[Senate Hearing 111-439]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-439
EXPLORING U.S. POLICY OPTIONS TOWARD ZIMBABWE'S TRANSITION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Baukol, Andrew, Acting Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs, Department of Treasury, Washington, DC................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Gast, Earl, Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S.
Agency for International Development, Washington, DC........... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Lindborg, Nancy, president, Mercy Corps, Washington, DC.......... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Moss, Todd, vice president for corporate affairs and senior
fellow, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.......... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Steinberg, Hon. Donald, deputy president, International Crisis
Group, Brussels, Belgium....................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
(iii)
EXPLORING U.S. POLICY OPTIONS TOWARD ZIMBABWE'S TRANSITION
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Kaufman, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order.
On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing entitled
``Exploring U.S. Policy Options Toward Zimbabwe's Transition.''
I'm honored that I will be joined by the ranking member of
this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I will invite him to
deliver some opening remarks in just a moment, when he arrives.
Just over a year ago, the subcommittee held a hearing on
the crisis in Zimbabwe, and that hearing came amidst months of
intense violence carried out by Robert Mugabe and his allies
against the opposition MDC's members, supporters, and families.
This was a deliberate campaign to hold on to power and subvert
the will of the people that was expressed in the March 29
elections.
Today, the situation in Zimbabwe looks different, at least
on the surface. Last September, with South Africa's mediation,
the parties signed the Global Political Agreement and committed
to form a transitional government. And after 5 months of
delays, this February, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn
in as Prime Minister, and the MDC assumed control of several
ministries. This came just as Zimbabwe's economy reached a low
point with world-record inflation and millions of people at
risk of starvation. The transitional government, under the
leadership of the new Minister of Finance from MDC, has been
able to stop that economic decline and has taken initial steps
to reverse it. It has stabilized the situation in other
respects, as well.
However, 8 months on, many aspects of the Global Political
Agreement are still not implemented, beginning with the
appointment of new provincial governors and the replacement of
the Reserve Bank Governor and Attorney General. Moreover,
security forces continue to operate as instruments of Mugabe's
ZANU-PF party, condoning land takeovers and harassing MDC and
civil society activists. At every turn thus far, hard-liners in
the traditional government have resisted moves that would
undermine their historic patronage system and power structures.
And, for the most part, they appear to be succeeding.
Reformers in the government are working hard to overcome
that resistance, but in many cases, they lack a leverage, as
well as qualified personnel and resources. In short, Zimbabwe's
transition remains a work in progress, incomplete, and far from
irreversible.
So, that brings us to today's discussion, U.S. strategy and
policy options toward that transition. Unsurprisingly, Mugabe
has increased his calls for the removal of United States and
European U.N. sanctions. Regional actors and leaders have
echoed that call and made it the focus of their resolution on
Zimbabwe at the SADC summit earlier this month. I would
understand, and even be sympathetic to their position, if there
was real progress being made toward implementing the Global
Political Agreement. But, no one really believes that. Rather
than deflecting responsibility, regional leaders should step up
and hold Mugabe accountable for implementing his share of the
agreement. They signed on as guarantors of the agreement, and
they should live up to that responsibility.
Let me be clear. I see no reason for the United States to
repeal sanctions until we see real, irreversible progress and
an end to widespread abuses. However, this does not mean that
our hands are tied and that the United States should be on the
sidelines. A strict wait-and-see approach is arguably not the
best way to influence this transition or keep pressure on
Mugabe and company. There are a number of actions that the
United States can take now, both symbolic and substantive, to
engage the government and help strengthen the hand of reformers
within it. And at the same time, there may be ways that we can
ramp up the pressure on those individuals obstructing the
agreement and perpetrating continuing abuses. We need to
explore all these options and move beyond the all-or-nothing
debate that seems to have frozen U.S. policy. That debate is
out of touch with the fluidity of this transition, as well as
the dynamism of our diplomats. Similarly, with our assistance,
we should now look at how we can best keep up with and
influence the changing situation on the ground.
I was pleased that President Obama pledged $73 million in
new funds for education, health, and livelihoods when he met
with Prime Minister Tsvangirai earlier this year. Scaling up
and shifting our assistance in Zimbabwe to help rebuild
institutions and lay the groundwork for economic recovery makes
practical sense. It's also another way in which we can
strengthen the hand of reformers within the transition. But, in
order to have that positive effect, this new assistance needs
to be well designed and well targeted, and it needs to be
coordinated with our diplomatic efforts. Today's hearings will
explore how the United States can best leverage our assistance,
together with our diplomacy, toward advancing the political
transition.
Now, we have a great lineup of witnesses this morning.
We'll hear first from Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Johnnie Carson. Assistant Secretary Carson is no
stranger to Zimbabwe; he was our Ambassador there from 1995 to
1997. Since taking office, I know he's been actively engaged on
the issue. We'll also hear, on our first panel, from USAID
Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast, and
Acting Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International
Affairs, Andrew Baukol. Both USAID and Treasury play critical
roles in our strategy toward Zimbabwe.
So, I thank all of you for being here. I ask that you keep
your remarks to 5 minutes or less so we can have plenty of time
for questions and discussion, and we, of course, will submit
your longer statements for the record.
On our second panel, we'll hear from Ambassador Don
Steinberg, who is currently deputy president for policy of the
International Crisis Group. During three decades of U.S.
diplomatic service, Ambassador Steinberg served as Ambassador
to Angola, Director of the State Department's Joint Policy
Council, Special Representative to the President for
Humanitarian Demining, Special Haiti Coordinator, and NSC
Senior Director for Africa. Since leaving government,
Ambassador Steinberg has written extensively on issues relating
to Africa, as well as the role of women in conflict and
peacebuilding.
We'll also hear from Dr. Todd Moss, vice president for
corporate affairs and senior fellow of the Center for Global
Development. Dr. Moss served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs from May 2007 to October 2008 while
on leave from the center. His research has focused on United
States/Africa relations and financial issues facing sub-Saharan
Africa, and he has worked for years on this economic crisis in
Zimbabwe.
Finally, we will hear from Nancy Lindborg, president of
Mercy Corps. Mercy Corps has been a humanitarian development
leader in Zimbabwe, providing assistance to more than 300,000
people. Ms. Lindborg traveled to Zimbabwe just a few months
ago, and she'll provide an important perspective on the
changing humanitarian situation there.
So, again, I thank everybody for being here. It's my
pleasure now to turn to our distinguished ranking member,
Senator Isakson, for his opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Chairman Feingold, and I
want to welcome Secretary Carson, and all the members that will
be testifying before the subcommittee today. This is a very
important hearing, and I associate myself completely with the
remarks of the chairman. Given the history of Robert Mugabe and
Zimbabwe, it's absolutely critical that reform and transition
take place and that the United States be engaged appropriately
to see to it that that happens. I look forward to hearing from
all of the witnesses today, and work with them on a strong
United States policy on Zimbabwe.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. I'll turn it
over to the questions.
Senator Feingold. Thank you so much, Senator.
I thank Senator Kaufman for being here, as well.
And we will now begin with Assistant Secretary Carson.
Mr. Carson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member
Isakson, members of the committee. I welcome the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss Zimbabwe. I look forward to
working with the Congress and this committee in advancing
United States interests and returning Zimbabwe to democracy,
stability, and economic prosperity.
I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for
the record, if I may.
Since the signing of the Global Political Agreement in
September 2008 and the launch of the transitional government
this past February, progress on reform in Zimbabwe has been
mixed and uneven. On the positive side, economic conditions
have steadily improved since February. The use of the dollar
has eliminated hyperinflation and given renewed confidence to
business and consumers. We have seen more market-based
activity. Budget transparency has become a reality, thanks to
the efforts of Finance Minister Tendai Biti. While purchasing
power continues to be a challenge for most Zimbabweans, the
signs of a limited recovery are manifest.
On the negative side, the political situation has changed
very little, if at all. Improved economic conditions have not
lead to any major political change, nor given the Movement for
Democratic Change, and MDC's leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, equal
footing to compete in the political realm. Robert Mugabe
remains firmly in control of government and government policy.
He is likely to remain dominant as long as he and his party
cohorts retain control over Zimbabwe's security apparatus which
includes the police, the intelligence services, and the
military.
Mugabe is surrounded by a half-dozen hard-liners who carry
out his policies. These include his Defense and Justice
Ministers, the armed services and political chiefs, and the
Attorney General. We have seen no evidence of dissent among
them that would threaten Mugabe's control.
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF hard-liners could take a number of
steps to show a commitment to democratic reform. Mugabe could
end the violent land seizures that continue to take place in
Zimbabwe. He could stop the harassments and politically
motivated arrests of MDC politicians and Members of Parliament.
He could swear in the MDC's remaining Cabinet members,
including the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Roy Bennett. And
he could repeal the country's draconian emergency decree that
restricts personal freedoms. President Mugabe could also end
media censorship and dismiss the corrupt Attorney General and
the Reserve Bank Governor.
The Global Political Agreement calls for a new political
dispensation in Zimbabwe. To follow through on that, President
Mugabe could publicly reaffirm his commitment to the drafting
of a new constitution and the holding of national elections
under international supervision and monitoring. The people of
Zimbabwe deserve to freely elect their leaders.
The steps that I have just outlined above do not require
any economic resources to complete, but they do require a
commitment to democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule
of law. If Mr. Mugabe supports the Global Political Agreement,
he should take these steps to ensure the effectiveness of the
government.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you today. I will be
pleased to take questions following this intervention.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the
committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss Zimbabwe. I look forward to working with the Congress, and
especially with this committee, in advancing U.S. interests and
returning Zimbabwe to democracy, stability, and economic prosperity.
The people of Zimbabwe continue to face extreme hardship, and
desperately need a government that respects human rights and rule of
law and works to rebuild institutions and public services. Thus far in
the current fiscal year, U.S. humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe has
surpassed $200 million for emergency assistance, including food aid and
food security, refugee support, health, and water, sanitation, and
hygiene programs. We continue to be the largest provider of food
assistance to Zimbabwe, and we stand solidly behind Zimbabweans in
their continuing time of need.
We note that this assistance would not be necessary were it not for
the antidemocratic and abusive practices of Robert Mugabe and his
followers. The United States has not sanctioned the needy and deserving
people of Zimbabwe. Our targeted sanctions are imposed specifically on
individuals and entities that have hindered democracy and abused human
rights there. The reason we imposed targeted sanctions and continue
them now is the failure of those individuals to act in the best
interest of the people of Zimbabwe. Our measures will remain in place
until genuine, sustained democratic opening has taken place.
September 15 marked the 1-year anniversary of the signing of the
Global Political Agreement (GPA) by the two factions of the Movement
for Democratic Change and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF). In February, a transitional government was initiated
based on the GPA. We commend Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and
members of his Movement for Democratic Change for entering the
government in spite of longstanding and ongoing abuse and intimidation
by President Robert Mugabe and members of his ZANU-PF party.
During the past 7 months, the transitional government has made
important progress in halting the devastating economic decline and
implementing measures to restore fiscal integrity. The elimination of
the worthless Zimbabwean dollar, rationalization of the budget process,
and other sound policies by Finance Minister Tendai Biti have
eliminated hyperinflation and begun to restore the confidence of the
people of Zimbabwe. Other reformist ministers are also embracing
change, and abandoning the failed policies of the past, and we strongly
encourage all political actors in Zimbabwe, of whatever political
party, to do the same. Challenges remain, however, as most Zimbabweans
continue to survive on less than $1 per day and as millions remain food
insecure.
Unfortunately, hard-liners from the previous Mugabe regime that
remain in Government, and others at their direction, continue to
violate the human rights of the Zimbabwean people. These hard-liners
have refused to move forward with agreements on senior government
appointments, media freedom, and other important reforms. The Governor
of the Reserve Bank was reappointed by Mugabe, before the formation of
the transitional government, and without consultation with the Movement
for Democratic Change. The Attorney General was appointed unilaterally
by Mugabe prior to the start of the transitional government, in
violation of the GPA. Since his appointment, he has carried out a
sustained campaign of politicized arrests and prosecution of members of
the opposition, in particular Movement for Democratic Change officials,
and members of civil society. Violent land invasions continue. So do
severe human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, by
members of the security forces, especially in the Marange diamond
mining area. Revenues from these diamond mines and from gold mines that
rightfully belong to the Zimbabwe people are plundered by these hard-
liners, and moved outside Zimbabwe for their own personal use.
The prospects for reform and democratic transformation in Zimbabwe
are immensely challenging, but we remain committed to facilitating
peaceful change to improve the condition of Zimbabweans. Our assistance
to Zimbabwe seeks to lay the groundwork for a return to democracy and
prosperity by supporting democratic voices and civil society, including
support to the Prime Minister's office for communications and other
capacity-building. In addition, our assistance supports efforts to
mitigate the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS and other epidemics. As
noted by President Obama in June, this humanitarian aid is directed
through nongovernmental organizations and contractors rather than
through the central government. In this way, we can be assured
assistance reaches the people who need it. We are mindful of existing
legal restrictions on our assistance and will continue to consult
closely with the Congress on any new or expanded assistance proposals.
This includes our recent notification and consultation on new targeted
programs in the agriculture and education sectors. These initiatives
were undertaken in response to President Obama's commitment to Prime
Minister Tsvangirai in June.
We continue to support those working for full implementation of the
GPA, and to seek ways to ease the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe
without aiding those forces who cling to power through repression and
corruption. The road to reform in Zimbabwe will be long and
challenging. In addition to a new constitution, reform of the electoral
process and electoral institutions, as well as the repeal of repressive
legislation which restricts freedom of speech and assembly, are
essential to free and fair elections. The GPA calls for the completion
of a new constitution by August 2010. Following a public referendum on
the constitution, internationally monitored elections should take place
as soon as feasible to enable the people of Zimbabwe to freely select
their President and other representatives. The international community
has joined us in calling for transparency in the process of drafting a
new constitution and the conduct of closely monitored elections.
We also call on the nations of Africa, in particular the members of
the Southern African Development Community, to ensure that Mugabe and
his cohorts fully implement the GPA and work toward democratic reform.
We were pleased that South African President Jacob Zuma visited
Zimbabwe last month and stressed the importance his government places
on democracy and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe and compliance
with the GPA.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Secretary Carson.
Mr. Gast.
STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Gast. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Isakson, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on how USAID is confronting challenges
and promoting progress in Zimbabwe.
While Zimbabwe's political transition brought with it great
promise, the stark reality of what it's like to live in
Zimbabwe remains tenuous. The number of Zimbabweans without
enough food to eat will exceed 2 million by early next year.
