[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-117]
ISSUES AFFECTING NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 20, 2010
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SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Elizabeth Drummond, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, January 20, 2010, Issues Affecting Naval Force
Structure...................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, January 20, 2010...................................... 39
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2010
ISSUES AFFECTING NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee......... 4
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 1
WITNESSES
Labs, Dr. Eric J., Senior Analyst, Congressional Budget Office... 5
O'Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 8
Thompson, Dr. Loren B., Chief Operating Officer, Lexington
Institute...................................................... 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 48
Labs, Dr. Eric J............................................. 49
O'Rourke, Ronald............................................. 67
Taylor, Hon. Gene............................................ 43
Thompson, Dr. Loren B........................................ 89
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
ISSUES AFFECTING NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 20, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Gene Taylor
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. Good afternoon and welcome to the first of many
hearings which this subcommittee will undertake on issues
affecting the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Today's
hearing is in advance of a budget submission which is due to
arrive to Congress on the first of February. This is the reason
that we are meeting prior to that day.
I do not intend for this subcommittee to be a rubber stamp
to the Department's request, no matter which political party
occupies the White House. As long as I have the great privilege
to serve as the chairman of this subcommittee, it is my
intention to ensure that the American people have the right to
witness the issues debated in open session and work with all
members of this subcommittee to recommend an authorization that
ensures our Navy and Marine Corps have the ships, aircraft and
other equipment that they need to do the job that our Nation
asks them to do.
Today is just the first day of a process of arriving at
those recommendations. I felt that it is important to start the
legislative session with an examination of alternatives to
restore our Navy's fleet to the numbers necessary to meet our
national security needs. To that end, I have requested our
witnesses discuss a wide range of issues affecting the Navy
force structure particularly in light of the President's
decision in October that the Navy play a much larger role in
theater missile defense.
I want to state for the record I support the decision to
put our Nation's theater missile defense on ships. Having had
the good fortune to serve here for 20 years, I have witnessed,
sometimes in horror, as our Nation has been asked by a number
of allies to leave, the billions of dollars of infrastructure
we left behind in Panama, the billions of dollars of
infrastructure we left behind in the Philippines. When the
Puerto Rican people asked us to quit using the island of
Vieques as a practice range, the Navy made the decision to shut
down Roosevelt Roads. And as we speak, we are in the process of
leaving Okinawa. In every instance we are basically one
election cycle away from a key ally asking us to leave billions
of dollars' worth of things behind. And if we were to put the
national missile defense in Eastern Europe, the same thing
could happen there.
If we put it on a ship, we are then off the coast of any
potential foe. We don't have to ask a host country for
permission to use our national missile defense; but most of
all, that we are able to move that position around as it is
needed around the world, and I think it is the way to go.
What I don't see is the Administration telling us where
those ships are going to come from. And I would remind this
committee, particularly those of you who have been around for a
while, the rule of three that we have all learned; that for
every troop we have deployed, we have one in theater, one on
the way to the theater, one returning from theater who is
training to do his original job. In the case of ships, it is
probably going to be a 4-to-1 ratio. So in order to have 24-
hour coverage every day of the year off a potential foe, that
means we are going to have to have four Navy ships prepared to
do that job.
I think it is important that we say this now before the
budget submission because, again, I am in support of the
President's request to put these things on ships, but I want
the President to make the request for those ships. Let us don't
pretend it is going to happen later. Let us don't pretend it is
going to happen overnight. From the day we order that ship, it
is probably at least three years to delivery for the first, so
we need to get started now.
I don't think our Navy is large enough to do the job they
are asked to do, but numbers alone are not the answer. Which
type of ship and what number is more important than just
quantity. Certainly I don't think we match up well in either
the total number of ships or the types of ships.
There are some would say we don't need our amphibious
forces. I would remind you that as we speak, one of those big-
deck amphibs is off in Haiti helping those people, and in the
case of south Mississippi, one of the big-deck amphibs came to
our rescue after Hurricane Katrina. Moving from the sea is the
only guaranteed access that we can count on, and I think we
need more, not fewer, amphibious assault ships.
There are those who say we don't need 11 aircraft carriers.
Again, I disagree. Those battle groups have done more to
maintain the peace in the world for the past 60 years than any
other force we maintain.
I am convinced that we do not have enough fast-attack
submarines. These boats kept the Soviet Navy in check during
the entire Cold War, and they will keep any other adversary in
check as we proceed into this century.
I am also convinced we don't have enough surface
combatants. The evidence is everywhere. We have carriers
operating without escort, amphibious assault ships transiting
the Strait of Hormuz without any antisubmarine warfare-capable
ship in company because the escort is off chasing pirates or
guarding oil platforms.
We have a looming need to replace the capability of the
Ohio class of strategic missile submarines, but doing so may
cripple the Navy budget in the later part of the decade.
In addition to the hard facts of types of ships and numbers
of ships are also matters that need to be debated. The Congress
was perfectly clear in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act that the next generation of cruiser has a
nuclear power system for electrical power generation and
propulsion. This action was based on a bipartisan support on a
clear and present threat that the access to fuel could be
restricted and leave the fleet without the ability to conduct
major operations.
I would remind the Members that a typical surface combatant
uses about 10 million gallons of fuel per ship per year, a
large-deck amphib about the same. And I think any clever foe is
going to take advantage of our vulnerability to the fleet
oilers, that the first ship that they attack is the oiler, and
if the oiler doesn't sail, the escorts don't sail. If the
escorts don't sail, the carrier doesn't sail.
And I would hope that we have learned the hard way in
places like Iraq and Afghanistan that every enemy, no matter
how sophisticated or unsophisticated, is smart enough to
exploit our weaknesses. This is a weakness that we can and have
already directed the Navy to address. And I regret to say that
that was two years ago. The Navy has done absolutely nothing in
pursuit of the nuclear cruiser to date.
My last major concern is the Ohio submarine replacement. I
expect to have a stand-alone-only hearing on this issue due to
the significant importance to national security. And I want to
make sure that we have identified the right ship and the right
missile before we make a 40-year commitment to the program.
Again, does it make more sense to build a ship to fit our
existing D-6 missiles, or does it make more sense to build a
missile that will fit a Virginia-class submarine? Since this is
something that is going to be a decision that will affect the
United States Navy for decades to come, we have to get it right
the first time.
These are all hard problems to tackle, and I look forward
to open debate with my colleagues in the coming weeks and
months. I am always open to suggestions from the members of
this subcommittee for hearing topics and look forward to your
input.
Today we have three very distinguished experts in Navy
acquisition and policy. Dr. Eric Labs is a senior analyst for
the Congressional Budget Office. His independent cost analysis
of ship construction has proven very helpful to this committee
over the years.
Mr. Ronald O'Rourke is the senior research analyst at the
Congressional Research Service and routinely provides the
Congress with in-depth and well-researched papers on
capability, cost and options for future procurement.
Dr. Loren Thompson is the president and chief operating
officer of the Lexington Institute. Dr. Thompson has appeared
before this committee before, and his insight is always
helpful.
For disclosure, the United States Navy was invited to send
representatives to testify. Secretary Mabus has agreed to do so
with the stipulation that the witnesses would not discuss the
upcoming budget submission. Subsequently, my understanding is
that Secretary Gates denied the Navy permission to testify.
While I think we would have had a better hearing with them, I
am satisfied that our panel today will have a frank and open
discussion on the best way to rebuild our fleet.
I would like to call on the gentleman from Missouri, my
friend and partner on the subcommittee, the Honorable Todd
Akin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
witnesses. We appreciate your willingness to appear before us
today. I hope this will be a useful springboard for this
subcommittee as we prepare to consider the President's fiscal
year 2011 shipbuilding budget request and the results of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Today's hearing gives us the opportunity to frame the
various issues our subcommittees must consider depending on a
number of alternative shipbuilding plans that could emerge
shortly. I hope our Members will use this hearing as a
foundation for the rigorous oversight and decision-making that
will be required in the coming weeks. I imagine that our
witnesses have been somewhat challenged in preparing your
testimony today, for we will all continue to rely on press
accounts and rumor as we wait for the first Monday in February.
In spite of the lack of new information, your preliminary
insights are valuable. I, for one, have been troubled by
certain reports such as those indicating the Navy may attempt
to eliminate as many as two carrier strike groups. Likewise,
indications that the Navy may not ramp production of the
Virginia-class submarine to a sustained rate of two per year
starting in fiscal year 2011 raised concerns about our ability
to meet combatant commander requirements for submarine
presence, and may have second- or third-order effects on the
total cost of shipbuilding.
There have also been stories in the media about pressures
on amphibious lift. In fact, the Commandant recently alluded to
the stress placed on the amphibious fleet in all scenarios
evaluated during the QDR. We need to ensure that the Navy and
the Marine Corps have both the quality and capability in our
battle force ships to maintain our maritime strategy, deter and
win any future conflict in which the United States may be
involved.
On the other hand, some of these concerns may be premature.
There have also been press accounts indicating that the next
shipbuilding plan will establish a 324-ship requirement that
would maintain the current minimum requirement for 11 carriers,
48 attack submarines, and 33 amphibious ships. Nevertheless, I
was interested to note in your prepared testimony several items
worth further consideration by this subcommittee.
For example, Mr. O'Rourke, you indicated that should the
Navy be forced to pay for the Ohio-class replacement program
within its current top line, it could result in significant
reductions in other shipbuilding programs. This is no great
surprise. But you also note that such reductions could result
in a substantial consolidation of the surface ship construction
industrial base.
Furthermore, Dr. Labs, in your testimony, you point out
that sea ballistic missile defense could require substantial
commitment of resources. That could make it difficult for the
Navy to fund other ship programs.
Therefore, whether or not the QDR and the upcoming long-
term shipbuilding plans substantially alter the requirements
for certain key platforms, the Navy and this committee will
have a number of difficult choices to make in the near term.
I thank the Chairman for holding this hearing today so
early in the year to allow us to properly understand these
issues. Thanks again to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimony.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Akin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Taylor. And the Chair wants to correct himself. It is a
D-5 missile, not a D-6.
Other members of the subcommittee are invited to submit a
statement for the record if they so choose. Without objection,
Members will have five legislative days to submit any written
statement.
Gentlemen, it is the norm for this committee for our
witnesses to speak for about five minutes. I think given the
gravity of the subject matter, and most of all given your
expertise, we are going to give you significant leeway on that.
We have cast all of our votes for the day, so if you could keep
it to about 10 minutes so that Members have an opportunity to
ask their questions.
Dr. Labs, if you would, please.
STATEMENT OF DR. ERIC J. LABS, SENIOR ANALYST, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE
Dr. Labs. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Akin and
members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the challenges that the Navy
is facing in its shipbuilding plan.
The subcommittee asked the Congressional Budget Office to
examine three matters: the Navy's draft shipbuilding plan for
fiscal year 2011, the effect that replacing the Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines with a new class of submarines
will have on the Navy shipbuilding program, and the number of
ships needed to support ballistic missile defense from the sea.
I would therefore like to make the following five points.
