[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-115]
FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO
FORT HOOD
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 20, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Dave Kildee, Professional Staff Member
John Chapla, Professional Staff Member
James Weiss, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, January 20, 2010, Findings of the Department of
Defense Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood............... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, January 20, 2010...................................... 37
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2010
FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO
FORT HOOD
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Clark, Adm. Vern, USN (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval Operations... 6
West, Hon. Togo, Former Secretary of the Department of Veterans
Affairs, Former Secretary of the Army.......................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 44
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 41
West, Hon. Togo, joint with Adm. Vern Clark.................. 46
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO
FORT HOOD
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 20, 2010.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
HVC 210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
The Chairman. Good morning. On November 5, 2009, a gunman
opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood,
Texas. In line at the center were soldiers preparing for
deployment to combat zones overseas by completing last-minute
administrative tasks.
Thirteen people were killed and 43 were wounded on the U.S.
Army base on United States soil.
The alleged gunman, Army Major Nidal Hasan is an active
duty Army psychiatrist. As of today, he has been charged under
Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice with 13
counts of premeditated murder and Article 80 of attempted
premeditated murder.
I am troubled by the fact that it would appear that some of
the circumstances that led to the shooting were the result of
military officers not following existing policies and
procedures. Specifically there are numerous stories in the
press, NPR, AP, MSNBC, CNN, Fox News and others, that the
alleged shooter's raters and senior raters failed to document
negative information in his official record. We have questions.
Why did it happen? Could it have been prevented? Was the
response adequate? More importantly, we all share the same
intent to ensure that everything possible is done, that this
does not happen again. There are several task forces and panels
examining these very questions.
Today we hear from the first of these groups to issue a
report. The independent review related to Fort Hood--Secretary
Gates chartered the review soon after the shooting and gave
them 45 days to quickly examine the Department of Defense's
programs, policies and procedures related to force protection,
emergency response, and support of health care providers, and
oversight on the alleged perpetrator prior to the shooting.
To co-chair this independent review, Secretary Gates picked
two seasoned senior leaders. One is the Secretary of Veteran
Affairs and Secretary of the Army, Togo West; and the former
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark.
Gentlemen, we thank you for your service and look forward
to hearing your findings.
It is also worth noting that Secretary West is no stranger
to this type of initial review. He co-chaired the independent
review group created by Secretary Gates following the
disclosure of deficiencies regarding Walter Reed in 2007. We
hope our witnesses will address the adequacy of our force
protection, emergency response policies to identify service
members with radical or violent tendencies before they may hurt
others. I am particularly concerned, though, about the system
of officer evaluation in the Army and other services. The
performance report--the Army calls it the OER--must accurately
reflect the strengths and weaknesses of officers. Problems must
not be passed from one assignment to another.
This hearing continues the committee's oversight of these
issues that began in several briefings at the end of last year.
We will continue this oversight in the coming weeks and months.
I said from the outset that we must take great care that our
inquiries into the shooting do not compromise or imperil the
prosecution of the alleged gunman in any way. We will continue
our inquiries in a thoughtful and deliberative manner that will
not undermine the legal case against the alleged shooter.
I would also remind the members of the conditions under
which the Department shared the annex associated with this
report, that we would not discuss its contents publicly and ask
that members respect those conditions. The primary concern of
this committee is the safety of all those who serve and/or
support our armed forces. We owe this to our service members
and the Department of Defense [DOD] civilians and, of course,
the family members.
At this time, I turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr.
McKeon, the gentleman from California, for his remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary West and Admiral Clark, I join Chairman Skelton
in welcoming you and thanking you, again, for answering, once
again, the call to duty to serve your country. You had a short
time to develop your findings and recommendations, and I
compliment both of you with regard to their breadth and scope.
In short, you have documented and highlighted the lack of
preparedness by the Department of Defense and by this nation to
first recognize and then deal effectively and comprehensively
with the existing and growing internal domestic terrorist
threat. This threat is not a Department of Defense problem
alone. As your report points out, an integrated synchronized
nationwide effort will be necessary to ensure national
preparedness to prevent and respond to future domestic acts of
terror.
Major Hasan may have been an individual actor in the Fort
Hood shooting, but the radicalization of an officer who took an
oath to support and defend the constitution of the United
States against all enemy, foreign and domestic and to bear
truth, faith, and allegiance to the Constitution should send
shock waves through all Americans as to the power and reach of
an enemy like Al Qaeda in Yemen to generate such radicalism
among other U.S. citizens.
Al Qaeda in Yemen declared war on the United States with
the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. While the U.S. has taken
actions to curb their power and influence as an external
threat, this nation and its allies seemingly have also taken
action to assist in the organization's growth.
For example, in 2006, the escape of 23 members of Al Qaeda
from a maximum security Yemeni prison, including several who
attacked the Cole, led to the formation of Al Qaeda on the
Arabian Peninsula. The 2007 release from Guantanamo Bay of Said
Ali Shari, one of the first detainees at that prison, allowed
him to join Al Qaeda in Yemen and to help plan the Christmas
Day attack on Northwest Flight 253.
Moreover, the nation has not learned the lesson from
September 11th that organizations that have information about
potential or actual terrorists must share that information with
all who might act to prevent terrorist activities. As is
becoming apparent, such was not the case in either the November
attack by Major Hasan, who had Internet contact with Al Qaeda
in Yemen, or the attempted Christmas day bombing of Northwest
Flight 253 by a terrorist acting under orders of Al Qaeda in
Yemen.
With regard to the Fort Hood shootings, your report is
clear that Major Hasan's supervisors were aware of his
shortcomings as an officer and medical professional and failed
to act appropriately, and the report is strangely silent on
whether or not Major Hasan gave any clear evidence of his
radicalization or whether there were any substantive clues
about that radicalization that his supervisors should have
acted upon. I hope that your testimony will address these
issues.
The report also points out numerous personnel policy
shortfalls that contribute to the Department's unpreparedness
to deal with internal threats. Among the many findings, there
was criticism of current policies, practices and procedures
related to identifying potentially violent behaviors,
information sharing, the accommodation of religious practices,
counterintelligence activities in cyber space, and definitions
of and responses to prohibited activities.
Although you make no specific recommendations as to how to
resolve these issues, you are clearly suggesting that these
policies, practices and procedures need to be refocused,
tightened and implemented with renewed vigor. Such a course of
action suggests the possibility for closer government scrutiny
by DOD and other agencies, for example, of various electronic
social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and Web pages and e-
mails of U.S. citizens. The report is silent on how much
initiative should be balanced against the First Amendment and
privacy concerns. I would be interested in your views on this
issue.
Finally, you made six recommendations for immediate action.
I would hope that, in your testimony and the follow-on
questions, you could address three of them in detail and why
you singled out these three from among all the other
recommendations for immediate action: Number one, the need to
synchronize continental United States DOD emergency management
systems with the national emergency framework; two, the DOD
enhancement of the Joint Terrorism Task Force; and three, the
creation of a DOD entity to concentrate in one place the DOD
effort to gather, analyze and interpret data useful for
identifying indicators of potential violent action and to
create a comprehensive and usable catalog of those indicators
that can be updated continuously and made available throughout
the DOD and the military services.
In closing, I want to thank you again for your past and
continuing service to this nation. Your report is a significant
first step in identifying the areas that need to be improved if
this nation is to be safe from internal domestic terrorist
activities.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
The Chairman. Now the witnesses.
The Honorable Togo West.
Secretary West.
Secretary West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might, Mr.
Chairman----
The Chairman. Make sure the----
Secretary West. There we go. I have it now. Thank you, sir.
I wonder if you have our written statement, I wondered if we
can submit it to you for inclusion in the record.
The Chairman. Of course. Both written statements will be
submitted in the record without objection.
Secretary West. We will take just a few minutes, Admiral
Clark and I, to hit some highlights that we would like to call
to your attention. I will go first, and then, with your
permission, he will pick up.
The Chairman. Very good. We look forward to it. Thank you,
sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOGO WEST, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary West. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon,
distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services, as
pointed out, more than two months ago, on November 5th, 13
people died, 12 members of the uniformed military and one
civilian; and 43 were wounded from a lone gunman who walked
into the Soldier Readiness Center in Fort Hood and began
firing. It was a day of tragedy, and it will be remembered as
such.
Shortly after that event, Secretary Gates empanelled this
review and asked Admiral Clark and me to chair it, and as has
already been noted, we did so, and the report has been
submitted to him, and it is now before you.
They asked us to take a careful look at personnel policies,
at procedures for force protection, emergency response measures
and support of those who provide medical care to those who
serve. He also asked us to take a look at how the Army applied
its policies and procedures to the alleged perpetrator.
Briefly, we organized ourselves into five teams, each led
by a senior official, and each was assigned one of those--the
first four tasks and also the fifth task. The reports from each
of those are in the report before you as taken by us and viewed
by us, edited by us and changed to reflect--and modified to
reflect our view on what could be concluded, what could be
findings, what could be recommendations.
There is, in the beginning, on Chapter 1, a one-page
summary of what we saw and found and concluded with respect to
the alleged perpetrator. And as the chairman has noted, the
remainder of it, the details are in the restricted annex, which
is available to you.
We did not, because there was already underway, look into
the intelligence aspects. That was assigned to a different
review, and we were directed in our terms of reference to avoid
interfering with it.
We did not, because it is under control of military justice
authorities, look into the criminal aspects of this matter.
Again, we were instructed not to interfere with that, and
similarly the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] has had a
separate review going forward to look into the sharing of
information portions that have to do with them.
Nonetheless, our mandate was widespread. It was directed
towards having us look to find gaps and deficiencies, as the
Secretary mentioned, in policies, procedures, practices by the
Department of Defense and the services across the board.
With respect to the alleged perpetrator, you will note that
we state openly in Chapter 1 that several military officers did
not apply Army policies to the alleged perpetrator. We also
recommended that that finding and similar findings that are
reflected in the annex be referred by the Secretary of Defense
to the Secretary of the Army for review as to responsibility,
accountability, and such other action as he shall deem
appropriate. He has done so. The referral has been made. The
Army has that review underway now.
