[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
HORN OF AFRICA:
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 17, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-108
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman
DIANE E. WATSON, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
BARBARA LEE, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, California
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 11
Ms. Leslie Lefkow, Senior Researcher, Africa Division, Human
Rights Watch................................................... 28
Ms. Sadia Ali Aden, Human Rights Advocate and Freelance Writer... 41
Kenneth John Menkhaus, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science,
Department of Political Science, Davidson College.............. 49
Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, Secretary General, The Sudan People's
Liberation Movement............................................ 57
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa
and Global Health: Prepared statement.......................... 4
Mr. Ted Dagne: Prepared statement................................ 17
Ms. Leslie Lefkow: Prepared statement............................ 30
Ms. Sadia Ali Aden: Prepared statement........................... 44
Kenneth John Menkhaus, Ph.D.: Prepared statement................. 52
Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech: Prepared statement........................ 59
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 78
Hearing minutes.................................................. 79
HORN OF AFRICA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND U.S. POLICY
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THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Payne,
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Payne. The hearing will come to order. Good morning and
welcome. I have convened this important hearing, ``The Horn of
Africa: Current Conditions and U.S. Policy,'' to discuss the
region of Africa that stays in the headlines perhaps more than
any other region on the continent but is yet so misunderstood.
This hearing comes on the heels of a similar one on the Great
Lakes Region that we had recently. The point of this type of
approach is to broaden the focus from particular countries to a
regional outlook.
The Subcommittee on Africa will continue to have hearings
dealing with other regions in Africa because it is so important
that regional integration and cooperation is occuring to
determine the future of Africa. Some of you may wonder why a
discussion about the Horn of Africa would include the Secretary
General of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. Sudan abuts
the Horn and is both impacted and impacts on what happens
there. It is a key country which borders nine countries and
therefore very essential.
We cannot and must not take a myopic view when we approach
these challenges in the African countries and regions. With
that view in mind, the inclusion of a witness from Sudan makes
absolute sense. As you will hear from our witnesses, the Horn
of Africa--named for the shape the peninsula takes as it juts
out into the Arabian Sea--has been marred by civil wars,
internal political turmoil, inter-state wars, famine, man-made
humanitarian disasters.
It is a focal point for the U.S. foreign policy mainly for
our counterterrorism--as it is highly vulnerable to terrorist
attacks and is considered a safe haven for international
terrorist groups as well as for humanitarian concern. Ethiopia
and Somalia fought three major wars over the past several
decades, while Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a bloody war from
1998 to 2000 in which over 100,000 people were killed and many
more displaced. The results of the Hague Decision and the
efforts of the Hague decision and the efforts of the Eritrean-
Ethiopian Border Commission remains unimplemented, and the two
countries have yet to move forward on the issue of Badme,
recognized as part of Eritrea by the Boundary Commission.
Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia rules with an iron fist,
overseeing the violence of the 2005 elections after which
nearly 200 innocent people were killed by Ethiopian
sharpshooters and countless people were imprisoned. Last month
elections were held. Although they were relatively peaceful,
they did not meet international standards, according to the
U.S. and the EU's commissions. Harassment, detention, and
killings of opposition members preceded the elections. Also,
changes in laws pertaining to NGOs must have been absent of
outside support and also weakened opposition groups. Opposition
leader, Ms. Birtukan Mideksa remains in prison and according to
Meles will never be released.
Somalia, one of the world's poorest nations, has been
marred by fractional fighting and humanitarian disasters since
the collapse of the central government in 1991. Famine and
lawlessness ensued and an estimate 300,000 Somalis died of
starvation during the civil war in the early 1990s.
A peace agreement was reached in 2004, and a Transitional
Federal Government was established following a long process in
Nairobi. However, Ethiopia invaded in 2006 tacitly encouraged
by the former U.S. administration and ousted the Unions of
Islamic Courts (ICU). The relative calm that followed the
Islamic Courts rule ended abruptly; open conflict erupted in
Mogadishu and beyond, and the humanitarian crisis exploded.
The TFG is now led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,
and he faces a major challenge by the terrorist group Al-
Shabaab. I commend the administration for the support it has
provided the TFG, and I urge it to increase that support to
defeat Al-Shabaab and restore peace.
On the humanitarian side, I am outraged by the continued
suffering of the Somali people. The World Food Program's
suspension of activities in January in the south and central
regions of Somalia has had a devastating effect on the
vulnerable populations. We must do more to protect and provide
support to the Somali people.
In the North, the people of Somaliland will go to the polls
on June 26. I hope the elections are fair and free. In a region
that has suffered from wars and anarchy, Somaliland has
consistently maintained relative peace and stability. This
upcoming election provides a positive milestone for the future
of the region and Somaliland.
One of the root causes of political instability in the Horn
is the underlying impact of the unresolved Eritrea-Ethiopia
stalemate. These two countries have not had diplomatic
relations with each other for 11 years, and the two have
resorted to pursuing a proxy agenda in Somalia rather than
resolve their differences.
Eritrea has become increasingly isolated. However, over the
past several years, President Isaias has stated that his
government is ready to constructively engage Washington on a
wide range of issues, including cooperation on the war on
terror. Some opportunities have been missed by the U.S., but
President Isaias must also do more to show he is serious about
the future.
Djibouti serves as the host to the U.S. Combined Joint Task
Force Horn of Africa, a staging area in the war on terror.
Djibouti is a strong partner. However, U.S. assistance has been
on the decline. I hope to see this change. I also hope recent
developments in the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea
bear fruit where recently they have come to an accommodation,
and I commend both countries for that.
In Sudan, the U.S. is committed to seeing the referendum
take place on January 9, 2011, and must respect the will of the
Sudanese people. We must also do more to help prepare the South
as the referendum approaches and for both possible outcomes.
Finally, a word on Kenya: On August 4, the people of Kenya
will vote on a referendum to approve or reject the draft
Constitution. Outside forces have been waging a negative
campaign over the past several months.
The new Constitution includes sweeping and much needed
reforms, as called for following the deadly post-election
violence in 2008. The process must be allowed to move forward
without outside interferences. We cannot go into the 2012
elections without having a Constitution that is approved by the
majority of the people of Kenya, and absent that or anything to
deter that could once again lead to the horrible bloody deaths
which followed the past national elections.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member for his
opening statement. Mr. Smith?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for calling this very important hearing. The peoples living in
the Horn of Africa confront some of the most repressive
governments in the world, and for many of them, the conditions
of daily life constitute a humanitarian disaster. In southern
and central Somalia, which has lacked a functioning government
since 1991, most of the people live in areas controlled by Al-
Shabaab, a foreign terrorist organization affiliated with al-
Qaeda.
We can hardly imagine the injustices and hardship of their
lives in an ungoverned land that has become a haven for
terrorists and pirates. It seems that the situation has only
grown worse since last June when Chairman Payne last called a
hearing to examine the situation in Somalia, and certainly it
has grown worse since 2006 when I, as chairman of this
committee, called a hearing on Somalia. I understand the
administration is reviewing its policy toward Somalia.
Certainly, it is time to do that, and I look forward to hearing
and learning about the options in this very, very sad and
tragic situation.
As to Ethiopia, Mr. Chairman, in recent years our
Government has officially recognized the grave human rights
abuses of the Meles government. But both under President Bush
and now under President Obama, our diplomacy has given Meles a
free pass. I would like to read from the summary of the State
Department's 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices on
Ethiopia:
``Unlawful killings, torture, beating, abuse and
mistreatment of detainees and opposition supporters by
security forces often acting with evident impunity;
poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention,
particularly of suspected sympathizers or members of
the opposition or insurgent groups; police,
administrative and judicial corruption; detention
without charge and lengthy pretrial detention;
infringement on citizens' privacy rights, including
illegal searches; use of excessive force by security
services in internal conflict and counterinsurgency
operations; . . . arrest, detention and harassment of
journalists; restrictions on freedom of assembly and
association. . . .''
The rest of the report continues that very significant
indictment of the human rights policies of the Meles
government. You mentioned the killings that occurred, the
slaughter, in 2005. Well, right after that occurred, I traveled
to Ethiopia. In Addis I met with President Meles, who was
absolutely dismissive and really held in contempt the
international community's concern and my concern regarding
those killings where security forces gunned down people in the
street who were protesting the corrupt election and the process
that was followed.
In regard to the May 23 elections in Ethiopia and the weeks
and months prior to the elections, it is well established that
the Meles government suppressed the democratic opposition.
Human Rights Watch concluded that
``the Ethiopian Government is waging a coordinated and
sustained attack on political opponents, journalists
and rights activists ahead of the May 2010 elections.
Opposition candidates and activists including Birtukan
Mideksa were assaulted or detained by police, and many
opposition groups were prevented from opening local
offices.''
In December of '09, the most prominent opposition newspaper
was closed, and in April 2010, the government began jamming
Voice of America broadcasts, so I want to thank other members,
including my colleague, Mr. Royce, who joined me in a letter to
Assistant Secretary Carson calling on our Government to send a
strong unequivocal message to the Ethiopian Government that its
conduct during and after these elections will be a very
important factor in the development of U.S.-Ethiopian relations
Since the election was in fact a sham, what is called for
are not a few soft post-election words but a fundamental
reorientation of our policy supporting not Meles, but the
aspirations of the people of Ethiopia to live in freedom and
dignity. Eritrea is a country that should receive much more
attention than it does from our Government and from the
international media. Five million people suffer under that
government which Freedom House lists as among the nine
countries it judges to have the worst of the worst humans
rights conditions in the world.
Somalia is also on the worst of the worst list, but of
course, there was no government responsible for the tragic
state of that country. Since there was strong evidence that the
Eritrean Government supplies Al-Shabaab and similar groups in
Somalia, it seems our Government should classify Eritrea as a
state sponsor of terrorism, and I look forward to a discussion
on that point. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing our
witnesses. I am glad we will be focusing again as we do almost
every time this subcommittee convenes, and that is on the
situation in Sudan.
Obviously, our concerns are absolutely profound with the
upcoming elections from the plebiscite that will occur, and as
we have had witnesses tell us again and again, the huge caches
and munitions and arms that are being smuggled into Southern
Sudan raises very, very ominous concerns about what is
intended, in the disruptions and the slaughter, the killings
that might occur if that situation is not defused and
mitigated.
Finally, on Kenya, you did make mention of outside sources
trying to influence the outcome of the Kenyan Constitution. I
would point out that the Kenyan Constitution includes language
that was crafted by a panel of experts, apparently with an
enormous amount of input from outside of Kenya, that radically
rewrites their Constitution with regards to abortion. Virtually
all of the churches in Kenya--the Catholic Church, the Anglican
Church, the National Council of Churches' representatives and
Evangelicals--are against the Constitution because it allows
abortion on demand, which has not happened.
Kenya's population and the polling that has been done shows
60 to 70 percent of the people in Kenya believe in the sanctity
of unborn children and reject the violence of abortion whether
it be chemical poisoning or dismemberment of a child, and that
is the reason why there is such angst regarding this
Constitution. Recently, a group of ``no'' campaigners, mostly
under church auspices, were attacked by bombs just within the
last few days. A half a dozen died, and maybe the number is
higher by now. Approximately 70 were wounded.
