[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-107
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANTUntil 5/5/10 deg.
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman
DIANE E. WATSON, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
BARBARA LEE, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, California
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, United States Department of State............. 7
Mr. Earl Gast, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development.............. 23
The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for
Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (Former
United States Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria).......... 49
Mr. Almami Cyllah, Regional Director for Africa, International
Foundation for Electoral Systems............................... 59
Witney W. Schneidman, Ph.D., President, Schneidman & Associates
International.................................................. 85
Mr. Gregory B. Simpkins, Vice President, Policy & Program
Development, The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation................... 94
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement................. 11
Mr. Earl Gast: Prepared statement................................ 26
The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman: Prepared statement............. 52
Mr. Almami Cyllah: Prepared statement............................ 62
Witney W. Schneidman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................. 88
Mr. Gregory B. Simpkins: Prepared statement...................... 96
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 120
Hearing minutes.................................................. 122
AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:01 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Payne. Good afternoon. Let me welcome you to this
critically important hearing entitled, ``An Overview of U.S.
Policy in Africa.'' Let me begin by extending our apologies for
the voting that we just completed. Hopefully, members will be
coming in, although there are a number of conflicts because of
the timing of the votes. Whenever the ranking member gets here,
we will interrupt and allow him to give his remarks. Currently,
he is on the Senate side, but he is on his way here.
As the title suggests, the purpose of this hearing is to
discuss the administration's policy on the continent of Africa.
And we are very pleased to be able to have this very important
hearing. We can certainly tell by the audience here that there
is a tremendous amount of interest in the continent, and we are
here to gain an understanding of both the overall policy toward
the region and the United States' position on key and pressing
issues of the day.
To that end, we have two distinguished panels, which I will
introduce following the members' opening statements. Let me
thank the witnesses for coming, particularly the Assistant
Secretary of State, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, and USAID Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator Earl Gast, as well as our
private panel consisting of Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Almami
Cyllah, Witney Schneidman, and Gregory Simpkins.
As someone who has followed and worked in Africa for over
40 years, there have been many sweeping changes, especially in
recent U.S. policy in Africa. The continent has gone from being
a region with little strategic significance in the view of
policymakers to one that holds critical and strategic economic,
national security and humanitarian interests in just the last
20 years.
Indeed, the United States has moved away from a policy in
Africa that hinged on containing the Soviet sphere of influence
during the Cold War, a policy, as many of us here know, that
too often led the United States to support dictatorial regimes
on the continent with disastrous results, which in some
instances are still being felt.
During the tenures of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush, U.S. interests in the continent greatly increased and the
focus began to shift away from solely humanitarian interest.
The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a preferential
program designed to spur increased African imports to the
United States and to build Africa trade capacity, and the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)--the
landmark $15 billion, now $48 billion treatment programs were
created by Presidents Clinton and Bush, respectively--both very
important programs which have a tremendous impact on the
continent. Both dramatically reshaped the discourse and the
depth of U.S.-Africa policy. As a matter of fact, the Africa
Diplomatic Corps did a great job in shaping the AGOA
legislation, and we have certainly benefitted from their input.
The Obama administration showed keen interest in Africa
early on with a brief visit by President Obama himself to Ghana
and an 11-day trip to seven countries in Africa by Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. I accompanied Secretary Clinton on part
of her trip, and must say that the response was overwhelmingly
positive and hopeful in terms of closer bilateral relations and
partnership in each of the African countries that she visited.
Many others were asking why not us because they were all
anxious to see the new team. You will hear also from our
Assistant Secretary, who also was on that very important trip.
In 2009, the President unveiled two new programs that will
change the landscape and deepen U.S. support for long-term
sustainable development on the continent.
The Global Health Initiative is a 6-year, $63 billion
program which includes the $48 billion authorized from PEPFAR
initially plus an additional $3 billion for PEPFAR to make that
$51 billion, and the remaining of the $63 billion to help the
partner countries improve health outcomes through strengthening
health systems, with particular focus on improving the health
of women, newborns, and children.
The U.S. Global Food Security Initiative is a welcome
paradigm shift back to strong investments in agricultural
development, both as a means to increased food security and as
a critical element of long-term sustainable development in poor
regions of the world, particularly in Africa. Both programs
have significant impact on the continent.
Another program which has a major impact on Africa is the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, another program started
during the Bush administration. The majority of the MCC
compacts are with African nations, 11 active compacts out of
20. There were 20 total compacts in Africa; however, Madagascar
was suspended following the recent coup. While these
initiatives are certainly very strong signs of U.S. focus on
Africa, many challenges remain, particularly in the area of
democracy and governance and conflict, which warrants an
ongoing discussion of U.S. policy.
My concerns over Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, and elsewhere are
well known. So I will instead highlight troubling issues of
three other countries emerging with problems--Ethiopia,
Somaliland, and Djibouti. I am deeply concerned and troubled
about the deteriorating conditions in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian
Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDR) regime is
becoming increasingly totalitarian. A few weeks ago, the
government began to jam the Voice of America Amharic program,
and the Prime Minister compared the VOA to the hate radio
station Libres des Mille Collines, the radio station which was
used by the Rwandan Government, who committed the genocide in
Rwanda. This is just unbelievable.
My concern continues for the deteriorating condition of
Mrs. Birtukan, who testified right here before this committee
and continues to languish in prison in Ethiopia, along with
hundreds of others without access to medical care, and her
situation is deteriorating as we speak. I hope to learn more
today on what our policy is toward Ethiopia.
The Government of Somaliland in February handed over a
woman named Mrs. Bishaaro, a registered refugee in Somaliland
to Ethiopian security forces. A few years ago, she was arrested
and tortured by Ethiopian security, and her husband was
executed. I understand there is a delegation visiting from
Somaliland currently and hope to learn what the United States'
position is on this case, and on Somaliland more broadly.
I am also concerned about the lack of development
assistance funding for Djibouti, a strong ally to the United
States, which plays an important role in the promotion of peace
on the Horn of Africa. I will speak more details on all of
these three countries during the question and answer period of
this hearing.
The committee looks forward to this very important hearing
and all of the witnesses and their testimonies. And let me once
again thank the witnesses and all of you for being here today.
And as you see, our ranking member has arrived, and so I will
now turn over the time to our ranking member for his opening
statement.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you may
know, I also serve as ranking on the Executive Commission on
China, and we had a hearing on Google and the whole human
rights issue there, which unfortunately, countries like
Ethiopia and a growing number of countries of Africa are taking
the capability and the expertise, technologically and
otherwise, that China provides, and they are using it as a tool
of repression. So this issue is certainly applicable to a
growing number of African countries where there are despotic
regimes.
I do want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
timely hearing to examine the current U.S. policy in Africa. I
am pleased to have the opportunity to engage in this discussion
with senior administration officials, the Honorable Johnnie
Carson and Mr. Earl Gast, as well as our second panel of
distinguished witnesses. I especially want to welcome my good
friend, Greg Simpkins, vice president of the Leon Sullivan
Foundation, who used to be our staff director on the Africa
Subcommittee when I chaired it. And it is a delight to welcome
him back to the committee this time as a witness.
While there are numerous, and I mean numerous, major
issues--and you brought up Ethiopia, Mr. Chairman. And as you
know, we together worked on the Ethiopia Human Rights Act.
Unfortunately, President Meles shows increasing signs of
deterioration when it comes to human rights and respect for
other parties. I hope our distinguished witnesses will speak to
that.
But let me raise three particular issues of concern to me,
but in no way is this an exhaustive list. One is with respect
to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. There are seven such
missions spanning the same number of countries. These
peacekeeping operations have a critical role to play in some of
the most volatile areas in the world, among vulnerable
populations that have suffered extraordinary violence and human
rights violations. Countries that contribute their personnel to
this highly laudable undertaking are to be commended for doing
so. But they must also accept responsibility for ensuring that
military personnel from their country do not exploit the
populations that they are assigned to protect.
Following deeply troubling reports about peacekeeping
personnel engaging in trafficking of persons, I chaired several
hearings--as you know, Mr. Chairman, because you were very much
a part of that--that focused on those egregious abuses,
particularly against children, particularly in the DR Congo.
When I rewrote the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act--as you know, I am the prime sponsor of the
original bill--when we did the authorization in 2005, we
addressed this issue. One provision amended the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking to include an
assessment of measures that respective countries are taking to
ensure that their nationals who are deployed abroad as part of
a peacekeeping operation do not engage in or facilitate severe
forms of trafficking in persons or exploit victims through
other means.
A second provision requires that the Secretary of State
submit a report to Congress at least 15 days prior to a vote
for a new or reauthorized peacekeeping mission that contains a
description of the measures taken to prevent peacekeeping
forces from ``trafficking in person, exploiting victims of
trafficking, or committing acts of sexual exploitation or
abuse, and the measures in place to hold accountable any such
individuals who engage in any such acts while participating in
a peacekeeping mission.'' And I would encourage the
administration to clearly comply with that law. Sometimes we
have less than stellar cooperation from any administration. So
I would ask that you really look to live up to that.
One might question the compliance with this reporting
mandate, both in terms of meeting the congressional intent of
this statutory provision, and in fulfilling the purpose for
which it was implemented. It is deeply disturbing that the
problem of sexual exploitation and trafficking by peacekeeping
personnel not only continues, but is growing worse. I learned
of continuing problems when I visited the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and inquired about MONUC 2 years ago. Not only
were serious allegations being made against peacekeeping
soldiers, but the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight
Services that is responsible for investigating those
allegations was moving its personnel to Nairobi, Kenya--far
from where it could effectively fulfill its mandate.
MONUC is not the only mission where concerns about sexual
exploitation apply. As a March 21, 2010, report by the Wall
Street Journal points out, allegations of sex-related crimes
against peacekeeping personnel in general increased last year
by 12 percent to a total of 55, and some of those allegations
involved minors. Furthermore, countries of accused personnel
only responded 14 times to a total of 82 requests from the U.N.
for information about sexually related investigations or their
outcomes.
I will be interested to explore, and I hope our panel can
provide some insights into this very serious issue. When the
people who are there to protect become the perpetrators of
crimes, who is to protect those innocent individuals? And I
know the U.N. has a zero tolerance policy. I hope we are still
not talking about zero implementation. I don't think that is
the case, but that was the case early on after that policy was
announced.
A second issue of grave concern, of course shared by every
member of this committee, is the situation in Sudan, which we
all recognize is at a critical crossroads. The country may
successfully traverse elections next month, and a referendum in
January 2011, and establish a stable, long-term peace in Darfur
along the way, or it could backslide into a state of carnage
and destruction that has plagued the country for two decades.
The implications are formidable, not only for the Sudanese,
but for the people in the entire region. And I would note
parenthetically my friend, Greg Simpkins, joined me when we met
with Bashir about 4 years ago. And frankly, the only thing that
General Bashir wanted to talk about was lifting the sanctions.
Greg will remember it well. Nothing about compliance, nothing
about living up to international norms and human rights. But
all he wanted to do is talk about lifting the sanctions.
Sanctions will be lifted when there is peace and when there is
respect for human rights.
And finally, as we discussed in our recent subcommittee
hearing, Mr. Chairman, our PEPFAR program has had an enormously
positive impact in addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic that has
ravaged Africa. We must ensure that we continue to work with
African countries to meet this and other global health
challenges. However, I must express my grave reservations with
respect to certain aspects of the President's Global Health
Initiative.
When the reauthorization of PEPFAR was being debated in
2008, references to integrating and providing explicit funding
for authorization for ``reproductive health,'' which nobody
would deny reproductive health in its clearest definition, the
most applied definition used in Africa, is something we all
want, but not when it is hooked with and used as code for
abortion. The term as we wrote that legislation did not appear
in the final legislation. Yet the new GHI emphasizes the
integration of HIV/AIDS programming with family planning, as
well as with various health programs. This is being undertaken
in the context of a family planning program and the action
taken by President Obama to rescind Mexico City Policy now
includes foreign nongovernmental organizations that provide
support and lobby for and perform abortion on demand.
When one considers that this involves over $715 million in
funding under the 2011 proposed budget, the ability for
abortion groups to leverage this funding in relation to U.S.
HIV/AIDS funding under GHI is deeply disturbing. This
integration priority is wrong. We are trying to prevent HIV/
AIDS, not children. It is time to recognize that abortion is
child mortality. Abortion methods dismember, poison, and starve
to death a baby, and it wounds their mothers.
Safe abortion, Mr. Chairman--and it is used by this
administration and by some in the U.N.--is the ultimate
oxymoron. Child dismemberment, forced premature expulsion from
the safety of the womb, chemical poisoning, and deliberate
starvation--let us not forget that one of the chemicals in RU-
486 denies nourishment to an unborn child. They literally
starve to death, and then the other chemical brings upon labor.
None of this can ever, ever be construed to be benign, cannot
be construed to be compassionate, or safe.
Goal number four of the Millennium Development Goals calls
on each country to reduce child mortality, while at the same
time pro-abortion activists lobby for an increase in abortion.
It is bewildering to me, Mr. Chairman, how anyone can fail to
understand that abortion is, by definition, infant mortality.
Abortion destroys children.
Let me also point out--and I hope this committee, and I
hope members and the audience, will consider this--that there
are at least 102 studies that show significant psychological
harm, including major depression and elevated risk of suicide,
in women who abort. It doesn't happen right after the abortion.
It kicks in later, leading to intermediate and long-term
results. At least 28 studies, including three in 2009, show
that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer by some 30 to
40 percent or more, yet the abortion industry has largely
succeeded in suppressing those facts. So-called safe abortion
inflicts other deleterious consequences on women, and includes
hemorrhage, infection, perforation of the uterus, sterility,
and death. Just last month, a woman from my own state of New
Jersey died from a legal abortion, leaving behind four
children.
Finally, at least 113 studies show a significant
association between abortion and subsequent premature births.
For example, a study by researchers Shah and Zoe showed a 36
percent increased risk for preterm birth after one abortion and
a staggering 93 percent increased risk after two. Similarly,
the risk of subsequent children being born with low birth
weight increases by 35 percent after one abortion, and 72
percent after two or more.
Another study shows an increased risk of nine times after a
woman has had three abortions. What does this mean for
children, especially in Africa? Preterm birth is the leading
cause of infant mortality in the industrialized countries after
congenital anomalies. Preterm infants have a greater risk of
suffering from chronic lung disease, sensory deficits, cerebral
palsy, cognitive impairments, and behavioral problems. Low
birth weight is similarly associated with neonatal mortality
and morbidity.
Mr. Chairman, it is about time, I believe, that we as a
nation--as you know, we have heard testimony from Dr. Jane
Kagia, an OB-GYN in Kenya and others from Africa, that Africa
wants its children protected, whether unborn, newborn, or 5-
year-olds, and we ought to adopt a consistent policy of human
rights protection that says all are welcomed, and we will shred
the welcome mat for none. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Ms. Woolsey.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am going to be
very, very quick because I want to hear from the witnesses. I
just have to say to the witnesses of both panels that I have
confidence that you are going to reassure me that you
understand that family planning is not the same thing as an
abortion, and that families or a woman's ability to choose the
appropriate timing for that family or that woman for a
pregnancy actually prevents abortions, savings lives, bringing
stronger, healthier, wanted babies into the world. So I am
looking forward to your testimonies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Ms. Woolsey. Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. No comments.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Now let us take our first panel.
First we have Ambassador Johnnie Carson. Ambassador Carson
serves as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
African Affairs at the Department of State. He has an
established career in the foreign service. He previously served
as Ambassador to Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda, as well as the
principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African
Affairs from 1997 to 1999.
