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 62
Mr. Wilson................................................... 55
THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 4, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Let me welcome you to the House
Armed Services Committee hearing on the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review [QDR]. Before we start, and before I begin my
opening statement, I just learned that we are to have five
votes rather soon, and I hope the witnesses will understand
while we are gone, we shall return because this is a very, very
important hearing and we really want to know what you have to
say.
So we will plow right on. Hopefully, I can make an opening
statement, Mr. McKeon can make his opening statement and see
how far along we go from there. Witnesses: Honorable Michele
Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Vice Admiral
Stephen Stanley, Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment, that is the J8, The Joint Staff; the Honorable
Christine Fox, Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
for the Department.
And we want to welcome our witnesses. And let me say this
is also, in essence, a continuation of the hearing we held
yesterday with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The release
of the report of the Quadrennial Defense Review is always a
noteworthy event in defense circles and particularly so here on
our committee.
In my view, the remarkable thing about the President's
budget we received yesterday on the QDR is the deep commitment
they reflect on the part of this Administration to preserving
the national security of our country. At a time of tremendous
economic difficulty, unprecedented deficits, spending freezes
in the other parts of the budget the QDR demonstrates a clear
need for, and the Department's budget reflects, real growth in
defense spending this year and into the foreseeable future.
Now, while we will have our disagreements about some of the
details I strongly support the Administration's decision to
request these increases. Congress has a constitutional
responsibility to provide oversight of and funds for the
Nation's Armed Forces. The congressional mandate of QDR directs
the Secretary to conduct a comprehensive examination of the
national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization
plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the
defense program and policies of the United States with a view
toward determining and expressing the defense strategy in the
United States and establishing a defense program for the next
20 years. Thus, the QDR outlines the Secretary of Defense's
thinking on that wide range of topics and provides a sort of
blueprint on how he sees the Department moving forward to meet
future security challenges.
It is important for Congress to understand what the
Secretary sees as our top national priorities, why, and the
measures required to deal with them. Then we can make sure the
required resources are available. But as Congress develops the
policy positions and makes funding decisions it is quite
natural that the legislative branch's determination of national
security priorities may differ from those set forth by the
executive branch. The framers of the Constitution designed it
that way. And if we are going to make different choices, both
in terms of policy and in terms of funding, it is incumbent
upon us to understand the implications of the available
options.
The QDR, this hearing, is important as anything in that
part of the process, although the primary consumer of the
report of the QDR is Congress, that is why the reporting
elements are in the law. I understand it has to be written for
a wide variety of audiences: the interagency, the international
community, the defense industry, academia, just to name a few,
and therefore it is not surprising that it fully pleases none
of them, never has, never will. Having said all of that overall
I find the 2010 QDR to be a solid product and superior to the
last several iterations that we have had, and I compliment
those who worked on it. And I commend you for your hard work on
focusing and linking strategy to resources which clearly lays
out four priority objectives of the defense strategy and six
key mission areas that require enhancement if that strategy is
to succeed.
That is clear strategic direction for our Nation's military
to not only win today's conflicts but to be prepared for
tomorrow's threats as well. The QDR recognizes that we must
continue to be ready to counter more than one threat at a time
but acknowledges that there are a variety of scenarios beyond
major regional contingencies that our military is likely to
face. That is a good step because the potential threats are
complex. Still, the way the QDR seems to treat the force-sizing
construct is to advocate for a force that is capable of being
all things to all contingencies. It is tough to determine what
the priority is, what the most likely risk we face may be, and
what may be the most dangerous. It seems that the QDR makes no
significant changes to major pieces of our current force. This
makes our task that much more difficult, because although the
QDR should not be budget-constrained, the plain fact is that
resources are not unlimited. Ultimately, Congress will need to
make prudent tradeoffs to meet fiscal realities while buying
down strategic risk. To do so, we need to know where our
current and projected force structure is inadequate. The QDR
should help us understand the consequences of those tradeoffs.
And my first reading indicates that perhaps it comes up a bit
short there.
I am pleased to see that for the first time, this QDR
elevates the health of the force to a strategic priority. It
rightly emphasizes the need to address the strains placed on
our men and women in uniform as well as their families. It pays
continued attention to military compensation, health care,
warrior care, as well as family support services. But I am
concerned that beyond casual mention of a need of greater
culture and language training, it does not pay enough attention
to the operational needs of our muddy boot warriors.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it clear that
the superiority of individuals and small units engaged in close
combat is essential if the United States is going to win these
sort of wars. These are most effective weapons. However, when
the QDR goes on at length about the need to develop high and
technological capabilities, there is no comparable discussion
about the need to develop a small arms and other individual
equipment to preserve the superiority let alone the development
of innovative means to ensure that these small units are fully
trained. You know, that is a shame because that is really the
best way to take care of our people.
Now, let me turn the microphone over to my friend, the
ranking member from California, Buck McKeon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask that my full
statement be submitted for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you. And I join you in welcoming our
witnesses here today. I thank you for being here this morning.
We look forward to hearing your testimony. For some time now
Secretary Gates has been pushing for balance in the Defense
Department in an effort to focus the program on prevailing in
the conflicts of today. In the Secretary's introduction to the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, he writes that his efforts to
rebalance the Department in 2010 continued in the 2011 budget
and were institutionalized in this QDR in the out-year budget
plan. For some time now, Secretary Gates has been pushing for
balance in the Defense Department in an effort to focus the
Pentagon on prevailing in the conflicts of today.
While we commend the Department for its laser focus on the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe efforts to make balance
a fixture in the QDR and the out-year budget is shortsighted
and puts the Department on the wrong path for the next 20
years. Choosing to win in Iraq and Afghanistan should not mean
our country must also choose to assume additional risk in the
conventional national defense challenges of today and tomorrow.
Last April we received a glimpse of the cost of balance when
the Secretary announced over $50.0 billion in cuts to defense
programs.
This year the impact is more subtle but I fear more severe.
As I told the Secretary yesterday, in my view, the QDR
understates the requirements to deter and defeat challenges
from state actors, and it overestimates the capabilities of the
force the Department would build. This QDR does an excellent
job of delineating the threat posed by those with anti-access
capabilities, notably China, but does little to address the
risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability, and force
structure.
As a result we find an out-year defense plan and QDR that
basically reinforced the status quo despite serious threats to
our current capability. Thus, this QDR provides a force
structure that is built for the years we are in today when the
purpose of the review is exactly the opposite: to prepare for
the likely conflicts of tomorrow. One must ask what is new
here. If this is really a vision for the defense program for
the next 20 years as the statute requires then why does the QDR
lay out a force structure for the next five years not to
mention one that looks a lot like today's force. The QDR is
supposed to shape the Department for 2029, not describe the
Pentagon in 2009. My concerns revolve primarily around one of
the QDR's key mission areas: deter and defeat aggregation in
anti-access environments.
In my view this is the mission area which should have
driven the growth and size and capability of our air and naval
forces, yet we cannot evaluate whether the QDR has the right
force structure for this critical mission area because it
offers no clear force-planning construct and abandons the two
war strategy. Oddly, the QDR seems to suggest that while this
threat grows we can make do with less than we previously
thought. For example, the last stated Air Force requirement for
fighters was 2,200, but the QDR now reflects a need for
approximately 1,500 combat-coded fighters with no mention of
aircraft required for training and test activities.
Likewise, the budget does not appear to take any steps to
mitigate the similar fighter shortfall in the Army and Marine
Corps. Another example of inadequate force structure is in the
area of missile defense where there is no indication that the
Navy has increased the requirement or funding for large surface
combatants to support its increasing role in the ballistic
missile defense [BMD] mission. This requirement was established
in 2006, at which time there was no BMD mission for these
vessels.
Our fighter and ship shortfall are the most obvious
examples where this budget and QDR fail to reflect the strategy
that looks beyond today's conflicts and considers the very real
emerging threats of tomorrow. I have more questions and
concerns regarding the QDR that I will address during the Q&A
[question and answer] session. Once again, thank you for being
here today, I look forward to your testimony. I yield back Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you Mr. McKeon. Madam Secretary, is it
my understanding that each of the witnesses are to testify or
just you?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we have submitted a joint
statement for the record, but we would each like to make an
opening statement if that is in line with your thinking, but it
is your call, sir.
The Chairman. But would it be an opening statement by one
or three?
Secretary Flournoy. Of three, if that is--.
The Chairman. You bet. We will start with you however. You
are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Flournoy. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman and Representative McKeon and members of the
committee. It is a pleasure to appear again before you today to
speak about the Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Our efforts in this QDR really have revolved around the
imperative to reaffirm our commitment to the health of
America's all-volunteer force, to rebalance our programs and
capabilities to fight both the wars that we are in today and
also prepare for future contingencies and to reform how and
what we buy. With the QDR report released and our written
statement submitted for the record, I would just like to spend
a few minutes to highlight some of the key points.
First, this QDR advances a strategic framework for the
Department that focuses on priority objectives that are
critical for the Nation. First, prevail in today's wars, places
like Afghanistan, Iraq, the broader war against Al Qaeda,
prevent and deter conflicts, prepare to defeat adversaries and
prevail in a wide range of future contingencies, and preserve
and enhance the all-volunteer force. These four priority
objectives are both timely and enduring. They capture the
essence of what the Department must do to protect and advance
American interests, and they constitute the key priorities that
drive how we think about the overall size and shape of
America's Armed Forces.
Second, QDR analysis strongly supports our conclusion that
the United States requires a portfolio of military capabilities
that provide maximum versatility across the broadest possible
and plausible spectrum of conflict. The changes directed under
the QDR enhance the agility of the force, particularly through
an increased emphasis on key enabling capabilities. By enabling
capabilities, I mean the kind of support forces that seldom get
the attention they deserve but have been in quite short supply
for today's wars and will remain critical for the future.
Examples include things like helicopters, UAVs [unmanned aerial
vehicles], platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance [ISR], electronic warfare capabilities,
communications networks, and enhanced cyberspace defenses.
Third, this QDR provides the Department with an approach to
force planning that is appropriate for the world we face, not
the world we would prefer to face. Today our forces are
simultaneously operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, and
elsewhere around the world. We need to ensure that our policy
and our planning paradigms ensure agility rather than reinforce
rigidity. As we have seen all too often, the wars we fight
often bear little resemblance to the canonical conventional
contingencies that had tended to dominate our defense planning.
We have come to learn at great cost that America's current and
future adversaries will not conform to conventional ways of
war, but will more likely use a mix of often asymmetric
approaches and try to bypass our strength.
The defense strategy articulated in this QDR reflects the
reality that U.S. forces must be capable of conducting
multiple, simultaneous, often long-duration operations across a
wide range of challenges. This includes prevailing in two
large-scale conflicts against regional aggressors, but it also
takes into account other scenarios, such as conducting large-
scale stability operations, defeating highly capable
adversaries employing cyber and space capabilities, extending
support to civil authorities in response to a catastrophic
event in the United States, among others. This range of
plausible challenges is why the Secretary has focused on the
need for a broad portfolio of capabilities that are versatile
across the range of conflict.
Fourth, our people. Our people are the most precious of our
military resources. While I am constantly impressed by their
professionalism, their morale, their effectiveness in the
field, there are indications that worry us after these long
years of wars, from post-traumatic stress [PTSD] to increased
rates of divorce and suicide. For too long, the health of the
all-volunteer force has been underemphasized in our defense
planning. This QDR has elevated the need to preserve and
enhance the force as a core component of our policy, our
planning, and our force management.
The QDR, in the fiscal year 2011 budget, proposed a series
of new programs and investments to shore up the health of the
all-volunteer force and the families who are making significant
sacrifices on their behalf.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, it is clear to us, and I know it is
clear to all of you as members of this committee, that the
Department of Defense [DOD] needs to further reform how it does
business. This QDR explores several critical institutional
issues that the Secretary has identified as priorities:
reforming security assistance to build partnership capacity;
institutionalizing our rapid acquisition capability;
strengthening our industrial base; reforming U.S. export
control systems; and crafting more strategic approach to
climate and energy issues.
These issues are critical to how the Department prepares
and executes national strategy. For eight years we have asked
our men and women in the front lines to innovate and adapt
under fire, and they have done so. The QDR argues the
Department of Defense as a whole must do the same.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that the congressional
requirement to the Department to submit a QDR actually helps us
and the Nation successfully adapt to a post-Cold War world. And
though we will continue to refine how best to rebalance our
Armed Forces and reform our Department for complex challenges
both today and tomorrow, I believe the QDR has been an
important institutional mechanism to facilitate much-needed
change. But as you know, there is no such thing as a risk-free
defense strategy.
I know I speak on behalf of the Secretary and the
Department when I ask for your continued leadership and the
leadership of this committee to help ensure that we prevail in
today's wars while also preparing for the next generation of
challenges and enable us to protect and advance America's
interest in a complex world. Thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy,
Admiral Stanley, and Ms. Fox can be found in the Appendix on
page 42.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much. We have nine minutes yet
on this vote. One 15-, four 5-minute votes, and probably
another 15-minute vote, so our witnesses are going do have to
bear with us. So let's move ahead, and then we will get to Ms.
Fox. Go ahead, and then we will break. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. P. STEPHEN STANLEY, USN, DIRECTOR FOR
FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES, AND ASSESSMENT, J8, THE JOINT STAFF
Admiral Stanley. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of
this committee, thank you very much for your time and the
opportunity to amplify the testimony of Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen. But more than that, I would like to thank you
for the strong support your committee provides to our men and
women in uniform. Your recent approval of our reprogramming
request to support operations in Haiti is just one of countless
examples of the support that you give our men and women in
uniform every day, and I just want to be thank you for them.
Now, back to the QDR. I believe the 2010 QDR sets the
Department on a new path, a path that requires significant
effort, effort that is ongoing but not yet complete. The QDR
focuses not just on winning today's fight, but also in the
complex and uncertain future security landscape and potential
conflicts the United States and our partners are most likely to
face in the future. The QDR directly addresses Chairman
Mullen's top three priorities. First, winning today's fight.
Second, balancing global strategic risk. And third, preserving
and enhancing the health of the force. Now, let me amplify on
the specific priorities.
First, the QDR appropriately supports our mission to
disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda globally and
particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through investment
and critical enablers such as rotary wing, ISR, and special
operation forces that have experienced persistent shortfalls
over the years, winning the fight requires changing our
capability mix and we are doing it.
Second, the second priority, balancing global risk in
today's complex security environment, requires a ready and
agile force with sufficient capacity and capability across the
range of military operations [ROMO]. The QDR recognizes the
importance of developing capabilities to address future
antiaccess and anti--and area-denial threats. Additionally, the
QDR focuses on regional forward-based and rotational engagement
with partners to set conditions that not only preclude conflict
but establish the security environments that undercut
extremism. Although we retain the capability and capacity to
act decisively when appropriate we prefer to partner and work
with others in major operations. Our forward-stationed and
rotational joint forces will ensure the ability to both sustain
forward engagement and rapidly project forces and power
globally to defeat future adversaries or as in Haiti rapidly
respond to international crisis.
His third priority, preserving and maintaining the health
of the force, begins with taking care of our people. Our men
and women in the Armed Forces are America's greatest strategic
asset. The QDR advocates important initiatives to enhance
warrior and survivor care, reinforcing the urgency to improve
research and treatment for a broad range of injuries,
especially traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress.
Additionally, the QDR prioritizes reducing stress on the force
through family support initiatives and an appropriate focus on
properly resetting the force.
