[Senate Hearing 111-479]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-479
AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE ROAD AHEAD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 3, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-845 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the
GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 60
Barbara Boxer............................................ 69
Robert P. Casey, Jr...................................... 71
Bob Corker............................................... 73
Gates, Hon. Robert, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
Richard G. Lugar......................................... 65
Barbara Boxer............................................ 69
Robert P. Casey, Jr...................................... 72
Bob Corker............................................... 74
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Mullen, ADM Michael, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington,
DC............................................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators:
Barbara Boxer............................................ 70
Bob Corker............................................... 74
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Dodd, Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared
statement...................................................... 59
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE ROAD AHEAD
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez,
Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar,
Corker, Isakson, Risch, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen, we
welcome you here today. Thank you very much for joining us. And
we appreciate your coming to share more details about the
President's plan, and for consulting and partnering with
Congress on the decision, obviously, of enormous consequences
for our soldiers, our security, and our country.
This is a decision that the President of the United States
has made, but ultimately all of us share responsibility for its
consequences. Given the complexities of our challenge and the
seriousness of the sacrifices ahead and the absence of strategy
over much of the last 8 years, I believe the President
exercised important leadership by taking the time he needed to
make the right decision, even as political pressure mounted in
different directions. His words and your testimony show that
the administration has confronted tough realities, carefully
weighed all of the options, and arrived at a comprehensive,
considered path forward.
I believe that the President appropriately narrowed the
mission in Afghanistan. What he presented to the American
people is not an open-ended, nation-building exercise or a
nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, and nor should it be.
The President was right to frame our commitment to Afghanistan
in the context of all of our national priorities, from the
drawdown in Iraq to our urgent challenges at home. And he was
correct to consider our mission there, in terms of our enduring
interests in Pakistan.
Over the last days, I've heard a number of people saying
that we are in Afghanistan today because that is the place from
which we were attacked. Frankly, 8 years later, that's simply
not good enough. We have largely expelled al-Qaeda from
Afghanistan. Today, it is the presence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan,
it's direct ties to, and support from, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and the perils of an unstable nuclear-armed
Pakistan that drive our mission.
What happens in Pakistan, particularly near the Afghan
border, will, in my judgment, do more to determine the outcome
in Afghanistan than any increase in troops or shift in
strategy. Congress has provided 7.5 billion in nonmilitary aid
over the next 5 years to help address the crucial Pakistani
dimension of the President's plan. That is a beginning. But, I
believe, and I think other members of the committee share the
belief, that there is more that we can and must do with the
Pakistanis, all of which can alleviate the pressure in
Afghanistan; indeed, even determine the outcome in Afghanistan.
And I believe it is important for the Pakistanis to
understand that our commitment to them and to the region is
long term even as troops are reduced in Afghanistan. In fact,
the conditions that permit a reduction in American troops in
Afghanistan are a benefit to Pakistan.
The President was correct to define success in terms of our
ability to empower and transfer responsibility to Afghans as
rapidly as possible while simultaneously achieving a sufficient
level of stability to ensure that we leave behind an
Afghanistan that is not controlled by al-Qaeda or the Taliban.
As I've said before to each extra family that is asked to
send a husband, wife, son, or daughter into harm's way, the
deployment of a single additional soldier makes all the
difference, but a public debate that reduces a difficult
mission in a complex region to a simple headline-ready number
of troops does us all a disservice. What will matter most on
the ground in Afghanistan is not the number of troops, but what
they will do and how they are integrated into a broader
civilian and military strategy.
I returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan in October with
serious concerns that even if additional troops are able to
clear the enemy and hold an area, even in the limited areas
where we will operate, unless we are able to build and transfer
leadership to local Afghans, unless the governance and
development pieces are in place, we risk squandering the gains,
time and time again. And right now, our military will tell us
that, in many places, that tripartite capacity is not there.
There are three principal conditions that I still believe
must guide the tasking of additional troops.
First, are there enough reliable Afghan National Army and
Police forces to partner with American troops and eventually
take over responsibility for security? The President has
recognized the critical importance of speeding up training and
mentoring. And to date, we've struggled to do so on the scale
required, and I look forward to hearing your plans today to
increase that training capacity and to quickly move Afghan
security forces into the center of the fight.
Second, are there local Afghan leaders with whom we can
partner? We have to be able to identify and cooperate with
tribal, district, and provincial leaders who command the
authority to help deliver services and restore Afghans' faith
in their own government.
Third, is the civilian side ready to follow swiftly with
development aid that brings tangible benefits to the local
population? The President has outlined a surge in civilian
personnel which will be crucial to locking in any of our
military gains and bringing stability to Afghanistan. And I
know, Secretary Clinton, that you've been working on that task,
and we look forward to exploring it with you today.
I would hope that, just as the exit strategy is based on
the conditions on the ground, so too should our strategy for
any escalation be based on conditions on the ground. I continue
to believe that, absent an urgent security need, we should not
send American troops in to clear places unless we are confident
that we have the Afghan partners and resources in place to
build on those victories and transfer both security and
government function to legitimate Afghan leaders.
I still remain concerned that additional troops will tempt
us beyond a narrow and focused mission. And with 30,000 troops
rushing into Afghanistan, I believe we'll be challenged to have
the civilian and governance capacity in place quickly enough to
translate their sacrifice into lasting gains.
Through conversations with the President and Vice President
in recent days, and the President's speech, I've been assured
that the administration recognizes the need to meet these
conditions. How we answer these challenges will go a long way
toward determining our overall prospects for success, and we're
all eager to hear in detail how we better--how we can do better
than we've done on each of these components.
Everyone understands that President Karzai's efforts and
followthrough will be critical to the outcome, and we all
understand that our ultimate goal, the cornerstone of our
strategy, is to empower and transfer responsibility to the
Afghans.
Some are trying to make much of the President's target
deadline. I think we learned in Iraq that, when our policy is
to be in another country, with troops, for ``as long as it
takes,'' our hosts are very good at taking as long as they
want. The President is correct to set a target. It will help
create a sense of urgency and for the Afghans who chafe at
foreign boots on their soil, it sends a message that, while
America will remain committed to the Afghan people, we aren't
interested in a permanent occupation.
We can all agree that the next 18 months are crucial to
reversing the momentum and laying the groundwork for a stable
Afghanistan, one where the police and army can play a greater
role in serving their citizens, and whose government focuses
squarely on reclaiming legitimacy with the Afghan people, and
where we have intelligence in place to engage in the
counterterrorism missions that, for years ahead, we will need
to be able to engage in.
We should all recognize that Americans, all of us,
fundamentally share this challenge. The Senate voted
unanimously to go to war in Afghanistan. It should humble all
of us that today there are simply no easy options. We have no
choice but to grapple with the complexities, reach the
conclusion that best serves the American people, and work in
partnership with other branches of government. And that is how
a democracy fights a war.
The President's speech offered a vision of the path
forward, but a great many questions remain, including how,
simply, beyond adding more resources, the United States and
Afghan civilian strategy will improve, what balance we will
strike between securing population centers and venturing into
the Afghan countryside, how we intend to finance this increased
commitment, and, crucially, how we intend to improve our
partnership with Pakistan.
We look forward to the conversation this morning.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen.
We appreciate very much that you have come to the Foreign
Relations Committee today. The presence of all three of you
underscores that success in Afghanistan depends on both
military and civilian programs. We must sustain this civil-
military approach, given the interlocking elements of the newly
announced strategy.
As we consider our course in Afghanistan, we should
evaluate options according to how well they contribute to
United States national security. The ultimate purpose of
committing tens of thousands of new troops and tens of billions
of additional dollars to the war effort in Afghanistan must be
to enhance United States security and our vital national
interests in the region.
This may seem to be an obvious point. But during long wars,
specific tactical objectives can become ends, in themselves,
disconnected from the broader strategic context or an
accounting of finite resources. Pursuing al-Qaeda or the
Taliban and improving governance and economic opportunity in
Afghanistan are important. But when our country commits the
level of forces contemplated by the President to a sustained
war, the objective must be absolutely fundamental to United
States security.
This is especially true at a time when our Armed Forces
have been strained by many years of high deployment rates, our
capacity for new government debt is limited, and our Nation has
not fully emerged from a severe recession.
The President made the case on Tuesday that what happens in
Afghanistan can directly impact the safety of Americans. I
believe that most Americans accept this point based on the
reality that the 9/11 attacks were conceived in Afghanistan and
that the Taliban forces who protected al-Qaeda are likely to
become more resurgent if we leave.
But much more discussion is warranted on whether the
Afghanistan mission is so central to our core national security
that it necessitates huge spending increases and the deployment
of a large portion of our finite combat capability.
In essence, we have to ask whether the costs of this
deployment are justified in our overall national security
context and whether we are mistakenly concentrating our forces
to fight a terrorist enemy in a specific location, even as the
global terrorist threat is becoming increasingly diffuse.
Terrorist cells that are associated with or sympathetic to
al-Qaeda exist in numerous countries in Africa and the Middle
East. Terrorist attacks were perpetrated in Europe by homegrown
cells. Killing Taliban fighters and training Afghan soldiers
and policemen are unlikely to substantially diminish these
broader terrorist threats.
Moreover, the results of even the most skillful civil-
military campaign in Afghanistan are likely to be imperfect in
the long run. I do not doubt that the application of additional
United States and allied forces will result in a military
setback for the Taliban. During this time, it is hoped that
progress can be made in building Afghan security forces. But
over the long run, we should recognize that problems stemming
from tribalism, corrupt governance, and lack of economic
opportunity in the country are almost certain to persist,
complicating efforts to ensure that the central government can
effectively govern the country and resist the Taliban when
allied troops are withdrawn.
Even if the President's plan achieves the very best
stabilization scenario, allowing for United States withdrawals
on the schedule he contemplates, we may be responsible for most
of the Afghanistan defense and police budgets indefinitely.
Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear how an expanded
military effort in Afghanistan addresses the problem of Taliban
and
al-Qaeda safe havens across the border in Pakistan. If these
safe havens persist, any strategy in Afghanistan will be
substantially incomplete.
Specifically, will Pakistan work with us to eliminate the
leadership of Osama bin Laden and other major al-Qaeda
officials?
As hearings in our committee have underscored, the
potential global impact of instability in a nuclear-armed
Pakistan dwarfs anything that is likely to happen in
Afghanistan.
The future direction of governance in Pakistan will have
consequences for nonproliferation efforts, global economic
stability, our relationships with India and China, and security
in both the Middle East and South Asia regions, among other
major issues.
The President did not dwell on Pakistan in his speech on
Tuesday evening, perhaps because sensitivities in that country
to American influences and intentions are extremely delicate.
But, the President and his team must justify their plan not
only on the basis of how it will affect Afghanistan, but also
on how it will impact our efforts to promote a much stronger
alliance with Pakistan that embraces vital common objectives.
Having made these observations, I want to recognize that
the President has been confronted with extremely difficult
choices in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He and his team have
worked through the problem carefully and deliberately to reach
their conclusions. There are no options available that are
guaranteed to succeed. Every conceivable course from complete
withdrawal, to maintaining the status quo, to the plan outlined
by the President, to an unrestrained and unlimited
counterinsurgency campaign, has its own set of risks and costs
for the United States. The President deserves credit for
accepting ownership of this difficult problem as we go forward
and for his clear advocacy expressed in the speech on Tuesday
night.
Congress and the American people now must evaluate whether
this course has a reasonable chance to succeed, if ``success''
can be defined, and whether the objectives outlined are worth
the expenditure of American and Afghan lives and treasure.
In this situation, the advocacy of the President and his
national security team must be as broadminded and thorough as
his policy review appeared to be. Within months, the President
is likely to ask Congress for additional funds related to
Afghanistan. In the meantime, the administration must be
prepared to answer many difficult questions about its strategy
as the American people study the potential consequences of the
President's decision.
I thank our distinguished witnesses for their very
substantial leadership. I look forward to hearing their
testimony today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Let me just say that Senator Dodd may have to leave at some
point during your testimony, because he has to chair the
Bernanke hearings--confirmation hearing today, so we respect
the fact that that will be the reason he might have to go.
Senator Dodd. I could have brought him here, Mr. Chairman,
and have a joint hearing between the Federal Reserve Chairman
and the----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And maybe he could have told us how we pay
for this. [Laughter.]
Madam Secretary, thank you for being here. Mr. Secretary,
if you would follow the Secretary of State, and then Admiral
Mullen, we look forward to your testimonies. If you want to
summarize, we can put your full testimonies in the record.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry and
Ranking Member Lugar, and to all the members of this committee.
It is an honor for me to be here to testify before you, and
also to continue the dialogue. Both the chairman and the
ranking member's statements, as would be expected, were
extraordinarily thoughtful, raised a lot of the hard questions
that we're grappling with, and posed the challenges that we
have to meet, both the administration and the Congress
together. And I want to thank the committee for the
constructive role that it has played in helping us to address
the difficult issues raised in the region of the world that we
are focused on today.
When President Obama addressed the cadets at West Point, he
set forth both the rationale and the difficult choices that his
policy represents. At the end of a very long and thoughtful
process that consisted of 10 meetings with the President and
his national security team, and probably three times that many
among the rest of us, without the President, the President
concluded that, among a range of very difficult decisions, this
is the best way to protect our Nation now and in the future.
Extremists who have taken root in the border area of
Pakistan and Afghanistan have attacked us before. They've
attacked our allies. They are now attempting to destabilize, if
not overthrow, the Pakistani Government and take back enough
control, if not the entire country, of Afghanistan.
We believe that if we allow Afghanistan to become a failed
state, if we allow the extremists to have the same safe havens
that they used before 2001, they will have a greater capacity
to regroup and attack again, and also to continue to provide
the leadership the operational and logistical support that they
currently provide to global extremism.
We believe they could drag an entire region into chaos. And
we know that, based on the reports from our military and
civilian leadership, the situation in Afghanistan is serious,
and worsening.
Now, I know we don't want to go back in history and anchor
our decision totally on what happened on September 11, 2001,
but I think it does have to be part of the national debate.
The damage done with those attacks against our economic and
military power centers was also an attack on my constituents,
because, at that time, I had the honor of serving as Senator
from New York. I witnessed the tragic consequences to the lives
of thousands of innocent families, the damage done to the
economy, and the damage to our sense of security, so I feel a
personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from such
violence, and I entered into the very intense consultations
we've been engaged in with that as my overriding goal, but
without any preconceived notion of exactly the best way to meet
that goal.
The case for action against al-Qaeda and its allies has
always been clear, but the United States course of action over
the last 8 years has not. The fog of another war obscured our
focus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere, the
Taliban regained momentum in Afghanistan, and the extremist
threat grew in Pakistan, a country, as you know well, with 175
million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of
challenges. So, it was against this backdrop that the President
called for this careful, thorough review of our strategy.
Our objectives are clear. We will work with the Afghan and
Pakistani Governments to eliminate safe havens for those
plotting against us, our allies, and our interests. We will
work to find reliable partners in the region to help us
stabilize it, which we think is fundamental to our national
security. We will develop a long-term sustainable relationship
with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the
mistakes of the past--primarily, our abandonment of that
region. The duration of our military presence will be limited,
but our civilian commitment must continue even as our troops
begin coming home.
Now, accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of
the American people is not easy. It does mean sending more
civilians, troops, and assistance to Afghanistan, and
significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan, which
we have begun to do, under the leadership of the chairman, the
ranking member, and this committee. We will be asking the young
men and women, who not only serve in the military, but are part
of our civilian service team, to be taking great risks and
facing extraordinary sacrifices. I want to assure the committee
that we will do everything we can to ensure that their
sacrifices make our Nation safer.
Now, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious,
but it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed
in public. The beginning of President Karzai's second term has
opened a new window of opportunity. We obviously have real
concerns about the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan
Government, and we will redouble our efforts to pursue them.
But, in his inauguration speech last month, I witnessed
President Karzai call for a new compact with the Afghan people
and the international community. He pledged to combat
corruption, improve governance, and deliver. His words were
long in coming, but they were certainly welcome. They now must
be matched with action. The Afghan people, the United States,
and the international community must hold the Afghan Government
accountable.
We will help by working with our Afghan partners to
strengthen institutions at every level. The President has
outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan responsibility.
As he said in his speech, ``The additional American and
international troops will allow us to accelerate our handing
over of responsibility to Afghan forces as we begin to transfer
our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.'' Just as we
have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly,
taking into account conditions on the ground. This is not a
cliff, this is a transition.
The timeframe for the transition provides a sense of
urgency in working with the Afghan Government, but it should be
clear to everyone that, unlike the past, the United States and
our allies will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan. Our
resolve in this fight is reflected in the commitment of troops
since the President took office, and in the significant
civilian commitment that will continue long after our combat
forces begin to leave.
Our civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian
experts and advisers are helping to craft policy inside
government ministries. We are engaged in a process of
certifying those ministries that we feel confident in providing
funding for, and we will not provide it if we cannot certify
them.
When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had civilians
on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the very next
day. As our operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is
growing even stronger. We are on the track to triple the number
of civilian positions in Afghanistan, to 974 by early next
year. When we started, there were about 320; they had 6-month
rotations. Our checking of their duty rosters showed that a lot
of them didn't spend more than 30 to 60 days inside of
Afghanistan, even though they'd been assigned there. We have
totally revamped how we are providing civilian assistance, and
we believe that we are beginning to make a difference.
Each of these civilians leverage not only, on average, 10
partners from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-
funded NGOs, but what we're finding, most interestingly, is,
they leverage expertise within the United States military. When
you put an agricultural expert embedded in a battalion, and,
along with the commanding officer of that battalion, they go
looking for soldiers with ranching and farming experience, we
have a real force multiplier. And when I was in Kabul, 2 weeks
ago, meeting with our civ-mil teams, that's--those are exactly
the kind of stories that I was told. And the military, who are
responsible for the clearing and a phase of our military
operations, told me repeatedly how important the civilian
presence was. As one said to me, ``I'm happy to supply whatever
support these valuable civilians need, and we need more of
them.'' This strategy will make that possible.
Not only do we believe we have the right people to achieve
our objectives, we believe we have a sound strategy. We'll be
delivering high-impact economic assistance and bolstering
Afghanistan's agricultural sector, the traditional core of the
Afghan economy.
A number of my former colleagues have talked with me, in
the last months, about the importance of agriculture and how
they tried for 8 years to help create jobs, reduce the funding
that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation--in effect,
draw insurgents off the battlefield by moving them from poppies
to pomegranates. Well, we have taken that advice seriously.
We also will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door
to those Taliban who are willing to renounce al-Qaeda, abandon
violence, and wish to reintegrate into Afghan society. We
understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency do
not do so out of ideology, theology, or conviction, but,
frankly, due to coercion and money. The average Taliban fighter
is--our information--receives two to three times the monthly
salary than the average Afghan soldier or police officer.
Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach
by seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and
working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries.
And that, of course, leads me to Pakistan. A strong,
stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner for the
United States and an ally in the fight against violent
extremism. We've seen progress over this past year, as people
in Pakistan increasingly come to the view that we do share a
common enemy. I heard that repeatedly during my recent visit.
But, we have a long way to go.
We will significantly expand support intended to help
develop the potential of Pakistan and its people, demonstrating
a long-term commitment. I spent 3 days in Pakistan last month,
and most commonly I heard, over and over again, ``You left us
before. Will you do it again? You walked away, you left us
holding the problem that you helped to create.'' We want to
send a clear message, as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation
does, that we intend to be committed over the long term.
We will not be facing these challenges alone. We have 42
other troop-contributing countries. Our NATO ISAF allies have
already made significant contributions. After this hearing, I
will leave for Brussels to begin the process of securing
additional Afghan commitments. Ambassador Holbrooke is already
there consulting with our allies. We've had a very encouraging
response in the conversations we've had thus far. And we're
looking beyond NATO to build the strongest, broadest possible
global coalition. Japan just announced a $5 billion commitment
to Afghanistan. We think other governments are beginning to
recognize that this is a common fight against a common enemy.
So, let me conclude where I began. We face a range of
difficult choices, but the President's plan represents the best
way we know to protect our Nation today and in the future. The
task we face is as complex as any national security challenge
in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this
effort as the responsibility of a single party, a single agency
within our government, or a single country. We owe it to our
troops and our civilians, who will face these dangers, to come
together as Americans, and come together with our allies and
the international partners, to help accomplish this mission.
I look forward, as always, to continuing to work with you
to achieve that goal.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, I'm
grateful for this opportunity to testify before so many good friends.
Many of you have been personally involved in our efforts in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. And I want to thank the committee for the constructive
role it has played in addressing the challenges we face in this region
of the world.
On Tuesday, President Obama presented the administration's strategy
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
and I will all be providing you with additional details. But let me
speak briefly at a more personal level about why we are making this
commitment.
Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the best
way to protect our Nation now and in the future.
The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have
attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to the very
same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have a greater
capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region
into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have
reported that the situation is serious and worsening. We agree.
In the aftermath of September 11, I grieved with sons, daughters,
husbands, and wives whose loved ones were murdered. It was an attack on
our country, but it was also an attack on my constituents. I witnessed
the tragic consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families,
and the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So I feel
a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from such
violence.
THE MISSION
The case for action against al-Qaeda and its allies has always been
clear, but the United States course of action over the last 8 years has
not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. And while our attention
was focused elsewhere, the Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan. And
the extremist threat grew in Pakistan--
a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its
share of challenges.
It was against this backdrop that the President called for a
careful, thorough review of our strategy. I was proud to be a part of
that process. And our objectives are clear:
We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to
eliminate safe havens for those plotting attacks against us,
our allies, and our interests;
We will help to stabilize a region that is fundamental to
our national security; and
We will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with
Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes
of the past. The duration of our military presence will be
limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our
troops begin to come home.
Accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American
people will not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, troops,
and assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our civilian
efforts in Pakistan.
The men and women carrying out this mission are not statistics on a
PowerPoint slide. They are our friends and neighbors, our sons and
daughters, our brothers and sisters. We will be asking them--and the
American people who support them--to make extraordinary sacrifices on
behalf of our security. I want to assure the committee that we will do
everything we can to ensure their sacrifices make our Nation safer.
THE METHODS
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is
not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. And the
beginning of President Karzai's second term has opened a new window of
opportunity. We have real concerns about the influence of corrupt
officials in the Afghan Government, and we will continue to pursue
them. But in his inauguration speech last month, I witnessed President
Karzai call for a new compact with the Afghan people and the
international community. He pledged to combat corruption, improve
governance, and deliver for the people of his country. His words were
long in coming, but welcome. They must now be matched with action. The
Afghan people, the United States, and the international community will
hold the Afghan Government accountable for making good on these
commitments.
We will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen
institutions at every level of Afghan society so that we don't leave
chaos behind when our combat troops begin to depart.
The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan
responsibility. As he said in his speech Tuesday, the additional
American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing
over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer
of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011. Just as we have done in
Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account
conditions on the ground.
A timeframe for transition will provide a sense of urgency in
working with the Afghan Government. But it should be clear to everyone
that--unlike the past--the United States and our allies and partners
will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the
region. Our resolve in this fight is reflected in the substantial
commitment of troops since the President took office and in the
significant civilian commitment that will continue long after our
combat forces begin to leave.
That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and
advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries,
providing development assistance in the field, and working in scores of
other roles. When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had
civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the next
day. And as operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is growing
even stronger.