In addition to several posts in sub-Saharan Africa, he
served as desk officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research from 1971 to 1974, and staff officer for the Secretary
of State from 1978 to 1982. Beyond the State Department,
Ambassador Carson served as the staff director for the House
Africa Subcommittee from 1979 to 1982, and he was a Peace Corps
volunteer in Tanzania from 1965 to 1968, a few years after the
inception of the Peace Corps.
During his career, Ambassador Carson received several
awards, including the Department of State's Superior Honors
Award, and the Centers for Disease Control's Champion of
Prevention Award. Ambassador Carson holds a bachelor of arts in
history and political science from Drake University and a
masters of art in international relations from the School of
Oriental and African Studies at the University of London.
Second, we have Mr. Earl Gast, Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Africa at the United States Agency for
International Development. As the senior assistant
administrator, Mr. Gast oversees the bureau's offices of Sudan
programs, East African affairs, administrative services, and
development programming. Mr. Gast has served at USAID for 19
years. He previously served as supervisory program officer for
the USAID caucus' regional mission and the USAID regional
mission director in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia, and as the
USAID representative to the United Nations agencies in Rome. He
also held posts in Iraq and Kosovo.
Mr. Gast holds a masters degree in political science and
Middle East studies from George Washington University and
graduated summa cum laude from the University of Maryland with
a bachelors degree in history and criminal law.
We will begin with Ambassador Carson.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Carson. Chairman Payne, Congressman Smith,
members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss U.S. Government policy toward
Africa. As you know, this is my first appearance before this
committee, and I salute your commitment to Africa, as well as
your efforts to examine tough issues. I look forward to working
closely with the Congress, and especially with you, Mr.
Chairman, and the other members of this committee.
I have a longer statement for the record, which I would
like to have submitted. But let me----
Mr. Payne. Without objection.
Ambassador Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. President Obama
has a strong interest in Africa and has made Africa one of our
top foreign policy priorities. This has been evident throughout
his first year in office. Last year, in July, President Obama
traveled to Ghana, where he met with President John Atta Mills
and spoke before the Ghanian Parliament about his vision for
the continent. President Obama has met in the Oval Office with
President Kikwete of Tanzania, President Ian Khama of Botswana,
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe, and in September,
at the United Nations General Assembly, he met with 21 African
heads of state.
All of the President's senior foreign policy advisors have
followed his lead. And last August, Secretary Clinton, as you
remarked, Mr. Chairman, embarked on an 11-day trip to Africa,
including stops in Kenya, South Africa, Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Liberia, and Cape Verde.
President Obama has said repeatedly that the United States
views Africa as our partner, and as a partner of the
international community. We are committed to substantial
increases in foreign assistance for Africa, but we know that
additional assistance will not by itself automatically produce
success. Instead, success will be defined by how well we work
together as partners to build Africa's capacity for long-term
change and ultimately the need for less development assistance.
As Africa's partner, the United States is ready to
contribute to Africa's growth and stabilization, but ultimately
African leaders and countries must take control of their
futures. Having said that, we are committed to a very positive
and forward-looking Africa policy built on five principles that
reflect our interest and define the work that we have been
doing over the past year.
First, we will work with African governments, the
international community, and civil society to strengthen
democratic institutions and protect the democratic gains made
in recent years in many African countries. A key element in
Africa's transformation is sustained commitment to democracy,
rule of law, and to constitutional norms. Africa has indeed
made significant progress in this area. Botswana, Ghana,
Tanzania, Mauritius, Benin, and South Africa are but a few
examples of countries that are showing democratic commitment.
But progress in this area must be more widespread, and
certainly cannot be taken for granted. Some scholars and
political analysts believe that democracy in Africa may have
reached a plateau, and that we may be witnessing the beginning
of a democratic recession. They point to flawed Presidential
elections over the last 5 years in places like Kenya, Ethiopia,
and Zimbabwe; the attempts by leaders and countries like Niger,
Uganda, and Cameroon to extend their terms of office; and
certainly in more recent months and years, the reemergence of
military interventionism in countries like Guinea Conakry,
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and just 1\1/2\ months ago, in
Niger.
Moreover, democracy remains fragile in large states like
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sudan, and arguably in
Africa's most important and most populous country, Nigeria.
During my recent visit to Nigeria, I was encouraged by the
steps Nigeria's elected officials at the national and state
level to elevate Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to the role
of acting President.
Although political progress has been made in that country,
Nigeria still faces significant political challenges and
uncertainty in the runup to the next Presidential elections,
probably in May 2011. It is important that Nigeria improve its
electoral system, reinvigorate its economy, resolve the
conflicts in the Niger Delta, and end the communal violence
that has occurred most recently in Plateau State. It is also
critically important that all of Nigeria's leaders act
responsibly and reaffirm their commitment to good governance,
stability, and democracy by choosing constitutional rule.
Second, Africa's future success and global importance are
dependent upon its continued economic progress and growth.
Africa has made measurable inroads to increase prosperity.
Countries like Mauritius, Ghana, Rwanda, Botswana, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Cape Verde have made significant economic strides
over the last decade, yet Africa remains the poorest and most
vulnerable continent on the globe.
To help turn this situation around, we must work to
revitalize Africa's agricultural sector, which employs more
than 70 percent of African households directly or indirectly.
Now is the time for a green revolution in Africa's agriculture.
Through innovative approaches and nontraditional technology, we
can improve the lives of millions of people across the
continent, and the administration's Food Security Initiative is
designed to help do this.
The United States also wants to strengthen its trading
relationship with Africa and to explore ways to promote African
private sector growth and investment, especially for small and
medium-sized businesses. We already have strong ties in energy,
textiles, and transportation equipment, but we can and should
do more in the economic field. The Obama administration is
committed to working with our African partners to maximize the
opportunities created by our trade preference programs like
AGOA, and we will continue to encourage American investment and
greater American trade with Africa.
Third, historically the United States has focused on public
health and health related issues in Africa. We remain
committed, and aim to help alleviate the health crisis across
the entire continent. We believe that African governments, as
well as the international community, must invest more in
Africa's public health systems, train more medical
professionals, and ensure that there are well-paying
opportunities for African medical professionals in their own
countries.
We must also focus on maternal and infant health care,
which are closely related to several millennium development
goals. The Obama administration will continue the PEPFAR
program that the previous administration launched to combat the
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. In total, the Obama administration
has pledged some $63 billion to meet the wide range of public
health challenges that confront Africa today.
Fourth, the United States is committed to working with
African states and the international community to prevent,
mitigate, and resolve conflicts and disputes across the
continent. Conflict destabilizes states and entire regions,
stifles economic growth and investment, robs young Africans of
the opportunity for an education and a better economic future.
Although there has been a notable reduction in the number of
conflicts over the past decade, areas of turmoil and political
unrest in countries like Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, and the
Democratic Republic can generate both internal and regional
instability.
Furthermore, we must not forget the extreme harm inflicted
by gender-based violence and the recruitment of child soldiers.
The Obama administration is working to end conflicts across
Africa so that peace and economic progress can replace
instability and uncertainty. The United States has been and
will continue to work proactively with African leaders, civil
society organizations, and the international community to
prevent new conflicts.
Over the past year, we have been diplomatically engaged in
Mauritania, in Guinea Conakry, in Nigeria, Niger, Kenya,
Somalia, and Sudan to help resolve conflicts. We have also had
discussions with leaders of a number of other countries where
the political situations are fragile and unstable. As we pursue
these avenues of promoting stability and peace in places like
Somalia, we are also shouldering the lion's share of
humanitarian assistance in countries like Somalia, Sudan, and
also Ethiopia.
Fifth, Mr. Chairman, we will seek to deepen our cooperation
with African states to address both old and new transnational
challenges. Africa's poverty puts it at a distinct disadvantage
in dealing with major global and transnational problems like
climate change, narco-trafficking, trafficking in people, and
the illegal exploitation of Africa's minerals and maritime
resources.
Finally, one of my personal goals as Assistant Secretary is
to expand our diplomatic presence in Africa. I am working
within the State Department and the administration, and also
with those in Congress to increase resources, both funding for
people and programs at our embassies and consulates in Africa.
I want, because I think we need, more American diplomats
working across Africa, and increased diplomatic presence is
important in making progress on all of the five principles that
I outlined.
I think we should be present in Mombasa as well as in
Nairobi, in Goma as well as in Kinshasa, in Kano as well as
Abuja and Lagos. Being in these cities will enable us to reach
important audiences that we do not reach directly now. We also
have to do a better job of using our diplomatic presence on the
continent to listen to the people of Africa and to learn from
them how we can better work together to meet the challenges
that they face.
The Obama administration believes in and is committed to
Africa's future and its great promise. I think this is a vision
that the members of this committee share as well. I appreciate
your commitment to this shared vision and your willingness to
work with me and the Department of State together to strengthen
U.S.-African relations and to work collaboratively toward a
future that brings better governance, expanded democracy,
greater prosperity, and economic growth to all of Africa's
people.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your time, and I
look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson
follows:]Carson
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Ambassador Carson. Mr.
Gast.
STATEMENT OF MR. EARL GAST, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Gast. Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, and Ranking
Member Smith, and other members of the Subcommittee on African
Affairs. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on USAID's
work in Africa today.
When I appeared before the subcommittee last April, I
discussed positive trends on the road ahead for Africa.
Unfortunately, some troubling political trends continue to have
a negative impact on the continent's development: The unsettled
political landscape in Zimbabwe, increasing restrictions on
political space in Ethiopia, evidence of democratic backsliding
in Senegal.
In each of these settings, poor governance and political
instability directly undermine the prospects for a better
future for Africa's children. By 2025, Africa's population will
exceed 1 billion persons, and the ability of each state to
respond to its people's needs will be tested like never before.
USAID is undertaking major programs to address Africa's
critical interlaced challenges of chronic health issues,
persistent food insecurity, poverty, climate change, and weak
governance. Each of these priorities is tightly linked to the
others. Failure in one area will limit our progress in others.
But by addressing these issues in an integrated manner, we hope
to see an increasing number of democratic African countries
with lower poverty rates that are on a sustainable path of
growth and that are less dependent on foreign aid.
Despite the extraordinary progress we have made in
addressing critical health threats in Africa, they persist, and
at an unacceptable, alarming rate. That is why President Obama
has reaffirmed our commitment to combat these threats with a
$63 billion Global Health Initiative. As you and others have
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, over the next 6 years, we aim to
prevent 12 million new cases of HIV around the world, cut the
numbers of tuberculosis cases in half, and prevent 3 million
child deaths.
The Feed the Future Initiative is another new
groundbreaking effort aimed at significantly and sustainably
improving lives. Every day sees new challenges to meeting the
world's demand for food. Feed the Future will help us achieve a
permanent solution to food insecurity, where every person in a
society has access at all times to enough food for an active
and healthy life. But because of Africa's heavy dependence on
natural resources and agriculture, food security is
inextricably linked to climate change. By 2020, fluctuations in
weather may halve the yield of rain-fed agriculture in some of
Africa's countries.
USAID's approach to climate change in Africa includes
integrating adaptation approaches into our bedrock development
programs. We also plan to expand investments in prediction and
analysis that identify vulnerabilities early enough in order to
mitigate threats. We will then use this information to
coordinate responses with other actors.
In each of these areas, good governance will be critical to
making changes sustainable. Consistent with the President's
vision, USAID's efforts at promoting better governance are an
integral part of our development agenda. With 17 elections
scheduled in 2010, we find ourselves with a uniquely far-
reaching opportunity to support democratic transformation and
sustainable development in Africa.
We know that Africa's challenges extend beyond a given
election and that elections are a mere snapshot of democratic
trends. They are certainly not the whole story. But that is why
we work to strengthen the rule of law, improve governance,
support a dynamic civil society, and promote a free and
independent media. These elements of democracy are just as
important as the ballot box. Voices need to be heard, systems
need to function, impartial justice needs to be dispensed, and
human rights need to be protected every day and not just on
Election Day. And this is the foundation for long-term
democratic change.
In less than a month, the first multiparty election since
1986 will be held in Sudan. The process has been halting, and
concerns are multiplying. But the elections are a requirement
of the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement which ended Sudan's
long and bloody civil war. If we dismiss the importance of
these elections out of a fear of an uncomfortable outcome, then
we are letting down the people of Sudan and risking an ominous
downward spiral.
If elections are not held, the crucial 2011 referenda on
the future status of southern Sudan and Abyei would almost
certainly be derailed as well. And should the referenda be
significantly delayed or canceled, there is a very real
possibility that Sudan would once again plunge into a
devastating war. Our commitment to helping the Sudanese secure
a peaceful and stable future for their country has never been
more critical.
Amidst all of these events, it is easy to overlook the
quite incremental successes also taking place. Consider the
democratic transformation underway across southern Africa.
During the past 18 months, Angola, Botswana, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia all experienced
peaceful elections. Although these elections still face
challenges, their steady democratic progress stands in sharp
contrast to the chaos and discord of neighboring Zimbabwe.
United States support for the process of democracy will be
critical to creating and sustaining environments like this
where it can grow and thrive. In concert with our simultaneous
commitments in health, food security, and climate change, we
are confident that we will soon see Africa begin to realize its
full development potential.
Before I conclude, I would look to note that today is World
Tuberculosis Day. Administrator Shah introduced our global
tuberculosis strategy, which aims to expand treatment and
control over the next 5 years. TB is curable, and our strategy
pledges USAID's continued commitment to ensure that people
around the world have access to the care and treatment they
need.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and other
members of the subcommittee for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast
follows:]Gast
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. As you can see, we have a
vote on, but I believe we will be able to do is to--I could
perhaps start with a question or two, allow the ranking member
to ask a question or so, and then we can recess. There will be
about 15 minutes that we will be in recess because we will
leave when there is no time left. And so we will be back in
ample time. Those who have to leave--those who need more time
can leave. You are excused.
Let me just as--and thank you both for this. And let me for
a moment--I see a number of Ambassadors here. Our diplomatic
corps of Ambassadors or Charges, would you stand just to--we
can acknowledge you.
[Applause]
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, as I have indicated,
with emerging elections coming in in Ethiopia, could you assess
the human rights conditions, and what are your estimates of the
political prisoners currently in jail now? And I wonder if you
are familiar with Mrs. Birtukan's situation, and where does
that stand, and also Mr. Mudaskan.
Ambassador Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are watching
ourselves with great interest the forthcoming elections in
Ethiopia, and we are encouraging the Government of Ethiopia, as
well as the opposition parties, to act responsibly during the
election campaign and during the election itself. We do not
want to see a repetition of the violence that followed the
flawed elections of 2005, in which the opposition felt that it
had not been treated fairly, protested after the elections, and
a number of opposition leaders were killed in the streets of
Addis-Ababa.
We think that it is incumbent upon the government to do
everything that it possibly can to ensure that the playing
field is level in the runup to the elections, that there be an
opportunity for the opposition parties to participate prior to
the elections in their campaigns, and that they be allowed--
everyone be allowed to vote freely and fairly on Election Day.
We certainly don't want to see the violence that we saw 5 years
ago.
We have had a number of conversations with the Ethiopian
Government about various aspects of the election, and we
continue to encourage the government to ensure that these
elections are as free and fair as they possibly can be.
With respect to the human rights situation and the number
of political prisoners, Ethiopia's human rights record could
indeed be far better than it is right now. There are a number
of allegations that have been made that have been documented in
the State Department's human rights report that indicate
shortcomings in the government's treatment of individuals who
come under their arrest. We encourage an improvement in those
human rights situations, and we encourage that the government
treat everyone in a humane fashion.
