[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
YEMEN ON THE BRINK:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-81
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANTWexler leaves 1/4/
10 deg.
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
Robert Marcus, Professional Staff Member
Genell Brown, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Former United
States Ambassador to Lebanon).................................. 4
The Honorable Robert F. Godec, Principal Deputy Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (Former United
States Ambassador to Tunisia).................................. 6
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D., Associate, Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace..................... 38
Mr. Jonathan Schanzer, Vice President for Research, Foundation
for Defense of Democracies..................................... 57
Mr. Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate & Regional Director for the
Middle East and North Africa, The National Democratic Institute 67
Mr. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, The Brookings Institution.............................. 74
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman and the Honorable Robert F.
Godec: Prepared statement...................................... 8
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 41
Mr. Jonathan Schanzer: Prepared statement........................ 59
Mr. Leslie Campbell: Prepared statement.......................... 69
Mr. Bruce Riedel: Prepared statement............................. 77
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 92
Hearing minutes.................................................. 94
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 96
The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement............................. 98
The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 100
The Honorable Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 101
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri: Prepared statement...................... 103
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Virginia: Prepared statement................. 104
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas: Prepared statement.................... 106
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Jim Costa, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California........ 112
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan
and responses from:
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman............................... 115
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D....................................... 118
Mr. Jonathan Schanzer.......................................... 119
Mr. Leslie Campbell............................................ 120
Mr. Bruce Riedel............................................... 122
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Michael T.
McCaul, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,
and responses from:
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman............................... 123
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D....................................... 126
Mr. Jonathan Schanzer.......................................... 130
Mr. Leslie Campbell............................................ 133
Mr. Bruce Riedel............................................... 135
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee,
a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
responses from:
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman and the Honorable Robert F.
Godec........................................................ 136
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D....................................... 144
Mr. Jonathan Schanzer.......................................... 147
Mr. Leslie Campbell............................................ 151
Mr. Bruce Riedel............................................... 154
YEMEN ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
presiding.
Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. In a
moment I will recognize myself and the ranking member for 7
minutes each for purposes of making an opening statement.
Without objection, all of the members may submit opening
statements or additional materials for the record. Before we
get to the statements, let me take a moment to inform my
colleagues about some upcoming committee hearings and other
events. We are still trying to deal with next week's hearing
and the administration's ability to testify at a Haiti hearing
versus all the other things they have to do in terms of Haiti,
but on Wednesday, February 24, the committee will host members
of the Russian Duma Foreign Affairs Committee for a series of
meetings on key issues, including Iran, regional conflicts,
arms control, trade and energy.
The following day we will welcome Secretary of State
Clinton for her annual testimony on the international affairs
budget. That will be February 25. In the near future, we are
hoping to hold hearings on a number of other topics, including
the upcoming nonproliferation treaty review conference, export
controls and foreign assistance reform. Now, I will yield to
myself.
With so many pressing issues in the Middle East, the
country of Yemen has received relatively little public
attention since the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, but
all that has changed in the last 3 months.
On November 5, 2009, 12 brave soldiers and one Army
civilian were brutally gunned down at Fort Hood, Texas, by an
Army psychiatrist with links to a radical Yemeni-American
cleric. On Christmas Day, a young, Nigerian man who had plotted
with al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen tried to bring down Northwest
Airlines Flight 253. Even before these heinous acts, the Obama
administration recognized that Yemen should be a much higher
priority and took steps to more than double U.S. economic and
military assistance to that country.
Today's hearing will focus on the numerous challenges that
endanger Yemen's domestic stability and regional security.
These include the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, religious and tribal conflict, separatist movements,
dwindling natural resources and a failing economy.
I am going to try to abbreviate part of my opening
statement because we do have two panels today.
Yemen is rich in culture, history and geographic beauty,
but it is also the poorest country in the Arab world. Yemen's
oil, which provides the government with 75 percent of its
income, is quickly running out. An even more precious liquid,
water, is also quickly running out. Yemen could, in fact,
become the first nation ever to exhaust its freshwater
supplies.
Then there is the pervasive use of qat, a narcotic plant
that produces feelings of euphoria and stimulation, but
ultimately undermines individual initiative. Sort of like being
in Congress. The overwhelming majority of Yemeni males are
known to chew qat, and for many, it is a daily habit. Qat
production may use as much as 40 percent of water resources
consumed by local agriculture.
The most immediate threats to Yemen's stability are the
ongoing civil war against Houthi rebels in the north, a
rejuvenated secessionist movement in the south, and a resurgent
al-Qaeda. The Houthi rebellion, which began in 2004, spilled
across the border and has engaged Saudi Arabia's military
forces since November.
The more unstable Yemen becomes, the more likely it is that
terrorism will thrive there, threatening U.S. regional
interests and our homeland.
After years of tepid bilateral relations, now is the time
for the United States to engage Yemen comprehensively.
President Obama is working with the Yemeni Government and
others to aggressively pursue terrorists. But a policy of
counterterrorism in isolation will not suffice. Yemen's
deteriorating security is intimately linked to a host of
political, economic and social problems. This hearing provides
an opportunity to ask some key questions: How important is
Yemen's stability to U.S. interests and U.S. security? Is Yemen
on the brink of becoming another ``failed state''? And, what,
if anything, can the United States do to tip the balance in the
right direction?
To help us answer these questions, we have two panels of
distinguished witnesses whom I will introduce shortly. Before I
do, let me turn to the ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for
any opening remarks that she would like to make.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, as
always. Thank you for holding this hearing, and thank you for
agreeing to the minority's request that we have a government
panel and invite administration witnesses to address the
critical issue of U.S. policy toward Yemen. I would note that
U.S. participation in last week's Yemen conference in London
and would be interested in hearing about the outcome of that
important conference. We also look forward to receiving more
detailed information on the overall strategy to address the
challenges in Yemen and other jihadists as a basis, and
framework for such a strategy was provided by the Congress
through the terrorist sanctuaries provisions of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
This provision focuses on situations involving a government
that either expressly consents to the use of its territory to
be used by jihadists, or, with knowledge, allows, tolerates or
disregards such use of its territory by jihadists and other
global extremist groups. While Yemen may not yet meet that
threshold, it is, unfortunately, coming dangerously close. It
is no accident that al-Qaeda found a home in Yemen akin to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The central government does not
control the tribal areas of Yemen, its borders, or, in some
cases, its population centers. Like other countries in the
region, a small group controls most of Yemen's wealth, which
relies on oil revenues.
However, Yemen's oil revenues are rapidly diminishing,
compromising the ability of that small group to buy off tribal
and commercial interests there. Like Saudi Arabia in 2003,
Yemen hosts many radical clerics who promote jihad. A
substantial separatist undercurrent has also emerged in the
wave of demonstrations sweeping southern provinces from 2007
through 2009. As protestors and government escalate in both
violence and rhetoric, the southern movement has become
increasingly isolated from northern society, threatening
further instability. These risks will increase as oil
production continues to fall, as revenues from oil sales
provide the foundation for the patronage system holding the
country together.
As the chairman pointed out, the ongoing Houthi rebellion
has again flared, with Yemenis accusing Iran of interference.
The potential for this to spiral out of control cannot be
understated or underestimated. Combined with additional local
conflicts, many fear that Yemen will continue to dissolve into
semiautonomous regions amid various insurgencies which
reinforce each other. The U.S. and other leading aid donors and
the World Bank have provided significant direct development aid
to Yemen over the past decade, over $300 million in Fiscal Year
2008 alone. Other donors have provided additional assistance,
but throwing more money at the problem has not improved the
situation.
The United States has also increased military and
intelligence support to the weak Yemeni Government and its
leader over the past several months as al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula has grown bolder. For years, Yemen has established a
pattern of appeasement with al-Qaeda elements and has refused
to keep wanted al-Qaeda operatives and associates jailed or to
transfer them to the United States. Many of these militants
initially protected the state from attack by al-Qaeda; however,
according to U.S. intelligence officials, al-Qaeda is now
targeting the Yemeni state, as well as U.S. and other foreign
targets inside and outside Yemen. There is an interesting
article in the L.A. Times by Greg Miller entitled ``Yemen
Group: A Top U.S. Worry.''
He says Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair
told a Senate panel that American spy agencies have intensified
surveillance of the al-Qaeda affiliates' operations and made
concerns that the group once considered a regional menace is
focused on the recruitment of Westerners and other individuals
with access to the U.S. homeland. In light of these
developments, I would ask our administration panel: Has the
Government of Yemen changed its strategic calculus, its mindset
about al-Qaeda and other jihadists? Do we now have a true
partner in fighting this threat? There have been numerous
reports of Afghan and Pakistan Arabs returning to Yemen,
penetrating political, security, tribal and religious
institutions.
Former Guantanamo detainees released by the United States
pepper the high-level and mid-level ranks of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and constitute elements of its operations in
Yemen and beyond. Last month, after bipartisan pressure, the
Obama administration agreed to stop returning detainees to
Yemen; however, this is far too little. We need a coherent
policy and a strategy now before Yemen deteriorates to the
point of no return and is further used as a launching pad or a
staging ground for attacks against our nation and our interests
abroad. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for the time and the
hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]
********** COMMITTEE INSERT ********** deg.
Chairman Berman. Thank you. Now, to introduce our first
panel. Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman is the assistant secretary of
state for near eastern affairs. A career member of the Foreign
Service since 1986, Ambassador Feltman previously served as
principal deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, and before that, as U.S. Ambassador to
Lebanon. Prior to his assignment in Lebanon, he headed the
Coalition Provisional Authority's Office in the Erbil Province
of Iraq. Ambassador Robert Godec is the principal deputy
coordinator for counterterrorism in the Department of State.
From 2006 to 2009, Ambassador Godec served as U.S. Ambassador
to Tunisia. He has also served as deputy assistant secretary in
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and was deputy coordinator
for the transition in Iraq. Secretary Feltman, we look forward
to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON)
Ambassador Feltman. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-
Lehtinen, members of the committee, thank you very, very much
for holding this hearing and inviting Ambassador Godec and me
to appear before you today. We look forward to working with
this committee in efforts to address the many challenges Yemen
faces that were outlined by the chairman and the ranking
member's opening statements. We would like to submit a
lengthier testimony for the record in which we will detail some
of these challenges.
Chairman Berman. Your entire testimony will be included in
the record.
Ambassador Feltman. Last week I was in London at the
meeting that Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen mentioned with
Secretary Clinton. This meeting focused on many of the issues
and challenges that we will be discussing today. The United
States, the United Kingdom, our Arab partners in the Gulf, the
Yemeni Government and other international partners reaffirmed
our shared goal of a peaceful, prosperous and united Yemen. The
meeting also marked the launch of a process, a process that
will continue to coordinate international efforts concerning
Yemen in the future. I would like to make four points in the
opening statement and then look forward to answering any
questions that the committee may have.
The first point, as Chairman Berman said, is that Yemen has
been a top U.S. foreign policy priority since this
administration took office 1 year ago. Given the gravity and
the complexity of the situation in Yemen, the Obama
administration launched a full-scale policy review shortly
after coming into office recognizing the increasing importance
of dealing with Yemen in strategic, not just tactical, terms.
The resulting strategy is twofold: Bolstering and supporting
Yemen on the security side, and promoting good governance and
development on the socio-economic and governance side. We
believe that focusing on one dimension at the exclusion of the
other is simply not going to work.
The attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day served as a
wake up call to some regarding the apparent growing capability
of al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen to carry out attacks beyond the
Middle East, but it confirmed what many of us have known for
years: Militant extremists in Yemen are able to operate in the
unsettled environment there, and they threaten U.S. national
security as well as Yemen interests and the interests of key
allies. With the support of this committee and Congress we have
been steadily ramping up security development assistance since
Fiscal Year 2008.
Recognizing the toxic effect of deteriorating governance,
and human rights protections and stagnant development, the
United States Government has developed an assistance strategy
that will take aim at Yemen's social and economic challenges.
The second point I would like to emphasize is that we are not
alone in engaging Yemen to improve the situation there. The
international community, and particularly Yemen's neighbor
states, is well aware that it must help Yemen address its
security and economic challenges both in the short and the long
term, and I think that the London meeting illustrated that
commitment. We will continue to coordinate closely with other
countries to work with the Government of Yemen to bolster its
ability to deliver services to its people, to fight corruption
and to confront the threat posed by al-Qaeda and other violent
extremists.
Third, just picking up on some points that Ranking Member
Ros-Lehtinen said, we are realistic about the capabilities of
our Yemeni partner. The Government of Yemen is beset by many,
many challenges, including unrest in the south of the country
and a violent conflict in parts of the north. The government's
ability to provide services and exercise its authority is
inconsistent over different parts of its territory. Its track
record on human rights, on governance, and on anticorruption
also has been wanting and is in need of intense focus and
attention. In terms of the Government of Yemen's determination
and willingness to confront the threat of al-Qaeda-related
militants in the country, we should be, and, in fact, we are,
encouraged by recent steps that the government has taken.
Our partnership and support for Yemen's counterterrorism
measures is not an endorsement of all the government's
policies. In fact, we are supporting government reform efforts,
education and training initiatives and an emerging civil
society in order to promote better transparency in governance,
better human rights protection and to ensure that the Yemeni
people can participate in shaping and addressing national
priorities. We will continue to seek improvements in all of
these areas, even as we help the government take on al-Qaeda.
Fourthly, finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of
your support and the participation of all U.S. Government
agencies in our pursuit of success in Yemen.