We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions in
Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each of these
civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to
experts with U.S.-funded NGOs. It's cliche to say that we have our best
people in these jobs, but it also happens to be true. When I was in
Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American colonel who told me that
while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his command, none
of them had the 40 years of agricultural experience of the USDA
civilian serving alongside his battalion, or the rule of law and
governance expertise of their civilian specialists from the State
Department. He told me: ``I am happy to supply whatever support these
valuable civilians need. And we need more of them.'' The President's
strategy will make that possible.
Not only do we have the right people to achieve our objectives, we
also have a sound strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic
assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's agricultural sector--the
traditional core of the Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce
the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw
insurgents off of the battlefield.
We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those
Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into Afghan
society. We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency
do so not out of conviction, but due to coercion or money. All Afghans
should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so
peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens,
and renounce al-Qaeda.
Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach, by
seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to
shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition for
influence to cooperation and economic integration.
We also believe that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be
a key partner for the United States, and an ally in the fight against
violent extremism. People in Pakistan are increasingly coming to the
view that we share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my
recent visit. Our relationship is anchored in our common goals of
civilian rule; robust economic development; and the defeat of those who
threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the peace of the world.
We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the
potential of Pakistan and its people. Our assistance will demonstrate
the United States commitment to addressing problems that affect the
everyday lives of Pakistanis and bring our people closer together. But
it will also bolster Pakistan against the threat of extremism. A
village where girls have had the opportunity to get an education will
be more resistant to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And a young man with a
bright future in a growing economy is less likely to waste his
potential in a suicide bombing. It was extremely important to have the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act--sponsored by Chairman Kerry,
Senator Lugar, and Chairman Berman--pass with bipartisan and bicameral
support. We will seek full funding from Congress, and I believe this
legislation will play a critical role in helping us transform our
partnership with Pakistan.
We will not be facing these challenges alone. We share this
responsibility with governments around the world. Our NATO allies have
already made significant contributions of their own in Afghanistan, and
this afternoon I will leave for Brussels to begin the process of
securing additional alliance commitments of troops, trainers, and
resources. Ambassador Holbrooke, our Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, is already there consulting with our allies.
The international community is also expanding its support to
Pakistan, and we are in close touch with partners to coordinate
assistance. We are also looking beyond NATO to build the broadest
possible global coalition to meet this challenge. Our objectives are
shared by people and governments from Europe to Australia, from Russia
to China to India, and across the Middle East. And we are reaching out
to Muslims everywhere to make it clear that the United States seeks to
build a better future with them in a spirit of mutual respect and
partnership.
THE MESSAGE
Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the President's plan represents the
best way we know to protect our Nation today and in the future. The
task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our
lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the
responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our
government, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and civilians
who will face these dangers to come together as Americans--and come
together with our allies and international partners--to help them
accomplish this mission. I look forward to working with you to meet
this challenge. And I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of
the committee, I would like to provide an overview of the
strategic thinking and context behind the President's
decisions; in particular, the nexus among al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and our objectives, and how
the President's strategy aims to accomplish them.
As the President first stated in March, and reemphasized
Tuesday night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its
extremist allies, and to prevent its return to both countries.
The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is
necessary to achieve this overarching goal.
Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are
mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from
one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.
While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now, and dependent
on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the
success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al-Qaeda's
message to the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the
winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al-Qaeda
have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and
mythology of the other. Al-Qaeda leaders have stated this
explicitly and repeatedly.
The lesson of the Afghan Taliban's revival for al-Qaeda is
that time and will are on their side, that with a Western
defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a major
strategic victory, as long as their senior leadership lives and
can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding.
Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda.
At the same time, one cannot separate the security
situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a
nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly
targeted by Islamic extremists. Giving extremists breathing
room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more
coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan.
By the same token, providing a sanctuary for extremists in
southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on
a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups
operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban,
in just the last year or so, has become a real threat to
Pakistan's domestic peace and stability, carrying out, with al-
Qaeda's help, escalating bombing attacks throughout the
country.
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of
much, if not most, of Afghanistan, and likely a renewed civil
war. Taliban-ruled areas could, in short order, become, once
again, a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, as well as a staging area for
resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan.
Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists, as
was the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts.
It would strengthen the al-Qaeda narrative, providing renewed
opportunities for recruitment, fundraising, and more
sophisticated operations.
It is true that al-Qaeda and its followers can plot and
execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to
London to Denver. What makes the border area between
Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other
location, including Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, is that this
part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist
jihadism, the historic place where native and foreign Muslims
defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse
at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining
superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for
this country and the world.
Some say this is similar to the domino theory that
underpinned, and ultimately muddied, the thinking behind the
United States military escalation in Vietnam. The difference,
however, is that we have very real and very recent history that
shows just what can happen in this part of the world when
extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments
complicit with, and supportive of, their mission.
Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank crossed the
Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993, Islamic militants
launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New
York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.
The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the
Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the
time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough
security and governance capacity to stabilize their own
country. The essence of our civil-military plan is to ``clear,
hold, build, and transfer.'' Beginning to transfer security
responsibility to the Afghans in summer of 2011 is critical
and, in my view, achievable.
July 2011, the time at which the President said the United
States will begin to drawdown our forces, will be the beginning
of a process, an inflection point, if you will, of transition
where Afghan forces begin to assume greater responsibility for
security. The pace and character of that drawdown, which
districts and provinces are turned over, and when, will be
determined by conditions on the ground. It will be a gradual
but inexorable process. It will be similar to the gradual but
steady conditions-based drawdown that began to take place in
Iraq about 14 months after the surge began there.
As with so many issues in the national security and defense
arena, the real challenge in Afghanistan is finding the right
balance. The prompt dispatch of some 30,000 United States
combat troops, on top of the 21,000 already ordered by the
President earlier this year, sends a certain message of the
President's resolve to both our partners and our adversaries in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. When this buildup is complete, total
United States force levels in Afghanistan will have more than
doubled under President Obama's orders, to about 100,000
troops. Whether you agree with what we are doing or not, there
should be no doubting, at home or abroad, this President's
commitment to the success of this mission.
On the other hand, we have to send an equally strong
message to the Afghan Government that, when all is said and
done, the United States military is not going to be there to
protect them forever, that the Afghans must step up to the
plate and do the things necessary that will allow them to take
primary responsibility for defending their own country, and do
so with a sense of purpose and urgency.
This is the balance we're trying to achieve, and I believe
the President's plan provides both the resources and the
flexibility to do so. Making this transition possible requires
accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more
capable Afghan army and police through intensive partnering
with ISAF forces, especially in combat. Even after we transfer
security responsibility to the Afghans and drawdown our combat
forces, the United States will continue to support their
development as an important partner for the long haul. We must
not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country,
only to see it descend into chaos and then into Taliban hands.
Let me offer a couple of closing thoughts. The President
believes, as I do, that, in the end, we cannot defeat al-Qaeda
and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the
security situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision
offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum
in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation
in Pakistan and Central Asia, all necessary to protect the
United States, our allies, and our vital interests.
As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and
women who have volunteered and revolunteered to serve their
country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds
and in our prayers as we take on this arduous, but vitally
important, mission.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us
to testify today. On Tuesday night, President Obama announced a renewed
commitment and more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I
would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context
behind his decisions, in particular:
The nexus among al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan;
Our objectives and how the President's strategy aims to
accomplish them; and
The military forces required.
WHERE WE STAND
As the President first stated in March, and reemphasized on
Tuesday, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent its return to
both countries. The international military effort to stabilize
Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating
al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing
missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we
might wish that to be the case.
While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the
Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the
Taliban would vastly strengthen al-Qaeda's message to the Muslim world:
that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply,
the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from
the success and mythology of the other. Al-Qaeda leaders have stated
this explicitly and repeatedly.
Taliban success in retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan
against the combined forces of multiple, modern armies--the current
direction of events--has dramatically strengthened the extremist
mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.
The lesson of the Taliban's revival for al-Qaeda is that time and will
are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their
strength and achieve a major strategic victory--as long as their senior
leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and
funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda.
At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in
Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan--a nuclear-armed nation of
175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists.
The two countries, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous
border of more than 1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in
Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for
extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more
pressure on a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups
operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, just in
the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's own
domestic peace and stability, carrying out--with al-Qaeda's help--
escalating bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks,
and the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad 7 months ago, that largely
motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. And we know the
Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in
Afghanistan and al-Qaeda.
A related point with regard to Pakistan: Because of American
withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing
of military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that
the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner.
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if
not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled
areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for al-Qaeda
as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the
offensive in Pakistan.
Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists--as was the
case 20 years ago--would beget success on other fronts. It would
strengthen the al-Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for
recruitment, fund-raising, and more sophisticated operations. Aided by
the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the
region and in susceptible populations across the globe.
It is true that al-Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute
attacks from a variety of locations--from Munich to London to Denver.
But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan
uniquely different from any other location--including Somalia, Yemen,
and other possible redoubts--is that this part of the world represents
the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native
and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused
its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining
superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the
United States and the world.
Some may say this is similar to the ``domino theory'' that
underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S.
military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we
have very real--and very recent--history that shows just what can
happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space,
safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their
mission. Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank crossed the
Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, Islamic militants launched their
first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to
make a similar mistake again.
THE WAY AHEAD
A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan--one that
is sustainable over the long term by their governments--is vital to our
national security. By the same token, the current status quo in
Afghanistan--the slow but steady deterioration of the security
situation and growing influence of the Taliban--is unacceptable. So too
is the status quo ante--a largely ungoverned region controlled by
extremists in which the United States had little influence or ability
to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.
The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's
momentum and reduce its strength while providing the time and space
necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance
capacity to stabilize their own country.
We will focus our resources where the population is most
threatened, and align military and civilian efforts accordingly--with
six primary objectives:
Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action
by the United States, our allies, and the Afghans;
Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population
and production centers and lines of communications;
Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing
al-Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;
Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan
National Security Forces;
Increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and employing
other local forces selectively to begin transitioning security
responsibility to the Afghan Government within 18 months; and
Selectively building the capacity of the Afghan Government,
particularly in key ministries.
This approach is not open-ended ``nation building.'' It is neither
necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style
Afghan nation-state--the likes of which has never been seen in that
country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting
textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the other.
It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal
of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating al-Qaeda by
building the capacity of the Afghans--capacity that will be measured by
observable progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage
of time.
The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build,
and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the
Afghans in summer 2011 is critical--and, in my view, achievable. This
transfer will occur district by district, province by province,
depending on conditions on the ground. The process will be similar to
what we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided
``overwatch''--first at the tactical level, then at the strategic
level. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans
and drawdown our combat forces, the United States will continue to
support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We
will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country
only to see it descend into civil war, and then into Taliban hands.
Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and
police through intensive partnering with ISAF forces, especially in
combat. It also means achieving a better balance between national and
local forces; increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities;
engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect
their own territory; and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and
reconciliation efforts.
At the strategic level, the President's plan will achieve a better
balance between investments in the central government and subnational
entities. At the national level, the focus will be primarily on
reforming essential ministries and pressing for the appointment of
competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and regional
level, there will be a shift to work through existing, traditional
structures rather than building new ones. In all of these efforts, we
must have a committed partner in the Afghan people and government. That
is one reason why there will be very clear and definitive timeframes
for reviewing our--and their--progress.
ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES
As the President announced, the United States will commit an
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to
24 months. These forces--the U.S. contribution to this fight--will be
deployed and concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the
country. The first of these forces will begin to arrive in Afghanistan
within 2-3 weeks.
In all, since taking office President Obama has committed nearly
52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of
approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and our other partners to
send a parallel international message of strong resolve. Our allies
must take the lead and focus their resources in the north and west to
prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds. We will seek
some 5-7,000 troops from NATO and expect the allies to share more of
the burden in training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Army
and police.
CONCLUSION
Let me offer a few closing thoughts.
It is worth remembering that the security situation in
Afghanistan--though serious--does not begin to approach the scale of
violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was
confirmed as Secretary of Defense 3 years ago this week. With all the
resources already committed to this campaign--plus those the President
has just announced--I believe the pieces are being put in place to make
real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24
months.
The President believes, as do I, that, in the end, we cannot defeat
al-Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the
security situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision offers the
best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan, and
fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central
Asia--all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our
vital interests. So, I ask for your full support of this decision to
provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources
they need to be successful.
This is will take more patience, perseverance, and sacrifice by the
United States and our allies. As always, the heaviest burden will fall
on the men and women who have volunteered and in many cases
revolunteered--to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be
uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous but
vitally necessary mission.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Gates.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, WASHINGTON, DC
Admiral Mullen. Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your
time today.
I'd also like to express my appreciation for all the work
this committee has done to get the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill
passed. And there, in these discussions, it can be easily lost
that that $7\1/2\ billion is actually nonmilitary aid, which I
think, having spent a lot of time in that part of the world, is
absolutely critical. And the other part of it is that it's over
an extended period of time. For too long in Pakistan, as many
of you know, it's been year-to-year, and so that 5-year
commitment is really significant.
And I want to ensure you, in the debates and the
deliberations that we've had in the administration with respect
to this strategy in this region, that there was an enormous
amount of time spent on Pakistan, and, Chairman, specifically
to your focus on this, that that was a very critical part of
the discussion, as well. And, by and large, the principles
agreed on the need to have a sustained, long-term partnership
approach with Pakistan, even given the complexities there.
And then, the linkage--I have come to believe that the
linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan is almost absolute and
that the outcome in Afghanistan bears directly on Pakistan's
future and how they'll act and how they see their future. So, a
stable, supportive Afghanistan will make a big difference in
how Pakistan sees its future.
I support, fully and without hesitation, the President's
decision, and appreciate the opportunity to contribute to what
I believe was a healthy and productive discussion. I've seen
lots of internal debates on national security issues in the
time that I've been chairman, but I can honestly say that
there's not one issue that was so thoroughly and thoughtfully
considered as this one, as, in fact, it should be, as Secretary
Clinton said, because this is the most complex national
security issue that faces us. It's also, in my belief, directly
tied to our vital national interests.
Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as
those of the Joint Chiefs, was given a voice, and every single
individual used it. We now have before us a strategy that more
appropriately matches us to the situation on the ground in
Afghanistan, and resources matched more appropriately to that
strategy, particularly with regard to reversing the
insurgency's momentum as quickly as possible, focusing
immediately on 2010. And given the stakes in Afghanistan for
our own national security, as well as that of our partners
around the world, I believe that the time we took was well
worth it.
Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already walked you
through the policy issues, the large policy issues in question,
and I won't repeat them here.
But, from a purely military perspective, I believe our new
approach does three critical things.
First, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers
better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ
their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat
al-Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven.
They will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who remain
the center of gravity in Afghanistan. They will still pursue
major elements of the counterinsurgency campaign desired and
designed by General McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves
at least some measure of active counterterrorism operations.
But, now, they will tailor this campaign and those operations
by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on
al-Qaeda's leadership, and by more effectively working to
degrade the Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and
accelerating the growth of competent Afghan National Security
Forces.
At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing
space for the Afghans to secure their own people and to
stabilize their own country. It's about partnering and
mentoring just as much, if not more so, than it is about
fighting and combat. Where once we believed that finishing the
job meant, to a large degree, ``do it ourselves,'' we now know
it cannot truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the
Afghans themselves. Fully a third of the United States troops
in theater are partnered with Afghan forces as we speak, and I
expect that number to rapidly grow over the next year.
Second, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives
commanders on the ground the resources and the support they
need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to
accomplish these more limited objectives. I've said it before,
and I believe it still today, that this region is the epicenter
of global Islamic extremism. And I acknowledge that there are
federated terrorists globally. But, this is the epicenter. It's
the place from which we were attacked on 9/11, as has been
discussed, and, should we be hit again, it's the place from
which, I am convinced, the planning, training, financing, and
leadership will emanate.
Al-Qaeda may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack,
but the Taliban will be the bricklayers. Though hardly a
uniform body, Taliban groups have grown bolder and more
sophisticated. I saw that just a few months ago in the Korengal
Valley, where Taliban forces attacked coalition outposts using
what I would call ``almost conventional small-unit tactics.''
Their fighters were better organized and better equipped than
they were just 1 year ago. That's been the case for the last 3
years. In fact, coalition forces experienced a record number
of--a record level of violence over the last year, up 60
percent in 2009, when compared to 2008. And through brutal
intimidation, the Taliban has established shadow governments
across the country, coercing the reluctant support of many
locals, and challenging the authority of elected leaders and
state institutions. Indeed, we believe the insurgency has
achieved a dominant influence in 11 of the--of Afghanistan's 34
provinces. To say there is no serious threat of Afghanistan
falling once again into Taliban hands ignores the audacity of
even the insurgency's most public statements. And to argue
that, should they have that power, the Taliban would not at
least tolerate the presence of al-Qaeda on Afghan soil, is to
ignore both the recent past and the evidence we see every day
of collusion between these factions on both sides of the Af-Pak
border. The cost of failure, then, is grave. That is why the
President's decision for the extended surge of--to Afghanistan
of 30,000 additional troops is so important. It gets the most
U.S. force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving
General McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the
initiative. It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency
approach, and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best
possible chance to set the security conditions for the Afghan
people to see our commitment to their future, for the Karzai
government to know our strong desire to see his promised
reforms, and for the Afghan Taliban to understand they will not
and cannot take back Afghanistan, and finally, for those beyond
Afghanistan who support the Taliban or who would see the return
of al-Qaeda, to realize the futility of their pursuit.
I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the
21,000 troops the President ordered shortly after taking
office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the
southern Helmand Valley. But, as I have testified before, Mr.
Chairman, no amount of troops in no amount of time will ever be
enough to completely achieve success in such a fight; they
simply must be accompanied by good governance and healthy
public administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of
my greatest concern. Like everyone else, I look forward to
working with the Karzai government, but we must have the
support of the interagency and international communities, as
well.
And that brings me to my final point. The President's new
strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based
approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in
isolation any more than he views the ties between al-Qaeda and
the Taliban as superficial. He's called for a stronger and more
productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is,
likewise, under the threat from radical elements and whose
support remains vital to our ability to eliminate those safe
havens. He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed
emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort,
more contributions by other NATO nations, and a realistic plan
to transition responsibilities to the Afghans.
His is a more balanced, more flexible, and more achievable
strategy than we've had in the past, one based on pragmatism
and real possibilities. And speaking for the 2.2 million men
and women who must go execute this and who, with their
families, have borne the brunt of the stress and the strain of
8 years of constant combat, I support the President's decision
and appreciate his leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the subject of
the President's newly announced strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The President's Tuesday evening announcement at West Point of our
strategy and increased military resources for Afghanistan culminates a
process of deliberate strategic review that began with the arrival of
General McChrystal's interim assessment in early September. I believe
this national-level review has been sober and essential. The challenges
we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan are great, and our interests there
are significant. This administration needed to take the time to look at
all the options and craft a balanced and sustainable approach. I
believe that the review has met this aim.
I support fully, and without hesitation, the President's decision.
REFINING THE STRATEGY
The facts compel us to act. Our strategic review confirmed that the
overarching policy goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its
capacity to threaten America and our allies from either country in the
future.
South Asia is the epicenter of global Islamic extremism; the
location of al-Qaeda's core leadership and the terrain that dozens of
Islamic terrorist groups call home. It is the location from which the
9/11 attacks on America were planned and driven. If the United States
should be hit again, I remain convinced that the planning, training,
and funding for such an attack will emanate there. It is a region where
a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan, is under direct threat from al-Qaeda
and affiliated Pakistani-Taliban groups that aspire to acquire and use
nuclear weapons against the United States and our allies. Thus, it is a
region with a unique--and deadly--combination of the most dangerous
terrorists and the most dangerous technology in the world. Our actions
in Pakistan and Afghanistan seek to prevent catastrophic outcomes from
these toxic forces, and constitute a most critical national interest.
Our strategic review paid particular attention to Pakistan. The
people of Pakistan are under as much, if not greater, threat from al-
Qaeda and Islamic terrorism than are we. We must encourage and aid the
Pakistani military fight against these extremists in South Waziristan,
in SWAT, and across Pakistan. We must also help Pakistan widen its
aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
the wider South Asia region, and the globe. We are deepening ties with
the people of Pakistan as well as with their security forces. We see
progress with our Pakistani allies as paramount to the way ahead.
In Afghanistan, we narrowed in on a challenging, but attainable
goal: to deny
al-Qaeda safe haven and the Afghan-Taliban the ability to overthrow the
duly elected Afghan Government. To achieve this refined strategic aim,
we must continue to deny al-Qaeda any Afghanistan toe-hold, reverse the
momentum of the Taliban insurgency, and build sufficient Afghan
Government and security capacity to eventually defeat the insurgent
threat. Our review also narrowed and refined the military objectives
for General McChrystal's NATO-ISAF force--focusing it on security of
key population areas while Afghan forces grow in size and capability,
prioritizing a robust NATO-ISAF program of training and mentoring
Afghan military and police, and establishing the conditions necessary
for Afghans to assume their own security. Each of these objectives will
hasten the day when we can begin thinning the U.S./NATO-ISAF security
forces presence, turning the internal security of Afghanistan over to
the Afghans. This strategy provides the time and space for the Afghans
themselves to build sufficient security and governance capacity to
stabilize their country.
Our refined military objectives for Afghanistan complement those in
the political and economic spheres. They also support diplomatic,
political, and military programs that the President's strategy calls
for us to undertake with neighboring countries--especially Pakistan--
that increase pressure against al-Qaeda's leadership; that expand
counterinsurgency operations against Taliban insurgents who threaten
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider region; and that help set the
conditions for improved regional security and stability.
MATCHING STRATEGY AND RESOURCES
Throughout this strategic review, I advised the Secretary of
Defense and the President that our commitment of military resources
must match our strategy.
I am pleased to inform this committee that the President's decision
accommodates this advice. The strategy he approved commits 30,000 more
U.S. forces, with some number of additional enablers, while calling for
our NATO and non-NATO allies to generate additional forces. This rapid,
coalition-wide buildup of force aligns with General McChrystal's
recommendations, even more so in light of the narrowing of objectives
for Afghanistan that the President announced Tuesday night.
The President's commitment is to rapidly send these additional
forces forward to get as much force into the fight as fast as General
McChrystal can absorb it. This allows Generals McChrystal and Petraeus
to plan for cohesive logistics and transportation support over the
course of the coming year. While there are no guarantees in war, I
expect that we will make significant headway in the next 18-24 months.
I also believe we could begin to thin our combat forces in about the
same timeframe. From a military standpoint, the President's commitment
to an increase in military force, especially backed by an increase in
civilian resources, is much better than one featuring periodic
assessments that trigger incremental force escalation.
The President's decision also supports accelerated expansion of
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--a critical initiative. We
simply must invest in the growth of an Afghan security force--through
more radical and in-depth partnering. The additional U.S. and coalition
forces heading to Afghanistan will focus a great amount of time and
energy toward empowering a strong and capable ANSF.
General McChrystal intends to use these additional U.S. troops to
conduct more focused counterinsurgency operations that enhance
population security against the Taliban in south and east Afghanistan.