If the Navy receives the same amount of money for ship
construction in the next 30 years that it has over the past
three decades, about $15 billion per year, it will not be able
to afford its 313-ship fleet.
Two, the Navy's draft 2011 shipbuilding plan as reported in
the press increases the Navy's stated requirement for its fleet
from 313 ships to 324, but the production schedule in the plan
by only 222 ships, or 74 fewer than the Navy's previous plan.
Critically, most of the reductions would come from the Navy's
combat ships.
Three, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the plan
would cost an average of $20 billion per year. I stress that
this is a preliminary estimate only, which we will revise when
the Navy formally submits its shipbuilding plan next month.
Four, building a new class of ballistic missile submarines
could cost about $85 billion. If the Navy received that amount
in addition to the resources needed to execute the draft 2011
plan, it could probably purchase the 56 additional ships
identified in the alternative construction plan that
accompanied the draft 2011 plan.
Five, if the Navy needs to dedicate ships to maintain a
continuous patrol for ballistic missile defense, then as many
as five to six ships per station would be needed. If the Navy
employs rotational crewing on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
ships or bases them in the European theater, then it could make
do with fewer ships.
In a report to this subcommittee in 2008, CBO estimated
that carrying out the Navy's 2009 shipbuilding plan to purchase
296 ships over 30 years would cost an average of almost $27
billion a year. Yet senior Navy officials have said in recent
months that the service expects to make do with $13- to $15
billion per year.
CBO compared the number of ships that could be purchased
with annual budgets of either $13 billion or $15 billion onto
three scenarios for average ship costs: $2.1 billion per ship,
as in the 2010 defense appropriation; $2.5 billion per ship,
which was the Navy's estimate for the costs of ships in its
2009 plan; and $2.7 billion per ship, which was CBO's estimate
for ships in the 2009 plan.
At the bottom end of the range, a $13 billion annual budget
would buy 144 ships over 30 years, assuming an average cost of
$2.7 billion apiece. At the top end of the range, a $15 billion
annual budget would yield 214 new ships over 30 years if their
cost averaged $2.1 billion each. This range is one-half to
three-quarters the number of ship purchases proposed in the
2009 plan.
The subcommittee then asked CBO to analyze the procurement
and inventory tables from a draft of the Navy's 2011
shipbuilding plan which was reported in the press. That plan
dramatically reduces ship purchases. Most of the cuts under the
draft 2011 plan and the alternative construction plan that
accompany it come from the Navy's combat ships, which are
defined here as surface combatants, submarines, aircraft
carriers and amphibious ships. Under the 2009 plan, the Navy
would have purchased 245 combat ships. That number falls to 166
combat ships purchased under the draft 2011 plan, and 207
combat ships in the alternative plan. Thus by 2040, the draft
2011 shipbuilding plan could produce fleets of 185 combat
ships, which compares with 239 today or 268 under the 2009
shipbuilding plan.
It is not clear from available information what the Navy
believes the draft 2011 plan would cost. CBO's preliminary
assessment of the draft 2011 plan suggests it would cost an
average of about $20 billion a year in 2010 dollars. The
alternative 2011 plan, which adds the 56 ships, would cost an
average of about $23 billion per year, CBO estimates.
Now, with respect to replacing the Navy's ballistic missile
submarines, many Navy and industry officials expect that the
new ships would be substantially smaller than the Ohio class.
However, that does not necessarily mean that they would be
cheaper to build even after removing the effects of inflation.
Press reports indicate that the Navy expects a class of 12
SSBN(X)s, the designation for the new Boomer, to cost a total
of about $80 billion. That total implies an average cost of
around $6.7 billion, or one press reported indicated a $6- to
$7 billion range.
CBO assumed that the SSBN(X) would carry 16 missile tubes
instead of 24 on the existing submarines and would displace
around 15,000 tons submerged, making it roughly twice as big as
the Virginia-class attack submarine, but nearly 4,000 tons
smaller than the Ohio-class sub. Based on those assumptions,
CBO estimates that 12 SSBN(X)s would cost an average of $7
billion each. In all, CBO expects the entire new class of
Boomers would cost about $85 billion.
In light of the crucial role strategic submarines play in
the U.S. strategic triad, policymakers may regard them as the
most critical part of the Navy shipbuilding plan. If those subs
are going to be replaced no matter what happened, and if the
Navy receives enough resources to pay for them above and beyond
what it might otherwise expect to allocate to shipbuilding, it
could buy more surface ships and attack submarines. Under the
alternative plan I mentioned earlier, that extra money, about
$90 billion over the 30-year period, would purchase 56
additional ships, 19 large surface combatants, 15 Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs), 4 attack submarines, 3 amphibious ships,
and 15 logistics and support ships.
Importantly, by 2040, the Navy's fleet would be about the
same size as today's battle force, not 50 ships smaller as
would be the case under the draft 2011 plan.
Finally, with respect to the BMD mission, in a CBO report
last year, my colleague Mike Bennett determined that three ship
stations would provide nearly full coverage of Europe from
Iranian missile threats by around 2018, once the Standard
Missile-3 Block IIA was deployed. However, the Missile Defense
Agency has stated that a broader and more demanding mission of
defending Europe as well as parts of the Middle East from
Iranian missile threats could require up to eight ship
stations. Beyond 2020, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) suggests
that with improvements in BMD-related missiles, radars and
sensors, the number of stations at sea could be reduced to
five.
Under the Navy's traditional deployment cycle, 8 stations
would require a rotation of 42 ships, whereas 5 stations could
require 26 ships to provide continuous BMD patrols.
The Navy could reduce the number of ships needed to provide
full-time BMD presence by employing alternative crewing schemes
or basing ships in Europe. For example, if the Navy rotated
crews to forward-deployed ships, three ships would be needed to
keep one operating full time in a designated BMD patrol area.
In that case, only 24 ships would be necessary to support 8
stations in the near term, or 15 ships for 5 stations beyond
2020.
The Navy, however, does not currently envision dedicating
ships to the single mission of missile defense. Instead it
plans to send BMD-capable ships on regular deployments to
perform the full range of missions required to surface
combatants, although some of those would be operating in or
near BMD station areas. Under that approach using rotating
crews and BMD-capable ships could prove more challenging
because the crews not in deployment would need to maintain a
high level of proficiency in many mission areas.
Alternatively, if the Navy was able to use BMD-capable
ships permanently in Europe or the Persian Gulf as it does now
in Japan to counter the threat of North Korean missiles, it
might need as few as five to eight ships, one for each station.
But even in that scenario, if the Navy needed to guarantee that
one ship per station was at sea at all times, it would need to
double the requirement from 10 to 16 ships.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. That concludes my formal statement. I am happy to
respond to any question you may have.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Dr. Labs.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Labs can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Ron O'Rourke.
STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Taylor, Congressman Akin,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
chance to speak today on Navy shipbuilding and force structure.
With your permission I would like to submit my statement for
the record----
Mr. Taylor. Without objection.
Mr. O'Rourke [continuing]. And summarize it briefly here.
The Navy's new 5-year plan reportedly will include about 50
ships, or an average of about 10 per year. Although LCSs and
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) account for less than one-
quarter of the Navy's planned fleet, they reportedly count for
about half of the 50 ships in the plan. In this sense, these
relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the 5-year
plan relative to their portion of the planned fleet, making it
easier to procure 10 ships per year within available funding.
At some point in the future when the LCS and JHSV programs run
their course and are no longer overrepresented in the
shipbuilding plan, procuring 10 ships per year could become
considerably more expensive.
The new five-year plan reportedly contains only two
amphibious ships and none after fiscal year 2012. This could
result in a dip in workload starting in fiscal year 2013 at
Northrop's Gulf Coast yards that might be deep enough to prompt
speculation about a possible consolidation of some kind at
these yards.
The Navy's new 30-year plan reportedly contains two
scenarios depending on whether or not the Navy pays for its new
SSBNs out of hide. By drafting these two scenarios, the Navy
is, in effect, reviving a debate about whether a service should
pay out of hide for platforms that serve a national mission of
strategic nuclear deterrence. Congressional Research Service
(CRS) testimony two years ago stated that the Navy appeared to
be laying the groundwork for reviving this debate.
The 30-year scenario shows that if the Navy pays for the
SSBNs out of hide, procurement rates for surface ships could be
reduced to levels low enough to make a substantial
consolidation of the surface ship industrial base a distinct
possibility, if not a likelihood. The scenarios also show that
if the Navy pays for the SSBNs out of hide, Navy force levels
would eventually drop well below required figures. The
resulting fleet would have substantial capability shortfalls.
The projected decline in force levels could immediately
begin to generate or reinforce perceptions of the U.S. as a
declining power. Such perceptions could make it more difficult
for the U.S. to achieve policy goals in a variety of areas,
such as trade, finance, climate change and nonproliferation.
Perceptions of the U.S. as a declining power might be
particularly likely in the Pacific Basin, where naval forces
play a prominent role in military operations, and where China,
which is modernizing its navy, is viewed as a rising power.
Perceptions in the Pacific Basin of the U.S. as the declining
power and China as a rising power could shape the political
evolution of that region in ways that could make it more
difficult for the U.S. to achieve various policy goals.
Regarding demands for ships for European BMD operations,
Department of Defense (DOD) testified last fall that it is
considering maintaining two ships at each of three stations for
a total of six ships on station in European waters. If the Navy
filled that requirement using east coast home-ported destroyers
operating on seven-month deployments, then maintaining those
six ships on station could require more than two dozen ships.
That figure might be reviewed as a high-end or worst-case
analysis. It could be reduced in a number of ways. A strategy
that combined European home-porting, multiple crewing, taking
advantage of transit presence and using an operational tether
could reduce it substantially.
The Navy reportedly wants to cancel the CG(X) cruiser and
instead procure an improved DDG-51. In assessing this plan, one
issue to examine would be the performance that the improved 51
in conjunction with off-board sensors would have against
advanced cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles.
A second issue to examine would be the vulnerability of the
off-board sensors and data links and the reduction in
performance that would occur if these sensors and data links
are degraded by enemy attack.
And a third issue to examine would be the improved 51's
growth margin, including the ship's ability to be back-fitted
with high-powered, directed-energy weapons such a laser. High-
powered, directed-energy weapons could be critical to the
Navy's long-term ability to affordably counter cruise and
ballistic missiles fielded by a wealthy and determined
adversary.
If policymakers decide that the Navy's improved 51 would
not be an adequate solution, and that a DDG-1000-based solution
would be unaffordable, then other options would include a DDG-
51 with modifications that are more significant than what the
Navy is reportedly considering, or a new design destroyer that
is more affordable than the CG(X) or the DDG-1000. My statement
outlines these two options.
Finally, the reported five-year plan would apparently stop
LPD-17 procurement in fiscal year 2012. This would make it more
expensive to use the LPD-17 as the basis for the LSD
replacement because of the lengthy interval between the fiscal
year 2012 and the start of the LSD replacement program years
from now. Procuring an additional LPD-17 within the five-year
plan, perhaps in fiscal year 2014, as the first LSD replacement
could reduce the cost of using LPD-17 as the basis for this new
program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks, and I will
be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke can be found in the
Appendix on page 67.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Loren Thompson.