The source of that is not known, but it does raise very
serious concerns about the attempts to disrupt the ``no''
campaign. The Constitution ought to be, in my opinion, the pro-
abortion language excised out of it. If that is going to be
discussed, let it be done by the legislature, but not through a
Constitution reform, which contains a lot of other things that
ought to be put into place. Nobody disputes that, so it is not
outside forces I would respectfully say. It is internal. The
people of Kenya, especially the faith community, is
diametrically opposed to the killing of Kenyan babies and the
wounding of their mothers by way of abortion.
Let me also say that the Obama administration has provided
some $11 million, and we do not know to whom and how that money
has been used. It may be higher. I have been joined by Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen and Darrell Issa of the Government Reform
Committee. We have asked for a full Inspectors General
investigation and a General Accountability Office investigation
into what the money has been used for because if we are backing
legislation that radically alters the Constitution, which then
radically alters the pro-life policy of Kenya, that is in
violation of United States law.
The Siljander Amendment makes it absolutely clear that the
U.S. Government cannot lobby either for or against abortion,
and if we are lobbying for a vehicle, a bill, a Constitution
reform proposal that radically changes it, our Government will
be in violation of our own U.S. law. So the ``outside forces''
are really the inside forces. The outside forces are really the
U.S. Government, we believe, and foreign non-governmental
organizations, including at least 20 pro-abortion, non-
governmental organizations heavily backed by U.S. funding that
are trying to promote the ``yes'' campaign.
I hope that they go back to the drawing board and quickly
excise that abortion-related language and bring back a
Constitution reform that the country can rally around because
they certainly do need a Constitution. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. We will begin with our
witnesses. Excuse me? Yes, Mr. Fortenberry. I didn't see you
slip in. Thank you. Sorry. I yield you as much time as you may
consume.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
willingness to hold this hearing today, and I appreciate the
opportunity to dialogue with our distinguished witnesses and
look forward to your scholarly insights on the developing in
the Horn of Africa, but, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my
comments on Somalia.
As I see it, Somalia is hanging by a thread, and the United
States is in the unenviable position of reconciling two complex
yet fundamental policy objectives brought into stark relief by
the release this week of the Department of State's Trafficking
and Persons Report, which noted that the Somali Government is
using child soldiers as young as 9 years of age in its fight
against militants. There is a harsh dichotomy that presents an
affront to our principles and moral sensibilities.
On the one hand, we must work to help prevent spiraling
instability and promote a semblance of just order in the midst
of a highly volatile security situation, and in tandem we are
obligated by law to combat the gruesome crime of child
conscription, a most serious human rights violation especially
prevalent in the world's ungoverned spaces where children can
easily fall victim to coercion and abhorrent abuse. As one of
the authors of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, which was
incorporated into the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Prevention Act of 2008, I am deeply concerned about this
situation, and we must have an urgent dialogue about ending
this pernicious human rights abuse.
Given that Somalia's defense, culture and higher education
ministers recently quit their post in frustration over the
Transitional Federal Government's lack of progress in bringing
order to that country, we need to have a clear understanding of
the current situation as well as the United States policy
options. We must also discuss how the U.S. can best use its
limited resources to compel the responsibility communities of
the nations to strengthen their efforts to combat Somalia's
rapid evolution into a barbarous and chaotic safe haven for
terrorists.
I would welcome hearing from our panelists on the way
forward for U.S. security interest as well as human rights
policy in Somalia. How do we move forward most effectively to
both support stability and justice in such a chaotic and
unpredictable environment? Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
you to convene a followup hearing on the specific situation in
Somalia if you would give that consideration, and I think we
need to explore this critical issue with the administration as
well. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I agree. I know we are all
opposed to the use of child soldiers, and if that is indeed
occurring with the TFG, we certainly should have that looked
into. We have also been joined by Dr. Boozman. I yield to him.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have a
comment. I just appreciate the hearing.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Now we will introduce our
witnesses. First, we will hear from Ted Dagne. Mr. Dagne is a
specialist in Africa Affairs at the Foreign Affairs Defense and
Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and
has offered his expertise to the CRS since 1989. Between his
work at CRS, Mr. Dagne served as professional staff member of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa
under chairmanship of Congressman Henry Johnson from 1993 to
1995.
From 1999 to 2000, Mr. Dagne served as a special advisor to
President Clinton's Special Envoy for Sudan and to Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan Rice, our
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Over the past 20 years, Mr. Dagne
has written over 2,000 major studies on Africa and has co-
authored two books on Somalia and Africa and the war on terror.
He also serves as the associate editor of the Mediterranean
Quarterly journal. Mr. Dagne is a graduate of Howard University
here in Washington, DC.
Next, we will hear from Ms. Leslie Lefkow, who currently
serves as senior researcher and Horn of Africa team leader in
the African Division at Human Rights Watch. While at Human
Rights Watch, Ms. Lefkow has used her specialty in abuses in
armed conflict and humanitarian crisis to conduct research in
Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Somalia. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Ms. Lefkow worked for humanitarian organizations
in Sudan, the Democrat Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone.
She holds graduate degrees from the University of Columbia in
law and Bryn Mawr College.
Following Ms. Lefkow is Ms. Sadia Ali Aden. Ms. Ali Aden is
a human rights advocate, freelance writer and co-founder of the
Adar Foundation, Somali Diaspora Youth and the founder of the
Diaspora Voice. Ms. Ali Aden's articles have been published in
various publications, including foreign policy forum,
IslamOnline, alJazeera Magazine and the World Press. She has
appeared for a number of interviews on NPR and BBC and other
media outlets. Notably, Ms. Ali Aden is also finalizing her
studies in medicine. Congratulations.
Next, we have Dr. Ken Menkhaus. Dr. Menkhaus is professor
of political science at Davidson College and joined the
Davidson faculty in 1991 with his specialization, which
includes development, conflict and peace operations in the Horn
of Africa. Dr. Menkhaus served as a special political advisor
to the United Nations operation in Somalia from 1993 and 1994
and as a visiting civilian professor at the U.S. Army
Peacekeeping Institute from 1994 to 1995.
Dr. Menkhaus has authored over 50 articles and books, has
made many interviews, and has appeared on media outlets
including BBC, CNN and the Voice of America. Dr. Menkhaus holds
a Ph.D. in international studies from the University of South
Carolina and received a Fulbright Scholarship during his
studies.
Lastly, we have Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, Secretary General of
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. Dr. Okiech was elected
to SPLM Secretary General in May 2008 and has served as a
member of the SPLM Political Bureau and SPLM National
Liberation Council.
Mr. Amum Okiech has an extensive career with SPLM and the
Sudanese Government, including his contributions to the
formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Front back in 1982--
one of the original members. Prior to his position as Secretary
General, Mr. Amum Okiech was appointed as Minister for Cabinet
Affairs in the Government of National Unity from 2007 to 2008.
He also completed an appointment as Secretary General of the
SPLM and member of both the Interim Political Bureau and the
International Committee in 2006.
In 2005 during the pre-interim period of the CPA, Mr. Amum
Okiech served as the appointed caretaker supervisor for Lakes
States by the late chairman Dr. John Garang of Sudan. We have
been joined by three other members, and I might ask, Ms.
Watson, would you like to make an opening statement, or, Ms.
Lee or Ms. Woolsey? Of course, we are moving behind, but if you
would like to make a statement--okay. Great. All right. Go
ahead.
Ms. Woolsey. Excuse me. I will just try to incorporate this
with my questions.
Mr. Payne. Excellent. Thank you very much. We will start
with our first witness, Mr. Dagne.
STATEMENT OF MR. TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Dagne. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith
and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify
before this subcommittee. The Horn of Africa region is by far
the most unstable region in sub-Saharan Africa today. Millions
of people have died and many more have been displaced or forced
into exile. One does not have to look in a refugee camp in
Kenya to find an Ethiopian, Eritrean or a Somali. Hundreds of
thousands of people from the Horn of Africa region are now
second-generation American citizens. Some have returned to help
their fellow brothers and sisters as humanitarian workers,
human rights advocates and journalists. Many have lost their
lives.
Ibrahim Addou, an American Somali, is one such person. In
December 2009, he was killed in a suicide attack in Mogadishu
along with over a dozen students, teachers and several
ministers. A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis
in Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents. Dozens of
humanitarian and human rights workers have been killed or
injured. I am making this point because what has gotten the
attention of the media is the dozen or so people who went back
to kill and maim their own people and not those who died while
helping others.
The Horn of Africa region has been marred by civil war,
internal political turmoil, interstate war, famine and man-made
humanitarian crisis. The region has also emerged as a place
highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The suffering in the
Horn of Africa is largely man made and some of the conflicts
were triggered in part because of failed leadership. Somalia
remains in a state of anarchy despite a peace agreement signed
in 2004.
Ethiopia's intervention in December 2006 made Somalia more
unstable than it was during the 6 months the Islamic Courts was
in power. What is forgotten is in those 2 years' period, more
than 22,000 people, most of whom innocent civilians, were
killed. Another area little is heard about is the Ogaden region
of Ethiopia where hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled
to refugee camps in Kenya over the past years. The Ogaden is a
forgotten tragedy. Efforts to resolve the conflicts in the
region have lead to an important peace agreement. Although,
this agreement has not lead to lasting peace and stability in
the region.
The United States has been actively engaged in the Horn of
Africa since the early 1960s. We helped secure the border
dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the comprehensive
peace agreement in Sudan. Relations between Eritrea and the
United States once strong are currently poor. Our relations
between Ethiopia and the United States are strong. Although,
some Members of Congress and human rights groups have been
critical of Ethiopia's human rights record and the handling of
the 2005 and 2010 elections.
What is the terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa? Well,
the takeover of power in Sudan by the NIF government in 1989
led to a significant increase in the activities of
international terrorist groups. The NIF government provided
safe haven for well-known international terrorist organizations
and individuals, and the government security services also were
directly engaged in facilitating and assisting domestic and
international terror groups. It was during the 5 year's stay in
Sudan Osama bin Laden laid the foundation of al-Qaeda. The
penetration by al-Qaeda into east Africa is directly tied to
Sudan's early years of support to international terror
organizations.
Indeed, the 1990s saw dramatic and daring terrorist attacks
against American interests in east Africa. Over the past 2
years, a number of local terrorist groups have emerged in
Somalia, including Al-Shabaab, the Ras Kamboni Group and Hizbul
Al-Islam, but what is the evolution of the terrorists groups in
east Africa? Well, we have to go back to the early '90s where
Islamic Courts began to emerge in parts of the country. At the
beginning, these courts functioned as local governments and
often enforced decisions by using their own militia. Members of
the Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, for example, provided the bulk of the
security forces for these courts in the 1990s.
By the late 1990s, Ethiopian Security Forces and their
allies severely weakened Al-Ittihad. However, the absence of a
central government in Somalia created an environment conducive
to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country.