Overall, I believe the QDR provides an accurate depiction
of the future national security requirement. Our challenge as a
Nation will be properly to resource it. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Stanley, Secretary
Flournoy, and Ms. Fox can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. I think because of the time, Ms. Fox, we will
postpone your testimony until when we come back. But we do have
these several votes so please bear with us and when we resume
we will ask you for your statement, then we will go into the
questions for the members. So we will stand in recess until we
return, hopefully very soon.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will resume.
Ms. Fox, you are on.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE H. FOX, DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT
AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
today.
As you heard a few minutes ago, the QDR concluded that we
must balance resources and risk across four major objectives.
Today I will briefly tell you how our defense program supports
these priority objectives.
The first is to prevail. To achieve our objectives in Iraq
and Afghanistan, our military leaders need help to address
persistent shortfalls. We are expanding our Special Operations
force by increasing the capacity of gunships, increasing
intelligence capabilities, adding personnel to the Special
Operations Command, and adding civil affairs and psychological
operations personnel.
We are making significant investments in enabling
capabilities such as helicopters, unmanned multi-mission
aircraft, and EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft.
The QDR points out the critical need for cultural and
language training. We have added funding to develop and expand
programs, particularly those focussed on Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
The next objective is to prevent or deter conflict by
helping to build the security capacity of our partners while
remaining strong ourselves. The program adds funding for the
Global Train and Equip Authority. We added $1.5 billion to curb
the threat of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and improve
homeland defenses. We directly address the very real threats in
the cyberspace domain by funding the rapid creation of Cyber
Command.
Prepare: We need to be prepared for a wide range of
contingencies, including the modern, high-tech capabilities
being developed by other nations. To be prepared for this broad
spectrum of potential contingencies, we need flexible,
adaptable, highly capable forces.
By now you have heard of our efforts to significantly
restructure and stabilize the Joint Strike Fighter [JSF]
program. This program is vital to our ability to keep pace with
worldwide technological advancements. CAPE [Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation] played a significant role in the program's
restructuring. In accordance with the Weapons System
Acquisition Reform Act, CAPE led the independent cost analysis
that informed the in-depth review of that program. The budget
submission fully funds JSF to the CAPE cost estimate.
The budget submission reflects our commitment to
modernizing all Army Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs], and it
supports development of a new ground combat vehicle. It invests
in shipbuilding, procuring 10 ships in fiscal year 2011. Our
shipbuilding program is described in detail in the 30-year
Shipbuilding Plan.
We added resources to expand the long-range global strike
portfolio, including a potential future bomber, and we robustly
funded a dependable missile defense system that moves toward a
regional defense strategy.
And preserve: Our fourth major objective is to preserve and
enhance our all-volunteer force. We have made significant
improvements to our health care system and benefits. Within
five years we will have secure data exchange and Web access for
DOD, Veterans Affairs, and third-party health care providers.
And we added funding for a variety of family support programs,
including a significant effort to modernize our DOD schools.
Of course another objective of the Department is reform.
Earlier I mentioned the JSF program restructuring and the role
of CAPE in accordance with the Weapons System Acquisition
Reform Act. CAPE's analysis informed other significant
decisions reflected in this budget submission such as the
decision to shut down C-17 production.
I believe that this program, a program that I have only
briefly sketched for you, fully supports the goals of the
Quadrennial Defense Review. It is focused on the needs of the
warfighter today and tomorrow. It is a program built on realism
informed by independent analyses.
Again, I thank the committee for this opportunity to speak
with you today and for your continued support.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Fox, Secretary
Flournoy, and Admiral Stanley can be found in the Appendix on
page 42.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
It appears to me that Admiral Stanley and Ms. Fox are
making their maiden voyage here before our committee. We
welcome you and hope we will welcome you back many times.
Doesn't it seem to be a stretch, Madam Secretary, for our
military to be designated to do all things, whether it be a
major force on force in the one end and a guerrilla insurgency
fighting on the other?
Secretary Flournoy. Mr. Skelton, the force-sizing and
shaping construct we developed in the QDR is a reflection of
the complex security environment that we face even now with
Iraq, Afghanistan, a war against Al Qaeda in many countries,
the relief operation in Haiti, and it is also a reflection of
what we anticipate that security environment will look like in
the future. We have not abandoned the two MTW or two major
theater war construct. We have gone beyond it.
So we certainly looked at and tested the force against the
classic two major theater wars because we think that is still
an important standard, but we didn't think it was sufficient.
So we looked at other cases; for example, being able to conduct
a large stability operation, conduct a major theater war, and
provide adequate support to the homeland at the same time. We
looked at another case that involved a major stability
operation, a medium-sized counterinsurgency operation, long-
duration deterrence in another theater, and extended homeland
support.
So the point is we need to test the force to make sure that
we have explored the full range of possibilities in the future,
and we draw greater insight as to the different kinds of
stresses on the force that we may experience. That has
positioned us to better invest in the capabilities, the
capacity, and the versatility that we will need for the future.
The Chairman. Don't you think you need a much larger Army
and a much larger Marine Corps to do all that you envision?
Combat skills are perishable, I am told. And to train someone
up to do--to be a first-class fighter in a guerrilla-type
warfare and then to transfer that person, that squad, that
platoon, that company into a major force-on-force where tanks
and artillery are used extensively, wouldn't you have an awful
hard time transitioning that soldier or Marine, that ground
fighter?
Admiral Stanley. Mr. Chairman, the way I would respond is
the joint force needs to have these capabilities. Each portion
of the force does not require them. Obviously we emphasize
certain capabilities in different portions of force. We don't
expect our ground forces to be able to operate ships at sea as
an example. Our Special Operations forces are very well-
skilled.
One of the challenges we face is learning from the lessons
that we have gained during the current conflict, which makes us
really the best counterinsurgency force in the world. How do we
then incorporate those into our doctrine so that we maintain
those skills and at the same time not move our capabilities
away from the ability to deal with one or two regional
aggressors?
The Chairman. What are they teaching in the war colleges?
Admiral Stanley. Sir, it is a combination. We are starting
to get these lessons into the war colleges. Specifically I
can't address it, but I would recommend that each one of the
services discuss that. There are initiatives to make this part
of our educational curriculum.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, could I add a point if I may? One
of the reasons we put such emphasis on eventually getting to a
more sustainable dwell time, deployment-to-dwell-time ratio, is
not only to reduce stress on members of the service and their
families but to increase the time at home for a broader range
of training, to be able to reacquire some of the more
perishable skill sets that may be lost, you know, in time
deployed on a particular operation. So that is one of the
driving factors towards getting to a more sustainable rotation.
The Chairman. Has there been a study or an analysis of the
size of the Army or Marines to fully contemplate doing what we
are doing today plus a major force-on-force conflict?
Admiral Stanley. You are touching on what I consider one of
the significant shifts in this QDR, and Secretary Flournoy has
already addressed it, but the idea of we didn't just pick a
timeframe just beyond the Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP],
line up two major aggressors or pick a couple of scenarios and
plan for the capabilities required for those scenarios. We now
recognize that what we need to do in this uncertain future is
to plan in a temporal aspect. So we plan for today and tomorrow
across this whole spectrum of capabilities.
The Chairman. That doesn't really answer the question I put
to you.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. This does concern me a great deal. I cited
yesterday when the Secretary and Admiral Mullen were testifying
the 12 military contingencies we had since 1977 in this
country, none of which were anticipated, none of them, and over
the next 30-plus years, I hope we don't have any. But as sure
as God made little green apples, there will be some out there
that we don't anticipate, and that is why I am concerned about
the size, the education, the training, and the readiness to do
all these things.
Admiral.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. I think your concern is well
founded, and I won't tell you that there is no risk there.
The Chairman. I don't want to be in a position ten years
from now to say, hey, Admiral Stanley, I told you so.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. The specific answer to your
question is yes, we have done a study. The scenario cases that
we picked--and again there are three scenario cases that we
tested the force against; so instead of just building for a
capability level, we tested the force against three different
visions of the future. That emphasizes the flexibility of the
force that we require. The size of the ground forces was part
of that, and the size of the force tested satisfactorily
against those three different scenario cases.
The Chairman. Ms. Fox, your testimony is to the effect that
we are looking to the future. However, I do notice a
substantial cut in research and development [R&D]. I think the
figure you gave us is about a ten percent cut in research and
development. Is that not the seed corn for future conflicts?
Ms. Fox. Mr. Chairman, I don't have the exact cut numbers
with me today, so I can't comment on the number. But I can tell
you that R&D absolutely follows procurement. So at times when
we are investing a lot in R&D, we are looking at new systems
and sometimes then it goes down as we start to transition to
procurement. When you look out I think that you will see that
R&D is a major part. For example, in the aviation plan that we
submitted, there is a significant investment in R&D.
Admiral Stanley. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment on
that? Your seed corn comment deals with, in my mind, science
and technology. And actually this budget request increases the
investment we are making in science and technology, which is a
subset of R&D. The actual R&D reductions that you are talking
about is principally one program, Joint Strike Fighter. Even
though Joint Strike Fighter got additional investment in R&D
over what was planned, there was a program reduction associated
with the planned program. So there is both an increase to our
Joint Strike Fighter and a reduction.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In following up on what the chairman was addressing, would
one of those scenarios, one of those three scenarios maybe
include having the present forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and
maybe having a major incursion or blowup in Korea? How would we
handle that?
Secretary Flournoy. We did look at that kind of scenario.
And while I don't want to get into classified details in this
setting, what I can say to you is that in many of those cases
we found that a lot of the U.S. contribution would be heavy air
and naval intensive, and there was certainly adequate flex in
our forces to provide that assistance to allies on the ground
who were engaged.
Mr. McKeon. Okay. Are we----
The Chairman. May I interrupt?
Secretary Flournoy. We would be happy to come brief you in
a classified setting on the detailed scenario analysis that
underscores----
The Chairman. If you will yield for just a moment----
Mr. McKeon. You bet.
The Chairman. It sounds like you are not going to put boots
on the ground but rely on the Navy and Air Force in such
situations. Is that the case?
Admiral Stanley. Again we did three cases. Each case had
different combinations of scenarios in it. So it is not three
scenarios. It is three separate scenario cases that include
multiple scenarios. Was Korea a part of it? Yes. OK, do we put
boots on the ground in Korea? Yes. The forces that----
Mr. McKeon. More than we have there right now?
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir.
Mr. McKeon. Where would they come from?
Admiral Stanley. It is from--so the question is when is the
operation actually conducted? We plan on the reduction of Iraq
forces----
Mr. McKeon. Well, I guess the question I have, Mr.
Chairman, is say this happened tomorrow.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir.
Mr. McKeon. We still have the forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Are we going to start loading them on planes and--
? I mean if this happened, and again I understand not wanting
to talk in details here, but the overall concept I think that
the chairman first addressed is we have been concerned about
moving--giving the troops adequate time at home and we are not
to that point yet. So it means we are already stretched pretty
thin. And then to say we could have two scenarios at the same
time going on and we would be able to match, I just think--I
would like to see that in a closed session----
Admiral Stanley. I want to be clear. In the near term the
demand on the force is such that there is significant stress
so----
Mr. McKeon. And significant risk.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. Another operation in the near-
term the size of a Korea would require the Nation to mobilize,
okay? It would take away our ability to rotate the forces, even
as little as we are now, one to one. Would we still prevail?
Yes. Would there be increased losses? Yes.
Mr. McKeon. Okay. If we could follow that up in a
classified, I would really like to do that.
Let me get to another point. The QDR highlights three areas
of operational risk: One, enabling capabilities; two, the
building of partnership capacity; and three, securing DOD
systems in cyberspace.
Are there any other areas of operational risk?
Secretary Flournoy. Those are the primary areas that we
identified, sir. And what we are referring to there is that if
we fail to make the recommended investments in these areas we
would be as a result accepting higher levels of risk. There are
other kinds of risk that the QDR talks about, institutional
force management and future challenges, but those were the
primary three operational risks we identified.
Mr. McKeon. Do our forward-deployed forces face operational
risk in anti-access environments, in the air and the sea?
Secretary Flournoy. We believe there are significant
challenges in the anti-access domain. And part of what we did,
we had a group within the QDR that focused on that, and we have
recommended a number of targeted investments that you will find
in the budget towards bolstering U.S. capabilities to deal in
that environment. We are investing in long-range strike
capabilities, developing a joint air-sea battle concept,
developing underwater unmanned vehicles and capabilities,
investing in the robustness of C4ISR [command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance], space, cyberspace, and so forth. And each of
those you can find in the budget, and I am sure Ms. Fox could
speak to those in more detail if you are interested.
Mr. McKeon. I see that we are cutting back the Air Force;
we are not growing the Navy sufficiently, I don't see, to meet
these risks. And so I just have some real concerns there in
this area.
One other point, Mr. Chairman. The force structure outlined
in the QDR through 2015 is very similar to the force structure
of the current force. Could you please highlight the most
significant changes that would carry us out in the future?
Secretary Flournoy. I think again the force structure
details some changes in platform numbers, and so forth, and we
are making substantial investments in new platforms, everything
from the F-35. We are on a path to eventually invest in a new
bomber once our study is complete. New SSBN, new UAVs,
underwater warfare capability ships, Army combat vehicles, and
so forth. But I would highlight what is even more important
than the platforms is the investment in the new technologies
and capabilities that are going on those platforms. Aegis is a
great example. There is the ship, which is a platform, but what
is really making the difference is things like ballistic
missile defense system that we are putting on, the radar, the
ISR, and so forth. So a lot of this QDR is investing not only
in the platforms, but really ensuring that we have the most
cutting edge capabilities on those platforms to enhance their
capability and enable us to really operate in fundamentally new
ways.
Mr. McKeon. So cutting back the number of planes, cutting
back the number of ships is offset by putting new technology on
the ships and planes that we have?
Secretary Flournoy. That is not exactly what I said. I
would like to ask both the Admiral or Dr. Fox to jump in here
because they have done most of the force structure analysis.
Admiral Stanley. So the 30-year shipbuilding plan actually
provides for growth in the Navy over the size of the Navy we
have today.
Mr. McKeon. Thirty-year?
Admiral Stanley. Thirty-year shipbuilding plan, and that
actually happens across the FYDP. There is some growth in the
size of the Navy.
Mr. McKeon. I think the Secretary said yesterday that he
felt pretty good about the very, very near future, and when you
get five years out, he said he felt pretty good, and then
longer than that is fantasy. I believe that was his quote.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. Clearly who knows what the
affordability is going to be out in that timeframe or what our
capability requirements will be. It is a projection, and I
won't give it any more credit than that. In the FYDP timeframe,
the five-year period that you referred to, there is some growth
in the size of the Navy. There is also some reduction in the
number of combat coded aircraft in the Air Force, as you have
discussed. We are shifting the focus over to the unmanned
platforms such as the Predator and Reaper, which give us an
attack capability we haven't had in the past. It is also one
that has proven very critical to the ongoing operations. So we
think it is a good and prudent investment. So the size of the
force, considering that new addition, is slightly smaller but
it is not significant.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral, when we do we get to the 331-ship Navy?
Admiral Stanley. Three hundred and thirteen is the Navy's
current plan, and it is out far beyond the FYDP, sir.
The Chairman. Say that again?
Admiral Stanley. Three hundred and thirteen I believe is
the----
The Chairman. Three hundred and thirteen, yes, sir.
