[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
NEITHER APPEASEMENT NOR IMPROVEMENT? PROSPECTS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH
SYRIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-99
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANTUntil 5/5/10 deg.
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota DANA ROHRABACHER, California
RON KLEIN, Florida EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
VACANTUntil 6/9/10 deg.
Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Staff Director
Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
Dalis Adler, Staff AssociateFrom Blumenfeld as of 9/9/09 deg.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Former United
States Ambassador to Lebanon).................................. 15
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 4
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement............. 18
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 42
Hearing minutes.................................................. 43
NEITHER APPEASEMENT NOR IMPROVEMENT? PROSPECTS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH
SYRIA
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:44 p.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary Ackerman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Ackerman. Committee will come to order. There has been
a lot of news about Syria lately, but that is not why this
hearing was scheduled. Work on this hearing began well before
SCUD missiles were once again in the news. In fact, the
conceptual roots of this hearing go back to May 2008, when
Hezbollah waged a brief, but effective, street war against the
legitimate, constitutionally framed, democratically elected
Government of Lebanon. We should all remember that event
because that was the point when American dreams and illusions
about Lebanon should have been laid to rest.
In a region where politics is a deadly business and no
quarter is given to the weak, the United States, throughout the
period from the Seda revolution to the Hezbollah insurrection
pursued a policy ripe with bombast and bluster, but backed only
by empty words. Facing vicious, determined foes playing for the
highest possible stakes, the previous administration offered
only token opposition while maintaining a fierce, hard line, at
least in words. Even as U.S. forces turned the tide in Iraq by
allying with previously adversarial Suni insurgents to defeat
al-Qaeda, our official policy remains fixed for the principle
that speaking to our foes was an insufferable dishonor.
As Vice President Cheney put it: We don't negotiate with
evil, we defeat it. A very admirable sentiment, but what
happened during this period of toughness and ideological zeal?
When U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which prohibited
arms sales or transfers to Hezbollah, was violated almost
instantly, what was the U.S. response? Empty words. When the
March 14 majority in Parliament and liberal journalists began
to be assassinated one by one, what was the U.S. response?
Empty words. When the March 14 majority was unable to convene
Parliament to name a president of their choosing, what was the
U.S. response? Empty words. When Hezbollah took to the streets
to challenge the authority of the Government of Lebanon, what
was the U.S. response? Again, empty words.
When Saudi Arabia and France changed policy and began to
court Damascus, what was the U.S. response? Empty words. When
Syria refused to cooperate with the IEA's investigation of the
bombed al-Qaeda reactor, what was the U.S. response? Empty
words. In terms of U.S. credibility, the Obama administration
inherited not a partial failure, but a total collapse. Even as
the Seda revolution was progressively swallowed up by
insurrection from within and subversion from without, previous
administration changed the rhetoric or its belief that speaking
directly to Damascus was an unwarranted gift. They certainly
believed in the efficacy of coercion from the moral high
ground, but somehow never actually got around to doing very
much of it when it came to Syria.
Sadly, what counts in the world and nowhere more so than
the Middle East, is power, hard and soft, and the will and
capacity to use it. During the years from 2005 to 2009, all the
bluster, notwithstanding our foes, took our measure and found
the United States clearly lacking. Nearly all the reverses
Damascus and its allies suffered from the Seda revolution have
now mostly been undone. From the policymakers and supporters of
the previous administration, who, in decency, ought to have
slunk off in shamed silence for having watched fecklessly as
this disaster, like Iran's steady march toward nuclear weapons
capability unfolded under their watch, what do they have to say
today? Appeasement, appeasement, they cry, attempting to evoke
the days leading up to World War II.
This charge is grotesque. Apart from the indecency of the
comparison with the unique horror and evil of Nazi Germany, the
cheap demagoguery of the word utterly fails to capture what the
Obama administration is actually doing. Where, one might ask,
is the long list of concessions from Americans to Syria? Where
is the surrender and the sellout of our allies? Where is the
retreat in the face of challenge? A few airplane parts? A few
inconclusive meetings? The string of defeats and failures that
brought us to the current impasse occurred, let us not forget,
during the previous administration. The seeming limits of
American power were brutally exposed well before Barack Obama
was even elected to his high office.
Appeasement? That is shameless nonsense and more empty
words. It is true that the Obama administration is pursuing a
different policy than the spectacular failure of its
predecessor, but that is just good sense. Everywhere but
Washington, not repeating mistakes is considered a good, or
even a very good thing. There is one criticism of the
administration's Syria policy that I do hold with and hope can
be corrected today. The explanation of it has been poor, and
the defense of it even worse. Though I have focused heavily on
foreign policy during my time in Congress, my professional
background is as a public school teacher and as a publisher of
community newspapers. From both positions I learned a lot, but
nothing more important than these two truths. Nothing explains
itself, and nothing sells itself.
If you want to understand that our policy with Syria is not
predicated on compelling major changes in Syrian behavior in
the short term, that has to be explained. If you want people to
understand that our policy of sanctions and political pressure
will be sustained until there are changes in Syrian behavior,
that has to be explained. If you want the people to understand
that dispatching an American ambassador to Syria is a tool to
send and receive messages and to gather political intelligence
for our own use, that has to be explained. If you want people
to understand that trying diplomacy with Syria is not a
betrayal of our values or our friends, that has to be
explained. That is why we are here today. Hopefully to make
things clear, to make things plain, to give the Obama
administration its chance to explain a policy which I suspect
will be frustrating and slow, but at least at the very least it
will be one founded on more than just empty words. Now I am
happy to call upon my friend and partner in the hearing, Dan
Burton.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman
follows:]Ackerman statement deg.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I make my
formal remarks I would just like to say since the previous
administration has been somewhat castigated, let me say the
support for Israel and Bibi Netanyahu and his administration
has been wanting by this administration. This administration,
in my opinion, has shown very little support and respect for
Mr. Obama and Israel, and that is of great concern to me today.
Let me now get to my statement. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
much for convening today's hearing to examine future relations
with Syria. I find it very important and timely in light of the
recent troubling reports surfacing in the media that Syrian
President al-Assad is continuing the country's dubious
precedent of sponsoring terrorism in the region.
Despite little evidence to suggest that the Syrian
Government has actively sought to improve upon its track record
as an international sponsor of terrorism, the Obama
administration, in concert with its overall misguided policy
toward the Middle East, has sought to improve bilateral
relations through enhanced diplomatic efforts. This is a
terrorist state. Just like the administration's policy toward
Iran and Israel, I find these efforts to be not only imprudent,
but also extremely counterproductive to U.S. policy in the
region. Now we see another of Obama's diplomatic efforts, the
engagement with Syria, come back to bite us in the end. I would
use stronger language but think you get the message.
Syria has not altered its hostile behavior, nor provided
any assurances that they are willing to do so as it continues
to undermine Lebanese sovereignty; pursue their own covert
nuclear program; support not only Hezbollah, but other Islamist
extremist groups, such as Hamas and al-Qaeda in Iraq; stockpile
both ballistic and unconventional weapons; preserve its close
relationship with Iran; and obstruct the investigations of the
International Atomic Energy Agency of their alleged nuclear
site that Israel targeted in 2007, among other things. In my
opinion, these illicit activities pose a substantial threat to
U.S. troops in the region, as well as the security of U.S.
allies throughout the Middle East.
In fact, Syria's behavior, like its sponsor, Iran, has
become increasingly belligerent and threatening, as evidenced
by the recent reports of its supplying Hezbollah with medium-
range SCUD missiles. This development comes a little more than
a month after U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs William Burns met with President al-Assad in Syria and
held additional talks shortly afterwards. During these talks,
the United States demanded that Syria stop the smuggling of
weapons in Syria to Hezbollah. Clearly, the administration's
policy of engagement, like in Iran, is not working. According
to some experts, as of this past December, Hezbollah was known
to possess missiles capable of reaching Haifa and Tel Aviv.
Now, as one recent Los Angeles Times editorial notes, this
new acquisition makes the Lebanese militants the first
irregular army to possess such weapons and enables them to
target virtually every bit of Israel. The administration warned
that such a move could destabilize the region, and clearly,
such a threat creates yet another setback for the President's
Middle East policy, a dangerous course of action that has been
one concession after another, rather than defending our allies,
like Israel, and our critical national security interests. It
would appear that this administration believes the problem with
Syria is an American failure to communicate with or to
``engage'' the Syrian regime, but the fact of the matter is it
is not the American willingness to talk to Syria that is a
problem, but Syria's refusal, like its patron, Iran, to halt
its hostile actions.
