[Senate Hearing 111-433]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-433
REEVALUATING U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 15, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Blank, Stephen J., Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, United
States Army War College, Carlisle, PA.......................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Response to question submitted for the record by Robert P.
Casey, Jr.................................................. 62
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Krol, Hon. George A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
John F. Kerry.............................................. 52
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 58
Olcott, Martha Brill, senior associate, Russia and Eurasia
Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC................................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 61
Sedney, Hon. David S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 20
(iii)
REEVALUATING U.S. POLICY
IN CENTRAL ASIA
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. OK. Thank you very much for being here. The
hearing of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South and Central Asian Affairs will now come to order.
Today, the subcommittee meets to examine United States
policy in Central Asia, a critical region to United States
national security interests.
This hearing will examine why Central Asia is important,
what United States policy interests are in the region, and how
the United States will implement these policies in the coming
years.
The Obama administration has just completed an internal
review of our policy toward Central Asia, and we look forward
to hearing the results of that review today.
The countries of Central Asia are strategically important
to the United States, due in large part to geography. The
region shares borders with Afghanistan, Iran, China, and
Russia. United States interests in recent years have centered
on the role that Central Asia plays in Operation Enduring
Freedom, but it is also important that we examine the issues
and challenges that face the region in isolation.
On March 10, 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis
Blair noted in congressional testimony that, ``Highly
personalized politics, weak institutions, and growing
inequalities,'' in Central Asia make these countries, ``ill-
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic violent
extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated
with energy, water, and food distribution.'' The political
systems of countries in the region are fragile, by virtue of
their post-Soviet legacy and varying degrees of instability
since their independence.
Some observers have commented that Central Asia is more a
geographic identification than a region with common goals,
ethnicities, and identities.
The United States should encourage countries in the region
to become more fully integrated, to advance their own stability
and prosperity, and tackle longstanding issues related to
terrorism and national resource allocation.
So, while this hearing will focus on the main issues
confronting the region, any examination of United States policy
toward Central Asia must start with the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In that same testimony, Director of
National Intelligence Blair warned that the growing challenges
to Central Asia's stability ultimately, and I quote, ``could
threaten the security of critical U.S. and NATO lines of
communication to Afghanistan through Central Asia.'' Through
the Northern Distribution Network--which we know by the acronym
NDN--Central Asia plays a key role with regard to
transportation of nonlethal supplies for our troops in
Afghanistan. With an increase in NATO troops headed to the
region, and an increasingly dangerous supply line through
Pakistan, Central Asia potentially becomes even more important
as we seek to get materiel into Afghanistan.
As these plans move forward, I have concerns about the
capacity of the Northern Distribution Network. While the
administration made considerable progress in negotiating
overland transport rights with Russia during the recent
Presidential summit, there is still work remaining on securing
agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the transit of
military cargo. We need to remain vigilant, to make sure that
there is proper oversight and accountability, as it relates to
the Northern Distribution Network.
The NDN also provides an important opportunity for local
development in the region. As the United States increasingly
relies upon Central Asia for logistical support in Afghanistan,
opportunities for local development will increase. As our
effort in Afghanistan ramps up, the United States should
consider the long-term sustainability and implications for the
local economies of Central Asia, for when we eventually scale
down our Afghanistan presence in the future.
There are reports that Central Asian countries have
concerns that the NDN supply routes will result in an increase
in extremist attacks on the supply lines. I look forward to
hearing how we'll address those concerns today.
The conflict in Afghanistan and increasing violence in
Pakistan have threatened to spill over into Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan, as both countries contend with Islamic extremist
movements. As the United States increases its force presence in
Afghanistan, and as Pakistan ramps up efforts against the
Taliban, there is concern that these elements could seek
shelter across northern borders. I hope our witnesses will
address what the increased troop deployment in Afghanistan will
mean for the region.
I'm also interested in hearing about cooperation between
our embassies in Central Asia and in Kabul and here in
Washington.
The administration has taken the correct strategic approach
in binding Afghanistan and Pakistan together as we confront
threats in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and along
the Durand Line.
Central Asia also is important as part of this equation,
and we need an increasingly seamless regional approach. So,
while the NDN and Afghanistan are critical elements of our
engagement with and in Central Asia, they cannot and should not
be the sole focus of our engagement. As we're looking to build
long-term relationships with both Afghanistan and Pakistan, we
must also enhance our engagement--our broad engagement--with
the countries of Central Asia.
I don't underestimate the difficulty of this, but Central
Asia poses a policy challenge to United States decisionmakers,
and our relationships in the region are complicated by
longstanding concerns about undemocratic governance and human
rights abuses. These circumstances call for deft engagement,
and I am confident that our diplomats are capable of navigating
a wide range of issues that reflect our national security and
economic interests, as well as our values.
When looking at the region apart from the war in
Afghanistan, our primary security concern must be in the realm
of nonproliferation. The Obama administration has emphasized
that proliferation of nuclear weapons and materiel is one of
the most severe threats facing United States national security.
Unsecure nuclear weapons and fissile materiel should be a top
priority of our policy.
Central Asia plays a key role in global nuclear affairs.
Throughout the cold war, nuclear weapons were stored and ready
for launch across this region. At the end of the cold war, the
international community had limited success in removing the
remaining Soviet nuclear arsenal and fissile materiel from
newly independent states in the region. Due to courageous
leadership in countries like Kazakhstan, as well as here in the
United States by visionaries like Senators Lugar and Nunn, the
threat of nuclear materiel falling in the hands of terrorists
was diminished. While these countries voluntarily relinquished
their nuclear arsenals after the fall of the Soviet Union,
today the region is still engaged in activities relevant to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; namely, uranium
mining, plutonium production, and the fabrication and testing
of biological and chemical weapons.
So, while there have been positive developments in the
region on this issue, there remains a significant cause for
concern. On the one hand, countries like Kazakhstan have
responsibly upheld and consented to international
nonproliferation norms. And in September 2006, the five Central
Asian companies--countries, I should say--established a nuclear
weapons-free zone. On the other hand, Central Asian countries
rank among the worst--the worst and most corrupt countries in
the world, according to Transparency International's 2009
report.
Whenever--as anyone who knows this area of our policy
knows--whenever there's a nexus of nuclear materiel and
corruption, the potential for this materiel to end up in the
hands of the wrong people increases, and, I would argue,
increases exponentially.
With Kazakhstan's desire to increase its commercial nuclear
market share, and its willingness to host an international fuel
bank, this issue warrants further and serious examination. We
must also recognize that Central Asia faces a host of
considerable challenges as it continues to develop as a region.
Tajikistan, which shares a border with Afghanistan, could
become, according to some--I'm quoting from some of the reports
we'll hear today--could--could become a failed state. A brutal
civil war from 1992 to 1997 left Tajikistan with very little
infrastructure and a tenuous peace. Swaths of the country
remain ungoverned, and drug traffickers, particularly along the
southern border with Afghanistan, are able to operate with near
impunity. Greater Tajik-Afghan cooperation is needed on border
control, counternarcotics, and law enforcement. USAID and other
international assistance agencies are performing impressive
work to contribute to the rebuilding process. But, also, their
resources are limited, and the need is, unfortunately, growing.
Uzbekistan has sought to build closer ties with the United
States after the 2005 closing of the K2 military base, which
provided support for Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2008,
Uzbekistan reportedly began to allow some NATO forces to
transit through the country, and in 2009 General Petraeus
signed an accord allowing for military education exchanges and
training.
These are important developments, but serious governance
and human rights concerns remain. The terrible legacy of the
Andijan massacre in July 2005, which resulted in the killings
of hundreds of antigovernment protestors, colors Uzbekistan's
relations with the international community to this day.
Unfortunately, Uzbekistan's political opposition has very
limited space within which to organize, and civil society
groups are closely scrutinized by the government.
After the K2 base closed, many of the activities were
transferred to the Manas Base in the Kyrgyz Republic. Earlier
this year, the United States signed a new agreement with
Bishkek, in which NATO supplies and troops could be run through
the Manas Transit Center. So, United States-Kyrgyz relations
saw another boost when Under Secretary Bill Burns visited
there, last July, to announce the formation of a bilateral
commission on trade and investment. These are welcome
developments, and we appreciate the Kyrgyz Republic's
engagement on these issues. The country has its own history in
contending with terrorist threats and the reports of increased
religious extremism, particularly in the rural areas of the
country.
Turkmenistan is perhaps the least understood country in the
region, as the country experienced its first transition to
power since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the transition
in 2006, there was hope for a more open and transparent system.
While there have been small steps, progress on this front has
remained slow. Turkmenistan does have a considerable impact on
energy prospects of its neighbors, its pipeline agreements with
Russia and Iran, and its increased cooperation with China
through a project that would send Turkmen gas through
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. The United States has
encouraged Turkmenistan's participation in the Nabucco Energy
Project, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about
this project.
Kazakhstan has grown in wealth, has also sought to play a
more prominent role in the international community. In 2010,
Kazakhstan will assume its--the chair and office of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, so-called
OSCE. The development of--this development, I should say, has
not been without controversy. The OSCE is the premier
organization in Europe and the former Soviet Union for election
observation, as well as monitoring for human rights violations.
According to independent monitoring organizations, Kazakhstan
has not fared well in these areas, but did commit to a set of
serious reforms in Madrid last year, which would look to reform
democratic institutions in the country.
We know that water and energy are central issues in this
region. We know that our witnesses today will address those
issues, as well.
We should also recognize the central role in Central Asia
that Russia is continuing to play. Russia has sought to play an
expanded role in the region in recent years, primarily in the
field of security cooperation, as well as energy projects.
While government is in--governments, I should say--in Central
Asia, strive to maintain their autonomy, several have signed
basing agreements and military cooperation pacts with Moscow.
In closing, I'd like to commend the work of USAID in the
region. As it has sought to address the myriad complex issues
with limited resources, from challenges related to water,
energy, drug trafficking, food security, and democratic
development, USAID certainly has its hands full. I look forward
today on how U.S. policy interests overlap with our investments
in the region's development.
This overview just begins to scratch the surface of the
challenges that countries of this region face, moving forward.
The United States has a wide and varied interest in Central
Asia as a region, starting with support for ongoing military
operations in Afghanistan, as I mentioned before. This cannot
be the sole focus, however. Our engagement in the region must
be broader than that. From the threats to loose nuclear
materiels to the rise of violent Islamic extremism, from the
challenges posed by poverty, weak democratic institutions, as
well as challenges posed by energy, U.S. engagement in the
region requires a strategic and long-term approach. This region
does not attract nearly enough attention here in Washington, as
we know. Glad to see there's a good bit of a crowd here today
to listen to our witnesses. But, I welcome this opportunity.
Before I introduce the panels, I want to say that I cut
back my statement and I want to make sure my full statement is
made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Casey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr.,
U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania
This hearing of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South and Central Asian Affairs will now come to order. Today, the
subcommittee meets to examine U.S. policy in Central Asia, a critical
region to U.S. national interests. This hearing will examine why
Central Asia is important, what U.S. policy interests are in the region
and how the United States will implement these policies in the coming
years. The Obama administration has just completed an internal review
of U.S. policy toward Central Asia, and we look forward to hearing the
results of this review today.
The countries of Central Asia are strategically important to the
United States due in large part to geography. The region shares borders
with Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Russia. U.S. interests in recent
years have centered on the role Central Asia plays in Operation
Enduring Freedom, but it is also important that we examine the issues
and challenges that face the region in isolation. On March 10, 2009,
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair noted in congressional
testimony that ``highly personalized politics, weak institutions, and
growing inequalities'' in Central Asia make these countries ``ill-
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic violent
extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated with
energy, water and food distribution.'' The political systems of
countries in the region are fragile by virtue of their post-Soviet
legacy and varying degrees of instability since declaring independence.
Some observers have commented that Central Asia is more a geographical
identification than a region with common goals, ethnicities, and
identities. The United States should encourage countries in the region
to become more fully integrated to advance their own stability and
prosperity and tackle longstanding issues related to terrorism and
natural resource allocation. So while this hearing will focus on the
main issues confronting the region, any examination of U.S. policy
toward Central Asia must start with the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
In his March 2009 testimony, DNI Blair warned that the growing
challenges to Central Asia's stability ultimately ``could threaten the
security of critical U.S. and NATO lines of communication to
Afghanistan through Central Asia.'' Through the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN), Central Asia plays a key role with regard to the
transportation of nonlethal supplies for our troops in Afghanistan.
With an increase in NATO troops headed to the region, and increasingly
dangerous supply lines through Pakistan, Central Asia potentially
becomes even more important as we seek to get materiel into
Afghanistan. As these plans move forward, I have concerns about the
capacity of the NDN. While the administration made considerable
progress in negotiating overland transport rights with Russia during
the Obama-Medvedev summit, there is still work remaining on securing
agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the transit of military
cargo. We need to remain vigilant to make sure that there is proper
oversight and accountability of the NDN.
The NDN also provides an important opportunity for local
development in the region. As the United States increasingly relies on
Central Asia for logistical support for Operation Enduring Freedom,
opportunities for local development will increase. As our effort in
Afghanistan ramps up, the United States should consider the long-term
sustainability and implications for the local economies of Central Asia
for when we eventually scale down our Afghanistan presence in the
future.
There are reports that Central Asian countries have concerns that
NDN supply routes will result in an increase in extremist attacks on
the supply lines. I look forward to hearing how we will address the
security concerns of the host governments in defending the NDN.
The conflict in Afghanistan and increasing violence in Pakistan
have threatened to spill over into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as both
countries contend with Islamist extremist movements. As the United
States increases its force presence in Afghanistan and as Pakistan
ramps up efforts against Tehrik-i-Taliban, there is concern that these
elements could seek shelter across their northern borders. I hope our
witnesses will address what the increased troop deployment in
Afghanistan will mean for the region.
I am also interested in hearing about cooperation between our
Embassies in Central Asia and in Kabul and here in Washington. The
administration has taken the correct strategic approach in binding
Afghanistan and Pakistan together as we confront threats in FATA and
along the Durand Line. Central Asia is also an important part of this
equation, and we need an increasingly seamless regional approach.
So while the NDN and Afghanistan are critical elements of our
engagement in Central Asia, they cannot and should not be the sole
focus of our engagement. As we are looking to build long-term
relationships with Afghanistan and Pakistan, we also must enhance our
engagement with the countries of Central Asia.
This will not be easy. Central Asia poses a policy challenge to
U.S. decisionmakers--our relationships in the region are complicated by
longstanding concerns about undemocratic governance and human rights
abuses. These circumstances call for deft engagement and I am confident
that our diplomats are capable of navigating a wide range of issues
that reflect our national security and economic interests as well as
our values.
When looking at the region apart from the war in Afghanistan, our
primary security concern must be in the realm of nonproliferation. The
Obama administration has emphasized that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and materiel is one of the most severe threats facing U.S.
national security. Unsecure nuclear weapons and fissile materiel should
be a top priority.
Central Asia has long played a role in global nuclear affairs.
Throughout the cold war, nuclear weapons were stored and ready for
launch across the region. At the end of the cold war, the international
community had limited success in removing the remaining Soviet nuclear
arsenal and fissile materiel from the newly independent states in the
region. Due to courageous leadership in countries like Kazakhstan, as
well as here in the United States by visionaries like Senators Richard
Lugar and Sam Nunn, the threat of nuclear materiel falling into the
hands of terrorists was diminished.
While these countries voluntary relinquished their nuclear arsenals
after the fall of the Soviet Union, today the region is still engaged
in activities relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, namely: uranium mining, plutonium production, and the
fabrication and testing of biological and chemical weapons.
So while there have been positive developments in the region on
this issue, there remains significant cause for concern. On one hand,
countries like Kazakhstan have responsibly upheld and consented to
international nonproliferation norms and in September 2006, the five
Central Asian countries established a nuclear weapons free zone. On the
other hand, the Central Asian countries rank among the most corrupt
countries in the world, according to Transparency International's 2009
report. Whenever there is a nexus of nuclear materiel and corruption,
the potential for this materiel to end up in the hands of the wrong
people increases. With Kazakhstan's desire to increase its commercial
nuclear market share and its willingness to host an international fuel
bank, this issue warrants further and serious examination.
We must also recognize that Central Asia faces a host of
considerable challenges as it continues to develop as a region.
A brutal civil war from 1992-1997 left Tajikistan with very little
infrastructure and a tenuous peace. Swaths of the country remain
ungoverned and drug traffickers, particularly along the southern border
with Afghanistan, are able to operate with near impunity. Greater
Tajik-Afghan cooperation is needed on border control, counternarcotics,
and law enforcement issues. USAID and other international assistance
agencies are performing impressive work to contribute to the rebuilding
process, but their resources are limited and the need is unfortunately
growing.
Uzbekistan has sought to build closer ties with the United States
after the 2005 closing of the Karshi-Khanabad (or K2) military base
which provided support for Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2008,
Uzbekistan reportedly began to allow some NATO forces to transit
through the country and in 2009 General David Petraeus signed an accord
allowing for military educational exchanges and training. These are
important developments, but serious governance and human rights
concerns in Uzbekistan remain. The terrible legacy of the Andijon
massacre in July 2005, which resulted in the killing of hundreds of
antigovernment protestors, colors Uzbekistan's relations with the
international community to this day. Unfortunately in Uzbekistan
political opposition has very limited space within which to organize
and civil society groups are closely scrutinized by the government.
We must also acknowledge that Uzbekistan has faced serious threats
of Islamic extremism. As recently as last May, in Khanabad and Andijon
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Group of
Uzbekistan both carried out attacks. Illustrating the truly regional
nature of the threat we face, both groups have also been active in
Pakistan, attacking government targets in reported retaliation for
Islamabad's support for the United States.
After K2 closed, many of its activities transferred to the Manas
Base in the Kyrgyz Republic. Earlier this year, the United States
signed a new agreement with Bishkek in which NATO supplies and troops
could be run through the Manas Transit Center. United States-Kyrgyz
relations saw another boost with Under Secretary Bill Burns' visit
there last July to announce the formation of a United States-Kyrgyz
bilateral commission on trade and investment. These are welcome
developments and we appreciate the Kyrgyz Republic's engagement on
these issues. The country has its own history in contending with
terrorist threats and there are reports of increased religious
extremism, particularly in rural areas of the country. This all comes
alongside mounting reports that the democratic promise of the Tulip
Revolution has unfortunately not been fulfilled. As the Kyrgyz Republic
faces these growing challenges, I hope that its government will choose
a path that respects the important civil liberties of its citizens.
Turkmenistan is perhaps the least-understood country in the region.
As the country experienced its first transition in power since the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 2006, there was hope for a more open and
transparent system. While there have been small steps, progress on that
front has been slow. Turkmenistan does have a considerable impact on
the energy prospects of its neighbors. Turkmenistan has pipeline
agreements with Russia and Iran and has increased cooperation with
China through a project that would send Turkmen gas through Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan to China. The United States has encouraged
Turkmenistan's participation in the Nabucco energy project and I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses on these prospects.
As Kazakhstan has grown in wealth, it has also sought to play a
more prominent role in the international community. In 2010, Kazakhstan
will assume the chair-in-office of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. This development has not been without
controversy. The OSCE is the premier organization in Europe and the
former Soviet Union for election observation as well as monitoring
human rights. According to independent monitoring organizations,
Kazakhstan has not fared well in these areas, but did commit to a
series of reforms in Madrid last year which would look to reform
democratic institutions in the country. Civil society in Kazakhstan has
made strides in recent years, particularly as it monitors government
reform efforts, but the recent imprisonment of leading human rights
activist Yevgeney Zhovtis has had a chilling effect on his colleagues
in the country.
Water and energy are continued sources of tension among the
countries of Central Asia. Those with energy resources lack water
resources and vice versa. There are yearly disputes between downstream
countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) who are heavy
consumers of water for agricultural needs and the less wealthy,
upstream nations of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, which rely on
the downstream countries for electricity.
Russia has sought to play an expanded role in the region in recent
years primarily in the field of security cooperation and cooperation on
energy projects. While governments in Central Asia strive to maintain
their autonomy, several have signed basing agreements and military
cooperation pacts with Moscow. In 1996, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan joined with Russia and China to form the Shanghai
Cooperation Initiative, to promote security along the countries' common
borders and combat terrorism. Renamed the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, Uzbekistan joined the group in 2001 and now hosts the SCO
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure. Some observers have commented that
this focus on counterterrorism is an attempt by Russia and China to
displace the U.S. role in the region.
In closing, I would like to commend the work of USAID in the region
as it has sought to address myriad complex issues with limited
resources. From challenges related to water, energy, drug trafficking,
food security and democratic development, USAID certainly has its hands
full. I look forward to hearing today how U.S. policy interests overlap
with our investments in the region's development.
This overview just begins to scratch the surface of the challenges
that the countries of this region face moving forward. The United
States has a wide and varied interests in Central Asia, starting with
support for ongoing military operations in Afghanistan. But as I have
said, this cannot be the sole focus of our engagement in the region.
From the threats of loose nuclear materiels to the rise of Islamic
extremism, from the challenges posed by poverty and weak democratic
institutions to the possibilities posed by new energy relationships,
U.S. engagement in the region requires a strategic and long-term
approach. This is a region that does not attract nearly enough
attention among policymakers in Washington. Therefore, I welcome this
opportunity to discuss some of these issues more in-depth and look
forward to hearing from our group of esteemed witnesses.
Senator Casey. We have two excellent panels today. And
these are, of course, panels of experts, not just commentators,
to examine all these issues in the allotted time that we have.
From the administration or the first panel, I'd like to
welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Krol.
Ambassador Krol has a long history with the State Department,
serving as United States Ambassador to Belarus, as well as
holding positions in Russia, Ukraine, and India. He has played
a key role in the government's effort to reexamine U.S. policy
in the region, and we look forward to his overview of these
issues.
Ambassador Krol, thank you for your service to our country
and for joining us here today.
I also would note--I want to note for the record--
Ambassador Krol, is it true you were born in Pittsburgh?--
That's good. Well, that's not the only reason you're here, but
that's important--pretty important reason to have you here, as
well.
I'd also like to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense David Sedney. David covers Central Asia, as well as
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. We
appreciate him taking the time to come here today to testify.
David has served in several challenging posts for the State
Department, as Deputy Chief of Mission in Beijing, as well as
Kabul. He served as Director for Afghanistan at the National
Security Council, as well as Senior Advisor to U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N., John Negroponte. As U.S. security concerns are
front and center in Central Asia, I look forward to hearing
from him on the National Distribution Network and other key
defense and security initiatives in the region.