STATEMENT OF DR. LOREN B. THOMPSON, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
LEXINGTON INSTITUTE
Dr. Thompson. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to
be here and discuss my views on the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) and future shipbuilding requirements.
The QDR is going to be organized around four themes:
prevailing in today's wars, preserving the force, preventing
new conflicts and preparing for diverse contingencies. The goal
is to balance joint capabilities for coping with conventional
and unconventional aggression, an approach that I think poses
little danger to the Navy's future shipbuilding plans since all
the vessels in the fleet are adaptable and versatile.
However, the current fiscal environment imposes two
pressures on the shipbuilding plan that the QDR will not be
able to fix. First of all, America's economy has fallen from 32
percent of global output at the beginning of this decade to
only 24 percent today, and as a consequence we will not be able
to continue sustaining about half of the world's military
outlays.
Second, the rising price of military pay and benefits is
squeezing technology spending out of the defense budget,
creating tensions between the Navy and the Marine Corps as to
which ships should be bought. Both of these trends portend
bitter debate over shipbuilding plans in the years ahead.
I would like to spend about half of my time talking about
the undersea fleets, since that is where our most pressing
budget problem is, and then spend the remainder of the time
talking about the surface fleet.
Turning to the undersea fleet, I think if you talk to most
of the experts in the field, they will tell you the submarines
are the one class of warship or the one type of warship that we
can count on still being survivable in hostile environments at
midcentury.
Now, aside from a handful of special-use submarines, the
U.S. Navy undersea fleet today essentially consists of two
types of warships: ballistic missile submarines that provide
secure retaliatory forces to our nuclear deterrent, and fast-
attack submarines, which, in addition to collecting all sorts
of intelligence, also conduct an array of other military
missions.
The Quadrennial Defense Review will reaffirm the priority
of the nuclear deterrence mission, but it will also signal
something else, that the bombers and the land-based missiles
that are the other two legs of the triad are going to be
contributing less capability in the future. So ballistic
missile submarines will become even more important in deterring
a nuclear attack in the future, and that has two implications.
First of all, we must be ready to replace Trident ballistic
missile subs when they begin retiring in 2027. Second, the
replacements must be even quieter than the Tridents to ensure
they cannot be targeted in a surprise attack. In other words,
the Navy can't just build more Tridents; it needs to design a
better successor. And in order for a new sub to be ready on
time, the six-year design cycle must commence in 2012.
Assuming a successful design phase, the Navy plans to build
the lead ship in 2019, another ship in 2022, and then one ship
per year between 2024 and 2033. But each of the Trident
replacements after the lead ship is going to cost $5 billion,
and the only way to find that kind of money in already
overstretched shipbuilding accounts would be to defer other
vessels. This funding dilemma is made worse by the fact that
the Navy waited too long to ramp up the production of the
Virginia-class attack subs, so it will now be unable to prevent
the attack sub inventory from falling below the required number
of 48 once the Los Angeles class begins retiring later this
year.
The Navy can manage the looming shortfall in attack subs by
incrementally extending the lives of legacy subs and
lengthening the tours of sailors at sea, but it will have to
build two Virginias every year between 2011 and 2025 to avoid
falling below 43 boats at the lowest point in 2028. That is now
the Navy's projected internal number. The lowest point is 43
boats in 2028.
The good news is that the time and money required to build
each new Virginia is falling steadily, and there is a lot of
things we can do to improve the Virginias if we extend the
production run beyond the planned 30 boats.
Nonetheless, we can't accommodate all this undersea design
and construction work within likely shipbuilding budgets
without displacing required surface levels. So therefore, I
think that special steps are going to need to be taken to fund
the Trident's replacement. With ballistic missile subs destined
to become the most important part of our nuclear deterrent in
the future, there is a strong case for funding the Trident
outside normal budget channels rather than cutting construction
of other warships to cover the cost of our most important
military mission.
Turning to the surface fleet, many of you have no doubt
heard the hottest shipbuilding rumor spawned by the QDR
process. Mr. Akin, in fact, alluded to it in his own remarks,
that the number of aircraft carriers will be cut from 11 to 10
or even to 9. I can assure you that if that happens, it won't
be because the Navy wants to do it.
It is true that we are headed down to 10 in 2013 because
there is a 33-month gap between when the Enterprise goes out of
the fleet and the first Ford class comes in. The Enterprise
would be prohibitively expensive to refuel because it has, if
you can believe it, eight reactors. But that is only a
temporary situation.
Although the Navy could meet current warfighting
requirements with one or two less carriers, a permanent cut
wouldn't be prudent for two reasons. First of all, warfighting
requirements are going to change in the future. We don't know
how, but they will change. Secondly, there is a high likelihood
that wartime attrition will occur in the future, so it makes
little sense to cut the number of carriers to the absolute
minimum currently required. And the Navy 2011 shipbuilding plan
will call actually for maintaining 11 flattops through the year
2040.
Now, there is a lot to be said that is nice about the next
class of carriers, the Ford class, that will be the successor
to the Nimitz. It delivers more sorties, it delivers more
power, it delivers more protection. In addition, it reduces
crewing requirements by several hundred personnel at least over
the lifetime of the ship, which means that during the time it
is operating, roughly 50 years, it will save nearly $5 billion
in operating costs.
However, I think the real key to the future viability of
aircraft carriers may not be a new hull; it may be getting
better airplanes on the flight deck. We have to push ahead with
the F-35 because it is stealthy, and the Navy next has to step
ahead, go ahead with the unmanned combat air vehicle because it
is unmanned and stealthy; otherwise I am not very optimistic
about the survivability or utility of carriers in the western
Pacific as we get to midcentury.
Well, I wish I could say that the story was that simple for
the rest of the surface fleet. What we see there, though, is an
unsettled picture created in equal parts by lack of money and
lack of agreement between the Navy and the Marine Corps as to
what needs to be bought.
In the case of the surface combatants, the Navy is poised
to abandon two of the three new classes that it announced at
the beginning of the decade. It wants to walk away from what
was then called the DD(X), now DDG-1000, land-attack destroyer
after three ships, and it also wants to cancel the CG(X) next-
generation missile-defense cruiser. Instead its plan is to
build an upgraded version of the multi-role DDG-51 Arleigh
Burke destroyer while upgrading other Arleigh Burkes and
Ticonderoga-class cruisers, Aegis boats, that are in the fleet
today.
Now, I think those plans make sense. The DDG-1000 is too
expensive to populate a 300-ship fleet, and its concept of
operations will put a very valuable asset too close to enemy
shores. CG(X) will probably not be needed at all once the Aegis
combat system is upgraded on legacy destroyers and cruisers
because the tracking of ballistic missiles doesn't have to just
be done from a ship; it can also be done from space by systems
like the new Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellite.
The third new combatant announced at the beginning of the
decade, the Littoral Combat Ship, is essential to expanding
fleet numbers to 300. I think Mr. O'Rourke referred to the fact
that we have managed to get the shipbuilding numbers up by
building a lot of smaller, cheaper ships, like the Littoral
Combat Ship, and I guess also the Joint High Speed Vessel. But
it really is essential for that reason for getting the fleet
back up above 300 again. However, the Navy has decided for
budget reasons to down-select to a single design. That step
really was necessary because it is very expensive to try to
maintain, upgrade and equip two different classes of ship for
what is essentially the same mission. I predict that if the
winning team does a good job of building this ship, then the
service never will go to a second source, that it will try to
save as much money as possible by sticking with one source.
Finally, as for the amphibious warfare fleet, that part of
the force posture looks likely to be a focus of controversy for
many years to come. The Navy and the Marine Corps have parted
ways on the need for 38 amphibious warships, and as a result
the Marines are now lobbying the Congress to fund vessels that
are not included in the 2011 shipbuilding plan.
To say they have parted ways is a bit of an understatement.
It is not just that the Navy wants to buy fewer than 38 in the
future; it wants to buy fewer than 30 in the future.
Personally, I agree with the position Chairman Taylor
expressed last year that we should fund serial production of
new amphibious assault and transport ships to provide the core
of the future sea base and replace aging vessels, but that does
not seem to be where the Navy wants to go. Secretary Gates has
foreshadowed the possibility that reductions in amphibious
warfare capabilities may emerge from the Quadrennial Defense
Review, but I would urge you to look very closely at the
reasoning about future threats and requirements before you go
along with that plan.
Well, I have exhausted my time, so let me just close by
observing that even if we kill the DDG-1000, and even if we cut
back on our amphibious warfare capabilities, the Nation's naval
shipbuilding requirements are not likely to fit within
projected budgets. Therefore, I think we need to have a
discussion about how important nuclear deterrence is to
national survival and fund the submarines supporting that
mission in a way that does not hobble other sea-service
missions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Thompson can be found in the
Appendix on page 89.]
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks all the gentlemen. And I want
to begin with the very basic question, and I deeply regret--
again, I want to make this perfectly clear, I consider
Secretary Mabus my friend. I voted for him, State auditor, and
I voted for him twice for Governor, and I wish he were here
today. I also had a very good friend by the name of Mike
Parker, retired as the Under Secretary of the Army after one
day for speaking his mind rather than what Secretary Rumsfeld
wanted him to say. So I understand the constraints on the
Secretary. But I do wish he was here today.
If the Secretary was here today, I would say to him, thus I
am going to say it to you; the President has outlined a plan to
put our Nation's national missile defense on ships. How many do
we need to do that adequately? What is it going to cost either
to convert an existing DDG-51 or to build a new version of the
51 for that purpose?
And I will start with you, Dr. Thompson. How many do we
need? What is it going to cost? What is the most likely way
that this is going to be done, through a conversion of a 51 or
a new class of 51s?
Dr. Thompson. Well, I don't think we are going to need a
CG(X) cruiser to begin with. I think the Navy has come to the
same conclusion. The original plan for taking the hull of the
DDG-1000 and using it also for a foundation of a missile-
defense cruiser was predicated on the belief that you needed a
lot of power generation and a very big sensor, because all of
the tracking and discrimination of enemy warheads was going to
be done by one radar on one ship.
We don't really need to go that route. We are living in the
era of networked warfare, and therefore there is the
possibility not just for netting together all of the Navy's
sensors at sea, but also overhead sensors from the Joint Force
and the Intelligence Community. If you do that, then you have
the potential to track incoming ballistic missiles, including
all sorts of confusing things like penetration aids, decoys,
debris and so on pretty precisely, and therefore you can do
that from a DDG-51 with less power requirements and a smaller
sensor because you have so many different eyes on the target.
Having said that, though, the requirement for the ships is
driven mainly by two things: What level of protection do you
want? We have spent tens of billions of dollars to deploy a
land-based ICB defense of the United States, and yet it could
not stop a determined Chinese or Russian attack.
The second thing is what sorts of technology breakthroughs
do we reasonably expect we can achieve in terms of radar
weight, in terms of power aperture, efficiency and that sort of
thing? I am not--being a liberal arts major, I am not going to
give you a precise answer on that; however, I would say that if
this is going to provide most of the defense for the
continental United States in phase 4, the White House's
announced plan, in other words by being able to deal with
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in addition to
short- and medium-range missiles, we are probably talking about
dozens of Aegis class vessels.
