[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE
NEW APPROACHES?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-86
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANTUntil 5/5/10 deg.
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
Jasmeet Ahuja, Professional Staff Member deg.
David Fite, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
Jessica Lee, Professional Staff Member deg.
Alan Makovsky, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
Pearl Alice Marsh, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
Peter Quilter, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
Edmund Rice, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
Daniel Silverberg, Senior Deputy Chief Counsel deg.
Amanda Sloat, Professional Staff Member
Kristin Wells, Deputy Chief Counsel deg.
Shanna Winters, Chief Counsel deg.
Brent Woolfork, Professional Staff Member deg.
Robert Marcus, Professional Staff Member deg.
Diana Ohlbaum, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
Laura Rush, Professional Staff Member/Security Officer deg.
Genell Brown, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator
Riley Moore, Deputy Clerk deg.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
(Former Senior Director for Russia on the National Security
Council)....................................................... 8
The Honorable Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security
Conference (Former German Ambassador to the United States)..... 21
Ms. Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs,
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation.. 31
Mr. Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center.............. 40
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Thomas Graham: Prepared statement............................ 11
The Honorable Wolfgang Ischinger: Prepared statement............. 23
Ms. Sally McNamara: Prepared statement........................... 33
Mr. Dmitri Trenin: Prepared statement............................ 43
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida: Letter dated December 11, 2009, to
the Honorable Barack H. Obama, President of the United States,
from Members of Congress....................................... 61
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 72
Hearing minutes.................................................. 73
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 75
Questions for the record submitted by the Honorable Barbara Lee,
a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
responses from:
Mr. Thomas Graham.............................................. 77
Ms. Sally McNamara............................................. 79
Mr. Dmitri Trenin.............................................. 83
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE NEW
APPROACHES?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman,
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. After
the ranking member and I make our opening remarks, I will
recognize the chairman and ranking member of the Europe
Subcommittee for 3 minutes to make opening statements and other
members of the committee for 1 minute should they wish to make
opening remarks. Members are welcome to place written
statements in the record, and we welcome our panelists and
everyone who is with us for a hearing on a subject that is
actually much more interesting than it sounds.
For over four decades after the Second World War, the
United States and Europe were focused on confronting the threat
posed by the Soviet Union. That threat disappeared with the end
of the Cold War, but it was replaced with a much wider, more
complex array of security challenges, many of which emanate
from outside the Euro-Atlantic region. Do we have the right
tools, institutions and approaches to deal with these new
threats? That is the subject of our hearing today.
In addition to the potential instability in Southeastern
Europe, we are confronting the ever-growing likelihood of a
nuclear-armed Iran, the menace of al-Qaeda that continues to
spread around the world, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
We also need to determine how to deal collectively with
concerns such as energy security, sea piracy and climate
change.
The existing transatlantic and European institutions--such
as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, or OSCE, and the European Union--have done a remarkable
job building peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic zone for
many decades. But they are now re-evaluating their roles and
capabilities to ensure that they can confront the challenges of
the 21st century as effectively as possible.
NATO has been an extraordinarily successful military
alliance for the past 60 years, but the purpose for which it
was created no longer exists. Since the Cold war has ended, it
has transformed to address new threats--but as demonstrated by
the current difficulty in obtaining sufficient troop levels in
Afghanistan, many alliance members question the desirability of
engaging in out-of-area missions. Other allies question whether
NATO should--and indeed is structured to--take on issues such
as energy security.
As NATO reviews its Strategic Concept, what should be its
mission for the foreseeable future, and what changes, if any,
need to be made to the structure of the alliance?
The OSCE is the Euro-Atlantic organization with the most
comprehensive membership, comprising 56 countries, all with
equal standing. But Russia has argued that rather than
fulfilling its goal of a continent-wide security organization,
the OSCE has focused mostly on human rights and so-called
``soft'' security concerns. Thus, Russia's leadership has
reiterated its call to strengthen and expand the OSCE's
responsibilities.
Following its meeting in Corfu last June, the OSCE set up a
process to consider ways to increase security from Vancouver to
Vladivostok. Can and should the OSCE become the preeminent
security organization in the transatlantic region and do more
to strengthen its political-military and economic and
environmental dimensions in addition to its human dimension?
Finally, the European Union has evolved from its initial
function of preserving peace between France and Germany to
developing a single economic union and seeking a more unified
approach to foreign policy among its 27 members. The U.S. has
often been critical of the EU for a lack of coherence in its
foreign policy decision-making and its comparatively low
defense spending. The recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty
is expected to herald a more united common security and defense
policy--maybe.
The EU is effectively handling humanitarian and training
responsibilities in Afghanistan, and it has conducted
peacekeeping missions in Chad, the Congo and the Balkans. But
is the EU adequately structured and resourced to address the
new threats, and do we want it to do more?
While these three institutions are studying these issues
internally, and academic commentators--including our
witnesses--have begun to identify the questions, there have
been few answers about the next steps. Some people talk about
strengthening the existing institutions to address the new
threats, but they do not say how or whether that is all that is
necessary. Others contend that we need to fundamentally rethink
and restructure how the transatlantic community addresses these
new threats.
This debate has also been fueled by the re-emergence of
Russia as a major power. The Euro-Atlantic community learned
the hard way in August 2008 that none of its institutions was
sufficient to prevent the conflict between Russia and Georgia.
Russian President Medvedev has proposed a new treaty to
rectify what he perceives as the failure of existing structures
to create a unified security sphere in Europe. His treaty is
centered on the concept of indivisible security: That is, that
one country cannot guarantee its security at the expense of
another's. Some in the West reject this proposal, arguing that
it is designed to undermine and weaken NATO. Others believe it
has generated an important dialogue about the existing
institutional framework. How should the transatlantic community
respond to Russia's proposal?
Russia is a vital actor on issues such as Iran and
Afghanistan, nonproliferation and counterterrorism. While a new
treaty may not be necessary, do we now have an historic
opportunity to put the Cold War behind us once and for all and
forge a strong partnership to face the new threats together? Is
it time to reconsider the prospect of Russia joining NATO?
The issues that will be discussed during this hearing are
vital to the security of all of our countries. I am delighted
we have such an extraordinary and distinguished panel of
experts with us today to help us consider these issues from the
American, European and Russian perspectives, and we look
forward to their testimony. But before we go to their
testimony, I want to turn to the ranking member for any
comments that she may wish to make.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, and
happy St. Patty's Day to you. I am not one of those who think
it fashionable to believe that this is now the Pacific Century
and that the transatlantic relationship between the United
States and Europe is largely unremarkable. On the contrary,
what happens in Europe remains very important to us today, just
as it was important to earlier generations of Americans.
There are two major issues that I hope will be discussed in
depth this morning: The European relationship with Russia, as
the chairman pointed out; and the role that Europe needs to
play in the world.
We all continue to want what was sought when the Cold War
ended 20 years ago: ``A Europe whole and free.'' However, it is
naive to think that can be accomplished with the kind of regime
that rules Russia today. We should not welcome into our ranks a
regime that: Sponsors widespread corruption; represses its
political opponents; and mounts open aggression and
intimidation against neighboring countries. We should also
recall the lessons of history and how appeasement in Europe has
been a certain path to a bitter, devastating outcome.
The leaders in Moscow today, despite their occasional
soothing statements, quite simply recognize that they need to
create the image of an ``enemy'' for their people in order to
justify their continued rule. Our efforts to appease them will
only lead them to raise the ante. Why? They have done little to
nothing to set a strong foundation for Russia's future economic
progress. They have also done little to set forth a realistic
foreign policy that will provide true security for Russia in
the future.
Instead, they have enriched themselves while sponsoring the
most shameful methods to eliminate their internal critics, all
the while keeping the Russian people distracted by creating a
facade that their country faces a threat from the West,
particularly from the United States.
It is easy to see what is wrong with the policies of those
who lead Russia today, but we need to see what is wrong with
our own policies toward Russia.
We cannot expect to have any real credibility if we condemn
Russia's invasion of Georgia, but then make excuses for that
invasion, ignore Russia's continue occupation of Georgian
territory, re-admit Russia into NATO's councils and then offer
to sell it our advanced weapons.
We cannot make major reductions in our strategic nuclear
forces and play with negotiating away our right to deploy
strategic missile defenses simply to cater to the Russian
leadership.
We cannot talk of human rights with sincerity if we ignore
the all-too-obvious campaign of beatings and murders of
independent reporters, lawyers and activists in Russia in
recent years. No. This is not the time for appeasement, arms
sales and abandonment of those struggling for democracy in
Russia and the countries that once formed the Soviet Union.
It is important that the leading states of Europe set for
themselves a role that reflects the reality of the world as it
is and of the events and policies in Russia as they are rather
than continuing to take the paths of least resistance and
wishful thinking.
For decades during the Cold War, the democracies of Europe
were basically asked to focus only on their own defense from
attacks by the Soviet block while the United States provided
leadership around the world and invested in the preparedness of
its troops, in global force projection capabilities, in the
introduction of precision-guided munitions and advanced
technologies; the states of Europe grew comfortable with
deploying forces that focused mostly on their own defense.
Now the United States seeks real, comprehensive support
from the leading states of Europe in the fighting in
Afghanistan. I am hopeful that the attempts by leading
countries within the European Union to: Develop strategic
airlift capability; to procure advanced military technologies;
and to prepare at least some troops for rapid deployment are a
sign that they recognize that Europe cannot continue to leave
the United States to assume all the responsibility for global
security and stability.
I am hopeful that the EU's mission to combat piracy off the
coast of East Africa is indeed a sign of new activism, but I am
not overly optimistic. The leading European states continue to
allocate insufficient funding to defense, and, when they do
deploy troops to truly important military operations, such as
in Afghanistan, many of them limit their troops' exposure to
combat by means of ``caveats.''
The leading European governments cannot expect the United
States to continue to offer our guarantee for their European
security if those governments continue to carry on as usual by:
Flirting with sales of arms to China and Russia; trading with
countries like Iran; and looking away when dictators repress
opposition whether in Cuba, Russia, Sudan or Iran. Europe
remains important to the United States, obviously, but our
calls for support must not go unheeded.
Moreover, the future of small states, like Georgia, cannot
be sacrificed for the sake of European commerce and
unwillingness to stand up in defense of a ``Europe whole and
free.'' Finally, we all welcome the European Union's efforts to
improve European defense capabilities, but we hope that those
efforts will not come at the expense of the NATO alliance and
its ability to ensure the security of Europe and to address new
threats.
Thank you, as always, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
speak. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Well, thank you very much, and now I am
pleased to yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Europe
Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, thank you, and I want to extend a
welcome to all of our panelists, but particularly to Ambassador
Ischinger, who served his country so well here and was a
resource for members of this committee as well as Dmitri
Trenin, whom I have had the opportunity to meet in Moscow and I
must say is well respected and well regarded both here and in
Russia and has done much to advocate for democracy in Russia.
Mr. Chairman, the evolution of European security and the
concept of an integrated Europe in the destructive aftermath of
World War II has really been dramatic and swift in an
historical context.