Thank you, David, for being here and for joining us this
morning.
We're honored to be joined by these two respected experts
from the United States Government.
And we may have other comments by other members of the
committee. I know that Senator Risch may be joining us soon,
and if he has an opening statement, we'll certainly turn to him
then.
I just want to turn to our witnesses. If our witnesses
could do your best to keep your statements to about 7 minutes,
that would help. And even if you can summarize your full
statements, the full text of your statement will be made part
of the record. Even if you haven't asked for that, we will do
that, if that's OK with you.
Ambassador Krol, we'll start with you. We're going to go in
alphabetical order. But, we're grateful for your testimony and
your presence here today.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE A. KROL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Krol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity today to speak with you
regarding United States policy toward Central Asia. Today's
hearing is particularly timely, especially after the
President's December 1 speech outlining the way ahead in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Obama administration places a
high priority on building principal partnerships in the Central
Asia region, in pursuit of our common interests.
You've asked, ``Why is Central Asia important to the United
States?'' and I would say that the United States has an
important interest in promoting stability, prosperity,
security, human rights, and economic and political reform in
Central Asia.
The region's economic growth and democratic political
development can produce a more durable stability and more
reliable partners for the United States, in addressing common
yet critical global challenges, from nonproliferation to
counternarcotics to energy security.
The massive energy resources of Central Asia are important
for the world economy, ensuring a diversity of sources and
transit routes, while also delivering new economic
possibilities in the region itself.
Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan
strategy. Just look at a map of the region, and you see that
three of the five Central Asian states border Afghanistan. A
stable future for Afghanistan depends on the continued
assistance of its Central Asian neighbors, just as a stable,
prosperous future for the Central Asian states depends on
bringing peace, stability, and prosperity back to their
immediate neighbor, Afghanistan.
The countries of Central Asia are already contributing much
to international efforts in Afghanistan. For example,
Uzbekistan is supplying electricity to Kabul. The Transit
Center at Manas Airport in Kyrgyzstan is crucial as a
logistical hub for transporting personnel and for refueling
operations. Turkmenistan provides humanitarian assistance to
Afghanistan. Tajikistan provides overflight clearance. And
Kazakhstan provides both humanitarian assistance and it has
just announced a new $50 million program to educate Afghan
students in Kazakhstan universities. And the Northern
Distribution Network is becoming a vital route for getting
supplies into Afghanistan for coalition forces.
As for the current U.S. policy priorities in the region,
since the early 1990s, the primary United States policy goal in
Central Asia has been to ensure that the countries remain
sovereign and independent, and to help them develop toward
becoming stable, market-oriented democracies. And the events of
September 11, 2001, made clear our common security concerns and
led to a significant broadening of the relationship.
Now, at a moment when Central Asia is once again at a
critical strategic crossroads, we want to expand our
cooperation in a wide range of areas. We will seek to work with
the governments and the peoples of the region, toward these
ends. And we believe that developing more substantive,
consistent relationship with these countries in areas of mutual
interest will also open room for progress on democracy and
human rights.
We have five main policy priorities in Central Asia.
The first is to seek to expand cooperation with the Central
Asian states, to assist coalition efforts to defeat extremists
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, bring stability and prosperity to
the region. This includes expanding the capacity and
reliability of the Northern Distribution Network.
Second, we seek to increase development and diversification
of the region's energy resources and supply routes. As recent
energy crises and price fluctuations have shown, the importance
of developing new hydrocarbon resources and distribution routes
to meet growing demands is important. Some of the largest
hydrocarbon deposits in the world are found in Central Asia,
and billions of dollars have already been invested in
developing the huge fields in Kazakhstan. And Turkmenistan
harbors one of the world's largest reservoirs of natural gas.
Global energy security is a key to peace and prosperity, and
our partnership with Central Asia in this field has never been
more important. And Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy,
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, is actively engaged with the
countries of Central Asia on this issue.
We also want to encourage the Central Asian countries to
draw on the expertise of international energy companies to
maximize the safe production of oil and gas, and contribute to
the export routes. And diversification of export routes will
strengthen the economic security, sovereignty, and prosperity
of these states.
We also seek to promote the hydro, renewable, and solar
energy resources in Central Asia. And we believe that the
prudent development of the region's hydro potential can
increase domestic energy supply and, in the future, provide
earnings from exports south to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But,
the development of hydropower projects must be done in
cooperation between the upstream and the downstream countries,
to avoid potential conflicts.
Third, we seek to encourage political liberalization and
respect for human rights. President Obama has made clear, we
don't seek to impose our political system on other nations, but
that does not mean that we do not actively promote good
governance and respect for fundamental human rights. We believe
that an active civil society and unfettered media serve as
vital spurs for better governance and political liberalization.
We'll continue to be a strong advocate for building democratic
political institutions in Central Asia, based on respect for
universal principles of human rights, justice, and dignity, to
which all these states have themselves committed, as members of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as
well as members of the United Nations.
We recognize that the pace of change is often slow, and our
program should focus on long-term, meaningful results. Policy
statements and high-level dialogue should not avoid difficult
topics like human rights and democratic institution-building.
We foresee human rights issues as an integral part of our
renewed bilateral dialogue with each of the Central Asian
states. And the dialogue must be with both the governments and
the societies. In this context, we see Kazakhstan's upcoming
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 as an excellent opportunity to
highlight the need for more consistent observance of the OSCE's
human-dimension principles in Kazakhstan and throughout the
region.
Fourth, we seek to foster competitive market economies and
encourage economic reform. We are coordinating bilaterally and
multilaterally to encourage the economic policies necessary to
improve the business investment climates in the region, and
support economic growth and job creation, to make the Central
Asian countries more competitive. We have a regionwide trade
and investment framework agreement through which we want to
encourage regional approaches to economic development and
cooperation, in reviving the Great Silk Road of trade that can
bring prosperity to all the states in the region. And we've
also added a bilateral component for each of the countries as
part of these trade and investment framework agreement
meetings, to promote the discussion of economic and investment
issues.
We also hope that the Northern Distribution Network will
encourage Central Asian countries to take steps to make it
easier to do business along this route.
We seek to promote transportation infrastructure
development to improve the capacity and reduce the cost of
trade among the Central Asian countries, and promote trade with
global markets in all directions.
We are not playing a great game in Central Asia in which
promoting regional cooperation and diversification of trade and
energy routes harms other existing trade routes and commercial
relationships. Diversity and competition encourage security and
efficiency in all markets and for all trading partners.
Finally, we seek to prevent state failure. Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, poverty, civil strife, regional
drug trafficking have created vulnerabilities in Central Asia
that could, if not addressed, lead to state failures. Many
states suffer from a lack of capacity in maintaining
governance, education, health, and economic standards. And many
are plagued by corruption that creates economic inefficiencies
and political weaknesses. We are trying to focus our dialogue
and programs to build needed capacities to ward off potential
failures. For instance, food security is a growing problem in
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and we're looking to continue and
enhance our food security assistance.
And agricultural reform is also sorely needed in the
region, and could make the region more food secure, as well as
economically diversified, and promote economic and political
stability.
Now, what steps are we taking to accomplish the goals? I
would say that since the advent of the Obama administration, we
have begun a systematic effort to elevate, enhance, and
energize our dialogue with the countries of Central Asia. This
past July, Under Secretary of State Burns led an interagency
delegation to Central Asia to deliver a message from the
President and Secretary of State that the United States has an
important interest in stability, prosperity, security, and
economic and political reform in Central Asia. The delegation
found renewed interest among the countries of Central Asia in
stronger ties and practical cooperation, based on mutual
respect and mutual interests.
And following this visit, we have begun to establish high-
level bilateral mechanisms with each country of Central Asia,
featuring a structured annual dialogue to strengthen ties and
build practical cooperation. And the first of these bilateral
consultations will actually take place this week, when Uzbek
Foreign Minister Norov leads a delegation to Washington.
And we plan to launch annual consultations with the other
four countries of Central Asia in the coming months. These
dialogues will focus on practical steps we can take to make
realistic progress on a mutually agreed agenda. We want to move
from words to actions, across the whole breadth of our
relationship.
We also plan to expand our education and professional
exchanges, promote people-to-people relations throughout the
region, and increase our public diplomacy efforts.
And another program we're working on is to bring the Peace
Corps to Tajikistan.
And on the assistant front, we have a range of programs
operating in all of the countries, including those that focus
on economic growth and health care, respect for human rights,
border security, counternarcotics, and developing democratic
institutions. But, in order to ensure that the programming
supports our strategic goals and is coordinated across all the
agencies, we are currently undertaking a whole-of-government
review of our assistance strategy in Central Asia.
And, Mr. Chairman, when I speak of ``whole-of-government,''
I mean whole-of-government, and that includes the United States
Congress, and this committee in particular. The administration
cannot achieve its objectives in Central Asia without the
understanding, the guidance, support, and resources provided by
the Congress. And I would strongly encourage members and staff
to visit Central Asia to enhance the engagement the
administration itself is undertaking. There you will see the
many outstanding efforts our embassy teams are making to
advance our security, our economic and our humanitarian
interests. They need your support and encouragement. And when I
say ``embassy teams,'' I mean these are not just State
Department people, this runs through all the agencies that are
present in our posts.
We also look for partnership and cooperation with
nongovernmental organizations and interested Americans who also
join us in promoting a more stable, prosperous Central Asia.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, this administration does not
consider Central Asia a forgotten backwater, peripheral to
United States interests. The region is at the fulcrum of key
U.S. security, economic, and political interests. It demands
attention and respect and our most diligent efforts. And the
Obama administration is committed to this very approach.
Thank you, sir. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Krol follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. George A. Krol, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, DC
Chairman Casey, members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity
today to speak with you regarding U.S. policy in Central Asia.
Today's hearing is particularly timely, especially after the
President's December 1 speech outlining the way forward in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The Obama administration places a high priority on
building principled partnerships in the Central Asia region in pursuit
of our common interests. In that connection, we are moving to elevate
and expand our cooperation with all the countries of Central Asia in a
wide range of areas.
why is central asia important to the united states?
The United States has an important interest in promoting stability,
prosperity, security, human rights, and economic and political reform
in Central Asia.
Central Asia's economic growth and democratic political development
can produce a more durable stability and more reliable partners for the
United States in addressing common yet critical global challenges, from
nonproliferation to counternarcotics to energy security.
The massive energy resources of Central Asia are important for the
world economy, ensuring a diversity of sources and transit routes,
while also delivering new economic possibilities in the region itself.
Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy. Just
look at a map of the region. Three of the five Central Asian states
border Afghanistan. A stable future for Afghanistan depends on the
continued assistance of its Central Asian neighbors--just as a stable,
prosperous future for the Central Asian states depends on bringing
peace, stability, and prosperity back to their immediate neighbor
Afghanistan.
The countries of Central Asia are already contributing much to
international efforts in Afghanistan. For example, Uzbekistan is
supplying much-needed electricity to Kabul. The Transit Center at Manas
International Airport in Kyrgyzstan is a crucial logistical hub for
transporting personnel and for refueling operations. Turkmenistan
provides humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Tajikistan provides
overflight clearance. Kazakhstan provides humanitarian assistance, and
it has just announced a new $50 million program to educate Afghan
students in Kazakstani universities.
And the Northern Distribution Network is becoming a vital route for
getting supplies into Afghanistan for coalition forces.
what are the current u.s. policy priorities in the region?
Since the early 1990s, the primary U.S. policy goal in Central Asia
has been to ensure that the countries remain sovereign and
independent--and to help them develop toward becoming stable, market-
oriented democracies.
The events of September 11, 2001, made clear our common security
concerns and led to a significant broadening of the relationship.
Now at a moment when Central Asia is once again at a critical
strategic crossroads we want to expand on cooperation in a wide range
of areas. We seek to work with the governments and the people of the
region toward those ends.
We also believe that developing a more substantive, consistent
relationship with these countries in areas of mutual interest will open
room for progress on democracy and human rights.
We have five main policy priorities in Central Asia:
1. We seek to expand cooperation with Central Asian states to assist
coalition efforts to defeat extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
bring stability and prosperity to the region.
While acknowledging the significant contributions of the Central
Asians to Afghan security, we want to facilitate and encourage broader
bilateral and regional support to include cooperation on border
security, counternarcotics, trade, and reconstruction.
This also includes expanding the capacity and reliability of the
Northern Distribution Network.
2. We seek to increase development and diversification of the region's
energy resources and supply routes.
Recent energy crises and price fluctuations have shown the
importance of developing new hydrocarbon resources and distribution
routes to meet growing demands. Some of the largest hydrocarbon
deposits in the world are found in Central Asia. Billions of dollars
have already been invested in developing the huge fields in Kazakhstan.
Turkmenistan harbors one of the world's largest reservoirs of natural
gas. Global energy security is a key to peace and prosperity, and our
partnership with Central Asia in this field has never been more
important. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, Ambassador Richard
Morningstar, is actively engaging with the countries of Central Asia on
this issue.
We also want to encourage the Central Asian countries to draw on
the expertise of international oil companies to maximize safe
production of oil and gas and contribute to export pipelines. The
expansion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and development of
the Kazakhstan Caspian Transport System project offer the possibility
of getting increased oil out of the Caspian Basin into world markets.
We're encouraging Turkmenistan to work with experienced U.S. energy
companies to develop its gas resources and diversify its export routes
across the Caspian. Diversification of export routes will strengthen
the economic security, sovereignty, and prosperity of these states.
We also seek to promote the vast hydro, renewable, and solar energy
resources in Central Asia. For example, the U.S.-Kazakhstan Joint
Action Plan calls for improved industrial energy efficiency auditing,
wind resource mapping and sharing information on energy-efficient
building materials and standards.
We believe that the prudent development of the region's hydro
potential can increase domestic energy supply and, in the future,
provide earnings from exports south to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Development of hydropower projects must be done in cooperation between
upstream and downstream countries to avoid potential conflicts.
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need the water for
agriculture, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also need reliable access to
gas and oil. And as Afghanistan stabilizes, it too will need to work
with its Central Asian neighbors on a fair and equitable sharing of
water resources.
3. We seek to encourage political liberalization and respect for human
rights.
President Obama has made clear that we don't seek to impose our
political system on other nations, but that does not mean we do not
actively promote good governance and respect for fundamental human
rights. We believe that an active civil society and unfettered media
serve as vital spurs for better governance and political
liberalization. We will continue to be a strong advocate of building
modern political institutions in Central Asia, based on respect for
universal principles of human rights, justice, and dignity to which
these states have themselves committed as members of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as members of the United
Nations. Democracy itself is about more than elections--its development
depends on protection of minority rights and freedom of expression,
government responsiveness and transparency, and a fair and effective
judiciary. Such liberalization can lead to greater domestic and
regional stability--and that is in every nation's interest.
We recognize that the pace of change is often slow and our programs
should focus on long-term, meaningful results. Policy statements and
high-level dialogues should not avoid difficult topics like human
rights and democratic institution-building. We foresee human rights
issues as an integral part of our renewed bilateral dialogues with each
of the Central Asian states. And the dialogue must be with the
governments and the societies. In this context we see Kazakhstan's
upcoming chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 as an excellent opportunity
to highlight the need for more consistent observance of the OSCE's
Human Dimension principles in Kazakhstan and throughout the region.
We will stress shared goals--highlighting that rule of law and
democratic institutions will foster transparent and predictable
investment climates and foster economic growth. Providing less
restrictive space for media, political opposition, and nongovernmental
organizations will give civil society legal outlets and contribute to
long-term durable stability.
4. We seek to foster competitive market economies and encourage
economic reform.
Competitiveness lags in the region. Kazakhstan--at number 67--is
the only country in Central Asia that ranks in the top 100 countries in
the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report. We are
coordinating bilaterally and multilaterally to encourage the economic
policies necessary to improve the business and investment climates in
the region and support economic growth and job creation to make the
Central Asian countries more competitive.
We want to encourage the Central Asian countries to improve
cooperation on water and energy. Disagreements between upstream
(Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and downstream (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan) countries have increased regional tensions and slowed
development initiatives. We seek to work with partners, such as the
European Union and the U.N. Center for Preventative Diplomacy in
Ashgabat, to improve cooperation on these issues and adopt market-
driven exchanges that incorporate international standards for riparian
resources.
We have a regionwide Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA), through which we want to encourage regional approaches to
economic development and cooperation--in reviving the great silk road
of trade that can bring prosperity to all the states in the region. We
have also added a bilateral component for each of the countries as part
of our TIFA meetings to promote discussion of economic and investment
issues. Efforts to improve the business climate, fight corruption, and
improve transparency and predictability will not only create
opportunities for U.S. companies, but will attract more reinvestment of
Central Asian wealth which has flowed abroad.
We also hope that the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) will
encourage Central Asian countries to take steps to make it easier to do
business along this route. Operation of the NDN will demonstrate
regional trade opportunities and highlight existing impediments. We
seek to promote transportation infrastructure development to improve
the capacity and reduce the cost of trade among the Central Asian
countries and to promote trade with global markets in all directions.
We also seek to promote regional cooperation on border security and
regulatory harmonization to reduce the time and added cost of crossing
multiple borders in Central Asia.
We are not playing a Great Game in Central Asia in which promoting
regional cooperation and diversification of trade and energy routes
harms other existing trade routes and commercial relationships.
Diversity and competition encourage security and efficiency in all
markets and for all trading partners.
5. We seek to prevent state failure.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, poverty, civil strife, and
regional drug trafficking have created vulnerabilities in Central Asia
that could, if not addressed, lead to state failures. Many states
suffer from a lack of a capacity in maintaining governance, education,
health, and economic standards. Many are plagued by corruption that
creates economic inefficiencies and political weakness. We are trying
to focus our dialogue and programs to build needed capacities and ward
off potential failure.
For instance, food security is a growing problem in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, and we are looking to continue and enhance our food
security assistance.
Throughout the region Soviet-era practices and cotton and wheat
monoculture have increased poverty and corruption, and infringements on
human rights in the forms of forced and child labor, and led to serious
environmental damage. Agricultural reform is sorely needed throughout
Central Asia and could make the region more food secure, economically
diversified, and promote economic and political stability.
what steps is the united states taking to accomplish its goals?
Since the advent of the Obama administration, we have begun a
systematic effort to elevate, enhance, and energize our dialogue with
the countries of Central Asia. This past July Under Secretary of State
Burns led an interagency delegation to Central Asia to deliver a
message from President Obama and Secretary Clinton: The United States
has an important interest in stability, prosperity, security, and
economic and political reform in Central Asia, and we want to work with
the governments and people of the region toward those ends. What this
delegation found was a renewed interest among the countries of Central
Asia in stronger ties and practical cooperation based on mutual respect
and mutual interests.
Following this visit we have begun to establish high-level
bilateral mechanisms with each country, featuring a structured, annual
dialogue, to strengthen ties and build practical cooperation. The first
of these Annual Bilateral Consultations will take place later this
week, with Uzbekistani Foreign Minister Norov leading a delegation to
Washington. We plan to launch similar Annual Consultations with
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in the coming
months. These dialogues will focus on practical steps we can take to
make realistic progress on a mutually agreed agenda. We want to move
from words to actions across the breadth of our relationship.
We also plan to expand our educational and professional exchanges
and promote people-to-people relationships throughout the region as
well as increase our public diplomacy efforts to tell America's story.
Another program we're working on is to bring the Peace Corps to
Tajikistan.
On the assistance front we have a range of programs operating in
each of the five countries of Central Asia, including programs focused
on promoting economic growth, quality health care, advancing respect
for human rights, strengthening border security, counternarcotics, and
developing democratic institutions. In addition, for 2010 the United
States will begin a comprehensive assistance program to address food
insecurity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan designed to increase
agricultural productivity, bolster farmers' income, and reform unfair
land regulations. Sustained funding over the next 3 years will help
ensure that this now food security assistance program will have a
sustainable impact.
The United States Agency for International Development takes the
lead in providing assistance. Other U.S. Government agencies also play
a role. In order to ensure that programming supports our strategic
goals, and is coordinated across agencies, we are currently undertaking
a ``whole of government'' review of our assistance strategy in Central
Asia.
Mr. Chairman, when I speak of whole of government I mean whole of
government--and that includes the U.S. Congress and this committee in
particular. The administration cannot achieve its objectives in Central
Asia without the understanding, support, and resources provided by
Congress. I would strongly encourage Members and staff to visit Central
Asia to enhance the engagement the administration itself is
undertaking. You will see the many outstanding efforts our Embassy
teams are making to advance our security, economic and humanitarian
interests. They need your support and encouragement.
We also look for partnership and cooperation with nongovernmental
organizations and interested Americans who also join us in promoting a
more stable, prosperous Central Asia.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, this administration does not consider
Central Asia a forgotten backwater, peripheral to U.S. interests. The
region is at the fulcrum of key U.S. security, economic, and political
interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent
efforts. The Obama administration is committed to that very approach.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sedney.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID S. SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sedney. Chairman Casey, Senator Risch, thank you very
much for this opportunity to speak with you today about
Department of Defense policy in Central Asia.
The Department of Defense's primary goal in Central Asia is
to support the war in Afghanistan. We provide this support in
two ways. First, we are using a network of air and ground
routes, known as the Northern Distribution Network, to ship
increasing amounts of supplies through Central Asia to our
troops in Afghanistan. Second, we continue to, as we have for
years, assist the sovereign countries of Central Asia in
maintaining their own security, in ways that they find
acceptable.
When announcing the troop surge--the troop increase in
Afghanistan--President Obama noted that the status quo was not
sustainable. And that's also true in Central Asia. Senator
Casey, in your opening statement, you mentioned concerns about
the capacity. I would say that, from our perspective, the
capacity, in terms of road routes, rail routes, and air routes,
is underutilized. There can be a lot more done, in terms of
utilizing that capacity, through Central Asia, toward
Pakistan--I'm--toward Afghanistan.
I draw your attention--I apologize for the lateness; we
just got them clear--to the two slides I added to my
presentation; one of distribution networks, in heavy green, of
the routes that we use through Central Asia and also through
Pakistan that bring supplies into Afghanistan; and the second
is a graph that shows the number of--the amount of supplies
we've used--that we've moved into Afghanistan through the
Northern Distribution Network, both the total amount and the
rolling average of numbers of containers moved. However, we
believe that amount has a potential to increase, and our
partners with the Central Asian states, in doing so, are
partnerships that we value very greatly, and we look forward to
that.
To achieve this success, we have to increase our engagement
with Central Asia on all levels, not just a military, working
in the short term to expand these logistical flows, and in the
longer term, to expand and deepen our relations. Obviously,
from the Department of Defense perspective on the security
sector, my colleague Ambassador Krol has laid out in many other
areas, where the United States Government has interests in
Central Asia.