As Secretary of State Clinton said recently, in states
where the odds of succeeding may be long, ``the risks of doing
nothing are far greater.'' In Yemen, the complexity of the
economic, political and security situation truly require a
whole of government approach to our policy. We cannot afford to
neglect the experience, the resources or the leverage available
across our Government. Thank you, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Berman. Ambassador Godec?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. GODEC, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FORMER UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR TO TUNISIA)
Ambassador Godec. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-
Lehtinen, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear today to discuss the challenge of
Yemen, the threat of terrorism and the way ahead on U.S.
policy. I join Assistant Secretary Feltman in asking that our
joint written testimony be entered into the record.
Chairman Berman. It is part of the record without
objection.
Ambassador Godec. I would like to build on my colleague's
statement and make three points. First, the threat from al-
Qaeda in Yemen is not new, but it is clearly evolving. The
presence of al-Qaeda in Yemen goes back to before the USS Cole
attack in 2000 when al-Qaeda affiliates attempted to kill U.S.
servicemen on their way to Somalia. The group has carried out a
string of attacks on embassies, tourists and the security
services in Yemen in the past couple of years. In August 2009,
the newly established al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP,
launched a failed attack against the chief of counterterrorism
in Saudi Arabia, and, of course, AQAP has claimed credit for
the attempt on December 25 by the Omar Farooq Abdulmutallab to
bomb Northwest Flight 253.
This was the first time that an al-Qaeda affiliate
demonstrated the will and the capacity to attempt a strike on
the continental United States. Second, well before December 25,
the U.S. Government was engaged in Yemen, and specifically,
this administration has focused on Yemen since day one. The two
pronged strategy described by Assistant Secretary Feltman will
help Yemen confront the immediate security threat posed by AQAP
and will also address the serious longer term political and
economic issues and challenges that drive extremism. This
strategy requires full Yemeni partnership. It also requires
close cooperation with regional partners and allies, and it
requires hard work and American resources.
The challenges are great and many, but the risk of doing
nothing is grave. With support from Congress, U.S. security
assistance to and engagement with our Yemeni partners has
increased in recent years. The Departments of State and Defense
provide training and assistance to Yemen's key counterterrorism
units. Working with DOD, we currently give substantial Section
1206 counterterrorism assistance to Yemen. Through our
antiterrorism assistance program we provide training to Yemen
security forces. We are currently consulting with the Yemeni
Government and assessing Yemen's security requirements to
identify opportunities to further strengthen Yemen's
counterterrorism capacity.
In the last year, senior administration officials have
traveled to Yemen frequently: General Petraeus; Assistant to
the President, John Brennan; Assistant Secretary Feltman; and,
most recently, the coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador
Dan Benjamin. All of them have stressed during their trips our
deep concern about AQAP. Our engagement is paying off.
President Saleh and the Yemeni Government have shown increased
commitment to confront AQAP. In the past 2 months, Yemen has
conducted multiple operations designed to disrupt AQAP's
operational planning and deprive its leaders of safe haven.
Yemen has significantly increased the pressure on AQAP. It has
carried out air strikes and ground operations against senior
al-Qaeda targets.
While these security operations are essential,
delegitimatizing AQAP also requires addressing Yemen's cycle of
radicalization while we build Yemeni institutions. A key part
of our work to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula is to assist the Yemeni people to build
strong institutions and forge a better future. Third, regional
and international cooperation is fundamental to our security
strategy. The threat of terrorism in Yemen is a common
challenge. It is a problem that will require engagement with
our partners, particularly those in the region. Secretary
Clinton has said today's security threats cannot be addressed
in isolation.
Last week's London meeting, during with the international
community reiterated its prior commitments to aid development
and security, was a good start. Now we must follow-up to build
on the momentum. Ultimately, the goal of U.S. and international
efforts in Yemen must be a stable, secure and effectively
governed country. It is the only road to success in our
counterterrorism strategy. Toward this end, while we work with
Yemeni security forces we will also assist the government and
people to strengthen institutions, build infrastructure and
deliver services. As the Government of Yemen grows more
transparent and responsive and Yemenis find hope for their
future, the seeds of extremism and violence will find less
fertile ground and the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula will truly recede. We look forward to continuing our
work with Congress, and this committee specifically, as we
refine and implement our strategy. I look forward, too, to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassadors Feltman and Godec
follows:]Feltman and Godec deg.
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Chairman Berman. Well, thank you both very much. I will
yield myself 5 minutes and begin the questioning. The ranking
member closed her opening comments with the question do we have
a partner in the Government of Yemen to confront and deal with
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? Now, you have talked about
some signs of improvements, of growing commitment. I guess two
questions. One, what are the things that could threaten that
continued commitment? Are we at the point where we can call it
a partnership? In Pakistan we have a sense these days that many
different organizations, the Pakistan Taliban, the Afghanistan
Taliban, Losher, Tiba, other groups that we consider terrorist
groups, along with al-Qaeda, have this level of coordination
they may not have had in earlier years. Is any of that taking
place in Yemen? The Houthis in the north, the rebellious
elements in the south, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is
there any morphing of goals and tactics with any of these
groups? So that is, I guess, my first two part question.
Ambassador Feltman. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The Government
of Yemen, let us be frank, has been an inconsistent partner in
the past on many of these issues, both on the security side, as
well as on the governance and development side. As both of our
opening statements indicate, we have been encouraged by the
determination that the Government of Yemen has shown in the
last couple of months to take on the al-Qaeda threat. We were
also encouraged by the determination the Government of Yemen
showed at the London conference last week to tackle the
development and governance challenges. We will stay engaged on
all of these, mindful of the needs and mindful of the past.
In terms of your question about what would threaten the
Government of Yemen's determination to continue the fight with
al-Qaeda, I will make a couple of comments. First, as some of
your own statements noted, the Government of Yemen has been a
victim of the al-Qaeda presence in Yemen. We believe that the
Government of Yemen fully understands this
threat, deg. and that helps explain the determination.
The Houthis in their current north and the secessionists in the
south are different from al-Qaeda in that we believe that these
are mostly local grievances. This is mostly based on local
politics, longstanding grievances in the south dating back to
the time of unification, longstanding grievances in the north.
This is different from al-Qaeda.
Chairman Berman. But that is the way it started out in
Pakistan, too.
Ambassador Feltman. These conflicts have a risk of
distracting the government from the al-Qaeda challenges, which
is one of the reasons we have been calling for a cease fire. We
are encouraged by the fact that the Saudis and the Houthis seem
to be deescalating their own conflict, with the Houthis
declaring a cease fire with Saudi Arabia. We want to see a
cease fire in the north that leads to the type of political
reconciliation that will address the grievances of the north
and not make the Houthi conflict a distraction from the fight
against al-Qaeda.
Chairman Berman. Okay. Let me just interject there because
I only have 1 more minute and I do want to get this question
out there for an answer. The Yemeni Government, backed by the
Saudis, has made numerous claims that the Iranian Government is
militarily, financially and politically supporting the al-
Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen. Many observers dispute
this. Is there evidence that Iran is materially supporting the
Houthis? What influence does the Iranian Government have in
Yemen?
Ambassador Feltman. We think at heart, at base, this is a
local conflict. These are local grievances. We have heard the
accusations, we are aware of the threat, we certainly are aware
of Iranian misbehavior in the region, places like Lebanon,
Iraq, et cetera, but this is overwhelmingly a local issue, and
we have called for outsiders not to interfere. Let us see this
solved locally.
Chairman Berman. Anything to add, Ambassador?
Ambassador Godec. Mr. Chairman, I would just----
Chairman Berman. I have 9 seconds.
Ambassador Godec [continuing]. Say that I believe Assistant
Secretary Feltman is exactly right in his remarks.
Chairman Berman. Okay. My time has expired. The ranking
member is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I wanted
to ask the excellent panelists about the budget increases that
have been presented. It was just recently released, the Fiscal
Year 2011 budget, and it increases assistance to Yemen $106
million, more than six times the $17 million that was spent in
Fiscal Year 2008. Economic support funds are increasing almost
sevenfold in just 1 year from $5 million in Fiscal Year 2010 to
$34 million for Fiscal Year 2011. So I wanted to ask about
those numbers. First of all, can that be absorbed on the ground
to accommodate such an increase in funding?
Does the Embassy have the ability to project its presence
on the ground to implement this funding and this programming
effectively? Also, how does the Yemeni Government itself have
the ability to absorb all of this increase? Related to that,
what are the performance metrics? How do we judge success and
how we are doing with this funding and programming? Lastly,
what conditions are we placing on U.S. assistance to the
Government of Yemen, particularly regarding the implementation
of its financial sector and economic reform program? So it is
basically the budget, how it is going to be absorbed, how can
we measure success of our funding, and what the Yemeni
Government is doing.
Ambassador Feltman. Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, thank you.
I mean, I should say from the outset that there is no cash
going to the Government of Yemen. I think we all understand
that. This is technical assistance, this is support, these are
helping get services delivered to the people at the local
level, but this is not a question of transferring cash to the
Government of Yemen. In September, USAID signed a new strategy,
a 3-year strategy, with the Government of Yemen that has two
pillars that get at some of the questions that you have asked.
One pillar is called a communities' livelihood program, the
other part is national governance program. It is getting at the
capacity issues in both directions.
For the first part, the community livelihoods initiative,
it is building capacity at the local level, helping services
get delivered at the local level: Health, education, youth
employment. How do you organize civil society, support civil
society so that they can engage with their local officials, and
at the national level, building capacity on budget
transparency, decentralization, issues like this? So we are
working both locally and nationally in order to build capacity
to help the Government of Yemen deliver services, create jobs,
and create economic opportunities. It is definitely a challenge
working in Yemen for security reasons, but USAID, U.S. State
Department, other U.S. Government agencies now have quite a lot
of experience in dealing in insecure environments and how you
deliver, monitor, your assistance.
In terms of conditionality, I want to go back to the London
conference for 1 minute because this was a question that
everyone had in London was conditionality and absorb to
capacity. There were $5.2 billion committed to Yemen a few
years ago at a Friends of Yemen conference hosted in London.
Most of that was coming from the Gulf. Most of that hasn't been
delivered. It hasn't been delivered because of questions of
capacity, questions about conditionality. So the international
community is working together to address these, sending a
unified message to the Yemenis about what we expect in terms of
transparency, in terms of responsiveness to real needs, in
terms of delivering services across the country, and the
unified message in terms of help and building the capacity of
the government. So it is more than just the United States that
are sending a message to the Yemenis about their need to
deliver, it is all of us working together.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee,
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Wow! Well, first,
you talk about the risk of doing nothing, and I couldn't agree
with you more on that, but I think, as we all know, there is a
risk of doing everything. It seems to me that we have been
trying to do everything, everywhere, mostly by ourselves in a
lot of instances, and we are starting to lack the resources, or
the ability, or the will of the American people to do that, but
you still can't do nothing. I think we should be looking at the
problem of trying to do everything. This place, I don't know if
I would call it looking like it is going to be a failed state.
I don't know that they ever got to the real state status in
order to become a failed state afterwards.
I can't remember when. I mean, you know, you have got the
Hatfields and the McCoys, you have got the Houthis and the
whatevers, and you have the separatists, and you have al-Qaeda
filtering or flooding in, depending on your perspective, and
these people spend the afternoon getting away from reality by
the whole country getting high and like, wow, we have got no
problems, just, we are running out of gas, we are running out
of water, we have no resources for ourselves, so let us forget
about it. I think we have to look around in the neighborhood
and try to figure out what we do to help, and, you know, there
are the Saudis who are unrealistic about the whole thing to
begin with, I think.
Somebody has to tell our friends over there that they have
to be part of the solution, the real solution, not just
throwing some money into the thing. Maybe they should go into
one of these airport machines and do a full body scan and
figure out that this place next door is really a wart that is
on their butt, and they better do something about it because it
is starting to turn malignant. I understand you could even
spread it through someone else's underwear. This thing is
highly problematic. My question is, instead of looking, or in
addition to looking for allies within the government in Yemen,
why aren't we doing more looking for allies within Saudi Arabia
and getting them to focus not just on throwing in
$1 billion and let us see what happens, but helping to provide
some infrastructure, some technology, some help, some support
to try to build the place because it seems to me they are a
heck of a lot closer than we are, and you don't need one of
these long flights to mess up Saudi Arabia.
I think they really know that, but I don't think they are
focused on real solutions. Do we have a partner there? Can we
spend more time walking them through what they should be doing
or how we could help them do what they know they should be
doing?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman Ackerman, I don't have the
felicitous terms or phrases that you do, but----
Mr. Ackerman. Whatever that means, I take it as a
compliment. Maybe you could provide an answer in whatever
terms.
Ambassador Feltman [continuing]. We agree with you. We
agree with your basic point. The GCC countries, Saudi Arabia in
particular, and the GCC as a whole, have vital interest in
Yemen. They are the immediate neighbors of Yemen and they have
faced the immediate threats that emanate from Yemen. You know,
Ambassador Godec mentioned the August attempted assassination
of Deputy Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the GCC have to be part of the
solution. Part of the discussions at the meeting in London last
week was how do we initiate a process? We don't want simply a
meeting, we want a process of addressing the long and short
term security, and development and governance challenges in
Yemen.
The GCC countries have stepped up as a response to London
and said, okay, fine, we are going to have a meeting February
27 and 28, the GCC meeting in Riyadh, to talk about Yemen in-
house with the Yemenis talking about Yemen. We see a new
seriousness on the part of the GCC countries to work directly
with the Yemenis on their own, and also to work with us in the
international community.
Mr. Ackerman. But the history of that seems to be just send
them in some money and here you go, guys, fix your problem. It
is hard to tell a patient, you know, here is $1 million, go
cure yourself. I think we have to have a more serious bilateral
discussion. with the Saudis in particular, others as well, but
sit down in a room with the Saudis, my suggestion, and say,
look, guys, here is what I think you really have to do. Not
just put money in there, but you have to do A, B, C and D, to
help build this place into a real place with some sense of
leadership, with some sense of being able to build a state that
can control themselves. They are living in a world of illusion
over there.