Much of the country's water and sanitation system is either not
functioning, or close to it. Schools and public hospitals were
closed for most of last year, and are only slowly beginning to
rebuild. Zimbabwe's first cases of the H1N1 virus were
confirmed last month, and the fragile health system will depend
on donor assistance to respond to an outbreak. The lack of
progress in democracy, governance, and human rights has been
disappointing.
The need is overwhelming, and while we agree that it is
premature to reengage the Government of Zimbabwe with a full
development assistance program, there is also a risk of doing
too little. We believe that positive change will come only when
there are better opportunities and demonstrable improvement in
people's lives.
As part of a closely coordinated group of international
donors, USAID adheres to the humanitarian-plus concept of
providing for the Zimbabwean people, while strengthening
democratic institutions and supporting timely, credible
elections.
In fiscal year 2009, the United States has provided $313
million, targeting the critical needs of Zimbabwe's people:
Health, water, food, agriculture, protection of vulnerable
people, economic recovery, and accountable and responsible
governance. Our quick response to last year's disastrous
cholera outbreak helped mitigate both its impact and its chance
of recurring this year. We mobilized $2 million to stem the
tide of an imminent malaria outbreak, protecting over a million
persons. We are helping small farmers improve food production
through access to credit, markets, and training. We are
assisting the drafting of a new constitution and strengthening
government institutions.
The $73 million pledged by President Obama this summer will
augment these activities, bolstering our programs in good
governance, civil society, independent media, and support for
victims of violence, as well as significantly expanding our
efforts to fight HIV/AIDS.
To help prepare for elections, USAID is supporting civil
society's pursuit of electoral law reform. We will also provide
them training on parallel vote tabulation, a system we
supported during the 2008 elections that was instrumental in
limiting the ruling party's ability to manipulate the results.
The whole of this assistance program is critical to helping
reformers in the transitional government move Zimbabwe toward
recovery and improve the lives of Zimbabwe's people. And our
support is carefully targeted to reach only these reformers. We
have been diligent in ensuring that none of our assistance is
diverted or misused by Robert Mugabe and his associates.
Zimbabwe's government is aware that true and full reengagement
with the international community can only begin when it takes
clear steps toward meeting donor principles on democracy, rule
of law, and economic stabilization. Until that time, USAID will
continue to do everything it can to respond to the needs of
Zimbabwe's people and work with them to build a better future.
And we will continue to celebrate signs of hope. Just this
week, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court issued a permanent stay of
prosecution in the case of human rights activist Jestina
Mukoko. Last December, she was abducted by police and tortured
in secret locations. The ruling that she cannot be tried,
either now or in the future, came from judges appointed by
Robert Mugabe and is a signal of progress and justice that we
applaud.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Senator Isakson, and
members of the subcommittee, for the continued commitment you
have shown to the Zimbabwean people, and for your support for
real reform within the government. I welcome any questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Earl Gast, Acting Assistant Administrator for
Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Senator Isakson, and members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on U.S.
policy options for Zimbabwe's transition and on how the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) is confronting challenges and
promoting progress.
As my colleagues from the Departments of State and Treasury have
already highlighted Zimbabwe's troubled history and provided the
context for our need to deliver targeted assistance to the people of
Zimbabwe and reform-minded elements of the transitional government, I
will focus my remarks on USAID-related matters.
To date in FY 2009, the U.S. Government has provided approximately
$313 million for health, vulnerable population protection, agriculture
and food security, economic recovery and market systems, humanitarian
coordination, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) programs, as well
as emergency relief supplies and food assistance in Zimbabwe. In
addition, funding has included support for civil society strengthening;
support to help fulfill the terms of the Global Political Agreement
(GPA) (e.g., resources for the constitution-making process); programs
to demonstrate responsible governance (e.g., improving the public
outreach capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister); assistance to
nongovernmental monitoring of compliance of all parties to the GPA; and
support for independent media.
The USG is the leading food assistance donor to Zimbabwe. To date
in FY 2009, USAID's Food for Peace program has provided nearly 190,000
metric tons of Public Law 480, Title II emergency food assistance,
valued at more than $166 million, through the World Food Programme and
the Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (C-SAFE). I would
also highlight the provision by our Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance's (OFDA) of nearly $31 million in FY 2009 for emergency
humanitarian assistance and our Office of Transition Initiative's
funding for transitional support in FY 2009 of $4.58 million.
In addition, OFDA committed more than $7.3 million in emergency
assistance this year for Zimbabwe's cholera outbreak to support the
provision of emergency relief supplies for affected populations,
humanitarian coordination and information management, health programs,
WASH interventions, and hygiene promotion and social mobilization
activities. OFDA has also committed more than $8.5 million for other
WASH programming to date in FY 2009 to improve community resilience to
cholera and other waterborne diseases and to help mitigate a potential
recurrence of cholera later in 2009. To date in FY 2009, OFDA has
contributed nearly $9 million for agriculture and food security
programming, including the construction and rehabilitation of water
catchment structures, training in conservation farming, distribution of
agricultural inputs, and improvement of livestock health. In addition,
to complement agriculture and food security programming, OFDA has
committed more than $2.5 million for regional food procurement and
distribution in Zimbabwe in FY 2009.
The $73 million in funding for Zimbabwe pledged by President Obama
during Prime Minister Tsvangirai's recent visit to the United States
includes significant interagency funding for HIV/AIDS programs through
PEPFAR ($46.5 million). It also expands existing USAID programs in:
parliamentary strengthening ($2.4 million); elections and constitution-
making ($3.2 million); rule of law ($3.8 million); consensus-building
($2.7 million); media ($1.5 million); victims of torture ($1.9
million); civil society/local government capacity-building ($5.8
million); maternal and child health, including tuberculosis ($4.1
million); and family planning ($1.2 million).
The President also indicated a desire to assist with education and
agriculture, both of which are being addressed through new programs.
One million dollars is currently being programmed in support of
textbook procurement and distribution. In the agricultural sector, $26
million is currently being programmed for a loan guarantee program to
provide inputs to farmers and to support farmer training, market
linkage development, and supply of inputs in out-years. These new
activities, as well as family planning activities, required waivers of
section 620(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Brooke amendment,
found in section 7012 of the FY 2009 Department of State, Foreign
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act (FOAA), both of
which prohibit assistance to countries in default on USAID loans, such
as Zimbabwe. With the signing of the waivers on September 9, these
activities can proceed. We believe that these programs in agriculture,
education, and family planning will rapidly yield results to
demonstrate the benefits of pursuing reform.
Other new activities this year will focus on reviving the ailing
public health system through provision of training, supplies,
equipment, and services. In this regard, earlier this year, USAID
mobilized an additional $2 million in urgent funding to address
increasing concerns that measles and malaria epidemics were imminent.
To prevent these epidemics and reduce the potential for increased
maternal and child mortality, USAID supported a measles immunization
and vitamin A campaign; procuring the commodities needed to improve
maternal and child health, such as syringes, IVs, and gloves; and
funding the training, logistics, management, and social mobilization
needed to effectively implement these programs. In collaboration with
the U.K.'s Department for International Development, USAID also
provided emergency funding for an indoor residual spray program, where
teams were quickly mobilized in 20 high-risk districts. The teams
sprayed more than 600,000 structures, protecting nearly a million
people from malaria.
Under the GPA signed September 15, 2008, Zimbabwe's leaders have
broadly agreed to pursue economic recovery, land reform, a new
constitution, freedom of expression and political association,
nondiscrimination, justice and national healing, free and fair
elections, and the restoration of the rule of law. The extent to which
the repressive elements within the government respect the terms of this
agreement, however, remains a source of concern.
USAID is responding by: assisting in drafting the new constitution;
assisting in the reform of governmental institutions and processes;
strengthening local government and Parliament; addressing emergency
health needs; and providing a humanitarian safety-net for those most
affected by economic instability.
To help prepare for new elections, USAID will help civil society
pursue electoral law reform and provide training on parallel vote
tabulation, a system that was instrumental in limiting the ruling
party's ability to manipulate polling data during the March 2008
elections. Furthermore, USAID will help democratic political parties
rebuild their structures after the movement of many key members into
government service and further losses as a result of inter-election
violence. If possible, assistance will also be extended to support the
development and reform of electoral systems.
To support economic stabilization and recovery, USAID will help
small farmers and improve agricultural production through access to
credit, skills development, establishment of market linkages,
strengthening of agricultural institutions, and a better overall
enabling environment. Implementation of these activities was made
possible through the recent approval of limited waivers to the section
620(q) and Brooke amendment restrictions. As conditions permit broader
USG engagement, USAID is prepared to expand its assistance to include
public financial management technical assistance (macroeconomic reform)
and the private sector.
USAID, in consultation with other donors and the U.S. Embassy in
Harare remains diligent in ensuring that none of our assistance is
diverted or misused by Robert Mugabe and his associates. All USAID
assistance is carefully targeted to support reformers within the
government and civil society. No funds go directly to the transitional
government as support is delivered in the form of goods and services
through grantees and contractors hired and monitored in compliance with
standard U.S. Government procurement procedures. U.S. Government
sanctions against designated individuals and institutions are carefully
observed in the award of contracts and grants and the designation of
beneficiaries of assistance.
The consultation process includes all major donors present in
Zimbabwe who meet on a weekly basis to review the operating
environment, assess progress, discuss challenges, and modify a
collective approach to providing assistance ensuring consistency
between donor programs. Consistent with the strongly unified position
on the concept of ``Humanitarian Plus'' of the donor community, USAID's
programs are centered around safeguarding the Zimbabwean people,
supporting the transitional government's ability to meet its
commitments under the GPA and to respond to the needs of its people,
and enhancing the likelihood of free and fair elections within 2 years.
Specifically, USAID efforts focus on re-establishing and strengthening
democratic institutions, processes, and systems; providing social
assistance to protect vulnerable people during the transition; and
supporting economic revitalization, especially in the agricultural
sector. All of the activities being implemented are done in close
consultation with Congress, State, and Treasury Departments and the
National Security Council and are consistent with the U.S. Government's
overall strategy in this transition period.
The United States is part of a closely coordinated donor group--
along with the United Kingdom, the European Commission, Canada, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, Australia, Germany, France, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands--that has agreed on five principles, and associated
benchmarks, to guide our reengagement with the transitional Government
of Zimbabwe:
1. Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance;
2. Commitment to macroeconomic stabilization;
3. Restoration of rule of law;
4. Commitment to democratic processes and respect for human rights;
5. Commitment to timely elections with international observers.
The donors have agreed to retain targeted sanctions on President
Mugabe and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
hard-liners until a credible reform-minded government is evident. They
have also agreed that while transitional assistance is scaling up, none
of this will be delivered in the form of budget support or directly
through the government. True and full reengagement, typified by full
sustainable development and cooperation programs can only begin when
the entire government takes clear steps toward meeting donor principles
on democracy, rule of law, and economic stabilization.
As USAID implements its transitional assistance programs, we are
planning for contingencies. All activities are implemented through
nongovernmental organizations or contractors and can be suspended
rapidly if the situation warrants such action. If the unity government
were to fail, we would rapidly scale back our programs to only support
reformists outside the government and address the most pressing
humanitarian needs. Some programming now under the rubric of
humanitarian plus, such as education and agriculture, might be
suspended. We are following a pragmatic approach in Zimbabwe, looking
for opportunities to strengthen people's resolve and to maintain the
forward momentum of democratization and reform. We believe that
positive change will come from the expansion of opportunity and
demonstrable improvements in people's lives. We will endeavor to
continue to support this change within the parameters of U.S. policy.
There have been improvements since the formation of the
transitional government in February, but enormous challenges remain.
U.S. support is critical to help reformers in the transitional
government move Zimbabwe toward recovery and legitimate democratic
governance defined by a constitution and elections. In the aftermath of
last year's flawed elections, some signs of reform have emerged.
Ministers from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party--and even
some ZANU-PF officials--are working hard to bring much-needed services
to the people. At the same time, there are strong opponents to reform
who seek to undermine the power-sharing agreement and discredit
reformists.
Due to U.S. and others' assistance, the humanitarian situation in
Zimbabwe has improved since the end of the massive cholera outbreak a
few months ago and an improved harvest in 2009 as compared to 2008.
However, deteriorating or nonfunctional water and sanitation
infrastructure requires major rehabilitation, the health system is in
the early stages of the recovery process after public hospitals were
forced to close last year, a gap continues to exist in agricultural
inputs for the current planting season, and the potential exists for
spread of H1N1, or swine flu, after health authorities reported the
first laboratory-confirmed cases in Zimbabwe in August. In addition,
the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)
estimates that between 2 million and 2.4 million people are likely to
be food-insecure during the peak hunger period, which typically lasts
from January to March.
The education sector witnessed dramatic deterioration in 2008 as a
result of the prolonged and violent election period, teacher strikes
and the hyperinflationary environment. A large number of schools were
closed for much of the year. However, the transitional government has
clearly indicated commitment toward education and most schools resumed
teaching in 2009. Currently, the sector is characterized by severe
shortages of essential supplies including textbooks, reduced
accessibility due to high staff turnover, destabilized planning and
management capacities, and inconsistent availability of teachers, who
in the past few months have intermittently gone on strike over low
wages.
This administration appreciates and understands ongoing concerns
over the lack of progress in democracy, governance, and human rights.
This administration is in full agreement that it is premature to
reengage the Government of Zimbabwe with a full development assistance
program. However, we believe that there is also a risk of doing too
little. The support USAID is providing and has proposed to provide to
reform-minded elements of the transitional government and the broader
community is critical if the people of Zimbabwe are to believe that
change can be achieved through an accountable government.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Gast.
Mr. Baukol.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW BAUKOL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Baukol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Isakson, other distinguished members of the panel. Thank you
for inviting me to testify, along with my colleagues, here
today. I'm also impressed with your next lineup of panelists,
including people from the Center for Global Development, Mercy
Corps, and the International Crisis Group. I had the pleasure
to visit a Mercy Corps project in Zimbabwe in July this year,
and was very impressed with what they're doing to help the
people of Zimbabwe.
Regarding Zimbabwe's economy, the bottom line is that the
economy has taken a turn for the better during the tenure of
the transitional government in the last 7 months, but progress
could be fleeting if it is not supported by a political
solution that restores democracy, the rule of law, and strong
institutions.
The last 7 months have been characterized by relative
economic stability as reformist elements began to undo some of
the more disastrous economic policies of the previous 9 years,
especially by doing away with the discredited Zimbabwe dollar.
This has ended hyperinflation and led to some reliable of
economic activity. The new Finance Minister has also introduced
other measures to reduce the government's interference in the
economy and to stop the quasi-fiscal activities of the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe. Government revenues are beginning to recover,
and the Finance Ministry has reduced government spending to
more closely match expected revenues. Let me note that I've met
Minister Biti several times over the past year. I think he's
doing a good job under very trying circumstances.
