[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-162]
AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 28, 2010
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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57-403 WASHINGTON : 2010
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AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JEFF MILLER, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts JOE WILSON, South Carolina
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland ROB BISHOP, Utah
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 28, 2010, Air Mobility Programs................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 28, 2010........................................ 21
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2010
AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking
Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee....................... 3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Air
and Land Forces Subcommittee................................... 1
WITNESSES
Johnson, Brig. Gen. Michelle D., USAF, Director for Strategy,
Policy, Programs, and Logistics, United States Transportation
Command........................................................ 4
Van Buren, David M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, joint with Lt.
Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S. Air
Force, and Brig. Gen. Richard C. Johnston, USAF, Director of
Strategic Planning, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force............... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Johnson, Brig. Gen. Michelle D............................... 27
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 25
Van Buren, David M., joint with Lt. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove
and Brig. Gen. Richard C. Johnston......................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 49
Mr. Smith.................................................... 49
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Owens.................................................... 55
Mr. Smith.................................................... 53
AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 28, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. Good afternoon. We will call the subcommittee
meeting to order. The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets
today to receive testimony on air mobility programs.
And we welcome our witnesses: Brigadier General Michelle
Johnson, who is the Director for Strategy, Policy, Programs,
and Logistics for the U.S. Transportation Command [TRANSCOM].
Welcome. Good to see you again.
Mr. David M. Van Buren, who is Acting Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Good to see you, sir.
Lieutenant General Philip Breedlove, Air Force Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements.
Welcome, General.
And Brigadier General Richard Johnston, who is the Director
of Strategic Planning at Air Force Headquarters.
Welcome, General.
Today's hearing follows the early March release of the
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS
2016. MCRS 2016 was a significant study by the Department of
Defense to identify mobility capabilities and requirements
needed to support the U.S. strategic objectives in the 2016
time frame. The study assessed the major components of the
mobility system, including aircraft, aerial refueling, sealift,
surface transportation ashore and afloat, pre-positioning,
forward-stationing, and infrastructure.
And that is, I think, the biggest questions that our
committee is going to have, is how the plans that are put in
place and that are reflected in the DOD budget that was
submitted to us reflect those requirements, and also what has
changed that has altered some of the numbers in those various
requirements so that we can best understand why the Air Force
and the Mobility Command think they need what they need, what
has changed, and how we are going to meet those needs as we go
forward, making decisions on the various airframes that we need
to build and some, of course, which will be being removed from
service at the same time; that, as we are doing all that, we
are meeting those requirements.
MCRS developed three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of
military operations linked to notional strategic environments,
which is a fancy way of saying trying to figure out what might
happen and to make sure we are prepared for it. Those airframes
will be necessary to support possible decisions regarding
future mobility force structure. Those cases included two
nearly simultaneous large-scale land campaigns, demanding
homeland defense consequence management events, and a long-term
irregular warfare campaign.
With few exceptions, MCRS-16 found the Department's planned
mobility capabilities sufficient to support the most demanding
projected requirements. Regarding strategic airlift, the study
determined that the capacity of the Department's strategic
airlift fleet exceeds the peak demand in each of the three
MCRS-16 cases. Peak demand for one of those cases required 304
strategic airlift aircraft.
Of note, the previous mobility study, the Mobility
Capabilities Study in 2005, or MCS-05, identified strategic
airlift force structure of 292 to 383 aircraft as a moderate-
risk force. We hope our witnesses will be able to talk to us
today about the differences between the 2016 and the 2005, as
to how they came up with the slightly different numbers.
Additionally, the current commander of the U.S.
Transportation Command and his predecessor, who is now the Air
Force Chief of Staff, have testified that a force of 316
strategic airlift aircraft is considered the sweet spot for
strategic airlift inventory. Congress passed legislation
adopting 316 as the minimum number of strategic airlift
aircraft last year.
The current Air Force programmed strategic airlift and
inventory includes 223 C-17s and 111 C-5s, for a total of 334
aircraft. In this year's budget, the Air Force proposes to
retire 17 C-5s in 2011, which would bring the inventory to 317
aircraft. We also understand the Air Force plans to retire five
additional C-5s in 2012, which would bring the total strategic
airlift inventory below 316.
For fiscal year 2012, we expect the Department of Defense
will submit a legislative proposal seeking to change the Title
X statute which mandates 316 strategic airlift aircraft be
maintained in the Air Force inventory if the Department still
plans to proceed with C-5 retirements beyond those now planned
for fiscal year 2011.
So, obviously, we want to know how to balance that out. Do
we need to maintain that 316 number, or is it possible to move
below it--is it possible and responsible to move below it? We
would want to know the explanations for that.
Regarding tactical or intra-theater airlift, MCRS-16 found
that the programmed fleet of 401 C-130s exceeds the peak demand
in each of the three MCRS-16 cases. The highest C-130 demand in
these cases would have required 335 aircraft. However, the 2016
study notes that the direct support mission to meet the Army's
time-sensitive airlift requirements was not assessed and that
C-130s may be required to supplement C-27s to support this
mission.
Of note, MCS-05 identified a moderate-risk intra-theater
airlift force structure of between 395 and 674 aircraft. We
hope our witnesses can address the Air Force analysis of the
Army's direct support requirements today, as well as how
tactical airlift inventory requirements have changed since the
previous mobility study.
The budget request also includes $65.7 million for 15
aircraft in a new start program called the Light Mobility
Aircraft. This program proposes to acquire commercial off-the-
shelf aircraft to satisfy a new Air Force light mobility
mission requirement designed to build partner capacity,
especially in lesser-developed partner nations.
This program would support irregular warfare efforts to
help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by
demonstrating an airlift capability that is consistent with
their needs for infrastructure, methods of employment,
acquisition and sustainment costs, and mission capability. We
hope our witnesses can further expand on this new requirement
in today's hearing.
Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and
colleague from Maryland, the ranking member on the committee,
Mr. Bartlett, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This committee has been actively working to try to
understand the risk the Department is taking in its aviation
programs. I hope this hearing will clarify some things for us
because I have some real concerns about the force structure
decisions that have been made.