As in Iraq, our troops will live among the population. Thus--and as
General McChrystal has successfully emphasized since his arrival as
COMISAF last June--we will continue to make every effort to eliminate
civilian casualties, not just because this is the right thing to do,
but because these casualties work against our goal of Afghan population
security. Although we must expect higher alliance casualties in coming
months as we dedicate more U.S. forces to protect the population and
mentor the ANSF, our extended security presence must--and will--improve
security for the Afghan people and limit both future civilian and
military casualties
MOVING FORWARD--CONCLUSION
No commitment of additional force in the number we plan for
Afghanistan is without risk. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I assess the
risks to our military forces and our military missions--at home and
abroad--from this force deployment decision to be acceptable. We can
continue to balance the additional force flow requirements for
Afghanistan against those coming available from drawdown trajectory
programmed for, and on track in, Iraq.
I believe that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be
gradual, and sometimes halting. Yet I believe we can succeed. The
President's announced strategy and this force-flow decision give us the
best possible chance for success. We must exhibit vision, apply
sufficient resources, and display endurance to realize our objectives
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most challenges we now confront in the
South Asia region are not military in nature. They require solutions
from and led by national and local governments. Yet none of these
solutions are possible in an environment of insecurity. Our role must
be to fill the security gap for a short time, concurrently growing our
partner government's capacity to self-secure. Pursued with resolve, our
actions will send an unmistakable message that the United States
remains committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets
of partnerships available to address future challenges without a long-
term need for large numbers of U.S. combat forces.
In providing advice to this President over the past 10 months, one
important point I have made, consonant with other key Presidential
advisers, is that our military activities must support rather than lead
our Nation's foreign policy. Our warfighting ability will never be in
doubt. But we have learned from the past 8 years of war that we serve
this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated
approach that employs all elements of national power to achieve the
policy goals set by our civilian leaders. This approach remains crucial
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and across South Central Asia.
On behalf of our servicemembers, I would like to thank the members
of this committee--and the Congress as a whole--for the sustained
investment in our brave young men and women in uniform, and for your
unwavering support of them and their families as they continue to serve
so magnificently and selflessly in this time of protracted war.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, each of you, for comprehensive statements that
are very, very helpful.
Let me focus in, if I can, on--Secretary Gates, you
particularly talked about the nexus with respect to the al-
Qaeda/Taliban relationship and why Afghanistan is important in
that. Last night, I had dinner with a group of Congressmen, a
number of whom either don't see the nexus or don't accept it
or, you know, somehow feel that we can get by notwithstanding
whatever nexus there is, that it doesn't rise to the level--in
a sense, building on Senator Lugar's opening statement, where
he, sort of, talked about the question of, you know, being
fixated on al-Qaeda and committing a certain number of troops
that may be out of proportion to the level of threat.
You've both--both Secretary Clinton and you, Secretary
Gates, addressed this in your statements, but there's a way in
which, I think, somehow, in the statements, people don't always
hear the exclamation point of it.
I'd like to ask you--I mean, if we have Congress--if we
have members of this committee who disagree with the decision
and who feel that somehow that nexus is not sufficient, that it
brings this national security threat to a level that says,
``You've got to have 100,000 troops,'' et cetera--you know the
arguments--what I want you to do now, if you can, is put the
exclamation point on it. I mean, how do you convey, through
your experience and the stakes that you're trying to protect,
what is really at stake here so people understand why the
President, who clearly, at West Point, said, you know, he
doesn't take this decision lightly--and we all understand that;
nobody would--to make this kind of commitment. What is it, in
the simplest of terms, that compels you to say, ``Al-Qaeda in
Pakistan remains a sufficient factor to require 100,000 troops
in Afghanistan''?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that I consider
the situation today, in this respect, more dangerous than it
was a year or 18 months ago, because it is clear that--just on
the Pakistani side of the border, that al-Qaeda is deeply
involved with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Pakistani
Taliban, in planning attacks against the Pakistani Government
and people, and attempting to destabilize that government. And
the al-Qaeda provides them with technical information, provides
them with operational information and support.
Al-Qaeda also is supportive of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the
terrorist group that is responsible for the bombings in Mumbai.
And al-Qaeda is providing them with targeting information and
helping them in their plotting in India, clearly with the idea
of provoking a conflict between India and Pakistan that would
destabilize Pakistan. They also are very much involved with the
Afghan Taliban. And so, they are supporting all of these
different groups in ways that are destabilizing, not just for
Afghanistan, but for the entire region. And al-Qaeda is at the
heart of it. And whether or not the terrorists are homegrown,
when we trace their roots, they almost all end up back in this
border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan, whether they're from
the United States or Somalia or the United Kingdom or
elsewhere.
And so, what we see is al-Qaeda, despite their being under
pressure and despite their limited numbers and despite the fact
that there are few of them in Afghanistan right now, that they
are taking advantage of the situation in the region to play a
very destabilizing and dangerous role.
What they have learned, as I suggested in my remarks, is
that, in an ungoverned space, you have the opportunity to
recover, reconstitute, and reassert yourself, which is exactly
what the Taliban did in Pakistan over a period of about 3
years, and now are in a position where, with their momentum,
are challenging, successfully to this point, significant
numbers of modern armies.
So, the point is that if given--if parts of southern and
eastern Afghanistan once again come under the control of the
Taliban, that would be space in which the al-Qaeda could
reconstitute itself, very much as the Taliban did in Pakistan
just in recent years, and then expand their operations and
their capabilities to launch attacks against Europe and the
United States and, really, all over the world.
The Chairman. If----
Secretary Clinton. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. So--go ahead.
Secretary Clinton. I would just add, to what Secretary
Gates said, the following three points.
First, we have increasingly come to see these organizations
not as separate independent operators that occasionally
cooperate with one another, but as part of a syndicate of
terrorism. They--the level of operational cooperation,
training, equipping, financing, has grown exponentially. And at
the head of the table, like an old Mafia kind of diagram, sits
al-Qaeda. And al-Qaeda still has much greater access to the
financing that comes from the gulf, and is able, then, to
support a lot of their Taliban partners in their various
undertakings. Al-Qaeda's experience in recruiting foreign
fighters has aided and abetted certain of the Taliban
operations inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani
military has told us that they've picked up foreign fighters in
South Waziristan. And the continuing training of new recruits,
people that then go off to Yemen or Somalia, or, indeed,
Denver, has a global reach that is unmatched.
Second, as Admiral Mullen said, the planning and the, sort
of, brains of the operation with respect to plots against us
remains al-Qaeda, but, increasingly, the Taliban are the
bricklayers. You know, the recent arrests here in our own
country trace back to Pakistan and trace back, certainly in the
case of Zazi, directly to an al-Qaeda-originated training camp
and training program.
But, finally, and perhaps most chillingly, the fact that
Pakistan is a nuclear power raises the stakes enormously. There
is no doubt in any of our minds that al-Qaeda seeks nuclear
materiel, seeks access to nuclear weapons. The challenges
within the Pakistani military, that Admiral Mullen can address,
because he's done yeoman's work in working on a--building a
better relationship. We walked away from the Pakistani
military, you know; we were sanctioned, we couldn't cooperate
with them. And there's a real gap between the leadership of the
Pakistani military that ever trained in or connected with the
American or the British or the Australian military and, sort
of, the younger officers. And there's a real struggle going on,
for influence, for the kind of advantage that would give this
syndicate of terror just a horrific challenge to all of us.
But, I think--if Admiral Mullen could have the time to add
to that.
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, I've certainly--agree with
the nexus. And I've watched it, over the last year to two, that
these groups are coming together.
I'm--and this--Secretary Gates talked about the linkage
between the LET and al-Qaeda. And it's actually not--so, it's
not local anymore. And that is an example of the collaboration
that's going on with all these units. I was struck, as I'm sure
you were, in Mumbai, that a terrorist outfit could literally
generate that kind of attack and then bring two nation-states
closer to conflict. That is not an achievement lost on anyone
that observed that. And those kinds of plots continue. The
ability to destabilize Pakistan, seeking that nuclear
materiel--those nuclear materiels and weapons--it's
extraordinarily dangerous. And I recognize both the price we
pay, in blood and treasure, and the cost--that it costs our
government, specifically. These--and my own view of this is
that, without addressing this, the potential risks of something
recurring, on the order of what happened before, is out there,
and the enormous costs that would be associated with that.
So, this decision and investment now is absolutely
critical. And the terrorist central cells that are there in
this border, that's really--this is really the headquarters.
There are other franchise cells throughout--in places like
Yemen and Somalia, but this is the most dangerous one. They all
need to be addressed. This has a significantly more capable
center of gravity, if you will, because of all the
organizations that are associated with al-Qaeda in this border
area.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that.
Secretary Gates. Can I just add one sentence? The----
The Chairman. Please.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Just in terms of underscoring
the central role of al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistan border
area--the reality is that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-
Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, place high value on their
affiliation with al-Qaeda in that border area. And there is
ample intelligence showing other terrorist groups that
basically are in the application process to become affiliates
of al-Qaeda. So, the central mythology and the central role of
these people is still there.
The Chairman. Well, let me just say that I think that it's
going to be very important in the next days to really build
this linkage and case so that people have a real understanding
of the importance. And it obviously begs the question--and I
don't want to abuse the time periods here, so I won't ask it
now; I'm sure colleagues will follow up on it--but, it clearly
begs the question of Pakistan's cooperation and what we can
expect in these next months. And I'm sure colleagues will
follow up on that.
I did want to mention congratulations on Chelsea's
engagement. I just finished playing ``wedding planner'' for my
younger daughter, and my advice to you is: hire a professional.
Secretary Clinton. Are you available? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. I am not--distinctly not a professional.
Voice. Can't afford him. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, let me follow up on your questions, as well as the
responses of the witnesses.
Secretary Clinton, in your testimony you said, ``We will
work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate
safe havens for those plotting attacks against us, our allies,
and our interests.'' As an additional point you say, ``We will
develop a long-term sustainable relationship with Afghanistan
and Pakistan so we do not repeat the mistakes of the past.''
Now, each of you responded in your testimonies to the
thought that al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups may be becoming
increasingly diffuse, by saying, ``Of course. But, this border
area is significantly different.'' Admiral Mullen, you pointed
out again that this area is unique as it would likely serve as
the base for the planning of future terrorist attacks against
the United States. Secretary Gates, you just mentioned how even
in the Maghreb and elsewhere, they feed into the so-called
spiritual or intellectual, leadership that is coming out of the
border area.
I would like each of you to further expound on a view we
have heard you all espouse, that ``We believe that a strong,
stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner for the
United States, an ally against violent extremism.'' Of course
that is correct. But, a number of historians have come before
this committee in previous discussions of these matters and
they've made comments such as this, that, ``The al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan has sometimes been useful for Pakistan to at least
influence, if not control, things over in Afghanistan so that
India would not have a strong influence there.'' When the
Indians were here visiting with you recently, they certainly
expressed some feeling of exclusion that came not only from
Pakistan, but of Pakistan's use of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Recently, the three of you have been engaging in active
diplomacy in Pakistan, and, collectively, with the President,
the Vice President, General Jones, and others, have convinced
the Pakistani military that they ought to do something about
Pakistani Taliban in Swat Valley and elsewhere. It is possible
that this success also has to do with a change in viewpoint of
the Pakistani military establishment.
But, we still get back to the point that we're talking
about, this border area which is comprised of two countries. On
one side, we are going to emplace additional troops dealing
with these 11 provinces in Afghanistan. What is not clear is
precisely what is going to happen in Pakistan in this alliance
of the two of us, the United States and Pakistan. And you would
say, ``Well, for good reason. Don't be naive. This is a very
difficult situation.'' As you said, Secretary Clinton, we have
a long way to go. This is a growing relationship. You've been
out in the countryside, visiting places the President of the
country has not chosen to visit as he is huddled there in the
capital. Indeed, this is very tough business.
I'd like to ask all of you about what I see as some of our
crucial objectives in our relationship with Pakistan and
continued engagement in the region. I agree with the chairman
on the importance of this concentration on the number of
troops, the number of months, and of whatever is going to
happen in the urban areas of the 11 provinces. But, what is
crucial is whether any of the three of you, or all of you, or
the President, the Vice President, General Jones, or anyone
else in your team, is going to be able to deal with the
leadership in Pakistan, whether it be the civil, military, or
intelligence leadership, so that they are prepared to face what
we are all seeing as the problem: the continued presence of
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the border area. No one wants
to talk about Osama bin Laden. Isn't this a major target? Isn't
this a reason why continued warfare is necessary?
Now, if it is so, we'd better talk about it directly to the
Pakistanis. This being a public hearing, the Pakistanis are
hearing that loud and clear, and they're going to have to
respond.
Now, it is all well and good for us to say the Pakistanis
have got to be stable over the long run with regard to their
nuclear weapons. Well, of course they need to be stable. They
understand that. They often have resented us talking about
their nuclear weapons, quite apart from the thought we might
protect them and their nuclear weapons, as this is in our own
interests.
Progressing from the President's plan is certainly not the
end of the story. Whether this plan works or not may depend
upon personal diplomacy and the ability of leadership in
Pakistan to come to very different, significant conclusions
from the past in terms of their view on the best way forward to
improve their welfare. I'd like to ask any of you how rapidly
you think this can occur. In 12 months? Eighteen months? Two
years? In other words, it better occur soon or we're going to
have the shifting of people back and forth across the border,
even as we have military success, as we will, in the provinces
of Afghanistan.
Would anyone want to respond?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator Lugar, I'll start, and
then I'm sure my colleagues would want to add to what I say.
I share your sense of urgency, your analysis of the
challenges that we confront, but I think we have to look very
clear-eyed at where we are starting from. When I went through
my round of confirmation hearings and then, sort of,
introductory hearings in the House--and that was back in
January--I said, at the time, that it was hard to believe that
the Pakistani Government was not going after the direct threats
that it faced from within its own borders. And that caused a
big outcry in Pakistan. But, I think it's significant that
we're sitting here today, having seen two major military
operations after the failure of some kind of accommodation and
unsuccessful peace agreements were finally recognized.
We are now making the case to our counterparts in Pakistan,
both in the civilian and the military leadership, that the
efforts they have made against the TTP, primarily in Swat and
now in Waziristan and the Mehsud tribal core, are necessary,
but far from sufficient, efforts to protect themselves, that
this syndicate, this network of terrorism has to be addressed,
that whatever the utility of any of these groups might have
been in the past, they have morphed into a form that poses a
threat to the Pakistani Government.
And this is an argument that, I think, takes time to make.
It is certainly an argument each of us, plus others, have
carried repeatedly, and will continue to do so. But, there is a
great gulf of mistrust. Secretary Gates can speak very
eloquently, since he was involved, in the 1980s, in working
with the Pakistani Government to put together the mujahideen
that led to the overthrow of the Soviet Union, but which the
Pakistanis feel like we then walked away from helping them cope
with. And they accommodated themselves, they went into survival
mode, and maybe even saw some certain advantages flowing from
those relationships, advantages that they were kind of making
lemonade out of lemons in order to obtain.
So, I think your analysis is right, but we're dealing with
a sovereign country that has a very clear idea of who they
think their overall enemy is--namely, India--but who has slowly
been convinced, because of what's happened inside their own
territory, that they have to take action. And I think that that
will continue to lead to positive steps.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
It is an honor to have this distinguished panel of
witnesses here today. I am pleased that the President has set a
goal for when we will begin reducing troop levels; however, I
am disappointed that he's decided to escalate our military
presence and did not give any goal or timeframe for when our
massive military operations in Afghanistan will actually end. I
do not support the decision to prolong and expand a risky and
unsustainable strategy in the region. And, while I support
ongoing civilian engagement in Afghanistan and counterterrorism
efforts in the region, I do not believe more American lives
should be risked for a war that no longer serves our most
pressing national security interests. We must promptly
transition to a sustainable, targeted counterterrorism strategy
for the region and the world, one that is as agile and global
as the enemy we confront: al-Qaeda.
So, rather than focusing so much of our attention and
resources on Afghanistan, I think we need a comprehensive,
global strategy that divides al-Qaeda from populations that
have principally local grievances. We need to improve our
intelligence capabilities, build partnerships with legitimate
local partners, and, if appropriate, utilize targeted tactical
operations.
Secretary Gates, you have argued that we must continue to
pour our resources into Afghanistan or it would be perceived as
a victory by al-Qaeda. And I have to say, I am somewhat less
concerned about the ``perception'' of victory and more focused
on actually defeating al-Qaeda for real.
I think the best way to do that is to recognize that we're
dealing, as you have recognized, with a global enemy with a
very limited presence in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda's stated
objective is to bankrupt the United States. So, I guess my
first question is, Do you at least acknowledge that investing
over $100 billion in just one country, in 1 year alone, risks
degrading our long-term ability to relentlessly pursue al-Qaeda
around the globe?
Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. Well, I think, first of all, just for
clarity, the costs that we are looking at for fiscal year 2010
for both the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, will be about $20
billion less than we spent in 2008. And I realize that's small
comfort, given how much we spent in 2008. But, I think the--I
go back to the chairman's comment, What are the consequences,
what are the costs, of Taliban being able to control space in
Afghanistan, and on the Pakistani side of the border, that
gives al-Qaeda the ability to reconstitute itself and perhaps
provoke a war between India and Pakistan or get access to
nuclear weapons from Pakistan?
Senator Feingold. Mr. Secretary, I understand that that's
your view of not doing something. But, my question is, Once we
spend this $100 billion, what are the consequences for our
resources in all the other places that we're talking about
here?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think----
Senator Feingold. That there's another side to this.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. I think that we have,
frankly, adequately resourced the effort to go after terrorism
on a global basis. We certainly have had successful operations,
some of which have been in the newspapers, and we are devoting
a lot of effort, and have received resources from the Congress,
to the kind of partnering that you have described, in terms of
trying to root out these terrorist organizations.
I will tell you, having come back to government after being
gone for 13 or 14 years, the improvement in the quality of our
intelligence, in terms of being able to go after terrorists,
and in the depth of our intelligence liaison relationships with
other countries, is a world apart from what I saw in 1993, when
I retired. So, we have made, I think, good investments, and
these investments continue, in terms of going after the global
threat. But, it's important to recognize where the home nest
is, and to deal with that, as well.
Senator Feingold. Well, I appreciate that. I question
whether we're adequately resourcing some other critical places
around the world that I've spent a fair amount of time
studying. I won't get into the specifics of it, but it's
something we can discuss in the future.
Admiral Mullen, in his assessment, General McChrystal
stated that even a ``properly resourced'' military strategy
would still leave large swaths of Afghanistan outside
government control. Indeed, as we've increased levels of troops
in the south, attacks have grown more deadly in the north.
What are the chances that an increase in troop levels will
only push militants into different regions?
Admiral Mullen. Senator Feingold, the principal threat, I
think, will continue to remain in the south and in the east. We
recognize, in the north, over the last year or so, that it has
gotten more difficult. But, General McChrystal is confident
that the spread, if you will, there--and also, to some degree,
to the west, although not really significant at this point--can
be handled by our NATO forces. And, in fact, the NATO forces
that--we have expectations for receiving additional NATO forces
here, commitments in the near future, to address that. His main
effort is in the south. That really is where he will focus most
of his troops, supported by his efforts in the east. And then,
that really gets to the most critical areas, from a Pashtun
standpoint, from a border standpoint. And the intent of this
strategy--and his, certainly, to support it--is not to do
counterinsurgency all over the country. We don't see it growing
to a point, at this point, where it would turn into something
equal to the kind of threat that we have and see in the south
and in the east, up north.
Senator Feingold. Admiral, several witnesses testified
before this committee that the majority of people we're
currently fighting in Afghanistan do not have an international
terrorist agenda, but, rather, ``tend to coalesce against what
is perceived as an outsider.'' And one former CIA station chief
in Islamabad has testified that if we send 40,000 additional
troops to Afghanistan, it would only produce 40,000 additional
militants. Actually, I'd like both you and Secretary Clinton to
answer this. Is there a danger that our current strategy has
provoked greater militancy and has thereby made it harder for
us to isolate members of al-Qaeda?
Admiral Mullen. We haven't seen this. I think General
McChrystal said, not too long after he got there--and this gets
to the whole occupation issue--we know we're not an occupying
force. Obviously, our actions need to support our intent with
respect to that, which is very clear. But, the Afghans that we
engage with are much more concerned with what we do with our
forces, as opposed to how many they are. McChrystal has shifted
the focus to secure them--population security for them. That's
what they seek more than anything else right now. So, we
certainly--while I recognize that, particularly because of
history, we haven't seen that extensively, nor have we seen an
extensive generation of additional militants, per se, although
that is a concern. And we're looking to get as many of them off
the battlefield, in this new strategy, as possible, as well,
with respect--by reconciliation, reintegration, et cetera. But,
that's got to happen through security--better security.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Admiral.
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I would just add three points.
One, General McChrystal significantly changed the way that
our military forces and NATO ISAF conduct themselves with
respect to the civilian population. He significantly tightened
the rules for air support for any kind of combat in order to
limit the number of civilian casualties. And he also issued
orders concerning nighttime raids, particularly with the use of
dogs. When I was in Afghanistan, I had a number of people tell
us that made a huge difference.
Second, in every reliable research that I have access to,
there is no appetite for the return of the Taliban, whatsoever.
What we have seen an increase in, over the last several years,
has been more hedging that people are understandably nervous
about, ``What's the outcome, and whose side should I and my
family end up on?''
But, there is no appetite for the return of the Taliban,
and we do not see what is a legitimate concern to keep in mind,
the potential reaction that would lead to increased insurgents.
We also know that a lot of the people who are in the
Taliban do not share the overall goal, which has morphed. You
know, the Omar--the Mullah Omar core group that heads the
Afghan Taliban and is closely allied with al-Qaeda has morphed
into, not just a nationalistic Islamist group, but now kind of
buying into this caliphate idea.
And therefore, a lot of the people who have been
conscripted, in effect, into service on behalf of the Taliban
have no real allegiance. So, part of the challenge here--and
it's something that we are working on with President Karzai;
obviously, we have a whole team embedded in NATO ISAF under
retired British general, General Lamb, who had played a major
role in Iraq, with the Sons of Iraq in The Awakening, is to
begin to do a much more thoughtful job to separate out--I mean,
the Taliban are a homegrown entity. The Talib, the students,
you know, they rose up, in part, against the oppression of the
Soviet regime, the chaos of the warlord era, and a desire to
have an Islamist state that imposed shariah order, et cetera.
So, we know that there is an opportunity for those who renounce
al-Qaeda violence, et cetera, to be reintegrated and to play a
part in the political system. Now, we might not like their
political agenda. I'll just put that on the table. You know,
Senator Boxer and Senator Shaheen and I would not particularly
be enthusiastic about a nonviolent, peaceful Taliban political
movement that legitimately played within the democracy. But,
you know, there is that possibility that I think we have to
recognize, if they do move into reintegration.
Senator Feingold. Well, my time's up, but I just want to
say, Madam Secretary, thank you for a thoughtful answer. I'm
sure you'd agree that it's at our peril that we minimize the
potential feelings of the Afghan people for an extended
presence there. I know you're aware of that, but we have to be
so careful not to minimize the importance of that.
I thank the Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And thank each of you for your service. I very much respect
the positions that each of you hold, and realize that there are
no easy answers. I know this has been very complex, and I know
it's very agonizing to come before panels like this when you're
part of the administration.
I do hope--and I see the chairman has left--but, since this
is so Pakistan-centric, I hope that Ann Patterson--I know she's
here--will be made available and we will have hearings with her
and others involved in Pakistan, maybe Petraeus. My
understanding is, we're trying to set up McChrystal and
Eikenberry this next week. Is that correct?