The international financial institutions have taken a
cautious approach to engagement in Zimbabwe due to the large
arrears but--by the government and the lack of a track record
on reform. The IMF has begun to lead short-term, targeted
technical assistance missions, and the World Bank is
administering a multidonor trust fund to support basic
analytical work on the Zimbabwean economy and to assess its
needs. Further actions will depend on continued reform, as well
as a plan to address Zimbabwe's arrears to the international
financial institutions.
The key question today regards United States actions in
Zimbabwe. We believe that it will be important for U.S.
agencies to have the ability to respond positively, if
conditions for assistance with economic reform are
demonstrated. Broad cash--broad assistance programs or cash
assistance by the United States are not appropriate now, but
targeted technical assistance that complies with current legal
restrictions could help address the capacity constraints that
have arisen from years of political repression and brain drain.
Such technical assistance would have to be provided to
officials and ministries who have demonstrated the willingness
to reform and who can show a continued commitment to these
efforts. This assistance could also be deployed or withdrawn
quickly, according to circumstances on the ground.
Nonetheless, while the United States can play a role in
assisting reform-minded Zimbabwean officials in areas of
economic governance, and while economic progress will likely
strengthen the reformers' hand in pressing for political
reforms, we should recognize that sustained improvement in the
economy will not come without a full restoration of democracy
and law and order.
Our assistance to Zimbabwe and our policy at the
international financial institutions are governed by existing
legislation and executive orders. For the target areas of
assistance that I discussed, the United States should be able
to act under the legislation, but we will find it difficult to
support broader engagement by the international financial
institutions, including any arrears clearance process.
Treasury also maintains targeted economic sanctions against
the Mugabe regime and has designated dozens of senior regime
officials, supporters, and state-owned or -controlled
companies. Treasury believes that, where circumstances clearly
warrant, we should consider licensing, delisting, or easing
sanctions on individuals or institutions to reward improved
behavior and provide a positive incentive for change.
In summary, Zimbabwe has arrived at a crucial crossroads in
its modern history. The United States and the rest of the
international community are right to be skeptical of Mugabe's
actions and withhold full reengagement and development
assistance. But, we should seek to support people and
institutions in Zimbabwe that are pursuing appropriate economic
policies and that are working to bring about a government that
reflects the will of Zimbabwe's people.
Thank you for your time. I'm anxious to answer any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baukol follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew Baukol, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office
of International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington,
DC
Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important
hearing on the current situation in Zimbabwe. Thank you also for asking
my colleagues from the Department of State and USAID to join me at the
witness table. I think we all agree that Zimbabwe's economy has taken a
turn for the better over the last 7 months and that progress could be
fleeting if it is not supported by a political solution that restores
democracy, rule of law, and strong institutions.
People who follow Zimbabwe closely are probably familiar with the
recent economic trends, but it is worth recapping the economic
mismanagement that devastated the country and contributed to the
profound fragility of the current situation. When Robert Mugabe took
office as leader of Zimbabwe after a long civil war, Zimbabwe had all
the ingredients necessary for prosperity. With a per capita GDP of
around $1,400,\1\ Zimbabwe was blessed with ample mineral resources,
decent infrastructure, and productive farms that made it a breadbasket
to Southern Africa. In 1980, Tanzania's then-President Nyerere told
Mugabe he had inherited the ``jewel of Africa.'' For almost two
decades, Mugabe's government managed to maintain economic growth and
roughly stable per capita GDP, but beginning in the late 1990s, the
wheels began to come off. Thanks to a set of disastrous economic
policies, headlined by a chaotic land redistribution scheme, five
decades of economic progress were erased in 5 years, with per capita
GDP in 2005 roughly equaling that in 1953, according to an analysis by
the Center for Global Development. The combination of undermining the
rule of law, instituting oppressive economic decrees, and suppressing
press freedoms and political opposition led one observer in 2003 to
describe Zimbabwe as a case study in ``How to Kill a Country.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, ``Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe's
Crisis,'' CGD Notes, Center for Global Development, July 2005.
\2\ Samantha Power, ``How to Kill a Country,'' the Atlantic
Monthly, December 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The economic crisis further deepened as bad policies and the
government's paranoid reaction to international isolation due to gross
violations of human rights fed the spiral of decline.
The government revalued the currency in 2006 but quickly
began resorting to the printing press to paper over yawning
budget deficits. Inflation hit 90 sextillion percent in
November 2008.
Despite its former status as a breadbasket for the region--
one that sourced U.N.-sponsored food aid to other countries in
Africa \3\--Zimbabwe's agricultural output declined to the
point that about half of the population was in need of food aid
in 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neglect of the medical sector and water infrastructure
helped lead to a cholera outbreak that killed 4,276, according
to the WHO.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ World Health Organization, June 9, 2009, update (http://
www.who.int/csr/don/2009_06_09/en/index.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An estimated one-fourth of the population left conditions in
Zimbabwe over the last decade; most went to South Africa in
search of jobs to support their families.
The country's reserves plummeted to $5.8 million by the end
of 2008, according to the IMF,\5\ despite the country's
possession of mineral resources such as chromite, coal,
platinum, asbestos, copper, nickel, gold, and iron ore.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ International Monetary Fund, 2009 Article IV Consultation With
Zimbabwe, 6 May 2009, PIN No. 09/53 (http://www.imf.org).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic activity and GDP plummeted, with the IMF estimating
that per capita GDP fell to $188 on a PPP basis in 2008.
In this context, the last 7 months have been characterized by
relative economic stability as reformist elements of the transitional
government began to undo some of the more disastrous economic policies
of the previous 9 years. In the weeks before the transitional
government became effective and only weeks after introducing a 100-
trillion Z-dollar note, the acting Finance Minister acknowledged the
ongoing dollarization of the economy by allowing Zimbabweans to conduct
business in other currencies. The rapid abandonment of the Zimbabwe
dollar by the populace--and later steps by the government to do away
with the discredited currency--have led to stabilization of prices and
some revival of economic activity. Finance Minister Biti has also
introduced other measures to reduce the government's interference in
the economy, including eliminating the 7.5-percent foreign exchange
surrender requirement, eliminating the 5-percent tax on bank profits,
eliminating import duties on capital equipment and raw materials,
cutting import duties in half on intermediate products, and stopping
quasi-fiscal activities at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (which took the
form of directed lending for favored businesses and sectors). Consumer
demand has rebounded modestly, and businesses are also reacting to the
new incentives of a stable currency and the removal of many
restrictions on economic activity.
Government revenues are beginning to recover, and the Zimbabwean
Government expects to take in about $1 billion in revenue this year, or
about 25 percent of GDP. This would represent a sharp uptick from an
estimated 4.2-percent of GDP in 2008. The Finance Ministry has slashed
government expenditures to more closely match expected revenues,
thereby avoiding the accumulation of massive arrears or the printing of
money to pay government debts. Yet the government is facing significant
pressures for increased civil service pay and expenditures in basic
social services that were neglected in recent years, especially in
health and education. It is also banking on large amounts of budget
support by the donor community, roughly 10 percent of GDP, which has
not materialized yet.
While there may be an interest from businesses in resuming
production and some room for the agricultural sector to take advantage
of the current situation, recovery will not be easy. The banking
sector--traditionally a critical source of funding for business
growth--suffers in Zimbabwe from a lack of liquidity. There are only
$700 million in deposits in the country's banking system--not nearly
enough to fund the lending needed to restart the economy. Zimbabwe's
banking sector is interested in gaining access to lines of credit from
abroad to enable local lending, but the general uncertainty about the
investment climate and the lack of a credible central bank make it
unlikely that Zimbabwe will be able to access additional credit lines.
Even local branches of international banks are strapped for liquidity,
with their parent banks unwilling to take on the risk of funneling more
capital into Zimbabwe. The central bank in Zimbabwe (RBZ) has been an
active part of the economic destabilization of the last decade, but it
has been neutralized for the time being by dollarization. Substantial
reform of the RBZ is needed to enable it to play a positive role in the
economy. In summary, Zimbabwe remains one of the riskiest locations for
investment, and Dunn & Bradstreet recently called it the worst
investment location in the world, equal to Afghanistan.
The international financial institutions (IFIs) have taken a
cautious approach to engagement in Zimbabwe due to the large arrears by
the government--over $1.3 billion--and the lack of a track record on
reform. The IMF has begun to lead short-term, targeted technical
assistance missions,\6\ and the World Bank is administering a
multidonor trust fund to support basic analytical work on the
Zimbabwean economy and to assess its needs. Further actions will depend
on a track record of reform as well as a plan to address Zimbabwe's
arrears.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In May, the IMF's executive board approved a request to lift
the suspension of technical assistance and allow targeted technical
assistance in the areas of tax policy, payments systems, lender-of-
last-resort operations and banking supervision, and central banking
goverance and accounting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zimbabwe has around $6 billion in foreign debt, of which $1.3
billion is arrears to multilateral bodies. It owes the IMF 89.5 million
SDRs, or around $140 million. At the development banks, Zimbabwe has
$702.5 million in arrears to the World Bank and $468.8 million in
arrears to the African Development Bank as of July 2009. Clearing
Zimbabwe's arrears at the IFIs will depend greatly on whether the IMF
and World Bank Boards find Zimbabwe eligible for the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Zimbabwe has limited domestic
resources, and competing expenditure priorities make it unlikely that
it could repay arrears--even in part--in the foreseeable future.
I would note that the donor community has been functioning well in
the case of Zimbabwe. The donor community coordinates closely and has
adopted a common set of principles for engagement in Zimbabwe. Donors
are united in seeking to support reformers when appropriate and enhance
social service delivery in key sectors such as health and education.
They are also working to enhance food production and reduce Zimbabwe's
dependence on food aid. Finally, some donors are working on key
economic governance issues, such as improving the Ministry of Finance's
financial management capability. We are actively looking at what role
the U.S. can play in assisting reform-minded Zimbabwean officials in
areas of economic governance in order to stabilize the region. The
depressed state of the Zimbabwean economy introduces fragility and risk
to the region, as witnessed by recent refugee flows and the spread of
the cholera epidemic beyond Zimbabwe's borders. Sustained improvements
in the economy will not come without a full restoration of democracy
and law and order. We are disturbed by new violent farm invasions and
other violations of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that cast
doubt on the commitment of the ZANU-PF to true cooperation with the
MDC. The continued presence of Gideon Gono as head of the central bank
is one example fueling these doubts. Mugabe reappointed Gono as head of
the RBZ at the beginning of the new government despite Gono's
leadership over the monetary policies that led to one of the world's
worst cases of hyperinflation. Gono has also been linked to several
corruption scandals and is currently subject to U.S. and EU sanctions.
Finance Minister Biti, the leading force behind recent economic reforms
and a member of the MDC, has effectively limited Gono's power by
terminating the RBZ's quasi-fiscal activities and has introduced
legislation to increase oversight over the RBZ.
We continue to look for signs of sustained commitment to economic
reform and believe that it will be important for U.S. agencies to have
the ability to respond positively if conditions for assistance are
demonstrated. Broad assistance programs or cash assistance by the
United States are not appropriate given the tenuous nature of the
reform process, but targeted technical assistance that complies with
current legal restrictions could help address the capacity constraints
that have arisen from years of political repression and brain drain.
Such technical assistance would have to be provided to officials and
ministries who have demonstrated the willingness to reform and
stabilize the economy and who can show a continued commitment to these
efforts. Such assistance could also be deployed--or withdrawn--quickly,
according to circumstances on the ground. Assistance to Zimbabwe is
also affected by other legislation, such as the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) and the recent designation of Zimbabwe as
noncompliant with minimum standards under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act.
As you know, the United States does not have broad economic
sanctions on the country of Zimbabwe. In accordance with Executive
Order (E.O.) 13469 of July 25, 2008, E.O. 13391 of November 22, 2005,
and E.O. 13288 of March 6, 2003; the Treasury Department has maintained
targeted economic sanctions against the Mugabe regime and has
designated dozens of senior regime officials, supporters, and state-
owned or -controlled companies. In cases where the behavior of listed
individuals or institutions changes, the U.S. Government could consider
easing sanctions via licensing, delisting, or other appropriate
measures, if warranted.
In summary, Zimbabwe has arrived at a second crucial crossroads in
its modern history. In light of Robert Mugabe's continued resistance to
heed the results of democratic elections, the United States and the
rest of the international community have a right to be skeptical of his
actions and withhold full reengagement and development assistance.
However, we should also support people and institutions in Zimbabwe
that are pursuing appropriate economic policies and working to bring
about a government that reflects the will of Zimbabwe's people.
Senator Feingold. I thank everyone on the panel, and we
will now begin with 7-minute rounds.
Assistant Secretary Carson, to some it may seem that United
States policy toward Zimbabwe has been pretty static since
February, when the transitional government was formed, with
perhaps the exception of the new funds President Obama pledged
in June that I was talking about before. How would you respond
to that impression, and while we maintain sanctions, how can we
convey to all parties in Zimbabwe that the United States is
actively engaged in preparing for different contingencies?
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would say U.S. policy has not been static, that we have
been, in fact, engaged. I think the indications of that are
clear. The President himself has taken a direct role by meeting
with Morgan Tsvangirai in the White House. Secretary Clinton
has met with Morgan Tsvangirai at the State Department.
Breaking with the previous administration's policy of not
meeting with senior officials of the Zimbabwean Government, I
have, in fact, tried to meet with, and talk with, senior
leaders. I met with Robert Mugabe, myself, in Sirte, Libya. It
was not a very easy conversation. I met with the Vice President
of Zimbabwe in New York in June. That was a much better
conversation and led me to believe that I might be able to have
a decent diplomatic conversation with the President of
Zimbabwe.
We continue to engage, as much as we possibly can, the
leaders in the region. Secretary Clinton, during her trip to
Africa in August, talked specifically about the situation in
Zimbabwe with the South African Foreign Minister, as well as
with the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma. We remained
engaged and active in providing additional, but very calibrated
and carefully delivered, new assistance to Zimbabwe in the
field of education and agriculture. We will remain engaged. We
will push as hard as we can for the full implementation of the
Global Political Agreement.
Senator Feingold. And speaking of the different
contingencies, has the administration developed a plan for how
we and other donors could assist Zimbabwe's economic recovery,
if there is a genuine democratic reform? And could such a plan
and dedicated resources, if we made them public, help leverage
the reform itself?
Mr. Carson. We have talked with our key partners in Western
Europe, on a number of occasions, about how we could
collectively work together to help Zimbabwe's recovery once
there was a political transition. We will continue to work with
our closest allies on this. We have not published anything with
specific numbers beside it, but we certainly have had these
discussions, and will carry on these discussions, with key
donor partners.