Ambassador Feltman. We agree with you on working with the
Saudis 100 percent.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flake. I thank the chairman, and I thank the witnesses.
I am sorry I wasn't here to hear your testimony. I have not had
a chance to really go through it, so forgive me if you have
gone through this already. We have known for, well, really
since the Fort Hood shooting, and suspected before that, that
there were problems there in Yemen. Can you tell me what the
state is doing now that it wasn't doing before? Is it just a
matter of intensity: We have got to build institutions faster,
we have got to work for the government there, we have got to
get the neighbors involved, or is it a complete change in
focus? What is happening today that wasn't, you know, 6 months
ago?
Ambassador Feltman. Sorry to monopolize the hearing, Bob.
In fact, the administration came into office last year and
looked around the world and focused on Yemen as one of the
priorities very early on in the administration, both in terms
of development and governance challenges and in terms of the
security challenges. There has been a series of meetings that
Ambassador Godec and I and our bosses have attended since last
year, a lot of meetings on Yemen, where we developed this two
pronged strategy I was describing earlier addressing governance
and development challenges, and addressing security challenges.
What has happened since December 25, though, is we have the
ability of really engaging the region and international
partners.
It was as a result of the December 25 attempted attack that
led British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to issue the
invitation, issue the call for the Yemen conference that I
attended last week with Secretary Clinton. This is allowing us
to coordinate our approach, coordinate our messages, get
international support and basically use the international
community and regional partners as increased leverage to
address challenges in Yemen. So the December 25 attempted
attack did not wake up the United States regarding the United
States administration's challenges in Yemen, but it did allow
us to use the international community in new ways.
Mr. Flake. We have had a number of successful predator
strikes in Yemen of terrorists over the past couple of years,
is my understanding. How does that impact the work that the
State Department does? Is it understood by the government? How
much are those moves by the U.S. supported by the government
there such as it is?
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I think I would just
underscore that the United States is cooperating very closely
with the Yemeni Government in a variety of ways on the fight on
counterterrorism. They understand the contributions that we are
making by way of training and assistance. They value it. I know
they find it very important. We have been working very closely
with them to address the threat, which they take now very
seriously. I do think that recent developments, the actions of
the government, have underscored just how seriously they take
it and how they do intend to address this problem.
Mr. Flake. So to the extent that there was push back from
government, that is lessened now after recent activity, or was
there no push back early on? Have they been cooperating all
along?
Ambassador Godec. I think it is fair to say that the
cooperation across time has been uneven. There have been
instances and times and places in the past where the
cooperation is not everything that we hoped it would be. I do
think that their recent actions, however, show on the part of
President Saleh and the government a new commitment and a
strong commitment to cooperate with us on counterterrorism.
Mr. Flake. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Berman. I thank the gentleman. His time has been
yielded back. Now the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you
both for being here. Just to reiterate the fact that the
implications of this country's stability on U.S. policy in
Yemen and the surrounding region in the larger context of our
efforts to curb extremism around the globe, you all are really,
I think, charting a new course in a new direction. The presence
of al-Qaeda in Yemen and elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula
really further illustrates the difficulties, of course, that we
will face in sustaining efforts to reduce extremism if the
United States engages these challenges with military centric
solutions.
I can't help but wonder and want to ask you this question
about any thoughts or discussion with regard to any
authorization to use force against Yemen. Of course, we, you
know, conducted military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as
part of our strategy. It is very similar now in terms of what
is taking place in Yemen. I wanted to find out, I hope not, but
has that been on the table for discussion? Secondly, I don't
know if you mentioned the numbers of al-Qaeda members that we
think are in Yemen versus Afghanistan to get a sense of, you
know, where the real fight is. Thirdly, I would like to just
ask about the increase in funding aimed at building Yemen's
military and counterterrorism capacity, but also, the zeroing
out of development assistance and what that means given our
overall strategy in terms of what we are trying to do on the
development front, which you have laid out.
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Lee, first of all, the
President has been clear, Admiral Mullen has been clear,
General Petraeus has been clear, we are not talking about U.S.
combat boots on the ground in Yemen. You know, we are not
looking at a situation like in Iraq or Afghanistan, something
like that. We are looking at supporting a new determination by
the Government of Yemen to go after the al-Qaeda threat. We are
providing support to the Government of Yemen in its own fight
against al-Qaeda. That certainly is in our interest. On the
number of al-Qaeda, you asked specifically, I will quote the
Foreign Minister of Yemen. Foreign Minister Qirbi of Yemen has
said that they estimate, the Yemenis estimate, 200 to 300. I
don't have anything more to add on top of what Foreign Minister
Qirbi would say in terms of numbers.
Ms. Lee. Excuse me. Correct me if I am wrong, but there are
fewer al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan than in Yemen?
Ambassador Feltman. Since my writ ends at Iran, I will
defer to Ambassador Godec.
Ambassador Godec. I think that, you know, there are many
al-Qaeda, unfortunately, around the world in a range of places.
They do pose a threat. It is not always easy to get a precise
handle on the exact number of al-Qaeda in any given location.
They do obviously pose a real threat, whether it be in Yemen or
Afghanistan.
Ms. Lee. Okay. So we don't know the numbers in Afghanistan
at this point or not?
Ambassador Godec. Congresswoman, I would be happy to get
back to you with an estimate on that, if you would like. We
would be happy to take that back.
Ms. Lee. Yes, I would like that. Okay. Thank you.
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Lee, you asked about the
development assistance. If you note, what we have done is we
have increased the ESF, that we are moving into a situation
where we are using ESF as our tool rather than development
assistance, so the overall levels of assistance have been going
up since Fiscal Year 2008. There is some, you know, shifting
between the budget lines, but the overall level is going up in
order to help the Government of Yemen address the challenges,
and particularly, as I said earlier, to try to work at the
local level, to try to show delivery of services at the local
level and do job creation at the local level.
Ms. Lee. Okay, but it is my understanding, correct me again
if I am wrong, that even with the ESF funds and the development
assistance account we are still looking at a reduction of about
$6 million over the previous year.
Ambassador Feltman. I will look at the numbers carefully.
The overall assistance, not counting the 1206 money, in Fiscal
Year 2008 we were providing about $17 million, Fiscal Year 2009
amounted to about $40 million, Fiscal Year 2010 amounts to $67
million, and the President's budget request that was just
submitted has $106 million for Fiscal Year 2011. So, in fact,
we are on a steady increase on both tracks of our policy which
means providing security assistance and providing assistance
for development.
Ms. Lee. Okay. Finally, let me just ask you how many
Americans are living in Yemen? Do we have an idea?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, our Embassy would definitely
have an idea, and I will have to get back to you on what they
report their estimates are.
Ms. Lee. Okay. But primarily are they U.S. Government
workers, personnel?
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Lee, it seems that the
estimate from the Embassy and consular affairs section is
40,000 to 50,000.
Ms. Lee. 40,000 to 50,000. Okay. Thank you very much. I
yield the balance of my time.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to the
chairman's question about Iran, Ambassador Feltman, you
described Iran's activities as misbehavior. Misbehavior? And
that the United States has asked regional neighbors not to
interfere in Yemen's internal affairs. That hasn't seemed to
work in Lebanon, or Iraq, or North Africa. Are we
underestimating Iran's interests and activities in Yemen?
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Burton, I am sorry if my
choice of words didn't properly convey how serious the
challenge Iran poses to U.S. interests in the region are
because it is enormous. I was Ambassador in Lebanon. I saw up
close how damaging to Lebanon's security the presence of
Hezbollah and Iranian support for Hezbollah is. I do not
underestimate the challenge that Iran poses or its----
Mr. Burton. Well, the reason I bring that up is the
attitude of the administration has been to try to talk to all
these people around the world and work out our differences
verbally and continue to go on, and on, and on saying, you
know, that we are going to do this, or we are going to do that,
we are going to impose sanctions if they don't change, stop
their nuclear development program, stop the terrorists in
Yemen, and so on and so forth, or stop their assistance to
them, and things don't change. It just continues to get worse.
We have had two attempts in the last year by people who were at
least partially involved or trained by al-Qaeda terrorists in
Yemen, and it just seems like we ought to use stronger language
and really be stronger in our interrogation of these people.
One of the things that has concerned me is officials over
in the Senate testified that an elite interrogation team
created to replace a controversial CIA program dismantled by
President Obama last year is now operational. It is not
operational, is it? Does anybody know who it is? I have no idea
who it is. Have you heard of who that is, either one of you? I
mean, is it operational, and, if so, who have they been
interrogating, and have they gotten any information, and, you
know, what is the result?
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I am aware that there is an
interrogation team. I believe there was testimony yesterday
about it, that it is operational. We can certainly get back to
you with additional details about it.
Mr. Burton. Well, over in the Senate officials testified
that this interrogation team really wasn't operational, and
then they came back and said a couple days later that it is
operational, and so, you know, once again we are hearing, it is
like a ping pong ball, it is operational, it isn't operational.
I would like to know really if it is, and, if so, I would like
to know what they are doing in Yemen and elsewhere to get
information about these terrorists before they try to blow up a
plane here in the United States or kill a bunch of people at
Fort Hood. I mean, you know, if we have got an interrogation
team and we know al-Qaeda is there or a subsidiary of it is,
why in the world isn't our intelligence people and our military
people capturing these individuals and really digging the truth
out of them, and also, using technology and procedures that are
going to be able to get information.
I know the President said, well, waterboarding is inhumane,
and I saw a television commentator on television actually going
through waterboarding. He said it was very scary, but he
survived it and it didn't seem to bother him too much, and yet,
when we used it they said, my gosh, it is inhumane and it is a
terrible approach to getting information. I think when you are
dealing with terrorists who want to kill 250 people or so on a
plane or terrorists that are instructing somebody at Fort Hood
to kill a bunch of American military personnel that we ought to
do whatever is necessary within certain bounds to get that
information.
I am one of those who believes we ought to use
waterboarding or whatever it takes to get that information
because once they kill a bunch of Americans, everybody is going
to say why didn't we do something about that? That is why I am
very concerned about this interrogation team, because I don't
believe it exists and I believe they are scrambling around
right now trying to get it together so they can say, yeah, we
have been doing that and we have had it for a while. One more
thing, Mr. Chairman, if I might. This guy that got his Miranda
rights after he got on that plane or after he got off the plane
and he got a lawyer paid for by the United States of America,
the FBI said they went over and they talked to his parents and
that gave them the information necessary to elicit more
information from him about what was going on in Yemen where he
was trained. Are we going to be sending FBI agents around to
parents all over the world to get information like that? That
is ridiculous. If we get a person who is a terrorist who tried
to blow up a plane, we need to get on him right away. Quickly.
Fast.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome. I am over
here. Last year I traveled to Yemen, walked the streets of
Yemen, along with our Navy Seals, of course. The thing that
struck me was as we moved through the city, at exactly 1
o'clock all of the men that we could see were reaching in bags
getting this green stuff, sticking it in their jaw. It was so
disfiguring, grotesquely. You could see it all over where we
looked over the streets. These weren't just young kids, these
were police officers, they were businessmen. The issue that I
want to ask is what are we doing to address this issue? It is
more than just a leisure thing. Qat has become the primary
degradation of their poverty.
It requires an immense amount of water of which there is a
shortage for. Their number one economic asset being oil will be
depleted in 7 years. It takes so much land to grow the qat that
they can't even grow food. So it seems to me that this is a
fundamental situation that I think we have got to address
because it is the driving characteristic of that economy, of
that culture, that is not only making Yemen a failed state, it
has become a failed state, and this is the driving force for
it. What is our strategy to deal with qat?
Ambassador Feltman. Representative Scott, I think you have
described the problem very articulately. You know, qat is
depriving families from income, it is preventing people from
effective employment, it is, as you said, using up precious
water resources. The World Bank and others are working on ways
to combat this, to tackle this. It is hard. You know, this is a
cultural thing, as you yourself witnessed when you were there.
You know, we are working behind this. We are working to back up
the World Bank and other people's efforts on this, and we are
trying to compliment it by the new USAID strategy I described
with you which will have some focus on small business
development and agribusiness development to try to create new
opportunities and new markets to provide incentives to get
people away from this.
This is a severe problem, it is a long-term challenge, and
you are absolutely right that all of us need to be working
together to address it. I don't think there is any short-term
fix to the long-term qat problem.
Mr. Scott. Well, thank you. Mr. Godec, let me ask you to
comment on the accuracy of the size of al-Qaeda there. Last
week I read in the New York Times where a member of the Obama
administration stated that we have killed approximately 20
percent, and they put an accurate figure of between 300 and
400, al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen. First of all, is that
accurate? 1) Have we eliminated in the past few months 20
percent? 2) Is the 300 or 400 the accurate figure of the number
of al-Qaeda in Yemen?
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, as Secretary Feltman said,
the number that we have on al-Qaeda in Yemen is from the
Foreign Minister, from Foreign Minister Qirbi. What he said was
200 to 300. Several hundred was his specific reference. That is
the best number that I have available this morning. Obviously,
as I said, the Government of Yemen has taken a number of steps
to address this threat. There have been a number of actions,
military, and law enforcement and others. A number of al-Qaeda
have been taken off the streets, a number have been killed, a
number are in prison. I can't give you confirmation that the 20
percent number is accurate. It may be accurate, but clearly,
ongoing actions are in fact, taking al-Qaeda off the streets in
Yemen right now. This really is a commitment by the Government
of Yemen to address this problem.
Mr. Scott. Yes. In my last 10 seconds I hope I can get this
in. This is a regional situation. Have we involved the nations
of Kenya, Ethiopia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia as well, and
Djibouti to impact a regional effort dealing with Yemen?