Through a shared commitment with the United States, the
modern transatlantic security structure was developed to deter
the Soviet Union as you have said and to promote cooperation
and prosperity for Europe. When one views the historical
context from Churchill's 1947 speech in Zurich calling for
closer European integration and cooperation, the formation of
NATO in 1949 and Schumann's 1951 speech that led to the
European Coal and Steel Community, the end result is that the
27-member European Union enjoys an unprecedented level of peace
on their continent, which is welcome by all.
But with peace comes a recognition that today's threats are
different. The Cold War is over, and the development of a new
security strategy taking into account the United States, Europe
and Russia must take a new turn. In fact, I believe the shared
common interest of the United States and Europe must view
Russia as a potential partner for continued peace and security.
In today's globalized world, the relationship is simply too
important to ignore. It is not going to go away. Russia is an
essential partner for security and progress in Europe and its
relationship with NATO, and OSCE is an important foundation to
overcome East-West security concerns.
While NATO should remain the cornerstone to Europe's
security, their ongoing strategic review should ensure
pragmatic dialogue and policies toward Russia. While there is
diversity in the opinions and beliefs as to the blueprint and
infrastructure, it is imperative that future transatlantic
security continues to embrace the concept of Europe whole, free
and united, and with that, I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired, and
on behalf of the ranking member of the Europe Subcommittee, but
in his absence, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and I welcome the panelists. I am going to have to run in and
out of this hearing because I have another hearing right down
the hall in another major committee which I am a member. Just a
few points, and I will be coming back. If I can't hear all your
testimony, I will read it. Let me just note people understand
that I worked for Ronald Reagan, and I was one of his primary
speech writers, and even before that, I was the ultimate cold
warrior.
I was in Czechoslovakia with the students there in 1968. I
went to Vietnam to work with anti-Communist elements there in
1967, and I have been engaged in a lot of anti-Communist
activity in my life, but the Cold War is over, and Russia is no
longer dominated by the Communist Party. It is time for us to
understand the Cold War is over, and people can't get over
that, and people keep vilifying Russia at our expense. The fact
is the challenge we face today is far different than the one
that I faced when I was younger and that our country faced
years ago.
The fact is radical Islam is on us. Radical Islam wants to
slaughter our people. We need Russia on our side. We do not
need to vilify Russia. We recognize their shortcomings, work
with them on it and try to establish a positive relationship.
China is the next major challenge we face. It is emerging, and
there have been enormous changes in Russia, anyone who has
visited Russia knows that. I went to Russia in 1985 as part of
a delegation from the White House, and I have been back a
number of times. It is a different country in a better way.
Well, the fact is, China hasn't had one iota of reform.
They still slaughter people for their religious beliefs in
China, the Falun Gong and others. They are rebuilding their
military and aimed it at us. Yet, we end up vilifying Russia
and not permitting Russia to have any of the trade benefits
that we have heaped upon China. We need to have a new alliance
system that will deal with the challenges of the future, and
that new alliance system has to include Russia, or the United
States will be vulnerable.
It is time to get out of the Cold War mentality and figure
out what is going to work to create a more peaceful world in
the future to meet these serious challenges. Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate you holding this hearing because we need to
encourage a national discussion on how we are going to shape
the future and what alliances we have to have if we are going
to have a peaceful future. Thank you very much.
Chairman Berman. I thank the gentleman, and I am going to
yield 3 minutes. Our committee is very privileged to have on it
the current president of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Parliamentary Assembly in a statement that not everyone thinks
we have gone to a Pacific orientation. The gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for having this hearing, which is quite timely. Welcome to
the panel. I may have to go. We have got a markup going in
another committee, but I too will read the testimony if I am
not here partially to listen to it. I will be very brief. As
all of you know, NATO is currently undergoing its own self-
analysis and a new strategic concept. The panel of experts
chaired by Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was
just down at NDU for a session, which I attended as the
President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
We are eager and will participate, and next weekend, the
NATO PA standing committee will finalize our contribution to
and our intervention to the Secretary General, who was here,
and who we had a meeting with 2 weeks ago. Having said all
that, this new strategic concept I would ask that you give your
opinion as to what should or should not be included because it
is critically important. I may have to re-assess some of my
positions because I find myself agreeing with Mr. Rohrabacher
on several points that he made, so either he or I may wish to
reconsider our position, but seriously, this idea of NATO is in
many respects sort of like the U.N.
I get so disgusted with the U.N., but if we didn't have a
place for people to go and talk, we would have to create one,
and NATO, for all of its shortcomings, if it were not to exist,
we would be well-advised to create something similar, and so
this strategic exercise is very, very timely, and I too agree
what has been one of my frustrations is sometimes the inability
of the Russian members of the DUMA who attend our NATO meetings
to set aside those issues that we disagree on and dive
wholeheartedly into those that we do and help us, nuclear
proliferation, radical fundamentalism.
All of those things are in our mutual interest to work
together on, and yet we get clouded by our inability to set
those aside or work on those because of the other areas which
made us great. Having said all that, I will look forward very
much to your contributions. Thank you for being here.
Chairman Berman. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has
expired. Does anyone else seek recognition for opening
statement? The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized
for 1 minute.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just agree with
several of the comments that have gone before. It is really
time for leadership to take center stage on this whole issue of
how to deal with Russia in a modern concept. As it has been
stated, we are no longer in the Cold War, but leadership
requires boldness. It requires looking at situations with the
intelligence and common sense that presents the immediacy of
now and the future, and there is no question about it.
When it comes to every major issue facing Europe and the
north Atlantic, Russia is dead center. I am a member of the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly and have an opportunity to have
visited Russia, and I have engaged with them. It is not a
perfect country, but let me just say if we are going to have
global peace, if we are going to learn how to work with our
resources in a way that provides for energy security, for a way
to deal with nuclear non-proliferation.
There is no question that we have to re-set our
relationships with Russia and be bold enough to entertain the
possibility of looking at Russia as a partner with NATO. Thank
you, sir.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired, and
now I am very pleased to introduce really an excellent panel.
Several of them I know. I actually, on one of those rare
occasions, did my homework and spent until very late last night
reading all their testimony, and I do commend it very much to
the members of the committee. There are really some fascinating
and interesting statements there.
Our first witness is Thomas Graham. He is senior director
at Kissinger Associates. He was special assistant to the
president and senior director for Russia on the National
Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, and director for
Russian Affairs at the NSE from 2002 to 2004. From 2001 to
2002, Mr. Graham served as the associate director of the policy
planning staff at the Department of State.
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is the chairman of the Munich
Security Conference. He previously served as Germany's Deputy
Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2001, Ambassador to the United
States from 2001 to 2006 and as Ambassador to the U.K. from
2006 to 2008. In December, Ambassador Ischinger became the co-
chair of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, which will
examine the security challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic region
and prepare recommendations for reforming the existing
architecture.
Ms. Sally McNamara is senior policy analyst in European
Affairs at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom of the
Heritage Foundation. Before joining Heritage, she worked at the
American Legislative Exchange Council as director of
International Relations. Previously, she worked as an aide in
the European Parliament and as a press officer for the UK
Conservative Party.
Mr. Dmitri Trenin is director of the Carnegie Moscow
Center. I have known him a long time, but not that long. From
1972 to 1993, he served in the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces
during which he spent 6 years from 1985 to 1991 as a staff
member of the delegation to the United States-Soviet nuclear
arms talks in Geneva. After retiring from the Russian Army, Mr.
Trenin held posts as a senior research fellow at the NATO
defense college in Rome and a senior research fellow at the
Institute of Europe and Moscow. Thank you all very much for
being here. Mr. Graham, why don't you start? All the testimony
in their entirety will be put into the record.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS GRAHAM, SENIOR DIRECTOR, KISSINGER
ASSOCIATES, INC. (FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)
Mr. Graham. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for this opportunity to testify on a very timely issue of
transatlantic security. As you said, Mr. Chairman, the Cold War
is over, but I would like to stress that the post-Cold War
world is also over. The hopes that we had a generation ago that
we would be witnesses the march of democracy and free markets
around the globe under American leadership is not the case
today.
Rather, we have entered a period of tremendous global flux
and uncertainty that will endure until a new global equilibrium
is established. This has consequences for Europe and European
security. First, and of greatest importance, I think it is
clear that global dynamism is shifting away from Europe and the
Atlantic region to Asia and the Pacific region. Now, Europe
remains important. It remains important for the United States
for a variety of reasons. Our closest traditional allies lie in
that area.
But Europe and the struggle for domination in Europe is no
longer the central drama of the current period, and that means
that the United States no longer has to worry about the
domination of Europe by a single power. Remember, we fought two
hot wars and one cold war in the 20th century specifically to
prevent the domination of Europe by a single power. Today, in
the current environment, we need a unified Europe. A unified
Europe that can work with the United States in dealing with
global challenges in Europe and beyond.
This means that the United States should be encouraging a
much greater role for a unified Europe both within NATO and the
EU as a security organization that is capable of dealing with
the problems in Europe and beyond, so the goal of the United
States should be through its policies and actions to encourage
the further unification of Europe, specifically, the further
unification of Europe in defense and security policy. Now, Mr.
Chairman, you have described in great detail the global
challenges that we face, and I think you are absolutely right
that the challenges now emanate from beyond Europe and not so
much from inside Europe.
That is a consequence very much of the success of the
policies that the United States and our European allies have
pursued for the past 65 years. In fact, the concerns about
instability in Europe and security threats emanating for Europe
is probably at its lowest in history, so we need to work on the
global challenges, and here Russia becomes a much more
important player. Now, Russia is of course a major challenge to
all of us in the United States and Europe.
It is a new Russia, but it is also a Russia that has made
clear over the past several years that it intends to pursue an
independent foreign policy as Russia has historically, but this
is a Russia that contrary to where it was in the immediate
post-Cold War environment no longer seeks integration with the
West and specifically with Europe. Now, this presents two
challenges for us. The first is, how do we deal with the states
of the former Soviet Union? This is an area that is critical to
Russia's great power aspirations and the way they think of
themselves as a great power.
Historically, this is the region that has given Russia its
geopolitical heft in the world. For various reasons, the
Russian elites believe that primacy in this region is important
for Russia's security and prosperity today. The Russians
believe that they ought to have a zone of privilege in the
former Soviet space to use President Medvedev's formulation.
Now, clearly neither Europe nor the United States is prepared
to recognize a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet
space, but we do need to find a way that we can work with the
Russians to minimize the risk that challenges there will
undermine our ability to work elsewhere.
The second challenge we face is how Russia defines its own
interest in Europe and how we should define those interests. As
a process of European integration proceeds, much of what
happens on the continent become in a sense European domestic
affairs in which Russian involvement should be minimal. Yet,
Russia believes that it should play a central role in Europe. I
believe that it can compete as an equal with the major powers
of Europe such as the U.K., France and Germany, but it realizes
that it cannot compete effectively against a unified Europe
which would have the potential power capability that far
outweighs Russia much the way the United States power outweighs
Russia today.
We will have to figure out a way in which we can in a sense
bring Russia's sense of its own interest in Europe in
conformity to the way the world is developing. Now, do we need
new mechanisms, new architecture to deal with these new
challenges? I would argue no, but clearly the architecture
needs to evolve to take into account the new situation. A few
preliminary thoughts on how we ought to do this. First, we need
to move to a situation in which more of the discussion really
has three pillars: The United States, a unified Europe in the
guise of the European Union and Russia, and we should be
setting up a triangular discussion, U.S.-EU, EU-Russian, United
States-Russian discussions on a whole range of security issues.
