[Senate Hearing 111-415]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-415
AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 2 AND 8, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
MARK UDALL, Colorado DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Afghanistan
december 2, 2009
Page
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 5
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State................. 11
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 17
Continue to Receive Testimony on Afghanistan
december 8, 2009
McChrystal, GEN Stanley A. USA, Commander, International Security
Assistance Force and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan........ 103
Eikenberry, Hon. Karl W., Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan.................................................... 109
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall,
Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Burr, Vitter, and
Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; William G.P.
Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member;
Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael V.
Kostiw, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel;
and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
Jennifer R. Knowles, Hannah I. Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant
to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay
Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield,
assistant to Senator Burris; Bethany Bassett, assistant to
Senator Kirk; Brandon Andrews, Anthony J. Lazarski, and Rob
Soofer, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Robert La Branche and
Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh,
assistant to Senator LeMieux; Charles Brittingham, assistant to
Senator Vitter; and Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Secretary Clinton,
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, welcome. Thank you all for
your many contributions to our Nation.
Today, the committee receives testimony from the
President's senior advisors on his strategy in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which the President set out last evening. The United
States has important security interests in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan region. Instability in Afghanistan or the return of
the Taliban to power would not only provide fertile ground for
al Qaeda and other extremists to regroup and renew plots
against the United States and its allies, but it would also
threaten the stability of neighboring Pakistan, a nuclear-armed
country.
For the sake of our military men and women who are, or will
be, deployed in harm's way, as well as the well-being of our
Nation, we have to get the strategy right. Our purpose and our
mission, what we are trying to accomplish, must be clear.
I agree with the President's emphasis on the training and
rapid growth of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)
and transitioning responsibility to the Afghan Government for
Afghanistan's security. Indeed, I have long believed that the
most urgent need in Afghanistan is to provide the training,
from basic training to mentoring to side-by-side partnering on
the battlefield, along with the equipment and the other support
elements to rapidly build the capabilities of the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). An Afghan
surge should be our goal, and any U.S. surge should be related
to that goal.
The President has also called for increased contributions
from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. We
need not only to ``Afghanize,'' but also to ``NATOize'' the
Afghanistan mission.
I also agree with the President's emphasis on the
importance of efforts to reintegrate local Taliban fighters
into Afghan society. An adequately funded plan for
reintegration is long overdue.
The President's strategy also makes clear that our
commitment to the future of Afghanistan requires action from
the Government of Afghanistan. That means recruiting of
soldiers and police needed to quickly expand Afghan forces; it
means serious anticorruption efforts; it means national
reintegration and reconciliation policies, and retention and
support for honest, competent ministry officials.
President Karzai has pledged to do these things, and
President Obama rightly insists on holding him to that pledge.
Setting the July 2011 date to begin the reduction of our forces
is a reasonable way, under the circumstances, to produce the
sense of urgency in the Afghan Government that has been lacking
up to now and is essential to success.
I believe the principal mission of U.S. troop increases in
Afghanistan should be to accelerate the transition to Afghan
forces to take the lead for providing Afghan security. This is
an important part of the approach outlined by the President.
Where I have questions is whether the rapid deployment of a
large number of U.S. combat forces, without an adequate number
of ANSF for our troops to partner with, serves that mission.
A critical component of transitioning to Afghan
responsibility will be the on-the-job partnering of ANSF with
U.S. and coalition forces. That partnering is vital to success
in Afghanistan, for the Afghans and for us. But, the current
shortfall, in terms of partnering, is not a shortage of
American combat troops, it's a shortage of Afghan troops.
In the key province of Helmand, the ratio of U.S. troops to
Afghan troops is about five U.S. troops to one Afghan soldier.
We are now partnered with about 2,000 Afghans in Helmand. The
desired ratio, according to Pentagon doctrine, is close to the
opposite: three Afghans for one U.S. soldier or marine. So, we
have enough troops in Helmand right now--about 10,000--to
partner with more than 20,000 additional Afghan troops, more
than are expected to be available to partner with us there next
year, according to Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Great
Britain. If so, doubling the number of U.S. troops in the south
will only worsen a ratio under which our forces are already
matched up with fewer Afghan troops than they can and should
partner with.
General James Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
said in September, ``If I could change only one thing in the
south of Afghanistan, it would be to have more Afghan troops.''
A few days ago, General Conway reiterated the point this way:
``To have American marines standing on a corner in a key
village isn't nearly as effective as having an Afghan policeman
or an Afghan soldier.''
It seems to me that the large influx of U.S. combat troops
will put more U.S. marines on street corners in Afghan
villages, with too few Afghan partners alongside them.
Partnering with, equipping, and in other ways empowering Afghan
forces to provide security for their country will demonstrate
our resolve and commitment to a stable future for Afghanistan
and the region. That should be the stated mission, and troop
increases should be judged by whether they advance that
mission.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Admiral Mullen for joining us today to discuss the vital issue
of Afghanistan.
Let me first reiterate, as I said yesterday, that I think
President Obama has made the right decision to embrace a
counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan and to resource it
properly. I would have much preferred that General McChrystal
receive the entire force he had requested, but I've spoken with
our military and civilian leaders, and I think the 30,000
additional U.S. troops that the President has called for, plus
greater force commitments from our allies, will enable us to
reverse the momentum of the insurgency and create the
conditions for success in Afghanistan.
I support the President's decision, and I think it deserves
the support of all Americans, both Republicans and Democrats.
What I don't support and what concerns me greatly is the
President's decision to set an arbitrary date to begin
withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan. A date for withdrawal
sends exactly the wrong message to both our friends and our
enemies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the entire region, all of
whom currently doubt whether America is committed to winning
this war. A withdrawal date only emboldens al Qaeda and the
Taliban, while dispiriting our Afghan partners and making it
less likely that they will risk their lives to take our side in
this fight.
Yes, our commitment to Afghanistan is not open-ended. Yes,
large numbers of U.S. combat troops will not remain there
indefinitely; and yes, this war will one day end. But, it
should end when we have achieved our goals. Success is the real
exit strategy. When conditions on the ground have decisively
begun to change for the better, that is when our troops should
start to return home with honor. Not 1 minute longer, not 1
minute sooner, and certainly not on some arbitrary date in July
2011, which our enemies can exploit to weaken and intimidate
our friends.
I am eager to hear from our distinguished witnesses how we
can say, as the President did last night, that our withdrawal
will begin in July 2011, no matter what, but that this
arbitrary date will also take into account conditions on the
ground. That seems logically incoherent to me, and I welcome
some clarity on this matter.
Another concern that I have has to do with the civilian
side of our counterinsurgency strategy. Greater military force
is necessary to succeed in Afghanistan, but it's not
sufficient. I am confident in our military strategy and
leadership, and I believe our troops can do everything that
General McChrystal laid out in his assessment of this summer. I
believe we can ``clear and hold,'' but I am concerned that we
and our allies do not have a unified plan to ``build,'' to work
with and support our Afghan partners in Kabul and beyond as
they build their own nation, their own economy, and their own
free institutions.
I'm also concerned by reports of divisions in our Embassy
and by major differences between our Commander and our
Ambassador. We can only succeed in Afghanistan if we have a
joint civil-military campaign plan unified at every level from
top to bottom, much as Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
established in Iraq during the surge. I look forward to hearing
what progress we're making on creating such a joint civil-
military effort.
I've been critical of the President during the past several
months, but that is now behind us. Our focus going forward must
be on winning the war in Afghanistan. I emphasize ``winning.''
This depends as much on the substance of our policy as the
signals we send to actors in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the
region.
The President was wrong to signal our intention to begin
leaving Afghanistan on an arbitrary date, but the fact is we
now have the right mission, we now have the right leadership,
and we now have a request for sufficient resources to succeed,
so our friends can know that we will support them, our enemies
can know that we will defeat them, and all can know that we are
committed to the long-term success of Afghanistan and Pakistan
as stable states that can govern themselves, secure themselves,
and sustain their own development. Though the nature of our
commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and their region will
change over time, our commitment to their success will endure.
We now have an opportunity to build a bipartisan consensus
in support of a vital national security priority, defeating al
Qaeda and its violent extremist allies in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and ensuring that these countries never again serve
as bases for attacks against America and our allies.
Americans need to know why winning this war is essential to
our country's security. They need to know that things in
Afghanistan will get worse before they get better, that,
unfortunately, casualties will likely rise in the year to come,
but that, ultimately, we will succeed.
I look to the President and to our witnesses here today to
lead an unfailing effort to build bipartisan support for the
war in Afghanistan, both among the public and here in Congress.
I will be an ally in this effort, and I pledge to do everything
in my power to ensure that we win this war--not just end it,
but win it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
I understand that the order that our witnesses desire to be
recognized is Secretary Gates first, then Secretary Clinton,
and then Admiral Mullen.
Secretary Gates, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I think
the Secretary of State's microphone is the only one working, so
perhaps we should allow her to be the only witness today.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for
inviting us to testify today.
Last night, President Obama announced a renewed commitment
and more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would
like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and
context behind his decisions--in particular, the nexus among al
Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--our objectives,
how the President's strategy aims to accomplish them, and the
military forces required.
As the President first stated in March and reemphasized
last night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to
prevent its return to both countries. The international
military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to
achieve this overarching goal. Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing
Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot
be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that
to be the case.
While al Qaeda is under great pressure now, and dependent
on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the
success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda's
message to the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the
winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al Qaeda
have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and
mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated this
explicitly and repeatedly. Taliban success in retaking and
holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces of
multiple modern armies, the current direction of events, has
dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular
perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.
The lesson of the Taliban's revival for al Qaeda is that
time and will are on their side; that, with a Western defeat,
they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic
victory as long as their senior leadership lives and can
continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling
back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to
the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
At the same time, one cannot separate the security
situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a
nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly
targeted by Islamic extremists. The two countries, bound by
ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border of more than
1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led
to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for
extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet
more pressure on a Pakistani Government already under attack
from groups operating in the border region.
Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the last year or so,
has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and
stability, carrying out, with al Qaeda's help, escalating
bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks and
the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad 7 months ago that
largely motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army.
We know the Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the
Taliban in Afghanistan and al Qaeda.
I would like to make a related point with respect to
Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from the region in the
early 1990s, followed by a severing of military-to-military
relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States
is a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We must change that
perception.
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of
much, if not most, of the country, and likely a renewed civil
war. Taliban-ruled areas could, in short order become, once
again, sanctuary for al Qaeda, as well as a staging area for
resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan. Success
in south and central Asia by Islamic extremists, as was the
case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts. It
would strengthen the al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed
opportunities for recruitment, fundraising, and more
sophisticated operations. Aided by the Internet, many more
followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in
susceptible populations across the globe.
It is true that al Qaeda and its followers can plot and
execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to
London to Denver. But, what makes the border area between
Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other
location, including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible
hideouts, is that this part of the world represents the
epicenter of extremist jihadism, the historic place where
native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in
their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to
defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would
have severe consequences for the United States and the world.
Some say this is similar to the domino theory that
underpinned and, ultimately, muddied the thinking behind the
U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however,
is that we have very real and very recent history that shows
just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists
have breathing space, safe havens, and governments complicit
with, and in support of, their mission. Less than 5 years after
the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of
Afghanistan, in 1993, Islamic militants launched their first
attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford
to make a similar mistake again.
A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
one that is sustainable over the long term by their
governments, is vital to our national security. By the same
token, the current status quo in Afghanistan, the slow but
steady deterioration of the security situation and growing
influence of the Taliban, is unacceptable. So, too, is the
status quo ante, a largely ungoverned region controlled by
extremists, in which the United States had little influence or
ability to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.
The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the
Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength while providing the
time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough
security and governance capacity to stabilize their own
country. We will focus our resources where the population is
most threatened, and align military and civilian efforts
accordingly, with six primary objectives: reversing Taliban
momentum through sustained military action by the United
States, our allies, and the Afghans; denying the Taliban access
to, and control of, key population and production centers and
lines of communication; disrupting the Taliban outside secured
areas and preventing al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in
Afghanistan; degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by
ANSF; increasing the size and capability of the ANSF, and
employing other local forces selectively, to begin
transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan Government
within 18 months; and finally, selectively building the
capacity of Afghan Government, particularly in key ministries.
This approach is not open-ended nation-building. It is
neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized,
Western-style Afghan nation-state, the likes of which has never
been seen in that country; nor does it entail pacifying every
village and conducting textbook counterinsurgency from one end
of Afghanistan to the other. It is, instead, a narrower focus
tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling,
and eventually defeating al Qaeda by building the capacity of
the Afghans, capacity that will be measured by observable
progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage of
time.
The essence of our civil-military plan is to ``clear, hold,
build, and transfer.'' Beginning to transfer security
responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical, and,
in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur, district by
district, province by province, depending on conditions on the
ground. The process will be similar to what we did in Iraq,
where international security forces provided overwatch, first
at the tactical level and then at the strategic level.
Even after we transfer security responsibility to the
Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will
continue to support their development as an important partner
for the long haul. We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989,
when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos
and into Taliban hands.
Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
development of a significantly larger and more capable ANA and
ANP through intensive partnering with International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF), especially in combat. It also means
achieving a better balance between national and local forces,
increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities, engaging
communities to enlist more local security forces to protect
their own territory, and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration
and reconciliation efforts.
At the strategic level, the President's plan will achieve a
better balance between investments in the central government
and subnational entities. At the national level, the focus will
be primarily on reforming essential ministries and pressing for
the appointment of competent and honest ministers and
governors. At the local and regional level, there will be a
shift to work through existing traditional structures rather
than building new ones.
In all of these efforts, we must have a committed partner
in the Afghan people and government. That is one reason why
there will be very clear and definitive timeframes for
reviewing our, and their, progress.
As the President announced, the United States will commit
an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended
surge of 18 to 24 months. These forces, the U.S. contribution
to the fight, will be deployed and concentrated in the southern
and eastern parts of the country. The first of these forces
will begin to arrive in Afghanistan within 2 to 3 weeks.
In all, since taking office, President Obama has committed
nearly 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, for a total
U.S. force of approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and
to our other partners to send a parallel international message
of strong resolve. Our allies must take the lead and focus
their resources in the north and west to prevent the insurgency
from establishing new footholds. We will seek some 5,000 to
7,000 troops from NATO, and expect the allies to share more of
the burden in training, equipping, and funding the ANA and ANP.
Let me offer a few closing thoughts. It is worth
remembering that the security situation in Afghanistan, though
serious, does not begin to approach the scale of violence that
consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was
confirmed as Secretary of Defense 3 years ago this week. With
all the resources already committed to this campaign, plus
those the President has just announced, I believe the pieces
are being put in place to make real and measurable progress in
Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24 months.
The President believes, as do I, that, in the end, we
cannot defeat al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving
and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. The
President's decision offers the best possibility to decisively
change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the
strategic equation in Pakistan and central Asia, all necessary
to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital
interests.
So, I ask for your full support of this decision to provide
both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources
they need to be successful. This will take more patience,
perseverance, and sacrifice by the United States and by our
allies. As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and
women who have volunteered and, in many cases, revolunteered,
to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be
uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous
but vitally necessary mission.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
Thank you for inviting us to testify today. Last night, President
Obama announced a renewed commitment and more focused strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide an overview of the
strategic thinking and context behind his decisions, in particular:
The nexus among al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan;
Our objectives and how the President's strategy aims to
accomplish them; and
The military forces required.
WHERE WE STAND
As the President first stated in March, and re-emphasized last
night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent its return to
both countries. The international military effort to stabilize
Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating al
Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions.
They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish
that to be the case.
While al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the
Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the
Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda's message to the Muslim world:
that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply,
the Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from
the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated
this explicitly and repeatedly.
Taliban success in retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan
against the combined forces of multiple, modern armies--the current
direction of events--has dramatically strengthened the extremist
mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.
The lesson of the Taliban's revival for al Qaeda is that time and will
are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their
strength and achieve a major strategic victory--as long as their senior
leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and
funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in
Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan--a nuclear-armed nation of
175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists.
The two countries, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous
border of more than 1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in
Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for
extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more
pressure on a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups
operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, just in
the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's own
domestic peace and stability, carrying out--with al Qaeda's help--
escalating bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks,
and the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad 7 months ago, that largely
motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. We know the
Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in
Afghanistan and al Qaeda.
A related point with regard to Pakistan: Because of American
withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing
of military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that
the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner.
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if
not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled
areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for al Qaeda
as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the
offensive in Pakistan.
Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists--as was the
case 20 years ago--would beget success on other fronts. It would
strengthen the al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for
recruitment, fund-raising, and more sophisticated operations. Aided by
the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the
region and in susceptible populations across the globe.
It is true that al Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute
attacks from a variety of locations--from Munich to London to Denver.
But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan
uniquely different from any other location--including Somalia, Yemen,
and other possible redoubts--is that this part of the world represents
the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native
and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused
its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining
superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the
United States and the world.
Some may say this is similar to the ``domino theory'' that
underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S.
military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we
have very real--and very recent--history that shows just what can
happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space,
safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their
mission. Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank crossed the
Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, Islamic militants launched their
first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to
make a similar mistake again.
THE WAY AHEAD
A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan--one that
is sustainable over the long term by their governments--is vital to our
national security. By the same token, the current status quo in
Afghanistan--the slow but steady deterioration of the security
situation and growing influence of the Taliban--is unacceptable. So too
is the status quo ante--a largely ungoverned region controlled by
extremists in which the United States had little influence or ability
to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.
The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's
momentum and reduce its strength while providing the time and space
necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance
capacity to stabilize their own country.
We will focus our resources where the population is most
threatened, and align military and civilian efforts accordingly--with
six primary objectives:
Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military
action by the U.S., our allies, and the Afghans;
Denying the Taliban access to and control of key
population and production centers and lines of communications;
Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and
preventing al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;
Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan
National Security Forces;
Increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and
employing other local forces selectively to begin transitioning
security responsibility to the Afghan Government within 18 months; and
Selectively building the capacity of the Afghan
Government, particularly in key ministries.
This approach is not open-ended ``nation building.'' It is neither
necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style
Afghan nation-state--the likes of which has never been seen in that
country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting
textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the other.
It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal
of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating al Qaeda by
building the capacity of the Afghans--capacity that will be measured by
observable progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage
of time.
The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build,
and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the
Afghans in summer 2011 is critical--and, in my, view achievable. This
transfer will occur district by district, province by province,
depending on local circumstances. The process will be similar to what
we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided
``overwatch''--first at the tactical level, then at the strategic
level. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans
and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to
support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We
will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country
only to see it descend into civil war, and then into Taliban hands.
Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and
police through intensive partnering with ISAF, especially in combat. It
also means achieving a better balance between national and local
forces; increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities; engaging
communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own
territory; and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation
efforts.
At the strategic level, the President's plan will achieve a better
balance between investments in the central government and subnational
entities. At the national level, the focus will be primarily on
reforming essential ministries and pressing for the appointment of
competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and regional
level, there will be a shift to work through existing, traditional
structures rather than building new ones. In all of these efforts, we
must have a committed partner in the Afghan people and government. That
is one reason why there will be very clear and definitive timeframes
for reviewing our--and their--progress.
ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES
As the President announced, the United States will commit an
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to
24 months. These forces--the U.S. contribution to this fight--will be
deployed and concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the
country. The first of these units will arrive in Afghanistan early in
2010.
In all, since taking office President Obama has committed nearly
52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of
approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and our other partners to
send a parallel international message of strong resolve. Our allies
must take the lead and focus their resources in the north and west to
prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds. We will seek
some 5 to 7,000 troops from NATO and expect the Allies to share more of
the burden in training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Army
and police.
CONCLUSION
Let me offer a few closing thoughts.
It is worth remembering that the security situation in
Afghanistan--though serious--does not begin to approach the scale of
violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was
confirmed as secretary of defense 3 years ago this week. With all the
resources already committed to this campaign--plus those the President
has just announced--I believe the pieces are being put in place to make
real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24
months.
The President believes, as do I, that, in the end, we cannot defeat
al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the
security situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision offers the
best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan, and
fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central
Asia--all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our
vital interests. So, I ask for your full support of this decision to
provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources
they need to be successful.
This is will take more patience, perseverance, and sacrifice by the
United States and our allies. As always, the heaviest burden will fall
on the men and women who have volunteered--and in many cases
revolunteered--to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be
uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous but
vitally necessary mission.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Gates.
Secretary Clinton.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Clinton. Thank you. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, members of the committee, I am grateful for this
opportunity to testify before so many former colleagues and
friends. My experience on this committee helped form my views
on many of the issues facing our Nation, and it's a privilege
to be here before you now in this different role.
Yesterday, President Obama presented the administration's
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates,
Admiral Mullen, and I will all be providing you with additional
details. But, let me speak briefly at a more personal level
about why we are making this commitment.
Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the
best way to protect our Nation now and in the future. The
extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have
attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to
the very same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have
a greater capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag
an entire region into chaos.
Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have
reported that the situation is serious and worsening, and we
agree. In the aftermath of September 11, I grieved with sons,
daughters, husbands, and wives whose loved ones were murdered.
It was an attack on our country and an attack on the
constituents I then represented. I witnessed the tragic
consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families and
the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So, I
feel a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from
such violence.
The case for action against al Qaeda and its allies has
always been clear, but the United States' course of action over
the last 8 years has not. The fog of another war obscured our
focus. While our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban
gained momentum in Afghanistan and the extremist threat grew in
Pakistan, a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal,
and more than its share of challenges.
It was against this backdrop that President Obama called
for a careful, thorough review of the strategy. I was proud to
be part of that process, which questioned every assumption and
took nothing for granted. Our objectives are clear: We will
work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate
safe havens for those plotting to attack against us, our
allies, and our interests. We will help to stabilize a region
that we believe is fundamental to our national security, and we
will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with both
Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes
of the past.
The duration of our military presence is not open-ended,
but our civilian commitment must continue, even as our troops
begin, eventually, to come home. Accomplishing this mission and
ensuring the safety of the American people will not be easy. It
will mean sending not only more troops, but more civilians and
more assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our
civilian efforts in Pakistan.
The men and women carrying out this military-civilian
mission are not members of a list or items on a PowerPoint
slide; they are our friends and neighbors, our sons and
daughters, our brothers and sisters. We will be asking them and
the American people to make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf
of our security.
I want to assure this committee, that I know takes its
oversight responsibility so seriously, that we will do
everything we can to make sure their sacrifices are honored and
make our Nation safer.
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but
it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in
public, and the beginning of President Karzai's second term has
opened a new window of opportunity. We have real concerns about
the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan Government,
and we will continue to pursue them. But, in his inauguration
speech last week that I was privileged to attend, I witnessed
President Karzai's call for a new compact with his country. He
pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver
for the people of his country. His words were long in coming,
but they were welcome. They must now be matched with action.
The Afghan people, the United States, and the international
community must hold the Afghan Government accountable for
making good on these commitments. We will help by working to
strengthen institutions at every level of Afghan society so we
don't leave chaos behind when our combat troops begin to
depart.
The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to
Afghan responsibility, something that President Karzai assumed
would happen, and which we took as a very good sign of a
renewed understanding of the necessity of Afghanization.
That transition will begin in the summer of 2011, when we
expect ANSF and the Afghan Government will have the capacity to
start assuming ownership for defending their own country. As
the President has said, we will execute the transition
responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.
But, we think a timeframe for such a transition will
provide a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan
Government. It should be clear to everyone that, unlike the
past, the United States, our allies, and partners have an
enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region,
so our resolve in this fight is reflected in the substantial
commitment of troops and in the significant civilian commitment
that will continue long after combat forces leave.
That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian
experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside
government ministries, providing development assistance in the
field, and working in scores of other roles. When our marines
went into Nawa this July, we had civilians on the ground with
them to coordinate assistance the next day. As operations
progress, our civilian-military coordination is growing even
stronger.
We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions
in Afghanistan, to 974, by early next year. On average, each of
these civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally
employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). It's a cliche to say we have our best
people in these jobs, but it happens to be true.
When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American
colonel, who told me that, while he had thousands of
outstanding soldiers under his command, none of them had the 40
years of agricultural experience of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) civilian serving alongside his battalion or
the rule-of-law and governance expertise of their civilian
experts from the Department of State (DOS). He told me, ``I'm
happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need,
and we need more of them.'' The President's strategy will make
that possible.
Not only do we have the right people to achieve our
objectives, we also have a sound strategy. We will be
delivering high-impact assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's
agricultural sector, the traditional core of the Afghan
economy. This will create jobs, reduce the funding that the
Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents
off of the battlefield.
We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door
to those Taliban who renounce al Qaeda, abandon violence, and
want to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand some of
those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of
conviction, but due to coercion or money. So, all Afghans
should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so
peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow
citizens, and reintegrate into their society.
Our regional diplomacy complements this approach by seeking
to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to
shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition
for influence to cooperation and economic integration.
We also believe a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must
be a key partner in the fight against violent extremism, and
people in Pakistan are increasingly coming to view that we do
share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my recent
visit. So, our relationship needs to be anchored in common
goals of civilian rule, robust economic development, and the
defeat of those who threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United
States, and the rest of the world.
We'll significantly expand support intended for Pakistan to
develop the potential of their people. We will do so by
demonstrating a commitment to Pakistan that has been questioned
by the Pakistanis in the past. We will make sure that the
people of Pakistan know that we wish to be their partner for
the long term, and that we intend to do all that we can to
bolster their futures.
Now, we're not going to be facing these challenges alone.
We share this responsibility with governments around the world.
I will go to Brussels tomorrow to begin the process of securing
additional alliance commitments of troops, trainers, and
resources. We expect Secretary General Rasmussen to have an
announcement today about the progress we're making in that
effort. Ambassador Holbrooke, our Special Representative, is
already there, consulting with our allies.
We're also asking the international community to expand its
support to Pakistan. Our objectives are shared by people and
governments across the world, and we are particularly reaching
out to Muslims everywhere.
Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult
choices in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the President's plan
represents the best way we know to protect our Nation today and
in the future. The task we face is as complex as any national
security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if
people view this effort as a responsibility of a single party,
a single agency within our government, or a single country.
We owe it to the troops and civilians, who will face these
dangers, to come together as Americans, and come together with
allies and international partners who are ready to step up and
do more.
We have to accomplish this mission, and I look forward to
working with you to help meet this challenge.
Thank you all very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I'm
grateful for this opportunity to testify before so many good friends.
My experience on the Armed Services Committee helped form my views on
many of the issues facing our Nation. It's a privilege to be before you
now in this different role.
Yesterday, President Obama presented the administration's strategy
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
and I will all be providing you with additional details. But let me
speak briefly at a more personal level about why we are making this
commitment.
Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the best
way to protect our Nation now and in the future.
The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have
attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to the very
same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have a greater
capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region
into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have
reported that the situation is serious and worsening. We agree.
In the aftermath of September 11th, I grieved with sons, daughters,
husbands, and wives whose loved ones were murdered. It was an attack on
our country, but it was also an attack on my constituents. I witnessed
the tragic consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families,
and the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So I feel
a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from such
violence.
THE MISSION
The case for action against al Qaeda and its allies has always been
clear, but the United States' course of action over the last 8 years
has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. While our attention
was focused elsewhere, the Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan. The
extremist threat grew in Pakistan--a country with 175 million people, a
nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges.
It was against this backdrop that the President called for a
careful, thorough review of our strategy. I was proud to be a part of
that process. Our objectives are clear:
We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to
eliminate safe havens for those plotting attacks against us, our
allies, and our interests;
We will help to stabilize a region that is fundamental to
our national security; and
We will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship
with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of
the past. The duration of our military presence will be limited, but
our civilian commitment must continue even as our troops begin to come
home.
Accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American
people will not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, troops,
and assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our civilian
efforts in Pakistan.
The men and women carrying out this mission are not numbers on a
PowerPoint slide. They are our friends and neighbors, our sons and
daughters, our brothers and sisters. We will be asking them--and the
American people who support them--to make extraordinary sacrifices on
behalf of our security. I want to assure the Committee that we will do
everything we can to make sure their sacrifices make our Nation safer.
THE METHODS
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is
not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. The
beginning of President Karzai's second term has opened a new window of
opportunity. We have real concerns about the influence of corrupt
officials in the Afghan Government, and we will continue to pursue
them. But in his inauguration speech last month, I witnessed President
Karzai call for a new compact with his country. He pledged to combat
corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of his
country. His words were long in coming, but welcome. They must now be
matched with action. The Afghan people, the United States, and the
international community will hold the Afghan Government accountable for
making good on these commitments.
We will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen
institutions at every level of Afghan society so that we don't leave
chaos behind when our combat troops begin to depart.
The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan
responsibility. That transition will begin in the summer of 2011, when
we expect Afghan security forces and the Afghan Government will have
the capacity to start assuming ownership for defending their country.
As the President said, we will execute the transition responsibly,
taking into account conditions on the ground. A timeframe for
transition will provide a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan
Government. But it should be clear to everyone that--unlike the past--
the United States and our allies and partners will have an enduring
commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. Our resolve in
this fight is reflected in the substantial commitment of troops since
the President took office and in the significant civilian commitment
that will continue long after our combat forces leave.
That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and
advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries,
providing development assistance in the field, and working in scores of
other roles. When our marines went into Nawa this July, we had
civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the next
day. As operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is growing even
stronger.
We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions in
Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each of these
civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to
experts with U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations. It's cliche to
say that we have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to
be true. When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American
colonel who told me that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers
under his command, none of them had the 40 years of agricultural
experience of the U.S. Department of Agriculture civilian serving
alongside his battalion, or the rule of law and governance expertise of
their civilian experts from the State Department. He told me: ``I am
happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and we
need more of them.'' The President's strategy will make that possible.
Not only do we have the right people to achieve our objectives, we
also have a sound strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic
assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's agricultural sector--the
traditional core of the Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce
the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw
insurgents off of the battlefield.
We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those
Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into Afghan
society. We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency
do so not out of conviction, but due to coercion or money. All Afghans
should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so
peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens,
and renounce al Qaeda.
Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach, by
seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to
shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition for
influence to cooperation and economic integration.
We also believe that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be
a key partner for the United States, and an ally in the fight against
violent extremism. People in Pakistan are increasingly coming to the
view that we share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my
recent visit. Our relationship is anchored in our common goals of
civilian rule; robust economic development; and the defeat of those who
threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the peace of the world.
We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the
potential of Pakistan and its people. Our assistance will demonstrate
the United States' commitment to addressing problems that affect the
everyday lives of Pakistanis and bring our people closer together. But
it will also bolster Pakistan against the threat of extremism. A
village where girls have had the opportunity to get an education will
be more resistant to al Qaeda and the Taliban. A young man with a
bright future in a growing economy is less likely to waste his
potential in a suicide bombing.
We will not be facing these challenges alone. We share this
responsibility with governments around the world. Our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have already made significant
contributions of their own in Afghanistan, and tomorrow I will go to
Brussels to begin the process of securing additional Alliance
commitments of troops, trainers, and resources. Ambassador Holbrooke,
our Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is already
there consulting with our allies.
The international community is also expanding its support to
Pakistan, and we are in close touch with partners to coordinate
assistance. We are also looking beyond NATO to build the broadest
possible global coalition to meet this challenge. Our objectives are
shared by people and governments from Europe to Australia, from Russia
to China to India, and across the Middle East. Beginning with the
President's speech in Cairo, we are reaching out to Muslims everywhere
to make it clear that the United States seeks to build a better future
with them in a spirit of mutual respect and partnership.
THE MESSAGE
Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the President's plan represents the
best way we know to protect our Nation today and in the future. The
task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our
lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the
responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our
Government, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and civilians
who will face these dangers to come together as Americans--and come
together with our allies and international partners--to help them
accomplish this mission. I look forward to working with you to meet
this challenge. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of this committee, thank you for your time today.
Let me state, right up front, that I support fully and
without hesitation the President's decision, and I appreciated
the opportunity to contribute to what I believe was a healthy
and productive discussion. I've seen my share of internal
debates about various national security issues, especially over
the course of these last 2 years, and I can honestly say that I
do not recall an issue so thoroughly or so thoughtfully
considered as this one.
Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as
those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice throughout this
process, and every one of us used it. We now have before us a
strategy more appropriately matched to the situation on the
ground in Afghanistan, and resources matched more appropriately
to that strategy, particularly with regard to reversing the
insurgency's momentum in 2010. Given the stakes in Afghanistan
for our own national security, as well as that of our partners
around the world, I believe the time we took was well worth it.
Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already walked you
through the large policy issues in question. I will not repeat
them.
From a purely military perspective, I believe our new
approach does three critical things:
First, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers
better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ
their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe
haven. They will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who
remain the center of gravity. They will still pursue major
elements of the counterinsurgency campaign desired and designed
by General McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least
some measure of active counterterrorism operations. But, now
they will tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing
on key population areas, by increasing pressure on al Qaeda's
leadership, by more effectively working to degrade the
Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and accelerating the
growth of competent ANSF.
At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing
space for the Afghans to secure their own people and to
stabilize their own country. It's about partnering and
mentoring just as much, if not more, than it is about fighting.
Where once we believed that finishing the job meant, to a large
degree, doing it ourselves, we now know that it cannot truly,
or permanently, be done by anyone other than the Afghans
themselves. Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theater are
partnered with Afghan forces, and I expect that number to rise
significantly throughout 2010.
Second, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives
commanders on the ground the resources and the support they
need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to
accomplish these more limited objectives. I've said it before,
and I believe it still today, this region is the epicenter of
global Islamic extremism. It is the place from which we were
attacked on September 11. Should we be hit again, it's the
place from which I am convinced the planning, training, and
funding will emanate. Al Qaeda may, in fact, be the architect
of such an attack, but the Taliban will be the bricklayers.
Though hardly a uniform body, Taliban groups have grown
bolder and more sophisticated. We saw that just a few months
ago in the Korengal Valley, where Taliban forces attacked
coalition outposts using what I would call almost conventional
small-unit tactics. Their fighters are better organized and
better equipped than they were just 1 year ago. In fact,
coalition forces experienced record-high violence this past
summer, with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent above 2008
levels. Through brutal intimidation, the Taliban has
established shadow governments across the country, coercing the
reluctant support of many locals, and challenging the authority
of elected leaders and state institutions. Indeed, we believe
the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11 of
Afghanistan's 34 provinces. To say that there is no serious
threat of Afghanistan falling once again into Taliban hands
ignores the audacity of even the insurgency's most public
statements. To argue that, should they have that power, the
Taliban would not at least tolerate the presence of al Qaeda on
Afghan soil, is to ignore both the recent past and the evidence
we see every day of collusion between these factions on both
sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
The cost of failure is, then, grave. That is why the
President's decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of
30,000 additional forces is so important. It gets the most U.S.
force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General
McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.
It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach,
and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible
chance to set the security conditions; for the Afghan people to
see our commitment to their future; for the Karzai government
to know our strong desire to see his promised reforms; for the
Afghan Taliban to understand they will not, they cannot, take
back Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan who support
the Taliban, or would see the return of al Qaeda, to realize
the futility of their pursuit.
I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the
21,000 troops the President ordered shortly after taking
office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the
southern Helmand Valley. But, as I have testified before, Mr.
Chairman, no amount of troops in no amount of time will ever be
enough to completely achieve success in such a fight. They
simply must be accompanied by good governance and healthy
public administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of
my greatest concern.
Like everyone else, I look forward to working with the
Karzai government, but we must have the support of the
interagency and international communities, as well.
That brings me to my final point. The President's new
strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broadbased
approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in
isolation any more than he views the ties between al Qaeda and
the Taliban as superficial. He has called for stronger and more
productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is,
likewise, under the threat from radical elements, and whose
support remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens.
He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed
emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort--and
that is happening--more contributions by other NATO nations,
and a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to the
Afghans. His is a more balanced, more flexible, and more
achievable strategy than we've had in the past, one based on
pragmatism and real possibilities. Speaking for the 2.2 million
men and women who must execute it, and who, with their
families, have borne the brunt of the stress and the strain of
8 years of constant combat, I support his decision and
appreciate his leadership.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the subject of
the President's newly announced strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The President's Tuesday evening announcement at West Point of our
strategy and increased military resources for Afghanistan culminates a
process of deliberate strategic review that began with the arrival of
General McChrystal's interim assessment in early September. I believe
this national-level review has been sober and essential. The challenges
we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan are great, and our interests there
are significant. This administration needed to take the time to look at
all the options and craft a balanced and sustainable approach. I
believe that the review has met this aim.
I support fully, and without hesitation, the President's decision.
REFINING THE STRATEGY
The facts compel us to act. Our strategic review confirmed that the
overarching policy goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and
defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its
capacity to threaten America and our allies from either country in the
future.
South Asia is the epicenter of global Islamic extremism; the
location of al Qaeda's core leadership and the terrain that dozens of
Islamic terrorist groups call home. It is the location from which the
September 11 attacks on America were planned and driven. If the United
States should be hit again, I remain convinced that the planning,
training and funding for such an attack will emanate there. It is a
region where a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan, is under direct threat
from al Qaeda and affiliated Pakistani-Taliban groups that aspire to
acquire and use nuclear weapons against the United States and our
allies. Thus, it is a region with a unique--and deadly--combination of
the most dangerous terrorists and the most dangerous technology in the
world. Our actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan seek to prevent
catastrophic outcomes from these toxic forces, and constitute a most
critical national interest.
Our strategic review paid particular attention to Pakistan. The
people of Pakistan are under as much, if not greater, threat from al
Qaeda and Islamic terrorism than are we. We must encourage and aid the
Pakistani military fight against these extremists in South Waziristan,
in SWAT, and across Pakistan. We must also help Pakistan widen its
aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
the wider South Asia region, and the globe. We are deepening ties with
the people of Pakistan as well as with their security forces. We see
progress with our Pakistani allies as paramount to the way ahead.
In Afghanistan, we narrowed-in on a challenging, but attainable
goal: to deny al Qaeda safe haven and the Afghan-Taliban the ability to
overthrow the duly elected Afghan government. To achieve this refined
strategic aim, we must continue to deny al Qaeda any Afghanistan toe-
hold, reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency, and build
sufficient Afghan Government and security capacity to eventually defeat
the insurgent threat. Our review also narrowed and refined the military
objectives for General McChrystal's North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)--focusing it on
security of key population areas while Afghan forces grow in size and
capability, prioritizing a robust NATO-ISAF program of training and
mentoring Afghan military and police, and establishing the conditions
necessary for Afghans to assume their own security. Each of these
objectives will hasten the day when we can begin thinning the U.S./
NATO-ISAF security forces presence, turning the internal security of
Afghanistan over to the Afghans. This strategy provides the time and
space for the Afghans themselves to build sufficient security and
governance capacity to stabilize their country.
Our refined military objectives for Afghanistan complement those in
the political and economic spheres. They also support diplomatic,
political, and military programs that the President's strategy calls
for us to undertake with neighboring countries--especially Pakistan--
that increase pressure against al Qaeda's leadership; that expand
counterinsurgency operations against Taliban insurgents who threaten
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider region; and that help set the
conditions for improved regional security and stability.
MATCHING STRATEGY AND RESOURCES
Throughout this strategic review, I advised the Secretary of
Defense and the President that our commitment of military resources
must match our strategy.
I am pleased to inform this committee that the President's decision
accommodates this advice. The strategy he approved commits 30,000 more
U.S. forces, with some number of additional enablers, while calling for
our NATO and non-NATO allies to generate additional forces. This rapid,
coalition-wide build-up of force aligns with General McChrystal's
recommendations, even more so in light of the narrowing of objectives
for Afghanistan that the President announced Tuesday night.
The President's commitment is to rapidly send these additional
forces forward--to get as much force into the fight as fast as General
McChrystal can absorb it. This allows Generals McChrystal and Petraeus
to plan for cohesive logistics and transportation support over the
course of the coming year. While there are no guarantees in war, I
expect that we will make significant headway in the next 18-24 months.
I also believe we could begin to thin our combat forces in about the
same timeframe. From a military standpoint, the President's commitment
to an increase in military force, especially backed by an increase in
civilian resources, is much better than one featuring periodic
assessments that trigger incremental force escalation.
The President's decision also supports accelerated expansion of
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--a critical initiative. We
simply must invest in the growth of an Afghan security force--through
more radical and in-depth partnering. The additional U.S. and coalition
forces heading to Afghanistan will focus a great amount of time and
energy toward empowering a strong and capable ANSF.
General McChrystal intends to use these additional U.S. troops to
conduct more focused counterinsurgency operations that enhance
population security against the Taliban in south and east Afghanistan.
As in Iraq, our troops will live among the population. Thus--and as
General McChrystal has successfully emphasized since his arrival as
Commander of ISAF last June--we will continue to make every effort to
eliminate civilian casualties, not just because this is the right thing
to do, but because these casualties work against our goal of Afghan
population security. Although we must expect higher alliance casualties
in coming months as we dedicate more U.S. forces to protect the
population and mentor the ANSF, our extended security presence must--
and will--improve security for the Afghan people and limit both future
civilian and military casualties
MOVING FORWARD--CONCLUSION
No commitment of additional force in the number we plan for
Afghanistan is without risk. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I assess the
risks to our military forces and our military missions--at home and
abroad--from this force deployment decision to be acceptable. We can
continue to balance the additional force flow requirements for
Afghanistan against those coming available from draw-down trajectory
programmed for, and on track in, Iraq.
I believe that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be
gradual, and sometimes halting. Yet I believe we can succeed. The
President's announced strategy and this force flow decision give us the
best possible chance for success. We must exhibit vision, apply
sufficient resources, and display endurance to realize our objectives
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most challenges we now confront in the
South Asia region are not military in nature. They require solutions
from and led by national and local governments. Yet none of these
solutions are possible in an environment of insecurity. Our role must
be to fill the security gap for a short time, concurrently growing our
partner government's capacity to self-secure. Pursued with resolve, our
actions will send an unmistakable message that the U.S. remains
committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets of
partnerships available to address future challenges without a long-term
need for large numbers of U.S. combat forces.
In providing advice to this President over the past 10 months, one
important point I have made, consonant with other key presidential
advisers, is that our military activities must support rather than lead
our Nation's foreign policy. Our warfighting ability will never be in
doubt. But we have learned from the past 8 years of war that we serve
this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated
approach that employs all elements of national power to achieve the
policy goals set by our civilian leaders. This approach remains crucial
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and across South Central Asia.
On behalf of our service members, I would like to thank the members
of this committee--and Congress as a whole--for the sustained
investment in our brave young men and women in uniform, and for your
unwavering support of them and their families as they continue to serve
so magnificently and selflessly in this time of protracted war.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Mullen.
We're going to have 6-minute rounds, and I will ask members
to strictly adhere to that 6 minutes, so we will all have an
opportunity to ask questions.
There's been some confusion about whether the beginning
date for U.S. troop reductions is set for July 2011, with the
pace of those reductions being condition-based, or whether the
July 2011 starting date itself is dependent on conditions on
the ground. Secretary Gates, which is it?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, July 2011 is when we expect
the transition process to begin.
Chairman Levin. But, is that date conditions-based, or not?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Next question. This question has to
do with the partnering ratio. There are currently just over
10,000 U.S. troops in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan,
and they are partnered with only 1,500 or so Afghan soldiers.