Mr. Taylor. Is that in addition to the existing fleet, or
is that taking the existing fleet and modifying it for that
purpose?
Dr. Thompson. Well, most of the money and most of the
effort is going to be spent upgrading the preponderance of the
Ticonderogas, not all of them, and virtually all of the Aegis
destroyers. However, those ships appear to be committed to
other missions at the present time, and so I would have to
conclude that when I say dozens, it is dozens above and beyond
the existing requirement.
Mr. Taylor. And do you see any evidence--and I would open
this up to the panel--do you see any evidence that the
Administration is actually moving in that direction? I know
they have said they are going to do it, but as far as budgeting
purposes not only for next year, but for the foreseeable
future, have you seen any evidence, any indications that they
are following up that pledge with the actual purchase of the
ships to do the job?
Dr. Thompson. Not the hulls. They are certainly investing
in the sensor and computer technology, they are developing the
munitions, but they are not funding the number of hulls that
would be required to ship most of this mission for continental
missile defense to the Navy.
Mr. Taylor. Dr. Labs, do you want to answer those
questions?
Dr. Labs. Sure, Mr. Chairman.
I don't disagree, I think, with anything that Dr. Thompson
said. I would just add a few observations in addition to that.
The Navy's 313-ship requirement, which was developed, if
memory serves correctly, back in about 2006, had a requirement
for 88 large surface combatants. That was a requirement that
was developed at that time where the BMD mission was not part
of the equation. So to the extent that the BMD mission is now
going to be layered on top of that requirement, obviously
additional ships in some number would be required.
How many ships, you ask? That would depend again, as I sort
of indicated in my testimony, how many stations are you going
to have where ships need to be in constant patrol? Are those
ships going to be in constant patrol? Do we need to have them
there providing coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week? If that
is the case, I would agree with Dr. Thompson that the
requirement for ships is in the order of dozens, as my
statement indicated. On the other hand, if you think you can
just surge ships to the area when a crisis is developing, if
you want to provide the coverage that way, then the number
would be considerably less and possibly even done as part of
the existing requirement of routine deployment of surface
combatants.
Another factor would be do you change how the rotation
factor occurs; is it the traditional rotation from the east
coast, or do you try to do multiple crewing? That, too, will
sort of affect the number of ships.
Mr. Taylor. Before you get too far along, you said a
destroyer in the course of its routine operations. In your
opinion or in the panel's opinion, can a destroyer that is
performing escort duty for a carrier also be counted on to
provide ballistic missile defense?
Dr. Labs. I would not necessarily want to count on a
destroyer that is providing escort to a carrier to do that. But
we also do deploy surface combatants independently or part of
surface action groups that are not necessarily doing duties in
carrier escort. But it is certainly possible, depending on what
the nature of the mission is or what is occurring, whether that
is possible. If you have a crisis situation, and you are
worried about protecting the carrier from the same sorts of
threats that you want to protect European cities, for example,
then you are going to need additional ships to provide, in my
opinion, that additional coverage.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just three quick additions to what has been
said already. In terms of evidence that the Navy has funded
what they are talking about in terms of conversions of existing
ships, it is my understanding that it is the Navy's plan, and
it has been for the last year or two, that every DDG-51
eventually be converted to a BMD configuration, and taking a
regular 51 and converting it to the current BMD configuration
costs about $40- or $45 million. It is my understanding for a
year or two now that that is the Navy's intention. So the Navy
is resourcing the idea of having many, virtually all, of its
51s and at least five of its Aegis cruisers be converted for
BMD capability.
In terms of funding new builds, if the press reports are
accurate about the cruiser destroyer requirement increasing to
96, then those press reports also indicate that the Navy is not
fully resourcing that, because even under the scenario where
the Navy does not have to pay for the SSBNs out of hide, and
the other shipbuilding programs are consequently not reduced,
the Navy is still not achieving and maintaining a 96-ship
cruiser-destroyer force, according to the tables that were
published.
And third, in terms of the additional burden on the
cruiser-destroyer fleet, one way of looking at it is to note
that over the past few years, the Navy has maintained an
average presence in European waters of about 1.7 cruisers and
destroyers, and now we are looking at increasing that to
something like 6, perhaps, if we have 3 stations with 2 ships
each. And then Eric is taking you through the preliminary math
on what that may mean. My math is not really substantially
different from that. That means if demands for cruisers and
destroyers in other parts of the world do not decline, then the
mathematics of this net increase in the cruiser-destroyer
presence level in Europe are going to increase demands for
cruisers and destroyers overall by about that much.
Mr. Taylor. In your opinion, going back to the question by
Dr. Labs, can a destroyer that is providing escort to a carrier
also be counted on to provide national missile defense?
Mr. O'Rourke. I think it is problematic in the sense that
the carrier is not necessarily always going to be in the
location that would be optimal for doing the BMD mission. Just
because the carrier, for example, is in the Mediterranean
doesn't mean it is in the right part of the Mediterranean to do
that mission. So there may be portions of time during which
that cruiser or destroyer might be in a good location to take
on that mission while it is also performing other missions, but
at other times it is not going to be in the right part of the
Mediterranean to do that.
Dr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, could I add one important
qualifier?
Mr. Taylor. Sure, Dr. Thompson.
Dr. Thompson. Every Aegis destroyer that is upgraded from
2012 on will be qualified to do ballistic missile defense, as
will 15 Ticonderogas. However, when they say ``qualified,''
what they mean is it will have the ability to shoot down a
short- or medium-range missile carrying a unitary, meaning a
relatively simple warhead. If we are looking at an
intermediate- or an intercontinental-range missile or something
carrying sophisticated penetration aids like decoys, it
wouldn't be able to do most of that. That requires additional
steps that were in the White House plan announced in September,
but the cost becomes quite imposing if you go up from that
level of capability.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for the integrity and tenacity you bring to
this subject and to this subcommittee.
And, gentlemen, thank you so much for being here.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Forbes, you are the acting Ranking Member,
so you will not be subject to the five-minute rule.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to stay as
close to that as I can.
I would also like to take us out just for a moment from the
trees and take a look at the forest. And when I am traveling
around now and I am talking to people about national defense
issues and budgetary issues, I constantly hear this word
``frightened'' from a lot of people.
One of the things that frightens me are two things. If you
turn around, you will see all of these empty chairs behind you,
and it bothers me to no end, frightens me, that the Navy is not
here asking or responding to our questions today. It frightens
me that the law requires that the Navy give us a shipbuilding
plan, and they just refuse to do it. And it frightens me that
when this committee then under a congressional inquiry demands
that they give us that shipbuilding plan, they just refuse to
do it.
And I am looking at some of the projections that we have
had, and we have had testimony in years past where we looked at
the Chinese, for example, and what they were doing with
aircraft carriers, and we were basically told, no, they are not
going to build aircraft carriers, and then that flipped, and we
were told about the subs that they weren't building, and that
flipped.
Just recently we had the Military Power of the People's
Republic of China report, which I am sure all of you are
familiar with, that projected that the Chinese had 260 ships in
their fleet. Last week Admiral Willard came in and testified
they have 290 ships in their fleet. That is a big difference in
just a short period of time when you look at the fact that we
are looking at about 287 ships.
We also just had a report in the Washington Times that the
White House National Security Council has recently directed the
U.S. spy agencies to lower the priority placed on intelligence
collection for China, and that was despite the opposition from
senior intelligence leaders who fear it would hamper efforts to
obtain secrets about Beijing's military and cyber attacks.
And here is my question for you: Why are our estimates
always seemingly so far off? That seems like a big gap, 260,
290.
Secondly, do you see any shift now; is it a concern to you
that our budget is now possibly playing a greater role in a
ship acquisition policy or policies than maybe our defense
posture is playing in those same policies?
And then the third question is, how is our force structure
being shaped by the growing capability of the Chinese Navy? And
does it concern you at all if we are lowering our intelligence-
gathering capabilities from what they are doing? And I throw
that out to any or all of the three of you.
Mr. O'Rourke. I guess I could start on that.
As you know, I maintain a CRS report on Chinese naval
modernization. I initiated that report in November of 2005. It
has been updated more than 40 times. And I did that to make
sure that there was a readily available source of information
for Members and staff on this topic.
In terms of what role China's naval modernization is
playing in Navy force structure, I guess I would say this, that
I think there are a number of relatively expensive investment
programs in the Navy's plan that to one degree or another are
China related. And so if China does not become a sizable
element of the public discussion over U.S. defense plans and
programs, then I think that creates a possibility that some of
those programs may not be fully funded.
One of those programs was the CG(X) cruiser, and the press
reports are now indicating that that program has been
cancelled, and the Navy is reportedly proposing to do that
because they are familiar--they are now comfortable with the
idea of doing the mission a different way with the approved 51s
and the netted sensors. But nevertheless, I think that if the
Navy had its druthers, and if its resources increased, it might
have preferred to still go ahead with that program.
And in terms of intelligence collection, one of the ways of
responding or of programming with a consciousness towards
Chinese naval modernization is to take steps to increase
intelligence and monitoring what is going on in China's Navy,
and I have talked about that in my CRS report on China naval
modernization. And so if you were to increase the emphasis that
China plays in your defense plans and programs, that is one of
the things that you would want to emphasize.
Dr. Thompson. I certainly don't think we are underfunding
the intelligence function. The Director of National
Intelligence stated 2 months ago that we are spending $75
billion a year on intelligence, which is a lot of term papers.
However, I am afraid that our performance is not improving in
this new era. We have a pretty bad track record. We didn't see
Pearl Harbor coming. We didn't see North Korea's invasion of
the South. We didn't see the Tet Offensive. We didn't see the
collapse of communism, and we didn't see 9/11. Yes, there were
some analysts off in some obscure places saw it coming, but the
system didn't see it coming.
And the implication that I draw from that, I mean, even
now, when I see the intelligence of this decade saying--the
intelligence community saying, you know, Iraq, they are
developing nuclear weapons and Iran isn't, when we all know the
opposite is the case, right? When you see something like that,
what it tells you is: don't count on the intelligence. Having a
margin of error in your military posture, funding on the
assumption your intelligence analyses are wrong, is the only
prudent thing to do.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Labs.
Dr. Labs. I guess the only thing I would add to that, to
your point, is the role of budgets, sort of, playing too large
of an issue relative to our other priorities in defense policy.
Certainly in all the time that I have been doing defense
policy in Washington, working for CBO, there has always been a
balance between your defense priorities and how much money you
have to spend on that. And the question always comes year to
year is, you know, where is that balance filling out? Is what
you buy and what you choose to do being driven primarily by
cost, or is it being driven primarily by the strategy that you
are seeking to do?