We already have annual U.S.-EU summits, semi-annual EU-
Russian summits. We need to regularize and institutionalize
United States-Russian summits, which now tend to be ad hoc, and
make them a regular part of the architecture. We also ought to
consider putting in place at least an annual event that brings
the United State, the EU and Russia together specifically to
discuss security challenges both in Europe and beyond. Finally,
with regard to NATO itself some suggestions: First, we need to
encourage the development of a European pole inside NATO.
This is already taking place, but the United States needs
to be more forward-leaning in encouraging this. Obviously, this
will change the way NATO operates, but I think that will be to
our advantage, and it will encourage the Europeans to take more
responsibility for what happens inside Europe as well as to
develop the capabilities to deal with the global challenges. We
ought to take the NATO Russia Council and focus that on the
challenges that emanate beyond Europe.
Working with the Russians in developing missile defense
capabilities, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, piracy and
other such issues, and eventually the NATO-Russia Council over
the longer term should become in effect a United States-EU-
Russia forum for discussing these challenges. In addition, we
need to reassure many of our allies, particularly in Eastern
Europe, that Article V means something within NATO, and that
means that we need to continue to develop contingency planning
for the defense of those areas and begin to practice and
conduct exercises to demonstrate that we have the capability to
do that.
Finally, we also need to provide assurances for the
countries that lie between Russia and NATO, specifically
Ukraine and Georgia, and one thing that we ought to consider is
a way of reiterating multi-lateral security guarantees for
these countries so that they can feel more comfortable that
they are not going to be a zone of geopolitical competition
between Russia, the United States and Europe. Finally, I think
that the long-term goal and ambition for the United States
ought to be to turn NATO into a Pan-European security
organization based on the pillars of the United States, the
European Union and Russia.
Clearly, this is a long-term ambition. The goal is distant,
but I think it provides a way of organizing our thinking at the
moment. One final point on process; the days are long since
past when the United States and Europe can agree on a policy or
a set of programs and then present them to the Russians and
hope that the Russians will acquiesce in fete accompli. We need
to have Russia at the outset of our discussions if we want them
to be with us at the end.
I think it is very important that as we discuss the NATO
concept, for example, that we do reach out as we have already
to the Russians to get their views, to take them into account,
and to see the extent to which we can meet their interest or
accommodate them without of course jeopardizing the long-term
interest of the United States or Europe. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham
follows:]Thomas Graham deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you. Ambassador Ischinger?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WOLFGANG ISCHINGER, CHAIRMAN OF THE
MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE (FORMER GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED STATES)
Ambassador Ischinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a
privilege and a personal pleasure for me to be back here in my
personal capacity. You have my written testimony. Please allow
me to summarize what I believe are my key views and salient
points. I will be very brief. First, I think it is important to
note that even if our main challenges of today and tomorrow
present themselves in areas far away from Europe, far away from
the transatlantic region, Europe and the United States are and
will continue to be, will remain each other's principal and
best allies. That is how we Europeans look at it, and it is our
hope that it is a view that is shared by the United States.
By the way, if you look at transatlantic trade and
investment statistics, the economic data support this political
desire very strongly. Let me add also that I think it is
important that from the United States you show a bit of
patience with post-Lisbon EU. We Europeans have learned to
understand that an incoming U.S. administration sometimes needs
a bit of time to get into gear. A lot of things in Europe are
new, so I would invite you to allow the EU to come to grips
with the new system. I think we will be able to do better. We
will be more effective in the future, but we take time.
Second, I share the view of those who believe that the key
issue for the transatlantic community as we look at current and
future challenges is Russia. My view is if we get Russia right,
most of the other things, cyber security, terrorism and many
other challenges, can be addressed more easily than if we do
not get Russia right. This therefore is the key issue. During
the debate on NATO enlargement, which began 15, 16 years ago,
agreement was reached with NATO that NATO enlargement should be
accompanied by initiatives which would address Russia's
concerns.
At the time, in 1997, the NATO Russia Council was
established, and while I believe this was the correct decision
at the time, this council and its later incarnations never
really lived up to expectations. In retrospect, this forum was
never really used for discussing common challenges and
searching for common strategies. As a result, the relationship
between Russia and NATO, between Russia and the West, between
Russia and Europe became increasingly burdened.
Third, Mr. Chairman, Russia for its part has repeatedly
expressed the view that they feel, rightly or wrongly,
marginalized in Europe. The proposal for a new security treaty
as presented by President Medvedev is a demonstration of this
frustration, but more importantly this security treaty with all
its flaws and the many question marks that one can attach to
this proposal, it does show that Russia considers itself as an
element of Europe, as belonging to Europe, as wishing to be
part of the European security architecture. I believe that is
very important.
Fourth, our key problem today between the West and Russia
is a fundamental lack of mutual trust. I have no time here to
go into why there is such a lack of trust, but I believe that
rebuilding and building trust has to be at the core of our work
as we move forward. The work which is currently being
undertaken to develop the future strategic concept for NATO
offers, in my view, a historic opportunity to deal with these
issues.
It is a window of opportunity to develop something which I
would like to call an offer for a new grand bargain, strategic
bargain with Russia. The new NATO strategic concept should
reaffirm, as it has just been said, the guarantee of Article V
binding all members of the alliance together, but this concept,
in my view, should also encourage sustained efforts to link
Russia to the West or at a minimum to make sure that Russia
understands that from our side of the bargain, of the possible
bargain, the door is open, and it is for Russia to accept it or
to decline the offer.
Sixth, regarding the institutional relationship between
Russia and NATO, in a way we were further advanced 15 years ago
than we are today. In the mid-'90s, as I recall, the Clinton
administration occasionally raised the question should or
should we not consider Russia a potential future member of the
alliance?
I would like to inform you, Mr. Chairman, and the members
of the committee that recently a colleague of mine, the former
Secretary of Defense of Germany, Vocko Ruhe, suggested that we
should go back to those ideas and reiterate an offer in
principal even if we are all agreed that there are many areas
in which Russia lacks the conditions to be a member of the
alliance, but we should make clear that if Russia wishes to
comply with the requirements, there is no obstacle in principal
to consider Russia a potential member of the Euro-Atlantic
Security institutions, including NATO, in the future.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, allow me to say that one of the
areas where I believe that trust building can be done in an
effective and in a useful way is the area of nuclear weapons.
From a European point of view, I speak as a West European, the
ongoing United States-Russian arms control discussions are an
important element in rebuilding trust, and that is why some of
us in Western Europe have raised the question of whether we
should not also raise the issue of negotiations about the
remaining tactical nuclear weapons on both sides, in Western
Europe, American weapons and of course if I can say it in this
way the unaccounted for weapons on the Russian side, which have
been a source of great concern for us over decades and many
years.
In this sense, Mr. Chairman, trust building and keeping the
door open and thinking out of the box on how we can organize
our work with Russia in the future in my view is the key
challenge, the key strategic challenge for us in 2010. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ischinger
follows:]Wolfgang Ischinger deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you, Ambassador. Ms. McNamara?
STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY MCNAMARA, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST IN
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Ms. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen,
and distinguished members of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Since the end of the Second World War, the
Transatlantic Alliance has been the backbone of American
foreign policy. The post-war political, economic, security
successes enjoyed by Western Europe and America and by the
Euro-Atlantic community more broadly after 1990 are well known.
How we got there is equally clear due in no small part to the
resoluteness of NATO.
Therefore, it is hard to believe that we are now talking
about demolishing the very architecture which underpinned this
extraordinary success story. Whether it is the European Union's
ham-fisted attempts to duplicate NATO's roles and structures or
Russian proposals for entirely new European security
architecture, supplanting NATO with either will kill the goose
that laid the golden egg of transatlantic security. The
question of whether new threats require new approaches is a
rehash of a 20-year-old debate: Is NATO relevant anymore? The
answer is unequivocally yes.
I was pleased to hear that the Cold War is over. I agree.
NATO has focused on new threats and challenges, and we need
only to look at Afghanistan for evidence of that. The alliance
is currently active on three continents in missions ranging
from counterinsurgency to counter piracy, and the reason NATO
has seamlessly adapted to these new missions is because it was
always an alliance of two things: A defense alliance and an
alliance of values. Unless the transatlantic community has
decided that neither security nor values matter any more, there
can be no rationale for downgrading NATO.
NATO is not a perfect alliance. It has its failings
epitomized not least of all by the inequitable burden sharing
among the allies in Afghanistan, but the perfect cannot be the
enemy of the good. Reforming and revitalizing NATO is the
answer to these new threats, not abolishing or undermining it.
At the NATO summit in Lisbon at the end of this year, NATO will
unveil its new strategic concept. As a truly strategic
alliance, NATO must outline the threats it faces not only
today, but tomorrow.
Most importantly, it must put resources and political will
behind addressing those threats, but above all, the United
States must reinforce the primacy of NATO in Europe security
architecture. Simply put, neither the European Union nor Russia
is capable of supplanting America's leadership role on the
continent in a stable, productive or healthy way. In terms of
economic development, the European Union does have a role to
play, especially in this area abroad, but in security terms,
its efforts have been dreadful.
Since the creation of a separate European defense identify
in 1998, overall European defense spending, military
capabilities and deplorable manpower have decreased. Since the
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty designed to answer the
infamous question who do I call when I want to speak to Europe,
little has been realized in terms of the EU's capability to act
as we saw so devastatingly in Haiti, and it is under the EU's
leadership that Tehran now stands far closer to getting its
hand on a nuclear weapon than it did when the EU began its
carrots and flowers approach.
In this respect, NATO must remain the cornerstone of
Europe's security. In terms of redefining the NATO-EU
relationship, the United States should adopt a few simple
principles. NATO's primacy in Europe's security architecture is
supreme. The EU should be a civilian compliment to NATO rather
than a separate military identify, and NATO must reserve its
resources exclusively for NATO missions. Another important
element of revitalizing NATO is ensuring that the alliance's
Article V guarantee is credible.
However, Russia sees calls to strengthen Article V as a
zero-sum game assuming anything that makes Article V stronger
will make Russia weaker. In November, Moscow unveiled the text
of its proposed legally binding European Security Treaty to
organize European security arrangements. It is with some irony
that this treaty was unveiled in the wake of Russia's
simulation of a nuclear attack on a NATO member, Poland.
Although the text of the treaty seems almost benign respecting
members' territorial integrity establishing new processes for
conflict prevention, we must sincerely doubt Russia's
willingness to take them seriously.
Moscow unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It has not ratified the
Energy Security Treaty. It redrew Europe's borders by force
when it invaded Georgia in 2008, and it remains in permanent
violation of the EU-brokered cease fire which it signed by
unilaterally recognizing the break away regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. As long as Russia's foreign policy
affirms a zone of privilege interest and identifies NATO and
the United States as major threats to global security and
Russian military interests, there is no reason to believe that
a new treaty will make Russia a better partner than the
existing architecture allows for.