In 2003, the leadership of Al-Ittihad, including Sheik Ali
Warsame, who is the brother-in-law of the terrorist listed, now
Sheik Aweys, and the leader of one of the terrorist groups
Hizbul Al-Islam, met and later decided to form a new political
front, the Islamic Courts Union, which came to the scene in
2006 included some of the top leaders of Al-Ittihad.
However, the young members of those Islamic movements did
not agree with the old guard and instead they decided to form
their own organization. This young generation of Islamists,
some of whom had fought in Afghanistan, met and formed later on
Al-Shabaab. Some of the key commanders and leaders of Al-
Shabaab come not from central Somalia or southern Somalia but
Somaliland. One of the top leaders is Ahmed Abdi Godane, also
known as Abu Zubayr, who was trained in Afghanistan, fought in
Afghanistan, is now one of the top leaders of Al-Shabaab.
Mukhtar Robow, also another Afghani trainee, is the top
leader and the face of the Al-Shabaab. Ibrahim Haji, also known
as Al-Afghani, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list, is also
from Somaliland and one of the top leaders of Al-Shabaab.
Hassan Al Turki, a member of the Ogaden clan from Ethiopia, is
one of the extremist leaders and a member of Al-Shabaab now.
The U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa region
have shown some success in containing terrorism and extremism.
Several countries in east Africa have benefitted from
training and material support from the United States. Several
known terrorists have been killed. In mid-September 2009, U.S.
forces killed Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaeda member and one of
the three involved in the attacks of the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. Of the three most wanted al-Qaeda leaders
in east Africa, the only one left now is the leader of the
group and the alleged mastermind of the embassy bombings,
Haroon Fazul.
On the other hand, the Ethiopian invasion, with the support
of the United States, is seen by some as having contributed to
the emergence of Al-Shabaab and the proliferation of other
extremist groups in Somalia. The ouster of the Islamic Courts
Union leadership by Ethiopia in 2006 created a security vacuum
that was quickly filled by the most radical elements of the
Islamist movement. As was the case when the withdrawal of the
U.S. and U.N. forces in the mid-1990s from Somalia also created
a security vacuum which was quickly filled by Somali warlords.
Al-Qaeda and its allies are reportedly much stronger today
than they were a few years ago even though al-Qaeda has not
been able to penetrate deeper into Africa and win a strong
following. Al-Shabaab has been able to recruit dozens of
Somalis from the United States, Europe and the Middle East, a
number of whom have carried out suicide attacks inside Somalia.
Many of these recruits joined Al-Shabaab at the height of the
fighting between the Ethiopian forces and Al-Shabaab. Some
thought they were going to fight a foreign invader. Others saw
this as a religious duty. Moreover, more Somalis sees now
themselves as victims of Al-Shabaab and view this group as a
foreign-controlled and led organization.
Let me now just speak briefly about the Horn of Africa
countries Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Djibouti's
pro-Western foreign policy stance and close alliance with the
modern Western government over the years have earned Djibouti
friends, including the United States. Djibouti is an important
strategic ally. During the 2003 Iraq War, Djibouti provided
access to its port and airfields as well as facilities for
training purposes. Djibouti also served as one of the two
locations worldwide for USAID Food for Peace program's storage
facilities.
Over the years, Djibouti has played key roles in
facilitating negotiations especially among Somali factions. The
last peace agreement, which led to the formation of the TFG was
negotiated in Djibouti. The government in Djibouti can be said
as open but dominated by one party. It is a multi-party system,
but the ruling party controls all the seats in Parliament and
regional councils. On April 8, 2005, President Guelleh won the
elections. He unfortunately was limited to two terms, but in
April of this year, the Djibouti Parliament amended the
Constitution by removing the Presidential term limits paving
the way for President Guelleh to run for a third term.
One issue that has been of major concern to the region and
the U.S. is the border disputes between Djibouti and Eritrea.
In June 2008, Eritrean and Djibouti forces clashed and an
estimated 35 people were killed with more than 50 wounded. The
crisis erupted after several months of tensions following troop
deployments to the border by both Eritrea and Djibouti. The
dispute centers around claims by both sides over Ras Doumeira
and the Doumeira Island.
After almost a year of no progress, 2 weeks ago the
Governments of Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to resolve their
dispute through negotiations under the auspices of the
Government of Qatar. Eritrean forces this then have withdrawn
from the border area, and Qatar has deployed its forces as
observers. Now to Eritrea. Over the past decade, Eritrea has
faced serious internal and external challenges. In 1998, the
war between the two neighbors led to the killings of 100,000
people and displacement of over 1 million.
The dispute between the two was followed by the most
serious rift within the Eritrean Liberation Movement. The
crisis split the top leadership, and in 2001, President Isaias
ordered the arrest of 15 top ruling-party leaders. The
government alleges that these officials, known as the Group of
15, were engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the government
during the conflicts with Ethiopia. The Government of Eritrea
also accused some American officials in the Clinton
administration of being co-conspirators. Two Eritrean employees
of the U.S. Embassy were also arrest, accused of being part of
the conspiracy.
None of these prisoners have been formally charged and have
been given access for visitors. Political parties in Eritrea
are not permitted to operate, and there have been no elections
since independence. The crackdown and allegations against the
former Clinton administration officials strained relations
between the United States and the Government of Eritrea. For
most of the 1990s, the government of Isaias Afewerki was
considered a strong strategic ally. Eritrea indeed played a key
role in the fight against the Bashir regime and support to the
SPLM and its allies. Eritrea was also one of the first African
countries to join the U.S.-led coalition of the willing.
Since the late 1990s however, U.S. officials have expressed
concern about the wide range of issues, including human rights
conditions, Eritrea's role in Somalia, border disputes with
Djibouti and Ethiopia and freedom of the press. Over the past
decade, the United States has imposed a number of punitive
measures on Eritrea. There is no U.S. assistance program in
Eritrea, and the U.S. also closed its consular section in
Eritrea.
Eritrea nationals seeking U.S. visa must now obtain their
visa in a third country. The Eritrean Government has also
imposed restrictions on visas. Although, in recent years the
government has issued visas to U.S. officials, journalists and
human rights organizations. In March 2010, the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and another State
Department official were issued. What were the efforts made to
improve relations?
Over the past several years, President Isaias has stated
that his government is ready to constructively engage
Washington on a wide range of issues, including cooperation on
the war on terror. In 2008, the Eritrean Government sent a
letter to then President Bush offering dialogue in order to
improve relations. The letter was delivered with a cover letter
by a Member of Congress to the White House in early 2008. The
Bush administration did not respond to offer for dialogue.
The Obama administration early on expressed interest in
engaging the Eritrean Government in order to address some areas
of concern. President Isaias in a letter to President Obama in
May expressed similar interests. A few months later, Assistant
Secretary of State Carson announced his intention to go to
Eritrea. The proposed visit by the Assistant Secretary however
took a different turn by late 2009. In December 2009, Carson
wrote to the Eritrean foreign minister stating that
``I registered my willingness to meet with you in
Europe or Africa to discuss some of the issues that
have generated division in our relationship. That offer
still stands. No meetings in Washington however will
take place.''
A few months after the offer to meet in a third country,
Carson's Principal Deputy, Donnie Yamamoto, applied for and
received a visa to go to Eritrea. Yamamoto went to Eritrea in
May 2010, but the Eritrean Government officials refused to meet
with him arguing that he obtained his visa to do work related
to the U.S. Embassy. Ambassador Yamamoto stated that he intends
to go back to Eritrea and has submitted another request for a
visa.
Interestingly, he is the only foreign official who has been
given access to the Eritrean prisoners in 2003. In late 2009,
the U.S. took the lead in the imposition of sanctions against
Eritrea and the U.N. Security Council. The sanctions were
imposed because of Eritrean alleged support to armed groups.
Eritrea also provided safe haven to the current President and a
number of ministers serving in the TFG. Now to Ethiopia.
I am sure you know what transpired. As the chairman said,
the elections were peaceful, but the outcome of the election
clearly indicates that the ruling party emerged dominant. The
ruling party, for example, won 545 seats out of 547. They have
also won the entire city council seats in the capital city as
well as all the regional state council seats. Now, if you look
at what happened in 2005, it was quite the reverse. The
opposition won over 160 seats and the entire seats in the
capital. What happened and what led to this? What were the
environments before the elections?
Well, pre-election conditions were marred by the
harassment, detention and in some cases killings of opposition
members. The combination of measures taken by the ruling party
over the past several years not only weakened legal opposition
but also crushed civil society, human rights groups and the
independent press activities. Moreover, use of government
resources, the civil service and the security forces to
strengthen constituency base of the ruling party through
intimidation and incentives help the EPRDF build a strong
following.
The forced exile of opposition leaders, civil society
groups and independent journalists also help the EPRDF to
secure victory. Some Ethiopians and outside observers also
assert that many were fearful of being killed or injured should
they express support to opposition groups. Recently adopted
laws restricting NGOs, media and the anti-terrorism law are
being used to stifle the activities of opposition groups, the
independent press and civil society groups. It is also
important to point out that opposition groups also contributed
to the sweeping victory of the EPRDF.
Since the 2005 elections, opposition groups in Ethiopia and
Diaspora have been fragmented and fought each other more than
preparing a united front. Opposition groups have often spent
more time in the capital or outside the capital than in
building a constituency base throughout the country. Opposition
groups were successful in 2005 in large part because of the
grass roots work that was done. The 2010 elections result
clearly show Ethiopia moving toward a one-party rule despite
the presence of other parties affiliated with the ruling party.
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has stated that he and a number
of the senior leadership of the ruling party will retire by
2015. Even at this juncture, the prime minister has served in
power longer than the military junta Mengistu. Moreover, it is
not clear at this juncture if the retirement of the old guard
will pave the way for a true multi-party democracy in Ethiopia.
I think I will conclude briefly by mentioning the situation in
the Ogaden. Once again, there are many people who have been
displaced and many people who have fled and many civilians who
are being targeted through rape, hanging and outright
destruction of their villages.
Lastly, on Somalia, I am sure my colleagues will cover it,
but let me briefly talk about what happened a few weeks ago
with the central government. In mid-May 2010, the Somali
Speaker of Parliament resigned after several months of disputes
with the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. A day
later, President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed fired the Prime Minister.
However, the reversal of the decision seemed pre-planned to
oust the Speaker from office by those close the President.
In late May 2010, the former Finance and Deputy Prime
Minister, Sheik Sharif Hassan, ran for Speaker and won the
support of 217 members out of 550. The Deputy Prime Minister
has been campaigning to oust the Speaker for several months. He
received the support in Parliament in part through bribing and
other means. The former minister resigned in protest arguing
that this was pre-planned and that Hassan used government
resources to bribe members of Parliament to support his
candidacy.
The current state of affairs in Mogadishu threatens the
authority of the President and the government and could also
lead to more defections. This situation could also help those
extremist groups and extremist element to get the upper hand.