Secretary Clinton. Senator Corker, that is correct. And we
would certainly make any witness available. We might want to
suggest that you plan a short public hearing and a longer
classified hearing. I think that would be very useful to get at
a lot of the issues that both Senator Lugar and Chairman Kerry
have raised.
Senator Corker. Well, I think if we're going to have the
classified briefing, which would be great, the station chief in
Pakistan would be very beneficial. But, you all can make those
decisions. I hope at least we'll have a public hearing with Ann
Patterson, who is an outstanding ambassador and certainly knows
what's happening in that area.
You can't help but be in Afghanistan and know that part of
what is driving what we're doing there is just the inertia, the
fact that we're there and we're loathe to leave before success,
whatever that means, and the fact that we're trying to prove to
Pakistan and Afghanistan citizens that we're real friends. So,
my point is, is that much of what you all have said, no doubt,
is true, but there's an underlying current that creates an
inertia, I think, for us to be there. And I know a lot of
comments have been made about the fact that it's very clear
what we're doing now, and maybe we weren't clear in the past.
And there's no doubt we were not clear in the past.
I would say that I still--I have average intelligence, and
I think it's still pretty unclear to me what we're doing. I
know, last March the President announced a more narrowed
mission, supposedly. It was evident to me it was anything but a
more narrowed mission.
I know, on September 22, General Jones came in and
created--showed us the metrics that are being used to measure
what's happening. I know the chairman was present. It was very
evident--and I don't mean to be pejorative--but we were nation-
building in Afghanistan. The metrics very much lay out a
nation-building in Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke has got a
whole team of people that--he would call it ``rebuilding a
nation,'' because he certainly goes back in history to the
times when Afghanistan was more of a functioning country. But,
my point is, it--you know, look, there's no question that the
metrics laid out in September were nation-building.
I met with Secretary Gates, who I greatly respect, at the
Pentagon, and we talked about a partial nation-building, and
now we talk about, you know, coming home in 18 months, with our
troops--I realize civilians will stay after that point in time,
and I realize that the coming-home part, based on testimony
yesterday, was really just a throwaway comment to sort of
appease people who are concerned about the buildup.
So, to me, it's really not clear. And I think that the
American people, who are going to be--the civilian side, in
particular, is going to be, for decades--the whole budget of
Afghanistan today is about $890 million. The 400,000 security
troops we're talking about are about $10 billion a year. And
I'm wondering, Madam Secretary, whether it would make sense to
really lay out clearly what all of this means, from the
standpoint of support for the next several decades, the amount
of civilian activity, and just from the standpoint of security,
what we really anticipate doing, over time? I know, in 18
months, the buildup, securitywise, is going to be lesser than
400,000, but I know, over time, at least--unless it's changed
again--that has been our goal, between Afghan police and army.
So, I would say to you that it's been very unclear, and
it's been like a sine wave, over the last 9 months, as to what
we're actually doing there. So, I'd love some edification.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator Corker, I'll do my best,
and then perhaps I could bring in some reinforcements, here, on
either side of me.
First, let me just provide the context, the best I can. In
our view, looking back, we never adequately resourced the
mission in Afghanistan. That's just a fact. And I think this
committee's work and reports certainly give a lot of credence
and support to that view.
There were, basically, 30,000 troops for a number of years,
with an additional, you know, 30-40,000 NATO troops, and we
didn't really have the kind of commitment that we were needing.
We also transferred a lot of the assets that should have
been used to support the troops we had in Afghanistan to Iraq.
That's just a fact, as well.
So, when the President took office, there were backed-up
requests for additional troops, that had been in the pipeline.
And I personally know several of the people who were commanders
on the ground in Afghanistan, going back to 2001; there were
always additional troop requests, which, because of the move
toward Iraq, were never given what was requested. So, that's
part of the history.
There was a pending troop request that the Bush
administration--and Secretary Gates can speak to this--looked
on favorably as they were going out the door, of 17,000 troops,
and then a request they left for President Obama of 21,000.
And so, right out of the bat, the President's, you know,
given a--what is a 38,000-troop request, and he orders a very
quick study, that Bruce Riedel, a very experienced intelligence
professional, headed up, along with Richard Holbrooke and
Michelle Flournoy, from the Defense Department. And, as the
President said when he made the announcement back in March,
``We're going to go forward with these troops. They've been
pending. There seems to be an argument for them. Our goal is to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda. We are changing commanders, something that is rare to
do. But, we're going to look at this again as soon as the
election's over,'' because the election season in Afghanistan
was taking hold.
Well, that's exactly what we've done. Unfortunately, the
election lasted a very long time, until, thanks to Chairman
Kerry, we finally began to bring it to a conclusion.
So, I don't blame you, and I don't blame anybody, for
wondering, you know, where we are, because of the history we
inherited and our effort to, frankly, make sense and
rationalize what was happening, and to put it into an
integrated civilian-military strategy. One of the first things
President Karzai said to me, when I saw him Kabul, was, ``I'm
confused.'' You know, and he's talked about how he said, ``I
understood what we were supposed to be doing from 2001 to 2005.
It was the war on terror. And then all of a sudden I started
hearing people in your government saying we didn't need to kill
bin Laden and Mullah Omar, and I didn't know what that meant.''
Well--so, there's been some confusion, which, frankly, this
administration has been trying to sort through. And we think
we've got it about as right as you get it, given where we
started from.
There is no doubt that putting these additional troops in,
in our mind, is necessary to reverse the momentum of the
Taliban, to demonstrate clearly to both the Afghans and the
Pakistanis that we are serious about our resolve to work with
them to try to stabilize their two countries, improve their
security situation, and that we know it cannot be just a
military undertaking; that's why we're emphasizing the civilian
side of it.
So, ultimately, Senator, we are going to have to maintain
civilian support for Afghanistan and Pakistan, going forward.
We think that's in our national interest, to do so.
But, I just want to make one final point. The July 2011
date is the date on which we begin to transfer authority and
responsibility to Afghan security forces. Now, what we have
tried to demonstrate is that the pace, the size of the drawdown
is going to be determined in a responsible manner, based on the
conditions that exist at the time. And if things are going
well, a larger number of forces will be transitioned out, and
the Afghans will be expected to take on greater responsibility.
So, it is not contradictory to set a date certain, yet to
condition it on the reality that we confront at that time.
Secretary Gates. Let me just say a word. I know that--time
to move on. But, first of all, one of my concerns, coming out
of the decisions in March was that it was clear they were
interpreted as providing for full-scale nation-building and
creating a strong central government in Afghanistan----
Senator Corker. As were the metrics.
Secretary Gates [continuing]. Neither of which is
achievable in any realistic timeframe, or sustainable, given
the costs and everything else.
So, I would describe, in just a few sentences, what I
believe our strategy is today, what these decisions represent.
It is to reverse the momentum of the Taliban. It is to deny
them control of territory in Afghanistan. It is to degrade
their military capabilities and, at the same time, grow and
strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan National Security
Forces so that they can manage the internal security of their
own country because they're dealing with better capabilities on
their side and degraded capabilities on the Taliban side. This
allows us to pull the bulk of our combat troops out and return,
in terms that--as Senator Feingold put it, to more of a
counterterrorism mission, because we don't have to worry about
the security situation inside Afghanistan. You cannot do pure
counterterrorism unless you have a government, or provincial
and local governments, that create a hostile environment for
the Taliban and that allow us to gather the information and
intelligence that we need to do the counterterrorism.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I--you stepped out for a
second.
The Chairman. No, I heard that, and I'm happy to--happy to
do that.
Senator Corker. Are we going to have a second round, just--
are we planning to do that or----
The Chairman. If we have time, we will try. Let's see where
we are.
Senator Corker. OK.
The Chairman. I'd like to do a second round, if they are
able to, but we have a time constraint. We'll see what we can
do.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
And thank you, all of you, for your dedicated service to
our Nation. We all appreciate it.
In 2001, every Senator voted to go against those who
attacked us using Afghanistan as the base. And President Bush,
in a lot of our views, turned away from Afghanistan, clearly,
toward a disastrous Iraq war. And many of us repeatedly urged
an end to that war and a refocus on Afghanistan. Well, here we
are, many years later, and Secretary Clinton is explaining the
results of that neglect.
So, 5 months ago, after our President asked for 21,000
additional troops for Afghanistan, I supported that request. It
wasn't easy for me, but I felt it was important to give him
that chance to refocus. We also included funding for the women
in Afghanistan, who have borne the brunt of the Taliban.
The President said when he announced his Afghanistan
strategy, that he needed those 21,000 troops--now, this is just
months ago--to, ``take the fight to the Taliban in the south
and the east, and give greater capacity to partner and train
with Afghan security forces.'' That's what he's saying again
now. I agree with that mission.
So, I voted. We sent 21,000 more troops. And here's the
thing. We're told, since we sent those troops, that the
situation has deteriorated. And I would like to put into the
record an interview with General McChrystal in which,
basically, he said, ``The Taliban--the fight against the
Taliban has gone downhill.'' And that was since the 21,000
troops were sent.
[The article referred to follows:]
[From the New York Daily News, Sept. 25, 2009]
Gen. McChrystal: Violence in Afghanistan Getting Worse
(By Richard Sisk)
Washington.--The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan has admitted he
was blindsided by the Taliban's comeback this summer in the bloodiest
fighting of the eight-year war.
``I think that in some areas that the breadth of the violence, the
geographic spread of violence, is a little more than I would have
gathered,'' Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal said in a CBS ``60 Minutes''
interview to be broadcast Sunday.
Despite the influx of 22,000 troops, bringing U.S. troop levels to
68,000, McChrystal said the battle against the Taliban has gone
downhill since he took command in June.
``They're probably a little worse,'' he said of conditions on the
ground.
McChrystal said his focus was on limiting ``collateral damage'' to
civilians.
``This civilian casualty issue is much more important that I even
realized,'' McChrystal said. ``It is literally how we lose the war, or
in many ways how we win it.''
McChrystal's recent gloomy report on the status of the war and his
pending request for more troops has touched off a fierce debate within
the Obama administration, pitting supporters of the military against
those favoring a more limited response targeting Al Qaeda in Pakistan.
The debate prompted McChrystal to tell the New York Times this
week, ''I have no intention of resigning.''
Senator Boxer. So, I would ask you, Why did the situation
get worse in Afghanistan after we sent 21,000 more troops? And
I guess I'd start with Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, the full number of
troops that the President authorized did not actually
ultimately arrive in Afghanistan until late in the summer,
early fall. The Marines arrived in southern Helmand in July.
And, in fact, the reporting that we're getting is that things
have begun to get better in southern Helmand, where the Marines
are. So, part of it has been a--first of all, it's been--I
think, when General McChrystal did his assessment, it was
really, at least as far as I'm concerned, the first
thoroughgoing assessment in the field on how things were going
since I became Secretary, in December 2006. And I think what
General McChrystal found, through doing that assessment and
traveling all over the country and looking at the situation,
was, as you just cited, that the situation was serious and
deteriorating.
We got his report in late August, and, as you know, we've
had this dialogue and effort inside the administration to
determine what to do on the basis of that assessment. But,
fundamentally, where the troops have arrived, the situation has
stabilized, and in some cases gotten better. And what General
McChrystal basically has said, that to stabilize the other
areas, these additional forces are necessary.
And maybe, Admiral Mullen would like to add.
Senator Boxer. Well, before he does--and I will, of course,
turn to Admiral Mullen--I just want to put in the record a GAO
study that shows that, as we added more troops, the violence
actually escalated.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Boxer. And this interview by General McChrystal was
at the very end of September.
So, Admiral, here's what I'm getting at. You know, I voted,
with reluctance, because I believed more troops would help our
situation. We added the troops. The violence got worse.
Now we're being told we should add more troops. And I guess
what I'm asking you is, How can we now leap to the conclusion
that more troops will mean less violence, when the opposite
seems to have occurred?
Admiral Mullen. Ma'am, General McChrystal's assessment--and
I agree with the Secretary of Defense, that it really was the
first thorough, comprehensive assessment that I've seen from a
commander, one. Two is, we've talked about underresourcing this
campaign, for a long time, for a good 4 or 5 years, seen the
insurgency just get worse. Particularly starting in 2006, it's
been very evident we couldn't resource it and get the troops
there, because of----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Our commitments to Iraq.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Admiral Mullen. So, it's where we found ourselves. And I
think the strategy that the President laid out in March,
significant in many ways, focused on the region, not just on
Afghanistan--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, specifically.
I've argued, and certainly it has occurred, many months
ago, that we need to have a national debate and discussion
about this, because I think that's been lacking, because of our
focus on what was the top priority for all of us, as directed
by President Bush. So, we're all learning as we go. I wanted--
--
Senator Boxer. I wanted to follow it up and ask you, as
you're explaining this, to consider this information. As I see
it--and I know this is correct, unless you disagree--that we
have, now, 68,000 American troops on the ground. There's 36,231
NATO troops. That's 104,231. There's roughly 94,000 Afghan
troops. And we won't count the 93,000 Afghan police, so we'll
leave that aside. That's roughly 200,000 versus 22,000 Taliban
and 100 Qaeda. So, my concern is--and this is why I interrupted
you, just to focus on this--it doesn't seem to me to be a
question of the numbers of troops. It's hard to say that
200,000 versus 22,000 is that different than 230,000 versus
22,000. It's the mission. And I guess what I'm sort of trying
to probe here is, How are we going to change the mission from
what President Obama outlined when I gave him my vote for the
21,000 troops?--which seems to me the same mission he's talking
about now.
Admiral Mullen. Three quick thoughts. One is, as we add
more troops and face this growing insurgency, the level of
violence is going to go up. It did in Iraq, in the surge; it
will do that here, as well, and, I want to be very clear, that
a very, certainly, tragic part of this, so will our casualties.
That should not be out of the sight of anybody with respect to
this over a period of time. But, it is the path to, actually,
reduced number of casualties and a lower level of violence,
first of all.
Second, McChrystal has changed the focus specifically to
focus on the key population centers. Secretary Clinton talked
about reducing the number of civilian casualties. Complete
change in focus, from a leadership perspective.
Third, he's changed, dramatically, how we partner with the
Afghan security forces, which we weren't doing before. We were
mentoring them, training them. Now we're in the field with
them, planning, living, fighting, et cetera.
So, those are fundamental shifts to get at achieving the
success that I think is possible with these additional forces.
Senator Boxer. OK. I really appreciate--that's the best
argument I've heard, but I still have tremendous doubts about
the numbers. I just think the objectives you've outlined we
ought to try to accomplish--with the numbers that are there.
Last question has to do with our forces, who are incredibly
stressed. I know, Secretary Gates----
The Chairman. Actually, Senator----
Senator Boxer. This is the last question. Divorce is up,
suicide's up, and psychological wounds are on the rise. So, my
quick question is--we know some of our men and women have been
deployed six or seven times. Are you confident, Secretary
Gates, that we're no longer deploying servicemembers who are
currently struggling with significant mental health problems
from their prior tours?
Secretary Gates. I think the only thing I can say in
response to that is, we are making every effort not do that. We
have put in place some very intensive screening processes. We
have hired an enormous number of mental health care providers.
We are trying to do everything we can to identify those who
have problems, to encourage those who have problems to come
forward and get treatment. The Army leadership, in particular,
has been very aggressive in this area. Can I say with certainty
that we're not deploying somebody who has severe problems? No.
But, I can tell you we're making every effort to avoid doing
so.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for coming here today and helping and being
engaged in this national dialogue on this important issue that
we really need to do. I view this, really, not as a Republican
problem or a Democrat problem; this is an American problem.
After all, we were all Americans before we were Republicans or
Democrats. And as polarized as this country is politically,
this is an issue that we really, really all need to pull
together on. And I appreciate you coming here and engaging in
this conversation.
Regarding the President's recent announcement on strategy,
I think that obviously he had choices, as the Commander in
Chief. And I think anyone who knows anything about this issue
has to be--has to have empathy for what he went through in
making this decision.
This is a problem that one could characterize only as a
Rubik's Cube on steroids. I mean, it is--it has so many facets,
it's--it is difficult to wrestle with. And the conclusion one
reaches quickly is that there are no good choices, there are
only choices to be made that would be in the best interests of
the American people.
Secretary Clinton observed that we don't hear much about
positives from there. And that is true. And obviously, the
media is much more interested in the negative than the
positive. But, you know, our objective, when we went into
Afghanistan--and I think everyone would agree with this--was to
get al-Qaeda, to stop
al-Qaeda, to squelch al-Qaeda. And that objective really has
been met. We have run al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, the Taliban remain. And that--the relationship
that Secretary Clinton described between al-Qaeda and the
Taliban complicates the issue tremendously.
And the difficulty that we hear, of course, is that al-
Qaeda has now migrated into western Pakistan, and there is a
slow drip, if you would, of those people migrating into Yemen
and Somalia, which is going to cause us a problem in the
future, I would think.
But, in any event, I think that's a positive that we should
look at, and the fact that we have driven al-Qaeda out of
Afghanistan, but we have to remain--we have to deal with what's
left over.
This is a question that I have, hopefully a brief question.
As we build up now in Afghanistan, as the President has said
we're going to do, and you look at what has happened in Iraq,
whether you agree or disagree with whether we went there--
whether we should have gone there in the first place or whether
the surge was good or bad, things seem to be generally better
in Iraq today than what they've been.
When you went through this exercise, was any consideration
given to stepping up the drawdown in Iraq as we build up more
quickly in Afghanistan? That is, did you consider stepping up
the schedule for withdrawal from Iraq? Could I get a brief
answer on that?
Secretary Gates. The answer is ``No.'' General Odierno has
a plan, in terms of the drawdown, to get our combat forces out
of Iraq by the end of August 2010, and all of our forces out by
the end of 2011. He has found that the conditions, the improved
conditions that you referred to, in Iraq have allowed for the
early withdrawal of at least one brigade; but, that was based
on the decisions--on the situation in Iraq itself. So, there
really--in none of our discussions, either in the Pentagon or
in the interagency, was there a discussion of accelerating the
drawdowns in Iraq.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. If I could just add to that. In addition to
the brigade, General Odierno has been very aware of the
requirements for some of the key things--smaller forces,
enabling forces--that he has agreed to transfer into
Afghanistan. So, he's been very supportive of this overall
approach, albeit very consistent with what the Secretary said,
in terms of interagency consideration.
Senator Risch. Thank you. And I'd encourage that we keep an
eye on that, and anything that can be done to accelerate that,
I think would be beneficial to everyone.
Secretary Clinton, you articulated, about as well as I've
heard, trying to thread the needle on the business of our
commitment. I heard you use the word ``commitment.'' I heard
you use the term ``long haul.'' And those are at odds with a
date. And that's a difficult needle to thread, because those
people have got to be convinced that we do have a commitment,
that we're there for the long haul, and yet, we say ``July
2011.'' Well, you know, we really need to be clear on this,
because the enemy is going to take their calendar out, they're
going to circle ``July of 2011,'' and say, ``Well, you know,
just like America, we are going to reevaluate, at that point,
whether we're going to step down until then and gear up at that
point.''
So, I--and again, I know it's a difficult needle to thread,
because the American people, including myself, want to see
success, they want to see us out of Afghanistan. And yet, at
the same time, the people there have got to be convinced that
somehow we are going to protect them if they cooperate with us.
So, I--and I--with all due respect--and I don't mean this,
maybe, the way it's going to sound, but I heard--Secretary
Gates, I heard you talk about ``a target'' yesterday, when you
were talking about July 2011. And yet, the impression I got
from the President was, it isn't a target as much as a hard
date for starting to drawdown. And those two things are very
difficult to reconcile. So, again, I'm being critical, here,
without an answer, but that is a difficult needle to thread,
but you're going to have to do it.
Secretary Gates. Let me just start, briefly, by saying that
I think, through the course of the questioning yesterday, what
I was trying to make clear is that the date of July 2011 to
begin thinning our forces and transitioning the security
responsibilities to the Afghans is a firm date that the
President has established, but the pace of that drawdown, the
location of the drawdown, and so on, will be conditions-based
and, to use his words, a responsible drawdown, as we have done
in Iraq. But, there should be--as I said in my opening
statement, and as Secretary Clinton just said a few minutes
ago, July 2011 is the time that the President has picked when
we have to begin drawing down.
Now, let me just reiterate the balancing act that we've--
the balance that we've tried to establish here. We are sending
a signal of significant, I think, commitment to be successful
in Afghanistan, with the deployment of these additional forces.
But, at the same time--and I--and as I said yesterday, one of
the things that became clear at the end of the surge in Iraq
was that the Iraqis wanted us out of the country as quickly as
possible. That is not necessarily the case in Afghanistan. They
live in a rough neighborhood, and our sense is, there are a
number of Afghans that would like to have us hang around, and
the United States Army and Marine Corps protect them for the
indefinite future.
So, one of the purposes of this date, an important element
of this date, is to put the Afghans on notice that--and give
them a sense of urgency that they must begin to accept their
responsibility for their own security, and it's going to start
then, because--so, they have to get their men recruited, get
them trained, and get them into the field and into combat with
us.
So, it's a combination of sending a message of commitment,
but, at the same time, putting the Afghans on notice that the
time is coming when they are going to have to establish their
own security--or, maintain their own security.
Senator Risch. I couldn't agree with you more that the
sense of urgency really seems to be lacking there, and they
need to be--as the chairman had said earlier, that they really
need to have a sense of urgency instilled in them. And they
think in terms of centuries, we think in terms of months, so
it's a difficult proposition.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, could I just add one comment to
that? I mean, this date has also been described as arbitrary.
It's not arbitrary at all. On the military side, we feel that
that timeframe, between roughly July 2009, when the Marines
arrive in Helmand, and into July 2011, we will know whether
we're going to be successful or not. And so--and thinking that
this is the--believing this is the right strategy and that we
will be successful, we think that time of beginning the
transfer of security responsibility and the transition is the
right time. And then, again, that--responsibly and based on
conditions. But, it was not an arbitrary date. It is the third
year--third summer, if you will, that the Marines will be in
Helmand, and we will have a clear indication from three
seasons, if you will, at the heart of the fighting season
there, that--which way this is going.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Thank you all for your service to our country. I think
we're all--a debt of gratitude, especially at a most difficult
time.
You know, Admiral Mullen, I heard you say that the
underresourcing of our engagement in Afghanistan over the last
4 or 5 years has brought us to where we are today. So, that, to
me, means that our adventure in Iraq has created a set of
circumstances where we have underresourced our efforts in
Afghanistan. Is that a fair comment?
Admiral Mullen. The--as I indicated, I think, in my
previous comments, clearly the priority and the direction I
had, both as chairman and as the chief of a service, was to
resource Iraq. And we were balancing deployments, balancing
time at home, and we----
Senator Menendez. So, you did not----
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Could not resource
Afghanistan.
Senator Menendez. So, you couldn't resource Iraq and
resource Afghanistan as you needed to.
Admiral Mullen. That's correct.
Senator Menendez. Now, I look at this July 2011 date, and I
see it as clearly aspirational. And I think we need to be
honest with the American people. Can any of you tell me that,
after July 2011, that we won't have tens of thousands of troops
years after that date?