President Obama has shown a greater willingness than almost
any other U.S. President to accommodate Russia under the rubric
of resetting United States-Russian relations, but abolishing or
undermining NATO as suggested by Russia will ultimately harm
American security interests. I would like to conclude with a
quote from President Obama:
``NATO stands as an example of how the United States
can advance American national security and the security
of the world through a strong alliance rooted in shared
responsibility and shared values. NATO remains a vital
asset in America's efforts to anchor democracy and
stability in Europe and defend our interests as well as
values all over the world.''
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McNamara
follows:]Sally McNamara deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you, and finally, Mr. Trenin.
STATEMENT OF MR. DMITRI TRENIN, DIRECTOR, CARNEGIE MOSCOW
CENTER
Mr. Trenin. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen,
esteemed Members of Congress, it is a great privilege and a
great honor for me to speak in this audience. The problem with
European security as I see it, to put it in a nutshell, is that
two decades after the end of the Cold War Russia and the new
states that emerged from the former Soviet Union, including
Ukraine and Georgia and others, find themselves outside of a
meaningful security framework for that part of the world.
The existing framework formed by the Atlantic Alliance and
the European Union, the twin pillars of peace and security, has
greatly expanded in the last decade. Yet, it has fallen
critically short of the promise of a Europe whole and free. Mr.
Chairman, you referred to the failure to prevent a war between
Russia and Georgia. This illustrates the risks that exist in
that part of the world.
Even before the Georgian war, it should have been clear
that safe limits for NATO's enlargement to the East had been
achieved. After Georgia, it became obvious to all. Right now,
the mood is certainly less somber than it was 18 or 20 months
ago. Yet, the fundamental problem remains, and it is just
beneath the surface. The roots of this problem, as I see them,
are largely psychological.
There is no longer an ideological divide across Europe, nor
is there a military standoff, trade and travel thrive across
borders, and yet there is a palpable obsession in Russia with
America's intentions toward it and an equally strong obsession
in many of the countries of central and Eastern Europe with
Moscow's motives. To call this problem essentially
psychological is not to dismiss it. Rather, it is to point to
the depth and strength of the prevalent sentiments.
The respective fears are, in my view, baseless, but they
are not harmless. They misinform and misguide and allow for
wide manipulation. The time to act is now as the United States-
Russia relationship is on the mend. As we know from experience,
windows of opportunity do not stay open forever. The issue is
how to go about squaring the circle of European security. In my
view, no silver bullet can do it. The draft treaty proposed
President Medvedev and referred to several times during this
session, in my view, is too conservative to be realistic. Even
though his proposed remedy is probably ineffective, his broad
initiative can be constructive.
Regarding Russia's fears, in my view, it is the United
States that needs to take the lead. The Obama administration
has exercised care, tact and patience, and it has taken a
number of Russian concerns aboard. This however is just
clearing the ground, not yet building upon it. Start is good,
but alone it is not good enough. No amount of strategic arms
reductions is capable of altering the nature of the United
States-Russian strategic relationship, which is basically
unchanged from the years of the Cold War.
The confrontations' afterglow, ladies and gentlemen, shines
on. If one looks for a game changer, which can replace that
pattern, it is cooperation on missile defenses, in my view. The
United States has already offered this to Russia, but the
Russians are not jumping at the offer. They evidently don't
want to be a mere add-on to the U.S. program. They aspire to a
parity-based deal. They claim an equal right with the United
States to discuss and define threats. This is a long list. No
question that working on that issue is going to be difficult,
and the positive outcome, a joint United States-European-
Russian missile defense system is not assured.
If however such a system were to become a reality at some
point, this would constitute a dramatic improvement, I would
say a revolution for the better in European security. As the
further enlargement of NATO to the east, its prospects really
depend on the countries' concern. Should an overwhelming
majority in Ukraine, including a solid majority in Crimea,
support accession, no force in the world would be able to veto
or exploit it. The current circumstances are different as
reflected in the recent election.
Georgia's situation is conditioned by the post-conflict
realities on the ground. Admitting any country to the alliance
should not lead to importing a real risk of military conflict
with third parties. Above all, Americans, Europeans and
Russians need to look to the future even as they draw lines
unto the past. The security interests of the 21st century call
for a common cause among them. This is evident, and this has
also been evident in this discussion so far. Even now, on
nuclear proliferation and climate change, energy, security,
counterterrorism, cyberspace and the arctic. There is a lot
that binds the three would-be partners together.
Russia of course will not be able to deliver Iran, but it
is a key partner in any effort to bring the Iranian nuclear
program to a peaceful resolution. Moscow will not determine the
outcome in Afghanistan, but it helps with U.S.-NATO transit
there and is able to contribute to an eventual settlement in
Afghanistan. Russia will not solve the world's energy needs,
but it can be helpful from Europe to East Asia to the Arctic.
In the end, one needs to ask oneself a question: What is the
future that we want?
If one wants a whole and peaceful Europe, one needs to
build an inclusive security community, a community of countries
that share security among themselves. Europe's general
prosperity can be helped by common economic space. A freer
Europe means the rule of law firmly established in all its
countries including Russia, democracy through participation and
adherence to international norms and commitments. It can be
helped by visa-free travel and open exchanges. The future it
shaped by the decisions taken today.
As far as the obsession with Russia is concerned, I think
that it is Russia's turn to lead just as it is the United
States' turn to take on Russia's obsession. Moscow needs to
treat its neighbors' concerns seriously. Russia has already
recognized Poland as a key country in the region and a key to
better relations with the European Union. This needs to be
expanded and deepened. The Russians need to develop a habit of
regular consultations with the Poles like they have already
developed with the Germans, the French and some of the others.
They need to open the archives much wider. They need to
reach out to the Baltic States without provoking them
unnecessarily with military exercises. To conclude, let me say
that to motivate movement toward the desired future, we need a
new narrative, not the divisive one of the Cold War days, which
is still heard today sometimes, and not the rosy one of the
immediate post-Cold War that hoped to do away with differences.
The Americans in view of their global role need to think
about broadening the community of responsible stakeholders,
specifically to include Russia, the Europeans about finally
reuniting their family, which remains incomplete and thus
insecure. As for the Russians, they need to find after all
their place and role in the world. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trenin
follows:]Dmitri Trenin deg.
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Chairman Berman. Well, thank you, and thank all of you.
Very interesting. I am going to yield myself 5 minutes. There
are many issues to go off on, but I want to clarify two points
that I am not sure I understand. Mr. Graham, you talk about
creating a European pole within NATO. Could you just describe
that a little more, and how does that relate to an EU security
activity?
Mr. Graham. Certainly. I think we are seeing a process
where Europe is moving toward a unified security and defense
policy. Obviously, with fits and starts, and it is not going to
be linear, but that means that increasingly we are going to
find that inside NATO we are not going to have a discussion
between or among the United States and dozens of other European
allies. We are increasingly going to have a discussion that is
between the United States and EU positions as EU articulates a
more common policy.
That means that the way we have gone about managing our
relationship with NATO is going to change. It will become much
more an institution that is built around two pillars: The
United States probably with Canada and a unified European
Union. That will lead to certain changes in, as I said, how we
manage the dialogue inside NATO, how we divide up the various
security roles, the various positions within our military and
security structures, and so on.
What I am talking about basically is the recognition that
as the process of European Union integration moves forward, we
are going to find ourselves facing increasingly a unified
Europe inside NATO. That is something that we should recognize.
It is something that I think we should foster because I believe
in the long run it is good for the United States, and it is
good for the security of Europe and our ability to operate with
Europe in challenges beyond the European continent.
Chairman Berman. There are a lot of questions that come off
of that, issues like EU countries that aren't in NATO, to what
the British and French think in the context of their entire
security arrangements about subordinating some of their
security forces to a larger European pole.
Mr. Graham. Absolutely, but here I think the process of
both NATO enlargement and European Union enlargement will
overlap. There is already a tremendous overlap in membership.
Chairman Berman. Right.
Mr. Graham. And I can foresee a time as Europe moves toward
a more unified position on foreign and security policy that it
becomes thinkable that countries like Sweden, Finland and
Austria will themselves will deg.become members of
the NATO alliance, so again, this is not something that
describes the situation now. It is a direction in which we are
moving. I think it is a direction that the United States for
our own interest ought to encourage. It shouldn't be something
that we should resist.
Chairman Berman. All right. Ms. McNamara, you talked about
strengthening Article V commitments. Now, I thought I heard a
very fascinating concept in terms of the ranking member's
opening comments regarding Article V obligations and the
participation of individual members of NATO and to what extent
we are going to review Article V obligations differently based
on how individual NATO members are meeting common threats and
participating in that, but, Ms. McNamara, what do you mean by
strengthening Article V?
Ms. McNamara. Article V is the heart and soul of NATO.
Chairman Berman. Yes.
Ms. McNamara. If you don't have Article V, then you don't
have NATO in my opinion.
Chairman Berman. We do have Article V.
Ms. McNamara. Yes. In terms of making it credible, it is no
secret that Central and Eastern Europe have some nervousness at
the moment about whether their security concerns are taken as
seriously as Western Europe. In terms of what Article V means,
and I think it will evolve in this strategic concept, but at
the moment it means more military exercises, it means more
investment, more officer exchanges. Those sorts of things are
all valuable, they are all credible, but it is also a political
thing, and I think politics really does play a part within
NATO, and I think unless Central and Eastern Europe feels part
of the conversation on an equal level.
As long as they don't feel an equal partner in this
conversation, then I think Article V cannot be credible. In
terms of one of the worst things we can do for Article V, it is
try and make NATO look like the European Union. I think that
would be a disaster, and having an EU Corps within NATO I think
goes to what Henry Kissinger said. He said if we have a
European Corps, then America loses out in the conversations
that matter the most because the conversation is brought to
America that has already been concluded by the Europeans.
Chairman Berman. Unfortunately, my own time has expired
before I ever got to the questions I really wanted to ask, but
thank you. The ranking member I yield 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I wish
to comment on assertions that Russia has been helpful with
Iran. Russian entities for years have facilitated the
advancement of Iran's missile and conventional weapons
capability. Russia is poised to sell advanced missile defense
systems to Iran. During the last Congress, we had to make
changes to the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act
because a certification could not be met, that is that the
President could not certify that Russian entities were not in
fact continuing to provide equipment, materials, technology and
other assistance to Iran's nuclear, chemical, biological and
advanced-weapons programs.
Russia, with China, has been one of the biggest obstacles
to securing comprehensive crippling sanctions at the U.N.
Security Council against the Iranian regime. Are these the
actions that we deem to be helpful? Rhetorical assurances from
the Russian leadership on Iran do not negate all of the other
Russian policies that undermine European and global security
and stability and in turn threaten U.S. security interests.
Today, as I look at Russia's actions, I am reminded of what
Winston Churchill called in the 1920s and 1930s as ``The
Gathering Storm.'' We all know what happened when such warnings
were ignored, and hopefully we will not repeat those mistakes
today with Russia.
Ms. McNamara, I wanted to ask you this question: Last
September, President Obama decided, as we know, to abandon the
established plans to deploy missile defense components in
Poland and the Czech Republic which were aimed at countering
potential long-range missile threats emanating from Iran.
The previous plan had been unanimously endorsed by the NATO
alliance at its summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Despite this
decision, which was viewed by many as a step to appease Moscow,
Russia is now complaining that Romania and Bulgaria have
expressed a willingness to host missile defense components on
their territory. Russia is also linking the issue of missile
defense to the signing of the next START treaty. Could you
please comment on Russia's strategy in regard to the issue of
missile defense and its possible implications for the national
security interests of the United States and our allies in
Europe?