After reviewing the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the President's
fiscal year 2011 budget request, it is still not clear to me if
force structure recommendations were made based on a real
requirement or simply constrained by the budget.
As a case in point, I would like to highlight the tactical
airlift programs and requirements. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council [JROC] validated a requirement for 78 Joint
Cargo Aircraft [JCA], yet the current program of record
reflects only 38. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study recently concluded that we have excess tactical aircraft
capacity; yet the study failed to account for the aircraft
needed for the direct support mission to meet the Army's time-
sensitive intra-theater requirements.
To complicate matters further, the President's budget
proposes to retire several of the older C-130s in fiscal year
2011. However, we subsequently are informed that you will have
to take assets from the Air National Guard to backfill the gap
created by the retirements.
If the MCRS is at all accurate with respect to the tactical
aircraft requirements, then why do we have to take C-130s from
the Air National Guard to fulfill mission requirements in the
active duty? I find this all very confusing and very
concerning. I hope that our witnesses will shed some light on
these decisions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look
forward to the discussion.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
We will proceed with the panel's testimony and then get
into questions.
Without objection, all witnesses' prepared statements will
be included in the hearing record.
And, with that, we will begin with General Johnson.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHELLE D. JOHNSON, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR
STRATEGY, POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND LOGISTICS, UNITED STATES
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Johnson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is truly an
honor to testify before you today on behalf of General Duncan
J. McNabb and the 140,000 men and women of the United States
Transportation Command.
Whether delivering equipment to give our warfighters
decisive advantage over the enemy or flying wounded warriors
home to receive the world's best life-saving care, these men
and women give everything to provide hope and to earn the trust
of the greatest fighting force on Earth.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the MCRS results indicated that
we have sufficient airlift, strategic and tactical, surge
sealift, pre-positioned material, and Continental United States
transportation assets to satisfy the most demanding scenarios
used to determine the requirements in this study.
However, the study did report a few exceptions where
current programmed capacities were not sufficient to accomplish
the mission: air refueling aircraft; offshore petroleum
discharge system, or OPDS; and infrastructure at foreign
locations. The advent of the new KC-X tanker will help address
the air refueling shortfall, and the Navy is researching
options for providing additional OPDS capability to ensure two
systems are available.
With respect to infrastructure, TRANSCOM remains ever
vigilant in exploring strategies to ensure we can accomplish
our mission. We are working infrastructure in two fronts.
First, we are developing and improving concepts and
technologies to overcome the constraints in delivering
warfighter requirements to austere destination theaters. Some
of this work includes joint high-speed vessels, airships,
cargo-carrying UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], and precision
airdrop.
Second, we are maturing our strategy for global access with
the completion of a global access study this summer. This work
goes hand-in-glove with the development of our en route
infrastructure master plan to identify and obtain funding for
investments for the most critical en route locations,
particularly multimodal locations like Rota, Spain, and Diego
Garcia, where their ports are connected by roadways to
airfields and, thus, provide critical support for our global
force projection.
Meanwhile, the men and women of TRANSCOM continue to
transport supplies to our forces around the world. We rally to
support humanitarian missions, such as Haitian earthquake
relief, while remaining on track to meet the President's
requirement for additional troops in Afghanistan by the end of
this summer. Though sometimes challenging, these missions are
the lifeblood of TRANSCOM.
And though I sit before you in the Air Force blue today and
am proud to do so, I do represent soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and basically our fourth component in the commercial fleets of
sealift and airlift in performing our mission. We appreciate
the congressional support that allows us to accomplish our
mission and ensure that transportation and logistics remain an
asymmetric advantage for the United States.
Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bartlett, again, thank
you for inviting me to discuss the remarkable work our TRANSCOM
team accomplishes around the clock every day. Thank you for
submitting my written testimony for the record, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Johnson can be found in
the Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Van Buren.
STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE;
LT. GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR
FORCE; AND BRIG. GEN. RICHARD C. JOHNSTON, USAF, DIRECTOR OF
STRATEGIC PLANNING, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE
Mr. Van Buren. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Bartlett, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Lieutenant General Breedlove, Brigadier General Johnston, and I
thank you for the opportunity to address the committee
regarding the Air Force's current and future mobility
requirements and programs.
Within acquisition, we are focused on our warfighting
customers and our strategic planning, represented by General
Breedlove and General Johnston. We are focused on what we buy
and how we buy it. We are working very hard on the critically
important KC-X program, with a planned award date this fall. We
have much effort, as well, on modernizing our aging force, such
as the C-5 reliability enhancement re-engining program, and we
plan to acquire 15 light mobility aircraft in fiscal year 2011
to foster building partnership capacity.
With a key emphasis on assuring affordability and reducing
cycle time of deliveries to our warfighter customer, our
overall efforts for C-17, C-5 modernization, C-27J, C-130J, and
C-130 modernization are currently proceeding relatively well.
The Air Force and its outstanding airmen remain focused on
a mission, the continued security of our great Nation. And we
thank the subcommittee for your shared commitment. We have
submitted a combined statement for the record, and we look
forward to answering your questions today.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren, General
Breedlove, and General Johnston can be found in the Appendix on
page 37.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
General Breedlove.
General Breedlove. Sir, no opening remarks. I join in Mr.
Van Buren's remarks.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
General Johnston.
General Johnston. Thank you, sir. No opening remarks, and I
also join Mr. Van Buren.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Well, I think it is obvious from the statement I gave the
questions that we have. I will start out in one general area,
and that is focusing on the C-5s and the C-17s and the balance
between the two and how you see that meeting the needs. And the
degree to which money is constraining your choices here is
something that we would like to know, as well, just in terms of
planning.
But in terms of getting to the right number combination of
those two aircraft, number one, if you could--and I guess I
will start with General Breedlove--if you could explain to us
better, you know, 316, 304, the differences in the outcomes
between the 2005 and the 2016 studies. What has changed, and
what makes you confident that 304 is enough to meet your needs
and demands?
General Breedlove. If you will let me just frame it, I
might ask----
Mr. Smith. Please.