And the balance that goes on there is something that every
Administration juggles. And I am not sure that I am in a
position to really judge whether the budget is getting too much
emphasis today compared to what the strategy should be. I know
that you can't, sort of, go about developing a strategy in the
absence of a budget, because if you could do that, you wouldn't
need a strategy; you could just do everything you possibly
wanted. There is always a balance of, sort of, costs and risks,
and how that balance is weighing out is certainly worthy of
discussion and should be part of the defense debate.
Mr. Forbes. Yeah, I guess the thing that concerns me most
is we don't get to have that debate because we don't have the
Navy here to ask those questions and we don't have their
shipbuilding plan to ask them questions about.
But thank you so much, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman and wants to
remind the gentleman that the Navy will be here in February,
but we certainly wish they had been here today.
Mr. Hunter has expressed that he has a conflict and needs
to leave fairly shortly. So, if there is no objection, I am
going to recognize him out of order for five minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, thanks for
your leadership on this and for the great support that you show
for our manufacturing base as well as our national security
when it comes to the Navy.
First question, Dr. Thompson, when you talk about the
fallout between the Navy and Marine Corps, is this because of a
shift in the way that the DOD looks at surface fires now for
land invasions? Is that kind of what we are talking about or
what?
Dr. Thompson. It is a lot bigger. It gets to a fundamental
disagreement about what the future role of the Marine Corps
should be. It gets to a level where the Navy--the political
appointees in the Department of the Navy actually want to
change the phrase ``forcible entry'' to ``theater access.''
This is a substantial watering down of the whole concept that
we have been building toward for a decade. It is less amphibs,
it is less mine sweeping, it is less naval surface fires, it is
pretty much less of everything, so the money can go to other
priorities.
Mr. Hunter. You said that the Marine Corps's mission, the
Navy is trying to redefine it. But is the Navy's mission being
redefined to, meaning they are going to stay offshore more? And
is that possibly due to fewer ships? Each ship is so much more
valuable now that they don't want to risk and they don't want
to get in close?
Dr. Thompson. The Obama plan, as set forth in general terms
by Under Secretary Work, is $15 billion a year for
shipbuilding. That is somewhat more than we have been funding
recently. So I don't think we can blame it on lack of ships.
There certainly, though, has been a breakdown in the
consensus between the Marine Corps and the Navy since the Obama
Administration began about what the proper purpose of
expeditionary forces are and what resources are required to
support them.
Mr. Hunter. When did that shift happen? And any of you,
please, chime in here. Is this kind of a new shift in thinking
in the Pentagon, or has this been around for a long time and it
has suddenly prevailed recently?
Dr. Labs. Well, I think that the debate between what is,
sort of, the proper role of the Marine Corps and the sourcing
for amphibious ships has actually been around for quite some
time. I mean, many people have discussed in the past about how,
you know, the amphibs, the Gators are all sort of the poor
man's Navy and that they don't receive, necessarily, the
highest priority in the shipbuilding accounts.
And all of this stems, in my judgment, from the budgetary
pressures that are on the Navy shipbuilding account but also in
other procurement accounts as a whole. And if you have a
program that is this big and you have this much to spend, you
are going to look for things to cut. And changing whether you
want to do a forcible entry capability as, sort of, a national
capability to maintain is one way to, sort of, reduce your
requirements for ships.
Mr. Hunter. So it is strategic--it isn't based on national
security and what we want to do; it is based on what the budget
is. And we are then defining what we want the Navy's mission to
be or the Marine Corps's mission to be not by what is needed
but by what the budget is.
Dr. Labs. I am saying that that is certainly one factor in
the equation.
Mr. O'Rourke. The press reports about the Navy's new
shipbuilding plan include a draft version of the Navy's report
on their new 30-year plan. And, in that draft report, there is
an acknowledgment that the dropping of the MPFF requirement is
something that was basically fiscally driven, that the
requirement is viewed as valid but not currently within the
Navy's reach bugetarily. And that is something that would be
near and dear to the Marine Corps in terms of their ability to
launch and sustain operations ashore from a position at sea.
And I tend to agree with Eric. I think that the tension
between the Navy and the Marine Corps about what kinds of ships
should be in the shipbuilding plan goes back a fair ways. And I
think there is a sense among some observers, correct or not,
that the Navy may accord a lower priority to amphibious ships
because they are not essential to the Navy's own combat
mission, as they are to the Marine Corps's. And, in the
presence of constrained funding, that tension can come out
between the two services.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to my colleagues for your
latitude on my questioning.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes, in the order of people who were
here at the time of the gavel, Mr. Larsen for five minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Going back to missile defense and ballistic missile defense
and so on, we are also--a few of us are on the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, which oversees missile defense, so I want to just
explore this a little bit.
Obviously, we have talked about how the Navy is
increasingly being called on to perform ballistic missile
defense operations. The preferred platform for the mission
appears to be the 51.
Help me understand. Does the future shipbuilding plan
envision the 51 being the sole platform? Is that the assumption
that you all are operating under?
Mr. O'Rourke. The reported shipbuilding plan would have the
51 be the dominant BMD platform, along with some number of
cruisers. But, numerically, it would be a very large number of
51s, plus some number of cruisers in addition to that.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Thompson, going back to what you were
talking about with regards to the 51s and the radar
capabilities of the 51s and modernizing them, is there a choice
to be made between, say, modernizing the 51s with Aegis versus
a different approach to radar tracking for missile defense?
Dr. Thompson. There is a wide menu, a big menu of options
for doing this. I think the reason the Navy favors the Aegis
solution is that it is relatively cheap compared with the
alternatives. And, secondly, if you buy an Aegis warship, you
don't just get a ballistic missile defense capability; you get
air defense, you get antisubmarine, you get a limited land
attack capability, and all sorts of other things.
So, from the Navy's point of view, they are acquiring a
multi-mission warship which can be continuously upgraded for a
wider range of ballistic threats also.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Would that be consistent, Dr. Labs, with
your thoughts on that?
Dr. Labs. Yes, Mr. Larsen. I think that what the Navy is
pursuing, at least based on press reports that we have seen so
far, is they are going to pursue the 51 for the foreseeable
future. They are going to upgrade everything that they have--
well, most the cruisers and then all of the 51s--to do that.
And they will follow on with continuing to build 51s or
some modified version of them, driven in part because they
think it is probably the most cost-effective solution and also
in part because it is, from their perspective, one of the least
technically risky solutions. They are very familiar with the
Aegis system. They are very familiar with the hull. And they
think they can do what they need to do with the least amount of
technical risk to be able to get the capability out to the
fleet that they want.
Mr. Larsen. I think, you know, we may have a debate about
this in the future. We could probably all agree on least
technically risky approaches.
But getting to that question, we passed a procurement
reform bill this last year. Presumably we are taking a whack at
the other 80 percent of procurement we didn't touch.
Is there anything in those bills that can provide us some--
I wouldn't call it hope, but provide some direction that maybe
the cost estimates that we are hearing about from you all can
be at least incrementally or marginally less?
Dr. Thompson. Oh, yeah. I mean, actually, the Navy--you
would never guess it to read the press coverage, but actually
the Navy is doing a better job than the other services of
getting its costs down and getting ships out to the fleet
faster. The Littoral Combat Ship made it to the fleet in half
the time that a traditional warship did.
In the case of the Virginia class, I think the Missouri is
going to deliver in 62 months, whereas the initial ship was
like what, 86, 88 months? And, as a result, the number of man-
hours required to build the first ship, 15 million, has fallen
to below 11 million now, if I have that right. And the cost has
come down by nearly 20 percent.
I mean, not only is there clear evidence in the Department
of the Navy that you can save money by doing this differently,
but they have actually--there is actually a lot of other room
for doing things like that. Like the chairman's idea of doing
serial production using the same amphibious hull for a range of
future warships rather than always coming up with a new class
and breaking the multiyear packages. There are lots of ways of
saving money.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. O'Rourke, have you given thought about the
procurement reform legislation we passed into law and how that
applies to future acquisition and how it impacts your analysis?
Does it at all?
Mr. O'Rourke. I guess the one thing I would say is that the
Navy has come through a period where it has recently introduced
several new ship designs. And so the Navy is now looking
forward to a period where it is introducing relatively fewer
new ship designs and is spending more of its time,
proportionately, on getting into regular, serialized production
of existing designs.
That, sort of, gets you away from defense acquisition
reform, because it gets you away from the issues that are posed
when you start a new acquisition program. But, in a sense, that
is precisely the Navy's point, that they are not going to be
initiating that many new shipbuilding programs in the future
and, consequently, can concentrate on the efficiencies that can
come by putting existing designs into regular, serialized
production.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Yeah.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman for five minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The first question is on nuclear propulsion. It is only the
aircraft carriers that are nuclear at this point in time, and I
think our chairman has raised, a number of times, the
vulnerability of other ships and their refueling needs.
How significant are the capital costs to have the lesser
ships be having nuclear propulsion systems? Can you amortize
those costs out to where the operating costs are much less over
time, even though the costs are more significant up front? Give
me an analysis along with the tactical advantages of having
nuclear power.
Dr. Thompson. Well, let me just say one thing up front,
which is that the ship that we have been talking the most of
adding to the nuclear fleet are the large surface combatants,
and the Navy is in the process of killing all those. So we are
reduced in terms of our options for doing that.
But, having said that, your point about amortization is
exactly right. Unfortunately, our political system does not
respond well to the notion of amortization unless everything
can be amortized before the next election cycle.
It costs a lot more up front to equip a ship with nuclear
power. It costs a lot less down the road to operate it with
nuclear power. But the system is much more responsive to the
upfront costs than to the later operating burden.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Dr. Labs. Mr. Coffman, CBO actually has a study right now
under way that looks at the question of nuclear versus
conventional propulsion. And some of the information I will
give here, you know, it is preliminary; we haven't sent the
study through our review process so far. But the increased
capital costs to a nuclear-powered ship can be anywhere from 20
percent to 50 percent higher initial upfront cost, depending on
the size of the ship and the type of the ship that it is.
And then you clearly save money over the long run by not
having to pay for fuel, but the cost of the break-even point of
that savings will vary from ship type to ship type. Like, for
example, large amphibious ships and large surface combatants,
which we are no longer planning to buy apparently, we would
have broken even around $200 a barrel for oil based on our
assessment so far, with other ships, smaller surface combatants
and smaller amphibs, at a much higher, you know, oil price
break-even point.
So, depending on--and that is strictly on the cost side.
Obviously, it gives you a number of tactical advantages, which
Dr. Thompson referred to, that can be factored into that
equation.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just very briefly, I think Loren is correct
in noting that the principal opportunity for introducing
nuclear power into surface ships other than carriers was the
CG(X). If the CG(X) is cancelled, then it becomes harder to
find other programs that will present near-term opportunities
for that. The only remaining area, I think, would be in terms
of the large amphibious ships. And if we are sticking with the
current designs of those ships, then you wouldn't necessarily
have an opportunity to introduce nuclear propulsion there
either.
While we are waiting for the new CBO report to come out, it
can be noted that the Navy performed a study on this issue in
2006, at the request of Congress, very much at the request of
this committee specifically. I have summarized the findings of
those studies in a CRS report on the issue of nuclear
propulsion for surface ships.