Ms. McNamara. Thank you very much. The abandonment of the
third site missile defense agreement came at a very, very
unfortunate time. It came on the 70th anniversary of the
Soviet's invasion of Poland. I think it was a little tone-deaf
to come out on this day. There is no doubt that the Czech
Republic felt as if a dirty deal had been done, as if they had
been traded away for the prospect of a future START agreement
with Russia, and we still haven't actually got that agreement.
For Russia, there is no doubt their objections to a third
site were not because it was worried about its strategic
security interests. They knew very well that the third site
couldn't harm them in any way. What it was about was what their
stated policy is; the zone of privileged interest. They view
they have a sphere of influence. I mean, you would have to be
in a coma to think that it is surprising now that they are
objecting to Romania or Bulgaria or any other Central or
Eastern European or former satellite republic being involved in
the phase adaptive approach.
I think when I talk about things on a political level, this
is entirely political. I don't think Russia's objections were
at all security-based. I think they were political.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and I just have a little time.
I wanted to ask the panelists if France and Russia are
currently negotiating a sale of one or more of France's Mistral
amphibious assault warships to Russia as well as a license for
Russia to produce additional such vessels in its own
shipbuilding facilities. If this contract is finalized, it
would be the first time that a member of NATO has sold to
Russia such a major weapons system. What message would this
sale send to our allies, namely in the Baltic States? To
anyone.
Ms. McNamara. I think it would be an absolute disaster. I
think in the words of a Russian general it will take us 40
minutes to do in Georgia what previously took us 22 hours to
do, and those 22 hours were very, very valuable because that is
what got the conflict on the front page of the international
media and finally got Russia to back off, so I think the sale
of this goes against everything that NATO is about, and it also
goes against what the EU about. The EU has a code of conduct
for arms sales, and one of the features of that is that you are
not meant to jeopardize regional stability, and this would
increase instability.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the ranking member has
expired. The gentleman from Massachusetts. It is the intention
of the chair depending on the time we finish the first round to
have a second round and get reactions to many of these issues.
Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. Delahunt. Yes. I would just like to note my
disagreement with the conclusion that has been articulated
about Russia invading Georgia when the EU itself, its envoy,
concluded otherwise. I think it is important to state that for
the record because it keeps getting repeated, and it takes on a
certain validity and legitimacy that it doesn't deserve, but I
don't want to focus anymore on that. I want to go to Mr.
Trenin's concept of obsession and a certain psychology here.
You, Mr. Trenin, talk about missile defense as being an
opportunity to be a game changer in terms of the psychology
that you refer to and presumably the obsession. What were, and
I will ask the Ambassador to comment on this, the obsession
that Russia has in terms of its national security, and I think
we have to empathetic here. Whether it is real or not, it does
create a fear that there is an encroachment that could threaten
the national security interests of Russia.
How did this obsession evolve, and why is missile defense a
potential game changer in terms of the psychology that
currently exists, Mr. Trenin and Ambassador Ischinger? You
don't have to pay any attention to him. That is you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Trenin. Mr. Delahunt, thank you for your question. I
think if you are certainly in Moscow, a lot of people at least
would feel you are being surrounded by the United States, that
you have very little power and the alliances to which you do
not belong and which harken back to the days of the Cold War
keep expanding. I do not share that view, but I understand the
sentiments of those who are responsible for Russia's strategic
assessment and Russia's foreign and security policy.
The one important paragraph in the Russian national
security strategy says that the biggest military threat
potentially to the Russian Federation is the United States
acquiring through building missile defenses a first-strike
capability against Russia. To me this is a fantasy that has
little relevance to today's world. Now, this is an official
statement, and this statement underlies Russian strategic
thinking and Russia's defense policy.
Now, if you build a missile defense system which is
operated jointly by the United States, Russia and Europe, then
this can no longer be advanced, this can no longer be
supported, this should be out of the Russian military doctrine
and out of the Russian national security strategy.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I only have 1 minute left, and
I want to ask the Ambassador to comment.
Ambassador Ischinger. Thank you very much. First of all, I
do not disagree in any way with what was just said by Mr.
Trenin. I would just like to point out that in the original
concept more than a decade ago when we created the NATO-Russia
Council as a counterweight to the idea of NATO enlargement, a
balancing act, the idea was that this would be underpinned or
supplemented by shared projects in many different areas which
were listed at the time.
Not much has been achieved in terms of doing things
together, certainly not in any sphere that is relevant to
military concerns and worries, which is why I believe that Mr.
Trenin is correct in pointing out that a shared effort in the
ballistic missile defense area could be a game changer. It
would actually force people to abandon the classic zero-sum
thinking and move into win-win types of thinking, which is
where we should be moving. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
join Mr. Delahunt in setting the record straight. A Russian
military retaliation against a Georgian breaking of a long-term
truce by sending their military into Ossetia and Abkhazia would
be no different in my mind than a United States military action
against Serbia if it launched its troops into Kosovo. We
shouldn't have a double standard here. The double standard is
very clear.
We demand Russia accept that Kosovo is independent, but no,
when it comes to people who don't want to be part of Georgia,
now we insist that they be forced to remain part of Georgia and
that Georgia has a right to use military force. It is
ridiculous. If we are going to have to be friends with Russia,
they have to know that we have a single standard for them and
for us. That standard should be truth, truth, and we haven't
heard that when it comes to Georgia as my friend says, a
repeated distortion of what happened there.
Let me note I went to the Reagan Library this weekend with
my children. Excuse me, not the library, the ranch, up there at
Ronald Reagan's ranch, and I was ushered up there because of
course I was a former speech writer for the President, and I
have been up to the ranch during the days when Reagan was
there, and there was a picture that I saw prominently displayed
at the ranch, and it was a picture of President Reagan and
Gorbachev and their families who were there. Reagan brought the
Gorbachevs up, and let me note that is after a lifetime of
being anti-Soviet on Ronald Reagan's part.
He invited Gorbachev up, and there was Gorbachev and
Reagan, and Reagan had given Gorbachev a cowboy hat, and if you
look real close at the picture, Gorbachev had the cowboy hat on
backwards. Let us note that it was an obsession about the Cold
War that seems to still be preventing us from moving forward
with the type of relations that we need to have with Russia on
our part and on the Russian's part as we have heard today.
Missile defense, what Ronald Reagan championed and which I
wrote numerous speeches with him on and worked with him on
those speeches was very clear.
Ronald Reagan thought of missile defense as a way to end
the Cold War and as potentially a method of cooperating with
our former enemies. He made that very clear, and the fact that
we put a missile defense system in place that was clearly aimed
at Russia was a total rejection of what Reagan's vision missile
defense was, and I would agree with the witnesses, Mr.
Chairman, when they say that missile defense----
Chairman Berman. Some of the witnesses.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Some of the witnesses when they say that
missile defense is something that could be used as a vehicle to
overcome this obsession on both sides, in Moscow and in
Washington, and also let me add Ronald Reagan did not want to
have huge mountains of nuclear weapons, and if we have a
missile defense system coupled with a logical and rational
reduction of nuclear weapons so that we don't have to waste
money, limited defense dollars on weapons that will never be
used, I think that would go a long way toward making this a
more peaceful world, and I would hope that our administration
follows that course. I have 1 minute for anyone who disagreed
on the panel or disagreed with what I had to say.
Chairman Berman. Go right ahead.
Ms. McNamara. I don't want to disagree. I just want to say
missile defense, one of the original architects of the concept
of missile defense was actually Winston Churchill when the V-2
rockets were raining down on London, and for him then I think
missile defense is very much what the motivating factor should
be today. It should be a protect and defend strategy, and if
Russia wants to be part of that, then okay, but we look at the
third site, there is this I think unfair bias that the third
site was directed against Russia. It was absolutely nothing of
the sort, and Russia knew that, and there was also deep
verification measures within the third site so that Russia
could absolutely be 110 percent sure that third site wasn't a
threat against them.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, we did not plan that missile defense
system with cooperation with Russia, and if they ended up with
some sort of missile defense system on our border, we would
probably feel a little bit upset about it as well, as well as
of course creating a military alliance that went right up to
our border. If we have a chance for future peace, we have to be
a partner with Russia against China and radical Islam, or we
lose.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
assume there was no picture at the ranch of President Reagan
and Prime Minister Thatcher, but----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, there was. In fact, there was a
picture of the Prime Minister.
Chairman Berman. Thank you for clarifying that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. She wasn't wearing a cowboy hat, however.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to get
your reaction to something. As I mentioned earlier, I am a
member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and I am one of the
General Rapporteurs there, and as such, I have been asked to do
a paper and lead a discussion on Russia, the NATO, this new
strategic alliance, and in that discussion, in that paper,
which we will do this coming May in I think either Belarus or
Latvia, I will make that recommendation that we offer
membership to Russia in NATO for some of the very pressing
reasons that we mention on this committee.
It seems very illogical for us to move with a new strategic
concept for NATO given this new opportunity, this new window
when every basic issue, energy security, cyberspace, the high
north, the climate change, missile defense, all of these.
Russia, the largest country in the north Atlantic should be at
that table. In that regard, I would like to take benefit of
your joint expertise to share with us what the response you
feel will be, what some of the challenges and problems might be
and the reaction from the membership from your perspective if
you could. Maybe I will start with you, Ambassador, and
certainly Ms. McNamara on extending membership to Russia in
NATO.
Ambassador Ischinger. Thank you. Thank you very much.
First, let me say, as I said in my opening statement, I believe
this is an important point whose time has come, but we need to
make it clear that all we can do is explain that there is a
door that is open. Russia will have to walk through that door
and would need to accept the conditionalities and the
principles that govern our Transatlantic Alliance. In other
words, this is not an invitation without a certain number of
clearly established conditions.
In principle, I certainly share the view that this is a
point that should be made in the context of the future
strategic concept because there is in my view no better way
than to express our continued commitment to this fundamental
idea of Europe whole, free and united provided that Russia can
meet the conditions. Thank you.
Ms. McNamara. Russia does not want to and will never want
to join NATO. They have stated on several occasions that they
thought NATO should be abolished when the Warsaw Pact was
abolished, so I like the idea that we have this hand of
friendship out to them, but I think Mr. Ambassador is right.
The North Atlantic Treaty itself says any European country or
North American country that abides by the rules of NATO, the
door is open to them.
We have a permanent open-door policy, so I don't think the
problem is opening the door. The problem is Russia doesn't want
to walk through it, and if you look at the things that we hold
dear, not using energy as a weapon, not resolving your
conflicts by military means, territorial integrity, not using
cyber attacks, respecting human rights, on all of these things
Russia is failing at the moment, and so they don't qualify to
get in, so I think we don't need to say Russia needs to get
into NATO. All we need to do is reaffirm the North Atlantic
Treaty, which I think is one of the best written treaties in
the world.
We stand behind the fact that NATO has an open-door policy,
but it is my expert testimony that Russia has no intentions of
walking through the door.