We believe that this kind of intensive engagement--
increased engagement with Central Asia is important to help
give our troops the support that is necessary to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat the al-Qaeda--the core goal that the
President has laid out for us.
The Northern Distribution Network, as I said, is the center
for that. These commercial air and ground routes through which
we ship supplies to Afghanistan represents a major
accomplishment of interagency and intergovernmental
cooperation. Since November 2008, in cooperation with the State
Department, and especially the embassy teams, we've worked with
Central Asian governments to build a robust transit network
that supports our shared fight against the threat of extremism.
We are, as I said, steadily increasing, and look to increase
even more, the traffic on the NDN, overcoming impediments. This
has not been an easy process, over the last year, to build up
this network. But, we have been doing so, again, with the
cooperation of Central Asian governments, decreasing
impediments and increasing the amount and speed of the flow.
From 20 containers a month in January, we now are in the
position to be able to ship 350 containers per week, and as I
said, expect this figure to increase further.
I want to stress here that that increase is especially
important, given the President's commitment to add 30,000
United States troops to Afghanistan, that comes on top of
33,000 additional troops that we have already sent to
Afghanistan in calendar year 2009, and the concomitant increase
in our allies and partners sending troops so far; we have
commitments of over 7,000 from--troop--NATO and other troop-
contributing nations at ISAF, to increase their presence. So,
all of this increase is going to be putting a greater demand on
all of these routes, both through Pakistan and through Central
Asia.
Additionally, we support infrastructure projects that will
help expand the NDN's capacity--a concern you raised, Senator
Casey. The recently begun Hairatan/Mazar-e-Sharif Railroad, the
first railroad that will extend into Afghanistan--$170 million
joint Uzbek-Asian development project--will connect Afghanistan
to the former Soviet rail system, and serve as the only direct
rail line into the country. That project was approved by the
Asian Development Bank at the end of September and will, we
hope, be completed within the next 12 to 18 months.
As part of the Northern Distribution Network, we are also
stressing local purchasing in Central Asia. We want to thank
the Congress for the provisions in this year's National Defense
Authorization Act that allowed that local purchasing in Central
Asia to proceed. We think that's important, both for the
cooperation of the local governments, benefits to the local
economy, and it's also a way to more economically address some
of the needs we have in Afghanistan. This local purchasing
process helps illustrate one of the benefits--and you, Senator
Casey, in your opening statement, mentioned that--the ancillary
economic benefits for Central Asia, bringing together the
economies of Central Asia, not just with each other, but also
with their neighbors in a broader world, as we are putting a
lot more additional throughput into this system, where you're
going to get a lot more benefit out of that.
But, most importantly, the Northern Distribution Network is
an effective means to supply our warfighters, and provides
capacity and redundancy to complement our already heavily
burdened lines in Pakistan.
The expansion--the actual expansion in number of
containers, is something we're still looking--our logistics
experts are still looking at how much expansion the Northern
Distribution Network will be able to support.
In addition to the Northern Distribution Network, we also
conduct overflights. And Senator, you mentioned in your opening
statement, the Manas Airbase. I want to express my appreciation
to the government and people of Kyrgyzstan for their support
for the transit center in Kyrgyzstan. Our negotiations this
year have come up with an agreement that is acceptable to both
sides, and I want to echo my colleague Ambassador Krol in
inviting you to visit Central Asia, and urge that if you visit
Central Asia, you stop in Kyrgyzstan and visit the transit
center. Under the leadership of an exceptional Air Force
officer, Col. Blaine Holt, the transit center serves thousands
of soldiers going into Afghanistan every day. Some of the
initial troops that are going there will be passing through the
transit center this week. The relationships with the local
people and with the Government of Kyrgyzstan have improved, I
think, quite dramatically over the past several months, through
a joint effort through our Embassy, our Ambassador and our
military forces on the ground in Kyrgyzstan. Again, I invite
you to go and see that transit center. I think it's really an
exceptional success story.
As you mentioned, Senator, as my colleague Ambassador Krol
mentioned, the threat of Islamic extremism is once again rising
in Central Asia. In 2009, the Islamic Jihad Union conducted a
suicide bombing in Uzbekistan. Throughout the summer, local
governments fought with suspected extremist cells in the
Fergana Valley. Local governments--the governments in the
region share our concern about extremism. In our discussions
with our counterparts from Central Asia, this issue has figured
much more strongly this year than--at the end of this year,
than it did at the beginning. This is very clearly a concern
that we share with them. We need to cooperate with them to
address this shared threat.
Our cooperation with the governments of Central Asia comes
in two areas: security assistance and humanitarian assistance.
Our security assistance focuses on the professionalization of
local militaries' border guards, counternarcotics forces, and
counterterrorism forces. So far, we've seen some really great
progress. The George Marshall Center has trained almost 1,000
Central Asian security professionals. Our National Guard State
Partnership Programs, which are really a key to our efforts in
Central Asia, use citizen soldiers to teach civil-military
relations. With training that we've been able to provide, with
the assistance of funds provided by Congress, we are helping to
improve the counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and demining
capabilities of governments that are eligible for this funding,
and help them move beyond the Soviet-era history. Through this
engagement, we work together to create stable governments,
peaceful societies, and a secure zone to the north of our most
important war effort.
We also, in some areas, have been able to carry out
humanitarian efforts, humanitarian assistance to enhance the
capacity of local governments.
We also have a very active high-level engagement with the
Central Asian governments. Our CENTCOM commanders have visited
Central Asia seven times in the last 3\1/2\ years. TRANSCOM--
our TRANSCOM commander has visited the region three times in
the last 2 years. And we are also looking forward to
participation in the annual bilateral consultations, described
earlier by Ambassador Krol. We think these broad efforts are
important to building a regional area.
As President Obama said, this is not just America's war.
Russia, China, Turkey, and even Iran share our desire to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. That's why they
support our efforts in the region, such as Russia's recent
decision to allow us unrestricted both lethal and unlethal--
lethal and nonlethal military transit. It's why our assistance
packages often overlap in Central Asia, often to mutual
benefit. A container traveling on the Northern Distribution
Network may travel on Russian-built rails, on Chinese-built
roads, through an Iranian-built tunnel, and over an American-
built bridge, before reaching Afghanistan. Regional powers
increasingly recognize that cooperation is necessary to defeat
violent extremism.
This is particularly true of Pakistan. Just as success in
Pakistan drives success in Afghanistan, it is also key to a
stable Central Asia. The IMU fighters captured in Central Asia
this summer did not only come from Afghanistan, they also came
from areas in Pakistan where they operate.
However, while Pakistan can export instability, it can also
export wealth. Central Asians know that a stable, prosperous
Pakistan means increased trade through Central Asia, and it is
for this reason--among these reasons that they support our
efforts to stabilize Pakistan.
As Ambassador Krol has outlined, our strategy in Central
Asia, a strategy that for 20 years has been remarkable in many
ways in its consistency and success, our engagement in the
Department of Defense, we believe, has enhanced security,
diplomatic ties, and trade, and helped accelerate the
achievement of our long-term goals. Even as some of our goals
are short term, we believe their benefits will be longer
lasting.
In Afghanistan, President Obama has asked the Department of
Defense to use the instruments of war to preserve the peace.
Central Asians understand that they will be the first
benefactors of this strategy, and we see them as eager to help
win the--help the United States, our allies, and our partners
win the war in Afghanistan. We must take advantage of their
interest in closer cooperation, work together to defeat violent
extremism, and help establish a stable peace. In logistics,
security assistance, political support, we must come together
to succeed.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, Department of
Defense, Washington, DC
Chairman Casey, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to speak with you today about Department of Defense
policy in Central Asia.
The Department of Defense's primary goal in Central Asia is to
support the war in Afghanistan. We provide this support in two ways.
First, we use a network of air and ground routes, known as the Northern
Distribution Network, to ship supplies through Central Asia to our
troops in Afghanistan. Second, we assist the sovereign countries of
Central Asia in maintaining their own security in a way they find
acceptable.
When announcing the troop increase in Afghanistan, President Obama
noted that, ``the status quo is not sustainable.'' This is also true in
Central Asia. To achieve success we must increase our engagement with
Central Asia at all levels--working in the short term to expand
logistical flows and in the long term to expand and deepen our
relations, from a DOD perspective particularly in the security sector.
Such intensive engagement will help give our troops the support they
need to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda.
shipping and transit
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN)
The NDN is a network of commercial air and ground routes through
which we ship supplies to Afghanistan. It represents a major
accomplishment of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation: Since
November 2008, in cooperation with the State Department and especially
their embassy teams, we worked with Central Asian Governments to build
a robust transit network that supports our shared fight against the
threat of extremism.
With the help of our Central Asian partners we are steadily
increasing traffic on the NDN and overcoming impediments that hinder
the network's efficiency as they arise. In both the air and on ground
we are increasing shipments while decreasing processing time. From 20
containers per month in January, we now ship 350 containers per week,
and expect this figure to increase further. Additionally, we support
infrastructure projects in the region which expand the NDN's capacity.
For example, the recently begun Hairaton-Mazar-Sharif railroad, a $170
million joint Uzbek-Asian Development Bank project, will connect
Afghanistan to the vast former Soviet rail system, and serve as one of
the few direct rail lines into the country.
As part of the NDN we are also implementing the Central Asia local
purchasing program. This program works with Central Asian businesses to
purchase local materials for use in Afghanistan, to the benefit of both
sides--we save money on shipping, while local economies benefit from
increased trade. In the process we help drive greater economic
cooperation, as local governments cooperate to keep transnational
transit routes open and local economies rise to meet international
purchasing standards. I would like to note that we could not have
implemented this program without Congress's addition of the necessary
provisions to the National Defense Authorization Act. We thank you for
this critical support.
The local purchasing program also demonstrates a potential benefit
that the NDN holds for Central Asia--the ability to reconnect the
region to the global economy. By expanding trade linkages the NDN helps
reconnect Central Asia to India, Pakistan, and other formerly closed
markets, while opening a direct land route from the heart of Asia to
the heart of Europe. For instance, the most direct route from Lahore to
Berlin cuts directly across Afghanistan and Central Asia. Ancient
traders knew this. So do today's airlines, who fly this route every
day. With the NDN we can help ground transit do the same.
Most importantly, the NDN is an effective means to resupply our
warfighters and provides capacity and redundancy to complement our
heavily burdened lines through Pakistan. This is particularly important
in light of President Obama's decision to send 30,000 more soldiers to
Afghanistan, and the commitment by our allies for another 7,000. Since
its inception 11 months ago, we have shipped almost 5,000 containers
along the NDN. We will expand this number in 2010 to meet the new
demand, and will continue to support our effort to defeat al-Qaeda.
Military Transit Routes
In addition to the NDN, which is purely commercial, DOD conducts
military overflights of most countries in Central Asia. We have close
relationships with each transit country, and are working to increase
overflights and open new flight paths.
Importantly, we also have access to the Manas Transit Center in
Kyrgyzstan, through which the majority of our combat troops transit on
their way to Afghanistan. We greatly appreciate the willingness of the
Kyrgyz Government to continue its support in our common struggle, and
look forward to maintaining this important link in our logistical
network.
stabilizing local governments
The threat of Islamic extremism is once again rising in Central
Asia. In 2009 the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) conducted a suicide bombing
in Uzbekistan, and throughout the summer local governments fought with
suspected extremist cells in the Ferghana Valley. Local governments
share our concern about extremism, and we cooperate with them to
address this shared threat in two areas: security assistance and
humanitarian relief.
Security Assistance
Our security assistance focuses on professionalization of local
militaries, border guards, counternarcotics forces, and
counterterrorism forces. So far we have seen great progress. For
example, to date the George Marshall Center has trained close to 1,000
Central Asian security professionals, creating a cadre of Western-
oriented professionals predisposed toward reform. Similarly, our
National Guard State Partnership Program uses citizen--soldiers to
teach Western-style civil-military relations.
With the help of DOD training our partner governments are building
modern counterterrorist, peacekeeping and demining capabilities, and
continue to engage us for help moving beyond Soviet-era military norms.
Through this engagement we work together to create stable governments,
peaceful societies, and a secure zone to the north of our most
important war effort.
Humanitarian Assistance
Our humanitarian assistance seeks to enhance the capacity of local
governments. We work closely with our partners in the State Department,
USAID, and the NGO community to implement programs that improve
government-civilian interactions, removing incentives for extremist
support.
diplomatic engagement
DOD carries out regular high-level consultations with our Central
Asian partners. For example, CENTCOM commanders visited Central Asia
seven times in the past 3\1/2\ years, while the TRANSCOM commander
visited the region three times in the past 2 years. In addition, we
participate in the Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC's) described
earlier by Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol. These efforts help build
the stable, cooperative relationships necessary to achieve our goals in
Central Asia.
regional actors
Regional powers realize that, as President Obama recently said,
``this is not just America's war.'' Russia, China, Turkey, and even
Iran share our desire to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. This
is why they support our efforts in the region, such as Russia's recent
decision to allow DOD unrestricted transit. It is also why our
assistance packages often overlap in Central Asia, often to mutual
benefit. For example, a container traveling on the NDN may travel on
Russian-built rails, Chinese-built roads, an Iranian-built tunnel, and
an American-built bridge before reaching Afghanistan. Regional powers
recognize that cooperation is the best way to defeat the threat of
violent extremism.
This is particularly true in Pakistan. Just as success in Pakistan
drives success in Afghanistan, it is also key to a stable Central Asia.
The IMU fighters captured in Central Asia this summer did not only come
from Afghanistan--they also came from Pakistan. However, while Pakistan
can export instability, it can also export wealth. Central Asians know
that a stable, prosperous Pakistan means increased trade through
Central Asia, and it is for this reason that they support our efforts
to stabilize Pakistan.
long-term strategy
Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol has already outlined America's
long-term strategy in Central Asia--a strategy that, for 20 years, has
been remarkable in both its consistency and its success. DOD's
engagement in Central Asia has enhanced security, diplomatic ties, and
trade, and accelerated the achievement of our long-term strategic
goals. Even though some of our actions are driven by short-term
concerns, their benefits will be long lasting.
the way ahead
In Afghanistan, President Obama has asked the Department of Defense
to ``use the instruments of war to preserve the peace.'' Central Asians
understand that they will be the first benefactors of this strategy and
are eager to help America win the war in Afghanistan. We must take
advantage of their interest in closer cooperation, and work together to
defeat the violent extremism and establish a stable peace. In
logistics, in security assistance, in political support--we must come
together in order to succeed.
Senator Casey. Thanks so much.
I will begin the questioning. We'll try to do 5 to 7
minutes. We'll do a couple rounds, I guess.
But, I wanted, Mr. Sedney, to go back to the Northern
Distribution Network. And I know your statement provided an
overview. I just wanted to highlight a couple of questions.
On the question of infrastructure, if you could design it
or plan any and all improvements to the line, what would you
change? Where are the defects or the shortcomings of the NDN?
Mr. Sedney. Well, the biggest shortcoming of the NDN, as
with our transit through Pakistan, is actually the entry into
Afghanistan, because of the legacy of history, where
Afghanistan's king, in 1905, declared that there will be no
railroads into Afghanistan; the fact that there are no current
rail links into Afghanistan. And once you get in Afghanistan,
of course, there's no rail among the different cities.
Similarly with roads, while there's been a lot of construction
of roads in Afghanistan, the roads and the--both the entry
points into Afghanistan and roads after that are huge limiting
factors in our ability to deliver supplies throughout
Afghanistan. So, really it's that interface along the border
that would be most important.
Similarly, again, the real bottleneck in getting supplies
into Afghanistan is really Afghanistan, in terms of the
infrastructure there. So, if we could expand rail access,
improve road access, expand bridges and other infrastructure,
that would be of great assistance in moving our supplies more
effectively to Afghanistan.
Senator Casey. Just so we don't leave our audience in the
dark--I know this map is hard to see, even from on the chart,
but even from a distance, you can tell there's a good bit of
information. Would you mind just kind of walking through what's
depicted here, what it means for the NDN. For those who can't
see from the back, it says, ``NDN the First Year,'' and then we
have a graph along both ends here, which I'd better not try to
describe, because I need you to do it. But, I think it's
important to walk through--this is a graphic depiction of the
NDN the first year. Will you tell us what this graphic
outlines.
Mr. Sedney. Certainly, Senator. What this is is a graphic
illustration of the--of, essentially, a--the expansion of the
NDN, going from nothing to something. So, the blue bars are the
total TEU's which are 20-foot containers--the 20-foot container
you see in a truck where we've moved 4,769 of those, as of the
end of November. So, the blue line just shows the total we've
moved, so each month is cumulative.
Senator Casey. So, the acronym TEU equals a container of
some kind?
Mr. Sedney. Right, it equals a 20-foot container.
Senator Casey. OK.
Mr. Sedney. It's a logistics term. I--but, if you think of
a 20-foot container, that's what it is.
In the--moving down on the graph, there's a dark line
followed by a dotted line that shows the numbers of containers
we've moved per week. And you'll see that that gets up to 300--
there's a dotted line--to 350 a week in November, and that's
actually what we're at in November and for the first week of
December. I just got the figures, from last night.
Senator Casey. So, just----
Mr. Sedney. So, that shows how many we're moving per week.
Senator Casey. Just so we're clear. June 2009, we're
talking about----
Mr. Sedney. Right.
Senator Casey [continuing]. You were moving 108 of these
containers per week.
Mr. Sedney. Right.
Senator Casey. That--the number per week went up to 134
containers per week in July; 200 between, I guess, August and
September; then there was a little dip----
Mr. Sedney. Dipped.
Senator Casey [continuing]. And then it's going up--as of
November, 350 of these containers moving per week, through the
NDN, is that accurate to say?
Mr. Sedney. That's correct, Senator. And the NDN--I want us
to just go back to the map for a second--is several routes. So,
we have routes coming across the Caucasus, across the Caspian
Sea, and then through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and also through,
actually, Estonia--we don't see it here on the map--and then
through Russia, and then again through Kazakhstan, and then
Kyrgyzstan, and then through Tajikistan into Afghanistan. And
the railroad actually allows us to deliver it through
Kazakhstan, then Uzbekistan, to Afghanistan. So, there are
several--there's different routes that we're using. The main
route is the one that goes into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan.
The numbers through Tajikistan are significantly smaller.
Senator Casey. Can you help us with----
Mr. Sedney. But, we're using all these different routes to
have multiplicity of routes.
Senator Casey. Can you help us with the miles, here; give
us a sense of the distance from end to end? And also, within
that, where is the threat--what part of that route would be the
most--at least, based upon recent history, the most dangerous?
Mr. Sedney. In terms of the most dangerous, I'd say the--
it's most dangerous once you get into Afghanistan. We haven't
had any security incidents on the route itself, outside, that
I'm aware of. So, really, the danger begins once you get into
Afghanistan. Does that mean that the Taliban and their allies
haven't thought about--wouldn't consider that? I'd have to
actually discuss that with you in a classified setting.
Senator Casey. OK.
Mr. Sedney. But, so far, there have been no security
incidents on that, and the problems have been inside
Afghanistan, on this--in this case.
Senator Casey. I'm a little bit--or, close to being over my
time. I want to just ask one more question, but let me come
back to that.
I want to get one question in to Ambassador Krol, before I
wrap up, on nonproliferation. We have, obviously, an unstable
geopolitical condition in the region. Ambassador, any
indications that Kazakhstan or one of its neighbors is
particularly vulnerable right now to extremists trying to
obtain fissile radioactive materiel? That's a concern we all
have, not only in these nations in this region, but, of course,
even in Pakistan itself. That's one of the main threats that
we're worried about. And I guess, (a) do you think there's a
real threat now?--I know there's limitations on what you can
say and we understand that--but, what strategy do we have in
place to minimize that threat, as it relates just to extremists
getting fissile or other nuclear materiel in this region, in
these nations?
Ambassador Krol. Right, Mr. Chairman. I think what I can
say, in this format, is that it's very much a high priority for
our government to monitor this and to work closely with the
governments in the region. And we have a very robust program
with Kazakhstan, which has been a many years duration, under
our Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, in ensuring the
safety and as well as the lack--denying access to materiels
that might be of some use and of concern. And this is a major
issue that we work with cooperatively with Kazakhstan.
And I could note that President Nazarbayev is actually
going to be coming to Washington for the Global Nuclear summit,
in April of this year, because of--naturally, it is a country
that, as you've noted in your own statement, has offered to
host a fuel bank on its territory and the like, as well, and we
work with great cooperation with Kazakhstan.
In the other countries in the area that matter is also
trying to develop border controls and infrastructure so that
the law enforcement agencies in these countries have the
capability to interdict and to identify, if there were to be
any movements of materiels. And this is something that,
actually, we've been working on and building and equipping
border posts throughout Central Asia. And I've visited several
of these and have seen the equipment that is put in, which is--
has x rays and things of this nature, in order to monitor the
situation. So, it is an ongoing part of our dialogue with each
of these countries, but also something that we're actually
taking action on, and continues.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Casey. And thank you for
holding this hearing on this very important region of the
world. I think just a cursory glance at the map tells us how
important the real estate is in this part of the globe.
Ambassador Krol, you made reference, and sort of a passing
reference, to the words ``failed state,'' which I think bring
considerable caution to all of us, because of what we've seen
happen in places like Somalia, Yemen, and other places. On
these--on the five countries in issue here, how do you rate
that danger--on a scale of clear and present danger being at
the top, to relatively stable at the bottom, how do you--how
would you rate the countries?
Ambassador Krol. Senator, as I mentioned in my statement,
that we see deficiencies in capacities in practically all of
the countries in the region. There are some that have greater
problems of capacity because of their history, the difficulties
that they face. Tajikistan is the most immediate one, as you
know, that they suffered from a terrible civil war for many of
the years in the nineties--the effort to try to establish good
governance in the region, also in controlling their borders,
particularly that have the border with Afghanistan, and
developing an economy and a political system that is responsive
to the people, in meeting the needs, the food needs, the
security needs of the people. And we are working very closely
in our relationship with Tajikistan to address these capacity
issues, as well.
These are--in Kyrgyzstan, is also a very--it's a poor
state, as well. Many of these issues are related to poverty, as
well as efforts to, again, try to build up good governance,
build up infrastructure and the economies of these countries so
that they can meet the needs of the people, as well as working
with their law enforcement agencies to ensure that they are
protecting people, but protecting people with a view to also
protecting and respecting their human rights.