With respect to the exact number of political prisoners, I
do not know. I can probably give you an estimate after I
consult with the embassy. The issue of Mrs. Birtukan, we
ourselves have asked the Ethiopian authorities about why she
was rearrested after having been paroled, and whether in fact
we can expect her release any time soon. I was in Ethiopia
approximately 3 weeks ago. I met with Prime Minister Meles for
over 1\1/2\ hours. Approximately 1 hour of the discussion was
devoted to issues related to democracy and governance and the
need to have free and fair elections. I raised the case of Mrs.
Birtukan, as well as a number of other individuals who were
being held by the Ethiopian authorities. I encouraged the
government to act in a responsible fashion in dealing with
these cases, and noted very clearly that the continued
imprisonment of people like Mrs. Birtukan undermine the
credibility and the image of the Ethiopian Government.
We will continue to talk to the Ethiopian Government about
issues related to democracy and governance and human rights as
well. We think that these issues are important in our bilateral
relationship.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I yield to the gentlemen,
the ranking member.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your testimony and for your comprehensive statements, which
were very, very good. I have half a dozen questions. I guess we
are coming back after the vote. But let me just start off with
what I left off with in my opening statement.
You know, when the Mexico City Policy, with all due respect
to the Obama administration, was lifted, many of us said the
unborn child in Africa is now at the greatest risk ever because
the nongovernmental organizations that will be funded see it as
their mission to bring abortion on demand to those countries.
And while you may not want to answer or respond, but, you know,
I authored the Child Survival Fund amendment back in the early
1980s--I have been here 30 years--which provided oral
rehydration therapy and vaccinations. We put $50 million in
that fund because it was all about the child survival
revolution, enfranchising, protecting, and putting our arms
around every child, regardless of race, color, sex, or
condition of dependency. And unborn children, obviously, are
dependent, but they are no less human or alive than all of us
in this room. Birth is an event that happens to each and every
one of us.
And I do believe there are people in the room that
disagree, people on the panel who disagree, but I do believe
that abortion is violence against children. And the statistics
clearly show it imposes serious harm upon women. Disability in
many parts of Africa, as we all know, is a death sentence. I am
working with a number of groups right now in both Kenya as well
as Nigeria that are working on autism because so many of those
children, once they manifest autism, are hurt severely. But
disability, like I said, is often a death sentence for some of
these children in the developing world.
We are going to see more disability, and it is absolutely
predictable, because these foreign nongovernmental
organizations, with a 50 percent increase in funding over the
last 2 years alone, see it as their mission to promote abortion
on demand in Africa. We should hold harmless those children.
And I am pleading with you. I am asking you. Who we fund does
matter. And let me just dispel one myth, and I know you know
this to be true. Under the Mexico City Policy first announced
by Ronald Reagan--that is how far back it goes--we were the
largest donor of family planning funds in the world. EU--no one
even came close, with the pro-life safeguards. So for those who
want family planning, fine. But the line of demarcation between
prevention and the taking of that innocent child's human life
is absolutely profound.
The Mexico City Policy, which has now been shredded by this
administration, means that these NGOs that are pushing abortion
on the continent of Africa have license and have huge U.S.
taxpayer funding to do it. And I am full of sorrow over that
fact. I don't know how to stop it. The administration has the
ability to do what they did, but frankly, you know, babies will
die, women will be wounded because of that. And I do hope
somewhere, somehow, you will take another look at that at some
point because those children are no less a child before birth
than they are 5 years later. They are just more mature. So I
ask you to consider that and look forward to coming back and
asking you some questions.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you. The time has been divided, and
so all time is expired. We will recess for it would seem to me
about 15 minutes. Thanks.
[Recess]
Mr. Payne. Thank you. We will reconvene our hearing. And
let me ask you, Ambassador Carson, last year, as we know,
Eritrea has been having some problems. However, as you may
know, I have had continued dialogue with the leadership, the
President of Eritrea, and we get the impression that Eritrea is
interested in trying to have some dialogue.
Now last year, I know you proposed to go to Eritrea--maybe
in an effort to try to resolve some of the issues there--and
there are some issues that we have raised with the President,
some imprisoned persons, et cetera. However, we have always
been able to have a dialogue and a discussion. I know that the
Government of Eritrea has offered to send a delegation to
Washington on a number of occasions, including a letter that
was sent to the President last year, and I think you might have
gotten a copy of it. And I understand that the Eritrean
Government issued a visa for your deputy last week.
So I just wonder what kind of prospects do you feel there
may be for the attempt to get some constructive dialogue with
the Government of Eritrea. What is the policy of the Obama
administration concerning the border dispute between Ethiopia
and Eritrea still unresolved? And as you know, there is now a
border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. In my conversation
with the President there, he was indicating there seemed to be
less interest in the Ethiopia-Eritrean problem but a lot of
concern about the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. And I
just wonder, has Eritrea been on the radar screen, and what is
your assessment of prospects of some dialogue?
Ambassador Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
question. The United States would like to have good relations
with all states in Africa, including Eritrea. But I must
confess that our relationship with Eritrea is very, very
fragile and difficult at this moment. We have in the
administration tried to reach out to that government in order
to find a way to encourage it to play a much more productive
role in the Horn of Africa, one of the most volatile regions on
the continent.
Our efforts to do so over the last year have been met with
resistance. Indeed, some 9 months ago, I sought to go out to
Eritrea and was never in fact given a visa. Secretary Clinton
also attempted to reach out to the Eritrean Government at the
highest level, and was also like myself rebuffed.
We have three sets of issues of concern with our
relationship with Eritrea. One is a bilateral relationship that
is difficult. We have had an Ambassador in Eritrea for now
close to 2\1/2\ years. That Ambassador has not been allowed to
present his credentials to the Eritrean Government. The
Eritrean Government has obstructed the activities of our
Ambassador, prevented him from making speeches, and
participating in embassy related activities, and they have done
the same thing to our personnel.
The Government of Eritrea has also interfered with the
movement of our pouches through the airport, detaining them for
weeks on end. And more than that, the Eritrean Government
continues to detain several Eritrean nationals who worked at
our embassy. These individuals have not been allowed to
communicate with their families, with their lawyers, or with
anyone else. And we do not know even today what their status
is. We have insisted on more than one occasion that these
individuals are innocent, local employees who were working at
our embassy.
So we have bilateral concerns that go from the top to the
bottom. But that is not the only set of problems we have. The
second set of problems is Eritrea's continued meddling inside
of Somalia. We believe that the Eritrean Government has been
one of the sources of assistance for El Shabab, which is
fighting inside of Somalia against the transitional Federal
Government. All of the other states in the region, including
all of the EGAT states support the TFG, but it is in fact the
Eritrean Government that has been the most obvious and clear
supporter in the Horn of Africa of what in fact is an extremist
Islamist group.
And then thirdly, we think that Eritrea has not played a
constructive role in trying to resolve border conflicts, not
only the longstanding decade-long conflict with Ethiopia, but
also a border conflict that continues to persist with Djibouti.
All three of these sets of concerns cast Eritrea in a negative
light.
Indeed, you are right, my deputy has just received a visa
to Eritrea, and last week the Eritrean desk officer at the
State Department received a visa. But we know that one swallow
in spring does not indicate that the winter is over. I think
that the Eritrean Government can do a number of very, very
concrete things in one of the three areas that I have mentioned
that would indicate that they are serious about addressing some
of the major concerns that are out there. The Eritrean
Government must perform better, not only with respect to its
citizens, but also with respect to its near neighbors, and also
with respect to the global community.
Eritrea has one of the worst human rights records on the
continent of Africa today. And the Government of Eritrea treats
many of its citizens the way they treat our local employees,
who have been in jail for more than half a decade without
access to lawyers or visitation privileges from their families.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. And I couldn't agree with
you more that there are certainly a number of grievances. And
we visited there, too, and tried to get some breakthroughs.
However, one of the problems that I do confront is that we do
have, it seems like, are different policies. This is, of
course, preceding--you have just been there for 6 or 8 months.
But the same things will happen in Ethiopia, and we have had
the closest relationship during the past 6 or 7 years with a
government that puts people in prison, locks women up, beats
people, has actually murdered a person in front of their
spouse, and violated the border agreement between Ethiopia and
Eritrea. But, you know, we have just continued to have no
resolution at the General Assembly to sanction Ethiopia.
And so we have this balancing act that makes it difficult
in some instances. You know, wrong is wrong, and all wrong
should be righted, and we should have a policy against
countries and people that do the wrong things. But it can't be
selective, and I think it just has got to be unilateral.
I am going to take 10 minutes because I am going to give my
colleague 10 minutes. And so I have used seven of it. I went on
at 5:30, so I will take just 3 more minutes to ask you a
question about. Well, the panel has to leave. That is the
problem, and the second panel has to come. If it was up to us,
we would be here until 9 o'clock tonight. But they have rights,
too.
[Laughter]
Mr. Payne. They may have more rights than we have, from
what I have been going through during the last couple of weeks,
and that is domestic, so we won't get into that.
In regard to Djibouti, our friends, there seems to have
been a reduction, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, from
development assistance to Djibouti, and they really have been
some of our greatest supporters. And I just wonder if you could
bring me up to date on that; and secondly, can either one of
you, update me on assistance to the TFG. They are struggling.
It seems if they could get the assistance that they needed,
they could handle El Shabab. And I just wonder if either one of
you might want to handle that.
But, Mr. Gast, I will ask you about Djibouti and its
assistance, development assistance. And even there is a
question--I might as well throw it in--that South Sudan was
also cut in an account as it deals with development. Now there
could have been reshuffling or reintegrated funds, but what we
saw looked as though there was not and increase but there was a
reduction in development assistance for South Sudan as they try
to prepare for the possibility of becoming a new nation.
Okay. I took 12 minutes. So we will have the responses, and
then I will yield to my colleague.
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
those three questions, very good. And I did hear your
commentary about Ethiopia, and would be willing at some point
to talk in more detail about that. But let me just talk about
Djibouti for a second. Djibouti indeed is a very close partner
and friend of the United States, and we value that partnership
and that friendship.
U.S. development assistance for Djibouti is approximately
$11 million, and it probably represents something of a small
decrease from where it has been in the past. But looking at the
development assistance relationship between Djibouti and the
United States gives a very false impression of the very large
amount of assistance that the United States gives to Djibouti.
As you are aware, we have an access agreement with the
Government of Djibouti, and that access agreement entitles
Djibouti to receive $31 million every year from the department
of Defense. And most of that money is earmarked for development
assistance projects inside of Djibouti and also for
infrastructure projects.
So looking at the $11 million doesn't tell the entire
story. And looking at the $31 million doesn't tell the entire
story as well because every time a U.S. Air Force plane lands
at Djibouti, every time a U.S. Air Force plane overnights at
Djibouti, the Government of Djibouti collects a substantial
royalty or rental fee for those use of airport facilities.
So I think it is substantially greater than the $11
million, $11 million plus $31 million plus every time there is
a flight in or out of there, and every time we have planes
overnighting on the ground. So it is substantially greater than
that. And on a per capita basis, the number really sort of
soars, and it is one of the highest recipients of U.S.
assistance on a per capita basis if you figure both of those
in.
My colleague may have another comment on that, on the
Djibouti, but I can come back to the other two questions. Do
you want----
Mr. Gast. So we are trying to divide up the work here. So
let me just finish on Djibouti. And Ambassador Carson is
absolutely right. If one were to look at the ratio of foreign
assistance per capita, it is one of the highest rates in the
world, actually.
But we have a very good relationship and partnership with
the government. We are increasing the number of AID officers in
Djibouti. And actually, if one were to look at the funding
levels last year and compare it to 2010, there is actually a
significant increase in funding of about 48 percent. So that
demonstrates the strong commitment that we have to Djibouti.
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the TFG,
the United States strongly supports the Djibouti process. It
supports the TFG, and it supports AMASOM. The United States has
been over the last 1\1/2\ years the largest single contributor
to the AMASOM presence in Somalia. We have contributed probably
in excess of $150 million for that AMASOM presence.
We have also been a very strong supporter of the TFG. We
have provided assistance, which we have reported both to the
Congress and to the United Nations Sanctions Committee. We have
provided assistance that has helped train their troops,
provision their troops with non-lethal equipment, and to
provide them with communications equipment. We do this in
support of their effort to fight El Shabab extremists who are
in Southern Somalia.
I think that it is wrong to say that if we only gave them
just a bit more, that they would succeed. I think the ability
of the TFG to absorb assistance is also a limiting factor. They
have to go out and recruit troops in order to be trained. They
have to be able to provide those troops with food, pay, and
barracks once they go back. I think that we have given
assistance up to the ability of the TFG to absorb it
effectively and utilize it in a way that will help them.
In fact we give them too much, it leads to them perhaps
using what they get inefficiently, selling of weapons, boots,
shoes, and other things like that. We are giving them a fair
amount. We will continue to support them, as we have done over
the last year. We want also to make it clear that what we are
doing is in a supporting role, not a leading role. This effort
is an African-led effort. This is something that has been
endorsed by the regional body, EGAD, the East African
community, endorsed by all of the states in the region, with
the exception of Eritrea. It is endorsed by the AU. It is also
endorsed by the Arab League.
South Sudan is more an economic question. I will let Earl
speak to that if he wants to. I can as well. But it is more
his----
Mr. Gast. Sure, absolutely. And let me just go back to our
support to the TFG. The Ambassador mentioned our assistance on
the security side. We also support them in building their
capacity to deliver services, which are vitally important to
the people, primarily right now in Mogadishu.
We have actually supported the Djibouti process through a
large grant through UNDP, and UNDP has also contracted, if you
will, to provide direct capacity support services to the TFG.
What we have recognized is that we needed new instruments,
additional instruments, to support the TFG. And in the last 6
months, we have initiated two new instruments supporting the
TFG in carrying out services to people in Mogadishu, building
capacity at the same time that people get services.
With regard to Southern Sudan, I think you are absolutely
right in your assessment that it is a numbers game, if you
will, because our commitment is still very strong to the South
and to Sudan. There is a temporary, if you will, a 1-year bump-
up in funding in 2009 to support the referenda processes that
will soon get underway. But if you look at historical levels,
they have actually increased slightly.
One of our objectives, U.S. Government objectives, working
within the interagency, is to multilateralize the support to
the South. We have been the principal provider of development
assistance, and we are now trying to get more actors engaged
and contribute more funding.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for your testimony again. And just let me ask--I am going to
ask a series of questions, and then please as best you can
answer those.
Given Eritrea's support for El Shabab, a State Department-
designated foreign terrorist organization, will the Secretary
designate Eritrea as a state sponsor of terrorism? Secondly, I
read recently, today, a letter that was sent out by CDC to all
the ARV implementing partners, and it says in sum that the
money, the expected funding, in 2011 and 2010, each partner
should be expected to have a flat lined budget for ARV
procurement and should not be exceeded. Then it goes on to talk
about how monies will have to be gleaned from somewhere else
other than the PEPFAR program.
Given the fact that there is a significant bump-up in the
Global Health Initiative, ARVs have literally saved the lives
of--in Uganda alone, the letter includes 100,000 HIV-infected
Ugandans. It seems to me that putting a tourniquet on that will
mean possible death for others who can't get the ARVs. Is there
an attempt to redirect funding to those programs so that these
lifesaving chemicals and cocktails can be provided to these
people? Please answer that.
Next, on Nigeria's President Umaru Yar'Adua, have we raised
the issue, especially the health crisis that he is facing? If
you could answer that, and the jamming of Voice of America. As
I said, I was late getting here because I am ranking member on
the China Executive Committee. When I chaired the Human Rights
Committee for this Congress for 8 years--as a matter of fact, I
say parenthetically that Mr. Payne and I used to be the only
two going late into the evening at those hearings--we had 27
hearings on China. And when Africa and Global Human Rights were
combined, we had three hearings on the issue of what China is
doing in terms of bad governance, jamming capabilities like
VOA, as Ethiopia is doing now, sham elections, and the use of
secret police to ensure that the despotic or authoritarian or
dictatorial regime stays in power.