And, basically, at the time, the Navy concluded that
putting nuclear propulsion onto a larger surface combatant
would increase its upfront procurement costs, other things held
equal in that ship's design, by several hundred million
dollars. I think it was something in the range of $700 million.
And the Navy calculated a break-even price for oil on a
lifecycle basis, as Eric mentioned. And the break-even analysis
is summarized in the CRS report.
But the main point is that, if you don't have a CG(X), then
you don't have a near-term program for thinking about putting
nuclear power more widely into the surface fleet anymore.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. The last question is, if the QDR does
reflect the Navy's point of view about theater access versus
forcible entry, what does that do to the Marine Corps's
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program?
Dr. Thompson. The short answer is that the Administration
would like to kill it.
There is a lot of maneuvers going on behind the scenes. In
fact, I am not sure what the Marine Corps will do if it doesn't
get the FV. There is no obvious alternative. It probably is
going to perform a lot better.
But I think a political decision has been made that this is
one of the programs they are going to target. So what they are
really looking for now is some excuse, in other words, some
failure in the reliability testing that will provide the venue
or the vehicle for allowing them to kill it. They all know that
there is no real alternative to the thing, but they have
decided that they don't want it to continue.
Mr. Coffman. Anyone else?
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, five minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Thompson, you, I think, did a nice job about laying out
the challenge of funding the SSBN production and, you know,
what pressures that puts on the rest of the program. And you
talked about paying for development and procurement outside of
the naval shipbuilding account. I mean, is there any precedent
for that? How do you envision, sort of, doing that?
Dr. Thompson. Well, you know, we pay for most of our
nuclear weapons in the Department of Energy in a completely
separate budget item. What is it? I don't know remember what
the exact budget number is, but it is even a different Cabinet
department. And we have been doing it that way since the
beginning of the Cold War.
The problem that we have here is that we are expecting
tactical and one service or two mission services to be traded
off against national survival-level missions, and it is an
apples-to-oranges comparison. I see this happen in the Air
Force all the time because they are responsible for the spy
satellites, they are responsible for the intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and so on. And, yet, they have to
trade that them off against, do I want more F-22s? And guess
what decision they usually make? It is a bad way to do
tradeoffs.
And I think if we took this handful of national missions
that are absolutely crucial, like nuclear deterrence, and put
them in a separate category and funded them as if they were a
first priority independent of intra-service tradeoffs, we would
probably get a better outcome.
I might mention parenthetically that in my two associates'
prepared remarks the point comes up that, if we were to do that
while leaving the planned shipbuilding budget at the level
currently expected, in other words, around $15 billion, but we
took SSBN(X) out and treated it separately, we would probably
solve most of our forward shipbuilding problems.
Mr. Courtney. So, when the QDR comes out, which, I mean, as
you point out, one of the predictions is that the triad is
going to become less of a triad and more of a--I would guess
that would be the opportunity----
Dr. Thompson. Correct.
Mr. Courtney [continuing]. To really, sort of, pose the
question about, well, okay, since we are creating a greater
reliance on that platform, then maybe we have to recognize that
by elevating it to a different place----
Dr. Thompson. Correct.
Mr. Courtney [continuing]. In terms of where you pay for
it.
Dr. Thompson. I mean, the bombers are already falling out
of the force, and there is a significant likelihood that we
will trade away a wing of ICBMs to the Russians to bring the
numbers down. So you are left with something that doesn't
really look like the triad. It is mostly Trident warheads.
And, in a situation like that, you have to make certain you
build the boat the right way and you have it ready at the right
time. I think that is a strong argument for doing it
differently than you would a new class of warships.
Mr. O'Rourke. As an addendum to what Loren said and to
answer your question about whether there was a precedent for
treating things budgetarily this way, you can argue that
ballistic missile defense is just such a precedent. That is not
a service, that is a mission, and yet it is its own category in
the defense budget that contains funding for BMD capabilities
in various services.
So if BMD has been separated out as a mission area for
collocating a variety of spending that contributes to that
mission, you can argue that that is a precedent for then taking
strategic nuclear deterrence as a mission and then locating
their variety of funding from various services that contributes
to that mission, so that the spending of that can be optimized
at the mission level rather than having it separated down into
the services where it competes against the other missions of
those individual services.
Mr. Courtney. And so, Ron, is that, you know, sort of, an
Appropriations Committee sort of task, or is it a policy
committee--again, if you really wanted to, sort of, move
forward with that kind of model?
Mr. O'Rourke. I don't know that it is more one side of the
House or the other, but it is something that the authorizers
and the appropriators could have a dialogue on to see whether
they wanted to have the budget restructured in that way.
Dr. Labs. Just, because it wouldn't just apply to,
obviously, the procurement accounts. You are talking about
somewhere, you know, in the neighborhood of probably $8 billion
to $10 billion in R&D before you even get to procuring the
first ballistic missile submarine, which, in their own right,
is going to be a $10 billion or $11 billion ship, the first
one.
Mr. Courtney. Well, I think as the chairman said, we are
going to probably have this conversation at another hearing.
And my time is running out, so thank you for your answers.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
To that point, Dr. Labs, I would hope at some point that we
could have a conversation, again, for the Ohio replacement
submarine that probably would not be delivered for 15 years. It
is my understanding that the purpose of this follow-on vessel
is to carry the D-5 missile, because the D-5 missile will not
fit in the Virginia-class submarine. So this is a fleet that
doesn't even start to get delivered until 2025.
I think the question we need to ask right now is, is the D-
5 missile still going to be the missile that this Nation wants
as our nuclear deterrent in 2025 and for 20 to 30 years beyond
that? And I would welcome your thoughts on that.
I would hate to build a replacement for the Ohio-class
submarine built around the D-5 only to find out in 2025 it is
no longer the missile that our Nation wants to build our
nuclear deterrence around. And I would hope the Navy is looking
into that, and I would ask your organization, as well, to give
us some thoughts on that.
Dr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, there are some things the Navy
is already doing in that regard. They actually are planning to
make the tubes on the next-generation satellites slightly
bigger than what a D-5 would require because their estimate is
that circa 2040 they will need a different missile. They start
with the D-5, but then they actually are considering moving to
a bigger missile as a follow-on.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. Whatever information you have along those
lines, I would welcome, Dr. Thompson.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island,
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. It is very interesting and important at
this time.
And, gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here
today.
My question is for the panel. With the possible deployment
of anti-ship ballistic missiles, there is, I would say, a need
for increased effectiveness of existing Aegis BMD ships and a
new level of fleet protection. And I am sure that you are aware
of the capability of the Cobra Judy Replacement ship. And I
have been briefed that the augmentation of a platform like this
with BMD capability can actually be used as a near-term, cost-
effective naval adjunct sensor.
So can you speak to your assessment of this capability and
how one or more of these ships could impact the number of BMD-
capable cruisers and destroyers we might need for this mission.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes, actually, I have been following the
proposal for doing something like that since I testified before
this subcommittee in July of 2008. In that testimony, I
referred to it as an ``adjunct radar ship.'' And there is a
proposal from industry to build several of those ships to act
as adjunct radars so that the radars on the surface combatants
don't have to be as big.
It may not necessarily reduce the numbers of cruisers and
destroyers you need, but it would allow you to do the mission
with cruisers and destroyers that had radars on them that are
not as big as they would otherwise need to be because some of
that radar burden is being picked up by these adjunct radar
ships.
So that proposal is out there. My understanding is that the
Defense Department and the Navy have been made aware of it and
that they have seen the outlines of it. I do not know what the
status of that proposal is inside the Navy or DOD
deliberations.
Dr. Labs. My understanding is the same as Mr. O'Rourke's.
We have often had briefings on the subject--or on occasion we
have had briefings on the subject, and I wouldn't have anything
more to augment to that.
Dr. Thompson. There is a lot to be said for proliferating
the sensors, because it means that any given radar no longer
has to carry the full burden of doing the tracking. All I would
say is that, if we are going to do this, I hope it is done
outside the SCN budget, because one thing we don't need is
another limited class of ships that, you know, cost more per
unit than the other ships do.
Mr. Langevin. Would this relieve the burden of the Aegis
cruisers having to--we talked about, if they were part of the
force defending the carriers, that they wouldn't necessarily be
in the right place at the right time. So does that deal with
that issue, that problem?
Dr. Thompson. Depending on how they were deployed, it could
make a significant difference in terms of how many Aegises you
needed in a particular area of operations or what level of
proficiency, what level capability each Aegis had to have.
Because, as you put more sensors on the target, you collect
more information. If you can net it and fuse it together, then
the burden that any one ship has to carry is reduced.
Mr. O'Rourke. It could also enhance the operational
flexibility of the cruisers by allowing you to put them in a
location that might be better in certain other ways for
performing the ship's mission because it didn't have to
necessarily be in some other location as it might have to be if
it were really carrying the full burden of collecting the radar
data.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
There have recently been--this is on another topic--there
have recently been comments from the Under Secretary of the
Navy and other press reports indicate the Navy may be unable to
achieve a sustained two-a-year production, two-a-year
construction of the Virginia-class submarines starting in 2011
due to cost pressures. I guess I would ask you, do you agree
with that?
And, also, what are the implications for the Navy's ability
to meet combatant commanders' requests should the Navy not
fulfill its two-per-year schedule? And what are the cost
implications to this program as well as other shipbuilding
programs for failing to increase production of the Virginia-
class submarine to two per year in 2011?
Dr. Labs. Mr. Langevin, there are several implications of
that. The press reports that we have seen so far indicate that
the Navy did get a submarine put back in 2015. So that draft
plan that they are looking at would have two per year, at least
from 2011 to 2015. Now, beyond that, that would be a different
story.
The question of whether the--the cost implications if they
don't achieve two a year is going to have--there are going to
be several effects. The first effect would be that if you go
back to having to build one submarine a year, that individual
submarine is going to be a lot more expensive. It will increase
the cost by on the orders of hundreds of millions of dollars.
It will have a second effect of it will increase the costs
of the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers that are being built
at Newport News. Already the re-centering of the carrier
program that was announced by Secretary Gates last spring to 5-
year centers adds a little cost to the submarines, on the order
of $20 million to $50 million, according to the Navy. So,
presumably, going back to one per year after 2015 is going to
increase cost not only on the subs but also on the aircraft
carriers as well.
Dr. Thompson. If we were to build any fewer Virginia-class
than two per year between now and 2025, then we would be
looking at a force of less than 43 at the low point in 2028.
Our warfighting requirement is for 48.
Now, we can fill that gap in a variety of ways. I mean,
they already have found some workarounds, like, for example,
compressing the construction time so that they cannot go any
lower. But every boat you take out of the sequence between now
and 2025, any less than two per year and you go down to 42 and
to 41, and you just can't cover the world. You have to decide
someplace that is not going to be covered today.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just very quickly, in terms of the cost
impact, it is worth remembering that when the Navy was working
toward the goal of getting the procurement costs of the
Virginia class down to $2 billion each in 2005 dollars, that
they had to take about $400 million out of the cost of the ship
to do that. About half of that improvement, about $200 million,
was achieved simply by going from one boat per year to two.