If the Los Angeles Times report is true, Syrian President
al-Assad, like Iranian leader Ahmadinejad, is saying one thing,
last month, for example, he reaffirmed his commitment to
seeking peace with Israel, while his actions indicate another.
Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute puts this
threat and its broader implications into perspective when he
said this past December that Iran may be Hezbollah's chief
patron, but Syria is the linchpin that makes Iranian support
for foreign fighters possible. While Israel may be the
intermediate target of the Iran-Syria nexus, the partnership
threatens broader U.S. interests.
This relationship was further evident in February in a
meeting in Damascus less than a week after Under Secretary
Burns' visit when President al-Assad, President Ahmadinejad and
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah were the
triumvirate, guaranteed their resistance against the U.S.-
Israeli alliance, and, as one foreign policy article put it,
openly mocked U.S. efforts to distance Syria from Iran and
stated that his government is preparing ourselves for any
Israeli aggression. Engagement with rogue regimes, like those
of Syria and Iran, does not work and undermines every U.S. and
international effort for peace and stability in the Middle
East.
The United States, and other nations, must hold the al-
Assad regime, and others like it, accountable for its continued
support of terrorists and subsequent efforts to destabilize the
region. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, Assistant
Secretary Feltman, as he sheds more light on the issues before
us, but I think it is extremely important, Mr. Chairman, that
we state as an administration, and as a government, our
unequivocal support for Israel in making sure that Israel's
right to exist is guaranteed, and we are going to do everything
in our power to make sure that Iran and Syria and their actions
are not going to be jeopardizing our relationship. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. You will get no argument from me.
Mr. Burton. I love you, man.
Mr. Ackerman. I would ask unanimous consent that Mr. Issa
be allowed to participate in the hearing, speaking and asking
questions at the end of each round. So ordered. Ms. Berkley?
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my points of
view are very well-known to this committee, and certainly to
the Mr.. deg. I just want to welcome the ambassador.
Anxious to hear what he has to say, less anxious to hear what
my colleagues have to say before we hear you, so let me be the
first to pass.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Royce?
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just when you think
that it can't get any worse, it does. Syria has gone from
supporting terrorism against U.S. troops in Iraq to political
murder in Lebanon. It then collaborated with North Korea to
build a nuclear reactor designed for weapons production. Now we
have allegations of SCUD transfers to Hezbollah, which is a
significant escalation of the threat that Nasrallah presents to
the region, especially given the fact that he could now lob
those SCUDs into Israel. I was in Israel in August 2006 during
the Hezbollah war and I was in Haifa. I remember at that time
the lack of restraint on the part of the rocket attacks into
the civilian sector of that town, into the business districts.
At one point the trauma hospital was targeted. I remember
going into the trauma hospital and talking with some of the
victims of those attacks, and Syria, of course, had
manufactured the weapons, the rockets. There were 70,000 ball
bearings on each one of them. When those crash into the
business district or crash into people's homes, you can imagine
what it does. I think there was a presumption in Haifa, because
it was such a cosmopolitan town with such a lot of Arab-Jews,
Druze, Arab-Israelis, Jewish-Israelis, and Druze-Israelis, that
perhaps the civilian sector wouldn't be targeted. It was.
So now, looking back, I remember going into a bunker at one
point when we were shelled by rocket fire. I think ahead of the
fact that if that was problematic, what is it going to mean
when Hezbollah has this option with the SCUDs? Well, it seems
the lure of a temperate Syria is a very enduring one because
when Bashar al-Assad came to power a decade ago there was hope
that his stint studying abroad and his interest in computers
would signal openness to the West. That was not to be. More
recently, The Economist noted that the increasing popularity of
sushi restaurants in Damascus was a sign that different winds
are blowing in Syria. That is an interesting theory.
For some time it has become fashionable in diplomatic
circles to believe that U.S. engagement with Syria would help
to flip Damascus out of Iran's orbit. This remains a theory.
Days after the Obama administration announced its intention to
return a U.S. ambassador to Damascus, Assad hosted Iran's
Ahmadinejad and publicly ridiculed U.S. policy in the region.
This was just after Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader,
joined them for that meeting. Our witness today will present
the case that increased U.S. engagement with Syria is key to
curtailing Syrian behavior. But it is important to remember
that the current debate over the fate of the ambassador
designee to Damascus is not a debate of diplomatic presence
versus no presence. We currently have a full and functioning
embassy in Syria that is engaging in all the things that our
embassies around the world do, just without an ambassador at
its helm. A full ambassador might get involved to more parties,
but I am hard-pressed to see how that would have curtailed the
assassinations, the terrorism, the proliferation. I just
thought I would take a moment and make that point. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. Mr. Ellison?
Mr. Ellison. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this
hearing. Although I won't exactly follow the fine example set
forth by Ms. Berkley, I hope to be close to her in terms of
being quick and brief. I want to admire and thank President
Obama's efforts to establish dialogue or improve dialogue
between Syria and U.S. officials. This is an important step in
trying to mend relations, and I believe that both Syrian and
American people gain from our two governments working together.
I also applaud the efforts of our witness, Assistant Secretary
Jeffrey Feltman, for being the first high level State
Department official to visit Syria since 2005. Efforts like
this are critical to trying to improve that relationship.
I also want to note that I don't believe that improved
dialogue between nations, even where there are clear and
legitimate conflicts, precludes efforts by either side to
pursue its national security interests. I don't think that
dialogue undermines either country's ability to see to the
well-being of its own citizens, and therefore, I don't think
that the efforts by the Obama administration to improve
dialogue in any way undermine U.S. interests. I think they
stand a good chance of improving them. Of course, there is no
guarantee, but without dialogue, it is certain that things will
not proceed on a productive course. So, with that, I thank the
witness for being here, and I look forward to the witness'
presentation and to the questions.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Ellison. Mr. Rohrabacher?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate you calling this hearing. I think that it is vital
for us to understand what is going on in that part of the world
because that is, of course, very involved with American
security, as well as Israeli security and the cause of peace. I
am looking forward to hearing the testimony. Let me just note,
I would like to know what will it take, what will it take to
turn Syrian policy around? What are we expected to do, and what
can we do that will take Syria and perhaps have it come in the
same course as Jordan and Egypt? Jordan and Egypt have now made
their peace, and they are certainly just as Arab as Syria, and
that is one thing that I would like to know.
Also, how do we promote friendship with a government like
Syria without sending a message of weakness? What can we do to
promote friendship, head them in the right direction, without
appearing to be weak? Our goal isn't continued, and shouldn't
be, some sort of hostility toward Syria or anybody else in that
area. Our goal should be is turning people from enemies, or at
least from hostile powers, into friends. During the Reagan
administration, let me note, there was nobody who was more
aggressive in dealing with the Communist threat than Ronald
Reagan, and by the end of his administration we had turned the
Soviet Union into a friend, or into a potential friend anyway.
So what is it going to take? Is the Syrian prerequisite to
peace with the United States and peace in that region, is it
eliminating Israel? If that is it, obviously, there is going to
be no peace. We need to know. Are you insisting that Israel as
a Jewish nation ceased to exist? Otherwise, we are going to
continue having this belligerency. We need to have that answer,
we need to study that. We have heard the litany of things that
Syria is doing that we disagree with, or not disagree with, but
find unconscionable: The supplying of weapons, especially if
they are rockets; support for groups that actually target
civilians, read that terrorism; support for groups that kill
American soldiers in their deployment in that part. These are
things that are just unacceptable, but how do we get the
Syrians then to stop those things? Not just prove it, but how
do we get them to change that policy?
One last note. I would like to know whether or not we have
a solution that would encompass the water issue. Very few times
do I come to hearings about Syria and this part of the world
where water is discussed with the degree that it should be
discussed, because I see that as a major factor that is never
really dealt with. Now, obviously the Syrians would like back
the Golan Heights. My reading of various people in Israel is
that the Golan Heights issue really isn't a national security
issue as much as it is a water issue. Is that the case? If that
is the case, how can we deal with that?
Is there a way to deal with the water issue, thus, the
Golan Heights and the security issue? Is there a way that we
can actually compensate or in some way mitigate what is going
on so that people won't be giving up water rights that they
believe are their own in order to have peace? These are some of
the questions that I hope we get at today, Mr. Chairman.
Appreciate you having this hearing so that we can have a better
understanding and better promote peace and stability in that
region. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Good questions, Mr. Rohrabacher. Hopefully we
will get some good answers. Mr. Engel?