I think, Ambassador Carson, that you mentioned the
democratic recession. I think it was you who said that. How
much of that slide can be attributed to indigenous forces
versus how much of that is being enabled and inspired by the
bad influence of Beijing? We know when Chairman Payne held
hearings on the genocide Olympics and the fact that Sudan has
been so profoundly and negatively influenced by Beijing, but
other countries too are catching the bad infection, if you
will.
I know that when it comes to child limitation, there was an
invite 2 years ago, and most of the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa took the bait and went to the Beijing, and with the
state family planning and the UNFPA hosting this conference,
sold the false dogma that if you want economic prosperity you
need to limit children, as if children are nothing but a drag
rather than an addition to an economy.
I would note parenthetically that last week, the Economist
carried--and I have been saying this for 30 years, 30 years,
that because of forced abortion in China and the singling out
of girls, that there would be a huge disparity over time. And
there was the Economist, hardly a right-wing, conservative
magazine--I read it every week, it has wonderful stories. It
was entitled ``Gendercide: The Missing 100 Million Girls.''
Now that model is being focused on and transported over to
Africa. Paul Kagame, in his country, the President of Rwanda,
came back from that conference and said, we need a three-child
per couple policy if we want to imitate the PRC. Well, the PRC
has such an aging problem now. Economically, they are about--
you know, you could predict when their economic fall will take
place because of this huge age disparity, not only missing
girls, but also missing children.
Adding to that, they are becoming a Mecca, a magnet for
human trafficking the likes of which we will never see again if
it could ever be reversed. But what I am raising is that this
bad governance model is being exported to Africa. And, you
know, so if you could speak to that, you know, guns for oil
would--high value minerals and materials, as I said before,
sham elections. They are learning the bad rather than the good
from real democracies like ourselves.
Finally, on the issue of peacekeepers and misdeeds,
atrocities committed against the people they are there to
protect, particularly sexual exploitation. I was in Goma in
January 2008 and met with the peacekeepers, and obviously also
met with people living there. I went to several health
facilities, but also met with the OIOS investigators, one of
whom took me for a walk away from the facility and said, ``If
the OIOS investigators''--and he was the head of it--``leave
here, the exploitation of children will be exacerbated, and
will increase, because you will not have an independent
monitoring body there on the ground.''
And I have raised this with the previous administration,
and I raise it again with you because it has gone on unabated.
The OIOS individuals have been redeployed to Nairobi. Only one
is in Goma. And if I am a 13-year-old child who has just been
abused by a peacekeeper, to whom do I go. You know, if this
independent body is not there to help me and to help me bring
an action against a peacekeeper, who has in this case raped or
abused me in some other way. I think that is so fatally flawed.
And he told me on our walk that this will mean impunity will
reign. And so I ask you what you think of that, whether or not
this administration--because I have raised it now half a dozen
times--will do anything to try to change it.
Ambassador Carson. Congressman Smith, you have raised a
number of questions. I am going to give, if I can, rather quick
answers to all of them. I would be glad to provide fuller
explanations if required. Some of these--there are a couple of
these that probably my colleague may want to answer with
respect to the healthcare questions.
The first question about El Shabab receiving support from
Eritrea and whether Eritrea should in fact be a state sponsor
of terrorism, and whether we are contemplating that. There is
no doubt that El Shabab is a terrorist organization. There is
no doubt that Eritrea has supported the elements of El Shabab.
There is no contemplation or thinking at this moment of
labeling Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism.
Your third question was about the lawyer, Mr. Birtukan. I
mentioned earlier that when I was in Ethiopia approximately 3
weeks ago, I went with Prime Minister Meles. I raised the issue
of Mrs. Birtukan. One of my deputies was in Ethiopia last week.
The issue was raised again. This is something that is clearly
on our radar screen. As I said, this continuation of this issue
gives Ethiopia a bad image. We will continue to engage and
discuss with Ethiopia about issues of democracy and human
rights, as we should, as we do with many countries across the
continent.
Your fourth question was on the jamming of VOA by the
Ethiopian Government. That has two things, and I want to be
very clear about it. It is deeply unfortunate that the
Ethiopian Government has chosen to jam VOA signals. As we all
know, there are only two or three countries in the world that
actively announce that they are jamming our signals. One of
those is North Korea, the other is Iran. We accept the fact
that the Ethiopian Government has disagreements with the
Amharic service of the VOA. Ethiopian officials have mentioned
this to me on several occasions, and we have discussed this
with Voice of America because the last thing we want to do is
to have a station letting out information which is false or
inaccurate. So it has been raised, and it is a concern. But we
still are very distressed about their decision to jam VOA.
But what distresses me even more is the second part of the
statement that was made, a comparison of VOA to Radio Mille
Collines. In deed, Radio Mille Collines was the voice of the
AMASASU, the hammer of the Rwandan Government back in 1994 that
resulted in the genocide of nearly 900,000 Rwandans. To compare
VOA with Radio Mille Collines is extraordinarily distressing,
extraordinarily distressing. It is something that is not
acceptable. This is not a comparison that should ever be made.
VOA has never done anything similar to Radio Mille Collines.
So there is a concern that we have. We raise it very
clearly. We have said it very clear. It is that second part
that is really very, very troubling to all of those who sell
that statement and who read it.
China and good governance in Africa. I am going to say that
Africa has indeed made very, very good strides in the field of
democratization, especially since the collapse of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we
have seen tremendous strides in democratization across the
continent. There is no doubt that much work remains to be done
in this area. I do not believe that the politics, the domestic
politics of Africa, are being influenced at this point by
China.
I think that China no doubt is an aggressive economic
player on the continent. But there were military coups and bad
governments in Africa prior to the reengagement of China in
Africa a decade ago. I think that there are enough people in
Africa doing both right and wrong, and they don't need outside
influences to steer them in either direction.
The last question you raised about U.N. peacekeepers and
the OIOS investigators. I think that without speaking for them,
the last two secretary-general special representatives in the
Congo have been seized with the issue of U.N. peacekeepers
sexually violating minors and others. I know that it was a
concern for Ambassador Bill Swing when he was the special
representative. It is a concern of Alan Doss, who is the
current special representative out there.
We continue to press the U.N. aggressively to act against
any U.N. peacekeepers, any U.N. peacekeeping units that are
engaged in sexual exploitation of children. As the chairman
pointed out last August, he was with the Secretary, I was with
the Secretary when we went to Goma. This continues to be an
issue of concern to us. I think that the numbers are down. I
will go back and look and see what we have on record, but I
think the numbers are down because we have made it an issue
with Alan Doss. We have made it an issue with General Gaye, who
is the force commander out there.
This is something that is unacceptable by U.N.
peacekeepers, and should be unacceptable on the behalf of the
Congolese military as well.
Mr. Smith. Ambassador, would you yield on that point very
briefly? The problem that I have is that without OIOS people
there, we may not know if it is down or up or at ebb tide. Why
would a young person necessarily feel any freedom to go to army
personnel--I mean, the army is doing terrible things. I mean,
there are a lot of bad actors here, and certainly the
peacekeepers have done more than their fair share of these
exploitations.
So, you know, by redeploying them out--and again, I got my
insight while there, but especially by talking to the OIOS
people themselves who said, ``Please, don't let us be
redeployed.''
Ambassador Carson. If I could, Congressman Smith, say that
one of the things that we have been doing very, very intensely
is informing people working with NGOs in the region, Congolese
NGOs, international NGOs, international organizations that are
out there, working with Congolese women's groups, working with
citizens there, explaining their rights, encouraging them to
let authorities know when these attacks are taking place, when
these sexual assaults are taking place, to report them and to
report them to a variety of people who can take action.
It is one of the major campaigns that we have underway, is
to increase the level of awareness, education, increase the
cadre of individuals capable of prosecuting, helping to train
more Congolese women police officers and soldiers so that women
and young kids who are sexually exploited will in fact have
someone that they know they can go to and trust and identify
perpetrators of these kinds of offenses.
We recognize the problem. We think it is an enormously
serious one, and we are trying to take steps to do as much as
we can to reign it in.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Real brief, ARTs.
Mr. Payne. Oh, yes, ARTs.
Mr. Gast. ARTs. Congressman Smith, I haven't seen the
letter from CDC, so I am not aware if they sent out a
directive, if you will, to some of their partners asking them
to straight line the budget for ARV procurement. It could,
however. I know it is a major push of the new administration to
make the procurement of ARVs much more efficient, and therefore
putting more people on ARVs by reducing the cost of treatment.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Smith. Get back to us, please.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you, Mr.
Gast and Mr. Ambassador. I recently have come and visited about
eight countries in 14 days over the period of 6 months, and one
of the things in looking at these countries and others that I
would like to focus on is development of Africa and the various
countries.
It seems as though, as I spoke to a number of heads of
states, they are concerned about their development, their
capacity building so their people can have jobs and creating an
economy. And, you know, I was participating in that along with
some of the other things that I think that have been talked
about, but they often have said that when you look at what the
United States, and they are very thankful, especially in aid
that we give with reference to HIV and other areas. But they
don't see as much participation or the additional participation
in regards to the overall economic development, the growth of
businesses, the growth of making sure we maximize, for example,
AGOA and going to AGOA II, so that they can feel a difference
and they can begin to move forward with their folks in a much
more progressive way.
One gave the example, you know, we are a nation of just,
you know, a couple of--10, 20, 25 years old, and ask where was
the United States when it was 10, 25 years old, and, you know,
they need some room to grow. Not talking about those countries
because we did see some, and we tried to make sure we went to
some--those that were good as far as democracies are concerned
and some that were bad. But I want to focus on those that are
trying to make those leaps positive.
In that regard, I want to focus two of my questions
around--because I believe a lot in the regional aspects of it,
but two things that are going on, and ask--one is in South
Africa. And as you know, South Africa is one of the few
countries on the continent of Africa to rank as an upper middle
income country. And to me, that is a remarkable status, given
the fact that it was just over 15 years ago that the South
African majority gained its independence, which is what I am
talking about, a relatively new democracy, from white minority
rule under apartheid. And I believe that we should support the
Republic of South Africa's efforts to grow, and in so doing
continue its role as a regional power and actively promote
regional peace and stability.
But there has been much discussion lately about a potential
$3.5 dollar deg.World Bank loan to ESCOM for the so-
called super critical coal-fired power plant in South Africa,
including also some $750 million for wind and solar power
investments. I am concerned that in the discussion the
significant development impacts the impeding energy crisis in
South Africa's role as an economic engine of the entire region
has been and/or can be lost.
It is also worth noting that this would be the first super
critical coal plant on the continent using far cleaner
technology than many plants in operation in the United States,
and even cleaner than some plants currently that are under
development in the United States. So I was wondering, could you
speak to this and whether the United States will support this
project in South Africa, which is critically needed for them as
far as energy is concerned, et cetera. That is in South Africa.
The other question then would be dealing with Nigeria. You
know, and I thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for the time that you
spent with in discussing the development issues in Nigeria in
particular. But given what has currently taken place in Nigeria
with the risk that key governance reforms could move backwards
given that there is a transition or seems to be a transition in
the government right now, could you tell me your feelings of
what is taking place in Nigeria? Does it look like it will be a
smooth transition? I know that recently all the cabinet members
were shaken up, and so I would like to have that.
And the last country that I wanted to have a brief
discussion about is--I think I have some of the answers because
I was talking to the distinguished chair, who is the most
knowledgeable man that I know on the continent and about the
continent, and that is dealing with Senegal. And I know that
the President has--you know, there has not been, for example,
any military coups or anything of that nature in Senegal. And I
see there is a lot of investors that are still interested in
investing there. And then yet you hear some concern because I
guess the President is going to run for re-election, and he is
83 years old. Could you just give me your feelings on where we
are with reference to Senegal? Because I think they are
important also being that they have not had any military coups
and have been an example of which individuals we are looking
at.
Mr. Gast. You make some very excellent points, Congressman.
And if you don't mind, what I would like to do is focus on your
questions concerning development, economic development, in
Africa. The administration is putting as its top priority, one
of its top priorities, the integrated development, an
integrated development approach to Africa to reduce imbalances
in funding and also imbalances in approach.
As Ambassador Carson mentioned in his opening statement,
approximately 70 percent of families in Africa are dependent on
agriculture in one way or another. With the food security
initiative and also with our general increase in economic
development resources, we are doubling the amount of resources
from 2009 to 2010 in economic development. And that will allow
us to do some of the things that we had done in the past that
proved to be successful. And that includes working with
governments to create a pro-business environment, the
regulatory environment, the policies and laws.
It is to create demand for reforms among civil society as
well as private sector organizations. That will go hand in hand
with the support that we are going to be providing on
increasing agricultural markets, both in-country as well as on
a regional basis, as well as the support that we will be
providing in agriculture on increasing production.
So I think that is something that this administration
should be very proud of, and I think we will be seeing some
very positive results. And I would say that with the exception
of last year, there has been sustained economic growth of about
5\1/2\ to 6 percent on the continent, and this is something
that we can build on.
Moving on to South Africa, you mentioned the $3.5 billion
coal fired plant that the government is proposing. I think it
would add some 3,400 megawatts to the grid. There is a power
shortage there. However, at this point, I don't know what the
position is of the U.S. Government with regard to voting at the
World Bank board.
Mr. Meeks. Could you check and maybe get back to us just to
let us know?
Mr. Gast. Sure.
Mr. Meeks. Just so that you know, I will be sending a
letter, and I was trying to get several members to sign on and
sending it to the administration strongly supporting it.
Ambassador Carson. Congressman Meeks, let me come in on the
issue of the coal-fired plant, which has indeed attracted a
great deal of attention. And as my colleague, Mr. Gast, has
pointed out, this plant would in fact provide a huge input into
the South African grid. The position of the U.S. Government as
respect to how we are going to vote on that issue has not been
determined yet, and it is a matter of internal discussion as we
sit here. We certainly will talk to our colleagues at State who
deal with financial issues, business issues, and also with our
colleagues at Treasury. And once a decision has been made, we
will certainly share that decision with you and communicate it.
You also asked two other questions about Nigeria and about
Senegal. In short, there has been a great deal of political
uncertainty in Nigeria since the middle of November, when
President Yar'Adua became ill and had to leave the country for
medical attention in Saudi Arabia. Approximately 3 weeks ago,
President Yar'Adua came back to Nigeria. But certainly over the
last 120 days, President Yar'Adua has not been seen in public
and has not been seen by many of the seniors members of his
government. Probably his wife and only a very small number of
people other than his doctors and caretakers, caregivers have
seen him.
This produced a great deal of uncertainty about the
leadership of the country. The Senate and the House of
Representatives in Nigeria took steps to elevate the Vice
President, Goodluck Jonathan, to the position of acting
President, where he has attempted over the last 30 days to
bring a level of stability and leadership to Nigeria that has
been missing as a result of the unfortunate of the President.
Last week, he dismissed the cabinet of the country, some 41
individuals. We hear that within the next 24 to 48 hours that a
new cabinet will be nominated for approval by the Nigerian
senate. We expect that approximately half of the previous
members of the cabinet will be reappointed, some of them to
different positions. New members will also be added to the
cabinet.
Nigeria will continue to go through a period of uncertainty
as long as the President of the country remains ill, and
probably up until some time next year, May 2011, when the next
Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in that
country. We think that Acting President Goodluck Jonathan was
elevated to his current position with unanimous agreement of
both the Nigerian lower and upper house, as well as the
unanimous support of all of the country's 36 elected governors.