Before I turn this over to Admiral Clark to fill in some
details with respect to the review and the report that you
have, three observations I think are important to point out.
First, what we learned is that there is never enough
preparation. There is never too much preparation. Authorities
at Fort Hood had already anticipated a possible mass casualty
event, as reflected in their emergency response plans. And
their response on that day showed that preparation.
Two minutes and 40 seconds after the 911 call was received,
first responders were on the scene of the shooting. By first
responders, I refer specifically to members of the Fort Hood
security team. A minute and a half after their arrival, the
assailant was incapacitated. Two minutes and 50 seconds later,
two ambulances and an incident command vehicle from the post
hospital arrived and began to provide life-saving health care.
With that response, lives were saved.
And yet 13 people died. Scores more were wounded. We can
prepare better. We must plan with greater attention and we must
make the effort to look around the corners of our future and
anticipate the next potential event in order to deflect it.
Secondly, we need to pay attention to today's hazards. The
fact is, we need to understand the forces that cause an
individual to radicalize, to commit violent acts, and thereby
to make us vulnerable from within.
Thirdly, there is much in this report that is about
violence, violence by a service member against his or her
colleagues. The effort is to detect the indicators that one
might commit acts of violence, to catalog them, to make them
available of the persons who need to know what are the
indicators and where have the indicators been noted and then to
prepare ourselves to act when that evidence is before us, to
make it available to our commanders so that they can act and to
be clear about their authority.
On further note, as has been pointed out, we were asked to
do this report within 45 days. The Secretary clearly had in
mind that there would be follow-on reviews of what we would
come up with. For that reason, although we have cast our net
widely, there is--there were also boundaries simply in terms of
what the 129 or so souls who are committed to our leadership
could accomplish. And thus you will find there is space left
for the follow-on reviews.
Often our recommendations account in terms with the need to
pay closer attention and to closer review that.
That, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member and members of
the committee, is how we structured ourselves.
And now if I may turn to Admiral Clark.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary West and Admiral
Clark can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]
The Chairman. Admiral, we welcome you at our hearing. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF ADM. VERN CLARK, USN (RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Clark. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, it is a privilege to be here
again today to take this opportunity to talk to you about the
review that Secretary West and myself have co-led. So let me
get right to it. I know you have questions.
First, let me talk briefly about force protection. The
principal message is this: There are many policies, dozens of
policies, in the Department about force protection. We have
built lots of barriers since 9/11. That said, existing policies
are not optimized for the internal threat, and the threat that
we saw, witnessed at the Fort Hood incident was evolving inside
the barriers.
Second, let's talk about ID-ing employees who can be a
threat in this kind of circumstance. It is a difficult
challenge. The reality is that there is insufficient knowledge
and guidance to identify individuals. Guidance concerning
workplace violence and the potential for self-radicalization or
radicalization in general, as Secretary West indicated, is
insufficient, and the key here is that we focused on violence
of any kind. What we found was a lack of clarity for
comprehensive indicators which then limit the commanders' or
the supervisor's ability to recognize these potential threats,
and so it doesn't matter if we are looking at somebody who
might be inclined to hurt themselves--and by the way, the
Secretary of Defense had that specifically in our terms of
reference, incidents of suicide or criminal and gang behavior
or somebody advocating supremacist activity and doctrine or
family violence or the evolving threat, like radicalization,
identifying the key indicators is critical to focusing the
force on the threat.
So our focus was on violence that comes from any kind of
behavior. But what we found especially was that policies on the
internal threat are inadequate. Prohibited behaviors and
actions need to be addressed. And our report says specifically
that such guidance exists, but it is incomplete for the day in
which we live.
Let me talk briefly about information sharing. The
Secretary of Defense indicated Friday in his reaction to our
review that we saw a requirement to create the ability to adapt
rapidly in the changing security environment which exists
today. Anticipating new threats, bringing a widely continuously
evolving range of tools and techniques and programs into play.
Robust information sharing is absolutely critical. Along with
that, the command-and-control system to convert information
into real decisions and real actions. It requires active
information gathering, and we must remove the barriers, all of
the barriers. Information sharing is a key element allowing
decision makers to connect the dots. We have got to get the
information, these indicators, to the appropriate levels of
command.
And let me speak briefly about the response that we saw at
Fort Hood because the Secretary asked us to address emergency
response. As Secretary West has indicated, we were impressed
with what we saw at Fort Hood.
Ladies and gentlemen, I served for 37 years. Secretary West
and I went down there on the second day after the formation of
our team. What I saw was the best after-action report I have
ever seen in my life. With the kind of candor that was
impressive. Lots of good news there.
The base personnel were prepared. They were trained. They
took appropriate action. Their action was prompt, as the
Secretary indicated. Their response to the active shooter was
impressive. There were courageous acts. The first responders,
the local law enforcement personnel, DOD civilians, health care
providers, all of their actions prevented greater loss.
That said, we still believe it can be done better. We have
got to focus on better tools for commanders, focus on violence
prevention in whatever form it exists. We must adapt and evolve
to the rapid change. We must understand that there is no single
point solution here. Change is going to continue at a rapid
pace. We have to share information so the right people can
connect the dots and exercise against the most stressing and
pressing scenarios to make sure that we have it right.
So we were impressed with what we saw at Fort Hood, both
the military and civilians on base as well as those in the
community who were key players in the outcome of November 5th.
And all of this reminds us of the greatness of our people, the
strength of our nation, and resiliency and character of our
people.
So, speaking for Secretary West on this point, and the rest
of the team, our hearts go out to the families of those that
were lost and those that were wounded in this incident. And the
thrust of our activity, of our effort, has been to do
everything we know how to do, to help the Secretary of Defense
put the spotlight on those immediate areas that need to be
addressed in phase two of his organized effort.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Clark and
Secretary West can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you.
Secretary West, Admiral Clark, we thank you for your very
thorough and telling testimony. It appears to me that there
were two disconnects that lead to a major question. Disconnect
number one is the actual performance of the alleged shooter on
the one hand, and the OER and academic evaluation. The second
disconnect would be one of intelligence-type, whether that
reaches the right superiors or not, which leads to the bottom
line question, which was a great deal overlooked because this
was a medical person in a special area in which there is a
shortage.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary West. Mr. Chairman, I pause just for a minute
because I am trying to reflect on how much my answer takes me
into discussion of an area we have covered in the annex rather
than the report.
The Chairman. Do your best.
Secretary West. Thanks for encouragement. But I would think
that we could say, in general, as to the way officers are
evaluated, especially medical officers, and the way that is
reported, that what we have concluded and have said to the
Secretary of Defense, that is this: First, the disconnect you
noted is correct. That is what we mean when we say that the
policies were not applied, that things witnessed were not
always reported where they needed to be reported, and that, in
fact, there are contradictory indications.
And with respect to the second--and we recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that he take some public steps about this,
that we had to say to the force--or he had to say to the
force--the Department has to say to the force, evaluations make
a difference, and we can't do the job of leading or protecting
against threats if honest evaluations are not done by those who
have the duty, the information, and the authority to do so.
The Chairman. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. A major piece of this, Mr. Chairman, is what
is part of the record. In our report, we don't tell the
Secretary of Defense what parts to make, what should go into
the record. We say, he asked us for gaps and weaknesses. And so
we said, look, if an individual's track history doesn't stay
with them, that leaves you open to potential weaknesses and
gaps. So there are certain things that are required by
regulation that cannot move from station to station with an
individual. That is something that needs to be looked at.
With regard to the issue of performance appraisal, we all
know that performance appraisal is a challenge in any
environment. That said, we used specific terms to say things
that we wanted to connote. We didn't use just the term
leadership. We used the term ``officership''.
If you look on Page six and seven of our report, we say
specifically what we think happened here. We believe that some
of the signs were clearly missed, or they were ignored. I
cannot tell you which, and I can't go further than that because
of the nature of the restrictions that are--of the information
that is in the restricted annex.
But there is no doubt in my mind or Secretary West's mind
that there are issues here, and if there were not so, we would
not have said that to the Secretary of Defense.
With regard to the intelligence matters, there--so we
didn't do the intelligence review. The President had already
outlined and authorized a review, and we were given specific
guidance: Do not interfere.
That said, Mr. Chairman, since our review team--began this
action, there have been a number of things in the public domain
that tell us that they--there is agreement that the
dissemination of information process needs to be improved, and
there was a release on Friday by the FBI that talked about the
improvements that are going to be made and are being made in
cooperation with the Department of Defense.
Our encouragement was this: We didn't tell them exactly how
to do this. By the way, we don't do policy. We were reviewing
policy. You want people that are going to do policy to be
confirmed by the Congress, not two people who are called on to
do this in a matter of few weeks, I believe. In fact, I am sure
of that, having been there. So what I am suggesting is, we
suggested whatever that outcome is, what needs to be done is to
ensure that the right information gets in the hands of the
operational command to give them a chance to connect the dots.
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Burgess, be allowed to participate in today's
hearing after all committee members have had an opportunity to
ask questions.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, the concern that I think all of us
feel probably most keenly is, are there other potential threats
out there? Do we have other potential people that are in the
system and the system is not adequately working to find them,
and are we open to further problems such as we have seen? The
report was strangely silent on whether or not Major Hasan gave
any clear evidence of his radicalization or whether there were
any substantive clues about that radicalization that his
supervisors should have acted upon.
We know from media reports of at least three instances
where he acted in a manner, in hindsight, which should have
raised concerns about his allegiance to the United States,
possibly prompted action by his supervisors. His statement that
Sharia law trumped the Constitution, his religious discussions
with patients and his presentation to his colleagues that
equated suicide bombers to service members who died for this
Nation.