Let me stop here, and I thank you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne follows:]
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Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, and I asked Mr. Dagne to
take additional time, which is unusual, but we wanted to get a
focus on the overall region. The State Department did not send
a representative, and this was about as close as we could get
to what the U.S. policy is, and I know it went over a bit, but
I appreciate the indulgence of everyone because this has to be
a matter of the record as we move forward as our committee
determines what we will be doing legislatively, and so I do
appreciate the indulgence of everyone and certainly appreciate
your very thorough testimony, Mr. Dagne.
We will now hear 5 minutes from Ms. Lefkow, and the others
will follow in that order, and then we will open for questions.
Thank you very much. I appreciate your being here, and thank
you for your patience.
STATEMENT OF MS. LESLIE LEFKOW, SENIOR RESEARCHER, AFRICA
DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Lefkow. Thank you very much, Chairman Payne and members
of the subcommittee for inviting Human Rights Watch to
participate in this incredibly important hearing. I am very
happy that Mr. Dagne has already covered so eloquently many of
the countries because I am going to focus my remarks on
Ethiopia, not obviously because it is more important than the
other countries, but it is at a critical moment with the
elections that just passed in May. Mr. Chairman, Ethiopia is
not democratizing. The May 2010 elections provided a stark
illustration of this fact.
As you know, the ruling party won more than 99 percent of
the vote, but what concerns Human Rights Watch more even than
the results of these elections is the fact that they are simply
a milestone in a broader agenda and strategy of consolidating
control. We are particularly concerned that the assault on
civil society in Ethiopia is a trend that will continue and
worsen, and this should deeply concern Ethiopia's friends and
partners.
It is clear now that the brief window of political space
that opened up before the elections in 2005 was an anomaly, and
that window has now been slammed shut. Human Rights Watch's
research on the ground indicates that the government has used a
multi-pronged strategy of oppression, and as I said, this was
partly in the lead up to the elections, but it is a strategy
that we fear will continue long after the elections, and one of
the elements in the strategy has been the repression of the
political opposition. I think you are all aware that government
critics have been subjected to arbitrary detention, to
harassment and sometimes even torture in detention.
The case of Birtukan Mideksa, of course one of the most
prominent opposition leaders, is emblematic of this trend. She
was re-arrested in December 2008 for allegedly violating the
terms of her pardon, but we hear about prominent cases like
Birtukan's. We don't hear very much about the millions of
Ethiopian's who suffer repression on a day-to-day basis outside
of Addis Ababa where there is very little spotlight on what is
happening. Eighty-five percent of Ethiopians live in the rural
areas.
I would like to just spend a moment talking about the
apparatus of control that is used in these areas. This is an
apparatus that is an inheritance from the Derg, from the
military regime of Mengistu, and it is a collection of
households into cells at village or neighborhood levels,
sometimes eight households, sometimes 10 households in cells,
and these administrative structures, as you can imagine, they
can be benign, but they can also be a very effective tool of
surveillance and monitoring and control, and this structure of
course is what was used very effectively in the lead-up to the
elections, but it is also a structure that will be there long
after any electoral period is over.
These structures are very much at the core of the
repression that is used in the rural areas. As one teacher told
Human Rights Watch a few months ago when we were doing research
in the country, you have to understand, he said, that at the
grass roots level everything is organized according to the
EPRDF ideology. Everything is organized and controlled by
cells. If you are opposition, you are excluded.
I think I am stressing this because to understand the
climate of fear that exists, that is sometimes not very
tangible if you are visiting for a day or a week or even a
month, but exists there and touches the lives of millions of
Ethiopians on a day-to-day basis, I think to understand that is
to understand how this strategy of oppression works and
succeeds. I would like to just spend one moment mentioning as I
mentioned the targeting of civil society because as I said,
this is a concern that is going to last far longer than any
electoral repression.
What we have seen in the last year since the adoption of
this very repressive NGO law is basically the evisceration of
independent civil society in Ethiopia. Most of the most
prominent Ethiopian human rights activists have fled in the
last year. The most prominent organizations have been gutted.
Their staff are now in hiding. Their budgets have been frozen.
They have had to shut offices. This is the bottom line in terms
of the effect of this law.
The media of course has also been a target over the last
year or 2, and I think we see that in a number of ways, and one
of the primary impacts of the media law and of the hostility
toward independent media is self-censorship. In fact, you see
even the semi-independent press will often not touch very
sensitive subjects. I see that I am running out of time. I am
going to take just another few seconds if I may to just mention
one other issue which is a key concern, and that is impunity of
the security forces.
The Ethiopian military's record in dealing with the very
real and legitimate security threats that Ethiopia faces is a
terrible record. As I said, the government faces genuine
security issues, but the way that security forces have dealt
with these threats has often been to indiscriminately attack
civilians, and there has been utter impunity conferred on the
perpetrators be they in Gambella, be they in the Ogaden area of
Somali Region or be there in neighboring Somalia.
This I think is an area of concern that the United States
as a friend and as an ally of Ethiopia must press in the coming
weeks and months. Accountability is at the core of a stable and
viable partnership with Ethiopia, and that of course should be
all of the shared goals of both the Ethiopian Government, the
U.S. Government and all of us here today. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lefkow follows:]
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Mr. Payne. Thank you. Ms. Ali Aden?
STATEMENT OF MS. SADIA ALI ADEN, HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE AND
FREELANCE WRITER
Ms. Ali Aden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Payne,
Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of this
committee, thank for your holding this very important hearing
that sheds light on Somalia's humanitarian catastrophe and the
impact on women and children. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be
given the opportunity to come and speak today on a subject that
is dear to my heart: The suffering of Somali women and
children. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to
ask that my full testimony be submitted into the record.
Mr. Payne. Without objection.
Ms. Ali Aden. Protracted wars, civil or otherwise,
victimizes predominantly woman and children, and nowhere is
this fact more pronounced than in Somalia. Whether in refugee
camps or in the neighborhoods of Mogadishu, the grim images of
women and children in profound state of anguish, vulnerable
human beings tormented by endless inter-Somali, inter-clan,
inter-warlords, inter-sectarian strife for power and
domination, but their stories are never the dominant narrative
of consequence of that long conflict.
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, Somali
women have played a pivotal role at the most dire period of
their country's history, especially in the social and economic
sector of the society. Women play an active role in maintaining
integrity, values and the structure of Somali family and
community. While by and large men fought in offense or the
defense of senseless clan strife, Somali women became the bread
winners of the society. That is reaffirming their profound
resilience and selfless capacity.
Today, because of insecurity created by the conflict
between warring forces, hundreds of thousands, particularly
women and children and elderly, are forced to flee and become
internally displaced persons. This on again, off again massive
security-related displacement of civilian population has become
the predictable nightmare resulting from each time the
insurgents and government clash. Today, Somalia remains one of
the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world.
With nearly 1.5 million internally displaced, these IDPs
are lacking water, shelter and food. Most cluster in make-shift
refugee camps outside Mogadishu. These IDPs may not have food
or water for days. Sadly, through these dire conditions, women
give birth to children and raise them under such uncertainties.
In Afgooye alone, 30 kilometers south of Mogadishu, there are
about 400,000 IDPs according to UNICEF. One-quarter of those
are children under the age of five.
Hundreds of thousands more refugees, women and children
mostly, ended up in refugee camps such as the Dadaab, which was
originally built for 90,000 refugees but now holds over 280,000
refugees of mostly women and children. According to Refugee
International, these refugees are in four main asylum
countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. Some have been
in exile for the past 18 years. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, there
are nearly 3.5 million civilians out of total population of 8
million are on the verge of starvation.
Whenever fighting intensifies, the flow of essential foods
stops, sometimes for months an in early 2010 when the World
Food Programme decided to suspend its delivery and distribution
of emergency food in the south and central Somalia. Armed
conflicts, droughts and absence of public infrastructure have
led to famine, disease and death of hundreds of thousands of
people. USAID's report of June 1, 2009, shows 3.5 million are
in need of humanitarian assistance. 650,000 of those are
children under the age of five.
Children are also increasingly being denied access to
education because of the continuing civil war. Seventy-five
percent are located in central and southern Somalia. Of the
displaced, some of those, especially women with maternal
mortality ratio of 1,044 per 100,000, live in difficult
conditions making Somali women among the most high-risk groups
in the world. Mortality among the children under the age of 5
is staggering 142 per 1,000 compared to world's combined 68.
The heroes under the radar at the Dr. Hawa Abdi Hospital,
which is located outside Mogadishu-Afgooye corridor kilometer
21 is run by Dr. Hawa Abdi assisted by her daughter Dr. Deqa
Mohamed. They hold in their camps surrounding the hospital
about 72,000 IDPs. Of those, 18,000 are families with children.
Out of those, 43 percent are children, 32 percent are women, 16
percent are elderly, and 9 percent are men. They have a daily
visit of 980 per day. Of those, 580 are children, 320 are women
and 80 are men.
They have five doctors, 60 nurses, 160 healthcare
personnel, some of them trained before the collapse of the
state. The assistance they get is only coming from medications
provided by Doctors without Borders and Dr. Hawa Abdi's
Hospital, herself, and other sponsors such as individuals and
Somalis in the Diaspora and sometimes the Italian Embassy. I
will touch on the child soldiers, Mr. Chairman, hopefully with
question/answer session, but the senseless game of tit for tat
between the insurgents, government and AMISOM is something also
that I would like to talk about later.
Without talking about the toxic waste, I would not think I
would be able to cover the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Mr.
Chairman, there is a ticking environmental bomb beneath the
Indian Ocean that were something to go wrong could potentially
cause or exceed damages being caused by the current massive BP
oil damages to countless barrels dumped in the Somalia waters.
Mr. Chairman, the illegal hyper-fishing still continues.
This practice has put certain Somali fishing communities in
economic dire straights, and I would like to emphasize that
more later, but I would like to offer my recommendations if
that is okay. I would like for the U.S. Government and for you
to help provide adequate access to humanitarian assistance;
support the formalization of the U.S.-Somali relationship. It
is encouraging that now Somalia has appointed an envoy to
United States.
We would like for President Obama, since he has started
already the process, to also appoint an envoy; provide
incentive for disarmament, especially for children; help
sustain the TFG to become strong and politically capable to
secure the country but also firmly press the TFG to continually
engage and reconcile with the opposition groups; engage and
empower the Somali Diaspora because they are essential to the
stability of the Somali state; and pass laws that prevent the
illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping from American
companies.
Lastly, support and provide services to individuals, Dr.
Hawa Abdi and other centers. I thank you for giving me the
opportunity to speak regarding this life and death situation.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ali Aden follows:]
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Mr. Payne. Thank you very much for your testimony and your
recommendations. Dr. Menkhaus, you may take more than the
allotted 5 minutes if you need since Mr. Smith kindly invited
you. I don't want to hear from him later that I didn't give you
the equal footing. Not as much time as you may consume, but if
you have to exceed 5 minutes, that is fine. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH JOHN MENKHAUS, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON
COLLEGE
Mr. Menkhaus. Thank you. Congressman Payne, Congressman
Smith, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to
share my assessment of the situation in the Horn of Africa and
its implications for U.S. policy, and with your permission, I
would like to go off script rather than read excerpts from my
submitted testimony, and instead provide some summary remarks
that I hope can tie together some of the issues that we have
discussed as a group this morning.