General Breedlove [continuing]. General Johnson to speak to
that, since they did the study.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Breedlove. But, sir, as I think you are aware, what
we are really concerned about is total ton-mileage required,
which the study came up of. And, as these aircraft are
balanced, the numbers will breathe one way or the other.
The C-17 brings unique capability, its outsize cargo and
lift capacity somewhat less than the C-5. So the balance is
really about not the type of the airplane but the ton-mileage
that they bring to the equation. As we lower C-5s, C-17s would
come up, and may come up in a nonlinear fashion since they
don't cover or carry the load that the C-5 does.
As far as the numbers 304 and 316, if you don't mind, I
will allow General Johnson to speak to it.
Mr. Smith. Please.
General Johnson. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity.
And as you noted in your opening comments, the MCRS did
take us forward in the way we have analyzed the fleet and the
mobility capacity. The fleet mixes that you describe can vary,
as General Breedlove described, to achieve the same outcome and
the same output capacity.
What the MCRS did that really improved over the fidelity of
the MCS-05 was to take the three cases that you described in
your opening comments and to stress air mobility in different
ways so to bracket the, sort of, capacity requirements.
One scenario had two major land campaigns that stressed
this air mobility, the strategic airlift requirement. One
really stressed the air refueling requirement, with a naval and
air campaign combined with an asymmetric land campaign.
And the third scenario took us to a new place to include
irregular warfare scenario over a long term that required the
rotation of forces and lacked infrastructure in a foreign
environment that could accommodate the strat airlift, and so it
put the strain on our system in a different way. And that was
combined with another land campaign.
And so those three scenarios were meant to bracket the
capacity which we would need with more fidelity, frankly, than
we had in the MCS-05. So, in itself, there is a range within
MCRS such that the least demanding requirement for strat
airlift demanded 274. Three-hundred-and-four was the greatest
requirement.
As General McNabb has said before--and you cited him and
General Schwartz as using the 316 figure. At the time, that was
their best judgment based on MCS, standing by for the results
of MCRS. And that is what General McNabb would express to you,
that there is that other clause that he would want to add that
was pending MCRS results.
And so the 304 provides the capacity that TRANSCOM is
looking for, and then we count on the Air Force to manage that
fleet internally to maintain that capacity.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Breedlove. Sir, if I could add just one thing----
Mr. Smith. Sure.
General Breedlove [continuing]. And I am sure General
Johnson would agree with me, that, in each of the three cases,
too, one of the biggest delimiters on how we could move men,
material, and equipment was the throughput capacity of the
APODs [aerial ports of debarkation] at the destinations. In
most cases, more aircraft made no difference in how fast we
could move the material through.
Mr. Smith. I am sorry. The ``throughput capacity of the
APODs'' exceeded my level of understanding. Could you----
General Breedlove. I am sorry. The aerial ports of the
debarkation, the places where we unload.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Breedlove. The capacity of the airport to receive
the material and then transload it and move it on was, in most
cases, the biggest delimiter in the study.
Mr. Smith. Okay. So basically what you are saying, then, is
that the mobility issues--and this would go back to General
Johnson--you know, have as much to do with what we are able to
accommodate on the ground as it is in the air.
General Johnson, do you want to comment on that?
General Johnson. Yes, sir. Thank you. That is great
insight.
And, as you know, for the business of Transportation
Command, we have become more sophisticated in our mode
selection and found that, even though it might be
counterintuitive, most of our throughput comes from the
surface. We do 90 percent of our support from sea and land and
only 10 percent by the air in mature theaters.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I get it.
General Johnson. So seaports and airports are the mainstays
for what we do.
In places where there are severe environments and lack of
infrastructure, throwing in more resources that require that
infrastructure don't actually help. It is counterproductive. So
this infrastructure and this intermodal selection is really
important, as we close the force.
Mr. Smith. Okay. One more quick question, and then I want
to get Mr. Bartlett in before we have to go vote.
As you are looking to retire C-5As going forward, I think,
as I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, 17 this year,
five next year, have you estimated how long you expect the life
of all of the C-5s to be? Do you have projections in 2013,
2014, 2015, going forward, for how many more C-5s you are going
to retire? And how does that impact the possible need for
replacements, new C-17s basically?
General Johnston. Sir, I can tackle that one.
You are correct, we have plans to retire 17 in fiscal year
2011 and then five in fiscal year 2012. And then we are also--
you know, we have to get relief from the 316 number, and we
have plans to, as the number of C-17s go up, to reduce the
number of C-5s accordingly, in order to maintain that 316
number so far until we have relief down to a lower number, 304
or what have you.
Mr. Smith. How many more C-17s above the 223 are you
expecting, at this point?
General Johnston. Right now, 223 is what we are planning
on, sir. We have no expectations to go any higher than that.
And if we have a higher number than 223, then you get into the
issue of how many C-5s are you going to retire. And then you
get to a fleet size of C-5s to a point where----
Mr. Smith. I got that.
General Johnston. Okay.
Mr. Smith. You actually have all 223 right now?
General Johnston. No, sir.
Mr. Smith. That is what I am asking. How many more----
General Johnston. Oh, I am sorry. We are at 197 right now.
Mr. Smith. Okay. So as they come up----
General Johnston. Yes, sir. We are at 197. Probably be
about 205, should be at 205 by the end of this year, fiscal
year 2010; 215 for C-17s in 2011; and then 223 in 2012.
And then, you know, depending on that mix, to stay at 316
or go below, we are planning on lowering the number of C-5s if
we do get relief to a number around 94 in fiscal year 2011 and
probably about 89 in fiscal year 2012 on the C-5s. Again, we
still have to ask for relief from that.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
I have C-27 questions, but something tells me Mr. Bartlett
will take care of those, so I will yield to him.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
In my opening statement, I mentioned that the Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study recently concluded,
``failed to account for the aircraft needed for the direct
support mission to meet the Army's time-sensitive intra-theater
requirement.''
Can you tell me what kind of analysis the Air Force is
doing to determine the number of aircraft required to perform
the intra-theater aircraft mission and the direct support
mission?
General Johnson. Mr. Bartlett, if I may, from the TRANSCOM
perspective, frame this a bit and then have the Air Force fill
in.