What substantive evidence did your review turn up regarding
Major Hasan's actions or statements that gave or should have
given his supervisors any indication of his radicalization? To
what degree did the three instances I cited in my opening to
this question arouse concern by Major Hasan's supervisors about
the appropriateness of such statements or actions and what was
done with regard to those concerns? What policies, practices,
and procedures limited or blocked the ability of Major Hasan's
supervisors to appropriately assess his developing
radicalization? And then I am concerned if political
correctness was involved here and if the need for psychiatrists
maybe overlooked some things. Those are kind of my major
concerns.
Secretary West. Mr. McKeon, let me try to answer that. And
I will try to answer, remembering there is a military justice
investigation underway and that I need to be careful not to
deal in evidence that will be used there.
First of all, let me say that, overall, I believe that in
the restricted annex, you will find a discussion of items you
mentioned. But on the question of whether signals were missed,
whether there were indications, let me say this: We have said
in the open report, in our--in the chapter we devoted to it and
also in our executive summary, and in fact I just heard the
Admiral talk and refer to that language again: Some signs were
missed. Others appeared to have been ignored.
The fact is that there was evidence and that is what we are
referring to for signs for senior officials to see, to note and
react to. We explain those in specifics in the annex. And our
concern is yes, there are policies in place that should have
made the reaction to them possible. It should make that
reaction possible throughout the force. And yet, we have
indications that they were not acted upon, the need for
properly recording in either the SSAER, the Senior Service
School Academic Evaluation or in the OER, the officer
efficiency report. SSAERs are used in all the military schools.
That is how we evaluate them, both academically and as
officers, to have those accurately reflect what is happening is
an important tool for telling future commanders what has
happened but also for making judgments on those officers as
they progress.
Secondly, I would add this. Again, perhaps as important as
anything is once recorded, the information needs to be--to get
to the people who have to make decisions. I think Admiral Clark
already pointed out the fact that we have several policies that
say--and we mention this in our report--or practices that keep
us from keeping certain kinds of information beyond the period
in the person's life, in the service member's life in which
that is recorded. If there has been alcohol or drug use and a
rehabilitation program, that information is not forwarded in
the files, it is no longer in there after that is done. And
there are other kinds of information as to which we have
policies that specifically exclude keeping them and making them
available in the file to go forward. We recommend that be
looked at.
There are times when it is important for us to be aware of
changed circumstances. And the circumstances we face today--I
thought you were going to ask about this when you first
mentioned it--could this happen again? Could an incident happen
again? As long as there are humans serving in the armed forces
of the United States or anywhere else, in government and
throughout our society, self-radicalization, becoming upset
because you believe that you have been inappropriately treated
in your workplace, prejudices of one sort or another can lead
to violent acts. We need to equip our force and our commanders
with the ability to detect it by getting them the information
that you refer to and by equipping them to act on it.
Mr. McKeon. If I may, the things that you addressed, the
alcohol or other prior things are things that affect the
workplace don't address the radicalization and that seems to be
the real crux of this. And that is the thing I think we need to
be mindful of as we move forward. Admiral.
Secretary West. May I just say you are right and I should
have mentioned the fact that those are also indicators, that is
what gets said, how one relates to one's colleagues and
professors, a view that suggests a willingness to act on that.
I am sorry. You wanted to----
Admiral Clark. And I concur with your assessment also. And
I align myself with Secretary West's comments. I won't repeat
all of those. I could answer your question in a very fulsome
way if we were in a closed session, and we are not, and would
welcome the opportunity to do that, because there are real
answers to your questions. And those will be spoken to in the
right time, when it is--there is authorization to release that
kind of information.
Let me just make one comment about your question, are there
others out there? I want to make sure that it is clear why I
don't have an answer to that, that the answer to that would not
be evident by researching the clarity and viability of the
policies, which is fundamentally what we have done. The
Secretary asked us to find these weaknesses on our core and our
structure and our architecture. And so I don't know how to
express the breadth of that over the course of this whole
discussion. It sometimes doesn't come through with just the way
the written word comes out.
But that answer specifically has to come from the
collection of intel sources. We did not pursue intel at all by
direction, and we weren't seeking to--our task was--he sent us
in a different direction. He sent us there, specifically,
though, to help equip the rest of the Department so they
wouldn't go off on a broad fan hunt themselves, that they could
put the crosshairs on the areas they had to go after first.
And so as a follow on to the things that Secretary West
addressed, it is clear that your question about--so what does
the nature and the breadth of this look like, that question has
to be answered. And we simply--we didn't go there because we
weren't interested in it. We went there because that was not
our task and we really--I do not have an answer for you.
That said, the things that Secretary West commented on, we
do believe that there are indicators, and those indicators need
to be examined because the issue of self-radicalization is one
that is new to us in many, many ways, and I listed that--a
series of kinds of behaviors that could lead to violence that
are well documented in policy and in directives and programs.
Such is not the case when we talk about self-radicalization.
That needs to be addressed with speed.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We are now into the five-minute rule.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary West, Chief
Clark. Thank you so much for joining us, and thank you for your
service.
Maybe we can go back a little bit and you can inform the
committee as to how he got his promotion, his evaluation, his
performance. Was he promoted by a board? How do you promote him
from a captain to a field grade officer major? Were there
several members sitting on this board that recommended that he
be promoted? Maybe you can give us some insight as to how that
was done.
Secretary West. Congressman Ortiz, again, trying to be
mindful on our part, that we have explored this in some detail
in the restricted annex, which I believe is available to you,
and that we want to be careful not to delve and talk in this
session about things that will have an effect on the military's
investigation. The standard practice for consideration for
military medical officers in the Army is, yes, they are
promoted. They are considered by a promotion board. That board
considers their officer evaluation reports, and it also
considers the record from their academic training, SSAERs, as I
mentioned. So they make their judgments based on that, and that
happens in the case of every medical officer, and so it would
have happened in the case of this officer.
Mr. Ortiz. There are several members sitting on this board.
Are they allowed to come up with a dissenting view that maybe
they were not all in agreement, that this individual should be
promoted?
Admiral Clark. These boards are controlled by statute
directive. In my time as the chief, this was one of the always
very important things that the Secretary of the service and
myself considered, including specifics about the guidance that
went to the board, and the board then functions in accordance
with the guidance it gets from the service Secretary.
The statutory process precludes controls, is a better way
to say it, controls in very exacting terms the kinds of
information that can come before the board. And this is to
ensure that everybody has an equal opportunity to promotion and
all the things that go with that that has been developed over
the years.
If you take our comment on pages six and seven of the
report, when we comment on the fact that it is our view that
some things were missed or overlooked, that can give you a
glimpse inside of what our opinion is. And again, I would
love--I don't like the idea that I am inhibited in what I am
allowed to talk to about in an open hearing about this. I might
wish it was otherwise. But I would just say to you this: You
can take comfort in the process if that communicates to you.
You can take comfort in the process.
What they are allowed to review is what is specifically in
the OERs or any material that the member chooses to put in
front of the board. And there is a very exacting process that
has to occur if there is other information that is going to be
placed in front of the board. And that is all I can say in an
open hearing. And with the restricted nature----
Mr. Ortiz. I understand. And the reason I ask this
question, I was just wondering whether, when this board met and
maybe if there were dissenting views, if they were able to
filter all the way to the chain of command?
Admiral Clark. I can only repeat what I said. I wish I
could say more.
Mr. Ortiz. Well, thank you so much. I don't want to take
too much time. But thank you for your service. And I just hope
that we can get to the bottom of it, and the reason I am asking
these questions is because, not only should we be worried about
our soldiers who might turn out to be bad apples like this guy,
but we saw the killings of the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency] in Afghanistan. And we are just wondering if we can
also--and maybe this is not in your line--but I worry about our
service people in Afghanistan and Iraq and hoping that we don't
get those bad people to be able to infiltrate our soldiers
before they do something like this.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Bartlett from Maryland.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your service.
I have a button with a message which I cherish. It was
given to me by Hap Baker, who was a principal architect for the
guidance system for the Patriot missile. I knew him primarily
in his role as an unapologetic defender of the Second Amendment
right, and I never saw Hap Baker without his hat and his button
on that said, ``politically incorrect and proud of it.''
Indeed, that button was such a part of Hap Baker, that I
attended his funeral and was pleased to see that it was there
on him in his casket. I probably should be wearing that button
today because maybe I am going to be politically incorrect.
I suspect that these officers might have felt that they
were following policy because they had two policies which were
in conflict. One of them was to be politically correct [PC] and
not appear to profile. The other was to offer an honest
competent evaluation of the performance of the officer. Now,
one cannot get inside their head, but I would suspect that they
may have given more weight to the politically correct policy
that you don't profile.
By the way, we do profile, and people understand that. If
you are looking for a rapist, you are probably not looking too
hard at preadolescent males and women. I suspect if the
ethnicity had been different here, that the policies might have
been applied differently. How do we get a proper balance
between political correctness and the obligation to honestly
and fairly evaluate?
Secretary West. Do you care who you get your answer from,
Congressman? May I take that on?
Mr. Bartlett. Sir?
Secretary West. Were you addressing that to me or the
Admiral?
Mr. Bartlett. To both of you.
Secretary West. Then I will take it on. I hear the term
politically correct all the time. And I know that people think
they know what it means, but I am not so sure. I think what we
are talking about, quite frankly, is, how do we do what we have
to do to get the information to spot people who are likely to
harm our service members, on the one hand, versus, how are we
careful that in so doing we are not taking steps that lump
people into a group and keep us not from favoring them but from
attributing characteristics to the entire group and thus
convicting one person before we actually learn what is
happening with that person?
So I don't think there is a real tension here that we can't
deal with if we realize this: In our force, we are already
handicapped in trying to identify a potential violator by the
fact that if it is a member of a military family, if he or she
is a member of the military family who wears a uniform, they
have access to our installations. They don't get searched. They
have their cards. They put them in, and they get in. So the way
that we stop them is to identify them ahead of time.
And I think that if we made these recommendations in our
report, that we can look for objective indicators. If you have
objective indicators, if you catalog them--that is why we
recommend it--an ongoing organization to do just like that,
look at the indicators that a person might commit violence,
make them available, and make our decisions on that basis, we
will be able to get the job done. And we won't have to worry
about PC or any other short-term expressions that suggest that
we are not looking at them because they are in a group.