Senator Feingold. What about holding out a more, sort of,
public carrot approach?
Mr. Carson. Well, we haven't put the carrot out there
directly, publicly, but certainly, when I spoke to Robert
Mugabe in Sirte, Libya, one of the notions was to help ensure
that there would be a successful transition; that the United
States would support such a democratic transition. He was not
interested in that.
Senator Feingold. Assistant Secretary, what is your
assessment of the effectiveness of our current targeted
sanctions, and to what extent is the administration looking at
the possibility of removing individuals or entities from those
sanctions, or adding new individuals and entities?
Mr. Carson. I think that those sanctions should remain in
place until we are certain that there is clear political
movement. And we should also take a look at adding additional
individuals to that list if they are perceived to be inhibiting
progress toward the full implementation.
Senator Feingold. Are there people under consideration in
that category?
Mr. Carson. At this point, no; but we are concerned about
individuals who may be profiting from mining ventures in
Zimbabwe.
Senator Feingold. OK. Secretary, as you know, Human Rights
Watch has documented how the police and army continue to use
brutal force to control access to the diamond fields in Marange
district in eastern Zimbabwe. Despite pledges from the
government that it would remove its armed forces from the
diamond fields, they have not left the area, and the abuses are
continuing. What is the United States position on suspending
Zimbabwe from the Kimberley Process? Could this make any
difference? And what other steps can be taken to cut off the
revenue flows that ZANU-PF gets from its control of these
diamond fields?
Mr. Carson. Let me just say that we are looking at this
very closely; we take all of those allegations seriously. As
you may know, Senator Feingold, we do already have a number of
senior police officials on our list of individuals who are
sanctioned. We will look at that list to determine whether we
should add additional individuals there. We are looking at
trying to remove Zimbabwe from the Kimberley Process if we
cannot, in fact, get some improvement in the handling on the
mineral resources there.
It is an issue of great concern to us. We do not believe
that Zimbabwe's minerals should be used to finance illegal
activities or activities which continue to support a government
which is not totally legitimate.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Assistant Secretary Baukol, you wrote in your testimony
that targeted technical assistance could be provided to
officials and ministries who have demonstrated the willingness
to reform and stabilize the economy. Could you talk
specifically about what this assistance would entail, as well
as what assistance, if any, we are currently providing to the
Minister of Finance?
Mr. Baukol. The targeted technical assistance I had in mind
was mainly to the Ministry of Finance, which has taken a number
of bold steps over the last 7 months to remove powers from the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. And those quasi-fiscal activities
free up prices, reduce the monopoly of the Grain Marketing
Board, and other important steps.
Currently, the U.S. Treasury is not providing any direct
technical assistance to the Finance Ministry. We have not
gotten a formal request from the ministry yet. The ministry is
getting assistance from the IMF. And I've talked to the
minister, and he's very appreciative about such assistance,
which is helping him do a number of things within the ministry.
As you mentioned in your opening remarks, there is serious lack
of capacity at a number of government institutions due to the
situation of the last several years. So, he's in serious need
of assistance in issues such as improving his revenue
authority, making sure that his revenue units are collecting
all the revenues that they can, and that they're not being
diverted to other places. Also, in terms of--on the spending
side, he's set up a single treasury account, which will help
him manage the spending process and make sure the money goes to
where it's suppose to go. But, he could use additional
assistance in a number of these areas.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carson, I always hate to show my ignorance, but
the chairman just mentioned something that I am not aware of,
and I'll bet you can explain it. What's the Kimberley Process?
Mr. Carson. The Kimberley Process is a governments,
industry and civil society initiative to stem the mining and
trading of rough diamonds; adherence to its certification
scheme assures that countries and companies legally mine the
stones and that the sale of the stones does not, in effect,
support illegal activities, illegal governments, and guerrilla
movements. It attempts to put a control mechanism on the flow
of illegally mined minerals, such as diamonds and other
extractive materials.
Senator Isakson. Who enforces that process?
Mr. Carson. It's collectively enforced by governments and
countries.
Senator Isakson. OK.
You had said in your testimony that the Mugabe government
had been taking some of the profits from minerals and diamonds
and taking it offshore for their own benefit. It that correct?
Mr. Carson. Yes, we believe that to be the case.
Senator Isakson. Can the Kimberley Process in any way have
any affect to stop that?
Mr. Carson. Yes, it can, and we are looking at this to try
to get governments and companies not to purchase materials that
have been mined from sources that are controlled by the
government illegally.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gast, in your printed remarks you refer to President
Obama's $73 million funding commitment to Zimbabwe, and, in
that, you broke it down into various things including PEPFAR.
My question is with regard to parliamentary strengthening,
education, and constitution-making, rule of law, consensus-
building, media, victims of torture, civil society, and local
government capacity. Those topics that you mentioned are a
total of $21.3 million of the $73 million. Who do you--who
does--who carries out that assistance? Do you contract with
NGOs, or does USAID carry it out? Can you give me some idea on
that?
Mr. Gast. Sure. Thank you for your question.
Yes, we do carry out some of the assistance directly, by
making grants to local institutions, Zimbabwean institutions,
that meet the criteria for our doing direct disbursements. For
those organizations that are weak and cannot meet U.S.
Government accounting standards, then what we do is use
international NGOs; and, in this case, one of our principal
partners is PACT, and PACT works on rebuilding the capacity of
the local NGOs.
Senator Isakson. What is PACT? Is that an acronym?
Mr. Gast. It's an acronym. PACT stands for Private Agencies
Collaborating Together.
Senator Isakson. OK, thank you very much.
Mr. Baukol, in your remarks you refer to--and I'll just
read it, ``As you know, the United States does not have broad
economic sanctions on the country of Zimbabwe.'' And then it
goes, ``In accordance with executive order'' such and such,
``the Treasury Department has maintained targeted economic
sanctions against the Mugabe regime and has designated dozens
of senior regime officials, supporters, and state-owned or -
controlled companies.''
What are those targeted--what are the Treasury's targeted
sanctions, as far as the financial institutions are concerned?
Mr. Baukol. We have listed a number of specific Zimbabwean
entities that have been supporting the Mugabe regime over the
last number of years. Our sanctions prevent these designated
entities from gaining any access to U.S. financial system by
preventing our banks and financial institutions from dealing
with any of the entities on our sanctions list.
Senator Isakson. So, in other words, if these guys that are
taking money or minerals and diamonds, and are getting it
offshore and then trying to launder it for their own benefit,
you try and put sanctions against those who are the
facilitators for that. Is that correct?
Mr. Baukol. Yes, that's the principle behind it. So, for
example, one of the sanctioned individuals is the chairman of
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, who's one of Mugabe's main----
Senator Isakson. Just got reappointed, I understand.
Mr. Baukol. He got reappointed last year. And he's--he and
his family are helping the Mugabe regime, so if they were
trying to divert funds anywhere, if it came to the attention of
U.S. financial institutions that it was going through U.S.
financial institutions, they would need to block those
transactions and not do business with these sanctioned people.
Senator Isakson. And do you coordinate these sanctions with
the State Department?
Mr. Baukol. Absolutely. When we come up with the list and--
of both individuals and entities, we work closely with the
State Department and the rest of the U.S. Government.
Senator Isakson. OK.
Last, Mr. Gast, I understand there's a drought in Zimbabwe.
Is that correct?
Mr. Gast. That is correct.
Senator Isakson. How severe is it? Is it a famine like
drought or----
Mr. Gast. No; but there's--there is a drought in southern
Africa, as well as east Africa, so we're concerned about that,
and we're monitoring it.
We, last year, because of the economic crisis and the
inability of getting any sort of input into the agriculture
sector, had to feed more than 7 million persons. This year, we
project the number to be around 2 million. Significant. But,
with our timely inputs of agricultural seed, fertilizer, in the
hands of people, the situation is much improved over last year.
Senator Isakson. Good. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Secretary Carson, what's the status of
press freedom in Zimbabwe these days?
Mr. Carson. Very, very limited. There is press censorship
and press control on publications of materials there. When
there is not absolute censorship, there is self-censorship
because of fear of running into political complications with
the government. The international media has limited access to
the country. At one point, there was no international media
allowed in. The government has since, in the last couple of
months, said they could come in, but they still have difficulty
getting visas and difficulty reporting. I would say, on a scale
of 1 to 10, press freedoms are probably somewhere around 2.5.
Senator Kaufman. Is there hope that's going to change in
the foreseeable future?
Mr. Carson. It would easy for that to change, if, in fact,
the government of President Robert Mugabe wanted it done. There
could be a removal of all restrictions on the press, and
permission for the independent media to come back to Zimbabwe.
Senator Kaufman. But, there's no indications that's going
to happen.
Mr. Carson. There's no indication that we will see an
opening of press freedom very rapidly.
Senator Kaufman. What's the status of the rule of law in
Zimbabwe these days?
Mr. Carson. The status of the rule of law is pretty bad.
Zimbabwe, in 1990, had one of the best judicial systems in
Africa. The courts were completely independent. Robert Mugabe's
regime has systematically eroded judicial independence. We have
seen, however, over the last couple of days, as my colleague
Earl Gast has pointed out, a decision by the Zimbabwe Supreme
Court, which, surprisingly, exonerated several individuals who
had been tortured by Robert Mugabe and harassed by his
government.
That was a rare sign of judicial independence. We hope it
will continue to move forward in a positive way; but, until we
see a long-term trend, this is more of an aberration than a
reality.
Senator Kaufman. And what would you say the status of human
rights are in Zimbabwe these days?
Mr. Carson. Status of human rights, very poor. There
continues to be farm invasions, violent farm invasions. There
continues to be political harassment of the MDC, including
political figures and parliamentarians. There continues to be
police abuse. There continue to be people held in detention.
On--again, on a scale of 1 to 10, I would say, human rights are
probably--respect for human rights would somewhere around 1.5
to 2.
Senator Kaufman. Is there real--any real indication, to
kind of sum this up, that the political situation in Zimbabwe
is going to change in the foreseeable future?
Mr. Carson. As I indicated in my testimony, President
Mugabe still has a very firm grip on power. He has that grip on
power because he retains the control and the loyalty of the
security forces--the intelligence services, the military
services, and the police. He also is able to mobilize young
party thugs on behalf of his government. If we see the signs of
a breakup in support for Mugabe by the security services, it
would be an indication both of a fracturing of the ZANU-PF
structures and also a weakening of Mugabe's leadership.
While we acknowledge the economic progress that has taken
place as being very positive, we have not seen significant
movement forward on the implementation of the Global Political
Agreement. Far too many political obstacles remain for Morgan
Tsvangirai and the MDC. We would like to see those obstacles
removed.
In my conversations with Vice President Joice Mujuru in New
York in June and in my conversations with President Robert
Mugabe in Sirte, Libya, in July, I encouraged the ZANU-PF
leadership to move forward on the full implementation of the
Global Political Agreement. If indeed we saw sustained progress
on the political side, then we could begin to reengage in more
significant fashion on both the political and the economic
side. You know, much has been done as result of Mr. Tendai
Biti's work on the economic side, but as far as I can see,
there has not been a correlation that links that economic
progress to political progress. We still see very little
happening that gives strong encouragement that Mugabe is ready
to let go.
Senator Kaufman. Could you just spend--my final question is
the influence of China in Zimbabwe.
Mr. Carson. I think the Chinese were, at one time, keenly
interested in exploiting Zimbabwe's vast mineral potential,
especially as the Western mineral companies started to retreat.
But, I think that the Chinese have become wary of Zimbabwe.
They don't want to be attached to what is, in fact, a long-term
losing proposition. There have been reports of large Chinese
loans to Zimbabwe. There's really no indication that these
loans have actually been extended to the government. I do note,
symbolically, that the last time Hu Jintao, China's senior
leader, made a trip to Africa, he went to Zambia and not to
Zimbabwe. The Chinese have been cautious in how they've dealt
with Robert Mugabe.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for another excellent hearing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.
I'll just use a part of a second round.
Assistant Secretary Baukol, as you said in your testimony,
Zimbabwe was recently called one of the worst investment
locations in the world, on a par with Afghanistan. In your
view, why is it one of the worst investment locations, and what
will it ultimately take for Zimbabwe to attract foreign
investment?
Mr. Baukol. Thank you, Senator.
I think there's a number of steps that Zimbabwe would need
to take, and progress on the political agreement would be at
the top of the list, I believe. In my consultations with the
financial sector in Zimbabwe, with private-sector
representatives in Zimbabwe, they point to uncertainties about
the rule of law, about contracts, about even their, you know,
funds in the financial sector, and a lot of these issues relate
to the Global Political Agreement. For example, the fact that
Mr. Gono is still head of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe leads
many people to be hesitant about putting new money into new
investments in Zimbabwe, because of fears that those funds
might, at some point, be taken in some way or another. So, in
addition to regular institution-building, which Zimbabwe needs,
sort of, across the board, I would say political progress would
be at the top of the list.
Senator Feingold. Assistant Administrator Gast, Zimbabwe
is, of course, a fertile country, and I understand why USAID
would be eager to transition from providing food assistance to
enhancing actual agricultural production. Beyond the loan
guarantee program you described to provide inputs and support
for farmers, is USAID looking to undertake any other activities
in this regard? What would they entail? And will Zimbabwe be
part of this administration's Global Food Security Initiative?
Mr. Gast. A very good question, Senator.
As Assistant Secretary Carson mentioned, our assistance is
very carefully calibrated, and we have met--had many
interagency discussions with Treasury, with State Department
and NSC, on a way forward, an approach in tying our assistance
with our policy. I think what we're doing now in agriculture is
appropriate. If you look at the statistics, I think it's less
than 10 percent of the population are in the formal economy and
have jobs. And so, we see this initial effort in agriculture as
a way of getting the small farmers engaged in commerce. We--if
this is successful, if we're able to show that there is a need
for credit--additional credit coming in, we can look at
expanding the program. But, we are contemplating designs for
new activities in the future, but we want to see how the
initial activities that we have underway now proceed, first.
Senator Feingold. And would further assistance for
agriculture require further waivers? And do you see any risk to
expanding our engagement in the absence of any real land tenure
security?
Mr. Gast. Absolutely right. Land tenure and security is
vitally important, and that ties, of course, to the GPA, the
Global Political Agreement.
The waiver--I think that we have used waiver authorities
appropriately on the Brooke amendment and the 620(q). And, with
the exception of that one--the Credit Guarantee Program--we did
not require waiver authority for agriculture. The only risk, in
the future, is if we want to--if we decide it's time to engage
with the ministry--and it's too soon for that, the Ministry of
Agriculture--we do have the 7070(e) provision which prevents us
from working directly with the government unless the Secretary
of State can certify that rule of law has been reestablished in
Zimbabwe.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Just one--out of curiosity, one question,
Mr. Gast. You talked about agriculture and building the economy
in Zimbabwe, and I am wondering if CARE is working in Zimbabwe
as an NGO? Do you know?