Admiral Stanley [continuing]. Current plan and it is beyond
the FYDP.
Ms. Fox. Sir, if I could add, actually in the plan it has
achieved about in 2020, so 2020, which is not in the fantasy
land of the 30-year plan and it is more in the----
The Chairman. For a lot of us, it is fantasy land.
Ms. Fox. Yes, sir. Well, I understand. But we get to about
300 ships across the FYDP, and we are able to sustain that for
a while. It is challenging in the mid-term with the SSBN, but
it is in the plan, you will see.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for joining us today, and I know it has
taken time to prepare for this report today. But my question is
that the QDR states that continued relationships with the
European Command are integral to our Nation's security.
Additionally, now that AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] has been
established as a separate combatant command, partnership with
key African nations would be the foundation of our success in
Africa.
With this in mind, what manpower and funding is needed in
these two areas to ensure that these strategic partnerships
would be successful? And the reason I ask that, when you were
testifying, you said that one of the things that we need to do
is to protect our people. We need to tie that to see what we
are doing because one of the weakest points that we have has
been in gathering human intelligence. Are we providing enough
schools, linguistic schools, and trying to nourish those areas
to the point where we would be in a position to be able to get
human intelligence? And maybe you can elaborate a little on
that today.
Secretary Flournoy. Let me just speak to underscore the
importance of the topic and then turn to my colleagues to fill
in some of the manning and programmatic details. We do believe,
the Secretary believes, that building the capacity of partner
states in places like Europe and very much in Africa is a
critical element of protecting U.S. interests. The more we
build partner capacity, the more they can operate alongside us
when we have common interests under threat, the more they can
deal with their own security environment in their neighborhood.
We are investing in the ability of the force, not only Special
Operations who have traditionally had these missions, but the
capability of the general purpose force to really partake in
that partner capacity building, particularly through language
and culture training, also through a sort of ``train the
trainer'' concept even within the general purpose forces.
But I would like to offer it to--I don't know--Christine to
address.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Ms. Fox. Sir, we did take language and culture training
very seriously in this program in support of the QDR. We have
added significant funding to allow us to, for example, increase
the Afghanistan-Pakistan--what is called the Hands Program,
which is a language and training program that looks at
immersion language training, and it ties careers to that
region. We do expect that program to be broadened beyond
Afghanistan, Pakistan, as we can. We have also done things like
make a plan that by fiscal year 2015 the Special Operations,
everything will be out of OCO [overseas contingency operations]
and into the base because we see that as an enduring need.
These language programs also we see as base kinds of funding
issues because of the enduring importance.
Admiral Stanley. Sir, the other thing I would offer is the
size of the Africa command staff is around 1,200. If I remember
correctly, we have fully staffed it. It is manned for that. We
expect that to continue to evolve as the mission is better
defined. And I would also highlight that it is not just the
size of Africa Command that is important here, it is the forces
that Africa Command has available to execute its mission. So
the forces are allocated to Africa Command to execute its
mission. And in the near-term, because of the stress on the
force that we have today, there won't be many forces for Africa
Command. As we are able to come out of Iraq, conduct the
responsible drawdown we have talked about, that will free up
forces. It will help us execute this vision for Africa.
Mr. Ortiz. So you do feel very comfortable that what you
have included in the QDR you are comfortable with it, that it
will do the job, protect our people, by getting the
intelligence and do what we have to do?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes. This is an area of focus and
investment. I think the capability and the capacity is going to
improve over time. Obviously, a lot of it lies outside of the
Department of Defense and includes the broader intelligence
community, but that has very much been a focus.
Mr. Ortiz. My time is up. Thank you so much.
The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry, please.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Flournoy, you have followed all of the QDRs since the first
one, and you know that often there are at least two criticisms
of QDRs. Number one is it is budget driven, not threat driven,
not related to strategy; it is more of a justification for what
the Administration was planning to do anyway rather than
setting a new course. Same criticism you often hear is it is
not really a 20-year focus document as the statute requires.
And I have read a number of criticisms about this QDR that
follows along the same line. I guess my question is, is the
statute unrealistic in what it is asking a Department of
Defense to do? I mean, can we ever have a four-year strategy
document that is based on strategy and threats, not constrained
by budgets? Can we ever look out 20 years in a document that
has to get the approval all around that gigantic building? Is
it unrealistic to expect what the law says?
Secretary Flournoy. I don't think it is unrealistic. But
what I would say is that the art of strategy is really matching
ends, ways, and means. And so what I like to say is the QDRs,
this QDR, is strategy-driven and resource-informed, meaning it
is not just a laundry list, a wish list of everything we would
like to do if we were totally unconstrained, it is a very clear
direction on strategy and guidance, but then it is informed by
resources to frame the decisions that we need to make as a
country, the tradeoffs that we need to make as a country, given
that we don't have unlimited resources for national security.
We did--we weren't constrained by that in the sense that we
looked at lots of alternatives that would increase top line,
that would shift resources, and so forth. And so the tradeoffs
of the choices of the QDR were informed by resources but not
overly constrained by them.
In terms of the longer-term perspective, our scenarios did
look out into the future. 2016 was one snapshot. 2028 was
another. And we pulled those insights forward to really focus
on refining the plans for the FYDP. That said once you get
beyond the FYDP in terms of the actual--you certainly need to
get beyond the FYDP for capability investment. Trying to map
out 30 years of force structure is extremely difficult given
that the world will change, your capability opportunities will
change, lots of things will change. So the vision is very clear
in the near- to mid-term and it is more aspirational in the
long-term.
Mr. Thornberry. I am thinking of the Chairman's questions
about the appropriate size of the various services, and it does
seem to me that it makes it more difficult for us to do our job
and make those tradeoffs about what we are willing to accept
more risk for, less risk for when you already build the budget
constraints into the beginning of the QDR.
So you don't even know what you would like to have to deal
with those contingencies, you already make those tradeoffs. And
so we are kind of in a position of take it or leave, you know,
this thing that you put in front of us. And again, my idea, my
conception is a strategy/threat-informed document, and then
through the political process in the yearly appropriation
authorization bills we may help with the President of course
with the Administration, make those tradeoffs.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could, again, I don't think we
built in the constraints in the front end. And I think once we
have a chance to brief you on the analysis, what we did is we,
when we translated the strategy into program and budget we made
some choices and tradeoffs. But one of the things briefing you
on the analysis will do is make that transparent to you, and
you all can decide whether you agree with the tradeoffs that we
made or whether you would make them differently. We hope we
will make a compelling enough case to convince you that we made
them the right way.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask related to that, there has been
a fair amount of talk about the internal red team by General
Madison and Andy Marshall. Did they produce documents or
product? And if so, can we see those?
Secretary Flournoy. They did produce a couple of memos to
the Secretary that were very much discussed and used in the
process. I will have to check on availability in terms of
whether they are treated as predecisional documents or not. But
let me get the question to that and come back to you, sir. We
would certainly like to share as much as we possibly can.
Mr. Thornberry. I think that would be helpful. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Taylor, the
gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of
you for being here. Admiral, I am going to direct my remarks at
you, to you. People often ask me what is the downside of term
limits and I answer, well, it takes a while to figure out when
someone is spitting in your ear and telling you it is raining,
particularly if they got a lot of gold on their sleeve. And for
quite a few years, I think that people sitting in that chair
have been spitting in my ear telling me it is raining when it
comes to getting a 313-ship Navy, including this year. This
year's budget request, I think we are in about 286 ships,
about.
Since Vern Clark, he was saying we needed at least 320. And
Admiral Mullen said a very minimum of 313, the number you
quoted. And now you are saying we are not going to fix this for
possibly two presidencies. You asked for nine ships to be put
in this year's budget be constructed. We are going to
commission nine ships. But you have also asked to decommission
nine ships. The net result of that is zero for this year. It is
not getting any better.
And so there are several ways to address that. Number one,
if those frigates are good enough to give to another nation,
why aren't they good enough to keep in the fleet for a few more
years. Particularly for a mission like piracy off of Somalia or
keeping the small boats away from our ships as they transit off
of Iran, I would think they would be ideally suited.
So why does it make sense to take a ship that is good
enough to give to an ally and retire it today if we need bodies
out in the sea? The second thing, you know, if a petty officer
third-class can figure out that we have a vulnerability in the
Pacific to having our eight oilers sunk in a first-move strike.
If the oilers don't sail, then the destroyers and the cruisers
don't sail, because they have to refuel every three to five
days. If the destroyers and the cruisers don't sail, then the
carrier can't sail alone. Where are you addressing that in the
QDR? That is a vulnerability that I guarantee Admiral Wu is
aware of, a petty officer third-class is aware of, so why
aren't we addressing it. That is a conventional threat again
that you don't mention whatsoever, and it needs to be
addressed. And I very much agree with Secretary Mabus's desire
to minimize the dependence on foreign oil. But he does so by
just using biofuels. You have still got that threat; you have
still got to deliver that biofuel. And I think the Seapower
Subcommittee, whether it is Chairman Bartlett or myself, has
made it abundantly clear that whenever possible, we want to
minimize that threat by putting nuclear power on those ships. I
don't see any effort on the part of the Navy to do that.
So the third thing is I just had a quick conversation with
our chairman and I just want to put a shot across your bow.
Expect language from this committee that says for every surface
combatant you want to retire, you had best have two new ones in
the budget because if you won't do what is a logical thing to
do on your own, then it is going to take a congressional
mandate to do it. So I would like to hear you respond on that
please.
Admiral Stanley. Sir, the first issue really is a broad
issue obviously. And first off, I am going to encourage you to
address this with the Navy. They will be able to give you a
much more definitive answer. You specifically talked about the
retirement of the FFGs, and was that the right thing, given
that we are below a 313-ship Navy. What I would say is that the
FFGs don't have the capability that we want in this flexible
force that we are looking for. You specifically spoke about
their capability being sufficient for specific operations like
pirate operations and such. And that is certainly valid. But
what we are looking for is a force that is just flexible across
a wide range of contingencies that would be more applicable to
our vision for the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS]. The size of the
force really sets the rotational forward presence posture that
we can have. To keep the same number of ships forward with a
smaller force requires the same thing that the Army is doing
right now, less time in dwell, okay. So there is a risk there.
If we are able to have a larger force, afford a larger force,
there is less risk, so I don't argue the point.
As far as how are we going to protect the force, this gets
into the Navy's plan for sea shield. That is some of the
capabilities we are trying to add to the platforms that are
going to be part of the battle group to help protect, you
specifically highlighted oilers. As far as your point on
nuclear power, nuclear power is very important to us. It is
also very expensive. It is an upfront decision versus a long-
term investment. So additional nuclear power is good, it is a
very flexible power source for our fleet but it is expensive,
sir, and I understand your push from the committee.
The Chairman. This needs a lot more thought, Admiral, and I
think we are going to do it on this side if it is not going to
be done on your side. Randy Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary, good
to see you. And you mentioned that we did not have unlimited
resources and the Chairman mentioned something wisely said that
this is about prudent tradeoffs in resources. I am sure all
three of you would agree with that. Also you would agree that
in part you are here to help us make those prudent tradeoffs in
terms of resources. Well, some facts that we have had over the
recent hearings are you have just heard from our shipbuilding
plan we are probably a $2.0 billion to $4.0 billion shortfall
annually.
OMB [Office of Management and Budget] says that currently,
based on the track run, we are probably looking at about 270
ships in the Navy. We know the Chinese now have 290 ships. We
know we have got a $3.0 billion shortfall on the maintenance
needs at our shipyards if we are to maintain our ships. If we
can't maintain them, we can't get to the goals that we have. We
know from testimony we had yesterday we have got an $18.0
billion shortfall on our F-18 strike fighters. But assume that
is too high. Let's take a third of that and just say $6.0
billion.
The other thing we know that China has gone ahead of us now
on the number of ships in their Navy. They have increased their
military spending again by 14.9 percent, they have got 128 acts
of cyber aggression per minute tied to Chinese Internet sites,
they have destroyed a PRC [People's Republic of China] weather
satellite, they are developing kinetic and directed energy
weapons for ASAT [anti-satellite] purposes, and they account
for 93 percent of the global supply of rare elements used in
technologies, in particular guidance systems for missiles, and
yet the White House National Security Council [NSC] that works
with you in developing the QDR downgraded China to a priority
two level for intelligence against the protest over
intelligence chiefs because of an allocation of resources. Now,
the reason I ask you that is because yesterday Admiral Mullen
also talked about moving a carrier to Mayport, Florida, and he
based it on the strategic dispersal plan. And in the strategic
dispersal plan it was based on three things. First of all, the
possibility of an accident. Well, for an accident like that to
occur we are talking about a one mile by 60-foot high debris
pattern. Just isn't going to happen.
The second thing was natural disasters. And if we could put
up on the screen this plan. That is a site and a chart of
hurricanes hitting Hampton Roads, which could be a natural
disaster. Now if you would put up chart two. That is a site of
them hitting Mayport, and it is a huge difference between the
two of them, so it is not a natural disaster.
So the third thing is a nuclear attack that could happen.
But if that risk there is for a nuclear attack, I am far more
concerned about the 1.7 million people living in Hampton Roads
than I am with the carrier, and maybe we should be allocating
dollars and cents to beefing up our sensors in a preventive
attack there.
So my question for you, now, Madam Secretary, allocate for
us if we have those limited resources, if I have got that
shortfall that I am looking at in shipbuilding, in maintenance
needs, in our strike fighters, and I can't do the intelligence
needs that I need for China, and then I am talking about as
much as $1.0 billion to Mayport, allocate for me the priority
between those items if we have limited dollars or do we just
do, as the Chairman, I will tell you he did yesterday, he just
punted it. And basically when you punt it, it means it is just
raw political power as opposed to an analysis of what we do.
How would you allocate those priorities of spending needs in
the items that I have just listed for you?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would come at this by saying,
first and foremost, that we have taken into account the
military investments of a number of countries, including China.
And in the QDR we have put a real emphasis on ensuring that we
have the capabilities we will need in the future to operate
effectively on the global commons in anti-access environments.
And so you will see very clear investments in long range strike
capabilities, in subsurface warfare, in resiliency of our
basing infrastructure, in space assets, in cyber assets----
Mr. Forbes. My point is that we have shortfalls in these
areas. How would you allocate the resources in a priority one,
two, three, four, five between the ones that I have just listed
to you, which we all agree are shortfalls?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I think the prioritization
relative across the capabilities is laid out in great detail in
this report.
Mr. Forbes. Madam Secretary, that is why you are here. I am
asking you if you can lay it out for me in these priorities
that I have given to you, or do we just simply say we are not
going to do that, we are going to leave it to raw power and how
that happens. What are those priorities between the shortfalls
that I have given to you if we can come up with an extra couple
of billion dollars?
Secretary Flournoy. Again, I wouldn't do it platform by
platform, I would do it by capability to deal with specific
risks and challenges, and that is the analysis that we have
done. Again, a lot of that gets into very classified arenas. I
would like to come back and brief you on exactly those
tradeoffs and how we have made them. But it is best done with
the scenarios and discussions of specific countries and
challenges.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here. Madam Secretary, on page 71 of your report you talk
about the interagency process. I am just going to read this
paragraph. ``Finally, the Department of Defense will continue
to advocate for an improved interagency strategic planning
process that makes optimal use of all national instruments of
statecraft. The complexity of 21st century conflicts demands
that the U.S. Government significantly improve interagency
comprehensive assessments, analysis, planning, and execution
for whole-of-government operations, including systems to
monitor and evaluate those operations in order to advance U.S.
national interests. One solution is to allocate additional
resources across the government and fully implement the
national security professional (NSP) program to improve cross-
agency training, education and professional experience
opportunities. This will help foster a common approach to
strategic and operational planning and implementation,
improving prospects for success in future contingencies.'' That
is a paragraph from your report on page 71. Mr. Thornberry made
mention of this, the QDR being a statute requirement for the
Department of Defense.