The partnering goal for the United States is almost the
reverse, as measured in units: three Afghan companies to one
U.S. company. Now, paraphrasing the National Security Council's
Director for Afghanistan, the 3-Afghan-to-1-U.S. ratio helps
prevent Afghan units from relying too much on the U.S. unit, to
the detriment of the Afghan unit's development. So, the current
number of troops could and should, under our own doctrine, be
partnering with 20,000 or so Afghan troops in Helmand. We don't
need more troops to partner more Afghans; we have more than
enough for that purpose. Nor do we expect 20,000 or more Afghan
troops to be assigned to partner with us in Helmand next year.
According to Prime Minister Brown of Great Britain, there will
be 10,000 more Afghan troops deployed to Helmand in the coming
year, to be divided approximately equally between U.S. and
British forces for partnering.
So, first, Secretary Gates, are my numbers correct?
Secretary Gates. Let me defer to Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, I think your numbers, as far
as those that are currently partnered, are correct, given the
availability of Afghan forces in the south, in Helmand.
Chairman Levin. In terms of what we expect to be deployed
by Afghanistan for their troops in the coming year?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it sounds about right.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Now, I thought I heard the President, at the meeting
yesterday in the Old Executive Office Building, say that we
would not have our troops clear an area unless they could turn
the cleared area over to Afghans. Now, Secretary Gates, did I
hear him correctly? If so, how is that possible, given the
paucity of available Afghan forces?
Secretary Gates. Let me start and then invite Admiral
Mullen to chime in.
First of all, clearly, as I've indicated, accelerating the
growth of the ANA and ANP is vitally important, but we are also
looking, as I suggested in my remarks, at local forces, as
well, partnering with local security forces. There is more than
just the ANP and the ANA in this mix. The plan clearly is that
we will not transition security responsibility to the Afghans
until the Afghans have the capacity in that district or that
province to be able to manage the security situation on their
own, with our allies and us initially in a tactical overwatch
and then a strategic overwatch situation.
The reality is that the circumstances, very much as in
Iraq, differ from district to district and province to
province, so the ability of the Afghans to take this on will
depend on the circumstances in each of these areas. In some
areas, it will take fewer Afghans. But, clearly a big part of
this is additional training, both basic training, but then
partnering in combat as training, to put more and more Afghans
into the fight and into a position where they can take
responsibility for security, and particularly in the context of
degraded Taliban capabilities. One of the purposes of the
United States going in with additional forces is, not just to
partner with the Afghans, and not just to train the Afghans,
but to degrade the capabilities of the Taliban. So, you have
the situation in which the capabilities of the ANSF are rising
at a time when our combat forces are degrading the capabilities
of the Taliban, and it's the point at which the Afghans are
able to handle that degraded threat that we would make the
transition.
Chairman Levin. Do I understand from your answer then, that
there will be situations where our troops will be clearing an
area and not have Afghans available yet, at that point, to turn
that cleared area over to? Is that fair?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, I think it is.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Admiral Mullen. But, if I may, just briefly. When General
McChrystal showed up, in June 2009, there were virtually no
units partnered. There are some 280 units out of 351 right now
who are partnered.
Chairman Levin. With some partners, not the 3-to-1 ratio.
Admiral Mullen. No, sir, we're not there yet.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Admiral Mullen. But, this is companies by companies. This
is in training and in fighting.
Chairman Levin. My final question, because I'm out of time,
is: What will be the ANA's projected size by July 2011?
Secretary Gates. The goal, by December 2010, is 134,000.
Chairman Levin. No, my question is July 2011.
Admiral Mullen. It'll be about 170,000.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Following the hearing, Admiral Mullen clarified for the
committee that the Department of Defense currently expects 162,000
Afghan National Army in place by July 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, do you think it's important to tell the
American people it's very likely that casualties will go up
during the course of this troop increase that's envisioned?
Admiral Mullen. Senator McCain, when we added the 21,000
marines, I was very clear about the potential that casualties
would go up. I don't think there's any question that casualties
are a part of the risk associated with these additional troops,
and that they will go up.
Senator McCain. I think the American people need to
understand that.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I agree with you.
Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your answer to Chairman
Levin's question, if I understand your answer--Chairman Levin
asked if the withdrawal plan for July 2011 was condition-based,
and you said, ``No.'' Will we withdraw our forces based on
conditions on the ground or based on an arbitrary date,
regardless of conditions on the ground?
Secretary Gates. What we're talking about, Senator McCain,
is the beginning of a process, not the end of that process.
Approximately 60 percent of Afghanistan today is not controlled
by the Taliban or have significant Taliban influence.
Senator McCain. I'd say, with respect, Secretary Gates, my
question is: Will the date of withdrawal, 2011, which the
President set, be based on an arbitrary date of July 2011,
regardless of conditions on the ground?
Secretary Gates. I think it's the judgment of all of us in
the Department of Defense (DOD) involved in this process that
we will be in a position, in particularly uncontested areas,
where we will be able to begin that transition in July 2011.
Senator McCain. Let's suppose you're not. Let's suppose
that conditions on the ground are poor so that our commanders
believe that it would jeopardize the success of the mission if
we start a withdrawal in July 2011. Will we do it anyway?
Secretary Gates. The President has indicated that we will
have a thorough review of how we're doing in December 2010, and
I think we will be in a position then to evaluate whether or
not we can begin that transition in July.
Senator McCain. I say with great respect, Secretary Gates,
the President announced that we would begin withdrawing on a
hard date of July 2011. I don't know why that date was
particularly picked and that may be a question in another
session, but he's announced that. At the same time, you said
conditions on the ground would determine withdrawal. Now, those
are two incompatible statements. You either have a winning
strategy and do as we did in Iraq, and then, once it succeeds,
we withdraw, or we, as the President said, have a date
beginning withdrawal in July 2011. Which is it? It has to be
one or the other. It has to be the appropriate conditions or it
has to be an arbitrary date. You can't have both.
Secretary Gates. Where we begin the transition is, I think,
the key factor here, Senator. As I suggested, we will have a
thorough review in December 2010. If it appears that the
strategy's not working and that we are not going to be able to
transition in 2011, then we will take a hard look at the
strategy itself.
Senator McCain. I say, with respect, I think the American
people need to know whether we will begin withdrawing in 2011
and conditions are ripe for that, or whether we will just be
withdrawing, no matter what.
Secretary Gates. Our current plan is that we will begin the
transition, in local areas, in July 2011. We will evaluate, in
December 2010, whether we believe we will be able to meet that
objective.
Senator McCain. I think that has to be made very clear.
Right now the expectation level of the American people, because
of the President's speech, is that we will be withdrawing, as
of July 2011, regardless of conditions on the ground. I think
that's the wrong impression to give our friends, it's the wrong
impression to give our enemies, and it's the wrong impression
to give the men and women who want to go over there and win; we
should not start withdrawing on an arbitrary date.
Unfortunately, that has not been made clear at all.
By the way, Admiral Mullen, the Army Counterinsurgency
Field Manual says, ``counterinsurgents should prepare for a
long-term commitment. The populace must have confidence in the
staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the host-nation
government.'' By announcing a date for withdrawal, don't you
think that contradicts the counterinsurgency manual?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, I believe, and the military leadership
believes, by mid-2011, we'll know how this is going. The
Secretary talked to the assessment. In fact, it's General
McChrystal's view that these additional forces will allow him
to reverse the momentum and head us in the right direction.
We'll have very solid indicators at that point, and then,
obviously, the July 2011 date is a day we start transitioning
and transferring responsibility; it's not a date that we're
leaving. The President also said that this will be based on
conditions on the ground.
Senator McCain. Then it makes no sense for him to have
announced the date. But I'm sure we'll continue this
discussion.
Secretary Clinton, I appreciate your statement, but I would
like a lot more specifics. We know that there are divisions
within the Embassy in Kabul. We know that cables were leaked,
and that the Ambassador there was against any increases in
troops there. We know that relations within the Embassy have at
least three factions. We also know that the ability of DOS
personnel has been significantly limited, as it was prior to
the surge in Iraq, because the environment is not safe for them
to go out and operate.
I have great confidence in the military operational
planning, and I'm confident it can succeed. But, as I said
earlier, I don't see the ``build'' component yet, and I would
like for you to submit to this committee a very specific plan,
just as we are receiving a very specific military plan, on
exactly how we're going to achieve the ``build'' part of it,
which I think there is an adequate model for it, in the case of
Iraq.
So, I appreciate your statements, and I agree with you
about the quality of personnel. I have yet to see a
comprehensive, cohesive, convincing plan to implement the
essential civil side of any successful surge.
Secretary Clinton. Senator McCain, first let me say, we are
more than happy to submit a plan. We have obviously been
working with our committee of jurisdiction and authorization on
a very close ongoing basis, and we'll be happy to share a lot
of the information with you, and we would welcome your response
and your advice.
I have to say, however, that the process that we engaged in
solicited opinions, and I thought it was a great tribute to the
President and to National Security Advisor General Jones that
the White House ran a process that actually sought out and made
it clear that diversity of opinion was welcome. I thought it
was useful to hear from a variety of sources. It wouldn't
surprise you, as it didn't surprise me, that people had
different opinions based on their perspective. But, as Admiral
Mullen just eloquently said, the President's made a decision.
There is no division. There is absolute unity and a commitment
to carrying out the mission. We'll be happy to share the
specifics of that with you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
I thank all the witnesses. We appreciate, enormously, their
contributions to our country.
Chairman Levin. We're going to take advantage of the
presence of a quorum here now to take 1 minute to consider the
1,938 pending military nominations, as well as the civilian
nominations of Dr. Clifford Stanley to be Under Secretary of
Defense; Frank Kendall III to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense; Erin Conaton to be the Under Secretary of
the Air Force; Terry Yonkers to be Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force; and Lawrence Romo to be Director of the Selective
Service.
Do I hear a motion to, en bloc, approve those nominations?
Senator Lieberman. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Voice. Second.
Chairman Levin. Second.
All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Levin. Opposed, nay? [No response.]
The ayes have it.
Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates. By the way, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I knew you would appreciate that
intervention.
Senator Lieberman. Oh, one more item of business.
Chairman Levin. I included the 1,938 pending military
nominations.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks also to Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and
Admiral Mullen for your excellent opening statements and for
all the hard and effective work that you did in support of the
policy that the President announced last night.
I agree with what Senator McCain said, that the President
has made the right decision in embracing a counterinsurgency
strategy for Afghanistan and resourcing it properly. In making
this decision, President Obama has respectfully disagreed with
the majority of members of his own political party, according
to every public opinion poll I've seen, and therefore, I think
it's fair to say that the President has quite literally put our
national security interests ahead of partisan political
interests. I hope that fact will inspire and encourage a
majority of members of both political parties to do the same
and to, thereby, show that America's political leadership is
still capable of suspending partisanship at the water's edge
when our security and our troops are on the line.
As chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, I'm very grateful that
President Obama argued so effectively last night that the war
in Afghanistan is a war of necessity because its outcome is
inseparable from our security here at home. That is why I
believe there is no substitute for victory over the Islamist
extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan. A war of necessity
must not just be fought, it must, of necessity, be won. Last
night, in the most controversial paragraph of his speech,
President Obama said that we will ``begin the transfer of our
forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011.'' That troubled me when
I heard it. But, then the President added words that reassured
me, which were that ``We will execute this transition
responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.''
Secretary Gates, this morning in your opening statement,
you added more detail and Admiral Mullen, you did, too, I
think, to the mode by which we will begin this transition in
July 2011. I'm particularly struck that you refer to it as a
``transfer of security responsibility,'' and you also say that
it will be very much like what we did in Iraq, where
international security forces provided overwatch, first at the
tactical level, then at the strategic level.
So, Secretary Gates, I want to ask you, as I read your
words today, am I correct in concluding that what will
definitely begin in July 2011 is a transfer of security
responsibility to the Afghans, but may not include,
immediately, a withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. No, and that is correct. I think as we
turn over more districts and more provinces to Afghan security
control, much as we did with the provincial Iraqi control, that
there will be a thinning of our forces and a gradual drawdown.
I would remind folks, here, since this is the second surge I've
been up here defending, that the surge in Iraq lasted 14
months: January 2007 to March 2008. Frankly, it was pretty
apparent to our adversaries in Iraq all along that the surge
was a very tentative situation because we were up here
defending it practically every day. So, the notion that our
adversaries in Afghanistan are not aware of the debates in this
country, and the debates in Europe and elsewhere, is, I think,
unrealistic.
Senator Lieberman. I agree.
Secretary Gates. They know these things. But, the reality
is, this is going to be a process. I think it has much in
common with the way that we began to draw down in Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. Am I right, then, that we're likely to
transfer security responsibilities to the Afghans in the areas
that are most stable, that are most uncontested at the
beginning? At the beginning, we probably will put our troops
back a ways, just to see how that works, rather than taking
them out of the country?
Secretary Gates. Yes, we're not just going to throw these
guys into the swimming pool and walk away. The reality is,
first of all, those transfers are going to take place in the
most uncontested places in Afghanistan. So, just as in Iraq,
you may have some districts and provinces being transferred to
Afghan security responsibility, and, at the very same time,
have extraordinarily heavy combat going on in other provinces
around the country, which is exactly what we saw in Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. Am I right that, in the policy that the
President announced last night, which does begin a transfer of
security responsibility of July 2011 to the Afghans, there is
no deadline for the end of that transfer; it will be based on
conditions on the ground?
Secretary Gates. It will be based on conditions on the
ground. But, by the same token, we want to communicate to the
Afghans this is not an open-ended commitment on the part of the
American people and our allies around the world.
Senator Lieberman. I agree with that.
Secretary Gates. We have to build a fire under them,
frankly, to get them to do the kind of recruitment, retention,
training, and so on, for their forces that allow us to make
this transition.
Let me just draw one other analogy to Iraq. In Iraq, once
it was clear the surge was working, it was pretty plain that
the Iraqis wanted us out about as fast as possible. The
security agreement and everything flowed from that. That's not
entirely clear in Afghanistan. They live in a very rough
neighborhood. So, we have the balancing act here. Frankly, the
centerpiece of our debates for the last several months have
been: How do you get the Afghans to begin to step up to
responsibility for their own future, their own security in a
way that allows us to have confidence that they will not once
again become the safe haven for al Qaeda? Figuring out that
balance, in terms of how you incentivize and give a sense of
urgency to the Afghans, and at the same time signal resolve to
our adversaries, was the tough part of this for us.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer. I think you
strike exactly the right balance, and I appreciate what you
said. We're not just going to throw the Afghans into the pool
and run away, until we're sure that they can swim on their own.
To me, that's the essence of moving down the road to victory in
Afghanistan.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was going to start up with the end status and state, but
it's been pretty well covered right now. I would only say this,
though. I am probably speaking on behalf of all of the members
up here because all of us have been both to Afghanistan and
Iraq. The troops themselves, they want to win, and they don't
like to even talk about a withdrawal date and that type of
thing.
Let me just ask you a quick question, Admiral Mullen. Most
of the time, when commanders talk about different options and
courses of action, they talk about the risk involved. The risk
is usually low, medium, or high. What was the risk level
associated with General McChrystal's 40,000 increase?
Admiral Mullen. Notionally and broadly moderate, but the
real critical path here is the development of the ANSF, which
we all think is high risk, particularly on the ANP side. That's
one of the reasons General McChrystal has shifted to
partnering, and one of the reasons that we are devoting our
best people, best leaders, and resources to accelerating that,
so that we can do what Secretary Gates mentioned earlier.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I'll pursue that in just a minute,
here. So, I would assume that the number 30,000 would be a
little higher risk than the moderate risk that comes with
40,000 troops?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, what I said in my statement is,
General McChrystal is going to get these forces this year in as
fast as we can get them there. His biggest concern is to
reverse the momentum. He thinks he can do that with these
forces. He's going to get them on the same timeline he asked
for and at about the same level.
Senator Inhofe. I understand. Now, I was privileged to be
with now National Security Advisor General Jones the last week
that he was on the job over there, and I know some of the
differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, but I've been asked,
many times--and I think we should get what we're looking at on
the record. During the peak of the surge in Iraq, we had about
165,000 Americans, and then in Afghanistan, when you start with
68,000, add 30,000 to it, you're talking about 100,000 in a
country that's about twice the size of Iraq. Why does it take
fewer troops? What's the major reason it takes fewer of our
troops, our participation, in Afghanistan, relative to the
size, as it did in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. One of the great strengthens of the review
was to focus the objectives specifically, and, in particular,
focus the objectives on key population centers. So, the troops
that General McChrystal has asked for, and that will add up to
about 100,000, are in key areas, particularly, the Pashtun
Belt, where he fundamentally believes, with these troops, he
can turn this around. While the ratio is a guide, it is not
sacrosanct, and he's able to focus where we need to focus to
get at this insurgency. Actually, the same was true in Iraq;
it's just that this need, with respect to these ratios and
these numbers, is about right for Afghanistan.
Secretary Gates. Let me just add one sentence. That is one
of the reasons why the added contributions from our allies and
partners are so important, because, basically, we want them to
take responsibility for the northern and western parts of
Afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in
the southern and eastern parts of the country.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, I think one thing that all
of you have said in your opening statements is, we need greater
participation by the Afghans, the ANA, and we also need greater
participation by the non-American coalition. We all agree with
that. I happened to be over there in 2003, when we were turning
over the training of the ANA to the Afghans, and it happened to
be Oklahoma's 45th Guard Unit that was in charge of that.
Afghans contend that they're great warriors; and yet, you
looked around--and I have ever since then--you see so many of
these young, healthy Afghans, that are walking the streets, who
ought to be in the military. What can we do differently than
what we've done in the past to encourage a greater
participation with the ANA?
Secretary Gates. Let me start, and then I'll ask Admiral
Mullen to contribute.
One of the things that they are doing that actually, I
think, makes a real difference is significantly increasing the
pay, both for the ANP and the ANA. The reality is that, based
on the information available to us, in many instances the
Taliban actually pay more than the Afghan Government. So, one
of the things that we can do, particularly in terms of
retention, is to increase their pay. I think most people
believe that pay increase will have a real impact.
Admiral Mullen. The Secretary talked earlier about
retention and recruiting; clearly, incentivizing that, from a
pay standpoint, is critical.
The other fundamental difference from several years ago, or
really since General McChrystal got there, is this partnership
piece. What I think you saw, Senator, was mentoring and
training teams, that kind of thing.
Senator Inhofe. That's correct.
Admiral Mullen. This is partnering, and it's getting
everybody off their bases and out with the community. Those two
differences are significant.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, I appreciate it. I was going to ask a
similar question. What can we do differently, in terms of
encouraging more non-American coalition forces? I was pleased
with the one statement that the President made when he talked
about the fact that he had actually talked to some of the NATO
allies before coming out with this. I wish he had done the same
thing on the third missile defense site in Poland. But, by
doing that, do you think that's going to encourage them and
make them feel they're more a part of this? Was that a good
move?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. What else can we do to encourage more of
the non-American coalition?
Secretary Gates. Secretary Clinton has been talking to her
counterparts, I've been talking to my counterparts, and we are
both hearing: 1,000 here, 800 there, and so on. I think that we
will make the 5,000 to 7,000 goal, and I think, as somebody who
has been critical of the allies and was once derided by my
British colleague for megaphone diplomacy because I was giving
them such a hard time on this, we have to realize that the non-
U.S. forces have increased in the last 2 years, from about
17,000 to 18,000 troops, to almost 44,000 troops. So, with this
add, we will be at nearly 50,000 non-U.S. troops in
Afghanistan, and I think that's a pretty significant
commitment.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
My time has expired, but, for the record, Madam Secretary,
you made a statement about President Karzai and the speech that
he recently made. I hope it's not just empty words. But, if you
would, for the record, give us your indication, your feelings,
about what he can do now to accomplish what you had suggested.
Secretary Clinton. I certainly will, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton. If I could just quickly add, one of the
most important parts of President Kazai's speech was his
assertion that ANSF would be taking responsibility for many
important parts of the country within 3 years, and that they
would be responsible for the entire country within 5 years.
That is very much along the lines of the kind of partnering and
transition that we think is realistic; we just have to keep the
feet to the fire and keep pushing it forward.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, and Mr.
Chairman.
There's been much made about this withdrawal goal as an
arbitrary one, but let me ask you, Admiral Mullen: This was
based on the advice of General McChrystal, and your advice,
about your expectation of what the situation on the ground
would be in 2011, given these additional resources and
additional change of policy, correct?
Admiral Mullen. I have a very clear view, and, I think, so
do General Petraeus and General McChrystal, that by mid-2011 we
will know whether we are going to succeed here or not. That has
been something that we've discussed and we agreed on. That's
why getting these forces in so quickly is so important to try
to reverse this thing. Some of it is based on the fact that the
Marines have been in Helmand this year, so, in fact, the
Marines will be in one of the toughest places for three
fighting seasons, if you will--2009, 2010, and 2011--and we
think, with the additional forces, we will have very strong
indicators about how this is going and our ability to transfer
and transition at that point.
Senator Reed. So you wouldn't describe the date as
arbitrary?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir. It wasn't arbitrary.
That said, what the President also said, the transition
would be responsible and it would be based on conditions. All
of us can look out and speculate what those conditions will be,
but I think we have to be careful about that. Transition in
July 2011 is the goal right now.
Secretary Gates. I would just clarify, if I could, Senator?
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Gates. The July 2011 date was chosen because it
will be 2 years after the Marines arrived in Helmand.
Senator Reed. Giving them the fighting opportunities, for
want of a better term, perhaps fighting obligations or fighting
challenges, that have a deadline.
The issue of the deadline also raises the issue of our
posture in Iraq. There is a deadline there, too, Mr. Secretary,
and that is a legal deadline, which I understand can't be
changed without the permission of the Iraqis, even if
conditions deteriorated. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. That's correct. All of our combat forces
are to be out by the end of August 2010, and all forces out by
the end of 2011. We do have some flexibility, in terms of the
pacing of the withdrawals between now and the end of August,
but even with the hiccups over the elections and the problems
with respect to the election law, at this point General Odierno
does not see any need to alter the pacing of the draw-downs in
Iraq.
Senator Reed. But, that was agreed to by the Bush
administration as a hard deadline without conditions, is that
correct?
Secretary Gates. That is correct.
Senator Reed. One of the other aspects of this new plan was
the process of deliberation that went into it. It took time.
But, from your comments this morning, that time, I sense, was
well spent. One aspect of this I think, Admiral Mullen, was
that the original plan by General McChrystal with 40,000 troops
would not have had the flow of forces as quickly as the final
plan adopted by the President. Is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. In particular, with respect to the NATO
forces, they're not committed yet, but we're hopeful that they
will be available more quickly and that we will do everything
that we can to get as much capability and as quickly as
possible.
Senator Reed. But, that is only about NATO.
Admiral Mullen. I don't want to overstate that.
Senator Reed. Right.
Admiral Mullen. It is accelerated, to some degree; I don't
want to overstate that, but it really gets him the forces he
needs this year to turn this thing around.
Secretary Gates. I would add that the final component of
his original request, the final brigade combat team (BCT),
would not have arrived in Afghanistan until the summer of 2011.
My own personal recommendation was, there's no need to commit
to that since it's so far in the future, and so, to Admiral
Mullen's point earlier, fundamentally General McChrystal is
getting more troops faster than under the original plan.
Senator Reed. All right, let me just rephrase that.
This process, as you've suggested, has produced, in your
minds, a better proposal across the board than originally was
submitted by the individual components: the Ambassador, General
McChrystal, U.S. Central Command, et cetera. Is that your
assessment?
Secretary Gates. I'm convinced everybody in the process
feels that way. One of the things that was clearly an issue,
and one of the concerns that I had, coming out of the March
decisions, was that they were interpreted very broadly, in the
press and elsewhere, as a commitment to full-scale nation-
building and creating a strong central government in Kabul.
There was understandable skepticism over such broad objectives,
and it sounded very open-ended. So, one of the principal
components of the dialogue over the last 3 months was: How do
we refine and narrow the mission to make it achievable, and
achieve the objectives, in terms of our own security?
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, some of the criticism of even
talking about a date--regardless of whether it's a hard
unconditional withdrawal as in Iraq, or the proposal of the
President for Afghanistan--is that it would embolden the enemy,
on one hand, or, on the other hand, they would lie low and wait
us out. It strikes me that the Taliban has been emboldened
quite aggressively over the last several years without any type
of deadline, and if they sit it out, what will you do if they
simply gave up the operational space to us for 18 months or 2
years?
Secretary Gates. We certainly would welcome them not being
active for the next 18 months because it would give us open-
field running, with our allies and the Afghans, to build
capacity. I think, as you make the point, we are already in a
situation in which they are emboldened and in which they are
being aggressive and where they have the momentum right now.
It's not clear to me what more they could do than they're doing
right now. The forces that we're sending in are intended, in
the first instance, as the Admiral has said, to reverse that
momentum and deny them the ability to control territory.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. I thank all of you for all your
presentations this morning and for your service to the Country.
We only have one Commander in Chief, and I want to be
supportive. I think this plan is within the framework of
something I think can be effective. I intend to support you and
examine it as we go forward to make sure that we're fulfilling
our role here in Congress to provide oversight and our
responsibility to our constituents. I want to thank you for
your presentations.
Secretary Gates, we talked earlier this year about too-
grandiose expectations for a country that has as many
difficulties and is as poor, such as with Iraq or Afghanistan,
and you recognized that in your answer to our questions. I'd
like to pursue that a little bit. That is, what can we
realistically expect? How can we create stability and order in
Afghanistan as soon as possible so that we can reduce our
troops as soon as possible from that country?
Most of the talk I've been hearing, and in your statements,
indicate a commitment to ANA, which I assume is commanded and
directed from the central government in Kabul. But, you did
indicate in your statement that you would want to engage
communities to enlist more local security forces to protect
their own territory. I heard former National Security Advisor
Brzezinski this morning on television talk about the need for
local militias. I saw former President Musharraf from Pakistan
in his op-ed in the Wall Street Journal saying that Afghans,
for centuries, have been governed loosely, through a social
compact between all the ethnic groups under a sovereign king.
So, again, how do you envision making progress to transitioning
to local security forces? To what extent must those forces be
directly accountable to Kabul, and to what extent can they be
local?
Secretary Gates. There is a balance that we have to strike,
and we do. I have felt, ever since I got this job, that we have
been too focused on the central government in Kabul, and not
enough on the provinces, the districts, and the tribes. The key
here is community security organizations that are willing to
work with the government in Kabul and that do not become the
militias for warlords.
The balance we're trying to strike, and what General
McChrystal cares about a lot, as does everybody else, is: How
do we encourage these local policing functions? Some of the
efforts I've seen at work in Wardak Province, where they
recruit locals. The tribal elders are telling me the roads that
have been closed by the Taliban for years have been reopened by
these local groups, but they are within the framework of the
provincial governor and the district leadership, so that
they're not operating independently or working for warlords.
Figuring out how to encourage that kind of activity and build
on it, but keep it within the framework of people who are in
governing positions and not just independent warlords, is the
key to that effort.
But, that kind of subnational subprovincial effort, I
think, ultimately will play an important role in all of this.
Senator Sessions. Of course, the National Guards are an
example. Every State has a National Guard, and the Governors
still appoint the commanders of those National Guards in
America. I think there is a sense of loyalty and fierce
commitment to local areas in nations like Afghanistan that we
may not be fully respecting. I think you're on the right track
with that thought.
One of the generals whom I met in the Pentagon recently had
a picture of one of the local officials on his wall, and he was
very impressed with him. A very strong leader who was doing
good work. I'm not sure how well he would perform if he thought
that everything had to be run through the national government.
Secretary Gates. I would just add, Senator, I think that
one of the keys here is, in a country that is as rural and as
tribal as Afghanistan, I think one of the challenges in
recruiting people for the ANA and the ANP is getting them to
leave their local area. That's why I think these local security
activities, if we can work with the Afghans to keep them within
a governance model, have such promise because these guys are
basically protecting their own turf.
Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more, and they can be
paid what, for them, would be a good wage, but far less than it
would cost to have an American soldier there.
Mr. Secretary, I regret to have to raise the problem with
the tanker competition. I notice the Northrop Grumman team has
announced a concern so great that they are announcing they may
pull out from the competition.
A number of serious changes were made in the Request for
Proposal (RFP), each one of those tilted against a
transformational aircraft, tilted against a larger aircraft, an
aircraft that could provide more cargo capacity and other
capabilities. The RFP was received with great concern by the
Northrop team because it's quite different from the original
RFP. There's no doubt about that. All the change is tilted in
the way I've mentioned.
So, my question, briefly, to you is: Do you believe that
competition is important in this aircraft for DOD and the
warfighter? Will you consider discussing some of these matters
and be open to changing an RFP if it's not fair and does not do
the job that you need for DOD? Or has a final decision been
made, given the entire process of discussion has produced no
alteration to make absolutely no changes in the tentative RFP
that's out there?
Secretary Gates. We promised a fair and highly transparent
process. We believe that the RFP is evenhanded. We are in a
comment period, and we have received a lot of comments, both
from the competitors and from Congress, as well as others. The
comment period is coming to a close. If we were totally locked
into not changing anything, we wouldn't have gone through the
comment period. We will look at the comments that have been
made and make a judgment at that point. We believe that both of
the principal competitors are highly qualified, and we would
like to see competition continue in this process.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your
public service and for your continued public service.
During the 1970s and the 1980s, I had the privilege of
serving with Congressman Charlie Wilson in the House of
Representatives. Mr. Secretary, I am so happy to see in your
statement, and I quote you, ``We will not repeat the mistakes
of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend
into civil war and then into Taliban hands.''
It was Congressman Charlie Wilson at that time who
singularly had been, in large part, responsible for us getting
into Afghanistan in the first place and fought us getting out.
So, thank you for stating the United States policy as strongly
as you have.
Now, I'm going to ask you and Secretary Clinton a couple of
questions that I think are for the long term. Other than the
policy that was announced last night by the President with
regard to the military activities, for the long term, we have
to integrate the military with the other agencies of government
to help stabilize the country. For example, Congress has
provided our commanders in the field with the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP) to quickly initiate
reconstruction projects and provide immediate assistance to the
Afghan communities after they've actually finished their
combat. But, we don't seem to have done a great job in
answering how we move from the post-conflict reconstruction
projects, often overseen by the military, to the long-term
development projects overseen by civilians? I wish you all
would address how DOD and DOS are working together to make that
transition for the long term in Afghanistan more seamless.
Secretary Clinton, DOS has undertaken a major review of
U.S. assistance programs, including agricultural assistance,
particularly with regard to malnutrition as well as alternate
livelihoods to growing poppies in Afghanistan. The United
States has tended to favor large development contracts using
third-country nationals instead of investing in the Afghans
themselves, the grassroots efforts that employ Afghans, and
therefore providing them with the skills and assistance to get
their crops to markets. So, if you would share with the
committee about your review of agricultural assistance, and how
we're going to work to make it more effective as you and DOD
work together, please.
Secretary Gates. First I would say that this situation in
Afghanistan has been, shall we say, personally of interest to
me, having worked with Congressman Charlie Wilson back in the
1980s, which was always an interesting experience.
First of all, the specific answer to your question is,
Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are, as we speak,
working on their joint civil-military campaign plan, which I
think will establish the basis for the kind of transition that
you're talking about. But, I would tell you, one of the
obstacles, at least in my opinion from observing, is that DOS
does not have the kind of flexibility in the way that it spends
money, and the ability to do so quickly and make commitments
quickly and have agility because of the number of restrictions
and processes that they have to go through with respect to
their funds. Frankly, I think one of the things that the CERP
funds have taught us, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that
that kind of flexibility and agility has been a huge asset for
the United States in both places.
Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, let me start by saying
that it's been a real privilege working with Secretary Gates
and DOD in trying to figure out how to have a more integrated
civilian-military strategy. Secretary Gates has been one of the
best advocates that DOS and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) have for increasing our funding, our
personnel, our flexibility and agility, so that we do have the
resources and capacity to be quickly responsive.
What we have done in the last 10 months is, number one, to
investigate very thoroughly what was on the ground in
Afghanistan, and we didn't particularly come away impressed. As
I said in my testimony, there were a little over 300 civilians.
Many of them were on 6-month rotations. If you looked at their
in-country time, a lot of them spent time out of the country.
They did not have well-defined missions. Most of our civilian
aid going into Afghanistan had been contracted out without
adequate oversight or accountability.
We stopped all contracts going into Afghanistan. We began
doing a complete scrub of them. I'm not saying that we have yet
perfected our oversight, but we have been working very hard to
improve it dramatically.
We are strongly supporting the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). We would like to
actually learn from the mistakes that are being made and in a
timely way, rather than waiting, as we did in Iraq, and then
being told that we've wasted tens of billions of dollars, which
is just unacceptable.
We also began to recruit civilians who were well suited for
the jobs we needed. There was a tendency in the past, for both
Iraq and Afghanistan, to basically tell Foreign Service
Officers, Civil Service Officers, in both DOS and USAID, that
if they went, spent their 6 months in one of those two places,
they would have an advantage in getting the best assignment
next. So, if you wanted to end up in Paris, you'd go to Baghdad
for 6 months, whether your particular expertise and experience
was needed or not.
So, we have painstakingly, under the leadership of Deputy
Secretary Jack Lew, actually matched each individual to the job
that was required. We will triple the numbers that we have on
the ground by early January. We've also required all of our
civilians to train at Camp Atterbury in Indiana, where our
military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) members train, so
that we can, from the very beginning, start integrating our
civilian-military forces.
I think that we're learning a lot of lessons as we go, but
you put your finger on one of our biggest problems. The CERP
funds that are accessible to our military forces, both in and
immediately after combat operations, are a tremendous tool for
doing projects and for winning allegiance. It's even being
used, as it was in Iraq, for enticing people off the
battlefield. There's nothing comparable on the civilian side.
We have to requisition money, we have to wait. A young captain
can access CERP funds in a matter of hours; an experienced
agricultural specialist, a rule-of-law specialist, has to wait
weeks, if not months, to get a project approved.
So, if we're going to be successful, and if we're going to,
frankly, be the kind of partners that our military needs, we
have to have more tools. We're getting more resources, but the
budget situation is going to be very tight, as everybody knows,
and whether our civilian personnel will have the resources they
need to be the partners they are required to be is going to be
challenging.
We will come with a very specific set of tasks, but your
question really goes to the heart of what we are trying to
achieve.
The final point I would make is that we have civilians in
DOS and from USAID serving all over the world in very dangerous
settings. They are in war and conflict areas, like Eastern
Congo, without any security support. When we have our troops on
the ground, as we do in Iraq or in Afghanistan, we try to take
even additional measures to make sure that our people can get
around. But, as Senator McCain said, it's very difficult
because of the security situation.
What we are doing is partnering more by embedding our
civilians with our troops. That carries a mixed message, as you
might guess, because we're trying to have a civilian face on
it, but we have to have enough security to function.
This is a highly complex assignment. We send individuals on
the civilian side; DOD sends units, battalions, brigades. We
are trying to do something that's never been done before, and
we need the advice, the help, and the resources that are
required.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since we have to be successful at the end of this trial
time, we'll look forward to that appropriation request, Madam
Secretary, and see if we can act expeditiously on it.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, to
all three of you, for your leadership at this very critical
time in the history of the world, not just our country.
Secretary Gates, I thought the President did a good job
last night of laying out the scenario as well as the way
forward. However, having just heard your opening statement, I
thought you were much stronger, even much more powerful, and I
hope that you will carry the message you brought to this
committee to our friends in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan
because, as you said, the perception among the Pakistanis has
to be that we're going to be there. The perception among the
Afghans has to be that we're going to stay there for the long
term. Otherwise, as one of the Taliban commented in the Afghan
press when I was over there last week over Thanksgiving, that,
``If the President comes out and says that, `In 2013, the
United States is out of here,' then we're going to sit back and
just wait until 2013.'' We all know that's the case. So, you're
exactly right, and I do truly hope that you will take that
message to our folks in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan at the
leadership level.
Admiral Mullen, you made a comment that I want to drill
down on for just a second. You said we will know by mid-2011 if
we're going to be successful. Now, let's assume that we are
being successful, that General Carter is doing well down in
Regional Command (RC)-South, that General Scaparotti is doing
well in RC-East, moving against the Haqqani Network, and that
the Pakistanis are stepping up in a greater fashion and helping
us out.
What does this mean, with the President having said that
we're going to start bringing our troops home in 18 months, but
if we are successful, what does that mean with respect to
bringing home the troops?
Admiral Mullen. Senator Chambliss, I think you very
accurately captured the overall situation. The Pakistanis have
started to move; we have a new government with a newly-elected
President in Afghanistan; we have great commanders on the
ground in our leadership; we have an increased level of
support, not just in terms of numbers, but, really, support
from our NATO allies; and we have a very unpopular insurgency
with respect to the Afghan people. I think there are great
opportunities here over the next 18 to 24 months. One of the
reasons it's so important, and to get these troops there is, as
I've said before, to turn this insurgency around. General
McChrystal believes, General Petraeus believes, and I believe
we can do that over the course of the next 18 to 24 months.
That will then provide an opportunity to start a kind of
transition, as far as security responsibility and thinning of
our forces, there. It's very difficult to know exactly what the
conditions will be, but if we get this right, they'll be a lot
better in the east and a lot better in the south, and provide
us an opportunity to transition; which is why, on the other
side, if we are unable to do that by then, I think we have to
reassess our strategy.
Senator Chambliss. So, what I'm hearing is that there is
flexibility in that timeline, based upon success or lack
thereof?
Admiral Mullen. I think the timeline is clear. I think the
flexibility is in where we transition and where we turn over
responsibility. This is something we all understand, and we
think we'll be able to do that. It's a little difficult to
predict exactly where that's going to occur, right now.
Senator Chambliss. Right.
Secretary Gates. Senator, if I might just add because I
appreciated your comments about the longer term. Now, what I'm
about to state is just my opinion, because, frankly, this
wasn't a part of our dialogue over the past 2 or 3 months, or
not a significant part of it. But, in my mind I think that--
particularly if the Afghans want us to--we need to think in
terms of a very long-term willingness to work with the Afghans,
in terms of military training, in terms of equipping, the kind
of long-term partnership we have with many countries around the
world, where we have a certain military presence in that
country, but--it's not a combat presence, it's a training-and-
equipping and that kind of a role--one where we are clearly
seen as their continuing partner. That would be my personal
opinion of how I would see this unfolding long-term, after our
combat forces are principally gone from Afghanistan.
Senator Chambliss. I appreciate that. My worry is, though,
that the headline in the Islamabad press today is that,
``President Sending 30,000 Troops; They're Coming Out in 18
Months.'' That's why I think what you are saying is important.
You carry your message--all of you--of exactly what we mean by
that 18 months.
Secretary Clinton, I have not always been a fan of the work
that USAID has done, but I've been in Afghanistan--not just
last Thursday, but about 6 months ago also--and had the
opportunity to visit with your folks. I have to say that
they're doing an amazing job over there, with respect to
educating children--we've gone from 900,000 to 6 million
children in school--and we still have another 6 million to go.
But, it's because, in my opinion, of what USAID has done, and
with the security that's been given by the military, that we
are seeing those children educated, which, for the long term, I
think is the biggest issue that we have.
Now, we assumed the other day that we knew what the
President might say, and he did call for a surge. When I told
your folks that, while we're surging troops, there also needed
to be a surge on the civilian side. You have indicated that
you're plussing-up those folks; that is the same thing DOS told
us the other day.
But, I worry about what's going to happen in 18 months.
Because security in Afghanistan has to be the way forward, not
just from the military standpoint; your folks on the ground,
DOS civilians, have to have security in order to be able to
improve the lives of the Afghans.
I'd just like your comment on whether or not you think the
levels you're talking about are enough. Are you going to ask
for more resources, for more people? Where do you see the way
forward?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, thank you for those very kind
words, which are so well-deserved by our people on the ground
in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They are really responding to the
mission and working extremely hard; but, of course, they have
to do so within a secure environment.
Our civilians are out around the country. They are also, of
course, in Kabul, working with government ministries. USAID is
certifying ministries, so we can determine which ones are
accountable and transparent enough to receive additional funds
from us. They are truly working at all levels of the Afghan
Government and in many sectors of society. But, security is a
key element as to whether they can be effective. Now, a lot of
our civilian workers are veterans of other very difficult
security environments; they are willing to go places that a lot
of folks are not, and I give them great credit for that. I
think we just have to come to you with our best estimate as to
what will be required to have the kind of civilian surge you
just referred to, because, as we put additional troops in, we
want to have more civilians embedded with them, we want to have
them right there, on the ground when combat is over, to begin
the building process and partnering with their civilian
counterparts. We are tripling the number that we found when we
got there, and we're changing their mission and requiring much
more of them. But, the numbers are going to have to grow if we
expect to deliver on what is required.
Senator Chambliss. You have an amazing PRT down in Lashkar
Gah; they're doing great work.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation to the three of you for your
continuing service, as well.
I've been a long-time advocate for benchmarks or
measurements to develop in the conduct of our missions, so we
can measure progress and continue to be objective while
engaging the efforts in Afghanistan-Pakistan. I know this
administration is committed--our allies--are committed to
proffering these objective benchmarks.
Are we in the process of developing new benchmarks in
connection with the new mission so that we can determine
whether we're 25 percent towards achieving certain goals, 50
percent, or a lot more needs to be done? If we are in the
process of doing that, will we be in a position to change the
benchmarks as things develop on the ground?
I'll start with you, Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. The answer is yes. I mentioned earlier
that the President has made it clear that there will be another
thorough review in a year, in December 2010, but we have
developed some clear benchmarks, in terms of not only the
security arena, but in terms of ANSF recruitment, retention,
fielding, partnering, and so on. The President made it pretty
clear and, I think, mentioned to the congressional leadership
yesterday, that he's expecting to get monthly reports on how
we're doing against these. We also have benchmarks on the
civilian side, as well.
Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, our civilian, military,
and intelligence agencies have all developed a range of
benchmarks, and they're in a constant process of being refined.
As Secretary Gates said, we're going to be looking to report on
those going forward.
The military has their own benchmarks, but, as Admiral
Mullen referenced, we have taken a much closer look at
districts, who controls what, what the capacity of governance
is, whether there's a shadow government, how much of national
sovereignty can be asserted. We're looking at those kinds of
yardstick measurements on the military side.
On the civilian side, a lot of it depends upon our
assessment of where we're starting. As Senator Chambliss said,
when President Karzai took office, there were a little less
than a million students in school, and they were virtually all
boys; now there are 7 million, and about 40 percent are girls.
But, there are 5 to 6 million yet to go. So, that's a very
clear benchmark.
In the agricultural area, we've already rehabilitated
irrigation canals and we've worked closely with the
agricultural ministry. We helped them, as did other
international donors with whom we coordinate, to provide
heartier seeds so that they had a bumper wheat crop. They just
had their first big shipment of apples and pomegranates to
India. We are supporting their acquisition of better fertilizer
and farm equipment. So, again, there are measurable benchmarks.
How much is the agricultural economy improving? How many people
are employed? What is the relationship between a lower poppy
crop and a higher crop of licit goods?
We are working with governance and rule-of-law challenges,
as well.
So, in each of these areas, we have realistic expectations,
we are trying to have good measurements, and we will be
carefully following that to see what kind of progress we're
making.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that. I think that is
critically important for not only determining how we're doing,
but also, I think, in keeping the support of the American
people, in seeing that progress is, in fact, being made, and
where it isn't, that a plan is now in place to try to change
the direction.
In that connection, do we have any specific ideas about how
to assist President Karzai in rooting out--if we can be of
assistance in that--the corruption within the government? It's
one thing to tell them that stopping corruption is what needs
to be done; it's another thing to expect it to be done. Can we
be of assistance, which I think probably would assure us of
some success?
Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, we have made a number of
requests of the Karzai Government. Obviously, who is put into
the cabinet, who are named as governors, and those who hold
other responsible positions are key to everything that happens
going forward.