As I say, the country will continue to experience some
political uncertainty as a result of the President's absence
and illness, but we hope that Nigeria will build on the 10
years of democracy that we have seen there. It is important, as
I said in my testimony, that Nigeria reform and improve its
electoral laws in order to be able to hold elections that
people are confident in. It is important that the government
continue to move in the fight against corruption in that
country. It is important that they deal with the sectarian
violence that has occurred in Jos, and clearly it is important
that they continue the program of amnesty and reconciliation in
the Niger Delta.
These are all critical issues for a country that is
absolutely critical, most of all to its citizens, but to the
region and to the global community. Nigeria, along with South
Africa, are the two most important countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. It is an extraordinarily important country. We need to
give it full attention 24 hours a day.
Senegal--a quick question. President Wade was here in town
on Monday and Tuesday. Senegal has been America's strongest
francophone-speaking partner in Africa, not just last week or
last year, but since its independence some 50 years ago. We
want and encourage Senegal's leaders, including President Wade,
to build on the democracy and the democratic institutions that
exist in the country today. We do not want it to move
backwards. It is important that all of those impositions of
power in Senegal continue to strengthen and build and carry on
that democratic legacy.
Too many countries in West Africa are both fragile and
weak, and have been subject to military interventions or to
extra civilian usurpation of power. It is important that
Senegal continues to move forward. So as I say, it is a strong
partner. Last year, President Wade was at the State Department
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The U.S. Government
provided some $540 million in one of the largest MCC grants
that we have given in support of that country.
It is our hope that Senegal will continue to be a beacon of
democracy and will continue to move forward on its economic
growth. But that is dependent upon the continued good
leadership which is required for that, that continued good
leadership.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. And will now hear from Mr. Royce. But
I want to also say that I have met with the South African
delegation regarding the coal plant, and they assured me it
will be the latest technology. They also have renewable energy
that is a part of the loan--and I concur that I believe that it
is necessary to move forward. You know, we are trying to keep
the environment clean, but actually Africa has done the least
to dirty the environment, and they are really hit the hardest,
not that we want to see any increase. However, I think that
should certainly be kept in mind, and I have also mentioned it
to some of our leadership, that I think we should support the
U.S. to have a position in support of the loan. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, it has been
good working with you over the years. I have maybe three items
I would like to bring up and get your input on. One is going to
be Joseph Kony. The second is going to be some more specifics
or concerns that I have about Senegal. And the last is
commercial diplomacy.
But first, let me say, we had a hearing in December with
Special Envoy Gration for this subcommittee, and I asked him
about the links between Joseph Kony's LRA and the Sudanese
regime. At that time, there were reports of an LRA commander
who had surrendered, and he told of the LRA's efforts to link
with Sudanese armed forces. General Gration denied that there
were links.
Earlier this month, based on on-the-ground information, a
report by an NGO, which is John Prendergast's Enough Project--
it is a pretty reliable organization. They reported that a
contingent of the Lord's Resistance Army had taken refuge in
areas of south Darfur controlled by the regime in Khartoum. We
know from the past that Kony had gotten ammunition. He had sent
his soldiers north when they were wounded to be treated by the
Sudanese. And, of course, both Kony and Bashir are both wanted
war criminals. What is your assessment there?
Ambassador Carson. Congressman Royce, thank you very much.
With respect to Joseph Kony, there is no doubt that earlier--
and I mean much earlier than now--there were very credible
reports of Sudanese support for the LRA. But over the last 2
years, we have not seen, I have not seen, credible reports
indicating a linkage between the LRA and the Sudanese
Government.
What we have heard and seen are things that are very, very
fragmentary and circumstantial. As near as we can tell, the LRA
over the last 18 months has been significantly degraded as a
fighting organization. Many of its top commanders have been
captured or killed, and the larger organization that comprised
the LRA has been fragmented into very, very small groups. Those
groups have moved from the Garamba force in the northern part
of the Congo up into the Central African Republic and have
occasionally been inside of South Sudan. And it is my
impression that today the fragmentary elements of the LRA are
in the Central African Republic.
We do have reporting from our embassy in Bangui based on
credible missionary sources of the most recent LRA attacks, and
those are in the Central African Republic, and not in the
Darfur region.
Now I will go back and look and take a look very closely. I
know John Prendergast. I have an enormous amount of respect for
him as an individual and a professional, and we read the Enough
Project material. But I cannot substantiate it. As I say, my
system has him in the CAR and not in the Darfur region. I have
to say that Kony has been as elusive to the Ugandan military as
Osama bin Laden has been to allied operations in the Afghan-
Pakistan area. Very, very difficult terrain that he is
operating in, very difficult to go after him. The Ugandans have
made a real effort, but it has been pretty difficult.
Mr. Royce. Well, John, the concern I have, though, when we
go into Darfur and Sudan, the guy that is on the ground to show
you around is John Prendergast. And his organization, the
Enough Project, really seems to have a handle on a lot of
information. I met with him this morning on some other issues
regarding Kony and some of these challenges with Darfur. But I
think if they file a report that there is a contingent of the
LRA that has taken refuge there in an area controlled by the
regime, let us make sure that Sudan doesn't give this
organization room to breathe, because in the past it has. And
so this is one thing I really think that sometimes the guy on
the ground who lives and breathes this, you know, has access to
information that we may not have.
And I would also like to discuss the Millennium Challenge
Corporation. You mentioned Senegal and the $0.5 billion that it
received. It was a lot of money, and there are problems with
Senegal, as you have pointed out. People don't talk about it
the way they once did. It used to be that we would look at this
as an impressive African model. And I think now we have seen a
Presidential payment to an IMF official, North Korean-built
statue that the President has a personal financial interest in,
and, of course, concerns about corruption throughout the
government.
There is also a commercial dispute involving a United
States telecommunications investment there, I guess. So the MCC
acknowledges that there are many red flags, but, you know, as
far as I can tell, the MCC hasn't come to you and asked that
you weigh in on its concerns about Senegal's drift away from
transparency or issues like its involvement with the North
Korean regime. And I wish the MCC would be more proactive on
that. But I was going to ask you if you could look into some of
the issues, Ambassador Carson. I know the Secretary chaired an
MCC board meeting this morning. Given the red flags on Senegal,
was that on the agenda? Did that come up, and can we do more on
that front?
Ambassador Carson. Congressman Royce, I am not sure whether
the Secretary chaired the board meeting or not, or whether in
fact there was a board meeting today. And as far as I am aware,
if Senegal was on the agenda, I am not aware of it. But I will
find out whether the Secretary was there, whether it was on the
agenda, and what the discussion was, and come back to you on
that.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Carson. Let me just finish
with my last question, if I could, and that is on commercial
diplomacy. We have had several conversations about this in the
past. Our posts simply must get more engaged in helping U.S.
businesses that get entrapped by local corruption and other
government snafus. I mentioned Senegal and there are growing
concerns about Ghana, which is another MCC country. And the
concern I have is that a model sort of develops here that,
rather than helps with the long-term development of Africa,
undercuts it. What are we doing to give our Ambassadors the
tools, and frankly the incentive, to fight for fair treatment,
as if those Ambassadors of ours had something on the line, had
something at stake in this effort to try to make progress on
this corruption front?
Ambassador Carson. Corruption is a problem in many parts of
the world, and it is a special problem in many parts of Africa.
The tools that we employ are well-known and universal. If
American companies are seen to be engaged in corrupt practices
overseas, we use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to prosecute
them in the United States. Equally, when we see that American
companies are the victims of corrupt practices overseas, our
Ambassadors and our senior officers, our commercial officers,
are requested and required to go out and serve as advocates for
them to ensure that they get a fair hearing and that their
cases are dealt with in an equitable fashion.
But we also have another tool at our disposal as well, and
we can in fact impose visa sanctions on individuals from
foreign countries, including in Africa, who are engaged in
systematic corrupt practices that we are aware of and have
sufficient evidence to ensure that we are identifying the right
individuals. And we have in fact prevented individuals who have
been engaged in corruption in Africa from receiving U.S. visas,
not only the individuals, but their spouses and their children
as well. So there are instruments. We do use them. And we
actually use them quite a bit more than is seen in the general
public.
Mr. Royce. I appreciate that it is not just some officials
in Africa. It is China in a big way, too, in Africa, and now
with this Senegal example, North Korea has developed a
relationship with a financial interest for the President of
Senegal. It is a complicated problem, but we want to make sure
our State Department officials on the ground have the resources
they need. And again, Ambassador Carson, thank you for your
great work for this country, and hopefully your continued work
to help the developing world. Thank you very much.
Mr. Payne. Well, I had to tell--the ranking member wanted
to have another round. I said we will have to allow the first
panel to leave. But you can see the tremendous amount of
interest that we have. There are dozens of more questions I
certainly would have liked to have asked, as well as the rest
of the team. But let me thank you for your patience and for the
wealth of information that you have given us. We look forward
to working closely with you. We can see there is a tremendous
amount of interest from the turnout that we had here, and
people still being here. And so we will stay in communication,
and if we have some additional questions, we will have 5 days
to get them to you. Thank you all very much for appearing.
We will now have our second panel. We will ask that
Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Mr. Almami Cyllah, Witney
Schneidman, and Gregory Simpkins come foward. I am going to
start reading your bios right now.
[Pause]
Mr. Payne. We will now have our second panel. Our second
panel will consist of four persons. I will read their
background information. Many of you are no strangers to us.
Actually, none of you are strangers to us. But we will start
with Ambassador Lyman, who is an adjunct senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations and currently adjunct professor at
Georgetown University. During his time at the Council on
Foreign Relations, he served as the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow
and Director of Africa Policy Studies.
Ambassador Lyman has an extensive career in diplomacy,
which includes two ambassadorships in Nigeria and South Africa
and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the
Director of the Department of State's refugee program.
Ambassador Lyman has published work in the Wall Street Journal,
Washington Post, and in 2002, he released his book, Partner to
History: The U.S. Role in South Africa's Transition to
Democracy. He holds a doctorate of philosophy and political
science from Harvard University, and he has been the U.S.
Ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa, as I already mentioned.
Second, we have Mr. Almami Cyllah. Mr. Cyllah is currently
the regional director for Africa at the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Mr. Cyllah has worked
with IFES for the past 9 years serving as country director for
both Haiti from 2001 to 2005, and Liberia from 2006 to 2009.
Before joining IFES, Mr. Cyllah served as country director for
Haiti and Kenya at the National Democratic Institute, where he
directed USAID funded programs with civil and governmental
entities, served as African Affairs Director at the American
International USA in Washington, DC, and has participated in
election monitoring specifically as an election commission for
national electoral commission in Sierra Leone.
In 1980, Mr. Cyllah received his bachelor of arts in
international affairs and politics from Catholic University of
America. He has also published several articles in the Africa
Report, the Washington Post, and Christian Science Monitor.
Following Mr. Cyllah, we will hear from Dr. Witney
Schneidman, president of Schneidman and Associates
International. Dr. Schneidman has worked with previous
administrations. Most recently, he served as co-chair of the
Africa Experts Group on the foreign policy advisory team, and a
member of the Presidential transitional team for President
Obama's 2008 campaign. During the Clinton administration, Dr.
Schneidman served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, where he managed economic and commercial
issues in sub-Saharan Africa.
Dr. Schneidman is the author of Engaging Africa: Washington
and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire and A Ten-Year
Strategy for Increasing Capital Flows to Africa: A Joint Effort
by the Corporate Council on Africa, and issued the commission
on capital flow to Africa.
Dr. Schneidman holds a doctorate of philosophy and
international relations from the University of Southern
California, and has commented extensively on relevant issues on
CBS News, CNN, and BBC.
Finally, we have our own Gregory Simpkins, who is, as you
know, Vice President in Policy and Program Development at the
Leon Sullivan Foundation. Mr. Simpkins had been involved in
democratization trade and capacity building programs since
1992, and he began work on foreign advocacy projects in 1987.
He has extensive experience in election monitoring and training
in sub-Saharan Africa, including the elections process in
Kenya, South Africa, and Guinea. Mr. Simpkins has worked with
the U.S. House of Representatives, serving as a professional
staff member for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human
Rights, and International Operations under then Chairman Smith
from 2005 to 2006, and in 1997 and 1998, for the Subcommittee
on Africa. He has testified in both congressional chambers on
trade preference reform and human rights in Africa.
Mr. Simpkins was also instrumental in establishing a number
of advocacy networks, including the Africa Democracy network
and the U.S. Civil Society Coalition for African Trade and
Investment. Mr. Simpkins maintains ``Africa Rising 2010,'' a
blog exploring current African issues.
Thank you very much, gentlemen, and we will start with
Ambassador Lyman.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, ADJUNCT SENIOR
FELLOW FOR AFRICA POLICY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH AFRICA AND NIGERIA)
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you for this hearing and the
opportunity to testify. Let me start with just a few remarks on
overall policy. We have heard a lot of that discussion. But as
you can tell from the discussion, this administration, the
Obama administration, has been very proactive in its policy in
Africa. In addition to the things that have been mentioned, I
would say that was demonstrated by strong and very timely
statements on Nigeria during this recent crisis by the
Secretary and coordinated with our European allies; also the
denial of visas to people in Kenya suspected of corruption; the
appointment of the presidential envoy for Sudan and a State
Department envoy for the Great Lakes; and the decision by the
Secretary to establish binational commissions with Angola,
Nigeria, and South Africa. These are all commendable steps. And
as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gast talked about two new
initiatives in development, food security and global health.
President Obama further set the tone of his administration
on his trip to Ghana that this administration would emphasize
good governance and democracy in its relations with Africa, and
Secretary of State Clinton reiterated that in her trip across
the continent. Nevertheless, the administration faces several
serious obstacles in carrying out these objectives. The civil
war in Somalia, which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, which links
to worldwide terrorist concerns, drags on, and without any easy
solution, and too few alternative strategies being developed.
The peace process in Sudan is fragile, and the slow process
of staffing in USAID has prevented the administration from
moving very far or very fast on these two new development
initiatives. The low level of staffing in the Africa Bureau,
which Ambassador Carson is trying to redress, is going to make
it too difficult to staff those three new binational
commissions because they take a lot of work and a lot of time,
and they are very important.
And finally, I would mention the increased threat of drug
trafficking through Africa and an alarming linkage of drug
trafficking, terrorist groups, traditional smugglers, and the
corruption that goes with that, which is a very dangerous
phenomena in West Africa, not only for Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau, but Ghana, Senegal and other countries.
But perhaps less well understood is that even as U.S.
assistance to Africa has tripled over the past decade, our
leverage from that assistance has diminished. By that, I mean
that the largest share of our assistance to Africa, now 80
percent of it, is in life-saving programs, HIV/AIDS, child
survival, emergency food. These are very commendable programs,
and we can be proud of them. But these are not the kind of aid
that you can turn off or cut back on, even when recipient
countries flout principles of democracy or human rights. And I
think we are going to see this dilemma as we face those issues
in Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, and elsewhere.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would emphasize the need for a
more comprehensive trade policy in Africa. In brief, despite
AGOA, aid for trade, and related U.S. support for Africa's
trade capacity, African countries side with China, India, and
Brazil in the DOHA trade negotiations against the position of
the United States. Meanwhile, the European Union undermines the
promising development of Africa's regional economic commissions
and hurts U.S. trading opportunities with its proposed Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). There has been no effective
response from the U.S. We could discuss that more.
Let me comment very briefly on the country situations that
you asked me to comment on. South Africa. The administration is
making very good progress on improving what had been a strained
relationship with South Africa under former President Thabo
Mbeki. President Zuma has reversed the positions that he took
and that Mbeki took on AIDS, which is a big step forward.