Chairman Berman. I think the time has expired. Maybe you
can work that answer into an answer to someone else's question.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. Sorry that I am a little late. Recently I visited
the prison at Guantanamo Bay, this is for the panel, and left
with a feeling that it was probably the best living conditions
that terrorist enemies had ever experienced. Dozens of those
inmates have been released from Guantanamo to Yemen and have
been reintegrated with al-Qaeda in Yemen. Despite all the
terrorist activity taking place within Yemen, it is still eager
to accept up to 100 additional inmates. My question is, can
Yemen really be serious about wanting to assist us in
eradicating al-Qaeda when it is eager to welcome Guantanamo
inmates? I understand we are not sending those inmates now, and
I agree with that policy, but if you can answer my question.
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, I know that in my region,
which is the near east region from Morocco through Iran, all
countries that have nationals who are incarcerated in
Guantanamo, all the countries policies are that they want their
nationals back. That is a standard policy across the region. It
varies from place to place about what that is, what they would
do with them, et cetera, but it is not unique to Yemen that the
Yemeni Government says please send the Yemenis back to Yemen.
As you pointed out, the President on January 5 made the
decision that because of the security environment, because of
threat considerations, that he was suspending the return of any
Yemeni Guantanamo detainees back to Yemen.
The previous administration had sent 14 detainees back to
Yemen, this administration had sent seven back to Yemen,
including one in September that was under Court ordered
release, but all of these decisions that the administration has
made were done by consensus, evaluating the threat environment,
evaluating the individuals in question and taking into account
all the information that we had.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Would you like to comment on it
as well?
Ambassador Godec. I would just indicate that, you know, I
share Secretary Feltman's views and comments on this. I agree
with him. I think there has been a very intensive process in
this administration, a review of all of the detainees in
Guantanamo by a task force of 60 lawyers, experts and various
sorts, and anyone sent back anywhere was done so by a unanimous
agreement. The key point, I think, with regard to Yemen at this
moment is that, as Secretary Feltman said, the President
announced on January 5 that he is suspending the transfer of
detainees back to Yemen.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. My second question is, recent
events in Yemen, coupled with past events, suggest that Yemen
is not a partner in the war on terror. I want to get your
thoughts on that and see if you believe this is a working
relationship which can be salvaged, and if it is worth
salvaging, what type of preconditions would you put on any aid
we might provide?
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, we would agree with you
that Yemen has been, I would describe it as an inconsistent
partner. There have been times when Yemen has focused on the
al-Qaeda challenges, there have been times when Yemen hasn't
been as focused as we believe they should. We are encouraged by
the determination the Government of Yemen has taken over the
past couple of months. We believe that the leadership in Yemen
from the President on down now understands that al-Qaeda is the
preeminent threat in Yemen to Yemeni interests. We want to
build on that. Our security assistance goes hand in hand with
our development assistance in Yemen, but it is based on a
partnership that must address these challenges.
Mr. Bilirakis. Would you like to address that as well?
Ambassador Godec. I would just underscore the importance of
looking at Yemeni actions. I think that those actions recently
have been very clear, and they have been taking the fight
directly to AQAP. Frankly, given that it is ultimately Yemenis
who have suffered most from AQAP attacks, more Yemenis have
died because of their attacks than others, I think that that
commitment is a good thing, it is a positive thing and it does
indicate, I think, that it will continue.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired. I
remind the committee that we have an excellent panel of expert
outside witnesses to testify after the Secretary and the
Ambassador are finished, and I recognize the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, I thank you both for
appearing here today, and I would ask unanimous consent that my
opening statement be entered into the record at this point.
Chairman Berman. Without objection.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, before I begin asking some
questions of the witnesses I just want to respond to my good
friend Mr. Burton. I respect him, but I do not agree. I
profoundly disagree with the idea that the United States of
America would engage in torture to ring confessions out of
would be suspects. Torture--waterboarding is torture--is not an
American value. We have always striven in this republic for the
higher plane. We represent values. That is what makes Americans
Americans. Not our ethnicity, not our religion, not our credo,
but our values. Torture is never, and must never be, an
American value. The facts of the case of Abdulmutallab, as a
matter of fact, would be contrary to what was suggested.
The visit to his parents elicited cooperation. The reading
of his Miranda rights was no different than the reading of the
Miranda rights to the shoe bomber, Mr. Reid, which occurred in
the previous administration, I might add, not once, but four
times. As a matter of fact, we now have the cooperation of the
suspect in sort of singing his song about his contacts and the
network. It has been an effective strategy. Not torture, but
good, hard investigative techniques. I wouldn't want anyone
watching this hearing, Mr. Chairman, to believe for a second
that the idea that torture is okay for the United States of
America as a weapon in the fight against terrorism because
torture actually can turn against us.
It puts every American who travels abroad at risk, it costs
us the high ground, and, as a matter of fact, it is
counterproductive. So I just wanted to say that at the
beginning, Mr. Chairman, because I wouldn't want anyone to
think that that view was representative of most of us, I think,
in the United States Congress on both sides of the aisle. Now,
if I may ask, isn't the problem in Yemen one of governance? I
mean, is there a functioning government we can work with? You
know, there are so many things one can point to that would
suggest serious disfunctionality. If we don't have a
functioning government to work with, how do we secure our
interest in what is now yet another boiling pot in an obscure
part of the world?
Ambassador Feltman. There are many problems facing Yemen.
There are many problems inside the government. I will quote a
former Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, who last week or 2
weeks ago described Yemen as a fragile state rather than a
failed state. There is a history of trying to solve problems
locally. There are 21 different governorates. The 21 different
governorates have different cultures, geography, relationships
with the central government, but there is, in fact, a
government. It may not be a government that is functioning as
well as we would all like it to, it may be a government that
there are certain grievances against it by different parts of
the population, but there is a government, and it is a
government that we want to work with in partnership on all of
these areas.
We don't only want to work with the government, and that is
an important point. There are 7,000 civil society organizations
in Yemen. This is a very vibrant civil society. We are working
with those as well. There are local governments that address
local challenges. We are working with that as well. So we are
not relying exclusively on the central government even as we
partner with the central government to face some security and
development challenges.
Mr. Connolly. Is it a government that is cooperating with
us, Mr. Assistant Secretary, in your opinion?
Ambassador Feltman. It is. As we have said here, we have
seen new determination that is encouraging in the fight against
al-Qaeda, and we have also seen new determination that is
encouraging in trying to improve the governance and its own
capacity.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Ambassador, we have 44 seconds.
Ambassador Godec. I would just underscore again that we
have seen, I think, some real changes recently in the
Government of Yemen and in its determination to cooperate with
us in key areas, areas that are of great importance to the
United States, first and foremost, the fight against AQAP. I
think that this is new and that it is a very positive
development. We hope going forward that we can deepen this
cooperation, certainly in the security area, but also in the
development area. It is essential. We need to work with the
Yemenis very closely, and we need the assistance of our friends
and allies in the region in order to address the challenges.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. I am sorry that I got here late.
Combination of trying to figure out what happened in Illinois
in the election last night and trying to figure out what
happened in Illinois in general in the past 100 years. There
was an article written November 19 of this past year in the
Washington Post concerning two brothers from the country of
Yemen. One of the brothers had been detained at Guantanamo for
the past 8 years, alleged to have been involved in the USS Cole
incident, the other brother living in Yemen. The brother in
Yemen talked about the promise of the President to close GITMO.
He says if the President does anything less than closing
GITMO, that is, moving GITMO to the United States, that the
hatred and animosity that the terrorists and possible recruits
for the terrorists have toward GITMO would be transferred to
the U.S. facility, ostensibly in Thomson, Illinois. He said
moving that facility will make the Yemenis even more prone
toward terrorism than they are now and even exacerbate and
increase the recruitment of al-Qaeda. I was wondering if you
could comment on that. You don't have to fight over who is
going to answer the question, you know.
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I think I would just
underscore that there is a real commitment on the part of the
administration and President Obama to close Guantanamo. I think
there is no doubt that it is a real problem for us around the
world, the existence of Guantanamo and the facility there. Our
senior military leaders have indicated that, in fact----
Mr. Manzullo. You know, I understand that. I am asking if
you could comment on what the Yemenis themselves are thinking
where one brother is incarcerated, the other one is out, on the
attitude of transferring that hate from GITMO to Thomson,
Illinois.
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I am not aware specifically
of any Yemeni reaction to the question of the possibility of
transferring the facility.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Ambassador, what I quoted you was
actually, let me give you the exact quote. Uthman Abdul Rahim
is the person at GITMO. His brother is Arif. Said he was
confident Obama would close GITMO in 1 year. If he doesn't or
if Uthman and other detainees are sent to a prison in the U.S.,
many families would consider it an even greater betrayal. ``The
families, their friends, their tribesmen will have more hatred
for the United States,'' Arif said, ``and perhaps they will
consider taking the same path as the extremists.'' So my
question to you is to comment on that statement coming from the
Yemenis themselves.
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I think that obviously we
have a situation where there are individuals in Guantanamo.
Something needs to be done with them and the administration is
considering all of its options.
Mr. Manzullo. I understand. I am just asking you to comment
on this. This is not a difficult question.
Ambassador Godec. I would be happy to take the question for
the record, Congressman.
Mr. Manzullo. This matter has been around for months. It
has been discussed publicly. It is not something that I am
going to give to you and you can take back and answer me in 6
weeks. I mean, you are familiar with the area more than
anybody. It is very intimate. This is one brother who is saying
his brother is at GITMO and if GITMO is transferred to the
United States, the hatred will transfer. That is a very simple
question. Do you agree with him or not?
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I would just have to repeat
or reiterate that I would really have to take that question
back for consideration. I am not sufficiently familiar with
this specific case or these two brothers in order to comment on
it.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Ambassador, that is the problem, okay? I
represent Thomson, Illinois. I had 12 hours notice that it was
going to be moved to my congressional district. I have got
nothing less than obscure answers every time I ask a question.
I am asking for, I mean, do you agree or not? This is a
statement of a Yemeni himself. If he hates GITMO and GITMO is
transferred, will he hate Thomson, Illinois?
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Manzullo. I would ask to have 30 additional seconds.
Chairman Berman. I am sorry. I don't understand how the
Ambassador can answer a question coming from someone that he is
not familiar with and evaluate whether it is an accurate
statement or not. In any event, my feeling is irrelevant, the
time has expired. The gentlelady from California, Ambassador
Watson, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past several
years U.S. foreign policy to Yemen has averaged between $20
million and $25 million annually. However, in Fiscal Year 2010
the Obama administration requested about $50 million in aid.
The assistance to Yemen in this fiscal year has already reached
$67 million, and the Fiscal Year 2011 request is closer to $100
million. So keeping these increases in mind, should we be
expecting a Yemen supplement later this year? Can you mention,
either one of you, who our partners are in Yemen, and what can
we expect from them in the next few years?
Ambassador Feltman. Representative, thanks for the
question. The money for Fiscal Year 2010 and the President's
request for the budget for Fiscal Year 2011 are in the regular
budget. They are part of our regular foreign assistance
numbers. Of course, we have had to evaluate how best to devote
those resources and came up with those figures for Yemen, so I
would not expect a supplemental for Yemen. In terms of the
partners, it is a good question because we do have to leverage
our assistance with others. In terms of Europe, the British are
major donors. The British have announced 50 million
starting in 2011. That is about $82 million, $83 million for
Yemen. So it is in the ballpark with what we are doing.
The Netherlands and Germany are big donors, the World Bank
is involved. The major donors are the Gulf countries, Yemen's
immediate neighbors, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others. The UAE
announced a $600 million plus pledge to Yemen just recently. So
the London conference that I attended with Secretary Clinton
last week was an important milestone because it started out a
process by which all of us will be working together in order to
support development, stability, economic opportunities in Yemen
which we hope will start to reverse some of the really
appalling social and economic indicators in Yemen that can feed
into the very hatreds and problems that we have been talking
about.
Ms. Watson. I understand that about 50 percent of the
children are malnourished and illiteracy is high, and piracy
has travelled from Somalia into Yemen in the last few years,
income from oil is failing, and, as in my own district, Los
Angeles, California, water scarcity is a growing problem. With
respect to these problems, what has been the result of the aid
that we have given, the aid that the partnership is involved
in, and how do we intend to improve the impact of this aid?
Tell us how it relates to our best interests, too.
Ambassador Feltman. I will answer the last first, which is
we firmly believe that if we just look at Yemen tactically we
are not going to be able to solve these issues, and if we only
look at Yemen from a security perspective, that is also
insufficient to actually address the security challenges. We
need to look at Yemen over the long term to address the sort of
development challenges, the grievances, the despair that people
have that can feed into a negative security environment. So we
want to address security, development, and governance at the
same time. We have a new strategy in terms of our assistance
strategy to Yemen. We signed it with the Yemeni Government in
September.
So before the Fort Hood attacks, before the December 25
attempted bombing, we were already looking at new ways in order
to most effectively get assistance delivered to the people on
the ground because you pointed out the social indicators
yourself. They are appalling. The Government of Yemen admits
they are appalling. We need to find ways to make sure that
health, education and job opportunities are available at the
local level.
Ms. Watson. Thank you. I will yield back my time, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentlelady has been yielded
back. I was advised, and actually remember, that a previous
member on the majority side, because I wasn't alert was given
about 50 extra seconds to question, and so I am going to
reverse the ruling of the lower Court and give Mr. Manzullo 50
seconds to pursue his question.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the
administration's top experts on the Middle East and on
counterterrorism, how would transferring the entire Guantanamo
Bay detention center to the U.S. make our nation any safer when
there are clear warnings, such as what happened on December 25?
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, I think that, you know, it
is clear that al-Qaeda needs sort of no further excuse than it
has already got to attack the United States. I mean, it is
constantly plotting and planning to attack the United States.