We have focused our efforts in four areas. First, to
enhance law enforcement cooperation. When I talk about the
civilian work that is being done, I don't want just to talk
about DOS and USAID. We have a lot of very experienced
officials from the Drug Enforcement Agency, from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, from the Department of Justice, as
well as places like USDA. We are enhancing intelligence-sharing
and cooperation on corruption and major crime.
Second, we are certifying Afghan ministries, and there are
some ministries that we believe are functioning well enough now
that we can, with confidence, provide funding and hold their
leadership accountable; others we're not going to touch until
they're cleaned out. They're not getting any U.S. civilian
assistance.
Third, we want to strengthen SIGAR. We are asking for
additional resources on the ground with auditors because we
want realtime reports.
Fourth, we are supporting the Major Crimes Task Force
(MCTF) and other Afghan anticorruption efforts. The MCTF is a
vetted Afghan unit supported by U.S. and British law
enforcement officials. It's focusing on corruption as part of
its mandate. It's recently charged several Afghan officials,
and others are under investigation.
Ultimately, it's up to the Afghans to end corruption, and
we have an expectation of that. We have no illusions that this
is going to happen easily or quickly, but we know how important
it is to be working to try to root it out.
Secretary Gates. I would just add, Senator, that I think we
have to be honest with ourselves that the massive influx of
money into Afghanistan that comes from ourselves and our
international partners is a huge factor in this, or at least a
significant factor. As Secretary Clinton has suggested, I think
we need to go back and look at how we are dispensing money and
how we are contracting and so on. The subject, I know, is near
and dear to Senator McCaskill's heart. But, how can we leverage
the areas where we're writing the checks into minimizing the
opportunities for that money to be siphoned off on its way to
the purpose we intend?
Secretary Clinton. Senator Nelson, if I could just add,
because Secretary Gates raised an issue that is connected with
this, and that is our contracting processes, something that
Senator McCaskill is focused on. Think about the long supply-
chain lines that we have getting into Afghanistan. When our
equipment, our food, everything that our troops use, our
civilians depend on, largely comes from the outside; when a
ship docks at Karachi, and the goods get loaded onto trucks,
and then the trucks start that long trip through Pakistan, up
into Afghanistan. It's a very difficult environment to operate
in. There's a lot of evidence that, in addition to funding from
the Persian Gulf and the illegal narcotics trade, that
siphoning off contractual money from the international
community--not just in terms of outright fraud and corruption,
but also intimidation and extortion--is a major source of
funding for the Taliban. We just have to be honest, here, about
how complex and difficult this problem is, and how, frankly, it
is not all an Afghan problem.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for coming. I know it's been a difficult
process you've been involved in.
As you were debating what to do, did all of you realize
this is the last best chance America has to get it right in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Politically, militarily, and
otherwise?
Secretary Clinton. We also realized how sad it was that we
were trying to make that decision 8 years later.
Senator Graham. Yes, ma'am. It is sad. It would have been
sad to have lost in Iraq. It would have been devastating.
Secretary Clinton. We'll talk about that offline sometime.
Senator Graham. There you go. [Laughter.]
We're talking about the future now. We're talking about
winning, I hope.
Please rank the consequences of a failed state in
Afghanistan to our national security interest, 1 being
inconsequential, 10 being grave. Where would you put a failed
state in Afghanistan, in terms of our national security
interest?
Secretary Clinton?
Secretary Clinton. Senator Graham, I would put it at a 10.
I think a failed state that is totally lawless, that is a safe
haven for terrorists, particularly the syndicate of terrorism
headed by al Qaeda, poses a direct threat to the security of
the United States of America.
Senator Graham. I think that does it. Do both of you,
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, agree with that? [Both
answered in the affirmative.] Okay. I think that is a good
evaluation. As to those who criticized the President, I think
all 3 of our witnesses are right; he did this because he
realized it was a 10, too, I hope. I'm sure he did.
The July 2011 withdrawal statement--Secretary Gates, who is
the audience for that statement?
Secretary Gates. I think that there are at least two
principal audiences. One audience--and a very important one--is
the Afghan Government, that they must accept responsibility, in
terms of their own governance, in terms of their own security
forces, in terms of accepting their responsibility and
understanding that they must take ownership of this conflict on
their own soil, that it's not just going to be fought by
foreigners on their behalf.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Secretary Gates. I think the other audience, frankly, is
the American people, who are weary after 8 years of war, and to
let them know this isn't going to go on for another 10 years.
Senator Graham. But, there are other people listening, and
I guess that's my problem. I can understand the frustration of
the American people. We've been here 8 years, and it seems to
be that it's not working out the way we would all hope. I can
understand that. But, I can't understand letting Afghanistan go
back into the abyss again. That's my dilemma.
In December 2010, you will begin to evaluate Afghanistan
anew, is that correct? Check our progress?
Secretary Gates. We're going to have a continuing process,
but there will be a full-scale reevaluation of where we stand
in December, yes.
Senator Graham. My question is, will the evaluation
decision be how fast we withdraw or whether or not we should
withdraw?
Secretary Gates. I think it'll be principally about whether
the strategy that we've put in place is working.
Senator Graham. Is it possible, in December 2010, to reach
the conclusion, ``It is not wise to withdraw anyone in July
2011?'' Is that possible?
Secretary Gates. I think the President, as Commander in
Chief, always has the option to adjust his decision.
Senator Graham. So, it is not locked in that we're going to
be withdrawing troops in July 2011; we're going to look,
throughout the process, particularly in December 2010, and make
a decision then as to whether we should withdraw at a certain
pace or not withdraw at all. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. I guess the way I would phrase it is that
it is our plan to begin this transition process in July 2011.
If circumstances dictate in December, I think, as I say, the
President always has the freedom to adjust his decisions.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Admiral Mullen, is it your understanding that it's
possible, in December 2010, not to begin to withdraw in 2011?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, I'd reiterate the President has
choices, as the President.
Senator Graham. So, his statement last night did not bind
him to start withdrawing in 2011. That's the understanding of
this panel?
Secretary Gates. I'd defer to Secretary Clinton, but I
think it was a clear statement of his strong intent.
Senator Graham. Right. I understand why he'd want to let
the American people know that we're not going to be there
forever, but this is a critically important event. I think that
the success of this operation depends on will and resolve, and
I just don't want the July 2011 statement to be seen by our
enemy, which is not one of the audiences you mentioned, which I
think are listening, that we have somehow locked ourselves into
leaving.
The question is, have we locked ourselves into leaving,
Secretary Clinton, in July 2011?
Secretary Clinton. Senator Graham, I do not believe we have
locked ourselves into leaving, but what we have done--and I
think it was an appropriate position for the President to
take--is to signal very clearly, to all audiences, that the
United States is not interested in occupying Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary Clinton. We are not interested in running their
country or building their nation. We are trying to give them
the space and time to be able to build up sufficient forces to
defend themselves. It is the best assessment of our military
experts, as evidenced by Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
General Petraeus, General McChrystal, and others, that by July
2011, there can be the beginning of a responsible transition
that will, of course, be based on conditions.
Here's what the President said, ``Allow us to begin the
transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011. We will
execute this transition responsibly, taking into account
conditions on the ground.'' To me, that is exactly the
appropriate approach for the President to take. As Secretary
Gates has said, the President's authority and his
responsibility as Commander in Chief require him to be
constantly assessing the situation, which he will do.
Senator Graham. Thank you. My time is up, but I would just
like to remind everyone there is another audience that wasn't
mentioned by Secretary Gates. It's the enemy. They have a vote
in this war. They are a participant in it.
Finally, the last question, if you could, Secretary Gates
and Admiral Mullen, would you grade NATO in terms of their
effectiveness as a fighting force over the last several years?
Secretary Gates. I think that it varies from country to
country, Senator.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, they have bled and died.
Senator Graham. I know they have, but would you give them
an A to an F? How is NATO as an effective fighting force, an A
to an F? Not just part of it, all of it.
Secretary Gates. Senator, in all honesty, I don't think any
good purpose is served by doing that. I would say that those
who have been fighting with us in the south: the Australians,
the British, the Dutch, the Danes, the Canadians, the Poles,
I'd give them all an A.
Senator Graham. Great.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by again communicating my respect for all
three of you for the service that you have given our country,
and for the good of our country, in a lot of different ways. I
also respect the process that this administration has gone
through, with you and others, such as National Security Advisor
General Jones, in terms of trying to work out what you may call
the ``best possible formula,'' perhaps it's the most realistic,
in your view. There's not a lot of good in the options that are
available in that part of the world.
There's been a lot of time spent on the notion of the dates
that were mentioned in the President's speech. I would prefer
to focus, as I have in the past, on the conditions that might
bring about an endpoint to our involvement. I would like to see
an endpoint, and this is something that you can expect to hear
more on, from our perspective, over the coming months. What
exactly is going to bring about the conditions under which we
can end our involvement?
There's also been a good bit of discussion about the nature
of the Karzai Government and issues such as corruption. I would
like to defer a dialogue on that until tomorrow; I'm on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I would like to address
this tomorrow. I think perhaps we may reach a point where we
might encourage the Afghanis to examine their constitution that
was arrived at, at the Bonn Conference in 2001, to try to
enable a greater devolution of this government, so you can get
into issues such as local authority and corruption at a local
level.
Where I really would like to spend my time today is how we
are separating out who actually should be confronted as an
enemy on the battlefield. As all of you know, a defining
characteristic throughout the history of Afghanistan has been
its resistance to foreign influence, particularly foreign
occupation, and I would say, very successful resistance. When
we talk about the Taliban, we're talking about terms that we
use interchangeably, but which aren't particularly
interchangeable. We had a pretty vicious Taliban Government,
which we assisted in getting rid of. We have an ideologically
charged group right now that operates principally in Pakistan,
which is associated with the forces of international terrorism.
Then, we have a third group which many believe is a group that
is growing with the greatest speed and that from the
perspective of many Afghanis, is ideological only in the sense
that it resents our presence, and is not viewed as a terrorist
organization, specifically, or even aligned with terrorist
organizations. It's viewed by many in Afghanistan as a popular
movement, who doesn't like a central government and whose size
can actually be elevated, its recruitment process can be
increased, by the wrong application of American force.
In that respect, rather than being an element that is
aligned with international terrorism, it is viewed by many
Afghanis as something of a regional militia that doesn't
particularly want to threaten U.S. interests outside of
Afghanistan. I would like to hear from you, and I'll start with
Admiral Mullen, but I invite anyone who wants to contribute,
how were these distinctions, in terms of history and in terms
of participation, made as you developed the policy that was now
announced?
Admiral Mullen. The citizens of Afghanistan are a people
very tired of war. They are very much waiting on the fence to
see which way this is going to go. All the information I've
gotten, both personally when I've been there as well as from
the commanders on the ground, indicate not only are they tired,
but they're not very supportive or not supportive at all of the
Taliban. It's a very small percentage that is supportive. I'm
talking about the last group, more specifically.
We believe there's a large percentage of that group,
Taliban sympathizers, which can be reconciled and reintegrated
with the right approach.
The other thing, in a larger sense, that I've watched over
the last couple of years, which is of growing concern, is the
collaboration of the Taliban. I understand that they can have
somewhat ideologically different perspectives, but they have
come together in ways that actually are hugely concerning to
me, on both sides.
Senator Webb. Since my time is running out, I want to seize
on something you just said, because I think it's a very
important clarification that you can make here. If those are
people who can be brought over to our view, and if we're having
trouble recruiting on the ANA, which we seem to be, while the
size of this resistance element seems to be growing, how are
you making the distinction, in terms of operational policy that
would give them reason to change their affiliation?
Admiral Mullen. If I understand your question correctly,
it's really done through direct engagement at the local level.
We've seen, very recently, numbers of them say, ``No, I don't
want to do this anymore.'' But, as I think you understand as
well as or better than anybody, we have to have a secure
environment in which they can do this. We don't have that in
many places.
So, General McChrystal and others are actually very
optimistic with respect to doing this, but we can't do it
without a level of security we just don't have in many of these
places.
Senator Webb. So, you do have an optimism that, over time,
these are people who, and despite the characterization that we
presently use, can be convinced to affiliate with the national
government?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, I do, I think they can.
In the end, I think the only way that we're not going to
occupy them is to not occupy them. That is a challenge that we
are, over time, committed to not doing that. The President
spoke to that last night. But, that's a message, obviously, we
have to deliver in fact, not just speaking to it, and to give
them responsibility for their own security. There's a big part
of the strategy that focuses locally--the Secretary talked
about it earlier--to not turn it back into warlordism. That's a
very delicate balance. But, the commanders on the ground that
I've engaged with are comfortable that this is very possible.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, welcome back to the committee. Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for your service.
I think there's already been some discussion about the ANP
and ANSF, at least in terms of the numbers. I'm interested in
knowing how analogous the situation there is with the training
and equipping of the ANSF to Iraq, and just in terms of their
capacity to take over battlespace, and how that fits in with
the timeline that you have laid out. What made the Iraq surge,
I think, so effective, along with the counterinsurgency
strategy there, was that the Iraqi Security Forces eventually
were able to step up and provide security for the population.
Do you see parallels there? How quickly might we expect that
capacity and capability to grow?
Admiral Mullen. I think, Senator, it's very much tied to
the momentum piece, which is going against us right now.
Turning this momentum around in a positive way makes a lot of
things possible, including improved retention, improved
recruiting, reduced attrition, and a much better overall ANSF.
That's why the security piece and the momentum piece are so
critical.
There are many analogies, I think, that are comparable
between both Iraq and Afghanistan. We're very concerned about
creating midgrade leaders, junior leaders, as well as officer
leaders, in both the ANA and ANP. That was a significant
challenge in Iraq. It is more so on the ANP side than on the
ANA side. Again, the same was true in Iraq. In fact, it was
really late 2007 before the police in Iraq really started to
step out and the leadership was there.
I think we have to be careful with comparisons. This is a
force that's been around. Certainly on the ANA side, they've
been in the fight, they've been in the fight a long time, and
they're good warriors. They have taken to this partnership
approach that General McChrystal has put in place. So, I think
there's a lot of potential there. There are similarities and
there are differences, and we're trying to take advantage of
those lessons to integrate those into an accelerated training
and equipping plan right now for them.
Senator Thune. Last night, the President said that we will
support efforts by the Afghan Government to open the door to
those Taliban who abandon violence. General Petraeus has
previously indicated that we lacked the nuanced and
sophisticated understanding of the Taliban to identify and
distinguish between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements of
the Taliban. My question is, how do we go about reliably
identifying the reconcilable elements of the Taliban?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, there are several efforts
already underway to answer the questions that General Petraeus
and others have posed. As you might know, General McChrystal
has asked General Lamb, a retired British general who was
instrumental in the work that was done in Iraq, to come to
Afghanistan to advise him. The Afghans themselves, led by
President Karzai, have a pretty good idea of who they think
can, if persuaded, be reintegrated.
But, this is very much a case-by-case effort. There are
certain aspects of it that we are very insistent on. One, that
they have to renounce any ties to al Qaeda, they have to
renounce violence, and they have to be willing to reintegrate
into Afghan society in a peaceful way.
We know that some of the Taliban will not renounce al
Qaeda; they are too closely interconnected. We know that
others, who call themselves ``Taliban,'' want to have a
continuing means of acting in a military capacity, and we want
them to have to give up their commitment to violence and, maybe
join the ANA, if that's appropriate, or join one of the
community defense initiatives. This is very painstaking work.
We have very high expectations for who we would support
reintegrating.
Secretary Gates. Let me just add to that. I think that,
here again, there may be some parallels with Iraq.
First of all, I think that reintegration, particularly at
the front end, is going to be retail, not wholesale. We will
end up, as we did in Iraq, turning to local leaders that we
have confidence in who will, in turn, then vouch for these
people and who will essentially pledge their community to the
reliability of these people that are willing to come away from
the Taliban.
A second point, we think that there's a fair percentage of
the foot soldiers in the Taliban that basically do this for
pay. So, creating economic opportunities as an alternative in
order to support their families is another vehicle for this.
Finally, to the Admiral's point, security is essential.
There are too many examples of people who have tried to leave
the Taliban themselves and all of their family have been
killed. Until we can provide a secure environment, at the local
level, that gives them some confidence they will not be
retaliated against, it will be a problem.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo the comments of some of my colleagues, that
I think the President is very fortunate to have the three of
you, and our country is even more fortunate. I appreciate your
service, and I appreciate how hard you have worked at coming up
with the best answer among a list of very bad choices.
It won't surprise you that I want to talk a little bit
about contracting. I will tell you that we've made progress.
When I joined this committee in 2007, no one could tell us how
many contractors were in Iraq. There wasn't even a number
available. We have made progress.
Now I want to talk a little bit today, if I have time,
about the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker,
the database that we put in place to try to track contractors,
and the problems that are arising about a lack of consistency
between DOS, USAID, and DOD on how they're utilizing this
database, and how much we can rely on the numbers. To the
extent that we can rely on the numbers, we know we have, as of
June, approximately 75,000 contractors in Afghanistan and 5,200
private security contractors in Afghanistan. One of the stark
differences between the contracting force in Afghanistan and
that in Iraq is the predominance of Afghans in our contracting
force; 50,000-plus of the contractors are Afghans and 5,000 of
the 5,200 private security contractors are Afghans. It's not
clear to me whether this has been purposeful or situational. I
would appreciate if any of you could briefly address whether or
not this is purposeful or situational.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I share the experience you just
described, because in February, when I asked to see a list of
all the contracts in Afghanistan, at that time we couldn't
produce such a list. We have been trying to not only get a
handle on the contracts, but trying to persuade contractors to
employ more Afghans. I think what you referred to is probably
both. I think it is, to some extent, a message, but it's also
just the reality of who is there and what the mission requires.
Clearly, what we're trying to do is review every single
contract. We stopped every one until we had a better idea of
what they were for and who they went to. We're trying to assert
more DOS and USAID oversight, and that's why we asked
Ambassador Tony Wayne to go to Afghanistan to run the civilian
side. We have to do a better job coordinating with, not just
our friends at DOD, but all the other government agencies. We
really welcome your efforts, and we want to be as cooperative
as we can.
Senator McCaskill. Let's talk a little bit about the U.S.
Army's Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program IV (LOGCAP IV).
Good news: We competed it. Good news: We ended up with three
different companies that are eligible for contracts under
LOGCAP IV. Not as good of news: I think I understand the
reality of why this probably occurred; we now have, instead of
one monopoly on logistical support for our troops, two
monopolies, in that we have given the contracts on a regional
basis as opposed to a task basis. Fluor has gotten the north
and DynCorp has gotten the south. They are not task-competing;
they have, in fact, been selected, it's my understanding from
the research we've done, to do everything in those regions.
I understand the efficiencies you get by doing that, but
what it really brings up again is the incredible importance of
monitoring and oversight, because when you have one company
doing all the work, even though it's not the whole contingency
operation, it is certainly within the north and the south. What
I am worried about is that there was testimony this summer that
we had 600 oversight positions vacant in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It wasn't clear from the testimony that was given at the time
how many of those positions were in Afghanistan. But, are we
plussed-up to where we need to be with oversight and monitoring
of these logistical contracts that cost us way more than they
ever should have cost us in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. As is often the case with these things,
you're probably better informed than we are. But, what I will
tell you is, we do not have as many contract monitors in
Afghanistan as we want. One of the things that I have
mentioned, both at the White House and within DOD as we talk
about 30,000 troops and so on, is, let's not forget about
contract monitors, logistical experts, and so on, to make sure
that we're doing this right. What I would like to do, Senator,
is take your question for the record, and we'll get back to you
on the number of vacancies we have for contract monitors in
Afghanistan.
Senator McCaskill. That would be great.
[The information referred to follows:]
Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) in Afghanistan: CORs are
trained and appointed to provide day-to-day oversight of Department of
Defense (DOD) contracts. DOD has a broad-based, focused effort to
identify and train CORs prior to deployment as part of our overall
effort to improve oversight of contracts in support of contingency
operations. DOD tracks required and assigned CORs on contracts in
Afghanistan, especially given the coming surge in requirements in
support of the Afghan theater. For example, contracts delegated to
Defense Contract Management Agency for administration in Afghanistan
currently require 473 CORs and have 414 CORs assigned for an 88 percent
fill rate as of January 2009. Achieving 88 percent this month
represents a 38 percentage point surge since September 2009. This rapid
increase highlights DOD's ongoing efforts to improve contract oversight
through the timely training and assignment of CORs.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, if I can only add one thing. This
goes back to your first question. In particular, I've asked
this question in RC-East, of General Scaparotti and his people
a few months ago, with respect to who gets contracts. There's a
very specific effort there to hire Afghans first. That, I
think, is represented in the numbers that you're talking about,
which, to me, makes all the sense in the world. You obviously
have to have somebody qualified. But to be able to put that
kind of income into that country is really critical.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, could I just add one other
consideration that I wish we could take into account?
There is an inherent tension between more monitoring, more
auditing, more contract oversight, and the kind of flexibility
and agility that we were talking about with Senator Bill
Nelson's question. We have to figure out how to manage risk
without being overly adverse to risk. We have to give our
people in the field--and I'm talking just on the civilian side
right now--enough discretion to be able to make smart
decisions, and yes, maybe even make some mistakes, because they
might have made an investment where it didn't pay off, but it
was worth trying.
It's complicated. We want to account for every single
penny, but we also want to be sure we have enough flexibility
to be smart as we try to do the job we've been given.
I don't know what the answer to that is, but I'd ask for
your consideration as we move forward so we strike the right
balance.
Senator McCaskill. I understand that tension, and it is a
real tension. I think, unfortunately, the lesson learned in
Iraq was that there wasn't enough of that tension. It was all
about, ``We need it today. We need it tomorrow. We don't care
what it costs. Get it here.'' Finding that balance is what
we're talking about here. That's why the data being input
correctly and why the oversight personnel are so important; if
we don't have those, we never create that tension. That's my
concern.
My time's up, and I don't have time to go into CERP. I do
think we need to take a hard look at CERP and whether it has
morphed into something other than what it was intended to be,
whether we're doing too many big projects. Are we monitoring or
are we just obligating? I know we've executed about $1.6
billion in CERP in Afghanistan since 2004. I think we need to
continue to look at CERP.
I'll do some questions for the record on the CERP funds
since I don't have time in my questioning today. I will look
forward to continuing to work on these issues with you and your
great folks that are trying hard.
Thank you again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Admiral Mullen. I've not had the opportunity to talk to you
about these issues because I'm a new Senator, but I appreciate
that opportunity today.
Let me say, first, that I want to join my colleagues in
commending the President for his recommendation for the
additional troops. I think it's the right thing to do. I had
the opportunity to go to Afghanistan in late October and meet
with General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry and talk
about these issues. I believe that the counterinsurgency
strategy is the right tactic that we need for success.
There's been a lot of discussion this morning about the 18
months and what that really means. I appreciate the elaboration
that was given.
Let me ask you this question. In every plan, you hope for a
successful ending, and you must have in your minds what that
successful ending looks like. If we are able to meet the
President's commitment to remove troops in July 2011, how do
you envision success looking like at that time? Secretary
Gates?
Secretary Gates. Sure. First of all, let me just again
underscore that what we were talking about in July 2011 is the
beginning of what we expect will be a gradual process of
thinning and reducing U.S. forces.
I think the end state in Afghanistan looks a lot like what
we see in Iraq, and that is the gradual transfer of
responsibility for security to the indigenous forces in
government and a security situation that allows us to drawn
down our forces. We have gone from 20 brigades to what will
soon be 10 brigades in Iraq. We have the agreements that we
talked about earlier, in terms of combat forces being out at
the end of the August 2010.
What you will see, in my view, is a map, if you will, that
changes colors in different places at different times, but
increasingly in terms of the Afghan Government's control or
control by local governments, district governments, and
provincial governments that are associated with the national
government and hostile to the Taliban and to al Qaeda. I think
this gradual transfer of security responsibility, with a
continuing role on our part as a partner for that country in
the long-term, is what I would call success in Afghanistan.
Senator LeMieux. To follow up on the questions of Senator
Ben Nelson, in terms of benchmarking, do you have specific
benchmarks that you have put in place for this next period,
this 18-month period, when the withdrawal of American troops
would begin, that would say there would be only this many
American casualties or this many Afghan troops trained as we
talked about before? Are those benchmarks in place now as you
work forward in the next 18 months?
Secretary Gates. We would not have U.S. casualties as a
benchmark, but we have some very specific benchmarks for us,
for the Afghans, and for our international partners, in terms
of whether they are fulfilling the commitments that have been
made.
Senator LeMieux. Just to touch quickly on the international
partner issue, you mentioned bringing 5,000 to 7,000 more
troops from international partners. In the past, you have been,
as you stated, somewhat critical of those troops, and you
wanted to make sure that those troops were caveat-free. Do you
believe that these troops that are coming, hopefully the 5,000
to 7,000 troops will be, as you said before, caveat-free and be
able to fully engage?
Secretary Gates. One of the positive developments I would
say of the last year, but especially since the NATO summit last
spring, has been a fairly steady reduction in the number of
caveats that are being imposed by governments. I think they are
realizing the need for this. You heard the German Defense
Minister a couple of weeks ago for the first time in Germany
refer to what is going on in Afghanistan as a ``war'' or
``warlike.'' So, they are, I think, domestically, beginning to
deal with the realities of Afghanistan, and I think that has
contributed to a reduction in the caveats.
Senator LeMieux. Secretary Clinton, we haven't talked a lot
today about Pakistan. Certainly, Pakistan is of huge importance
to the success in this region. What commitments do you think we
will get from Pakistan to continue in their efforts? I know
they launched this offensive in Waziristan that's been somewhat
successful and continues on. Where do you see their
participation, in the next 18 months, to make sure that we're
succeeding?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, over the last year they have
certainly demonstrated their commitment and willingness to take
on the Pakistan Taliban, who directly threaten them. I spent 3
days in Pakistan recently, and spoke at length with both the
civilian and the military intelligence leadership, as well as
many citizens, press, and others. I think the unity of support
that the people of Pakistan are showing for this effort is
profoundly significant. But, as we have said, it is not enough.
It is difficult to parse out the different groups that are
operating within Pakistan, all of whom we think are connected
in one way or another with al Qaeda, and partition some off and
go after the others.
It will be our continuing effort--and Admiral Mullen has
been instrumental in working on this with his counterparts--to
make the case that the Pakistanis have to do more against all
of the insurgent terrorist groups that are threatening them,
that are threatening us in Afghanistan, that are threatening
the Afghan people, and are threatening other neighbors in the
region. We hope that we'll be able to make that case
successfully.
Senator LeMieux. Does Pakistan understand now that having a
stable and secure Afghanistan is in their national interests?
Secretary Clinton. I think that they certainly understand
that having an unstable, destabilizing Afghanistan that offers
launching grounds and training for those who threaten them is
not in their interests.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux and others have talked about the
benchmarks, and you've indicated that they exist in whatever
the current form is. Would you submit those to us for the
record? We saw an earlier version, but we'd like to see the
current version of the benchmarks, for the record. If there's
any classified benchmarks, we will, of course, honor that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense is currently in the process of reviewing
our metrics for Afghanistan. We have scheduled a briefing for Members
of Congress in March on the revised metrics.
Chairman Levin. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, to the three of you. The unanimity that you
represent by being here together is powerful and inspirational.
I want to thank you, along with the members of the committee,
for your leadership and your service. I, too, hope and will do
my part to assure that the politics in this important policy
debate we're having end at the water's edge. Again, your
presence here today makes that statement loud and clear.
Secretary Clinton, if I could just follow up on Pakistan,
do you have any concerns that the July 2011 transition date
sends a message to the Pakistanis that we're going to leave the
region, that we're not committed in a long-term way?
Secretary Clinton. Again, I think that the messages that
are being heard by different audiences are consistent with
their perspectives. As Senator LeMieux seemed to imply in his
question, there is a lot of concern in Pakistan about what our
commitment means, both in terms of whether we put more troops
in or not, whether we leave them in or not. The Pakistanis,
understandably, worry that our actions in Afghanistan increase
cross-border efforts that threaten them, which they are not,
obviously, in favor of seeing increase.
We have worked very hard with our Pakistani counterparts to
explain that we have a long-term commitment to Pakistan; we are
not going to be in and out, the way we have in the past; we
want to be partnering with the Pakistanis; we want to be
supporting their democracy and their development--and that is
independent from Afghanistan; but that we have unfinished
business in Afghanistan, and that requires us to take the
steps, which the President outlined, but that we also are
asking for more help from the Pakistanis to go after al Qaeda
and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban inside their own
territory.
Senator Udall. So, in an ideal world, we would get the job
done militarily in the short-term; in the medium- and long-
term, we would have a presence in the region, economically,
diplomatically, and politically.
Secretary Clinton. As we have with so many other countries,
we have troops in a limited number of countries around the
world; some have been there for 50 or 60 years, but we have
long-term economic assistance and development programs in many
others. We think that's a likely outcome in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan, that we will be there with a long-term
commitment.
Senator Udall. Let me turn, if I could, to the civilian
surge. I had a close friend who follows what's happening very
closely, and he said, ``Who's going to be in charge of the
civilian surge?'' I've heard some discussion of a civilian
counterpart to an ISAF commander for the civilian efforts that
we're going to put forth.
Secretary Clinton, could you speak to whether there would
be an official who's in charge of the surge, and what sort of
authority that person might have?
Secretary Clinton. We are actually discussing that with our
allies. It's one of the issues I will be talking to them about
in Brussels. You know there's a United Nations presence in
Afghanistan. There is also the NATO ISAF presence. Not everyone
who contributes civilian aid is a member of NATO or ISAF, but
they all are members of the United Nations. So, how we
coordinate and better hold accountable our civilian aid is a
matter of great concern to all of the contributing nations,
whether they are troop-contributing, nontroop civilian, or non-
NATO.
For example, Japan has just announced a significant
civilian commitment of $5 billion. They're not a member of
NATO. They don't have troops in NATO ISAF. So, we're looking at
the United Nations, we're looking at NATO ISAF, but we're going
to come up with a coordinating mechanism that can meet the
needs of all the various parties who want to contribute to
Afghanistan's future.
Senator Udall. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I assume
that General McChrystal understands the importance of that
handoff and that coordination.
Secretary Gates. Nobody wants it more than he does.
[Laughter.]
Senator Udall. Let me turn to the Secretary and Admiral
Mullen. Given that this increase in troops in Afghanistan will
occur prior to the official drawdown in Iraq, what effect do
you see this additional deployment having on dwell time and the
length of deployment cycles, reset, and then the Services'
requirements to take care of our troops both here at home and
in theater?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, that is not just tied to this
decision; it's something I think that we watch carefully and
have for the last several years. What is happening in the
Marine Corps--and the ground forces, obviously, absorb the
brunt of these deployments--is actually moving out to a dwell
time ratio of almost 2 to 1. They're at 1.5 to 1 right now. We
want to get to a point where they're home twice as long, the
``2,'' as they are deployed, and that, in this deployment
cycle, General Conway thinks he'll be able to continue to
progress out in that direction, with the exception of some of
the smaller, more critical enabling kind of capabilities, over
the next year or so.
On the Army side, we're actually making progress as well,
moving away from 1 to 1 dwell time ratios, though not as
rapidly; with this deployment decision, we expect it to
probably take a couple more years to get to a point where he's
out to a 2 to 1 dwell time ratio.
The Iraq drawdown is taken into consideration in all this.
We're still able to gradually improve dwell times, although we
are extremely concerned about the continued pressure, stress,
and strain that our military, our ground forces in particular,
and their families have gone through. We're paying a lot of
attention to that.
General Casey sent a note yesterday to the J-1, the
manpower and personnel staff section of the Joint Staff,
reemphasizing what he had said before, that this can be
managed; certainly there are challenges associated with that,
but he's comfortable that he can lead his Army through this at
this enormously important time.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I'm going to explore with you an issue
that Senator Graham raised, and it's an issue that you touched
on in your testimony. I think it is a fundamental question, and
that is, why Afghanistan?
In your statement, you list six primary objectives of the
strategy, one of which is preventing al Qaeda from regaining
sanctuary in Afghanistan; yet, we know that al Qaeda has the
presence in as many as 20 countries. In Yemen, for example, al
Qaeda's strong enough that a cell there was able to launch a
successful attack on our Embassy just a year ago.
The fundamental question to me is, how will it make us
safer to invest more troops and more treasure in Afghanistan as
long as al Qaeda still has the ability to establish safe havens
in other countries? What is it about Afghanistan that makes it
critical that we invest more troops, more civilian personnel,
and put more people at risk in that country?
Secretary Gates. First of all, as the President indicated
last night, this is the country where, when the Taliban
governed it, the attack against us was launched in 2001. It is
the only country from which we have been attacked successfully.
Al Qaeda and its leadership are still in the border area of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is still the wellspring of
inspiration for extremist jihadism everywhere. Afghanistan is
where these extremists, in many respects, consider that they
defeated the Soviet Union and, in fact, give themselves credit
for its ultimate collapse. Whether it's in the United States
and the plots that we continue to see, or in Somalia or Yemen,
the fact is that the inspiration, and oftentimes the guidance
and strategic leadership, comes from the al Qaeda leadership
that is there in that border area.
What we have seen develop in the last year is an unholy
alliance, if you will, of al Qaeda, the Taliban in Pakistan,
and the Taliban in Afghanistan. These people work off of each
other's mythology, off of each other's narrative. Success of
one contributes to the success of the other.
If anything, the situation, I think, is more serious today
than it was a year ago, because of the attacks of the Taliban
in Pakistan on Pakistan and the effort of al Qaeda, in
collusion with the Taliban in Pakistan, to try and destabilize
Pakistan itself. More safe havens on the Pakistani side create
opportunities for success in Afghanistan. But, we know, from
historical experience, that safe havens and Taliban control of
space in Afghanistan not only gives them the opportunity to
organize better attacks against the West and our allies and
friends, but now creates an opportunity for them to further
destabilize Pakistan.
This area--as the President said last night and as I said
in my opening remarks--that we're talking about, Afghanistan in
particular, is the epicenter of global extremist jihad. If that
center were to disappear, if that leadership were to disappear,
and al Qaeda were defeated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think
you would face a very different and very significantly less
important threat from these various regional movements that put
enormous emphasis on their alliance with al Qaeda in Pakistan-
Afghanistan. Whether it's al Qaeda in the Maghreb or whether
it's al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, they put enormous value on
this connection back into the al Qaeda that have fled
Afghanistan.
I think that Afghanistan has a unique place in the
historical narrative of these extremists that makes it
especially important to us and, as the President said last
night, preventing the Taliban from returning and defeating al
Qaeda is in our vital national interest.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates has given an excellent
answer to the question of, ``Why Afghanistan?'' My question for
you is, can we succeed, despite the brilliance of our leaders,
the courage of our troops, and the efforts of the civilian
component? Is this an impossible task? We have a corrupt and
ineffective government as a partner. We've seen, in the last 2
years, even with the presence of NATO troops, the government
lose control of much of the country. Can this work, despite
everybody's best efforts?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we believe we can. I think it
is important to underscore your question, because, along with
the question about, ``Who is the enemy?'', this is the critical
question as to the commitment that the President has made.
The reasons why we do believe success is possible is,
number one, we think that the Afghan leadership and the people
of Afghanistan are ready for an approach that makes them more
accountable, responsible, and a true partner. I've been to
Afghanistan in the past. In the last trip, I was struck by what
Defense Minister Wardak told me. He said it was the first time,
with General McChrystal now in charge of NATO ISAF, that they,
the Afghans, felt like they were full partners. They'd been
invited into NATO ISAF headquarters, they were getting access
to intelligence that they'd never been given before. His
enthusiasm for the new leadership that we have on the military
side was striking to me, because I've known him for all these
years. He has been truly a good soldier, just trying the best
he could under very difficult circumstances, but he didn't feel
like he was fully supported or partnered until relatively
recently.
Second, I think that the wake-up call about the
deteriorating situation has not only been heard by the United
States, but by our friends and allies. I think that there was
an attitude, perhaps, that, ``Okay, the Americans want us
there. We'll show up. We'll do the best we can.'' As Secretary
Gates said, some of our NATO ISAF troops were extraordinarily
brave, courageous, and successful; others were kind of just
there to fulfill a commitment. But, there seems to be a new
awareness that this is not just America's fight, and I'm very
encouraged by that.
Third, look, I've spent a lot of time with and around
President Karzai, and I really believe that, if we work with
him in a more effective manner, we will get a better outcome
from him and from the team around him. He has some very good
cabinet ministers who are doing really excellent work. There
needs to be more of them. They need to be supported more. They
need to be held accountable. But, my sense from the very long
and candid conversations I had with him is that there's a
window of opportunity here that we have to seize.
Finally, I think that the impetus that the President's
decision is giving us will change the reality on the ground.
The President's announcement last night, the resolve that he's
showing, the fact that very obviously this is not an easy
political call for him to make, it has significant budget
implications for our country, I think will help to summon the
very best of everybody and will give us the chance of success
that I believe we can achieve.
So, I'm not naive about how hard this will be, but I think
it's the right decision. I think it can lead to success if we
implement it the way we should.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to echo my sentiment about having you here and
the service that you are providing, not only to our President,
to our country, but I want to thank each and every one of you
for the fact that you have spent 3 hours already answering
questions.
Some of these questions you've already talked about a
little bit, but let me just ask another specific question
concerning NATO. Obviously, the President talked about the fact
that we're going to look to NATO to help send additional
troops. I think that we do know that some of them are
constrained by some of the mandates that their countries have
put on them. I think, Secretary Gates, you mentioned a little
bit about that. But, I do know that some of the countries have
mentioned, in the past, about starting their own withdrawals.
In particular, I believe Germany has suggested a transition by
2013, and they have 4,000 troops; Canada suggesting some
pullout in 2011 in Kandahar, and they have 2,500 troops; the
Italian leaders, with 2,800 troops, leaving Herat by December
2011; Dutch leaders suggesting they might want to pull out by
2010. I was just wondering if that is still a concern.
Secretary Gates, do you have some information on that?
Secretary Gates. It is a concern. The only two firm
decisions that have been made that I'm aware of are that the
Dutch will leave next year with their forces, and the Canadians
will leave by the end of 2011. These are parliamentary
decisions that have been made.
Frankly, our hope, just going back to Secretary Clinton's
final remarks in response to Senator Collins' questions, our
hope is that the President's speech last night, and his
decisions, will help change the political dynamic among some of
our allies. I must say, just the first reactions that I saw on
the news this morning from the Europeans, I think, were very
encouraging--President Sarkozy's comments, the comments of the
NATO Secretary General, and so on.
I'm not aware of a German commitment or any kind of firm
decision to leave at a particular time, but our hope is that
what the President has decided will change the political
dynamic.
The truth of the matter is, the governments--Admiral Mullen
and I run into this all the time--of our allies are really very
strongly supportive of the mission in Afghanistan. The military
and defense leaders in these countries--and, I think probably
also the foreign ministers--are very supportive. The problem
is, some of these governments are in very delicate coalition
governments, and so their domestic politics are a real concern
for them, in terms of what they can do. The will is there; the
political capacity to deliver has been a challenge for some of
them. Our hope is that what the President has decided will help
change that dynamic.
But, specifically, to your question, I'm only aware of the
Canadians and the Dutch that have a specific deadline.
Senator Hagan. I was also wondering about the budgets. I
know that many countries are experiencing a decline in the
economy right now and budgets are tight. Admiral Mullen, I was
wondering how this is affecting NATO, and particularly some of
the PRT projects. How do you foresee Admiral Stavridis
addressing these issues?
Admiral Mullen. Not unlike what you've heard from Secretary
Clinton and Secretary Gates, he has been incredibly active in
engaging the leadership--both civilian and military
leadership--of these NATO countries.
What I have seen, certainly that they have concerns, just
like we do, with respect to the budget, but they are less with
time. The demarcation point was the NATO summit in April, where
the support, enthusiasm, and actually hard work to figure out
how we can do this better together has taken a marked turn for
the positive. It is very unlike anything that I've seen for the
previous 2 or 3 years.
There are concerns about budgets in each of these
countries, and yet they continue to contribute; in many cases,
now, they've added more troops and more capabilities. They're
making contributions in very difficult economic times, though
not as many as we would like, sometimes. But, again, the
overall thrust and approach from NATO and other non-NATO
contributing nations has been very, very positive, and I am
encouraged by that.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Secretary Gates. Could I just say that when I listed some
of our NATO allies and the contribution and the sacrifices
they've made, and giving them an A in response to Senator
Graham's question, there is a non-NATO ally that has played a
significant role with us in RC-South, and that's the
Australians. I wouldn't want to omit the contribution and the
sacrifice they've made.
Senator Hagan. They're doing a great job.
Secretary Clinton. I would just add that we don't want to
get in trouble with any of our friends or allies. There are
many smaller countries that have really punched way above their
weight. We'll submit, for the record, a list of all of them. We
are also seeing a number of them, the Poles, for example, that
have been extremely responsive and very helpful. There are a
lot of other countries that have done their part.
We also are seeing, in some ways, more of an international
element to this. Again, when all of it's put together, we'll
submit that for the record.
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Senator Hagan. I see that my time is up, but I did want to
say that I know that the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade from
Camp Lejeune is fighting the terrorists in Afghanistan, as well
as Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne, and I wanted to echo the support
that I have from North Carolina on behalf of all the troops
that are serving us in such a valiant way.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, to all three members of our
panel. It's been a long and good hearing, and all three of you
have been wonderful.
I have to say, first, I want to thank Senator Sessions for
bringing up the issue of the tanker.
Secretary Gates, I want to say that I agree with everything
you said. There were minimal discrepancies last year that
caused this award to Northrop Grumman to be tossed out, and one
can only read the RFP this year as almost directing a lighter,
smaller, and inferior product. I think Northrop Grumman is
absolutely justified to take itself out of the competition at
this point. I hope that can be rectified.
Admiral Mullen, how quickly can we deploy these additional
30,000 American troops and their equipment not just to the
theater, but the ultimate destination? How difficult will that
be?
I noticed in the press yesterday, a White House official
said, ``The President is saying this has to happen, so the
military will make it happen.'' How difficult is that going to
be?
Admiral Mullen. There is a big difference between Iraq and
Afghanistan; we don't have a Kuwait. So, what we deploy into
Afghanistan, in great part, goes straight in. It's not as
robust, from an infrastructure standpoint, et cetera. So, the
logistics challenges are significant.
Senator Wicker. Significantly greater.
Admiral Mullen. They're significantly greater than Iraq.
But, we've been working this for months. As Secretary Gates
said in his opening statement, actually the first troops will
be there in a couple of weeks and are already under orders
since the President made his announcement last night.
Significant numbers of them will arrive in the spring--March-
April timeframe--and roughly 20,000 to 25,000 by the July
timeframe. That is getting them in, getting them prepared, and
obviously getting them on mission.
Senator Wicker. When will we be at 30,000 additional troops
sir?
Admiral Mullen. Later in the summer is the estimate--
summer/fall for precision there. One of the things that the
President did in his decision was give the commander on the
ground the flexibility to say what troops he wants and when.
We're working our way through that, quite frankly, with General
McChrystal, given that flexibility, and so it'll take us a
while to be exact. But, the vast majority of them will go by
the summertime, and certainly finish out by the fall.
Senator Wicker. Have we ever done it that quickly before?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. In fact, in Iraq we actually did it
more quickly because we had a better infrastructure.
Senator Wicker. Under less difficult circumstances.
Admiral Mullen. I'd say less difficult circumstances.
Senator Wicker. All right, sir.