However, there is concern in South Africa over a drift in
economic policy, over the President's refusal there to abide by
requirements for reporting his financial holdings, and holding
other officials to similar account, and worries over the
erosion of independence of the national prosecutor and the
judiciary.
On the positive side, just last week, President Zuma spent
3 days in Zimbabwe, high-level, in intensive negotiations,
which have resolved some of the issues in that country's
government of unity.
On Nigeria, very quickly, you know the crisis, and we have
talked about it. But let me just say that beyond the crisis,
there are underlying problems in Nigeria. And perhaps the
biggest danger in Nigeria is the danger of becoming irrelevant
in all of the areas that we think Nigeria is important. For
example, Nigeria is well-regarded as a major oil producer, but
failing to develop and resolve key policies in oil and gas
arrangements could prevent the investment that Nigeria needs to
double its output, while at the same time, other countries,
Ghana, Uganda, Brazil, others are increasing their production.
Nigeria could become just another producer, not one of the
major ones.
Perhaps more serious, failure to develop its own
infrastructure, power supplies, railroads, et cetera, means
that factories are closing, people are becoming unemployed.
There is a serious problem in the elite commitment to the
serious problems that Nigeria faces. Now the binational
commission offers us an opportunity, but I hope we go beyond
just our laundry list of things we want. Assistant Secretary
Johnnie Carson has certainly referred to them, e.g., electoral
reform. But I hope we go into the commission with some positive
proposals on public-private partnerships to help develop the
infrastructure and mobilize the capital, using the Food
Security Initiative to revive Nigerian agriculture, and that we
go on through public diplomacy, engage the Nigerian business
community and civil society in supporting these efforts.
Ethiopia--you have talked about that. It is a conundrum.
Ethiopia is a valuable ally in our counterterrorism program. It
is becoming one of Africa's most populous and influential
countries. China, India, Saudi Arabia, and other countries are
investing there. Companies from all over the world searching
for oil and minerals are crawling all over the country. But for
all of the reasons you have discussed, both you and Mr. Smith,
we are seeing a regression in democracy and a violation of
human rights, et cetera.
Now here is the problem. What I said earlier about
leverage, Ethiopia is one of the major recipients of U.S. aid
to Africa, but 84 percent of that aid is HIV/AIDS, child
survival, and emergency food. There is no room for playing with
these programs for political purposes, and Prime Minister Meles
knows it.
The U.S. can only hope to persuade Ethiopian leaders that
it is ultimately in their interest to foster once again
democratic government and find ways to address demands in the
Ogaden and elsewhere. But as to our leverage, strangely enough,
the more we do in these very important areas may actually be
diminishing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyman
follows:]Lyman
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Mr. Cyllah.
STATEMENT OF MR. ALMAMI CYLLAH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Mr. Cyllah. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, I wish to thank you,
your colleagues, and your staff for holding this hearing today.
It could not have come at a more opportune time. Nearly 20
countries in Africa are holding elections in 2010. We have
included in our region statement to you those elections that
are scheduled for this year in Africa.
As you know, IFES is the premiere organization providing
professional support to electoral democracy. Since its founding
in 1987, IFES has worked in more than 100 countries around the
world, striving to promote citizen participation, transparency,
and accountability in political life and civil society.
Democracy, Mr. Chairman, and governance work, in my
opinion, is the foundation on which all other aspects of U.S.
foreign policy in Africa can be built. If you have a country
with a strong democratic institution, I believe that provision
of aid will be more effective, violence will be less common,
and human rights will be more respected. Mr. Chairman, the
right to vote is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. If governments are accountable to their own
people through elections, everyone will benefit.
Mr. Chairman, when an election in Africa draws
international attention, it is very seldom good news. For
example, elections in Kenya fueled violence that left more than
1,500 people dead and about 300 people displaced, while
elections in Zimbabwe suffered from massive fraud and brutal
abuse. In Sierra Leone and Ghana, on the other hands, the
tense, highly contested elections did not generate into
violence. These elections have become historical landmarks
instead for their credibility and peacefulness.
Many countries that experience field elections such as
Kenya and Zimbabwe share a number of similarities. The
incumbents in these countries exploited their positions of
power for material gain and ran for re-election. Years of
misrule, however, give rise to a popular and determined
opposition. To prevent themselves from losing power to the
opposition, the incumbents compromised the independence of the
electoral commissions and the sanctity of the electoral
process. The extremely close result in Zimbabwe led to a brutal
government crackdown, while that in Kenya also led to a
widespread violence.
Mr. Chairman, let me quickly point out that this violence,
when you talk to the citizens of those countries, the citizens
are always calling for more transparency of elections and not
to abandon electoral democracy. An impartial and professional
electoral management body could have prevented this violence or
at least reduced its likelihood. Sierra Leone and Ghana share
many of the opposite characteristics leading to successful
elections in both countries. The Presidents of Sierra Leone and
Ghana could not run for another term, so the incumbents had no
direct stake in the election.
Moreover, the electoral commissions, who are relatively
independent, enjoy the support and engagement of the various
stakeholders and demonstrated their capacity to run elections.
As a result, the electoral commissions were able to conduct
relatively good elections resulting in those two cases peaceful
transfer of power.
What are some of the lessons learned from these difficult
and successful elections? Some of the lessons learned, Mr.
Chairman, are electoral fraud and interference are less likely
when an electoral management body is, one, independent in
budget, tenure, and opinion; professional and capable of
effectively implementing a credible electoral process; support
by the various stakeholders. When attention is focused on the
electoral management body and effective implementation of the
electoral process, it is more likely that the process will run
its course without significant intervention.
When an incumbent is running for re-election, and the
electoral management body lacks independence, the process is
more likely to be manipulated. Where poverty is widespread,
when leaders flaunt their ill-gotten wealth, the opposition can
mount effective mobilization. Where the population is polarized
by antagonistic mobilization of support, elections are more
likely to be rigged in favor of the incumbent, with a very high
probability of electoral violence. Where the electoral disputes
resolution mechanism is robust, aggrieved parties will be less
likely to resort to violence.
Mr. Chairman, IFES has a few recommendations to you as
policymakers and to the administration. These recommendations,
Mr. Chairman, are very simple: Provide assistance throughout
the electoral process because elections do not begin and end on
Election Day. Elections, just like democracy, are a process,
but not an event. If any state of the electoral cycle is
ignored or manipulated, the entire process could fall apart.
Thinking in long-term and providing strategical systems
contributes to much more successful and peaceful elections.
Some of the other recommendations, Mr. Chairman, include,
first, special attention should be paid to how electoral
management bodies are appointed in Africa. Second, during the
registration process, assistance should be given to the
electoral management body to clearly and fairly define
procedures. Third, during the campaign period, assistance
should be given to the electoral management body to establish
binding campaign codes of conduct along with the legal power to
enforce them. Fourth, throughout the process, the electoral
management body must be helped to develop and carry out
effective civic and voter education. Fifth, electoral
management bodies must be assisted and accredited in domestic
and international observers. Sixth, assistance must be given to
the electoral management body to establish an impartial and
effective dispute resolution system prior to the elections.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, countries should not be stripped of
the electoral assistance after conducting a series of
successful elections. This is particularly true as elections
have become closer and more contentious in recent years. While
this represents a welcome spread of multiparty democracy, it
also represents an increasing risk of conflict. Kenya has made
this painfully clear. Even countries such as Ghana and South
Africa, however, which are viewed as bastions of democracy in
Africa, should not be written off in terms of assistance.
Assistance could help these countries further consolidate their
democratic gains and assume a greater leadership role in the
continent.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for holding this
hearing, and I look forward to questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cyllah
follows:]Cyllah
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Dr. Schneidman.
STATEMENT OF WITNEY W. SCHNEIDMAN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, SCHNEIDMAN
& ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Schneidman. Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith,
thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing
and timely hearing on U.S. policy toward Africa.
One of the most important issues on the African continent
is the relative poverty of the nearly 1 billion people who live
there. It is critical to realize that while conditions in many
of the 53 nations are simply unacceptable, vital progress is
being made. One of the most important trends is the slowing
rate at which people are falling into absolute poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa.
From 1980 until 2000, an average of 10 million people
annually fell below the poverty line. Between 2000 and the
onset of the global economic recession in 2008, there was a
virtual plateau in the number of people entering poverty in
Africa. In fact, there were 1.2 million fewer people living in
poverty in 2005 than there were in 2002, which suggests that
Africa is poised to enter a new era of growth, productivity,
and opportunity.
Mr. Chairman, it is against this background that I would
like to respond to the issues that you asked me to address, and
to make several suggestions on how the administration,
Congress, U.S. companies, and civil society might build on
these important trends. The African Growth and Opportunity Act
continues to be the essential framework for U.S.-African
economic and commercial relations. Nevertheless, in the 10
years since it was passed into law, its promise as a stimulus
to the creation of light industrial manufacturing and job
creation remains to be fulfilled. My recommendation therefore
is to have Congress provide an exemption from U.S. taxation for
bona fide foreign direct investment income earned by U.S.
companies outside of the extractive sectors doing manufacturing
or service business in any AGOA-eligible country.
This would be a great stimulus for American investment in
Africa and would contribute to growth domestically by
encouraging companies to repatriate capital to the U.S. It is
also estimated that for every dollar deferred under this
arrangement, there would be an additional $5 of African income
produced. The administration is to be congratulated for its
effort to create binational commissions with Nigeria, South
Africa, and Angola. If structured correctly, these commissions
can make a genuine contribution to the deepening of relations
and enhancing specific objectives.
In each commission, however, I would urge that there be a
finance working group to consist of representatives from Ex-IM,
OPIC, TDA, and the U.S. private sector and appropriate
individuals from the partner nations. Not only would this
increase the impact of the commissions, but it would provide
invaluable support to American companies seeking to enter or
expand in Africa's most significant markets.
Regional economic integration is at the forefront of
Africa's development agenda, and it should have more priority
on our own agenda for the region. To help achieve this, I would
recommend that the assistant secretaries at State for Africa
and Business and Economics, the assistant administrator for
Africa at USAID, and the assistant trade representative for
Africa meet as a group on a regular basis with the heads of the
regional economic commissions in Africa, along with the
Economic Commission for Africa at the African Union and the
African Development Bank. Such a mechanism would be low-cost,
and it would contribute more focus for U.S. support for
regional economic integration and market development.
Candidate Barack Obama was right to say that his
administration would make the millennium development goals
America's development goals. The reality for sub-Saharan
Africa, however, is that a number of countries will fall short
in a number of areas in meeting the 2015 deadline set by the
international community. For one, there is a financing gap of
an estimated $20 billion a year on aid to Africa. The immediate
question for the Obama administration, therefore, is how will
it respond to those countries who do not meet the MDGs.
Of course, we cannot wait until 2015 for the answer. We
need to begin planning for the inevitable now. It is vital that
the State Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review and the Strategic Development Review being drafted in
the White House provide clear direction to this most important
question.
On the issue of education, school enrollment in Africa is
among the lowest in the world. African governments and Africa's
partners need to invest more resources in education at all
levels on the continent. The President's African Education
Initiative, which allocates $600 million to benefit 80 million
children through scholarships, textbooks, and teacher training
programs, is an important beginning. But we have to do more,
and do it with urgency. And this is why I support the African
Higher Education Expansion and Improvement Act of 2009 that
will provide Africa with long-term assistance to improve the
capacity of its institutions of higher education through
partnerships with institutions of higher education in the
United States. Hopefully, this bill will pass in this session
of Congress.
Let me close by underscoring the need for a concerted
effort by the public and private sectors to work together to
enhance mutual interests. Over the last several years, I have
been involved with the Africa, China, U.S. trilateral dialogue
established to explore ways in which the United States and
China can work in common effort in support of African's
development objectives. This unique initiative is the
collaboration of the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation, the Council
on Foreign Relations, the Brenthurst Foundation in South
Africa, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.
Last month in Liberia, we had the fourth meeting of the
trilateral dialogue, and it focused on corporate social
responsibility and economic development. Participants included
President Sirleaf of Liberia, former President John Kufuor of
Ghana, the U.S. Ambassadors to Liberia the United States and
China, and representatives from Chevron, Coca-Cola, Marathon
Oil, DeBeers, Fina Bank, the China-Africa Development Fund, the
China Export-Import Bank, and the China-Henan International
Group, which has infrastructure projects in eight African
countries.
All participants agree that corporate social responsibility
targets must be a clearly stated part of all contracts that
governments negotiate. Moreover, it was apparent that companies
contributing to health, education, and job creation need to be
part of the national dialogue on development goals, and that it
is up to government to monitor compliance. We feel that the
trilateral dialogue has a great deal of potential to enhance
U.S.-Chinese cooperation in Africa, and would encourage the
Obama administration and the Chinese Government, in conjunction
with the African Union, to establish a similar mechanism.
Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for holding this very
important hearing and asking me to be part of it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneidman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Payne. Well, thank you very much for your contribution.
Thank you. Mr. Simpkins.
STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY B. SIMPKINS, VICE PRESIDENT, POLICY &
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, THE LEON H. SULLIVAN FOUNDATION
Mr. Simpkins. I would like to thank subcommittee Chairman
Payne and Ranking Member Smith for allowing me to testify
today, and I appreciated my time working with you both and look
forward to supporting your initiatives for Africa's
development.
The Leon H. Sullivan Foundation has had a longstanding
interest in U.S. policy toward Africa. We led a civil society
coalition in 2008 that issued a questionnaire on Africa policy
to the Presidential candidates. I am happy to say that our
current President and Vice President were the first to answer
that questionnaire. And we presented a white paper on our
Government's Africa policy shortly after the election of
President Obama in 2008, and we are about to launch a survey on
the views of our stakeholders on American Africa policy that
will be shared this September at our Africa Policy Forum at the
Sullivan Global Reunion in Atlanta.
I also am policy committee chair of the African-American
Unity Caucus, a coalition of dozens of organizations that focus
on the various aspects of our policy toward Africa. Every
September, during the Ronald H. Brown African Affairs series,
our members present forums on important Africa issues facing
our Government.
Certainly, we expect President Obama to continue the
growing engagement with Africa that his immediate predecessors
championed and take America's relationship to Africa to a new
level.
Unfortunately, this administration faces crises that
distract from longer-term planning and implementation of
development policy for Africa. There are countries in Africa
with active violence, such as Somalia, Sudan, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, or others with simmering
tensions, including Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya,
Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
Meanwhile, there are long-term issues that also must figure
into American policy. Good governance, enhancing agricultural
production, food security, stemming the tide of disease,
raising the level of education, stemming the impact of the
brain drain, and many other issues pose a challenge in
executing an effective Africa policy. In selecting policy
options, the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation has developed
recommendations for the administration and congressional
actions that include, one, effective diplomacy in conjunction
with regional African organizations to address warfare, lack of
governance, and piracy involving Somalia, Guinea, and other
troubled countries; two, multilevel strategies to identify and
implement a lasting solution to the complex problems in Sudan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo and their longstanding
warfare and violence, and in some cases genocide; three,
American security assistance and U.S. Government and private
sector support for more effective programs in communities in
Nigeria, Angola, and other oil-producing African countries;
four, diplomatic and programmatic attention to simmering crises
in Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, and other African countries
facing internal turmoil before these tensions overflow; five,
consensus among African and African Diaspora leaders on dealing
forthrightly with the regime in Zimbabwe.
And I would like to at this point acknowledge the
chairman's intervention in Zimbabwe to support respect for
democratic governance. It is much appreciated.