Secretary Gates. I think that the President, and we, have
been clear that July 2011 is the beginning of a process of
drawing down in Afghanistan. That process will be based on the
conditions on the ground. But, it--you know, the President is
very--I think I can speak for him, and Secretary Clinton can
correct me if I get it wrong--the President, throughout this
process, was very concerned about an open-ended conflict, of
just unending commitment of significant numbers of troops and
dollars in this. And so, I think that, you know, he has not put
deadlines, in terms of when our troops will all be out, but
clearly he sees the--July 2011, as I said in my opening
statement, an inflection point where we begin to draw down
those forces in Afghanistan, and with a view to transferring
this responsibility to the Afghans over a period of probably 2
or 3 years.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that, and
you've reiterated it several times. Let me go back to my
question.
Can any of you tell this committee that, in fact, after
July 2011, we won't have tens of thousands of troops for years
after that date?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I can tell you what the
intention is. And the intention is----
Senator Menendez. But, you--I don't--Madam Secretary, I
don't want to hear what the intention is. I want to know, Can
you tell the committee that there won't be tens of thousands of
troops after July 2011, for years after that? It's unlikely,
right? It's----
Secretary Clinton. No, I----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Unlikely.
Secretary Clinton. I can only answer the way that I am
comfortable in giving you the best information available at the
moment, and that is that there is a convergence of opinion
between us and President Karzai in his second term. In his
inaugural address, he said he wanted the responsibility, and
would be prepared for the responsibility within 3 years, for
Afghan control over many important parts of the country--right
now, about 60 percent of the country is not contested--and
within 5 years, the Afghans would be responsible for their
entire security.
So, that is his aspiration. It happens to be very much in
line with what we want to see happen. There will be, starting
in July 2011, troops withdrawn, based on conditions. Sitting
here today, I would believe that we will be able to start the
transition, as planned, in 2011. We also know that there will
be, probably for the foreseeable future, a drawdown and
transfer out of combat troops, but a request for continuing
logistical support for the Afghan security force.
So, you know, that is the kind of, you know, target that
we're aiming at.
Senator Menendez. Admiral Mullen, is it true that right now
the Afghan Army only has about 10,000 soldiers that can operate
without us being alongside them?
Admiral Mullen. That's a--it is a small percentage, yes,
sir.
Senator Menendez. So, what we are talking about is a
massive increase that we seek in the Afghan army, which
presents a daunting obstacle, considering the fact that finding
sufficient literate recruits, and reversing what is an abysmal
retention rate, is a huge challenge. Something we haven't done
in 8 years, we're going to do in 18 months. And a large
national army also requires a strong and capable central
government to command it, and clearly a permanent foreign
subsidy.
So, when I hear these dates, I believe that they are as
solid as quicksand and, at best aspirational. And I appreciate
the aspiration, but the reality is, as someone who has to cast
a vote for that money that will be coming forth, I can't tell
the people of New Jersey, or this country, that we are doing
that clearly on aspirations. I think we need to be a lot more
honest about our assessments.
You know, I see--this is putting a lot of eggs in President
Karzai, who has been there since 2001, first as a transitional
President, and then as an elected President. And what has he
presided over? He's presided over massive corruption, where,
you know, anywhere between 20 or 40 percent seems to be the
going rate of skimming off of the taxpayers' money; where
members of his family and members of certain ministers'
families ultimately seem to do very well in business
transactions, they travel to some of the best places in the
world, they have bank accounts overseas, outside Afghanistan--
and we want to say that we're really going to condition them?
I'd like to see us condition their travel and their bank
accounts to make sure that we're not going to see the continued
corruption. That's a serious effort to have some type of
control and say that we're not having a blank check.
You know, I look at President Karzai, when he makes his
speech about ``my brother Taliban''--well, maybe there will be
a day of reconciliation, but first you've got to fight the
Taliban before you get to the point of reconciliation, so that
they understand there is a need for reconciliation.
And so, it worries me that a lot of what we're putting our
eggs in, here, is someone who doesn't even speak in the terms
of fighting the enemy, and an Afghan police that is so rife
with corruption and is cooperating with the Taliban.
And then, I look at the disadvantage of having Karzai there
if our national security is as you've defined it, as creating
stability and creating an opportunity for the Afghan Government
to ultimately have the space and the time to fulfill what is
ultimately nation-building, we still will have the security
issue as a concern if Karzai doesn't perform, 18 months from
now. We still will have that security issue.
So, as you've defined our national security interests,
whether Karzai performs or not, we will be stuck in that set of
circumstances. And that's a real problem.
I don't get a sense we have a clear civilian counterpart.
Even General McChrystal says, ``Who is my civilian
counterpart?'' And do we really believe that 974 civilian
personnel versus 100,000 troops is going to meet the civilian
aspect of this?
And finally, I get no sense that we have a Pakistan
strategy. We have been talking about offering them a strategic
relationship. They don't seem to want a strategic relationship.
They want the money, they want the equipment, but, at the end
of the day, they don't want a relationship that costs them too
much. And it seems to me, the more we build up our troops in
Afghanistan, the more reliant we become on the Pakistanis in a
variety of ways.
So, I just don't get the sense, at this point in time, of a
comprehensive policy that says that I should vote for billions
of dollars more to send our sons and daughters in harm's way in
a way that we will ultimately succeed in our national security
goals. I hope I can be convinced before that vote comes, but,
as of right now, I'm not.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Do you want to convince him right
now? [Laughter.]
Secretary Clinton. I'll wait and do that, Mr. Chairman.
We'll bring in more reinforcements.
The Chairman. Thanks.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I--first of all, thank you to all of the witnesses for your
service and commitment to the country. I know the last thing
you want to talk about is July 2011, but I do want to try and
focus on something.
I've been very impressed, quite frankly, with what all of
you said yesterday, in Armed Services and what you've said
today. Admiral Mullen, I saw you this morning on FOX--with
regard to this July 2011 date. Secretary Clinton, and I quote,
said in her speech, ``Just as we have done in Iraq, we will
execute this transition responsibly, taking into account the
conditions on the ground.'' You have said today, Secretary
Gates, that the goal is to ``clear, hold, build, and
transfer,'' which is what we did in Iraq. We transferred
authority; now the Iraqis are in control, and I think that's
the goal all of us want in Afghanistan.
The problem on the July 2011 date is the concern a lot of
people have that there's one constituency we're not talking to
yet. We're talking to the American people, who want to win and
come home. That's what they want to do. We're talking to the
Afghans and President Karzai about taking responsibility for
their own country. ``The United States is not going to be your
surrogate army, and we're not going to stay forever.'' And
that's important. But, al-Qaeda and the Taliban are the other
constituency, and this July 2011 date, if they interpret it as
an end game for us, gives them some opportunity. So, I think
statements like what you said, Secretary Clinton, about being
determined by the outcome on the ground and the circumstances
on the ground, and Admiral Mullen, you've been quite clear, and
Secretary Gates, you said yesterday that the President has
the--can change his mind anytime he wants to, based on the
circumstances that take place.
I'm not asking a question, but I'm going to tell you why
the confusion still exists with some of us who are scared about
sending the wrong signal. White House Press Secretary Gibbs,
this morning, according to an article by Chip Reid of CBS News,
in responding to a question about the July 2011 date, said the
following, and I quote, ``The President told me it is locked
in, there's no flexibility, troops will start coming home July
2011, period. It's etched in stone. Gibbs said he even had the
chisel.'' That type of statement is not helpful to that
constituency, being al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who don't need to
be encouraged that there's a tolerance level beyond which we
won't go in this battle, because each of you said that this is
the epicenter of Islamic terrorism. I believe that too. The
intelligence that all of us have seen is that way. And as we
speak to our constituencies, the Americans and the Afghans,
we've got to also understand that we're talking to the Taliban
and
al-Qaeda, and our resolve has to be there or the commitment
we're making to these troops is not going to have the force
behind it that it needs to have.
So, I'm not asking you a question. I don't want to put you
between Mr. Gibbs and yourselves and your excellent testimony
today, but that is the open question that, to me, has to be
dealt with in delivering the message. And I won't ask any of
you to have to respond to that, but I think it's important.
Two questions from me. On the Taliban and al-Qaeda, have
we--are we tracking their source of arms? Do we know where
they're getting their arms? You had referred, Admiral Mullen,
to the skill level of the encounters we had had most recently
with them, which tells me they have both the equipment and the
leadership that they can fight a pretty doggone good battle.
Where are they getting this from? Is it coming from Iran? Is it
coming out of Pakistan? Is it a combination? Do we know?
Admiral Mullen. The, probably, most significant threat that
we see for our people is the IED network, that is growing in
Afghanistan. And actually, an awful lot of that's homegrown.
It's--there's not a lot coming in from the outside. Rather than
specific arms, certainly financing, we're trying to pay
attention to that, where they're getting their finances from.
Some of it's coming from the opium piece, some of it's coming
from the gulf, some of it's coming from the fact that they tax
like crazy; you know, they tax all the locals. So, trying to
impact that--and actually, we've put people in place to focus
on this specifically in Afghanistan.
So, from that standpoint, those are the focus areas, rather
than the individual weapons. At least it's my experience in
that part of the world, you don't run into anybody that doesn't
have a weapon. It's a question of who they're going to use it
against. It--so, from that standpoint, we're hard after that.
Secretary Gates. Let me give you an example on the IEDs.
The most devastating IEDs that are being used against our
troops and against our MRAPs and so on, is based on ammonium
nitrate, a fertilizer. It's illegal to have that fertilizer in
Afghanistan, so there's clearly a smuggling network that is
bringing in huge quantities of these. One of the IEDs that went
off under one of our MRAPs and blew it in half was 1,500 pounds
of this ammonium nitrate. And what they do is, basically, use
as a triggering device mines that are left over from the Soviet
era. So, there's a lot of stuff left over from a period when,
frankly, some of us were involved in shipping a lot of arms
into Afghanistan.
Senator Isakson. Thank you for that answer.
Secretary Gates, you and Secretary Clinton both. Secretary
Clinton, I have your statement here about Afghanistan and
Pakistan, you said, ``We'll develop a long-term sustainable
relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not
repeat the mistakes of the past.'' And I think, in your
testimony, you refer to the mistakes of the past. Is that in
the context of inconsistent engagement with Pakistan? Is that
the mistake you were referring to?
Secretary Gates. I think that the--it was really turning
our backs on both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistanis--and
it goes to a question that was asked earlier. I mean, the truth
is, there is a great deal of mistrust on the part of the
Pakistanis toward us. They believe we have abandoned them, or
betrayed them, on several different occasions, only the most
recent of which was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. And so,
we have a lot of work to do in trying to convince them that
we're not trying to take over their country, that we're not
trying to take control of their nuclear weapons, and that we
are actually interested in a long-term partnership with them.
But, it is because--and I was Deputy National Security Advisor
and then DCI at the time--you know, we were dealing with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of eastern
Europe. I mean, it wasn't where we were twiddling our fingers--
twiddling our thumbs at the time, but the fact remains, the
United States turned its back on Afghanistan.
And the irony is--and I was talking to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee about this yesterday--the irony is that
Charlie Wilson, over there, who was so successful in getting
money for CIA and--to give to the mujahideen, the weapons to
beat the Soviets, after the Soviets left, tried to get money
for the civil side on Afghanistan, and, where he was able to
get hundreds of millions for the weapons, couldn't get very
small amounts to try and build schools and so on. So, that was
the mistake, in both countries.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much. Thank you again for
your service to the country and your patience with the
committee today.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo my sincere appreciation to all three of you
for your service to our country. I have the greatest confidence
in your abilities and your commitment, and I thank you for
that. I know you're doing your best and that you're working
together as a team.
Secretary Gates, you pointed out that this is part of a
coordinated strategy to deal with the epicenter of terrorism,
which is in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas. I want to raise
one other issue. You talked about external forces that are
supporting the terrorist organizations and the recruitment
strategies. Well, one of the strategies I thought the
administration was pursuing was the closing of Guantanamo Bay,
not only because it wasn't effective in what we are trying to
accomplish, but also that it was a recruitment symbol for
terrorist organizations. We've fallen behind on that. Can
you just comment briefly on whether we are still committed and
how important that is as part of our strategies on dealing with
terrorists?
Secretary Gates. We very much are committed to closing
Guantanamo. We have very detailed plans on how to do that. We
are, I think, in the final stages of selecting a facility, and
we are, at the same time, in the process of identifying
detainees that we believe can be transferred to other
countries. I think there are about 215 detainees left; we've
identified, I think, 116, at this point, that we think can be
transferred.
The President has every intention of doing this, and we
will do it. The logistics--the--principally, the logistics of
it have proved more complicated than----
Senator Cardin. How important is this----
Secretary Gates [continuing]. We anticipated, but I think
we're about there.
Senator Cardin. How important is this in regards to our
strategies against terrorism?
Secretary Gates. Well, one of the reasons why I articulated
the opinion that we should close Guantanamo not long after I
got this job, in--at the end of 2006, is because I--you know,
the irony is, Guantanamo is probably the best prison in the
world today--elliptical trainers, reading rooms, flat-screen
TVs--and probably the most highly disciplined guard force in
the world. But, it has a legacy. And what I said 3 years ago
is, it bears a taint, and it is a recruiting tool for al-Qaeda
and for other terrorists and Islamic extremists. So, I think
that there is unanimity in the administration that we need to
get this done, and, as soon as we can finalize the logistics, I
think you'll see pretty quick progress after that.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me say from the outset that I am
unconvinced on the need for the additional troops. I have
concerns about committing more Americans to this effort.
First, let me get the number. The President has authorized
30,000, but, as I understand it, that number could be more than
30,000 when you talk about the backup support troops.
Secretary Gates. During our discussions, one of the things
that has--that I've tried to make clear consistently is that
when you're looking ahead, it is impossible to foresee every
need. And where I do not--where I have asked the President for
some flexibility is in medics, in intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, in counter-IED capabilities--in short--road
clearance, engineers--those things associated with safeguarding
the lives of our troops. And I have asked him for a modest
amount of flexibility on that. And it's in the range of about
10 percent of the 30,000. My hope is that I won't need to use
much, if any, of it, but trying to look ahead a year or more, I
felt that having some flexibility was important, particularly
in terms of safeguarding our troops.
Senator Cardin. I understand that. So, we are really
looking at, potentially, 33,000 additional troops.
Secretary Gates. Potentially.
Senator Cardin. OK. Just so we get the number right.
Now, with adding more troops, we raise the stakes. I want
to talk about the benchmarks. You say the circumstances on the
ground will dictate the withdrawal, the standdown of troops in
July 2011. We have benchmarks that are currently being
developed for Afghanistan. I would like to hear more specifics
as to what would be the circumstances on the ground that would
affect your recommendation on troop levels starting in July.
Are we talking about the performance of the Afghan Government?
Is that part of what we're looking at, with how they control
the security of their country? Are we looking at the number of
military that they have ready to stand up? Are we looking at
the cooperation we've received from the international community
as part of this? Are we looking at the activities of the
Taliban, and specifically how much of the nation they control,
or how many al-Qaeda are actually in Afghanistan? What--and I
hope you can be specific--what are we looking for as far as the
circumstances on the ground, so that Congress can at least
carry out our responsibility in evaluating this request? Do we
know what we're looking at 18 months from now, what
expectations we can expect? And can you be specific on this?
Any one of you.
Admiral Mullen. Two of the highest-risk areas from my
perspective with respect to this strategy. One is Karzai and
his government. And I mean that down to the subdistrict level,
not just in Kabul. And the other is the development of the
Afghan security forces. And we've set annual targets, year-to-
year targets for that development, some of the reasons that
have already been discussed here.
But, with respect to the Karzai government, specifics: good
ministers; good governors; anticorruption; local governance; is
the money actually going to the people; are goods and services
getting to the people in the villages; reintegration;
reconciliation. ANSF, the annual targets that I talked about
specifically, we've got to reduce the attrition rate, increase
the retention rate, specifically; and then, they will
transition to more security forces in the lead. Corruption, in
particular, in the police--on the police side, which has been
mentioned. International support. We expect offers. We need to
see those and actually what they're doing on the ground, not
just military, but civilian, as well. There are noncontributing
nations--Japan being one, recently contributing--agreed to
contribute up to--or, $5 billion to Afghanistan.
Pakistan, shifting their strategic calculus. Do we see that
happening? Because we've got to work with them to get at these
safe havens for al-Qaeda.
So, those are some of the--at the major level----
Senator Cardin. Well, I would hope we could be more
specific.
Let me just challenge you on one criteria--the corruption
of the Karzai government, which has been well documented. Does
our strategy mean that if progress is not made, we reduce our
troop levels quicker; or if progress is made, we keep more
troops there? How does that translate to U.S. troops being in
theater? Is it a positive sign for removing troops or a
negative sign? Corruption.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, what we're looking for is
capacity and effectiveness. We believe that corruption is one
of the reasons why the Karzai government has not developed the
capacity it needs, nor has it been effective enough.
I mean, I don't want anybody to think that we're trying to
aim toward some zero-corruption standard in Afghanistan. I
mean, that doesn't exist anywhere in the world, and
particularly in that part of the world. But, what we do expect
to see is a government that delivers more for the people,
thereby obtaining the allegiance of more people in more parts
of the country, that can support the effective ministers and
the effective governors, especially where we need them. We each
have experiences with different ministries that we think are
quite competent and very professional--you know, the Defense
Ministry, the Interior Ministry--increasingly, the Finance and
the Education and the Agriculture Ministry.
You know, I didn't have time to respond to Senator Menendez
at the length and with the thoroughness that his long litany
deserves, but this is not all a negative picture. And I think
it's unfair--it's unfair to our efforts, it's unfair to the
efforts of many people inside the Afghanistan Government who
are truly making a positive difference in the performance that
we would expect from a functioning government. We have to do a
better job, in the international side, to coordinate our aid,
to get more accountability for what we spend in Afghanistan.
But, much of the corruption is fueled by the money that has
poured into that country over the last 8 years, and it is
corruption at every step along the way, not just in the palace,
in Kabul. You know, when we are so dependent upon long supply
lines, as we are in Afghanistan, where everything has to be
imported, it's much more difficult than it was in Iraq, where
we had Kuwait as a staging ground to go into Iraq. You offload
a ship in Karachi, and by the time whatever it is--you know,
muffins for our soldiers' breakfasts or anti-IED equipment--
gets to where we're headed, it goes through a lot of hands. And
one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the
protection money. That has nothing to do with President Karzai.
So, I think we need a--we owe you a more careful unpacking
of a lot of the concerns, and we will endeavor to provide that.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I'd like to welcome all three of you again after our
brief exchange yesterday. It's been interesting to hear how
different committees approach the same situation. Welcome to
the Foreign Relations Committee.
I would like to say, first of all, that I think we have
pretty broad agreement about the concerns that we are facing in
Afghanistan. I mean, even among members who have been pretty
vocal here today, the question really is to continue to examine
the process that we are proposing in order to address those
questions. And I think there have been some really excellent
points made today by Senator Feingold, who talked about a
concern that I've had for a number of years here, that we are
losing our maneuverability. We did it in Iraq. We are in danger
of, to a certain extent, losing it in Afghanistan as we face a
threat to this country that has a high degree of mobility. And
Senator Corker, I think, has made some really valid points. And
you've heard, again and again, this question about timeline
versus concept. And I'm going to mention something on that
again.
But, before I do, I want to just--Secretary Gates, I want
to give you my view on something that you said, just to clarify
my view for the record, when you said that, in your view, a lot
of Afghanistans don't want us to leave, and that being one of
the motivations behind putting some sort of a date on the
beginning of the leaving process, I would say perhaps that's
more true among people who are in the government than it is
Afghanis, writ large. I would comment, there's an Asia
Foundation survey, this year, which shows that 56 percent of
those surveyed were sympathetic to antigovernment groups that
used violence against us. And this is a country, as I mentioned
yesterday, that has a long history of opposing any sort of
foreign occupation. So, that's the other side of this.
And I think there's some legitimacy in the concern that
Senator Boxer mentioned, with level of violence that might be
engendered by military presence in areas where there's a
perception of occupation. And we discussed that yesterday. I
won't go in it again today.
But, I'd just like to lay out three basic thoughts here.
One is, if we're talking about a stable, supportive
Afghanistan, which is something that came up in testimony, it's
very difficult--particularly if we're talking about being there
long term, as, Secretary Clinton, you've mentioned--it's very
difficult to do that without a stable, viable government of
some sort. And I'm curious--and I've mentioned this a number of
times before--about the process through which this government
was formed. The constitution that formed this government, as a
result of the Bonn Agreements, which, on paper, created a
centralized system and there might be an adjustment needed,
constitutionally or otherwise, that devolves some sort of power
if, realistically, we're going to look at a stability in the
provinces and above.
And the second is, you can't grow a national army of
400,000, including national police, without people who are
willing to support that concept. And we're having a very
difficult time in growing that. And I've not heard anything
from the President, through yesterday to today--and, Admiral
Mullen, I'd like your thoughts on this--with respect to where
we are, in terms of meeting the goals that we announced, in
terms of growing that national army.
And then, third, you can't really talk about this timeline.
This is probably one of the greatest difficulties of the way
that this has been presented. It's very difficult to talk about
a timeline for withdrawal without clearly laying out, in an
affirmative way, what the conditions on the ground will be that
will enable this process to begin. And we haven't really heard
in these exchanges, from yesterday and today. What is this
going to look like--not necessarily specifically, province by
province, but what is this environment going to look like when
this turnover can occur?
So, those are the three questions that I would have. And,
Secretary Clinton, I'd very much like to hear your views on the
nature of this government and how we can operate there long
term without addressing some way to perhaps change the
constitution.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I'll take No. 1; I think
that maybe Admiral Mullen can take No. 2, and Secretary Gates
can, you know, be our cleanup hitter.
I think you raise a very profoundly important question, and
it's something that I began discussing with President Karzai
during my last visit. There has to be the decentralization of
the--of government functions and authority that reflects the
way the country actually operates. I think this has to be
undertaken in a very clear process headed by--motivated by the
interests of the Afghans themselves.
I think the Bonn constitution, which was a credible effort,
you know, made a number of assumptions that were at variance
with both the past and the current reality within Afghanistan.
So, this is a--this does seem to be a conversation that
President Karzai is willing to engage in. There are certain
redlines for him, as there would be for any President of a
sovereign country. But, he was very open to it. Looking for
ways to bring in some of the traditional decisionmaking
processes, like the loya jirga, and make it a part of an
ongoing governmental authority--there's a lot there that we
should be looking at. And so, I think your suggestion is one
that we will be talking to him further about.
And just, finally, I think, too, that the way that the
government currently functions is something that could not
necessarily have been predicted 8 years ago at Bonn, but----
Senator Webb. I would strongly agree with you on that, by
the way. I think, in the context of 2001, it was an
accomplishment to have achieved this constitution.
Secretary Clinton. That's right. And so, now I think it is
time to take stock, and there are many different ideas being
discussed, and what we need is to make this an Afghan process--
I just want to reiterate and close with this--the last thing in
the world we want is a bunch of international experts flying in
to Kabul to tell the government and the people of Afghanistan,
``Here's how you must, you know, construct your government.''
But, let's work together to get the lessons that have been
learned, and then try to translate that.
Senator Webb. The challenge would be for Karzai to
understand that, in the long run, that would be in his self-
interest, I would say.
Secretary Clinton. Well, not only that, it would be in the
interest of his legacy.
Senator Webb. And it's in the interest of the Afghan
people. Yes.