I'm batting cleanup on our side. I was to ask about the
allied troops and our hope for 5,000 to 7,000 additional troops
from those allies. By the way, let me say, I'm glad, Secretary
Clinton, that you hastened to add that the smaller deployments
are also appreciated. Secretary Gates, you mentioned
specifically several countries as getting an ``A,'' and I'm
afraid that those that weren't specifically named may be
wondering what their grade is going to be.
But, it appears from what you say, the firm information we
have actually takes us in the wrong direction, that the two
firm numbers we have mean less allied help. So, our decision
not to deploy 40,000 of our own troops, and rather deploy the
30,000, is based on a hope and not based on any assurances from
these allies. I think that's the testimony today, but I just
wanted to nail that down.
Secretary Gates. The situation that we have is that we have
received private commitments from some countries, but, because
they have not yet announced them at home, we're not in a
position to make that announcement for them. I will just give
you an example. I made two telephone calls the day before
yesterday, and I received the assurances of between 1,800 and
2,000 troops.
Senator Wicker. Additional troops?
Secretary Gates. Yes. We've all been talking to different
people. I think there's a fair degree of optimism in terms of
the additional troops.
I would also make the point that I made earlier in the
hearing with respect to the 40,000 U.S. troops. Early in this
process, it seemed to me that, because the final BCT that
General McChrystal had asked for could not deploy before July
2011, there was no need to make a commitment to that upfront. I
would rather use a smaller number on the American side to
leverage both the Afghans and our allies. But, General
McChrystal, essentially, is going to get more troops, earlier
than he would have with the original 40,000 U.S. troop request.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Admiral Mullen, you've been doing this a long time. You're
a graduate of Annapolis with advanced degrees. When in history
has a commander ever announced both a surge and a withdrawal at
the same time? I think that's been very rare in history. If so,
what gives us a comfort level that this sort of approach is
going to work?
Admiral Mullen. I have great comfort in the quickness with
which we will deploy these forces to reverse the momentum,
which is absolutely critical. I spoke earlier to my belief that
we will know well by mid-2011 where we stand and which
direction--whether we're succeeding or whether we're not. From
my perspective, the President said we will start to transition
and transfer responsibility, which is critical; it really is
the way home, as it has been in Iraq, to transfer that security
responsibility, and then start to transition, based on the
conditions on the ground at the time.
I think that is doable. That, from my perspective, makes
sense at this point, based on our overall understanding of the
situation. From that standpoint, again, I'm very supportive of
the decision.
The message that it sends to the Afghans and to our allies,
the commitment and the resolve that this additional troop force
shows, as well--all those are really positive messages. But,
come mid-2011, we're going to know whether this is working or
not.
Senator Wicker. I'm going to support this Commander in
Chief because the alternative is unacceptable. Perhaps you
would like to submit for the record, if you can think of ever
an occasion in history when a commander has announced both a
surge and a withdrawal at the same time.
[The information referred to follows:]
In 1972, the United States was in the process of withdrawing from
Vietnam. The goal was to reach troop strength of 30,000 by 1 July 1972
and 15,000 by 1 December 1972. In the midst of this withdrawal, the
North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive in April 1972. The
United States surged Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft to halt this
offensive. In 60 days, 18,000 sorties were flown. This surge of
sorties, during the troop withdrawal, halted the North Vietnamese
advance. President Nixon responding to a request from General Abrams
slowed the withdrawal to 49,000 by 1 July.
In December 1972, the peace negotiations between the United States
and North Vietnam stalled. The United States still in the process of
withdrawing troops from South Vietnam again surged aviation assets to
bring North Vietnam back to the peace table. From 18-30 December 1972,
700 B-52s conducted 4,000 sorties against Hanoi and Haiphong. The North
Vietnamese got the message and returned to the peace talks.
Senator Wicker. You're in a very difficult position. You've
had to parse words today and make sense out of a contradictory
policy, a policy that, at first blush, on its face, is a
paradox and a contradiction. I expect the left is going to rise
up this afternoon, based on testimony, based on your answers to
Senator Graham, and protest vehemently the statements that
you've made about the flexibility and about the President
always having the opportunity to change his mind and do what's
right for the Country and right for national security.
I'm going to support this President. I put great stock,
Admiral Mullen, in your statement that you enthusiastically and
without hesitation, without qualification, support this policy.
I wish you well. I want to be your teammate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all three of you. Being one of the last
Senators, most of my questions have been answered, but I do
want to say, I don't think you're necessarily in a difficult
position; I think you've done very well for the last 3 hours,
answering questions very directly about the policy, the
comments you've made, that this patience that we have to have
as a Country of what more sacrifices we have to make, and
giving us the sense of the civilian and, the military end. The
President spending the time to review the policy and set it out
and create flexibility, I think, has been the right move. So, I
disagree with my counterpart on the other side, my Republican
friend.
I would say that one thing I want to put to rest, and I
want to make sure I'm clear on this because I think you've said
it 100 times and I'm going to pound this 1 more time, is the
whole issue of withdrawal. You've made it very clear, withdraw
and transition are similar but different. I hope that I'm right
on this, that in July 2011, withdraw will occur, in some form;
it might be 100 troops, it might be 50,000 troops. That is
undetermined. It may last 1 year, it may last 1 month, or it
might last 3 years. But, the withdrawal process, which really
is a transition process, is a goal that we're shooting for in
2011. Is that what I understand?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Begich. Okay. I've heard this, and we're going to
continue to hear this, though I hate to say this because I
think this committee is very bipartisan. We all are spending
the time to look at this issue and there's agreement, all
across the board here, supporting the President's mission, and
I agree with it 100 percent. But, this whole issue of the
withdrawal, everyone's trying to pull that apart. Really what
you've done is set a target, giving the Afghan Government a
target of what we're trying to shoot for, in the sense of when
we think their commitment's going to be at the highest level
possible to make this transition. Then, there will be decisions
made, at the end of December, leading into July, of what level
of transition that might be. It might be very small. It might
be very large. That's undetermined yet, but that's the target.
Am I correct in saying that?
Admiral Mullen. That's fair.
Secretary Gates. December is more about: is the strategy
working? Are we headed in the right direction? Are things
moving the way we anticipated they would? The decisions with
respect to transition would begin in July, as you've described
it.
Senator Begich. Great. I'm just hoping, as we move forward
on this discussion, we're not going to beat the withdrawal
issue over the head so many times. It's not a hard deadline; it
is a target--a target that may mean a few people, it may mean
thousands of people, but that will be determined as the
strategy plays out. I want to just echo that. Hopefully, we'll
be done with that discussion, we'll support the Commander in
Chief, you all, the efforts of our troops on the ground, and
the effort we need to do in Afghanistan.
I want to ask you a little more in depth in regards to the
Afghan troops and how you see them training up. I know you had
some target amounts of 134,000 troops in December 2010, and
moving that up to 170,000 troops, I think, by July. How
confident, if you were to measure, on a percentage scale of 100
percent--obviously, 100 percent confident--that you can reach
that successfully? What would be one or two challenges that may
cause us to not get to that goal?
Admiral Mullen. I think that area is the highest risk area
for us. We all identified that throughout the review and
believe that. That's where General McChrystal is. We've put
great leadership in place to address that. It has to be led by
security, or we can't get there, so that we can create an
environment in which more Afghans participate. There is a
fundamental shift with the partnership piece, which is a
significant breakthrough on how to do this, and we have a lot
more confidence in that regard. But, it's one of the reasons we
really have annual targets, so that we can look at how we're
doing and adjust accordingly. Secretary Gates talked earlier
about retention, attrition, and all those challenges that we
have, more so on the ANP-side than on the ANA-side. I think
we're very clear-eyed on what the challenge is; we are going to
assess ourselves rigorously throughout the process. Training is
probably the biggest challenge that we have with respect to
meeting the goals that we've set out for ourselves.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Secretary Clinton, I want to follow up with you. I'm
actually very supportive of you getting as much flexibility
with the use of your monies. I would even offer to suggest
that, as we deal with the Defense Appropriation bill, why we
don't figure out how to fix this now rather than waiting until
next summer, because we'll lose 8 or 9 months, which every
month, every day, seems critical. So, I would look to you and
the administration to have a suggestion, seeing that we haven't
done the defense components, so why not figure out how to make
that happen.
I think you said you're going to triple up or get about 970
civilians on the ground, give or take a few there. But, you
also indicated that you need more, in time. Have you figured
out what that number is? I agree with you. I think, as we do
the military plus-up, the civilian component is critical. I
appreciate your review and change that you've done to really
focus on this component and getting unified efforts with the
military. I think that is critical.
Have you thought of a number? Or is that something you can
give for the record at some point?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, thank you. I'm hesitant to
state a number now, but we will provide it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Secretary Clinton. But, there is a large idea that I think
your question suggests. We should start looking at our budgets
as national security budgets if we're really intent upon having
an integrated civilian-military strategy. Again, I have to
compliment Secretary Gates, who's been an advocate of this long
before I ever thought I'd be sitting here at this table in this
position. We have to be willing to look across the government
at a whole-of-government approach to something as critical as
our national security and the mission in Afghanistan. That's
going to take some changes in how we do business and how we
think about it.
So, I would, obviously, welcome the continuing support from
this committee and others as we try to get it right. This will
be, I'm sure, the subject of the Appropriations Committee, but
where's the money going to come from? Is it going to be part of
the budget? How's it going to be costed out? All of that has to
be worked through between the administration and Congress. But,
as we're doing that, I think we have to quit stovepiping our
efforts and start thinking more holistically, which is really
what our policy intends to present.
Senator Begich. My time is up, and, Secretary Clinton, I
want to say I 100 percent agree with you; this hearing today--
and I want to thank the chairman for doing this--has what I
consider three critical pieces to the equation that are sitting
in front of us today, and not just one component. So, I really
do appreciate your comments. Anything I can do as an individual
member, I'll be happy to do that. Thank you again for all your
service. Thank you for bringing forward 3 hours of answers to
many questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich.
Senator Kirk.
Senator Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me add a word with my colleagues, to
thank you for your patience this morning, but, far more
importantly, for your patriotic service to the country and your
service to our Commander in Chief.
I wanted to just follow up a little bit on Senator Collins'
question. If I understand it, when General McChrystal advocated
a strategy along these lines, it wasn't just the troops, he
said, and I'm quoting here, ``A foreign army alone cannot beat
an insurgency. The insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan
solution. This is their war.'' He went on to say, any success
must come ``by, with, and through the Afghan Government.'' In
other words, without a legitimate, credible, reliable Afghan
governmental partner, it sounds to me like the strategy would
be flawed.
By all reports that we have, President Karzai had been
installed, basically, as a result of a flawed election, if not
a fraudulent election, by default, and that he presides over a
culture of corruption and is dependent on, unfortunately, an
opium economy.
What I'm concerned about is whether we are taking a leap of
faith here with respect to our Afghan governmental partner and,
not irrespective of that but related to that, if we're going to
send 30,000 more troops and spend additional United States
dollars, should we not be looking for more indices or evidence
that he truly will be a partner that has the response from his
own citizens, and support of them, so that we're not just in
there without him and, maybe, unfortunately, being perceived as
``occupiers''?
On the one hand, obviously, Secretary Clinton, you, as you
have said, have been closer to him. You've heard the words.
But, I think a lot of us are wondering whether this is for
real, on their side.
Secretary Clinton. Senator Kirk, first let me say, with
respect to the strategy and the execution, I think it is fair
to say that probably the two experts in the world right now on
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are, on
counterinsurgency, General Petraeus; on counterterrorism,
General McChrystal. They are very committed and confident that
we will see success. Now, they could be wrong. We're all human
and we can make a different assessment, or reality can turn out
to be a lot more ugly and difficult than any of us imagined.
But, on the side of the positive with respect to the strategy,
I certainly put a lot of stock into what they say, and up the
chain of command to Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates.
It is absolutely the case that General McChrystal pointed
out one of the salient features of the campaign that we are
waging, and that is to have a good, solid partner in the Afghan
Government.
I think it is unfair to paint with such a broad brush the
President and Government of Afghanistan and to basically
declare that they are incapable and unwilling to defend and
protect their own country, and that they are fatally flawed. I
do not believe that.
I believe it is a much more complex picture, as most human
situations are. I believe that the way that our government
interacted with President Karzai and his government over the
last several years bred a lot of the confusion and the
inadequacy that we are now having to contend with.
I am not making the case that this is a perfect
partnership, but I think it has the elements of real progress,
if we are smart enough, as to how to put them together into a
winning strategy.
The people on the ground, the people who are responsible
for implementing this strategy, including Ambassador
Eikenberry, who wholeheartedly endorses the President's
definition of our mission, believe it's hard, but doable. That
is what I believe. As we say, the proof is in the pudding;
we're going to find out because of the President's decision.
I think your caution has to be kept in mind. But, I also
believe that we have to come at this with a sense of resolve,
determination, and a cautious optimism that we can make this
work. I think that there is a very strong argument that we can.
Secretary Gates. I would just like to pitch in and echo
Secretary Clinton's comments about the dangers of painting the
Afghan Government with too broad a brush. The reality is, as
she indicated earlier, there are some number of ministers--and
I would say, including two that we work the most closely with,
in Defense and Interior--who are quite competent, quite
capable, and have been good partners for us. Similarly, when we
have had a good governor go into a province, we have seen a
situation turn around, literally in months, when a competent,
honest governor is put in place. There are more than a few of
those in Afghanistan.
All the problems that you've described and that have been
discussed here this morning are real, they exist, but there are
enough examples of the kind of people we need to partner with,
who are already in the Afghan Government or are governors, that
I think is what contributes to, I won't say optimism, but a
feeling of some confidence that this is going to work.
Senator Kirk. Thank you.
One other question. It goes back to the Pakistan situation.
With the nuclear capabilities there, the place is rife with al
Qaeda; whereas, less so, according to National Security Advisor
General Jones, on the Afghanistan side. Could you just give us
a little bit of flavor about the thinking of another option
which might more directly or readily address the President's
concerns and his mission: the option of trying to secure and
seal the Afghanistan-Pakistan border while we're working to
ensure the security and stability of nuclear weapons, and doing
what we can to destroy the safe havens in Pakistan while we
seal the border so the terrorists aren't fleeing back into
Afghanistan, as one strategy, as opposed to the 30,000 troops
in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, there are a lot of views on
borders around the world. My experience and the experience of
an awful lot of people who have been doing this for a long time
is that borders are pretty tough to seal, and certainly this
one is probably as tough as any in the world.
At least from my perspective, it doesn't mean we shouldn't
have security up there, because we do. In fact, we're working
very hard to establish centers that are manned by both
Afghanistan and Pakistani military members--and we have one--to
better secure that border. I think that getting to the point
where you think you can secure that I just don't think that it
can be done, first of all.
Second, the focus on Pakistan; it's been mentioned here,
and I won't belabor it. Pakistan's own effort is absolutely
vital here. It's a sovereign country. They've really done a
lot. A lot of us, a year ago, would not have predicted that
they would have undertaken the efforts that they have to go
into South Waziristan, and Swat before that. We're working to
support that and their interests. Our interests are very much
mutual because of the threat that has been discussed before.
It's going to take some time to do that.
Then, there's that long-term partnership, actually on both
sides of the border, that is absolutely critical. When I go
there, one of the questions that comes very quickly from
military and civilians in both those countries is, ``Are you
leaving? Are you going to abandon us again?'' The importance of
the President's message last night, and this decision, is a
significant step in that direction, to reaffirm that's not the
case. We can't afford to do that again.
Senator Kirk. Thank you very much. Thank you all very much
again for your service and your patience.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kirk.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know whether
this is a case of saving the best for last or simply the last
for last. [Laughter.]
I have been very gratified to hear the testimony of these
three distinguished Americans here today.
Admiral, I want to thank you for your lifetime commitment
to our Armed Forces.
Secretary Gates, I want to thank you for your continued
service. The President was wise to ask you to remain, and you
were a true public servant to decide, in spite of the
advantages of private life, to remain. I'm grateful to you for
that.
Secretary Clinton, I remember with a great deal of fondness
our service on this panel together, literally side by side, and
the journey that we took together to Afghanistan several years
ago. I can't help but think that if we had had the kind of
nuanced and complex analysis at that point, perhaps we wouldn't
be here today. But, we are. I am gratified that all of you,
along with the President, took the time to think this through
to maximize our chances of getting it right. So, it's good to
see you again. On a somewhat lighter note, I haven't had a
chance to see you since the news about your daughter's
engagement was announced. Congratulations.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh. The bottom line for me--and several of you
have stated this--is there are no easy answers here; there are
only difficult choices. There are no guarantees, but it does
seem to me the strategy you've settled on maximizes the chances
of success, maximizes the chances that we will be able to
ultimately leave Afghanistan, not temporarily, but permanently,
while securing the national security interests of the United
States. That's what this ultimately has to be all about.
I think it's important to note that I'm sure none of you
want to be here recommending that we spend more money in
Afghanistan or that we send more troops to Afghanistan. But, we
have to remind ourselves, and the American public, that we are
there because we were attacked from that place and 3,000
innocent Americans lost their lives as a result of that. We owe
it to the American public that we maximize the chances of that
not happening again. I think your strategy does that.
Regrettably, we are likely to remain under threat from
radical Islam and organizations like al Qaeda, no matter what
we do. If we leave, we run the risk of it returning to a safe
haven from which attacks can be launched on our Homeland. If we
stay, regrettably our service men and women are placed in
harm's way. But, I do think the strategy you've settled on
maximizes the chances of minimizing those combined risks on an
ongoing basis. I thank you for that.
Although neither one of them is here, I want to thank
Senator Lieberman for his comments. I think he was exactly
right when he pointed out, ``Look, you're receiving some tough
questions from both the right and the left today.'' The
President is not doing this because it is politically
expedient; he's doing it because he believes it's in the
national security interests of the United States. That's the
kind of decisionmaking I want to see in a chief executive, and
I think it's the kind of decisionmaking he has, with your help,
exhibited here today.
I also want to associate myself with some of the comments
of Senator McCain and several of our colleagues on the other
side of the aisle who are going to support this President in
his decisionmaking. For those who believe that the ability to
forge bipartisan decision making is just impossible in
Washington, their comments today are evidence that that is not
necessarily so. I want to thank them for putting partisanship
aside and choosing to support our Commander in Chief in a very
difficult situation.
I do take issue with a couple of things that were raised by
Senator McCain. I would associate myself with your comments. I
think that the notion of--and I think, Secretary Gates, you
mentioned this--demonstrating both resolve as well as a sense
of urgency simultaneously is exactly the combination we need to
exhibit here. So, we demonstrate resolve by maintaining our
commitment, but, at the same time, we insist that the Afghans
have the sense of urgency which is ultimately going to do more
than we can do to make this a successful undertaking.
So, by having an exit strategy in place, I think we say to
them, ``We are with you, but only so long as you do your
part.'' I think that's vitally important to the ultimate
success of this undertaking. I personally don't find it
incompatible to have a deadline that we aspire to meet, we do
everything to meet, that we expect to meet, but, at the same
time, of course take into account changes in facts on the
ground that may occur over the next year and a half. As you
pointed out, this is a longer period of time than it took for
the surge in Iraq to prove to be successful. So, I think it's
important to keep that in mind.
I do have two brief questions. You've been very patient and
you've stayed a long time. But, these are two critiques that
have been offered, and I want to give you an opportunity to
address them. You have, in part, already.
But, you hear some people say, ``The Taliban and al Qaeda
are two different phenomena, and we can address combating al
Qaeda without really having to combat the Taliban within
Afghanistan.'' You've pointed out that the Taliban is not a
homogeneous group; there are differences, and we're going to
try and appeal to the reconcilable, to peel them away from the
irreconcilables. But, there is still a hard core there. I think
the words that you've used--one of you used the words that they
``collude in some of their operations,'' that there's a
``symbiotic relationship between the irreconcilable elements of
Taliban and al Qaeda.'' So, I'd like to give you a chance, both
Secretaries, to address this issue, which I understand your
testimony already touched on with regard to that irreducible
hard core of the Taliban; it simply is not possible to defeat
al Qaeda or minimize the risk from al Qaeda without also
combating that irreconcilable element of the Taliban.
Secretary Gates. I would just say that we have to remember
that it's the part of the Taliban that we think is
irreconcilable that, in fact, provided the safe haven for al
Qaeda. There is just a significant amount of intelligence of al
Qaeda identifying themselves with the Taliban's aspirations in
Afghanistan, and the Taliban talking about their relationship
with al Qaeda and the message that al Qaeda has.
The Taliban are clever. We wouldn't be in the situation
we're in if we did not face an adaptable and clever adversary.
They recognize that the reason they're not in power right now
is because they allowed al Qaeda to launch the attack against
the United States. So, every now and then you'll see some
report or another that the Taliban is saying, ``Let's downplay
the relationship with al Qaeda so we don't get hit again.''
But, the fact is, there is plenty of evidence of these two
organizations and, as I put it in my opening statement, their
symbiotic relationship.
What has made it more dangerous over the last year, as I
said earlier, is that now we have the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan, the Taliban in Pakistan, whose target is the
Pakistani Government and who are working closely with al Qaeda,
along with their compatriots in Afghanistan.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Clinton, anything you'd like to add?
Secretary Clinton. Senator Bayh, in addition to the
inspirational and aspirational role that al Qaeda plays, they
provide very specific services; they help to provide funding
and they help to provide targeting, training, and equipping.
Very often they have their planners working closely with the
elements of the Taliban, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in
order to target both institutions of the respective
governments, as well as international sites, embassies of other
countries, and certainly our own presence and our troops.
I don't think there's any doubt any longer that there has
been a developing syndicate of terror, and those tentacles
reach far and wide. Yes, they do reach to Somalia, to Yemen, to
the Maghreb, et cetera, but they are focused and grounded in
the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It's our assessment that it might have been possible, if we
had gone at it somewhat differently in the beginning of this
war, to have captured and killed enough of the al Qaeda and the
Taliban leadership to have made a difference. But, we are where
we are right now, and we know that the training that is done
and the communication that is done out of that area poses
direct threats to us, our friends, and our allies.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
If I could be permitted one final question.
Another point of view that's offered, voices that are
raised, suggests, ``We're focusing on the wrong place. Al Qaeda
is now principally located in the tribal areas of Pakistan. We
should focus on Pakistan. Why are we doing this in
Afghanistan?'' My understanding of your testimony here today is
that, number one, were we to adopt that strategy, the Taliban
would, over time, reassert itself in Afghanistan, having safe
havens there from which to launch attacks against America and
our interests. That's number one. Number two, we can't go into
Pakistan; we have to try and build up the Pakistanis'
capability of dealing with the problem on the ground there.
Number three, we are doing that. This is not an either/or
choice. In fact, if you made it one, ignoring one would
undermine the other, so we have to look at these two theaters
in conjunction, doing both simultaneously, to ensure that we
combat the threat.
So, if you'd care to address this notion that we could do
one, but not the other, which seems to be out there in the
minds of some.
Admiral Mullen. They're inextricably linked, and there's no
question that if the Taliban came back--their strategic goal is
to take over the government again in Afghanistan--that they
certainly have all the ability to provide that kind of safe
haven because they are so linked across that border. I see the
linkage between these two countries in my travels; nothing is
more evident than that. That's why the President's strategy,
even in March, drove this to a regional approach, not a single-
country approach. You just can't do one without doing the
other.
Secretary Gates. Let me just say, and this may be the last
thing I say in this hearing, what is essential for our national
security is that we have two long-term partners in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Quite frankly, I detest the phrase ``exit
strategy'' because what we are looking at over time is a
transition in our relationship with the Afghans, a relationship
that now, where there is the preponderance of a military
relationship as we try to secure the country and put it in a
position where they can accept responsibility for their own
security, and, frankly, to prevent al Qaeda from coming back.
Over time, as we are successful in that, the civilian component
and the development component of our relationship with
Afghanistan will become predominant. We may have a small
residual military training-and-equipping role with Afghanistan
in the future.
This goes to the point I made in my testimony. We will not
repeat the mistake--and we must not repeat the mistake--of 1989
and turn our backs on these folks and, when we have the
security situation with them under control, then the civilian
and the development part must be the preponderant part of our
relationship far into the future.
Senator Bayh. That's one of the truly refreshing things. In
past administrations from time to time, there had been friction
between DOD and DOS, but here you're working hand in hand, and,
in fact, understand that you both have to go forward together
to truly get the job done on a permanent basis. I'm most
gratified for your collaboration.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your patience.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Bayh.
Our witnesses, you've been excellent. You've been
responsive. You've been more than patient. Because we promised
you that you'd be out of here by 12:30 p.m., I believe, we owe
you 10 minutes, and a lot more than that.
Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
AID TO AFGHANISTAN
1. Senator Akaka. Secretary Clinton, some argue that progress in
Afghanistan had stalled in recent years, in part, due to insufficient
accountability. Metrics, proper oversight, and benchmarks will be
critical to the success of the strategy outlined by President Obama.
What are the administration's plans to maintain accountability to
determine whether Afghan ministries and agencies are worthy of
receiving direct U.S. aid?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
2. Senator Akaka. Secretary Clinton, please describe the positive
and negative possible outcomes of sending some aid directly to
ministries and entities in Afghanistan.
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
3. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, civilian casualties from air
strikes draw a strong reaction from leaders in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region. The smallest number of civilian deaths can become an invaluable
propaganda tool for the insurgents. Earlier this year, General
McChrystal issued guidance directing restraint in the use of close air
support (CAS). However, air strikes remain a key part of our regional
strategy. Do you think we have found the proper balance in the use of
air strikes in the region?
Secretary Gates. I do believe we have struck the right balance
between minimizing civilian casualties and retaining the benefits of
air power. Air power can be essential for self defense and as an
asymmetrical advantage. However, its use must be judicious. I believe
the Tactical Directive has achieved that balance.
With regards to limiting civilian casualties, the Tactical
Directive issued in July 2009 states:
``. . . I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit
the use of force like CAS against residential compounds and
other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in
accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain
of using CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in
the long run make mission success more difficult and turn the
Afghan people against us. . . The use of air-to-ground
munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is
only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions.''
The above quotes deal directly with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and
troops requiring CAS in self defense. The Tactical Directive does not
prevent troops from protecting themselves as a matter of self defense,
but makes them determine whether CAS is the only option available to
them.
Deliberate air strikes are used against specific targets, but only
after the request has gone through an intense targeting process, where
intelligence is closely scrutinized to protect against civilian
casualties. Air strikes are a valuable tool and I believe we have
struck the right balance in conducting air strikes against necessary
targets, protecting our troops, and limiting civilian casualties.
PAKISTAN
4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, there continues to be concern
over Pakistan's role in the conflict. This will become more significant
in light of the President's strategy if extremists continue to cross
the border easily. Do you feel the current effort to improve security
and governance in the Pakistan and Afghanistan border areas will
support our new Afghanistan strategy?
Secretary Gates. Our support for Pakistan in their efforts to
improve security and strengthen their government institutions is a
vital part of the President's strategy. We fully recognize that our
success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with
Pakistan. That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of
the border. The Pakistani people are beginning to understand that they
are the ones most endangered by extremism as terrorist attacks on
targets in cities and settled areas increase. The Pakistan army has
gone on its largest offensive in years with the overwhelming support of
the Pakistani people. The questions that have been raised in the past
about Pakistan's capacity and resolve are being answered by the
Pakistani people and the actions that the Pakistan military has taken
in Swat and South Waziristan. They are an important first step.
However, much remains to be done. To assist Pakistan in these
efforts, the United States has committed $1.2 billion to support
counterinsurgency operations and $7.8 billion over the next 5 years to
expand economic and social opportunities available to the Pakistani
people. If we are going to successfully rid the region of violent
extremism, we must confront all threats to stability and security of
the Pakistani people.
MEDICAL EVACUATION CAPACITY
5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you stated earlier this year
that the goal in Iraq was to have a soldier in a medical facility
within 1 hour of being wounded. In Afghanistan, the time was closer to
2 hours. I know you have been working diligently to reduce this
timeframe. As we increase the number of troops in the region, what is
your assessment of the medical evacuation capability in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. In November 2008, I directed a comprehensive
bottom-to-top review on how to best synchronize efforts in theater and
accomplish the goal of improving the Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)
benchmark to a 1-hour execution standard in Afghanistan. Improving
MEDEVAC response times requires a systematic approach and the
synchronization of aircraft, medical capabilities, communication,
infrastructure, and security to support these operations.
We must always remember that the single most important factor in
the execution of the MEDEVAC mission is patient care. The effort to
save human life warrants accepting additional risk when there is a
reasonable expectation of success. So while we have changed the MEDEVAC
standard to reflect a 60-minute total mission time, commanders and
flight crews must not be so overly focused on meeting the 1-hour
standard, as patient needs may dictate longer flight legs to
appropriate medical care and surgical intervention.
Over the last 12 months, we have executed a number of force build-
ups across Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States and our
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have increased the
MEDEVAC and surgical platforms in theater to best support this increase
of forces and the battlefield dispersion of personnel. Based on
detailed analysis and coordination, we are now executing a course of
action that will maintain and sustain the 60-minute or better average
for MEDEVAC missions in Afghanistan that we are achieving to date. This
analysis was used in determining the correct mix of MEDEVAC
organizations associated with the force expansion.
NEW STRATEGY, FORCES, AND FORCE RESTRICTIONS
6. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, we have been fighting in
Afghanistan for 8 years. Now, we are facing a more sophisticated and
resilient insurgency than any time since 2001. What are the key
elements in our new strategy that will allow us to reverse the momentum
in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. Reversing the Taliban-led insurgency's momentum and
denying their access to, and control of, key population and production
centers are at the top of the list of focused objectives that we share
with our Afghan partners. Reversing the momentum requires us to reverse
the trend of expanding Taliban influence over the population,
particularly in the south. This means we must increase the number of
districts that are under government or local control and reduce the
number of districts that are contested or under Taliban control. In
addition, establishing security in these districts, focused efforts to
build Afghan governance capacity, and to enable the Afghan people to
hold their officials accountable are critical and will increase the
people's trust and confidence.
This strategy is coupled with the expansion in the quantity and
quality of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Growing the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) and
training them to a sufficient level will allow Afghans to take control
of the security of their own country.
Population-centric counterinsurgency has proven effective at
reversing negative trends in the areas where International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) forces have cleared and held and have enabled
Afghan security and governance to develop. By July 2010, the bulk of
the additional forces approved by the President will be in Afghanistan
and partnered with an expanded ANSF. These forces will expand and
consolidate the security zones to connect key population and production
centers, with our main efforts initially focused in the south--at the
historic heart of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.
7. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, many of our allies have
restrictions on how their troops can be used in Afghanistan. In some
cases, this even restricts their troops from offensive combat. Do you
foresee any of these restrictions being modified or removed as we
execute the next phase of the war in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, in fact, some of the restrictions have already
been modified or removed based on the last Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) ISAF Caveat report. Two nations removed all
caveats: Estonia and Portugal. Three nations reduced caveats: Bulgaria,
Italy, and Slovenia. Only one nation increased their caveat and that
was the Netherlands.
8. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, since the release of General
McChrystal's assessment, there has been a healthy debate over the
number of troops being deployed to Afghanistan. However, we should not
focus solely on the number of troops alone. Ignoring the total number
of troops proposed by the administration, what is your assessment of
the mix of U.S. forces by capability? Will we have the right equipment
and personnel in place to achieve our goals in the region?
Admiral Mullen. The mix of forces is based on capabilities
requested by General McChrystal. As he has testified, he is getting the
force structure he needs to be successful. The reality is, however, the
requirement will continue to change, so we have to keep on it. We have
made extraordinary improvements in things like intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment, but this progress will need
to continue. With the additional forces that have been approved, we are
going to have to work through getting additional equipment to support
our troops, including, for example, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles and engineer equipment to help us find and dispose of
improvised explosive devices. I think we are doing an extraordinary job
across our government providing this equipment, but I think it is
something we have to watch constantly.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
CERP PROJECTS AND TRACKING
9. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, an
October 2009 quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector
General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) indicates ongoing problems
with the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Congress has
provided $1.6 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for CERP in
Afghanistan, and that CERP was created to fund primarily small-scale
projects to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs at the
community and provincial levels. However, SIGAR found that while DOD
has established procedures to account for CERP funds, it has not
established adequate mechanisms for monitoring and executing CERP
projects. The report goes on to claim that program managers have
limited visibility over the execution of CERP projects in part because
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), which oversees CERP, has no central
system for retaining the physical files in Afghanistan, and electronic
records are either incomplete or nonexistent.
SIGAR also found that CERP funds increasingly are being obligated
for large-scale projects that cost $500,000 or more. While these large-
scale projects account for only 3 percent of all projects, they consume
67 percent of CERP funds. These projects pose increased risks for CERP
because they are usually more complex than the small projects and
require several years to complete. Most CERP managers have been trained
to implement smaller-scale projects. Moreover, troop rotation schedules
result in a lack of continuity in the management of large, long-term
projects. SIGAR recommended that the Commander of USFOR-A develop and
implement: (1) a process to systematically collect and track
information on CERP projects; (2) a centralized system for maintaining
records; and (3) a plan that addresses how to manage the heightened
risks associated with projects costing $500,000 or more.
What has DOD specifically done to address the findings of this
SIGAR report as it relates to its management of the CERP in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. By its nature, CERP involves
decentralized implementation by local commanders in theater. Its
hallmarks are responsiveness to urgent needs and flexibility. We have
heard the concerns expressed by Members of Congress, studied the
findings of recent audit reports, and examined lessons learned from
previous deployments. We have taken steps within DOD, the Army, and the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater to improve the oversight of the
program--all without diminishing the key element of flexibility and
responsiveness this program provides to the commander in the field.
DOD recognizes that additional improvements can be made in the
management of CERP to maintain the flexibility and accountability
essential to a field-driven program. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is
leading a review of CERP to examine ways to make the program more
efficient and effective. The review will examine the issues you raise
as well as others that we view as important to implementation of this
crucial program. Following this review a report will be made available
in the spring to Congress.
10. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
the plan for implementing a central system for retaining physical files
and electronic records of CERP handled by USFOR-A?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
is leading a review of the CERP to examine ways to make the program
more efficient and effective. This report will be completed and made
available to Congress in the spring. As part of the review, DOD is
examining the current CERP data management system in theater with the
goal of improving efficiency, transparency, and accuracy of data
recordkeeping and reporting. DOD is also working with the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) to ensure compatible electronic
recordkeeping to improve interagency coordination on CERP projects. We
believe CERP managers are doing a commendable job implementing the
program under difficult conditions, and believe the Deputy Secretary's
comprehensive review of the program will ensure they have the proper
tools required to execute this crucial program.
11. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do you
think there needs to be congressional reforms to preserve the integrity
of the CERP while also ensuring proper oversight of these projects and
funds available for use by field commanders? If so, what might you
propose?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Current legislation provides
sufficient oversight for the CERP. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is
leading a review of CERP to examine ways to make the program more
efficient and effective. Following this review, a report will be made
available to Congress in the spring.
CERP is critical to supporting commanders in the field in executing
counterinsurgency operations in support of the President's strategy.
DOD continues to support congressional reforms to improve the
flexibility of traditional foreign assistance programs and facilitate
interagency cooperation.
12. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
DOD doing to better train CERP managers in the types and scale of
projects that they will handle in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As noted in the recent report
(House Report 111-105) submitted to the 2009 Supplemental
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2346), which requested a description of the
``training provided for members of the U.S. Armed Forces deploying to
Afghanistan and Iraq on the use of funds under the CERP,'' training is
vital to the success of CERP. Adequate training ensures the following:
deployed commanders and their appointed representatives in theater use
appropriate criteria when choosing and monitoring CERP projects;
financial agents and managers for CERP place sufficient controls on,
and accurately account for, the funds appropriated under CERP; and the
program helps further the strategic goals of the CENTCOM Commander.
As the Executive Agent for the CERP, the Army currently conducts
training in the continental United States (CONUS); for deploying
individuals and units; and in theater, for individuals and units
already deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has enhanced CERP
training for four key positions: the project manager, the project
purchasing officer, the paying agent, and the unit commander. The first
three positions form a triad of expertise that every project must have.
Unit commanders are vital to ensure the appropriate projects are
identified. Integrated training and detailed procedures provide the
checks and balances necessary in every project. In addition, there are
numerous initiatives underway to enhance CERP training for individuals
and units, both pre-deployment and in theater. The existing training,
plus the Mobile Training Team and Distance Learning programs being
developed, provides the necessary tools to ensure effective and
efficient management of the CERP.
13. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how are
large-scale CERP projects vetted within the greater framework of
reconstruction in Afghanistan to ensure their utility and prevent
duplication or unneeded projects?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. In Afghanistan, the U.S.
Government Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan provides the
overarching framework for reconstruction in Afghanistan within which
CERP projects are vetted and coordinated.
As part of the plan, DOD and the Department of State (DOS)
established an executive working group with 14 subworking groups. One
of these subgroups is the infrastructure working group (IWG) under
USAID. The meetings are co-chaired by USAID, USFOR-A (through the Joint
Project Integration Office (JPIO)) and the U.S. Embassy. The IWG, as a
priority, is working to establish a number of infrastructure
strategies. The first three are for water (completed), roads (working),
and energy (scheduled for development in January 2010) sectors, and IWG
provides overarching guidance for CERP projects as well.
USAID now participates as a voting member on the CERP review board
at the command level. Their participation prevents duplication of
effort and also helps identify any problems with sustainment of
projects nominated for CERP. The increase of U.S. Government civilians
in the field significantly improves the integration coordination and
de-confliction of reconstruction projects across civilian and military
funding streams.
14. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what do
you feel is an acceptable cost limit that should be in place on the
type of CERP projects that field managers could implement?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) provides guidance on the CERP approval authorities in
theater. This guidance is supplemented by approval limits provided by
CENTCOM, USFOR-A, and U.S. Forces-Iraq, and all procedures are
continually reviewed to ensure they are responsive to changing
operational requirements. Projects in Iraq are capped at $2 million and
require a Secretary of Defense waiver to exceed that limit. Projects
over $1 million in Iraq and Afghanistan require approval by the
Commander, CENTCOM.
DOD strives to ensure commanders in the field have flexible
resources to address local urgent reconstruction requirements as part
of the counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, DOD does not seek to
institute cost limits but rather ensure the appropriate approval
authorities are in place and adequate numbers of trained personnel are
available to commanders to manage CERP projects. The Deputy Secretary
of Defense is leading a review of CERP to examine ways to make the
program more efficient and effective. Following this review, a report
will be made available to Congress in the spring.
Finally, DOD is aware that the project requirements in Afghanistan
are different than project requirements in Iraq, based on the unique
conditions in each country, the nature of the conflict, other available
foreign assistance, local government resources, and our own force
presence. In Afghanistan, as we increase the forces available to
implement the President's strategy, CERP will become an even more
critical tool to respond to humanitarian needs, to help address
grievances of local populations, and to enable economic opportunity
through complementary larger-scale infrastructure projects.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
TIMELINE IN AFGHANISTAN
15. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, in August 2009, General
McChrystal stated that if additional resources are not provided, we
``risk an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer
possible'' and that we risk ``mission failure.'' What are the current
risks to mission success as these additional troops flow into theater
over the timeline you presented?
Secretary Gates. The President's decision rapidly resources our
strategy, recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive
and ultimately enable success. We have greater clarity on the way
forward and additional forces will begin to deploy shortly. By this
time next year, our intent is to demonstrate that the insurgency has
lost the momentum. By the summer of 2011, we intend to make it clear to
the Afghan people that the insurgency will not win, allowing them to
side with their government. Increasing our capability and strategy will
involve much more than just force increases, but the additional forces
are significant.
The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed by a
clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I'll briefly mention
three. The first is the Afghan Government's credibility deficit, which
must be recognized by all, including Afghan officials, as a critical
area of focus and change. Equally important is our ability to
accelerate development of the Afghan security forces. Third, the hazard
posed by extremists that operate and easily pass through both sides of
the border with Pakistan must be mitigated by enhanced cross-border
coordination and enhanced Pakistani engagement.
Looking ahead, we are confident we have both the right strategy and
the right resources to mitigate these risks.
16. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, how will this increase affect
the ongoing drawdown of troops in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. The responsible drawdown of troops in Iraq
continues forward as planned. While the responsible drawdown in Iraq
will be executed concurrently with the increase in forces in
Afghanistan, the Iraq drawdown is not dependent upon the Afghanistan
increase and the Afghanistan increase is not dependent on the Iraq
drawdown. The transportation feasibility analysis at this time also
indicates no significant impact to Iraq drawdown as we increase forces
in Afghanistan.
The U.S. policy on Iraq has not changed; we are committed to
fulfilling our responsibility as outlined in the security agreement
between the United States and Iraq. Our drawdown following the national
elections will be based on the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
Commander's assessment that security conditions remain stable and will
follow our strategy to transform the force into an advisory and
assistance role. As our requirements in Iraq continue to decrease,
units that redeploy from or are no longer required to deploy to Iraq
will return to the pool of forces available to deploy in support of our
mission in Afghanistan or other global requirements.
We will continue to analyze and monitor this issue closely and if
conditions change to impose emerging impacts on the Iraq drawdown as a
consequence of the Afghanistan troop increase, then we will certainly
keep you informed.
17. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, is there sufficient air and
sealift assets to meet timelines in Afghanistan and Iraq?
Secretary Gates. We have a large number of professionals who are
balancing the demands of both operations. Their greatest challenge is
overcoming the differences that exist between Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iraq's infrastructure is more accommodating. Afghanistan does not have
a neighbor like Kuwait that provides a major logistics hub.
Additionally, Afghanistan does not have the number of runways, rail
hubs, or road networks like those that exist in Iraq. I remain
confident that our professionals will continue to adapt and execute the
mission we have assigned them.
18. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, the President stated that a
responsible withdrawal of troops will begin in summer 2011. Are there
any caveats to this timeline?
Secretary Gates. The President did not pick the summer 2011 date
arbitrarily. During the strategy review, we looked closely at the
current and projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the
country. Based on that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July
2011 is a realistic date for us to plan to begin transferring
responsibility for security to the ANSF in some parts of the country.
At the same time, we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
on those assessments, the President will determine the scope and pace
of a gradual and responsible draw down of U.S. combat forces.
This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
take primary responsibility for defending their own country and prepare
to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.
PROJECTED NUMBERS OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES
19. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, as we work to increase the
capability of the ANSF, please clarify the security force goals. Are we
aiming to meet the projected numbers established by March 2009 goals of
134,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP, or levels recommended by General McChrystal
of 240,000 ANA and 160,000 ANP?
Secretary Gates. We plan to grow the ANSF to 134,000 ANA and 96,800
ANP forces by October 2010. As of early December of last year, ANP
strength was already approaching 95,000, and we expect to reach the ANP
target well ahead of October 2010. Looking beyond October 2010, we will
continue to set annual goals to grow the ANA and ANP based on an
ongoing evaluation of our capabilities and the requirement to develop
additional ANSF.
20. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, when will we reach our goal
numbers for the ANA and ANP?
Secretary Gates. We are on track to meet our current goal of
134,000 ANA forces by October 2010. We expect to reach our goal of
96,800 ANP forces early in 2010, well ahead of schedule. We will
continue to reevaluate our needs and capabilities in regards to growing
the ANSF.
COSTS OF EACH NEW SOLDIER
21. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) estimated that each additional soldier deployed to
Afghanistan will cost $1 million. Is this estimate accurate?
Secretary Gates. That estimate is roughly accurate if all costs, to
include new and expanded base camps and additional equipment, are
included.
22. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, does this OMB cost estimate
include any contractor support?