Mr. Gast. I'm not certain that they are--they likely are in
Zimbabwe.
[The written information supplied for the record by Mr.
Gast follows:]
CARE is one of USAID's Office of Food for Peace partners providing
emergency food assistance. It is funded through the Consortium for
Southern Africa Food Emergency comprising World Vision, Catholic Relief
Services, and CARE. C-SAFE is the second largest food assistance
provider in Zimbabwe and works in collaboration with the World Food
Programme (WFP).
In addition, CARE receives funds from USAID's Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance to provide livelihood support to disadvantaged
populations.
CARE is expected to receive a grant from the USAID Mission to
support similar work fairly soon. CARE is working with the savings and
loans groups (ISAL) under their livelihood programs in Zimbabwe.
Senator Isakson. Well, the reason I mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, just to amplify that building of the economy,
building of local enterprise, agriculture, and things like
that, when I was in Tanzania in May, I visited CARE's operation
in a number of places, and they've established a program called
Village Savings and Loan, where they're actually getting the
money to the individuals who are then contributing it back out
in the form of small microloans, and are building businesses
that are value added. These businesses are really having a
tremendous positive effect. I know it is in that country, and
it seems like that type of thing might be, eventually, what we
could, hopefully, get to Zimbabwe to help those people out.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Baukol, did you have something to say
about CARE's presence in Zimbabwe?
Mr. Baukol. Yes, when I was there in July and I toured a
project that was led by Mercy Corps, but it included a number
of other NGOs, including CARE, as well as Africare, OXFAM, and
several others, and it was doing things along the lines that
Senator Isakson described.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. Senator Kaufman.
Well, I want to thank this panel very much. This is a very
important part of our signaling, through this committee and
otherwise, a serious American engagement in the issues of
Zimbabwe. I thank the panel.
And I'd ask the second panel to come forward.
[Pause.]
Senator Feingold. Welcome, to the panel. I look forward to
hearing from you.
Ambassador Steinberg, would you start it off for us,
please?
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD STEINBERG, DEPUTY PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
Ambassador Steinberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to
begin by congratulating you and Senator Isakson for holding
this hearing.
Crisis Group believes that Zimbabwe now has the best chance
in a decade to put behind it the divisions, abuses, and self-
implosion that is the legacy of Robert Mugabe for the country.
There is the combination of an exclusive government, a
reemerging civil society, an educated population, once-proud
manufacturing, agriculture, and mining sectors waiting for
recovery, and the good will of countries in the region and
beyond.
In this regard, we are very concerned that, despite these
hopeful possibilities, a wait-and-see attitude from the
international community, including the United States,
especially in the political area, risks creating the ultimate
self-fulfilling prophecy of a failure of this inclusive
government and a return to even worse conflict and repression.
When Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC colleagues joined the
Unity Government in February, skeptics portrayed them as
neophytes who would very soon suffer from Mugabe's ``divide,
rule, co-opt, and destroy'' strategy. Nonetheless, against long
odds, we saw some immediate improvements. Schools and hospitals
were reopened; the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; and food and
other products returned to market places. We saw a substantial
reduction in human rights abuses, although they're continuing,
to some extent. The cholera epidemic was brought under control.
And a bipartisan committee was put together to draft a new
constitution.
We all recognized that this was all very fragile, however,
and we saw exactly the same kinds of problems that Secretary
Carson and others have identified: The continuing farm
seizures; the arrest and repression of MDC parliamentarians;
the reappointment of Gideon Gono at the Reserve Bank and
Johannes Tomana as the Attorney General's Office; and the
general frustration of the Global Political Agreement.
But, it's important to remember that Prime Minister
Tsvangirai said publicly, and continues to say, ``Don't punish
us, and don't punish the people of Zimbabwe, for working with
Robert Mugabe.''
When he came to the United States and Europe this summer,
Tsvangirai was met with lukewarm encouragement, a lot of
skepticism, and, frankly, very little cash. Tellingly, no one
called for a Marshall Plan for Zimbabwe. In fact, this
hesitation, in our view, risks thwarting the very changes that
we want to see in the country, both by weakening the hand of
the MDC and the moderates in the ZANU-PF party and by reducing
popular support for the reform process. If you look at the
humanitarian relief situation, less than half of the
requirement to feed individuals has been met. We're hearing of
a possibility of a new outbreak of cholera when the rainy
season hits. We are seeing strikes by teachers and health
workers because of a lack of resources for the government. The
government can't even buy grain from its own farmers because
the Grain Marketing Board has no money. And even the vital
process of constitutional reform has been stalled because the
government doesn't have the money to pay for the outreach
consultations that are required.
We're equally concerned that the MDC, in particular, is
risking its relationship with the masses in Zimbabwe. It's
losing its political and popular support because it hasn't been
able to deliver on what it promised when it went into
government.
Mr. Chairman, we are fully on board with the maintaining of
sanctions on the hard-liners who are thwarting the reform
process in Zimbabwe. Asset freezes, travel restrictions, et
cetera, are essential. And we believe that, in fact, these are
essential to leave in place until a new constitution has been
decided, and an electoral reform process is in place.
But, at the same time, we should be highlighting, rather
than hiding, the 313 million dollars' worth of assistance that
the United States is giving to agriculture and education and to
civil society. In addition, we should be helping to empower
civil servants and members of the legislature and judiciary. We
should be looking to encourage trade and foreign investment in
Zimbabwe to create jobs to address a 90-percent unemployment
rate and to attract back the 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans who
have fled across the border to South Africa.
Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I understand that some worry
that a strategy like this would prematurely reward Mugabe and
his hard-liners, or in some way reduce the pressure on them to
participate in the reform process. In truth, the assistance
would strengthen the hands of moderates and make it more
difficult for extremists to again seize power. It would create
a situation where we can avoid more repression, more isolation
for Zimbabwe's people, and more hardship for the region.
Let me put it simply, if you want to sideline those who are
trying to sideline the democratic reform process, it's time to
support the people of Zimbabwe and the Unity Government now.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Steinberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald Steinberg, Deputy President International
Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium
Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and Ranking Member Senator
Isakson for bringing us together today to explore policy options toward
the transition in Zimbabwe, and for your continuing leadership on these
issues.
As an international nongovernmental organization committed to
preventing and ending deadly conflict, International Crisis Group
believes that Zimbabwe now has its best chance in a decade to put
behind it the divisions, abuses, and self-implosion that has been the
legacy of the abusive regime of Robert Mugabe. The combination of an
inclusive government, a reemerging and vibrant civil society, an
educated population and workforce, a once-rich manufacturing,
agricultural, and mining sector waiting for recovery; and the good will
of countries in its region and beyond can open the door to a post-
conflict recovery that would benefit both its long-suffering people and
the broader southern African region.
But for all the hopeful possibilities inherent in this situation, a
``wait-and-see'' attitude from the international community, including
the United States, risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of a
return to conflict and repression.
MDC'S ENTRY INTO GOVERNMENT
When Morgan Tsvangirai led his party, the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), into a unity government with Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU-PF) in February 2009 under the terms of the Global
Political Accord, sceptics gave the new formation little chance of
success. Tsvangirai and the MDC were portrayed as neophytes who would
soon become the latest victims of Mugabe's ``divide, rule, co-opt and
destroy'' strategy. It was broadly understood that the MDC position was
driven by a pragmatic assessment of their options. Mugabe and his hard-
line allies and security forces held most of the cards: a monopoly on
force, a willingness to repress and abuse its political opponents, and
the obsequious support of South African President Thabo Mbeki, charged
by the Southern African Development Community to negotiate a solution
to the longstanding electoral and political crisis. The MDC calculated
that its capacity to affect change would be greater within government
than outside it.
Understandably repulsed by the autocratic actions, human rights
abuses, and corrupt practices of Mugabe and his coterie, foreign
donors--including the United States--have held back on support to the
new government in which they maintain the upper hand. The original
approach of providing only narrowly defined humanitarian assistance was
eventually modified to a position described as ``humanitarian-plus,''
and included support for not only life-saving emergency projects, but
also for agricultural recovery, civil servants involved in relief
exercises, and health and educational institutions. This approach was
seen as balancing a desire to improve the lot of Zimbabwe's population
with continuing pressure on the actors in the new government--
especially Mugabe and ZANU-PF--to meet their commitments toward a
transition to democracy governance.
Against long odds, the new government started out reasonably well.
Many schools and hospitals reopened. The Zimbabwe dollar, which had
been turned into an international joke by multibillion percent
inflation, was shelved. Civil servants were paid a small stipend and
returned to work; goods started to return to empty store shelves; a
cholera epidemic was brought under control; and a bipartisan
parliamentary committee was formed to reform the constitution. Human
rights activists reported a significant drop in government abuses.
An ambitious reconstruction program--the Short-Term Economic
Recovery Programme--identified the need for about $8.5 billion in
resources, including foreign assistance and investment, and was
generally well-received by foreign donors and the Bretton Woods
institutions. Prime Minister Tsvangirai, Finance Minister Tendai Biti
and their MDC party received much of the credit for these
developments--even from the rank-and-file army--and a new sense of hope
returned to Zimbabwe.
But Tsvangirai could see clearly that these changes were fragile
and pleaded for foreign help to consolidate them. ``Don't make us pay
for working with Mugabe,'' he wrote in a powerful opinion piece in the
London Times.
Indeed, from early on, there were ample signs of concern. Farm
seizures have continued virtually unabated. While human rights abuses
declined, ZANU-PF-led security forces have continued to arrest and
detain activists and MDC parliamentarians. Hard-line partisans like the
Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, and the Attorney General, Johannes
Tomana, were unduly reappointed, top generals boycotted the new
national security establishments and showed public disdain for
Tsvangirai, and ZANU-PF has delayed or ignored key commitments under
the Global Political Accord (GPA). The constitutional reform process
has been thwarted by ZANU-PF's insistence that the secretly authored
Kariba draft serve as the basis for a new constitution.
Some old regime elements, especially hard-line generals and other
Mugabe loyalists, are actively thwarting the new government, motivated
by fear of a loss of power and its financial benefits; possible
prosecution for their crimes; hatred of Tsvangirai and the MDC; and a
belief that that they are the guardians of the country's liberation.
These forces continue to work flat out to undermine the inclusive
government by stalling processes that should lead to the fulfilment of
the GPA and refusing to implement government decisions. True to form,
Mugabe is giving them backing, calling into grave question his
commitment to make the inclusive government work.
THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL DISENGAGEMENT
During his visit to the United States and Europe this summer,
Tsvangirai was met with luke-warm encouragement, much skepticism, and
very little cash. In addition to the revulsion over supporting a
government including Mugabe, Zimbabwe's timing was awful. It was
seeking massive foreign aid and private investment at a time when
donors were cutting aid budgets and foreign investors were seeking safe
havens in the stormy global economy. Tellingly, no one has called for a
``Marshall Plan for Zimbabwe.''
In fact, this stance risks thwarting the very changes the
international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of the
MDC and moderates in ZANU-PF, and by undercutting popular support for
the reform process. The humanitarian situation remains dire, with
reluctant donors pledging less than half of the $718 million required
to ward off disease and hunger. The United Nations and nongovernmental
organizations have warned of a potential new cholera outbreak ahead of
the rainy season. Moreover, doctors and teachers have gone on strike to
demand better pay. The government is unable to buy grain from farmers
because the Grain Marketing Board has no money. The constitutional
reform process is stalled in part over the failure of the government to
finance outreach and consultation programs.
Already, there are disturbing warnings that the MDC is losing
contact with its popular base, including in the context of the
constitutional reform process. Civil society activists are increasingly
complaining that this process is being driven by political elites for
their own purposes. Similar arguments are emerging with regard to
efforts to develop mechanisms to hold the perpetrators of human rights
abuses accountable for their actions. Within the MDC itself, some
question the wisdom of remaining in the unity government.
Further, despite succession battles within ZANU-PF between the
rival factions of the hard-line Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa and
the more moderate Gen. Solomon Mujuru and his wife, Vice President
Joice Mujuru, the forces committed to Mugabe seem to be firmly in
control.
MAINTAIN TARGETED SANCTIONS; ENHANCE TARGETED ASSISTANCE
Mr. Chairman, the United States must stand firmly against those who
are thwarting the democratic transformation in Zimbabwe. Tough targeted
sanctions--including trade and travel bans and assets freezes--against
such individuals and the companies they control under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and
section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code should remain in place
to secure the commitment of the recalcitrant parties to their
commitments under the GPA.
But at the same time, targeted reconstruction and development
assistance--channeled through fully transparent, credible and
accountable mechanisms and institutions--is essential now. Such
mechanisms do exist: The International Monetary Fund, for example, has
ensured responsible use of the one-time expansion of special drawing
rights to Zimbabwe equivalent to a $500 million loan for the purpose of
building and repairing schools, hospitals, roads, railways and
communication networks. The United States, other donors, and
international financial institutions should:
Expand assistance to support revival of the education,
agriculture, water, health and water sanitation, including
support for the soon-to-be-announced Government Works Program.
Particular attention should be given to programs to assist
women, including reproductive health care and girls' education.
Help empower a functioning civil service and legislature,
and support reform of politicized government institutions,
including the judiciary.
Strengthen civil society--groups of women, academics,
journalists, lawyers, farmers, and others--fractured and
polarized in recent years by Mugabe's divide-and-rule tactics.
Adopt innovative programs to encourage new trade and foreign
investment in Zimbabwe to address the country's massive
unemployment rate and promote the return of 4 million
Zimbabwean migrants who are increasingly the target of
xenophobic attacks in South Africa and elsewhere in the region.
AMERICA'S INTERESTS IN ZIMBABWE'S RECOVERY
Mr. Chairman. At a time when crises in Afghanistan, Burma, Congo,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan fill
the in-boxes of American policymakers, it would be easy to move the
slow-simmering crisis to the back burner. Neither the MDC nor ZANU-PF
consorts with global terrorists, and collapse of the unity government
will not lead to jihadi training camps in rural areas. Zimbabwe is
neither a supplier nor a major trafficker in illegal drugs, arms, or
persons. Its refugees are not flooding into the United States. Zimbabwe
has no oil, and most of its minerals face free-falling global demand.
No exotic diseases threaten pandemic: it suffers from ``just'' cholera,
malaria, and HIV/AIDS. The country straddles no sea-lanes and has no
pirates.
But there are strong motivations for broad American engagement.
Just because the global effects of Zimbabwe's implosion have so far
been modest, this could change rapidly. Transnational threats incubate
in unexpected ways in the hothouse of instability and weak governance.