Sixth, U.S. Government assistance and American private
sector investment in all forms of infrastructure in Africa in
order to make AGOA more practically effective; seven,
encouragement of business-to-business linkages between African
and American small and medium enterprises for AGOA to be more
broadly implemented; eight, effective rules for how to proceed
in the fight against corruption in Africa, as well as a
stepped-up U.S. effort to facilitate the return of stolen funds
to repay debts and address unmet social needs; nine, elevation
of the importance of U.S.-Africa agricultural trade, capacity
building assistance for African producers, and encouragement
for investment by Americans in African agriculture; ten,
enhanced support for distance learning and student and teacher
exchanges, as well as encouragement of the involvement of
members of the African Diaspora in America in diminishing the
impact of Africa's brain drain, especially in the health
sector; eleven, stronger endorsement for effective corporate
social responsibility practices as embodied in the Global
Sullivan Principles for Corporate Social Responsibility, which
is part of the trilateral dialogue that Mr. Schneidman talked
about; and finally, continued empowerment of women and youth
through African civil society organizations and the enhancement
of the capacity of civil society organizations themselves.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Simpkins follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. And let me thank you all of
you for your testimony. Let me begin with you, Ambassador
Lyman. Since you were an Ambassador both to South Africa and
Nigeria--of course, South Africa elections are over, but with
Nigeria's coming up--in your opinion, how do you rate the
democracy and civic involvement in both Nigeria and South
Africa today as opposed to when you were Ambassador in those
countries? In other words, do you feel that there has been
progress overall when you look back, or would you say there has
been a decline in those two very important, most important,
countries on the continent?
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start
with Nigeria. I think the sad thing about Nigeria after the
return to civilian rule in 1999, which gave everybody,
especially the Nigerians, a great deal of hope--the elections
got steadily worse. In 1999, it was no great shakes; in 2003,
it was worse, and in 2007 worse than that. It is because the
focus was more on amassing winning votes and less on improving
the process. There is a fundamental problem in Nigeria that
Nigerians identify, and that is loyalty is up, not down. That
is, you get your job by the party picking you, and then you do
whatever it takes to get elected. And then you don't have to
collect taxes because your largesse comes from the center
through the oil revenues, which are distributed, which you then
use for patronage.
It is not a good system for solving these underlying
problems of Nigeria, which I mentioned. I think that the
remedies are very clear. They have had studies on what to do
about electoral reform. They have had studies on how to develop
the delta. I think everybody in Nigeria knows that the ethnic
violence we have seen is also competition for land and
resources, and it is also manipulated by political leaders.
Everybody, I think, knows where the solutions are. The
question is how do you get the elite to act with much more
foresight and long-term commitment to Nigeria? I think that is
going to be a difficult thing to do. I think we can encourage
it. Civil society, ironically, in Nigeria is very active, more
active than when I was there for sure, and there are lots of
institutions operating, but they haven't really had an impact.
And the business community, ironically, doesn't--it presses for
better economic policy, but it stays out of politics. It
doesn't press for greater governance and democracy. And that, I
think, is something we ought to engage the community on.
There is a lot of dynamism in Nigeria, as you well know,
Mr. Chairman. But I think they are at a very critical stage,
that as I suggested in my testimony, Nigeria could slip ever
downward if they don't grasp these fundamental problems. They
are going to have to start with electoral reform, and they
don't have much time before the next election, and then they
have got to move from there in many ways.
In South Africa, I think there has been a lot of progress
in the sense that the institutions of democracy and the
constitution have held up fairly well. The courts have been
strong, particularly the constitutional court. Elections have
been carried out reasonably well. There is freedom of the
press, et cetera. What is disappointing is that because it is
almost a one-party state, because the ANC is so dominant, that
the dynamism, the new ideas, and the ethics have to come from
the ANC. And I think they have slipped on all three.
There is a good deal of corruption, and much of it is
covered up. There is not cohesion on economic policy. There is
not efficiency in the administration. These are worrisome
trends. I don't think it is in crisis mode, but I do think
there is going to have to be some revitalization of commitment.
Perhaps there is some serious, serious thinking within the ANC
and outside of it as to how they get back to some of those
exciting principles that we all felt in the 1990s.
Here again the United States can be very encouraging. We
have a very dynamic team now in South Africa. But we have to
engage a lot of people. We have to encourage a lot of
discussion on these areas. Again, there is an active civil
society. There is an outspoken opposition in the Parliament.
But until the ANC starts to reform itself, there are going to
be some serious problems.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Well, since you hit the big
two, maybe you can just make a comment about Ethiopia and their
upcoming election.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, as I stated, it is a real
conundrum. Here is a very important country, very important to
our strategy in East Africa, very important in security
matters, increasingly influential, other countries investing in
the country, a very shrewd and smart leader. And on the other
hand, as we heard already today, increasingly more oppression,
more arresting of people, control of the press, nastiness
toward American institutions like the VOA. Very disturbing. And
the question is, what do we do in that kind of a situation? And
as I suggested, the aid program doesn't give you that kind of
leverage.
This aid is lifesaving. It is wonderful. But 84 percent of
it is keeping people alive. You can't say, well, you are not
having clean elections, we are going to cut back on ARV
treatments for HIV/AIDS victims. You can't do that. So we have
to find another way to bring our influence to bear. But I think
we have to recognize that we have limited influence under these
circumstances. And I think it is a serious problem in our
relations with Ethiopia.
I do think that voices have to come even from outside the
administration because the administration is caught in this
conundrum--they have got all these security and other issues--
voices in Congress, voices from the press, et cetera, to say,
as Ambassador Carson himself said, these things question
Ethiopia's reputation and its position in the world. I think
those are the kinds of things that may help. But I suggest this
is a serious, serious dilemma.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Let us see. Mr. Cyllah, we have seen
that 50 years ago, there were a number of elections that were
held--I don't know, maybe 10 or 12, that will be celebrating 50
years this year. Absent the three that we have heard and
mentioned, could you give me an assessment on the, say, two or
three other elections that would be coming up this year, and
how do you think their previous elections were, and how do you
anticipate the upcoming 2010 elections.
Mr. Cyllah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things we
have noticed is that, of course, we don't have the 90 percent,
98 percent win anymore where the one party moves. So there is
quite an improvement in Africa. But a country like Burundi is
an interesting one to look at this year, which in the past also
having been a military, one-party dictatorial government is
moving toward the democratic reign. Difficulties, yes, but do
we stop support? I would say no because I think every little
bitty step that they do take toward democracy is important. We
have seen Burundi evolve, a lot of women in the process, which
changes a whole lot of things in that part of the world, so as
in Rwanda.
But at the same time, we have to continue to hold these
leaders accountable and ready to answer questions. As I would
say, listen to them, but also verify as to what they are
telling you because they want you to hear what they think you
want to hear. Basically, that is how they will bring it to you.
Elections--of course, this has been mentioned quite a bit.
Sudan is going to be having elections. So these are some of
those elections that we need to pay close attention to. Once
again, the important thing for us is that one of the
difficulties we have had over the years, Mr. Chairman, is that
support to elections have come right close to the elections.
Support to election process is more so the event that we see,
and failing to look at the whole process.
There is an electoral cycle. Pre-election processes are
just as important as Election Day. Post-election processes are
just as important. I think it was one American leader who had
said that preparations for the next elections begin the day
after you announce the results of the last elections. We have
not seen that happen in Africa in a consistent way. And I think
that is what my recommendation had been, for us to look at
elections as an election cycle rather than looking at elections
as the event.
So a long-term process in those elections support I think
will help. And again, there are so many other countries that we
have on this list. It is maybe a little too late to provide
that electoral cycle support, but for other elections upcoming,
I would recommend that you as policymakers and the U.S.
administration look at that very important.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Just one other quick question. There
is a new phenomenon going on now, at least that started in
several countries. I think Togo, Gabon, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are three countries that the children of
the previous ruler have come in, although some are just recent,
certainly Gabon. But do you see any potential for better
governance with the second generation coming in? I know it is a
U.S. phenomenon where families tend to get into politics, and
the Middle East also, I guess, Morocco and some other. Egypt it
seems like is in waiting. Syria has sons replacing their
parents.
Have you seen any kind of improvement, or do you have
optimism that the second generation may have learned from the
previous generation? Is that a good trend? Of course, we have
had the Roosevelts and the Kennedys and the Bushes in the U.S.
So you can't say you can't have it. I just wonder what your
opinion might be.
Mr. Cyllah. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is a very good
question. And the point for me and the point for our
organization is whether the process went well and whether the
people who are going to be ruled by these people accept those
results. We see in Togo, for an example, that there is not an
acceptance, and following as indeed the son I think is going to
be a little better than his father, from all the brutalities
that his father committed. We see the opposition really
critical of what those results have been, and there are still
demonstrations, and that we have not seen the massive arrests
that his father used to do when he saw an opposition.
Congo--it is a wait and see also. But the President, I
think, is not going to be able to follow in his father's
footsteps because I think there is a lot of opposition. And
people are pretty much talking to each other, and they see the
results of those bad governments and what it has done to their
citizens.
You did not mention one other country that is quite
interest to us, and that is Senegal. There is also the talk
that----
Mr. Payne. That is true.
Mr. Cyllah [continuing]. That the President is also
grooming his son to become President. Once again, the important
thing is we follow the real process of having electoral
democracy. If that is the case, and if the results show that,
yes, they are winning, then, yes, I think we will accept that.
But if they have the military and they are going around abusing
people, I think it is a wrong step that they will be taking.
And I doubt if they will be successful for a long time. It is
never sustainable, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Lyman. I had a point on that, Congressman. I
attended a conference up in Cambridge recently sponsored by the
Africa Business Club of the Harvard Business School. I went up
there thinking there would be about 50 or 60 young people to
talk to. There were 900 people at that conference. I would say
70 to 80 percent were Diaspora Africans, mostly from Nigeria,
but from everywhere. And these were young people studying in
business schools, law schools, colleges all over, bright and
sharp as anybody you have ever met, asking tough questions of
business leaders, et cetera. It was very inspiring and moving.
And the question is, are they going to have an opportunity to
do the things they were talking about this conference, whether
it was investment or changes, et cetera, in their home
countries?
They wanted to do it. So that was the whole purpose of the
conference. And if there is hope for change and positive
change, it comes from that generation. It was a very, very
impressive experience.
Mr. Payne. That is very interesting, and I did think in
terms of Senegal, too. I guess for some of the countries, it
may be a little easier than the others for the son to do
better, you know. I will leave it at that.
Let me ask my final question, and then I will turn it over.
Dr. Schneidman, what is your assessment of the administration's
Global Food Security Initiative? Do you feel that the impact
for agricultural development in Africa is key? Or if a failure
happens, what would the position be for famine or lack of
adequate food security? Could you touch on that whole area of
this initiative of the Obama administration?
Mr. Schneidman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question,
which is really quite a critical question. You know, this thing
in talking with Ambassador Carson and others, one gets the
impression that the Obama administration is looking at the Food
Security Initiative much like the Bush administration looked at
PEPFAR, much like the Clinton administration looked at AGOA. We
haven't seen it--I haven't seen it happen yet, and I am
concerned about this. I am concerned, number one, that the
leadership is in the Department of Agriculture. No aspersions
against the Department of Agriculture whatsoever, but I think
one knows that the way you drive policy is really from the
White House, certainly the State Department, and I haven't seen
that interagency team emerge yet to give this initiative the
definition that it requires.
Secondly, addressing the issue of food security is a
multifaceted proposition. Not only are we talking about seeds
and irrigation, but we are talking about trade. We are talking
about farm to market. We are talking about roads,
infrastructures. So I am concerned here in the early days that
the initiative has not been defined well enough, and the
leadership is not yet clear enough.
Mr. Payne. Yes, Mr. Simpkins.
Mr. Simpkins. The coalitions that I work with are focusing
on the administration's food security policy. As my colleague
just said, it is very complex. As you recall, when the
Secretary announced it, she talked about seven distinct parts.
They are not all integrated with one another. We want to work
with the administration to make this work because we know how
important it is. It is just going to be very difficult, and we
haven't yet seen a real action plan for how to live this out.
And we are hoping that the Congress, particularly the
House, will help with that because I think--no offense to my
colleagues from the State Department--a lot of the policy comes
from the Congress. And in this case, I think that the bills
have been introduced--I think Ms. McCollum has a bill. In the
Senate, they have bill. I think working with those, we have at
least some starting point to make this happen.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank our panel for your testimony and leadership, and to the
long stayers in the audience who have been very patient as we
have voted and asked our questions.
Just let me begin. Ambassador Lyman, you, like Ambassador
Johnnie Carson, who talked about many believing that some
African countries have reached a plateau--and he used the term
a ``democratic recession.'' You talked about stalled and in
some cases regressing democracy. And I am wondering if our
other panelists first and foremost think that too is an apt
description of, you know, the macro view of sub-Saharan Africa.
Secondly, on the issue of trafficking, back in 1998, I
introduced the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. It took 2
years to get it passed. There was an enormous amount of
indifference, not overt and outright opposition, but
indifference to enacting the bill. When I would talk about
trafficking, even domestically, I would talk to U.S. attorneys,
and they would say, ``Oh, you mean drug trafficking.'' I mean,
that was the immediate go-to concept that they had. They didn't
seem to understand that there was this explosion of human
trafficking, sex and labor trafficking.
It took 2 years to get the bill passed. And then about a
year or so for the Bush administration--and, Mr. Chairman, you
might recall--because when it comes to human rights, there
can't be any partisanship--I chaired a hearing in this room in
which we held the Bush administration to account for its very
slow and tardy designation of the TIP office and the naming of
the countries. The Trafficking in Persons report, which is now,
as it ought to be, an annual event, and even more frequently if
there are countries that go on or off the Tier list. But there
was this sense of indifference that greatly appalled me.
Well, we had some initial success among countries. There
was a robust acceptance by some that, yeah, they needed to do
something. I am happy to say that in this 2009 report, Nigeria
is a Tier 1 country, as well as Mauritius. Nigeria more than
doubled the number of trafficking offenders convicted and
improved assistance to victims. Their NAPTIP office runs seven
shelters. Two other shelters are run. I have visited some of
those shelters in Abuja as well as in Lagos. They do a
wonderful job on a shoestring budget. They are Tier 1.
The sad story is the number of countries that have slipped
over these last several years. There are now seven African
countries--and we will get a new report, as we all know, in
June--seven African countries on Tier 3, a dozen and a half on
what we call the Watch List. That is the bubble. They can
easily slip into Tier 3. A particular situation occurred this
year. When we had the Haitian earthquake, Niger, which has some
8,800 to 43,000 Nigerians living under conditions of judicial
and hereditary slavery, according to the TIP report, has all
kinds of problems with child prostitution. There are children
being sold into sexual bondage. Money was taken out of the TIP
work, Trafficking in Persons work, for Niger and put into the
Haitian effort. And that was one of my questions that I meant
to ask and will ask of the administration. When is it going
back?
But it seems to me it is quickly deprioritized when it
comes to African countries. Again, if you look at the list,
look at the map, there is an awful lot of red, you know, the
designation of Tier 3, egregious violators. I am worried that
this is slipping.
I held hearings in this room on Mauritania. Mauritania
still is a Tier 3 country due to slavery. Sudan is a slave
country as well. I hope that all of you might speak to this
festering sore of trafficking. Even when I was in Nigeria, a
Tier 1 country, I learned to my shock and dismay that the Juju
men put the fear of--and it is not God--into these women and
young girls prior to their being trafficked into Europe,
whether it be into Rome or anywhere else, for modern day
slavery.
So if you can speak to the issue, I don't think we are
doing enough. And I think as the transfer of funds of Niger
clearly underscores, there are other spigots of money that
could have been tapped, in my opinion, in order to help the
Haitian catastrophe.