Mr. Payne. All right.
Mr. Menkhaus. I am focusing my remarks on Somalia and our
policy specifically with regard to the political crisis in
Somalia. My colleagues have already made reference to the
security threats and the humanitarian policies there, so I
won't return to that in great detail. Our policy in Somalia has
been framed for several years by support to the Transitional
Federal Government or TFG. That has never been a policy that
has been embraced because it was seen as having high promise
but because it was always seen as the best of bad options.
The bad news; after 6 years of a 5-year transitional
government is that the TFG is no longer the best of bad
options. It is simply a bad option. It is not working. The
government is in disarray. Most of its members have resigned or
reside outside the country. It controls only a few districts of
the capital that are in fact secured by African Union
peacekeepers. It has been notorious for corruption. Its
security forces have been a law until themselves at times. It
has, in short, been an enormous disappointment at the cost of
millions of dollars.
The fundamental problem with the Transitional Federal
Government is not that it is weak. If it were only weak, state
capacity-building assistance would be the cure. This is not a
case of a government that is willing but not able. This is a
case of a government that is neither willing nor able. Top
political elites see the Transitional Federal Government as an
opportunity to make money without taking the risks and the hard
work of actually reviving the failed state in Somalia.
Shabaab as a result has consolidated control over all the
territory from the Kenyan border to most of the districts of
Mogadishu and now all the way up to Beledweyne on the Ethiopian
border and south central Somalia. Shabaab is not strong. It has
numerous internal divisions, but it is the only player on the
playing field, and so it is strong mainly as a function of the
TFG's weakness. Many observers believe that Shabaab can be
melted. There can be defections.
There are large groups within Shabaab that are not really
committed to hard-core jihadism, but those individuals and
groups, as with the rest of Somali society, will not rally
against Shabaab, will not defect from it unless they see a
viable alternative, and at present, there is no viable
alternative in Somalia. So the population is acting in a
predictably risk averse manner supporting tacitly or
acquiescing to Shabaab control.
What can we do in the face of this very deeply frustrating
situation? I would like to add that by all accounts there is
frustration in U.S. Government and frustration in other foreign
capitals over this. The time is ripe for a policy shift. I
would argue that for starters we need to look at a
diversification strategy, not to decertify the Transitional
Federal Government, but to demote it to a transitional
authority tasked strictly with implementing key transitional
tasks in this government.
Meanwhile, we should be engaging any legitimate powerful
and effective authorities that we find at the subnational
level. That is not simply to say that we should be supporting a
policy of building blocks of regional states. There are some
regional states, such as Somaliland and Puntland that can and
should be engaged. We already provide support to them. We can
deepen that support, but that is not necessarily a model for
the rest of the country. In fact, in much of southern Somalia,
regional states, Federal states are actually an invitation to
war.
Instead, we need to look where governance is actually
happening empirically in Somalia. It is not in fact an anarchic
country. There is lots of ``governance with a small g'' going
on, and most of it is actually happening at the municipal level
in towns, Cross-clan alliances forged by common business
interests and the need to secure basic law and order do occur.
They occur beneath Shabaab in some cases, in spite of Shabaab
in other cases, and beyond Shabaab's control in other areas of
the country.
We should be engaging any local authority that we can find
that is effective to create some competition for good
governance in Somalia to put pressure on the TFG and to end its
monopoly on access to external assistance. In addition, we need
to consider a regional strategy. As Ted Dagne has already
alluded to, Somalia forms part of a regional conflict complex.
We have got to in particular put pressure on Ethiopia and
Eritrea to resolve that long-running impasse that infects the
rest of the region.
We also need to put pressure on our friends in the
Ethiopian Government to come to some kind of rapprochement with
the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Those two developments
alone would have enormous positive benefit in Somalia. We need
to recognize that the U.S. Government has good relations with
most of the governments in the region, and that is a great tool
for us, but the problem is, as many of my colleagues have
alluded to, those governments are in fact enemies of large
sections of their own populations, and that is a problem for
us.
Recruitment by al-Qaeda or other radical groups is going to
enjoy ideal conditions where people are angry with repressive,
predatory governments that are supported by the United States.
We need to recognize that some of these allies of ours in the
region are allies, but we are fighting somewhat different wars.
Our principal concern is al-Qaeda's influence in the region and
by extension Shabaab's ability to engage in terrorist attacks
in the region. Their principal interest is political
survivalism and sometimes the use of counterterrorism agendas
against domestic opponents who may or may not in fact be
enemies of ours.
Finally, if we were gaining more security in the region at
the cost of some compromises on humanitarian access, human
rights, democratization, we could at least be having an
interesting ethical debate over tradeoffs. The tragedy in this
region and the tragedy for U.S. foreign policy is we are
getting none of those. The region is palpably more insecure
today than it was 5 years ago even as we have forfeited voice
on matters of humanitarian access and democracy and human
rights deferring to some of our regional allies rather than
confronting them, and we are getting nothing right now, and I
think that is really grounds for a major policy rethink in the
region. I will stop there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Menkhaus follows:]
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Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. We have our final witness,
Mr. Amum Okiech.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAGAN AMUM OKIECH, SECRETARY GENERAL, THE
SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
Mr. Amum Okiech. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Congressman
Smith and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for holding
this important hearing on current conditions and U.S. policy in
the Horn of Africa. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on
behalf of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the people
of Sudan about the momentous changes taking place in our
country and the role we hope the United State of America can
play in helping us avoid a return to conflict in Sudan and
ensure a brighter future for the Sudanese people who have seen
so many years of war and suffering.
Mr. Chairman, sir, if you may allow me, I have submitted a
written testimony, and I would like to use to the few minutes
to proceed to make recommendations?
Mr. Payne. Without objection.
Mr. Amum Okiech. And I will start by stating that Sudan, my
country, is a failed state. Sudan is a failed state because at
independence, the Sudanese political leadership have failed to
develop and agree to an inclusive nation-building consensual
project, a project that would have transformed the decolonized,
multi-cultural society and build it into a multi-cultural
inclusive nation. This failure led to profound national crisis
expressing itself in multiple devastating civil wars and to an
entrenchment of a highly repressive extremely violent military
dictatorships, transforming the Sudanese state into a
predictory state.
Mr. Chairman, sir, this state failure and national crisis
and misrule is responsible today for causing the imminent
disintegration of the Sudanese state. The CPA, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, was an attempt to resolve the
Sudanese national crisis and to end the conflict between the
Central and Southern Sudan, Abyei Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile
regions on the other hand, while civil wars still continued in
other parts of the country in eastern Sudan and in the Darfur
region in western Sudan.
Today, with the developments that are happening in our
country, I would recommend the following: That the Government
of the United States of America support a full implementation
of the CPA and that it will lend its active support to ensure
the conduct of the referendum on self-determination for the
people of Southern Sudan in time as agreed in the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement that is no later than January 2011.
We ask for your support for the conduct of this referendum
to ensure that it is transparent, free and fair and would
result to a credible choice by the people that would be
credible on reflecting the will of the people of Southern
Sudan, and we would call on the Government of the United States
of America to accept, respect and recognize the choice of the
people of Southern Sudan in the interest of peace, which most
likely will be a choice for independence or secession of
Southern Sudan given the fact that unity has not been made
attractive in 5\1/2\ years of the interim period.
I also recommend that the United States of America assist
the North and Southern Sudan to negotiate post-referendum
arrangement to establish friendly cooperative relations to
serve the best interest of Southern and Northern Sudanese
peoples. I recommend that the Government of United States
recognize the new independent state in Southern Sudan and focus
its support to the Government of Southern Sudan to build
capacity of institutions of governance in the would be new
state so as to emerge as a stable, peaceful and prosperous
state that would contribute to peace and stability in our
region, the Horn of Africa.
And with regard to Northern Sudan, we recommend that the
Government of United States continue to support the conduct of
popular consultation in the two states of Blue Nile and
Southern Kordofan and continue to work to end the conflict and
war in Darfur and achieve peace and justice through a peaceful
settlement that would end the marginalization of people of
Darfur and respond to the legitimate needs and aspirations of
the people of Darfur to govern themselves and participate in a
fair manner in the governance of the rest of Northern Sudan.
We also believe that it would be important to support the
democratic forces in Northern Sudan, including the SPLM in the
north to achieve a fundamental transformation of Northern
Sudanese state from a totalitarian fundamentalist state into a
secular democratic state that would achieve inclusivity and
realize peace and marginalization within Northern Sudan so that
there would be peace within Northern Sudan and transform the
relations between Northern Sudan and its neighbors, including
Southern Sudan and all the other neighbors, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Chad, Libya and Egypt into peaceful relations and ending all
forms of interventions and attempt to export destabilization
which has been the practice of the ruling political force in
the north.
To end, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the United States of
America can use in a smart manner incentive and disincentives
in the Sudan to encourage the Sudan achieve a transition into
peace, possibly into becoming two stable states, and the two
stable states will join hands together, work in good relations
and join with the other states in the region to build a free
peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Amum Okiech follows:]
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Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, and let me thank all of the
panelists, and as I indicated and so that it is clear for the
record that our witness who just testified is representing the
SPLM, which is a movement. He is not a representative of the
Government of South Sudan just so it is very clear. Let me
begin. You heard the bells. What I will do is to ask a quick
question, perhaps take 3 minute or so. I will let Mr. Smith
give that quick question. We would then recess for 15 minutes,
and we should be back. We have, as you can see, a 15-minute
vote, and there is 5 more minutes to go, but we will stay. When
it is zero numbers on the time remaining, we will still get
there in time.
Then, when that vote is completed, there will be a 5-minute
vote and perhaps a second 5-minute vote, so we should actually
be back within 15 minutes supposedly, but let me ask the first
question in regard to Sudan, Dr. Menkhaus. We all feel that the
current Government of Somalia is weak. We are aware of the fact
that I guess for 15 years there was no government, and I
imagine when the TFG actually started with the concept, it was
really not an elected body. It was a body put together by clans
and subclans. It was felt that if everyone could included, that
at least that can transition toward an official election.
Of course, it is very difficult to have elections when you
have the lack of security. With the sort of merger more or less
or the coming together of the TFG or ICU. Initially, the TFG
said they would not accept any members of the ICU after
conferences and so forth over a course of a number of years.
They tended to accept moderate members of the ICU, and that is
how Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became its head.
Having said all that, and you did mention regional
possibilities of working underneath the government, so I just
wonder if you could spend a couple of minutes once again sort
of going over your theory of how a governing body could at this
time be installed and what it would look like, how would it
operate? You are not going to do that in about 2 minutes, but
you could do as much as you can, and then I yield to the
gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Menkhaus. Thank you. The first principal behind a
diversification strategy would be to cease rewarding the very
bad behavior that is causing the failure of the TFG in the
first place. We have got with the Transitional Federal
Government--and we have had this in other parts of the world as
well where we have governments that appear to be both unwilling
and unable to govern--we run the risk of moral hazard, in which
we are reinforcing the very behavior that we are trying to
overcome.