So if you were to go from two boats per year back to one,
you would expect that the cost of the ships would increase by
roughly that same amount. So we are looking at something in the
range of a $200 million increase in unit procurement cost in
2005 dollars, which would be higher in today's dollars, should
you go back down to one per year.
In terms of the vulnerability of the procurement profile to
being reduced to less than two per year, there are really three
periods in question. One is between now and fiscal year 2013.
And it seems to me that it is unlikely that you would fall off
two per year between now and fiscal year 2013 because those
boats are covered under a multiyear procurement plan, and
dropping below two per year in that period would entail
breaking that multiyear contract, which has a very significant
termination liability attached to it.
The second period is 2014 through 2018, when you are no
longer under the current multiyear contract that calls for two
per year. And I think during that period there is a fair amount
of vulnerability for DOD or the Navy to look at taking a boat
out every once in a while and dropping to something less than a
solid two per year.
And then an even higher period of vulnerability starts in
fiscal year 2019, when we start building the new SSBN, because
then at that point you run into this issue of the SSBN putting,
potentially, very much pressure on the remainder of the
shipbuilding budget, including the attack submarines.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, could I ask for clarification
on one thing? I know my time----
Mr. Taylor. Sure.
Mr. Langevin. The Ohio Replacement Program, if I could, on
cost, you--at least, Dr. Thompson, you said it is expected that
they would run about $7 billion a copy and $85 billion for the
fleet of Ohio replacements.
Can you talk about how that figure was arrived at? Was that
based on paying for it individually, one at a time, or was that
assuming a bulk buy, if you would, of the Ohio replacements?
Dr. Thompson. Dr. Labs and Mr. O'Rourke both cited similar
numbers, $6 billion to $7 billion per ship, in their prepared
statements. The Navy's actual internal estimate is $15 billion
for R&D, $10 billion for the lead ship, and then $5 billion for
each ship thereafter.
Dr. Labs. Mr. Langevin, the $7 billion figure and the $85
billion was in my prepared statement as a CBO estimate. We
determined that by not using a bulk buy or a multiyear
procurement process, but we did give them the benefits of, in
effect, a rate effect of assuming that at least one attack
submarine was being built in the yard or under a teaming
arrangement, like we are building attack submarines today, each
year that a new boomer was being built.
And then the estimates were based on adjustments for
inflation in terms of the time period that we are building it
based on Virginia-class analogies adjusted for a larger-class
submarine, a larger weight.
Mr. Langevin. And if it were a multiyear procurement buy,
would that number come down significantly?
Dr. Labs. I would have to go back and sort of, take a look
at that in comparison to what has happened with Virginia class.
There would certainly be some degree of savings in that, but I
couldn't tell you off the top of my head how much that would
be.
Mr. Langevin. Could you do that and get back to the
committee?
Dr. Labs. Sure.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just as a quick addendum to what Dr. Labs has
testified, the SSBN(X) would not be, under current law,
eligible for a multiyear procurement through the first few
ships in the program, because you need to establish design
stability as a statutory requirement for qualifying for
multiyear procurement (MYP).
But for the first few ships in the program, you could use a
block buy, as was done for the first few ships in the Virginia
class. And the savings on the Virginia-class block buy were in
the range of about five percent. If it was an augmented block
buy that also had Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) authority,
which was not the case in the Virginia block buy, it could be
something north of 5 percent. Later on in the program, when you
get into a real multiyear procurement thing the savings might
be more, closer to 10 percent.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz [presiding]. Ms. Pingree.
Ms. Pingree. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you for your testimony today. It has been very
enlightening to me. As a freshman Member, I always have a lot
to learn, and I appreciate all of your perspective on this.
I just have one question, again, kind of a procurement
question. We have been talking a lot about the dependence on
the DDG-51s. And I will start with Mr. O'Rourke, but if anybody
else has a comment, I am interested to learn.
You have said in recent years that the Navy, particularly
with this increased dependence, needs to procure at least three
DDG-51s per year in order to match and meet the required force
structure levels. In the past, you have based this assessment
on historical data detailing the useful service life of major
surface combatants and the minimum level of investment needed
to maintain the Nation's surface combatant industrial base.
Several Navy reports on industrial base have also noted
that, in order to maintain two major surface combatant
shipyards, a minimum of three DDG-51s must be procured each
year, along with additional work in the yards.
So my question, and particularly given that I have one of
those yards in my district and we are interested in industrial
capacity, and I know that is something that is important to the
Chair, as well: If the DDG-51 procurement rate going forward is
below three ships a year, what impact will that have on the
Navy's ability to sustain a major surface combatant force and
maintain a strong industrial base?
I know we have talked around this a little bit, but I just,
kind of, want to go over this again to talk about these
specific numbers.
Mr. O'Rourke. All right. The rate that is reportedly in the
plan is one and a half ships per year.
Ms. Pingree. That is what we understand.
Mr. O'Rourke. And at least half of that, if not more than
half of that, would need to go to Bath Iron Works if Bath were
to operate at a level commensurate with what it has had in
recent years.
In terms of the impact on the industrial base generally,
which includes both Bath and the Ingalls yard down on the Gulf
Coast, the impact would depend also on how much amphibious
shipbuilding there is, because that is work that would add to
the workload, especially down at the Gulf Coast yards. And this
plan does not have very many amphibious ships in it.
And that is one reason why I tried to signal that in the
five-year plan there is an issue with the amount of surface
ship work. And, in particular, in the five-year plan, it
relates to the amphibious ships in the Gulf Coast yards. But in
the 30-year plan, it also relates to the scenario that happens
if the Navy has to pay for the SSBNs out of hide. Because that
drives down many of the other shipbuilding programs into one-
per-year rates. In fact, as I have said at times in the past,
it turns the Navy's plan into a digital shipbuilding program;
it has nothing but ones and zeros in it.
And that rate is sustained in that scenario for a long
enough period of time that I think that would make a
consolidation of some kind of the surface ship industrial base
a distinct possibility, if not a likelihood.
Ms. Pingree. Uh-huh. Which is certainly a reduction in our
industrial capacity.
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes.
Dr. Labs. The alternative to that, if it does not--and I
would agree with Mr. O'Rourke. I think a long run where you are
building one DDG-51 equivalent per year would lead to some kind
of consolidation. But if it didn't, it would certainly lead to
a much higher unit cost for those ships because you are paying
for a lot more overhead on one ship as opposed to spreading it
over a number of ships.
Dr. Thompson. Well, if we knew 10 years ago what we know
now, we wouldn't have built any DDG-1000s and we would have
built three or four DDG-51s in various upgraded variants
instead. And we would be doing it now and well into the future.
Bath is not going to suffer. If the Navy had its way, it
would send all the surface combatants to Bath. But in the
current----
Ms. Pingree. We appreciate you saying that.
Dr. Thompson. Oh, well, that is what the Navy tells me.
Ms. Pingree. I am sure the Chair would differ, but I
appreciate it.
Dr. Thompson. But, however----
Mr. Taylor [presiding]. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Mr. Thompson, I
am sorry, you are just way out of line.
Dr. Thompson. I am merely characterizing----
Ms. Pingree. We know Secretary Mabus would never let that
happen.
Dr. Thompson. As a matter of fact, he has been quite vocal
on maintaining the industrial base, so you are right about
that.
But I think, as a practical matter, Bath probably is not
looking at any serious shortfall in workload going forward,
given the fact that it has all of the Zumwalt class and will
get some of the DDG-51s.
Ms. Pingree. Thank you.
You know, I am going to regret asking a stupid question,
but what do you mean when you say ``out of hide''?
Mr. O'Rourke. It means you have to pay for the SSBNs within
your budget without an offset----
Ms. Pingree. Oh, so taking it out of your hide.
Mr. O'Rourke. Uh-huh.
Ms. Pingree. Got it.
Mr. O'Rourke. That you don't get an offsetting increase to
your budget to help pay for it, whether that increase is within
the shipbuilding account or within a new specialized account
elsewhere in the DOD budget, that you have to absorb it along
with everything else that you were already planning on doing.
Ms. Pingree. Got it. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman.
And since we are coming upon the season of Lent, the Chair
is going to try to be forgiving to the gentleman from New
England for making a very reasonable remark, however
inaccurate.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Massa.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, sir.
I was interested to just hear the statement, ``If we knew
10 years ago what we know now, we probably would have not
purchased any DDG-1000s.'' And, for the record, at least one
member of this committee did, in fact, know 10 years ago what
we know now and, in other capacities, was incredibly verbal in
opposition to that ship class, an opposition I continue to be
verbal on.
We built the two command ships based on a previous
generation of amphibious hulls. Is it outside the box, Mr.
O'Rourke, to consider using LPD-17 platform to replace those
two command ships?
Mr. O'Rourke. It is not outside the box at all. In fact,
there have been multiple press articles over the last year or
two about how the Navy is considering, or was at least at one
point considering, using either the LPD-17 hull or the T-AKE
(Auxiliary Cargo (K) and Ammunition (E) Ship) hull as the basis
for a new command ship.
I think if you have a command ship in the program, that
would continue to be the Navy's going-in way of looking at the
issue. But it appears now that, under fiscal pressures, that
the command ship has dropped out of the Navy's program
entirely, in which case the question doesn't arise anymore.
Mr. Massa. And your estimate on the remaining hull life on
the two command ships, Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge, that we
currently have?
Mr. O'Rourke. I would have to see when they were
commissioned. I actually haven't looked at that lately. But
they are not young.
Mr. Massa. Commensurate with my birth. So you are correct.
Dr. Labs, we have had a lot of conversation today about
ballistic missile defense and a fundamental re-shift in
national strategy that has a tremendous impact on the U.S. Navy
fleet. We have also talked a lot about in-hide/out-of-hide for
SSBNs. Is it not true that ballistic missile defense is a
national defense priority and not a naval defense priority?
Dr. Labs. I think it is reasonable to characterize
ballistic missile defense that way. And, certainly, many
observers, you know, do so.
Mr. Massa. Since the construction of all land-based and
aerial activities associated with ballistic missile defense did
not come out of those services' hides, is it not, therefore, at
least argumentative that we should examine other funding
streams for this series of constructions of enhanced Burke-
class destroyers as we are discussing enhanced funding streams
for strategic ballistic defense submarines?
Dr. Labs. I would certainly agree that it is reasonable to
look at alternative funding streams for that purpose.
Mr. Massa. So you wouldn't consider that to be an
irrational consideration?
Dr. Labs. No, sir, I would not consider that to be an
irrational consideration.
Mr. Massa. All right. Thank you.
To my good friend with regional concerns from New England,
you obviously are very, very focused on and very knowledgeable
about submarine fleets, and I welcome that.
What is your vision of what we are going to do to replace
the three that I know of, and perhaps more, special mission
submarines that are currently extant in the force? Have you
heard or seen, has anyone discussed, are we are going to go do
that with serial productions with enhanced hulls that we are
going to take out of the current, or is Carter and her fellow
hulls going to just live forever?