Secretary Gates. Yes, the OMB estimate includes all costs and,
therefore, incorporates functions performed by contractors.
REINTEGRATION OF FORMER INSURGENTS
23. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates, how effective has the effort
been to reintegrate former Taliban, the Northern Alliance, and
Mujahedeen fighters so that they are no longer fighting for the
insurgency?
Secretary Gates. The insurgency in Afghanistan is composed of a
complex network of alliance and allegiances among various groups.
Reintegration efforts will help break down these connections,
separating hard-core Taliban from those fighting for non-ideological
reasons. Any reintegration effort will also need to ensure that those
groups aligned against the insurgency (e.g., the Northern Alliance) and
those ``on the fence'' (e.g., many former mujahideen who fought against
the Soviets) do not feel that reintegration programs provide perverse
incentives for members of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.
To implement the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) process, the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was
established in March 2003. The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) implemented the ANPB on behalf of the Afghan Government, the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and Japan as the lead
country on DDR issues. The ANBP disarmament and demobilization process
lasted from October 2003 to November 2005. The Disbandment of Illegally
Armed Groups project, established in 2005, was designed to follow the
DDR program. This program focused on reintegrating Northern Alliance
and associated groups following the fall of the Taliban. It still
exists today and discussions are underway on how to coordinate this
effort with programs to reintegrate former Taliban.
Previous reintegration efforts in Afghanistan did not achieve
significant results. Reintegration of those insurgents and their
leaders who want to renounce violence and join mainstream Afghan
society is an important effort, which must be led by the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and be community-focused.
Our civil-military team is actively working alongside GIRoA to develop
their reintegration program. Part of the reintegration program includes
utilizing local leaders to vouch for the reliability of those who are
willing to leave the insurgency.
To assist the GIRoA in assimilating these insurgents, USFOR-A is
working with ISAF to develop support to a GIRoA reintegration program
in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010. Job training, education, and relocation assistance stand out
as potential opportunities for support.
Finally, security is also essential. To attract insurgents to an
Afghan-led reintegration program, ISAF will partner with ANSF and
community leaders to provide sufficient security and prevent
retribution.
POLICY GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN
24. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, what overall U.S. policy
goals are being pursued in Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. As President Obama reaffirmed in his December 1
remarks at West Point, our core goal in Afghanistan remains: to
disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their
return to Afghanistan. To do so, we and our allies will surge our
forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key
population centers, training Afghan forces, and transferring
responsibility to a capable Afghan partner.
Our governance efforts will help develop more responsive, visible,
and accountable institutions in Kabul and at the provincial, district,
and local level, where everyday Afghans encounter their government. We
will increase the number of civilian technical advisers in key central
government ministries, as well as in provincial capitals and district
centers, to partner with Afghans in this capacity building effort. We
will support the Afghan Government's reinvigorated plans to fight
corruption, with concrete measures of progress toward greater
accountability.
We believe job creation is critical to undermine extremists' appeal
in the short-term and for sustainable economic growth in the long-term.
Our top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military
agriculture redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan's once
vibrant agriculture sector. This will help sap the insurgency of
fighters and of income from poppy cultivation. Creating links to cross-
border trade with Pakistan will support sustainable long-term economic
growth and job creation. Simultaneously, we will sustain our successful
efforts to build the Afghan Government's capacity to provide improved
health services and educational opportunities to the Afghan people.
Improving educational opportunities for all Afghans, regardless of
gender, is a top priority for the Afghan people. It is also a necessary
step for diminishing the influence of extremists, improving the pool of
qualified individuals who can serve in Afghanistan's security forces,
and improving Afghanistan's long-term economic potential.
This region is the heart of the global violent extremism pursued by
al Qaeda, and the region from which we were attacked on September 11.
New attacks are being planned there now, a fact borne out by a recent
plot, uncovered and disrupted by American authorities. We will prevent
the Taliban from turning Afghanistan back into a safe haven from which
international terrorists can strike at us or our allies. This would
pose a direct threat to the American Homeland, and that is a threat
that we cannot tolerate.
25. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, what policy goals and
benchmarks are tied to the withdrawal of forces in Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
STRATEGY TO REDUCE CORRUPTION AND THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS
26. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, I assume that we have as
part of our new strategy a plan to better address governance and
corruption. In his inauguration, President Hamid Karzai stated that he
was going to fight corruption. What tangible steps has he outlined?
Secretary Clinton. Yes. We are developing robust plans for
addressing governance and corruption and are working more directly with
the Afghan Government on these critical issues. The Afghan Government's
most significant progress to date is the creation of the Major-Crimes
Task Force (MCTF), a multi-ministry initiative responsible for
investigating corruption, kidnapping, and organized crime cases and
preparing them for prosecution and an anti-corruption prosecution unit
within the Attorney General's Office. The Afghan Government also has
agreed to establish an Anti-Corruption Tribunal of specially vetted
judges to oversee high-profile cases. The MCTF receives financial and
technical support from DOD and the Department of State's (DOS) Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, while Department of
Justice provides technical support.
To improve transparency and accountability, the Afghan Government
has been active in implementing hiring reforms and a vetting process
for Afghan Government employees through the Civil Service Commission,
and in improving the capacity of the High Office of Oversight (HOO) so
that these entities can better serve as oversight mechanisms for
corruption efforts nationwide. Embassy Kabul, the International
Community, and the Afghan Government are in extended discussions about
the future of the HOO and how to make the body as effective as
possible. At a recent press conference, the HOO publicly named the
Afghan ministers who had not yet filed asset declaration forms and it
is actively working to secure 100 percent compliance.
In December, the Government of Afghanistan hosted a high-level
conference in Kabul to address corruption where President Karzai and
others spoke frankly and openly about the challenges that corruption
creates for Afghanistan. Karzai's recent cabinet appointments also
suggest that he is taking corruption seriously and seeking to limit
corruption at higher levels of government.
Unfortunately, this progress has yet to be complemented with
tangible actions against any of the high-level government officials
accused of corruption. We will watch the Afghan Government very closely
over the next few months and expect to see some substantive changes in
the near future.
27. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, what is President Karzai
doing to increase transparency in the appointment of provincial and
ministerial posts?
Secretary Clinton. We remain concerned about the appointment
process for ministerial and provincial posts in the Afghan Government.
While the Government of Afghanistan has made steps in the right
direction, significant challenges remain.
The Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission
and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance are jointly
responsible for the appointment of high-level Afghan Government
officials, including provincial governors. With the assistance of the
international community, these institutions have established a set of
mechanisms to adequately identify, recruit, vet, and hire high-level
government officials. Unfortunately, the Government of Afghanistan is
not adequately utilizing these resources, particularly for politically
influential positions and important governorships. In many cases,
President Karzai continues to rely on political patronage networks in
choosing leaders for key positions.
28. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, overall development of the
Afghan economy appears to be at a standstill. The issue of poppy
eradication continues to be a roadblock for agriculture development.
What is being done to provide security for farmers who do not grow
poppy, so that the Taliban do not intimidate the farmers? Is a
comprehensive development strategy being developed?
Secretary Clinton. I would not say that economic development in
Afghanistan is at a standstill. There have been some important
successes in this last year--including a deal with India involving
exports from Wardak province in Afghanistan--that are encouraging.
Large-scale eradication targeted at individual farmers as part of
our counternarcotics approach over the last few years proved
problematic because it gave the Taliban a way to step in as protectors
of farmers, driving a wedge between farmers and their government and
us. In recognition of this, we revised our counternarcotics strategy
during the summer so that we are putting greater focus now on
interdiction of the nexus between narco-traffickers and the insurgents,
and on the connection between the poppy trade and corruption; and on
helping farmers to grow legal crops that will be profitable and able to
supplant opium poppy in the long term. We are thus taking the
counternarcotics fight to the people who are ultimately hurting farmers
and undermining the Afghan Government and rule of law, and at the same
time helping link farmers to their government through Afghan Government
programs that supply farmers with agricultural inputs and help to
develop agricultural value chains. Our revised counternarcotics
strategy is integrated with our Agricultural Strategy, and in this way
helps to create jobs and restore Afghanistan's once vibrant
agricultural sector. Our counternarcotics strategy is thus part of a
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach aimed at helping the Afghan
Government wage a counterinsurgency and develop the country at the same
time.
General McChrystal's counterinsurgency approach centers on
protecting the population, and this includes farmers. We will expect
the Afghan national security forces to be involved in this as well,
further forging a positive connection between the people and their
government.
DIPLOMATIC TEAM DYNAMICS AND ALLIED SUPPORT
29. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, an effective and continuous
diplomatic effort is key to progress for the Afghan Government, and an
effective ambassadorial team is critical to facilitating that progress.
What is the working relationship between Ambassador Eikenberry,
Ambassador Holbrooke, and Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
30. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, I understand that many of
the troop-contributing nations for Afghanistan have placed very
specific caveats on what missions and what type of support that they
will provide. What, if any, are the caveats, and do these caveats pose
an obstacle to meeting our stated objectives?
Secretary Clinton. I appreciate the continued commitment of our
NATO allies and other partners to the international mission in
Afghanistan. Forty-three NATO and non-NATO countries provide over
40,000 troops with thousands more arriving in 2010 to reinforce the
ISAF. Over 600 allied and partner military personnel have been killed
serving in Afghanistan. U.S. allies and partners recognize that
securing Afghanistan against the threat posed by extremists and
terrorists and providing a better future for the Afghan people is in
our common interest.
Caveats that limit the geographic and operational flexibility of
ISAF forces remain a challenge in Afghanistan. Despite this challenge,
the trend over the last year has been positive with several nations
dropping specific caveats and a majority of ISAF troop contingents are
now caveat free. We continue to impress upon our allies and partners
the importance of providing the commanders on the ground the maximum
possible flexibility in the employment of ISAF forces.
I defer to DOD for a detailed discussion of how caveats impact the
operations of U.S. forces.
TIMELINE AND RESULTING CHANGES
31. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how long do you expect it to
take to build up capability to affect an increased level of security?
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, will there be an increase in
contractor support based on this troop increase?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. Contractors are a critical enabler in
Afghanistan and will continue to provide a wide range of tasks
essential for operations including maintenance, construction,
transportation, security, and base support. The contractor footprint in
Afghanistan increased substantially during the fourth quarter and now
stands at 104,000. CENTCOM estimates the number of contractors will
grow to 148,000 to 186,000 in support of the increase in forces.
Approximately 75 percent of these will be Afghani nationals, providing
a boost to the economy and promoting stability.
33. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, what additional costs will be
necessary for contractor support of these additional troops in
Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. OSD Comptroller is working with the military
departments and CENTCOM to determine the additional operational costs
needed for the additional troops. The Secretary of Defense has stated
that the total cost will be between $30 billion to $35 billion per
year. The additional costs required for contractor support will be a
subset of the operations and maintenance request. Contractors are a
critical enabler in Afghanistan and will continue to provide a wide
range of tasks essential for operations including maintenance,
construction, transportation, security, and base support. The costs
associated with contracted support are impossible to determine in
advance of requirement development, however, these costs will not be
over and above any funds requested by the Department in support of the
troop increase.
34. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how is the normal force
rotation and dwell time affected by the troop increase?
Admiral Mullen. The 30,000 troop increase will have no significant
effect on normal force rotation or dwell for the Services.
The Army will be able to source the requested capabilities on the
anticipated timelines without breaking 1:1 unit dwell.
While current Marine Corps deployment-to-dwell policy of 1:3 is not
being met, the Active component goal of 1:2 is being met across many
core units. The challenges associated with meeting these goals remain
acceptable to the Marine Corps.
The Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard reported that the troop
increase will have no significant overarching effect on force rotation
and dwell time.
TROOP NUMBERS AND USE
35. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, when all of the troops are in
place, how many of them will be solely dedicated to training the ANSF?
Admiral Mullen. Currently, in NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
(NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
there are approximately 830 U.S. forces whose sole task is to train
ANSF forces in institutions, schools, and other formalized programs of
instruction. These forces train ANSF trainers, coordinate resources
exclusively in support of training, and advise and coach the ANSF on
management of institutional training.
4/82 IBCT and 48th IBCT, consisting of approximately 6,000
soldiers, provide Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentor
Teams (PMTs) to fielded ANA units from battalion to corps level and to
ANP units from district to police region level.
When all of our forces are in place, these troops will be augmented
by a infantry battalion from the 10th Mountain Division, which is
approximately 600 soldiers.
However, our relationship with the ANSF extends far beyond these
institutional training programs. A key tenet of General McChrystal's
strategy is partnering with the Afghan security forces in order to help
them build capacity so that they can assume responsibility for their
nation's security as quickly and as successfully as possible. These
partnered forces provide daily operational, doctrinal, and logistical
advice, mentoring, and coaching.
All U.S. combat brigades deployed to Afghanistan will be partnered
with Afghan forces across all echelons of command. Therefore, as
additional U.S. forces deploy to Afghanistan and we accelerate the
growth of ANSF units, the number of U.S. forces partnered with Afghan
units will also rise.
36. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how many U.S. forces are
currently training ANSF?
Admiral Mullen. Currently, in NTM-A/CSTC-A, there are approximately
830 U.S. forces whose sole task is to train ANSF forces in
institutions, schools, and other formalized programs of instruction.
These forces train ANSF trainers, coordinate resources exclusively in
support of training, and advise and coach the ANSF on management of
institutional training.
4/82 IBCT and 48th IBCT, consisting of approximately 6,000
soldiers, provide ETTs and PMTs to fielded ANA units from battalion to
corps level and to ANP units from district to police region level.
However, our relationship with the ANSF extends far beyond these
institutional training programs. A key tenet of General McChrystal's
strategy is partnering with the Afghan security forces in order to help
them build capacity so that they can assume responsibility for their
nation's security as quickly and as successfully as possible. These
partnered forces provide daily operational, doctrinal, and logistical
advice, mentoring, and coaching.
All U.S. combat brigades deployed to Afghanistan will be partnered
with Afghan forces across all echelons of command. Therefore, as
additional U.S. forces deploy to Afghanistan and we accelerate the
growth of ANSF units, the number of U.S. forces partnered with Afghan
units will also rise.
37. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how many ISAFs are currently
conducting the mission in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. As of 9 December, coalition forces in Afghanistan
total 109,370. The United States contribution of that is 67,640.
38. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, for those U.S. troops whose
responsibility is to train the Afghan forces, what portion will be
embedded with the Afghan forces?
Admiral Mullen. A key tenet of General McChrystal's strategy is
partnering with the Afghan security forces in order to help them build
capacity and assume lead security responsibility as quickly and as
successfully as possible. Today, 26 out of 40 U.S. battalions, or about
14,000 troops, are partnered with ANSF in this capacity and provide
daily training to ANSF units. As additional U.S. forces deploy to
Afghanistan and we accelerate the growth of ANSF units, the number of
U.S. forces partnered with Afghan units will also rise.
TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES
39. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how long does it take for U.S.
troops to train Afghan forces?
Admiral Mullen. There are three main efforts in training the ANSF.
The first is institutional, where soldiers and police receive basic
training through schools and other formalized programs. Basic training
for the infantry soldier, who make up the majority of the ANA is 8
weeks long. Those soldiers who will become part of a newly formed
battalion receive an additional 5 weeks of unit collective training at
the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC). Soldiers selected to be NCOs
during basic training receive another 3 weeks of training. Those
soldiers who serve in specialty billets can receive 6 to 8 more weeks
of specialty training after basic training. ANA officers receive
between 20 weeks to 4 years of training depending on the program.
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) receive 8 weeks of basic training either as
new recruits or with their district as part of Focused District
Development (FDD) or Directed District Development (D3). Afghan Border
Police (ABP) also attend 8 weeks of basic training, either as new
recruits, or as serving police as part of Focused Border Development
(FBD). Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) receive 16 weeks of
training, consisting of 8 weeks of basic training and 8 weeks of
specialized training. ANP officers receive between 6 months and 3 years
of training, depending on the program.
However, the process of training the ANSF is a long-term commitment
by U.S. forces that extends well beyond basic training programs. The
second training effort for U.S. forces are ETTs and PMTs, which are
provided to fielded ANA units from the battalion to corps level and to
ANP units from the district to police region level. There are currently
two U.S. BCTs providing ETTs and PMTs: the 48th IBCT and 4/82 IBCT.
The third training effort is U.S. partnership with ANSF units. This
partnering is a key tenet of General McChrystal's strategy, and is
designed to help ANSF build capacity and assume lead security
responsibility as quickly and as successfully as possible. Once units
graduate from their respective institutional training programs, they
continue to receive advice, mentoring, and coaching through their
partnership with U.S. and coalition forces. For instance, upon
graduation, every ANA Kandak and higher level headquarters is partnered
with a coalition unit and receives daily doctrinal, operational,
administrative, and logistical training. Furthermore, when these ANA
units are employed operationally, they routinely fight alongside a
coalition operational unit.
As a result of force expansion, all ANA and ANP in critical
districts will be partnered with IJC forces.
40. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, when will there be sufficient
and fully trained Afghan forces prepared to protect their own country?
Admiral Mullen. As the President articulated in his December 1
address, U.S. forces will begin transitioning responsibility to the
ANSF in July 2011. This transition will occur province by province, and
will be executed responsibly, taking into account conditions on the
ground. While the conditions necessary to transition responsibility
will be present in some provinces in the summer of 2011, others will
likely require further U.S. training and assistance before this process
can begin.
In part, decisions about the location and pace of U.S. transition
and eventual withdrawal will be made based on the capability of the
local ANSF. A key tenet of our strategy is to accelerate the growth and
build the capacity of the ANSF so that they can assume responsibility
for their nation's security as quickly as possible. Decisions about the
targeted growth of the ANSF will be made on a year-by-year basis, based
on current security conditions and past progress.
As President Karzai articulated in his November inaugural address,
the Afghan Government's goal is to assume security responsibility for
the entire country within the next 5 years. We will work with our
Afghan partners to support this goal.
41. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, given the current proficiency
of the ANP Force, will Afghan police officers who were trained locally
in provinces outside of the new academy in Kabul be retrained with
revised law enforcement standards?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. AUP recruited and trained locally will
complete the ``Basic 8'' 8-week training program. This program uses a
curriculum reviewed by the DOS International Law Enforcement and
Narcotics Division and approved by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior
(MoI).
AUP patrolmen are being trained at a Regional Training Center
either individually or a part of their district through the Focused
District Development program or in their home district through the
Directed District Development (D3) program. MoI and NTM-A/CSTC-A are
coordinating to maximize the rate of untrained police completing this
reform training.
42. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, which American contracting
company is supporting the training of the ANP?
Admiral Mullen. Currently, support for the training of ANP is
provided under a DOS contract with Dyncorp International, LLC. However,
we intend to transition the training effort to a DOD-managed contract
to improve oversight and maximize efficiencies. The new acquisition
strategy will leverage an existing Counter-Narcoterrorism and
Technology Program Office (CNTPO) multiple award Indefinite Delivery/
Indefinite Quantity contract with the following companies: Lockheed
Martin Integrated Systems; Northrup Grumman Information Technology;
Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, LLC; Raytheon Technical Services;
and ARINC Engineering Services, LLC. The contract with Dyncorp has been
extended until 31 March 2010 to allow time for the transition and to
minimize disruption and risk to performance of this critical mission.
43. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, how long have they been
assigned this task, and how long will they stay should their contract
be renewed?
Admiral Mullen. The current DOS contractor (Dyncorp) has been in
place since 2003. This contract has been extended until 31 March 2010
to allow time for transition to a DOD-managed contract.
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS
44. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, I have not heard much about the
successes in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. What is the
overall plan and who leads the effort?
Admiral Mullen. DOS and USAID are the leads for U.S. government
reconstruction efforts, as part of a broader international effort in
Afghanistan. DOD does provide reconstruction assistance through the
CERP funds and some DOD organizations (like the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers) provide assistance upon request on a reimbursable basis to
USAID/DOS.
Under the CERP, the field commanders are using these funds to
address a number of areas that help our counterinsurgency efforts in
supporting the Afghan people and, as needed, do small-scale
infrastructure projects that help improve people's lives and provide
humanitarian assistance. Of the $1.2 billion appropriated for CERP in
fiscal year 2009 for use by both Iraq and Afghanistan, about $550.7
million is being spent to support over 2,215 projects. DOD support to
Afghan reconstruction efforts is most visible through the 12 U.S.-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that operate at the provincial
level. The DOD components of PRTs utilize CERP funds to support
reconstruction priorities at the provincial/district levels based on
Afghan-led prioritized plans. These Provincial Development Plans (PDPs)
were developed by Afghans at the district/provincial level and were
approved by the National Government of Afghanistan in alignment with
the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The PRTs (and maneuver
forces) and other donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work
with the provincial development committees to align CERP and other
donor funds to prioritized requirements in the PDPs. As a result, CERP
funds and other donor funds are used to build, for example, schools,
roads, power systems, irrigation, medical clinics, and government
buildings.
On August 10, 2009, General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry
established an overarching civilian-military plan titled: ``U.S.
Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For Support to
Afghanistan''. This civilian-military plan is working to integrate all
U.S. Government capabilities and resources in Afghanistan, and provides
U.S. Government priorities and objectives for the 11 transformative
effects areas broken out by regional commands for fiscal year 2010
through fiscal year 2012.
In summary, the DOS leads U.S. Government development efforts in
Afghanistan, and like other donors, is guided by the ANDS. DOD supports
these efforts and employs CERP for projects that enhance
counterinsurgency operations, i.e., those that focus on the security of
the Afghan population.
45. Senator Burris. Admiral Mullen, are relief and other
reconstruction efforts aided or hampered by the presence of the PRT?
Does this vary by region?
Admiral Mullen. PRTs provide critical capabilities in that they
generate immediate local relief efforts and support more expansive
reconstruction efforts. Both effects are essential to execution of the
President's strategy for Afghansitan and Pakistan. PRTs provide
immediate local relief, using discretionary funds to accomplish short-
term employment, self-help, and minor construction efforts that assist
field commanders in the hold and early build phases of
counterinsurgency operations. When synchronized properly, PRT efforts
are complimentary with and greatly enhance reconstruction work executed
by the GIRoA, the U.N., other U.S. Government agencies, and numerous
NGOs--development efforts that anchor the build phase of
counterinsurgency operations. The effectiveness of reconstruction
efforts in general, and the effectiveness of PRTs in support of
reconstruction in particular, depends upon several factors unique to
different regions of the country, including the security environment
(permissive, semi-permissive, or non-permissive), human terrain
factors, and governance capability, among others. I am unaware of any
down-side to PRTs. One recent study highlights the manner in which PRTs
made a positive impact on relief and reconstruction, reducing violence,
increasing local political participation, and facilitating a linkage
between tribes and the government.\1\
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\1\ Malkasian, Carter & Meyerle, Gerald. March 2009. ``Provincial
Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?'' Strategic Studies
Institute. P. VIII.
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______
Questions Submitted by Senator Paul G. Kirk
PRESIDENT KARZAI AND CORRUPTION
46. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, you recently returned from
Afghanistan. Having attended the inauguration of President Karzai after
an election most are calling fraudulent and having sat face-to-face
with him, I would like to hear your thoughts on President Karzai and
whether demonstrable progress on his part is a realistic goal. Should
not demonstrable progress be a pre-condition to further commitment of
our troops?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
47. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, news reports indicate that you
warned President Karzai to reduce corruption or lose foreign
assistance. How accurate is that statement?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
48. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, how do we measure progress by
the Karzai Government, and what is our timetable for his progress?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
49. Senator Kirk. Secretary Clinton, what will you or the President
do if President Karzai cannot or will not meet our requirements for
progress?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
50. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, you recently indicated that a
way to hold the Afghan Government accountable would be to withhold
funds for projects ``where we can control the flow of dollars.'' Can
you elaborate on that statement? What projects are you referring to?
Secretary Gates. The international presence in Afghanistan has
significantly increased the influx of assistance dollars and, as a
result, the number of contracts. Corruption--which may be associated
with contracts awarded, work that we are having done, and development
projects with others (including the Afghans)--is a major concern.
Corruption can occur at any level. The very presence of large amounts
of assistance in a society where rule of law is virtually absent and
the institutions of government are weak opens up opportunities for
corruption.
While the United States works vigilantly to ensure the contracts we
enter into and the contractors we work with are not engaging in
corruption, this is primarily an Afghan issue--effective anti-
corruption measures require laws, regulations, and an effective
enforcement infrastructure, none of which Afghanistan yet has. We
welcome President Karzai's recent commitments to a more active effort
to combat corruption.
As the Secretary of State noted in her testimony, USAID is working
on a process to certify Afghan ministries to receive direct funding
from the U.S. Government, based on their financial and human resources
management capabilities and transparency. I refer you to USAID for
further details regarding this process.
DOD and DOS are also reviewing our contracting processes to find
ways to improve our ability to respond directly to the needs of the
Afghan people, and to reduce avenues for potential corruption. These
efforts include awarding smaller contracts, increasing local
procurement, and deploying additional contracting officers to the field
to oversee contracts and partner with Afghans.
COSTS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS
51. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, as Secretary of Defense, how do
you plan to pay for a continuing war in Afghanistan with 30,000 more
U.S. troops? Do you anticipate a supplemental spending bill? Will there
be bridge funding?
Secretary Gates. I will work with the OMB on how best to address
the funding. I anticipate requesting a supplemental appropriation for
fiscal year 2010. Our fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations
budget request will cover all approved operations.
52. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, with this many more troops going
in, what will the budget for fiscal year 2011 look like?
Secretary Gates. We are in the final stages of developing the
fiscal year 2011 budget request. Once the President approves the
request, I will be able to discuss the details.
53. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates, how much more do we plan to
spend in Afghanistan going forward until the Afghan Government is ready
to assume responsibility for its security and development?
Secretary Gates. The amount we plan to spend will depend on how
much longer we need to be in Afghanistan, the number of forces required
to accomplish the mission, and how much training and equipment the ANSF
requires to assume the lead for security responsibility. All
considerations are subject to conditions on the ground and how quickly
we progress towards our goals.
There are numerous considerations to take into account when trying
to estimate how much we plan to spend in Afghanistan before the Afghan
Government is ready to assume responsibility for security and
development. While I cannot address development costs, military cost
considerations for sustaining Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the
U.S. commitment to the ISAF, and contributing to the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) include:
Troop subsistence; special pay; supplies; fuel;
ammunition; and transportation for troops, vehicles, tanks, helicopters
and other equipment.
Repair or replacement of equipment that has been
destroyed, damaged, or worn out during operations.
Funds for training and equipping Afghan military and
police units, as well as funds to help the Government of Pakistan build
a counterinsurgency capability that will support U.S. military efforts
in Afghanistan.
LOCAL AND REGIONAL EFFORTS
54. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, as part of
the national security team, I believe you were asked earlier this year
by the President to identify and evaluate regional and local Afghan
leaders who might support a political solution. New efforts are now
reported in Afghanistan's eastern region to get the Taliban to sit down
and talk. What do you see as the prospects for these regional and local
efforts?
Secretary Gates. Reintegration of those insurgents and their
leaders who want to renounce violence and join mainstream Afghan
society is an important effort, which must be led by the GIRoA and be
community-focused. Our civil-military team is actively working
alongside GIRoA to develop their reintegration program. Part of the
reintegration program includes utilizing local leaders to vouch for the
reliability of those who are willing to leave the insurgency.
To assist the GIRoA in assimilating these insurgents, USFOR-A is
working with the ISAF to develop support to a GIRoA reintegration
program in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010. Job training, education, and relocation assistance
stand out as potential opportunities for support.
Finally, security is also essential. To attract insurgents to an
Afghan-led reintegration program, ISAF will partner with ANSF and
community leaders to provide sufficient security and prevent
retribution.
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
55. Senator Kirk. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, what more
can we and our NATO allies do to strengthen these prospects going
forward?
Secretary Gates. Afghanistan's international partners have
demonstrated their strong commitment to our common goal in Afghanistan.
As the U.S. Government has increased its troop levels, so have our
partners in the ISAF. As a result of recent NATO and non-NATO pledges
to commit approximately 7,000 forces, international assistance will
reach 50,000 forces. Furthermore, several allies and partners, led by
Japan, have made major financial contributions to programs to help the
Afghan military and economy.
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
ROLE OF NEW TROOPS AND ALLIED SUPPORT
56. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, you have described our mission in
Afghanistan as ``hand in glove.'' What do you mean by that?
Admiral Mullen. Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires
more than military might. Our strategy includes civil and military
efforts that work together to achieve success in the region. The
duration of our military presence is not open-ended--nor does it need
to be. However, our civilian commitment must continue, even as our
troops begin eventually to come home. Our counterinsurgency approach
focuses on measurable security progress and protecting the Afghan
population. Supporting the establishment of responsible security
elements and government at the sub-national level is an important
example of integrating civil and military efforts. For example, our
support for Afghan reintegration policies and anti-corruption efforts
demonstrate the importance of coordinated civil-military action that
will greatly contribute to our progress. Similarly, through the U.S.
Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For Support to
Afghanistan, military components work closely with international and
Afghan governments and NGOs to ensure military plans and operations
account for the contributions of civilian agencies. Civilian expertise
is needed from the very beginning to shape governance conditions and
help build Afghan capacity.
57. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, you seem to envision our troops
in Afghanistan playing some role in development. What is that role
specifically?
Admiral Mullen. DOS and USAID are the lead for development for the
U.S. Government. By working with U.S. Government civilians, our forces
play a significant supporting role in helping the Government of
Afghanistan provide public services within key areas of Afghanistan.
Traditionally, U.S. and combined operations secure the populace,
providing access for government development specialists. Having secured
the area, commanders work with other U.S. Government agencies, the
GIRoA, and international NGOs to identify and coordinate projects that
will provide both immediate benefit and lasting effects.
In a more recent development, U.S. forces have been able to
contribute to stability through the National Guard's Agri-business
Development Teams (ADTs). These teams, comprised of Army National Guard
members and USDA and USAID civilians, provide technical assistance to
Afghan farmers in Afghanistan. In addition to aiding farmers, ADTs
advise Afghan officials assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation, and Livestock on how to best assist the population--a
short-term investment in building the long-term confidence Afghans must
have in their government. ADT efforts are coordinated with U.S.
development and security programs. Recently, the U.S. Embassy hosted an
agricultural aid conference to share information and organize efforts.
58. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, what do you see as the difference
in mission for the 68,000 already deployed and the 30,000 more that
will be deploying? Will these new troops have a greater focus on
development?
Admiral Mullen. The additional 30,000 U.S. forces will include
three maneuver brigade combat teams to perform comprehensive
operations, a training brigade, and required associated enablers. The
additional forces that will arrive in 2010 will expand upon the gains
made by the existing and additional forces added in 2009, and
collectively will allow us to more effectively execute our new
strategy. Their presence will accelerate the growth and development of
ANSF through direct training by ISAF training forces and comprehensive
partnering with both existing and additional counterinsurgent maneuver
brigades. In addition, these forces will serve as a bridging force to
provide the space and time to support improvements to governance, the
capacity of the Afghan Government, and to grow the ANSF.
I fully support the expansion of civilian efforts in Afghanistan as
part of an all-of-government approach. Enabling economic development
will offer the Afghan people the ability to sustain security gains and
is among the key efforts of our fully-integrated civil-military plan.
Additional forces, together with the existing 68,000 U.S. forces and
our allies and partners, will work hand-in-hand with civilian partners
to achieve the President's objectives and our long-term core goal.
59. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, where do NATO troops fit into
this mission as we send additional troops to Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. NATO troops continue to play an integral role in
our strategy in Afghanistan and their additional troop offerings
provide increased flexibility and coverage across a range of missions.
They are lead nation for Regional Command (RC)-North (Germany), RC-West
(Italy), RC-South (UK), and RC-Capital (Turkey). Additionally, they
provide Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) that mentor, train,
and now partner with the ANA and Police Operational Mentor Liaison
Teams (POMLTs) that mentor, train, and partner with the ANP.
60. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, what commitment do we have from
NATO today, December 2, 2009, to also send more troops and resources to
the region? Will we have help militarily, financially, or both?
Admiral Mullen. As of December 2, 2009, there was discussion and
political commitment of 5,000 additional forces from international
partners. After the December 4, 2009, NATO Foreign Ministerial and the
December 7, 2009, ISAF Force Generation Conference, NATO and non-NATO
Troop Contributing Nations pledged 6,800 forces, which was more than we
originally expected. Additional commitments are also possible. Several
shortages in capabilities remain, including the need for additional
trainers, OMLTS, and POMLTs. There are a number of nations that the
United States may have to assist militarily and/or financially, within
the existing budgeted resources and authorities. Some of these nations
have provided combat forces without caveats, offsetting the need to use
U.S. forces.
61. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, you have also indicated that our
troops are not yet at their ``tipping point.'' Do you think this
increase in troops will keep our military forces from tipping at all?
Admiral Mullen. Our men and women in uniform and their families
continue to bear a significant burden. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I,
along with the Secretary of Defense, closely monitor the health of the
force and are taking active measures to address and mitigate risks.
The deployment of 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan comes
alongside a parallel drawdown of forces which will reduce forces in
Iraq from about 115,000 to 50,000 by August 2010. The Iraq drawdown
remains on track and on schedule.
The Army's overall operational tempo will reduce slightly in the
coming year, although reaching the desired long-term ratio of dwell
time to boots-on-ground time of 2-to-1 will come a bit more slowly than
originally planned. Current Army assessments indicate that at least 70
percent of our Active component forces will be able to achieve the 2-
to-1 ratio in 2011. We will continue to make significant progress
toward dwell-time goals in the Marine Corps. Across the force, we are
closely managing the deployment of small-unit enablers, who often
operate at a 1-to-1 ratio.
Meanwhile, the Services continue their efforts to care for
servicemembers and their families. These efforts include a vast array
of initiatives that will continue to address servicemembers' mental and
emotional health, quality of life, predictability in their assignments
and deployments, and recruiting and retention.
62. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, will deployment lengths or dwell
times change as a result of sending more troops to Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. The Services do not anticipate any increase to
deployment lengths and dwell times will remain above Service redlines
as a result of sending additional troops to Afghanistan.
The Army has already programmed growth in capabilities needed to
support ongoing operations which will lead to improved dwell ratios in
both Active and Reserve components.
The Marine Corps deployment lengths will not change as a result of
the addition to the force in Afghanistan.
The Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard reported that the troop
increase will have no significant overarching effect on deployment
lengths and dwell time.
63. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, how heavily will we rely on our
National Guard and Reserves for this troop increase in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. The Services will continue to rely on the National
Guard and the Reserves as a part of the total force in support of OEF.
Commander, U.S. CENTCOM has not yet completely defined his
requirement for optimal use of the 30,000 authorization; therefore, the
ultimate composition of Active and Reserve component forces cannot yet
be determined.
For the Army, of the approximately 13,000 soldiers currently
scheduled for deployments associated with the Afghanistan
reinforcement, only approximately 1,000 of them are Reserve component
members.
The Marine Corps will continue to rely on its Reserve component
through a rotation of forces while continuing to meet its deployment-
to-dwell policy of 1:4.
64. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, please describe the training
mission. How dangerous will embedding additional trainers and an
increased force presence in the region be for our troops and allies?
Admiral Mullen. Our new approach toward training ANSF includes
tighter, restructured training programs to deliver more
counterinsurgency-capable units. ANA and ANP elements upon completion
of a formal program of instruction will have the capability of
conducting hold operations with some capability to clear while closely
partnered with coalition forces.
However, the ANSF training mission extends beyond the initial
program of instruction at the training center. Coalition advisory teams
will join ANSF units before entering training and remain with ANSF
units through training and beyond as they are fielded. ISAF maneuver
units are partnering with ANSF elements to provide mentoring and
valuable on-the-job training, as well as enabler support while Afghan
enabler capabilities are subsequently developed.
Advisory teams are indeed largely provided by coalition allies. We
expect that ANSF units and their mentors, not unlike the coalition
maneuver units with which they are partnered, will face an increased
threat in the initial months of the deployment of additional forces as
the insurgency's momentum is reversed. ISAF training, advising,
mentoring, and partnering will prove critical to mitigate risks as
rapidly expanded ANSF growth and fielding occurs and ANSF capabilities
develop.
CIVILIAN EFFORT AND COLLABORATION
65. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, we owe an immense debt to the
troops serving in Afghanistan today. It is now time to strengthen their
mission of training local army and police forces in preparation for the
gradual reduction and ultimate disengagement of U.S. forces, so that
our civilian personnel can help build responsive governance
infrastructures at the provincial level. When will that happen and how
would DOD support this?
Admiral Mullen. The ANSF is continuously developing the capacity
that will ultimately allow them to take responsibility for their
nation's security. In some cases, ANSF units are already doing this. In
all cases this will be executed responsibly, taking into account
conditions on the ground which will differ from region to region.
As U.S. forces are able to begin our military transition,
international forces will continue to partner with and support the ANSF
for some time. In addition, a significant civilian commitment will
remain in Afghanistan during the progressive military drawdown and long
after our troops depart in order to support Afghan programs and
policies for political-economic development.
However, our civilian commitment must continue, even as our troops
begin eventually to come home. Our counterinsurgency approach focuses
on measurable security progress and protecting the Afghan population.
Supporting the establishment of responsible security elements and
government at the subnational level is an important example of
integrating civil and military efforts. For example, our support for
Afghan reconciliation and reintegration policies and anti-corruption
efforts demonstrates the importance of coordinated civil-military
action that will greatly contribute to our progress. Similarly, through
the ``U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For
Support to Afghanistan,'' military components work closely with
international and Afghan governments and NGOs to ensure military plans
and operations account for the contributions of civilian agencies. Our
forces understand that security operations can provide a basis for
stability, but civilian expertise is needed to provide mid- and long-
term political-economic development.
66. Senator Kirk. Admiral Mullen, will there be a concentrated
civilian effort with this surge?
Admiral Mullen. DOD strongly supports civilian increases in
Afghanistan as a critical element of our strategy and as an essential
element of improving civil-military integration. We have already seen
significant improvements with initial civilian increases in 2009 and
the establishment of a U.S. Government senior civilian structure,
whereby a U.S. Government civilian counterpart is established at each
level of the military chain of command to coordinate civilian efforts.
We are aware that military force increases put a further strain on
scarce civilian expertise. DOS will work with our military commanders
to identify civilian requirements. I refer you to DOS for further
details.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
AIR FORCE AERIAL REFUELING TANKER
67. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, General Duncan McNabb, the
Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, testified before the House
Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2009, to the following: ``The KC-
X will be a game changer. Its value as a tanker will be tremendous. Its
value as a multi-role platform to the mobility enterprise will be
incomparable. It will do for the whole mobility world what the C-17 did
for theater and strategic airlift. It will be an ultimate mobility
force multiplier.''
The logistical challenges that a landlocked country such as
Afghanistan poses during a prolonged conflict such as OEF are
undeniable. The military leader assigned the task of addressing those
challenges recognizes the game changing value of a multi-role platform.
With this information in mind, why would you not afford a certain
amount of extra value on cargo capability in the assessment of a future
tanker proposal in the upcoming competition?
Secretary Gates. The Department has valued extra KC-X cargo
capability in the draft Request for Proposal (RFP). For example, to
meet the KC-X mandatory self-deployment requirement, the KC-X must be
able to carry at least 14 cargo pallets. This exceeds the KC-135's
capability of only six cargo pallets. In addition, the number of
mandatory airlift requirements has increased from 6 in the last
competition to 42 in the current draft RFP.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES
68. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, please provide details on
all requests for U.S. Forces from U.S. commanders for Afghanistan
between January 2002 through January 2009, including the number and
type of forces requested, whether or not the request for forces were
met, when it was met, and, if the request was declined, why it was not
met. Please provide an unclassified response, and, if necessary, only
classify those portions of the response considered to be classified.
Admiral Mullen did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
NATION BUILDING
69. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, there is much talk of
building capacity or fostering economic development in Afghanistan,
though the administration has insisted that our efforts in Afghanistan
do not constitute nation-building. Can you explain the difference
between nation-building and what the President plans to do in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
ALLIES AND THE REGION
70. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, how have our key allies,
including Canada, Britain, Germany, France, and other European allies,
responded to the President's proposal?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
71. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, do you expect our key allies
to fully cooperate with the President's request for additional
coalition forces?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
72. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, is Pakistan fully prepared
to cooperate with the President's latest plan, including providing full
support and staging for intelligence gathering and airstrikes?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
73. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, to what extent do you
believe that the stability of Pakistan is linked to the stability of
Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
74. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, does the Pakistani
Government share the view that the stability of Pakistan is linked to
the stability of Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE
75. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, it is widely acknowledged
that insurgents in Afghanistan profit directly from the narcotics
trade, to the tune of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars
per year. Can you discuss what efforts are being undertaken to stem the
illegal drug trade and what successes, if any, have been achieved?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
76. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, what is the status of
agribusiness development efforts aimed at encouraging farmers to
produce legitimate crops rather than narcotics?
Secretary Clinton did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
NEW STRATEGY, TIMELINE, AND BENCHMARKS
77. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, on March 27, 2009, President
Obama announced a ``comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan'' that included 21,000 new troops. Is the December 1, 2009,
announcement an indication that the previous comprehensive strategy was
insufficient and, if so, what new facts caused the President to realize
this?
Secretary Gates. The President made clear in March 2009 that it was
important to regularly reassess our progress in Afghanistan to ensure
that we had the right strategy, the appropriate mission, and the
necessary resources. In the 6 months after the strategy was announced
in March 2009, several important factors changed, resulting in the
appointment of new U.S. leaders to Afghanistan. As General McChrystal
reported in his September assessment, the situation in Afghanistan was
more serious than we had believed and the Taliban had gained the
initiative in many areas. In addition, the Afghan election process
highlighted serious corruption within the Afghan Government and
illustrated the necessity for effective governance in Afghanistan. In
Pakistan, the situation had also changed as Pakistanis took the fight
to the extremists that threatened their state.
The strategic review completed on 1 December 2009 was a deliberate
process to check alignment of goals, methods for attaining those goals,
and resources required. This led to a more focused approach to
achieving a clear set of concrete operational objectives in
Afghanistan. Our refined strategy calls for a more rapid deployment of
additional U.S. and international forces to reverse the Taliban's
momentum and accelerate ANSF growth. Most important, the President's 1
December speech reaffirmed the March 2009 core goal: to disrupt,
dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return
to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
78. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, reports have indicated that
General McChrystal's assessment requested up to 80,000 additional
troops in Afghanistan. How did the President arrive at the troop figure
he announced on December 1, 2009?
Admiral Mullen. The strategic review was a deliberate and
disciplined three-stage process to check alignment of goals, methods
for attaining those goals, and resources required. The President
focused on asking the hard questions and took the time to carefully
consider all of the options before agreeing to send any additional U.S.
forces to war. General McChrystal's assessment was certainly a key
input into the process, as were consultations with our NATO allies,
ISAF partners, and regional stakeholders.
A number of issues were explored in depth: national interests, core
objectives and goals, counterterrorism priorities, safe havens for
terrorist groups in Pakistan, the health of the global U.S. military
force, risks and costs associated with troop deployments, global
deployment requirements, international cooperation and commitments for
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Afghan capacity in all areas to
include Afghan security forces, central and sub-national governance and
corruption (including the narcotics trade), and development and
economic issues.
After considering all of these issues, the president announced the
deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces on an accelerated timeline.
In addition, our allies and partners have added some 7,000 additional
U.S. forces through the NATO/ISAF Force Generation Process. Additional
international commitments are possible.
79. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, do you believe that we can
achieve victory in Afghanistan with fewer troops than General
McChrystal said would be needed for maximum success?