In the case of the Transitional Federal Government, the
millions of dollars that have gone to it virtually
unconditionally over the years have provided a very nice living
for a number of people who have positioned themselves at the
spigot of foreign aid in the TFG, and they have exhibited no
interest in building a government capacity. How to work around
them? By working with regional polities as well, not
decertifying entirely the TFG.
I think there are powerful arguments that at least the
shell of a transitional government is needed to be filled by
whomever in the near future. But why not work with Somaliland
more aggressively, more with Puntland, more potentially with
the Galmudus region, other regional or municipal authorities
where they appear. Presumably this would only occur across
south central Somalia if Shabaab were in fact to lose control
over some of these areas, and I think that is entirely possible
in the coming year or 2.
They are deeply unpopular among Somalis. If given the right
conditions, I think they can be pushed out of different areas.
What we could do is provide Somalis, particularly at the
municipal level, with opportunities for functional cooperation.
It is at the town level where cross-clan alliances are forged.
We are already pretty good at this, UNICEF, NGOs, a number of
different U.N. specialized agencies have worked with town
authorities across the country.
It is where I have seen over the past 15 years some of the
best most effective, most legitimate governance occurring. What
that would do is it would give people confidence in an
alternative, and it might provide Somalia with the opportunity
to cobble together what some of us have been calling, for lack
of a better term, a ``mediated state.'' That is to say a state
that isn't built from the top down, but rather one which is
negotiated from Mogadishu with these local fluid polities,
whatever is found at the local level.
It is going to be messy. It is going to be hybrid. It is
going to be difficult for us to interface with at times, but
the Somalis understand it full well and have learned to work
within it over the past 20 years.
Mr. Payne. Very good. Thank you very much. When I return, I
would like to expand a little bit more and also hear from Ms.
Ali Aden about some of those points that you mentioned, the two
things that must stop, the toxicity and the fishing. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ali Aden, let me
ask you a question if I could, and thank you for your very
troubling and incisive testimony. The AMISOM mission of 5,200
people mostly from Burundi and Rwanda, in your view is it
enough? You spoke of the 1.5 million internally displaced
persons. You quoted USAID about 3.5 million people in need of
humanitarian aid, and obviously the security situation totally
exacerbates that problem if not creates it in the first place,
and the others might want to speak to this as well, whether or
not that mission is sufficient.
I remember when the first deployment of AU peacekeepers
went to Sudan, I went over and met with them, and they were
grossly underpaid, getting $1 a day. They were in very, very
hostile situations. They had very poor rules of engagement, not
their fault, but the fault of those who sent them, and I am
just wondering if your sense is that this is a robust mission.
Also, we found in DR Congo, and I actually chaired three
hearings on it, with regards to peacekeepers committing
atrocities against individuals, mostly women, mostly small,
young girls in terms of rape, and in Goma it was a terrible and
is a terrible situation.
Has anti-human trafficking protections been integrated into
the AU mission there, and anyone else who would like to speak
to that as well?
Ms. Ali Aden. Thank you. On the issue of AMISOM, if it is
enough, has become obvious with the Somali community and how
the Somali society sees as foreign intervention. Some would say
that the AMISOM is not needed in Somalia, but because of the
way the conditions are in Somalia, there has to be some sort of
elements or troops like AMISOM that can keep the peace, but
there is no peace to keep, so peace has to be established
first.
What the Somalis always talked about, and we have argued
consistently on different forums is that perhaps the
international community, especially the United States should
consider bringing in forces that are coming from surrounding
nations rather than just the neighboring countries and avoiding
the front-line states such as Ethiopia, Kenya and now Uganda.
As far as the capacity is concerned, we don't believe AMISOM
has the capacity to do the work.
They are not underpaid. They get paid much better than the
Somali soldiers that have been trained in Uganda and now that
are coming back with no pay and selling their guns, so perhaps
reducing the numbers from 5,000 in a smaller pace and bringing
in Somali soldiers and paying the Somali solder from some of
that salary would do a better job for Somalia on security. As
for AMISOM, now there are unconfirmed reports that it has
established a prison in this compound that keeps closed not
only from the international community, but also from the Somali
Government. There has to be a mandate that clearly states that
law has to be respected and civilians have to be protected.
Mr. Smith. I am going to have to run over to vote, I guess
you too, Mr. Chairman. I would like to hear whether or not
there is a protocol to combat human trafficking to make sure
that women and children especially are not exploited.
Mr. Payne. You can go ahead.
Mr. Smith. You are going to stay?
Mr. Payne. Yes. You can answer that.
Ms. Ali Aden. Human trafficking?
Mr. Payne. Yes.
Ms. Ali Aden. Well, there is a more of a child soldier than
trafficking. There is some that exist, but it is more with the
women, especially from the refugee camps surrounding Dadaab,
and there have been reports that it has been talking about that
not only inside Somalia and refugee camps but also where the
Somalis have sought refuge such as in Kenya and in Dubai where
Somali women are being sold as sex slaves.
Mr. Payne. Now, once again in regard to the military, what
is your opinion as it relates to the African Union's forces as
opposed to Somali-trained forces who have been trained in Kenya
and other places? If you were in charge, how would you fit that
group in?
Ms. Ali Aden. As far as the Somali soldiers that have been
trained are concerned, like I say, when they come back, there
is no salary for them, and there is no food, so the only
alternative that they have is having a soldier that has been
trained and who has a gun in his hand either join the
insurgence or sell his gun to gain food for his family. A
better way to go about it would have been to train these
soldiers inside Somalia so they become familiar not only with
their colleagues that they are working with, but with their
superiors because when they come back, the superiors have been
trained outside so the soldiers and superiors don't have a
relationship, and when they come back, there is no respect
between the two.
Training the soldiers inside Somalia, offering them a
salary that can sustain them and their families will help them
and keep them away from joining the insurgents and thinking
more of a nationalist rather than always supporting their clan,
and that will only come if they are recruited on the base of
their capacity, their knowledge, their previous experience and
their health. Instead, they are being recruited when they are
being taken to these different countries based on the clan of
who recruiting these soldiers to be trained.
Mr. Payne. And, Dr. Menkhaus, what is your opinion on the
soldiers, the military element?
Mr. Menkhaus. First with regard to the African Union, the
AMISOM forces, I think our first observation has to be that
their mandate is to protect the Transitional Federal Government
first and foremost. Their relations with the Transitional
Federal Government are very poor. There is no trust on either
side between the two, and as a result, the AMISOM forces are
deeply frustrated. They would like to expand their mandate to
be able to work with other entities like Al-Sunna wa al-Jama'a
in taking the fight to Shabaab. I am deeply concerned about
that.
As someone who served in UNOSOM, I know even 30,000 plus of
the world's best peacekeepers confronted with a sustained urban
guerrilla war are not going to be able to succeed in Somalia. I
think in the long run Shabaab is going to see its demise, not
from military defeat, but from being eroded from beneath, and I
think that is first and foremost a Somali task, not an AMISOM
task. Moreover, AMISOM has been responding to Shabaab shellings
by returning fire in densely populated neighborhoods. That
results in extensive civilian casualties which is precisely
what Shabaab wants.
It has infuriated Somalis against AMISOM, and as a result,
that is just exacerbated the general feeling of anti-foreign
sentiment among the population in Mogadishu. The problem with
bringing Somali militia in as security forces is not only that
they haven't been paid, but the money has been made available,
but because of corruption, TFG officials are taking that money,
and as a result, up to 75 percent of the TFG security forces
who have been trained by outsiders have in fact either deserted
or defected.
I would add a final point, and this is a potential game
changer. If AMISOM were to withdraw, which is another scenario,
not necessarily to expand, but to withdraw due to frustration
and Uganda and elsewhere, the Transitional Federal Government
would not be able to protect itself at all. It would almost
certainly have to flee the country, so it would be a game-
ending change.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you. The hearing will stand
recessed. Thank you.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed.]
Mr. Payne. The hearing will reconvene. I thank those of you
in the audience who could stay and thank the witnesses for
remaining with us. Let me ask you, Mr. Dagne, the situation in
the Ogaden region of Ethiopia is deeply concerning, troubling
as you have already mentioned considering reports of sexual
violence perpetrated by Ethiopian troops and the effective
isolation of the region imposed by the Ethiopian Government.
Since the government suspended food aid to Ogaden in 2006,
it seems the humanitarian situation has continued to
deteriorate, yet very little has been done by the international
community to pressure the Ethiopian Government to peacefully
resolve the issue in the Ogaden. In your opinion, why has so
little been done to engage the Ethiopian Government on this
issue, and given that the Ogaden region is cut off from contact
with outside entities and access to the region, it is highly
restricted, from what sources are we able to collect
information on the status and the condition of the inhabitants
in the Ogaden?
Mr. Dagne. I think most of the information that we are
getting about the Ogaden comes from the refugees near the
border in Kenya. There are also human rights groups,
journalists who have gone into the Ogaden without the
permission of the Ethiopian Government, and they have
documented what they have seen, interviews of the victims. I
have gone at least three times in the past couple of years. I
went into the refugee camps and in Nairobi and documented a
number of interviews of the victims as well as conditions
internally.
What is different about the Ogaden is that rarely you will
see reporting about the atrocities that are being committed.
The targeting in the Ogaden is exclusively against civilians,
especially women. Rape is one of the methods used by the
Ethiopian security as well as hanging. We have a number of
cases of individuals who were handed. One particular person
that comes to mind that you and I had met 2 years ago and last
year is a young lady named Redwan. She was hanged by the
Ethiopian security, left for dead. Fortunately, for her, she
wasn't dead, and she was helped out, moved into a neighboring
country, and she is still awaiting for the United Nation's
Refugee Agency to process her status.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Let me ask you, Ms. Lefkow, the
Ethiopian judiciary has been under severe criticism for years
by some observers and opposition groups for allegedly lacking
independence and effectiveness. Do you agree with this
assessment and criticism, and what are the major problems
facing Ethiopia's judiciary? What can, in your opinion, the
U.S. do to help strengthen the independence of the judiciary in
Ethiopia?
Ms. Lefkow. I would be happy to try and address that. May I
also add a couple of points with regard to your question on the
Ogaden area?
Mr. Payne. Yes.
Ms. Lefkow. Maybe if I start with that? The allegations of
abuses in the Ogaden is an issue that Humans Rights Watch has
been extremely concerned about over the last 3 years. We did a
very in-depth investigation in 2007 into these allegations and
documented crimes that we in our assessment amounted to war
crimes and crimes against humanity, so these are very, very
serious crimes by the Ethiopian military, to some extent also
by the Ogaden National Liberation Front. They are not clean.
Their record is not entirely clean either. I think it is
important to say that clearly, but the scale of the abuses
against civilians was overwhelmingly for the most part on the
part of the Ethiopian military.