The direct support mission is still being analyzed. This 78
requirement that you mentioned was from the Army and JROC
approved, and it is being analyzed in terms of the mix, the
mixture that still matches up in terms of numbers.
But in the meantime, the Air Force and TRANSCOM are very
intent on providing direct support to the Army. And so we have
already, in the last year, provided a concept of employment
test with two C-130s, because C-27s aren't available yet, with
which the Army was very pleased.
In addition to that, General Odierno and General McChrystal
have both expressed great appreciation to General McNabb for
the additional direct support that AMC [Air Mobility Command]
and TRANSCOM are providing in the form of 30 to 40 of C-130s in
theater right now at the beck and call of the Army to provide
the support they need, in addition to the airdrop support each
and every day.
And so, numerically, what we are looking at is, in addition
to the 38 JCAs that you described, General McNabb and
previously General White, in previous testimony in another
committee, have cited that about 40 C-130 equivalents will be
probably required to fill that bill. And so that is earmarked
and set aside to make sure we can support the Army, and further
supported by the notion that only about three airfields in
Afghanistan are accessible by C-27s and not C-130s.
So we think we can continue to provide that support with C-
130s until continued analysis can narrow down the exact number
of C-27s. But it is tremendously important for us to earn that
trust from the field commanders on the ground, and we seem to
be doing so now.
General Breedlove. Sir, if I could add just a short note,
you are correct. And in the 78 number, I think our JROC used
the number of 75, but they are close enough. The way we are
addressing that is the 38 C-27s, which is the program of
record, plus the 40 that General Johnson has mentioned, to
bring the 78, a number that we will hold dedicated to that Army
mission.
We are currently flying under a construct called ``direct
support apportioned.'' It is the construct that was worked out
specifically by the Army. They are, as General Johnson
mentioned, very, very happy with the way that is working out.
And, again, General McChrystal and General Odierno have both
personally approved and look forward to the way ahead on direct
support apportion via the 78 aircraft.
Mr. Bartlett. It is interesting that 38 plus 40 is 78, but
we really don't have 40 C-130s or we wouldn't be taking them
from the Guard, would we?
General Breedlove, you know, over many months in many
committees, I have asked the question, has there ever been any
study that came to a different conclusion than that we needed
78 Joint Cargo Aircraft? And the answer has always been, ``No.
That is still a validated requirement.'' And if that is true,
sir, why are we disregarding this validated requirement in our
procurements?
General Breedlove. Well, sir, I think I would agree with
you, there have been no other studies that indicate any other
number other than 78. And it is our intention to fill that
requirement with the 38 C-27s and 40 apportioned C-130s, not
necessarily from the Guard but from the general pool of the C-
130s in our TRANSCOM fleet.
And, currently, the absolute requirement on the ground
downrange now is being fulfilled by those C-130s, which are
earmarked every day on the Air Tasking Order as ``direct
support apportioned.'' So we are going to meet that requirement
via those 38 C-27s and 40 aircraft dedicated against the
requirement of 78.
Mr. Bartlett. But we are taking those aircraft from our
Guard and making them shorthanded. And the C-130 is not the 27,
because it requires a longer field.
Where we are now, you may be able to meet the need; where
we may be next month, you may not be able to meet the need. I
remain very concerned that this validated requirement for 78 is
just being ignored and filled by an aircraft that we are kind
of stealing from the Guard that doesn't really meet the
requirements because it is not the same aircraft.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this
time.
Mr. Smith. I actually have a few more questions. Actually,
I wanted to ask about the Civil Reserve Air Fleet [CRAF],
something I don't understand as well as I would like to, and
how that figures into all of your plans, how you would assess
the utility of it at this point.
General Johnson, do you want to take a quick stab at
talking about that a little bit?
General Johnson. Yes, sir. What has been helpful to us in
this study is to be able to measure a steady state over a long
period of time to see how we really do business with the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet so we can understand better how we can surge
with the organic fleet. So the study was able to measure that.
And you and I have had a chance to talk about--we tend to
look at CRAF in terms of wide-body equivalents, in terms of the
aircraft. But what is the bottom line is the amount we relied
on CRAF, whether MCS or MCRS, is roughly equivalent, but what
we have been able to look at is more of this steady-state
rotational role the CRAF serves.
And they primarily carry passengers and bulk cargo. The
over- and outsized cargo and the weapons and the specialized
sensitive equipment we carry on our ``gray tails,'' as we say
it, or our organic fleet. So we look to CRAF to do bulk cargo,
palletized cargo, and passengers. And so they manage that
steady-state requirement day-in and day-out.
And, in a long conflict, as we are in now and as we
measured in MCRS, we had a better way to see what the role is
for the CRAF. And our fleet seems manageable. We have
requirements in each stage of CRAF to handle an activation
surge, and we have participation from our fleet. And even right
now, as we speak, there is a meeting with our civil carriers to
help upgrade the CRAF program, to make it more responsive in
this environment, and to upgrade the rules that really came
into play in the Cold War.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you.
We do have a series of votes, including a motion to
recommit, which always adds a hour-hour, in the middle of it.
So it is going to be a good 45 minutes to an hour, I suspect,
before we are able to come back.
And I can't even guarantee we are going to have that many
more questions. I have a few more. But there may be Members who
went to the vote who would like to have the opportunity to ask
questions. I hate to make you hang around for an hour, but I am
going to have to, just to make sure the committee has an
adequate chance to ask questions.
So we will be in recess until we can get back from the
votes. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Smith. The votes always take longer than they actually
should.
We should also explain, Mr. Bartlett will not be able to
come back. He had a 3:30 meeting with Ashton Carter from the
Pentagon, as a matter of fact. And he informed me he will have
to attend that.
And, General Johnson, we were talking a little bit during
the break there. You have had some further clarification on
some of the C-130 answers. And, please, elaborate.
General Johnson. Yes, sir. Thank you. I think if I could
frame and then will look to my left for the Air Force to fill
in some details.
But the reference, the 130 force and the excess tails that
are available that we found in a study--and I say ``excess'' in
quotation marks--there were sufficient airframes to handle all
the scenarios.