Secondly, or thirdly--and if you could answer these, I
would really appreciate it--microcredit. Are we doing enough
with regards to microcredit for Africa? Mr. Simpkins, I know
you made a trip. It was on behalf of the committee. I couldn't
join you because of votes in Zimbabwe. You spoke about Zimbabwe
in your testimony. I remember you coming back with a
devastating report about the scorched earth policy that Mugabe
was following. And you also spoke in your testimony in terms of
action, stronger endorsement for effective corporate social
responsibility practices as embodied in the Global Sullivan
Principles. Could you give us an update where all of that is? I
mean, are the Sullivan principles being taken seriously?
And finally--two finals--Paul Kagame, in the upcoming
August elections--Mr. Cyllah, you might want to speak to this.
Do you think the U.S. Government, especially with the
deteriorating human rights situation there, is doing enough to
make sure that that election truly is free and fair?
And finally, I asked our previous panel about this ART
implementing partners letter from CDC, which I find very
disturbing, that were freezing the antiretroviral drugs that
will be provided to those who are HIV positive. The letter says
since 2003--this is the one that went to Uganda, and we are
trying to track down the ones that went to the other partners:
``Since 2003, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief has successfully provided chronic lifesaving
treatment to more than 100,000 HIV-infected Ugandans.
The U.S. Government recognizes that in the coming
years, the number of patients in need of antiretroviral
treatment will increase dramatically. While the U.S.
Government is committed to continuing treatment for
those already enrolled, funding for HIV programs is not
expected to increase in the near future.''
In the next paragraph, they talk about, ``Each partner
should expect to have a flat line budget for ARV.'' That to me
will be a death sentence to huge numbers of people who will
need this lifesaving drug. Your thoughts on that, because I
think we need to push back on that one.
Ambassador Lyman. Well, let me speak to a couple of the
issues you raised, Congressman, very serious ones indeed. The
trafficking in people is a terrible issue, and you can say it
is part of poverty, et cetera, but it is really part of
criminality. And some countries, as you point out, have made
progress, when it is publicized, when people react to it and
realize what is happening. Other governments are weak or don't
care enough. I think you in the Congress have put a spotlight
on this, which makes a difference because it really is terrible
exploitation.
My guess is, although I am no expert, that you are getting
links between the various criminality groups, the groups that
traffic people, the groups that traffic drugs contraband, et
cetera. Building up capacity in Africa to deal with this I
think is extremely important.
I would also point to one other thing that has not been
emphasized strongly enough, and that is the role of the Africa
Union in this regard and the sub-regional groups because these
are cross-border problems. And you need to develop cooperation
across borders among these groups. And I think that may need a
lot more attention in order to get at this problem and to
strengthen the cooperation amongst security services.
Mr. Smith. If you could yield on that briefly. Also, on the
protection side, the cooperation of faith-based organizations.
Ambassador Lyman. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Which, if mobilized, can be a prevention tool
and a----
Ambassador Lyman. Absolutely. I don't know about these
letters on that freezing, but it touches on a big issue that
has to be faced, not only the United States but the world. We
have made tremendous progress under PEPFAR in going from--what
is it--100,000 people to 4 million people now worldwide on
these drugs. The future, as you know, is that there are 40
million people in the world who are infected. Eventually, all
of them will need treatment at some point. And therefore, that
rising curve is something that we in the G8 and others have to
think about. How do we do this? How do we carry this? Who will
be responsible, as you say, for people's lives every day? And I
am not sure what is behind the letter, but I do think that we
have to start to think about how we plan ahead, how we finance
this, how it doesn't eat up all of the other financing of
things we need, but doesn't run into the problems you
mentioned.
I haven't heard about that letter, and I will certainly
want to look into it myself. But I think we are going to face
this question more and more. As we get more successful, and
then we say, well, now we have got to go to 6 million, 8
million, 10 million, et cetera--I think it is an issue worth
watching very closely.
Mr. Schneidman. Congressman Smith, let me respond quickly
to three of the issues that you raised. The first is the notion
of a democratic recession in Africa. My first reaction to
hearing my colleague, Mr. Cyllah, talk about 20 countries who
are going to have elections this year in Africa doesn't strike
me as much of a recession. But I think more fundamentally, I
think we have to be very careful about talking about Africa in
broad brush strokes. With as many nations as there are on the
continent, 53, some countries are doing better than others.
Some countries do better at this election than they did the
last one, or they will do better in the future. And I think the
challenge to those of us who are partners with the continent,
be it through civil society or government, is how to maximize
the better outcome.
I think Ambassador Lyman has described quite graphically
and accurately the decline in the quality of elections in
Nigeria. Having said that, maybe in Zimbabwe, you know,
elections there, which have not been strong elections at all,
actually can play a role in alleviating this crisis in the
coming months and years, if we can get those elections right.
So I think we have to guard against broad-brush generalizations
and really talk about specific countries and what are the
natures of the democratic challenges.
Let me talk about trafficking in persons. I have had some
experience. First, to applaud your initiative and your energy
in bringing this to the forefront. In my work, I deal with
American companies to help give them strategic advice in their
investments in Africa. And I have dealt with some oil companies
in Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, and in each one this
has been a very important issue. And the companies take this
very seriously. And the dynamic that happens is when the report
comes or is about to come, the dialogue with the State
Department increases quite dramatically, and with the embassy,
and with the host governments. And it really helps to elevate
the whole dialogue as it concerns the creation of shelters, as
it concerns radio advertising, as it concerns posters. And it
is not perfect by any stretch, but it certainly has the
attention, I think, of critical stakeholders. And I can only
encourage you to sort of continue your efforts because it is
taken seriously by some of the companies that I work with. And
I think it does have an impact on the ground, certainly in the
dialogue between our embassies and the host governments.
As for microcredit, I think a lot is going on there, and I
think we have learned a lot, starting with the Gramene
experience in Bangladesh and organizations like BRAC and
others. And I think there is a consciousness about how to be
effective with microcredit in Africa. We are seeing it not only
in USAID, but a number of philanthropic initiatives as well.
My concern, where there is a lack, is in small and medium
enterprise sector. I developed the Liberia Enterprise
Development Fund with Mr. Bob Johnson, who put up $3 million.
We were able to leverage $23 million from OPIC. And that fund
is now giving out loans in the area of $30,000 and $40,000 and
$50,000 and $100,000, and this helps to create companies that
can employ 10 and 15, 20, 50 people and that have real growth
potential.
My concern with the microcredit, as important as it is, it
is really sustaining you for today. It is not really building
for tomorrow. And I think we have to give better thought how
the microcredit can link and grow into the SME level and how we
address that SME level in a more systematic way across the
continent because the appetite is so strong, and the
environment is increasingly there for what I look at as
enterprise-led development, where people want to start
companies. They want to join companies, and they understand
that the government is not an answer to their job search.
Mr. Cyllah. Congressman, it is quite interesting the way
you talk about the democracy plateau in Africa because I will
say that looking at the organization I represent, we don't see
a democracy plateau. We see a plateau in the support to the
democratic process in the various African countries. And so I
go to Dr. Schneidman. I think we have to take these countries
one at a time and look at--if you look at Ghana for an example,
before 1997, I mean, there was a leader who took all supreme
court justices and shot them at the beach. But pressure mounted
where he didn't change out of the goodness of his heart, but
out of pressure.
And so I think he later on developed a process where he
felt he really did hand over power to a civilian government,
and we are beginning to see a process in Ghana moving toward
real democracy. But I think again, as I said, elections are not
just the event, and the habit from the West has been we look at
these elections a few months before the elections; we send
observers. After the elections, they say, oh, these elections
are really good. I can give you a good example--and this is
again Ghana. I went on a pre-election assessment to Ghana,
where after the assessment, we had a press conference where we
were asked as to what we saw. We all said, yes, we saw a
peaceful transfer; we saw a peaceful process going on. And one
of the reporters asked me directly, where are you from, and I
told him. And he said, many are from Sierra Leone; how can you
come and tell us that this place is peaceful. Do you know the
body language we use? Do you understand the language that we
speak.
So exactly, we don't. And I think we were just looking at
the initial stages as we saw rather than looking at the
process. If we had had the opportunity to be there long-term,
we probably would have seen some of the violence or some of the
undercurrents by the elections that maybe are upcoming. I think
that is where we talk about having an election process being
supported and an election cycle being supported rather than the
election event.
Elections in Zimbabwe--well, we saw what happened after the
elections were stolen. So again, that confirms to us that the
people themselves who are going to be ruled were not accepting
of those results. They went to the streets. And as I said
earlier, if we had given support to Zimbabwe from the onset, we
probably would not have seen this happen.
That brings me to the other question again as to are these
leaders ready to change. My answer is no. So do you give them
that kind of a support? My answer is not to be friends of
people, but to be friends of the country and those people, not
the leaders. You know, I have a good example when I wore a
human rights hat some years back. I was invited to be part of a
panel with one of your former colleagues, Congressman Bill
Green, in Pennsylvania at one of the universities. And we were
criticizing the policies of South Africa and Zaire then and now
Congo. And we were talking even about Ethiopia again at that
point.
One of the participants came directly at Congressman Green
and said, why are you always criticizing friends of America or
the U.S. Why don't you look at the Soviet friends as well?
Well, the congressman was talking about Ethiopia, criticizing
Ethiopia. But then what it said to me was that we were
supporting the leaders who were supporting friends, and we are
not supporting the process and the people in those countries. I
think that is what we need to look at, and those are the
recommendations that we will make to you, to look at the
electoral process in each of those countries, and think in long
term, just like you think democracy in a long-term process.
Thank you.
Mr. Simpkins. Well, in terms of the regression in
democracy, I think there has been a sliding back because, as my
colleague says, we look at the event of Election Day, and not
the whole process. I do agree we come in too late. You can't
parachute into an election situation and really do a good job.
I have seen the chairman on the campaign trail in a number of
places, and you know that there are things that happen long
before Election Day that determine whether you are going to win
or not.
Back in 1992, I was part of the team that observed the 1992
elections in Kenya, and that election was manipulated months
and months before when the electoral districts were
apportioned. There were these huge districts for the opposition
and these little tiny districts for the ruling party. So quite
naturally, they have an advantage from the start.
The other thing is that on election commissions, we need to
have permanent election commissions. You can't do this on an ad
hoc basis, which is what we are doing too often.
Thirdly, I think that we seem to be allergic to working
with political parties. And when we look at countries like
South Africa and Namibia and Equatorial Guinea even, part of
the reason why you have these states dominated by one party,
even Botswana, which is a democratic situation, is that the
opposition is too weak to really compete. I observed the
election in Equatorial Guinea just several months ago. And
honestly, it is very difficult to say that that is a good
election when you win by 97 percent of the vote. But the
opposition is so terrible that even if the President didn't
campaign, he probably still would win, though not by 97
percent.
We need to put more effort and resources into working with
these political parties so they are able to genuinely compete.
Even in some cases where there is competition, it is
competition between one person and another person. Both their
parties are cults of personality and not real parties. That is
why we have a problem with this whole succession of sons
because if you had a real party, there would be people within
that party who would be in line to be the next President.
Now in terms of trafficking, Mr. Smith, you know, you and I
have traveled to countries in looking at that, and one of the
things we saw was a lack of effective law enforcement, for one.
You have situations in which families don't do due diligence on
people who come by and say, well, look, I can take your
daughter to the city; she will make money; she will send money
back home. They have no idea if that is real or not, and often
it isn't real.
When we first started talking about this--I talked to some
of my African friends, and they said, oh, you don't understand
us. We have cultural differences. People, cousins, come from
the city, and they come to town, and they don't get paid, and
they work in the house because at some point they are going to
get an education. Well, that is not what we are talking about.
We were in Sudan in Khartoum and talked that group CEAWAC. We
were talking about slavery. They were talking about bride
stealing. There is a big difference. But they didn't seem to
grasp the difference in that.
So the other thing is a lot of these young women are sent
to the West, to Italy--a lot of Nigerians are sent to Italy. A
lot of them go throughout Europe, and a lot of them end up
here. And it is very difficult for us to tell people how
terribly they do in enforcing trafficking laws when we have
raids here where for a long term there have been whole, you
know, cabals of traffickers.
Now Zimbabwe, you are right, I went with--in fact, Dr.
Pearl Alice Marsh, to take a look at the situation there. You
know, I don't think I have ever seen in 30 years in looking at
Africa a country devolve so much. There was a CODEL that Mr.
Royce led back in 1997, and Zimbabwe was one of the countries
we visited. And it was an oasis after being in Angola and
Democratic Republic of Congo. You end up in Zimbabwe that had a
really successful stock exchange and gas stations with what
looked like 7-Elevens. Everything was good. The economy was
going well. And then all of a sudden, the government took it
into its mind to find this money, this foreign money, that was
in the system, and the inflation rate went up so high that even
the banks were going on the black market to get money.
But they told the businesses, the shopkeepers, you have to
use the official rate that we have. So as a result, they went
out of business because they were losing money with every
transaction. Then they went after the commercial farmers. Now
the commercial farmers admitted that they got this land as a
result of it being taken from Africans. So it should have been
transferred. That is not a question. The question is how it was
done.
The black farmworkers were not given the land. Cronies were
given the land, and they did not know how to deal with it. When
their production went down, the manufacturing in Zimbabwe,
which was dependent on commercial farming, also went down. Then
they had the situation that we saw, which was they went after
the traders looking for this foreign money in the system. They
put all of them out of business, even ones who had licenses.
Now you have the whole economy, formal and informal, that is
out of business.
So it is ironic, though, that when we disallowed Zimbabwe
from being in AGOA, they were still in the generalized system
of preferences, and they still happened for a long time to be
one of our leading trading partners. So that is an anomaly in
the system that we need to look at.
Now you asked me about the Global Sullivan Principles. We
have several hundred endorses from around the world in America
and Europe, in Africa, in Asia, including I think a Chinese
company or two, and in Latin America. And we think that it
governs the way businesses deal with their employees, but also
their communities. And we are looking at using it for a water
program in Liberia, where we want to work with the companies
that use water so that they clean the water and provide it to
their employees so they don't have to go looking for water for
their families, and also to their communities.
Lastly, on the PEPFAR issues, theoretically, I would agree
with the President's view that at some point we need to
transfer responsibility for paying for these treatments to
African governments. My only concern, and my main concern, is
that too many of these governments don't have a working
healthcare system. So if you do it too quickly, what you are
doing is just ending the reality of treatment.
Mr. Payne. Well, let me thank you all very much. That was a
very healthy exchange, and I really appreciate all as we could
certainly go on. And I, first of all, appreciate your staying
over the time. I am sure that you intended to stay, but this
has been a very important hearing. We have been attempting to
get the Assistant Secretary here for some time. And so you made
history because you are here with him at this hearing before
our subcommittee. And your information was great.
I just want to thank you, Dr. Schneidman, for mentioning
the bill that I introduced, the Higher Education and Expansion
Improvement Act. As you know, we have been pushing education
for the girl child, elementary and secondary. And I would
certainly like to once again request my great friend, the
ranking member, to take a look at the bill again. We are trying
to get a great co-sponsor to it. So we will confer the next day
or two to see whether we can move that forward in a bipartisan
way.
Let me also ask for unanimous consent to enter into the
record a statement by the African Rights Monitor about human
rights and humanitarian conditions in the Ogaden, and I will
enter that without exception, without objection.
And finally, once again, thank you all for your attendance,
and those of you who stayed to listen, it has been very
instructive, and we will certainly glean a lot of important
information as we move forward in our policies here in the
United States Congress.
At this time I ask unanimous consent for members to have 5
legislative days to revise and extend their remarks. And
therefore, at this time, the hearing stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 8 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Minutes
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