What if the H1N1 virus had emerged in Harare and swept through a
country where the health infrastructure had been ravaged?
Zimbabwe's recovery is of major regional importance. If Zimbabwe is
a smallish country of 12 million people, the southern African region--
with a market of 200 million, growing oil production, peacekeepers
throughout Africa, and a location along key shipping lanes--is by
contrast of great strategic, commercial and political importance to the
United States. A prosperous Zimbabwe could be an engine of growth for
the region, providing key links to regional communications, transport
and electricity grids. Zimbabwe has long been considered a potential
breadbasket for the region, based on what used to be efficient
agriculture, albeit needing serious and responsible land reform.
By contrast, instability in Zimbabwe is profoundly destabilizing to
its neighbors. An estimated 4 million Zimbabweans fleeing economic
hardship and political abuses have flooded across borders, overwhelming
the social services and the good will of South Africa, Botswana, and
other neighbors. Botswana, Africa's shining star of stability and human
rights, has built an electrified fence and resorted to detention and
expulsions to keep desperate Zimbabweans out.
This regional importance has been one reason why the SADC has been
advocating greater international support for the unity government.
South Africa itself has put up about $75 million to support the process
of democratic transformation. During his visit to Harare in late August
and a subsequent meeting with Secretary of State Clinton, South African
President Jacob Zuma gave welcome indications that he will press a
tougher stance vis-a-vis Mugabe on outstanding GPA obligations, respect
for rule of law, and cessation of repressive actions by the security
forces under his control.
But regrettably, the international community cannot rely solely on
Zimbabwe's neighbors to promote this process. As shown again in their
September 7-8 meeting in Kinshasa, many SADC leaders continue to kowtow
to Mugabe. Following a presentation in which he told these leaders that
the unity government is doing well, SADC unproductively called for the
lifting of targeted international sanctions on Zimbabwe and cancelled
an extraordinary summit on Zimbabwe to review the weak implementation
of the GPA.
Working with regional actors, the broader international community
and, of course, the Zimbabwean people themselves, the United States has
a unique opportunity to promote democratic transformation and
socioeconomic recovery in Zimbabwe.
I know that some worry that such a strategy would prematurely
reward Mugabe and his hard-line supporters, or somehow reduce the
pressure on them to cooperate with the reform process.
In truth, a policy of engagement and targeted assistance through
credible and transparent channels would strengthen the hands of
moderates and make it more difficult for the extremists to again seize
power, which would result in even greater repression and isolation for
Zimbabwe's people and greater instability throughout South African and
beyond. Put simply: We believe that if you want to sideline Mugabe and
his hard-liners, you should support the people of Zimbabwe by embracing
the unity government now.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Moss.
STATEMENT OF TODD MOSS, VICE PRESIDENT FOR CORPORATE AFFAIRS
AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON,
DC
Dr. Moss. The situation in Zimbabwe is not unlike a forced
marriage between a violent criminal and a courageous spouse who
is trying to restore order and sanity to a shattered household.
The challenge for the United States is to help support the
credible parts of the coalition without emboldening the
criminal parts. Fortunately, I think that we do have policy
options to achieve that very goal.
Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, other
members of the committee. Appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to suggest ways the United States can respond
forcefully and strategically to the challenges in Zimbabwe.
While on leave from the Center for Global Development, I
proudly served in the State Department of the previous
administration, but did not work directly on our policy toward
Zimbabwe. I have, however, been actively involved with the
country for two decades, and now lead the Center's work on
Zimbabwe, which also does include some informal assistance to
the Ministry of Finance on the technical aspects of arrears
clearance.
I believe we should be clear. Morgan Tsvangirai won the
March 2008 elections and rightfully should be President.
Instead, we have a highly imperfect interim Unity Government;
the cabal, responsible for destroying Zimbabwe's economy, for
unleashing violence, and denying the will of the voters, are
still in positions of power; the coalition government is thus
extremely fragile. However, we must recognize that the
situation on the ground is far better than it was a year ago.
Mr. Tsvangirai is Prime Minister. There are credible and
capable people from his party in charge of key ministries; most
notably, finance, power, and health. Policy changes implemented
by the Minister of Finance represent a clear break with the
past. I believe the United States should support this positive
progress, while still remaining clear-eyed about the risks
ahead.
A passive wait-and-see approach is a sure recipe for
failure. The Unity Government can only survive if it shows
forward momentum. Nor is it an option for the United States to
throw its full weight blindly behind an uncertain coalition
government. The only practical option for the United States is
to find creative ways of supporting democratic forces,
technocratic reforms, and economic recovery, while keeping
resources out of the hands of the old guard and maintaining
pressure on the instigators of violence.
What might such a strategy entail? First, the United State
must maintain targeted sanctions until it is clear that those
people on the list are no longer actively working to undermine
democracy and U.S. interests in the region. Second, we should
continue to be forceful with Zimbabwe's neighbors to live up to
their commitments, both to enforce the terms of the coalition
deal and to provide adequate support. The diplomatic and
financial efforts, so far, from South Africa are far from
sufficient for a country that claims regional leadership.
Third, the United States must find ways to provide ring-fenced
support for activities and select ministries involved in
restarting critical public services. Expectations are extremely
high among the Zimbabwean population for positive, tangible
change.
I'll focus the remainder of my time on this last dilemma,
how the United States can help economic revitalization without
unintentionally giving comfort to negative forces, how we can
help one part of the coalition without emboldening the other.
An easy first step is for the U.S. Treasury to support
efforts already underway at the multilateral development banks
to assist the Ministry of Finance. We can even encourage the
World Bank and the African Development Bank to seek and find
special prearrears clearance money for Zimbabwe. These
institutions are thinking hard about how to be constructive,
but they're also looking for clear signals from key
shareholders, like the United States.
U.S. bilateral efforts must encourage forward progress,
while ensuring that any assistance is fully accountable. For
the sake of speed and flexibility, I believe we should build on
existing U.S. pipelines and expertise in health, agriculture,
and private investment. And I'll briefly suggest four specific
examples.
One, we should designate Zimbabwe a focus country for the
President's AIDS and malaria initiatives.
Two, noting that nearly 3 million Zimbabweans will be food-
insecure this year, we should make sure that Zimbabwe is
included in the White House African Food Security Initiative.
Third, the administration should direct the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Export-Import Bank
to find creative ways of catalyzing private capital. For
example, OPIC could announce an intention to launch a Zimbabwe
Enterprise Fund, as it has done in places like Liberia.
Fourth, we should make--the United States should make a
modest contribution to the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor
Trust Fund. A major U.S. contribution is neither likely, nor
necessary, but some participation would be a visible sign of
American intentions and support.
By using these existing mechanisms and some creativity, the
United States could mobilize significant resources, perhaps,
from these four examples, as much as $500 million, to
contribute toward Zimbabwe's recovery and reconstruction, and,
at the same time, support the political process of restoring
Zimbabwe to the community of democracies.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Moss follows:]
Prepared Statement of Todd J. Moss, Vice President and Senior Fellow,
Center for Global Development, Washington, DC
Thank you Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and other
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to suggest ways the United States can respond
forcefully and strategically to the economic and political challenges
in Zimbabwe.
I proudly served in the State Department of the previous
administration, but, in the interest of full disclosure, did not work
directly on our policy toward Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, I have been
actively involved with the country for two decades and now lead the
Center for Global Development's work on Zimbabwe.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For example, Benjamin Leo and Todd Moss, ``Moving Mugabe's
Mountain: Zimbabwe's Path to Arrears Clearance and Debt Relief,''
Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, forthcoming October
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zimbabwe has experienced an economic and political trauma not
unlike a major conflict.\2\ My colleague, Michael Clemens, and I
estimate that Zimbabweans have over the past decade fallen back to an
average income level not seen since the 1950s.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, ``After Mugabe: Post-Conflict
Lessons for Zimbabwe,'' Africa Policy Journal, Harvard University,
April 2006.
\3\ Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, ``Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe's
Crisis,'' Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, July 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tragedy of Zimbabwe, of course, is that this economic collapse
is entirely man-made. Since September 2008 the country has been
administered by an interim unity government that was forced on Robert
Mugabe by regional leaders following the flawed March 2008 elections
and a brutal campaign of violence against the Movement for Democratic
Change and its supporters. We should be clear: Even in an environment
of intense intimidation and repression, Morgan Tsvangirai won those
elections.
The current arrangement is highly imperfect, not least because the
men responsible for destroying the economy, unleashing the violence,
and denying the will of the voters are still in positions of power. The
Mr. Mugabe is still surrounded by men who have every reason to try to
cling to power and grab what they can. The coalition government is thus
highly fragile and has made halting progress.
However, it is critical to recognize that the situation on the
ground is far better than it was a year ago. Mr. Tsvangirai is Prime
Minister and there are credible and capable people from his party in
charge of key ministries, most notably finance, power, and health.
Policy changes implemented by the Minister of Finance represent a
clear break with the past and have stabilized the macroeconomic
climate. Inflation is under control and the poisonous influence of the
central bank has been marginalized. The country may register positive
economic growth for the first time since 1998. But an upturn is far
from certain and far from robust.
I believe the United States should support this positive progress,
while still remaining clear-eyed about the risks ahead. The challenge
for U.S. policy is to continue to support recovery and the restoration
of democracy while still maintaining pressure on the negative elements.
A passive wait-and-see approach is a recipe for failure. The unity
government can only survive if it shows forward momentum and, given the
depths of the country's plunge, assistance from the international
community is essential.
Nor is it an option for the United States to throw its full weight
blindly behind the coalition government. Given the real uncertainties
ahead, a big push seems neither prudent nor strategic.
The only practical option for the United States is to find creative
ways of supporting democratic forces, technocratic reforms, and
economic recovery while keeping resources out of the hands of the old
guard and maintaining pressure on the instigators of violence.
What might such a strategy entail?
First, the United States should maintain targeted sanctions until
it is clear that those people on the list are no longer working to
actively undermine U.S. interests in the region.
Second, we should continue to be forceful with SADC to live up to
its commitments, both in terms of enforcing the coalition deal and
providing adequate support. The contributions so far from SADC members,
especially South Africa, have not been sufficient to the task. We
should prevail upon new SADC chair Joseph Kabila of Congo to keep
Zimbabwe on the SADC agenda.
Third, the United States should find ways to provide ring-fenced
support for activities and select ministries involved in restarting
critical public services. Expectations are high among the Zimbabwean
population for positive, tangible change. Lack of visible progress will
undercut the reformist position of the Prime Minister and his party.
The United States can make significant contributions in all three
of these areas. I will focus the remainder of my testimony on this last
piece: how the United States can help economic revitalization without
unintentionally giving comfort to negative forces.
An easy first step is for the U.S. Treasury to support efforts
underway at the multilateral development banks to assist the Finance
Ministry. We can even encourage the World Bank and the African
Development Bank to seek prearrears clearance money for Zimbabwe. These
institutions are thinking hard about how to be constructive but also
looking for signals from key shareholders.
U.S. bilateral efforts must simultaneously encourage forward
progress while ensuring that any assistance is fully accountable. For
the sake of speed and flexibility, options should be prioritized that
build on existing U.S. pipelines and expertise in health, agriculture,
and private investment. For example:
1. Designate Zimbabwe a focus country for the President's Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative
(PMI). Current HIV/AIDS spending by the United States in Zimbabwe is
approximately $30m per year, even though the country has among the
world's highest prevalence rates. By comparison, PEPFAR obligated $696m
to Zambia for FY 2004-08. For malaria, Mozambique and Zambia received
$19m and $14m, respectively in FY08, versus $200,000 for Zimbabwe.
2. Include Zimbabwe in the food security initiative. The USG
provided $112 million in FY09 to Zimbabwe for emergency assistance,
with USAID's Food for Peace accounting for 85 percent. Assistance could
be expanded and broadened to include targeted agricultural productivity
aid, in line with the White House focus on restoring long-term food
security in Africa. The U.N. estimates that nearly 3 million
Zimbabweans are food insecure this year. Restarting the country's once-
great agricultural base is vital to long-term revitalization.
3. Encourage OPIC and ExIm to catalyze private capital. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation should announce an intention to
launch a Zimbabwe Enterprise Fund. OPIC has already created more than a
dozen private investment funds targeting Africa and several country-
specific funds, such as the $30 million Liberia Enterprise Development
Fund. The U.S. Export-Import Bank should also consider, at the earliest
possible moment, reopening a Zimbabwe window. This would provide trade
credit for critical parts and supplies as the country rebuilds its
power, transport, and water systems. If the administration wanted to be
especially forward-leaning, it could begin negotiations with China ExIm
Bank for small jointly funded infrastructure projects. This would not
only leverage our economic influence, but also send a strong political
signal to Harare.
4. Make a modest contribution to the multidonor trust fund. The new
government's survival depends in large measure on providing cash to
restore social services and build the depleted civil service. Although
a major U.S. contribution to the World Bank-administered multidonor
trust fund seems unlikely and unnecessary, some participation from the
United States would be a visible sign of American intentions and
support.
By using these existing mechanisms and a little aggressive
creativity, the United States could mobilize significant resources to
contribute toward Zimbabwe's recovery and reconstruction--and at the
same time support the political process of restoring Zimbabwe to the
community of democracies.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Dr. Moss.
Ms. Lindborg.
STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Feingold,
Ranking Member Senator Isakson, and other committee members.
Thanks for holding this hearing today. It's an important topic
at an important time.
And, as my copanelists have all strongly underscored, the
principal dilemma is, How do you engage? How do you address the
critical humanitarian challenges as the bottom has fallen out
of what used to be a well-run county over this last decade? And
how do you do so without compromising, given the tenuous
political situation?
Mercy Corps works in about 40 countries around the world,
most of them conflict-affected, very transitional, difficult
environments. Each is different, but one of the lessons that
we've drawn from each of those environments is that there is
often a lot of room to work at the community level, and up to
and including local municipalities, that enables you to help
encourage positive progress, energize a population that's eager
for positive change, and at the same time address not just the
immediate impacts of humanitarian crisis, but some of the
systematic underpinnings that will cause them to occur over and
over again, such as the cholera crisis that ravaged Zimbabwe
last year and has every indication that it could return this
coming year because of the massive failures of the water
sanitation and public education systems.
We've been operational in Zimbabwe since 2002. We see, with
the advent of the Unity Government, several signs of positive
hope that we think further justify the importance of moving
past strict humanitarian support and into recovery and early
reconstruction at the ground up.
The first is that, since the dollarization of the economy,
lives have changed in a stark way at the human level, at the
family level. The ability to go out and buy bread at a cost
that hasn't triple by 100,000 percent by the end of the day has
simply changed how people live their days, created a
substantial amount of optimism that's directly pegged to the
advent of the Unity Government. The staggering hyperinflation
has subsided, and people are able to get on with their lives
with increased dignity.