Admiral Mullen. I am confident that the President's decision to
deploy 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along with at least approximately
7,000 additional forces from our allies--all of which will arrive on an
accelerated timeline in 2010--will give the commander on the ground the
tools necessary to achieve the President's focused objectives.
80. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, do you believe that a
timetable for withdrawal is consistent with a commitment to victory in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The President did not pick the summer of 2011 date
arbitrarily. During the strategy review, we looked closely at the
current and projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the
country. Based on that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July
2011 is a realistic date for us to plan to begin transferring
responsibility for security to the ANSF in some parts of the country.
At the same time, we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
on those assessments, the President will determine the scope and pace
of a gradual and responsible drawing down of U.S. combat forces.
This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
take primary responsibility for defending their own country--and
prepare to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.
81. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the United
States can afford to accept anything less than full achievement of its
objectives in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent
its return to both countries. The international military effort to
stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal.
Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually
reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as
much as we might wish that to be the case.
The Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting
from the success and mythology of the other. Taliban success in
retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces
of multiple, modern armies--the current direction of events--has
dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular
perceptions of who is winning and who is losing. The lesson of the
Taliban's revival for al Qaeda is that time and will are on their side.
With a western defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a
major strategic victory--as long as their senior leadership lives and
can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling back
the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate
defeat of al Qaeda.
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if
not most, of the country and likely renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled
areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for al Qaeda
as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the
offensive in Pakistan.
What makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan
uniquely different from any other location is that this part of the
world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic
place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in
their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat
the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe
consequences for the United States and the world.
A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to
our national security. Success will require patience, perseverance, and
sacrifice by the United States and our allies.
82. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, you have indicated that the
timetable in Afghanistan is not a fixed deadline for withdrawal. Can
you explain why the summer of 2011 was selected as the target date for
beginning troop withdrawals?
Secretary Gates. As previously stated in my response to Question
80, the President did not pick the summer of 2011 date arbitrarily.
During the strategy review, we looked closely at the current and
projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the country. Based on
that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July 2011 is a realistic
date for us to plan to begin transferring responsibility for security
to the ANSF in some parts of the country. At the same time, we will
assess conditions as we move forward. Based on those assessments, the
President will determine the scope and pace of a gradual and
responsible draw down of U.S. combat forces.
This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
take primary responsibility for defending their own country--and
prepare to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.
83. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, under what circumstances could
the summer of 2011 timetable be adjusted?
Secretary Gates. As previously stated in my responses to Questions
80 and 82, the President did not pick the summer of 2011 date
arbitrarily. During the strategy review, we looked closely at the
current and projected capacity of the ANSF in some parts of the
country. Based on that analysis, we reached the conclusion that July
2011 is a realistic date for us to plan to begin transferring
responsibility for security to the ANSF in some parts of the country.
At the same time, we will assess conditions as we move forward. Based
on those assessments, the President will determine the scope and pace
of a gradual and responsible draw down of U.S. combat forces.
This is an issue of balance. We need to show both our partners and
our adversaries in the region that we mean business: we will deploy the
forces and the civilian resources that we believe are necessary to
accomplish our strategic goals, and retain the tactical flexibility to
adapt if circumstances require. At the same time, we have to send a
clear message to the Afghan Government that the U.S. military is not
going to be there forever. We are not an occupation force. Afghans must
take primary responsibility for defending their own country and prepare
to do so with a sense of purpose and urgency.
84. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, what are the minimum benchmark
conditions that would allow the United States to confidently begin
withdrawing troops from Afghanistan with a minimal risk of a failed
state or civil war?
Admiral Mullen. DOD is currently working with our interagency
partners to refine the benchmarks that we will use to measure progress
in light of the President's new strategy. However, broadly speaking,
success in Afghanistan will emerge as the ANSF develops the capacity to
provide security for the nation and effective governance and
development take root. As this happens, the United States will continue
to provide overwatch, eventually withdrawing our troops to the point
where we have a minimal presence. The pace and locations at which this
process will take place will depend on several factors, the two most
important of which are the performance of the Afghan Government at all
levels and the development of the Afghan security forces. We will not
transfer responsibility to the Afghans until the Afghans have the
capacity to manage the security situation on their own.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON AFGHANISTAN
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:35 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill,
Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Vitter, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Howard H. Hoege III,
counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; William G.P.
Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R.
Knowles, Christine G. Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and Greta
Lundeberg, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
Senator Begich; Nathan Davern, assistant to Senator Burris;
Bethany Bassett, assistant to Senator Kirk; Brandon Andrews,
Anthony J. Lazarski, Mark Powers, and Jared Young, assistants
to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason
Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; and Rob Epplin
and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome.
Today the committee hears from Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador
to Afghanistan, and General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International
Strategic Assistance Force (ISAF). Let me begin by thanking you
both on behalf of the committee for your repeated and
continuing service to our country. Thanks to your families for
their continued support of the task that you've accepted, and
please also convey our thanks to the troops and the civilians
that you lead and their families for their extraordinary
service.
General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, you're
charged with executing a civilian-military plan of action to
implement the strategy that the President announced last week.
The President's plan emphasizes protecting the Afghan people
consistent with the recommendations in General McChrystal's
assessment, and includes military and civilian actions with the
goal, according to Secretary Gates, to clear, hold, build, and
transfer security responsibility to the Afghans.
Key elements of the President's plan for going forward in
Afghanistan include: First, training, equipping, and partnering
with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to empower them
to provide for Afghan security.
Second, the President has called for rapidly deploying an
additional 30,000 U.S. soldiers and marines over the coming
months, likely to be joined by at least 7,000 additional
soldiers from NATO and other allies participating in the
Afghanistan mission.
Third, the President has directed that a reduction of U.S.
forces will begin in July 2011, with the pace and location of
troop reductions to be determined by conditions on the ground.
Our Achilles heel in Afghanistan, in the words of one
Marine company commander, is not a shortage of U.S. troops;
it's a shortage of Afghan troops. To succeed in Afghanistan, it
is important that we have adequate Afghan partners in combat
operations and that after a town or village is cleared of the
Taliban the security forces left to maintain order are Afghan
forces.
In the key province of Helmand, the ratio of U.S. troops to
Afghan troops is about five U.S. troops to one Afghan soldier.
The desired ratio should be much different, one Afghan company
to one U.S. company at the beginning of partnering, leading to
three Afghan companies for every one U.S. company as training
of Afghan troops progresses.
Currently, the 10,000 U.S. marines in Helmand Province have
approximately 1,500 Afghan soldiers and 700 Afghan police, just
over 2,000 combined Afghan strategic forces, with whom to
partner. Doubling the number of U.S. troops in the south
without a much larger increase in available Afghan troops will
only worsen a ratio under which our forces are already matched
up with fewer Afghan troops than they can and should partner
with.
The limited availability of Afghan forces to partner with
raises a troubling question: Why aren't there more Afghan
forces in the fight? By most accounts, Afghan soldiers are good
fighters, are motivated, and are well respected by the Afghan
people. Yet there were recent news reports that the Afghan Army
soldiers in Helmand were declining to go on some missions
because they said they were not there to fight, but to rest.
Last week Secretary Clinton was reported as saying: ``We have
to bring the Afghan security forces into the fight.''
According to the latest numbers from the Combined Security
Transition Command in Afghanistan, there are currently some
95,000 Afghan soldiers trained. Of this force, there are 80
combat battalions. About half of those are listed as capable of
independent operations or of leading operations with coalition
support. But last week the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mullen, said in an interview that there are very
few Afghan soldiers that are in the lead.
I hope our witnesses this afternoon can give us the ground
truth as to how many Afghan soldiers and police are present for
duty and are now partnered with U.S. combat troops in the fight
and how many Afghan units are in the lead in combat operations
anywhere.
In addition to the ANSF, there is a community defense
initiative, which appears to be an Afghan version of the Sons
of Iraq. I hope our witnesses will describe this initiative and
discuss its strengths and weaknesses.
I understand that the President has directed his military
commanders not to begin clearing an area unless our troops will
be able to turn that area over to Afghan security forces. What
our witnesses could clarify is at what point in the ``clear,
hold, build, and transfer'' process the Afghan forces will take
over responsibility for an area's security. Is the plan that we
hold? Do the Afghans hold? Do we hold together?
As Marine Corps Commandant General Conway recently pointed
out, ``It isn't nearly as effective to have U.S. marines
standing on street corners in Afghan villages as it is to have
an Afghan policeman or a soldier.'' I agree, U.S. troops should
not be left for months holding street corners in villages
recently cleared of the Taliban, waiting for Afghan security
forces to take over that mission.
Increasing the number of U.S. forces acting without
sufficient Afghan partners will feed Taliban propaganda that
portrays U.S. forces in Afghanistan as occupiers, and could
lead to greater, instead of lesser, Afghan dependency upon us.
The President's strategy also makes clear that our
commitment to the future of Afghanistan requires action on the
part of the Government of Afghanistan to fight corruption,
deliver services, institute policies for reintegration of local
Taliban fighters, and address other urgent problems. President
Karzai has pledged to do these things and President Obama
rightly insists on holding him to that pledge.
Setting the July 2011 date to begin reductions of our
forces is a reasonable way to impart to the Government of
Afghanistan a sense of focus and urgency, something that has
been lacking there up to now and is essential to success, both
theirs and ours. President Karzai has acknowledged the value of
the July 2011 date, saying that ``It's good that we are facing
a deadline'' and that the Afghan people ``must begin to stand
on our own feet.'' I'd like to hear from our witnesses whether
they support and agree with the President's decision to
establish a July 2011 date to begin a U.S. troop reduction.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank General McChrystal and Ambassador
Eikenberry for joining us today. I want to thank you both for
your many years of distinguished service to our country and I
want to express my deep gratitude to the Americans you lead,
both our civilians and our men and women in uniform, as well as
their families, who are serving and sacrificing at this moment.
I want to reiterate up front that I support the President's
policy for Afghanistan. I think he made the right decision,
really a brave decision, against the objections of many in his
own party, to reject half measures, to affirm a
counterinsurgency strategy and to resource it properly. I think
this policy can succeed and I think it deserves robust public
support, both from Republicans and Democrats alike.
My main concern is the decision to begin withdrawing our
forces in 2011 regardless of conditions on the ground. We
discussed this issue a lot last week and I appreciate the
efforts of Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen to
try to clarify the meaning of this decision. I understand that
this date marks the beginning of a process and that the pace of
our drawdown will be condition-based. Still, the fundamental
problem remains: We've announced a date, divorced from
conditions on the ground, when we will start to withdraw our
troops.
It doesn't matter whether we call it a cliff or a ramp or
anything else. It's still an exit sign, and it sends the wrong
signal to our friends and our enemies. On this issue, the
administration and I will just have to agree to disagree.
It matters immensely what signals we send. That's why I was
very pleased to see Secretary Gates is in Kabul today and that
the message he delivered was: ``We are in this thing to win.''
I couldn't agree more, and we can win.
With this counterinsurgency strategy, plus the additional
troops and resources we are committing, we can reverse the
momentum of the insurgency. We can create conditions for the
vast majority of insurgents to lay down their arms and
reconcile with their fellow Afghans. We can train appropriate
numbers of more capable and battle-tested Afghan security
forces to lead the fight in time against a degraded enemy. We
can isolate al Qaeda and target them more effectively, and we
can create the time and space for Afghan leaders, with our
support and pressure, to reform their government, to crack down
on corruption, and to build a nation that will never again
serve as a base for attacks against America and our allies.
That is our theory of victory. But we can only succeed if
our civilian and military efforts are completely joint and
integrated, beginning at the top with our distinguished
witnesses today. We've all read the reports of differences
between you gentlemen. I know you're both professionals and I
trust that any tensions you may have had are now past and that
you are now focused, as I am and as I trust the President is,
on the future, on your common mission, and on succeeding.
This requires a joint civilian-military campaign plan,
which we were told last week that our civilian and military
leaders are now in the process of drafting. We've heard a lot
about numbers, both troop levels and civilian surges. We've
heard a lot about dollar amounts and various programs. We've
heard a lot about goals and aspirations.
I want to hear about strategy. What is our strategy for
helping the Afghans build political and economic order after we
clear and hold ground? What is our strategy for supporting
Afghan leaders in reforming and strengthening their government?
What is our strategy for working with President Karzai in
getting the best performance possible from him and his
government? I hope we can gain greater clarity in this hearing
today on the elements of our civil-military strategy.
We have questions, of course. But we cannot lose sight of
one important fact: We now have an opportunity to build a
bipartisan consensus in support of a vital national security
priority: defeating al Qaeda and its violent, extremist allies
in Afghanistan and Pakistan and ensuring that these countries
never again serve as bases for attacks against us and our
allies.
Americans need to know why winning this war is essential to
our country's security. They need to know that things in
Afghanistan will get worse before it gets better; that, sadly,
casualties will likely rise in the year to come, but that
ultimately we will succeed. Americans need to know these
things, especially those brave Americans who are leading this
fight.
If you take only one thing back with you to our fellow
citizens in Afghanistan, let it be this: America and this
Congress are fully behind them. We believe in them. We believe
in their mission. We believe they can succeed. We in Congress
will do all in our power to get them everything they need to
win and then to return home with the honor they deserve and the
thanks of a grateful Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
General McChrystal, let's start with you.
STATEMENT OF GEN STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL, USA, COMMANDER,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AND COMMANDER, U.S.
FORCES AFGHANISTAN
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of this committee: Thank you for the
chance to appear before you today.
I welcome this opportunity to testify on our way ahead in
Afghanistan and I'm pleased to do so with Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry, an old friend.
Let me begin by saluting the bravery of the men and women
of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
They're anchored by over 68,000 courageous Americans, our close
partners in the NATO alliance, and a 43-nation coalition. We
honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the veterans, and their
families.
We also recognize the toll paid every day by our
counterparts in the Afghan security forces and by Afghan
civilians, who ultimately suffer the most from this insurgency.
It is for them and for all of us that we seek a stable
Afghanistan, a defunct al Qaeda, and a secure future----
[Audience interruption.]
Chairman Levin. You'll have to remain seated, please, and
no more outbursts, please.
Thank you. You can continue.
General McChrystal.--and a secure future in that vital
region of the world.
I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 and have commanded
forces there every year since. Despite that experience, there
is much in Afghanistan that I have yet to fully understand. For
all of us, Afghanistan is a challenge that is best approached
with a balance of determination and humility.
While U.S. forces have been at war in Afghanistan for 8
years, the Afghans have been at it for more than 30. They are
frustrated with international efforts that have failed to meet
their expectations, confronting us with a crisis of confidence
among Afghans who view the international effort as insufficient
and their government as corrupt or at the very least
inconsequential.
We also face a complex and resilient insurgency. The Quetta
Shura Taliban, or Afghan Taliban, is the prominent threat to
the Government of Afghanistan, as they aspire to once again
become the Government of Afghanistan. The Haqqani and Hizb-e
Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups have more limited
geographical reach and objectives, but they are no less lethal.
All three groups are supported to some degree by external
elements in Iran and Pakistan, have ties with al Qaeda, and
coexist within narcotics and criminal networks, both fueling
and feeding off instability and insecurity in the region.
The mission in Afghanistan is undeniably difficult and
success will require steadfast commitment and incur significant
costs. I participated fully in the President's assessment and
decisionmaking process and was afforded multiple opportunities
to provide my recommendations and best military advice, which I
did. Combined with insights and policy considerations from
across our government, I believe the decisions that came from
that process reflect a realistic and effective approach.
To pursue our core goal of defeating al Qaeda and
preventing their return to Afghanistan, we must disrupt and
degrade the Taliban's capacity, deny their access to the Afghan
population, and strengthen the Afghan security forces. This
means we must reverse the Taliban's current momentum and create
the time and space to develop Afghan security and governance
capacity.
The President's decision rapidly resources our strategy,
recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive and
ultimately enable success. I fully support the President's
decision. The President also reiterated how this decision
supports our national interest. Rolling back the Taliban is a
prerequisite to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
The mission is not only important, it is also achievable.
We can and will accomplish this mission. Let me briefly explain
why I believe so. My confidence derives first from the Afghans'
resolve, since it is their actions that will ultimately matter
most in ending this conflict with their interests and, by
extension our own.
Second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. The
Taliban have no widespread constituency, have a history of
failure in power, and lack an appealing vision.
Third, where our strategy is applied we've begun to show
that we can help the Afghans to establish more effective
security and more credible governance.
Finally, Afghans do not regard us as occupiers. They do not
wish for us to remain forever, yet they see our support as a
necessary bridge to future security and stability.
I've been back in Afghanistan for 6 months now. I believe
that with the President's decision and ongoing reforms I
outlined in our initial assessment, our efforts are now
empowered with a greater sense of clarity, capability,
commitment, and confidence.
Let me start with clarity. The President's recently
completed review of our strategy, to include his deep and
pointed questioning of all assumptions and recommendations, has
produced greater clarity of our mission and objectives. We also
have greater clarity on the way forward. Additional forces will
begin to deploy shortly and by this time next year new security
gains will be illuminated by specific indicators and it will be
clear to us that the insurgency has lost the momentum. By the
summer of 2011, it will be clear to the Afghan people that the
insurgency will not win, giving them the chance to side with
their government.
From that point forward, while we plan to have fewer combat
forces in harm's way, we will remain partnered with the Afghan
security forces in a supporting role to consolidate and
solidify their gains. Results may come more quickly and we must
demonstrate progress towards measurable objectives, but the
sober fact is that there are no silver bullets. Ultimate
success will be the cumulative effect of sustained pressure
across multiple lines of operation.
Increasing our capability has been about much more than
troop increases. For the past 6 months, we've been implementing
organizational and operational changes that are already
reflecting improvements in our effectiveness. But the
additional forces announced by President Obama are significant.
Forces to increase our capacity to train the ANSF and forces to
partner with Afghan Army and police in expanding security zones
in key areas will provide us the ability to reverse insurgent
momentum and deny the Taliban the access to the population they
require to survive.
The additional capability we are building translates into
credibility in the minds of Afghans, who demand proof, not only
that we want to protect them, but that we can. In a war of
perceptions where the battlefield is the mind of an Afghan
elder, the hope of an Afghan mother, the aspirations of an
Afghan child, this can be decisive. Our commitment is watched
intently and constantly judged by our allies and by our
enemies. The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along
with additional coalition forces and growing ANSF numbers, will
be a significant step toward expanding security in critical
areas and in demonstrating resolve.
The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed
by a clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I'll
briefly mention three. The first is the Afghan Government's
credibility deficit, which must be recognized by all, to
include Afghan officials, as a critical area of focus and
change.
Equally important is our ability to accelerate development
of the Afghan security forces. Measures such as increased pay
and incentives, literacy training, leader development, and
expanded partnering are necessary to position the ANSF to
assume responsibility for long-term security.
Third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both
sides of the border with Pakistan, with freedom of movement
across that border must be mitigated by enhanced cross-border
coordinations and enhanced Pakistani engagement.
Looking ahead, I'm confident that we have both the right
strategy and the right resources. Every trip around Afghanistan
reinforces my confidence in the coalition and Afghan forces we
stand alongside in this effort. But I also find confidence in
those we are trying to help. That confidence is found when an
Afghan farmer chooses to harvest wheat rather than poppy, or
where a young adult casts his or her vote to join the police,
or where a group of villagers resolves to reject the local
insurgency.
We face many challenges in Afghanistan, but our efforts are
sustained by one unassailable reality. Neither the Afghan
people nor the international community want Afghanistan to
remain a sanctuary for terror and violence. If we are to be
confident of our mission and our prospects, we must also be
accurate in our assessment of that progress. We owe ourselves,
our leaders, and the American people transparency and candor,
because the price to be paid is high and the stakes are even
higher.
In closing, my team and I would like to thank you and your
colleagues for your support to the American men and women
currently serving in Afghanistan and to tell you a bit about
them. We risk letting numbers like 30,000 roll off our tongues
without remembering that those are fathers, mothers, sons, and
daughters serving far from home, selfless in their sacrifices
for each of us.
The other day I asked a young, combat-experienced, sergeant
where he was on September 11 and his answer was, ``Getting my
braces removed.'' It reminded me that it had been more than 8
years since September 11, and many of our servicemembers and
family have experienced and sacrificed much. But as I see them
in action at remote bases, on patrol, partnering with Afghan
forces, recovering in combat hospitals, they don't talk about
all they've given up. They talk about all they are
accomplishing and their determination in this endeavor.
This is not a force of rookies or dilettantes. The brigade
commander in Khost is completing his fourth combat tour in
Afghanistan and his experience and expertise is reflective of
the force that represents you. All have felt fear and
loneliness. Most have lost comrades. None have lost heart.
In their eyes, I see maturity beyond their years. In their
actions, I see a commitment to succeed and a commitment to each
other. I am confident that I share your pride in what these
great Americans are doing for our country in Afghanistan, and
it will be my privilege to accept your questions on their
behalf.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General McChrystal follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, USA
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of this
committee, thank you for the chance to appear before you today.
I welcome this opportunity to testify on our way ahead in
Afghanistan, and I am pleased to do so with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry,
an old friend.
Let me begin by saluting the bravery of the men and women of the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. They are
anchored by over 68,000 courageous Americans, our close partners in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, and a 43-nation coalition.
We honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the veterans, and their
families.
We also recognize the toll paid every day by our counterparts in
the Afghan Security Forces and by Afghan civilians, who ultimately
suffer the most from this insurgency. It is for them--and for all of
us--that we seek a stable Afghanistan, a defunct al Qaeda, and a secure
future in that vital region of the world.
I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 and have commanded forces
there every year since.
Despite that experience, there is much in Afghanistan that I have
yet to fully understand. For all of us, Afghanistan is a challenge that
is best approached with a balance of determination and humility.
While U.S. forces have been at war in Afghanistan for 8 years, the
Afghans have been at it for more than 30. They are frustrated with
international efforts that have failed to meet their expectations,
confronting us with a crisis of confidence among Afghans who view the
international effort as insufficient and their government as corrupt
or, at the very least, inconsequential.
We also face a complex and resilient insurgency. The Quetta Shura
Taliban, or Afghan Taliban, is the prominent threat to the Government
of Afghanistan, as they aspire to once again become the Government of
Afghanistan. The Haqqani and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups
have more limited geographical reach and objectives, but they are no
less lethal.
All three groups are supported to some degree by external elements
in Iran and Pakistan, have ties with al Qaeda, and co-exist within
narcotics and criminal networks, both fueling and feeding off
instability and insecurity in the region.
The mission in Afghanistan is undeniably difficult, and success
will require steadfast commitment and incur significant costs.
I participated fully in the President's assessment and
decisionmaking process and was afforded multiple opportunities to
provide my recommendations and best military advice--which I did.
Combined with insights and policy considerations from across our
Government, I believe the decisions that came from that process reflect
a realistic and effective approach.
To pursue our core goal of defeating al Qaeda and preventing their
return to Afghanistan, we must disrupt and degrade the Taliban's
capacity, deny their access to the Afghan population, and strengthen
the Afghan Security Forces.
This means we must reverse the Taliban's current momentum and
create the time and space to develop Afghan security and governance
capacity.
The President's decision rapidly resources our strategy, recognizes
that the next 18 months will likely be decisive, and ultimately,
enables success. I fully support the President's decision.
The President has also reiterated how this decision supports our
national interests. Rolling back the Taliban is a pre-requisite to the
ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
The mission is not only important; it is also achievable.
We can and will accomplish this mission.
Let me briefly explain why I believe so.
My confidence derives first from the Afghan's resolve, since it is
their actions that will ultimately matter most in ending this conflict,
with their interests--and by extension our own--secured.
Second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. The Taliban have
no wide-spread constituency, have a history of failure in power, and
lack an appealing vision.
Third, where our strategy is applied we've begun to show that we
can help the Afghans establish more effective security and more
credible governance.
Finally, Afghans do not regard us as occupiers. They do not wish
for us to remain forever, yet they see our support as a necessary
bridge to future security and stability.
I've been back in Afghanistan for 6 months now. I believe that with
the President's decision and ongoing reforms I outlined in our Initial
Assessment, our efforts are now empowered with a greater sense of
clarity, capability, commitment, and confidence.
Let me start with clarity.
The President's recently completed review of our strategy--to
include its deep and pointed questioning of all assumptions and
recommendations--has produced greater clarity of our mission and
objectives.
We also have greater clarity on the way forward.
Additional forces will begin to deploy shortly, and by this time
next year, new security gains will be illuminated by specific
indicators, and it will be clear to us that the insurgency has lost the
momentum.
By the summer of 2011, it will be clear to the Afghan people that
the insurgency will not win, giving them the chance to side with their
government.
From that point forward, while we begin to reduce U.S. combat force
levels, we will remain partnered with the Afghan security forces in a
supporting role to consolidate and solidify their gains.
Results may come more quickly, and we must demonstrate progress
toward measurable objectives, but the sober fact is that there are no
silver bullets. Ultimate success will be the cumulative effect of
sustained pressure across multiple lines of operation.
Increasing our capability has been about much more than just troop
increases. For the past 6 months we have been implementing
organizational and operational changes that are already reflecting
improvements in our effectiveness.
But the additional forces announced by President Obama are
significant. Forces to increase our capacity to train Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), and forces to partner with Afghan Army and
Police in expanding security zones in key areas, will provide us the
ability to reverse insurgent momentum and deny the Taliban the access
to the population they require to survive.
Our commitment is watched intently--and constantly judged--by our
allies and by our enemies.
The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along with
additional coalition forces and growing ANSF numbers, will be a
significant step toward expanding security in critical areas--and in
demonstrating resolve.
The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed by a
clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I'll briefly mention
three.
The first is the Afghan Government's credibility deficit, which
must be recognized by all, to include Afghan officials, as a critical
area of focus and change.
Equally important is our ability to accelerate development of the
Afghan security forces. Measures such as increased pay and incentives,
literacy training, leader development, and expanded partnering are
necessary to position the ANSF to assume responsibility for long-term
security.
Third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both sides of
the border with Pakistan, with freedom of movement across that border,
must be mitigated by enhanced cross-border coordination and enhanced
Pakistani engagement.
Looking ahead, I am confident that we have both the right strategy
and the right resources.
Every trip around Afghanistan reinforces my confidence in the
coalition and Afghan forces we stand alongside in this effort.
But I also find confidence in those we are trying to help.
That confidence is found where an Afghan farmer chooses to harvest
wheat rather than poppy . . . or where a young adult casts his or her
vote or joins the police . . . or where a group of villagers resolves
to reject the local insurgency.
We face many challenges in Afghanistan, but our efforts are
sustained by one unassailable reality: neither the Afghan people nor
the international community want Afghanistan to remain a sanctuary for
terror and violence.
If we are to be confident of our mission and our prospects, we must
also be accurate in our assessment of progress. We owe ourselves, our
leaders, and the American people transparency and candor, because the
price to be paid is high, and the stakes are even higher.
In closing, my team and I would like to thank you and your
colleagues for your support to the American men and women currently
serving in Afghanistan--and to tell you a bit about them.
We risk letting numbers like 30K roll off our tongues without
remembering that those are fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters--
serving far from home--selfless in their sacrifices for each of us.
The other day I asked a young, but combat experienced Sergeant
where he was on September 11 and his answer--``getting my braces
removed''--reminded me that it has been more than 8 years since
September 11.
Many of our servicemembers and families have experienced and
sacrificed much.
But as I see them in action--at remote bases; on patrol; partnering
with Afghan forces; recovering in combat hospitals--they don't talk
about all they've given up. They talk about all they are
accomplishing--and their determination in this endeavor.
This is not a force of rookies or dilettantes. The Brigade
Commander in Khowst is completing his fourth combat tour in
Afghanistan--and his experience and expertise is reflective of the
force that represents you. All have felt fear and loneliness--most have
lost comrades. None have lost heart.
In their eyes I see maturity beyond their years. In their actions I
see a commitment to succeed--and commitment to each other.
I am confident that I share your pride in what these great
Americans are doing for our country in Afghanistan.
It will be my privilege to accept your questions on their behalf.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Ambassador Eikenberry.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL W. EIKENBERRY, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
AFGHANISTAN
Ambassador Eikenberry. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
McCain, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you
for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan today,
and I'd like to ask that my full statement be submitted for the
record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Last week in his speech at West
Point, President Obama presented the administration's strategy
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His decision came after an
intensive, deliberative, far-reaching review. I'm honored to
have been part of that.
I believe that the course that the President has outlined
offers our best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure
that al Qaeda cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks
against us. I can say without equivocation that I fully support
this approach.
I consider myself privileged to serve as the U.S.
Ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats,
developmental specialists, and civilian experts who form the
most capable and dedicated United States embassy anywhere in
the world today, and I'm extraordinarily proud of them.
I'm also honored to testify alongside General Stan
McChrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years.
I want to say from the outset that General McChrystal and I are
united in a joint effort where civilian and military personnel
work together every day side by side with our Afghan partners
and with our allies. We could not accomplish our objectives
without this kind of cooperation.
Mr. Chairman, the United States is at a critical juncture
in our involvement in Afghanistan. On December 1, the President
ordered 35,000 additional troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an
accelerated timetable, with the goal of breaking the
insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the training of
the ANSF, and establishing security in key parts of the
country. On the civilian side, we aim to increase employment
and provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity,
and to improve the critical ministries in the economy at the
national level. These steps, taken together, I believe will
help to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build
support for the Afghan Government.
As the President said, we will be clear about what to
expect from those who receive our assistance. After a difficult
election, the Afghan Government does show signs of recognizing
the need to deliver better governance and security. We await
urgent concrete steps in a number of areas.
I would also like to briefly discuss the three main pillars
of our efforts in Afghanistan: security, governance, and
development. General McChrystal has already addressed our plans
for improving security and building the ANSF. Since assuming my
post, I've made a special point of getting outside of Kabul to
see conditions firsthand, and I fully concur with General
McChrystal's assessment that the security situation remains
serious. Sending additional U.S. and other NATO ISAF forces to
Afghanistan is critical to regaining the initiative and I'm
confident that as these troops arrive, the situation will
stabilize and turn in our favor. Additional troops will also
permit us to expand our work with the Afghan Army and the
Afghan police so that they may take a larger role in providing
for the security of their own people.
As President Obama said, ``The transition to Afghan
responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011, when we expect
Afghan security forces to begin assuming lead responsibility
for defending their country.''
Moving on from security, the second pillar of our
comprehensive strategy focuses on governance. At the national
and the sub-national levels, our overarching goal is to
encourage improved governance so Afghans may benefit, see the
benefits of supporting a legitimate government and the
insurgency in turn loses its support.
As General McChrystal has pointed out, one of the major
impediments our strategy faces today is the Government of
Afghanistan's lack of credibility with its own people. To
strengthen its legitimacy, our approach at the national level
is on improving key ministries by increasing the number of
civilian technical advisers and by providing more developmental
assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By
focusing on ministries that deliver essential services and
security, we can accelerate the building of an Afghan
Government that is sufficiently visible, effective, and
accountable.
At the provincial and the district levels, we're working
jointly with our military partners through our provincial
reconstruction teams, district development working groups, and
district support teams, which help build Afghan capacity,
particularly in the areas of greatest insecurity in southern
and in eastern Afghanistan.
Underpinning all of these efforts is the need to combat
corruption and promote the rule of law. With our assistance,
the Afghan Government is steadily building law enforcement
institutions to fight corruption, organized crime, and drug
trafficking. In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated
his intention to make merit-based appointments in his new
cabinet and to implement an anti-corruption strategy. We're
encouraged by his statements.
Cultivation of poppy and trafficking in opium also continue
to have a debilitating effect on Afghan society. Our strategy
is multi-pronged, involving demand reduction, efforts by law
enforcement agencies and the military to detain traffickers and
interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural
development.
The narcotics problem will, of course, never have a
solution without economic development. This leads to the third
pillar of our effort, which is development. In recent months
we've adjusted our approach to focus on building key elements
of Afghanistan's private sector economy, increasing our
emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue
collection, and improving the coordination of assistance within
the U.S. Government and the international community. These
steps were taken to produce improvements in the lives of
ordinary Afghans and to contribute directly to more effective
government and lessen support for the insurgency.
Rebuilding the farm sector, in particular, is essential for
the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who
form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that
some 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income
either directly or indirectly from agriculture.
Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that we're concentrating
on what's essential and attainable. The President's strategy is
based on a pragmatic assessment of the security interests of
the United States and our belief that a sustainable
representative Government of Afghanistan and a sustainable
economy for Afghanistan are essential to success. We need a
viable Afghan Government so our forces can draw down and the
investment of U.S. taxpayers can be reduced.
In closing, I need to mention two important risks we face
in carrying out our strategy, and I know that General
McChrystal shares these. The first is that, in spite of
everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the
essential tasks of governance and security on a timely basis;
and the second is in our partnership with Pakistan. The efforts
we're undertaking in Afghanistan are likely to fall short of
our strategic goals unless there's more progress at eliminating
the sanctuaries used by the Afghan Taliban and their associates
in Pakistan.
If the main elements of the President's plan are executed
and if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I'm
confident we can achieve our strategic objectives. I say this
with conviction because, for the first time during my three
tours of duty in Afghanistan, all of the elements of our
national power are being employed with the full support of the
President and increasingly of our allies.
Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but
I'm optimistic that we can succeed with the support of
Congress. Our mission was underresourced for years, but it's
now one of our government's highest priorities, with
substantial development funds and hundreds more civilians.
We will soon have increased our civilian presence in Kabul
over threefold and in the field over sixfold, and this is just
over the past year. We will, of course, need more.
U.S. foreign assistance is also comparatively small, but an
essential fraction of the total amount spent in Afghanistan
over the last 8 years. Additional resources will be necessary
and we look forward to sharing more details of our anticipated
needs with Congress in the coming days and weeks.
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan represents a daunting challenge,
and success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the
additional troops and other resources provided by the President
and with the help of Congress, we will work tirelessly to
ensure al Qaeda never again finds refuge in Afghanistan and
threatens our country and our Homeland.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eikenberry follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the committee,
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan
today. Last week, in his speech at West Point, President Obama
presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
His decision came after an intensive, deliberate and far-reaching
review of conditions, risks, and options available. The course he
outlined offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups cannot regain a foothold to plan new
attacks against our country or our allies. I fully support this
approach. It has been welcomed by the Afghan Government, which said it
will spare no effort to achieve the strategy's key objectives. I hope
it will be welcomed here in Congress.
I consider myself privileged to serve in Kabul and to represent an
extraordinary team of diplomats, development specialists, and civilian
experts from many fields and multiple agencies who form the most
capable and dedicated U.S. mission anywhere. Our civilian presence will
have tripled by early 2010 and, with the support of Congress, we
anticipate it will expand further next year. More important than the
numbers of people are the skills that these men and women possess, and
their willingness to work tirelessly under the most difficult
conditions. Many of them are out in the field with our military at the
forefront of our Nation's effort to stabilize Afghanistan and the
region. I am extraordinarily proud of them.
I am honored to testify alongside General Stan McChrystal, my
professional colleague and friend of many years, to describe how we
will carry out the President's strategy for Afghanistan. My testimony
will focus on the civilian role in that strategy, but I want to
underscore at the outset that General McChrystal and I are united in a
joint effort in which civilian and military personnel work together
every day, often literally side-by-side with our Afghan partners and
allies. We could not accomplish our objectives without such a combined
effort, and I am proud that we have forged a close working relationship
at the top and throughout our organizations, one that will deepen in
coming months as additional troops and civilians arrive.
Our Nation is at a critical juncture in our involvement in
Afghanistan, and my testimony today represents my assessment of the
situation and prospects for achieving our goals.
A mission that in past years was poorly defined and under-resourced
is now clear and, thanks to Congress, better resourced. The President,
on December 1, authorized 30,000 additional troops to deploy to
Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable, with the goal of breaking the
insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the training of Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF), and restoring security in key areas of
the country. I joined Secretary Clinton and General McChrystal in
Brussels last week to present the administration's decisions to the
allies, and we anticipate our troops will be joined by a substantial
increase of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. Our military
effort and civilian assistance will be closely coordinated. On the
civilian side, we aim to increase employment and provide essential
services in areas of greatest insecurity, and to improve critical
ministries and the economy at the national level. These steps will, I
believe, help to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build
support for the Afghan Government.
As the President said, ``we will be clear about what we expect from
those who receive our assistance.'' We expect the Afghan Government to
take specific actions in the key areas of security, governance, and
economic development on an urgent basis. In the eighth year of our
involvement, Afghans must progressively take greater responsibility for
their own affairs. As we reduce our combat role, we will be
transforming our diplomatic, security, and economic relations to
reflect a more fully sovereign Afghanistan.
I firmly believe these adjustments to our course provide the best
possible chance of achieving success on a reasonable timetable, but I
will also give you my honest appraisal of the challenges as I see them.
No way forward is without risk. Eight years after the terrorist
attacks of September 11 and the removal of the Taliban from power,
Afghanistan remains a disconnected society, divided by factionalism,
plagued by corruption and illegal narcotics, and challenged by
insecurity. These problems are in large measure the product of nearly
three decades of war, which broke down the fabric of Afghanistan's
centuries-old society and contributed to deep poverty, illiteracy, drug
addiction, and unemployment. This has been compounded in recent years
by a growing disillusionment among Afghans, both with their own
government and with the uneven results of the assistance delivered by
the international community. The United States must approach the
daunting complexities of Afghanistan with an awareness of our
limitations. Our forces and our civilians are trying to help a society
that simultaneously wants and rejects outside intervention. Afghans
yearn for the peace and stability that has been denied them for too
long. We will not fully heal their society's deep-seated problems, but
we can help them along a path to normalcy and stability that is key to
protecting our own vital interests. We are, simply put, helping
Afghanistan build security forces and other basic institutions of
government to prevent a return to the conditions that it endured before
September 11, 2001.
Let me mention two challenges we face. The first is that, in spite
of everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the
essential tasks of governance; the second is our partnership with
Pakistan, which the President has stated is inextricably linked to our
success in Afghanistan. Though these risks cannot be discounted, if the
main elements of the President's plan are executed, and if our Afghan
partners and our allies do their part, I am confident we can achieve
our strategic objectives.
I say this with conviction, because for the first time in my three
tours in Afghanistan--two while in uniform and now as ambassador--all
the elements of our national power are employed with the full support
of the President and, increasingly, of our allies. We have made great
strides over the last 6 months in improving interagency coordination
and civil-military collaboration. Our military and civilian teams on
the ground are the best ever fielded. More important, after a difficult
election, the Afghan Government shows signs of recognizing the need to
deliver better governance and security, though we await concrete steps
in many areas.
Achieving our objectives on an accelerated timetable will almost
certainly take additional resources--more troops, but also more
development aid and additional civilian personnel to assist the Afghan
Government and people, so they can assume control of their own affairs.
The administration will be working with Congress in coming days and
weeks to define our request.
I would like to now discuss the three main pillars of our effort in
Afghanistan--security, governance, and development--and then say a few
words about the organization of our mission and about the wider region.
SECURITY
General McChrystal has already addressed our plans for improving
security and building the Afghan National Security Forces. The civilian
role in this effort at the local level is to partner with the military
and with the Afghan Government in restoring basic services and economic
opportunity in cleared areas. I will return to this partnership and our
role in it shortly. First, though, let me give you my perspective as
ambassador on the security situation.
Since assuming my post in May, I have made a special point of
getting outside Kabul as frequently as possible to see conditions
around the country first-hand and to consult with Afghans, allies, and
our own civilian and military personnel. I fully concur with General
McChrystal's assessment that the security situation, which worsened
dramatically this past year, remains serious. The Taliban and other
extremists groups exercise increasing influence in many areas of the
south and east, and attacks and instability are rising in parts of the
north and west as well, which long have been relatively stable. The
insurgents are loosely organized, yet resilient and effective in many
areas. Augmenting U.S. and NATO-ISAF forces is critical to regain the
initiative. I am confident that, as the additional U.S. troops arrive
in coming months, the situation will stabilize and turn in our favor.
Most Afghans have little interest in a future under the Taliban's
brutal and arbitrary rule, and the troops now deploying will reassure
them that they have the opportunity for a secure and better future. Our
troops will serve as a bridge, improving security in key areas, just as
the Marine and Army units sent earlier this year are doing with great
skill in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.
Additional troops will also permit us to expand our partnering with
and training of the Afghan army and police, so they can take on a
progressively larger role in providing security. We all recognize the
extraordinary challenges of building competent security forces.
Afghanistan has not had a national army recruited from all ethnic
groups and regions for many years, and low literacy, high attrition,
and the lack of resources and expertise pose continuing problems.
However, our forces are highly skilled at this training and partnering
mission, which they have performed ably under the most difficult
circumstances in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan. I am confident that
deployment of additional U.S. troops will yield improvements in the
ANSF.
On the civilian side, we are supporting our military's efforts. Our
Drug Enforcement Administration provides specialized training to the
Afghan Counternarcotics Police. Our Federal Bureau of Investigation
assists the Afghan Ministry of Interior in improving law enforcement
capabilities. Lastly, our Border Management Task Force, which includes
U.S. Central Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and its
Customs and Border Protection Agency, assists both the Afghan Border
Police and the Customs Department.
As part of assuming the sovereign responsibility of protecting its
people, the Afghan Government must build the ministerial capacity to
recruit, train, and sustain the army and police, so that when our
support begins to diminish Afghan forces are capable of protecting the
country on their own. Simply put, the Afghan army and police need the
full commitment of their political leadership. As President Obama said,
the transition to Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of
2011, when we expect Afghan security forces and the entire Afghan
Government can begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their
country.
We should recognize that one reason Afghanistan has been slow to
assume a larger role in providing for its own security is the
widespread concern among the populace that it will be abandoned by the
international community, as happened after the withdrawal of the Soviet
Union in 1989. For more than a decade afterward, Afghanistan endured
brutal civil war, anarchy and later, the repressive Taliban regime that
harbored and enabled al Qaeda. The fear of once again having to fend
for itself again is deeply felt in the country, which lies in a
volatile region where many of its neighbors have competed to control
events inside Afghan borders.
While the United States does not intend to continue our high level
of deployed forces indefinitely, we are fully committed to assisting
Afghanistan. To give Afghans confidence that they will not be abandoned
again, the United States is committed to engaging in a strategic
dialogue to define our long-term relationship on the basis of shared
interests and values, just as we do with other nations. We will
continue to assist and advise the ANSF to ensure they succeed over the
long term. Though our relations are today dominated by questions about
security, we have no territorial ambitions and do not seek permanent
military bases. Afghans should be confident the United States is a
trustworthy friend on whom they can rely after our combat forces begin
to go home. Afghanistan's place in Central and South Asia must be
secure.
GOVERNANCE
The second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on
improving Afghan governance. I would like to describe the civilian role
in this effort, first at the national level and then in the provinces
and districts. At both levels, our overarching goal is to encourage
good governance, free from corruption, so Afghans see the benefits of
supporting the legitimate government, and the insurgency loses support.
As General McChrystal points out, one of the major impediments our
strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack of credibility with its
own people. To build its legitimacy, our approach at the national level
is on improving key ministries, both by increasing the number of
civilian technical advisers and by providing more development
assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By focusing on
key ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can
accelerate the building of an Afghan Government that is visible,
effective, and accountable.
We must support the government's ability to deliver for the Afghan
people. Afghan ministers say that too much of the development
assistance provided is spent outside their national budget, often on
programs that are not their priorities. We agree, and as part of the
President's new emphasis we are committed to providing more direct
assistance. We are reviewing the financial management systems of these
key ministries and, if their financial system can be certified as
accountable and transparent, we provide direct funding to be used for
basic services, such as health, education and agriculture. Similarly,
to extend the government's reach around the country, Afghanistan needs
educated, trained, and honest civil servants. To accomplish this, the
United States and international partners will train current government
employees in public administration and help build a pool of
administrators and technical managers.