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing today. I appreciate it very much. I think
it is timely, and I think there are important issues to talk
about and be answered. Ambassador Feltman, I am glad you are
appearing before our committee today. Often we hold hearings at
regular intervals to review U.S. policy toward one region or
another, but today things are different. The events are more
complicated, the situation is more dangerous and the worst
actors are more heavily armed. Early last decade I was pleading
with the Bush administration to develop a policy toward Syria.
It was unclear what our goals were toward the Assad regime or
how we would accomplish them.
Then, its support for terrorists groups, development of
weapons of mass destruction, support for guerillas entering
Iraq and occupation of Lebanon were the most destabilizing
policies coming out of Damascus. You may recall that in 2003
Congress passed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act, which I wrote. It enshrined these
factors as conditions for improving relations with the United
States. Since the passage of that law, Syria withdrew its
forces of occupation from Lebanon. Unfortunately, it continues
to develop weapons of mass destruction, and support terrorists,
and reports indicate that Syrian influence inside Lebanon is
growing. Lebanon once again seems to be held hostage to Syria.
Syria was a charter member of the State Department's list
of state sponsors of terrorism back in the 1970s and remains on
that list today. Less than 3 years ago, Israel was forced to
destroy a Syria nuclear reactor based on a North Korean design
that was the center of a nuclear weapons program, and now we
hear that Syria has sent SCUD missiles to Hezbollah. I am not
sure how things could be much worse. At the same time, there
are indications that the Obama administration has taken
observable steps to improve the relationship with the Assad
regime, including expediting requests for waivers of sanctions
and sending an ambassador back to Damascus. Frankly, I don't
know why. Leopards don't change their spots.
Unless there is something I don't know about, unless
something has happened behind the scenes, unless there is a
wink and a nod by the Assad regime that they want to work with
us and cooperate with us to stabilize the area, not destabilize
the area, I don't know why we are sending an ambassador at this
time. You know, right after we announced we were sending an
ambassador, it is an olive branch, what happens? Assad welcomes
Ahmadinejad of Iran to Damascus. It is almost like he is poking
a finger once again in the eye of the United States. So I don't
know why we are doing this. I will ask the same question that I
asked of the previous administration: Do we actually have a
policy toward Syria, and is it in our best interest, and what
are we doing?
I am glad that the State Department has condemned the
shipment of advanced weapons, including SCUD missiles, to
Hezbollah, but I want to hear what we are going to do about it
and how warming up to Syria is going to make things better. As
for me, Representative Mark Kirk and I will introduce a
resolution today condemning Syria's shipment of SCUD missiles
and other advanced weapons to Hezbollah. Our resolution calls
on the administration to put additional pressure on Damascus,
including imposing all remaining sanctions under the Syria
Accountability Act. To this day, I remain unclear as to why the
Syria Accountability Act has not been fully enforced. It wasn't
fully enforced under the previous administration, it is not
being enforced under this administration, and, in fact, I am
hearing that some of the sanctions that had been imposed are
now being loosened. I would like to know why.
So, Mr. Ambassador, I thank you for appearing today, and I
look forward to addressing the basic question: What is our
policy toward Syria? I don't think an answer is that we want to
make nice with them so they will be our friends. I would like
to have as many friends as we can have, but I also like to be
realistic. Unless Syria has indicated to us that it is willing
to work with us to stabilize the area rather than work with its
friend, Iran, to destabilize the area, I don't know what we get
out of talking with them and somehow pretending that that is
going to make things better. If the Assad regime really wants
to change, then I think we should work with them, but if it is
going to be the same old stuff, we have been down that dead end
before and I really don't think that is a solution for the
future. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. McMahon?
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Feltman, it
is an honor to see you again, and thank you for being here. As
we know, examples of civil unrest throughout the Middle East,
the Gulf States, Iraq, and even Bosnia, have been tied to Iran,
yet these examples are of autonomous states sort of battling
extremism within their borders. Unfortunately, Syria's
partnership with Iran stands out against these examples and
seems to be one of the most direct and mutual alliances. In
fact, President Assad at the Trilateral Conference even
referred to the Iran-Syria partnership as a circle of
cooperation that is expanding. Unfortunately, with the most
recent news of Syria transferring SCUD missiles that have been
modified to be fit with chemical warheads to terrorist proxies,
like Hezbollah, Assad is right, this relationship is definitely
expanding.
Syria's support for Hezbollah, an Iranian-controlled entity
in neighboring Lebanon, leaves Lebanese Christians and moderate
Muslims in fear of raising their voices against the Syrian
hegemony over Lebanon reversing the gains made in the Seda
revolution that resulted in the end of Syrian occupation of
Lebanon. I hope that increased engagement will eventually bring
about a Syrian Government that is not compelled toward violence
and belligerence by Iran and one that decides to finally move
toward peace with Israel and its neighbors. Secretary Feltman,
I would appreciate your insight into the administration's
vision for Syria going forward, particularly after the most
recent revelation, and also your views on Syrian influence on
Lebanon given your previous position as the U.S. Ambassador to
Lebanon. I cannot help to think that we almost needed to
include Iran in the title of this hearing given its hand in
these disturbing matters, and look forward to probing the Iran-
Syria relationship further with you under the chairman's
leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. McMahon. Mr. Green, did you
want to make a statement?
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
particularly timely hearing. I would like to welcome Ambassador
Feltman to our committee. Five years ago the U.S. removed its
ambassador from Damascus in protest to the Assad regime's
presumed role in the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister.
Now, as the administration prepares to reinstate diplomatic
ties, we must once again reassess the situation in order to
move forward with a policy toward Syria that also meets our
regional goal of a safe and secure Middle East. While it has
been no easy task addressing the challenges posed by the Syrian
Government, it is in our national interest to seek the change
to these troubling policies. Unfortunately, the Obama
administration's first year of engaging with Assad has yielded
few substantive achievements.
While Syrian facilitation of insurgents in Iraq has slowed,
top U.S. generals and senior Iraqi officials say the problem
still remains. At the same time, an increasing body of evidence
suggests that Damascus has provided the terrorist organization
Hezbollah with a new generation of sophisticated weaponry that
changes the equation along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Therefore, Ambassador Feltman, I hope you will share with us
whether the President is ready to renew the sanctions on Syria
under the Executive Orders, or whether there is consideration
in allowing the Executive Orders to expire. Is the
administration considering lifting any of the sanctions on
Syria, including those imposed pursuant to the Syrian
Accountability Act? While I appreciate the steps of the
administration to normalize U.S. relations with Syria, in
absence of any tangible changes in the Syrian Government, we
must continue to be steadfast and insist in order to achieve
serious bilateral relations. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for
holding the hearing. I look forward to the testimony of our
witness.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Green. Mr. Issa?
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After my long absence
and my current leave of absence, it is good to be back. Mr.
Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I think
nothing could be more timely than to have an Assistant
Secretary whose experience as the Council General in Jerusalem,
and then during perhaps the worst of all times to be Ambassador
in Lebanon. Like an earlier speaker, I was in Israel during the
2006 war. Unlike the earlier speaker, I was also in Lebanon. I
saw that because of the actions of Hezbollah, paid for and
funded by a combination of Iran and Syria, both Israel and
Lebanon suffered greatly in that war. We could push blame
toward the Lebanese for not doing enough to secure their
borders or we could push blame toward Israel for using cluster
bombs on areas of Lebanon, including civilian areas, but
neither would have occurred without Iran's constant support and
use of its proxy in Damascus.
I do support engagement. I even go so far as to support
that after this long hiatus, I was with Ambassador Scobie just
before she was withdrawn, I do support it could be time to send
an ambassador back. Mr. Chairman, Secretary, it is very clear
that ambassador must go back with the kind of tough language
and plan that will make a difference in the behavior. I believe
in engagement, I believe in meetings, I have met with Bashar
Assad from the first meeting after he was President through
perhaps one of the last to be made, but a little bit like our
former chairman, Mr. Lantos, I believe we need to walk in and
say we could perhaps be your best friend, and then give them
hell.
We need to make it very clear that Syria's behavior, both
in their support of al-Qaeda fighters going into Iraq to the
detriment and the loss of American lives and their continued
relationship with Iran, they have put us in a position where we
cannot ease sanctions, we cannot support that government in its
current form. Nothing stops us from having constructive
engagement, nothing should stop us from recognizing that there
are Americans who have families in Syria, and, of course,
conversely, Syrians who have families in America. We have deep
ties in the region. They are long. We even have a period of
time in which Syria was our ally, but that period is now long
ago.