One of the scenarios actually tested our intra-theater
forces harder, in a sense that there are rotational forces and
it goes over a long period of time, 7 years. And what we found
that, even though the airframes were available, it is the crew
force that is not able to sustain the rotations over time
because of the way our policies work between the active duty
and the Guard and the Reserve.
Without being too arcane, the crew ratios differ, and the
access to the crews on the active-duty side can work, but the
limited number cannot support the conflict on its own; we need
the help from the Guard and Reserve forces. The crew ratios in
the Guard and Reserve forces are different, and therefore it is
difficult to access the crews to sustain a long rotational-type
conflict. And that is the shortfall that the study found, was
in the crew forces, not so much in the airframes.
And, with that, I think if I could yield to the Air Force
to perhaps talk about the allocation of the crews and airframes
within the force structure, that might bring some clarity. I
hope that helps.
Mr. Smith. Yeah, that would be great. Thank you.
General Johnston. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to just further elaborate on Mr. Bartlett's question.
The most stressing scenario from the study led us to a 335
number for C-130s. Of course, our current program of record is
401 aircraft. And in addressing the direct support mission to
the Army, as I was explaining to Mr. Bartlett, there is a
requirement, validated by our JROC, for 75 aircraft.
I think there may be a little confusion in that that 75 is
very close to the 78 number that the Army was originally going
to buy of C-27s. Currently, our program of record for C-27s is
38, and that is what we will proceed with.
Mr. Smith. And if I could clarify, building off Mr.
Bartlett's questions, it is true that since the original study
came out and said we need this many C-27s, no new study has
been done that says we need that many C-27s.
But I think what you are saying is, things have happened
that have called into doubt, in your mind, whether or not you
need the 78, I guess it was. We haven't done a full, formal,
100 percent study that says, ``Here is the new idea,'' but
there, as was discussed, the number of airfields that actually
the C-130 can access.
Do you plan to do--not to shift subjects on you in mid-
sentence here--but do you plan to do a more formal requirements
study for the C-27?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would like to get back to you,
take that for the record. I think it is prudent that we would
look at that, but I don't want to commit until I have gone back
and taken a look at our requirements guys and asked them that.
Because we do agree that 78 was a number that was developed
by the Army, not by us, and we need to take a look at what that
is, especially now that we have the experience, that we gained
in October through December of last year when we actually did
this mission for the Army and did it well.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 49.]
Mr. Smith. Well, it would be helpful to the committee.
Obviously, this is an issue of some concern to a number of
Members. If we could have a more firmed-up requirements look at
why you think this different ratio would work and play out for
you.
General Breedlove. Sir, we got that, and we will get back
to you.
And just to clear one point from our conversation with Mr.
Bartlett, we do not intend to move any aircraft out of the
Guard into the active duty to cover that 40. That 40 aircraft
comes out of the general pool. That mission will be shared by
active duty and Guard alike. So there is no movement across the
active or the ANG [Air National Guard] to accommodate that 40
aircraft.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
I wanted to have you talk a little bit about the tanker. We
are all very much aware of the fact that there is a huge need
and that it has taken too long to fill that need. There is
certainly a tortured history and many to blame for the fact
that it has taken that long. But be that as it may, we need the
new tanker. And we are optimistic that we are now on a path to
get it.
But if you could quantify a little bit for us, either
General Johnson or General Breedlove, you know, how bad is it
right now in terms of our needs for tanker capacity. And in
many of these studies, I did not see in front of me estimates
of how many tankers we would need, how many we have, how we are
going to handle the fact that they are getting old and, you
know, will be out of service. And where are we going to have
shortfalls as we wait to build the new tanker?
General Johnson. Sir, if I may lead off, the study found
that in two of the three scenarios we did not have sufficient
air refueling support in the fleet. And in one case, we would
need 103 percent of what we have, and obviously did not have
sufficient use; and then 120 percent in the more air and naval
campaign kind of scenario. And this tanker fleet, the existing
fleet consists of the 59 KC-10s and the 415 KC-135s and the 79
Marine Corps KC-130s.
And the thing that is telling, probably, about this fleet
is that this study used KC-135 equivalents. And anything that a
modern aircraft would bring would help, because up to 19
percent of the KC-135s are in depot at any one time. So a new
aircraft would immediately provide more availability and better
mission-capable rate right just to start with, let alone with
the other capabilities it would bring in the requirements in
the contract.
So, as far as TRANSCOM is concerned, not only do we need
more, the better quality would facilitate this. And the better
capability might reduce the top-end numbers because of what it
can bring, but we had to model what we have in KC-135
equivalents.
So, again, I think the depot rate really spoke to the age
of the aircraft in this.
Mr. Smith. So when you come to those figures of the
shortfall in your scenarios, you are assuming that at any given
time roughly 20 percent of that fleet will not be available.
General Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay. That is factored into your scenario.
General Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Well, I just want to reiterate this committee's commitment
to do whatever we can to move that process forward as quickly
as possible. We understand we now will likely--or will have a
competitive bid with two companies. Certainly, I think that is
good, to have competition. But we hope we will make a decision
on that as quickly and as timely as possible. And it is my
commitment on this committee to try and not muck with that, if
you will. We want to get this decision done as quickly as
possible. And just, you know, anything we can do to help or not
hinder, please let us know.
I don't have any further questions. I know Mr. Coffman--I
am sorry--Mr. Coffman had been here, and he told me after the
meeting that he did have a question, so I will give him a shot.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, when we look at the logistical support for Iraq
and we are facing down in Iraq, we have port facilities that
are available to offload key vehicles and various support
equipment as well as weapons systems. But when we look at
Afghanistan, it is incredibly logistically difficult to
support. And we have really relied on airlift capacity to bring
in things that we would not normally bring into an airstrip. I
think pretty much all of our weapons--I think that things like,
I think, chow and fuel maybe go on rail and then are trucked
in, but pretty much everything else, I think, comes in through
airlift.
And so, are you able to meet the demands for Afghanistan
now, number one? And, number two, when we phase down from
Afghanistan, will we then have surplus capacity in terms of our
airlift capability, or will the numbers and type of aircraft be
reasonable to meet future challenges?