Perhaps this will come from your think tank experience and
your experience now after one year on the job. And my only
question is, you can have the remainder of my time to talk
about it, would we better help our country rather than have a
Quadrennial Defense Review to have a Quadrennial National
Security Review that required all the agencies of government to
put their heads together and present us with a document that
got into this balancing of resources and strategy that involved
all of the agencies? And you can take the remainder of my time
to discuss it.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, thank you very much. This is a
topic near and dear to my heart. I actually think we need both.
I think it would be very helpful to have a mandate to do a
Quadrennial National Security Review and also a QDR. Absent
that requirement I would say this Administration has sort of
taken upon itself to conduct the national security strategy
review, which is almost complete, the QDR, the QDDR, which is
the Diplomacy and Development Review that State is conducting,
a QHSR, which is the homeland security review, an intelligence
review and a number of other space and nuclear, cyber and so
forth.
We have done those in parallel, and we have done those,
even though we are not required to do so, in a highly
interagency fashion. I think this QDR had much more interagency
transparency and participation and input than any of its
predecessors. And the value of that is that when it comes time
to putting forward departmental budgets we are actually getting
a lot more synergy across departments and starting to get a
more comprehensive and balanced approach. One of the things you
will hear Secretary Gates consistently advocate for is greater
investment in our civilian partner agencies, particularly the
State Department and USAID [U.S. Agency for International
Development], to build up their professional cadre, to build up
their expeditionary capability so that they can operate more
effectively alongside the U.S. military when it is deployed to
defend our interest overseas.
Dr. Snyder. If we were to do a statutory requirement for a
Quadrennial National Security Review, it sounds to me like what
you all have done is you have got reports from the stovepipes.
You say you thought it would be helpful. What would you suggest
we put in such a requirement?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, the reporting requirements are in
stovepipes, that is true. But what we have tried to do is put
together a process that is forced integration. So for example,
when you see assumptions about homeland security in the QDR,
they will match the planning assumptions that are in the QHSR
that comes out of the Department of Homeland Security. But a
statutory requirement would sort of formalize what we have been
de facto working towards in our process, which is greater
integration across agency programs and budgets.
Dr. Snyder. My result was a document that would have more
than one paragraph on interagency.
Secretary Flournoy. I think the challenge would be how
would Congress receive and deal with that given the cross-
jurisdictional nature of a lot of the results that would come
out of a review like that.
Dr. Snyder. I am sure the quality of the report would be so
good that we would receive it well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, last
October, I joined a letter with my colleagues to the Secretary
of Defense urging that he take steps to preserve the Minuteman
III industrial base with regard to the sustainment of Minuteman
III system through the year 2030, which is, as you know, the
program of record within the Air Force. You replied on behalf
of the Secretary, and I have the letter that was back in
November you sent me. And in your reply, you indicated that the
Department of Defense would be in consultation with the
Departments of State and Energy and undertaking a Nuclear
Posture Review and this review would address that issue, which
is supposed to come out later on this spring I understand.
I was comforted to know at least the Departments of State
and Energy were consulting with Defense on this vital issue. My
question is what about NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration]. To your knowledge--I asked the Secretary
yesterday and he had no knowledge of any consultation. But to
your knowledge has the Department of Defense consulted with
NASA or vice versa, has NASA consulted with the Department of
Defense on the 2011 budget impacts on the defense industrial
base with regard to the large-scale solid rocket motor [SRM]
production.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I believe those consultations have
happened in the context of both the development of the national
space policy and the space posture review which is going on in
parallel with the----
Mr. Bishop. On what level are those discussions held?
Secretary Flournoy. I think at working level so far. The
Space Posture Review is a little bit behind the QDR. It is
going to be released in June. The Nuclear Posture Review is a
little farther ahead. That will come out March 1st.
Mr. Bishop. That is a good thing to hear. But I also have
in here the part of the solid rocket motor capabilities report
to Congress that was last June. And in that in the executive
summary on page 47 it says delays in the NASA Ares program
would have a significant negative impact on the large solid
rocket motor prime contractors industrial base and on some of
the SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers. So the
key phrase was ``significant negative impact.''
So the question is this report said a delay in NASA's Ares
program would have a significant negative impact. What would
the cancellation of the Ares program have if the
Administration's recommendation goes through as part of the
NASA budget. If a delay is a significant negative impact on
solid rocket motor industrial base, what is an outright
cancellation going to do to the solid rocket industrial base?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I will have to get back to you
with an answer on that. I do not have an answer off the top of
my head, but I am happy to do that.
Mr. Bishop. Will the Nuclear Posture Review you mentioned
in reply to the letter and you just talked about address the
impacts on the industrial base.
Secretary Flournoy. I am sorry, could you repeat the
question?
Mr. Bishop. The review that you are talking about having
the posture review that you mentioned earlier, will this
address NASA's impact on the solid rocket motor industrial
base?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, this issue will be addressed in
the NPR, and it will probably be also mentioned in the Space
Posture Review.
Mr. Bishop. I appreciate that very much. That is very
important to me. And once again, if a delay is a significant
impact, a cancellation has got to be a little bit more than a
significant impact.
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I yield back Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
the report and for your testimony. It would be very helpful to
me, and I think the committee to hear just a sort of one, two,
three, four list of ways in which we are changing course from
the prior QDR, the prior plan. I imagine you could do that
somewhat off the top of your heads. You know, to me, at least
since you are so familiar with this you could say to me at
least I think the most significant changes are one, two, three.
But it would be very helpful to us if you could maybe prepare a
spreadsheet that details the ways in which we are changing
directions in this new QDR compared to where we were.
The committee has a good sense, you know, year to year, of
where we are headed and what the major trends are, and what we
need to do in our planning to anticipate the, you know meeting
the future needs of defense. And so since we know where we are
it would be very helpful if you just sort of told us how this
changes things. Madam Secretary.
Secretary Flournoy. We are happy to come back to you with a
written response. But I will just speak from my perspective. I
think there are several things. One is the emphasis that has
been placed on institutionalizing lessons-learned from the last
eight years of experience and ensuring that we actually invest
in the kinds of enabling capabilities that give the force real
agility both today and in the future. That emphasis on agility
and enablers is really very different. Second, to the extent
that we look across the full range of conflict and into the
future, the emphasis on asymmetric approaches, the kinds of
warfare that are sort of outside of the canonical conventional
paradigm but that we think are much more likely to define the
future operating environment, the QDR's emphasis on that is
different.
The third thing I would cite is elevating the emphasis on
taking care of our people, not just--it is something that every
QDR says, but to actually make it a strategic imperative and a
strategic objective in our strategy and to put program and
budget behind that, I think that is very new. I will invite the
Admiral and Dr. Fox to also offer their answers.
Admiral Stanley. I would reemphasize something I said
earlier, which is the idea of the recognition in the priority
of temporal planning in our capabilities development. What we
need for a time period beyond the FYDP is different than what
we need today. That is a huge change, and it quite honestly
excites me, and I think it is the right thing for our Nation to
be pursuing. The second thing I would emphasize is the
recognition of the importance of what I would call Phase Zero
and Phase One operations, our peacetime operations, rotational
presence, partner capacity building, those types of operations.
A small investment here can prevent the wartime requirement in
the future. So I think that is a huge shift.
Mr. Marshall. If I can quickly interrupt. This is a
consistent theme with me trying to encourage as many dollars as
possible to be in our defense budget, accomplishing those kinds
of objectives, because we just politically cannot defend them
when they are in State and elsewhere. Unless they are described
as, you know, those kinds of investors are being described as
developing our security, furthering our security interest, they
are just not fundable in the long-term. Too easy to attack.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. And the last thing that I would
emphasize is the idea of the rotational requirement and how
important it is for us to be out there not just in the Navy,
but across all of the services engaging with our allies and
partners in building those security--that is it, sir.
Ms. Fox. Sir, I would only reemphasize the importance of
the enablers as emphasized in the QDR and in the program,
whether it is unmanned aircraft or ISR, electronic warfare or
language and authorities as you were just describing. I think
all of those enablers have been identified in the current wars
that we are in as being vital and we anticipate that they will
be vital in the long-term. The other very important emphasis of
the QDR is the need for flexible adaptable forces because the
future is so uncertain, as many of you identify.
Mr. Marshall. If I could, in just the last couple of--if in
coming back to us with something in writing you could
prioritize these. You know, here are the biggest changes to the
smallest changes and cover them in some detail, here is where
we were, here is what we are changing, and maybe add this is
why we think these changes are terribly important. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, just a
comment. I want to express a concern about the continuation of
a policy from the last Administration that seems to rely on
nation-building as a principal tool for achieving America's
national security objectives. And Mr. Chairman, I think you
raised a point about whether or not counterinsurgency warfare
has a detrimental effect on our conventional war fighting
capabilities. As someone who fought, was a combat leader in the
first Gulf War, but also served in the war in Iraq in 2005 and
2006, I want to tell you it definitely does have an eroding
effect on the conventional combat capabilities of our ground
forces in their inability to exercise their combined arms
capacities, and I think that that is a very significant thing.
I want to ask a question in concern about the United States
Marine Corps and the future and that, whether or not the United
States Marine Corps is just going to be a second land army or
whether or not in your view in this QDR is there a significant
emphasis on amphibious warfare, is there enough emphasis or a
significant emphasis on forced entry capability, and I wonder
if you can address that, as well as what in your mind, I have a
concern that there is not enough emphasis on this, what will
happen in terms of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle [EFV] and
in terms of platforms such as our amphib Navy, and I wonder if
you can address that?
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. First off, does the QDR
emphasize amphibious warfare, and does this budget support it.
I think the answer to that is yes, that there is clear
agreement that we will require forced entry capability for the
Nation for the future and continues to invest in that. The
question really gets at how much is required, and that is much
harder.
And you know, we look at the different scenarios and how
they stack up to try to determine what the size of that
capability needs to be. I can tell you that the professional
military advice of the commandant is that the Marine Corps is
too heavy. We have to win today's war, he is not trying to say
that, but as that completes he wants to restore the mobility
and the rapid deployability of the Marine Corps has been just a
core ethic. EFV plays into that. The program was delayed a
year, as I am sure you are aware. That was viewed as a prudent
risk reduction effort, not as a shift away from EFV. So my
sense is amphibious warfare is here with us, it will continue
to be a supporter, and EFV will be a part of it.
Mr. Coffman. As well as forced entry capability?
Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Very well. I just want to echo from my first
statement that I believe that we can influence the affairs in a
given region, a failed nation-state, by using our special
operations capability as opposed to using our conventional
warfare capability, and I hope that that is something that is
seriously looked at. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from
Guam, Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for your testimonies today. I want to ask a few questions as
the QDR relates to the military buildup on Guam. And I note,
that the QDR states that DOD plans to turn Guam into a hub for
security activities in the region. I believe that this is a
smart strategic move on behalf of DOD. However, I would like to
get more details on just exactly what does this mean.
Does the DOD envision security above and beyond what is
already currently outlined in the DEIS [Draft Environmental
Impact Statement]. I am interested in learning about the
sequence of events for the military buildup on Guam given the
DOD's evolution of engagement with the government of Guam--or
the government of Japan by giving them flexibility to relook at
the international agreement. The community has serious concerns
about the EIS, and I think one of the key ways to mitigate
these concerns is to extend the buildup timeline so that we can
fix major issues in the EIS and also give Japan time to
implement their end of the bargain. Is this something that you
would consider, and if not, why not?
Secretary Flournoy. I think in the QDR we reaffirmed the
plans that are in place for Guam consistent with the
realignment agreement that we have reached with the government
of Japan. I think that given the change of administrations
there, we are very much interested in reaffirmation of their
commitment from their side. And as we get that we will be
refining the implementation details. I will also say that the
QDR has recognized the importance not only of Guam but the
western Pacific more broadly. And one of the follow-on studies
that is being done is to really look at how do we expand both
our training opportunities and our bilateral and multilateral
partnerships in that region with Guam as a real hub for that,
but looking at other areas as well in terms of increasing our
opportunities for training and for partnership.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. I have a couple more questions, so
I want to get through with this. Additionally, I note that the
QDR states finally the United States seeks to develop
additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the
Pacific area that respond to the need for readiness. Can you
elaborate on this finding in the QDR? What opportunities for
training are envisioned for the western Pacific? There is a
section 2837 of fiscal year 2010 NDAA that requires a report to
Congress on training and readiness requirements. Will this
report address specific training needs for the Marines in the
western Pacific while following the tenets of the QDR?
Secretary Flournoy. We are looking at the training
requirements first and foremost for the Marines that we will be
putting on Guam but also for the other naval and air forces
that are there. And again, this is part of a holistic review of
our posture with a particular emphasis on the western Pacific,
and we will be reporting back to you on those results in the
coming year.
Ms. Bordallo. Good. And my final question, I would like to
further clarify an answer that I got from Secretary Gates
yesterday about long-range strike capabilities, specifically
the development of the Next Generation Bomber. What is the
timeline for conducting and completing this study which is
outlined in the 30-year aviation plan?
Secretary Flournoy. I would like to defer that to Dr. Fox.
Ms. Fox. Thank you. The study is ongoing now and we expect
to have results in time to start to inform our activities for
Palm 12. This is going to be part of a family of capabilities
that we are going to be looking at and so we will be moving out
on that very smartly.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. All right. Thank you everyone, and
I yield back the rest of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Madam
Secretary, and Ms. Fox, I guess my concern and question will be
more in your area of expertise. I very much appreciate Admiral
Mullen yesterday, and Madam Secretary, you today talking about
your concern of family and troops and family and suicides,
divorces. I have Camp Lejeune in the district I represent, and
we do a tremendous amount of work. I have one young man who
served in the Marine Corps that is averaging about almost 10 to
15 new cases every month of families who are in a bad situation
from PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] to TBI [Traumatic
Brain Injury]. I hope as we go through this process of
reviewing the QDR, and I would like you and Ms. Fox to tell me,
are we really prepared for what is coming.
I had the opportunity, as any member would, you yourself,
to read the book, The $3 Trillion War by Joe Stiglitz realizing
that after they leave the military, they go into a veteran
health care system. That is not what this is all about. But the
numbers that I believe are growing as our men and women are
coming back from Afghanistan and Iraq, Admiral Mullen said
yesterday, five, six, seven deployments, and as long as we are
the deployments are going to be seven, eight and nine and they
come back with the families. One problem I have seen that
concerns me and it is not really the military's fault, but we
are not able to certainly recruit graduates of psychiatry
schools to go into the military, so we are having to contract
with other sources. In this report as we go into it, do you
feel, and I know you do feel that you have done the very best
job you can, but are we at a point that we are being realistic
with the stress on the serviceperson and the stress on the
family.
And let me give you one example, then I want you to
respond. This committee is probably tired of hearing me say
this, but it is a story that I will never forget. In 2007,
National Reading Day we were home for Easter, and I was able to
read to the kids at Johnson Elementary School at Camp Lejeune.