Mr. Secretary, I have known you, I have known you to be a
fighter, I have known you to be a survivor, I have known you to
care about these people and their well-being enough to tell
them what they don't want to hear. I hope that with your
guidance the new ambassador, if confirmed, would, in fact, go
with the kind of understanding that we must change Syria's
behavior, and that the Obama government must recognize that
engagement should not turn into a simply blind eye toward the
behavior of one country, particularly when this country has a
history of turning a blind eye to Syria's occupation of
Lebanon, and their continued support of Hezbollah for a long
time in the country and a very, very clear movement by the
current, well, by the same Syrian regime now to reassert itself
in Lebanon.
I do have to note that we left Syria because of the
assassination of Rafic Hariri. Saad Hariri has gone to Damascus
in order to try to improve relations between these two
countries. That is a brave move for a man who truly believes he
went to meet with somebody who had a hand in the assassination
of his own father. We need to be as brave, but we also need to
support the bravery of the people of Lebanon and the people of
Israel who have put up for too many years with the kind of
attacks in violation of international law by a country who
enjoys full diplomatic status around the world. So, Mr.
Chairman, I look forward to hearing Ambassador Feltman's
statements, I look forward to working with him in his current
position, as I have in the past, but I join all the rest of the
speakers--the opportunity to speak last is actually very good
because I got to hear and agree with every statement made
before. With that, I thank the Mr. and yield back.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Burton. Can I make one comment real quick, Mr.
Chairman, before we go further?
Mr. Ackerman. Absolutely, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. I just want to say that he is Lebanese.
Mr. Ackerman. In that case, I want to reconsider my----
Mr. Issa. I was born in Cleveland. Let us make that
perfectly clear.
Mr. Burton. Yes, I understand, but he is of Lebanese
descent, and so is my wife, so, you know, I have to be real
careful about what I say around this place.
Mr. Ackerman. The record will so indicate.
Mr. Burton. My wife is better looking.
Mr. Ackerman. The gentleman was not recognized for that
purpose. I am delighted to welcome back to the subcommittee a
very distinguished diplomat and dedicated public servant,
Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, who was sworn in as Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on August 18, 2009.
A career member of the Foreign Service since 1986, Ambassador
Feltman served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs from February 2008 to his
present assignment, serving concurrently as Acting Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau since December 2008. From July 2004 to
January 2008, Ambassador Feltman served as the U.S. Ambassador
to the Republic of Lebanon. Prior to his assignment in Lebanon,
he held posts in Iraq and Israel at both the U.S. Embassy and
the Consulate in Jerusalem and Tunisia, among other countries.
It is always a pleasure to welcome you back, Mr. Ambassador.
Your entire statement will be placed in the record. You may
proceed as you will.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON)
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Ackerman,
Ranking Member Burton, distinguished members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss U.S. policy toward Syria, and thank you for allowing me
to submit a longer statement for the record. In holding this
hearing on Syria, the committee is examining a policy area
where the United States faces a number of challenges and
adverse conditions. Syria is a nation with which we have grave
concerns and a number of serious disagreements ranging from
human rights practices to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
We also believe, however, that we should test the
proposition of whether we might find some long-term interests
in common through the practice of clear eye diplomacy. After
all, Syria has said, just one example, that it wants to see a
stable, sovereign, secure, prosperous Iraq. That is our goal.
And unlike the Iranians refusal to acknowledge Israel's right
to exist, Syria's leaders have also said repeatedly over the
past 16 years or so that they view a comprehensive peace in the
Middle East as being in Syria's interest. To that end, the
Syrians have pursued a number of rounds of peace negotiations
with Israel. We, of course, want to see a comprehensive peace
in the region, and that would, of course, have to include
Syria.
You know, I share what all of you have said today, the
feelings that you have expressed today. Syria's actions fall
far short of its words in favor of peace in the region and a
stable and prosperous Iraq. Syria's Government also denies its
citizens many essential rights and freedoms. It maintains an
alliance, as you have all noted, with Hezbollah, one of the
most dangerous and destabilizing elements in the region. It
facilitates many of Iran's aggressive policies. For many years,
the United States has sought changes to these and other Syrian
policies. The question is what are the tools that we should use
when seeking changes to Syrian policies? What tools might lead
to a more constructive U.S.-Syrian relationship to the benefit
of both of our countries?
You know, I know that by virtue of my tenure as Ambassador
to Lebanon I am sometimes, often, personally associated with
the period when the United States was a leading member of a
coalition determined to isolate and to pressure Syria into
withdrawal from Lebanon. I believe that the tools that we used
at the time were appropriate and effective. After all, Syria
did withdraw from Lebanon. That approach worked in a particular
context. There was an extraordinary unity of purpose at the
time among the majority of Lebanese in the aftermath of the
murder of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and that same
extraordinary unity among the key regional and international
players. Such remarkable unity of purpose among so many
different players is not sustainable indefinitely. Today, the
Lebanese are pursuing a number of different, often conflicting,
agendas, including reproachment by many with Syria.
The international consensus of not talking to Damascus has
dissipated. The French, the Saudis, the Turks, many others,
have all moved to have more robust dialogue with the Syrians.
For over a year the Israelis engaged Syria in several rounds of
proximity talks facilitated by Turkey. Clearly, the intense
regional and international consensus that made our isolation
approach so effective back in 2005 no longer exists. We must
find the tools that are going to work today. I believe that the
United States must have principal engagement with Syria as one
of our tools, though let me add that engagement with Syria does
not come at the expense of our friends in the region, such as
Lebanon and Iraq. We are moving cautiously. By using
incremental steps focused on areas of mutual interest, we are
gauging the Syrians' sincerity.
We have discussed a number of the areas where we believe we
may be able to make progress. In return for positive steps on
the parts of Syria, we are prepared to consider steps we might
take consistent with reciprocity, consistent with our
principles and consistent with our commitments to our allies in
the region. The most important part of engagement is to discuss
directly, firmly and at authoritative levels those parts of
Syrian policy that most trouble us. When President Obama
directed that American officials engage Syria's leaders
directly, he was under no illusion that face to face dialogue
would instantly, from one day to the next, overturn Syrian
policies with which we disagree.
Indeed, the most disagreeable and dangerous of these
policies is not likely to be fully reversed unless, and until,
Syria and Israel resolve the differences that separate them, a
process that we are trying very hard to facilitate. Now, to
those who would point to periodic visits of senior American
officials to Damascus, who would cite continued Syrian support
for Hezbollah and Hamas and then declare engagement a failure,
I would say the following: The United States and Syria have
been substantially at odds for several decades. The decision of
our President to draw on a full inventory of diplomatic tools
at his disposal does not anticipate instant success. Rather, it
marks the initiation of a sustained effort to succeed where in
the past we have failed to make progress.
We need, I think, to proceed with patience and persistence.
If confirmed by the Senate, Ambassador Robert Ford should soon
be posted to Damascus, enabling him to proceed with his work as
the President's personal representative. As we try to minimize
the prospects of war and maximize the chances for peace in a
region where our national security is defended by American men
and women in uniform, we have no choice but to use all the
tools of state craft at our disposal. In closing, I would like
to recall President Obama's words last December in Oslo when he
said that engagement lacks the satisfying purity of
indignation.
He said,
``But I also know that sanctions without outreach,
condemnation without discussion, can carry forward only
a crippling status quo. No repressive regime can move
down a new path unless it has the choice of an open
door.''
We simply must make sure that the leaders in Syria and
elsewhere understand fully and accurately the position of the
United States before they act. This is not something to be left
to rumor, or left to second or third-hand knowledge, or to
others. This is our job, and to do less would amount to
negligence. It would amount to unilateral diplomatic
disarmament. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
taking any questions you and the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman
follows:]Jeffrey Feltman deg.
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Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I have not
seen you that animated for a while. I suppose you feel pretty
strongly about this. I guess if you don't have an ambassador,
then you don't have an ambassador that you can recall. I
suspect there are quite a few that I have seen that I wish we
had an ambassador just for that purpose. Let me ask you, there
have been reports in the media that the President of Israel
while on a trip overseas, I believe, proclaimed that Syria has
had some traffic over missiles intended for Hezbollah. What can
you tell us about that?
Ambassador Feltman. Mr. Chairman, the specific issue,
reports in the press on SCUD missiles, I need to discuss in a
different setting than this one, but let me make some comments
on this area. We have been concerned about the provision of
weapons to Hezbollah for some time. It reinforces the point
about needing to sending an ambassador back to Damascus. We
don't normally say everything that we are doing behind the
scenes publicly, but I need to make a couple of references
here. On February 26, I asked the Syrian ambassador, Imad
Mustafa, to come see me in my office because we were so
concerned of information we had that Syria was passing
increasingly sophisticated ballistic weapons to Hezbollah.