Cutting across this entire effort to improve Afghans' confidence in
their government is the need to combat corruption and promote the rule
of law. Without institutions that serve the needs of ordinary Afghans
and government officials who are accountable and honest, Afghanistan
will always be in danger of returning to the conditions that made it a
haven for violent extremists.
With our assistance and that of our allies, the Afghan Government
is steadily building law enforcement institutions to fight corruption,
organized crime, and drug trafficking. With the support of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and our
military, the Ministries of Interior and Counter Narcotics, and the
Afghan National Directorate of Security recently created the Major
Crimes Task Force, which is responsible for investigating major
corruption, kidnapping, and organized crimes cases. Similarly,
Afghanistan's Attorney General recently established a special Anti-
Corruption Unit, aimed at prosecuting misconduct by mid-and high-level
government officials. In addition, a specialized Anti-Corruption
Tribunal is being created to handle significant corruption cases,
including prosecutions involving provincial officials. Our Mission's
Department of Justice team is also providing support.
In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to
make merit-based appointments in his new cabinet and to implement an
anti-corruption strategy, including by expanding the powers of the
existing High Office of Oversight. We are encouraged by his statements,
but we need to work together to aggressively implement this goal and
produce results. In addition to his cabinet, it is important that
qualified appointments are made at the vice minister, provincial and
district levels, which would give the Afghan Government greater
credibility with its people and permit more rapid reforms. Secretary
Clinton last month discussed with President Karzai the necessity of
moving swiftly to develop concrete plans to implement this agenda to
improve government accountability and performance.
Beyond the national level, I would like to address our efforts to
promote governance at the provincial and district levels. We are
working jointly with the military through our Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, District Development Working Groups, and District Support Teams,
which help build Afghan capacity in key areas, particularly in areas of
greatest insecurity in southern and eastern Afghanistan. We are
improving governance beyond Kabul through rule-of-law programs and
other mechanisms that have proven effective in giving Afghans a greater
stake in their government, including through the National Solidarity
Program. We have expanded our support for the Afghan Social Outreach
Program to create provincial and district councils and build citizen
involvement. We are working with the Afghan Government to provide
incentives for sub-national leaders to improve performance. I would
like to emphasize that we are concentrating on what is essential and
attainable. In all of these efforts, we must not wait too long to
create an Afghan autonomous capability, or we risk building a
dependency that will be that much harder to break.
Some might argue that we are reaching too high--that Afghanistan
has rarely in its history had a central government capable of carrying
out these tasks and that to expect a coherent state to emerge now is
unrealistic and a waste of resources. I disagree with that argument on
several levels. First, while the Afghan state has never been
particularly strong, Afghanistan has had functioning governments in
Kabul that were widely viewed as legitimate. Second, the government
structure we are helping to develop is one with the minimum set of
capabilities that any state must possess to serve its people.
Our goal is not nation building, nor are we attempting to impose a
Western model of governance. Afghanistan is a poor country that will
remain dependent on international aid for years to come. This strategy
for improving governance is based on a pragmatic assessment of the
national security interests of the United States, and our belief that
sustainable representative government is essential to success.
Afghanistan needs a viable government so our forces can draw down and
the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars can be reduced. Achieving those
goals will prevent the need for the United States and its allies to
intervene to protect ourselves from extremists who, unless we succeed,
might once again find refuge in Afghanistan.
The cultivation of poppy and the trafficking in opium without a
doubt has the most debilitating effect on Afghan society, feeding
corruption and undermining the legal economy, while generating funds
for the insurgency. Our strategy for combating the pervasive impact of
illegal narcotics is multi-pronged, involving demand reduction, efforts
by law enforcement and the military to detain major traffickers and
interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural
development. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration works closely
with Afghan partners to investigate and prosecute major traffickers.
With our support, the Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force has become
the most effective judicial organization in Afghanistan today, with
successful investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of hundreds of
drug traffickers. But the narcotics problem will never have a
satisfactory solution without economic development in this still
desperately poor country.
DEVELOPMENT
Along with security and governance, the third pillar of our effort
is development assistance. In recent months, we have adjusted our
approach to focus on building key elements of Afghanistan's private-
sector economy, increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing
government revenue collection, and improving the coordination of
assistance delivery within the U.S. Government and across the
international community. These refinements are designed to produce
measurable improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans--and thus to
contribute directly to more effective government and to lessened
support for the insurgency.
We are targeting much of our assistance where violence is worst and
shifting to more flexible and faster contract and grant mechanisms, to
ensure our dollars are effectively supporting our efforts in the
provinces. Development specialists at the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), joined by experts from multiple departments and
agencies of our government, are focusing on key sectors, such as
agriculture. Rebuilding the farm sector is essential for the Afghan
Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who form the recruiting
base for extremist groups. We estimate that at least 80 percent of the
Afghan population derives their income, either directly or indirectly,
from agriculture. Our agriculture efforts also seek to reinforce our
governance strategy, so that the Agriculture Ministry will increasingly
be--and be seen as--a tangible example of a more effective government.
At the same time, we are encouraging long-term investment,
specifically by funding water management and electrification projects
that deliver power and large-scale irrigation, and we promote mining
and light industry that leverage Afghanistan's agricultural products
and natural resources.
We are also helping Afghanistan's Government increase revenue
collection. Without improvements in its ability to collect taxes and
customs receipts, Afghanistan will always remain overly dependent on
the international community and will struggle to meet the needs of its
people. The Afghan Government has made progress in recent years in
increasing domestic revenue collection, which has risen from 3.3
percent of gross domestic product to 7.7 percent. That is still too
low. Most low-income countries collect 11 to 12 percent of their gross
domestic product on average, and we and our other partners are working
with the Ministry of Finance on reforms that will further increase
revenue. The biggest problem remains corruption, however. The current
rough estimate is that only half of the revenue collected actually
makes it into the treasury. Low domestic revenue undermines the Afghan
Government's ability to provide services, while graft and bribery
diminishes confidence in and support for the government.
Representatives from the U.S. Treasury Department are working with the
Afghan Finance Ministry and other essential ministries to build
fiduciary systems that will permit us to provide them more direct
funding.
Additionally, our Department of State and Commerce experts are
assisting the Afghans to promote regional trade to help their economy.
We expect that Afghanistan and Pakistan will shortly conclude a Transit
Trade Agreement that will open new opportunities for commerce between
the two countries. Finally, we also seek Congressional support to soon
pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation to create long-term
and sustainable employment opportunities. Improving official commercial
and trade relations will also contribute to an improved Afghanistan-
Pakistan security relationship.
OUR CIVILIAN EFFORT
Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but I am
optimistic that we can succeed with the support of Congress. Under-
resourced for years, our mission is now one of our government's highest
priorities, with substantial additional development funds and hundreds
of additional personnel. By early 2010, we will have almost 1,000
civilians from numerous government departments and agencies on the
ground in Afghanistan, tripling the total from the beginning of 2009.
Of these, nearly 400 will serve out in the field with the military at
Provincial Reconstruction Teams or at the brigade-level and on forward
operating bases. By comparison, 1 year ago there were only 67 U.S.
civilians serving outside Kabul. The hundreds of dedicated Americans
who have taken on this assignment voluntarily accept hardship and risk
and deserve our recognition and appreciation for the exemplary work
they are performing under very difficult conditions. They are an
extraordinarily skilled group, chosen because they have the proper
skills and experience to achieve the results we seek.
In coming months, as our troops conduct operations to stabilize new
areas, they will be joined by additional civilian personnel to work
with our Afghan partners to strengthen governance and provide basic
services as rapidly as possible. The integration of civilian and
military effort has greatly improved over the last year, a process that
will deepen as additional troops arrive and our civilian effort
expands. We have designated Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) as
counterparts to NATO-ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands.
These SCRs are senior professionals, experienced in conflict
environments. They direct the work of U.S. Government civilians within
their regions, subject to my overall guidance. This organizational
structure has two important features: First, it ensures that our
civilian efforts are fully integrated with the military's in the field.
Second, it is decentralized, enabling quick response to local needs,
which is essential to deal with the varying conditions in Afghanistan.
To maximize our impact in priority areas, we have created District
Support Teams, which allow civilians in the field to collaborate with
the military to build Afghan capacity in assigned districts.
U.S. foreign assistance is a comparatively small but essential
fraction of the total dollars spent in Afghanistan over the last 8
years. Our increased civilian presence has enabled us to more
effectively and more rapidly invest our assistance in the areas of
agriculture, job creation, education, health care, and infrastructure
projects. Additional resources will be necessary for our effort to keep
pace with the military's expansion, to carry out the President's
strategy on a rapid timetable. We look forward to sharing additional
details on our anticipated needs with Congress in the coming days and
weeks.
We have also improved our contracting to enhance performance and
increase the effectiveness of our development aid programs. In a
conflict zone, a degree of program risk is unavoidable, but U.S.
Government agencies in the mission remain accountable to Congress for
every dollar they spend. Given the great amount of resources and
emphasis devoted to Afghanistan, our programs receive extraordinary
oversight, including by a Kabul-based Special Inspector General for
Afghan Reconstruction, multiple audits of USAID and International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs, and a hotline to report fraud,
waste, and abuse.
PAKISTAN
Finally, let me say a few words about Pakistan and the critical
impact that developments in that country will have on our efforts over
the next year. The expanded military and civilian effort we are
undertaking in Afghanistan is likely to produce measurable improvements
in security and in Afghanistan's governance capacity, but we will
likely fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress
at eliminating the sanctuaries used by Afghan Taliban and their allied
militant extremists in Pakistan. The vast majority of enemy fighters
our troops face on the battlefield are local Afghans, fighting in their
home provinces or regions. But the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents
receive significant aid and direction from senior leaders operating
outside Afghanistan's borders. The Afghan Taliban's leadership may
employ those sanctuaries, as they have in the past, to simply wait us
out and renew their attacks once our troops begin to go home.
Recognizing this, the administration has emphasized the need for a
regional approach that deals with the interrelated problems of
Afghanistan and Pakistan and seeks to improve relations between the two
governments.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a daunting challenge. I have tried to
describe how our Mission, as part of an integrated civil-military team,
will pursue the President's goals and our country's interests. I have
also given you my best assessment of the risks we face. Let me, in
closing, once again thank the men and women of the U.S. Mission in
Afghanistan and our Armed Forces. Together with the members of other
NATO-ISAF armed forces, the international community and our Afghan
allies, they do exemplary work on a daily basis that helps to protect
the American people. They are prepared to work even harder to help the
Afghan Government to stand on its own and handle the threats it faces.
They believe firmly that our mission is necessary and achievable, and
so do I. Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the
additional troops and other resources provided by the President--and
with the help of Congress--we can ensure al Qaeda never again finds
refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
We'll try a 7-minute round and hope that we can get to
everybody by the time that you two have to leave us.
General, let me ask you the first question. Is it your
personal professional judgment that the President's strategic
plan is the correct plan?
General McChrystal. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is.
Chairman Levin. Are there any elements of the plan you
don't agree with?
General McChrystal. I'm comfortable with the entire plan,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Ambassador, do you support the President's
plan and each of its elements?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Now, the President has set a specific date
of July 2011 for the start of U.S. troop reductions. It's
specific and it's set, as directed by the President. He's also
indicated that the pace of the reductions is dependent on
conditions on the ground.
General, do you fully agree with the July 2011 date which
the President directed as the start of reductions of some U.S.
forces?
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I do, and I'd like to
explain why.
Chairman Levin. Please.
General McChrystal. Sir, from the military strategy point,
I view it in a wider context. First, most importantly, I think
the President has stated and other leaders of our government
have the commitment to a strategic partnership with Afghanistan
and the Afghan people. So I believe that the context that
provides, that we will not abandon them over time, is very,
very important. It gives them a consistency in our commitment
to them and some assurance for the future.
Sir, on the other end of that, in the very near term, the
President has provided our force additional combat forces,
which I view, and I described in my opening statement, as being
able to provide us time and space to reverse Taliban momentum
and make progress against the insurgency in the near term,
which I think the next 18 months are critical. During that
period, I believe we'll be able to degrade the ability and the
capacity of the insurgency significantly. Simultaneous to that
will be growing the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan's
security capability, the Afghan Army and Afghan police
specifically, but also supported by governance.
So I believe that when we hit July 2011 that's not a
significant factor in our campaign plan. In fact, I think it
has a positive forcing function on our Afghan partners in
reminding them that, although we have a long-term commitment,
we also have shared responsibility. So I think there are some
positives.
I do want to point out that I understand that there's an
information operations challenge. The Taliban particularly will
try to paint this in a particular picture, and I think we just
have to deal and combat that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, how many Afghan soldiers are now partnered with
U.S. combat troops and are in the fight in Regional Commands
(RC)-South and RC-East, where the major fighting is occurring?
What's that number?
General McChrystal. Sir, if you'll permit me to pull out my
numbers here.
Chairman Levin. If you could just give us the number of
Afghan soldiers, one number, partnered with U.S. combat forces,
in the fight?
General McChrystal. In RC-South, sir, that would be 16,700.
Chairman Levin. 16,000?
General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. How about east?
General McChrystal. Sir, that would be 23,300 army. Neither
of those numbers include the police.
Chairman Levin. Now, in Operation Cobra Anger in Helmand
it's reported we have 1,000 marines there right now in that
operation and there's about 150 Afghan troops. When we were in
Helmand Province, where we visited, there were five U.S. troops
for each Afghan troop. I think I stated it correctly. But
currently in Operation Anger there's 1,000 marines, joined by
150 Afghans. That's about seven U.S. troops for every one
Afghan.
Given the number of Afghan troops that are there, why are
these ratios so inconsistent with what our own doctrine is,
which says that we should have a one-to-one partnership, one
unit of ours for one unit of the Afghans, hopefully leading to
one unit of ours to three Afghan units by the end of the
partnering period? How come the ratio is so reversed of what
our doctrine requires?
General McChrystal. The primary reason is there are not yet
enough Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police
(ANP). The main focus of our coalition element or strategy has
recently been in the south. In the Helmand area, when you and I
were there, you're correct, it was about one Afghan security
force participant to five coalition. That's now 1 to 3.6 and by
the end of January we'll have it 1 to 2.3.
Chairman Levin. Now, the British insist on one-to-one. The
Australians insist on one-to-one. It's their doctrine. It's
their mission that they are mainly there for partnering with
the Afghan troops, and so their requirement, which they insist
on, is about a one-to-one to begin with. Why do we not have
that same insistence, determination, that our doctrine, which
is one-to-one, be implemented, since partnering and training
the Afghan forces is such an important part of our mission?
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more.
There are simply not yet an ANA to meet everyone's
requirements. We are fielding as we speak this month 1,900
additional ANA soldiers between December and January. That's 16
new ANA companies. All will go into the Helmand area.
Chairman Levin. We're going to have 20,000 there by what
time?
General McChrystal. Of our additional forces?
Chairman Levin. No, of our forces. We have 10,000 in
Helmand now. We're going to add another 9,000 or 10,000.
General McChrystal. Sir, by mid-spring, late spring.
Chairman Levin. So the ratio is still going to be
overwhelmingly U.S. to Afghan, even after those Afghan
additions; isn't that right?
General McChrystal. Sir, by April we will create another
brigade of ANA forces that will go to the south--I'm sorry. Two
brigades by summer and an additional corps headquarters. We're
flowing everything we can build in the Afghan army into that
area. I absolutely agree with your point.
Chairman Levin. General Jones indicated in a news interview
last weekend, I believe, that currently at least 7 of the 34
Afghan provinces today--that's 20 percent of their provinces--
have the conditions for successful transition, right now. Now
quoting General Jones: ``Specifically, security, economic
development, and reasonably good governance.''
Why not transfer responsibility now, since the conditions
exist now for successful transition?
General McChrystal. In fact, the Afghans have the lead over
the entire country. Legally, they're a sovereign country. It's
different than Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Then why did Secretary Gates and Secretary
Clinton repeatedly say that transition is going to begin in
July 2011, if the conditions for transition in seven provinces
exist now? Why wait?
General McChrystal. Senator, in fact, the city of Kabul has
already transferred to----
Chairman Levin. How about the other seven provinces?
General McChrystal. There are areas where they, in fact,
have the lead now, they execute, because there are not
coalition forces operating in those areas. So the legal mandate
that might be executed to do that I think is really in that
case a formality. They have the lead in most of those areas
right now, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Eikenberry, during the decisionmaking process
there were several cables that you sent back that were
classified Secret and yet were revealed to the media. They
indicated that you had strong reservations about the surge.
Have those reservations been resolved in your mind?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, 100 percent with the
refinement of the mission and with clarification on the ways
that we're going to move forward and the resources allocated
against this, absolutely.
Senator McCain. General McChrystal, Secretary Gates said
today in Kabul: ``We're in this thing to win.'' Do you agree
with his statement and do you have what you need to win?
General McChrystal. I agree with the Secretary's statement.
We are in it to win. I think we have what we need to win. But I
think the ultimate winners become the Afghan people.
Senator McCain. What do you expect we will have achieved by
2011? I understand there's going to be a major review of the
plan by December 2010. What do you expect we will have achieved
by 2011 when, as the response to Senator Levin's statement, is
a firm date for beginning withdrawal of U.S. troops? We will
have benchmarks that you will be sharing with us, I'm sure. Go
ahead.
General McChrystal. Absolutely. The most important thing we
will have done by the summer of 2011 is convince the majority
of the Afghan people that in fact we are going to win, we and
the Afghan Government are going to win, and that, that is going
to be the direction for the future. What we will do is start by
reversing the Taliban momentum and the perception of momentum,
because at the end of the day success in this fight is about
what the people believe.
We will be able, between now and summer of 2011, to reverse
that momentum, to increase the number of security zones we
have, providing more areas contiguous security. So for example,
a farmer in Garmsir in the central Helmand River Valley, which
has been secured now by a combination of Afghan forces and
marines, who've done a great job, we'll be able to move product
all the way from Garmsir to Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. Currently
we don't have contiguous security; we have pockets of security.
We'll be able to grow that. We'll be able to increase their
ability not only to live in their own neighborhood more
normally, but also to live a life more normally.
Senator McCain. What if we haven't achieved those
objectives by July 2011? What do we do then, since we have a
firm date for the beginning of a withdrawal?
General McChrystal. Sir, of course we always assess our
strategy as we go along and make decisions based upon the
situation.
Senator McCain. But we still have a firm date.
You said, General McChrystal, ``The success of this
operation will be determined in the minds of the Afghan
people.'' What would you say to Afghans, Pakistanis, and others
in the region, both our friends and enemies, who may now feel
like hedging their bets or sitting on the fence because they
doubt America's commitment and resolve?
General McChrystal. Sir, there will be some who are in
opposition and some who are in ignorance, who will try to use
that as a point of propaganda. I think if we point out the
long-term strategic partnership both to the Government of
Afghanistan and to our Pakistani partners, and our short-term
clear commitment by the additional forces and the focus of our
strategy, I believe that we can make that point effectively.
Senator McCain. It is obvious from your experience in
Afghanistan that the Afghan people do not want the return of
the Taliban, and that is a significant advantage and one that
perhaps has not been made as clear to the American people, not
only because of the things they might do to harm the United
States, but the terrible treatment of the Afghan people,
including women in Afghanistan.
General McChrystal. Senator, that is absolutely correct.
Everywhere I go, I have never seen evidence that the Taliban
have popular support, like a political liberation movement.
They get their support largely through coercion. So the average
people are simply waiting to see whether or not their
government can defeat that insurgency.
Senator McCain. Is it still your goal to train 400,000
Afghan security forces by 2013?
General McChrystal. Sir, I believe that we need to
significantly increase the ANSF. I recommend that we stay on a
very aggressive timeline to try to reach that, but adjust those
goals on two things: one, if the insurgency's size creases, it
might be able to be adjusted; and also the ability of the
Afghan Government to provide recruits, retention, and those
things which enable the growth.
Senator McCain. What level do you expect it to be by July
2011?
General McChrystal. Sir, I believe between the army and
police total it will be approaching 300,000 people.
Senator McCain. What about the strain on the men and women
in the military, General?
General McChrystal. Sir, I think the strain is significant.
But I was out at Walter Reed yesterday morning, as I went
through with my wife and visited soldiers who'd been wounded,
not just in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq. Every soldier we
spoke to talked about wanting to get back in the fight, even
though it was clear that many would be very challenged to do
that.
Every soldier that I see in the field expresses the same
sort of focus. So I believe that while there's clear strain on
families, and we cannot understate the importance of the
programs that this body has done for wounded warriors and for
families, I believe this force wants to win, and I believe that
commitment is the most important thing.
Senator McCain. How important is it that we find and bring
to justice Osama bin Laden and what effect would that have on
our effort there?
I'd also be interested in your view, Ambassador.
General McChrystal. Sir, I believe he is an iconic figure
at this point, whose survival emboldens al Qaeda as a
franchising organization across the world. It would not defeat
al Qaeda to have him captured or killed, but I don't think that
we can finally defeat al Qaeda until he is captured or killed.
Senator McCain. Until he is captured or brought to justice.
Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I'd only add to that, that
it does remain important to the American people, indeed the
people of the world, that one day Osama bin Laden is either
captured or killed or brought to justice for his responsibility
for the murder of many Americans and citizens of the world on
September 11, 2001.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses. I know you have an
enormous task ahead of you. You have our support and our
thoughts and our prayers are with you. We look forward to
making your life miserable by coming over to visit you.
[Laughter.]
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I promise to come with Senator McCain and to the extent
that I can try to make his visit less miserable for the two of
you than it would otherwise be. [Laughter.]
I thank you both for your extraordinary service. I do want
to say a word about Senator McCain's opening statement today.
It builds on what he said last week when Secretaries Gates and
Clinton and Admiral Mullen were here. It's obvious that he
disagrees on the question of the deadline, or whatever one
calls it, for July 2011, exit strategy. But he made an
important statement today, which is he's just going to have to
agree to disagree. The administration and he are going to have
to agree to disagree and go forward, because he supports the
basic program.
I hope this sets a tone for people in both parties. No
matter what they feel about one or another detail of the
decision the President made, it is now American policy, and the
truth is we all ought to come together behind you, General
McChrystal, and the troops that you're leading, and Ambassador
Eikenberry, you and the civilian personnel you're leading, and
give you 18 months when you don't have any carping or
backbiting from Washington to get the job done for us. I thank
you for that.
I never felt uncomfortable or critical about the length of
the deliberative process that President Obama conducted, but I
thought the worst thing about it was that it appeared that
people associated with it were leaking documents or arguments
to try to affect public opinion, and one was this alleged email
that you sent, Ambassador Eikenberry, because none of us,
obviously, saw it. I didn't see it.
I appreciate what you said to Senator McCain, that you have
a good working relationship with General McChrystal. But what
the media was reporting was that the substance of the email was
your concern that if we sent too many troops too quickly, it
would take the pressure off of the Afghan Government. I wanted
to ask you to deal with that in two ways, if you would. It's
awkward to ask it and yet the media is talking about it, so I
think it's best to give you a chance to comment in public.
The first is, to what extent the publication of that email,
with its skepticism, that a lot of people here in Washington
share, about the government in Kabul, what effect, if any, it's
had on your relationship with President Karzai and the
government. The second is, if you could deal with the
substance, which is I gather--what we heard of the email, it
had a substantial policy argument, which was that first we
better get the Afghans to shape up before we send in more
troops.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thanks, Senator. Let me take the
second half first, on the substance. There was a very
deliberate review process that both General McChrystal and I
talked about in our opening statements, and during that review
process all of us were encouraged to render our best analysis
and best advice. It was an extraordinary process, as it should
have been given the complexities and the consequences of the
decision. During that time, all of us participating had
opportunities in videoteleconferences, through face-to-face
discussions, through written correspondence, to submit our
views.
The second point I wanted to make is that at no time,
Senator, was I opposed to additional forces being sent to
Afghanistan. I do share General McChrystal's security analysis
that he conducted. It was comprehensive and it was correct. The
situation in parts of Afghanistan, the security had
deteriorated, and still in parts of Afghanistan it remains very
difficult.
The only way to address those problems, those challenges of
insecurity, is additional forces, whether U.S. or non-U.S. NATO
forces. We have an absolute consensus that we need to
accelerate the building of the Afghan army and police. The best
way to do that is additional U.S. forces. But all of us had
questions, of course, when we have a very significant decision
to be made about additional forces, important to understand the
number, the timeline, the purpose, the context.
But the third point I'd make then: With the President's
decision, with the refinement of the mission, with clarity on
what ways we were going to use and what resources would be
allocated against that, at that point in time I was 100
percent, and am now 100 percent, supportive of the decision
that was made.
With regard to effect on my relations with the Afghan
Government, I maintain, Senator, good relations with President
Karzai. My embassy, our embassy, maintains excellent relations
with the Government of Afghanistan, and we're going to continue
to improve upon what is already a very good working
relationship.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate both parts of your answer.
When I was last there with Senator McCain in August, it was
clear that you had a good, an honest relationship with
President Karzai and the administration, there are
disagreements, but then a commitment to one another, that's
exactly what we want.
General McChrystal, just following up, I take it that the
leak of the email has had no lasting effect on your ability to
work with Ambassador Eikenberry? Obviously, if we're going to
employ all elements of our national resources to Afghanistan,
the relationship between the two of you is critically important
to that.
General McChrystal. It's fine, Senator. We work together
literally every day. We have dinner together. That is an
absolute misperception. We also know that we're only going to
be successful together, both the two of us, but then also all
our coalition and Afghan partners.
Senator Lieberman. That's great. Thank you.
When Secretary Gates was before the committee last week, he
told us: ``Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are, as
we speak, working on a joint civil-military campaign plan just
as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker developed for Iraq
in 2007.''
I wanted to ask you first whether the Secretary is correct?
Are you writing such a plan? Second, if so, can you tell us a
little bit about the process by which the plan is being
written? Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Actually, if I could, Senator, there
is an existing civil-military plan. General McChrystal and
myself back in August, after intensive combined staff work on
the civil-military side, we had signed a joint campaign plan
that General Petraeus, when he reviewed it along with
Ambassador Holbrooke, said it was absolutely the best civil-
military plan that he's ever seen. We're proud of the work that
was done on it.
We are in the process of having to revise that plan based
upon the implementation now of the new strategy. This plan is
not a document which sits on a shelf. To give you an example of
the integration that follows from this plan, at the national
level we have 14 national level working groups. What do I mean
by that? We have a national level working group for
agriculture, a national level working group for infrastructure
development.
These are fully integrated teams that sit on these working
groups. For instance, agriculture; members of U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) sit on the team, the
Department of Agriculture. Very importantly, from General
McChrystal's command, we have the National Guard sitting on
there and more of their military command.
I could go through all of these various functional groups
that we've established. That's at the national level
horizontally. But vertically, from Kabul all the way down
through the province, all the way through the district, we have
a fully integrated civil-military unified effort. We're
impressed with what we have. We're committed to making it
better.
Senator Lieberman. General McChrystal, do you want to add
to that? I'm curious as to whether you have integration at the
staff level on civil-military to work on the next phase of the
plan.
General McChrystal. We absolutely do. On a daily basis,
they are meeting and working.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you both.
Thanks very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McChrystal, when there's fighting near the Afghan-
Pakistan border area and our troops are engaged with the enemy
insurgents, what have been the rules of engagement with regard
to what our troops can do when the enemy retreats back into
Pakistan?
General McChrystal. The intent of our rules of engagement
is always to protect our forces, to never take away from our
forces the ability to protect themselves, their wellbeing. We
have the ability to fire across the border--artillery, air
strikes, direct fire weapons--and that actually happens with a
fair amount of regularity. But it also happens with
coordination. We have a series of mechanisms in place with the
Pakistani army so that as an incident occurs, before we shoot
we immediately contact them and try to work out all the details
so that they in fact approve the engagement with the enemy.
That reduces misunderstandings.
There are times when there are misunderstandings about
that. So we constantly work with our forces to try to make sure
we don't create issues. But we also try to prevent, both the
Pakistani military and us, there being any kind of a scene.
Senator Wicker. So we don't pursue across the border? Our
troops don't have the ability to do that; is that correct?
General McChrystal. Sir, I'd like to take that part for the
record, whether they actually legally can. We have not been
doing that, not going across on the ground.
Senator Wicker. So they're under orders not to do that?
General McChrystal. Sir, let me take that for the record,
to make sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Wicker. I just wondered, because you had testified
that ``organizational and operational changes were going to
need to be implemented, and I just was curious, and maybe you
might want to take for the record that question too, as to
whether our ability to pursue the enemy across the border, with
the cooperation of the Pakistanis, might be part of those
changes.
So thank you for that, and I look forward to your answer.
Mr. Ambassador, there are going to be Afghan parliamentary
elections next year. I think it's beyond dispute that the
presidential election was riddled with fraud and that the
turnout was much lower than expected because of intimidation by
the Taliban. What are our lessons learned from the presidential
election to help us going forward to the parliamentary
election?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, clearly the presidential
election that Afghanistan went through was a very difficult
process. There was fraud. In areas of Afghanistan that were
challenged by insecurity, there was lower voter turnout. I
would emphasize, however, that the rule of law, the rules
according to the constitution, remained intact, and for that
the Afghan people are proud.
In the early 1990s when there was a change of political
power in Kabul, it took place through warlords firing rockets
down into the city of Kabul. So the Afghan people are proud
that they made it through this process, difficult though it
was.
Now, against that, what lessons were learned, Senator?
There has to be improvement in the electoral system of
Afghanistan. The commission which has the oversight for the
running of the election, it needs improvement. It needs help
from the international community in that regard.
Second, I think that the Afghans are politically going to
have to come together and look at the election cycles that
they've established right now. Between this year and 2024,
every year except one has elections. They're going to need to
look hard at that pace of elections.
Then third, there's going to have to be reform and work
done for voter registration to get a better handle on who is
actually eligible to vote out there. I think that the Afghan
parliament and President Karzai's administration, over the next
several months, will be looking at this. Right now the
parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in the
spring. That will be a very ambitious timeline. I know it has
security consequences, but it's a major point on the political
agenda, for Afghanistan, and we're talking with the government
about this.
Senator Wicker. Is a major point of your political agenda
to provide better security against coercion of the voters? What
would be our plans for that?
Let me interject: Were you surprised at the low turnout?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I was, I was, Senator, not on the
day of the election. If you had asked me when I first came into
Afghanistan on this tour of duty in May 2009, several months
before the election, I would have suggested a much higher voter
turnout in eastern and southern Afghanistan. One of the key
factors that voter turnout was not high in those areas was
insecurity. So as I said earlier in the testimony that I agreed
with General McChrystal's security assessment, low voter
turnout in areas where there is insecurity, not surprising.
I was surprised, though, to see how far security had
trended downward.
Senator Wicker. Is a major agenda item providing better
security for voters so they'll have more confidence that they
can get back and forth to the polls?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd defer to General McChrystal on
that, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Is that a major item, General?
General McChrystal. It absolutely is, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Let me ask this, then. President Karzai in
his inauguration speech mentioned his desire to convene a loya
jirga. It has been further elaborated on by spokesmen saying
that members of the Taliban would be invited to this loya
jirga.
Was this an American idea? I understand much of the
President's inaugural address was written in consultation with
Americans. Is that our view, Mr. Ambassador, that a loya jirga
would include members of the Taliban? When might this occur?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I know that President Karzai has
discussed holding a loya jirga. He has articulated that the
purpose of the loya jirga would be to gain a consensus among
the people, renew their support for the presence of the
international community in the way ahead.
With regard to Taliban participation in this, Senator, I
don't know. I have not discussed that with President Karzai.
Senator Wicker. Do you have an opinion with regard to
whether that would be advisable?
Ambassador Eikenberry. With regard to political discussions
between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, Senator,
that's very much a political question for the Afghan
Government's administration. The principles that President
Karzai has set forth about discussions of anybody rejoining
Afghan society, Taliban rejoining Afghan society, the set of
principles that he's established--number one, that they would
have to renounce their ties to international terrorism; number
two, renounce violence; number three, to follow the
constitution of the Government of Afghanistan--those are
entirely consistent with our own views.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Just a quick procedural point.
We do expect that we'll have an opportunity at least for a
brief second round. I want everyone to know that we expect that
opportunity will be present.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen.
General McChrystal, the rules of engagement within Afghan
emphasize minimizing civilian casualties. That was a point you
made when you took over, and Admiral Mullen made the same point
yesterday at Camp Lejeune. I don't want to be presumptuous, but
my understanding is it is based on your experience, your
understanding of counterinsurgency warfare, the experience of
the Soviets before us; you were not directed to do that by
anyone; is that correct?
General McChrystal. That is correct, Senator. I did before
I deployed out watch the situation going on, so I had formed
opinions, but got no specific direction.
Senator Reed. Very good.
One of the issues here is not only the increase in size of
forces, but it's the unity of command and the unity of effort.
That stretches across several dimensions--COIN operations,
counterterrorism operations, counternarcotic operations, civil-
military coordination, operations between NATO and Afghan
security forces, operations between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
intelligence operations versus tactical operations in the
field.
Can you in a few minutes tell me, Ambassador Eikenberry
also, what are you doing specifically to address this issue of
unity of effort, and how important is it to your success?
General McChrystal. Senator, it's absolutely critical to
our success, unity of effort across the civil-military and
within military operations. What we have done is, as we arrived
out, we've done some organizational changes. The standup of the
Intermediate Joint Command, General Dave Rodriguez's command,
provides a corps-like headquarters over the regional commands
that allows him to orchestrate this fight much better than we
could have done before or was the habit before.
Additionally, internal to each what we call battle-space
owner, starting at the regional command level down to typically
a brigade combat team, we have moved to put all the elements
that operate in that battle space under the control of that
single battle space owner.
I'll let Ambassador Eikenberry talk more about what they've
done. But we've also established a civil-military lashup so
that each regional commander has a senior civilian
represenative that is right next to him all the time. So that
gives us unity of effort so that they are literally joined at
the hip as we move forward there.
We've changed the structure and focus of our special
operating forces so that they come under either the regional
commander's focus, to ensure that they are implementing his.
What we can't do is have multiple wars being fought. We have to
have one overall effort.
There is still a distance to go. There are some national
limitations. There are cultural limitations within the U.S.
military, and there are other steps. But we have made huge
progress.
The last point I'd make is, our effort to partner with the
Afghans starts at the Ministry of Defense level, the Ministry
of Interior, which is much more robust than we did before. I
see the ministers almost every day. We have video
teleconferences (VCTs) with them. They're in our VTCs every
day. So that we and the Afghans are planning the fight
together, executing the fight, talking about the fight
afterward together. That goes down at the lower levels and
increasingly, as Senator Levin said, the partnering down at the
lowest levels, the closer we get, that gets us not only better
forces, it gets us unity of effort.
Senator Reed. Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, four points in our own
efforts on the embassy side to try to achieve unity of effort.
First of all, within the government itself, within the embassy.
I'd mention as an example of some of these working groups that
we have established an agricultural working group. We're very
proud of the success that we've had in pulling together the
interagency on the civilian side of the government, so that you
will not have one agricultural group meeting with USAID,
another led by the Department of Agriculture--fully integrated.
If you were to go into our rule of law group, you'll find in
that same room the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Department of Justice, State
International Narcotics and Law, and the military.
General McChrystal already mentioned the second point about
our civil-military coordination. I mentioned that to Senator
McCain. As you get down to outside of Kabul, for the first time
I truly believe we've really got it lashed up well. The senior
civilian representative concept we have for a military regional
commander, not a political adviser but a fully empowered co-
equal that has responsibility for all the civilians from all
agencies assigned in that sector, and, very importantly, can
take the resources assigned and can allocate them so that
they're in support of major military efforts.
Third point is with our unity that we have with the
international community: difficult, challenging, but still the
United Nations mission led by Kai Eide. We work closely with
Mr. Eide. He's made good progress there. We have more work to
do in that area. That's important because Afghanistan's going
the need international commitment for many more years. So we
continue to work hard to ensure that's a success.
Then the fourth and final area, just what General
McChrystal had said on the military side. Really, who's the key
partner for our unity of effort? It is the Afghan people. So
increasingly as we see more competency within Afghan
ministries, we will be encouraging the Afghan ministry partners
to lead the efforts. We'll go down to their ministry. We'll
help them, but they'll be in the lead and we'll be in support
of those efforts.
Senator Reed. A quick question to follow up, Mr.
Ambassador. In terms of the civilian surge, not just in
numbers, but in the duration of the service: I think there are
some agencies that are giving you or giving this effort 3
months, 4 months, in terms of personal assignments. Is that
adequate?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Tours of that length are not. We've
made great progress, though, Senator, with support of most of
our departments and agencies in really getting that turned
around. There's a real commitment there. I'll give you an
example. The Afghans have established a major crimes task force
in Afghanistan. It's going to be their FBI. Our FBI has sent a
group of mentors to work with them. The initial plan was each
mentor would be there for several months and rotate out. We
talked to Director Mueller directly and said, for an endeavor
like this you can't build trust in a couple of months; it has
to be a long-term endeavor. So he has 10 agents on the ground
right now in Afghanistan, 1-year tours of duty each. So we're
making a lot of progress in that area. We still need to do
better, though.
Senator Reed. General McChrystal, but you might want to
also comment, Ambassador: Even with the most dedicated and
talented government in Kabul, Afghani Government, the ability
to reach out into the provinces is limited. It's limited by the
constitution. The governors are appointed by President Karzai.
It's limited by the lack of any ability to raise revenues
locally. In the short run you're going to have to essentially
fill in the gaps, which seems to be similar to the issue in
Iraq with the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP)
funding, where military units and their civilian counterparts
were using funds to jump-start some of the build activity.
Is that your plan, essentially?
General McChrystal. Sir, it is. We will seek every chance
we can to use the central government's ability to reach down,
every chance we can to use existing provincial or district
governments. But we'll also help wherever we can. In some
cases, just security alone makes it difficult, for example, for
a district subgovernor to get out and do the kinds of things
that he wants to do or would normally do. So we're going to
have to partner with them, and it'll be unique in every place,
doing the right answer.
Senator Reed. Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd agree with what General
McChrystal laid out. We are working very hard as well, Senator,
with the different programs, with our developmental programs
delivered in the civilian side, to make those much more agile
and much more flexible, so that, as General McChrystal's forces
move with ANSF into a new district and it becomes imperative
that on an urgent basis we're able to start delivering economic
assistance and try to get jobs created. We've made a lot of
progress here in the last 6 months about refining programs, so
that, as an example, when General McChrystal's marines went
into Nawa District in Helmand Province in the summer, 24 hours
later we had a USAID developmental specialist on the ground,
several days after that agricultural programs, jobs for work
programs, digging of irrigation districts, that was underway.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador and General, thank you for being here. Thank you
for your public service all these years.
I had the opportunity to visit with you in Afghanistan
along with Senator Burr and Senator Whitehouse at the end of
October. Since the time of our trip--and perhaps, General
McChrystal, you could answer this question first--has the
situation improved in terms of our fight against the
insurgency, stayed the same, or slid backwards?
General McChrystal. Senator, I believe it's improved. I'm
not going to say dramatically, and I try to always let events
be provable. But I absolutely believe it's improved.
Senator LeMieux. Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd say, Senator, if we take this
through the political lens, there's been some very significant
improvement. Of course, what's happened since your visit, we
made--the second round was decided upon, and then Abdul
Abdullah withdrew, President Karzai elected, inauguration. I
have to say that when we looked at President Karzai's--listened
to his inauguration address, there was a lot of positive things
in that about governance and about security.
I think we're seeing more confidence being displayed right
now from President Karzai's administration. Actions have to
follow the words. I heard that Secretary Gates, today in his
visit to Kabul, in his discussions with President Karzai and
the national security team of President Karzai, came away with
the very good impression that the Afghan leadership has a sense
of determination about them.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you.
General McChrystal, it seems to me with the addition of the
30,000 troops and a goal, at least an aspirational goal, to
draw down those troops, at least start to by July 2011, that
this puts a lot of pressure on you and your team. You're going
to get these troops starting in January. The troops I guess
will not be fully deployed in theater until maybe the summer,
and even that might be ambitious. So you have what it seems to
me is a year to show real success with the full complement of
the troops.
Do you think that that's possible? Would you think that on
a scale of one to ten, with ten being very likely and one being
not likely at all, that you have a chance for success in that
period of time?
General McChrystal. I believe the chance is very high. I am
confident that, although there's pressure on us to move
forward, I think that's fine. There's also pressure on our
Afghan partners, because they realize we need to move forward,
and that's good. I think there's going to be a tremendous
amount of pressure on the enemy. Because of the forces already
on the ground and then the changes we've made and this
additional 30,000, I think we're going to be able to make very,
very significant progress.
Senator LeMieux. Ambassador, do you think that the Afghan
Government senses the pressure of this timeline and that they
are fully engaged to make this a successful period for us?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I do. Success for all of us
in Afghanistan, of course, is the point when the Government of
Afghanistan is able to provide for the security of its own
people. There's a bit of ambivalence right now on the Afghan
leaders and their people, and it's understandable. On the one
hand, they do want to stand up and have full control of their
sovereignty. That was reflected in President Karzai's
inauguration address, where he said within 5 years over the
course of his second term he wants Afghanistan's security
forces to be in the lead responsible for security nationwide.
Against that, given the history of modern Afghanistan,
given the uncertainty of the neighborhood that they live in,
there's a nervousness about losing the presence of NATO ISAF
and the Americans. So there's the tension. I believe, as the
General does, that this July 2011 date is a very good forcing
function to get the Afghan leadership to stand up, to have a
hard target for their army and police to move to.
President Karzai's initial reaction to it was positive. He
said: ``We need that kind of pressure; we want to stand up.''
But at the same time, as General McChrystal has said, we're
going to have to be cognizant of Afghanistan's long-term needs
for security. So, as President Karzai said in his inauguration
address, the idea of having a strategic partnership with the
United States or refining that is something that I think is
going to be essential as we move forward and define what that
long-term relationship with Afghanistan is about.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you.
General, the American people still want us to capture and
kill Osama bin Laden. It occurs to me that, in terms of your
warfighting and trying to break the will of our enemy, that
that would be an important strategic military goal as well. Are
we still about the business of trying to capture and kill him?
Recently Secretary Gates said that we haven't had good
intelligence on his whereabouts in years. Can you discuss with
us what part of the mission capturing and killing Osama bin
Laden is for you right now?
General McChrystal. Senator, I am responsible as Commander
of ISAF for inside Afghanistan. Were Osama bin Laden to come in
there, of course that would become a huge priority for all of
our forces. If he is not inside, it's outside of my mandate
right now. I do believe it's very important.
Senator LeMieux. Ambassador, can you speak to that at all?
Ambassador Eikenberry. The exact same perspective, Senator.
Senator LeMieux. The last thing I'd like to discuss with
you is Pakistan. Recently the President said that we cannot
tolerate a safe haven for terrorists, and this might be where
Osama bin Laden is, whose location is known and whose
intentions are clear. The New York Times has reported that the
administration has said in private that if the Pakistani
leaders will not allow us to follow these insurgents and fight
them, that we will continue to do so even without their
permission.
What kind of cooperation are you getting from Pakistan and
do you believe that they are going to be willing and good
partners as we fight this cross-border battle?
General McChrystal. My current partnership with the
Pakistani military, led by a personal relationship I have with
General Kiyani, is very good and it's getting better all the
time. Unlike a few years ago, they now face a very significant
internal insurgency from the TTP or what we call the Pakistani
Taliban. I believe that as they focus on that more, our shared
strategic interests become closer in alignment, both ours the
United States and Pakistan, but also Afghanistan's and
Pakistan's, because neither can achieve security and stability
without success on the other side of the border.