It poses a real threat to us in its many manifestations.
Mr. Manzullo. You are not answering the question. Nineteen
seconds.
Ambassador Godec. I would just emphasize that Guantanamo
needs to be closed. It is essential that it be closed. I think
that obviously the administration has----
Mr. Manzullo. I want to say how disappointed I am in your
unwillingness to answer this very simple question. I am now out
of time.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recently, I will just
ask this question, the New York Times ran that story on Imam
University. Four thousand men gather there in a football-sized
mosque every week, and, as they say in the story in the Times,
Zindani, the headmaster who is the theological advisor to Osama
bin Laden, after all this, this is a guy who is a designated
terrorist by the U.S. Treasury, he sort of oversees this
operation, and this is where John Walker Lindh studied before
fighting us in Afghanistan, it is where the internet preacher,
Anwar al-Awlaki, who preached to the Fort Hood shooter got his
ability to give lectures.
He also was tied to the Nigerian who attempted to hit us on
Christmas Day. Now we have reports that up to three dozen
Americans who have converted to Islam during incarceration in
the United States are currently in Yemen, and they have
traveled to Yemen to study Islam. Now, I assume that means they
are going to the Imam University where these other terrorists
were trained. Law enforcement officials have been concerned.
They say they have dropped off the radar for weeks. Now, in the
past, President Saleh has been lobbied to have Zindani removed
from the terrorism list. I don't know what he is thinking about
this university, but I would think that it might be time to do
something since this is being used to train terrorists. I
wanted your opinion in terms of your feelings about that and
maybe what steps you are taking.
Ambassador Feltman. Congressman Royce, thanks. Let me make
a couple of comments and ask Ambassador Godec to add. As you
know, Yemen is a sovereign country so part of our dialogue with
Yemen, our requests of Yemen of course are associated with
things like how to build an effective counterradicalization
program. Ultimately, these decisions are Yemeni decisions, but
yes, we are engaged with the Government of Yemen on exactly the
sorts of recruitment tools that we see happening in Yemen. We
have also talked to the Yemenis about watching their own
immigration rules. I think the Yemenis have recently picked up
some Americans, in fact, for immigration violations and people
who have overstayed their visas, which is an encouraging----
Mr. Royce. You have got 36 ``blond-haired, blue-eyed
Americans,'' who our Government said ``we thought we had this
place blanketed, we thought we were working it very closely,
but now they have fallen off the radar.'' So, you know, I
understand we are appealing to them, but in the meantime,
terrorists are being trained apparently.
Ambassador Feltman. No. Without question, this is a
concern. There is very little ability, I think, of the U.S.
Government--you would have to talk to the immigration officials
to prevent the travel by U.S. citizens. So we have to be in
touch with the Government of Yemen about any violations in
their own rules. We are also doing things to promote
counterradicalization in Yemen. We are working on programs. The
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau of the State
Department, for example, runs a very effective program on
religious tolerance in Yemen. So we are working on this
problem----
Mr. Royce. Yes, I understand, but you have still got 4,000
people meeting every week in a football-sized mosque where, if
the New York Times is correct, they are being encouraged by,
what will we call it, the brain trust for al-Qaeda, to launch
terrorist attacks, and that is still going on, right?
Ambassador Godec. I would just underscore what Assistant
Secretary Feltman said. We are deeply concerned about this, we
are very well aware of this and other institutes, and schools
and universities which are engaged in transmitting or teaching
the extremist message. It is something that we are seized with.
We are working with the government on this. We are looking for
a variety of ways to address the problem. It is a serious
issue.
Mr. Royce. In the meantime, with al-Shabaab. You have got
these Yemenis from this same university are training and
fighting with al-Shabaab right now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired.
Remember, for the remaining members who haven't questioned yet,
we do have a second panel. Now it is the gentleman from
American Samoa, Mr. Eni Faleomavaega, who is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
your leadership and initiative in having this hearing this
morning. I do want to say that I think too often we don't say
enough to express thanks on behalf of the members and certainly
our colleagues to those of our fellow Americans who serve in
the Foreign Service. Secretary Feltman and Ambassador Godec,
thank you for your commitment and your dedicated service on
behalf of our country. I mean that sincerely because in this
part of the world, for any given day any of your lives could be
taken. The sacrifices that your families make, I think we
sometimes tend to overlook that. We do deeply appreciate the
service that you give to our country.
Yemen has 24 million people and is a failed state. Several
incidents and instances where our country has given some kind
of connection in such a way that has not necessarily been
positive. Just to make sure for the record that I have a sense
of understanding, the al-Qaeda movement, was this initiated by
Osama bin Laden? Your understanding, gentlemen? I just want to
make sure.
Ambassador Godec. Yes. I mean, he certainly was one of
the----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Founders.
Ambassador Godec. Yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Okay. Would it be safe for me to say also
that one of the deepest concerns that our country has raised is
that Yemen has become a breeding ground for al-Qaeda? Then I
would like to ask, what is the estimated number of al-Qaeda now
present in Yemen?
Ambassador Godec. The number that we have is from the
Foreign Minister of Yemen, Foreign Minister Qirbi, and he has
said that there were several hundred, 200 to 300, specifically,
al-Qaeda in Yemen right now. That is the number that we have.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I want to make this connection, and I am
not trying to be parenthetical about what I am expressing
concern about. If the media reports are accurate, there are
some 27,000 Taliban in Afghanistan and a couple of hundred al-
Qaeda. We already have 68,000 soldiers on the ground in
Afghanistan, and we are about to send another 30,000 soldiers
to Afghanistan totaling approximately 100,000 soldiers that are
going to be looking for these 27,000 Taliban and a couple of
hundred al-Qaeda. And I suspect in the next 18-month period,
that there is going to be another $100 billion that we are
going to have to spend to look for these people. My question to
both of you gentlemen: Is there some kind of a policy about
proportionality?
How many Yemenis are we going to be chasing when the al-
Qaeda is going to be acting or giving its presence, whether it
be in Africa or in other parts of the world? My concern is that
is there some point where the administration is making a
determination to say we have got a couple hundred al-Qaeda in
Yemen, so therefore, we have got to do everything that we can.
Is the issue of al-Qaeda just a security concern or is it more
than just that? What is it that attracts these people to join
the al-Qaeda movement? I am sure it is not just for the fun of
killing Americans.
I think it is a deep-seated idealogy, thousands of years of
traditions, tribal rivalries and all of these things at play.
But here, our whole objective is security on our part, to
protect the security of the American people. Who doesn't want
that? In the meantime, we are going to be killing these people
who have no idea what democracy is about, nor do they care. I
just want to ask you gentlemen a question. We are going to be
giving more economic assistance to Yemen, more of the same
thing that we are doing to Afghanistan, but is it going to
solve the problem of al-Qaeda? Gentlemen? Here is my problem.
Ambassador Godec. Go ahead. Please.
Mr. Faleomavaega. There are no ethnic Afghans. There are 12
million Pashtuns, 7 million Tajiks, almost 3 million Uzbeks and
three or four other major tribes that make up the population of
Afghanistan. Right on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan
are 27 million Pashtuns, even though they may be Pakistani
citizens. So is it any wonder Osama bin Laden has been freely
roaming between Afghanistan and Pakistan? We couldn't find him
after 8 years. What makes you think that we are going to be
able to solve the Afghanistan problem by sending 100,000
soldiers to do this task?
Ambassador Feltman. I know we are running out of time but I
would just like to note, Representative, if I may, that Yemen
is different.
Chairman Berman. You have made that point, and you have run
out of time.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Sorry. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Miller. Both of our witnesses have to leave at 11:15.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There have been a lot
of questions this morning about governance in Yemen, and
sometime in the past Yemen led the region in democratic
governance reforms, and that obviously is not the case now.
Whether you call it a failed state or a fragile state, it is
pretty clear that much of Yemen is ungoverned and all of it is
lightly governed. General Anthony Zinni said that ungoverned
areas were a Petri dish for extremism and radicalism and that
certainly appears to be the case in Yemen. There was a recent
Washington Post article that said there was a London conference
to encourage or insist upon very broad political and economic
reforms in exchange for a package of long term development and
security assistance, not just from the United States, from
other nations.
What is the nature of what we are asking Yemen to do? What
do they appear to do? Are other nations supporting us in our
demands? Are we supporting the demands of other nations? And
then second, you mentioned earlier the neighbors of Yemen are
the natural donors. They have got the money to do it. There was
a conference in 2006. There were pledges of $4.7 billion in
assistance to Yemen, but the most recent information is only 7
percent of that pledged aid has arrived. Why is that?
Ambassador Feltman. On the last question, we believe the
figure is more like a third. It is still only a third of what
became $5.2 billion. There were some extra pledges that came
in. Part of it is questions of capacity, part of it is
questions of governance, lack of confidence in some of the
institutions of the state. So part of our challenge now is
working together, sending a collective message to the
Government of Yemen about what do we expect in terms of how
they would manage this assistance, and providing assistance and
actually managing donor funds, managing accounting for donor
funds and delivering services. We ourselves believe that we
need to be working across Yemen.
I would describe Yemen as being poorly governed in many
cases. We are working, for example, through our Middle East
Partnership Initiative in 14 governorates. USAID's new two
pronged strategy is trying to get at some of the areas where
there has been an absence of government functions in a way to
try to build those functions so that there is a sense by the
local population that their grievances are being addressed,
that their needs are being met. What is encouraging out of
London was the consensus among the regional partners, the
international community and the international organizations
represented there, which is that we need to be working
together.
We need to be working not to interfere in Yemen, not to be
imposing international mandate or something on Yemen, but to
encourage the Yemenis to put in place types of systems that are
responsive to the real needs of the people. In addition, we are
working, through these civil society organizations, to help
them organize themselves to be able to make demands of the
Yemeni Government. Yemen has elections next year. In April 2011
there will be parliamentary elections in Yemen. We hope that
those elections involve the sorts of groups that would make
those elections credible--responsive political parties, active
civil society, full engagement by women in the electoral
process. The international community will be sending these
sorts of messages and providing this sort of assistance as we
move ahead.
Mr. Miller. Who are these 200 or 300 people? AQI, al-Qaeda
in Iraq, appears to be entirely indigenous. They aren't going
anywhere. They are just going to stay there. Are these 200 or
300 Yemeni mostly, or are they from elsewhere? Have they failed
in Afghanistan? More broadly, are they native to Yemen or are
they being given sanctuary by other Yemenis, which, by Yemenis,
would suggest more support for them and less support by the
government.
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, many of them are Yemeni, but
some do come from other places. Some of them are Saudi. As we
know, at least one of them is also a dual Yemeni-American
citizen. They are from a range of places. Some of them do have
experience or training in other regions, in South Asia, for
example, but many of them are Yemeni. They have built over time
their relations through tribal, and marriage and other ties.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired. At
11:15 I am going to excuse both witnesses, and any members who
have not been able to question them will have the first
opportunity to question, assuming that is an appropriate way to
work it out for the next panel. The gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Klein, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, nice to
see you, and Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. I think
we all understand that there is a clear price to pay if we
don't increase our attention to this part of the world. We also
know that we have a responsibility to commit serious and
rigorous oversight over what we are doing and the resources
that we are putting into that area. The language in the Yemen-
U.S. End Use Monitoring Agreement basically says that the
equipment can be used for a mutual threat or for ``internal
security, individual defense or civic action.'' I don't know if
I am alone in thinking this, but the language sounds somewhat
ambiguous, and I understand this is standard language for State
Department commitments like this.
There was a recent story in the New York Times that talked
about Yemeni extremist groups having no trouble in buying or
stealing equipment from Yemen's military, which has struggled
to maintain its morale, discipline, in a region torn by tribal
allegiances, and largely beyond control of its government.
Again, I want to be clear, this is the epicenter of what could
be a serious problem with al-Qaeda and others, so I am very
committed to the goals here, but we also know we have to be
very smart. We have had experiences in the past where we have
put military equipment and resources in a particular country
that isn't stable and that equipment gets into the hands of
people that are not only going after our men and women and
supplying terrorists. So the question is--tell me about this
end use monitoring agreement. How we are using it? Has it been
revised to reflect an increased commitment to Yemen, and
obviously a need for transparency? What oversight do we have in
making sure that these resources and equipment are going to be
used for the purposes intended?
Ambassador Godec. Congressman, we are obviously very
concerned about the possibility of the misuse of our
assistance, whether it be sort of broadly developmental
assistance or security assistance. We have a variety of
controls that are in place in both cases. Specifically with
respect to security equipment, we do have these end use
monitoring agreements. We have a Blue Lantern program in
effect. So we do have the opportunity to follow-up. So it is
not just a matter of give the equipment and then it is sort of
there and we don't ever get to see it again. We do have an
opportunity to check up on it and to ensure that it is being
properly used.
I can assure you that, you know, we are quite vigorous in
our efforts to help ensure that there is proper use of the
equipment that we are giving, the security equipment. We do not
want it misused, we do not want it transferred or given away or
for other things to happen which would be inappropriate. So it
is a serious concern on the part of the Embassy, it is a
serious concern, I know, on the part of the Department of
Defense and others, and we are aggressively working through the
various programs that we have got, Blue Lantern and others, to
follow-up.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Ambassador, are the challenges different in
Yemen in terms of this oversight? Obviously each country has
its different set of challenges, but knowing what we know about
Yemen and the level of involvement that the government has in
controlling, or the military or how the military is operating,
and the threats and the extremist groups there, are you
comfortable at this stage that we are doing everything we can?
Or not only just language in a commitment agreement, it is
actions, obviously, are the key here. Are you comfortable we
are doing every single thing we can, or is this an ongoing
process to evolve, making it as safe as possible?