And as I closed, I let the kids ask me questions. The last one
I said this is my last question. And he looked at me and said
my daddy is not dead yet. That is out of the mouth of a six-
year-old child, my daddy is not dead yet. Please, in the minute
and a half that is left, tell me that we are doing what has to
be done, what needs to be done, or we need to do more. Thank
you.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, Secretary of Defense Gates is
personally seized with this set of issues. I think every time
he visits troops and families he comes back with a new list of
we have got to do better at X, Y and Z, and I have seen it
every time. I think one of the things we have done is intensify
the partnership between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] because it is really going
to take that team effort to deal with the full range of
challenges. It is a significant area of leadership, focus, and
attention and I think investment in the QDR. It is going to go
way beyond the QDR and continue to require that attention. But
let me just turn it over to Dr. Fox to give you some of the
programmatic details.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Ms. Fox. Sir, we have increased the unified medical budget
to over $50.0 billion and in this budget. And in that over
1,000 additional civilian full-time equivalents have been added
for Wounded Warrior programs such as the ones that are
necessary to treat the issues that you are concerned with, as
are we of course.
As Secretary Flournoy already talked, the electronic
records and information sharing that should help facilitate the
transition from the Defense Department to VA and to third-party
health care as well. We are looking at families very carefully
and we have $8.8 billion in the budget for family programs. A
noninsignificant effort, this year was to identify that our DOD
schools needed to be increased, and so we will be refurbishing
103 of those schools by 2015. And we are in the OCO adding
forces, 22,000 for the Army, and OCO that started last year
continues this year, also 4,400 additional forces funded out of
the OCO funds for Navy because of their individual augmentees.
And this is designed to start to relieve a little of the stress
on the force. The issue is, as the Secretary said, it is very,
very important to the Department.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman thank you for the time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Nye, the gentleman
from Virginia.
Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panelists for being here today. A number of members of this
committee today have expressed concerns about our force
structure and how to best go forward. In fact, Admiral Stanley,
you said today that a 313-ship Navy is far beyond the FYDP. In
a time when we are facing major shortfalls and key defense
programs such as shipbuilding and ship maintenance accounts and
interestingly enough, coming just four years after a background
which the Navy was unable to close many of the installations
that it had recommended closing, I was disappointed to note
that there is a sentence in the QDR that calls for homeporting
an East Coast-based nuclear aircraft carrier in Mayport, which,
of course, we know it would require building a fifth nuclear
carrier homeport in the United States, even at a time when our
carrier fleet is about to be reduced to its lowest level in
decades.
We saw a December 3rd draft of the QDR that suggested that
providing an alternative port to dock an East Coast aircraft
carrier to mitigate the risk of a manmade or natural disaster
was sensible, and then a few weeks later, we saw the final QDR
recommended that instead of an alternative port, actually a
homeport for an East Coast carrier be established at Mayport.
So my question, Madam Secretary, is, it appears that the
specific homeporting recommendation changed significantly from
the December draft that we saw. And what I am curious to know
is can you explain the evolution in that recommendation from
one that seemed to have all the strategic benefit at minimal
cost to one that seems to have presented substantial costs
around $1.0 billion by many calculations and operational
challenges with minimal additional strategic benefits. Can you
talk about the process by which that changed?
Secretary Flournoy. Sure, I am happy to, sir. Secretary
Gates has testified multiple times previously that he has been
troubled about the risk to the carrier fleet from either a
disaster or a catastrophic terrorist attack against Norfolk
given not only the concentration of the fleet there, but the
very unique nuclear support infrastructure there. So as part of
the QDR, we were directed to look at a couple of options. We
looked at two principal courses of action. One was to execute
the move to Mayport and actually homeport the carrier there,
another was to maintain Norfolk as the exclusive homeport and
simply have an alternative port.
Analysis was done on both of those, and the analysis
concluded that the strategic benefit of dispersing the aircraft
carrier fleet and the nuclear maintenance facilities across the
East Coast, that the benefits of that would outweigh the cost.
The truth is we have always had, certainly on the west coast
and on the East Coast, multiple carrier homeports. What has
changed is going from a mix of nuclear conventional to a
nuclear-only fleet.
And so now we have a single point of vulnerability that we
need to address. We believe that given the incredible
investment in the carrier fleet and how strategic an asset that
is that this is a, you know, this is a reasonable insurance
policy to safeguard the strategic value of that asset.
Mr. Nye. Let me just in following up on something that Mr.
Forbes raised in his questions, Admiral Mullen, in his
testimony yesterday essentially said that the risk analysis
done to support that decision was a judgment call and that the
idea of strategic dispersal applying to East Coast carriers
also applies equally to many other assets, for instance, our
East Coast nuclear missile submarines. What I would like to
know is if you agree with his assessment on that and whether
the DOD currently has plans to disperse all those other assets,
and can you comment on how the decision making process works to
decide how you prioritize the need to disperse those various
assets?
Secretary Flournoy. I think that we have not looked as
closely at the other assets. That may be work that we will need
to do in the future.
Mr. Nye. Just one last question. Again, following up on Mr.
Forbes' question on the prioritizing. And you said in your
testimony that the Secretary, together with Admiral Mullen, has
taken action to direct resources away from lower priority
programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be
addressed, and I don't think anyone would argue with that. But
can you tell me which are the lower priority programs that just
missed the cut to be included in the QDR?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, I think the Secretary has been
very clear on several that didn't make the cut. C-17s being one
given that we have every mobility study that the Department has
conducted in recent years, says that we have more than enough
of those particular planes. And if you go through the
cancellation, program cancellation list, that gives you a sense
of where we decided that we could afford not to pursue
additional capability.
Mr. Nye. My time is expired. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here today. Secretary Flournoy, I am pleased to see that the
QDR recognizes that caring for our wounded, ill, and injured
military members is the highest priority. The QDR includes
plans to improve the treatment of our wounded warriors in
several ways, including providing world-class care and
management, benefit delivery and standardization of services
across the military departments. However, I am concerned that
the current plans for the wounded warrior support at the new
Walter Reed National Military Medical Center when it opens at
Bethesda in September 2011, is not at the same level of support
currently furnished by the Army at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center. Wounded warriors who move to the new medical center
will experience a significant degradation of services and
support. This is unacceptable. What assurances can you give me
and military families that all of the wounded warrior support
now provided at Walter Reed including barrack space at Bethesda
campus will be available when the new medical center opens in
September 2011?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, this is outside my area of
personal responsibility, but again, this is an area that I know
that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are working very
hard. We are closing Walter Reed because of a previous BRAC
[base closure and realignment] decision, and there is a lot of
attention to ensure that as we consolidate capability at
Bethesda, that we meet not only today's wounded warrior needs,
but those of the future. And again, all I can do is assure you
that this has gotten very high-level and consistent attention
and will continue to do so in the future.
Mr. Wilson. And please extend to the Secretary and anyone
else that there is significant concern about the relocation
expansion, and this is just so crucial as military families.
For each of you, the QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for
the role of Reserve and [National] Guard forces. The past 8
years have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and
Reserve forces can augment the active force especially in
unique skill sets. However, due to their commitment to the
overseas fight, the historical role of the National Guard as
our Nation's strategic reserve has waned.
Given the first of the six key mission areas to the QDR is
defend the United States and support civilian authorities at
home, how will the Guard meet its historical role? Do you
foresee efforts to grow the Guard and Reserve with regard to
military construction [MILCON] and equipment?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, what I will say is that we are
looking at trying to reduce the OPTEMPO [operational tempo] of
the reserve component along with the total force and to sort of
get them back to a more normal rotation schedule. We are also
going to undertake a study this coming year of the roles of
Guard and Reserve. In the meantime, what we have tried to do is
really make targeted investment, improving their ability to
respond to any kind of homeland contingencies, in particular,
the establishment of homeland response forces that will be
aligned with each of the ten FEMA [Federal Emergency Management
Agency] regions and increase the responsiveness to some kind of
catastrophic disaster.
I think the Army is also paying significant attention to
the equipment issues you raised and replenishing those stocks
as units return from overseas deployments.
Mr. Wilson. And that would include movement of equipment
from theater back to the United States?
Secretary Flournoy. Eventually yes. I don't know if the
Admiral has more to add there.
Admiral Stanley. Yes, the simple answer is yes, we are
going to move the equipment back and refurbish it as part of
the reset that we envision. The other thing I would add is this
discussion on the Guard and Reserve is what should be the
balance between a rotational Guard and Reserve and a strategic
reserve that you brought up. And the Guard believes very
strongly that they want to continue the rotational role that
they have been part of for the last eight years, so we are
trying to figure out the balance there.
Mr. Wilson. And when you say the Guard wants to, as a 31-
year veteran of the Guard, I know Guard members are very proud
of their service and very grateful for the opportunity to serve
overseas, but we always have to keep in mind, particularly in
my region, the consequences of a hurricane, possibly an ice
storm, and the Guard has just served with such distinction. And
so again, I appreciate very much what you are doing on behalf
of the Guard and Reserve, and Guard and Reserve families are
very grateful. I yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The witnesses, Madam
Secretary, I understand turn to pumpkins right at one o'clock.
It looks like we are going to come out even because we have
just two more questioners, and we will get on with it and
again, you don't have to turn to a pumpkin. Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Flournoy,
the issue of energy independence remains critically important,
and in fact, I think the QDR acknowledges this and states,
``climate change and energy are two key issues that will play a
significant role in shaping the future of the security
environment.'' Although they produce distinct types of
challenges, climate change, energy security, and economic
stability are inextricably linked. I believe that the
Department of Energy [DOE] and our national labs offer unique
capabilities that can help address this major challenge. And in
particular a strategic partnership between the Departments of
Energy and Defense could be extremely beneficial to the
security of our Nation and our Armed Forces.
I wanted to ask you if you could provide me a little bit of
an update on the efforts of the Department of Defense and the
DOE, the efforts that they are taking to organize a
collaborative energy security strategy and what you might see
as some of the obstacles along the way.
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you, and I will invite Dr. Fox to
comment as well. This QDR was really different at congressional
behest in addressing energy and climate issues up front as
strategic concerns, both in terms of how they will affect the
operating environment for the military of the future, but also
because DOD is such a large energy consumer. And this gets to
your question. We are having extensive interaction with the
Department of Energy. We have actually created a new position
for someone who will focus on a very serious person in the
Pentagon, senior civilian, who will work with the services
focused on operational energy concerns, and we are waiting for
her to be confirmed. But I believe she will be the sort of
focal point for that partnership to really use the fact that
DOD has such a large market share, if you will, in the energy
domain to drive further innovation in terms of alternative
fuels, in terms of efficiencies, and so forth. But I don't know
if there are some additional programmatic details you want to
add.
Ms. Fox. I can only add that the Department really is very
focused on this and are working hard this year in studies to
look at vulnerability of DOD bases, for example, to climate
change outcomes. We are looking hard at the use of renewable
energy in planes and ships, and we are also looking at ways to
become more energy efficient across the Department to reduce
costs, and all of that will be benefitted by this partnership
with the Department of Energy.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Dr. Fox. Secretary Flournoy,
shifting gears a little bit, the battles in Iraq and
Afghanistan have yielded tremendous insights in how to
effectively wage counterinsurgency operations. And as a result,
the Air Force has identified the need for a light attack armed
recognizance aircraft. And I wanted to ask you sort of where in
the procurement process that is today, and have you at all
explored the idea of potentially using the Air National Guard
as an option for a future bed-down of those potential aircraft.
Secretary Flournoy. I am going to defer to my operational
and programmatic colleagues here on that one.
Admiral Stanley. The light attack aircraft is envisioned to
be something that our military can use to better engage with a
lot of the strategic partners that want to build security
relationships with something that they can afford, they can
use, be easier for us to train and equip them. So that is the
genesis of the idea. The idea has not matured much beyond that,
and certainly not to the point of being bed-down in specific
areas.
Mr. Heinrich. I just say that I look forward to learning
more about what the Air Force has in mind and how to best
leverage the potential there. And with that I would yield back
the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Wittman, wrap it up.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all so much
for joining us today. I wanted to talk a little bit about
shipbuilding. I know the budget has 15 point--or $15.7 billion
in there for shipbuilding. The 30-year shipbuilding plan houses
313 ships. The current level of funding, 9 ships a year over 30
years, 270 ships. If you start to break that down, what you are
looking at is over a five-year period, eight of those are joint
high-speed vessels. If you then look at those, they are small
surface combatants, we are building 42 battle force ships. Then
17 of those are LCS ships, a little less expensive. So without
the JHSVs and LCSs, we are only building 24 battle force ships
in the last 5 years, and we are leaving the more expensive
large surface combatants to fund in the future. On top of that,
it looks like we are going towards a 275-ship Navy rather than
a 313 ship Navy. On top of that, too, we are adding a BMD focus
into this.
My concern is now we are providing a BMD mission to the
Ticonderoga-class and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. And
those destroyers are only going to be fit for meeting a short-
range missile defense not a long-range missile defense. So if
we are making those BMD decisions in an already challenged
environment with shipbuilding and putting that additional
mission set out there for our surface combatants, and if we are
making BMD a priority, then we need to know what the COCOMs'
[combatant commands'] requirements are and how we can answer
those requirements either for the current forces on a new
procurement, and I really don't see the answer for that in this
budget. There is lacking some specificity there. And it is also
concerning too that we are not defending against that long-
range threat but only the near-range threat, those threats like
we would see with Iran. Can you tell me what the President's
plan is to address our BMD mission, and that is from either a
new procurement point of view, or how our current forces will
answer the increased mission load, and also if you can tell me
when developing the future years defense plan, what
consideration was given to the impact on our core ship building
industrial base? Specifically, why are we pushing funding on
the more expensive ships out in future years and doing the less
expensive ships here? It seems like to me a lot of different
decisions that are going to create tremendous pressure on our
BMD capability and our shipbuilding needs and our budgets.
Secretary Flournoy. I will take on the broader BMD
question, and then I will leave the shipbuilding issues to Dr.
Fox and perhaps the Admiral wants to chime in. On BMD, on the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review [BMDR], I guess I would say we
are doing two things: We are certainly sustaining and
strengthening the ability to defend the homeland against
limited attack, so that is not going away. In fact, we are
continuing to invest in that. But what we are really beefing up
as a new area of focus is regional ballistic missile defense.
And part of that is going to be initially ship-borne, but
eventually much of that will migrate onto land-based SM-3
[Standard Missile-3] systems.
And so the naval component is critical but it is one
component of a broader system that also envisions a number of
land-based systems. I think one of the things we are doing now
is scrubbing the impacts of that on both the buys of future SM-
3s, particularly as we get beyond the first variant, but also
on how this will affect the overall sort of operational concept
for BMD related naval assets. But let me turn it over to Dr.
Fox, and then perhaps the Admiral will chime in.
Ms. Fox. Well, as you characterize we did put $15.7 billion
in an account this year. And it does have the split that you
refer to which is consistent in our view with the QDR strategy.
There is an increased emphasis, you are absolutely right, on
some of the smaller ships like JHSV because it does help enable
that part of the strategy that Secretary Flournoy has outlined
to you. But that doesn't mean we are walking away from the
higher-end capabilities. We are going to be building two
Virginia-class submarines a year across the FYDP. There is no
more period even within the FYDP where we will go to one, it is
two straight across. We will have two DDG-51 destroyers.