Mr. Graham. While I agree sort of long term that what we
want to see is Russia part of NATO, I think the offer at this
point actually will focus the discussion more on what the
conditions are for getting in becomes an ideological debate of
some sort that actually detracts attention away from what we
ought to be doing at this point, and that is looking at areas
of concrete cooperation between NATO and Russia. We have talked
about some already, but I think the concrete cooperation is the
key.
That is what builds the trust. That creates the habits of
cooperation that makes thinkable over the longer term NATO
transforming itself into a Pan-European security organization,
but I do think if you make the offer to Russia now, you will
find yourself side-tracked in a discussion of what that really
means, which I think is a waste of valuable time.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
am going to recognize the gentleman from New Jersey. I yield 5
minutes. We have a vote going on. We will have to take a short
recess to make those votes.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and let me
thank our panel for their great and incisive insights today.
Mr. Graham, you spoke of the unified defense policy for the EU,
and I am wondering if you might speak to the issue of lessons
learned from the Balkan War. I, like many colleagues, made trip
after trip. I was actually in Vukovar immediately prior to its
fall, and I remember during the Bush administration, and it
carried right into the Clinton administration, there was always
talk about let Europe handle it.
Right where you sit, and I chaired the hearing, and we had
the translator when Mladic and the Dutch peacekeepers sold out
Srebrenica, killing over 8,000 people in a matter of just a few
days, and I am hoping that lessons learned from that are being
very judiciously applied. I would ask you to speak to that. In
follow up to the question about whether or not Russia should be
invited into NATO, what do you consider the risks to be with
regards to China? The border between China and Russia obviously
is thousands of miles long.
The population density on the Chinese side vis-a-vis the
Russian side is something in the order of 250:1 in many places.
There is occasionally a fire fight of incursion that occurs,
and even though they may have mutual agreements right now,
there are potential cinder blocks or sparks that could ignite
into a war. That would then bring NATO and by extension
obviously the United States into a war with China. Is that a
concern? If you could speak to that very quickly.
Finally, I have co-chaired or chaired the OSCE Helsinki
Commission here. I have been on the commission since 1983 and
strongly oppose the Kazakhs getting the chair and office at the
OSCE because of their human rights beliefs, which are not good.
The Kazakh government has sought to de-emphasize human rights
because of security and their closeness to Russia. Is that a
concern that you might share--as to whether or not they change
by taking the Russian view of the OSCE and its many principles
in trying to change it? We have had a major fight with Russia
trying to undermine what was the consensus for years. Mr.
Graham?
Mr. Graham. Yes, very briefly on Balkans. Obviously, in the
1990s the Europeans didn't cover themselves with glory in those
series of events, and the United States did play an important
role in putting together the final settlements. The point is
that we need this to change over time, so we need to engage in
a serious discussion with our European partners on the roles
and responsibilities that Europe will assume inside Europe for
European security and stability. I think they have learned the
lessons as well, so that is a discussion we need to have.
On Russian and NATO with regard to China, that is another
reason why I don't believe that we should make the offer
explicit at this point because it does raise that issue, but
through, as I said, a process of concrete cooperation with the
Russians, I think you put that issue to the side. We will also
need to obviously engage with conversations with the Chinese
going forward as to what greater cooperation between Russia and
NATO might mean for China's relationship both with Russia and
NATO and the United States.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Trenin?
Mr. Trenin. In my view, it is a great idea whose time is
passed. It could have been had in the early 1990s. It could
have been had in the early 2000s. Right now and for the
foreseeable future, Russia will not give up its strategic
independence. NATO can only live with so much divergence and so
much diversity in its ranks, and clearly no one wants China as
it would be adversary. As to Russia-China relations, it is the
best relationship that Russia has had with China in many, many
years, but it is a very different relationship.
For the first time since the two countries have known each
other, Russia sees China as a stronger party, and Putin sees
his best, most important achievement as President fixing every
inch of the China-Russian border, and that speaks volumes about
their friendly relationship. It is friendly, but it is very,
very important that it is very serious.
Ms. McNamara. Talking about the Balkans War, the EU has
learned absolutely nothing. If you remember, when we started
the unfortunate conflict, I am sure you remember this line:
This is the hour of Europe. The follow up line to that was:
This is not the hour of the Americans. For the EU, this was
about their aggrandizement, not about the safety and security
of the people of the Balkans. In terms of what they have
learned, they said we need the Maastricht Treaty and then we
will be able to do more. We need Amsterdam. Then, we need
Lisbon. None of these things have done anything.
Chairman Berman. Ambassador Ischinger, I am going to just
give you an additional 30 seconds here to get your reactions.
Ambassador Ischinger. Thank you. Well, just two very brief
points. First of all, I think that the EU has been on an
important learning curve because of the events in the 1990s. I
believe that mainstream Europe continues to believe that
America should continue to consider itself and to be a European
power. Even as we grow, we don't want the United States to
consider its own role in Europe to be terminated, not so.
On the Kazakhstan issue, on the Kazakhs question because
that has not been referred to, let me just say that I don't
think too many people were happy with this development for the
very reasons that you outlined yourself. However, my own
personal impression has been that surprisingly or maybe not so
surprisingly the leadership in Kazakhstan has gone out of their
way to play a useful and relevant chairmanship role in the
OSCE. In other words, I think the actual conduct has not
justified the concerns that we had as we went into this.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
committee will recess for about 15 minutes as we take our
votes, and then we will be back to at least give me a chance to
ask the question I wanted to ask.
[Recess.]
Chairman Berman. This is my ideal time because I am the
only one here I have to recognize. I recognize myself for
another round while we wait for some of my colleagues to get
back from the votes. We have a process here sometimes where the
staff suggests questions, and one of the questions they
suggested to me was one that says that a lot of us in the West
believe--we see it in the context of Iran, we see it in the
context of our mission in Afghanistan, counterterrorism--that
Russia is an important actor on these kinds of threats that we
have all alluded to in this hearing on proliferation issues.
We also see it as a difficult partner, and is that view of
Russia as a ``difficult partner,'' is that a difference caused
by the issue of core values? Is it caused by a different
perception of the threats facing us? I guess I would add to the
question--or is it what Mr. Trenin talked about--to the extent
that there is a Russian obsession that--I forget his terms--it
was not well placed, but it was not a harmless obsession with
U.S. intention that therefore clouds perceptions and maybe
comes across as separate from core values.
What is the cause of the difficulties of the incredible
amount of work that seems to have to be done to sometimes get a
true partnership on these major threats. Any of you?
Ambassador, did you want to start?
Ambassador Ischinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be
happy to start. I just offer one or two observations. I believe
it is correct to find in many areas Russian behavior as that of
a difficult partner, certainly not an easy partner. Russia has
not been known to say yes and amen to each and every proposal
that we have made. I do not share the view that the reasons for
this lie primarily in different perceptions on values. I
believe that the fundamental reason why Russia has been a
difficult partner is that Russia tends to define its interests
in a very straightforward manner.
Russian interests are Russian interests, and the additional
problem has been, and I believe I alluded to this earlier, is
that there has been a tendency to believe that whatever is good
for NATO or for that matter the United States, cannot possibly
be good for Russia, this is thinking in zero-sum terms. I
believe we would see Russia to be a less difficult partner if
we managed to create more mutual trust, and if we manage to
create in the way that Russia deals with us and we deal with
Russia more of a thinking in win-win terms.
Russia knows that it is not in Russia's interest for Iran
to be a military nuclear power, but I am certain that there are
a number of strategists in Moscow who are not interested in
giving on the silver platter so to speak a dramatic
international political victory to the United States so long as
more fundamental issues between the United States and Russia
have not been resolved, so I believe this zero-sum thinking is
one of the reasons, which has made it more difficult than it
should be to reach common positions. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Well, unfortunately, my time has expired.
I may be able to get back to this. Although, I just want to
point out the ranking member raised this specific issue of Iran
and Russia, and in a sense you are giving your thoughts about
why that is so. The only person here who has not yet had a
chance to question is the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner,
so he is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
patience. Voting is a necessary inconvenience around here
unfortunately, but thank you for your patience. I just have I
guess one question, two parts. The stumbling block to many with
respect to moving ahead with a United States-NATO-Russia
relationship is the situation in Georgia. I have a slightly
different version of events than have been expressed here.
Well, not slightly, but a different version.
Regardless of that, it appears to many that the situation
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia or the Russian behavior there is
in violation of the Sarkozy agreement, and until we get that
resolved, it is sort of difficult to move in the direction I
think we all want to see us go. If that is the stumbling block
that many that share my opinion believe it to be, how and what
is the best form in your opinion to address this, NATO, U.N.,
OSCE, EU, a combination of all of the above? I guess to all of
you or to those who wish to respond, how do we move this ball
down the field? Yes, sir.
Mr. Trenin. Mr. Tanner, I think that before we finally
resolve the issue, which I think will take a long time, and it
is not clear to me how the issue will be resolved. What is
clear to me as I look into the future is that Georgia will
probably not be restored in the border in which the
international community recognizes it, but that is for the
future. I think we need to make sure that there is no war
again. I think we need to make sure there is no fighting, there
are no shootings on the border, and I think that it is no
accident as people say that in the past 15 months the situation
in Georgia and around Georgia has been relatively calm.
There hasn't been a single major incident, and this is not
an accident. People worked on that, and I think the Russians
recognize the commitment of this administration in Washington
to transparency in their relations with Georgia and the fact of
that relationship on Russia. I think there are fewer Russian
fears than there used to be, and I think this is all for the
good, and let me say just one thing. The very idea of Russia
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia was predicated on the
fear of a war of revenge wages by Georgia and fully supported
by the United States of America.
They only recognize that in order to deter what they
thought was another, but more serious, attack on them supported
by the United States. Otherwise, it was foolish for the
Russians to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just tied
their hands, but that is a product of fears and misjudgment but
based on a high-degree of mistrust between Moscow and
Washington in the times of the previous administration.
Ms. McNamara. Really, the only thing I think I agree with
Mr. Trenin on is that I think we are going to go through a
very, very long time before this dispute gets solved. Where I
depart from him, whether you think Georgia was to blame or not,
and I have serious reservations about the EU's report, I think
the EU report should be renamed blame the victim. That is the
only credibility that report had. The disproportionate use of
force by Russia and their unilateral recognition thereafter was
hugely provocative, and they have also militarized the region
heavily, 10,000 Russian troops, five bases. This is not really
the actions of someone who wants to resolve this peacefully
going forward.
However, I think we are sending mixed messages. On the one
hand, we are saying Georgia is an ally, they are going to get
into NATO someday, but on the other hand, the Americans won't
even entertain upgrading Georgia military equipment to help
them in Afghanistan, and of course Georgia was one of the first
countries to respond when President Obama outlined his new
counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan. I think the
Americans need to make it very clear that Georgia is an ally of
the United States, and I think there needs to be a little bit
more energy on the part of the United States. In terms----
Chairman Berman. I am sorry. The time of the gentleman has
expired. That is the problem with 5 minutes. It goes by fast.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A couple of
different questions that are related to one another with
regards to this discussion we have been having this morning
with Russia. The Kremlin has been described both during the
Soviet era and now today as a bit of a puzzle palace to say the
least, and I am still trying to get a better understanding as
to the decision-making process as they transition with a new
President. Clearly, it seems to be that the Prime Minister is
still involved to a high degree in the different factions that
are taking place.