Secretary Clinton. You know, one of the--one of--I mean,
one of the things that President Karzai has said to me is that,
you know, his family--his family has fought for Afghanistan for
300 years. I mean, he carries that sense of patriotism very
close to his heart. Now, we may have different views about how
he sees his role and how he's conducted it, but I think it is a
serious mistake not to put yourself into the shoes of the other
person and to actually listen and understand how they see the
reality they inhabit. And so, that's, you know, part of what
we're trying to get better than it's been over the last several
years.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. ANSF, just quickly, Senator Webb, we're at
about--on the army side, about 96,000 right now. That said,
we're sort of in the 55,000 to 60,000 that actually are out
there in the field. So, we've got to work on the overhead
aspect of this.
One of the real fundamental changes that McChrystal's put
in place is the partnership piece. So, I mean, we have company,
platoon, squad-sized units out, you know----
Senator Webb. In terms of growing the size of the Afghan--
--
Admiral Mullen. I think that's a----
Senator Webb [continuing]. National----
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. That's a----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Military, where are we from
where the goals would have been at this point? Are you on
target, in terms of growing the actual size of the----
Admiral Mullen. Well, I think that----
Senator Webb [continuing]. National army?
Admiral Mullen. I mean, the targets just recently, you
know, got reset by McChrystal, so we're 96,000 in the army
right now, we need to be at 134 about 12 months from now, by
next----
Senator Webb. Right.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. September, roughly. And that
kind of increase each year, to build to whatever the eventual
outcome is, aspirationally, notionally, 400,000 between both
the army and the police, specifically. But, our--we've got to
reduce the retention--or, we've got to increase retention
significantly, reduce the attrition, and increase recruiting.
One of the things is just incentives. I mean, the Taliban
make a lot more money than the national security forces right
now. So, General McChrystal is, as we speak, increasing the pay
fairly significantly for the security forces, which we think
will have an impact.
So, we think we understand what the specifics are, what we
need to do, and--but, it's really about, now, executing that,
and we don't underestimate, particularly on the police side,
the significance of the challenge and the risks that are
associated with that.
In the end, they're the ones that are going to provide the
local security, they're the ones that are going to be able to
``hold'' and on which to ``build'' in the long run, and we know
that.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me just say that--we're going to run up
against a timeframe here--there's going to be a vote, I think,
somewhere in the next 10 or 15 minutes----
Senator Webb. All right, well, let me just--in terms of the
third question, it's been discussed a good bit, so I will just
leave it as an observation so we can move the hearing on and--
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
And, in addition to that, Secretary Gates, I know, has to
leave at noon, sharp. And Secretary Clinton needs to leave for
Brussels. So, we do want to try to wrap it up, if we can.
Admiral Mullen. I'd be----
The Chairman. I know that we need----
Admiral Mullen. Chairman, I'd be glad----
The Chairman. I'd prefer to have a second round----
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. I'd be glad to stay. I'm
kidding. [Laughter.]
I'm going with my boss. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. We would love to have had a second round, but
this will be an ongoing conversation. I think we'll have some
chances--maybe even get the committee together for a good
conversation rather than just a hearing. And, I think if you're
willing to do that, I think it would be very helpful, at some
point in time.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by thanking each of you----
The Chairman. And I can't tell you--I don't know why we
have a hurricane above us here today. I apologize for----
Secretary Gates. We thought it was a Senate bowling alley.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. That would be news to me, I don't know.
Senator Shaheen. I want to applaud each of you and the
President and everybody who's been involved in the very
thorough review of what our strategy should be in Afghanistan.
New Hampshire is, this week, sending another 140 National
Guard members over to Afghanistan. And, as you pointed out,
Secretary Clinton, these are mothers and fathers, sons and
daughters, and we owe them, and all of the men and women
serving there, a mission that they can understand and support.
And I think it's appropriate, also, that we continue to have a
rigorous debate in Congress and in the Senate about what we're
going to do. So, thank you all for that.
There have been a number of mentions about the importance
and the potential for reconciling certain Taliban elements, and
the importance of that to the success of what happens in
Afghanistan. Have any of those overtures begun? And who do we
see is going to do those kinds of negotiations? How do we
envision that happening?
Secretary Gates. First of all, we have tried to, in our
discussions, differentiate between reconciliation and
reintegration. It may seem like a semantic point, but we
consider reconciliation to be, What opportunities are there
with Taliban leaders to bring them over and along with the
people who are fighting for them?
I think the general view is that, until the momentum shifts
against the Taliban, the likelihood of significant
reconciliation, in those terms, is not very bright. So, that's
part of changing the momentum, is beginning to get these guys
to think differently about the future.
With respect to reintegration, this is really about getting
the foot soldiers to decide that they don't want to be a part
of the Taliban anymore. And we have some very limited anecdotal
information about people deciding they didn't want to fight for
the Taliban anymore, and going back to their villages. The key
here--and we think that there is some significant percentage of
these foot soldiers who actually are doing this for pay or who
have been intimidated into doing it. So, if we can provide
economic opportunities, or the international organizations, or
whoever, or our efforts on agriculture can create more
opportunities for them to earn a salary--but, the security
piece is absolutely central, because there are also too many
stories of people who have wanted to quit the Taliban who not
only, themselves, have been killed, but all of their family
have been killed. And so, the security environment in a village
or in a district has to be such that these people who want to
put down their guns and pick up a plow can do so without the
fear that they and their entire families will be massacred.
And again, this is a matter of establishing the security,
but it's also a sense of--Secretary Clinton referred, earlier,
to more of a hedging on the part of the Afghans because of
their uncertainty of who's going to win, because the winners--
if the winners are the other side, and they've picked our side,
they will be killed. And so, they are waiting to see where the
momentum is shifting. And, frankly, it's this shift of momentum
that we think is important and that is a fundamental purpose
behind this surge of troops to push that Taliban back and to
create an environment in which these people, as they look at
this situation to decide which way they want to go, go our way,
go the way of the Afghan Government.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton, I know you're on your way to a NATO
meeting, and I had the opportunity, a couple of weeks ago with
Secretary Gates, to be part of the first of a forum on global
security with a number of our NATO allies, and was on a panel
with the German Defense Minister, and was impressed with his
willingness to look at Germany's role in their NATO mission,
and just wondered what message you're going to take to our NATO
allies to encourage them to talk to their publics about the
importance of the mission in Afghanistan.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we have been reaching out
vigorously to our counterparts. Certainly, the President has
spoken with a number of heads of state, the Vice President,
Secretary Gates, myself, National Security Advisor Jones. And
we've gotten a very encouraging response.
Secretary General Rasmussen, at NATO, has been very
positive about the President's decision, and has carried that
message to capitals across Europe. And I think that, as the
weeks ahead unfold, there will be significant announcements of
additional troops. Our hope is that the aggregate of the troop
announcements will be between 5,000 and 7,000. That would give
us a lot more leeway in many of the parts of the country that
we want to continue to make sure are secure. It would help with
the performance of certain functions, as well as the important
role of training the police and the army.
So, we are encouraged. There will also be an international
meeting, at the request of Prime Minister Brown and Chancellor
Merkel at the end of January, which is a very important event
for a lot of our NATO ISAF allies. So, I think that, you know,
we will see, in real terms, the delivery on the rhetorical
support that the President's decision has engendered.
Senator Shaheen. And will your discussions also include
better coordination of the different NATO forces who are in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Well, that certainly is a conversation
that we are in the midst of. I held a meeting, when I was in
Kabul, with about a dozen of the NATO ISAF Foreign Ministers
who were there for the inauguration, and one of the points that
I stressed is how we have to do a better coordinating our
civilian aid, how we would like to see a civilian counterpart
to General McChrystal, who is the commander of the NATO ISAF
forces. Not all the ISAF members, as you know, are in NATO, so
trying to structure this the right way is challenging, but
there's a great and growing understanding of why we need to do
a better job with all of the partners, NATO ISAF, the United
Nations. Obviously, the United States believes that we have to
play a major role in this because of the burdens that we have
assumed, but we want the international support, as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. And I'm out of time, but I just
wanted to urge followup on what we heard from Senators Webb and
Cardin, that the measures of how we're going to determine our
success over the next 18 to 24 months, I think, will be very
important to make sure that we understand, and that the public
understands, what we're looking at that shows us that we're
being successful.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I want to thank Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and
Admiral Mullen for at least two things--your public service at
this time in our Nation's history, as well as the review, that
you just conducted along with the President, which was both
thorough and essential, contrary to some of the commentary
around Washington.
I wanted to return to a topic that I know some have
explored to some degree already, and that's President Karzai
and his government. We know that on a number of occasions--in
order to get this right--and we have to get it right; I can't
imagine a more serious, grave situation we've faced in recent
American history--you have to get the security right, the
governance part of this right, as well as other issues, like
development. And to get governance right, President Karzai has
to be a full partner in this.
I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan in August, and I know
that being on the ground for a few days doesn't confer
omniscience on any Senator, but I have to say that, meeting
with President Karzai in August 2009 and May 2008, I came away
very troubled by his answers to questions I and others have
posed to him, and stunned by some of the things he said or did
not say in those meetings. So, I keep returning to this
question, among others, when we analyze our strategy.
So, I wanted to get a sense of, in a very specific way--I
know, Secretary Clinton, in your testimony, you rightly and
appropriately said the Afghan people, the United States, and
the international community will hold the Afghan Government
accountable for making good on its commitments and President
Karzai's recent pledges--of what, specifically, will we do to
hold him accountable, both him personally, but also his
government? I know you understand the importance of this.
Secretary Clinton. Well, there are a number of steps. You
know, we have been working closely with the Afghan Government
in support of a major crimes tribunal. We have enhanced our
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence--FBI, DEA,
Department of Justice--in order to clearly and unequivocally
present evidence of corruption that we expect action to be
taken on with respect to charging and prosecuting and removing
from office and seeking restitution from those against whom a
case can be made. We are also working to certify ministries as
to which will or will not receive the money from the United
States. And we want that to be part of our overall
coordination, to go back to Senator Shaheen's question, so that
we can have an international--an internationally accepted
standard for transparency and accountability in these
governments. We are working closely and encouraging the right
decisions, in our view, to be made about members of the new
Cabinet, governors to be appointed, and the like.
So, there's an intense ongoing consultation. I would think
that probably Ambassador Eikenberry and other members of his
leadership team spend many hours every day in direct
consultation and conversation with, not only President Karzai,
but others in positions of responsibility.
So, I mean, we're moving on all of these fronts, Senator
Casey, and it's--it's not easy, and we think that our
intentions are clear, and we expect to see progress made. But,
again, I don't want to paint some Utopia that we are attempting
to achieve; that's just not in the cards. It's not in the cards
anywhere.
And the United States has been deeply involved in other
countries, going back 60 years, often with combat troops on the
ground, where there was massive corruption, where there was
instability, where there were fraudulent elections. And, you
know, you just--you know, you have to have a certain level of
strategic patience here in order to see things through. And I
think that, you know, President Karzai and his government have
been under more scrutiny than probably most ever have been. I
mean, we do a lot of business with a lot of countries that have
elections where the leader is reelected at 98 or 99 percent,
and we don't say a word, we just keep going. Now, the
difference is, we have our young men and women, military and
civilian, in a combat situation, and we have to expect more.
But, we need to put it in the broader context of, you know,
what we have done around the world for decades, and, you know,
the kind of efforts that prove successful and in keeping with
the national security needs of the United States.
Senator Casey. Well, I want to commend the work that you,
Ambassador Eikenberry, and others have done. I know it's not
easy and that there are limitations of what we can do when
dealing with a sovereign government. But, I know how important
it is.
I wanted to raise another issue, and ask whether Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen want to add to anything that we've
explored already. But, the second element of this decision, in
terms of getting it right is governance. What do we do with, or
can we have a positive impact on, local and provincial leaders?
One thing that was heartening to me, as disappointed as I was
at some of President Karzai's answers, was that the two
ministers that we met with, Minister Wardak as well as Atmar,
with army and police responsibilities, obviously, were said to
be, and, I think, in the limited time we had with them, gave
evidence that they're very competent and they've got a lot of
skills.
We also met some capable local and provincial leaders. So,
what's the strategy with regard to engaging local or provincial
leaders? And how does that factor into getting this governance
piece right?
Secretary Gates. From the time I--actually, from my
confirmation hearings, I've been concerned that, among other
things, we were too focused on the central government in
Afghanistan, and particularly the notion of trying to build a
strong central government in a country that had never had one,
and that we weren't paying enough attention to the local and
tribal leaders and the traditional institutions in Afghanistan.
The--one of the tragedies of 30 years of war is that many of
those local institutions--the tribal shuras and so on--had been
significantly weakened as elders have been shot or executed
or--and their authority undermined, and the Taliban goes after
them specifically. And so, I think a really important part of
the President's decisions and our discussions was, How are we
going to engage, at the subnational level, at the provincial
level, at the district level, and at the local and village
level? And it's everything from the President's talk to
Secretary Clinton and myself about communications--how do we
communicate with those people, convey to them what we and the
Afghan Government are trying to do? And so, and how do we work
with them? And the truth of the matter is--and we'll get into
it further with you all down the road--but, in terms of the
transfer of security responsibility, in a lot of these
districts and areas, it may not be the Afghan National Army or
the Afghan National Police that we--that--to whom we turn for
providing local security; it may well be a local security force
that operates within the context of the provincial government
or the district government. We've seen some experiments with
this in Wardak province and elsewhere, and they've worked
pretty well. And so, I think it's going to be a mix.
And, to answer the question that Senator Webb asked, my
view is, we will do the transfer of security in the same way we
did it in Iraq, and that will be a judgment by the ISAF
commanders of when an area is ready, when the local forces are
ready, to assume that responsibility with us in a tactical, and
then a strategic overwatch, sort of a cavalry over the hill, if
you will. And I think that--but, local security forces and
local governance are going to be a big part of that--a big part
of that equation.
The caution that we have is not to cross the line into
reestablishing warlords and local militias that, in fact, are
operating independent of the government, whether at the
district or provincial or national level.
Senator Casey. I know I'm out of time, but----
The Chairman. Senator--yes.
Senator Kaufman, we're in the back 7 minutes of the vote,
and there's a grace period, as you know. Senator Cardin's going
to come back, so we can, hopefully, you know, get the two last
Senators in, here. But, if you want to truncate a little bit,
it's your choice. We won't----
Senator Kaufman. I will try.
The Chairman [continuing]. Require it.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. I will do that.
And it--look, I want to thank you very much for wrestling,
which I find to be--agree with several statements that were
made--one of the most complex problems I've ever seen, and the
most difficult problem, because it involves lives of the folks
that are just the best among us. And I also want to thank you
for the infinite patience to wrestle with us on this issue, and
the ability to do that. And I can't think of three people who
would be better, that I'd be happier, to see wrestling with
this problem than the three of you.
Now, I want to agree with what Senator Casey and a lot of
other people have said. I think the No. 1 problem here--there's
a lot of problems, so--you know, I don't minimize any--but, the
No. 1 problem is, Do we have a partner, in the Afghan
Government, for success? That, to me, is the really key
question. I spend time--two trips to Afghanistan, met with
folks and talked to them. There's a lot of other problems. But,
that's the No. 1 problem, in my mind. And one of the great
things, I think, about the President's proposal is, he came up
with a way, which I thought no one could, to kind of give me
some hope that we can do something with the present government,
and that is setting the deadline of July 2011. Because people
came in and talked to me, and I've talked to so many people on
this, and they all say, ``Well, we should use our leverage on
Karzai.'' I don't think we had any leverage in Karzai until you
set a date certain that we're going to leave.
So, I think it's very--and kind of in a cleanup position at
the end of this thing--I think it's really important--there's
been a lot of confusion back and forth on the deadline, so I
just want to make it clear, to send a message to the Afghan
Government. You have no doubt that the President has a deadline
of transferring troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011. Is that
fair to say? Is it fair to say, therefore, to deal with so many
other problems we have--and comparisons have been here--there
is no--you have no doubt that we will not be adding more troops
to Afghanistan after this deployment, outside of the 3,000,
potentially, that you may have to add?
Secretary Gates. That is the commitment that we have made
to the President.
Senator Kaufman. That's right. So, when--this is not like
what we--comparisons to Vietnam, where we had promises and then
didn't--this is not even like Iraq. This is a firm commitment
by the President of the United States, agreed by the major
foreign policy strategic planners in our government, that in
July 2011 we're going to start drawing down troops, and we're
not going to be adding more troops. I think that's a
significant message, and I think it's the only message. If we
stick to that message--it's the only message that can have--
help--that the Karzai government can, in fact, be successful.
And because of the lack of time, I will yield to the
Senator from New York for questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before you begin, Senator, if I could just--I want to thank
you, because I've got to take off and vote. And I'll hold the
vote open, get them to protect you, here. But, I really
appreciate your coming in. I know it takes a lot of time, but
it does, as you know full well--and, Secretary, you know
perhaps even more--sort of, helps the process to work, and, in
the end, is critical to our own deliberative process. So, we
thank you very, very much for doing that. And I wish you well
on your journey.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to each of you, for being here. You've provided
such extraordinary leadership for our country, and we're
extremely grateful.
I agree with my colleague, this is the most difficult issue
any of us can face.
I'd like you just to touch, briefly, if you can, on the
issue of
al-Qaeda. Secretary Gates and I, last time we spoke, talked
about, Why do you care if al-Qaeda has a foothold in
Afghanistan? He provided very detailed analysis about why that
type of foothold would be able to be a launching ground for
similar terrorist attacks to
9/11, and also the overwhelmingly destabilizing effect with
regard to Pakistan, which obviously has nuclear weapons; it
could pose grave security risks to the United States.
My concern is, What's to stop al-Qaeda from moving to
Somalia or Yemen or any other place? And, you know, to the
extent you can talk about this on a nonsecured basis, what are
some of the things that you intend to do, militarily and in
other operations, with regard to other places al-Qaeda will
create potential strongholds?
Secretary Gates. Well, very briefly, as I said in my
opening statement, al--the Afghan-Pakistan border area is the
epicenter; it is the historic--it is the site of the historic
victory over the Soviet Union by many of these same actors. And
it is where the planning and the inspiration--certainly the
inspiration, much of the training, much of the planning for al-
Qaeda operations emanates from. And wherever people have been,
whether it's Somalia or Yemen or the United States or the
United Kingdom, almost always, the roots trace back to this
border area. It is the home base, if you will, of this
operation.
And it's interesting, as I said earlier, how other
terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda of the Maghreb, al-Qaeda
of the Arabian Peninsula, gravitate and look to that area for
leadership and inspiration and legitimacy of their efforts in
the context of terrorist aspirations.
And all I can tell you is that we are very aggressive in
going after al-Qaeda, and we have the authority of the
President to hunt them down wherever in the world we find them.
Secretary Clinton. I would just add, Senator, that al-Qaeda
has very deep roots now in this border area. You know, they
have operated, in the case of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others,
in and around this area, going back 20 years--well, 30 years.
They have a degree of protection from both the Afghan side and
the Pakistan side.
If you read the long articles that David Rohde wrote when he
escaped, there is a governmental presence, in effect, in the
ungoverned areas of Pakistan that gives them every reason to
believe they're secure. And they're--and they--and it's not
just one or more people picking up. They have extended
families, they have networks of connections that would have to
be disrupted.
So, I don't see that it would be very attractive or easy
for them to leave where they are, and I'm not sure there is any
terrain anywhere in the world that is more hospitable to them.
So, for all those reasons, I think that's where you will find
them.
Secretary Gates. Maybe most significantly, we would love to
see them leave there.
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I'd add to that is--and it
goes to Secretary Gates' comment about having been seen to
defeat the Soviet Union, and this would be seen to defeat the
only remaining superpower. And that is an inspiration for
recruiting, it is an acceleration for their global extremist
capabilities, and it is what, in the long run, I worry the most
about, if they are seen to be able to do that. Even as they are
more diminished, which they have been over the last few years,
but they are very, very deadly, and they seek the same kind of
aim.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, thank you again for your
testimony and your time. We're extremely grateful for your
extraordinary leadership.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. As I'm sure Secretary Clinton
is aware, we've had a vote going on, on the floor of the
Senate, so there's been a little bit of shuffling back and
forth. But, I do want to thank Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen, on behalf of our chairman, for your
patience here today, and particularly for your service to our
country.
And, with that, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. Secretaries
Clinton and Gates, and Admiral Mullen, thank you all for your
tremendous service to this country. The President and the American
people are lucky to have such able, dedicated public servants at this
important moment in our history.
The decision regarding how to move forward in Afghanistan
represents an incredibly difficult moment--for the President, for this
panel, and for our Nation.
Every American wants our troops to succeed in Afghanistan. Every
Senator is committed to the security of our Nation and the stability of
the world. And this week, the President laid out a serious proposal
that merits careful consideration.
Sending young Americans into battle is something none of us take
lightly. All of us have been to the funerals, spoken to the families,
written too many letters of condolence. The cost to our country--in
blood and treasure--has been high in Afghanistan, and the gain
insufficient. As the President said this week, the status quo is not
sustainable.
A better way forward relies upon the development of the
comprehensive, detailed, and realistic plan for Afghanistan that we
have been lacking for far too long. Without it, we cannot justify the
continuing loss of American lives and resources, and no amount of
sacrifice will accomplish our national security goals.
For my part, I remain skeptical about sending more troops to
Afghanistan. This will only be acceptable to the American people--and
it will only work--if it is part of a broader strategic effort,
encompassing both diplomatic and economic initiatives.
I hope that, in today's hearing, you'll help us consider some of
the fundamental questions that are on the minds of many Americans.
First of all, how does this policy fit in with our broader effort
to keep America safe? How does it help us achieve our national security
goals in Pakistan, and in the region?
Does the plan encompass the diplomatic and economic imperatives
that must accompany a shift in military strategy? In my view, a
strategy for success must include narrowly defined, achievable goals
like protecting key population centers, providing for targeted and
limited economic development (including schools, roads, water, and
agriculture), cracking down on rampant corruption, and boosting the
capacity of the Afghan Government (not just at the national level, but
at the local level) to meet the basic needs of the Afghan people.
Do we have allies who are ready to stand with us? We all agree that
our NATO allies need to do more, and that we need to work in closer
concert with them. But how do we go about working with our NATO allies
so that we can agree on a plan in which each of us can share our
strength, and the burden of this effort?
Do we have a reliable partner in the Karzai government? We must be
able to have confidence that the regime is ready, willing, and able to
work with us. The Afghan people must be able to have confidence that
their government can provide basic physical and economic security.
Finally, and perhaps the question weighing heaviest on the minds of
the American people, do we have a credible plan for completing this
mission and bringing our troops home as soon as possible? Our effort
must come to an end someday, and someday soon, because, as President
Obama says, our goal was never to occupy Afghanistan. Our roadmap must
have a destination, a path toward a day when the Afghan Government will
be able to take basic responsibility for its own people and its own
future.
We wrestle with these issues because that future is inextricably
linked with our own. Although there are questions to be answered, I
appreciate the President's sincere, thoughtful proposal--and I
appreciate the presence of our witnesses today. The challenges we face
in Afghanistan and Pakistan are many and complex. I look forward to
discussing them with you all.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. The President's strategy in Afghanistan calls for both
military and civilian activities to stabilize and rebuild the country's
economy.
With regard to the coordination of civilian and military
development activities, what is the chain of command among the
numerous agencies engaged in some aspect of development, and
how does this structure aid or hinder coordination?