On March 1, a couple days later, the NSC delivered a
similar message to the Syrian ambassador. On March 10, Bill
Burns delivered a similar message to the Syrian ambassador, who
then has gone publicly and said we have never delivered such
message. Either he is not listening, or he is not delivering
the message to his castle, or something else, but it reinforces
the point that when we have an issue of this urgency, we need
to be having access to the leadership in Syria to express our
concern.
Mr. Ackerman. Let me get a clarification. You said that you
said to the ambassador that we had information about the
transference of ballistic missiles. You did not say SCUDs, is
that correct?
Ambassador Feltman. That is correct.
Mr. Ackerman. Okay.
Ambassador Feltman. But a general point here. President
Assad is making decisions in a very volatile and dangerous
region. Syria has made mistakes before, and Syria has, in fact,
paid the consequences for those mistakes that they have made
before, but not only Syria, it has affected the region. He is
listening to people like Hassan Nasrallah, he is listening to
people like Ahmadinejad, you know, people made reference to the
February so-called summit he hosted. We need to be making our
message to him loud and clear and directly. It is not the same
to have an embassy without an ambassador. I know. I have been
in the diplomatic service for well over 20 years.
You go in in the Arab world, and many times at a lower
level if you are not the ambassador, and that lower level
official is not going to give bad news higher up. When
President Assad is taking decisions that could affect war and
peace in his region, he needs to have a clear understanding of
what the implications are, what the U.S. positions are what the
red lines are. That is one reason why we are sending an
ambassador back to Damascus, assuming the Senate confirms
Ambassador Ford.
Mr. Ackerman. We have spent a large part of the time
discussing the sending back of an ambassador. There are no
votes in this House to confirm an ambassador or otherwise.
Could you give us an understanding of where you think this sits
in the Senate?
Ambassador Feltman. Of course. It has been voted up the
Committee of the Ways, confirmation by the full Senate. There
are consultations ongoing with many of the same questions that
some of the members of this committee asked about it. We would
like to see him confirmed and in place as soon as possible. We
would like to have had him in place now.
Mr. Ackerman. Is there a question that he won't be
confirmed? Is that why you are that concerned?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, you remember it took me a few
months to get confirmed, so I could be talking from my own
personal experience. I think we need to make the case firmly to
everybody about why it is that having an ambassador in Syria
allows us to be effective in our diplomacy. It is not a reward
to this or that party.
Mr. Ackerman. Well, my time is just up. I am going to keep
other members to the time, so I will call upon Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. You know, I have great confidence in the
Mossad. They are pretty good. They tell me that their
intelligence gathering capability is about as good as the CIA,
which, incidentally, is under assault right now which is kind
of unfortunate, but nevertheless, the Mossad, I am sure, told
their top officials that they had information that SCUD
missiles were being transported through Syria to Hezbollah. So
I know you want to do this in a closed meeting, and Mr.
Chairman and I have just talked about that and I am sure we
will probably do that, but just assuming, assuming that is the
case, why in the world would we want to reward Syria with an
ambassador? You know, this kind of thing smacks of appeasing
somebody that is kicking you in the teeth or someplace else
even more severe.
I remember in my history that Lord Chamberlain went to
Munich trying to pacify Hitler by saying, you know, if we sign
an agreement, we will, you know, maybe give you an ambassador
or whatever it is, that you won't expand beyond the
Sudetenland, and we ended up with 60 million people getting
killed in World War II. I just don't understand that. Maybe you
can explain to me why you think this is a positive step. Now, I
don't have any problem with Syria getting an ambassador if they
show some real reasons why they should have diplomatic
relations with us, but they are still labeled a terrorist
state, they have been supplying Hezbollah, and Hamas and
possibly al-Qaeda, and that really troubles me.
Then, I just said in my opening statement, I want to read
this one more time, it said this relationship was further
evident, talking about the Syria-Iran relationship, in a
February meeting in Damascus less than 1 week after Under
Secretary Burns' visit between President al-Assad, President
Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah
where the triumvirate guaranteed ``their resistance against the
U.S.-Israeli alliance,'' and as one foreign policy article put
it ``openly mocked U.S. efforts to distance Syria from Iran,''
and stated that his government ``is preparing ourselves for any
Israeli aggression.'' This was just not too long ago and right
after we had Under Secretary Burns visiting and talking to
them.
I mean, it is like they just spit right in our face, the
three of them together. So, you know, I understand that the
President has a different approach to foreign policy, you know,
he has a softer approach saying he wants to reach out and try
to make, you know, the world a safer place because we are
having, at least attempting to having relations with everybody,
but these guys are continuing to give aid and comfort to the
enemy of Israel, our strong ally, they are giving them weapons,
SCUD missiles that can reach any part of Israel, at least this
is what I think, and we are going to go ahead and confirm an
ambassador over there?
Now, you know, I have talked to the Syrian ambassador here
and he seems like a nice guy, and he has got a lovely wife, and
I would like to see us have a positive relationship with Syria,
but I don't see how in the world we can take steps in that
direction if this kind of crap is going on. Pardon my
vernacular, but I just would hope that you would take that
message back to the administration, and I certainly will convey
it to my colleagues in the Senate saying, hey, you know, let us
let them know that we would like to have relationships, but we
certainly don't want to reward them when they are kicking us in
the teeth or spitting in our eye. You can comment, if you would
like.
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Burton, with all due
respect, I disagree that sending an ambassador is a reward.
President Assad, as I said, he is making decisions. He is
making decisions that could send the region into war. He is
listening to Ahmadinejad, he is listening to Hassan Nasrallah.
He needs to listen to us, too.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me. Let me interrupt. I want to read you
this one more time. This is important. President Ahmadinejad,
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Assad said
they guarantee their resistance against the U.S.-Israeli
alliance, and, as one foreign policy article said, openly
mocked U.S. efforts to distance Syria from Iran and stated that
his government is preparing ourselves for any Israeli
aggression. That doesn't sound like he is willing to start
talking. Now, go ahead. I am sorry. Go ahead.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Engel?
Mr. Burton. Can we let him just respond real quickly?
Mr. Ackerman. Yes, but you are going to have to keep it
brief or allow us each extra minutes to tell whether we have a
lovely wife.
Mr. Burton. Okay. Well, you can respond later then.
Mr. Ackerman. Go ahead, Ambassador.
Ambassador Feltman. I would just like to make a comment on
that awful meeting in Damascus that took place because it is
interesting. If you watch the sort of travel politics of the
Middle East, you will find there is a pattern that as Western
visitors go to Damascus, you know, the French, the Americans,
even the Saudis in some place, you soon see the Iranians
showing up, and it is interesting. It may be telling that, in
fact, there is the sudden sort of summits after there has been
a U.S. visitor, or a French visitor, a Saudi visitor. It
suggests to me that there is more going on, and it is not all
negative, behind the scenes.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Feltman, you
have had a long and distinguished record that I have admired,
other people have admired, so I mean no disrespect to you, but
I listened to your words very carefully in your opening
statement and you said, ``engagement with Syria will not come
at the expense of our friends in the region, such as Lebanon
and Iraq.'' Does that also include Israel?
Ambassador Feltman. Yes. Absolutely. Unequivocally.
Mr. Engel. Okay. I am glad it does because sometimes I
wonder if the administration still considers Israel a friend.
Ambassador Feltman. Absolutely. Our desire to get the
comprehensive peace is because it stems from our commitment to
Israel's security.
Mr. Engel. Okay. You know, I am glad to hear it. You have
heard a lot of consternation here on both sides of the aisle
about Syrian transfer of missiles to Hezbollah. I know you said
you couldn't really say a lot of this publicly, but what can
you tell us publicly? What did the Syrians actually transfer to
Hezbollah and when did they do it?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, I really am sorry. I am
just not able to give you a very satisfactory answer in this
setting on that. I hope that we would be able to in other
settings, or perhaps in the future.
Mr. Ackerman. If the gentleman would yield?
Mr. Engel. Yes. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. We will be inviting the Ambassador, the
Secretary, to meet with us in a different setting.
Mr. Engel. Okay.