How would the four of you describe the decision-making
process taking place today within the Kremlin as it relates to
these very foreign affairs issues that we are talking about?
Multiple factions? Different camps? Different schools of
thoughts? Who wants to start? Yes, Mr. Trenin.
Mr. Trenin. Well, thank you, sir. I believe on the
important issues dealing with foreign and security policy there
is a shared responsibility by the President and the Prime
Minister, but clearly the Prime Minister is the leading actor
in this duo, and on all important foreign policy issues, he
weighs in very heavily, so it is Mr. Putin, but as far as the
execution of foreign policy is concerned, Medvedev is the man
who fully assumes the presidential duties, so you have an
interesting and strange, almost unheard of situation in Russia
in which you have dual leadership, but there is leadership
within that dual leadership, and it clearly belongs to the
Prime Minister.
Mr. Costa. Do you see it continuing to change?
Mr. Trenin. Well, I see Mr. Putin being almost as
influential today as when he was president of the Russian
Federation.
Mr. Costa. Ms. McNamara, do you agree?
Ms. McNamara. I absolutely agree. I think the decision
making is opaque, but it is transparent from the point of view
that we all know that Putin is in charge, and I don't think he
is going anywhere. This is deeply undemocratic. I think going
to this broader question of decision making and where they are
going, Russia is not the enemy, that they are a strategic
competitor, and I think going to the heart of the relationship
is the fact that United States and Russian interest core values
and threat perception fundamentally differ, and I think until
we realize that, we are not going to get a partnership going
forward that we want.
Mr. Costa. Ambassador?
Ambassador Ischinger. I have nothing to add.
Mr. Costa. Okay.
Ambassador Ischinger. Except to the very last point if I
may? I believe that strategically there is a convergence of
interest between the West and Russia. There are very few
central challenges that I can think of that we can solve and
address without Russia in a meaningful way, and there are very
few issues that Russia can resolve without cooperation with the
West. That is the challenge that we should focus on and explore
as best we can.
Mr. Costa. Mr. Graham?
Mr. Graham. Yes, I agree with what is said about Mr.
Medvedev and Mr. Putin, but I would add a further point that we
tend not to focus on. Much depends on what type of information
the top decision makers are getting, both Medvedev and Putin,
and obviously there are a number of different sources, a number
of different factions, if you will, within the Russian
Government, within their military, security services, foreign
policy organizations that pass information forward that provide
the basis for decision making, whether it be Putin or Medvedev.
What we have found is that much of the information that is
passed forward from our perspective actually distorts what our
policies are, what our intentions are and what we are actually
doing in the world, and this is another argument for much more
intense engagement with the Russians using the channels that we
have, creating channels that provide us as much direct access
to the senior leaders and also those that pass up the
information.
Mr. Costa. Don't you think that is internally within Russia
deliberately done by many?
Mr. Graham. Well, look, I mean, there are numbers of
opponents to better relations between Russian and the West
within the Russian bureaucracy.
Mr. Costa. Okay.
Mr. Graham. But there are also a number of people that
would be prefer to have better relations, and we need to
understand that is a reality, we need to deal with it, but I
think it is incumbent upon us to pass as much information
forward on our positions as possible.
Mr. Costa. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired. I yield
to the ranking member 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for the time, Mr.
Chairman. As you know, I have a resolution, House Resolution
982, calling on France not to proceed with such ship sales to
Russia, which I have referred to in my previous questions. This
issue is of tremendous importance to our allies in the Baltic
States, and our friends in Georgia, and I would ask that you
give your full consideration, Mr. Chairman, to consider House
Resolution 982 at the next committee markup. It is no
commitment your considering it.
Chairman Berman. I got distracted. Remind me of what H.
Res. 982 is? I am bad with numbers.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is the measure dealing with the French
sale of ships to Russia that I had referred to in my previous
set of questions.
Chairman Berman. Yes, you did.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I also would like to
ask unanimous consent if I could to insert into the record at
this point the text of a bipartisan letter that I and 70 other
Members of Congress sent to President Obama last December,
asking that he focus on the important issue of the murders of
Russian reporters, activists and lawyers in his discussion with
the Russian leadership.
Chairman Berman. Without objection, it will be included in
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]Ros-Lehtinen
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And to the panelists:
Regarding the arms sales to Georgia--do you think that the
United States or other NATO allies should sell strictly
defensive weapons to Georgia to help that country deter another
potential attack on its territory by Russia? I know that we
have differing views on the earlier attack. Do you think that
the United States and other NATO allies should sell strictly
defensive weapons to Georgia to help that country deter another
potential attack?
Ms. McNamara. Well, I think arms sales should be based on
general principles. America decides to sell arms to certain
countries and have different trade treaties with different
countries depending on how trustworthy they are, how much
technology they want to transfer, et cetera, et cetera. If we
have decided that Georgia is an ally, then I don't see why not.
However, one of the things you do have to consider in any arms
sale is regional stability.
If we think Georgia is an ally and can contribute to
regional stability, then okay, but I think you have to look at
it on a case-by-case basis, but I see absolutely no objection
to selling them defensive weapons, and we mustn't forget as
well that NATO has stated on the record that they do view
Georgia as a future member of the alliance. We have the NATO-
Georgia Commission. They are a special ally if you want to put
it that way.
They don't have the membership action plan, but they are a
special ally, and we have designated them 1 day to be a full
member, so I find it pretty objectionable that we are thinking
about selling an assault ship to Russia, but we won't give
defense weapons to Georgia. I find it quite unconscionable on
some level.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Amen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
yield to you.
Chairman Berman. Any other panelists want to answer?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Trenin. Thank you. I think one needs to consider that
from the standpoint of Georgia, Russia occupies the territories
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and from the standpoint of
Georgia, the most important duty of the Georgian Government is
to restore the territorial integrity of the Georgian state. As
people sell arms to Georgia, they need to consider that those
arms may be used in the ways that a sovereign government in
Georgia would decide to use them, and that I think is a major
concern that should be weighing on people's minds.
Ms. McNamara. I think if Georgia uses defensive weapons to
defend itself, then that is a good thing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Yes, sir? Mr. Graham?
Mr. Graham. Yes, just briefly on this. I mean, you always
have to be concerned about the consequences. I would pick up on
what Dmitri Trenin says. If you are going to make the sale, you
have to have to have some sort of sense of what the Georgian
Government is going to do with them, and no matter what we may
think about what the Russians have done or may do, the fact of
the matter is that as in August 2008, the United States is not
prepared to do anything militarily, and if you get involved in
another shooting conflict, it will redound to our disadvantage.
Ambassador Ischinger. Just one sentence. Thank you. If, as
I believe, our key job is to try to build trust and the working
relationship with Russia, I would advise restraint, and I would
support the considerations offered by Dmitri and by Tom. Thank
you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, very much, to all of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you will excuse me, I have to
attend another event.
Chairman Berman. I understand. Thank you very much. All
right. Yes. We are now on second rounds. Okay. Mr. Scott is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Ambassador, in your remarks, you
mentioned that we need to rethink what security means in terms
of our dealings with Russia, and I think you used the words it
needs to be rethought from a standpoint of from each other to
with each other, and you see, that is sort of where I think we
have got to be useful going forward, find those areas that we
can work together on, Russia, the United States and NATO. I
think that has to be the arrangement.
I don't think it should be Russia and the United States
without incorporating the role of NATO. I think that NATO to do
anything other than that rushes itself off the cliff of
irrelevancy. How can you rethink a new strategic concept for
NATO, and you are leaving Russia on the sidelines when it is
Russia plays such a critical role in every major feature and
concern? The whole issue of energy, their use of energy as a
political weapon, how can that be dealt with with Russia in
isolation?
The fear within the European countries themselves are
divided of that. It just seems to me that common sense says we
have got to find a way to rethink and reinvent this. I am
reminded of the advice that Frank Sinatra gave the answer to
the question that asked Frank Sinatra why have you been on top,
the '30s, the '40s, the '50s, the '60s, even into the '80s up
to the time near his death he was packing them in in Madison
Square Garden, and when the question was put to Frank Sinatra
why have you lasted, Frank Sinatra simply said because I have
constantly reinvented myself, and so how do we move forward
with this in getting a way to do this.
Pointedly, I want to ask you a question about that, but
really where are the problem areas within Russia? What is the
thinking on one side or the other and what is that reasoning?
Where is the resistance within the European block at we need to
work with? Why not identify these problem areas to a greater
cooperation and try to defeat these, and most of them from my
experience in dealing with this issue is simply fear, and
leadership requires that you have the boldness to lead, and
that succumbs the fear. Where do we start with this, and where
are the problem areas that are preventing us from this
corporation?
Ambassador Ischinger. You raise a key issue, and I am sure
the other panelists have their own views. My view would be that
one of the areas that we should focus on are those areas where
mistrust is greatest, and for a number of reasons, mistrust
appears to be significantly greater on the military side than
in some other areas. This is why I believe that measures which
would create an atmosphere and a culture of cooperation of
shared objectives would be helpful. That can be done, for
example, in the very large area of arms control where I am
pleased to see that the United States has taken initiatives and
is working hard to move forward, but that is an area that is
larger than just the START follow-on treaty.
I happen to believe that one of the biggest challenges for
the West, one of the biggest global challenges is the
prevention of further nuclear proliferation. If we wish to
strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, we need, if we
can, to have Russia on our side as a partner in an effort to
strengthen the treaty, to make the up coming review conference
a success and not a dismal failure like the one that we had 5
years ago, et cetera, et cetera, so military and arms control
and proliferation would be my issue number one. Others are not
unimportant, but would have to be in the back seat.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman is expired. The
gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again,
I would suggest that the misrepresentation of Russia's military
retaliation against Georgia's invasion of Ossetia and Abkhazia
has not done the cause of world peace or the cause of more
cooperation between our countries' service. Let us note that
the Russian military action was precee deg.ded by the
Georgian military attack, which violated a long-term truce, and
while I certainly would agree that it was a disproportionate
response, let us note such a disproportionate response could be
predicted if Serbia sends their military into Kosovo.
Chairman Berman. Would the gentleman yield just for 1
second?
Mr. Rohrabacher. As long as it is not off my time.
Chairman Berman. It is only 10 seconds of your time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Go ahead.
Chairman Berman. The Georgian move was in South Ossetia, I
am unaware of a move in Abkhazia by the Georgians.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. All right. Well, I will take a look
and see exactly how that proceeded, but one thing we do know is
it wasn't dissimilar to what our position is in Kosovo and
perhaps it wasn't all that different from what happened when
Great Britain was in a dispute over the Falkland Islands and
used a disproportionate response when the Argentineans
attacked, and it would be wrong to say that Great Britain
attacked the poor Argentineans and used force, and thus we
should be suspect of Great Britain.
It doesn't go. It is not consistent. We are either going to
be consistent in our dealings with our dealing with the
Russians, or they are not going to trust us. Let me ask a yes
or no or a one-answer question from all the panelists. Which
country represents the most dangerous long-term threat to
American security and world peace? China or Russia? One answer.
Write it down.
Mr. Graham. Neither.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Ambassador Ischinger. Same answer.
Ms. McNamara. No comment.
Mr. Trenin. Neither country, and certainly not Russia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Certainly not Russia?