General Johnson. Sir, thank you for that question.
Afghanistan is about the most difficult location we could
imagine to supply logistically, and yet a lot of the ratios
remain. We provide about 80 percent of the supplies for
Afghanistan by surface. And because it is an immature theater
and, as you said, the infrastructure is not as robust, we
provide about 20 percent by air. It is a sensitive, lethal type
of cargo.
However, still 80 percent by surface, because that is the
way we work. Normally, in a mature theater, we would provide 90
percent by sea and land and only 10 percent by air.
The other thing that helps us not build in too much of an
excess when we are in a, you know, great push, as we are now,
is that we really tap into our commercial capacity. And that is
one of the asymmetric advantages that Transportation Command
has. We work with our civil reserve air fleet. We work with
commercial partners on the sea and on the land. And so we not
only bring in supplies by the ground via Pakistan but also from
the Northern Distribution Network, with which I am sure you are
familiar, whether from northern Europe, through Russia, or
through the Caucasus, through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
And we tap into existing rail lines. And the advantage of
this is these are commercial lines with commercial products.
And so, when they arrive in theater, they are supplying the
forces, but when we step back down at the end of this, the
commercial infrastructure remains, hopefully, for the benefit
of the region and their development, but not at the expense of
the DOD [Department of Defense] to maintain it because it is a
commercial network.
In fact, I was able to travel with General McNabb to Manila
last fall to be with him when he thanked the president of the
Asian Development Bank for their investment in a railway link
between Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan to link the
railway to the Ring Road. It helps us because it helps us gets
supplies in, but it helps the region be more viable. And a
peaceful and stable Afghanistan is something that all of the
neighbors seek. Even though the neighbors are interesting
there, they see the advantage there, too.
So that is one of the great leverages that TRANSCOM brings.
I hope that that comes to the nature of your question.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, if I could--but I understand
that all the vehicles--is it true that all the vehicles are
coming by air, all the MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles] are coming by air?
General Johnson. Over 2,000 of them have come now, sir, and
we have probably about 6,000 to go. I mean, there is a large
family of those vehicles.
But what we have started to do is an intermodal solution
that will close it quicker to send 300 to 400 by sea and then
to an intermediate staging base near Afghanistan but not
necessarily within the country, then offload and shuttle and
use C-17s to the advantage for which they were made, to be able
to fly these long legs, and cycle in faster than if we do, you
know, four at a time or eight at a time in a wide-body
aircraft.
So, initially, yes, indeed, we have gone by air. We are
looking at ways to do this intermodal system to get them
faster. And we are able to, actually, now, keep up with the
production rate and the integration rate so that we are getting
them into theater over 500 a month, and we will be able to
match the absorption rate that CENTCOM [Central Command] can
take.
So it is something we are watching very closely, and there
is not much room to spare, but we are on track.
Mr. Coffman. What is the dividing line between what is
flown into the country and what is brought in by surface
transportation?
General Johnson. Normally, it is this idea of sensitive and
lethal. It is something that you need to have and we can't
afford to have out of our eyesight. But we have actually done
experiments up the Pakistan line of communication with trucks
with close RFID [Radio Frequency Identification] tracking, so
that we have an eye on where they are, to see how that would
work on the surface and see what is possible. We do it very
carefully to make sure that we don't lose, again, control of
what we have.
It also provides us flexibility to be able to adjust to
convoys with this RFID technology to be able to say, let's move
this convoy ahead or adjust its order as we go through. So we
try to use good supply-chain methods to have accountability for
them.
But on the ground--and you cited it initially, very
astutely--food, construction materials, lumber, fuel, sort of
fungible commercial products that can come in.
General Breedlove. Sir, if I could just add one little
piece to that to get to your specific question about how the
mission is being accomplished inside Afghanistan.
The tactical airlift piece of that, we are meeting the
requirement and exceeding it, in some cases. If you were to
talk to General McChrystal's staff right now and ask them what
their needs are inside Afghanistan, it would be rotary-wing
lift, especially high-altitude-capable rotary-wing lift.
And, as was mentioned earlier, all the airfields that we
use in Afghanistan, only three require an airfield that is
smaller than a C-130 can service. A C-27 would be good for
that, and that would be part of that mission set.
But almost all of the requirements that we struggle to meet
are rotary-wing lift to distribute after we move it in via
tactical air or via ground commercial.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on the
shortage on rotary-wing lift?
Mr. Smith. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Coffman. General, just as a follow-up, could you
address the shortfall on rotary-wing lift and where we are in
terms of meeting that capability?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would really like to get you a
good answer for that, if I could take that for the record and
get back to you. That is not exactly the detail I brought
today.
In general, it is heavy rotary-wing lift that can
essentially operate at higher altitudes above 6,000 feet.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 49.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I am going to recognize Mr. Kissell in just a second. I do
have a 4 o'clock meeting back up in my office that I have to
get to. So, at some point during the course of his questions, I
will slip out and turn the committee over to Mr. Kissell to
wrap up.
And I just want to, before I go, thank all of our witnesses
for their testimony and their work on behalf of our country.
Difficult decisions. I appreciate your work. We look forward to
working with you on all those issues.
And, with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for not being here for the opening comments. I
was doing some work on the floor. So I am not sure if this
would have been discussed earlier. I know parts of it have been
discussed since I have been here.
But, a few weeks ago, right after the situation in Haiti
first developed, there was a hearing that we had, and one of
the questions that I was able to ask--and it concerned
transport, and I am not sure if some of you might have been
there or not--but I asked the question: Do we have lift
capacity to be able to handle the situation in what is going on
in Afghanistan and all of the challenges there, plus other
places that we have to be, plus having a situation like Haiti
come along, and to be able to accomplish all of this? And I was
told that, yes, we did; we were able to rearrange some training
exercises and move some equipment around; that we are fine.
About 3 weeks after that, I got a call from the head of our
National Guard in North Carolina, General Ingram, saying that
the Air Force had stated that they wanted to take two of the
Air National Guard-North Carolina C-130s. And I think it was 10
all together from different States, two from North Carolina.
And they were very concerned about this. We expressed that
concern. We were advised last week that this was being worked
out and that we should not worry about it anymore.