Answer. Starting from the bottom--at Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and District Support Teams, civilian employees from USAID, USDA,
and the State Department on their agencies work in teams with one
designated as the senior civilian at each platform, responsible for
coordination. They coordinate closely with the military commanders of
the PRTs to ensure that the projects they are overseeing complement
those that the PRT commanders are executing through programs like the
Commanders' Emergency Response Program. Our civilian and military
leaders at each platform seek concurrence from their counterparts
before spending funds.
Senior civilians report to the senior civilian representative at
the Regional Command their PRT or DST falls under. The military PRT
commander at a given PRT reports to a superior at his or her respective
Regional Command. This ensures that civilian-military coordination on
all matters--including development--occurs at the Regional Command
level.
If matters need to go higher for review or resolution, the
civilians send them to the U.S. Embassy, who is responsible for all
civilian assistance, and the military chain is through USFOR-A in
Kabul. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal have a close
working relationship and meet regularly to share views and coordinate
their respective activities.
The net effect of this is that we have developed synchronized
civilian-military chains of command, to ensure coordination at each
level: district, provincial, regional, and national. So far, our
experience has been that this has promoted coordination on development
and other issues.
Question. Who is ultimately in charge of the strategy?
Answer. In theater, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal
are responsible for implementing the strategy. They report to the
President.
Question. How are DOD reconstruction activities integrated with
those of civilian agencies?
Answer. The activities are coordinated at the district, provincial,
regional and national level through the mechanism described. At the
district and provincial level, the PRT Commander and civilians are part
of the Integrated Command Team. They are in constant contact with one
another to ensure that their activities are complementary, and do not
conflict or duplicate one another. Similar structures exist at the
Regional Commands. Task Force and maneuver battalion commanders, who
also have the ability to carry out development activities, frequently
consult with PRT commanders and their civilian counterparts in their
Areas of Responsibility, which can cut across provinces and districts.
In a given month, the number of Regional Command development
conferences, secure conference calls, and meetings on development can
be daunting, but ensure that our civilian and military reconstruction
activities are well-coordinated and supporting our objectives in
Afghanistan.
Question. Does DOD fully participate in country team deliberations?
Answer. Yes. DOD is well represented at our Embassy in Kabul.
Question. What is the role of Ambassador Tony Wayne with regard to
DOD activities?
Answer. Ambassador Wayne, as Coordinating Director for Development
and Economic Affairs in Kabul, oversees all U.S. Government nonmilitary
assistance to the Afghan nation. In this position, he supervises a wide
range of Embassy sections, programs, agencies and offices in the field.
He is kept abreast of DOD activities, including development activities
funded through programs like CERP.
Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles
in Afghanistan.
If U.S. military forces will begin departing the country in
as soon as 18 months, who will manage the programs and sectors
that DOD has been managing?
How will a transition be accomplished?
Answer. As part of the transition and drawdown process, we will
examine each program to determine which programs managed by DOD should
be continued. There will be close coordination with U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan to ensure continuity. We will notify the Congress as
required by law or request authorities as needed based on a careful
evaluation of each program.
Question. In the context of a counternarcotics strategy in
Afghanistan, what are the respective roles of State/INL, USAID, and
DOD?
Answer. INL, USAID, and DOD coordinate closely with the Office of
the Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP), the
State Department's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA),
Embassy Kabul, and the larger Washington interagency to oversee and
execute programs in support of the U.S. Government's Counternarcotics
Strategy. These efforts support progress toward an end state in which
the Afghan Government, in partnership with its neighbors and the
international community, can effectively fight the drug trade within
its own borders and break the narcotics-insurgency link by denying drug
funding to insurgents.
The new U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, now in its
final stages of approval, includes objectives aiming to disrupt the
nexus between narcotics and the insurgency, as well as address linkages
between narcotics and official corruption. While each agency and bureau
hold particular expertise and capability to execute specific
counternarcotics (CN) programs, interagency working groups--with
participation by DEA, DOD, ONDCP, INL, SCA/A, S/SRAP, DOJ, USAID, and
other interested parties--in both Kabul and Washington meet regularly
to ensure that programs and policy align with overall U.S. Government's
goals in Afghanistan. Working groups meet bimonthly in Washington, DC,
and monthly in Kabul.
Specifically, INL carries out programs to build the capacity of the
Ministry of Counternarcotics in CN public information and messaging;
enhance provincial-level capacity and commitment to CN; expand drug
addiction prevention and treatment capacity; and support provincial-
level supply reduction through Governor-Led Eradication and the Good
Performer's Initiative. INL also engages with multilateral partners
such as the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime to consolidate regional
commitment to combating the flow of Afghan opiates and to diversify the
base of international support for enhanced CN, law enforcement, and
rule of law cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors.
USAID, alongside the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is working to
dramatically expand support for agricultural development, which forms
an important cornerstone of the new U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan. USAID programs work to increase agricultural sector jobs
and income through increasing farmers' access to inputs and effective
extension services; regenerate agribusiness by increasing linkages
between farmers, markets, credit, and trade corridors; rehabilitate
watersheds and improve irrigation infrastructure. Further, in order to
increase Afghans' confidence in their government, USAID works to
increase capacity within the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and
Livestock to deliver services and promote the private sector and farmer
associations through direct budget and technical assistance.
DOD's counternarcotics mission is to support the Combatant
Commander and law enforcement through information-sharing,
intelligence, training and equipping, infrastructure, and emergency
assistance. In December 2008, DOD approved revised rules of engagement
for USCENTCOM to give military commanders on the ground the flexibility
to target narcotics production facilities and facilitators for military
action if they are determined to provide support to insurgents. In
addition, intelligence efforts are being closely synchronized in
theater through the Interagency Operations Coordination Center and the
Afghan Threat Finance Cell for counternarcotics and threat finance
operations in order to target joint drug networks and insurgency
effectively.
INL, DOD, and DEA also work closely together to improve the
capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the
Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) to conduct interdiction activities,
investigations, and operations in order to disrupt and dismantle drug
trafficking organizations and prosecute those involved in the illicit
drug trade. DEA holds the operational and mentoring lead for training
the specialized vetted units of the CNPA, including the Sensitive
Investigative Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and
Technical Intercept Unit (TIU), and conducts joint operations with
these units on counternarcotics and counterinsurgency nexus targets. In
support of this effort, INL provides operational, maintenance, and life
support for CNPA facilities in Kabul and Forward Operating Bases
throughout the country. In addition, INL supports ongoing training,
equipping, and vetting assistance for the DEA-mentored specialized
units. INL contributes aviation assets to joint CNPA/DEA operational
missions, which include mission planning, reconnaissance, transport,
aerial escort and overwatch, in-extremis support, insertion/extraction,
search and rescue, and medevac assistance using INL's 10 armed and
armored (Huey-II) rotary wing assets, to interdict traffickers and
target, seize and destroy processing labs, chemical and drug caches/
storage. Aviation support to DEA/CNPA is also provided with INL's fixed
wing and leased aircraft.
DOD assistance includes support for the MI-17 program in the CNPA
Aviation Interdiction Unit (AIU), which currently has a total of 12
helicopters, with 7 in country and 5 in the United States for training.
In addition, DOD provides advanced training to the NIU and support to
the DEA country office and FAST (Foreign-deployed Advisory Support
Teams) officers.
Finally, DOD also supports the Border Management Task Force,
including tactical training, equipment, and infrastructure for the
Border Police, and construction of border crossing points, to help
control borders and decrease drugs leaving Afghanistan and the
importation of precursor chemicals and IEDs.
Question. How are each agency's activities integrated into a
coherent strategy?
Answer. The U.S. interagency is working diligently to finalize a
formal U.S. Strategy on Counternarcotics in Afghanistan, which is in
the final stages of approval with the Office of the Special
Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan
(S/SRAP). This strategy supports the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan
Strategy, the implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy, and
is integrated with the U.S. Agriculture Assistance Strategy for
Afghanistan. As part of the administration's ``whole of government''
approach to assisting the Afghan Government in waging its
counterinsurgency, the Counternarcotics Strategy also supports the U.S.
Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.
Following final approval of the strategy, the interagency
Counternarcotics Working Group will draft implementation plans for
specific programmatic aspects of the strategy.
Each agency's programs support the draft provisions contained
within this strategy, which has been drafted in accordance with
guidance provided to the Counternarcotics Working Group by S/SRAP and
the Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). In addition to
informal verbal and written guidance provided during extensive working
group and policymaking discussions, such guidance from S/SRAP and SCA
also includes an internal CN action plan developed by SCA and approved
by S/SRAP in May 2009. This currently serves as a template for
interagency activities while transitioning to the revised
counternarcotics strategy.
Question. Who is responsible for National Police training?
Answer. Afghan National Police (ANP) training is coordinated in
Afghanistan by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB).
Within the United States Government, the Department of Defense is
responsible for U.S. efforts on police training.
Although State initiated its own police training program in
Afghanistan in 2003, in 2005 a multiagency agreement gave the
Department of Defense (DOD) authority over all U.S. Government efforts
to organize, train, and equip the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the
Afghan National Army (ANA). Congressional funding for this effort is
provided exclusively through Afghan Security Forces Funding (ASFF)
given to DOD. DOD transfers funds to State which INL uses to deploy
U.S. civilian police trainers and advisors to conduct training and
mentoring of the ANP. DOD's representative in the field, Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), determines program
requirements; the U.S. Chief of Mission provides policy guidance.
Contractual responsibility for ANP training is scheduled to
transfer from INL to CSTC-A on March 31, 2010. This will serve to
streamline management of ANP training so that resourcing, funding, and
other management issues are more efficient. State will continue to play
a role in Afghan law enforcement training through program policy,
oversight, and direction of the police program through Ambassador
Eikenberry, the U.S. Chief of Mission. INL and DOD are also currently
assessing future requirements in advanced training and training/
mentoring for gender-specific programs.
Question. How will the U.S. monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral
police and army training?
Answer. Training and preparing Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) to take the lead in protecting the Afghan people and their
territory is a key element of the President's strategy in Afghanistan.
Building the ANSF has been and will continue to be a significant and
critical task, and we have reached out to our NATO allies and other
international partners to help us work with the Afghan Government to
achieve this goal. The international community has responded positively
to the requests made by the Afghan Government by providing trainers,
equipment, and funding. In close coordination with the Afghan
Government, NATO allies, and international partners we have established
programs of instruction for training the army and police that ensure a
uniform approach to building the ANSF. Finally, in 2009, allies agreed
to establish a NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan under U.S. LTG
William B. Caldwell IV, who also commands the U.S. Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan. This ``dual-hat'' command arrangement
will help ensure that the diverse international efforts to help the
ANSF are coordinated and that training provided to the army and police
is effectively monitored and evaluated.
Question. Please provide the following information:
The Afghanistan Government ministries that will receive
direct U.S. financial support.
The U.S. Government agency that will oversee that support,
including which agency will be responsible for determining the
readiness of each ministry to handle the proposed level of
support.
The level of funding proposed for each ministry.
The objective that the financial support is designed to
achieve.
The entity, United States or Afghan, that will be
responsible for monitoring and evaluation.
Answer. As part of our effort to support the Afghan Government's
ability to deliver services for the Afghan people, USAID is reviewing
the financial, management, procurement and expenditure systems of key
ministries regarding their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance.
Assessments (financial and procurement) are conducted for ministries
that USAID intends to fund with direct assistance. If the assessments
determine the management, procurement, financial, and expenditure
systems can be certified as accountable, the USAID Mission in
Afghanistan certifies the ministry as having the capacity to accept
direct funding. If the assessments determine additional specific
technical assistance is required, USAID will provide it. As of December
2009, the Ministries of Public Health, Communications and Information
Technology and Finance have been assessed and certified to directly
accept U.S. Government funds. USAID is planning to conduct assessments
on the Ministries of Education; Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock;
and Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
For those ministries that have been certified to receive direct
USAID, assistance, the breakdown of funding and objectives are below.
It should be noted, however, that for those ministries with pending
certification, no determination has been made regarding the exact
dollar figure for direct assistance, and objectives of such assistance
are still in development.
Ministry of Public Health: $236 million/5 years
Objective: Allowing the continuation of basic health services
in 13 USAID-supported Afghan provinces.
Ministry of Communication & Information Technology: $1
million/2 years
Objective: Allow for the improvement of information and
communication technology coverage and infrastructure
throughout government institutions, as well as to increase
access to information for the people of Afghanistan.
Ministry of Finance: $30 million/2 years
Objective: The Civilian Technical Assistance Plan allows the
GIROA to recruit, hire, and place expatriate advisors,
deployed at the central and subnational levels in specific
technical areas in accordance with the needs of the Afghan
ministries/agencies. It is a multidonor initiative to
rationalize the placement of technical assistance, ensuring
that the assistance provided is demand-driven and that
there is an overall picture of the number and placement of
advisors.
Furthermore, we are also contemplating direct budget funding of
$200 million per year for 5 years to be used to fund
priority programs in the Afghan Government's development
budget, with at least 50 percent of the funds going to
specific high-priority areas in the South and East, and
tied to clear benchmarks.
Ministry of Education: certification pending
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development:
certification pending
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock:
certification pending
Oversight, monitoring and evaluation of this direct assistance will
be handled by USAID. In the case of the Ministry of Public Health, it
should be noted that a specialized grants and contracts unit within the
ministry will be responsible for the coordination and administration of
grant and contract awards.
USAID also contributes to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
(ARTF) Fund, a multidonor trust fund administered by the World Bank
that pays a portion of the Afghan Government's operational costs, as
well as funds certain national-level development projects. The
operational costs covered by the ARTF include delivery of services such
as health care and education, and paying the salaries of about 250,000
nonuniformed civil servants throughout the country. The National
Solidarity Program (NSP) is GIROA's flagship development program which
provides a mechanism for the government to deliver urgently needed
services to its rural population. Through the NSP, the government
develops connections to the local population and provides them with
resources to build infrastructure projects, identified and implemented
by the communities themselves.
The World Bank administers the ARTF program, although it is
considered direct assistance to the Afghan Government. Donors
contribute to a single account, held by the World Bank in the United
States. The ARTF Management Committee makes decisions on proposed
allocations at its monthly meeting, and those decisions are translated
into funds through grant agreements signed between the World Bank and
the Government of Afghanistan. The World Bank also monitors the
projects.
In 2009, USAID provided $230 million to the ARTF, and in FY 2010 we
will provide $650 million to the same account, with not less than $175
million of that amount going toward the NSP. From FY 2003 through FY
2008, USAID provided approximately $400 million to the ARTF.
Question. In October of this year, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors briefed the committee on its operations worldwide, including
our programming for the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. The BBG
noted in a followup written response that, in spite of working with the
Afghan Government since the fall of 2005, ``The Ministry of Information
continues to block the contract for the operation of the Khost
facilities . . . Minister of Information Khurram continues to block
efforts to resolve this issue . . . '' How has the situation changed
since October?
Answer. The Department of State has worked closely with the
Broadcasting Board of Governors to resolve the impasse with the
Government of Afghanistan over the commissioning of the Khost
transmitter site.
After many months of active engagement on this issue with Afghan
officials, on December 3, 2009, the U.S. Embassy informed BBG of a
possible interim solution to the impasse. Under this plan, Minister
Khurram agreed in principle to a rapid startup of the Khost facility
and operations for 6 months. If, during this period, BBG and the
Ministry cannot come to a permanent agreement, then the Afghan
Government has the right to shut down the transmitter.
BBG has advised the Embassy that it accepts the proposal, and has
asked that our concurrence be transmitted to the relevant ministries so
that startup of the transmitter can be expedited.
The central issue in any permanent agreement remains control over
the content of Voice of America--and, presumably--RFE/RL Pashto
broadcasts when they begin in mid-January 2010. The ministry apparently
still wants to insert language into the bilateral agreement governing
the broadcasts that would give them the right to terminate the
transmission of programs deemed detrimental to the national interests
of Afghanistan.
BBG has rejected that language, and proposed alternative language.
BBG has pledged to begin discussions immediately, and work closely with
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to reach a final agreement in timely fashion.
______
Responses of Dr. Robert Gates to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION
The President's strategy in Afghanistan calls for both military and
civilian activities to stabilize and rebuild the country's economy.
Question. With regard to the coordination of civilian and military
development activities, what is the chain of command among the numerous
agencies engaged in some aspect of development, and how does this
structure aid or hinder coordination?
Answer. The Department of Defense does not engage in ``development
activities'' per se, but rather urgent humanitarian, reconstruction,
and counterinsurgency activities that can also aid the development of
Afghanistan. The newly established USG integrated civil-military
decision-making chain allows for planning and coordination of
activities at all levels from the district/company-level to the
national/embassy-level. While new, this structure has already exhibited
vast improvements in the coordination of civilian and military
activities.
Within this chain, there are two primary nodes of coordination of
``development activities'': the Provincial Reconstruction Team where
military and civilian actors develop integrated plans for executing
critical projects, and at the U.S. Embassy where national-level working
groups provide a forum for coordinating large projects. In addition,
USAID has a seat on the national-level Commanders' Emergency Response
Program (CERP) coordination board that reviews projects above a certain
funding level.
This question would best be served by additionally asking our State
Department counterparts.
Question. Who is ultimately in charge of the strategy?
Answer. With regards to the overall U.S. strategy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan the President of the United States and his Cabinet are
ultimately in charge of the U.S. strategy. In Afghanistan, Ambassador
Eikenberry is the lead U.S. Government official responsible for U.S.
Government (USG) policy. General McChrystal is responsible for U.S.
military efforts while also serving a unique role of being the
international military commander. General McChrystal and Ambassador
Eikenberry are responsible for coordinating USG efforts.
With regards to civilian-military coordination, in August 2009,
both General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry published an
``Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to
Afghanistan'' that provides guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and
the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in
Afghanistan. The plan represents the collaborative effort of all the
USG Departments and Agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of
different equities, resources, and approaches. The plan is based on
close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective civilian and military
mechanisms for integrated assistance. But its most important component
is a strong partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIROA) that will build the capacity needed to provide
Afghanistan with a stable future. The ultimate goal is for the GIROA to
have full responsibility for its own security and administration as the
international community continues to offer economic assistance,
training, and other noncombat support for the continued development of
the country.
Question. How are DOD reconstruction activities integrated with
those of civilian agencies?
Answer. In August 2009, both General McChrystal and Ambassador
Eikenberry published an ``Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan
for Support to Afghanistan'' that provides guidance from the U.S. Chief
of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S.
personnel in Afghanistan.
The newly established U.S. Government integrated civil-military
decisionmaking chain allows for planning and coordination of activities
at all levels from the district/company-level to the national/embassy-
level. While new, this structure has already exhibited vast
improvements in the coordination of civilian and military activities.
Within this chain, there are two primary nodes of coordination of
``development activities'': the Provincial Reconstruction Team where
military and civilian actors develop integrated plans for executing
critical projects, and at the U.S. Embassy where national-level working
groups provide a forum for coordinating large projects. In addition,
USAID has a seat on the national-level Commanders' Emergency Response
Program (CERP) coordination board that reviews projects above a certain
funding level.
Question. Does DOD fully participate in country team deliberations?
Answer. DOD participates in and contributes to virtually every
aspect of Country Team deliberations. Ambassador Eikenberry and General
McChrystal meet frequently to discuss issues and approve coordinated
civil-military planning that addresses Afghanistan's challenges. The
Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan, endorsed by both Ambassador
Eikenberry and General McChrystal, forms an Executive Working Group and
15 national-level working groups--each cochaired by a civilian and
military representative. Several of the Embassy's sections have
detailed or embedded military members who bring valuable experience and
perspective while also serving as conduits to the military
organizations for informal communication. Internal Embassy products,
such as cables and briefing and information memos, are provided to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Combined Joint Task Force-435
(CJTF-435), and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in draft form for
input and comments. Finally, a military liaison office headed by a U.S.
Air Force brigadier general ensures that the Embassy is well informed
and connected to military planning and activities. The Ambassador
relies on this general as a trusted confidant and sounding board. DOD
participates in every aspect of Embassy deliberation including policy
formulation, drafting of policy documents, and final decisionmaking at
the Ambassador's level.
Question. What is the role of Ambassador Tony Wayne with regard to
DOD activities?
Answer. Ambassador Tony Wayne, the Coordinating Director for
Development and Economic Affairs at U.S. Embassy Kabul, is responsible
for overseeing economic and development activities in Afghanistan. He
plays a vital role in ensuring U.S. civilian and military assistance
activities are harmonized and mutually reinforcing. For example, he and
his group worked to ensure governance and other civilian assistance
efforts can be available to go into contested Afghan localities at an
appropriate time after or with the U.S. military as part of our clear,
hold, build, and transfer approach. He cochairs the Executive Working
Group (EWG) with Brigadier General Frank McKenzie of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The EWG meets weekly to coordinate
and direct the activities of all 15 of the national-level working
groups established under the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan.
Ambassador Wayne plays an important role for the Embassy in overseeing
the activities of the Senior Civilian Representatives in each of the
Regional Commands. In addition, he ensures the efforts of the
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
and other relevant civilian agencies undertaking assistance activities
in Afghan development are done as a ``whole of government'' approach so
they have the greatest possible efficiency and effect.
Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles
in Afghanistan. If U.S. military forces will begin departing the
country in as soon as 18 months, who will manage the programs and
sectors that DOD has been managing?
Answer. Regarding the transition start date, it is imperative to
understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process. We are
increasingly looking to the Afghan Government to take on more
responsibility, and we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
on the assessment of conditions on the ground, the President will
determine the scope and pace of a gradual and responsible drawdown of
U.S. combat forces. DOD trainers and advisors will remain in
Afghanistan conducting security sector capacity-building and reform to
ensure a sustainable transition.
The President's strategy is an integrated civil-military strategy.
Increased civilian resources are being established now to ensure the
capability exists to sustain efforts. As Secretary Clinton described
during her testimony, the Department of State will seek additional
resources, including additional civilian personnel in Afghanistan, to
implement the President's strategy. The State Department, in
coordination with our military commanders, is currently examining the
requirements for additional personnel to complement our military force
increase.
In order to coordinate these civilian activities with our military
efforts, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal published the
``Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to
Afghanistan'' in August 2009, which provides guidance from the U.S.
Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S.
personnel in Afghanistan.
U.S. Government senior civilian positions have been established and
integrated at each level of the military chain of command to serve as
counterparts to military commanders and coordinate civilian efforts.
This newly established U.S. Government integrated civil-military
decisionmaking capability in theater allows for planning and
coordination of activities at all levels from the district/company
level to the national/embassy level. Although new, this structure has
already contributed to vast improvements in the coordination of
civilian and military activities.
Within this chain of command, there are two primary nodes of
coordination for stabilization and reconstruction activities: the
Provincial Reconstruction Team where military and civilian actors
develop integrated plans for executing critical projects, and at the
U.S. Embassy where national level working groups provide a forum for
coordinating large projects. In addition, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has a seat on the national level
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) coordination board that
reviews projects above a certain funding level.
Question. How will a transition be accomplished?
Answer. The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold,
build, and transfer. How the latter phase of this process is
accomplished will largely be dictated by conditions on the ground and
it will be done responsibly. The duration of our military presence will
be limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our
troops begin to come home.
Regarding the transition start date, it is imperative to understand
that July 2011 is the beginning of a process. It is not when we rush
for the exits; rather, it is when we begin the responsible drawdown of
our forces and the responsible handoff of missions to our Afghan
partners. There is no determination of how long this will take and
there is no withdrawal date on the right-hand side of July 2011. There
is also no specific guidance with respect to how many troops will be
pulled out.