I think that these are also, similarly, issues in
Uzbekistan and in Turkmenistan and in Kazakhstan.
But, the ones that concern us the most are--because they
are the poorest countries in the region, are Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan.
Senator Risch. Mr. Sedney, I'm looking, here, at the map,
and I assume the green that's on here are the main routes that
we're talking about. What are the yellow and the red?
Mr. Sedney. The yellow lines are road lines and the red
lines are rail lines--other rail lines that we're not using.
That's my understanding, sir. Yes.
Senator Risch. You mentioned that you've jumped--and you
gave us the chart here that goes from 20 containers a week up
to 350 containers a week. And these are inflow into
Afghanistan. Is that what you're telling us?
Mr. Sedney. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Risch. And, where do these start from?
Mr. Sedney. Some of them start from the United States, and
some of them start from Europe, some of our logistics centers
in Europe. Some of them directly from the United States, others
are things that are sent to Europe, and then we have some
distributions centers there. But, it's both.
Senator Risch. And are they ship-delivered, or air-
delivered?
Mr. Sedney. The Northern Distribution Network is ship and
rail, until it gets to Afghanistan, when they're transferred to
trucks for onward delivery in Afghanistan. So, they're ship--
for example, the ones that through the route here are ship-
delivered to Georgia, go by rail across the Caucasus, then
shipped across the Caspian to Kazakhstan, and then rail through
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The green line up here actually
terminates in Estonia, and so it goes by ship to Estonia, then
gets on the rail network in Estonia, goes through Estonia, and
then into Russia, then on into Russia and the rest of the way.
But, the containers are--the Northern Distribution Network
right now--and that's because of the cost efficiencies of
moving things by rail, as opposed to truck.
Senator Risch. The--you mentioned Russia be allowing us to
cross--and obviously you have it on the map here, where we are
crossing Russia with these containers. Has that situation
changed any, or was there a--when was there a change in
Russia's agreement to do this?
Mr. Sedney. We began the Northern Distribution Network
effort a year ago, and at that point in time, Russia and NATO
had a transit agreement, and we used that transit agreement as
part of--as a member of NATO, to begin that. Last--this past
summer, when President Obama was in Moscow, he and President
Medvedev agreed on unrestricted lethal and nonlethal transit,
including through air, with the Russians. And so, that was a
major change. So far, we have conducted two flights, I believe.
Secretary Clinton, in her visit to Moscow in--September was it,
George?--in September, announced the first flight, and we've
had a second flight. We continue to work with Russia and
Kazakhstan to try and make that a route that we're able to use
on a regular basis.
Senator Risch. What--how would you characterize the safety
of the transportation across these routes? And I'm particularly
interested in the ones that come from the west--from the north
and west, and come into Afghanistan. Are--have you had
incidents of attacks there, or what--how would you characterize
that?
Mr. Sedney. So far, the record has been exceptional. We've
had no incidents. We've had no incidents relating to attacks,
or anything of the kind. There has been--the speed has
continued to increase, as I mentioned. The comparison we would
draw with the--is with the routes coming up from the south,
through Pakistan, where we do have--have had, over the last
several years, a number of attacks. Although the actual success
rate for containers getting through Pakistan is very high--in
the high 90 percent--in the high 90 percents, coming--in the
Northern Distribution Network, it's basically 100 percent.
Senator Risch. Finally, if I could get both of you to
comment on this, how would you characterize the various
countries--their governments' commitment to suppressing radical
fundamentalists operating within their territories?
Mr. Sedney, could we start with you and----
Mr. Sedney. Sure. I would say that all the governments of
all the countries involved are concerned about radical
extremism, both as in terms of their own country's internal
situation, and also their concern about Afghanistan. And my
discussions, and our discussions at the Department of Defense
with the governments of the region, they're very concerned with
either a return to the Taliban or some other extremist elements
controlling Afghanistan, because they see that as, long term,
destabilizing to the region and their country. At the same
time, they have concerns about their own internal security. And
I would say that, as I mentioned in my testimony, that concern
is focused on the Fergana Valley, which is actually shared,
pretty much, among three of the states. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan all have access to the Fergana Valley. And that
center of extremist activity in the Fergana Valley affects
those three countries, I would say, in a very--in a reasonably
significant way.
Senator Risch. And do all five of the countries have about
the same level of enthusiasm for controlling the radical
movements?
Mr. Sedney. I would say, in terms of their interest in
doing it, they're all concerned. I wouldn't--I have a hard time
drawing a distinction among them about how concerned they are.
The level of threat varies by countries, and so the countries
with the greater threat and the more activity spend more time
on it. But, in terms of their concern, your closest question, I
think they're all pretty much concerned equally about that.
Senator Risch. Ambassador Krol.
Ambassador Krol. Senator, I would agree with my colleague,
David Sedney, that in my travels in the region and discussions
with the governments, it's quite clear that they are quite
concerned about the impact or the possible growth of religious
extremism in their own countries. And it is a matter that we
discuss with them, and it's also something that they try to--
take measures to try to monitor, themselves. I think a lot of
it is also due to the concerns that they have about their own
governance and poverty issues, too, in order to meet the needs
of the people, but also to respect the human rights of people
and their--and respect for religions, and not to view that all
religions and religious groupings are extremist, but to make a
considered division as to those that preach terror or preach
intolerance and those that are in, as one would say, the
mainstream of religious beliefs and practices.
And so, it's a sensitive issue for all of these countries,
because they are secular; they come out of the Soviet
experience of looking in a particular way about religion, but
they are looking and grappling at ways to be, as it were,
respectful of the growth of religiosity and of the religious
rights of their citizens, as well, while trying to balance it
with their concerns that there may be certain groups that may
try to use this for extremist purposes in their own countries.
But, it's certainly an element of our bilateral discussions
with them, and it is a very important one.
Senator Risch. Were they secular governments when they
originally went into the Soviet orbits?
Ambassador Krol. Well, they--as the--the history of the
region would show that they were originally, as it were, part
of the Russian empire. And then, when the Soviet Union was
created, they were, basically, in many respects, forced, under
the Soviet system, to be communistic and atheistic, too. So,
there were many efforts that were made, in that past and over
the 70 years, to suppress religious feelings as well as
religious groups throughout this particular region. And since
they've become independent and the Soviet Union had--has
disappeared, there is somewhat of a resurgence, there's been,
of religious belief in these countries, and--which is an
understandable one. But, it also has created certain concerns
as how that religious fervor will be directed, and what kind of
organizations and individuals are involved in it.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
holding this hearing. This is a very important part of the
world that many times goes overlooked.
And I think in answer to Senator Risch's question, the good
news is, these governments repress terrorists; the bad news is,
they repress everybody. And so, you know, this is an area
where, if you look at it from the context of political rights
and civil liberties, you are in a very bad neighborhood.
But, I want to focus in on freedom of the press. And when
you look at freedom of the press, using the Freedom House
ratings, Turkmenistan is 193rd in the world, Uzbekistan is
189th in the world, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are tied at 168.
Ambassador Krol, what are we doing in order to try to promote a
free press in these four countries?
Ambassador Krol. Senator, you're quite right. The picture
of media freedoms is a particularly disturbing and sad one in
Central Asia. But, it's not one that's a landscape that is
devoid of hope. If you take, for instance, Turkmenistan, which
you had noted, too, that since the coming to power of President
Berdymukhamedov, there has been somewhat of an opening to--at
least to the United States--to engage in some programs of
training people in the media. And there have been, actually,
visits of people from--that I've met here in Washington and
talked with about in Turkmenistan--of a generation of people
who are involved in journalism and in media, who, through our
programs, are coming to the United States to see how we and how
our media operates. And although when they go back they haven't
yet been able to, sort of, use some of this in order to, you
know, change dramatically, it's a beginning. And this is
something that's important and that, as we are working with
these people and these governments to use these openings of
engagement, to show them that having a free media is not
something to be feared, but it's something that can strengthen
a state and strengthen a society, and how it's vitally
important for democratic development.
And this is throughout the region, where we are developing
constructive programs of trying to work with the local
governments and societies to develop a media and an
understanding of the role of the media in these societies that
is not one of hostility. And it's a long process, and there's
been, sort of, the ups and downs of it, because, most of these
countries, there is a desire to control the media from the
state. But, to have an independent media that can be actually
critical, and play a role in accountability and things of this
nature, is very difficult, in the political cultures of these
countries, to accept. But, we keep trying to work on this with
people in civil society and in the governments, to try to
persuade them of the benefits to--and for the outcome of
stability in their societies, by having a free media.
Senator Kaufman. Do we have any leverage in this? I--you
know, I think trying to convince these leaders that it's in
their interest to have a free media is a--at the best, an
uphill battle. Is there anything--do we have any leverage--the
United States of America--to try to promote these values, which
we feel are important for stability?
Ambassador Krol. Right, well I think that they--for these
countries to know when they want a good relationship with the
United States, which they all would like, that this is an
important issue for the United States. And it's not just for
our own interests, but because of the broader interests we see
for themselves. And, as you said, it's difficult for them to
understand that. But, I think there is some leverage that they
know that when they hear this from us consistently--and it's
not simply preaching, but it's that we're offering constructive
programs and things of that nature--that it has, in some
respects, led to some openings and some cracks in their view on
how to deal with the media. But, it's something that demands,
you know, commitment and constant--and a consistent message to
them.
Senator Kaufman. I totally agree. I absolutely totally
agree.
Now, Kyrgyzstan is a little bit better. Is there anything
we can learn from that?
Ambassador Krol. Well, it has had a reputation of being--
having a rather freewheeling press, but I would have to say,
Senator, there have been some disturbing signs of--where
journalists have been beaten up, and there's been some pulling
back in the media, if you want to call it self-censorship, and
things of this nature. And this is something, again, that we
speak about with the Kyrgyz authorities, who are quite proud of
their, sort of, being a--as they would view, an example of a
free--more free society in the area, that they really need to
address these issues, because they're becoming increasingly
disturbing and need to be addressed. And I know it's disturbing
to many people within Kyrgyzstan, as well. So, it's an issue
that we deal with; it's right in our bilateral discussions with
them. And unfortunately, it's one that we have to keep raising
with great consistency.
Senator Kaufman. Good, I encourage you to do that.
Can both of you comment on the extent that Afghanistan's
narcotics problems spill over into Central Asia?
Ambassador Krol. Senator, the growth of narcotics trade,
and even the usage of it, is increasing, is our understanding
in Central Asia. And in my travels in the region, speaking with
the governments on it, they see this, as well. And it's an area
where they want, and we work cooperatively with them, to
increase their counternarcotics programs and their own capacity
to deal with counternarcotics in the region. I don't have the
figures, but I know that our sense is that it is growing, and
not just the trade, but also the usage of narcotics in these
countries. So, we're working with them on their own health
issues, first, to recognize that there's a problem, but then,
also how can we work with them to thwart it.
And this is also a cooperative effort with regional actors,
such as Russia and organizations like the European Union, the
United Nations, and elsewhere, because it's a global scourge.
Senator Kaufman. I have one last thing. You mentioned
Russia and their involvement. We talked about freedom of the
press, political rights, civil liberties. Are Russia and China
actors to help these issues move forward, or are they actors to
try to discourage these leaders from getting involved in
political rights, civil liberties, and a free press?
Ambassador Krol. Well, I think that they--China and Russia
have more interests that are from the economic standpoint and
from their--and their security standpoint in the region, less
so in what they would view as interfering in the domestic or
internal affairs of these countries. So, I think that they are
interested, and their view of stability is, you know, is
ensuring that there are strong governments in the area on it
too.
But, it's an issue that we have discussed, I think, with
Russia, as well, about why it's also in their interest, too, to
see that these--having these societies and their own societies
develop these institutions--democratic institutions and a free
press and everything, is something that we can all benefit
from.
Senator Kaufman. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Kaufman. Thanks for being
here today. It's a busy time for the Senate. We're grateful
when our members are at a subcommittee hearing like this.
I know we're just about out of time. We're almost at 11:15.
I know we have a second panel, and we're trying to keep this
within the hour-and-45-minute timeframe. We've been here an
hour and 15, so we have to move.
Just one quick question--and I know there are many, many
more that we could ask, and we'll submit those questions for
the record, but, Mr. Sedney, before we wrap up this first
panel, I wanted to ask you about the bilateral military
cooperation between the United States and these Central Asian
countries. What can you tell us about that, the nature of it,
the extent of it, what kind of training is done, any kind of
joint military exercises, especially in light of what's
happening to the south, with our engagement in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sedney. Certainly, Senator. We have a range of military
activities with each country that reflects each country's,
essentially, own perceptions of its needs and their willingness
to engage in those activities.
I'll start with Kazakhstan. We have a very broad range of
military cooperation with Kazakhstan. I'd highlight the fact
that the Kazakhs sent troops to help participate in Iraq. The--
we have provided, actually over the whole--almost 20 years,
since the independence of Kazakhstan, a wide range of training
with Kazakhstan, both, I mentioned before, the Marshall Center,
but also through the NATO Partnership for Peace. We have been
helping with the Kazakhs to help to train up a battalion of
peacekeeping forces--the KAZBRIG--using different sources of
funding for that. There have been--there are areas, in terms of
military sales, that we are having--we've moved forward with.
And under the FMF program, there's a program to supply
Kazakhstan with Huey helicopters. We've had some discussion
about some other military supply issues. So, there's a really
wide range of activities with Kazakhstan.
With Uzbekistan, we did have a wide range of activities,
but, following the incident at Andijan, the massacre at Andijan
that you mentioned, the Uzbek Government cut off our military-
to-military ties, to a large extent, so our military ties with
Uzbekistan are very limited now, and--but, we believe that
with--there's a possibility of doing more of the recent
language, that I believe has been included in legislation, that
allows for the--for IMET and some other programs from
Congress--we think is a good step forward.
In terms of Kyrgyzstan, obviously a smaller military, but
we've had a range of cooperation, including in the border
areas, in--training in borders and training units where we--in
terms of assisting in the struggle against terrorism.
Tajikistan, the focus has been much more on military
education and exchanges there.
And in Turkmenistan, similarly, we've had some exchanges as
well as some border activities.
But, I can get you a more inclusive list, and will do so,
sir.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
I know we have to move to our second panel, but I do want
to thank both Deputy Assistant Secretaries for their presence
here, for their testimony, and for your public service,
especially at this time in our Nation's history. We're grateful
that you were able to join us today.
And we'll move to our second panel. As we transition to the
second panel, I'll begin to do a quick overview of our two
panelists' biographies. It won't--as we always do in these
hearings--the overview doesn't do justice to their whole
careers.
First I wanted to introduce Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, who is
a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Dr. Olcott has followed interethnic relations in Russia
in the states of the former Soviet Union for more than 25
years, and has traveled extensively in these countries and in
South Asia. In addition to her work in Washington, Dr. Olcott
codirects the Carnegie Moscow Center Project on Religion,
Society, and Security in the former Soviet Union.
Dr. Olcott, we're grateful for your presence here, and for
your scholarship in these areas.
Dr. Olcott is joined today by Dr. Stephen Blank. Dr. Blank
has served as the Strategic Studies Institute expert on the
Soviet Bloc and post-Soviet world since 1989. The Strategic
Studies Institute is housed at the Army War College in
Carlisle, PA.
Dr. Blank, we wanted to note that for the record, about
Pennsylvania.
Dr. Blank's current research deals with the--with
proliferation, and the revolution in military affairs, and
energy and security in Eurasia.
I'm proud that the Army War College is represented here
today; as I mentioned, located in Carlisle, PA. I was also glad
to hear that Dr. Blank is a graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania.
Is that correct? Did I get that?
Dr. Blank. Yes, sir.
Senator Casey. Another highlight.
Despite all of that Pennsylvania background, I'm going to
start with Dr. Olcott. [Laughter.]
We'll go in that order.
Thanks, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, RUSSIA AND
EURASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Olcott. Thank you. I lived in Philadelphia for a year,
so----
Senator Casey. All the more reason why you should go first.
Dr. Olcott. Thank you. OK. It's a privilege to be here
today, and I will enter my full testimony into the record, and
just try to hit the highlights of what I've sent in.
Senator Casey. For the record, both statements will be----
Dr. Olcott. Thank you, very much.
Senator Casey [continuing]. The full statements will be in
the record.
Dr. Olcott. OK. We've heard the priorities of U.S. policy
in the previous panel, and so I don't want to spend my time on
them. I would just note that these priorities, with the
exception of adding the NDN, have been largely unchanged since
2001.
In my testimony, I want to look at what's changed in
Central Asia since 2001, and then make some very brief policy
recommendations.
I would argue that U.S. engagement in Central Asia is going
on against a very different backdrop than was the case in 2001,
and what we've seen is, first, that the Central Asian states
are much more actively engaged as international actors than
previously. There are lots of examples of it. The most notable,
I would say, is Kazakhstan's forthcoming chairmanship of the
OSCE, which begins in 3 weeks.
Second, the next most profound change is the rise of China
in the region. The Chinese Central Asian pipeline was
inaugurated yesterday, in the presence of the President of
China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. China is
rapidly becoming the largest foreign owner of oil and gas
resources in the region, and a critical source of developmental
loans for that region.
Third, I would say that the limits of Russia's ability to
reassert its economic and military power in the region have
been reached, and though the Kremlin itself may not recognize
this. I would say that the Collective Security Treaty
Organization has as yet been unable to turn its proposed Rapid
Reaction Force into an effective regional multinational force
that is able to engage in anywhere like the range of activities
that NATO pursues in the countries of its engagement.
Second, with regard to Russia, I would say that the new
customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, set to
be introduced in the first half of 2010, is more a sign of a
competitive weakness of Russia's economy than of that country's
economic strength.
And third, with regard to Russia, their relations to these
states has been done great damage by the drop in the price of
gas, and the drop in demand for Russia's gas in Europe.
The fourth set of international factors that have changed
are the influences of leading actors in the Islamic world,
which have increased in Central Asia in recent years. Despite
the efforts of the United States and European Union to isolate
Iran, this regional nation continues to play a visible role in
Central Asia. Trade with the Arab world is increasing,
especially with the states of the gulf. This is going on in an
environment in which Turkey's influence has remained relatively
unchanged. And this is not to say that these countries have a--
had a pro-Islamic policy. Several of the countries in the
region are very close to Israel. And this has not changed at
all.
Fifth--and I think this is really important--the United
States and Central Asian security interests, which have been so
overlapping for the last 8 years, could soon begin to diverge,
as the United States activity in Afghanistan could be entering
its final stage. Now, for the first time, Central Asian states
have to begin to worry about how they're going to protect their
borders, and their security more generally, when Washington
departs.
Point two. There have been a variety of changes in the
economic and political environment in the region. While a host
of regional problems remain, the countries of Central Asia are
becoming increasingly more differentiated, one from the other.
Although none in the region can be considered to be a
democracy, each is developing a distinct political system, and
some come much closer to democracies than others. The stability
of these systems have not yet been tested by succession in
either Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, and all five countries still
face the challenge of bringing a post-Soviet generation of
leaders to power.
I'd like to make a few comments about Kazakhstan's
political system, which I think is relevant, because the
Kazakhs are becoming chairman of the OSCE. And I have detailed
comments about the other systems in the text, but for now let
me make a few comments about Kazakhstan. Despite some
disturbing recent events in Kazakhstan, the seemingly
politically motivated handling of the Zhovtis case, which
involved a vehicular death while he was behind the wheel; the
new Internet law; the treatment of independent media, more
generally; the increasing use of criminal courts to try to
settle political and business infighting--nonetheless,
Kazakhstan is a country in which vigorous political debate is
still possible, including in at least some forms of media,
where NGOs--where many NGOs--are able to function in public
space, and where private space is almost entirely free of
government interference. And I distinguish private space from
public space.
The United States has considerable leverage in Kazakhstan,
given that country's desire for an OSCE summit to be held in
Astana in summer 2010. But, this leverage and our criticism of
Kazakhstan's system should be applied in a systemic fashion.
OK, I'm not going to talk about the others, with regard to
politics.
Second, economically, the region has become much more
differentiated, divided into rich and poor countries. Let me
talk briefly about the poorer ones. Again, I have, in the text,
about everybody.
The economic challenges that the region's two poorest
countries face--Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan--have increased.
Chronic energy shortages have hampered the development of both
countries, and in atypically cold winters, this reaches crisis
proportions, which was the case in 2007-08.
We've now had the breakup of the regional electricity grid.
This creates new short-term challenges, but it could prove to
be positive for each country's development if it leads to more
rapid reform of their respective electricity sectors. This will
not be possible without substantial international guidance,
including by the United States, and funding from the IFIs.
Without careful management, it could lead to an exacerbation of
regional tensions because of the shared water system.
I'm almost out of time, so I'm going to skip the next part.
Third, I think that there has been increasing
differentiation of the countries themselves. Again, with the
exception of Kazakhstan, there has been a process of
retraditionalization, which has become the dominant social
factor in all the other countries. This has been accelerated in
places where the quality of education has declined most
markedly, such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and rural areas of
Kyrgyzstan. Islam is a growing factor everywhere in Central
Asia.
Let me go to my four recommendations, very, very briefly,
because I'm out of time.
First, I think the United States should expand military
assistance to the Central Asian countries, especially
assistance that is geared toward enhancing their capacity to
maintain effective border controls for the time in which we
will have left the region.
Second, I think it is time to visit the old--revisit the
U.S. multipipeline strategy. The new Turkmen-China pipeline has
given Central Asia realistic alternatives to Russia. Europe has
other ways it can reduce its vulnerability to trade disruptions
from Russia; details in the text. And Turkey is not always a
more commercially attractive option. They need to get good
prices from Turkey, as well. The key, for me, is getting
commercially attractive terms of trade, and this should be what
our priority is. I can come back to that, if there's interest.
Third, U.S. policy must look more creatively at the
challenge of building democracy in the region, and be more
sensitive to the differences between countries and to the
effects of generational change. More focus has to be placed on
working with the IFIs to improve both the physical conditions
and content of education at the primary and secondary levels,
as well as access to the Internet. These societies will not
remain secular ones unless educational conditions in rural
areas improve.
And finally, the United States has to redouble its efforts
to enhance coordination of assistance from the IFIs and other
forms of bilateral assistance to be able to better leverage the
kind of Western assistance that goes into these countries, to
help these states deal with--and to relieve their short- and
medium-term energy shortages, as well as address their long-
term challenges in the energy sector.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Olcott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Russia and
Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
In my allotted time I will provide a brief summary of my written
testimony, which was submitted to you.
Although congressional focus on the region has increased, U.S.
priorities in Central Asia have changed little over the past 8 years,
since 9/11 and the launching of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.