Mr. Bartlett. I think that the average American would like
us to be a little politically incorrect in circumstances like
this if it is going to result in better security.
Would you agree, Admiral?
Admiral Clark. I absolutely believe that the people of the
United States expect, and they should expect, that we will
pursue the best security posture that we know how to possess.
And certainly our people deserve nothing less. My take on this
is that this is especially challenging, and this is why I refer
to the Secretary of Defense, again, commenting on the nature,
the rapidly changing environment in the last decade. The fourth
generation warfare scheme is that our enemy intends to go
after--pursue us in the scenes, and the inside, internal threat
is an area that our review suggests very clearly that we have
done an inadequate job identifying these indicators.
Our focus is on identify the behavior so we equip and
enable the commanders. I love one of the things that the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the day our
panel, our review was set up, one of the reporters said
Admiral, what are you--how do you look at this? And he came out
clearly and boldly and said, I expect commanders and leaders in
organizations to understand what is going on in their command
and for the chain of command to be functioning in a vibrant way
and that is the answer to these kinds of problems and
challenges. The reality is that the guidance on what kind of
behaviors to look for for the self-radicalized individual are
inadequate.
I will tell you that already some have already been
published; I saw a review of one, and a message that went out
in the U.S. Army yesterday. We have to move fast and this is
the requirement.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary West and
Admiral Clark, it is great to see you both again, you have been
great public servants for many, many years. I want to ask this
issue that has come up in the discussions about the fact that
we have an annex, which I did go and look at in this discussion
today. I think this is going to be a frustrating experience
trying to figure out where to go for the American people and
policymakers if we have this dichotomy between a discussion and
hear common generalities, versus talking about a specific case.
I need to understand--by the way, that is not a classified
document, it is for official use only. It is one thing if we
had out in that room the criminal case file, interrogation,
whatever is there.
But in fact, what you all are conducting is an
administrative proceeding based on the records that are in the
military in order to problem solve. And it is not clear to me
why the American people are not entitled to see because it is
part of the problem-solving process, these unredacted reviews,
career reviews or academic reports, or college transcripts, or
whatever is in that record as part of an administrative
proceeding.
You are not putting those things out there, we have--you
know, he did this performance in college and we have concluded
then, based on that, that he is a criminal. I mean, help me
with that. Here is the problem, you say it is it not the right
time to have this discussion. When is the right time going to
be? Will it be after I assume there will be a criminal trial,
although that may not be, there can still be adjudication of--I
am not talking about this case, but there is always going to be
a potential question is someone mentally fit to go to trial,
where will this all go?
I don't know what the right time is going to be for the
American people and the people in Texas and the military to
have the kind of public discussion of this specific case. If I
was a family member, I would not be satisfied with go to the
annex and we will discuss it. I would want to know what
happened with this specific case. So when is the right time,
where is your advice coming from that we cannot--that you
cannot in an administrative proceeding just put the documents
out there of things that clearly occurred before the criminal
investigation. So where does your advice come from and what was
your specific advice with regard to an annex versus specific
documents?
Secretary West. Congressman, there are several aspects, but
I think I can do them quickly. First of all, the specific
question, where is the advice coming from, it is coming from
the DOD lawyers. Secondly, what would it be based on? Well, it
is based on a couple of things: First, yes, the annex is FOUO
[for official use only]. What is contained in it has two
effects. One is that much of it is from officer efficiency
reports and the like, those are specifically protected.
Secondly, the overall concern that is what contained in there
will have an effect on the military justice proceedings. And on
that score, we have already been warned not to discuss that
openly. It is available to you.
Thirdly, I would point out that even the annex, as you
point out is redacted, is only redacted as to names. Everything
else that we wrote is there disclosed, what happened as we
found out, what we recommended, what is in the record, all
disclosed in that annex.
And I think, fourthly, the question, well, when is the time
to discuss it. Yes, you have given the answer, it is after the
conclusion of the military justice proceedings which may be a
trial, I assume that is what everyone is preparing for, but I
don't know it.
I would make one other observation. We were not asked to
find out what happened. We were asked to assure the Secretary
of Defense that there were not gaps or deficiencies in the
policies, practices, or procedures that would help us either
identify such a person and deal with them, or protect the
force, or be prepared for mass casualties going forward, or
support military caregivers. And also to look specifically at
how the Army applied its policies to the alleged----
Dr. Snyder. That is where the gap is here today, because we
can go back there and try to sort all this out in the annex,
but it is going to be a frustrating thing for the American
people to try to sort out where the policies applied, should
the policies be different. I think lawyers, for the most part,
will say this may upset the criminal trial, but we have got to
be sure we are not throwing that net out so broadly of
protection that it's going to keep us from making America
safer, our military safer and avoiding these kinds of
tragedies. I am not clear that we are at that point today with
this publication of this annex.
Admiral Clark. May I make one very quick observation? In
order for the American people to understand this part of the
process, so we have five teams and one of the teams dealt with
the issues as prescribed in the terms of reference and as
Secretary West has indicated. Look at the gaps, look at the
weaknesses and look at the application here so that it is clear
that we thought through the longer term process, the person
that headed that effort for us was a four-star general from the
United States Army.
And it is not just coincidence that he has already been
given the task by the Secretary of the Army. We recommended
that the Secretary of Defense refer this, the findings that we
have in hand to the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of
the Army has named that same officer to proceed with the case
in order to speed the process and rapidly come to a judgment of
accountability.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the
Admiral and General, thank you, thank you very much. I have had
the privilege of being with you in previous years when you were
in uniform and it is a pleasure to see today and this important
work that you have done to try to get to the bottom of the
tragedy that happened at Fort Hood.
I saw today in the Express, and it is not earthshaking
news, but AP Hasan sanitized history. I want to take my
question in a little different direction. I know those who
evaluated his performances are probably hurting very badly
because maybe they did not see what they should have seen or
reported what they did see in his actions, but I am very--want
to know the environment of where these psychiatrists in the
military were working.
And let me explain that. There is no excuse for what
happened, none, and you have already pointed that out and you
have made recommendations that I know that the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Army will follow many of those
recommendations. I know there is an investigation going on by
the military as this relates to what criminal actions might
have taken place, but is there an environment where we have
more and more of our troops with PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder] and more and more of our troops with TBI [traumatic
brain injury] and other mental problems from going deployment
after deployment after deployment.
It is an environment that because we have not as many
psychiatrists as we need in the military that maybe, and this
would be your opinion, if that is anything you looked at in the
investigation, but is an environment that we need to have these
psychiatrists, we need to have these psychiatrists to help the
families and to help the military. And so maybe, that is no
excuse, maybe what should have been a red flag was not a red
flag. I will ask you both if you would respond to that.
Secretary West. I think I will give you my answer rather
briefly Congressman, and then let Admiral Clark speak. I think
you very well articulate what could have been a possibility or
more specifically what could be a situation that we face today.
Admiral Clark. You identify one of the things that I am not
sure a lot of people understand and our report says that United
States military has had people in the combat zone for 20 years,
virtually 20 years. And so we all need to understand that there
is stress on the force. Now one of the things that--and so I
agree with you that these are realities, and these people--we
came to the conclusion, and by the way the Secretary gave us
specific instructions to go look at the care of the health care
givers and we haven't addressed that today, we are of a
conviction that they largely have been treated as a separate
group.
We believe they need to be treated just like the combatants
do. They need the same kinds of programs and support and all
that goes with that. And so we did not look at TBI, PTSD, the
Secretary had a view, I guess, that he didn't need our view on
that, he must have looked at that and he had that where he
needed it. And so we came to the conclusion that these people
are a critical part of the readiness posture of the United
States military and so great care is required and programs to
support them are required.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank both the gentlemen
for being here today and their responses to each member's
questions. Thank you for your answers to my question. I hope
that my colleagues did hear as I think I heard your response
very clearly. Thank you and with that I would yield back my
time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, once again for your continued service to our
country.
I want to ask you from a different angle something that I
may be wrong on or it may be something to think and I didn't
know whether you really had a chance to look at this incident.
I think it is important for us to understand how we protect our
forces internally, as you said, but I am looking more at this
as an administrative issue, and certainly one section of it was
what my colleague just talked about, our need for psychologists
and people in the military and how difficult it is to get them
in there.
But I am looking at more at a sense of supervisor to
somebody who works in this particular case the alleged
attacker, because on the day that this happened as I was
driving in the car, I heard a radio station where one of the
direct supervisors for the last year and a half, he had now
retired a Colonel, I believe, who had now retired and had been
out of the military for about six months, was on a radio talk
show talking about this alleged attacker. And I don't know if
you all got that interview, but he went on and on about a half
an hour about all the signs he had seen with respect to this
alleged attacker. And how he never reported it.
And so, I mean, I think it comes down to two things: One,
it is always difficult as a manager, and if you go and you ask
or you go and take a look at the surveys and ask what is the
toughest part of being a manager, it is the firing of people or
demoting of people, or the turning in of people. It doesn't
make any of us feel good. So there is that just human reaction
of, you know, I have somebody here who is crazy and how am I
going to move him on--and we tend to move them on versus how do
I fire him.
Then there is the whole legal issues of how do we go about
firing someone and how difficult it is to do that. So my
question is, did you take a look at that? Especially with the
whole issue of how much you can damage the career of somebody
who has made the military career, and certainly I have heard
from several soldiers of personal experiences where they are
going to seek some help with a psychologist, for example,
within the military, has come back to damage their career so
much to the point where they have had to get out of the
military.
So were you given that information about this talk show and
this particular gentleman and how he referred and how he saw
all these signs and how he never did anything about it? And the
only thing that gentleman said was, I couldn't wait fast enough
to retire because this guy was a walking time bomb.
And more importantly, when you look at administrative
proceedings, do you have any recommendations of how we get to
this very basic, I am a manager, but I don't want to hurt this
guy's career, but he might be a crackpot?