Mr. Trenin. Certainly not Russia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you very much. Let me
note the courage of the last man to speak the truth when we are
here to have an honest discussion. Let me tell you something.
It is very clear that China is an emerging threat and a greater
threat every day. We have headlines in the paper where we find
out, and we talk about Russia's relationship with Iran, which
we have pushed them into Iran's arms by excluding them from the
EU market and the United States' market when they needed it the
most.
Let us note the Chinese, who we have totally open markets
with, are now arming Iran, arming Iran and selling all kinds of
weapons systems to Iran, and that is consistent with a pattern
throughout the world. Yet, do we try to magnify any flaw of
China? No. In fact, we are magnifying the flaws of Russia while
accepting all of these things of China while sending over our
technology and massive investment by our private sector.
In fact, I would suspect that some of the technology that
they are selling to Iran originated in the United States? Mr.
Chairman, we have a totally inconsistent approach to China and
Russia, and unless we understand that it is Russia who offers
us some hope of a cooperative relationship because they have
had the reform, and China has had no democratic reform and is
in fact worse off now in terms of civil liberties than it was
25 years ago that it is going to hurt our cause. It is going to
hurt the cause of world peace. It is going to leave us in
jeopardy.
There are areas we can work with Russia on, the arctic is
an example. Instead of trying to make that an international
solution to what we are going to do in the Arctic, we should be
working with Russia and have them work with us to find a
formula that is good for Russia and good for us rather than
just trying to establish a global solution, missile defense it
has been said here quite often and let us note the threat that
we face right now, not just China in the future, radical Islam
is at our throats.
They slaughter people in Russia, too. Our President didn't
even bother to go and stand next to Putin when they murdered
hundreds of its children a few years ago. When our people were
lost, Russians have built a magnificent monument to the people
that were lost in 9/11, to the victims of terrorism and didn't
get so much as a thank you. Listen, we need to reach out to the
Russians so they will be our friends, or we will pay a dear
price because China is going to be our enemy.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa,
for a second round.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On that
cheerful note, we have talked a lot about what is right and
what is wrong with our current policy with regards to Russia,
and the inconsistencies I think clearly are there not only
today but in the previous administration. Mr. Trenin, what
would you suggest because I am always very focused in terms of
setting the expectation bar at a level that is achievable, what
do you think with this administration if you were to be
advising is achievable here in the next couple of years?
Mr. Trenin. Well, Mr. Costa, I think that it is clear that
after the START follow-on treaty is signed, which I expect to
happen very soon, the big thing of course will be its
ratification, but on the diplomatic front, the big thing will
be moving onto the next issues, and the next issues will be
related to missile defense, and I think that turning a problem
into an opportunity would be something that is both important,
timely and achievable.
Mr. Costa. What about Iran?
Mr. Trenin. With regard to Iran, I think that the Russians
have been moving toward a position that is closer to the
position of the United States.
Mr. Costa. What is achievable?
Mr. Trenin. Well, I think the achievable thing, it does not
depend on Russia. The problem is that as I sit here today, I
see the Iranian leadership so split that they are essentially
unable to reach out to the international community, and I am
very, very worried about what will happen over Iran.
Mr. Costa. Ms. McNamara, what do you think is achievable?
Ms. McNamara. Over Iran, I don't think Russia is going to
be any meaningful help to you whatsoever. I don't think it is
in their interests to do so. They may eventually support
sanctions, but the only sanctions they will support are going
to be so watered down as to be meaningless. We have already had
three rounds of sanctions against Iran.
Mr. Costa. Are the sanctions won't affect them?
Ms. McNamara. I mean, of course. They have----
Mr. Costa. I mean, in things that they view critical in
terms of----
Ms. McNamara. They have a huge economic interest.
Mr. Costa. Right.
Ms. McNamara. But apart from that, they have geopolitical
interest.
Mr. Costa. Sure.
Ms. McNamara. And I think the rise of Iran they see as a
counter-balance to the United States' power in that region. I
think in terms of sanctioning Iran, we have to go down a
coalitions-of-the-willing approach, and I hope Germany will be
part of that because they have 5,000 companies currently doing
business in Iran.
Mr. Costa. All right. So you think trade is achievable in
the next couple of years?
Ms. McNamara. Certainly, Russia wants to be a member of the
World Trade Organization, and they want to get rid of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. However, being a member of the
international community means you have to be in good standing.
I don't think the United States should give away things for
free. I think in terms of taking a relationship forward, these
should be on the table, but you have got to earn it.
Mr. Costa. Yes. Do either of the two of you care to opine
on what is achievable here in the next 2 years? Mr. Graham? Mr.
Ischinger?
Ambassador Ischinger. On Iran, I belong to the school of
thought that does not think that sanctions will change a lot
for a number of reasons, including the inability of the Iranian
leadership to react to whatever we are doing, so I don't think
that the sanctions issue will take us closer to a solution. I
believe that there are a lot of things that are achievable, but
they are in the area of bilateral United States-Russian
relations, including missile defense, including arms control
and a number of issues related----
Mr. Costa. Incremental progress, yes. Mr. Graham?
Mr. Graham. Building on that, I think there are a number of
areas, nonproliferation. We are already working very closely
with Russia on a lot of nonproliferation issues, securing
fissile material inside Russia, the former Soviet space. That
has been expanded. That is something that we can build on with
the Russians, and both of us exercise global leadership. Civil
nuclear, if the 123 Agreement is eventually resubmitted to the
Congress, is ratified or allowed to go through, that would open
up the possibility for cooperation on civil nuclear energy,
very positive, an area where Russia has certain unique
technologies we don't. It would be valuable doing a joint
venture somewhere in a third country. All of this I think also
creates an environment in which is easier----
Mr. Costa. What you can build on.
Mr. Graham. That we should build on but also helps us with
Iran in that area as well.
Mr. Costa. Right. Quickly before my time expires, I am
concerned about the gaps in NATO defense and assets and forces
and with their flat or declining defense how do expect NATO to
continue to perform? Who wants to take a whack at it? One
person.
Ms. McNamara. I think you are absolutely right. There are
only five countries in the whole NATO alliance who spend the
benchmark of 2 percent of GDP on defense, and I think that has
got to change. Will it change? I don't think so in the
immediate future, so NATO has got to do better with what it has
got. What we can't do is say we are going to have a second
defense identity within the European Union to draw on those
resources because most of the resources come from the member
states, and so the worst thing that we could do is have a
separate defense identify within the European Union because it
is not additionality. It is taking away from NATO.
Mr. Costa. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
know you guys are probably wanting to go somewhere else, but I
want to just, if you don't mind, yield myself another 5 minutes
to just pursue a couple of issues that were left dangling.
Unfortunately, Ambassador Ischinger's most recent comment
requires me as the sponsor of a piece of sanctions legislation
vis-a-vis Iran to say you may be right, but I don't know that
you are right.
Absent an effort to get a meaningful international
sanctions regime at the same time keeping the avenue for
engagement open so that there is a diplomatic alternative to
deal with this issue if the regime chooses to exercise it,
without that kind of regime, you are left with only two
consequences. One is living with a nuclear Iran and figuring
out how to live with a nuclear Iran and all that means, and the
other one is a military confrontation, and so it is not quite
on the subject of our hearing, but the issue was raised about
the French sale to Russia.
In fact, I was asked to move a resolution on that subject
through the committee. Ms. McNamara had a chance to respond,
but no one else did. Do any of you have thoughts on either that
sale or what our response or the NATO response should be to
that sale? Mr. Trenin?
Mr. Trenin. The sale is actually pretty controversial
within Russia, and people say that this is a blow to the
Russian domestic defense industry, not unheard of, but I think
that most sensible Russians see it as a symbol of trust between
Russia, and they underlined that, a major NATO power. To them,
to those who are for the deal, the thing is that this will
create a bond, a security relationship, not just between Russia
and France, but between Russia and NATO, and I just wanted to
highlight that.
Chairman Berman. Mr. Graham?
Mr. Graham. I will just second what Dmitri has just said. I
agree that is important. It is important. It is important for
building trust, but I also think it underscores as Dmitri said
the problems that exist in the Russian defense industry, which
is another reason why I think Russia doesn't pose the threat
that many people here think it does.
Chairman Berman. Ambassador?
Ambassador Ischinger. Arms exports are almost always
problematic. That is true in this case also, but when one
weighs the pros and cons, I would definitely come down on the
side of Dmitri and Tom. I think trust building is at this
moment the most important point. Mr. Chairman, if I could just
add one sentence to your question on the sanctions. I did not
mean to indicate that I would be opposed to sanctions. I just
have a great deal of hesitation that they will bring about a
rapid solution of our problem in regard to Iran. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Ms. McNamara wants to respond to the
responses.
Ms. McNamara. Just very quickly. In terms of building trust
with Russia, well your NATO partner should also be able to
trust you, and there is absolutely massive push-back on this
sale from many NATO allies, not least of all in Central and
Eastern Europe. I think it would behoove France to take into
account the trust it has built with its own NATO partners who
it has an alliance guarantee with rather than those outside the
alliance.
Chairman Berman. Thank you. In the prepared testimony, we
didn't spend much time or any time talking about it that I
remember, there was sort of a reference to the Russian decision
on the conventional forces agreement, and then I think it was
Mr. Graham's testimony that suggested a way to deal with it is
to restructure it not so much to focus on where Russian forces
are stationed, but on a level of transparency on where they are
stationed and notifications as a way of both getting that
agreement sort of back into operation and an area to build
trust in.
I guess, Mr. Trenin, would the Russians be open to that
kind of a suggestion and particularly important, I guess, for
some of the Eastern European countries?
Mr. Trenin. Well, I think we missed an opportunity earlier
this decade when the CFE Treaty, the adapted CFE Treaty was not
ratified, and I think that it needs to be made clear that the
Russian----
Chairman Berman. Refresh my memory.
Mr. Trenin. There was a treaty signed in 1990 between the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand and
NATO on the other hand, so that is the treaty from which Russia
pulled out. Russia pulled out of the treaty that operated on
the assumption of the Warsaw Pact and NATO facing each other in
Europe. Now, there was another treaty, the adopted treaty,
concluded in 1999, which took account of the changes,
geopolitical, geostrategic changes in Europe in the decade of
the 1990s.
The Russians as well as the Ukrainians, the Belarusians and
the Kazakhs ratified that treaty, but no NATO country did
because Russia had not withdrawn from Georgia and Moldova, and
that I think----
Chairman Berman. No NATO country ratified it.
Mr. Trenin. No NATO country ratified that.
Chairman Berman. It wasn't just our fault?
Mr. Trenin. No, no.
Chairman Berman. Okay.
Mr. Trenin. I think that it is very important that the CFE
Treaty is brought back or at least a system that guaranteed
military security in Europe is brought back, and I think it is
important to start negotiations, discussions on the new
parameters of the treaty or the treaty that exists, the 1999
treaty that was signed by NATO counties, but not ratified by
those countries. Absent that treaty, we have a certain amount
of insecurity in Europe, and it is in everyone's interest to
minimize that amount.
Chairman Berman. Anybody disagree with that? Okay. On that
note of unanimity, I think we will thank you all very much for
being here, very interesting, a lot more issues we could cover,
but not enough time. So with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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