We are upgrading them and looking at the improvement in the
improved DDG. We are sustaining the carrier build. So I feel
that we are doing both. We are trying to meet that broad
spectrum of capabilities that we have been talking about. You
asked about the industrial base. The industrial base along the
Gulf Coast is going to be stressed a little by the shipbuilding
plan due to the amphibious changes, and that might force a
consolidation, but that will let you have more opportunity to
talk to the Navy about that but that is absolutely true.
The other thing about the industrial base I would just like
to add is in the years where we are building the SSBNs there
could be some pressure on the combatants.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. We came out right on
time for you, and we appreciate your testimony, your hard work,
your answering our questions. And some of them, I realize were
very difficult and that you don't have the answers to
everything, but I think you did remarkably well. Keep doing
well and we will ask you of course to come back. And Ms. Fox
and Admiral Stanley, thank you for your initial testimony here.
And Secretary Flournoy, you are always so good to be with us,
and thank you for your wisdom.
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you very much, sir.
[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 4, 2010
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
Mr. Reyes. The Army budget request contains funds to continue
expanding infrastructure at Ft. Bliss and other installations. The QDR
states that four Army brigades will remain in Europe until a future
decision is made on force structure needs in Europe pending the
undergoing global defense posture review. When will the Department of
Defense announce a final decision on European force structure?
Secretary Flournoy. The Department will announce any decision on
force structure of U.S. forces in Europe following an assessment of
U.S. posture and capabilities, which will be informed by the NATO
Strategic Concept review expected in Fall 2010. Any changes to our
defense posture will be informed by, and occur only after, close
consultations with our allies, partners and Congress.
Mr. Reyes. The Army budget request contains funds to continue
expanding infrastructure at Ft. Bliss and other installations. The QDR
states that four Army brigades will remain in Europe until a future
decision is made on force structure needs in Europe pending the
undergoing global defense posture review. When will the Department of
Defense announce a final decision on European force structure?
Admiral Stanley. OSD is leading an effort to review our global
posture, and as part of this effort is working closely with Geographic
Combatant Commanders. European Command will weigh in to help determine
the most appropriate force structure for Europe based on U.S.
requirements and the needs of our partners and allies in the region. I
expect the timing of this decision will be paced by the information
uncovered in the study as well as by NATO's decisions about its
strategic concept, which are not expected until the end of 2010.
Mr. Reyes. Has the DOD considered maintaining a presence in Europe
by rotating brigades to Europe from U.S. home bases?
Secretary Flournoy. During the QDR, the concept of rotating U.S.
forces to Europe instead of stationing forces forward was considered.
It is important to note that maintaining a rotational presence forward
on a long-term basis requires approximately three times the number of
personnel as would be required to station forces forward - due to the
need to generate forces for deployment, to maintain the ``boots-on-the-
ground to dwell'' ratio, and to achieve training readiness prior to
rotational deployment. The Department continues to examine U.S. global
force posture, including both rotational and forward-stationing
solutions.
Mr. Reyes. Has the DOD considered maintaining a presence in Europe
by rotating brigades to Europe from U.S. home bases?
Admiral Stanley. Yes. However, the final decision about the size
and type of U.S. presence in Europe will be made based on the
requirements of U.S. defense strategy. This decision will weigh the
advantages of being able to build relationships through permanently
basing forces in Europe against the flexibility offered by rotational
forces as well as the associated costs of the options. The analysis
will also address NATO's decisions about its strategic concept, which
are not expected until the end of 2010, and will be scoped to include
an assessment of our European defense posture.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. The 2006 QDR highlighted the need to expand the WMD
``Response Dimension'' including an emphasis on WMD elimination
operations that locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a
state or non-state actor's WMD capabilities and programs in a hostile
or uncertain environment. The 2006 QDR also highlighted the need to
organize, train, and equip joint forces for this increasingly important
mission. Can you describe the progress that has been made to-date in
this area since the 2006 QDR? And since the new 2010 QDR places equal
emphasis on countering WMD and preventing proliferation, what gaps
still exist and how will 2010 QDR priorities address these gaps?
Secretary Flournoy. Since the 2006 QDR, important progress has been
made to expand and enhance WMD elimination capabilities. In 2007, the
United States Strategic Command created the Joint Elimination
Coordination Element (JECE) within the Army's 20th Support Command in
Aberdeen, Maryland. The JECE is tasked with forming a deployable Joint
Task Force-Elimination (JTF-E) to respond to WMD-related incidents and
is responsible for providing the manpower, joint expertise, and
knowledge required for the JTF-E to execute its mission successfully in
non-permissive and semi-permissive environments. The JTF-E concept has
proven its effectiveness in numerous training evolutions, particularly
in U.S. Forces Korea exercises.
To build upon the success of the JECE and address remaining
capability shortfalls, the 2010 QDR report directed the establishment
of a standing Joint Task Force-Elimination Headquarters to provide
additional capacity and capability to plan, train, and execute WMD-
elimination operations across a variety of scenarios and areas of
operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is leading a
coordinated effort with the Services and the Combatant Commands to
develop options for the command and control structure and force
composition and manpower levels of a standing JTF-E Headquarters,
including the possible incorporation of WMD exploitation, intelligence,
and coordination cells.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Secretary, you will recall that the NDAA for
FY2010 required the Department to prepare and submit a report and
recommendations on the organization, manning, and management of the
U.S. Special Operations Command. We look forward to reviewing this
report and your recommendations in the coming weeks. Since the 2010 QDR
places a Department-wide emphasis on ``taking care of our people,'' can
you address how this applies to our Special Operations Forces in terms
of recruitment, retention, and the management of op tempo? Will your
forthcoming report address these issues and provide actionable
recommendations?
Secretary Flournoy. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
places significant emphasis on taking care of its people and works in
close collaboration with the Military Departments on all matters that
affect special operations personnel. USSOCOM understands that the
backbone of the organization is not equipment or facilities, but it is
the talented and dedicated men and women who sacrifice on a daily basis
that form its fundamental strength.
Concerning recruitment, USSOCOM, in coordination with the Military
Departments, has maintained the very highest standards for recruiting
from civilian society as well as for accessions from the general
purpose forces (GPF). USSOCOM consistently attracts outstanding
individuals as a result of meaningful and challenging career
opportunities within the special operations field, as well as an
institutional culture that places great value on leadership and
personal development.
Although successful recruitment is necessary for USSOCOM's
effectiveness in fulfilling its mission, it is not sufficient;
retention is equally important. USSOCOM has undertaken a number of
initiatives to retain its most talented personnel including the
implementation of far-reaching monetary incentive programs, such as a
critical skills retention bonus, obligating the service member to
additional years of service. This incentive program has been highly
successful in retaining experienced and highly trained specialists when
the training investment is at its highest and the operator is at his or
her most effective. Another incentive to retain senior operators is
assignment incentive pay. This program offers a monthly stipend to
encourage our most experienced personnel to maintain their service in a
SOF specialty. Another incentive offered is a higher level of special
duty assignment pay to attract service members to a duty assignment
characterized by extremely demanding duties. Enlisted operators who
enter the Warrant Officer corps are offered a bonus for extending and
continuing their SOF service in positions that demand additional
training and leadership skills.
An important component related to retention is operational tempo.
As you are well aware, the past nine years have been very demanding for
our military as a whole, and in particular for our special operations
forces. USSOCOM is working hard to improve the deployment-to-dwell
ratio for its personnel. As an example, USSOCOM is working with the
Military Departments to increase GPF Combat Support (CS) and Combat
Service Support (CSS) that provide dedicated or direct support to
deployed SOF. Concurrently and with the full support of the Military
Departments, USSOCOM is also significantly growing its own organic CS
and CSS force structure in accordance with the QDR. When the effects of
these initiatives are realized, a considerable burden will be lifted
from USSOCOM CS and CSS forces, resulting in deployment to dwell ratios
closer in line with Department goals.
The forthcoming Report on Special Operations Command Organization,
Manning, and Management, as required by Section 933 of the NDAA for
FY2010, will not directly address issues relating to the discussion
above as it focuses specifically on the eleven elements required by
Section 933, but it does provide a number of actionable recommendations
for greater efficiency and effectiveness within USSOCOM that will
enable us to meet the needs of our special operations forces.
Ms. Sanchez. The 2010 QDR directs the establishment of a standing
Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters that will plan, train, and
execute WMD-elimination operations. Can you outline the role of SOF
within this Joint Task Force and can you describe how USSOCOM will fit
into this proposed framework, both operationally and administratively?
Admiral Stanley. We are currently studying the precise architecture
of the Joint Task Force-WMD Elimination (JTF-E). Although the use of
Special Operations Forces in some WMD-elimination missions will be
critical, the alignment of SOF with respect to the JTF is part of the
ongoing study. Thus, command relationships between JTF-E headquarters
and the Combatant Commanders have not been determined.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. The QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role
of Reserve and Guard forces, including evaluating the ideal Active/
Reserve mix for current and future operations. The past eight years
have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces
can augment the active force, especially in unique skill sets. However,
due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of
the Natural Guard as the Nation's strategic reserve has waned. Given
that the first of the six key mission areas of the QDR is ``Defend the
United States and support civilian authorities at home'' how will the
Guard return to its historical role? How will their training and
equipment change to reflect their need to focus on the domestic
defense?
Secretary Flournoy. In recent years, policy debates have focused on
whether the National Guard should be an operational reserve or a
strategic reserve. In the Department's view, these roles are not
mutually exclusive. The National Guard still provides strategic depth
for the Nation, but the National Guard also serves as part of an
operational force. In fact, the Department could not implement the
National Defense Strategy without drawing on the National Guard and
Reserve as part of the operational force.
The Department appreciates the dual role of the National Guard in
serving the States and the Department of Defense in protecting our
Nation and its citizens. We continue to pursue ways to balance these
dual roles and to ensure a more sustainable deployment tempo for the
National Guard and Reserves. Using long-range scheduling for
predictability and individual volunteerism for flexibility, the Air
National Guard has reached a nearly five-to-one dwell-to-deployed
ratio, with the Army National Guard close behind, approaching four-to-
one. As Secretary Gates observed in February 2009, our goal for the
Army National Guard is a dwell-to-deployed ratio of five to one.
To support efforts to balance the overseas and domestic missions of
the National Guard, the Department of Defense invests billions in
training and equipping the National Guard. Over the last three years,
the Department has committed nearly $16 billion total for Army National
Guard and Air National Guard procurement. The on-hand rate for the
National Guard--which averages 70% historically--has improved from just
under 40% in 2006 to nearly 80% by the end of FY09. The Department's
objective is to reach roughly 90% by FY15.
The National Guard already plays a critical role in domestic
operations--both homeland defense and defense support to civil
authorities. As noted in the QDR report, the Department is evolving its
approach to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives (CBRNE) consequence management forces and will be
restructuring existing National Guard forces to support the creation of
a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency
Management Agency regions. These ten HRFs will provide a regional
response capability with enhanced lifesaving capabilities and reduced
response times; focus on planning, training, and exercising; and forge
strong links between the Federal level and State and local authorities.
These forces will receive specialized CBRNE training and equipment, and
will focus exclusively on domestic operations for an extended period
during the normal force generation rotation cycle.
Mr. Wilson. The QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role
of Reserve and Guard forces, including evaluating the ideal Active/
Reserve mix for current and future operations. The past eight years
have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces
can augment the active force, especially in unique skill sets. However,
due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of
the Natural Guard as the Nation's strategic reserve has waned. Given
that the first of the six key mission areas of the QDR is ``Defend the
United States and support civilian authorities at home'' how will the
Guard return to its historical role? How will their training and
equipment change to reflect their need to focus on the domestic
defense?
Admiral Stanley. The National Guard continues to maintain its role
in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), homeland defense, and
consequence management while supporting the operational mission
requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. There are ongoing
studies to find the optimal balance between an operational force and a
strategic reserve within the Reserve Component and the National Guard
in particular, which will inform their training and equipping
requirements.
Mr. Wilson. The QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role
of Reserve and Guard forces, including evaluating the ideal Active/
Reserve mix for current and future operations. The past eight years
have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces
can augment the active force, especially in unique skill sets. However,
due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of
the Natural Guard as the Nation's strategic reserve has waned. Given
that the first of the six key mission areas of the QDR is ``Defend the
United States and support civilian authorities at home'' how will the
Guard return to its historical role? How will their training and
equipment change to reflect their need to focus on the domestic
defense?
Ms. Fox. The question of whether the National Guard should be an
operational or a strategic reserve is an extremely important one. There
are ongoing studies seeking optimal ways to balance these dual roles
and to ensure a more sustainable deployment tempo for the National
Guard. In the Department's view, these roles are not mutually
exclusive. The National Guard provides strategic depth for the Nation
and augments the operational force. In fact, the U.S. military forces
cannot satisfy all of today's demands without them.
The National Guard already plays a critical role in domestic
operations--both homeland defense and defense support to civil
authorities. As noted in the QDR report, the Department is evolving its
approach to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives (CBRNE) consequence management forces and will be
restructuring existing National Guard forces to support the creation of
a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency
Management Agency regions. These ten HRFs will provide a regional
response capability with enhanced lifesaving capabilities and reduced
response times; focus on planning, training, and exercising; and forge
strong links between the Federal level and State and local authorities.
These forces will receive specialized CBRNE training and equipment, and
will focus exclusively on domestic operations for an extended period
during the normal force generation rotation cycle.
Mr. Wilson. Concurrent with fighting two major wars, the U.S.
military had been involved in many humanitarian operations resultant
from unforeseen disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane
Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia. While the QDR nods to the
fact that the military must be prepared for contingency operations, it
falls short in outlining how this is possible without continuing to
overtax the force while engaged in multi-theater operations. What
importance is the Department placing on the possibility of contingency
operations? And, how can we ensure that our military remains always
prepared to face those events which are impossible to predict?
Secretary Flournoy. The analysis that underpinned the QDR report
examined the force's ability to face a multitude of individual
scenarios, just as the force has historically performed a multitude of
concurrent missions. These scenarios combined large-scale
contingencies, a variety of smaller-scale episodic events, and routine
operations that U.S. forces historically perform. Several natural
disaster scenarios were included, and they were treated the same as
other episodic scenarios in that they made up the foundational
activities underlying all sets of scenarios. In this way, we were able
to ensure these types of missions are accounted for in determining the
impact on and capabilities of the force.
Mr. Wilson. Concurrent with fighting two major wars, the U.S.
military had been involved in many humanitarian operations resultant
from unforeseen disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane
Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia. While the QDR nods to the
fact that the military must be prepared for contingency operations, it
falls short in outlining how this is possible without continuing to
overtax the force while engaged in multi-theater operations. What
importance is the Department placing on the possibility of contingency
operations? And, how can we ensure that our military remains always
prepared to face those events which are impossible to predict?
Admiral Stanley. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
clearly strained our Armed Forces. Until there is significant reduction
of our force commitments to these contingencies, that strain will
continue. We work hard to ensure forces we deploy overseas are fully
ready for their assigned mission - and they are. The Department
regularly assesses its ability to respond to crises, although we cannot
predict with much accuracy which situations the Department will
actually face. However, as we experienced with Haiti and other recent
natural disasters, we do have sufficient capability and capacity in the
non-deployed force to effectively respond to contingency operations.