With that Central Asia became an area of direct security concern
for the United States first to help launch the attack on Afghanistan,
and now with the growing security challenges within Pakistan, as a
critical supply route. Second, U.S. interest in increasing direct
Western access (through Turkey) to Central Asia's energy resources also
increased, especially since our allies in Europe experienced energy
shortages caused by Russian cutoffs of gas to Ukraine. Third and
finally, of course, U.S. policy continued to press for the advancement
of rule of law, the spread of democratic values, the expansion of civil
society and the development of market economies in the region.
While the first set of concerns, those relating to the
participation of the Central Asian countries in ISAF efforts, is of
greatest immediate moment for U.S. policymakers, there remains a
widespread belief that without attention to the third set of concerns,
the long-term stability of the region will not be insured. And for the
past 10 years, U.S. support for multiple pipelines, especially those
that bypass Russia by transiting Caspian gas across Turkey, has become
something of a mantra of U.S. policies in the region, supported by
three U.S. administrations and both political parties.
U.S. policymakers have generally been reassured by Central Asian
policymakers that they share the first and third set of goals--support
for ISAF and for multiple pipeline routes--but it is on the third set
of policies that they have required constant reassurance. While these
countries vary in the openness of their political systems as well as
the market-based nature of their economies, all of the leaders in the
region remain unconvinced that their populations are suited for Western
style democracies, each believing that stability is best guaranteed by
a ``strong hand.''
Because of this there has been very little systematic reexamination
of U.S. policies in Central Asia, just a discussion of how best to
advance these interests; i.e., what modifications should be made in the
policies that are being applied to advance these goals. Major increases
in funding are rarely on the table, so mostly in recent years, in
particular, the discussion is on how to spend money more effectively,
and how to shift resources from country to country in the region.
But as the war in Afghanistan begins to enter a new, and hopefully
now final phase in which the focus on making the Afghan Government more
competent to ensure domestic security, it seems worthwhile to reexamine
some of the premises of U.S. policy in the region, from the perspective
of whether the conditions in the region have changed in these last 8
years, making these policy objectives more difficult to attain, or no
longer as relevant.
what has changed in central asia?
U.S. engagement in Central Asia is going on against a very
different geopolitical backdrop that was the case 8 years ago.
First the environment has increased in size and scope, with all of
these countries being more engaged in the international community, at
various levels, than they were previously. There are numerous examples
of this, from Kazakhstan's forthcoming chairmanship of the OSCE, only
days away now, or Turkmenistan's effective redefinition of its doctrine
of positive neutrality to allow for far greater international
engagement than was true under its late founding president. Just
looking at the travel schedules of these five leaders is enough to make
anyone exhausted, not to mention how many heads of states and Foreign
Ministers that they receive. But to date no U.S. President has visited
Central Asia, with visits by U.S. Vice Presidents and Secretaries of
State few and far between.
The second big change is the rise of China in the region. This week
the Presidents of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have
all gathered in Turkmenistan to mark the opening of the new gas
pipeline which links gas fields in these three countries with markets
in China. When this pipeline is completed and filled to planned
capacity these Central Asian countries will be able to ship to China
roughly two-thirds the volume that currently goes to Russia. Most of
this will come from Turkmenistan, which took a $3 billion loan from
Beijing in June, to help Ashgabat compensate for its loss of income
following its cutoff of gas sales to Russia in April 2009. That same
month (April) China has also offered Kazakhstan some $10 billion in
financing, part as loans and part for shares in MangystauMunaiGaz,
which will make Chinese companies the largest single foreign owner of
on-shore oil and gas assets in Kazakhstan. China also substantially
increased its share of trade with both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and
is responsible for many of the major road projects in the latter
country.
Third, the limits of Russia's ability to reassert its economic and
military power in the region seem to have been reached, although the
Kremlin itself may still be having difficulty accepting this. Moscow
has tried to expand the functions of the CSTO (Collective Security
Treaty Organization) to make it parallel to NATO in importance, but has
not been able to turn its proposed Rapid Reaction Force into a regional
multinational force able to engage in anything like the range of
activities that NATO is capable of pursuing. While Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all participate in the CSTO, Tashkent has
effectively frozen its membership, by passing legislation which bars
the Uzbek military from participating in military activities outside
the borders of the country. The reason for this, Tashkent's conviction
that Russia plans to use its new CSTO base in Osh to regulate the
internal developments in CSTO Member States, rather than the mutual
defense functions that the organization was designed to regulate.
Russia's economic position in the region has also been weakened
largely because of the global economic crisis, which brought with it
lower oil and gas prices, and tough choices for the formerly cash rush
Russian Government. The new customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan,
and Belarus, set to be introduced in the first half of 2010, is more a
sign of the competitive weakness of these economies rather than their
economic strengths. While Moscow has set up a fund for helping its CIS
partner states cope with the global financial crisis, some major
investment projects, like Kambarata hydroelectric station have been
slow to materialize and many of the loans offered have been for the
purchase of Russian manufactured goods, albeit on low-interest long-
term notes. Most damaging of all has been the drop in demand for, and
price of, Russia's gas in Europe, which meant that Gazprom needed less
Central Asian gas and was willing to pay less for it.
Fourth, the influences of leading actors in the Islamic world have
increased in Central Asia. Despite years of U.S. and EU efforts to
isolate Iran, this regional nation continues to play a visible rule
throughout Central Asia. Turkmen gas exports to Iran are set to double,
and with the boycott of Uzbek cotton (because of their child labor
practices) Iran is buying more and more of their crop. Trade with the
Arab world is increasing, especially with the states in the gulf. They
are becoming a source of influence for Uzbekistan's small- and medium-
size entrepreneurs and will be visible public presence in Tajikistan is
building the world's largest mosque, set to open in 2014, built by
funds from Qatar and UAE. While this is going on Turkey's influence has
remained relatively unchanged. It is also important to note here that
this has not been a pro-Islamic policy, as these governments are as
close to Israel as they were previously and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
in particular remain very solicitous of these Jewish communities
Fifth, the Central Asians know that the United States is now
thinking about going home. For the last 8 years Washington has been
able to argue that U.S. and Central Asian security interests in
Afghanistan were almost entirely overlapping. Now however, the Central
Asian states have to begin worrying about how they are going to protect
their interests when Washington departs, both to protect their borders
from possible incursions by armed groups and illegal trade (such as
drugs and arms) and refuge flows, and to try and maintain good
relations with whomever may come to power in Afghanistan. Tajikistan
has already provided refuge for several thousand ethnic Tajik refugees
from Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan is pressing for international dialogue
with all political elements in Afghanistan (through the revival of a
variant of the 6+2 formula). In fact, in each of the countries of the
region there is wariness about the potential stability of the Karzai
government or a formula what might occur if a broader social consensus
is not achieved there, especially given the increasing social
fragmentation in Pakistan.
what has changed within central asia: increasing political social and
economic differentiation
For certain questions it still makes sense to talk about Central
Asia as a distinct region, with shared historic influences, ethnic
communities that are dispersed across new international borders, a
largely shared water system, and transport linkages that are at least
partly the product of natural geographic divides (mountains) as much as
the legacy of three generations of Soviet planners. Yet the countries
of Central Asia are becoming increasingly more differentiated from one
and another, making it necessary.
First, while none of the countries in the region can yet be
considered to be democracies, each is developing a very distinct
political system, whose stability has not yet been fully tested by
succession (in the case of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) or by the
transfer of power to a post-Soviet generation of leaders (in all five
countries). In general the United States has found few effective levers
to use to try and speed up the process of democracy-building in the
region, which overall has had at least as many setbacks as successes in
the past 8 years. Let me quickly review developments and prospects
here:
Kazakhstan: Despite some very disturbing recent developments
(the seemingly politically motivated handling of Evgenii
Zhovtis' case involving a vehicular death that occurred while
he was driving, the new Internet law and the treatment of
independent media more generally, and the increasing use of
criminal courts to try to settle political and business
infighting) Kazakhstan is a country in which vigorous political
debate is still possible, including in at least some forms of
media, where NGOs are able to function in public space and
where private space is almost entirely free of government
interference. In general the new constitution is a step in the
right direction, allowing for enhanced parliamentary power, and
a larger degree of judicial independence. But for it to have
meaning subsequent parliamentary elections will need to be much
freer from top-down management, opposition political parties
will need to become more competent, and the reform of the legal
system will need to be carried out with greater vigor. The
United States has considerable leverage in Kazakhstan given
that country's desire for an OSCE summit to be held in Astana
in summer 2010, but criticism is best applied in a systemic
fashion.
Kyrgyzstan: The Bakiyev government has not made good on many
of the promises to liberalize the political system that were
made during the ``Tulip'' revolution. It is not clear what
leverage the United States has, given fears of losing access to
the airport at Manas, and that Bakiyev's people have decided
that Russia's ``political engineers'' are more to their
likening than American style NGOs.
Tajikistan: More and more power is being concentrated in the
hands of President Rahmon and his family, and the role of
opposition parties and NGOs has diminished substantially.
While public space has been reduced, private space remains
largely unchanged, with the exception of a much more aggressive
effort by the state to modify Islamic traditions and teachings
in order to emphasize an albeit more modest (in how weddings,
funerals, and other rituals are carried out) but strictly
Hanafi school of Islamic law. Here, too, U.S. leverage is
extremely limited, unless we want to cut out much-needed
economic assistance in order to teach the Tajik Government a
political lesson. Such a practice would further endanger
regional stability as it could lead to popular unrest with
unpredictable outcomes.
Uzbekistan: I have argued elsewhere (in Central Asia's Second
Chance) that had a more robust financial assistance package
(from the IFIs and not just bilateral U.S. assistance) been
offered to Tashkent in the aftermath of 9/11 the process of
both economic and political reform could have been speeded up
in that country. Since Andijian the security capacity of the
Uzbek Government has been enhanced, but there has also been,
albeit very slow, some improvement of the country's legal
system, and at least one prominent political prisoner has been
released. U.S. leverage here is limited, especially given the
kinds of financial limitations on the assistance side of the
equation, but Tashkent is more eager for a close relationship
with the United States than has been true for several years.
Turkmenistan: There has been something of a political opening
since Niyazov's death, but public and private space remain
quite limited in the country, especially given how little
contact most Turkmen are able to have with the larger global
community.
Second, economically the region has become much more
differentiated, divided into rich and poor countries, as well as
countries with largely open, and those with largely closed economies.
Once again Kazakhstan is in a largely ``stand alone'' situation, with
the strongest and largest economy in the region. The government made
use of its National Fund to stabilize the country's economy during last
year's global crisis, and although the fundamental causes of the
weakness of Kazakhstan's banking system have yet to be addressed, the
corner seems to have been safely turned at least for the moment.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were largely insulated from last year's
crisis by the insulated nature of their economies, which are still
largely state owned or (save for Uzbekistan's small and medium business
sector) largely state managed. Uzbekistan dealt with its population's
loss of remittance income (from Russia and Kazakhstan) by launching a
massive public works program, but the long-term economic stability of
both countries will not be assured without substantial reform,
especially of the agricultural (and water intensive cotton) sector.
The economic challenges that the region's two poorest countries
face, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have increased. Chronic energy
shortages have hampered economic development in both countries and led
to a serious deterioration of social and economic conditions in rural,
and especially in remote rural communities. As winter 2007-08
demonstrated, in atypically cold years the situation becomes one of
humanitarian crisis, where the international community is called upon
to provide food and warm shelter. The breakup of the old Soviet-era
centralized regional electricity grid (with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan's
withdrawal) is likely to create new short-term challenges, but will
prove to be a positive step for each country's economic development if
it leads to more rapid reform of their electricity sectors (production,
distribution, and tariffs). This will not be possible without
substantial international guidance, including by the United States and
funding from the IFI. Without careful management, it could lead to an
exacerbation of regional tensions, especially if upstream users
precipitously cut water to downstream users to generate electricity.
Kyrgyzstan has proved an amenable environment to work in to try and
alleviate the challenges energy shortages particularly through the use
of alternative sources of energy. Working with Tajikistan is more
challenging, in part because of the more endemic corruption in that
sector there.
Third, the populations of the Central Asian countries are becoming
more distinct, in part because of different educational and cultural
influences. Within a generation there will no longer be a common
language uniting most of the citizens of this region, and neither
Russian nor English will be able to fill this role.
Kazakhstan's population has been most influenced by global forces,
through the education of thousands of young people in the West each
year (who are required to return home for at least 2 years and placed
in government service), extensive contact with Asian countries, and for
another sector of the population, a growing influence from the Islamic
world (through seminaries in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the gulf states and
Turkey). While these trends could produce social tensions (especially
since here, too, there is a retraditionalization going on in rural
areas) the polity that is emerging is quite complex.
In all of the other countries the process of retraditionalization
is the dominant social factor, and its pace has been accelerated where
the quality of education has declined most markedly, such as
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and in rural areas of Kyrgyzstan. Islam is a
growing factor everywhere in Central Asia. Despite the efforts of all
of the states to control its practice (and the Western press tends to
exaggerate the amount of religious repression that exists) religion is
a dynamic force everywhere in the region.
what lessons should be drawn?
First, the United States should expand military assistance to the
Central Asian nations, especially assistance that is geared to enhance
their capacity to maintain effective border controls. This is the most
valuable assistance we can provide them with in the short term.
Second, it is time to revisit the old U.S. multiple pipeline
strategy. The new Turkmen-Uzbek-Kazakh-China pipeline has given the
Central Asians a realistic alternative to Russia. Europe can reduce
their vulnerability to trade disruptions from Russia by adding more LNG
into their energy mix, and creating more interlinkages within the EU as
well as a EU-wide strategic reserve. Policies toward this end are
already under debate in the EU. The priority of the Central Asian
states must be on getting commercially attractive terms of trade.
Opening new pipelines through Turkey go only partway toward achieving
this, especially if Turkey's gas lobby keeps transit fees high and
purchase prices at the Turkish border low (the reason why Azerbaijan
has just signed a small gas deal with Russia). The gas trade has to
become on a commercial footing.
Third, U.S. policymakers must look more creatively at the challenge
of democracy building in the region, and become more sensitive to the
differences between countries and the generational change that is
occurring at the societal level. There should be more attention to in-
country projects that improve the physical conditions of education, so
that children will go to school. Access to the Internet is critical,
but projects must be designed that provide energy as well as Internet
access. These societies will not remain secular ones unless conditions
in rural communities improve, for that is where the overwhelming
majority of the population lives, and unless this occurs there will be
no ``home'' to go back to for Western-educated Central Asian youth.
They will simply be unwelcome, or at best alien.
Fourth and finally, the United States should redouble efforts to
enhance the coordination of the IFIs and other bilateral assistance
providers to work with the Central Asian states to help them relieve
their short- and medium-term energy shortages, as well as addressing
the long-term challenges. This requires bottom-up and not just top-down
engagement, but the former is easier to achieve local government
support for and ownership of than the latter. While the format of
bilateral consultations that have been developed by the Obama
administration reflects the reality of five increasingly more
differentiated countries developing, there are a host of regional
problems that much be addressed in concert.
Senator Casey. Dr. Olcott, you are one of the few that
observed the time pretty closely here. Doing a lot better than
most of the folks around here, Senators and non-Senators alike.
I know I went over my time. I think our other witnesses did,
too, but we won't talk about that.
Dr. Blank.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. BLANK, PROFESSOR, STRATEGIC STUDIES
INSTITUTE, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE, PA
Dr. Blank. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey, Senator Shaheen, it's a great honor to
testify before this committee. and my remarks reflect my views,
not those of the Army or the Defense Department, or of the
great State of Pennsylvania, even though Martha and I actually
went to graduate school together in another State. But, we'll
leave that aside.
Senator Casey. Don't talk about that today.
Dr. Blank. Yes.
Central Asia is of pivotal importance, not just because of
Afghanistan. The urgency of the war in Afghanistan colors our
thinking about the region, but there are multiple security
issues and threats there that could impact upon international
security in general, and United States foreign policy and
security interests in particular. Many of them are domestic in
origin.
These countries, to varying degrees, suffer from what a
colleague of mine, Max Manwaring, calls ``illegitimate
governance.'' They are authoritarian states in which we see
manifestations of despotism, clan, familial rule, nepotism,
suffocation of the autonomous space for political action, and
in most cases they believe that all opposition is inherently
extremist, terrorist, and fundamentalist, which leads to the
self-fulfilling prophecy that, as a result of this, all
opposition generally tends to crystallize around an Islamic
radical vocabulary, because that's the language that's
available to them, and all other opportunities have been
snuffed out.
Beyond that, succession is the Achilles' heel of all the
governments in the region. When President Niyazov died suddenly
in 2006, about 3 years ago exactly, there was widespread
anxiety, throughout the region and in Russia, that a war might
break out or the internal upheaval might break out. That was
not the case, but the perception that this was a very likely
possibility underscores the weakness of the succession
mechanisms in all of these authoritarian cases, and the fact
that political disputes cannot necessarily be resolved
peacefully by these local governments.
Furthermore, the chance of any genuine regional security
cooperation from within--organizations like the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization or the Collective Security Treaty
Organization--is very slim. Both of these are externally
generated. The idea did not come from the region themselves.
They are, first of all, vehicles for the major great powers,
Russia and China in particular, to assert their interests, and
then, second, opportunities for Central Asian governments to
assert their interests, vis-a-vis Russia and China. But, they
are untested. It is unclear whether or they could adequately
respond to new challenges; and what's more, the CSTO, which is
the military arm of this, has explicitly said it will not
intervene in the domestic affairs of the Central Asian states,
which is precisely where challenges may come about.
Furthermore, within the region, there are rivalries among
the states. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are notorious for being
contenders and rivals for regional leadership. And Kazakhstan,
because of its outstanding economic success, is in a position
to try and advance its claim to regional leadership, which only
exacerbates the rivalry with Uzbekistan further.
Martha has alluded to the problems of water. Water and
electric energy, and energy use in general, are extremely
sensitive issues that have led to, already, political clashes
and rising security tensions among Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan. And, beyond that, Uzbekistan has a long history of
being at odds with all of its neighbors and habitually waging
economic warfare by closing borders or restricting energy
shipments and so on.
So, we have a region which has extremely diverse security
challenges and rather few instruments with which to meet them,
and which is growing in importance, because not only of the war
in Afghanistan, but because, first of all, of its proximity to
major international actors, like Russia, China, Iran, and the
Indian subcontinent, and because European energy security
depends, ultimately, on Europe's ability to gain unfettered or
free competitive access to Central Asian energy. And to the
extent that Europe can't do so, it becomes dependent on Russian
gas, in particular.
However, in that situation, what we find is that, despite
the growing importance of Central Asia, there is no discernible
United States strategy for Central Asia. There is a strategy
for the Northern Distribution Network, but there is no strategy
that ties together the energy, Afghanistan, domestic issues,
and no commensurate investment of United States resources,
either private or public, in these states, to the degree that
its importance is growing. And as a result, our influence, sad
to say, is diminishing. And after 2011, assuming that the
administration follows through on President Obama's
announcement that we will start withdrawing troops from
Afghanistan, our credibility in the region will decline even
further, unless there is alternative forms of United States
presence on the ground, commensurate with the requirements of
victory in Afghanistan and stability in Central Asia.
Under those circumstances, we face a very significant
situation, because, as Martha has pointed out, we are at about
the limit of where Russia can go, in terms of influencing the
region, and we're only at the beginning of Chinese economic
power, as manifested throughout Central Asia. The Chinese are
now investing, in very large numbers in Central Asia, in major
projects worth billions of dollars; the pipeline that was
opened yesterday is only one of them. Reports say that they
will not invest in projects for anything less than $5 billion.
So, this gives you an example about the scale of Chinese
thinking.
Furthermore, there are reports from the region--
unconfirmed, but nonetheless they came to me--saying that the
Chinese Government told Kyrgyzstan, during the negotiations
over Manas, that if the United States couldn't give them the
money they wanted, China would make up the difference,
indicating China's willingness to play a major security role in
Central Asia through, first of all, economic leverage. But,
ultimately, economic leverage will not be the only
manifestation of Chinese presence.
Therefore, the United States has to reconsider Central
Asia, in strategic terms. We must continue the Bush
administration's emphasis on integrating Central Asia with
South Asia, to the extent that it's possible, and overcoming
Indo-Pakistani rivalry, in general--and, in particular, in this
region--so that both of these states can help Central Asia,
rather than compete against each other there.
Furthermore, there must be a sustained strategic
perspective within the government--as Ambassador Krol said, a
whole-of-government perspective--to bring together all the
relevant agencies to work together toward a common aim in
Central Asia.
Third, there must be much greater high-level--not
ambassadorial, but high-level--Cabinet, Vice President,
Presidential--attention paid to the region, visits both to and
from the region at those levels, and a tremendous integration
with Europe on the issue of opening up pipelines so that states
like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can feel free to build the
Nabucco pipeline or other pipelines to Europe without fear of
retaliation from Russia, and gain genuine economic
independence.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blank follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen J. Blank, Professor, Strategic
Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
Central Asia's importance to the United States is rooted in the
following three facts: its proximity to Afghanistan and thus the seat
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda that have attacked us and will do so again;
its proximity to key states like Russia, Iran, China, and the Indian
subcontinent; and its large energy deposits which are becoming critical
for Europe. These facts have led every administration since 1993 to
advance the following broad geostrategic goals for Central Asia. First
it is critical that the threat posed by the Taliban and its allies in
al-Qaeda and other associated terrorist groups be eradicated. Second,
we seek to preclude the rebirth of any Eurasian empire and thus
guarantee that Central Asian states retain their full sovereignty to
choose their own path in world affairs without being subordinated to
any one state. Third, we seek equal access for Central Asian states to
global energy markets rather than dependence upon one exclusive
intermediary like Russia. Therefore we correspondingly seek equal
access to their markets, including energy, for our own companies. Last,
in practice, despite rhetoric to the contrary, democracy promotion has
always come in fourth behind these objectives and that remains the case
today.
Those objectives and interests are at risk today from a combination
of factors that place the security of Central Asian states at risk.
Security and the threats to it in Central Asia are both
multidimensional. The most urgent of the threats to regional security
is, of course, the war in Afghanistan. But that war itself comprises
multiple threats to the region while it exacerbates the risks posed by
all the other existing threats to Central Asia. In some respects the
threats posed by Afghanistan are classical or old-fashioned ones: e.g.,
the threat of a war spilling over Afghanistan's boundaries to engulf
neighboring countries or should the Taliban and its allies win, the
threat of terrorism spreading into Central Asian countries. In that
event these terrorist movements would no doubt soon try to overthrow
the ruling Governments of Central Asia, most likely in Uzbekistan since
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is an already existing
organization. But Uzbekistan would likely not be the only state in
which we would see such action as terrorist and insurgent groups would
also probably try to incite hostile action against the other
Governments in Central Asia.