Mr. Kissell. In another hearing maybe a couple of weeks
ago, somebody had said to me, to the same reference, to tell
General Ingram it is going to be fine.
In what you said a couple minutes ago--and I am not even
sure who said it. I apologize for that. Someone said that we
have no intentions of taking Air National Guard equipment, C-
130s, to regular Air Force for a certain mission. Now, can we
still assume that you don't need those C-130s for any other
mission also, at this point in time?
General Johnston. Sir, let me address the one that you
asked first, which was directed more at the schoolhouse,
providing C-130s to the Little Rock school house in order to
continue that training.
The E models at Little Rock are, you know, they are
retiring. They are coming out of inventory. We are going to
retire all the C-130Es. And the airplanes that you are
referencing, it was 12 Air National Guard C-130s we were
looking at and six Air Force Reserve C-130s, for a total of 18.
And that was part of the fiscal year 2011 presidential budget.
We heard you, and we are looking at a more efficient and
effective way to manage the three components and come up with a
solution that not only meets the State mission but as well as
the schoolhouse mission at Little Rock Air Force Base. And we
have been discussing with the Air National Guard as well as the
Air Force Reserve and, of course, the active component, we have
come up with a smart solution to address those concerns.
And it hasn't been formally presented to the Secretary. And
once it is--Secretary Donnelly--he will work that through to
you all, to Congress, with the solution. And my sense is that
he will come up--or, you should see a response on that in the
next few weeks.
Mr. Kissell. If you would keep us in the loop on that, it
would be much appreciated.
And I missed some conversation here, and, once again, I do
apologize. The C-27, the number we were looking, at one time,
78? Did I hear that we are down to 37?
And Mr. Bartlett's question I missed. But, at one time,
there seemed to be some talk up on the committee that the
development of this joint cargo plane for the Air Force and the
Army, it seemed to be going to the Air Force, who didn't seem
to want it; that the Army wanted it. You know, where do we
stand now? Are we down to 37?
You mentioned earlier about the ability of this plane to be
useful in a lot of situations in Afghanistan. What is the
status of this plane right now and its needs and where we are
going with it?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would be happy to take that
question.
The Army created the original requirement for a Joint Cargo
Aircraft. And, in their study, they developed a requirement for
78 C-27-type aircraft, and that was the program that they
embarked on.
Then the Department of Defense entered the discussion and
decided that that mission was more appropriately provided by
the Air Force. And the Air Force was given the mission of doing
direct support mission for the Army.
At that time, the decision was also taken by the Department
that 38 aircraft would be purchased of the C-27 variety. And
since we have excess C-130 capacity in our Air Force--the
current study says we need about 335, and since we have 401 in
the total inventory, we would augment the 38 Sherpa buy with 40
aircraft from the general C-130 population to accomplish the
Army direct support mission. And so that would bring us back to
a level of 78 aircraft available for that mission.
And, as the chairman has aptly asked, we have as an Air
Force now gone back and studied to see if the actual
requirement is for 78. That was the number that the Army came
to in their judgment.
Since that time, we have had a lot of experience. We
conducted a direct support experiment in Iraq, from October to
December of last year, and we gained a lot of insight into what
the Army requires to do that mission. The Army commanders on
the ground were ecstatic with the performance of the Air Force
in that mission.
And so we were able to gain enough knowledge to know that
what we will be able to do, as we further look at this, is use
the 38 C-27s, plus 40 aircraft from the general population, to
do the direct support mission. And then, as I spoke to the
chairman, we will go back and bring back to the committee an
answer about when and how we will study to see if that is the
right number.
In the meantime, we are accomplishing this mission
currently in both Afghanistan and Iraq at the direction of
General McChrystal and General Odierno. We are doing this via
general support apportioned, which means we have aircraft that
are set aside every day for direct support of the Army on the
ground. And they, the aviation brigade commanders, can lay out
the work for those aircraft on that day. And the Army is very
happy with our performance in this general support apportioned
role that we are doing now.
And so, that is sort of the status of the problem. Does
that answer your question, sir?
Mr. Kissell. Yes, sir. Thank you so much.
And the chair recognizes Mr. McIntyre from North Carolina.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you gentlemen for your service to our country.
As you know, we have been interrupted by votes, and so
hopefully what we ask right now has not already been asked. We
would ask for your indulgence.
But the average age of the C-5 is more than 27 years old.
It has a very low mission-capable rate, I think about 30
percent below the C-17.
Since the C-5A is much less available than the C-17 and is
20 years older and will have to be replaced at some point, has
there not been some consideration given to keeping the C-17
line open, in light of that situation?
Mr. Van Buren. Right now, the stated requirement for C-17
is 223 aircraft. It comes under the total force structure for
strategic aircraft, which is 111 C-5s. So, right now, we have
no acquisition plans for anything beyond the 223.
Mr. McIntyre. I mean, would you be willing to consider
that, given the age situation with the C-5?
General Johnston. Sir, as we compare the number of C-17s
and number of C-5s that we have and we compare it against the
MCRS number of 32.7, which is the highest case number of
million-ton-miles per day, we feel that the number of 223 C-
17s, based on the number of C-5s we feel will be in the force
for the next 20 years or so, is about right.
Mr. McIntyre. All right.
No further questions right now, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell. Being we have no other Members here,
Congressman McIntyre, any other questions you want to ask?
Mr. McIntyre. No, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell. Okay.
We would like to thank the panel for being here. And we do
apologize for the interruption. I know there are questions that
you will be getting back to us on, and as individuals in the
committee, we appreciate that. And thank you for coming. Thank
you for your service.
And this is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 28, 2010
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 28, 2010
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 28, 2010
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
General Breedlove. Yes, the AF is presently engaged in an Air
Mobility Command led analysis to determine the Direct Support Mission
requirement. We anticipate preliminary results mid to late summer 2010.