Admiral Clark. I wish to goodness that I was not
constrained about talking about this. You might imagine how I
feel about this having served 37 years and making the judgment
that we have made in here. We said to use the word officership,
we weren't just talking about the alleged perpetrator. They
were responsible for developing him and educating him and
training him and developing him in the field of medicine, and
as an officer in the United States Army. Our impression and the
words in our report are as straightforward as we can say them.
It needed work.
Ms. Sanchez. Any comments, Secretary?
Secretary West. Yes, I would add this, with respect to your
question about having heard or known something about that
conversation you had, it is not specifically referred to in our
report or in any of the information furnished to us. I have no
doubt that the Colonel of whom you spoke was interviewed and
the results of that interview are part of what is in our annex.
So I don't think that what that Colonel had to say if he
was indeed a supervisor has been lost or missed, that has now
become part of the record for the military justice review
frankly.
Secondly, on the broader question of how, if we are going
to--I am rephrasing it a bit, but if we are going to propose
all these things designed to get this information and act on
it, are we sure we are not pushing commanders and supervisors
to damage the careers of those that is to whom they make a
hasty judgment or a judgment based on not enough information.
And that tension has certainly been there in the discussion
especially in the team that did the work that supports our
Chapter 2, which is on personnel policies and practices. In
fact, we have a section called ``barriers to taking action'' on
the information, because there is this tension.
I had one officer by the way, and I am taking too long, who
is actually in this room, who talked to me quite candidly about
the tough decisions a commander makes in deciding when to move
on information and when not. What will that do to the career of
the person? Is it fair to record it? And that is even part of
the policies on what we do or do not pass along from command to
command, from section of a person's career to the next station.
All those concerns are in there. And yes, you are right, we are
in this report pushing for a relook at that very balance. And
so the danger you mention is quite possibly there. Because we
are saying it may be more important under the circumstances
that we face today to look harder for the information and once
we get it, to consider whether we don't need to, they make sure
it is passed along to the right places and perhaps acted on,
but the danger you mention is there.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentleman, and you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing may be a
little frustrating for some people, maybe to our witnesses
because some of you feel somewhat constrained by you have been
told to talk just in a particular specific area, fortunately we
are not constrained and don't seem to fit into boxes very
easily anyway.
The term political correctness has come up a number of
times this morning and it seems to be a high on my mind. It
seems to me, standing back looking at the forest from a
distance, you have a guy who was Muslim, okay. But we also know
that some percentage of these guys get radical and they are the
ones who start wars and things in the Middle East and blow
people up.
We have one of them who works for the military and he got
radical on us and shot a bunch of people, that seems to be just
the simple face of it, maybe that is not politically correct
but the appears to be the facts.
So my question is as I read through all this report, there
is nothing that really makes any reference to theology or
religion or what drives this guy. And I suppose maybe there is
a difference of opinion, maybe some people think that somebody
committed a crime, like someone just goes whacky in the office
and decides to shoot some people, and perhaps the other
perspective is that we are dealing with an act of war or an act
of terror where someone, because of an ideological motivation,
decided that something tripped him and decided it was time to
do holy war.
You have been tasked, though, gentlemen, with looking at
procedure, it seems to me, that procedure would have to take a
look at people who are potentially time bombs, even if it is a
time bomb motivated by theology or by some sort of radical
religious view. And so my questions are several: First, was it
an act of terror? Mostly looking for a yes or no.
Second of all, procedurally, is it possible for us to say,
hey, watch out for people that are from a certain sect of
Mohammed or whatever it is that potentially can go crazy, and
can we specifically look at that when you are looking at
somebody's performance appraisal and watch for that. I guess
people would call it profiling, but some people would also call
it common sense. And those are my two main questions, if you
could hit those quickly because I have another one or two.
Secretary West. I will be quick and I will go directly to
the second one first. It is always possible to look at acts or
statements and it doesn't matter whether their statements of I
don't like that guy because of the way he walks or the color of
his hair, or I have a concern and it is based on what I believe
my religion tells me to do. I do not think religion or theology
are off bounds when we look at indicators of potential
violence.
With respect to----
Mr. Akin. So procedurally we can do that, it is not illegal
when you are reviewing somebody's profile or their jacket comes
before you and this guy happens to be this and this, and you go
okay, watch, we are okay to say to look at it more closely.
Secretary West. Well, years ago I was the DOD general
counsel, I am not today so I am not going to opine on it
legally. I am just going to say we recommend that we look at
all the indicators.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Is it an act of terror as the first
question?
Secretary West. I am going to pass on that one. I was not
asked to do that, I wasn't asked to try to determine it. I know
this, the people who died were terrified and the people who
were wounded were, too.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, sir. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. Secretary West's answer to the question is
exactly right. And my early focus in my opening statement about
violence and indicators is all about the subject that you are
raising to us. And I notch down all different kinds of
categories of people that the focus is violence. We didn't care
where it came from. We wanted to come forward with
recommendations that said go look at this. In an area of self-
radicalizations the indicators are not understood and therefore
we do not react that well because we have not spent the time to
talk within the Department about what those indicators are.
As I indicated just Friday the Army's publishing the best
that they have got today. Our recommendation says you need to
put together a group of people and look at this long term. This
isn't going to stop, this is not a single point solution.
Mr. Akin. Admiral, could I just cut in because my clock is
running pretty tight here. I still don't think we have this
figured out. And part of what concerns me is that after this
event at Fort Hood we had this guy Louie Soffi speaking, Louie
Soffi is part of the Islamic society of North America, and
according to the Justice Department, is connected with the
Muslim brotherhood. We are talking about a guy who is one of
these money launderers who is a radical Islamist, and he is
speaking to make people feel better at Fort Hood about Islam.
I think we need to build in somehow the political
correctness is overriding looking at the common sense that
there are factors that drive this behavior and that has to be
built into the model, I am out of time. I would like a
response, Admiral.
Admiral Clark. May I?
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Clark. This is a two-way street, we know that we
have over 3,500 Islamic believers serving effectively and
faithfully. And so the street runs both ways.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And Mr. Secretary, Admiral Clark,
thank you for taking on this assignment.
Secretary West, it is my understanding that prior to this
service, you were on the Walter Reed, the group that looked at
Walter Reed and the independent review group, it is my
understanding and this really picks up on something Admiral
Clark said as well, in that looking at the care of the mental
health professionals or providers or professionals overall,
they looked at the issue of provider fatigue, medical provider
fatigue.
What can you tell us about what you saw in that instance
and the review and the questions that were raised, have we made
progress? I know that Admiral Clark was saying yes, we need to
look at those, and how we are treating and dealing with this
issue. What have we done?
Secretary West. I had the answer for you until you asked
me, ``What have we done?'' Because I think we need to be able
to give you that answer more specifically than I can today. I
remember sitting in a hearing two years ago at Bethesda Naval--
at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda and seeing a
health care professional, an officer stand up in the stands and
say it is good that you're here and that you are looking at the
care that we provide to those who have served and have been
wounded, but keep in mind and your term is a good one about the
fatigue for the caregivers and its effect on us, because if we
are not whole in body and soul and mind and all those things
then we don't deliver the best of care.
So it was very powerful and it was one of the reasons why I
believe the Secretary included it in terms of reference this
time. What we found is that whatever is being done, more of it
needs to be done and our recommendations say that.
Mrs. Davis. Do you have any way of knowing how we are
monitoring that? Who is overseeing that to understand the
extent to which we do have a lot of people hurting out there
who are in tough positions?
Secretary West. I think professionals that have periodic
surveys and the like, but in terms of a real look, this may
have been one of the first ones that had this much chance to
look at it, and so that is why we devoted so much time to it in
our discussion, but I don't know how on an ongoing basis it is
monitored other than the way they are assessed as they
developed professionally.
Admiral Clark. Let me just add one thought, this is a real
challenge because when unique 1H's go deploy, the whole group--
the person's chain of command at home base don't go with them
in the medical sense very often, you know they go as
individuals. We found--so we examined the policies and what we
see is that when the person gets home, who assumes
responsibility for the monitoring function, that is something
that needs to be examined.
And then also look at policy in a way they are put in
place. For example, in order to care for the combatants there
is a policy in one of services where the docs coming home go.
In order to provide continuity of care for the combatants, they
go with them to their home--that extends their deployment,
there is a cost to that. I am not saying it is the wrong
policy, it might well be the right policy, but somebody has to
examine this. And as I said, we have not treated the docs, the
medical personnel, like the combatants in terms of the kind of
programs and processes to support them that the combatants
have.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I know there are some practices of
embedding physicians with national guard, for example, as part
of TRICARE, and that sounds great, but there may be some
downsizing.
Getting to another personnel issue, because I think it has
been addressed about the appropriate judgment and standards of
officership as you spoke about and we know and even not
necessarily in the military, but in medical school, generally,
that it is difficult to perhaps not--inhibit a person's career
in some way, and that that has its downside in terms of the
processes, personnel practices, we have talked about that you
have to go through.
Are you are you--part of what you look at also to say how
many times have we intervened in careers to suggest that people
are in the wrong place. Is that something that as you looked at
this, you have identified that yes, in fact we see this is
actually working, or in fact, it doesn't look as if that is
happening in many instances at all?
Admiral Clark. I fully expect the phase two examination
where they drill deeper has to look at this, because we raised
the foundation for it to be looked at in our report. What I
really believe has to happen is that they need to understand
the process that they have. What we found is there is the
educational side of this, the doc side of this, and that is one
review group. And then there is the officer side of this. The
Secretary and I were having a discussion one afternoon talking
about the specifics of this and wondering about the what-ifs.
There is no way to know if this counseling had occurred, if
that kind--what was it like?
And the core of our institution is that we grow and develop
people, we are proud of what happens when young people in the
United States of America go serve, what mom and dad and aunts
and uncles see about how they have grown when they get home.