Ambassador Godec. Well, clearly, Congressman, I think it is
an ongoing process. It is something we have to evaluate
constantly. We have to look at are we doing this as well as we
can? In my experience, there is almost always opportunity for
improvement in human life, so there may be some opportunities
for improvement. I am comfortable that we are aggressively
following-up on this, that we are focused on it and that there
is a genuine effort to ensure that this equipment is being put
to the purpose that we, you know, the administration, that the
Congress and that the American people want that equipment put
to, which is helping to enhance the security of Yemen, and
therefore, ultimately, the security of the United States.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Secretary, do you have any thoughts on this?
Ambassador Feltman. I concur with what Ambassador Godec
said. We are aware of a poor human rights record in Yemen, and
we are aware of the fact that the country is awash in a black
market on weapons. So, these factors very much play into how we
do the monitoring. Like Ambassador Godec, I am comfortable with
where we are, but this is something we need to watch all the
time.
Mr. Klein. I would ask, obviously this is a very important
issue and the worst thing we can have for our country, and our
troops and our interests over there, to find that U.S. weapons
are being used against us, so just be vigilant about it and we
will stay in touch. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired. The
last questioner for 2 minutes will be the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. Then we will bring on our next
panel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much to both of you for
your service. Let me commend President Obama for modifying our
Yemen policy by asking the National Security Council to
undertake a comprehensive review, quite contrary to our friends
who have indicated that has not been the case, and quite
contrary to the ignoring of Yemen for the last couple of years.
Putting that on the table, I believe this is serious. I think
it is at a crisis level. I would ask you to engage the Yemenis
to let them know that it is at a crisis level. Number one, who
are our allies to help us with the Yemen policy about the
crisis of al-Qaeda and terrorists in Yemen? Who are we working
with? Who are we pumping up? To whom are we saying this is in
your best interest as well? Finally, their actions have cost
lives. I am very unhappy about it. I don't think we should take
them lightly, and I would like to hear you tell me how we are
not taking them lightly. Thank you.
Ambassador Feltman. First, our partners in addressing al-
Qaeda are virtually everybody, all 20 countries and five
international organizations that were together in London last
week with Secretary Clinton. Everybody recognizes that this is
a threat to Yemen, it is a threat to the region, it is a global
threat. So we have partners across the globe vis-a-vis the al-
Qaeda threat and it is particularly important that, you know,
the Saudis and Yemen's immediate neighbors are very, very
strong partners on this, and they themselves have been victims
of the security threats emanating from Yemen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How are you highlighting the crisis? You
know, how are we ramping up? How are we pushing Saudi to do
more?
Ambassador Godec. I would just underscore we are in
constant contact with the Saudis. I think it is regularly
discussed with the Saudis, the issue of Yemen and how to
address it, but I think the Saudis themselves are very much
seized with this challenge.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentlelady has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. I thank both of you for being with us.
Very much appreciate your insights into the situation. I now
want to welcome our second panel. We very much appreciate your
patience, and your being here today and taking the time to both
prepare and share your insights with us. Dr. Christopher Boucek
is an associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program where his
research focuses on regional security challenges. Before
joining the Carnegie Endowment, he was a post-doctoral
researcher at Princeton University and a lecturer in politics
at the Woodrow Wilson School. Jonathan Schanzer is vice
president for research at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies. Until recently, Mr. Schanzer was deputy executive
director of the Jewish Policy Center and the editor of the
JPC's journal, inFOCUS Quarterly. From 2004 to 2007, Mr.
Schanzer served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S.
Department of Treasury.
Leslie Campbell is a senior associate & regional director
of the Middle East and North Africa at The National Democratic
Institute. Prior to assuming his current position in 1996, Mr.
Campbell served with the NDI in Russia, Croatia and Serbia. Mr.
Campbell just returned from a trip to Yemen where he has been
working on governance issues for over a decade. We look forward
to hearing about his experiences on the ground there today.
Finally, known, I think, to all of us is Bruce Riedel, a senior
fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The
Brookings Institution. In 2006, he retired from the Central
Intelligence Agency after 30 years of service.
Mr. Riedel served on the National Security Council staff as
a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East under the
last four Presidents. He was a negotiator at several Arab-
Israeli peace summits, including at Camp David and Wye River.
In January 2009, President Obama asked him to chair a review of
American policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, the results of
which the President announced in his speech on March 27, 2009.
Mr. Riedel has traveled extensively in Yemen and it is
interesting to note that his father served there with the
United Nations during the last days of the British Colony in
Aden. Thank you all for being here. Dr. Boucek, why don't you
start. Your entire statements will be made part of the record
and you could summarize.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BOUCEK, PH.D., ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Boucek. Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member,
distinguished members of the committee, I would like to thank
you for the opportunity to be here toady to discuss this very
critical issue about Yemen and American policy toward Yemen. I
think, broadly speaking, Yemen is facing three critical
challenges: Economic, human security and demographics, and hard
security and terrorism. What I would like to do very briefly is
speak about the first two, about the economy and human
security. I think one of the things that becomes very apparent
when you are looking at Yemen is every issue in the country is
connected to every other issue and they compound one another
and make one another worse.
On the economy, this is the single biggest challenge facing
the Yemeni Government. About 75 percent of the country's income
comes from the sale of oil. Right now the country's quickly
running out of oil has been noted in the previous panel.
Several years ago the country was producing about 450,000
barrels a day. Right now they produce about 180,000 barrels a
day, and that is quickly running out. Within 10 years, most
likely 5 years, the country will be out of oil, and there is no
planning for a post-oil economy. Right now there is discussion
about liquified natural gas possibly taking the place of oil
sales. However, it is unlikely that natural gas sales would
either meet the current volume of sales of oil or would come on
line in time that oil goes off line.
Furthermore, inflation is currently about 12 percent, and
that is down from 20 percent earlier last year. Unemployment is
officially at 35 percent, which is on par with the Great
Depression in this country. Unofficially, it is probably closer
to 50 percent. The economy suffers from a whole series of
subsidies which fuel the other problems going on in the
country. On human security, there are currently 23 million
Yemenis, in 20 years there will be 40 million, and in three
decades there will be 60 million. There is no way that the
Yemeni economy can absorb all of this labor domestically. Yemen
will have to become a net labor exporter.
Furthermore, education and healthcare is in a poor state.
The Yemeni Government is not able to provide social services
throughout much of the country. Corruption in governance, as
has been mentioned in the previous panel, is a major issue with
the way in which the Yemeni Government has historically
governed, has led to more and more problems in the long run.
The biggest probably concern in my estimation is water. The
country is quickly running out of water. Nineteen of twenty-one
aquifers are not being replenished, and it has been estimated
that 99 percent of water consumed in the country is extracted
illegally. Right now there is no system to govern the
extraction of underground water, and this is something that
needs to be focused on.
As the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, it is
very likely that Sanaa will become the first capital in modern
history to run out of water, and this is a catastrophic
problem. Where 20 million Yemenis or 40 million Yemenis will go
when they run out of water is a major concern. The last issue,
hard security, I believe others on the panel will speak about
in more depth. There is an ongoing civil war in Saada against
Shia Zaidi revivalists. There is a southern secessionist
movement and a resurgent al-Qaeda organization which has proved
over the last years to have the capacity to strike domestically
inside the country, regionally inside Saudi Arabia, and now
internationally.
I would just say one thing about the hard security issues,
and that is this civil war in Saada is rapidly accelerating the
economic collapse of Yemen. The country is spending money at an
alarming rate, money that they don't have to spend on water,
education, fighting al-Qaeda, anything else. By some
estimations, the country is spending over $200 million a month
of hard currency reserves, which would equate to about $1
billion over the course of the last round of fighting.
Moreover, the conflict has led to a huge budget deficit
forecast for this year, 23 percent by some estimations.
Over 80 percent of the Yemeni budget is things that you
can't cut, including salaries, pensions and subsidies. This war
needs to end not only for humanitarian reasons, but for the
immense damage it is doing to the Yemeni economy. I think I
would like to conclude by saying that when we are looking
forward and we are thinking about how to engage with Yemen and
how to deal with Yemen looking ahead, we need to make sure that
we focus on the systemic challenges to Yemeni security. By
that, I mean the economics, and the hard security and the human
security issues. We need to look at all of this in totality. It
will not be al-Qaeda that leads to the downfall of the Yemeni
Government, it will be these other issues.
Right now we have the opportunity to get on the right side
of this issue by focusing our attention on these long term
issues. Yemen has always been a weak state, but it has a strong
society. I think that is something that we need to keep in
mind. Furthermore, I would reiterate what was said in the
previous panel, that the American Government needs to keep the
pressure on the Yemenis to make the painful choices that it
needs to make on addressing issues like governance, on
corruption, on subsidies, and keeping its attention focused on
al-Qaeda. It will be only through the international community
keeping the attention on Yemen and leading this discussion that
the Yemeni Government will make this a priority. With that, I
would like to thank you again for the opportunity to be here,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucek
follows:]Christopher Boucek deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you. That is an optimistic note to
start off on. Jonathan Schanzer?
STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN SCHANZER, VICE PRESIDENT FOR
RESEARCH, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Schanzer. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen
and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank you for the
invitation to address you today.
I had the opportunity to visit Yemen in 2003 to conduct
research on al-Qaeda. During my visit, I met with high level
officials and journalists who made a convincing argument that
Yemen was working hard to defeat the terrorists in its midst.
Upon my return from Yemen, I even wrote several articles
praising Yemen's effort. However, those efforts soon flagged,
and today I believe that Yemen's counterterrorism program is
woefully insufficient.
Al-Qaeda has been active in Yemen since 1989. It attempted
its first known attack against U.S. soldiers in Yemen bound for
Somalia in 1992. In subsequent years, al-Qaeda used Yemen to
house its businesses and logistical hubs, and by the 1990s, al-
Qaeda's affiliates in Yemen carried out several small
operations before shifting their sites to high profile U.S.
targets, notably the USS Cole in 2000. More attacks followed.
In 2002, al-Qaeda elements attacked the French tanker, the
Limburg, and then nearly succeeded in shooting down a U.S. oil
company's helicopter with SAM missiles and automatic gunfire.
To be clear, the nature of the threat in Yemen is as
serious as any country in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda has long
viewed this country as critical for training, financing and
executing attacks.
Yemen's understanding of this, however, was initially slow
and begrudging. Only after the Limburg attack did the Yemenis
appear to understand the need to work more closely with us.
Thereafter, Yemen developed closer ties with U.S. Special
Forces, the CIA, and the FBI. It allowed us access to air space
and its waters. It even monitored mosques and launched a public
relations campaign whereby clerics convinced young radicals
that jihadism was anti-Islamic in nature. In short, Yemen
earned the millions of dollars that we provided them in
counterterrorism in the early part of this decade.
This effort yielded tremendous results. In November 2002,
based on Yemeni intelligence, the CIA launched a hellfire
missile on six high value al-Qaeda operatives from a predator
drone. Cooperation with Yemen also yielded many important
arrests. This unlikely success story was remarkable, but it did
not last long. In retrospect, this decline was not about a lack
of capabilities, it was about Yemen's unwillingness to continue
cooperating with the United States.
In April 2003, 10 USS Cole suspects somehow escaped from a
Yemeni jail. This was shocking. Jailbreaks almost never take
place in the Arab world. This raised the question of whether
Yemen had allowed the jailbreak to occur.
Later that year, President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced he
would release dozens of al-Qaeda fighters if they simply
pledged not to return to terrorism. What began as an influx of
Yemeni fighters to the Iraq insurgency led to an increase in
terrorist infrastructure. In 2006, another 20 jihadists broke
out of jail. One of them notably was Nasir al-Wahishi, an
associate of bin Laden who went on to lead al-Qaeda of the
Arabian Peninsula. In 2007, even as Yemen rounded up terror
suspects, it released other high value prisoners, including bin
Laden's former bodyguard and an organizer of the USS Cole
attack.
Meanwhile, Saleh has welcomed Hamas delegations on several
occasions. He confirmed in 2002 that his country had raised
$7.8 million for Hamas. Recently, a Yemeni news agency
announced that Yemen opened a paramilitary camp for foreign
fighters to train in Gaza as well. Yemen has refused to seize
the passports and assets of Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who we
heard about earlier, after his designation by the United
Nations as an al-Qaeda financier. In fact, Zindani travelled to
Saudi Arabia in December 2005 for a summit of the organization
of the Islamic conference as part of President Saleh's official
delegation.
The current thinking in Washington is that Yemen needs our
help. It undoubtedly does. However, upping our aid to Yemen
without strict preconditions is not the answer.
If Yemen continues to allow terrorists to roam free, the
problems in Yemen will continue to amount, and it is up to the
Yemenis to fix this. The government must prove it will put our
taxpayer funds to good use rather than squander them as it has
in recent years. The government must prove that it has a plan
before we commit our taxpayer money. Indeed, Yemen must
articulate how it will reverse the poor policy choices that
have brought us to this position today.
U.S. aid should never be guaranteed. U.S. allies must earn
it. In recent years, Yemen has failed to uphold its end of the
deal. It must now demonstrate that it is ready to get serious
about combating terrorism again. On behalf of the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, I thank you for inviting me to
testify here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer
follows:]Jonathan Schanzer deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you very much. Mr. Campbell?
STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE & REGIONAL
DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, THE NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. On behalf of The National Democratic Institute, or
NDI, I also thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
returned from Yemen late last week after talks with government
and opposition figures, and exiled leaders from the former
South Yemen. NDI has been active in the country for almost 20
years. My task last week was to seek dialogue and compromise
among political leaders as a way of addressing the political
concerns which are at the heart of the war in the north and the
unrest in the south. Unlike the failed states that Yemen is
often compared to, the country laid the groundwork for a long-
term solution to extremism years ago through democratic and
political reforms.