Ambassador Feltman. I mean, what I can say is this is a
really, really serious concern of ours. If these reports turn
out to be true, we are going to have to review the full range
of tools that are available to us in order to make Syria
reverse what would be an incendiary provocative action. You
know, I think the United States has shown in the past that we
are able to act when there has been actions like this. I expect
that all options are going to be on the table looking at this,
but this is a serious allegation. If this proves to be true, I
would argue that Syria has made a mistake. Syria has made
mistakes in the past, Syria has paid the consequences for
mistakes in the past.
The trouble is it is not just Syria that pays for the
consequences of Syria's mistakes when we are talking about this
volatile region. It is an argument, Congressman Engel, why I
think it is so important that we have an ambassador who is
explaining all this to the senior leadership of the Syrian
Government. An ambassador is not a reward, it is a tool for us,
among other tools, to advance our policies. Not a single one of
these waivers that you have mentioned has been lightened, has
been canceled, has been set aside. They are all still in place.
We are talking about taking an additional tool out of the
toolbox to use.
Mr. Engel. But with all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, I
mean, I understand the logic of, you know, everybody else is
talking to them, why shouldn't we be there, why shouldn't we do
it? You know, that is really great, but, you know, what are
their responsibilities? I don't think it should be a reward
that we send an ambassador. I think we should send an
ambassador when it is in our best interest. Now, you and I are
going to disagree about whether it is in our best interest
because I think that if Assad thought that there was any real
chance of any kind of a reproach moment with the United States,
he wouldn't have welcomed Ahmadinejad shortly thereafter, I
think it was the very next week, in Damascus and made all the
statements that Mr. Burton mentioned.
I agree with what Mr. Burton said. You know, the SCUD
missiles are the last in a long line of egregious behavior by
Syria. Several years ago we all remember Israel and Lebanon,
Israel and Hezbollah, actually, fought in a war that everyone
was mortified that such a war would happen, and as part of the
agreement ending that hostility, there was not supposed to be
any kind of a rearming of Hezbollah. Now, I am told, and again,
the SCUD missiles is just the last straw that broke the camel's
back, but I am told that in the past 3 years Syria has been
facilitating rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which
undermines the Lebanese Government, and that Hezbollah is, in
essence, stronger than ever before. I would like you to comment
on that.
Ambassador Feltman. Three years in which we didn't have a
U.S. ambassador able to even make the point----
Mr. Engel. Surely you don't think having an ambassador or
not having an ambassador had anything to do with that. Assad
cannot be trusted, and what are we doing--you know, when you
sleep with the dogs, you get fleas.
Ambassador Feltman. You know, it is----
Mr. Engel. Could I get an answer, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Ackerman. On the next round. Members may ask their
questions in one round and get an answer in the next round, but
they are going to receive their 5 minutes. I can give the
witness a chance to testify, but that is up to the members.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Syria has had a
chemical weapons program for many years, and according to the
Director of National Intelligence, it has the capability to
deliver chemical agents either by plane, ballistic missile, or
by artillery rockets. Keeping in mind my opening comments about
the fact that I saw the results of those, of the transfer from
Syria of the Katyusha rockets with 70,000 ball bearings in
every one of those and they were coming down like rain in
Haifa, here is my question: Would Syria hesitate to transfer
such weapons, given what they have transferred in the past to
Hezbollah?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, I don't know. We have to
make the case for them not to do it. We have to make the case
internationally, regionally. It is not like we are sitting
around here passively just saying, huh, will they do it, will
they not do it? I have had a long conversation this morning
with the Foreign Minister of Syria, with Walid Mouallem, who
categorically denied it, by the way, and said I could share
that more publicly. We are not being passive as we wait and
analyze will they, will they not do it? We are trying to find
all the ways to show the Syrians why it is firmly not in their
interest to carry through with such transfers, trying to show
the Syrians why it is not in their interest to permit or to
facilitate giving of weaponry to Hezbollah, transferring
weaponry across the Lebanese border.
Mr. Royce. The international community is engaged as well.
I am thinking of the IAEA----
Ambassador Feltman. Exactly.
Mr. Royce [continuing]. And their engagement with Syria.
But Syria has continued to stonewall the IAEA with respect to
their reactor, right? What is our assessment of the Syrian
nuclear program? We have had the destruction of that reactor,
but is the program continuing?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, I mean, we would share the
concern that the IAEA has expressed, that the international
community has expressed about Syria's intentions. Syria is a
signatory to the NPT. Being a signatory provides certain
obligations onto Syria not to develop nuclear weapons and to
provide the access to IAEA inspectors to show, with confidence,
that they are complying with the NPT. Clearly, that hasn't
happened. I have seen reports about Syria permitting access to
another previously declared facility, but it is not related to
the Alkhabar one that you are referring to. In order for Syria
to be able to restore confidence by the international community
in the nature of its nuclear program, in its compliance with
its NPT obligations, it needs to give full access to the IAEA.
You know, we await the next reports of the IAEA, but we
understand, you know, the concerns right now.
Mr. Royce. Have we seen any further North Korean/Syrian
contact, by the way, to your knowledge?
Ambassador Feltman. To my knowledge, no, but I may not be
the----
Mr. Royce. Okay. Let me yield the balance of my time to my
colleague from New York who wanted to have his question
answered and he ran out of time. I am going to do that at this
time. If you would like to respond to Mr. Engel's question.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Engel?
Mr. Royce. Mr. Engel?
Mr. Engel. Yes. I thank the gentleman. I was asking about,
you know, engagement. You know, you just said that you picked
up a phone and you spoke to Walid Mouallem, a former Ambassador
here, Syria's ambassador to Washington, who is now the Foreign
Minister, and you argue that only by sending an ambassador to
Syria could we have top level discussions with the Syrian
Government. Well, you just said that we currently do not have
an ambassador, he is being confirmed, and you were able to pick
up the phone and speak to the Foreign Minister. Who is more top
in the Assad government than the Foreign Minister? So I don't
understand why you keep saying that only by having an
ambassador can we have communications with them.
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, I am sorry if I implied
only by an ambassador. What I am saying is that it enhances our
ability to get our message across. The way that it works in the
Arab world in a lot of the places, I hate to generalize, is
that, you know, you go in and a message doesn't go very far,
particularly a negative message, a bad message. An ambassador
can go in at a very high level on a regular, continual basis.
When we have issues of such national security concern, as we
have with Syria, I think it is ever more important that we
maintain a dialogue at the top level, particularly if we know
who else is----
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Royce's time is now up. I would ask the
Ambassador if he could conclude. If the members want, we will
do more than 5 or 10 minutes or 15, but I think we have to try
to be consistent. Ambassador, please continue. Finish your
thought.
Ambassador Feltman. No. It is just, my thought was that--I
am repeating myself, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize, but when we
know where President Assad is getting his information, which is
the constant contact with the Iranians, with Hezbollah, with
Hamas, he needs to be able to hear from us directly and
continually as well. That is my argument. We are not doing
engagement because it is a pleasurable experience with the
Syrians. We are doing engagement because it is in the U.S.
national interest.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Costa?
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I mean,
I think we get what is in our national interest, but are you
telling us that we have no other contacts with the Syrian
regime? I mean, no intermediaries, no third channels, no
indirect conversations that are currently taking place?
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Costa, you are
absolutely right. We have other channels to the Syrians. When I
meet with any of my colleagues in Europe, for example, we often
talk about Syria, compare notes, because we all recognize the
challenges that Syria poses. We have a variety of ways. These
issues are so important to us that the Syrians shouldn't always
hear from second party, from third party, from whatever their
ambassador in Washington may tell them we are saying, they
shouldn't hear about rumor, read about it in the paper. They
need to understand from us what are the implications of what
they are doing, the potential dangers of what they are doing.
Mr. Costa. But through these, and I am not talking about
through third parties, but I am talking about Americans that
are conveying either through, I mean, we have had Americans
visit Syria and others, that there is any ambiguity as to what
this administration's policy is toward Syria and what the
possible consequences are, you think that President Assad
doesn't understand that there is consequences to his actions?
Ambassador Feltman. Maybe I could use a positive example.
We have had several references to Iraq. Iraq is something that
was high on my list when I went to Syria in March, and May and
then later last year. Now, I think you will hear U.S. generals
will talk about the number of foreign fighters that are coming
through the pipeline through Syria into Iraq to do really bad
stuff in Iraq has dropped. It was, you know, like over 100 a
couple years ago, it is less than 10 a month now.
Mr. Costa. Has that dropped because of our efforts or
because----
Ambassador Feltman. It is in part of our efforts, it is in
part the Iraqi efforts, but it is in part the Syrian efforts as
well. The Syrians have shut down some of the foreign fighter
pipelines that go through Syria that exploit Syrian territory.