Indeed, all the Central Asian Governments have acted consistently
upon the belief that all opposition to them is by definition Islamic,
fundamentalist, and/or terrorist, and have therefore harshly repressed
those phenomena whether that assessment is true or not. As a result the
field has been left open only for such opposition movements to thrive.
Therefore should the Taliban win in Afghanistan there would be, so to
speak, ample dry timber lying around for them to ignite in their quest
to spread their message and their politics. Thus the long-established
threat of a revolutionary movement supported from abroad but finding
sources of replenishment in neighboring states could become a genuine
threat to regional security. But the threat potential embodied in this
quite possible outcome becomes more likely by virtue of the existing
shortcomings in these states' security systems.
If we look at their domestic politics it becomes clear that only
Kazakhstan is relatively (and I emphasize relatively) secure and likely
to flourish in the near future. But it suffers from an ever-growing
democratic deficit and its economy greatly depends on the price of
energy and other commodities. Nonetheless under these conditions of
autocracy and widespread corruption it is creating an educated middle
class and striving to bring authentic prosperity and sustainable
economic growth to the country. Given its proximity to Russia and China
we can also assume that they would react quite vigorously to any
genuine threat to Kazakhstan's security. Nevertheless its democratic
deficit, uncertain succession picture, and the fact that its politics,
like that of its Central Asian neighbors, is dominated by familial,
clan, and factional politics are all negative signs concerning its
prospects for future stability. Moreover, because Kazakhstan also
aspires to a degree of regional leadership in Central Asia, it cannot
stand aloof from regional issues and could be well drawn into potential
future conflicts of the type discussed below.
Turning from Kazakhstan, we find that the situation everywhere else
is nowhere near as promising as in that case and in some cases much
worse. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are either failing states or
perilously close to it. Turkmenistan is a repressive autocracy (if not
quite as much as under Sapirmurad Niyazov who died in 2006) with a
limited state capacity and a virtually complete dependence upon gas.
Uzbekistan is no less repressive and has been dominated by President
Islam Karimov since it became independent in 1991. It too depends
heavily upon commodity prices for energy, gold, cotton, and Karimov has
repeatedly brutally stifled any sign of opposition. In all four of
these states, and possibly to a greater degree than Kazakhstan politics
are largely those of family, faction, and clan leading to highly
corrupt regimes even if it were not for the influence of the pervasive
problems caused by the huge importation of narcotics from Afghanistan.
In Tajikistan President Ermomali Rahmonov has built himself a $300
million palace worth about half as much as the country's annual budget
of $700 million and appointed his daughter to be Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Similar phenomena are also visible in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan where the President's daughters exercise enormous powers.
Similarly in Kyrgyzstan President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has just
appointed his son to be head of the Central Agency for Development,
Investment, and Innovation. The Government of Kyrgyzstan is also shot
through with criminality and corruption and like all the other Central
Asian states has been relentlessly snuffing out all possibilities for
liberal or democratic politics. Like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan has been
hard hit by the current economic crisis and suffers from serious energy
shortages. In all these states as well the scourge of narcotics has
grown to alarming proportions following what appears to be an iron law
that states through which drugs traverse as they go to market
invariably end up by becoming havens for large-scale use of drugs as
well. Apart from the wasted lives and huge social and health costs by
this epidemic of drug use, the drug trade only adds to the pervasive
corruption in these countries.
Thus in all these countries misrule, nepotism, corruption, clan,
faction, and family-based politics, a high degree of poverty, difficult
economic conditions, and political repression are pervasive and the
stuff of daily life. This lethal cocktail of security challenges offers
the Taliban and al-Qaeda numerous opportunities for recruitment,
especially as Islam is the only credible language of sociopolitical
expression if all others are repressed. Should they win in Afghanistan
their ability to exploit regional security challenges will grow
commensurately. But the security deficits of the region go beyond this
list of pathologies. There is no basis for regional security
cooperation, quite the opposite. Uzbekistan is at odds with all of its
neighbors and has repeatedly waged economic warfare against them or
closed its borders. Neither is there any serious effort at regional
economic cooperation so most countries compete with each other rather
than seek ways to cooperate with each other for their mutual benefit.
Indeed, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are quite openly rivals for
leadership here and that rivalry only mirrors the greater absence of
regional cooperation that we find here. Every security organization set
up that involves Central Asia was initiated by an outside power or
powers like the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) or the Russian and Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO). But it is quite uncertain what degree those organizations can
actively maintain security in Central Asia should a determined
challenge emerge.
And we should understand that sooner or later such a challenge will
emerge, for example through a possible succession crisis, a highly
plausible scenario. When Niyazov died the regional and Russian
expectation was that such a crisis could break out leading to military
conflicts. Thus a new crisis could evoke that same expectation or
actually become a conflict and it is by no means clear how well
prepared anyone is for such a contingency. The CSTO is a defense pact
but it is hardly truly collective as Russia provides most of the troops
and it is mainly an organization that can allow Russia to maintain
bases in Central Asia. Although it claims it will not intervene in
members' domestic affairs, it is quite possible that it is there
precisely to quell local insurgencies or opposition movements since it
is very doubtful that Russia could fight off a terrorist movement
successfully based upon its utter failure in the North Caucasus or that
it has the manpower and quality of forces needed to do so.
Similarly the SCO is explicitly not a defense or hard security
organization. Rather it is a means for regulating Russo-Chinese
relations in Central Asia, resolving earlier border problems, working
together to counter democratic ideas and the U.S. presence where it
insists upon democratic reforms. It also is an organization that allows
Central Asian states to voice their collective needs of a material
nature in regard to security to both China and Russia and induce them
to transfer resources to those governments to provide for such security
as such actions are seen as being in everyone's common interest. Its
cohesion is untested and Uzbekistan periodically breaks with the SCO
and CSTO to insist upon going its own way. So its potential as a
security provider is untested and probably limited. Thus all regional
security mechanisms are untested and could easily turn out to be
unreliable.
This factor, on top of regional domestic problems listed above, is
of considerable significance since it makes regional cooperation and
conflict resolution much harder and such conflicts are already brewing.
The states possessing energy deposits lack water and vice versa.
Therefore water usage issues, particularly as many actors have
continued disastrous Soviet environmental practices relating to water,
irrigation, and the use of water for hydroelectric power have become a
source of constant friction and could yet lead to conflicts among these
states in the absence of any kind of regional or international
supranational authority. We see this in the constant rivalries among
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that have led to a breakdown of
previously existing regional accords. But it also is the case that
China and Russia have also pursued beggar-their-neighbor water policies
relating to waters of importance to Central Asia that have or soon will
have disastrous environmental impacts upon the region. As the issue of
climate change and the melting of ice from the mountain ranges in
Central Asia become more critical issues, those trends could even
aggravate the already profound threats from the erosion of the Aral Sea
and local rivers and the selfish and misguided water policies of states
leading to conflict over basic issues of water and electricity.
Arguably Central Asia is one of those regions where a war breaking out
over resource and environmental issues is quite conceivable.
All these issues should engage us because this region's importance
is growing. This growing importance is not only due to the consequences
of Afghanistan's war but also because of the significance its energy
resources has for Europe and Asia. Moscow has shown that it will do
whatever it can to keep these states from selling energy independently
to Europe or at high prices to Russia. Moscow's openly neo-colonial
policies here are crucial to maintaining its autocratic economic-
political system at home and frustrating reform of its own energy and
overall economic policies and thus the political system. Those policies
of controlling these states' pipelines and supporting their antiliberal
regimes is equally crucial to the prospect of Moscow's preserving an
exclusive sphere of influence here and of dominating European economies
and politics by control over the provision of gas and to a lesser
degree oil. Control over Central Asian energy and politics is critical
to Russia's larger strategic goal of forestalling European integration
along democratic lines both in Central and Eastern Europe and with
regard to Georgia and Ukraine, and thus the Caucasus, if not Central
Asia itself.
Russia has made clear that while it talks a good game about
cooperation in Afghanistan its government is not really ready to
provide it, having allowed just one flight to date under the terms of
its agreement with the administration. Otherwise its bureaucracy has
obstructed all other attempts to get more flights going. Similarly,
Moscow tried to bribe Kyrgyzstan and threaten it at the same time to
kick the United States out of its air base at Manas, hardly signs of a
desire for genuine cooperation. But Russia also wants to control
Central Asia in order to prevent China from supplanting it as a
customer for energy and/or a major economic power and security provider
there. That effort goes on for despite the rhetoric of cooperation a
Sino-Russian rivalry for influence continues there with Russia seeking
to limit Central Asian states' ability to sell China energy directly
through pipelines from the area built by them and China. However,
Chinese economic power is proving to be too much for Russia under the
conditions of the present crisis and Moscow even had to say it welcomed
Chinese investment there. But we should also understand the magnitude
of Chinese efforts here.
To give a few examples, recently it lent members of the SCO $10
billion and has also recently announced major energy and
infrastructural initiatives in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Tajikistan. China granted Turkmenistan, $3 billion for developing a new
gas deposit at Yuzhny Iolatan. China also announced its intention to
invest over $1 billion in hydroelectric energy, power transmission, and
transport projects in Tajikistan that will tie Tajikistan's
infrastructure much closer to China. Finally, China's Export-Import
Bank is lending the state-owned Development Bank of Kazakhstan $5
billion, and CNPC is lending Kazmunaigaz, Kazakhstan's state-run gas
company, another $5 billion. Moreover, China National Petroleum
Corporation is buying a 49-percent minority holding in Kazakhstan's
company AO MangistauMunaigaz from Kazmunaigaz National Co. And we can
expect further deals of this magnitude.
According to some members of U.S. nongovernmental organizations,
China also told the Kyrgyz Government that if the United States did not
offer it enough money to keep the Manas air base (now a transit center)
open, China could furnish the money, demonstrating its willingness to
play a broker's role and gain leverage with both Washington and
Bishkek. These sources also quoted German diplomats who noted that
China is now committed to truly big investment projects and will not
invest in Central Asia for less than $5 billion. Neither do these deals
exhaust China's ongoing and prospective investments in Central Asian
energy and infrastructure.
This capability flows directly from China's huge cash reserves and
willingness to spend in a time of economic crisis to gain political
leverage globally and not just in Central Asia. Since the United States
will not invest such sums and in many cases, especially those tied to
support of the war in Afghanistan, is legally debarred from doing so,
and Russia will promise but not deliver the goods; China, who will
deliver without strings concerning recipients' democratic credentials
stands poised to reap an enormous geopolitical harvest in Central Asia.
recommendations for the obama administration
All of the aforementioned factors should normally impel the U.S.
Government to regard this region as a whole as one of growing
importance for the United States. But it appears that our interest
remains almost exclusively focused on the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN) through Central Asia that has been set up to relieve logistical
pressure on our forces in Afghanistan near Pakistan. Of course, the
establishment of the NDN has also led the Taliban to start moving north
and attacking it, not surprisingly since so many of its successful
attacks have been directed against our other logistical networks
through the Khyber Pass. But those attacks against the NDN have
contributed to mounting anxiety in Central Asia about the war spilling
over into their territories and attacks by homegrown insurgents
encouraged by, or otherwise supported by, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Yet
while we must defend the NDN we seem to have overlooked the importance
of other issues in Central Asia. High-level visits do not occur unlike
the case in Russia, China, etc. The administration has apparently opted
to forgo public discussion of the region's democratic deficits as it
has also done with Russia and China, in my opinion, a wrong decision
even if it is an understandable one.
Likewise, there does not seem to be any strong push by senior
officials above the ambassadorial level to get Central Asian energy
moving through Nabucco or other pipeline plans offered by the EU. Even
if the EU and not the United States is the author of the Nabucco
pipeline, surely the stakes involved here are such that we should be
moving openly and vigorously to support it, line up financing for it,
and convince Central Asian Governments to commit to it by giving them
assurances that they will not suffer negative consequences for so
doing. Also there is no public sign of awareness of the seriousness of
the region's energy, water, and environmental issues or any truly
strong push for enhanced U.S. trade and investment programs to counter
the Russian and Chinese quests for lasting influence here. In other
words our Afghanistan strategy appears to remain incomplete, an AfPak
(Pakistan) strategy rather than an overall regional strategy that
embraces the entire region and sees all of its dimensions in their true
strategic importance.
As I have previously written, Central Asian Governments' interest
in maintaining the maximum amount of flexibility and independence in
their foreign relations coincides neatly with both U.S. capabilities
and interests. It obviously is in Washington's interest that its
logistical rear in Afghanistan be stabilized especially at a time of
prolonged economic hardship in the region and mounting conflict in
Afghanistan. The intended supply road can and hopefully will provide a
major boost to local economies by giving contracts to local companies
and hopefully provide employment to some of the unemployed in these
countries. But the Obama administration should not stop there. America,
especially with European support, can leverage its superior economic
power to regain a stronger position in the region and help prevent
these embattled states from falling further prey to Russia and/or China
who cannot compete at that level with the United States or with the
United States and Europe together. In any case Russia's answers to
Central Asian issues consists of maintaining the status quo against all
changes, leaving these states as backward states dependent on their
cash crop and with little or no possibility of cooperating amongst
themselves. In other words, the Russian approach over time enhances
their vulnerability to challenges stemming either from the Taliban, the
global economic crisis, or a confluence of the two phenomena.
Meanwhile the business community is playing a bigger role in
Central Asian states besides Kazakhstan, the regional economic leader.
And that role is going beyond energy investments. Although Washington
cannot offer state-backed loans and elaborate project credits, as does
Beijing, it supports WTO membership for all Central Asian states and
has established a U.S.-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement. Accordingly there is an opportunity here for the Obama
administration to enlarge upon this foundation with a considerably
larger and multidimensional program of trade, aid, and investment
throughout Central Asia to accomplish the standing U.S. objectives of
enhancing these states' economic independence, economic security, and
opportunities for their independent participation in the global economy
without a Russian or Chinese filter.
Scholars have long realized that it is the construction of
infrastructural projects that can overcome Central Asia's centuries-
long isolation from major international trade routes and provide not
just lasting economic growth but also access to new possibilities for
political action and integration, not just into regional blocs but into
the wider global economy. Meanwhile, changes in transport facilities
and communication devices that began in Soviet times and that have
continued since then to the present are exercising a decisive influence
upon emerging geostrategic and economic realities in Central Asia.
Specifically the 19th century vision of an integrated network of rail
lines connecting the former Soviet and Tsarist empires, Iran, India,
and Europe is becoming a reality. Equally importantly market access
varies inversely with transport cost. To the degree that Central Asian
energy costs more to transport to world markets the less access it will
have. But conversely to the extent that roads and other forms of
travel, transport, and communication are built into Central Asia that
lower the cost of transporting people, goods, and services it can be
more integrated with the broader global economy. Surely such ideas lie
behind various Russian and Chinese projects for such developments as
well as the rivalry over pipelines to send Central Asian energy to
Europe and Asia. Thus the NDN project falls squarely into that category
of exemplary infrastructural projects that may serve purposes other
than economic stability and global or regional integration but which
ultimately can facilitate those objectives and outcomes. Therefore our
investment policies should build upon the NDN to invest in further
large-scale infrastructural projects to help develop the region, create
jobs, generate progress, and advance regional economic integration.
Beyond that, the necessity of supplying troops with large amounts
of potable water suggests a second benefit from this road. Perhaps it
can galvanize greater cooperation among Central Asian states, if not to
increase the amount of water they consume, then at least to upgrade
their quality for the benefit of all of its users. There is no doubt
that water shortages are a real threat to the stability of some of
these societies and a cause for unrest in them.
Therefore such infrastructural and environmental projects could
provide a spur for a much needed but still obstructed regional economic
integration or at least enhanced cooperation. There is no doubt that at
least some, if not all these states are receptive to the idea of
greater cooperation against the Taliban. Shared participation in a
major logistical project that brings mutual benefit while supporting
the war effort could lead to spillovers that foster still more
cooperation in other areas like water. While it is true that the U.S.
budget is strained and has many claimants upon its resources, this is a
region where relatively small sums given the totality of U.S. budgetary
outlays could make a substantial geopolitical difference. Moreover, it
might be possible to arrange matters so that the budget is not busted
here while redirecting existing programs toward a more holistic and
integrated, i.e., multidimensional understanding of regional security
needs and thus toward greater effectiveness. Certainly neither Russia
nor China could compete with a truly serious investment of U.S.
resources and time here.
But we should not think that we can do this on the cheap. The
lessons of Manas are clear: If the United States seeks a policy
position in Central Asia commensurate with the requirements of victory
in Afghanistan then it will have to pay for it by investing the
resources necessary to do the job. Otherwise its regional credibility
will steadily diminish. We cannot pretend that a geopolitical struggle
is not occurring in this increasingly critical region of the world.
Since ``power projection activities are an input into the world
order,'' Russian, European, Chinese, and American force deployments
into Central Asia and the Caucasus and economic-political actions to
gain access, influence and power there represent potentially
competitive and profound, attempts at engendering a long-term
restructuring of the regional strategic order.
specific recommendations
Specifically the U.S. Government under President Obama should
consider and act upon the following recommendations and policies in
order to facilitate the aforementioned strategic goals of victory in
Afghanistan and the enhanced independence of Central Asian states.
First it must continue the Bush administration's emphasis
upon regional integration of Central Asia with South and East
Asia in regard to energy electricity, and other commodities.
But it should also expand its horizons to foster greater U.S.-
European cooperation so that these states can trade more openly
with Europe and the United States as well. Greater involvement
by the EU that parallels NATO involvement would therefore
contribute to this latter enhancement of existing U.S.
policies. And it should invest in capabilities that can help
overcome regional energy and water issues, perhaps by
encouraging Army Corps of Engineers and private engineering
firms to work in the region with local governments.
Second, it must build upon that foundation and conceive of
the road it now seeks to build for logistical purposes to
supply U.S. forces as also being a powerful engine for regional
economic development and integration. This aspect of the policy
called for here as part of the overall strategy for winning the
war in Afghanistan and stabilizing Central Asia must be a
multilateral project with as many local and other key partners
(NATO, Russia, and China) as possible.
Third, it must not detach the NDN from other parts of U.S.
policy. Instead the administration should see it as the
centerpiece of a coordinated policy and policy actions to
integrate together existing programs for trade, investment, and
infrastructural projects, particularly with regard to water
quality and increasing water supplies for all of Central Asia
in order to lay a better foundation for the lasting economic
and thus political security of Central Asian states, and
indirectly through such support, for their continuing economic-
political independence and integration with Asia and the global
economy.
Fourth the United States should offer much more overt and
vigorous economic and political support to the Nabucco project
either with the EU or directly to Central Asian states who
might wish to take part in it in the form of investment,
exploration assistance, building pipelines, providing insurance
and financing, etc. A policy that neglects this has directly
negative repercussions in both Central Asia and Europe and only
strengthens a Russia that by both word and deed has indicated
its disinterest in genuinely serious policy cooperation in
Central Asia.
Fifth it must, at the same time, reform the interagency
process which was universally regarded as broken, in order to
pursue security in this region and in individual countries in a
holistic, multidimensional, and integrated way that enhances
all the elements of security, not just military security. While
we do not espouse any particular course of reform of the
interagency process, there are several points that can and
should be made here. First, the strategy and policy outlined
here is not purely or mainly military. Second, it therefore
should optimally not be led by the U.S. military but include
them under civilian leadership as an important, but not
dominating element in that strategy for Central Asia. While in
Afghanistan actual hostilities requiring a military strategy
are required, it is also accepted that an important component
of our policy and strategy there must be to improve governance
and economic conditions for the population. The overall
strategy must shun the previous procedures and lack of
integrated planning for both hard and soft power elements of
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan that has led to ``stovepipe
efforts that do not achieve full and efficient results and
effects in areas of operations.''
Instead as one recent paper on the subject of reforming this
process notes, if the U.S. system is to address the ever
increasing level of complexity in providing security at home
and abroad, ``indeed if it is to operate as a system at all
rather than a collection of separate components--then security
reform must stress unity, integration, and inclusion across all
levels.'' And this new process must take a long-term view of
the problems with which it will grapple, especially in the
light of our own financial crisis. Within that call for reform
there are several common themes in recent works and statements
on this subject that emphasize as well the need for
multilateral support for such programs.
Furthermore, in all our efforts, whether they are regional or
within a particular country, experience shows the absolute
inescapable necessity that the operation to provide such
multidimensional security must be organized along lines of
unity of command and unity of effort to succeed. Whether the
format is one of a country team led by the ambassador that
pulls all the strings of U.S. programs together or a Joint
Integrated Task Force (JIATF) is almost a secondary question.
The paramount need is for well-conceived plans that can be
implemented under the principle of this unity of command
leading to a unity of effort.
Sixth, a key component of an expanded, integrated, and
holistic approach to security in both Afghanistan and Central
Asia must entail a vigorous effort to combat narcotics
trafficking. This is not just because it is a scourge to both
Afghanistan, and the CIS, but also because it is clear that the
Afghan governments either incapable or unwilling to act and is
more concerned with blaming others for its deficiencies here.
Furthermore, such action will convince Central Asian states and
Russia that we take their security concerns seriously and
facilitate their cooperation with our policy and strategy.
conclusions
Arguably it is only on the basis of such an integrated
multidimensional and multilateral program that a strategy to secure
Central Asia against the ravages of economic crisis and war can be
built while we also seek to prosecute the war in Afghanistan in a
similarly holistic way. It has long since been a critical point or
points in U.S. policy for Central Asia that we seek to advance these
states' independence, security, and integration both at a regional
level and with the global economy. U.S. experts and scholars have also
argued for such a perspective as well. Thus the NDN project could and
probably should serve as the centerpiece of a renewed American economic
strategy to help Central Asia fight off the Taliban and cope
simultaneously with the global economic crisis. An integrated program
of economic and military action in Central Asia is surely called for
given the scope of our growing involvement and the stakes involved in a
region whose strategic importance is, by all accounts, steadily
growing. Especially as we are now increasing our troop commitment to
Afghanistan and building this new supply road, challenge and
opportunity are coming together to suggest a more enduring basis for a
lasting U.S. contribution to Central Asia's long-term security. In
effect the present crisis has brought matters to the point where the
United States has obtained a second chance in Central Asia even as it
is becoming more important in world affairs. It is rare that states get
a second chance in world politics. But when the opportunity knocks
somebody should be at home to answer the door.