That is the essence of what officership is about and creating
and establishing and enforcing standards. We suggest it be
looked at.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, we thank
you again for your service, you are good and decent men who
have done good things for our country. Sometimes, though, we
see today the American people oftentimes feel that we don't ask
the questions that they wish we would ask and they constantly
say you ask the questions you want to ask, but you don't ask
the ones that are really on our mind.
And they have indicated recently they are not going to
tolerate that anymore, so we struggle here to try to get our
arms around the questions that is really of concern to them.
And here is what they seem to be saying to me, they are
concerned about individual acts of violence and that is what we
talk about. But even more concern to them is when those
individual acts of violence have an association or support from
a more orchestrated, long-standing patterns of violence that
are sort of woven into tapestry of concern to the American
people that seems to be missing from your report.
Let me be specific on that. If we have had--I don't want to
focus on the individual shooter, but if he had been a,
Republican, no one would have argued okay, the Republican party
caused him to do this, if had he been a Democrat, the same
thing. No right-minded person. But as Mr. Akin mentioned
earlier, there are radical Muslim extremist groups that with
objective indicators, because we hear them on our streets
interviewed by TV cameras. We read their threats and we sit
corroborated in acts of terrorism.
My question to you is this, I want to go back to the
political correctness issue. Mr. Secretary, I want to give you
a definition of it because you said we didn't have one.
Political correctness is really the failure to say or do
something that might offend anyone, even if that statement or
action is true and can be beneficial if stated or done. My
question is not as to the shooter, but why didn't we at least
ask the question in this report, whether that political
correctness kept any of the military personnel from applying
their policies the way they would have done.
That looks like to me it should have been a question asked.
And even more particularly, my question to both of you is did
we ask them if that political correctness kept them or impacted
them from applying their policies.
Secretary West. The question we asked was, ``Did you apply
your policies?'' And the question we asked in our review of the
facts we got was, ``And if not, can we tell why not?'' Which
is, I think, another way of getting to yours and you will see
about three paragraphs in our restricted annex that go to that,
what kind of considerations were being taken into account when
they failed to act? I think you'll find that we cover your
concern.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
Admiral Clark. My response to that would go along these
lines, that in the open annex we stress and focus the
indicators for prohibited actions and activities. Here is the
instruction, DOD instruction, and in our view it needs work.
When I ask myself that question, I get to--I probably don't use
the words that you would use, maybe I would, maybe I wouldn't,
that is not the point. The point is we were focusing on
violence. Violence that would generate from any source, do we
have it covered, do we have the guidelines in place so that
commanders know what the reaches of their authority are and
what indicators they can say, ``That one crosses the line.''
In our view--and then I talked about information sharing,
see this is a puzzle that fits together and if they do not have
all the information that would allow them to connect the dots,
they won't get the right answer. Our conclusion is that these
areas require immediate focus.
Mr. Forbes. And we want to get that balance both of you
talked about, but to get it, we have got to make certain we are
not going too far on one side with actual policies where even
by implication are keeping us from getting the answers that we
need. Thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. And thank you both for being
here. I am going to disagree with my colleagues when we talk
about political correctness, because I don't think that is
really what this is about. I think it is about lack of
leadership, lack of common sense, lack of awareness, a lot of
other things.
When you talk about officership, Admiral, I can remember
when my husband was an Army officer, you were responsible for
everything around you, not simply for your own behavior, but
you were responsible to notice and work with others and to
report. And there is a commonsense element here that is really
missing. So right now I would like to focus on that. I want to
know what is going to happen to the officers and the people
around him. Those who saw things, what was their responsibility
to each other, the responsibility to his country, the
responsibility to the Army? What are we doing about them? And
you can hand them training manual after training manual, you
and I both know that if the light is not on, it doesn't matter.
So I am more concerned about that. I don't know if it is an
unwillingness or unawareness, I am not sure exactly what is
wrong there, but I worry mostly about that. And it is the same
thing with the recent attempt for bombing, most of us sitting
there would say, sure I can add one, one, and one. Uh-huh, I am
not confused, I can get there. And the same thing here with all
the different pieces. I know we talked about connecting the
dots, but I really don't think you needed the whole tapestry to
recognize that we had a problem here.
And I was very upset hearing my colleague talk about
somebody who observed that and I am not sure what he did with
it, because I didn't hear the interview that they were talking
about, but I really worry about the rest of us that are sitting
there and can't add one, one, and one and get to the right
answer. So if you would both please comment on that.
Admiral Clark. Well, I think your comments are very
insightful, and I would be in alignment with your comments
completely. You can't legislate good behavior, but you lay out
by directive standards and guidelines and then leaders take
over. So we use the term officership because we wanted to
differentiate just between leaders and the requirement that an
officer has that is even beyond what leaders are required to
do, to create the environment for success for our people. So
with regard to suggesting that the connection of the dots all
had to be done to solve all the problems, we haven't said or we
haven't taken that position. We have said that there were
indicators that were there and they were either missed or, on
page six and seven, I spoke to earlier. So clearly, the essence
of the institution is about leadership.
I talked about the growth and development aspect of it, but
then helping people along the road on the growth and
development process with the kind of feedback that oftentimes
changes their life, changes their future. And so that is why I
find myself in alignment. That said, we were asked to look at
gaps and weaknesses. And we can see that there were things that
would have made it even more clear had the dots been connected.
And then we talk about information sharing, we are not just
talking about information sharing across agencies, we are
talking about what happens from command to command. Information
does not move because it is kept in local files and not as part
of the official record. And we believe that in order to deal
with this evolving threat that the Secretary, his words were
that this really evolved in the last decade, but you the
changing threat, what happens when you have the alleged
perpetrator being a field grade officer inside a member of the
family.
Well, this changes the fabric. We believe that you can't
leave a stone unturned. And a stone unturned means give them
every tool we know how to give them.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Secretary West. I think I would follow the Admiral's lead
on all of that, but especially on one with reference to page
seven of our report. I think there is no clearer indication of
the fact that we share your view about the responsibilities of
leadership of supervisors, of officers when they are being
responsible for those under their command or under their
supervision. We have two bullets there, both of them Mr. McKeon
asked about in his opening comments. And that is, first, that
the Secretary communicate directly to the force, and to
commanders, and to all, the necessity to be part of what is
happening with those around them who are under their
supervision, whether it is supervision--in reaching out and
seeing and knowing what is happening to them, how they are
developing.
And then secondly, the second bullet to communicate, how
important it is to be honest and complete in our evaluations of
those whom we are supposed to supervise and to be responsible
for it. Those two things, I think, go directly to taking
responsibility for those for whom you are responsible.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Yes, each of us has to use our eyes and
ears.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for
your service and for being here today. A couple of points, I
was looking at your report, I think it's in the executive
summary here, and by the way, I did go look at the annex which
is useful, but I have some sympathy with what my colleague from
Arkansas, Dr. Snyder, said about, since that is redacted, the
names out, it would be kind of nice if we could see it. But I
am looking at page 6 in the report here and it says, as
directed in the terms of reference we reviewed the accession,
training, education, supervision and promotion of the alleged
perpetrator of the incident at Fort Hood.
I know that is how we talk and there are lawyers
everywhere, so we have an alleged perpetrator and we have an
incident. But I think picking up with Mr. Forbes' comments,
most Americans say we had a brutal mass murder, not an
incident. And as you pointed out, Mr. Secretary, certainly the
victims, those killed and wounded and their families and those
around were indeed terrorized, whether that is an act of terror
or not, we need another lawyer to sort that out for us.
And so I think following up again on Mr. Forbes's comments,
the American people recognize the 9/11 Commission was correct
years ago when it said we have an enemy, and that enemy is
Islamist extremists, their words. And the concern is that we
may not be paying attention to the fact that the alleged
perpetrator was, in fact, an Islamist extremist and how he was
radicalized whether self-radicalized or radicalized by an imam
in Yemen. I suppose it is still being looked at as probably a
matter for the trial, so we don't need to go into that.
But I think there is some frustration out there, and you
have heard some of it out here from us, that we seem to be
overlooking what is the 800-pound gorilla or the elephant in
the room. That this is something more than a random act of
violence with an alleged perpetrator, and it is certainly more
than an incident. You said, Mr. Secretary, that you thought we
need to look at ways of carrying this information forward and I
think you are on to something there. I know many, many years
ago, when I was a second lieutenant in the Marines we were
asked to keep a platoon commander's notebook. And in that
platoon commander's notebook we had every Marine's name and
number and the wife's name and dog's name and kept track of
things so we knew who those Marines were in our platoon, we
would keep track of it.
And then because of FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] came
out that you can't do that, because those little notebooks with
your comments will be taken away and made public. And I think
that from that time it seemed the next 25 years that I served,
and Admiral you served so many more, and thank you for that by
the way, that ability to keep track of our men and women has
gone further and further away from the little platoon
commander's notebook to the fact that you can't keep track in
the major events that occurred in the lives of our men and
women in uniform. So the question to you is, I can't quite
track it here, but have you made a specific recommendation to
do something specific about some statute, or is that part of
the reference that you have made for action by the Secretary of
Army or something? Can you address that?
Admiral Clark. The part that has referred to the Secretary
of the Army is the specifics about determining the
accountability and take measures as he deems required. So we
step forward, and I indicated before, I believe you were here
when we talk about in order to speed that process in a manner
in which we manage ourselves and our structure in organization,
so with have coherency and continuity in a person that is not
only collected all of our information that steps forward and
does the next phase also.
You know, your comments about the platoon commander's
notebook remind me, again, of what officership is all about.
And it also aligns itself with what the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff said on day one, hey, I expect the chain of
command to function effectively and know what is going on in
the unit and in the group.
Mr. Kline. With respect, if I may, I only have got 20
seconds. But the point is that officership needs some tools and
that platoon commander's notebook was part of it. So the
question is, is there a recommendation that we take some
legislative action that would allow for simplicity's sake that
platoon commander's notebook to be reinstated because it is not
there now?