President Saleh's decision to establish basic democratic
structures arose from a pragmatic decision after the 1990
reunification of north and south that democracy, or at least
elements of democracy, were necessary to govern a quarrelsome,
stratified, armed and proudly independent population in a poor,
rugged and diverse country. The existence of strong leaders
from a variety of political groups and tribes, a history of
dialogue and consensus building, vibrant civil society and the
existence of nascent, democratic institutions all auger well
for a comprehensive solution to the country's current
instability. As was mentioned by a previous speaker, Yemen once
led the Arabian Peninsula in democratic reform.
Yemen has extended the voting franchise to women,
established an independent election commission, held regular,
mostly fair, elections, encouraged the formation of
nongovernmental organizations and has tolerated, even
encouraged, the development of opposition political parties,
and it has created elected local government councils. Yemen's
Parliament, while still developing, is an important forum for
seeking consensus on policies and it does exercise oversight
over Executive Branch decisions, although that oversight is
limited. In an initiative that has been noted as a potential
democratic development model for the Arab world, Yemen's main
opposition parties ejected extremists from the ranks and formed
the ``Joint Meeting Party'' coalition of moderate Islamists and
former South Yemen socialists in 2003.
Having said that, democratic institutions have atrophied
and the Yemen Government's increasing unilateralism is
exacerbating the country's challenges. While the democratic
institutions that have been built could be a part of a
genuinely stable government, the limited democratic reforms
have not weathered political crisis of the past several years
well. Political debate is becoming polarized, elected local
councils lack resources and training and they are hampered by
centrally appointed officials who still exercise control. There
is increasing suspicion that President Saleh is grooming his
son, Colonel Ahmed al-Saleh, who heads the Yemen Republican
Guard, to ascend to the presidency when his term expires.
Still, others believe that President Saleh may amend the
constitution to extend his term, which should end in 2013. The
current focus on security in Yemen allows the government to
skirt responsibility for its own domestic failures. Perversely,
some ruling party officials in Yemen seem to welcome the
country's infamy believing that development aid, controlled
mostly by the ruling party dominated government, and more
military assistance will bolster their credibility. The
ultimate antidote to Yemen's instability, though, in my
opinion, can be found in continuing the political reform
started almost 20 years ago. Inclusion and dialogue with the
Houthis in the north and the former southern Yemen leaders and
modern Islamists, combined with better governance, will largely
muzzle and constrain the extremists.
Last week I helped facilitate discussion between the ruling
GPC and the opposition coalition, suggesting a formula by which
the governing party and the opposition could form a joint
dialogue committee to plan an agenda for talks inclusive of all
Yemen political factions, including from the south and the
Houthi tribal areas. President Saleh agreed to participate in
such a dialogue, but full agreement on the process remains
illusive. At minimum, the Yemen Government should release
political prisoners in the south, estimated at 900 by Human
Rights Watch--mostly southerners who have been arrested for
planning demonstrations--as a sign of good faith. The
opposition coalition should agree to move forward with the
national dialogue if those prisoners are released.
The principal of dialogue is valid. There will be no
lasting antidote to Yemen's instability without inclusive
government and some form of power sharing. Here are some
recommendations: The ruling regime cannot solve the problems
unilaterally and must work through the existing institutions to
help facilitate dialogue; the Government of Yemen should enact
policies that devolve district and governorate level fiscal,
social and governing authority to local elected councils that
already exist to ensure that local development priorities are
reflected in national policy; addressing grand corruption must
happen and requires a serious commitment to investigate and
prosecute corrupt actors at the highest level of government; to
build confidence in outcomes from the political process, the
Government of Yemen should implement previously agreed upon
political and electoral reforms, including agreements with the
opposition that have been made previously; for the U.S.
Government, development assistance should include democratic
reform and governance; as a key pillar, aid packages should
include clearly defined, achievable benchmarks for democratic
reform against which continuation of aid would be evaluated;
and finally, security and stabilization strategies supported by
the U.S. Government and implemented by the Government of Yemen
should include stipulations to ensure that legitimate, peaceful
opposition movements operating within the political framework
are not defined as destabilizing political forces and not
repressed, as they are currently. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell
follows:]Leslie Campbell deg.
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Chairman Berman. Finally, Bruce Riedel.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE RIEDEL, SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Riedel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to the other
members of the committee. I thank you for taking my written
testimony into the record, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
shout out to my dad. He will deeply appreciate it. You already
heard how complex, difficult, and indeed, dire the situation is
in Yemen. Much of what I have been listening to in the last few
minutes I completely agree with. What I would like to do very
briefly is cover three points: Our enemy, our partner and our
allies. Osama bin Laden has had his eye on Yemen as a redoubt
for al-Qaeda since at least 1989. It is the historic home of
his family. He is very familiar with it. He knows the situation
there.
In the last several years he has made a concerted effort to
try to revive al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and he was
behind the decision to merge al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and al-
Qaeda in Yemen 1 year ago. It has turned out to be a force
multiplier for both. Al-Qaeda's goals in Yemen, I think, are
twofold at least. First, they seek Yemen to become a base to
threaten not just the Yemeni Government, but more importantly,
Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States, and now to strike
globally. It was no accident that the first attack by the new
al-Qaeda in the Arabia peninsula of significance was the attack
on Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. He had successfully led the
repression of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, and they sought to
eliminate him.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also operates within a
network of traditional jihadist and other extremist religious
elements. I wouldn't focus so much on the numbers. I think
those numbers don't really tell you very much. I would focus on
the jihadist networks, not all of which are violent, but many
of which are fellow travelers with al-Qaeda and its world view.
The most dangerous element today is of course the recruitment
of foreigners and Americans to operate against the United
States. Secondly, al-Qaeda wants to use Yemen to expand the
global battle space against America, that is, to stretch our
resources even further, if possible, to bog the United States
down in local conflicts in Yemen which can become quagmires,
and, through all of this, relieve some of the pressure that the
al-Qaeda core in Pakistan and Afghanistan is underway today.
The al-Qaeda core continues to regard Pakistan as its
number one priority, but there it is facing increasing pressure
from American efforts. The best case for al-Qaeda would be to
entice, to goad, to lure the United States into another
bleeding war in Yemen as part of its grand strategy to wear
down the United States through bleeding wars throughout the
region. Al-Qaeda's grand strategy is, in short, to do to the
United States in the 21st Century what they believe the
Mujahedin did to the Soviet Union in the 20th Century. They
would welcome large American deployments of combat troops on
the ground. The United States clearly needs to be aware of this
trap. I think so far the Obama administration, and the American
military and CENTCOM has been well aware that there is no made
in the USA solution to this problem, and that as difficult and
complex as our partner is, Yemenis have to in the end be the
ones who provide law, governance and order in their own
country.
Consequently, we need to work with the Yemeni Government.
You have heard already how flawed it is. Successive American
administrations have found dealing with Ali Abdullah Saleh
very, very difficult to do. He has his own agenda, he has a
record of inconsistency. His sympathy for America is limited,
to put it mildly, but he is the leader who is there. I am glad
to hear that he seems to be more focused on al-Qaeda from the
administration. That is a step in the right direction. But he
continues to be much more concerned about two of his more local
problems, the Houthi Zaidi rebellion in the north, which has
been an on and off problem for most of the last decade which
has now dragged the Saudis into the war as well, and
secessionism in the south.
Let me say one word about the problem in the north. That
deals with the question that you raised of Iranian involvement.
Iranian involvement in this conflict is certainly a plausible
scenario, but so far, the evidence of Iranian involvement is
simply not there. We at the Saban center have looked very hard
at the evidence that we can find, and so far, it doesn't add up
to anything significant. That doesn't mean there isn't
something there we don't know about, but we can't find it, and
we would welcome more information from the Yemenis and the
Saudis on it. More importantly, though, seeing the Houthi
rebellion as an Iranian machination is also a trap, a trap to
draw us into a local conflict which is not relevant to
America's national security interests.
We need to be careful not to be drawn into these local
conflicts, and here, the administration's efforts to encourage
dialogue, to encourage a return to ceasefires, are steps in the
right direction. Second, of course Saleh is even more worried
about southern secessionism. Yemen today is really a country
created by a shotgun marriage in 1990, reinforced by a civil
war in 1994. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula seeks to appeal
to southern secessionism, seeks to use that as a way to
increase its strength and its importance. Here again, we need
to be careful not to be drawn into these local conflicts. A
word about our allies. This is very much not just an American
problem.
Yemen sits athwart one of the most important strategic
choke points of the global economy, the Bab al-Mandeb. I had
the opportunity just 2 months ago to sail through there. There
is a very impressive international effort to prevent piracy in
those waters today, but it is entirely defensive. We have no
offensive effort to stabilize the northern and southern shores.
Many, many countries around the world have an interest in
stabilizing this: China, India, the United States, Europe and
others. Our challenge has to be to motivate all of them to work
together on this. In particular, the Saudis, the UAE, Qatar and
Oman have to be motivated and pushed to take real steps, not
just pledges of support, but real steps to help stabilize
Yemen.
They need to open up their job markets to Yemenis. There
will never be enough jobs for Yemenis in Yemen, but there are
jobs in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. They need to deliver
on their aid promises, they need to deliver on their promises
to rebuild the Port of Aden in order to make it a thriving
capital once again on the Indian Ocean. The administration has
made a strong start in London in this direction, but one thing
we have learned over the last 30 years of United States/Yemeni
relations is we have got to have constancy and consistency in
our policy, and we have got to keep our eye on the ball. It is
too easy to lose interest in Yemen because, after all, it is a
remote place on the far side of the world, but as events of the
last few months have demonstrated, this is an important country
to American national interests. Thank you very much, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Riedel
follows:]Bruce Riedel deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank all of you. I am going to recognize
on the majority side, Mr. Costa first, and then Ms. Woolsey,
and then on the minority side go in seniority order, so I now
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this
important hearing today. Before I get to my questions to the
witnesses let me, as it was discussed in the previous panel for
the record and I would like to submit it, indicate that
notwithstanding the fact that Guantanamo is an emotional issue
and has been, both during this administration and the previous
administration, there is bipartisan support for closing it.
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense in both administrations,
said that Guantanamo itself is a condemnation and it will be an
advertisement for al-Qaeda as long as it is open; Admiral
Mullen has said Guantanamo has been a recruiting symbol for
extremists and jihadists who would fight us; General David
Petraeus, serving in both administrations, again, I oversee a
region in which the existence of GITMO has indeed been used by
the enemy against us; Admiral Dennis Blair, Guantanamo is a
rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and harmful to our
national security; and finally, General Colin Powell, who
clearly served in the previous administration, said Guantanamo
has become a major, major problem for America's perception as
it is seen and the way the world perceives America, if it was
up to me, I would close Guantanamo not tomorrow, but this
afternoon.
Clearly, this is an issue that, notwithstanding its passion
and emotion, there is overwhelming bipartisan support for
closing that facility. To Yemen. Your recurring themes as it
relates to the challenges with governance, the problems with
the economy and our partners as we try to get it right or
recalibrate a prescription to get this current governance, the
President, on the right track is troubling for me. You said, I
guess I understood in all the witnesses who testified just now,
that there was a good start, I guess, in London last week. Is
that correct? Am I getting a head nodding there? Maybe? Maybe
not? How do we keep the commitment, Mr. Riedel, with your long
history on the point that you closed on with Saudi Arabia, with
the other Gulf States, to actually make good on their
commitments and to ensure that we, as a partner, and the
Europeans are serious about follow through?
Mr. Riedel. It is deeply ironic for the Saudis now to be
supporting the Saleh government since they spent much of a
decade trying to overthrow it, but they seem to have finally
come around to the notion that he is the only game in town and
that he is better than the alternatives. Whether they are
willing to put money behind that, open up job opportunities, as
I said, is the question that remains in front of us. I think
the administration has to appeal to the king at the highest
level, President Obama to King Abdullah, to recognize this is
now a very serious threat, not just to us, but to Saudi Arabia.
After all, it was Prince Mohammed bin Nayef who was almost
killed by this group. I think the Saudis can be brought around.
I think they recognize. I think that attack last August was a
wake up call for them as well.
Mr. Costa. You think their active participation in effect
will bring the other Gulf States in a serious effort to provide
financial support and resources?
Mr. Riedel. It is tricky because there is a lot of rivalry
between the Gulf States there.
Mr. Costa. I understand.
Mr. Riedel. The Qataris like to promote reconciliation
between the government and local rebels. The Saudis prefer to
go after the local rebels. I think we have to provide the
leadership, frankly. I think we are going to have to be the
ones to corral them.
Mr. Costa. We are going to have to provide the glue that
keeps this thing stuck together and stay with it. Mr. Campbell,
you talked about your efforts last week or in 2 weeks with the
various party factions within Yemen. Is there really a desire
to make these weak institutions work?
Mr. Campbell. I think there is desire. As I have mentioned
also, the institution----
Mr. Costa. Or is it just a competition for power and who
runs the country?
Mr. Campbell. There is some competition. The paramount
tribal leader in Yemen, Sheik Abdullah al-Akmar, died last year
and his sons are attempting to move up the chain. They are
attempting to challenge President Saleh's son. So some of this
is local politics and jockeying among people seeking power, but
some, I think, is genuine.
Mr. Costa. My time is almost up. To the other two, and I
don't know if you care to comment on it, but the water issue I
will get to. That is an issue that I am heavily involved in in
California. With the issue of the drug problem, the qat, how
significant is that a scourge within the population?
Chairman Berman. Unfortunately, the gentleman's time has
expired, but perhaps we can get back to that. I recognize the
ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I do have some
questions but knowing that we may be called to a vote at any
moment, well, I am alone so I will ask it, Mr. Schanzer, can
you expand on your testimony regarding Yemen's ties to Hamas?