Mr. Wilson. Concurrent with fighting two major wars, the U.S.
military had been involved in many humanitarian operations resultant
from unforeseen disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane
Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia. While the QDR nods to the
fact that the military must be prepared for contingency operations, it
falls short in outlining how this is possible without continuing to
overtax the force while engaged in multi-theater operations. What
importance is the Department placing on the possibility of contingency
operations? And, how can we ensure that our military remains always
prepared to face those events which are impossible to predict?
Ms. Fox. We account for these types of demands in our force
structure planning. There are numerous, classified ``Steady State
Security Posture'' events set abroad and within the United States that
represent the demands of humanitarian assistance operations. The ``QDR
Strategic Environment'' was based on a context of many of these types
of day-to-day events and was a component of in the QDR analysis.
Sadly, DOD has many opportunities to provide humanitarian
assistance globally. Our military forces have the capabilities
necessary to enter an environment where the normal operations of
governing have been disrupted and support stabilizing activities such
as establishing communications, providing medical assistance,
conducting logistical operations and contributing to security. These
skills are consistent with preparing for domestic and overseas
operations.
Mr. Wilson. Senior leadership in the DOD has made the starting
point on ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' how to implement a repeal of current
law, rather than whether the law should be repealed. This has
introduced undue command influence into the debate. I fear that
everyone below the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs in the military now knows that expression of opinions that would
argue for not changing the policy could be subject to sanction. And if
not sanction, then the senior leadership's views that the law should be
repealed will have a chilling effect on the objectivity of the input a
comprehensive study might seek. How would you envision that, given
these public positions, Congress can obtain the unbiased, objective
input from military personnel of all ranks? Would you support military
personnel testifying before Congress on this issue?
Secretary Flournoy. As you know, on February 2, 2010, Secretary
Gates announced the formation of a Department of Defense Working Group
to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654, should
that occur, and develop an implementation plan for any new statutory
mandate.
The Working Group is firmly committed to soliciting the views of a
wide array of individuals from the different services, including, as
the Secretary has directed, military families. Over the course of the
next eight months members of the Working Group will meet with a wide
array of individuals of all services, rank, age and assignment,
officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions and concerns
regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. Likewise, the
Working Group will seek to hear from the many responsible voices of
those individuals and groups with diverse views on this important
matter.
The two co-chairs of the Working Group, Department of Defense
General Counsel Jeh Johnson and Army General Carter Ham, are asking all
members of the Working Group to be neutral and objective in conducting
this assessment. The Department of Defense is mindful that this is an
emotional subject, the topic of intense debate, and that almost
everyone familiar with the issue has an opinion about it. Mr. Johnson
and General Ham are committed to leading this Working Group in an
objective and thorough manner, and will provide the Secretary with
their best assessment of the impact of repeal, regardless of what that
may be, to permit the Secretary to determine, as he said in his
testimony, how best to prepare for implementation of a Congressional
repeal.
The Department of Defense is also committed to engaging with
Members of Congress throughout this process. The Department of Defense
will work closely with Congress to provide appropriate witnesses as
necessary for testimony on this issue and expects that the Department's
witnesses will answer all questions, including questions regarding
their personal opinions, fully and truthfully.
Mr. Wilson. Senior leadership in the DOD has made the starting
point on ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' how to implement a repeal of current
law, rather than whether the law should be repealed. This has
introduced undue command influence into the debate. I fear that
everyone below the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs in the military now knows that expression of opinions that would
argue for not changing the policy could be subject to sanction. And if
not sanction, then the senior leadership's views that the law should be
repealed will have a chilling effect on the objectivity of the input a
comprehensive study might seek. How would you envision that, given
these public positions, Congress can obtain the unbiased, objective
input from military personnel of all ranks? Would you support military
personnel testifying before Congress on this issue?
Admiral Stanley. To better understand the dynamic of this issue to
the current force, the Secretary of Defense has established a high-
level working group to undertake a comprehensive review of repealing
the current law. This review will include participation from service
members across a range of age, rank, and warfare communities, including
families, and reach out across the force to develop insights and
recommendations. The results of this study will inform our senior
leaders and help shape their advice. As evidenced by the testimony
given by the Service Chiefs after the statements made by Secretary
Gates and Chairman Mullen, I do not believe there has been undue
influence.
Mr. Wilson. Senior leadership in the DOD has made the starting
point on ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' how to implement a repeal of current
law, rather than whether the law should be repealed. This has
introduced undue command influence into the debate. I fear that
everyone below the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs in the military now knows that expression of opinions that would
argue for not changing the policy could be subject to sanction. And if
not sanction, then the senior leadership's views that the law should be
repealed will have a chilling effect on the objectivity of the input a
comprehensive study might seek. How would you envision that, given
these public positions, Congress can obtain the unbiased, objective
input from military personnel of all ranks? Would you support military
personnel testifying before Congress on this issue?
Ms. Fox. At least at this point, the repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654
is not a programmatic issue and, for that reason, I do not have the
specific knowledge or responsibilities necessary to speak
authoritatively about it. I understand that the Department is carefully
considering the implications of repealing this law and is treating the
issue with the diligence it is due. Should anyone from CAPE be called
to testify, I will not place undue command influence or sanctions on
them.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADY
Mr. Brady. One part of the QDR talks about the destabilizing impact
of climate change and the importance of energy security. I'm interested
in the impact of climate change on the threat landscape, as discussed
in the QDR. Specifically, it says that weak nations are least likely to
be able to respond to the natural disasters caused by climate change,
that it is destabilizing fragile nations and increasing poverty. This
is an important point, because weak and failed states are the best safe
havens and breeding grounds that terrorists have. Can you talk about
that connection between climate change and terrorism and how the
Department of Defense plans on addressing it?
Secretary Flournoy. The 2008 National Intelligence Assessment of
the Impacts of Climate Change, conducted by the National Intelligence
Council (NIC), concluded that climate change will have significant
geopolitical effects around the world and will contribute to a host of
problems, including poverty, environmental degradation, and the
weakening of national governments. Climate change will contribute to
food and water shortages, increase the spread of disease, and may help
spur mass migration, although the causes of migration are complex and
usually difficult to attribute to a single factor. The NIC assessment
warned that the storms, droughts, and food shortages that might result
from a warming planet in coming decades could create numerous relief
emergencies. Thus, we assess that climate change is a stress that has
the potential to accelerate state failure in some cases, and may also
lead to the spread of insurgency as weak governments fail to cope with
its effects. We have already seen Al Qaeda seize on climate change as
another grievance against the West, and attempt to use it to stir up
resentment against the United States and other developed countries.
The Department of Defense works closely with other U.S. Departments
and agencies in addressing these concerns, focusing on building the
security capacity of partner states, a key mission highlighted in this
year's QDR report. We recognize that in some nations, the military is
the only institution with the capacity to respond to a large-scale
natural disaster. Working closely with interagency partners, DOD has
undertaken environmental security cooperation initiatives with foreign
militaries that represent a non-threatening way of building trust and
developing response capacity.
Mr. Brady. The QDR spends a significant amount of time talking
about the threat posed to our defense infrastructure by climate change.
Coastal installations, especially, are vulnerable to the rising sea
levels and increasingly strong storms that scientists say climate
change is producing. Given the billions we have invested in this
critical security infrastructure, can you talk about the Department's
plan for dealing with this and other impacts of climate change in the
QDR's 20-year timeframe?
Secretary Flournoy. DOD is working and will continue to work to
assess, adapt to, and mitigate the effects of climate change.
Domestically, the Department will leverage the initial efforts of the
Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP), a
joint effort among DOD, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental
Protection Agency, to develop climate change impact and installation
vulnerability assessment tools. We are concerned not only about effects
on physical structures, but also broader effects on testing, training,
and readiness activities, and the challenge of sustainable land and
ecosystem-based management. The Department will need to build further
on this foundation in order to develop a long-term approach to address
climate impact on DOD's infrastructure.
Mr. Brady. The strategy we're discussing is obviously strongly
focused on asymmetrical threats and nontraditional enemies. One part of
the QDR addressed something which most people may not realize--that
climate change is making these threats worse. It says that climate
change is accelerating instability and destabilizing already fragile
governments with droughts, famines, floods, and mass migrations. These
sound like exactly the kind of things that cause states to fail--and
those failed states are usually the safe havens of terrorist groups.
Can you please explain the connection between climate change, failed
states, and terrorism in the context of preparing for wars against
asymmetric threats?
Secretary Flournoy. The 2008 National Intelligence Assessment of
the Impacts of Climate Change, conducted by the National Intelligence
Council (NIC), concluded that climate change will have significant
geopolitical effects around the world and will contribute to a host of
problems, including poverty, environmental degradation, and the
weakening of national governments. Climate change will contribute to
food and water shortages, increase the spread of disease, and may help
spur mass migration, although the causes of migration are complex and
usually difficult to attribute to a single factor. The NIC assessment
warned that the storms, droughts, and food shortages that might result
from a warming planet in coming decades could create numerous relief
emergencies. Thus, we assess that climate change is a stress that has
the potential to accelerate state failure in some cases, and may also
lead to the spread of insurgency as weak governments fail to cope with
its effects. We have already seen Al Qaeda seize on climate change as
another grievance against the West, and attempt to use it to stir up
resentment against the United States and other developed countries.
Climate change is just one stress factor in a complex strategic
environment. The integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense
can build the capacity of partner nations to maintain and promote
stability in order to prevent conflict. The U.S. Armed Forces will
continue to develop capabilities necessary to help create a secure
environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if
necessary, to support civil authorities in providing essential
government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and supplying
humanitarian relief in response to natural disasters, such as those
that may be caused by climate change.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank the
witnesses for being here today and for their many months of hard work
on the QDR. One area of this review that I disagree with is what I
think is an incompatible evaluation of the future of manned fighter
aircraft. This is an area that Congressman LoBiondo and I have worked
on for several years and this review confirms what I think we have
suspected. That a fighter gap exists and it has grown by 536 aircraft
from two years ago. Yesterday's statements from Secretary Gates cast
significant doubt on the Department's commitment to addressing this
shortfall. The 162d Fighter Wing in Tucson is the Nation's largest Air
Guard Fighter unit and they are flying some of our Nation's oldest
fighter jets. Under the future force structure plans in this review,
our fighter gap will continue to grow and the 162d is right in the
crosshairs. While 5th generation aircraft like the Joint Strike Fighter
will surely be more capable than their predecessors, we MUST
acknowledge that there is an important quality to quantity. Ultimately,
the 162d in Tucson and dozens of other units around the country are
responsible for the security of our homeland and they must have
aircraft on the ramp to carry out that mission. According to the Air
Force's supporting documents, shortages are ``likely'' between 2017 and
2024 and these retirements are NOT offset by procurement of the Joint
Strike Fighter. We need a smart and immediate solution to this problem.
One area where I believe we are making leaps and bounds forward is on
reforming our energy portfolio. As you know, the Department's energy
usage has been one of my key areas of focus. I have been working hand
in hand with the Services and my colleagues on the Committee to set key
performance goals for reductions in petroleum usage and increases in
efficiency that will save lives on the battlefield and money in budget.
This is the first time that energy issues have been included in this
review as a key component for future strategic planning. Over the last
eight years, we have learned a great deal about the strategic
significance of a secure energy supply. During the invasion in 2003,
Marine Corps ground forces used 90% of its energy on transporting and
protecting the other 10% they used for operations. That's just one
example of how the Department's energy appetite has put servicemembers
between the enemy and the energy supply. For the first time, this
review takes into account these untold costs of energy supply lines in
troops diverted, money spent and lives lost. While this is the first
major strategic document to cover this subject area, the services have
already leaned far forward in making energy a focus of their
modernization plans. Battlefield renewable and spray foam technology
have reduced consumption by as much as 75%. At home, drastic increases
in the use of renewable, responsible energy have offset installation
usage. At Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in my District, we recently held
a ribbon cutting for the largest solar powered community in the country
with more than 80,000 solar panels that will provide 75% of the
neighborhood's energy requirements. These are inherently smart, good
things that I fully support. As I mentioned, I have been a strong
proponent of reforming DOD's energy usage. Over the last year, I have
been working aggressively with the Committee and the Services on
developing an overarching master plan for DOD's energy portfolio. 1.
Can you talk a little bit about the specific areas where you envision
DOD moving forward on both operational energy and installation energy?
2. Does this year's budget demonstrate a significant enough investment
in growing the renewable energy portfolio within DOD to match up with
what you have included in the QDR? 3. Are Energy Savings Performance
Contracts (ESPCs) a fruitful endeavor for the future or do you see them
waning over the long haul? 4. In 20 years, what accomplishments and
milestones should we have met in order to achieve the strategic goals
outlined in the review?
Secretary Flournoy. 1. The confirmation of the Director of
Operational Energy Plans and Programs will be a key step in moving
forward on operational energy challenges. We look forward to the
arrival of the Director, when confirmed, and the focus that senior
leader will bring to the kinds of operational energy issues you have
highlighted. The Department will be implementing the Energy Key
Performance Parameter as well as the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in the
requirements and acquisition processes, respectively. The Department
will begin to develop the rules governing each, to give context for
setting and understanding the values of each and their relative
importance compared to all of the traditional factors in the
acquisition tradespace. Two significant studies to help provide this
context and develop this set of rules will be completed this Spring. In
addition to the technology investments and demonstration programs
underway, the Department will realize significant reductions in its
demand for delivered energy in the battlespace.
The Department is investing more to improve the energy profile of
fixed installations. Financing for these investments has come from
annually appropriated funds, including military construction, operation
and maintenance, and the Energy Conservation Investment Program (ECIP).
The Department has used third-party financing through Energy Savings
Performance Contracts (ESPCs) and Utilities Energy Service Contracts
(UESCs). The Department is also pursuing other innovative financing
mechanisms, such as Enhanced Use Leases (EULs) and Power Purchase
Agreements (PPAs). The Department's basic investment strategy is
twofold: 1) reduce the demand for traditional energy through
conservation and energy efficiency; and 2) increase the supply of
renewable and other alternative energy sources. Investments that curb
demand are the most cost-effective way to improve an installation's
energy profile.
2. In addition to being well situated to support energy
conservation and efficiency projects, DOD installations can be used as
test beds for next generation technologies coming out of laboratories
in industry, universities, and the Department of Energy. The
Department's built infrastructure is unique for its size and variety,
reflecting the diversity of building types and climates throughout the
United States. For a wide range of energy technologies, the Department
can play a crucial role by filling the gap between research and
deployment. For technologies that prove effective, the Department can
go on to serve as an early customer, thereby helping create a market.
This will allow the Department to leverage both the cost savings and
technology advances that private sector involvement will yield. The
Department is pursuing the energy test bed approach on a small scale
through the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program
(ESTCP). We hope to expand it, working closely with the Department of
Energy and other agencies and organizations. The FY11 budget is only
the first step toward implementing the QDR, a foundation document that
will guide development of future budgets as well. This means we will be
making additional investments in Program Objective Memorandum-12 and
beyond as the renewable energy and smart grid technology matures.
Demonstrations being performed under the Net Zero Joint Concept
Technology Demonstration, and the Marine Corps EXFOB (Example Forward
Operating Base), are focused efforts to introduce renewables and smart
grid technologies, in conjunction with existing generators, in
operational settings. These are methodical, prudent efforts to create
the right mix of reliable technologies that will help take convoys off
the road and make U.S. forces more secure.