Admiral Clark. And you see our reference throughout talking
about giving them the tools that they need and the gaps that
exist. And so measures that have occurred because of
interpretations is what policy review is all about. And so if
it requires your kind of action, then it is exciting to know
that there are people in the Congress who are ready to lead
that effort.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Taylor.
Secretary West. May I?
The Chairman. Yes, please respond.
Secretary West. In the back of our report, there is
appendix C that lists for your convenience all the findings and
recommendations by chapter and by subject, 2.8 or 2.9 of that
is recommendations, carries a recommendation that I think goes
to what you said, the ability to collect information and to
carry it forward, so that is part of what you had. The second
thing is you mentioned that the victims and the wounded were
terrorized, I think my language was terrified. In both cases, I
think we acknowledged that they died and were wounded with
courage, honor and dignity.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor, gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, gentlemen, for your continued
service to the nation. Admiral, I am going to--I think this is
the first time you have appeared before this committee out of
uniform, so you are free to speak your mind.
Admiral Clark. Yes.
Mr. Taylor. Could this have happened on your watch and
regardless of how you answer that, why and what is the message
for the base commanders who are still in uniform?
Admiral Clark. Well, since we judge today that the policies
and the programs and the procedures to guidance on unauthorized
and prohibited activities are inadequate today, then I would
suggest that they were inadequate when I served too. And that
is the what and the why.
Mr. Taylor. And your specific recommendations now that you
are out of uniform.
Admiral Clark. My recommendations are focus on the
behaviors and focus on anything--we are talking about
protecting our people and our workplace, focus on the violence
indicators. And then once you do that somebody said, does it
include this, does it include that? Of course it does. It
includes anything that is going to create harm for our people.
Go deal with it, create the guidance on the indicators and
empower and enable the commander so they can take the actions
they need and connect the dots.
Mr. Taylor. In the case of this individual, did anyone--did
any of his coworkers or did any of his patients raise an alarm
flag and say I think this guy is dangerous?
Admiral Clark. I wrote this down at the top of my page, I
am constrained. I cannot----
Mr. Taylor. I really don't think you are.
Admiral Clark. I'm sorry, I am. My interpretation of it is
I am. By the way, this is not my report, we have turned it
over.
Mr. Taylor. Again, I am asking you, Vern Clark, not Admiral
Clark, you, Vern Clark, former CNO [Chief of Naval Operations],
an opportunity to talk to the American public, did anybody in
his command or patients raise a red flag that, I think, this
man is dangerous?
Admiral Clark. And I am here representing the work of this
review. If you want to invite me back for another day to have
discussions about other topics, I am here representing this
review and representing this review, this area of discussion, I
am restricted, and I would be happy to talk about it in closed
session.
Mr. Taylor. You are invited back at your convenience, and I
wish you would say it today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank
you both for your long service to this country, but I want to
start out saying how offensive the notion of this review in its
classification ought to be to the American people. This is just
another incident in a long pattern before this committee of
information that is withheld from the public that is neither
germane to national security interests in terms of its
classification, nor is it impending on any legal processes. I
read it, it is just merely a finding of facts prior to the
event. And it ought to be available to the American public.
And so I think we have classification. It ought to be
politically embarrassing and that ought to be a classification
top secret, secret, confidential, politically embarrassing.
Because the majority of information that has come before this
committee that has been classified is merely classified because
it is politically embarrassing.
General Mukasey had said right after the incident that
after these people were killed that it was a great tragedy but
would be a greater tragedy if, in fact, we overreacted. And I
think he was referring obviously to the Muslim Americans
currently serving in the military. I served during the Cold War
both in the Army and Marine Corps, and there was a
counterintelligence strategy for what we could detect
individuals who had sympathies with those who might be
ideologically aligned to our opposition at the time, Marxist
communism.
We no relationship with a series of organizations that, in
fact, were aligned, directly or indirectly with our adversaries
at that time again during the Cold War. It would seem to me
that we are at war now, and whether we called it the global war
on terror or whether we call it overseas contingency operations
with a version of radical Islam that has somehow morphed into a
political ideology that has declared war on the United States.
And so do you see that out of your recommendation that we
are, in fact, have been able to have a system of
counterintelligence that looks at linkages, looks at objective
patterns and behavior to try to decipher these sympathies with
those who are aligned as enemies to this country.
Secretary West. I think the quick answer, Congressman, is
yes, I think to some extent Secretary Gates even touched on
that kind of an idea in his statement the other day when he
released a report. The fact is we do have to respond today to
today's imperatives, and those imperatives include the
possibility, that is why we are doing this, that an incident
like this could occur again or worse, several, several at
different installations and that they could be part of a
coordinated effort.
So we need to look at now at what Admiral Clark just again
reemphasized as the indicators and then collect them and make
them available so the people can use them as match sticks as
they evaluate what is happening in their units.
Mr. Coffman. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. I reinforce my earlier comments. Certainly
that kind of collection is authorized in certain circumstances,
and although those are not a part of this committee's work but
other committees in the Congress. It is a matter of, in the
public domain, that improvements need to be made in that regard
and that is all then about information sharing and might press
the point earlier in response to another question inside the
Department and in interagency domain to help commanders connect
the dots.
Mr. Coffman. Let me say in closing, thank you for your
testimony, I served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps
in 2005 and 2006, and I served with the Muslim Americans there
and I was impressed with their service and dedication to their
country. I do believe that they would want a
counterintelligence operation to where there would be no
question about their loyalty to this country, but I think they
are a valuable asset to the Armed Forces of the United States.
Thank you again. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you gentlemen
for being here this morning and for the work you have done. I
apologize, but I have my own hearing so I got here late, but I
did want to cover two areas that I think--if they have already
been covered I apologize. The first one is the sharing of
information. In terms of, I guess, the kind of intelligence
that we know we have and have the capability to evaluate
internally, you are--let me start there, what are your
recommendations in terms of how much we haven't shared and how
much we should?
Admiral Clark. Good to see you again, sir.
In the entire area of information sharing, our
recommendation is, and the simplest way to say it is, take down
the barriers. Get rid of them. And make sure you do it inside
the Department, too. But certainly do it in the interagency
process.
I have in front of me an immediate release, FBI release, on
Friday, saying a series of things are going to be done. In your
other committee, I know this is going to be something you are
going to look at. Now, other investigations have occurred. The
President chartered an examination of the intelligence process.
I am sure that is the subject of your other work. But my
response would be just as it was to Mr. Taylor; I am not here
to represent that report. I am here to represent this report.
But our recommendation is we need the barriers removed. We
need to make sure that--we are going to hold the commanders
responsible. And to do that, we need to make sure that they
have the tools, and sometimes the tool is maybe a risk-
assessment tool that helps them look at a series of diverse
information. Other times it is straightforward raw
intelligence. And so, remove the barriers, is the simplest way
I know how to say it, sir.
Secretary West. I would say we have two information sharing
problems that we address in our report. The first, as the
Admiral alluded to, is amongst ourselves within the Department
of Defense from one commander to another, from one command
level to another, to get the information that is needed to make
assessments there.
The second one I also alluded to and the product of one of
the FBI investigations is sharing between agencies. And there,
again, we saw some breakdowns, and we made some specific
recommendations for some improvements, including increasing the
operation of the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Mr. Reyes. Like Mr. Taylor, I hope we get an opportunity to
have you back where you are not constrained by just reporting
back on this report. The other issue--because as you probably
know, I represent Fort Bliss, and I get a chance to talk to
soldiers and their families. One--and I am curious to hear your
thoughts. One of the things that they are conflicted about is
the fact that, before they deploy, they are expected to read up
and know about the country they are going to, Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The incident at Fort Hood has sent I guess a chill down
that says, if you are looking at the Internet to learn more,
you may either become susceptible to radicalization, you may be
getting the wrong information, you may--somebody may be
monitoring it that may reflect negatively on them. How do we
draw a balance on making sure that our troops going overseas
into these areas are as knowledgeable as possible but yet don't
have this cloud over them about the work that they do on their
own through the Internet?
Secretary West. I think that raises a good question,
Congressman.
I have to say that I don't think we either discussed it or
analyzed that particular part of the balance, if you will, in
preparing our report. We have been focusing, frankly, on
whether even in that research I will have to say or that--those
connections--there are indicators that need to be--that we need
to be aware of and at least evaluate. Your point as to whether
there is a kind of, what, and interim effect or an inhibitor in
leading up to prepare is, I think, a valid one. I guess my
answer is, if we pursue our research on the Internet with
honest hearts and good intention, I think that is likely to
show itself.
But if there are repeated efforts that lead to a growing
radicalization, remember, it is not just that it is a
collection of indicators, a whole host of them that are needed
to be read. I think if they are read properly, then we should
be able to separate the wheat from the chaff. But the people
who are in danger of self-radicalization and therefore of
violent acts and those who are simply preparing to go, now that
may not be the most satisfactory explanation, but it is the
best one I have.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, thank you.
Admiral, good to see you this afternoon.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned understanding the forces of
radicalization and/or self-radicalization.
Admiral, you indicated key indicators of violence, lofty
terms.
Certainly easier said than done. The clarity of hindsight
allows us in most instances to weave a Tinkers to Evers to
Chance connect-the-dots program that would say, oh, yeah,
surely had we done that, we could have stopped whatever
incident might have gotten involved. But in the fog of the
present, the unclarity of the ongoing, of the day-to-day, we
ought to always strive to get better at whatever it is we are
doing. And if we have got your report, great, and as we plug in
those things.
But I am concerned that--and Secretary West, you may have
just called for a constant surveillance of Internet activity by
all of us. Do we want to live in a country that creates a
surveillance program of thoughts and ideas and those kinds of
activities in our quest to be safe? There is a movie out
there--I think Tom Cruise starred in it--where they set in
place a system to anticipate crime, and they would go and
punish folks who they thought would commit a crime in the
future before it was committed just because it occurred between
their ears.