In our assessment, the patterns of crime declines somewhat
in 2007, 2008 after the initial campaign by the government. We
have actually been doing another set of research just in the
last few months on what is happening in the Ogaden trying to
get an updated picture of what is happening on the ground
because as you know, it is extremely difficult to get solid and
credible information, and we are very concerned about some
ongoing military clashes in the region and ongoing targeting of
civilians.
I think there are two new elements that we are seeing in
the region. One is that the regional government in Somali
region has established like almost a paramilitary force called
the New Police, and it is these forces that seem to be
responsible for a lot of abuses against civilians now, so this
is a new development since 2008. The other I think new element
in the Ogaden area is a real expansion of oil development.
We were hearing this from dozens of people we spoke to just
last month of an expansion of the oil exploration in the area,
which is having kind of a knock-on effect because this is a
conflict zone, and a lot of people are pastoralists, nomadic
herders, and they are actually not able to go to their
traditional lands anymore because the oil companies with
Ethiopian military support have actually seemingly fenced off
large areas, so this is a kind of new dynamic that we are
seeing, which I think will have some serious effects on the
ground and on civilians, and I may just quickly----
Mr. Payne. And on that point, is there the presence of the
People's Republic of China's military there or security forces
armed from China since it is PetroChina that is doing the
exploration in the Ogaden?
Ms. Lefkow. Not that we are aware of. The security forces
for the oil seems to be primarily Ethiopian military, so the
national defense forces. Although, there are also----
Mr. Payne. Okay. I know that several years ago there was a
conflict with the OLF, and I think a number of Chinese security
forces were killed in a combat with OLF and Chinese military or
paramilitary or security, and you can go on.
Ms. Lefkow. Thank you. The other issue I wanted to mention,
I mean, I guess it is in relation to the Ogaden. I think there
is a couple of points worth making. I think with regard to the
U.S. policy, I think there is a positive and negative side to
the U.S. positioning, the government positioning on Ogaden. On
the one hand, I think the U.S. has been pressing quite hard for
humanitarian access over the last few years. I think there is a
recognition that the humanitarian situation in the Ogaden area
has been very, very serious and continues to be very serious,
and I think that is an important positive position.
I think the problem is that there hasn't been enough push
back on the fact that the Ethiopian Government has essentially
closed down this region to any kind of independent access.
Journalists can't get in there, diplomats can't get in there.
We certainly can't get in there. They have effectively
established an information blackout on the Ogaden area, and I
think there needs to be much greater challenging of this by the
U.S. and by other of Ethiopia's partners.
I think on that score, what we see, the National Security
Council statement after the elections last month was an
important signal it seems of a shift in U.S. rhetoric toward
Ethiopia. It think it was a strong statement. It was a welcomed
statement of concern about the electoral process, but what we
need to see is those words matched by action and to see the
apparent greater concern for the human rights situation
translate into real policy consequences for Ethiopia if it does
not shift course.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Just finally, Mr. Amum
Okiech, could you explain to us the relevance of the change and
the split in the energy portfolio by President Bashir into
three, separating oil, mining and electricity recently, and has
the cooperation of the NCP changed or improved after the
national election and the recent appointment of the new
cabinet? You can give me your assessment of the new appointees
in the North and as I mentioned, the splitting of the energy
portfolio. Do you think this has something to do with the
upcoming referendum on January 9, 2011?
Mr. Amum Okiech. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The decision to
split the ministry of mining and energy into three separate
ministries is driven by the consideration that possible outcome
of the referendum may be secession of Southern Sudan where
petroleum is largely produced in Southern Sudan, and it may be
a ministry that may not be there after the referendum in
Northern Sudan or possibly having very limited functions.
In that case also, the National Congress Party has been
investing in the center of Sudan, particularly in the northern
parts of Sudan in building dams for the production of energy
from hydroelectric power as well as also developing plans to
develop agricultural irrigated schemes along the Nile,
particularly in Northern Sudan. Now, this program of building
hydroelectric power and dams in Northern Sudan has caused a
very serious concern that would need attention by the
international community and the Government of United States.
The Nubian people, who are a marginalized people in the far
north or Northern Sudan, are under attack and are in danger of
extinction because the process of the constructions of the dams
is being done without their consultation. Their villages and
land is being submerged under water. Also, there is an
intentional cultural genocide that is being carried out where
the ancient civilization of the Nubian people is being
destroyed and submerged under water. This is going to be a loss
not only to the Sudanese people, not to the Nubian people; this
is a human patrimony that need to be protected.
Also, the land of the Nubian people is being usurped from
them. They are being displaced and being sent to inhospitable
areas without compensation, and actually tomorrow here in
Washington there is going to be a memorial by the Nubian people
to remember the victims who have been killed by the Sudanese
authorities resisting to defend their land from being usurped
in the process of building dams, so the ministry of energy is a
ministry that is going to focus in development of energy,
particularly hydroelectric energy, and building of dams.
Why the mining, the third ministry, is being separated was
the aim of development of mineral resources, particularly in
eastern Sudan, especially gold, and the people of eastern Sudan
are marginalized, are excluded from these processes. There land
is being taken. Their resources are being used, and revenues
from the exploitation of the mineral resources in eastern Sudan
are not being brought to benefit the marginalized people of
eastern Sudan, particularly the very people whose land these
resources are found.
Again, there is also an issue of concentration of the
opportunities of development in the center and exploitation of
resources of the marginalized areas like the far north or the
east in the benefit of the ruling elites in Khartoum to the
total marginalization and exclusion of the people of eastern
Sudan, particularly the Bija, so the petroleum ministry now has
been assigned or has been located to the SPLM, and an SPLM
minister would be developing this portfolio. I believe the main
important task would be to bring in transparency in how the oil
sector has been developed and managed.
There has been a serious lack of transparency. The National
Congress has developed this sector exclusively and in a very
controlled-type process excluding the Government of Southern
Sudan from participating in the management of the oil sector
whether in the development of the production in the fields or
in the management of its transport and processing as well as in
the auction and sale of the Sudanese petroleum. The reports,
including of international and independent organization like
Global Witness indicate that Southern Sudan has been cheated
for up to nearly 26 percent of its share, which is giving
Southern Sudan less than half of its deserved rights, and this
is a serious issue.
With the formation of the government of national unity or
the Government of Sudan in Khartoum, definitely there is
cooperation. The SPLM has been allocated 30 percent of the
total portfolios representing Southern Sudan having been the
party that has won election in the south while the remaining 70
percent is occupied by the National Congress Party and other
parties associated with it or allied to the National Congress
Party. We are desirous to develop better relations with the
National Congress as we manage the transition of our country
through the remaining short period of the interim period
possibly to emerge as two independent states.
It is only through dialogue and serious discussions that
the parties are required to have that we will be able to avoid
a return to war and avoid a collapse of real peace but achieve
a transition to permanent peace even if that would mean
establishment of appeals of two states. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. At this time, before I turn
over to the ranking member, let me recognize in the audience
the Honorable Asha Abdalla, chairperson of the Somali's Women's
Parliamentary Association. Would you stand please and be
recognized? Thank you. We are very pleased to have you with us
here. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ali Aden and Mr.
Menkhaus, could you tell us do you believe that the United
States is doing enough with regards to Somalia? Resources,
policy-wise and the like, Ms. Ali Aden?
Ms. Ali Aden. Thank you. First of all, as a student who is
trained in medicine, I have always learned the importance of
history, knowing the history of the patient in order to treat
the patient. I believe our Government, United States
Government, whether it is this one or the previous ones truly
missed the opportunity to study the history of the conflict and
all the contributors of that conflict. When Ethiopia invaded
Somalia back in 2006, we have consistently spoken to the State
Department discouraging that support should not be given to the
invasion, and of course we thought that policy was an ill-
advised foreign policy.
That was not going to work, and we found out the results.
It created more radicals in Somalia and in the region, and
everybody else who was involved since that was the worst
decision the United States has ever made to support Ethiopia.
Now, coming back, if the current administration is doing
enough, I would say no, and the reason I say that is because
the U.S. administration is depending always on neighboring
countries to understand Somalia and to find a cure to the
disease that lies on land. We see 150 ships are in the seas
outside Somalia, all trying to stop the piracy, when in fact
the piracy is the symptom. It is not the disease.
The disease lies on land, and that is to find political
stability in Somalia. Therefore, what the United States
Government should do is instead of depending on the
intelligence collected by the Ethiopian Government, Kenyan or
Ugandese to actually do things in their own way and engage the
Somali people, especially the Diaspora. There is a huge force
of Somali Diaspora sitting outside Somalia, some in neighboring
countries.
Somalis in the Diaspora send every year what we know
documented by the UNDP, $1.5 billion to Somalia, and that is
only how much we know. They sustain Somalia plus the resilience
of those inside, so what the U.S. needs to do is to empower
what existed because I don't believe in anarchy, and most of us
who advocate for change believed to build on what existed. Let
us not make the same mistake that we made with the Islamic
Courts when we destroyed them because we had opportunity there
to build on them.
There are safe regions in Somalia, in the northwest,
northeast. Let us have reconciliations supported by United
States Government and allies and hold a serious and genuine
reconciliation that is holistic that includes all the
stakeholders and hold inside Somalia, the safe areas, and most
of us have been proposing lately in different forums to have
the next reconciliation, which is the last, the most holistic,
hopefully the most productive and the only one that is needed
from here on forward held in Hargeysa. Why take it outside? The
people in the northeast and northwest need the funds that we
spend outside trying to reconcile these people.
Also, the 4.5 formula, the clan formula system is not
working. It is a formula that has become the worst obstacle and
impediment to peace process in Somalia because these people
selected are loyal to the clan and not to the nation. We should
elect people based on their capacity, capabilities and previous
experience and inject the Diaspora into the government. We have
few right now in the government who left from the Diaspora, but
it is like a drop in the sea. We need to have more, maybe flood
more of the Diaspora into the government and hopefully create
the change that we need with the help of the nationalities like
the American citizens who went there.
Mr. Menkhaus. In my view, I think we are not doing enough
on several levels, first on humanitarian relief. Somalia is the
site of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.
Historically the United States Government has been extremely
generous. It is been a leader in the provision of humanitarian
assistance to those in need, but because of the suspension of
food aid, there is a debate right now as to why WFP and others
have suspended their activities in south central Somalia.
On the one hand, it is because of insecurity from Shabaab
and other groups. On the other hand, it is because of concerns
about the Patriot Act and OFAC and the liability that Americans
and organizations might have if substantial benefits accrue to
a terrorist organization from our assistance. We need to grant
a waiver to those organizations. For organizations working in
areas controlled by Hamas and Hezbollah, that would be not only
an important way to remove one of the hurdles to resumption of
humanitarian aid, we would also put all of the burden on
Shabaab when Somalis ask the question, ``Where is the
assistance?'' Somalia is in huge trouble now. It is the hungry
season, there is no food aid, and we need to make sure that
they understand exactly who the obstacle is. It is not us. It
is not the Treasury Department. It is Shabaab. I think that we
can do that without guarantees that the aid will not
substantially benefit Shabaab. I think it is low-handing fruit
for us.