Senator Casey. Dr. Blank, thank you very much.
You're both very good on time. We appreciate it. You'll be
invited back, for several reasons.
I'll start, and I know we're limited on time, but I'll
start just with one broad question, and then I want to make
sure that Senator Shaheen has a chance to ask questions. She's
a faithful attendee at all of the committee hearings, but also
at subcommittee hearings, as well. We're grateful she's here.
Dr. Blank, I wanted to focus on an issue that we're all
concerned about in different parts of the world, but especially
as we go forward with the President's new strategy in
Afghanistan, and that's Islamic extremism. In particular, I was
struck by a line--as well as many parts of your testimony, but
one in particular on the fourth page of your testimony--you
say, and I quote, ``This lethal cocktail of security challenges
offers the Taliban and al-Qaeda numerous opportunities for
recruitment, especially as Islam is the only credible language
of sociopolitical expression if all others are repressed.'' In
light of that statement, as well as others you've made, and in
light of the obvious threat that Islamic extremism plays in
this region and around the world, what do you think our
strategy should be, going forward, and what are your greatest
concerns about that threat?
Dr. Blank. I think that we need to find more creative ways,
as Dr. Olcott suggested, to make clear our enduring interest in
democracy. I would tie it to the fact that all of these states
are signatories of the final act, which gives us an
international legal platform to say that, ``You have all signed
the Helsinki Accords and therefore, you know, we feel that, if
you signed this treaty, you should be held to account, just as
we should be, and are.'' But, beyond that that, therefore,
there needs to be a commensurate investment by the United
States in the economies of these countries, in order to
strengthen their economies and create social and economic
conditions which will foster internal and indigenous autonomous
political participation by groups.
I mean, one of the, sort of, eternal truths of political
science is that, to the extent that economic prosperity
develops in a country, more and more citizens and social groups
form to advance political and social interests that they have.
Now, it's a long-term process; it doesn't happen in 1 year or 5
years. But, it's a process that would over time help to
stabilize the situation.
In many of these states--for example, in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan--we face the possibility of these states being
failing states, and particularly if there should be a
succession crisis which deprives the government of its ability
to lead at a crucial moment.
We have an instrument to foster investment on a large scale
through the Northern Distribution Network and accompanying
infrastructural projects associated with it. Now, if we were to
use those--that lever--or those levers--to craft out of that an
eco-
nomic strategy to increase investment and create jobs, so that
migrants don't have to go to Russia and return when conditions
in Russia deteriorate or face racially motivated attacks
against them, as is increasingly the case in Russia, then we
would be able to strengthen those economies and give them a
more solid economic basis for security at home and greater
economic independence abroad.
There are economic mechanisms available; there are
investment mechanisms through the Asian Development Bank and
other international financial institutions, as well as through
American private investment. And we need to push all of those.
And we also need to push American investment in energy in these
states, along with our European allies, through the Nabucco
pipeline so that energy-holding states will not be afraid to
invest in such a pipeline, for fear of retaliation. They will
have diversified alternative means of economic independence and
growth, because that's the only long-term basis on which you
can build a truly secure foundation for democracy, and an
alternative to Islam. If we're going to promote an alternative
to Islam, we have to show that it works.
Senator Casey. I'll move to Senator Shaheen. But, Dr.
Olcott, do you want to add anything to that before we move on?
Dr. Olcott. Thank you. I think that it's important not to
exaggerate the threat that Islamic extremism poses in these
countries. There's a clear return to Islam in all these places.
I think Islamic extremism is something we face everywhere, now,
as a risk.
The key, though, is enhancing the capacity of these states
to deal with situations on their borders. And, for me at least,
as somebody who's been traveling to the area for 30-some-odd
years already, I think we really have to be concerned, as I say
in my testimony, about the risks to secularism being
transformed or simply not going into the next generation. That,
I think, has to be one of our focuses. As think about
democracy, we have to be aware of how different these states
have become over the 20 years since independence. And our
tactics and strategies have to reflect that.
Education--and relating to Steve's point about migrants--I
think that there has to be more job creation. I think we also
can't overestimate what we're going to do with the money we are
now spending--for example, in relation to the Northern
Distribution Network is not--if we're going to be out of there
in 2, 3, or 4 years, by itself, it's not going to create enough
economic opportunities to transform these economies.
So, I think, again, the administration should be held to
having some sort of new strategy, and it should be something
that is implementable, and it should be something that takes
U.S. intellectual capacity and puts the United States in
driver's seat, working with other international actors, to have
a more coherent view of what it takes to get these weaker
states to become stronger.
But, Islam is going to be part of the picture. I think the
key is that we have to strengthen secular society. And I agree
entirely with Steve--economic stakeholders, in my opinion, are
what makes these systems more democratic; it creates in-country
supporters for rule of law.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to be
here this morning.
I'm sorry I missed the first panel, so I may have missed
some of the comments, relative to some of my questions.
But, Dr. Blank, I want to go back to your talking about the
human rights and extremism, because Kazakhstan, as has been
pointed out, is about the take over the chair of the OSCE, and
this provides us an opportunity to try and encourage them in
the area of doing more to address some of its potential reforms
in the country. Are we doing anything, or the European
community doing anything, to encourage them to make some
positive moves on human rights and freeing up more internal
discussion within the country before it takes over the
chairmanship?
Dr. Blank. I believe that we are doing things. I--actually,
I was a member of a task force that were--actually participated
in drafting an analysis of this issue, and there was meetings--
there were meetings in Astana in October, and there was the
Annual Review Conference in Warsaw in September, where the
United States participated.
So, we are doing things, but I suspect we're not doing
things in public, which I think is effective when it's combined
with private representation, because Kazakhstan made all sorts
of promises, in 2007 at the Madrid conference, as to what it
would do once it became chairman of the OSCE, since it's the
first non-European state to hold that position, and the
promises have not been kept. The Internet law, the media law,
the Zhovtis affair that Dr. Olcott referred to, where a leading
human rights activist found himself in a tragic situation
because he hit somebody with his car while he was driving, and
killed him, and then was then sentenced to a much greater time
than, say, inadvertent vehicular homicide would normally have
brought--these kinds of things, the use of the criminal courts
to criminalize political and business differences--all these
phenomena are going on in violation of the promises made at
Madrid. So, there needs to be both private representations made
to Kazakhstan and public representations made to Kazakhstan.
And also, I think, since the government in Astana is eager to
hold an OSCE summit for 2010, that the human rights issue must
be squarely addressed and at the forefront of this summit,
because it would make no sense for heads of state to travel to
a faraway place, whether it be Astana or Helsinki, in--with the
35th anniversary of the Accord, if the chairman of the OSCE is
not living up to its promises with regard to human rights and
security.
Senator Shaheen. Would you go as far as to suggest that
they shouldn't take over the chairmanship?
Dr. Blank. Well, it's far too late to make that kind of
suggestion. That horse left the barn at Madrid, 3 years ago.
There's no way you could deprive Kazakhstan of the
chairmanship, and I think it would be foolish and futile to
try, at this stage, to say so. I think what you need to do,
though, is to hold them to account. We, as a leading democracy
in the world, are held to account every day, in the world
media, for our shortcomings. It used to be civil rights 40
years ago; it's Guantanamo today, or other kinds of things. The
Government of Kazakhstan is a mature, enlightened government.
They have exceptional political leadership. They understand the
issues involved, and there's no reason why they should be
exempt from that kind of criticism, based on their past
promises, and based on the fact that they've signed the
Helsinki Accords and promised to be bound by them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Olcott, I was particularly interested in your
testimony, because you talked about education, something that
we don't often hear here, surprisingly enough. And I happen to
agree that education is one of the best ways in which we move
countries toward democracy and help them, assuming that it's
education that is available to all and is not biased in favor
of fundamentalism. And I'm curious, because, as I think about
this part of the world and its former domination by the Soviet
Union, I would have thought that education would have been
engrained as part of that, and that that would be a part of the
society. Has that changed since they have left the Soviet bloc?
And what are the forces that are driving that? And are we
seeing an occurrence of the madrassas that we've seen in other
parts Central Asia?
Dr. Olcott. Thank you for the question.
The situation in Central Asia is distinct from other newly
independent areas. These countries started with virtually 100
percent literacy. The challenge now is to maintain the quality
of education, especially in rural areas. And that's one that
none of these governments has had enough resources to do.
Kazakhstan's done a much better job than everybody else. But,
in all the other cases, it's very uneven.
Turkmenistan is a separate case, because the higher
education institutions were closed, effectively, at the last
years of Niyazov's life, and now they're being open. So, they
have particular challenges.
But, everywhere else what's happened is--especially in the
poor countries--as it's gotten more expensive to heat schools,
to repair schools, it's been hard to keep teachers, that the
percent of kids going to school has begun to drop, especially
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the rural areas. And the
electricity shortage means that schools have no electricity, in
most rural areas in those two countries, from October until
almost May. Imagine sending your kid to walk 2 miles each way,
to sit in an unheated school that has no electricity.
So, the challenges of maintaining a highly educated
population are really ones that these countries are going to
have trouble meeting entirely on their own.
Specialized technical education, which was a great boon of
the Soviet system, has also almost entirely died out in much of
the region. So, technical expertise is beginning to decline.
I'm not against people going to Russia to work at all. I think
migration is a great way to enhance economic recovery of places
that have excess labor, if your neighbor has labor shortages.
But, the whole question of having technical training is where,
again, EU and the United States can be a help, is really
critical. So, the opportunities of growing a new generation
that has basic skills--women's education is only a family
challenge; there's no access denial for women--and specialized
technical education, so people can get--have jobs, both at home
and in Russia, where there's a huge labor shortage, I think are
really critical things and could be building blocks in any move
to a more democratic next generation.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
That may have to be our last word. I have to go, and I know
that we're trying to get close to keeping this to the hour,
unfortunately. We could spend, not just another 20 minutes, but
another 20 hours.
But, we're grateful, Dr. Olcott, for your testimony, and
Dr. Blank, for yours, as well.
And we will be submitting questions for the record, which
will be further development of these issues, and more of an
opportunity for you to give us the benefit of your expertise.
And I'd love to get together again and talk more about the
strategy, going forward, in terms of what the administration's
doing. I think it's important, especially as we're coming to
the end of a new administration, that we try to do everything
we can to get this right.
Thanks very much.
The hearing's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary George Krol to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Stability and Extremism.--In your written testimony, you
wrote that one of the five main policy priorities is to ``expand
cooperation with Central Asian states to assist coalition efforts to
defeat extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bring stability and
prosperity to the region.''
On December 17, the Washington Post published an article describing
how Tajikistan has become the ``front line between the [Taliban]
insurgency and Central Asia'' as the Taliban advance north into Kunduz.
According to this article, more than 3,600 Afghan refugees have fled to
Tajikistan since January 2008, and ``security forces in Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have reported clashes with Islamist
terrorists, opposition warlords, and drug traffickers in Afghanistan.''
There seems to be a tension between our ongoing efforts to defeat
extremists in Afghanistan and the destabilizing effect it has on
Central Asia.
As the administration's efforts to defeat extremists in
Afghanistan and Pakistan continue, are the Taliban and/or other
extremist groups moving north into Central Asian countries? If
so, please describe.
Answer. We are concerned about possible relocations of extremists
to Central Asia as efforts to defeat them in Afghanistan and Pakistan
prove successful. In Central Asia, the United States provides a range
of security-related assistance, including programs focused on
strengthening border security. Improved border security will minimize
the chances of extremist groups moving north from Afghanistan. In
addition, U.S. assistance programs promote stability by fostering
economic growth. We are engaged with the countries of Central Asia on
strategies to diversify economies and ensure sustainable growth,
including programs to improve business practices, particularly in
agriculture, and promote economic reform.
Regarding Afghan refugees in Tajikistan, the State Department and
the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe are monitoring closely the situation, and
we do not anticipate that the increase in the number of asylum seekers
from Afghanistan will threaten Tajikistan's social and political
stability. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has provided the Tajik Government training and
technical assistance to register and protect asylum seekers and
refugees, and UNHCR provides assistance directly to refugees. In 2009,
the U.S. Government, through the State Department's Bureau for
Population, Refugees, and Migration, contributed $1.2 million to UNHCR
for programs in Central Asia and awarded grants to renovate several
schools in mixed Tajik-Afghan refugee communities and to increase the
capacity of a hospital to serve Afghan refugees.
Question. Does the administration have a strategy to help defeat
extremist groups in Central Asia that flee Afghanistan and Pakistan? If
so, please describe.
Answer. The United States continues to provide considerable
security-related assistance to the countries of Central Asia. Programs
focus on border security, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism,
including training for security and border personnel, provision of
equipment, and investment in infrastructure such as modern border
posts. In addition, the U.S. Government has extensive assistance
programs in Central Asia that promote stability by helping the
countries to address conditions of poverty that could create an
environment conducive to development of extremism. USAID has programs
which help strengthen the region's energy markets, promote agriculture
and trade, and implement economic reform--all of which is aimed at
improving economic growth. We also assist the Central Asian states with
programs that ``invest in people'' by improving the quality of and
access to basic education and protecting human health.
Question. Is there a destabilizing effect for countries in Central
Asia from our policies to defeat extremists in Afghanistan and
Pakistan? If so, please explain.
Answer. No. Each of the countries of Central Asia has a strong
interest in seeing extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan defeated, and
each of the countries has provided significant assistance to coalition
efforts to bring stability and redevelopment to Afghanistan. Assistance
from Central Asia ranges from supplying electricity to Kabul, to
providing food and medicine, to building schools and hospitals. We also
rely on our Central Asian partners and Russia to move coalition
military supplies through the region to Afghanistan.
Question. Please clarify how the administration will help support
stability in Central Asia? What type of assistance will the United
States extend to Central Asian states?
Answer. The United States supports development and stability in
Central Asia through a full range of assistance programs, including
programs focused on promoting economic growth, quality health care,
advancing respect for human rights, strengthening border security,
counternarcotics, and developing democratic institutions. In addition,
for FY 2010 the United States will initiate assistance programs to
address food insecurity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan by increasing
agricultural productivity, bolstering farmers' incomes, and reforming
unfair land regulations.
Question. Please explain how the Obama administration's approach to
Central Asia differs from that pursued by the Bush administration.
Answer. The Obama administration has begun a systematic effort to
elevate, enhance, and energize our dialogue with the countries of
Central Asia. We seek to work with the governments and people of
Central Asia to promote stability, prosperity, security, and economic
and political modernization. We aim to do so with a focus on mutual
interests, building on common ground wherever it exists, but not shying
away from dealing plainly with our differences. To promote stronger
ties and practical cooperation, we have launched an effort to construct
high-level bilateral mechanisms with each Central Asian country. Led by
Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake, Jr., these ``Annual
Bilateral Consultations'' will feature a structured dialogue to address
the full range of bilateral issues.
Question. Northern Distribution Network.--During his testimony, Dr.
Stephen Blank of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute
said that while the United States has a strategy for the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN), ``there is no strategy for [Central Asia]
that ties together . . . Afghanistan and [domestic] issues, and no
commensurate investment of U.S. resources, either private or public, in
these states to the degree that it is growing.''
Please respond to this comment.
Answer. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is part of an
overall strategy to support efforts in Afghanistan, and expanding
cooperation with the Central Asia states to support efforts in
Afghanistan is part of our overall strategy for Central Asia. Our
Central Asia strategy includes other integrated priorities: we seek to
promote development and diversification of the region's energy
resources; we are working to encourage greater political liberalization
and respect for human rights; we aim to help develop competitive market
economies and promote economic reforms; and, we seek to address
problems of poverty and food security. These issues are interconnected,
and progress in one area can help reinforce progress in another area.
The administration requested, and Congress appropriated, a
significantly increased level of development and security assistance
resources for Central Asia in FY 2010.
Question. The administration will need to increasingly rely on
Central Asian states for military supply routes for our efforts in
Afghanistan. How will the administration balance U.S. interests in
Afghanistan that increasingly rely on authoritarian and repressive
Central Asian states with the administration's stated goals of
encouraging political liberalization and respect for human rights?
Answer. We can and are pursuing both of our objectives to promote
stability and development in Afghanistan as well as to encourage
greater political liberalization and respect for human rights in
Central Asia. The Annual Bilateral Consultation framework gives us a
new mechanism to address the full range of bilateral issues with each
of the countries of Central Asia.
Each of the consultations covers interconnected issues, such as
energy, economic and political modernization, security, and people-to-
people contacts. We aim to make progress in our relations with the
countries of Central Asia in all of these areas. We understand that
positive steps in one area can reinforce forward movement in others.
For example, sound energy policies contribute to long-term prosperity,
which is also underpinned by strengthening the rule of law. Healthier
and more prosperous societies are better able to sustain their own
security, and contribute to regional security--just as security against
violent extremist groups buys space for the development of modern
economic and political institutions. And increasing people-to-people
exchanges will highlight that enduring relationships are not only about
connections between governments, but also about connections between
individuals and societies.
Question. Tajikistan.--Please describe the latest status of State
Department efforts to bring Peace Corps to Tajikistan.
Answer. The State Department recently met with officials in the
Government of Tajikistan and Peace Corps to discuss the prospect of
bringing Peace Corps to Tajikistan. The Government of Tajikistan is
currently considering whether to ask the United States to prioritize
startup of a new Peace Corps Program in Tajikistan.
Question. English Language and Educational Exchanges.--Does the
State Department have a strategy to invest in English language programs
in Central Asia? If so, please describe, including the amount of money
we have spent and will spend for FY 2010.
Answer. The State Department has an effective and well-coordinated
continuing strategy to promote English language programs and improve
the competency of teachers of English in the five nations of Central
Asia. This strategy relies on a network of specialists in the United
States, Central Asia, and elsewhere in the region.
The Public Affairs Officer in each U.S. Embassy coordinates closely
with other American diplomatic and local staff members on a range of
English language programs. A Regional English Language Officer based in
Astana, Kazakhstan, advises posts in the region about English language
programming. There is also typically at least one Foreign Service
National (FSN) employee in each embassy dedicated to promoting English
language initiatives that assist teachers of English in the host
nation.
In Washington, the Office of English Language Programs in the
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs coordinates daily with U.S.
diplomats in Central Asia in efforts to engage English language
professionals and students abroad by teaching English, supporting U.S.
Embassy-sponsored English language programs, developing curricula and
materials, facilitating teacher-training workshops, and consulting with
Foreign Ministries of education, universities, and NGOs.
Following are key elements and individuals in support of English
language initiatives in Central Asia. FY 2008 funding for activities in
Central Asia is included for reference. FY 2009 funding data are not
yet finalized but should be available in the next month. FY 2010
program figures are not yet available.
Regional English Language Officers (RELOs)
Regional English Language Officers (RELOs) organize and participate
in teacher-training seminars and workshops, advise posts on questions
pertaining to English teaching, conduct needs assessments, and offer
guidance on all aspects of an academic program. RELOs consult with
host-country ministry, university, and teacher-training officials, as
well as lecture and present workshops on English as a Foreign Language
(EFL) methodology and practices. RELOs work closely with English
Language Specialists, English Language Fellows, and U.S. Embassy-
related English Language Programs.
FY 2008 Funding: $341,000.
The English Language (EL) Fellows Program
The EL Fellow Program sends talented, highly qualified U.S.
educators in the field of Teaching English to Speakers of Other
Languages (TESOL) on 10-month fellowships to overseas academic
institutions in all regions of the world. The Program promotes English
language learning and enhances English teaching capacity abroad.
Through U.S. Embassy projects, Fellows share their expertise, hone
their skills, gain international experience, and learn other cultures.
FY 2008 Funding: $420,000.
The English Language (EL) Specialist Program
The English Language (EL) Specialist Program recruits U.S.
academics in the field of Teaching of English as a Foreign Language and
Applied Linguistics to support U.S. Embassy short-term (2-to-4-week)
projects abroad. Project topics may include curriculum design and
evaluation, teacher training, textbook development, or English for
Specific Purposes.
FY 2008 Funding: $37,072.
English Access Microscholarship Program
The ``Access'' program provides a foundation of English language
skills to talented 14-to-18-year-old students from disadvantaged
sectors through after-school classes and intensive summer learning
activities in countries worldwide. Students' improved English language
skills lead to greater mutual understanding, better job and educational
opportunities and the ability to compete for and participate in
exchanges in the United States. Students gain insights into U.S.
culture from American educational materials and an emphasis on active
learning. ``Access'' is the first step in ECA's continuum of
educational and exchange opportunities to reach disadvantaged young
people around the world.
FY 2008 Funding: $283,726.
The ``E-Teacher'' Scholarship Program
Under the E-Teacher Scholarship Program, five distance education
courses are conducted by U.S. universities for foreign English language
teachers nominated by U.S. embassies. Courses have included ``Teaching
Critical Thinking,'' ``Assessment for English as a Foreign Language,''
``Teaching English to Young Learners,'' ``English for Business'' and
``English for Law.''
FY 2008 Funding: $34,972.
English Language Programs Materials
ECA's English Language Programs Materials Branch provides a variety
of specialized materials to aid in the teaching and study of English.
They include ``English Teaching Forum,'' a quarterly, peer-reviewed
journal for teachers of English as a foreign language that has been
published since 1962. Over 77,000 copies of the journal are distributed
each year by U.S. embassies in more than 100 countries.
In addition, more than 80 titles of English language materials for
teachers and learners are available in multiple formats: print, video,
audio, and online. New materials include the innovative ``Shaping the
Way We Teach English,'' a 14-part teacher-training video series, and
``Celebrate! Holidays in the U.S.A.,'' a full-color reference text
describing 24 U.S. holidays and celebrations.
Online Resources for English Language Teachers, including journals
and magazines, online publications, reference materials, and English
Teaching Forum magazine are available on the Office of English Language
Programs' Web site: www.englishprograms.state.gov.
English Language Instruction via TV in Turkmenistan
An innovative English Language instruction program was initiated by
the U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Section in Turkmenistan. Embassy
Ashgabat worked with a local TV station to develop an introductory
English language learning program for a Turkmen audience. Through a
grant and collaboration with a local television station, the Embassy
produced 23 thirty-minute episodes of ``Salam Dostlar'' (``Hello
Friends''). The program was broadcast during prime time on
Turkmenistan's Channel 4 TV once a week. The Embassy issued a grant for
$13,340 to cover the filming, production, DVD production, and fees to
the local TV studios. That price tag, however, doesn't reflect the true
costs of the program, because U.S. Embassy staff wrote the scripts,
starred in the shows, and worked tirelessly to get the TV studio to
broadcast the programming.