Dr. Thompson. Well, in the case of the Seawolf class, this
is sort of a nightmare to maintain, because it is a unique
class of three ships, and doing spare parts and sustainment is
very expensive.
Over the long term, the logical solution would be to build
a variant of the Virginia class. I fully expect Virginia class
to go beyond 40 ships anyway, so that would be the logical way
to go. Given the other constraints, particularly in the
undersea ship construction part of the SCN budget, I don't
think we could really afford any alternative to that.
Mr. Massa. Is it out of the box to consider that perhaps
the three one-of-a-kind Carter-class submarines can act as
escorts for the three one-of-a-kind Zumwalt-class DDG-1000
surface combatants?
Dr. Thompson. Could you say that again?
Mr. Massa. Since we are into building three of a kind, the
Carter class and the Zumwalts, for which nobody knows what we
are going to do with those anyway, perhaps there is some
synergy in combining those two shipbuilding programs that I
would consider to be somewhat less than successful.
But one last specific question as far as submarines go. We
haven't discussed at all today surface infrastructure--in other
words, bases, where we are going to put everything. Obviously,
the Navy is operating under some incredible fiscal constraints,
and that is only going to get worse.
In a perfect world, it would be nice to park a nuclear
aircraft carrier anywhere. In a non-perfect world, does it make
sense to spend almost as much money on creating a new nuclear-
capable homeport as it does building a nuclear-capable ship?
Dr. Thompson. I might be able to make the strategic case
for Guam but not for Florida.
Mr. Massa. So you would, from your expert opinion, question
the allocation of significant dollar bills into nuclearizing,
for lack of a better word, all of the infrastructure necessary
in a northern Florida port, specifically in Mayport?
Dr. Thompson. I wouldn't question it. It is a waste of
money. I already know the answer: It is a waste of money.
Mr. Massa. So that is relatively frank speaking in a
building that is not used to relatively frank speaking.
Dr. Thompson. You know, we are spending $4 billion a day in
this government that we do not have. And, meanwhile, our share
of global GDP has fallen from 32 percent to 24 percent in one
decade. So, to spend that kind of money to get no additional
gain in terms of military capability is bordering on the
scandalous.
Mr. Massa. Mr. O'Rourke, you and I have had a relationship
that spans now more than a decade, and we have engaged in
tabletop intellectual conversations about the Navy for some
time. And yet here we are with three DDG-1000s of which will
have no general ship fleet purpose and some 52 LCSs that will
need to be refueled every 48 hours if they operate at any
operation tempo (OPTEMPO) necessary.
Is there anything at all in the budget with respect to
looking at things like tankers?
Mr. O'Rourke. You mean tanker ships as opposed to----
Mr. Massa. Well, unless someone has figured out a way of
aerial refueling the LCSs.
Mr. O'Rourke. You mean oilers.
Mr. Massa. Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke. The Navy does have a downstream plan to
replace the current oiler fleet. And reportedly in the press
reports that came out last year, the Navy for a time was
looking at bringing forward the start of the new oiler program
and combining it with what had been the MLP program into some
kind of combined TAO-MLP.
In the most recent reporting about the Navy shipbuilding
plan, that idea has once again been set aside. And the Navy is
proposing to build a reduced-cost Mobile Landing Platform
(MLP), and the TAO is now once again out beyond the end of the
FYDP.
Mr. Massa. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I always
appreciate your insights and inputs.
And, Mr. Chairman, that calls it for the day.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any additional
questions.
I just want to thank each of you gentlemen for being here.
We appreciate your expertise and your willingness to share that
with us.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I guess my parting thoughts would be--and I want
to thank all of you for being here.
Mr. Thompson, I am going to try to forget that incredibly
inappropriate remark.
But the biggest concern is--and I have also been very
fortunate to know Mr. O'Rourke for a while. You know, for at
least 10 years, Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) have come
before this committee saying the ideal fleet is 313 ships. And
under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, what they
say they need and what the Administration asks for have never
matched up. Not one President that I have served with has asked
for a minimum of 10 ships. And given the 30-year expected life,
10 times 30 gets you to that 300-plus-ship Navy.
Having seen the disconnect between what the Navy says they
want and what the Administrations, be it the Democrats or
Republicans, ask for, I have some very serious concerns that
the President's plan to put our Nation's missile defense on
ships is not going to be followed up with the proper budget
request.
And I realize we don't live in an ideal world. I realize
that no one could have envisioned six, seven years ago that we
would spend $24 billion on mine-resistant vehicles. On the flip
side, I think every penny of that was worthwhile because kids
are coming home alive that would have died needlessly, lost
their limbs needlessly. So we recognized the vulnerability, I
regret to say, too late, but we did recognize that
vulnerability. We took the steps to keep people from dying
needlessly. And those vehicles that worked well in Iraq are now
being retrofitted and on their way to Afghanistan.
So that is $24 billion that will not be available. I am
also aware that, depending on who you ask, $12 billion to $14
billion a month is being spent on those two conflicts. Again,
when I got here in 1989, I don't think too many people saw us
in a land war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those things happened.
So, given the realities of the world, but also given, as
Mr. Thompson pointed out, things we don't expect to happen do
happen, and we don't have the luxury of saying, ``Gee, we
didn't see it coming,'' particularly if it is a nuclear missile
attack coming from someone we didn't expect any time we didn't
expect against our Nation, what should we be spending this year
to start putting that nuclear defense from the sea into place?
I realize I have just laid out the realities of the world,
but what should we be spending, starting this year, to make the
plan that the President announced work?
And, by the way, since all of you have spoken very freely,
if you don't think we ought to be putting our Nation's missile
defense on ships, say so now.
Dr. Thompson. Virtually any attack on the United States is
going to come over an ocean. And that means having the
deployability, the flexibility of putting the defenses at sea,
at least one of the layers, makes a lot of sense strategically
and operationally.
We are not going to get much mileage out of the Zumwalt
class. So I think we have to move on to thinking about, well,
how many DDG-51s do we need? At the very least, we should be
building three a year in the upgraded configuration, maybe
four. But I am not sure, as you pointed out in your own
remarks, that the Administration has thought this all the way
through yet.
Mr. Taylor. Dr. Labs.
Dr. Labs. Mr. Chairman, as you know, as a CBO analyst I am
not in a position to make policy recommendations. But that
being said, if you are----
Mr. Taylor. But, Dr. Labs, I think you are off the hook
because we asked your opinion.
Dr. Labs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My performance review is
coming up in two weeks. I am not sure----
Mr. Taylor. I would remind the gentleman that no money may
be drawn from the Treasury except by an appropriation by
Congress.
Dr. Labs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you decide that you want three ballistic missile
stations in Europe at sea and you want to maintain and you want
to populate those stations more or less on a continuous basis
or something close to it, then you are going to need in the
neighborhood of what we were talking about, the three to five
ships per station.
So, depending on how fast you want to get there, you would
need to start adding ships into your shipbuilding plan pretty
much as soon as the acquisition system can accommodate them.
Meaning that, if you add money this year, you may not be able
to buy the ship immediately, but maybe you can; it kind of
depends on what the capacity is that the Navy currently has
available to add ships to the program.
Mr. Taylor. So, in specific numbers--and, again, I realize
we are not living in an ideal word--in specific numbers, how
many ships should we be asking for this year for that purpose?
Dr. Labs. Well, given that the Navy is already planning--
has already got the Zumwalts being built at Bath, are planning
to request for one DDG-51 this year, certainly doubling that
procurement rate would be the first logical step that I would
take if you were trying to achieve that level of capacity, you
know, say, by about 2018 or so.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. I am under the same strictures that Eric is
about making policy recommendations. But if the issue is trying
to meet the near-term pressure for BMD capability in Europe,
then the steps that you might want to look at, in terms of
their ability to produce capability in the shorter run, there
are two. And one of those would be to fund the modernization of
existing 51s at whatever maximum capacity----
Mr. Taylor. You had given us the amount of, what, $54
million? Is that what you said, sir?
Mr. O'Rourke. I think it is $40 million to $45 million, the
last time the Navy asked.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. And are you pretty confident of that
number, since we don't have a very good track record of coming
in under budget?
Mr. O'Rourke. That answer is several months old, so it is a
little bit higher. But the Navy has already had some experience
in doing this, so I think there is less risk in that number
than there would be in building a lead ship, for example.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Mr. O'Rourke. So it may be something higher than $40
million to $45 million.
But if you are trying to find ways to generate BMD
capability in the short run to meet a demand that has appeared
for BMD capability as a result of the Administration's new
plan, then one option would be to look at funding the
conversions of existing 51s into a BMD configuration at
whatever annual rate both funding and industrial capacity could
support.
And the other would be to put additional money into the
procurement of SM-3 missiles. Because the inventory of those is
fairly low, and once you put money into that, those missiles
will appear two to three years later.
If you want to solve a longer-term problem about having BMD
capability, then that is what construction of new ships can
handle. But construction of new ships, putting that into the
budget now will not produce a new ship until about five years
from now. If what you are really concerned about handling first
is this near-term problem, then it is conversions and
procurement of SM-3 missiles that are the options that could
address such a concern within that time frame.
Dr. Thompson. If I could just reiterate something I said
earlier, if we just modernize at the current standard, it won't
do us much good in terms of defending the United States or
other countries that are being attacked by intermediate- or
long-range missiles. Because the standard that we are
modernizing to right now is for short- or medium-range missiles
with relatively simple warheads--in other words, the sort of
thing that Iran might do in its first generation of offensive
weapons.
If we want to defend the United States or, say, Japan
against a longer-range missile, then we are talking about step
three or step four of the plan that the Administration
announced in September, rather than step one, which is what we
are doing now.
Mr. Taylor. For the panel, what is your understanding on
the modification of an existing DDG-51 to a theater missile
defense configuration? What is the timeline on that, best-case
scenario, worst-case scenario?
Mr. O'Rourke. My understanding is that is being done now as
a part of the general modernizations of the existing 51s. And
those modernizations are, the last time I checked, being
accomplished through a two-part plan of roughly 12 months'
duration between the two parts, where the ship comes in and has
some hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) upgrades for
roughly 6 months and then comes in at a later point for combat
system upgrades, again another 6 months or so. And, presumably,
the BMD work would be done principally during the second of
those two modernization periods.
And so, after about 12 months of work, which would take
more than 12 months to accomplish because of the time in
between those two periods, at the end of that process you now
have a DDG-51 that is modernized in various ways, including the
addition of a BMD capability.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
Are there additional questions for the panel?
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, the only thing----
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. I would like to comment on is that
your remarks about Mr. Thompson's statement about Bath may have
been a little bit off, but he was right on the money on
Mayport. And so we want to make sure that we get that down for
the record.
Mr. Taylor. So noted.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. No.
Mr. Taylor. Ms. Pingree.
Mr. Massa.
Ms. Pingree, I would remind you that I really wasn't a
proponent of that third 1000, so we--but anyway.
Ms. Pingree. I appreciate that, sir.
Mr. Taylor. But, again, we thank you very, very much. I
think we all think this hearing could have been much, much
better had the Navy been here today, but I think you gentlemen
did a fine job. Thank you.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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