Politically, another set of low-hanging fruit is
engagement. We do not have enough people in our embassy in
Nairobi engaging on Somalia. The State Department will be the
first to tell you, and USAID as well, we need a full-court
press of engagement across every spectrum of society. Right
now, we have very limited opportunities to dialogue with
Somalis in civil society, in business and politics and
religion.
We are actually losing a public relations battle with
Shabaab, which is doing outrageous things in the country, such
as banning the viewing of world cup soccer matches. How that is
possible, I don't know. We need to be able to take control of
the narrative. There is so much that we are doing that is
positive. There is so much that Somalis do like about the
United States, and I think one of the things that we can do
much more is people to people development and diplomacy.
That is one of our great strengths around the world, the
amount of foreign assistance that isn't necessarily official.
It is unofficial, sister city programs. All kinds of
opportunities are out there for the American people to engage
with Somalis so that they start again to see us as they once
did, which is the land of opportunity and a source of freedom
and development.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so much. Because we are running out of
time, I have a number of questions, but we have another set of
votes. On Eritrea, the International Religious Freedom Act
designation of country of particular concern, again Eritrea has
been named a CPC country. This week, Eritrea became a Tier 3
country on its violations of human trafficking and particularly
as it related to labor trafficking.
A number of important recommendations have been made by the
U.S. Commission on International and Religious Freedom about
going beyond the 2005 actions, which was just to prevent the
sale of defense articles to Eritrea, including, and I think one
of the best targeted sanctions against individuals and
institutions identified as responsible for or complicit in
serious human rights abuses. I was wondering either now or for
the record if any of you had any specific thoughts?
It would seem to me two terrible designations, CPC and Tier
3, religious freedom, human trafficking and all the other
problems Eritrea has. We need to take it a new level I would
think, but what is your view? Ted?
Mr. Dagne. I think it is important to put this in proper
context. One, I do think that putting Eritrea along the line of
Saudi Arabia and Sudan in terms of religious discrimination in
my view is way off target. The major religions, including
Christians, Muslims and the minorities, Jews coexist peacefully
for centuries, and yes, there has been a problem registering
the evangelicals in particular in Eritrea, but to make the
conclusion that across the board there is religious
discrimination I think is in my view wrong and cannot be
factually supporting.
I have read the International Religious Commission report.
I met with them a week ago, and I asked the last time they went
there to investigate this. It was 2004, so while there are
problems in registering some religious groups, I think it is
important that this issue is put in proper context.
Mr. Smith. But with all due respect, is it your testimony
that forced recantations of faith and torture of believers is
not happening or not happening to the degree? I mean, if they
asked to go tomorrow, would they be allowed to go and visit
with the religious prisoners? I am talking about either State
Department or the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom because both bodies, independent and
separate, our own State Department and this independent
commission, have come to the identical conclusions, which are
contrary to yours.
Mr. Dagne. My investigation, my research, and I have been
to Eritrea more so than those who had claimed to have been
there to do this report is that yes, there are people who we
have been detained and arrested by the Eritreans, but I have
not witnessed, heard or saw any credible evidence to show me
that the religious leaders have been tortured. There have been
a number of releases of religious individuals who have been
arrested for one reason or another, some of whom have been
arrested for refusing to serve in the national service.
Some have been arrested for meeting according the
government rules and regulations illegally, but I am not here
to say that there are now discrimination, there are no arrests,
yes. Have there been deliberate delays and denials of
registration of religious groups? But what I am stating for the
record is that this has to be put in the proper context that
Eritrea does not deliberately discriminate or penalize its
religious leaders or followers.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Lefkow, do you agree with that?
Ms. Lefkow. I do, and I don't. I mean, I think we have
documented some very serious human rights abuses in Eritrea,
including on the score of denial of freedom of religion to
various groups including Pentecostals and Jehovah's witnesses,
and I think we are extremely concerned about the human rights
situation, actually. There is no question that it is a society
that has become increasingly militarized where military service
and conscription, for example, continues indefinitely.
This is generating an outflux of refugees from Eritrea that
has grown substantially in the last couple of years, and I
think this is always a good indicator of things going very
wrong at home when you have these kind of increased migration
flows, but I think where I would agree with my colleague is
there is another dimension to Eritrea's human rights crisis.
It is also very much part of the regional picture, and I
think the one thing that the United States has to be incredibly
cautious about is having a balanced and principled approach to
the region because I think that the appearance of imbalance and
of partisan backing to forces that commit abuses as has been
referred to already, for example, supporting or being perceived
to support the Ethiopian military when it commits abuses, being
perceived to support the TFG when it commits abused, being
perceived to support AMISOM when it indiscriminately shells
civilians in Mogadishu.
I think this is very much contrary to the interests of the
United States to have this perception circulating, and I think
that is why it needs to be extraordinarily careful about how it
handles the situation with Eritrea because to be seen as
zealously anti-Eritrea and not taking a balanced approach to
the very serious human rights abused that the Ethiopian
Government is committing I think is not the interest of this
government in this country.
Mr. Smith. I would agree. I mean, we have raised when it
was under the Bush administration, and I actually did the
Ethiopia Human Rights Act. Mr. Payne, our chairman, did it the
following 2 years later, and we were very discouraged by our
Government through both administration's response, but with
Eritrea, it seems to me that we are trying to stand in
solidarity with those who are in prison, and I would love it if
the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom could
visit and have access to prisoners. I doubt that they can, but
I will follow up on that.
Finally, and this would be for the record because we are
out of time, but, Ms. Ali Aden, you talked about the toxic
waste and radiological, and Eni Faleomavaega on this committee
has been absolutely dogged in reminding us year in and year out
that the French detonated so many atomic weapons which have had
a disproportionate, horrific impact on the ecosystems and the
lives of people living in the South Pacific, and now it would
appear there is a kind of deja vu here with regards to toxic
dumping.
I wonder if for the record or briefly now but certainly for
the record because Nick Nuttall of the U.N. Environmental
Program has raised this. He did it during the tsunami when he
said people were getting sick because of this stuff washing up
on shore. Could you provide a more detailed record and anyone
else who would like to on this toxic dumping of radiological
and mercury and all the other terrible things that do grave
injury to people?
Ms. Ali Aden. Also included in my testimony, written
statement, the information that I put in there is what is out
there so far because it seems the international community is
busy with the piracy, and like I say, it is a symptom, so for
the past 15 years or so, toxic waste dumping has been taking
place in the Somali Sea, most of it coming from the European
countries and Asian countries.
Mr. Smith. Do you have any names of companies that might be
doing that?
Ms. Ali Aden. There are no names that have been publicly
announced, but there has been certain countries in Europe, and
there are some in Asia, so I would not want to go ahead of the
game when this hearing was not just about these countries, but
I would love to have a hearing where really the whole issue is
dominated by the toxic waste dumping in Somalia because what
you have is a ticking environmental bomb. If things even work
out in Somalia, we don't know what is going to happen on the
next tsunami or if anything else goes wrong.
I cannot name particular countries, but we know
consistently European countries and Asians have been named even
by the U.N. agencies and also the former U.N. Envoy, Ould-
Abdallah, has also mentioned that.
Mr. Payne. Let me thank you all very much. I think we are
on the court on most of these issues. However, I don't want you
to say I said something behind your back after you left, but
let me also talk about the conscription in Eritrea now. It is
wrong, and they say you must join the military. However, as you
may recall, when I was coming up, I had to also by law go into
the military, and if I didn't, I could be imprisoned or not
allowed to have student aid.
Many in the United States of America left the country and
went to Canada if they did not want to go into the military. I
am not condoning it. I am just simply saying, and I think your
point was good about on balance on the religions. I visited
religious places in Eritrea myself and saw the Jewish, the
Catholic, the Protestants and so forth. There is no question
that there has been a restriction on the registration of new
religions, including some of the Evangelicals, and we discussed
that.
The other thing too we were able through negotiations on a
trip that I had with Mr. Dagne many years ago after
consultation with the leadership of Eritrea that a number of
prisoners were released after we had dialogue with the
President and his cabinet people, and so I think that dialogue
is much more important than a hammer. To try to exclude and cut
Eritrea off and have no dialogue I think gains us nothing.
I do think that as long as there is some opportunity to
have dialogue, I would not like to see them put on a state
sponsor of terrorism with North Korea and Iran. Eritrea is not,
in my opinion, a North Korea or Iran. With 5 million people, I
am not sure they can bring the world down, but we need to try
to get them to understand that there must be more cooperation.
Mr. Dagne?
Mr. Dagne. Just for the record, Chairman Payne, the
national service in Eritrea is a service for everyone across
the board for less than 2 years, and it is not entirely
military training. You are not recruited into the military. The
1 year actually is studying for your twelfth grade, and it is
about 6 months where they will be getting military training,
and no one, including the President's son, actually had gone
through that, the son of the defense minister. Everyone had to
do that service the same way they do it in Israel and in other
countries.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Ms. Lefkow. Sorry. I just want to clarify for the record,
and our objection at Human Rights Watch is not toward
conscription per se, not at all.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Ms. Lefkow. Our concern with Eritrea is the indefinite
nature because we have found that in many, many cases the 2
years ends up actually being many, many years and sometimes
indefinite service in Eritrea, so that is the concern.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. All right. I do hope we can revisit
Somalia. As you know, I went to Mogadishu and had an excellent
day there on the ground and met with women's groups and
education groups and 30 different women's groups at one time,
educators and so forth, and I think that there is a great
opportunity. I think we are not maximizing it. Of course, I had
an unpleasant experience on the way out because it was so
positive.
The press conference was so positive about my wanting
Americans to come back. I was the first American to go there
maybe in a dozen years or so. Al-Shabaab shot missiles at my
plane on the way out, however. Fortunately, they didn't
succeed, but I think it was desperation because they don't want
people to come in because they thrive when others stay out, so
I hope that we can have enough security so that we can get the
EU and other Americans to go into work with the fledgling
government.
Now since I must get over to vote again, but there was one
thing I wanted Mr. Smith to hear, but I am sure that staff can
relay it to him that we looked at the language in the
Constitution, and the draft Constitution of Kenya says that
abortion is not permitted unless in the opinion of a trained
health professional there is a good need for emergency
treatment or the life of the health of the mother is in danger,
so to say that the new Constitution will allow abortion on
demand is totally incorrect.
It does not say that, and people continue to say that, but
it is not correct. Abortion is illegal in Kenya. This reaffirms
the current Kenya penal code. It does not change the penal
code, and that outsiders are going in and reinterpreting what
it says. It says that abortion is not permitted unless in the
opinion of a trained health professional there is a need for
emergency treatment or the life or the health of the mother is
in danger, period.
With that, I will ask unanimous consent that members have 5
legislative days to revise and extend their remarks. Without
objection, it is so ordered. Let me once again thank the
witnesses. We could be here all day, and if there were not
votes, we would be here all day, but thank you all. You were an
excellent panel, and thank you those in the audience. Thank
you. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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