[See page 12.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
General Breedlove. From an Air Force perspective, we are satisfied
with the size and make-up of our rotary-wing lift fleet. The Air Force
is currently recapitalizing the existing HH-60 fleet and pursuing the
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform for Global Strike Command and Air
Force District Washington. These programs will allow the Air Force to
meet our anticipated commitments. Furthermore, as our rotary-wing
missions evolve or additional missions added, the Air Force will
continue to conduct the appropriate analysis to meet national security
objectives. [See page 16.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 28, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. The previous mobility study, Mobility Capabilities Study
2005 (MCS 05), identified a ``moderate risk'' range of strategic
airlift aircraft as 292-383. Why does the current study identify only
304 aircraft as meeting the most demanding scenario?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. Last year, General McNabb testified that 316 strategic
airlift aircraft is a ``sweet spot'' considering both wartime needs and
the contributions of the civil reserve air fleet, or CRAF. His
predecessor, General Schwartz, also identified 316 strategic airlift
aircraft as the ``sweet spot.'' Has this belief changed in TRANSCOM? If
so, why?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. In your remarks provided to the subcommittee, you noted
that TRANSCOM supports the Air Force acquisition of light mobility
aircraft and that it will ``pay dividends in our global logistics
mission,'' but that TRANSCOM has no current plans to use these
aircraft. Can you expand on how the light mobility aircraft will fit
into the mobility mission from your perspective?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. MCS 05 identified a ``moderate risk'' range of 395-674
intra-theater airlift aircraft necessary to meet requirements. MCRS
2016 concluded that only 335 intra-theater aircraft are needed to meet
the most demanding scenario examined. Why has the requirement for
intra-theater airlift aircraft dropped so significantly?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. The MCRS 2016 makes use of the CRAF fleet but it does
not detail this usage in million-ton-miles. In previous testimonies for
a number of years, DOD officials have depended upon CRAF to provide 20
million-ton-miles (MTMs) of capacity per day. Does the MCRS 2016 raise
this number or in any way increase the dependence on CRAF?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. What was the greatest gap or shortfall that the MCRS
2016 identified? Are there gaps that currently exist that are projected
to be mitigated before 2016?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. To what extent is the MCRS 2016 a budget constrained
forecast?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. MCRS is the anxiously awaited bedrock for many of the
mobility-related budget decisions we will make in Congress this year,
and for years to come. In order to provide some additional context,
please share with us the major MCRS learning points for TRANSCOM, and
how you intend to apply that information in your future decision-
making.
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. Current operations are a fact of life and the backdrop
for many decisions involving DOD. Were current operations taken into
account for this mobility study? Tell us about that?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. How is the MCRS-16 study tied to the priorities of
USTRANSCOM?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. How has recent experience with the Afghanistan forces
increase, the Haiti earthquake, and the Chilean earthquake either
validated or questioned the results of the study?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. Last year, DOD agreed to establish objectives and
measure of effectiveness to monitor CRAF modernization; what concrete
steps have been taken to accomplish these improvements and what
progress has been made?
General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. A recent newspaper report noted that the Air Force plans
to issue ``technical corrections'' to its solicitation for bids to
build a fleet of aerial refueling tankers, and that these corrections
would be revisions in the rules for foreign-owned prime contractors so
that it would be easier for EADS to bid without a U.S.-based industry
partner. What corrections will be made to the KC-X request for
proposal?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. Please describe the acquisition and sustainment strategy
for the light mobility aircraft. How did you arrive at a quantity of
15? What validated requirement are these aircraft filling?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. The average age of the C-5 is more than 27 years old,
and has a very low mission capable rate (30% below the C-17). Since the
C-5A is much less available than the C-17, and is 20 years older, and
will have to be replaced at some point, why shouldn't consideration be
given to keeping the C-17 line open?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. The KC-135 fleet averages 49.8 years old and the KC-10
fleet averages 26.3 years. MCRS 2016 noted that some scenarios require
more aerial refueling aircraft than the 415 KC-135s and 59 KC-10s in
the Air Force inventory. Is the Air Force funding modifications to
these aircraft that will allow them to better meet requirements for
availability until KC-X enters the inventory?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available
at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. MCRS 2016 determined that 335 intra-theater airlift
aircraft were required to meet the most demanding scenario, but MCRS
2016 did not evaluate the Air Force's direct support mission to meet
the Army's time-sensitive cargo requirement. How many intra-theater
aircraft need to be added to that 335 number to meet total inventory
requirements for intra-theater aircraft?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available
at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. We understand that the active Air Force was planning to
move 18 C-130s from the reserve component to the active to meet
training and operational requirements? If the force structure is, in
fact, adequate, why is that move necessary? General Wyatt testified
before the committee last week and indicated that there may be changes
to that request. Can you please update the committee on the issue?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available
at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. On February 27, 2008, the Air Force and Army Chiefs of
Staff sent a letter to the committee on the C-27 program noting a
requirement to ``build international partnerships around a common
airframe.'' Since we have a program to procure 38 C-27s, why does the
Air Force need the Light Mobility Aircraft to also do this mission?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available
at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. Recent legislation passed by the Congress last year
requires the Air Force to maintain a strategic airlift fleet of 316
aircraft. With 111 C-5s, we will reach 316 aircraft when the 205th C-17
is delivered in the first quarter of 2011. Does the Air Force plan to
retire any of planned 17 C-5s before the first quarter of 2011?
General Johnston. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. We understand that the Air Force plans to retire an
additional 5 C-5s in 2012. Does the Air Force plan to submit a
legislative proposal to change the requirement for strategic airlift
aircraft from 316 to a lower number?
General Johnston. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. What are long-term Air Force plans for inventories of C-
130 and C-27 aircraft?
General Johnston. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. The MCRS only considered the program of record until
2016. Although the C-5 could fly until 2025 and beyond, realistically
when do you expect to completely remove the C-5As from the fleet?
General Johnston. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. EADS, the parent company of France-based Airbus,
recently announced that they intend to bid without a U.S. partner for
the KC-X tanker program. It concerns me that any foreign-owned and
foreign government financed company could possibly control the
development, production and support of such a key piece of our national
military capability. I am also concerned about the delays in this
program's status. As an Air Force veteran I fully appreciate the
tactical need for an upgraded fleet. I would have serious reservations
about an award to EADS and any further delays. How would you resolve
these concerns?
Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at
the time of printing.]
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