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Question. In the context of a counternarcotics strategy in
Afghanistan, what are the respective roles of the State Department's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/
INL), USAID, and DOD?
Answer. The U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan
supports the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy. It is
integrated with the U.S. Government Agriculture Assistance Strategy for
Afghanistan, which focuses on the redevelopment of the agricultural
sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes for rural
families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy. The
CN Strategy also supports the United States Government Integrated
Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.
Although State/INL, USAID, and DOD work together as a part of the
``whole of government approach'' to assisting the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in waging its
counterinsurgency, general responsibilities fall within these
respective areas:
1. Public Information (State/INL and DOD);
2. Alternative Development (USAID and USDA);
3. Interdiction (DEA, DOD, and State/INL); and
4. Law Enforcement/Justice Reform (DOJ and State/INL).
DOD's main focus is on interdiction efforts to decrease narcotics
trafficking and processing in Afghanistan while building Afghan
capacity to disrupt and dismantle significant drug trafficking
organizations. DOD supports CN operations in Afghanistan by detecting,
monitoring, and supporting the interdiction, disruption or curtailment
of emerging narcotics-related threats to our national security.
Question. How are each agency's activities integrated into a
coherent strategy?
Answer. The U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan
supports the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy. It is
integrated with the U.S. Government Agriculture Assistance Strategy for
Afghanistan, which focuses on the redevelopment of the agricultural
sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes for rural
families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy. The
CN Strategy also supports the United States Government Integrated
Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.
The CN Strategy focuses on resources for those programs that will
contribute directly to: (1) breaking the narcotics-insurgency-
corruption nexus and, (2) helping to connect the people of Afghanistan
to their government.
Question. Who is responsible for National Police training?
Answer. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the overall lead and has the
responsibility for U.S and NATO efforts to man, train, and equip the
ANP. NTM-A/CSTC-A coordinates closely with the Afghanistan Ministry of
Interior, U.S. Embassy, the European Police Mission, and other
international bodies in this effort.
Question. How will the U.S. monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral
police and army training?
Answer. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-
A) commander, who is dual-hatted as the NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan commander, Lieutenant General Caldwell, is responsible for
monitoring the overall quality of instruction for the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Lieutenant General
Caldwell took command on November 21, 2009, when CSTC-A/NTM-A was
recently upgraded from a 2- to 3-star headquarters, and he will
continue to monitor the training, by both U.S. and international
partners, of the Afghan National Security Forces.
BUDGET SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN MINISTRIES
Please provide the following information:
Question. The Afghanistan Government ministries that will receive
direct U.S. financial support.
Answer. DOD does not provide direct U.S. financial support to any
Afghan ministry. DOD provides indirect support to the Ministries of
Defense and Interior through the Afghan Security Forces Fund. These
appropriated funds support developing the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), including the provision of equipment, supplies,
services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and
construction.
Additionally, DOD was authorized in the FY10 NDAA (sec. 1222(d)) to
transfer $50M in the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund
to the Department of State for the National Solidarity Program,
administered by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
We are currently discussing the appropriate path to implement this.
This question would best be served by additionally asking our State
Department counterparts.
Question. The U.S. Government agency that will oversee that
support, including which agency will be responsible for determining the
readiness of each ministry to handle the proposed level of support.
Answer. As the Secretary of State noted in her testimony, the
Department of State will be responsible for certifying ministries to
receive direct budget support.
This question would best be served by additionally asking our State
Department counterparts.
Question. The level of funding proposed for each ministry.
Answer. Because the State Department is responsible for this type
of funding, and DOD will not be directly providing funding to any
Afghanistan Government ministry, this question should be redirected to
the Secretary of State.
Question. The objective that the financial support is designed to
achieve.
Answer. Because the State Department is responsible for this type
of funding, and DOD will not be directly providing funding to any
Afghanistan Government ministry, this question should be redirected to
the Secretary of State.
Question. The entity, United States or Afghan, that will be
responsible for monitoring and evaluation.
Answer. Because the State Department is responsible for this type
of funding, and DOD will not be directly providing funding to any
Afghanistan Government ministry, this question should be redirected to
the Secretary of State.
BBG OPERATIONS
Question. In October of this year, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors briefed the committee on its operations worldwide, including
our programming for the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. The BBG
noted in a followup written response that, in spite of working with the
Afghan Government since the fall of 2005, ``The Ministry of Information
continues to block the contract for the operation of the Khost
facilities . . . Minister of Information Khurram continues to block
efforts to resolve this issue . . . ''
How has the situation changed since October?
Answer. This question would best be served by asking our State
Department counterparts.
______
Response of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Question Submitted
for the Record by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. Over the past 8 years, I have consistently voiced my
concern about the dire situation of women in Afghanistan, and worked to
secure resources to help them build better lives. I was surprised that
President Obama did not mention Afghan women in his speech on Tuesday,
particularly since they are so important to the future of Afghanistan.
How does the President's strategy take into account the
needs of women?
If President Karzai negotiates with Taliban leaders, as he
has indicated he may, how will the United States help ensure
that women are protected?
Answer. We remain deeply committed to promoting women and girls'
equal and active role in Afghan society. Women's empowerment and full
and equal civic participation are critical to economic stability,
security, good governance and development--key pillars of our strategy
in Afghanistan, which is aimed at preventing the reestablishment of an
environment conducive to the return of al-Qaeda. In particular, we will
work to ensure that the judiciary upholds the equal rights guaranteed
to Afghan women in their own Constitution, and to extend the rule of
law and strengthen Afghan civil society's own efforts to advance
women's empowerment.
We understand and share your concern about how reintegration of
former insurgents into their communities might adversely affect the
rights of women. During that process, we must distinguish between
irredeemable ideologues and those who were coerced to fight by economic
or other exigent circumstances. We have made clear that we are willing
to work with anyone who renounces al-Qaeda, lays down their arms, and
respects the human rights of their fellow citizens as is enshrined in
the Afghan Constitution.
______
Responses of Dr. Robert Gates to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. I am gravely concerned about the threat posed by
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan, as statistics
indicate that they are responsible for 70 to 80 percent of all American
casualties there.
You have been instrumental in providing Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles--which are designed to survive IED attacks--
to protect our service men and women. Since 2007, thousands of these
armored vehicles have been delivered to or ordered to be sent to Iraq
or Afghanistan because of your direct involvement.
However, in General McChrystal's report to President Obama on the
situation in Afghanistan, he indicates that abandoning important
protective measures--such as the use of armored vehicles--in the near
term will save lives in the longer term.
Specifically, he states that the use of armored vehicles in secure
areas of the country conveys ``a sense of high risk and fear to the
[Afghan] population.''
General McChrystal goes on to recommend giving leaders the ability
to accept ``some risk'' and use less protective equipment, such as
armored vehicles and body armor, in order to better relate to the
population.
But, he concludes that doing so ``could expose military personnel
and civilians to greater risk in the near term.''
Are you comfortable with accepting this ``risk'' since the
weapon of choice in Afghanistan is the IED, where the enemy can
target U.S. forces from a distance?
Answer. I am never comfortable accepting risk when it involves the
safety and lives of our troops. However, our Nation and coalition
allies are committed to reducing the influence of the Taliban and
developing a capable Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), which means
that, unfortunately, ``risk'' will be involved in accomplishing our
goals. There are numerous measures within the Department of Defense
(DOD) that we are taking to mitigate and reduce the ``risk'' of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to our troops in Afghanistan.
Finding solutions to countering IEDs and reducing the ``risk'' to our
troops is one of my top priorities as Secretary of Defense.
The Presidents' recent decision to deploy 30,000 additional U.S.
troops to Afghanistan will be a big boost to our C-IED battle by
allowing us to flow in extra specialized personnel and equipment in the
near term that will provide for greater counter-IED (C-IED) capacity.
There is no single solution to countering the threat of IEDs.
However, we can reduce and mitigate the IED threat with technical
solutions and by attacking vulnerabilities along the entire spectrum of
the IED network, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has focused many
efforts along these lines. I believe that General McChrystal's
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is ultimately our greatest hope for
reducing the risk to our troops. One of the indicators that his COIN
strategy is working will be in the increasing volume of human
intelligence (HUMINT) collected from the local citizens. As we continue
to successfully implement General McChrystal's COIN strategy, I
anticipate that instances of citizens providing us with HUMINT will be
on the rise, and have an exponential impact in combating the IED
menace.
Finally, I am certain that the recent establishment of the Counter-
IED Senior Integration Group (C-IED SIG), led by Dr. Carter and
Lieutenant General Paxton (the Joint Staff Operations Officer), will
have a positive impact in providing coherence to DOD's C-IED efforts.
They will be evaluating all current initiatives within DOD and ensuring
that we galvanize the full resources of the Department and U.S.
Government in combating IEDs and reducing the ``risk'' to our troops in
harm's way.
Question. In light of General McChrystal's proposed strategy, how
is the Department of Defense going to balance the threat of IEDs with
protecting our troops?
Answer. Finding solutions to countering IEDs and more effectively
protecting our troops is one of my top priorities as Secretary of
Defense. As the statistics indicate, IEDs account for the greatest
number of casualties and deaths among U.S. and coalition forces in
Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, there is no single solution to countering the threat
of IEDs. Reduction and mitigation of the IED threat is possible through
technical solutions and attacking vulnerabilities along the entire
spectrum of the IED network, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has
focused many efforts along these lines. The President's recent decision
to deploy 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will be another
boost to our C-IED battle by allowing us to flow in extra specialized
personnel and equipment that will provide for greater C-IED capacity.
General McChrystal's strategy contains the seeds for reaping the
greatest potential gains in our C-IED fight. The central pillar of his
strategy is protecting the population. When we reach the tipping point
where the people of Afghanistan believe that we are credibly providing
for their security and are there to stay, they will reject the Taliban,
and provide us and our Afghan partners in the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) with the human intelligence (HUMINT) to effectively
reduce the IED threat. We have already seen several instances in
Helmand province where our counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign has
produced positive results with local citizens identifying the location
of IEDs for our Marines. As we continue to implement General
McChrystal's COIN strategy, I anticipate that instances of citizens
providing us HUMINT will become the norm, and have an exponential
impact in combating the IED menace.
Finally, we recently established a Counter-IED Senior Integration
Group (C-IED SIG), led by Dr. Carter and Lieutenant General Paxton (the
Joint Staff Operations Officer), to evaluate current initiatives within
DOD in order to ensure unity of effort within the Department. Dr.
Carter and Lieutenant General Paxton just returned from a visit to
Afghanistan to assess the situation and look at ways to catalyze our C-
IED initiatives and synchronize actions across the Department. I can
assure you that we will continue to explore every available method to
reduce the threat of IEDs to our troops.
______
Responses of ADM Michael Mullen to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. Over the past 8 years, I have consistently voiced my
concern about the dire situation of women in Afghanistan, and worked to
secure resources to help them build better lives. I was surprised that
President Obama did not mention Afghan women in his speech on Tuesday,
particularly since they are so important to the future of Afghanistan.
How does the President's strategy take into account the
needs of women?
Answer. The President's strategy highlights the protection of the
Afghan population--all elements, including women and children. The USG
recognizes the powerful role women can play in changing the environment
in Afghanistan while balancing that within the cultural context. In
providing security for critical population centers in Afghanistan, the
U.S. military will reduce the risks faced by women and create an
environment whereby development and humanitarian agencies can help
Afghan women better realize their social and economic potential.
In the training of the Afghan National Security Forces, the U.S.
military has ensured a focus on protecting human rights--including
gender rights. In fact, women serve in the Afghan National Police
force. In the development of Commanders' Emergency Response Program
projects, commanders take into account the needs of Afghan women as
influencers in their environment.
Question. If President Karzai negotiates with Taliban leaders, as
he has indicated he may, how will the United States help ensure that
women are protected?
Answer. The USG does not have a direct role in reconciliation or
negotiation with Taliban leaders. However, the USG has stated to
President Karzai, with the support of the wider international
community, that any political settlement must respect the fundamentals
of the Afghan Constitution which respects and protects the human rights
of all individual, including women.
______
Response of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Question Submitted
for the Record by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. Our strategy in Afghanistan requires us to have
legitimate, capable, and reliable Afghan partners. However, the Karzai
government is riddled with corruption. Transparency International
recently described Afghanistan as the second-most corrupt nation in the
world, with the public sector worsening for the second year in a row.
Last month, for example, the Afghan Minister of Mines, Mohammad Adel,
reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award the country's largest
development project to a Chinese mining firm. Given that Karzai has
been reluctant to fire corrupt ministers in the past, it is unclear
whether he will follow up his words with actions.
What specific benchmarks will you use to ensure that the
Karzai government is taking steps to combat corruption and
promote transparency within the ministries? Is there a timeline
associated with the benchmarks? What are the repercussions for
not meeting the benchmarks? What steps are taken to certify
that the ministries have met our benchmarks? Who is conducting
the certification process?
Answer. President Obama and I, as well as many leaders from the
international community, have consistently voiced our concerns to
President Karzai and the Afghan Government over corruption and the
absence of rule of law. President Karzai's inaugural address was
particularly strong on the steps he intends to take on corruption. He
reinforced this stance on December 15 on the occasion of an
anticorruption conference in Kabul. But the Afghan Government must now
take measurable actions to combat corruption; they have the
responsibility to demonstrate to the Afghan people--and the wider
international community--that they are making progress. Among other key
reform/anticorruption measures, we hope to see the following specific
actions taken:
Appointment of competent, reform-minded individuals to lead
critical ministries (e.g., Finance, MAIL, Health, Education,
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Defense, and Interior),
and also to key provincial and district positions in the south
and east.
Concrete action by the Afghan Government against corrupt
officials and known criminals (e.g., increased investigations
by the Major Crimes Task Force resulting in criminal charges;
public prosecutions of corrupt officials).
Enhanced oversight of ministries, especially police (e.g.,
creation and strengthening of inspector general functions in
core ministries; increased audits of major programs).
Decreased evidence of political interference with
Afghanistan's Chief Prosecutor and other Afghan law enforcement
bodies, and more generally in anticorruption enforcement.
We will monitor these steps and we have a responsibility to ensure
that the considerable foreign assistance we provide does not add to the
problem and is utilized appropriately and effectively.
Fighting corruption is not easy and we should not expect results
overnight. However, it is clear that some ministries fare better than
others. A key element of our governance strategy is to address
corruption through strengthening the capacity and capability of Afghan
institutions, thus developing greater accountability and transparency.
President Karzai has announced measures to reduce corruption: the
simplification of administrative systems through the anticorruption
commission, reducing the opportunity for corruption and improving basic
services for the population; and streamlining international donor
coordination through the Afghan Government. Afghanistan has recently
set up a Major Crimes Task Force and plans to create a commission
against corruption. Several U.S. agencies work with a range of Afghan
counterparts on training and building such capacity. There is also a
crucial role to be played by the Afghan people themselves--through
civil society organizations, Parliament, other institutions and through
media debate--to set out what they need from their government and what
they will be able to give in return.
We have a system for certifying ministries to receive U.S. funds
directly and will expand that. USAID is reviewing the financial,
management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries
regarding their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. As of
December 2009, USAID has assessed and certified that the Ministries of
Public Health, Communications and Information Technology, and Finance
can directly accept U.S. Government funds. Assessments of other key
ministries are planned. We are using fewer big contractors, reducing
the layers through which our assistance flows. Finally, we are
dramatically increasing the numbers of USAID officers and inspectors to
monitor our aid.
______
Responses of Dr. Robert Gates to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. I understand why the Afghan Public Protection Force can
play a critical role in helping to secure rural areas. Having local
residents take ownership in providing security will be essential to
success. I am concerned however that the AP3 and other such efforts are
susceptible to command by local warlords.
Can you describe the command structure of these local
forces? After we have trained them, to whom do they report?
Answer. It is important to note that the Afghan Public Protection
Force (APPF), the security arm of the Afghanistan Public Protection
Program (AP3), currently consists of a single pilot program in Wardak
province. The APPF is NOT a tribal militia but a community-based force
that is part of the Ministry of Interior. They are a uniformed service
with a term of enlistment and receive salary and benefits. The
personnel in the APPF are drawn from the community and are generally
representative of the different ethnic and tribal groups. Since they
are a security force that is part of the Afghanistan National Police,
they are not under control of warlords but under the command of the
district police chiefs. They sign an enlistment contract and swear an
oath to the Government of Afghanistan. They are also held accountable
by local community councils of elders that help select individuals for
this program.
Question. Once we have achieved our desired end state with respect
to security, what's the end game for these militias?
Answer. Again it is important to note that the Afghan Public
Protection Force (APPF) is not a militia but a security force that is
part of the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior. They are already part of
the Afghan National Police (ANP) and in the long term, when security
improves, they will transition into the ranks of the regular Afghan
Uniform Police (AUP) or be released when their term of service when it
expires.
Question. Do we have any safeguards or controls on these militias?
Answer. Again, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is NOT a
militia. The APPF is under control of the Ministry of Interior and
reports to the district chief of police. They also have U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF) mentors with them as well as a Police Mentoring
Team (PMT). The SOF and PMTs, as well as the battle space owners and
local police chief all provide oversight and additional training.
Question. Who is providing arms and training to these local groups?
Answer. The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) recruits receive
formal training from qualified Afghan National Police (ANP) Instructors
at the ANP Mehter Lam Regional Training Center in Laghman province. The
training and ANP Instructors are monitored by U.S. special operations
forces (SOF) until their formal graduation. While at Mehter Lam, the
recruits are issued uniforms, individual weapons (AK-47s) and other
individual equipment which they keep for the duration of their service.
The weapons are procured by the United States and provided to the
recruits through the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI). Accountability
of the weapons is maintained jointly by Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the MOI. Once they graduate from
initial training, the APPF receive additional sustainment training back
in their district conducted by U.S. SOF, Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs),
and the battle space owner.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Bob Corker
Question. In detail, what is the military and the civilian end
objective, or definition of ``success'' for Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. As President Obama stated in his December 1 speech at West
Point, our overarching goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Between now and the attainment of that goal, we must deny al-Qaeda
a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the
ability to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan. We must strengthen
the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that
they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. And we must
do this with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is
inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.
Success in these efforts will bring us to the point at which we can
begin to transition our relationship with the Afghans to one of
partnership that reflects growth in their capacity to run their own
country. Ultimately, success in Afghanistan is when that country can
stand on its own two feet, defend its borders, provide for internal
security, and keep terrorists like al-Qaeda out.
Question. In detail, what are the ground conditions necessary to
begin to drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan--both positive and
negative? Under what conditions would the beginning to drawdown be
postponed?
Answer. In order to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must create conditions on the ground aimed
at achieving the operational objectives which will permit the drawdown
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. We must reverse Taliban momentum, deny
the Taliban access to and control over population and production
centers and lines of communication, disrupt Taliban outside of secured
areas and prevent al-Qaeda from gaining sanctuary, degrade Taliban
capabilities to a level at which the ANSF on its own can effectively
combat the Taliban, increase the size and capability of ANSF while
leveraging local security forces, and selectively build the capacity of
the Afghan Government.
Over the next 18 months, there will be a series of reviews which
will gauge our progress in Afghanistan. The rate of drawdown and
transition to our Afghan partners beginning in July 2011 will depend on
conditions at that time.
Question. What level of involvement did President Karzai, or
members of his government, have in the development of the new U.S.
plan? Was he, or senior members of his government, completely engaged
in developing the plan? What level of consultation occurred? Did Karzai
know the details of the plan prior to President Obama's call on
December 1 to discuss the plan? Is Karzai a full partner in the
execution of the plan? Please explain your responses and any
hesitations that you may have.
Answer. We are in full partnership with President Karzai and all
levels of the Afghan Government. Our strategy reflects our daily
consultations with President Karzai and other Afghan officials. A
critical outcome of the plan the President described on December 1 will
be to transition the full range of security, governance. and
development activities to the Afghans as quickly as conditions and
their capacity allow. This is a clear request from the Afghan
Government. We expect that over the long term, we will enhance and
normalize our relationship with Afghanistan and its people to reflect
our own interests and their exercise of complete sovereignty. As we
continue this transition, our programs and plans will make increasing
use of Afghan leadership and processes, while ensuring accountability.
______
Responses of Dr. Robert Gates and ADM Michael Mullen to Questions
Submitted for the Record by Senator Bob Corker
Question. In detail, what is the military and the civilian end
objective, or definition of ``success'' for Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. As the President first stated in March, and reemphasized on
1 December 2009, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent
its return to both countries. The international military effort to
stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this goal. Defeating al-
Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions.
In Afghanistan, success is an Afghanistan capable of maintaining
and securing its own sovereignty and able to prevent al-Qaeda from
using its territory as a safe haven. As the President said, we will
begin transitioning to Afghan lead in ensuring security in Afghanistan
by July 2011. This process will be conditions-based, district by
district, province by province, and the pace determined by the ability
of the Afghan security forces.
To this end, our military objectives are clear: reverse Taliban
momentum; deny the Taliban access to and control over population and
production centers and lines of communication; disrupt Taliban outside
of secured areas and prevent al-Qaeda from gaining sanctuary; degrade
Taliban capabilities to a level at which the ANSF on its own can
effectively combat the Taliban; increase the size and capability of
ANSF while leveraging local security forces; and selectively build the
capacity of the Afghan Government.
Question. In detail, what are the ground conditions necessary to
begin to drawdown U.S. forces in Afghanistan--both positive and
negative? Under what conditions would the beginning to the drawdown be
postponed?
Answer. Regarding the transition start date, it is imperative to
understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process. It is not when
we rush for the exits; rather, it is when we begin the responsible
drawdown of our forces and the responsible handoff of missions to our
Afghan partners. There is no determination of how long this will take
and there is no withdrawal date on the right-hand side of July 2011.
There is also no specific guidance with respect to how many troops will
be pulled out.
What we aim to do is degrade the Taliban-led insurgency while
building sufficient Afghan capacity to secure and govern the country.
This has a number of implications for the military mission, which now
focuses on six operational objectives: reverse Taliban momentum; deny
the Taliban access to and control over population and production
centers and lines of communication; disrupt Taliban outside of secured
areas and prevent al-Qaeda from gaining sanctuary; degrade Taliban
capabilities to a level at which the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) on its own can effectively combat the Taliban; increase the size
and capability of ANSF while leveraging local security forces; and
selectively build the capacity of the Afghan Government. Ground
conditions specifically refer to our ability to work toward these
focused objectives as we continue to clear, hold, build, and ultimately
transfer responsibility for security to the Afghan Government.
Question. What level of involvement did President Karzai, or
members of his government, have in the development of the new U.S.
plan? Was he, or senior members of his government, completely engaged
in developing the plan? What level of consultation occurred? Did Karzai
know the details of the plan prior to President Obama's call on 1
December 2009 to discuss the plan? Is Karzai a full partner in the
execution of the plan? Please explain your responses and any
hesitations that you may have.
Answer. President Karzai and key Cabinet members were consistently
consulted when appropriate in the development of our more focused
strategy. The President's strategy makes clear that our commitment to
the future of Afghanistan requires action on the part of the Government
of Afghanistan to fight corruption, deliver services, institute
policies for reintegration of local Taliban fighters, and address other
urgent problems. This is the stated goal of President Karzai and his
government and we expect the Afghan leaders to achieve these goals with
our support.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