Restrictions on the movements and operations of
international NGOs have been lifted. Where we were once
virtually shut down for almost 6 months last year, we're now
able to operate with little or no political impediments.
We have project partnerships now, that were previously
unheard of, at the municipal and local level, where we are able
to work, with them with technical assistance, on community-
driven, community-identified projects that have immediate,
long-lasting effect on the quality of life for the citizens.
This is a sense of optimism that I think is important to
support. There is both the opportunity--indeed, the
imperative--to do so. The imperative is also because of the
risk of the humanitarian relapse. As you've heard and as you
know, Zimbabwe has been the important recipient of humanitarian
assistance. It has been a Band-Aid. The cholera will reoccur if
the water sanitation systems aren't addressed. The food
insecurity will continue to run rampant if we aren't able to
get at the ways for people to increase both at the community
and a more systemic level, their food production. And the
education system requires immediate and serious attention and
investment to get that back up and running.
Therefore, I strongly urge that the United States begin
shifting assistance policies toward recovery and reconstruction
to a broader and more focused engagement, in a targeted way
that ensures accountability, partnerships with those who are
eager and able to work, in partnership with the communities and
with international assistance actors, to ensure that the
projects are indeed for the benefit of the communities and that
the responsibility is for increased services to the population.
I would echo the three primary areas for this assistance
being support at the community level, rebuilding the social
fabric; helping families restore their livelihoods, support
private-sector recovery to revitalize the economy, particularly
in agriculture; and critical areas of health and education,
because that's where it will matter most.
These recommendations are incremental and feasible steps
that we can take. Absolutely, we should continue to press the
government on performance benchmarks, but not let those
shortcomings preclude all efforts to support recovery.
It's a targeted, incremental assistance strategy of early
recovery and reconstruction, with much to gain.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy Lindborg, President, Mercy Corps,
Washington, DC
I would like to express my appreciation to Senator Feingold, Chair
of the subcommittee, and to the ranking member, Senator Isakson, for
the opportunity to offer testimony today on the situation in Zimbabwe.
I thank the subcommittee for holding this hearing to review what is a
critically important U.S. policy challenge in Africa. Zimbabwe has been
on a difficult path in recent years, but the events of the past 6
months give some reasons for hope--and therefore it is a very
appropriate moment for this body to review the U.S. Government's
policies toward the country.
I am here today in my capacity as the President of Mercy Corps, a
major international humanitarian and development nonprofit organization
that currently works in 40 conflict affected and transitional
countries, helping to rebuild safe, productive and just societies.
Mercy Corps works in some of the world's most challenging transitional
environments, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. Our work is
supported by a wide range of public, private, and international donors,
including a strong partnership with USAID. Mercy Corps has been
operational in Zimbabwe since 2002, working hand in hand with local
communities in 6 of the country's 10 provinces. We respond to the
relief and development needs of more than 100,000 of Zimbabwe's most
vulnerable people. Our programs are working to create support systems
for orphans and other vulnerable children, enhance food security,
increase access to safe water, sanitation and community health
information, and coordinate a humanitarian response to vulnerable
displaced populations.
The humanitarian efforts of the U.N. and NGOs have been critical in
saving lives during the difficult period since 2005, when the
Government's ``Operation Restore Order'' forcibly cleared out urban
slums and displaced 700,000 people. However, we now have an urgent
opportunity to move beyond the series of Band-Aids we have been
collectively applying and begin supporting recovery and reconstruction
in Zimbabwe. The international community has been understandably
reluctant to invest in recovery given the tenuous political situation.
However, we see an important opportunity to support and reinforce a
positive path for Zimbabwe and, most urgently, address the continuing
humanitarian crises at a more systemic level. With my testimony today,
I will discuss why international support for recovery is so critical at
this stage and offer some recommendations on next steps for
international recovery and reconstruction assistance.
As many of you know, Zimbabwe has been gripped in a spiraling
collapse for the last decade. However, since the advent of the Unity
Government in February of this year, there have been growing glimmers
of hope. During my trip this summer to Zimbabwe, I saw firsthand the
availability of goods in the stores and increased optimism in the
communities I visited. Most importantly, we have seen the following
indicators that progress is happening and should be supported:
The economic situation has improved drastically following
the adoption of the U.S. dollar as the country's working
currency. After suffering through unimaginable hyperinflation
since early 2007, with prices doubling on almost a daily
basis,\1\ the dollarization of the economy in January 2009 has
restored a level of basic functionality within the economy. As
a result, trade with neighboring states is returning, stores
have rebuilt their stocks, and widespread shortages of basic
goods are a thing of the past. This has laid an important piece
of the foundation for Zimbabwe's economic recovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ John Hanke, Economics Professor at Johns Hopkins--http://
www.cato.org/zimbabwe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions on the movement and activities of NGOs, which
were put in place following last year's electoral controversy
have been greatly eased. These restrictions were suspended in
August 2008, and since then international aid agencies have
been able to move freely through much of the country. We are
not now facing political interference with our activities.
Within some of our projects, we now have partnerships with
local government officials, something that would have been
unthinkable a few years ago. The Unity Government has taken a
more open and collaborative approach to NGOs, and this has
built on the easing of restrictions the government initiated a
year ago.
Finally, in our experience, Zimbabweans are feeling a sense
of cautious optimism about their country for the first time in
years. After a decade of watching the creeping collapse of
their country, they are finally seeing signs of progress, and
some reasons for hope.
Despite these signs of progress, the potential for further
humanitarian crises could threaten what has so far been achieved. The
fear of a renewed cholera outbreak during this year's rainy season \2\
and forecasts of a significant food gap this winter \3\ are stark
reminders of the country's fragile state and persistent humanitarian
challenges. The cholera outbreak which began last fall and persisted
until July 2009 vividly illustrates how Zimbabwe's emergencies flow
from infrastructural collapse. Approximately 100,000 people fell sick
and over 4,000 died from a disease that is a virulent result of poor
infrastructure and weak social services. Cholera typically spreads via
the contamination of drinking water with human waste. The wide impact
of this epidemic reveals the massive collapse of the country's safe
water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as the poor state of
public health education. Risky water, if boiled, becomes safe to drink,
yet this message was clearly not understood by much of the population.
Upon catching cholera, mortality can be reliably averted through basic
medical treatment and ingestion of simple rehydration solutions. The
fact that thousands still died shows how comprehensively the health
care system has collapsed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Zimbabwean health expert Itayi Rusike has said cholera is
``endemic''--that is, a persistent problem--in the country. http://
reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-7VA4Z4?OpenDocument
&rc=1&cc=zwe.
\3\ Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS-NET) report, August
2009 http://reliefweb.
int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7VG3QS?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=zwe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extend this scenario of collapse across Zimbabwe's other social and
economic sectors and one begins to understand the level and scope of
recovery challenges that the country now faces:
The health system, once among the very best in Africa,
remains in shambles. While the cholera epidemic has mercifully
abated, it could easily reappear and the system continues to
face other challenges, most recently a staff strike over
inadequate and sometimes unpaid wages.
The education system, which once gave Zimbabwe some of the
highest literary rates in Africa, has greatly deteriorated.
Teacher wages are now being paid, but remain low relative to
the expenses that teachers face. Transport costs alone can
consume up to a quarter of teachers' salaries. Facilities are
crumbling for a lack of basic maintenance; the poor water and
sanitation infrastructure at many schools continues to
contribute to cholera risks. Basic school supplies are so
scarce that some students this year are going to class without
any books.
The agricultural sector is falling far short of its
potential productivity and continues to face serious obstacles.
Annual agricultural production in the country declined by 30
percent from 2006 to 2008.\4\ Smallholder farmers are among the
hardest hit, as declining yields, diminished purchasing power,
and livelihood vulnerability will cause an estimated 2.8
million households to experience food insecurity within the
coming year.\5\ The fruits of the economy's collapse are
evident in the more than 1 million Zimbabweans who have
migrated to South Africa in search of work. The basic economic
infrastructure supporting the agriculture sector, such as input
suppliers, processors, and market and transport linkages, has
greatly deteriorated. Without this infrastructure in place, the
sector will struggle to recover, and we will continue to see
Zimbabwean economic migrants flooding into South Africa in
search of work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ WFP/FAO Study, June 2009.
\5\ Ibid.
The humanitarian challenges that Zimbabwe faces are, ultimately,
systemic problems and must be addressed through investments in recovery
and reconstruction.
The international community is understandably reluctant to invest
resources in recovery and reconstruction without further progress in
the political sphere. However, we believe that a strategic approach to
recovery assistance would both address some of the systemic causes of
humanitarian needs, as well as support positive progress. Conversely,
withholding recovery resources may simply undermine confidence in the
Unity Government and provide convenient excuses if conditions fail to
improve.
I therefore strongly urge the USG to begin shifting assistance
policies toward recovery and reconstruction, both to address the
systemic drivers of the humanitarian crises and to reinforce the
potential for positive political and social change. Recovery efforts
can be most effective if they engage municipal authorities, community
leadership, and civil society in joint efforts to address basic
recovery needs in ways that were not previously feasible. With the
changing environment, NGOs can work in partnership with willing local
officials of any party to provide key inputs, rehabilitate
infrastructure, and address key training and capacity-building needs.
One example is our current work in Mutare, Zimbabwe's third-largest
city. Mercy Corps is supporting the rehabilitation of the entire water
purification system of Mutare, and is doing so in close collaboration
with the local municipal authorities. We manage all the procurement and
control the funds, but the municipality provides the technical staff
and personpower required to revitalize the water system. With this
model of collaboration, the accountability and management of donor
funds are ensured while the government takes responsibility for
providing increased services to its population. This sort of joint NGO
local government-community collaboration is a good model for engaging
the local government in the restoration of services, while maintaining
accountability and project integrity. Whether in MDC or Zanu-PF areas,
this kind of approach has the potential to provide positive incentives
for constructive government behavior.
What Zimbabwe most needs are programs that will enable recovery in
key economic and social service sectors. Particularly notable have been
the loss of community-level resiliency, the implosion of the country's
economy, and the degradation of key social services. We see the
greatest areas of immediate need and near-term potential as:
1. Increase recovery and transitional support at the community level
There are many community-level initiatives that can begin
reknitting the social fabric and restoring livelihoods. After the
crippling effects of the last decade, these efforts are essential to
enable families to support themselves with dignity and hope, to address
the needs of the country's 1.5 million \6\ orphans and foster further
confidence in the road ahead. Such efforts go beyond the scope of
humanitarian relief by enabling communities to take charge of their own
recovery. Livelihoods are a critical component here--the restoration of
livelihoods will have a positive effect on household-level food
security and mitigate vulnerability to hunger and disease, including
efforts to restart and expand smallholder agricultural production.
Meanwhile, the country's longstanding financial crisis means that
small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs, who play a critical role in the
functioning of rural economies, lack reliable access to credit and so
cannot finance the rebuilding of their businesses. The country's
microfinance institutions have yet to recover from the hyperinflation
and need infusions of lending capital in order to resume operations.
NGOs have been working to set up savings-and-lending cooperatives for
more than 5,500 households, have constructed over 500 market stalls to
support small entrepreneurs, and helped to establish more than 1,800
household gardens--but much greater investments are needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8092896.stm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community-level reconstruction support is also needed in the areas
of water and sanitation services. A huge proportion of the population
continues to lack access to safe drinking water and hygienic latrine
facilities. Rectifying these problems is a critical step in protecting
against future cholera outbreaks. Mercy Corps is working in partnership
with community leaders and local officials to build and rehabilitate
wells in more than 100 villages, constructing hundreds of sanitary
latrines, and training thousands of community members on good community
hygiene practices. These are good first steps--but it is time to begin
a larger scale shift of community infrastructure resources toward
recovery rather than emergency response, and begin thinking on
multiyear timeframes rather than 6-to-12 month relief cycles.
2. Support private sector recovery to revitalize the economy
Efforts to restore livelihoods and productivity at the community
level must be complemented by the rebuilding of Zimbabwe's commercial
agriculture sector, especially to avert future food crises. This
recovery is greatly impeded by the deterioration of the economic
infrastructure that formerly supported the sector. The agriculture
``value chain'' of economic actors and functions that brings goods from
individual farmers to processing to market to sale is in extreme
disrepair. Vital private-sector networks of agricultural input
suppliers, product vendors, warehousers, and traders have largely
broken down. Assistance in rebuilding these value chains will be a
vital component of efforts to restore agriculture production and
revitalize the sector.
The nonagriculture sectors of the economy also need extensive
support if they are to recover. The manufacturing sector is operating
well below capacity and the private sector in general faces a
longstanding lack of access to credit. While the dollarization of the
economy and the corresponding end to hyperinflation has improved the
economic environment, there is a persistent lack of available credit to
finance recovery of businesses.
3. Target critical areas of health and education, in partnership with
responsible, accountable government actors when possible
The health and education sectors have fallen from among the best in
Africa to collapsed sectors that provide little to no services. Both
sectors are underfunded and face persistent threats of staff strikes
over inadequate and irregular salary payments. Rebuilding these systems
will be a long-term effort, but efforts should start now to extricate
Zimbabwe from its current cycle of humanitarian crises. Mercy Corps'
experience in Mutare demonstrates that it is possible for NGOs to work
in constructive partnership with local government structures to
initiative service recovery activities. This model should be rapidly
extended to the health and education sectors, so donor resources begin
to support service recovery efforts wherever local government actors
and communities are willing to engage constructively and accountably in
such programs.
CONCLUSION
These recommendations represent the first incremental and feasible
steps on Zimbabwe's long road to recovery. Working at community and
local municipal levels, significant progress can be made in further
building the capacity of key actors, rehabilitating shattered systems,
and supporting positive progress. NGOs, local civil society
organizations, and U.N. actors can all play a role in this process,
serving as channels for smart, targeted recovery assistance that can
support and reinforce ongoing Government reform efforts and avert
additional humanitarian crises. Donors should continue to press the
government on performance benchmarks, but should not let government
shortcomings preclude all efforts to support recovery. On balance,
investments in Zimbabwe's recovery are a risk worth taking. If the
United States begins to incrementally ramp up recovery support, there
will be multiple opportunities along the way to review the government's
engagement with the recovery program and determine whether such efforts
are making progress. There is relatively little to lose--but
potentially much to gain.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Thank all of you.
And we'll do 7-minute rounds again for this panel.
Ambassador Steinberg, some argue that--as you've already
alluded to--that engaging too much right now could give the
wrong impression, give Mugabe and company breathing space. How
do you respond to that, and how specifically do you see the
balance between strengthening the hand of reformers in the
government and then, on the other hand, keeping the pressure on
Mugabe and his allies?