FY 2008 Funding: $13,340.
Training of English Language Instructors in Hyderabad
Two programs for teachers of English in Central Asia are provided
under separate U.S. grants to The English and Foreign Languages
University (EFLU) in Hyderabad, India, and the American University of
Central Asia (AUCA).
Under the first grant English teachers from Central Asia travel to
the Hyderabad institute to improve their language skills and learn
updated teaching techniques. Under the second grant, specialists from
Hyderabad will travel to AUCA in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to conduct
English classes for AUCA faculty to enable them to improve their
English speaking competency.
Funding: First grant (phase 1 and 2; 4 years total) EFLU: $681,430.
Second Grant EFLU and AUCA: $350,000. (Program will commence in FY 2010
using FY 2009 Funds).
Question. What types of educational exchange programs do we have in
Central Asia? Please describe the different programs, the number of
students involved, and how much money we spend on these programs. Which
programs are the most effective? Which programs are the least
effective?
Answer. The Department of State sponsors a wide range of
educational exchange programs for teenagers and adults in the five
countries of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
Below are descriptions of Department of State-sponsored educational
exchange programs with the FY 2008 amounts spent on each and the
approximate number of participants in each program. Each program model
has its unique target audience and all are models that have proven
effective worldwide and in the region. Also included is the
International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). Although not strictly
defined as an educational exchange program, IVLP is an important
component of U.S. exchange initiatives in Central Asia.
Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program
The FLEX Program provides opportunities for high school students
(ages 15-17) to spend a year in the United States, living with a host
family and attending an American high school. The FLEX Program was
established in 1992, under the FREEDOM Support Act. Program
participants learn about the United States firsthand by participating
in family life, school study, and extracurricular activities. They take
part in activities in their local communities and have the opportunity
to share their own culture with Americans.
FY 2008 Funding: $4,518,673.
FY 2008 Participants: 291.
Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program
The Muskie grant program provides opportunities for Eurasian
graduate students and professionals for 1-year nondegree, 1-year
degree, or 2-year degree study in the United States. Eligible fields of
study are: business administration, economics, education, environmental
management, international affairs, journalism and mass communication,
law, library and information science, public administration, public
health, and public policy.
FY 2008 Funding: $2,931,000.
FY 2008 Participants: 50.
Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program
Founded in 1978 in honor of the late Senator and Vice President,
the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program brings mid-career
professionals from developing and transitioning countries to the United
States for 1-year nondegree programs that combine graduate-level
academic work with substantive professional affiliations.
FY 2008 Funding: $555,960.
FY 2008 Participants: 8.
Junior Faculty Development Program
This program provides 1-year fellowships in the United States for
early-career university faculty from Eurasia to develop curricula,
acquire new teaching skills and to upgrade knowledge in specific
fields.
FY 2008 Funding: $402,793.
FY 2008 Participants: 19.
Fulbright Program
Created in 1946, Fulbright is the flagship international
educational exchange program sponsored by the U.S. Government. The
program provides opportunities for Americans and citizens of more than
155 countries, who are chosen for their academic achievement and
leadership potential, to study, teach or conduct research abroad and
develop ties that build mutual understanding.
FY 2008 Funding (Scholars and Students, U.S. and Foreign):
$1,677,304.
FY 2008 Participants (Scholars and Students, U.S. and Foreign): 46.
Study of the U.S. Institutes for Scholars
Scholar Institutes are designed to strengthen curricula and improve
the quality of teaching about the United States overseas. These
Institutes host multinational groups of university faculty or secondary
school educators. Each institute is thematically focused on a field or
topic of U.S. studies. Participants interact with American scholars,
meet with experts in their disciplines, visit civic institutions, and
explore the diversity and culture of the United States. Scholar
Institutes typically take place during the months of June, July, and
August, with the exception of U.S. National Security which occurs in
January and February.
FY 2008 Funding: $137,004.
FY 2008 Participants: 8.
Teaching Excellence and Achievement Program
The Teaching Excellence and Achievement Program (TEA) brings
secondary teachers of English as a Foreign Language from Central Asia
and other world regions to the United States for 6-week institutes at
university schools of education to further develop their subject area
expertise and enhance their teaching skills. U.S. teachers make 2-week
reciprocal visits to these regions to strengthen linkages between U.S.
and foreign schools.
FY 2008 Funding: $408,000.
FY 2008 Participants: 28.
Critical Language Scholarship (CLS) Program
The CLS Program provides fully funded, group-based intensive
language instruction and structured cultural enrichment experiences for
7 to 10 weeks for U.S. citizen undergraduate, Master's and Ph.D.
students. The CLS Program is part of a U.S. Government interagency
effort to expand dramatically the number of Americans studying and
mastering critical-need foreign languages.
FY 2008 Funding: $273,765.
FY 2008 Participants: 15.
Global Undergraduate Exchange Program
The Global Undergraduate Exchange Program offers scholarships for a
semester or a full academic year of nondegree study in the United
States to undergraduate emerging student leaders from underrepresented
sectors of selected countries in different world regions. The program
also includes community service activities and internships.
FY 2008 Funding: $1,498,553.
FY 2008 Participants: 50.
Global Connections and Exchange (GCE)
Through linkages between overseas and U.S. schools, the Global
Connections and Exchange Program offers teachers and students
specialized training and facilitation for interactive online projects
to enhance educational transformation, English acquisition, computer
literacy and access to resources within a student-centered learning
environment. Projects are currently being conducted in the Middle East/
North Africa, South and Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The program
currently provides travel to the United States by a small number of
teachers from Central Asia.
FY 2008 Funding: $304,978.
FY 2008 Participants: Hundreds of students receive GCE training in
Central Asia; 3 Central Asian teachers travel to the U.S.; 10 Americans
travel to Central Asia.
FORTUNE/State Department Global Women's Mentoring Partnership
Launched in 2006, this program provides approximately 35 emerging
women leaders from around the world with the opportunity to develop
their leadership, management and business skills while gaining
experience in the U.S. business and nonprofit environments, where they
are mentored by FORTUNE's Most Powerful Women leaders. Project
activities include a 3-4-day orientation program in Washington, DC, a
mentorship assignment for approximately 3 weeks at a U.S. host company,
and a final wrap-up session in New York City.
FY 2008 Funding: $5,714.
FY 2008 Participant: 1.
International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP)
The IVLP brings established or potential foreign opinion-makers to
the United States for 2-to-3-week programs to gain firsthand knowledge
about U.S. policies, politics, society and culture through carefully
designed visits that reflect the participants' professional interests
and support U.S. foreign policy goals. Participants are selected by
U.S. embassies. The programs are established for next generation
foreign leaders in government, politics, media, education, the arts,
science, labor relations and other key fields.
FY 2008 Funding: $2,466,150.
FY 2008 Participants: 118.
National Security Language Initiative for Youth (NSLI-Y)
NSLI-Y is part of a multiagency U.S. Government initiative launched
in January 2006 to improve Americans' ability to engage with people
from around the world who speak Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Korean, Farsi,
Russian, and Turkish. Through NSLI-Y, U.S. citizens, ages 15-18,
receive full merit-based scholarships to participate in summer,
semester, and academic-year language programs in countries where the
seven NSLI-Y languages are spoken. While on the program, participants
are immersed in the cultural life of the host country to afford them
invaluable formal and informal language practice and to spark a
lifetime interest in foreign languages and cultures. In Tajikistan,
students have the opportunity take part in a summer program to study
Farsi.
FY 2008 Funding: $201,825.
FY 2008 Participants: 15.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary George Krol to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Casey
Question (a). Northern Distribution Network.--The Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) provides an opportunity for local economic
development and regional cooperation.
Ambassador Krol, does USAID have enough resources, both in
terms of staff and funding, to support initiatives along the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN)?
Answer. We believe the current resource levels should be sufficient
to fund our priorities in Central Asia including programs to facilitate
Defense Department local procurement. Existing USG assistance projects
in all five Central Asian countries will help build capacity of local
businesses and producers so that the U.S. military can procure local
goods along the NDN. Current USAID programs focus on working with
governments to promote commercial law reform, customs reform and fiscal
management in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and to some extent in
Turkmenistan. Programs also encourage producers to provide agricultural
inputs and strengthen market chains for agricultural products in
Uzbekistan. A similar program will begin soon in Tajikistan. Other USG
projects are working to help define a course toward improvement of
transportation infrastructure and to reduce trade barriers which would
support both short term NDN concerns and longer term regional
integration goals.
Question (b). What are the implications of the July 2011 troop
withdrawal for the region in terms of the economic activity spurred by
the NDN? How do we plan to stay engaged on the economic development
front to ensure that local economies do not suffer without the NDN?
Answer. United States assistance programs in the region focus on
building the capacity of government, businesses, and producers to make
them more competitive on world markets and facilitate trade. Our
assistance to the region began in 1992, and the USG plans to continue
engagement in areas including the promotion of economic growth well
beyond 2011. Assistance programs for the region are not specifically
formulated for the NDN, but rather seek to help the Central Asian
countries develop robust and diverse economies that are attractive to
foreign investors and meet international quality standards for
products.
Question. Afghan Refugees in Tajikistan.--The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees recently reported that more than 3,600
Afghans have fled to Tajikistan since January 2008. This has the
potential to further strain Tajikistan's ability to provide social
services and create tensions between the local population and the
refugees.
Do you anticipate that the increase of refugees from
Afghanistan will threaten Tajikistan's social and political
stability in the short term?
What is the Tajik Government and the international community
doing to accommodate the refugees? How is the U.S. Embassy in
Dushanbe coordinating a response to the refugee issue with the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul?
Answer. The State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe have
been monitoring closely the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in
Tajikistan.
We do not anticipate that the increase in the number of asylum
seekers from Afghanistan will threaten Tajikistan's social and
political stability. That said, however, the Tajik law requiring
refugees arriving since 2000 to settle outside the capital and other
large cities may strain the infrastructure of small towns. Given the
reemergence of security threats in northern Afghanistan, the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has
contingency plans in place to protect and assist asylum seekers fleeing
from neighboring countries, in case of major refugee outflows.
The Tajik Government processes applications for asylum, grants
residency documents to protect asylum seekers from deportation, and
allows asylum seekers the right to work. The government conducts
refugee status determinations and has the authority to award
citizenship to long-residing refugees. UNHCR has provided the Tajik
Government training and technical assistance to register and protect
asylum seekers and refugees, and continues to assist in these
functions. UNHCR provides refugees monthly cash assistance, winter
clothing, blankets, school uniforms and other school supplies, among
other items. UNHCR is working with the international community to
provide refugees opportunities for higher education in Tajikistan. In
2009, the U.S. Government, through the State Department's Bureau for
Population, Refugees, and Migration, contributed $1.2 million to UNHCR
for programs in Central Asia and awarded grants to renovate several
schools in mixed Tajik-Afghan refugee communities and to increase the
capacity of a hospital to serve Afghan refugees.
There is strong coordination between the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe regarding this situation through regular
reporting and information-sharing.
The State Department and Embassy Dushanbe will continue to monitor
the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Tajikistan and will
coordinate with the Government of Tajikistan, UNHCR, and the
international community to increase local capacity to secure durable
solutions for the vulnerable displaced population.
Question (a). As you are aware, Yevgeney Zhovtis, founding director
of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of
Law, was sentenced to 4 years in prison for vehicular manslaughter
following the death of a young man, Kanat Moldabaev.
Can you provide an update on the Embassy's engagement with
the Kazakh Government on this issue?
Can you also describe how Mr. Zhovtis' imprisonment has had
an impact on the rest of the human rights community in
Kazakhstan?
Answer. Secretary Clinton discussed the Zhovtis case with State
Secretary-Foreign Minister Saudabayev in September in New York. Deputy
Secretary Steinberg also discussed the case with Foreign Minister
Saudabayev during their meeting on the margins of the OSCE Ministerial
in Athens in December. Ambassador Hoagland has raised the Zhovtis case
at the highest levels at every available opportunity with Kazakhstani
officials as have I both in Washington and in Astana. South Central
Asia Assistant Secretary Blake pressed the Kazakhstani Government
during his December visit to Astana to ensure a fair and transparent
appeal process. The U.S. mission to the OSCE has also raised the
Zhovtis case in the Permanent Council in Vienna. We will continue our
engagement.
Civil society organizations both in Kazakhstan and internationally
have noted the negative impact this prosecution has had on the
development of Kazakhstan's civil society. The Zhovtis case has also
galvanized human rights and civil society activists in the U.S. and in
Kazakhstan to advocate for reform of Kazakhstan's judicial system. The
U.S. Department of State has also expressed similar concerns. The
Government of Kazakhstan has indicated that not all legal options have
been closed. In November, Kazakhstan's Parliament passed amendments
that would allow the Supreme Court to review cases like the Zhovtis'
appeal. President Nazarbayev has not yet signed the amendments to bring
the amendments into force.
Question (b). Congressional concerns about democratization and
human rights in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been reflected in
appropriations legislation, with restrictions on funding for failing to
meet democratic commitments.
Have these conditionalities resulted in concrete changes in
behavior by the authorities in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan?
Answer. We have not yet seen significant concrete progress on human
rights and we remain very concerned about the progress of human rights
in both countries and continue to seek opportunities to engage them on
human rights issues.
With regards to the Government of Kazakhstan, their interest in the
chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) provided many opportunities to raise our human rights concerns
and engage them on their democratic commitments. The United States,
other nations, the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR), and a wide range of civil society actors have urged
Kazakhstan to implement its OSCE commitments and domestic democratic
reforms.
Although Kazakhstan has made some steps forward in reforming its
laws to meet its OSCE commitments, further progress is needed. We
continue to engage with them and encourage a deepening of their reform
efforts.
With regard to Uzbekistan, the United States and the Government of
Uzbekistan have just completed an inaugural discussion called the
Annual Bilateral Consultation (ABC). In the discussions, the U.S. side
raised human rights and democracy concerns as well as U.S.
congressional conditionalities. We will continue to seek all
opportunities to engage Uzbekistan on these issues.
Question. Child Welfare and International Adoptions.--Currently, 6
Pennsylvanian families and 59 other American families await approval on
their pending adoptions of Kyrgyz children. I along with a few of my
Senate colleagues have worked with these families to secure the
finalization of their adoptions so that these children can leave
orphanages, which are disrupting their physical and mental growth, and
into loving homes. These families, however, have been waiting for as
long as 2 years to finalize their adoption, and they are losing hope
that the process will ever end since the Kyrgyz parliamentary working
group on adoption has postponed its discussions on international
adoptions and pending cases until February 5, 2010.
Ambassador Krol, has the Embassy in Bishkek identified this
as a serious problem? If so, is the United States currently
undertaking programs to assist the Kyrgyz Republic and other
regional governments in improving child welfare standards?
Answer. Yes, the Department of State (the Department) views this as
a serious issue. The Department has urged the Kyrgyz Government to
complete its criminal investigation into alleged fraud and corruption
in the adoption process and resolve the pending cases so that eligible
children can be placed in permanent homes. We have repeated this
message to Kyrgyz officials in Washington and through U.S. Embassy
Bishkek. Most recently, we called for the resolution of the pending
cases in a December 7 meeting with seven Kyrgyz delegates in the United
States for a political study tour. We also raised the issue in a
November 12 meeting with the Kyrgyz Ambassador to the United States,
and in an October 5 meeting with the Kyrgyz Foreign Minister. Our
Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic has discussed the pending cases
repeatedly at high-level meetings there.
The Department has also raised the visibility of the issue, and
addressed questions and concerns expressed by Kyrgyz officials and
shared by some Kyrgyz citizens, through outreach efforts. A U.S.
adoption expert visited the Kyrgyz Republic in June to share her
knowledge with Kyrgyz officials, nongovernmental organizations,
journalists, and others. In May, the Department sponsored an adoption-
themed study tour to the United States for three high-ranking Kyrgyz
officials. The Kyrgyz officials also met with representatives of the
families with pending cases as well as some Kyrgyz children who had
been adopted by Americans. We will continue to urge the Kyrgyz
Government to resolve the pending cases and act in the best interests
of children involved in the intercountry adoption process.
Question. Water and energy are continued sources of tension amongst
Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan's planned withdrawal from the power
grid will most likely lead to electricity shortages in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. While Uzbekistan fears their water supply with be cut off
from the upstream countries.
Ambassador Krol, what are the short-term prospects that
these disputes over resources could lead to conflict among
countries in the region? Are you concerned that water shortages
in Central Asia could limit agricultural development in
Afghanistan?
Answer. We are closely monitoring the seasonal electricity
shortages in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which could be compounded by
Uzbekistan's decision in December to withdraw from the regional power
grid. We are working with the World Bank, U.N., and EU to address the
long-term water and electricity situation in the region, and we
discussed regional electricity sales and transit with Uzbek Foreign
Minister Norov when he was here in Washington December 17-18.
In both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, a severe winter could lead to
electricity and heating shortages. Both countries rely heavily on
hydropower, and water levels are frequently low during the winter.
Kyrgyzstan is less at risk because it has a seasonal energy swap
agreement with Kazakhstan, as well as a rationing plan for electricity.
Uzbekistan's decision to withdraw from the Central Asia Power Grid
will likely exacerbate these winter electricity shortages, but the
decision was made in response to Tajikistan's and Kyrgyzstan's
persistent payment problems and overconsumption from the grid.
Separately, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are negotiating annual gas
purchase agreements with Uzbekistan.
Unfortunately, water management is not a new issue in the region,
and it has long caused tension between upstream and downstream
countries. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need water for
agriculture, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan use the water primarily to
produce energy. As Afghanistan stabilizes, it will need to work with
its Central Asian neighbors on equitable sharing of water resources.
Prudent development of the region's hydroresources can increase energy
supplies and improve management of the agricultural sector, but
development of hydropower projects both in Afghanistan and in Central
Asia must be done in cooperation between upstream and downstream
countries. Water shortages in Central Asia typically occur in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but both of these countries provide
electricity to Afghanistan primarily from gas-fired powerplants. These
waters shortages are therefore unlikely to impact Afghanistan's
electricity supplies in the short run.
______
Responses of Martha Brill Olcott to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Casey
Question. Chinese President Hu Jintao was in Central Asia this past
weekend for the opening of a natural gas pipeline which runs from
Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. His visit highlights
China's increased strategic interest in Central Asia. Dr. Olcott, will
Chinese investments in infrastructure and energy transmission, for
example, increase much-needed cooperation amongst the Central Asian
countries? Please discuss pros, as well as cons, of Chinese investment
in the region.
Answer. I do not believe that Chinese investments in Central Asia
will serve to increase much-needed cooperation among the Central Asian
countries. China's approach to these countries has been to emphasize
bilateral, rather than multilateral, forms of engagement. This is true
of the negotiations for the new gas pipeline which runs from
Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China. While the
opening of the pipeline was an event that all of the regional
Presidents attended, it does not appear that any of these men has been
made privy to the arrangements made with the other leaders. China does
not seem to have exerted any diplomatic influence to try and reduce the
atmosphere of competition that exists between the leaders of these
countries. If anything, much like Russia, the leaders in Beijing seem
to feel that it strengthens rather than weakens China's ability to
negotiate agreements that serve China's own national interests in the
region. Most of the problems that have arisen as a result of the lack
of regional cooperation (such as energy and possible water shortages)
have little potential for impacting on China's own security needs.
It is not clear that there will be any direct benefit to the United
States from China's growing role in Central Asia. In recent years there
had been some hope that U.S. firms might be able to partner with
Chinese firms to gain access to on-shore oil and gas deposits in
Turkmenistan. But the announcement of a new Chinese-led consortium to
develop that country's giant South Iolatan field is strong evidence
that this will not be the case. This $9.7 billion project does not
include any major international oil company in its consortium.
China's presence does ensure that there is competition for Central
Asia's oil and gas reserves, creating pressure on Russia to offer the
Central Asians commercially attractive terms. But if anything, in the
long run, China is likely to offer the Central Asians less attractive
terms than the Russians do, as Moscow has some ability to pass on
higher prices to its customers in Europe, while Beijing is using all
the energy purchased from Central Asia in its own domestic market that
is heavily subsidized by the Chinese Government.
However, China has substantial financial resources to bring into
projects in the region, and they will continue to be attracted to
invest in Central Asia, given that Beijing considers these neighboring
countries a region of continuing interest. Their interest is likely to
be much more sustained than that of either the United States or the
European Union.
Question. Dr. Olcott, in your written testimony you mention that
the ``U.S. has considerable leverage in Kazakhstan,'' given their
desire for an OSCE conference to be held there in 2010. What
specifically can the United States do to encourage democratic reform?
Answer. While the United States will have considerable leverage in
Kazakhstan until the issue of an OSCE summit is resolved, the best
chance U.S. officials will have of encouraging democratic reform in
that country is to do so quietly and behind the scenes, where they
should pressure Kazakh officials to create greater legal protections
for independent media, work toward depoliticizing the judicial system,
and reduce restrictions on independent political activities. President
Nazarbayev's interest in receiving one of the few meeting slots
available during the global nuclear summit in April in D.C. is also a
point of leverage. But expecting that the Kazakh officials will engage
in public self-criticism is unlikely to yield results.
______
Response of Dr. Stephen Blank to Question Submitted by
Senator Robert Casey
islamic extremism
Question. Dr. Blank, in your testimony you discussed both Islamic
extremism and clan and factional politics. To what extent is Islamic
extremism a threat to the security of Central Asia, as compared to
political factionalism, drug and human trafficking, criminal gangs, and
ethnic and clan conflict? In what countries is this threat most acute?
Answer. There is no doubt that Islamic extremism is a threat to all
of the Central Asian states, but there is no way to measure it
precisely or even to clearly distinguish it from other sources of
instability like political factionalism, drug and human trafficking,
criminal gangs, and ethnic and clan conflict. All of these overlap and
intermix. The extent of the extremism threat is exaggerated because
local governments indiscriminately label all opposition as terrorist
and extremist. However, on its own Islamic extremism is not enough to
destabilize the current governments in the region. In some cases such
as Kazakhstan the governments are even stronger than before 2000.
Nonetheless, were the Taliban to take power in Afghanistan, the
probability of destabilization would be increased. Taliban-affiliated
or similar groups originating in Central Asia would be inspired, as
might their activity, but could not destabilize the existing
governments without external support. Islamist extremist groups may add
to instability with other causes such as a succession crisis. To be
effective, though, the extremist group would probably have to ally with
one or more other contenders for power. In terms of overall
vulnerability there is no doubt that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the
most vulnerable.
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