3. The Department has made wide use of third-party financed energy
conservation projects accomplished through vehicles such as Energy
Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) and Utility Energy Services
Contracts (UESCs), which allow the Department to use industry funding
to pay for new energy-related equipment to reduce life cycle costs of
facilities and pay it back from the accrued energy savings. ESPCs and
UESCs typically generate 15-20% of all facility energy annual savings
that the Department realizes. Use of ESPC and UESC for 2009 reached an
award value of $258 million. DOD annual energy savings from these
contracts are expected to reach nearly 1.2 billion BTUs, which,
although significant, represent slightly more than one-half of one
percent (0.5%) of DOD's annual consumption. From 2003-2009, third-party
financed energy contract awards totaled $1.74B. The Department can
build on this progress by increasing the use of third-party financed
contracts, enabling more cost-effective, long-term facilities operation
and maintenance with no upfront costs. Third-party financed contracts
are a valuable tool in our ``energy tool box'' towards reduced energy
demand. The Department is very happy with energy savings performance
contracts as they are valuable financing tools and contracts designed
to make ESPCs as practical and cost-effective as possible for Federal
agencies. The Department is continuing annual energy auditing to
identify and establish facilities' energy requirements. ESPC contract
vehicles will be utilized to bring solutions for many of those
requirements and assist the Department towards annual energy intensity
reductions. The Department appreciates the continued support the
Congress has provided to third-party energy financing contracts.
4. It is as difficult to predict where the Department's energy
profile will be in 20 years as it would be to make such a prediction
for the United States as a whole. One strong indicator of success in 20
years will be whether or not energy, and its related factors of
unrefueled range and logistics tail mitigation, are as significant
considerations as the more mainstream factors of lethality, speed, and
crew protection in designing U.S. forces' equipment. Some of the
significant milestones for the Department, looking out over the next 20
years, are the maturation and full implementation of the Energy
Efficiency KPP and the development of a methodology for determining the
Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel applicable across all Military Departments.
Another key milestone will be integration of energy considerations, at
the tactical, operational, and strategic level, into our analytic
agenda. We need to do that in order to develop the analytic capital to
support incorporating energy considerations in the tradespace when we
make next generation weapon system decisions.
Ms. Giffords. Under current projections, there continues to be a
gap in the Air National Guard, even under the most optimistic
projections. In the next 7 years, the Air Guard will lose 80% of its
fighter aircraft to attrition and close 13 Fighter Wings unless the
Department acts now. Last year we were promised a plan for
recapitalizing the Air National Guard's fighter fleet but neither the
budget nor the QDR appear to contain one. 1. What is the long-term
strategic plan for maintaining the fighter expertise in the Air Guard?
2. The timeline for JSF and the timeline for aircraft retirements leave
a multi-year gap. How does the Department plan to fill that gap with
the required number of manned fighter aircraft and under the current
realities of the F-35 program? 3. We were also promised a comprehensive
report on the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. What is the Department's
long-term plan for resourcing ASA? 4. In determining the overall force
structure for Air Force fighters laid out in this report, what criteria
did the Department use to arrive at its final number set? 5. Did the
Department make any determinations on apportioning capabilities and
missions between the Active and Reserve components? 6. Assuming that
Reserve Component forces are less costly, as they normally have been,
is the Department prepared to adjust the total top line number of
fighter based on cost savings that could be realized by apportioning
more aircraft to the Guard and Reserve?
Secretary Flournoy. The Air Reserve Component made up of the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and the Active Duty Air Force are
full partners in the Air Force's Total Force concept, providing
critical capabilities for the Joint Warfighter across the full spectrum
of conflict. Today the Air Reserve Component flies some of the newest
and also some of the oldest fighter aircraft in the Air Force
inventory. The FY10 budget retired 257 of the Air Force's oldest
fighter aircraft and recapitalized a number of Air Reserve Component
units with newer and more capable 4th generation fighters from the
active inventory. In FY11, F-22s will be delivered to the combined
Active and Reserve Component wing in Honolulu, Hawaii. Similar F-22
wings already exist at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, Holloman Air
Force Base, New Mexico, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. As the F-
35 is delivered to both the Active and Reserve Components, additional
4th generation aircraft will become available to recapitalize older Air
Reserve Component fighters.
The 30-year Aviation Plan, which DOD has provided to Congress,
provides the Department's current long-term plan for fighter forces. In
addition to this, there are currently a number of congressional reports
addressing Air Reserve Component fighter force structure that are being
staffed within the Department. I expect that these reports will be
complete within the next few months.
The FY11 President's Budget reflects a complete review of Air Force
fighter requirements. These requirements were developed based on a
thorough examination of the current and future strategic environment.
The Department determined there were minimal impacts on Air Reserve
Component Homeland Defense missions, other flying missions, and overall
pilot and maintenance capability.
During the past two decades, the Air Reserve Component has borne a
significant portion of the burden imposed by forward deployed
operations. The Air Reserve Component's ability to provide forces at a
reduced operating cost is directly tied to the Active Component's on-
going investment in the Air Force-wide equipment, modernization, and
training pipeline. Historically, the ratio between Active and Air
Reserve Component aircraft has not exceeded a 60/40 mix. If the Air
Reserve Component grows beyond 40% of the total Air Force,
sustainability and potential cost benefits diminish. At the end of
FY11, the percentage of Air Reserve Component combat-coded fighter
aircraft is projected to be 42% of the total combat-coded fighter
force.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. The QDR highlights the Department of Defense's efforts
to rebalance U.S. military capabilities to emphasize flexibility of the
force, with increased focus on ``enabling'' systems. The focus on
enabling systems, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
electronic attack systems, and enhanced cyber defensive and offensive
capabilities, will significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to
protect and advance National Interests.These new enabling technologies
not only contribute to our ability to execute full-spectrum operations,
but also greatly enhance force protection. Developing unmanned,
remotely operated, or electronic capabilities is, I believe, important
to our National Defense. But I also believe that developing policies of
employment are equally important. As DOD develops more and more
capabilities to act remotely, how are you ensuring that these
capabilities are being employed lawfully? Is there a joint doctrine for
employment of UAVs or is each service responsible for developing their
own? How does DOD ensure that nation-state sovereignty or international
laws are not violated as U.S. forces employ remotely operated systems--
both for ISR missions and bombing missions?
Secretary Flournoy. The Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) establishes joint guidance, considerations, and
concepts for optimum UAS employment across the range of military
operations. Additionally, specific UAS employment considerations are
addressed in more detail in the areas of command and control (C2),
interoperability, airspace management, and coalition participation.
Lawful operation of any military capability, manned or unmanned, in
international or sovereign airspace, rests primarily with our combatant
commanders who employ force as necessary to meet mission requirements
in accordance with orders and guidance approved by the Secretary of
Defense, including Rules of Engagement (ROE) that comply with
applicable requirements of U.S. and international law. UAVs are
operated under such lawful orders, guidance, and ROE--as other military
platforms. Although strikes may be conducted using UAVs, those strikes
are under the control of the UAV's remote human operator.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE
Mr. Nye. Under Secretary Flournoy, as you might expect, I was quite
disappointed to see that the QDR included the recommendation that the
Nation invest upwards of $1 billion to establish a redundant East Coast
homeport for nuclear carriers. Coming just 4 years after a 2005 BRAC
round in which the Navy was unable to close as many installations as it
had recommend, the QDR suggests that it makes sense for the Navy to
build a fifth nuclear carrier homeport in the United States, even as
the carrier fleet is reduced to its lowest level in decades. Secretary
Flournoy, I would appreciate hearing your perspectives on why such an
investment makes sense in an era of unprecedented federal deficits, a
national debt of about $14 trillion, major shortfalls in key defense
programs such as shipbuilding and maintenance accounts, and signs that
various acquisition programs that are critical to our Nation's military
capabilities--such as the F-35--are experiencing substantial cost
increases that could devour enormous portions of future military
budgets.
Secretary Flournoy. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are one of
this Nation's most valuable strategic assets. Whereas in the Pacific
they are based at three locations, in the Atlantic these assets and
their associated nuclear maintenance facilities are currently
homeported at a single location. In the QDR, the Department concluded
that the strategic benefit of dispersing aircraft carriers and nuclear
maintenance facilities across the East Coast outweighs the costs to
upgrade Mayport. The decision to homeport, and not just create an
alternate East Coast port, provides the additional nuclear maintenance
facility necessary to reduce the risk to our being able to sustain our
East Coast carrier fleet from any large magnitude event, such as a
terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster. The cost of this
effort is expected to be approximately $500 million and will take about
eight years. It is the Department's view that this investment in risk
mitigation is prudent, representing approximately 10% of the cost of a
single carrier, or about 1% of the value of the carrier fleet.
Mr. Nye. I would appreciate hearing about the evolution of the QDR
homeporting recommendation. According to a December 3 draft version of
the document that was widely circulated by the media, the
recommendation at that time was to ``provide an alternative port to
dock East Coast aircraft carriers to mitigate the risk of a manmade or
natural disaster.'' That recommendation appears to suggest making the
minimal investments necessary to build alternative docking capacity,
but to hold back from spending hundreds of millions of dollars more in
investments necessary to maintain carriers at Mayport, or from
incurring the many operational inefficiencies that will result in
nuclear workforce, carrier airwing transport, and support ship
movements that would result from homeporting a carrier in Mayport. I am
also aware of a late December draft of the QDR that recommended
homeporting a carrier in Mayport, but did not include the investment
into maintenance facilities. And then, of course, the final QDR
recommends homeporting and maintenance facilities at Mayport--and the
Navy FYDP includes more than $200 million for those purposes, an amount
that does not even reflect the complete costs of the effort. So, it
appears that the homeporting recommendation changed greatly from early
December--can you explain this evolution from a recommendation that had
all of the strategic benefits at a fraction of the cost and operational
challenges into one that presents substantial operational and financial
costs but minimal strategic benefits?
Secretary Flournoy. The QDR went through numerous drafts and
revisions over many months before it was officially released in
February. All versions prior to the February release were staff drafts
only. From June through August 2009, the QDR Global Posture Issue Team,
which included senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Navy, analyzed the
issue. In the fall, Secretary Gates and senior Departmental leadership
reviewed and approved the QDR recommendation to support homeporting a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport, Florida. The rationale
supporting this decision rests on strategic dispersal and the security
of our Atlantic carrier fleet in the event of a terrorist attack,
accident, or natural disaster.
Mr. Nye. In your testimony you stated ``the Secretary--together
with Admiral Mullen--took action to direct resources away from lower-
priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be
addressed. Can you please tell me what lower priority programs just
missed the cut to be included in QDR? Your Direct Quote from testimony:
``Early in the QDR and in the course of the process of completing DOD's
budget submission for FY 2010, the Secretary--together with Admiral
Mullen--took action to direct resources away from lower-priority
programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed,
both within that budget and in the years that follow it.''
Secretary Flournoy. To support increases in needed capabilities,
the Department's leadership identified areas where the Department could
assume increased risk and take reductions. For example, reductions were
taken in the Future Combat Systems, F-22, and Presidential helicopter
programs. The Secretary also terminated under-performing programs,
including DIMHRS and the Net Enabled Command and Control program.
Finally, DOD proposes to conclude production of the C-17 aircraft,
having completed the planned procurement of those aircraft.
Mr. Nye. Yesterday, Admiral Mullen testified that the idea of
strategic dispersal that applies to East Coast carriers also applies to
other singularly based assets including, for example, submarines
equipped with nuclear weapons at Kings Bay or long range bombers. Do
you agree with this assessment? Then would it be accurate to say that
the DOD will look to disperse other grouped assets or singularly placed
infrastructure?
Secretary Flournoy. I agree that strategic dispersal is an
important concept to protect the Nation's strategic assets. The
Military Departments continuously assess risks to the force, consistent
with their Title 10 responsibilities, and take risk mitigation
measures, such as strategic dispersal, when appropriate. The QDR Report
makes clear that in key regions, U.S. forces will need to have access
to networks of bases and supporting infrastructures that are more
resilient than today's in the face of attacks by a variety of means.
Redundancy and dispersal concepts are critical concepts we are
exploring in our ongoing global posture review.
The decision to homeport, and not just create an alternate East
Coast port, provides the additional nuclear maintenance facility
necessary to reduce the risk to our East Coast carrier fleet from any
large magnitude event, such as a terrorist attack, accident, or natural
disaster.
Strategically dispersing carrier homeports on the East Coast
provides a more equivalent risk reduction to that afforded the Pacific
carrier fleet, which is strategically dispersed to homeports in
Washington, California, and Japan.
The analysis on East Coast carriers led to the conclusion that the
strategic benefit of dispersing aircraft carriers and nuclear
maintenance facilities along the East Coast outweighs the costs to
upgrade Mayport. A similar cost-benefit analysis would be applied in
any future decisions to disperse key assets strategically.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Mr. Kissell. The QDR outlines the need to ``Succeed in
Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism''. Within the models
and scenarios you used to plan for military operations other than two
simultaneous conventional wars, did your calculations address our need
to surge in both Iraq and Afghanistan? Is the force able to sustain two
major counterinsurgency operations as we see today while fighting other
scenarios you used during your war games prior to publishing the 2010
QDR? Additionally, we have repeatedly heard about a need to increase
the number of civilians involved in the counterinsurgency effort. We
know that civilians are training the police, incorporating supply
systems, partnering with government officials, and working in the
industrial sector. These are just a few examples of the areas civilians
are contributing, but as we know, our war fighters are also performing
many of the same duties in some degree. Often, our young sergeants,
lieutenants, and captains are serving in roles far beyond their scope
of understanding in an effort to get the job done. I am impressed with
their efforts and applaud their versatility; however, we need more to
allow our war fighters to focus on security operations. In the Succeed
in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism section of the
QDR you include one sentence acknowledging the use of civilians. The
sentence states, ``The Department is also exploring ways to better
integrate civil affairs functions with complementary stability
operations activities, such as those of Provincial Reconstruction Teams
and Human Terrain Teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.'' What steps
are being taken now, so that in the future we are not asking our young
combat officers and non-commissioned officers to secure areas as well
as serve partner with government officials, supervise the repair of
water treatment plants, and determine if a contractor is building a
school or a bridge to specifications. If you are using Afghanistan and
Iraq to model future counterinsurgencies and if the lessons from both
theaters should be adopted into doctrine, are you emphasizing a robust
partnership between the Department of Defense and the Department of
State? Please explain the Department's exploration into ways to better
integrate. I would like to remain aware of your efforts and any final
decisions that are made.
Secretary Flournoy. The Iraq and Afghanistan surge and post-surge
periods were accounted for in the analysis. The QDR report describes
two broad periods, near- to mid-term, taking into account continuing
combat activities in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the mid- to long-term,
which takes into account the decrease in combat activities in and
drawdown of forces from Iraq. It is in this second period that multiple
combat operations beyond the current counterinsurgency operations were
analyzed, recognizing the current demand on U.S. forces.
DOD recognizes that whole-of-government approaches are fundamental
to the success of counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Secretary Gates
has voiced strong support for building the capacity of civilian
capabilities within the U.S. Government. Consistent with this guidance,
the ``Strengthening Interagency Partnerships'' section of the QDR
Report notes that, ``the Department will continue to work with the
leadership of civilian agencies to support the agencies' growth and
their operations in the field, so that the appropriate military and
civilian resources are put forth to meet the demands of current
contingencies.'' To that end, the Department included interagency
partners in its QDR team that looked at capabilities required for COIN
missions. Similarly, the Department is providing support to the ongoing
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development and Homeland Security Reviews
underway at the Departments of State and Homeland Security,
respectively.
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