Ambassador Steinberg. We talk a lot about keeping the
pressure on Robert Mugabe, but I don't see what the pressure
has gotten us. I don't see the bottom line for a policy that
says, ``Hold back on assistance to the people, hold back on
assistance to the reformers, and simply maintain the existing
sanctions that we've had,'' that, frankly, have only a modest
impact on the individuals involved. The real collapse, in their
economic standing, has nothing to do with the sanctions that
have been put in place; it has to do with the fact that the
economy has imploded. And, in fact, we're in a classic
situation where sanctions on the country, to some extent, even
enhance the power of the individuals in office to use their
sinecures for their own benefit. The fact that Gideon Gono was
printing money endlessly, all night long, and giving it to key
securocrats and generals and other ZANU-PF hard-liners, simply
reinforced his power. So, I just don't understand a philosophy
that says, ``Hold back, stick to the old policy,'' and somehow
hope that Robert Mugabe will finally see the error of his ways
and step back from power.
If you heard his interview with Christiane Amanpour 3 or 4
days ago, Mr. Mugabe is a man who has no touch with reality.
Indeed, it is a pretty remarkable development that Morgan
Tsvangirai has been able to achieve what he has within this
government. There is a reason that he's a frontrunner to get
the Nobel Peace Prize this year. And if you watched the
Amanpour interview, you know it's because anybody who can deal
with Robert Mugabe, deserves it. So, my suggestion, again, is
engage in a very targeted way.
The other point that I wanted to stress is that you provide
assistance to Zimbabwe in a fully accountable way. The IMF has
just announced a $400 million loan for Zimbabwe. It's the same
loan that they're giving to every country to help them react
more effectively to the global economic crisis. But they've
said, ``We're not going to give it through the Reserve Bank,
we're going to give it through the Minister of Finance, Tendai
Biti. We're going to have very strict standards in place that
ensure accountability, and we're confidant that that money is
going to be well used.'' I think the United States can do the
same.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, Zimbabwe's neighbors, with
the one exception of Botswana, have not been willing to stand
up to Mugabe and press him to implement his part of the
agreement. Do you see any hope for any of the regional players
to play a more constructive role? And particularly in light of
your work as a diplomat in southern Africa, how do you think
the United States should go about engaging with the different
regional players on Zimbabwe?
Ambassador Steinberg. We've been incredibly disappointed
with the SADC countries, given their strong interest in seeing
development and recovery. Zimbabwe is a small country by global
standards--12 million people--but, the entire region of
southern Africa is of vital importance to us. It's a region
that has 200 million people, a region that's expanding its oil
interests, a region that is providing a broad number of
peacekeepers globally, a region that we're depending upon to
guard important sea-lanes. And it is a key part of this
regional network to get Zimbabwe back on track. In that regard,
the kowtowing that has gone on by the regional leaders to
Robert Mugabe, especially during the days when Thabo Mbeki was
running the process, was very disturbing. And at the recent
summit in Kinshasa, Robert Mugabe walked in and said,
``Everything's going great, so cancel that meeting that you
were going to have to talk about the problems here. And, oh, by
the way, why don't you ask the international community to lift
the sanctions on me.'' In reality, that's exactly what they
did, and that was extremely disappointing to us.
One positive development we see is the arrival on the scene
of South African President Jacob Zuma. He has shown a much more
evenhanded approach toward the situation. He recently traveled
to Harare and delivered some pretty tough private messages,
although he remains very respectful, publicly, to Robert Mugabe
and the hard-line ZANU-PF elements. And he came back to South
Africa and reinforced in speeches to Parliament and civil
society, the stakes at play for South Africa in Zimbabwe,
including the repatriation of 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans who
are in the country, who, unfortunately, are facing an increased
xenophobic sense, including fatal attacks in townships, which
are undercutting Zuma's approach.
Senator Feingold. I thank you.
Ambassador Steinberg. And so, the conversations that
Hillary Clinton had with Jacob Zuma recently, where she was
reinforcing his resolve, were very important.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Dr. Moss, in your written testimony, you write that the
U.S. Treasury should support efforts underway at the
multilateral development banks to assist the Finance Ministry.
What do those efforts entail? How could the United States
support them? And do you see any risk that money provided by
the banks to Zimbabwe could end up in ZANU-PF hands?
Dr. Moss. Morgan Tsvangirai has met with the management of
the World Bank--for example, he'll be seeing President
Kaberuka, of the African Development Bank, in Istanbul this
week--and he's been asking them for their help. Now, of course,
the bank is constrained because of arrears that the government
owes to these institutions, so they do not get their normal
allocation, as a regular country would get. But, these banks
all have special facilities for dealing with difficult
situations. In the African Development Bank case, it's called
the Fragile States Facility. The World Bank has a similar
facility. And these are flexible pots of money that these banks
can use in situations where the situation is evolving; they can
be opportunistic and responsive. It's not huge amounts of
money, but it's money that can used very strategically to try
to encourage better outcomes and to get countries back on a
normal path.
That's precisely where Zimbabwe is now, and I think that
the--the management of both the African Development Bank and
the World Bank are thinking about how they can be constructive,
but they're also mindful that their board, which includes the
United States, is sending mixed signals on how creative and
aggressive to be. And I think that the U.S. Treasury, through
some subtle signals, could indicate that they would like the
banks to try to be creative. I think the World Bank and African
Development Bank are fully aware of the problems. They're not
trying to work with the Central Bank Governor. They're not
trying to work with some of the ministries still controlled by
ZANU-PF. They're specifically trying to work with the reformist
elements within government, and I think that's a trend we
should try to encourage.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Steinberg, would you define current
United States policy toward Zimbabwe as wait and see?
Ambassador Steinberg. No; I think it's a little more than
that, and I'm a little surprised that we portray it as such.
That sends a signal to the Zimbabwean public that they're not
getting as much support as they could. I would be stunned if
the average Zimbabwean knows what was told in the first panel,
that the United States is providing $313 million this year to
support Zimbabwe. Our attitude is tantamount to shooting
ourselves in the foot. One diplomat said to me that the policy
is ``engage-and-see,'' and maybe that's more appropriate, but
I'd much rather be sending the message that we recognize that
something exciting is going on in Zimbabwe and we have our eyes
fully open to the challenges. I meet frequently with civil
society actors from Zimbabwe, with the head of the Human Rights
Commission, with labor union leaders, and they all say there is
a new sense of hope, there's a new sense of freedom, there's a
new sense of possibility. And it's all going to go down the
tubes if Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC leave the government,
and hard-line military leaders take over. It would be
tantamount to a military coup, and it would occur if the MDC
left. Then we're back at square one. In fact, we're back before
square one.
Senator Isakson. And I take it from listening to all of
you--you didn't say it this way--but tangible support of the
MDC by the United States would be a positive element within
reaching the Global Political Agreement eventually, is that
correct?
Ambassador Steinberg. No, Mr. Senator. Direct support to
the MDC, if that's what you're suggesting, would be a mistake.
We cannot, in effect, pick sides in this process. Robert Mugabe
would use that as the biggest sign that the United States real
policy is regime change, and he would use that to build up his
security forces to, essentially, arrest senior officials. He's
trumped up charges against Roy Bennett, for example, the Deputy
Agriculture Minister-to-be, basically accusing him of launching
a coup against the Government of Zimbabwe. So, I think we have
to avoid that.
What we can do, however, is to support a process where--we
know that the MDC is going to get most of the credit of this
process. I said before, the best way to sideline Mugabe is to
reinforce this government.
Senator Isakson. Well, I think both you, Dr. Moss and Ms.
Lindborg, all suggested a--I think Ms. Lindborg called it a
``modest contribution'' to the multinational fund. Is that
correct? And you said that, I think, Mr.--how much is a
``modest contribution''?
Dr. Moss. Well, without getting into the--there's a portion
that's supposed to just do analysis. The United States, I
believe, has made a small--I think it's about $200,000--you
could check with the Treasury officials--small contribution to
the analytic part that will do some research about what the
donor community should do in the future. But, I think that the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund is being set up in a way that could
channel resources to select ministries involved in restarting
public services, principally in health and education, as a
way--if we look--the part of the dollarization is that civil
servants now have to be paid in U.S. dollars, there's very
limited dollars coming into the country. Tendai Biti is looking
for financing mechanisms to allow the civil service to be
rebuilt and to get the schools and clinics running again. The
donor community is trying to work--trying to find ways that
they could do this, where the ZANU-PF elements couldn't get
their hands on the money, and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund is one
of those possibilities.
And, I think, that the United States doesn't very often
behave in a way, or provide assistance in a way, that would--we
don't often do these large Multi-Donor Trust Funds; the
Europeans are much more--it's much more common approach. But, I
believe, that even a modest token amount--I wouldn't want to
put a figure on it, but north of a million dollars--would help
to allow us to have say at the table in talking about how the
funds were used and protected, and also, it would be an
important signal that the United States was playing with our
allies in helping to restore those services.
Senator Isakson. Well, the reason I was looking for you to
quantify that--and I understand why you don't want to put a
number on it--but, in listening or reading to all of you, our--
it appears we're not in a wait-and-see mode, but we're in a
not-enough mode, in terms of supporting the credible parts of
the coalition in that country. I know Ms. Lindborg mentioned
that we only put $30 million in PEPFAR, and, compared to other
countries, a lot more is necessary considering how bad the
situation in Zimbabwe is. Is that not correct?
Ms. Lindborg. The overall--I would put the overall
humanitarian assistance needs, especially to move it into early
recovery and reconstruction. And there is the need and the
opportunity to increase it and to work with other international
donors.
Senator Isakson. And Mr. Steinberg mentioned food security,
and that we are doing about half of what really needs to be
done. Is that correct?
Ambassador Steinberg. The consolidated appeal from the
United Nations is in the neighborhood of some $300 million. The
total need in these areas is about $720 million, and we're
about halfway there on each.
Senator Isakson. OK.
So----
Dr. Moss. If----
Senator Isakson. Yes, Mr. Moss.
Dr. Moss [continuing]. If I might add, it's not just that--
you know, we are providing assistance in--especially in food
assistance and the health care sector--it's not just that we
need more; it's that it needs to be that the United States is
responding to changing events on the ground in Zimbabwe. And I
think that it's fine to say there's a low-level equilibrium.
Even in the worst of times, the American people do not abandon
people that are starving and dying of AIDS. That's a stance we
should stick with. But, when things start to change, and we
want to encourage progress, I think we need to respond
strategically, and while it's not a full wait-and-see, I think
the response from the United States has not been sufficient to
help to try to build momentum for further progress in Zimbabwe.
Senator Isakson. And having met Morgan Tsvangirai when he
was here, it appears to me that his willingness to accept the
prime ministership, rather than cause confrontation over a
flawed election, that he is probably the best chance to really
bring about fundamental change in Zimbabwe. I guess that's why
he'd get the Peace Prize if----
[Laughter.]
Senator Isakson. Dr. Steinberg.
Ambassador Steinberg. Yes, we speak with Mr. Tsvangirai
very frequently, and I think we have to remember the pressure
that he is under from his own supporters. They're saying,
``What have we gotten out of this process?''
Senator Isakson. Right.
Ambassador Steinberg. ``You have a nice position as Prime
Minister, other ministers have nice jobs, but what are we
getting out of it?'' And he's got to be able to demonstrate
that to his population.
The other point that I made in my testimony orally, and is
more developed in my written testimony, is a division that's
starting to occur very similar to what is going on in Kenya
right now--where the inclusive government is losing credibility
with the population. I'm very concerned that it's going to be a
situation where it's them, the politicians, against us. One of
the key processes that's underway right now is the
constitutional reform process, where Robert Mugabe is trying to
force a draft, called the ``Kariba Draft,'' to be the basis of
constitutional reform. It is a very bad document. It would
enhance power of the executive, basically turning the
legislature and the judiciary into the handmaiden of the
executive. It provides powers for a 21-day state of emergency,
with no restrictions upon it, that the President can simply
declare. Our concern is that, unless we strengthen the hand of
the MDC, they may be forced to actually accept this. And, if
that's the case, we will see this divide occurring between
women's organizations, labor unions, human rights groups, and
the political class.
Senator Isakson. Well, I want to thank all the panelists.
I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing
today. I want to apologize for having to slip out, but I just
got a call.
Thank you very much for your testimony and for being here
today.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson, for your very
strong participation.
And back to Dr. Moss, if Mugabe and other hard-liners in
the government continue to obstruct progress, or if the
transitional government were to collapse, what punitive policy
options do you think the United States should consider that
haven't previously been pursued?
Dr. Moss. Well, I think if we have the scenario where we're
back to where we were right after the elections, where there
was an organized campaign of violence against the MDC in a
ward-by-ward weeding out and attack on folks, if we start to
see a major security crackdown, then I think that the United
States will have to take a much more forceful stance with
regard to the region. I think recent attempts to try to get the
U.N. Security Council involved in Zimbabwe, which were blocked
by China, I think that could--that would be something that the
United States would have to pursue. And I think, in a sense,
calling the South African's out--this has been their process;
they've asked us to abide by it, to respect them as the
regional hegemon, and to get behind it. For the most part,
we've done that. And if they don't live up to their
responsibilities, I think we need to assert international
rights in that arena.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor.
Ms. Lindborg, you say that it is time to begin a shift of
resources toward recovery, rather than emergency response. What
are the practical implications of such a shift, in terms of
USAID's work and planning? And do you see any risk of making
that shift before there is greater progress with the political
transition?
Ms. Lindborg. Practically, what it means is that you would
expand out of just directly responding to humanitarian need and
provision of assistance, such as food or temporary measures to
beat cholera, and moving to addressing some of the systemic
causes of these emergencies.
One--and one example is in the third-largest city of
Zimbabwe, Mutare. We're working very closely with the municipal
officials, who came in with the recent elections, to install a
new water system so--with a filtration--so that this will get
at the spread of cholera that occurs; and, at the same time, a
broad public education campaign. So, it's moving past just
treating the cholera, to treating the causes of the cholera at
a more systemic level.
Similarly, on the food and economic sectors, there are many
things that one can do that move out of the emergency box and
into the kind of investments that lay the foundation for deeper
recovery and, ultimately, to connect in with the kind of
development that one would hope Zimbabwe can move to soon.
I think there is little risk and there is much to gain,
particularly in terms of supporting the kind of optimism that
my copanelists have alluded to, and the expectations that some
of the early signs of progress have wrought within many of the
Zimbabwean population.
Senator Feingold. Well, this was a very thought provoking
and helpful panel. I thank you. And I thank all the witnesses
that came before us today.
And that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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