What changes should we require from Yemen regarding its ties to
this extremist group and other violent extremist groups, as
well as their state sponsors? Also, in your testimony you state
that of the 74 Guantanamo Bay prisoners who returned to
jihadism, at least a dozen have rejoined al-Qaeda to fight in
Yemen. An alarming statistic. When you say as long as Yemen
fails to take counterterrorism seriously, the transfer of
Guantanamo prisoners is ill-advised, do you recommend no
transfers to Yemen or to anywhere? Thank you, sir.
Mr. Schanzer. Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, I thank you very
much for the question. With regard to Hamas, I would posit that
the Yemeni Government does not view Hamas as a terrorist
organization, but rather views it as a resistance organization.
It has really been supporting Hamas, whether through training,
through weapons, through financing from almost its inception
from the late 1980s. That aid has been stepped up since the
year 2000, since the intifada broke out in 2000, where there
have been several high level delegations from Hamas that have
come to Yemen. The President himself has welcomed them and has
rolled out the red carpet for them. They have gone around and
met with various political officials within Yemen.
So there is a lot of concern there, and it really
underscores the question as to whether we can rely on Yemen to
fight some terrorist elements and then ignore others. I think
we need to be asking for consistency as we move forward.
As for Guantanamo Bay, I would say that the figures that
you cite from my testimony are, in fact, very alarming. That it
is a very high percentage of recidivism. It is my
recommendation right now that no prisoner be allowed to return
to Yemen at this point until they are able to first get a
handle on their prison break situation, and also perhaps
articulate their policy of who gets let out of jail and why.
And then, more broadly, just why is it that such a high
percentage of these fighters are returning back to the field?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Just one note. A
member had brought out the bipartisan support for the GITMO
closure. I wanted to point out that the House passed the Lewis
of California amendment that said no funds should be used to
bring Guantanamo detainees to the United States without a
Presidential certification. That passed June 2009. It was a
motion to recommit that was on the floor preventing an
Executive Order from taking effect, and it failed by only one
vote. So I think there is a different interpretation of
bipartisan support. I will yield back the balance of my time,
Mr. Chairman, so some members can ask. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. I thank the ranking member. We have been
called for votes so we have about 8, 10 minutes here, and then
I think we are going to have to end this. The gentlelady from
California, Ms. Woolsey.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Here is a general
question to any of you that would like to take a stab at it.
What have we, or have we, learned lessons from our involvement
in Iraq and Afghanistan, lessons that can be used regarding
Yemen before we find ourselves sending troops and taking a
position that may not fit with the rest of the world? Can we do
something besides military involvement in Yemen early on by
adopting a smarter security platform, like increasing
development aid, debt relief? Do we have enough smart ways to
try to offset what could happen? Because this is the world's,
well, isn't it one of the world's poorest countries, if not,
the? Can we support civil society programs, support women? How
are women treated in Yemen? Don't start with that, start with
my original earlier question. We will talk about women if we
have time.
Mr. Schanzer. I am happy to just address one or two points
on that. In terms of what we have learned from Iraq, I think
that the recent success, or relative success let us say, of the
surge underscores the point that we really do need cooperation
on the ground from various tribes and political leaders. I
believe that it is something that we don't have at this point
from Yemen. There needs to be a coalition of tribal leaders and
elders who are willing to work with the United States, and
Yemeni forces for that matter, to truly get to the heart of
this terrorist problem.
As for the nonmilitary solutions, we haven't heard much
about this, but the Yemeni regime is an authoritarian one, and
there is a lot of discomfort with that on the ground in Yemen.
The fact that you have a President who has been in power since
1978 and is now grooming his son to succeed him should not be
lost in this committee. We need to start to see democratization
take place in Yemen, and I think as that starts to happen,
hopefully we will see a drop in militancy as well.
Mr. Riedel. If I can address your question as well, I think
there are actually many good news stories in Yemen. One of them
is that, as Assistant Secretary Feltman said, there are 7,000
civil society organizations in the country, many of them very,
very active, very able to do the work. They are service
delivery organizations, women's organizations, handicapped
organizations, advocacy organizations. There are elected local
councils, and I think with devolution of power, with
decentralization, they can better address local concerns. I
should also mention that tribal leaders in Yemen already have
reached out to U.S. nongovernment organizations, like NDI, but
also to the U.S. Government asking for help in terms of
conciliation, getting service to their areas.
They are not hostile in most cases, actually, to the U.S.,
and so you have an infrastructure to build dialogue with the
tribes that does not require military assistance. On the
question of women, Yemen is a very conservative country, it
resembles the Gulf countries that way, but women vote. They
have been elected both to local councils, hundreds and hundreds
of them to the national Parliament. They are registered to vote
in large numbers and quite assertive. A number of women have
been cabinet ministers, ambassadors and so on. I don't want to
gloss it over too much because there are many challenges, but
Yemen has an underlying basis that makes it much more than just
a poor, conservative country. It has much more potential.
Mr. Riedel. If I could add a point. I think a lesson we
have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is our al-Qaeda enemy is
very agile, very adaptive, they have a very strong learning
curve, and we have to be just as agile and adaptive. We need to
not be dragged into local conflicts which we become bogged down
in, which become very, very costly for us. That means that the
counterterrorism only or the military only approach is not the
approach that is going to work. The kind of approach that you
suggested of trying to build governance, reaching out, bringing
in allies, getting others to be part of this is absolutely
crucial. Going it alone, relying purely on troops on the ground
is a strategy that doesn't work.
Mr. Boucek. I would just add briefly that looking at
nonmilitary solutions, there are things that we can do.
Something that would be very helpful would be to help Yemen
draft and implement effective counterterrorism legislation so
that they could charge the people we would like charged, help
train judges and lawyers to convict the people we would like to
see convicted, help professionalize the police service so this
cuts down on abuse, professionalize the prison service, so they
stay in prison once they are incarcerated. I think there are
things that we can do that are low cost and high impact in that
way.
Ms. Woolsey. I have 1 second so this is just a general
question. Is it possible if the government is a dictatorship
and doesn't want to help us?
Chairman Berman. I think we will leave that question in the
either. Gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized.
Mr. Burton. I will be quick because I know we have votes
on. Let me just ask this question. First of all, I want to make
a statement, and that is there is an organization called SERE,
the Survival, Evasion, Rescue and Escape Training Program, and
it has been used by all pilot Special Forces for generations,
including the Navy SEALs. In that training program they use
waterboarding. These are our troops that they train and they
have been doing it for 30 years. So when they talk about
waterboarding being torture, I think for the edification of my
colleagues, they ought to take a good look at the training that
our troops are going through, or have been going through, for
at least 30 years. Now let me just ask this question. Yemen,
Mr.--how do I pronounce your name?
Mr. Schanzer. Schanzer.
Mr. Burton. Schanzer. There have been two escapes from the
prisons that you were talking about a while ago, and you also
said that it is very rare that this takes place. Is the
administration there in Yemen, in your opinion, complicit with
somebody, maybe an al-Qaeda or other organizations, in allowing
these people to escape? Would it be because of sympathetic
views or because of financial reasons, if they are complicit?
Mr. Schanzer. Well, if you are asking, sir, if at the
highest levels of government, if they are cooperating with al-
Qaeda, I would say that the answer is no. I believe there have
been more than two prison breaks. These are the two major ones,
but there have been others as well. And these seem to
underscore that the security apparatus has been infiltrated by
jihadists, by al-Qaeda. So at the mid-level we are seeing some
of that infiltration and cooperation and that largely stems, at
least as I understand it, from tribal affiliations, and perhaps
financial considerations as well.
Mr. Burton. Well, how can the legal apparatus function
there if you have got people who are in opposition to the
positions the government is taking in incarcerating these
people, how can that system even work? I mean, it seems to me
that it is just wide open, and how can the United States work
with a government like that that can't control the prison?
Mr. Schanzer. Well, Representative Burton, this is exactly
the point of my testimony. It is my assertion that Yemen has
really failed to demonstrate how it is willing to accept the
training and aid that we plan to give it in order to step up
its counterterrorism efforts. We need to see, I think, very
distinct milestones set by the Yemeni Government and an
understanding of where they have been lacking to date, and how
they plan to really take things in a new direction. In my
estimation, they have really failed over the last decade.
Since the USS Cole bombing they have learned very little.
In fact, I would say they have actually gone backwards. So the
question is, as we begin to engage with Yemen, I know we have
been hearing lots of warm and wonderful things from the
administration, but I would say that even if they have
articulated a renewed interest, what we have seen is a record
over the last 10 years of going backwards. This is of great
concern to me and to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Mr. Burton. Well, the only other thing I was going to ask
is you have made some comments about the Yemeni Government and
how we should deal with them. It escapes me how we can work
with them and give them all the money, the financial assistance
we are giving them, and you say that they are going to have to
solve the problems themselves because we can't start a third
front in the world war against terrorism. If all these things
are going on, how are we going to do that?
Mr. Riedel. Consistency and constancy in our engagement,
and having our eyes wide open about our partner. We have no
delusions about Ali Abdullah Saleh and the people around him,
but taking this problem over as an American problem is not the
solution either. We don't have the resources to take it over as
an American----
Mr. Burton. Well, the only thing I will say, and I will end
with this, it seems to me that if they are going to Yemen away
from Pakistan and Afghanistan because of the heat that has been
put on them there and we can't really do whatever is necessary
to defeat them, we are going to give them sanctuary in a place
and it is going to cause us more problems down the road. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Riedel. I think, Mr. Congressman, we are putting heat
on them now, and there are real results from some of these
military actions by the Yemenis assisted by the United States.
My suggestion is let us not take our eye off the ball 6 months
from now when we think we have got the problem in a redactive
mode. We have got to stay at this for a long time to come.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. I am going to yield myself to ask a couple
of questions and hopefully then get Mr. Scott into this.
Schanzer says strict conditionality on our aid, Riedel says no
boots on the ground. Riedel, what do you think of Schanzer's
position on aid? Schanzer, what do you think of Riedel's
position on boots on the ground?
Mr. Riedel. If I could, Mr. Chairman, let me be clear.
There may be places for Special Forces, there may be places for
particular kinetic action. I am not ruling out any kind of
military role, but not a large-scale Iraq or Afghanistan kind
of operation.
Chairman Berman. I understood that you were focused on
that.
Mr. Riedel. Okay. Conditionality is always a good idea. It
is always very difficult when you are trying to entice the
partner to work with you and how you go about that
conditionality. Our experience with Yemen over 30 years,
though, argues for a fair amount of conditionality.
Mr. Schanzer. Mr. Chairman, I would actually say that I
agree very much with what Mr. Riedel says. I think the idea of
putting troops on the ground in significant numbers is ill-
advised. The idea of Special Forces working with the Yemenis is
acceptable. I like the idea of continued predator drone
attacks, hellfire missiles. Why that has stopped in recent
years, I do not know. As I understand it, the Yemenis are
uncomfortable projecting the fact that they are working with
the United States. This is something that they don't want their
population to be aware of. I would love to see that cooperation
continue, and continued, you know, joint cooperation on other
CT efforts as well.
Chairman Berman. And then my final question. Your comment
about Yemen and Hamas, you talk about a conservative regime. Is
it conservative in the sense of Islamic fundamentalists, in the
sense of Muslim brotherhood? Is that the appeal or is it more
of a tactical kind of decision about who to ally with?
Mr. Schanzer. Mr. Chairman, Yemen is a very complicated
country, to be sure. The government has to appeal to various
tribal elements, various political factions. The Islah Party,
which is the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, is a popular one in
Yemen. I think that it was a tactical decision on the part of
the President to figure out a way to support one jihadist
movement. You have to remember, of course, that the Arab-
Israeli conflict, or let us say resistance against Israel, as
they call it, is really the lowest common denominator in the
Arab world. This does not excuse, in my opinion, what the
President has done. But he has decided that this is the one
thing that he can squarely get behind, and I think that this
really demonstrates a great deal of inconsistency on the part
of the Yemeni Government.
Chairman Berman. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Consistent with us making our vote.
Mr. Scott. Absolutely. Do want to make this point, though,
as I mentioned before, having just come from over there. Two
points. One is there is a great sense of urgency that I think
we may have even a greater sense of urgency. We have an
immediate problem. Yemen is ground zero for the national
security of our nation on the war on terror. It is not coming
from Pakistan, I think, because we have the troop manifestation
up there, but if you look at the past, the USS Cole, if you
look at Fort Hood situation, if you look at the assassination
situation, the Christmas Day underwear bomber, all come out of
a situation in Yemen. There is a reason for that. Now, what I
think is we have to have a dual track. We are sort of in a, not
only in a box, but we are sort of in a straight jacket of a box
we have got to get out of. I think, after going there and
talking with our special operations people and our Navy SEALs,
I think that needs to be the approach. We have got to find a
way to cripple the operation of al-Qaeda in Yemen immediately
to give the people in the United States some breathing room and
to give us some help on our war on terror here. That is where
the attacks are coming from, that is where it is. The other
thing I wanted to say is that I think that there needs to be
more emphasis on Yemen from the East Africa standpoint, from
the Horn of Africa standpoint. From my visit there, Yemen has
far more connectivity to East Africa, particularly the
relationship between Somalia and Yemen. They feed one another.
You have got the training camps for al-Qaeda in Yemen, but you
have also got the training camps for al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab
connected in Somalia. So those are the points I wanted to try
to get out. I think it is very important for us to emphasize we
have got to kill al-Qaeda in Yemen.
Chairman Berman. As much as I would like to get your
reaction to that, I think if we are going to make the vote, we
better adjourn the hearing. Thank you all very much. Appreciate
your being with us today.
[Whereupon, at 2:36 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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