So I don't want to build an unrealistic expectation that in
a free America, in an America where the--where our protections
under the Constitution allow us to think and say and express,
that we don't sacrifice that in this quest to be safe because I
don't know that you will ever get there and you won't be safe
enough, and I don't know that I want to live in a world where I
can't go to the Internet with some expectation of anonymity to
look for things on the Internet if I am searching for bombs or
whatever. But just to create that expectation and prepare the
American people's mind that we, in fact, in the military,
Department of Defense, could in fact surveil our people so
closely that a fratricide incident will never occur or that if
it does occur, we have spectacular failure of command; I don't
know that I believe we can do that. Just your comments.
Secretary West. I am not sure, Congressman, that I called
for it. But I certainly acknowledge that I understood the
Congressman's concern and the concern of events by his people.
Because we do advocate looking for the indicators and recording
them and having an entity that can make a collection of what
kinds of indicators we are to be looking for.
You solved the problems I had with your question because we
are not calling for it for the American people. We are talking
about the fact when people are part of the military family,
they come privileged to enter our facilities by just inserting
a card.
Mr. Conaway. So they sacrifice their----
Secretary West. Some things. That is already established.
Mr. Conaway. I understand that. But the more they sacrifice
in terms of their personal freedoms and personal privacies, the
less attractive the uniforms will be.
Secretary West. I think you are right.
Admiral Clark. And I would love to comment on that. I don't
want to align myself with the movie. That is not where I want
to go. And you don't either.
Mr. Conaway. I don't remember the name of the movie.
Admiral Clark. I don't know either. I haven't seen it.
Mr. Conaway. Chilling.
Admiral Clark. What I do believe is we could have done
better on this one. So we want to do as well as we know how to
do. And the keyword again is this balance thing. And this is
why we took great care not to define exact outcomes but to say,
Mr. Secretary, as you look at this, this is an area you need to
put the spotlight on when you look at the policy, programs, and
procedures. We believe there is fruit to be harvested here, and
then people in responsible positions in the administration make
the decision about what that balance is going to be. And we
believe that that is going to require everybody to challenge
the assumptions and then move forward, and certainly the
Congress has a role to play in all of that.
Mr. Conaway. I think understanding the radicalization
process, I think what--you look at a fellow, Hasan, all of the
advantages that he had, born here, grew up here, all of the
educational advantages he had; how did he decide to do what he
did? Allegedly--I am a CPA [Certified Professional Accountant],
not a lawyer, so I can talk a little clearer, perhaps. Anyway,
thanks for your comments this morning. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I am the last member here, so I guess I am the end
of the totem pole. So, hopefully, I just think that, though, if
we are ending here, we need to get back to the beginning, and
that is what the chairman said. And I think that you have seen
consistency on both sides of the aisle here. A lot of the
questions we have over here are a lot of the questions that
were raised on the other side. And I think the chairman,
though, said it best at the beginning, what we have here are
two issues that the American people in my district, and I am
sure across this country, are concerned with, and that deals
with the breakdown between communication of the federal
agencies, the Department of Defense, the Department of the
Army, the FBI and the CIA, whoever should have known about
these things or been communicating. I mean, after 9/11, as we
all know, that is why we have Homeland Security, so we don't
have these breakdowns in communication between federal
agencies. That is one thing that is not acceptable to the
American people.
So those questions and those solutions as we move forward,
and I understand that you are under restriction. I am a former
judge advocate. I served at Fort Hood. I was in the First
Calvary Division, and my son was born at the hospital that
Major Hasan worked at. So it is very emotional for me to sit
here. But as a lawyer, I understand what your restrictions are
and what the Army--I always say that--to people that are quick
to react to this situation, what the Army has done or not done.
And my initial pushback is we need to give the Army the benefit
of the doubt that we are doing things the right way, and we are
not purposely doing things to expose people to risk or danger
that we can do better. And I think that, with this review,
hopefully, that that is true.
And whether or not you can address that specifically that
we will get better and that as, Admiral, you said that if we
had inadequate policies, that those dots will be connected, and
we will address them in the future.
The one question, though, I did have with that, Admiral,
and I don't know if you are specifically saying that, you
alluded to the fact that commanders will be held responsible.
And I don't know if that means retrospectively because there
were things missed. But I don't really understand what you mean
when you said that if the policy is inadequate, but we are
going to hold commanders responsible. How can you hold
commanders responsible if the policy was what it was?
Admiral Clark. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify.
Certainly what happens when issues like this come up and
hearings are held, the judgment is, did the commander do what
he could do with the tools that he had? That is what I am
saying. If it is within the ability of the commander to have
the information that is required or to take the actions or to
pursue the lines of inquiry, then they are held accountable. If
they do not have, which is certainly the case in a number of
these things that we are citing today where policy, we believe,
was inadequate, then that is another story. And as a former
judge advocate, you know how you would advise the commander
when they came before you.
Mr. Rooney. And I will say, I didn't finish my point with
the chairman. The second point was, what may or may not have
been missed with regard to Major Hasan and how we connect those
dots and have the correct policy that is adequate, and what we
can expect from our commanders moving forward? So those are the
two things that I think the American people quite simply want
to know. And I will just--if I could clean up a few things here
because I have a minute left.
Mr. West, absolutely, a terrorist act could have been one
of the charges referred here. Whether or not it is or it isn't,
I don't actually know. I know that there is murder,
premeditated, attempted murder charges here. But within the
rules and scope of the law, terrorist act is certainly evident
here. I am not going to question why it was or was not charged.
But you are right.
Secretary West. We are not there. It may well be charged.
Mr. Rooney. I do just want to close with this. I think with
this idea that has been raised a few times here with political
correctness versus good order and discipline, I sort of
disagree a little bit with what was just said. All of these
guys wearing the uniform behind you understand that when they
sign up, they are sacrificing a lot of constitutional rights,
that the rest of us--that is part of sacrifice. That is part of
service. And we know that when we are signing our name on the
dotted line and filing--and getting into formation every
morning. That is part of the deal.
But I just think that it needs to be--I think it needs to
be remembered that the Supreme Court has upheld time and time
again that for the sake of good order and discipline,
sacrificing some of the rights that we civilians have,
including political correctness for the sake of--it might not
be all politically correct in the military, that the military
gets to do that, to keep us safe. So, with that, I will just
thank you for your service and for your testimony.
The Chairman. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. Very briefly. And our report points out that
there are differences between uniform members and civilians in
the Department. And I then refer back to Mr. McKeon's comments
early on that this is not just an issue in the Department of
Defense. And so if you look at the kind of threat that we are
describing, we are talking about a challenge to us as a people.
And so we didn't say, go change those rules; don't change that
mix. But we did point out that it is different. And so if when
we then examine the whole force protection of the environment,
we have to understand what we have and we have to make
judgments and those judgments have to be made on balance, and
then those policies have to be defined and in an enabling way
that goes back to the point that we pressed here: Let's equip
and enable the commander, the leaders in these institutions so
that they can lead the command with the context of good order
and discipline and all that goes with that.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon, final comments.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, thank you for being here and for being able to
answer some questions and not being able to answer questions. I
don't know if we all understand all of that. But it is what it
is. I said in my opening statement that an officer takes an
oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I also said
in my questioning that the media reports that we have been
given, one of them was that Major Hasan had made a statement
that Sharia law trumped the Constitution. What I want to know
is, if you can answer that, did he, in fact, say that? Yes or
no.
Admiral Clark. Sir, it is in the restricted annex. Any
reference to anything that he might have said that we decided
to cite.
Mr. McKeon. Okay. If somebody is an officer in the armed
services and they make a statement such as I quoted that would
indicate opposition to the oath that they took as an officer,
why would they then have a right to be promoted to higher rank,
or why are they even indeed left as an officer in the service?
Secretary West. I think it is fair to say that statements
like that are indicators that ought not be missed and that
ought to be taken into account in making decisions on precisely
what you said.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.
Admiral Clark. May I clarify that I didn't say whether that
such a comment was in the restricted annex? Any comments that
he might have said that we decided to include in the annex are
in that restricted section, and I would personally enjoy a
fulsome discussion on that particular subject.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Let me ask, in summary, if you agree with my comments that
we have all been frustrated, as you know, by our inability to
discuss all aspects of the shooting at Fort Hood?
Some things are clear. More needs to be done to identify
and document behavior that suggests an individual may present a
danger. We need to carefully examine what new tools or
authorities may be needed to address this. Do you agree with
that?
Secretary West. You said it better than we wrote it, Mr.
Chairman.
Admiral Clark. I align completely with your words.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We also heard there was a failure in what the independent
review, your independent review, has described as officership;
that at least in the case of Major Hasan, military officers
failed to accurately document Major Hasan's performance and
abilities in his academic and his military evaluations. Do you
agree with that?
Secretary West. That is with greater detail than we said
it, sir. What we said is they failed to apply Army policies to
the perpetrator, and they also--there are inconsistencies in
what they wrote.
The Chairman. Okay.
Admiral.
Admiral Clark. Secretary West is correct.
The Chairman. Let me ask as a last question, I think it is
very, very important. Your term officership, I think across the
board, those in uniform should fully understand that term.
Would each of you give the definition of that term one more
time?
Secretary West. I am going to let Admiral Clark go first.
It is a term that he uses most often. And then I will give my
view.
The Chairman. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. We talked about it at length inside our
review. And just a couple of days ago, one of the staff members
came up and provided me with this instruction that has it in
it. And it happens to be from the Uniform Services University
of the Health Sciences. And if you would like, we can provide
it to you. But it talks----
The Chairman. Would you like that to be part of the record?
Admiral Clark. That is fine. That is--I agree with
everything that is in here, and it talks about all of the
elements that unify the role of a commissioned officer in the
United States of America, and talks about upholding the
Constitution and the oath, and then the standards and all of
the things that we would expect that go with leadership and a
person who decides to live the lifestyle of service in the role
of leadership supporting the goals and objectives and the
principles and values of the United States of America.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know Mr. McKeon joins me, as well as all of the members
of the committee, in thanking you for your service on this
panel, your leadership, and of course the fact that you have
been such outstanding American leaders in the past. Thank you
very, very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
January 20, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
January 20, 2010
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