I believe firmly that they have done that because we are
talking to them about it. We are talking to them about, you
know, where we see our interests, where we see their interests,
and of something that perhaps could have been done more quickly
had we been able to have the continued high level dialogue that
we now have when we have visitors but we aren't able to sustain
on a continual basis. You know, one of the members mentioned
about how would we define progress. Well, if I could, speaking
of Iraq, I would like to borrow a line from one of our most
esteemed diplomatic colleagues whom we all respect, Ryan
Crocker. Ryan Crocker was once asked how do you define progress
in Iraq? He said, well, it is not going to be linear. You know,
you are going to see some progress here, you might see some
progress here, and then some stagnation, then something else
here. I think that is what we are talking about. We are not
talking about that we are going to see just because we have
sent an ambassador back to Damascus, that just because we are
sending visitors, a line that goes from A to B to C to D. I
think we are going to see a nonlinear reaction.
Mr. Costa. Okay. I get that. I get that response. Okay. So
let us put a little more meat on the bone. When Under Secretary
of State William Burns traveled to Syria in February, I guess
he was questioned afterwards candidly. We can discuss areas of
which we disagree, but we also identified areas of common
ground on which we can build on. So if we talk about it not
being linear and something here and something there, then what
are the something here and something there that we can build
on, in your opinion, that would I guess at some stage include
an ambassador to Syria?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, frankly, I think that the Iraq
portfolio is extremely important.
Mr. Costa. The what?
Ambassador Feltman. The Iraq portfolio is extremely
important. Not only the issue of security of our forces in Iraq
and the foreign fighter pipeline, but also the situation of
Iraqi refugees. Syria hosts hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
refugees. They have provided them healthcare, education. We
would like to see them open up the labor markets so they can
provide income, loosen up on some of the NGO restrictions to be
able to help them, but it is an area where I believe that we
have a national interest in working with the Syrians, and I
believe that is optimistic. This may sound minor to the
committee, but I am always concerned about the safety and
security of the NEA family, our Americans and Syrians,
Americans and anyone who are working overseas. The Syrians have
been very responsive to our request to try to find new property
to build a safe and secure working facility. This has happened
since we have started talking to the Syrians. It didn't happen
for years before. As I said, it is not linear. We are not
talking Hezbollah weapons progress right now, but there are
areas where talking to the Syrians have led to some positive
developments.
Mr. Costa. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Costa. Mr. Rohrabacher?
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, with all due respect, Mr.
Ambassador, I don't think your approach has any significance at
all in the major issues to be solved there. Making it a little
easier on the Syrians this way or that way and how they can
deal with some influx that came in from Iraq, I am sorry, that
is not what is keeping us in a belligerent relationship with
Syria.
Ambassador Feltman. And what have we eased up on, with all
due respect, Congressman? There are four Executive Orders in
place. The Syria Accountability Act remains in force, the Iran-
North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation remains in force, the
Treasury rulings remain in force. Where have we given them a
gift?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I got your point. You are saying the stick
doesn't work, and I am trying to tell you that the let us make
things here easier, give you some sweets at the end, doesn't
make it better as well. What I would like to ask you is the
questions I asked in the beginning. What are the central
issues, the central issues that need to be solved in order for
us to take Syria, which is now in a belligerent position, there
is--all these egregious behavior things that have been detailed
today are absolutely accurate. I will tell you that in the
Soviet Union that long list existed, but we turned the Soviet
Union into at least someone wasn't belligerent anymore toward
us. What are those specific things that we can do that need to
be solved?
Do the Syrians demand that they are not going to be friends
with the West until a Jewish state of Israel no longer exists
and the Palestinians are able to go home? Is that a
prerequisite? If it is, what the hell are we even worrying
about them for, because that is never going to happen. If it is
short of that, what are those issues? I mentioned the Golan
Heights. I have talked to Israelis, I have talked to Syrians,
and they tend to think that the actual security element of the
Golan Heights is not something that is the biggest stumbling
block. Their reasoning Israelis don't want to make the deal is
because it is also the water issue, which is vital to the
Israelis as well, I might add. Is there something? Okay, the
Golan Heights. That is an issue that needs to be solved. What
else? Is that the only issue? If it is, let us try to solve
that.
Ambassador Feltman. No, I agree with you, Congressman, that
it is the peace issue that is going to take away the worst
problems that we have.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Feltman. It is the peace issue. You know, the
disarming of Hezbollah, the hosting of Hamas, all these issues
are going to be probably solved most easily through a
comprehensive peace. That is why we are pushing so hard.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Correct. Correct. If you take them from a
belligerent country into a country like Jordan or Egypt, all of
those issues will be solved. So how do we do it? We don't do it
and just say we are going to send an ambassador and rah, rah.
No. What is the specific issues the ambassador has to solve?
Golan Heights is one. We know that, right?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, Senator Mitchell has been
going to Damascus because of the very issues that you are
identifying here. We want to get to a comprehensive peace. The
Syrians are different than the Iranians. You talked about the
question about are they going to remain belligerent until
Israel disappears? That is not what they say, that is not how
they are negotiating, history has indicated. They have said
they want to live in peace in the region. They have gone
through a number of rounds of talks, direct and indirect, with
the Israelis on how you get to that peace.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Feltman. So it is a different stance than Iran
has.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you are convinced that with Syria at
least, they have not made an ultimate demand about the
nonexistence of Israel by permitting the right of return of all
the Palestinians, they haven't made that as part of their
demand of being nonbelligerent. Okay.
Ambassador Feltman. Their acts don't suggest that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So thus, we should then proceed
knowing that that is a possibility, because peace is not a
possibility if that is their position. So there are specific
things that we need to tackle. First of all, talk to me about
the Golan Heights.
Ambassador Feltman. The first thing is how do you get the
Syrian and Israeli track started again? That is extremely
important. Senator Mitchell has been spending a lot of time on
it. The Israelis and Palestinians right now are, I am sorry,
the Israelis and Syrians right now are starting from a
different perspective. The Syrians are saying we want to start
from the presumption that the territorial issue, the Golan
Heights, is going to be solved, we are going to have all the
land restored to us in 67. The Israelis are saying we want to
start without such preconditions, we want to explore where we
can go. So we have differences in how they want to start, but
both sides do want to start. Senator Mitchell has been working
on how we bridge that gap. It is extremely important to get to
that process.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And if we bridge that gap, you think that
we could actually make that turn from belligerency into
possibly nonbelligerency----
Ambassador Feltman. It is not going to be like a light
switch. It is not going to go from one side to the other
overnight. It is going to be a long process.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am not sure you are right about that. I
have seen other countries do light switch changes, so thank you
very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing.
It has been an interesting day, Ambassador. We first had a
hearing at Homeland Security with former Senators Graham and
Talent who are on the committee that dealt with weapons of mass
destruction, and today, this morning, two of your members from
the State Department were here on the Nonproliferation Treaty
and the nuclear summit that was held last week. By coincidence,
our brilliant Mr. has a hearing on Syria. I take no connection,
but it allows you to think carefully on some of these very
important issues that we have. First of all, do we have an
ambassador from Syria to the United States?
Ambassador Feltman. Yes. He has been here several years,
something four, five, six. His name is Imad Mustafa.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And has he been consistently here for
those 6 years?
Ambassador Feltman. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So he has been through the Bush
administration. To your knowledge, the previous administration
was engaging that ambassador? He was not blackballed? He was
moving around in the country?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, he was moving around the country,
certainly. He is a very active blogger, if anyone follows his
blog. The previous administration minimized contact with him.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And so he was here, present, but had
minimal contact.
Ambassador Feltman. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Even though I had chances, I believe, to
interact.
Ambassador Feltman. I think he is very active up here.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think he was very active up here. So I
want to dispel the myth that the Obama administration is soft
on protecting this nation or soft on engagement. I think it was
a very bold move for the meeting that was held last week.
Obviously, there needs to be an end solution to that meeting,
and that would be that we get agreements that would put us as
allies against nuclear proliferation. I think the idea of an
ambassador to Syria is certainly one that is an obvious, that
we have to engage and know what is going on, but at the same
time, we have to be firm in knowing what is going on, and our
positions need to be strong.
So in our engagement with Syria can you restate for me, and
if I missed it in your testimony, what is going to be the firm
position of the United States. If this ambassador happens to be
confirmed, what will their role be in Syria? Many of us have
been in Damascus, we have met with Dr. Assad and we have been
told many good things, that I want to work, I want to be
collaborative, but what will be our position? Then I want you
to answer the question as to, it seems like you had an answer
that said I may not be able to speak about it, but the point is
we have heard that there is some transit opportunities for Iran
to provide resources to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
We see a denial by the Prime Minister of Lebanon. So what
is it? Is it unspoken? Whatever the case is, I think we have
some challenges with the destabilization of that region. I
would like for Syria to be a good neighbor. I frankly believe
that there is so much work to be done for the Syrian people in
their economic status and otherwise that that is a full plate.
So how will we manage our position, and what will that position
be with the new ambassador in Syria?
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you, Representative. In terms of
having a chief admission, an ambassador, back in Damascus for
the first time in more than 5 years, he is going to be
pursuing, I think, a fairly simple formula. Syria says it wants
to live in peace in the region. I think that he will be working
to see how we could promote the type of actions that would
prove Syria's words. How could we help change the calculus so
that Syria would see that it is in its interest to be doing
actions that are consistent with those words that they want to
live in peace. These are really tough issues. Also, Syria, I
would expect, wants to be accepted as a more respected member
of the international community. That means living up to
international obligations and also having a certain respect for
human rights inside Syria, giving respect to its own people.
The ambassador is going to be pursuing all those sorts of----
Ms. Jackson Lee. And what will they be pursuing with
respect to Lebanon and Hezbollah and the alleging interaction
between Syria and Iran?
Ambassador Feltman. I mean, our policy is firm. Lebanese
sovereignty is for the Lebanese. The Lebanese should be in
control of Lebanon's fate. That is a message that we deliver to
all the parties in the region, but particularly Syria. All of
us have an obligation to help in the stability of Lebanon, all
of us have an obligation to enforce the arms embargo
incorporated in 1701. This is one of the most serious issues
that we have got to deal with with Syria every day.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Well, you guys have changed people
in that chair in one hearing more than the Mets change pitchers
in 20 innings. Mr. Fortenberry?
Mr. Fortenberry. I will just throw strikes, all right?
Mr. Ackerman. Throw strikes.
Mr. Fortenberry. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. My best to your
Deputy, Michael Corbin. We had a very productive visit in
Nebraska, particularly with the Iraqi refugee community. He did
an excellent job.
Ambassador Feltman. Heads a sports event too, I hear.
Mr. Fortenberry. Wow! That got back to you?
Ambassador Feltman. Yeah.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, he was very generous with his time.
Ambassador Feltman. He had a great trip. He had a great
trip.
Mr. Fortenberry. Good. Good. I am glad to hear that.
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you for hosting him. He is a good
guy.
Mr. Fortenberry. It was very helpful for him to be here, he
was very well-received, so thank you for doing that. Let me ask
you to take this to a little bit higher level. What is
President Assad's end game? Clearly Syria meddles with
destabilizing elements in the region. They have some type of
partnership with Iran, they have, at least in the past, sought
nuclear weapons capability. Is this to preserve power, is this
to cut a bet with those who he perceives are going to have
power so that he is protected, or is this some other hegemonic
intention?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, your question is a
difficult one. I would make a few comments. First, Syria is not
Iran. We don't accept the proposition that Syria and Iran
alliance is a permanent fixture in the Middle East. Syria is a
secular state. Iran is not a secular state, shall we say. Syria
has said it wants peace with Israel and has even engaged in
talks with Israel. Iran rejects it. So there is obviously a
different calculus at play when President Assad is making his
decisions than when the Iranians are making their decisions. I
look now at what seems to be a growing reproach, an ongoing
friendship between Syria and Saudi Arabia.
That must be putting some tensions in the relationship
between Syria and Iran because certainly Iran and Saudi Arabia
do not see eye to eye on a lot of issues in the region,
including relations with Iraq and the sort of government that
would be emerging in Iraq. So far it looks to me as though the
Syrians try to hedge their bets a bit, try to keep the door
open in one direction while keeping their alliance with Iran. I
would argue that it is part of our diplomatic job to try to
show the Syrians why it is in their interest to moderate the
behavior that we find so troubling in the region. You know, the
Syrians aren't going to simply act because the United States
asked them to act. The Syrians are going to want to see that
something is in their interest. That is how we all are as
countries. Our job is to show them that it is in their interest
to have the words that they say about living in peace in the
region match by their actions.
Mr. Fortenberry. First of all, I think it is important to
reflect on this very question in order to get to the mechanisms
by which we could potentially invite Syria to join the
responsible community of nations internationally, to be a
responsible player that does want to live in peace in the
Middle East, but what are those leverage points, if you will,
that would help turn the relationship to one that is
productive, stable and has continuity in the future for the
long range goal of peace, and particularly peace with its
neighbors?
Ambassador Feltman. The most important thing, frankly, is
the Israel-Syria peace track. Comprehensive peace, of course,
is set on a two state solution between Israel and Palestine,
but a comprehensive peace would include Syria because that is
where we really have the leverage to show the Syrians that it
is in their interest to move in a different direction, when
they can see that they could actually achieve some of their
goals in a Syria-Israel peace process. That is the big game.
That affects Hezbollah, it affects Hamas, it affects
everything. I don't think that we should be simply waiting for
the breakthrough which we hope happens to tomorrow on a Syria-
Israel track. We need to be working with the Syrians on a whole
variety of issues. I mentioned a couple where I thought that
there was some potential now to move ahead, you know, vis-a-vis
Iraq and things like that, but there are a lot of really tough
issues where we need to be dealing with them.
Mr. Fortenberry. And there is a disposition to do this? An
openness?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, the Syrians don't like the
fact that we have four Executive Orders, the Syria
Accountability Act, the Treasury ruling, that they are a state
sponsor of terrorism. They don't like any of that, but frankly,
the ball is in their court. They would like to see us move away
from those things. Well, for that to happen, they have got to
take some actions that correct the troubling behavior. We do
have some things to talk about, we do have some leverage with
them.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. There is a vote on in the House
and we are just about out of time. Maybe 1 minute a piece for
anther round for those who might want to ask a quick question.
I have a very quick question. Not that we need to or seek other
people's advice or guidance in determining U.S. policy,
especially with the appointment or assignment of ambassadors,
but certain of our friends are not very reluctant to express
their opinions or objections from time to time. Much has been
made of Israel during this hearing this morning. Have we heard
any objections from the Israelis or any concerns about us
looking to reappoint an ambassador?
Ambassador Feltman. In all my discussions with the
Israelis, Mr., this has not come up. They have not raised this.
I don't think this is a serious issue for them.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Engel, 1 minute.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to do this
all. The unanswered question I had was that while we are
concerned about the SCUDs that have come in recently, for the
past 3 years, Syria has allowed the rearming of Hezbollah in
Lebanon. That is very upsetting, that Hezbollah is now stronger
than it was before the war. So, you know, I would like you to
comment on that. Many friends of Lebanon, which I consider
myself to be one, believe that Syria is exploiting the end of
its isolation in order to stage a political comeback in
Lebanon. I would like you to comment on that.
Ambassador Feltman. I mean, you know, I, too, Congressman
Engel, share your concern about Lebanon. I have, you know,
deeply felt feelings about Lebanon from the time that I was
there, and I am proud of what we all did together under the
leadership of the courageous Lebanese people, but what is
happening is that Lebanon has some real assets, the pluralism
of Lebanon, the openness of Lebanon, and these are being
exploited by forces who are using this pluralism of openness to
promote an agenda that is not Lebanese. The best thing we can
do for Lebanon is to solve these regional conflicts that allow
others to make a mess inside Lebanon by exploiting the benefits
of Lebanon.
Mr. Engel. I will let it go because I know we have a vote,
Mr. Chairman. I do look forward, Mr. Ambassador, to that
private meeting.
Mr. Ackerman. Ms. Jackson Lee, do you have a----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, I do. Ambassador, we were on the line
of questioning about what the forceful position would be for
our ambassador. What position or what interaction with Dr.
Assad forcefully would we be taking as it relates to Syria's
relationship with Iran?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, these are not going to be
easy conversations that our ambassador has on a subject like
Iran. We profoundly disagree with Syria's promotion of Iran's
aggressive behavior in the region, and that is going to be
clear from day one that our ambassador is on the ground. As I
said earlier I don't think we can talk about a light switch
turning Syria from one side to the other. This is going to be a
long, long haul. We believe that it is important to make the
case to Syria why the path they are on is so dangerous for
Syria and for the region and how there are other aspects, there
are other ways that Syria can go that are more promising.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is what I hope I will hear. Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. That was the final word.
Ambassador, thank you very, very much. It has been enlightening
and more exciting than I suspected.
Ambassador Feltman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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