I think that helps to pull us into alignment. Pakistan does
have sovereign strategic interests, which I respect, and I
think it's important that what we as a Nation do is recognize
those and, just like we do with Afghanistan, reinforce that
long-term partnership.
Senator LeMieux. Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, you know that a major shift
that the administration made when it announced the strategy in
March was to try to pull together the regional aspects of
security in central and south Asia, so not looking just at
Afghanistan or Pakistan in isolation, but looking at the two
together. So with the naming of the special representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, and his frequent
partnership on the military side with General Dave Petraeus,
there is a full-time effort being made.
I would also say that when you talk about our embassy in
Islamabad, Ambassador Anne Patterson, our embassy in Kabul,
that we do work together under Ambassador Holbrooke's direction
to try to find ways to facilitate cooperation beyond the
military and security domain between Afghanistan and Pakistan--
political dialogues that we try to encourage and more promising
in the area of economic cooperation, trying to help both sides
reach a transit trade agreement to improve trade, working with
both sides to help improve customs posts along the frontier.
Some of those projects have led to positive results. There's
not going to be any real significant breakthroughs there, but
we do have a comprehensive approach.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you. Again, thank you both for your
service.
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say welcome, add my welcome to Ambassador
Eikenberry and General McChrystal, and to thank you each for
your extraordinary and dedicated service to our country.
I also want to thank all the men and women under your
leadership for their sacrifices. As we discuss Afghanistan
policy today, I ask that we keep our military and civilians in
mind and also in our prayers as they stand in harm's way.
Ambassador Eikenberry, much has been said and written about
the problems with the Afghan Government. One of them is
corruption, of course. Clearly we must have a reliable Afghan
Government to partner with in pursuing our new strategy.
Without question, the goal of unity of effort I think has
really set a new spirit in Afghanistan and has brought many
parts of our government to bear on what we need to do.
You also mentioned about improving the key ministries in
order to build legitimacy in the Afghan Government. Ambassador,
you have a first-hand view of the ministries and local
governments in Afghanistan. What is your view of how the
government is doing today? You've touched on this, do you want
to go deeper into it as to what we need to do to bring an
improvement about?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I'd start and say that,
again having gone through a very difficult election process,
President Karzai did emerge as the winner and he is our partner
now as the leader of Afghanistan. I give you one area where I
think we're doing reasonably well and I'm optimistic, another
area where I think we can expect to see improvements; the third
area will be the most difficult.
First of all, at the national level. You've talked abut
some of the ministries of Afghanistan. We're focusing our
efforts on the key ministries, the security sector, the
financial sector of course, key ministries that deliver
important services, health and education; and finally, those
ministries which are going to be very important to Afghanistan
for the generation of income for its people--agriculture,
mining potentially, energy, water management, and so forth.
Those ministries have had a lot of progress over the last
several years. We expect President Karzai over the next several
days will announce his new cabinet. We're cautiously optimistic
we're going to get generally good ministers named there. We'll
work closely with those important ministries with good leaders.
We think we have good programs aligned here to see further
success in capacity-building.
The next area is in the rule of law and justice. There is a
lot of work that needs to be done, but we do have some success
that we're building upon and we do have a commitment from
President Karzai in his inauguration speech that he's going to
tackle head-on the issue of corruption.
It's not going to be an easy fight at all and indeed help
is needed from the international community, help for programs.
But also the international community has to change its way over
time of how we dispense aid. A lot of money that goes into
Afghanistan right now goes outside of the Government of
Afghanistan. We'll work with the Afghan Government. I think our
government's setting a very good example for the international
community to make improvements in that area.
The third area is at the sub-national level, and this,
Senators, is the most difficult area, about how do you reach
out into a district of Afghanistan, if you're a minister
sitting in Kabul, and provide health services in insecure
districts of Afghanistan right now that General McChrystal's
forces and ANSF are moving into and trying to push the Taliban
back. That's the area that is the most problematic. We have
good work going on in that area. We have some good aid
programs, but this is the one we're going to have to lean into
very heavily with our Afghan partners to try to figure this
out.
We talk about clear, hold, build, and transfer. That
transfer piece out in that far district, that's the one that's
the most problematic for us.
Senator Akaka. You mentioned these different departments
that we are sending there to help the Afghan Government. One
that you alluded to but didn't mention is Commerce and the
possible development of businesses within these districts, and
also the government level as well.
General McChrystal, since the release of your assessment of
the region there has been a healthy debate over the number of
troops being deployed to Afghanistan. However, I feel we should
not focus solely on the number of troops alone. General,
ignoring the total number of troops proposed, my question has
to do with equipment and with personnel. Are we sending the
right personnel there, with the right equipment in place, to
achieve the goals that we have in those regions?
As you mentioned, the ultimate goal is the capture of al
Qaeda. You probably know what you need in terms of personnel
and equipment. So my question to you is, do we have the right
equipment and personnel to achieve our goals in the region?
General McChrystal. Sir, the short answer is we do, but the
reality is the requirement keeps changing, so we have to keep
on it. We've made extraordinary improvements in things like
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment.
In many cases people think of Predators, but it's a really wide
array of that, differing capabilities, to include people.
That's one that keeps growing and we've done a tremendous
effort at continuing to grow, but it will need to continue.
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, things to
protect our forces; the engineer equipment to help us find and
dispose of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). So the answer
is, I think we're doing an extraordinary job across our
government providing it, but I think it's something we have to
watch constantly as this effort evolves in nature and scope.
One area that I never cease to talk about, we are getting
great people out there. As Ambassador Eikenberry mentioned,
tour length is something I continue to encourage all the
participants, to include our coalition partners, not to go with
very short tours because you lose continuity and language
training. This is one where I would tell you, we across the
Department of Defense (DOD) can do better and must do better.
We don't have enough people who speak Dari, Pashtu, Urdu, and
we are not producing them fast enough.
There is a ramp-up. Yesterday, I met with about 160 people
that--under Chairman Mullen's direction we've created the
Afghan Hands Program and I talked to them. They're midway
through training, language training and cultural training in
preparation to going to the key jobs. But that has to be a
start. We have to produce people who are culturally aware,
linguistically armed to be effective, and then have enough time
in theater to be effective.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you both for your service to your
country. I've been honored to visit you in the field and I
appreciate that work and the good briefings we have gotten and
the professionalism you've shown.
At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not too long ago,
a Brookings individual testified that he wasn't sure whether we
should increase troops or not, but no military in the world was
better prepared than ours to be successful if given that
challenge. I think that's very, very true. I couldn't be more
proud of what you and your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and guardsmen have done.
General McChrystal, I read your assessment. I thought it
was highly sophisticated and a nuanced analysis of the
challenges that we face. Some people think the military never
talks about civilian issues and economics and security and
those kinds of things, but you are looking at it
comprehensively. No issue I think raised by Members of Congress
weren't at least addressed in your analysis of the challenges
that we face.
I do not like that we've had to commit more troops to
Afghanistan. I had hoped that we could be able to bring down
those troops. I think the Commander in Chief has analyzed this
and come up with a proposal that I intend to support. You say
you can make it work. It sounds like to me that it can be made
to work consistent with my analysis of the events, and I intend
to be supportive of it, and certainly look forward to the hope
that we will be able to draw down our troops and turn over the
government to the local people.
Twice I've talked, or maybe three times, with Secretary
Gates about the dangers of too great expectations about
Afghanistan. They have historical challenges, regional history;
extremely remote, extremely poor; and not a history of a strong
national government. So I'd like to pursue this with you a bit.
Secretary Gates recently indicated in his prepared
statement for his appearance, I guess it was last week, that he
would want to engage the communities in Afghanistan, to enlist
more local security forces to protect their own territories. I
heard former National Security Adviser Brzezinski on television
a week or so ago, talk about the need for local militias, and I
think I know what he meant by that. Former President Musharraf
of Pakistan in a Wall Street Journal op-ed a few weeks ago
reminded us that for centuries Afghans have been governed
loosely through a social compact of sorts between all ethnic
groups, but under a sovereign king or a sovereign central
authority.
Now, Ambassador Eikenberry, your statement made me a bit
nervous. In your written statement you said that: ``Some might
argue that we are reaching too high, that Afghanistan has
rarely in its history had a central government capable of
carrying out these tasks, that to expect a coherent state to
now emerge is unrealistic and a waste of resources. I disagree
with that argument on several levels.''
I also believe that one of the breakthroughs in Iraq was in
Anbar, al-Anbar, when the marines made a compact with tribal
leaders and basically funded those leaders to use their young
men to oust al Qaeda, who they did not like and wanted to see
ousted. To my knowledge, they weren't all sent off to Baghdad
to be trained. They were loyal to their local leaders. They
shared a common goal with us.
I know there's tension between creating militias not loyal
to the central government. I know there's dangers in that. But
it seems to me we have to take some risks and in some of these
areas that are remote, that have good and decent leaders, that
if we can just support them we could perhaps be able to not
have to commit our own troops there.
So I'll ask both of you: Do we have this right? Are we
overcommitted to a centralized authority? Or are we willing to
look sufficiently at local militias and national guard areas?
General McChrystal. Senator, I think we are getting it
right. Like you said, Afghanistan has a unique sensitivity to
militias, even more so than Iraq did, because the history after
the civil war that began in the period with the departure of
the Soviets saw the rise in these militias that were predatory
and they were under warlords, and they're just absolutely
feared and hated today. But they also have a very strong local
security tradition as well.
What we're trying to do, and we're working in a number of
areas with something called a community defense initiative to
enable villages and small elements of tribes to deny their area
to insurgent access. What that means is we'll support them and
they provide local security. We don't want to create militias
that then move around the battlefield and become a problem.
There's a balance.
There is still a need, in my opinion, for a very credible
ANA because it helps bind the nation together. As we found in
Iraq, it's also a source of pride there as well. So I think the
combination of the two, keeping a very close eye on the
sensitivity. Every time I talk to Afghans about the local
security initiatives, I will get: ``Yes, but be very careful;
yes, but make sure you don't arm the wrong group that will do
it.'' So I think we need to do it, but with caution.
Senator Sessions. Ambassador Eikenberry?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I agree with General
McChrystal. There is a balance here. It's the absence of a
coherent state of Afghanistan that paved the way for the rise
of the Taliban and then facilitated the entry of al Qaeda. So
you can't ignore the need for a central Government of
Afghanistan with the ability to provide for the security of its
people and deliver sets of basic services.
Senator Sessions. Do you see as your vision that there has
to be very strong control from the capital, from Kabul, to each
one of the local security forces that might exist?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No, I think I would agree with
General McChrystal that it's essential that the Government of
Afghanistan has a capable army that is able to reach throughout
the country. It has to have control over its police forces.
Then what's that right balance of minimum service provision
from the Government of Afghanistan that has to flow through the
country in the area of health care, education, I think that
trying to get that proper balance right is essential.
Senator Sessions. I hope so.
My time is up, but I would say, Ambassador Eikenberry, that
the Department of State (DOS) is challenged in fulfilling its
responsibility, at least its paper responsibilities, in
Afghanistan. We are well aware that the PRTs are dominated by
the military because you don't have people there. Secretary
Clinton said last week, I believe, that there are about 900
civilian DOS people in the country, 900 plus. That would be
about 1 percent of our total.
So, if the DOS could fulfill a greater role, I would be
supportive of it. But so far we're not seeing the numbers that
justify confidence that you're going to get there.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Do I have a moment to respond,
Senator?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, the civilian uplift that
we've had over the last year is most impressive. I've had a 35-
year military career and I have gained over this past year an
extraordinary respect for how the civilian elements in our
government have responded to the requirements of Afghanistan.
We've had a threefold increase of civilian personnel assigned
to our embassy and throughout Afghanistan, as I said in my
opening statement, we'll soon reach that point over a 12-month
period of time, a sixfold increase of who we have out in the
field.
Senator, it's not the number of people. Given that the
numbers are impressive, but it's not the numbers of people
ultimately that matter. An example: Right now in Helmand
Province we have 5 agricultural experts who in turn are
mobilizing a 500-man Afghan agricultural delivery capability
that's reaching 14,000 farmers. We have in the Ministry of
Agriculture several advisers and their expertise at the level
that they're able to over time really help build a capable
Ministry of Agriculture.
So it's not necessarily the number of people; it's what
those people can do. If we're talking about military units--the
military deploys platoons, companies, battalions. On the
civilian side, we deploy individuals. Every individual is
unique, and I'm very proud of the fact that over this past year
we've tripled our presence on the ground. We intend to keep
going.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. It's still a small number.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to begin by saying I share a number of the
concerns that Senator Sessions just raised with respect to this
potential contradiction between the cultural and political
history of Afghanistan and what we are attempting to do in this
policy.
Ambassador Eikenberry, I'd like to start by saying I read
your written statement in full. I really appreciate its
frankness. I think it is important for us to set out with an
awareness of the limitations that we have, which is something
that you mentioned. I want to come back to that in a minute.
Let me really begin here by saying I supported strongly
this evaluation process, this lengthy evaluation process. I
think it was very important for us to get the best minds of our
government involved in it.
In that respect, General McChrystal, I'm going to give you
an opportunity here to straighten the record on something a
little bit along the lines of what I think Senator Lieberman
posed to the Ambassador. This process took several months. In
early September the Senate Majority Leader wrote a letter to
Secretary Gates asking for an update on the evaluation.
Secretary Gates wrote back: ``Until the President makes his
decision on the way forward in Afghanistan, it would be
inappropriate for me or our military commanders to openly
discuss the advice being provided or the nature of the
discussions being carried out.''
That was right about the time that you popped up on 60
Minutes with a rather lengthy interview. When people were
actually in the White House discussing options, you were seen
giving a speech in London, and there are a number of people who
believe that this was detrimental and even divisive as this
process moved forward.
So can you explain to us your view on how those actions
were compatible with the policy outlined by the Secretary of
Defense?
General McChrystal. Yes, Senator. The 60 Minutes interview
was scheduled before I deployed and filmed in July, so it was
before this process and before that guidance. So there was no
intent or connection with that.
The discussion in London which you're referring to, there
was no intent on my part to influence or in any way negatively
impact the decisionmaking process. I regret if there's any
impression that it did, but there was absolutely no intent for
that.
Senator Webb. You are aware that it was the same day that
people were meeting in the White House to discuss the way
forward?
General McChrystal. I was not aware of that at the time.
Senator Webb. Ambassador, I would like to ask you two
questions. The first: In your testimony you talk about ``we
need to address our efforts to promote governance at the
provincial and district levels,'' which I totally agree with.
My question for you is, do you believe this is achievable under
the current constitutional system that Afghanistan has or would
you prefer to see another system of government that devolves
power in a way that would make this more compatible with the
history and culture of Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I think the limiting factor right
now is not the framework of the constitution; the limiting
factor that exists, Senator, is just the difficulties that the
Government of Afghanistan has, after 30 years of war, trying to
develop the necessary organizational capacities to deliver
services. They're challenged very much in terms of the
development of human capital.
Senator Webb. So it's your view that this is not a result
of the present constitutional system, but rather just of
governance, given the interruptions in the structure that has
been in place?
Ambassador Eikenberry. That would be my view. I know that
the Afghan leadership right now, starting with President
Karzai, is looking at the possibility of reforms that are
perfectly within the constitution. A very important one is the
idea of taking more financial resources and allocating that to
a provincial governor, allocating that to a district governor.
Right now they're really starved for funds.
There is additional discussions going on about what should
be the right mix of electoral bodies and representative bodies
at the subnational level. But again, the way the constitution
exists today I don't see that as a limiting factor. But I do
see very significant challenges in developing governmental and
economic livelihood at some of the most challenged districts in
Afghanistan.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
I would like to pose another question for you that I think
you are perhaps uniquely qualified to address, given your
experience on many different levels with China culturally,
historically, and also governmentally. The Chinese Government
was known to be on a very good relationship with the Taliban
Government prior to our driving it out. There are a number of
reports about Chinese economic projects in Afghanistan right
now. Could you give us a summation of the nature of the
relationship between China and Afghanistan and in terms of
China cooperating with us in the program that you're putting
forward right now?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I think that clearly China sees a
stable Afghanistan as in their own security interests. The
Chinese Government has its own concerns with international
terrorist groups that are known to operate in the border
regions and inside of Pakistan, that have an impact on Chinese
internal security. The Chinese have made very significant
investments inside of Afghanistan. They have one major
investment right now, a billion dollar investment in a copper
mine in Logar Province, and they're looking at potential
additional investments in other of the mining sectors of
Afghanistan.
Senator Webb. I'm aware of that project. It's an
interesting one to follow.
Are they cooperating with us on a government-to-government
level with respect to what we're attempting to do here?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We have an active dialogue with the
Chinese Government, as we do with many others, in terms of the
overall development strategy and political strategy in
Afghanistan.
Senator Webb. So are they proactively cooperating with the
approach that we're taking? That's the question. Are you aware?
Ambassador Eikenberry. They have their economic interests,
which they've put investments into in Afghanistan----
Senator Webb. Excuse me, but my time is up. Just as a
question of fact, has there been a proactive announcement of
any sort from China with respect to the policy that we're
attempting to put into place?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We have a good policy dialogue with
the Chinese over Afghanistan----
Senator Webb. Has there been a statement, yes or no, in
terms of supporting what we're doing?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I would not say that their level of
engagement in Afghanistan is on the level in terms of our----
Senator Webb. Just answer, if you would, please. Has there
been a statement to your knowledge from the Chinese Government
that they support what we are attempting to do?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I'm not aware of policy----
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Ambassador Eikenberry.--not aware of policy statements from
the Chinese.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it's good to see you in this part of the world.
Ambassador Eikenberry, thanks for your hospitality. General
McChrystal, thanks for Thanksgiving dinner. We enjoyed visiting
with 68,000 of your and my closest friends. It was a great day,
and I want to second what you said about the morale of your
troops. It's unbelievable that, in spite of the difficulties
that we've had in Afghanistan, are continuing to have and will
have, the morale over there is spectacular. I think a lot of
that is attributable to leadership.
General McChrystal, we had the opportunity to meet with
some of your team that you put in place. First of all, let me
just ask you. I know a lot of these folks have been hand-picked
by you. Do you have your team in place? I don't expect you to
discuss individuals or specifics, but is your team in place
there now? Do you have what you want?
General McChrystal. Sir, I do. I've been extraordinarily
well-supported, not only by the leaders and organizations who
provided me the people, but by the families who've given them
up for this period.
Senator Chambliss. Resource-wise, of course we know you're
going to have to plus up as you bring additional troops, but
where are you from the standpoint of having the equipment that
you need to carry out your mission?
General McChrystal. With the additional forces that have
been approved, we're going to have to work through getting
additional MRAPs. We're going to continue to increase our ISR
equipment, and some other things. But it is generally on track,
Senator.
Senator Chambliss. I want you to walk through with us this
issue of building up of the Afghan troops, both the military
and the security police, because I went back and read your
report again and also read your testimony from today and heard
what you've had to say, and obviously the critical point that
we can seriously think about turning that country over to the
Afghan people from the standpoint of security--not governance,
but from the standpoint of security--is the point in time when
the military as well as the security police are trained to the
point to be able to protect the citizens of Afghanistan.
In your report you indicated that at that point in time we
had about 94,000 Afghan military personnel trained. Is that
still in the range of where we are?
General McChrystal. Yes, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. You indicated that we had about 84,000
ANP trained. Again, is that in the range of where we are?
General McChrystal. We're a little higher on the police
now. It's in the low 90,000s.
Senator Chambliss. Now, of those numbers, General, what
percentage of that can we really count on? What's the hard-core
number that you can say, ``go hold and secure X province'' or
whatever?
General McChrystal. For the Afghan army, we work with a
calculus of about 77 percent present for duty. There are some
not available in training, some that, in fact, are not
available because they've gone AWOL and different challenges.
But it's pretty good. So a significant percentage of that
93,000 or 94,000 we can put out on actual operations.
On the ANP, it's less, and that is because the level of
training and the commitment that we've had over time is much
newer and much more immature. So while there may be most of the
92,000 or 93,000 ANP currently on the payroll out in their
jobs, the ones that I would say are effective is smaller than
that. They have a drug problem, they have a few other things.
Senator Chambliss. On the military side, are the Taliban
paying their soldiers more than we're paying Afghan troops?
General McChrystal. Sir, there's no set pay scale, but by
our intelligence they are paying them the equivalent of about
300 U.S. dollars a month, and that is higher than we are paying
Afghan army or police.
Senator Chambliss. Do we intend to ratchet that pay up so
that we can at least compete financially with the Taliban?
General McChrystal. In coordination with the Government of
Afghanistan, we just almost doubled Afghan army and police
training. It's at parity now. It's less than $300 a month, but
it's much closer.
Senator Chambliss. I'd like for you to go through some
benchmarks relative to these training numbers. My understanding
is you eventually want to get to 240,000 military and 160,000
police. You indicated to Senator McCain that you're still on
the timeline of 2013 of accomplishing those numbers. But
looking at where we are today and knowing that in 2010, the end
of 2010, you're going to assess the situation on the ground,
the biggest part of that assessment is going to be the number
of military and security police that you have available to be
assigned to different areas to start transitioning to them.
How many do you expect to have trained by the end of 2010
from both the military and security police standpoint?
General McChrystal. Sir, for the Afghan army our goal is
134,000 soldiers in the force trained, all have gone through
initial entry training, and through partnering we expect to be
able to raise the effectiveness of each of their force's
individuals and organizations. But about 134,000. Of that,
obviously less are actually in units in the field, but a good
significant percentage would be.
Sir, of the police, I expect to have us get over 100,000.
They are currently authorized 98,000. Expect to get approval to
increase that to the low 100,000 to 110,000 range. I think the
biggest progress we can make in police, though, won't be in
aggregate numbers. It will be in improving their leadership,
improving their levels of training.
We were only partnering with about 20 percent of the police
as of this summer. We are increasing that dramatically with the
forces that the President approved in March, and we will
increase that significantly again with these additional forces
that have come forward.
Senator Chambliss. In your report to the President on
August 30, you indicated by October 2010 you wanted to get to
that 134,000. So the additional troops that are being sent are
not going to plus up that number in your mind relative to the
number of military folks you can have trained?
General McChrystal. Sir, we don't believe that we can speed
it up any faster than the 134,000 about a year from now,
October 2010. But we are going to put a significant portion of
the force that the President just authorized into both the
training base, where they get initial training, and then the
rest of the force will essentially all be partnering.
Senator Chambliss. One of the areas where you're going to
send some of these 30,000 additional troops is down into
Helmand, where you're obviously having a very tough time, a
very tough fight down there, where the Marine Corps deployed
some additional marines recently. Let's assume that you have
great success there. Assume you have great success against the
Haqqani network over in RC-East. General, if you have that
success and they get to the border and they cross the border
into Pakistan, what do we have to have from the Pakistan
military on the other side of that border to really accomplish
our mission and meet the challenge that you've laid out there?
General McChrystal. Sir, what I'm seeking the Government of
Pakistan to do is essentially be intolerant of the Haqqani
network. The Haqqanis are Afghans. They want a sphere of
influence from the Khost bowl all the way up into Kabul. That's
their aspiration. They live in northern Waziristan, in the
Miram Shah area, and they have a sphere of influence there.
They have had historic relations with al Qaeda and now with the
TTP.
What I am hopeful that the Pakistani Government will do is
be intolerant of the existence of the Haqqani network inside
Pakistan. If they will prosecute that policy, I believe inside
Afghanistan we can deal with the remainder of the Haqqani
network.
Senator Chambliss. And Helmand?
General McChrystal. Sir, in Helmand--one point I'd want to
make. You're right, the Marine Corps and our British partners
and the Danes and others--it's a team effort down there--we're
not reinforcing failure; we're reinforcing success down there.
We're expanding the areas. The additional forces are going to
let us expand so that we have contiguous security zones.
There's a significant area that I want to get at as soon as
we get the first marine forces in and we're going to do that,
and that's going to send not only a powerful operational pulse
to us, but it's going to send a powerful communications network
or message to not only the narcotraffickers but to the Taliban.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service to our country. While I
think the President made the best choice, I think we have to
remember that he made the best choice among a lot of bad
choices.
I would like to speak a little bit about contracting as it
relates to the Afghans that are being hired. Following up a
little bit on Senator Chambliss's line of questioning, I know
the Joint Contracting Command has issued directives to some
contractors, especially on security personnel, that at least
half of the contracting force must be from the area, not just
Afghans but Afghans in the immediate vicinity of the bases that
we're hiring them to perform security on.
I know that for the other civilian contractors we're
running at a very, very high percentage of Afghans. It is a
marked and much different situation than we had in Iraq. Now,
it's my understanding that President Karzai has expressed
frustration with this because these contractors are paying more
than the military police and the army. So it is even worse than
us competing against the Taliban; we're competing against
ourselves since, as you have clearly stated, the most important
part of this mission is to add to the police and the army.
So how are we going to fix this problem?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, two points. What you're
raising is very important. It's very important. First of all,
President Karzai said in his inauguration speech that he would
like to move forward and over the next several years take these
various contracting companies, foreign contracting, private
security companies, and move those under a more formal
licensing from the Government of Afghanistan. We fully support
that. It will be difficult to try to agree upon the standards,
but we see examples where it can work and we think that's the
direction that we should be going.
That's very consistent with the idea over the next several
years about Afghanistan taking further steps to really reclaim
its full sovereignty, getting its army out front, its police
out front. Private security contractors is another issue.
Second, with regard to our own embassy policies, we're
already working very hard, wherever we can, to try to take any
kind of security contract group that is expatriate and we're
trying to move that in the direction now where there's
increasing numbers of Afghans, beginning with the strategic
detachment for our U.S. embassy.
Senator McCaskill. You haven't addressed the problem,
though. I'm somebody, I'm an Afghan, and I am toying with
whether or not I want to continue to be a hanger-on with the
Taliban or I want to join the good side. I look and I can go
and get trained as a police officer, or I can get hired--I have
a little bit of English, just a little bit--or I can get hired
for more money watching an American base.
That's not hard. I go for the more money watching the
American base, or even a more extreme example, which is even
more frustrating, I can peel potatoes in the mess and make more
money than taking up arms on behalf of my country.
I understand that this was great in theory, but in
executing this policy to use Afghans aren't we denying
ourselves success in our own mission?
Ambassador Eikenberry. When I talked about the move towards
Afghan licensing of security companies, that would address--I
didn't explain that, Senator. That would be a move to try to
address what you're getting at then, pay structures that are
inconsistent with the national security----
Senator McCaskill. What about on our other kinds of
contracts? What about the LOGCAP contract and all the people
that are being hired in terms of moving supplies and food and
all of those services? How are we addressing this pay
disparity, that they're making more from us than they could
make by joining forces with the Afghan Government?
General McChrystal. You've hit something that's very, very
important, and I bring it back to counterinsurgency and unity
of effort. Counterinsurgency is a complex system. Every time
you change one thing, it has intended and unintended effects
somewhere else.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
General McChrystal. What we have done since 2001 is come in
with all good intentions, and someone is given a requirement to
do something like build a school. The quickest and most
efficient way to do that particular task may be to hire people
from outside Afghanistan. It may be to pay a higher wage
because you can get it done faster. But the unintended
consequences are that people who would be school teachers or
people who would be soldiers pick up and move into something
that is not effective or efficient for the nation for the long
haul.
What has happened in Afghanistan is a number of things are
now out of balance. We have doctors and educated people doing
things because they could make money, usually for the
international community, but they're not taking their rightful
place in the economic system overall.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
General McChrystal. This is where we have to improve unity
of effort because when you aren't unified, decisions are made
that seem to make sense, but it's very complex because it's not
just U.S. military, it's not just U.S. Government, it's
international community, and then, in some cases, just straight
business interests.
Senator McCaskill. I hope that you get with the Joint
Contracting Command and discuss this because I hate that we
could be working against ourselves on this. I get it that it
was a good idea in isolation, but, as you said, it's like a lot
of other things, there's always unintended consequences and I
think we need to be realistic about the unintended consequences
of this policy.
On CERP funds, when I first came to this committee it was
explained to me this was walking-around money for people on the
ground to help. I remember General Petraeus explaining it to
me, it would be like somebody realizing if they helped fix a
storefront in Baghdad that could do more to stabilize that
neighborhood than many other things we could be doing, and for
them to be able to do that quickly and efficiently is great.
What has happened in Afghanistan with the $1.6 billion
we've spent there, now 67 percent of that money is being spent
on projects that are bigger than a half a million dollars. We
are doing big stuff. I'm very worried that we don't have a
singular database between USAID and the military on these
projects. I'm worried that the training for CERP was about
committing funds, but not about monitoring or oversight of
these large projects.
General, who is the person that signs off on sometimes
multimillion dollar projects that are much bigger than fixing a
window on a storefront, or much bigger than what I believe CERP
was originally intended to do?
General McChrystal. Inside my command now, it goes by
levels of spending. I sign some. Others have to go to General
Petraeus for approval. But I absolutely agree that there is a
need for walking-around money kind of CERP, and then there is a
need for larger projects that particularly enable COIN.
I bring up roads. Sometimes people ask me, ``how can you
build a road with CERP?'' In fact, sometimes building a road is
the best COIN thing we can do. I'm pretty proud of where we've
gone. Ambassador Eikenberry and my teams have pulled together
the review of all the money that's spent, USAID and CERP,
because it's looked at together now. We don't spend CERP money
without their team on it, and we're allowed to be part of the
USAID part.
It's not perfect, Senator, I'm not going to kid you.
But I think we have come a long way and understand the
importance of targeting that money effectively.
Senator McCaskill. I think that's great. I'm going to
continue to keep a very close eye on that, because I think
there's going to be some problems if you don't stay joined at
the hip on this particularly. I get the insurgency strategy,
but I don't think the military ever envisioned training people
to oversee large construction projects. That was why USAID got
its mission. So I want to be careful that we don't drift too
far away, especially if you guys are working together.
I hope you're handing off to USAID where appropriate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service. When our colleagues go
over to visit, I would just make a recommendation to committee
members. If you get a chance, go to the Bagram Confinement
Facility.
General McChrystal, you have done a great job. I wish we
had jails like that in South Carolina. It really is a very
impressive facility, and I want to commend you and your staff
and the embassy, working together, to come up with a new
detainee policy that I think will help the war effort. You've
done a good job there.
The narcotics court, where we're doing some of the high-
profile narcotics cases, well-vetted judges, secure
environment. Obviously, we need to expand that into the
corruption area, but those are two facilities I think where you
can see some real success. So I want to commend you both for
that.
Now, to make sure I understand the way forward, because
it's been pretty difficult, quite frankly, to figure out what
the rules are going forward, but I think I have a better
understanding today. July 2011, it is my understanding that
we're going to begin withdrawing troops on that date, according
to President Obama. The only question is how many and how fast.
Is that right, General McChrystal?
General McChrystal. That's my understanding, Senator.
Senator Graham. So let it be said that the policy going
forward is that in July 2011 somebody in Afghanistan, even if
it's just one guy, somebody's coming home, right?
General McChrystal. That's correct.
Senator Graham. Okay. On a scale of 1 to 10, failure in
Afghanistan, a failed state, what would that mean to our
national security, 1 being inconsequential, 10 being
catastrophic?
General McChrystal. I believe it would be a 9 or 10, not
just because I believe al Qaeda would move back in, but also
because I believe regional instability as it would spill over
into Pakistan and other areas would be absolutely negative to
our interests.
Senator Graham. Ambassador Eikenberry, what would you say
to that question?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I concur with General McChrystal's
assessment.
Senator Graham. How many Taliban are there, generally
speaking? I know you don't have exact numbers.
General McChrystal. Our estimate right now is between
24,000 and 27,000 full-time fighters, with some people
obviously part-time.
Senator Graham. How much of the country do they have
significant influence over?
General McChrystal. They affect people's lives
significantly in much of the south--Kandahar, Helmand, Gosni,
Zabul, up to Kabul. They do so in significant parts of RC-East,
and then in patches of north and west--Kanduz, Baklan, a little
bit in the Balkh area, out in Bagdiz and out in Ferra. In the
north, it doesn't change the pattern of life significantly for
the average Afghan who lives up there, except in selected
areas.
In the south, because of their ability to impact things
like the Ring Road and commerce, it is a significant impact on
everything, the way everybody lives.
Senator Graham. Is every Taliban a Pashtun?
General McChrystal. The vast majority, Senator.
Senator Graham. So that's one reason why they're a problem,
because that's where they live.
Now, how big is their air force? They don't have one. I
don't mean to be cute. They don't have an air force. They don't
have a navy. Their biggest weapons system would be what?
General McChrystal. They have rockets, ground-launched
rockets, 122s, things like that.
Senator Graham. How have they been able to accomplish what
they've been able to accomplish with thousands of coalition
forces, 90,000 Afghan army folks, 90,000 Afghan police? How
have they been able to come back so strongly?
General McChrystal. Several reasons, I believe. The first
is there weren't that many coalition forces or Afghan security
forces.
Senator Graham. That's a good point. If you had to rate the
reasons in terms of the majority, would it be lack of security
forces on our part?
General McChrystal. I would put that right with weakness in
governance at the local level in Afghanistan. The two together,
weakness in security forces and inadequate governance, opened
the door for them to come in.
Senator Graham. Why haven't previous commanders asked for
more troops if it was that obvious?
General McChrystal. Sir, I haven't asked commanders. I know
there were some previous requests tabled.
Senator Graham. At the end of the day what part of the lack
of governance has led--is it at least an equal contributing
factor to them coming back, a lack of the Afghan Government to
deliver basic services?
General McChrystal. I believe that it is.
Senator Graham. One of the reasons they've been able to
seize power and influence is they can provide services the
Afghan Government is unable to provide, like resolving legal
disputes; is that true?
General McChrystal. That's correct.
Senator Graham. So in the next 18 months, to roll them back
we're going to put combat power in that we've never had, right?
We're going to do the governance piece differently than we've
ever done; right, Ambassador Eikenberry?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We're going to make efforts, yes,
Senator.
Senator Graham. On the legal system front, there are less
than 500 lawyers in all of Afghanistan as I understand it. Is
18 months realistic for us to basically recapture lost momentum
in the area of governance and security, knowing that at the end
of the 18 months we're going to be withdrawing no matter what?
General McChrystal. I think when you look, I think we can
reverse momentum, I absolutely do. I think the most important
thing is much of what happens in an area determines who secures
that area. If we secure that area and then we can provide the
opportunity for the Government of Afghanistan, with assistance,
to start to build those nascent legal capacities and what-not,
I think that is much of it.
What has happened is a vacuum of security and a vacuum of
governance together.
Senator Graham. Yes, sir. That vacuum is being filled in
different forms throughout the country.
Do you feel totally comfortable with the idea that the
enemy now knows that we're going to be withdrawing, but they
don't know at what pace; that that's not going to compromise
your ability to be successful?
General McChrystal. I think more importantly, if we
carefully articulate and strongly articulate the concept of a
strategic partnership over the long haul, that's a much more
powerful idea. In the short term, we have a tremendous
additional capability that's being fielded in addition to what
we're already using, as you saw when you were out. Then the
idea of a strategic partnership, in my view, that takes the
strategic horizon away from the insurgents.
Senator Graham. Let's go down on some of the constraints
that both of you will be working under. I want the American
public to know the hand you've been dealt and the assignments
available to you. Number one, no matter how many Afghan army
folks are on the payroll or numbers on a piece of paper, we're
only using 150 in this new operation. So I think that says a
lot about the state of the army.
Another rule you have to operate under is the 96-hour rule.
As I understand the policy, ISAF forces have to turn over a
detainee within 96 hours of capture to the Afghan Government,
and all they can do in field interrogation is basically ask
them basic questions. Is that policy going to be in effect as
we move forward?
General McChrystal. Senator, we're working through that
policy, how it will affect U.S. forces as we try to move
additional forces under ISAF. I'm working with General Petraeus
on what the right calculus is there. In the long term, as you
mentioned, we now call it the Detainee Facility in Parwan. We
changed the name of the Bagram facility. That will go to Afghan
control, and with our assistance they will run that facility.
We will help provide them expertise, particularly in things
like exploitation, effective use of intelligence.
I believe in the long term that's the most effective thing
we can do, is build their capacity to do counterinsurgency when
we partner with them.
Senator Graham. My time has expired. Could you send the
committee a list of the rules of engagement that each country
operates under now and in the future, so we could evaluate what
these new troops are actually able to do in terms of engaging
the enemy?
General McChrystal. Their caveats and what-not?
Senator Graham. If you could do that.
General McChrystal. Certainly, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Graham. God bless. You have a big challenge and
we'll be pulling for you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Kirk.
Senator Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McChrystal, Ambassador Eikenberry, let me render my
own salute to you for patriotism individually and the people
that you represent. Thank you for your patience this afternoon.
My first question, General, would go to you. It's a follow-
up basically on the chairman's question about the disparity of
troops, U.S. troops to Afghan troops. I understand we're
working as hard as we possibly can to redress that imbalance.
Just so we can understand perhaps what it is we're looking at
here and what to prepare for, is there a risk until we close
that gap in the trainers and the combat troops that our troops
will be viewed more as occupiers and therefore we may incur or
incite further insurgents and violence and therefore perhaps
even put our guys and gals in more harm's way than otherwise?
General McChrystal. There are several components to that.
The first is, we know that how we are viewed will be based on
how we operate, more than the numbers we have. So I think it's
very important that our forces operate with a level of cultural
respect and clear desire to protect the population. They're
doing a good job of that, although we obviously can always
continue to get better.
As we work with the Afghans, they want to be secured by
Afghans, but they are tolerant. They understand the need for
coalition forces to do it until Afghan security forces are
available to do it. So I would say that we need to continually
communicate to them that, while we are doing this in the
bridging period, that we are working as hard as we can to
create their forces.
I think if they didn't see and feel that effort was real
and significant, that it would be difficult to continue to win
their support.
Senator Kirk. Just a follow-up. How do we communicate? Do
we communicate through our trainees, to the population? Or is
it we communicate as best we can in our combat gear that, we're
really here to help you and not to occupy?
General McChrystal. We do it on a number of levels. We
start, of course, at the official interaction at the government
level, then all the way down to our forces in the field and
Ambassador Eikenberry's great civilians as we partner, to
interface as much as we can, as often as we can--shuras at the
local level, just day-to-day interactions.
We also do a number of communications activities, where we
use different media ability to communicate the reality of what
we're doing to the Afghan people. I participate in some of
that. I talk to youth forums, things like that. In every case,
we try to give them a clear view of what our real efforts are
and our real intentions.
Senator Kirk. Thank you.
This is also on training, because I understood that one of
the problems or challenges that we face in our training is the
fact that the middle level commanders, if you will, unlike our
chain of command that's pretty direct and authoritarian, that a
lot of these folks are cronies and that they're appointed
through favoritism and so forth. I wondered first, is that an
accurate representation? If not, maybe you could correct it. To
the degree that it is accurate, how do we react to that? How
long would it take to train and develop the kind of chain of
command that we feel comfortable then handing off to, to know
that the population is secure and they're doing their job?
General McChrystal. Sir, we have an extraordinary military
in the United States. So whenever we try to compare ours to
anybody else's, it's very difficult because at every level in
the chain of command we just over many years built a culture
that is very effective.
What I do recognize in the Afghan army and even more in the
Afghan police is in many cases there's nepotism, there's
corruption, there's inefficiency, and there isn't yet a culture
that automatically produces those leaders. Yet for all the
times we see challenges, I go out in Garmsir--Mr. Chairman, I
think you met the young Afghan battalion commander, an
extraordinary professional. Those kinds of leaders are the
future, and if we partner effectively we'll grow those kinds.
It will take them a generation or two to get to where I
think they want to be. But we can make progress.
Senator Kirk. Thank you.
One other thing about this strategy, and I know you and I
agree and I think the Ambassador agrees that this will only
work if we can work it by, with, and through the Afghan
Government. For everything I can see--a fraudulent sort of
installation, an economy that's dependent on opium, corruption
rampant throughout the government--am I wrong to say that we
are taking a leap of faith here with President Karzai, and that
my sense of it is--I have absolutely no doubt about the
strength and the courage of our folks and what we're going to
do, but the way I look at it, if there's a weak link in this
formula, it's the bet we're placing on President Karzai.
Can you tell me if that gives you pause, and if so, your
degree of confidence that this at the end of the day is going
to be a sound bet and not that we're betting on the wrong horse
here?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, the challenge of
establishing accountable governance in Afghanistan goes beyond
one individual. This is a societal problem. This is a problem
of a state that was utterly decimated by three decades of
warfare. It's a state that has two generations really without
education. It's a very profound challenge.
We have programs that we're partnered with the Afghans to
try to help them to develop accountable governance. We're
making progress in certain areas, in the areas of law
enforcement. We have a very robust training program, us with
the international community and the Afghans, to try to help
develop a more competent civil administration. It's a priority
area for President Karzai. We support that.
We have major efforts to try to improve the financial
accountability of ministries. We're making progress in those
areas.
But against that, it remains an extraordinary challenge. We
are encouraged with President Karzai's commitment in his
inauguration address to try to place more emphasis on this
area, and certainly political leadership and political emphasis
is going to be absolutely indispensable to make further
progress. But it's going to remain a challenge.
Senator Kirk. General, is that good by you?
General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
Senator Kirk. I thank you very much. My time has expired. I
wish you Godspeed and thank you once again.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kirk.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Let me first of all make sure you
understand that I'm probably not alone in disagreeing with the
comments made by the Senator who was somewhat critical of the
way the CERP is put together. The CERP, train-and-equip, and
IMET have been three of my favorite programs, and I think I've
been somewhat responsible for advancing the CERP program and
changing also the CCIF in other areas.
What's good about the program is they don't have to go
through all that stuff. I've probably been over there as many
times as anyone else has. When I talked to the commanders in
the field, they say that anything we can do in 3 days instead
of 3 months is going to have 10 times the value. So I'm hoping
that you will continue to talk about the success of that
program.
General McChrystal. Sir, I'd like to throw something in on
there. It's important for several reasons. One, whatever you do
quickly the Afghans appreciate more, because they understand.
It also increases the credibility of the local leader, the
decentralized leader we have forward. If that person can say
yes and then produce quickly, it raises his ability to do
future interactions and leverage. That's one of the huge values
of it.
Senator Inhofe. We'll continue to try to enhance that
program.
Several people have mentioned the agricultural development
team, but not really giving it the credit that I think it's
due. People talk about the negative things. From 2007, the
number of hectares that was in poppy development went from
193,000 to 157,000 to 123,000--a reduction of 22 percent in 3
years.
Now, I'm particularly proud of this because as we speak we
have 60 of our Oklahoma 45th Infantry Division in a plane going
over there for the second time. They come back and, Mr.
Ambassador, they tell me the success of the story and the
happiness that is generated by their relationships.
So I'd like to ask you, of course, if you agree with that
assessment.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I can go first. We
absolutely agree with the assessment. The agricultural
development teams, to include from the 45th of Oklahoma, are
really making a profound difference.
We have a very good civil-military integrated agricultural
approach. Each element brings their own strength. The United
States Department of Agriculture, they have tremendous
technical expertise. They know how to build agricultural
systems. Our USAID team members, they know how to deliver
programs. What these agricultural development teams are able to
do, they take the best of the military--they have their
security, they have mobility--they can get out into parts of
the farm areas of Afghanistan that are insecure.
Senator Inhofe. They've actually had their hands in the
dirt before. These guys know what they're doing.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Absolutely. It's a great compliment
to our overall ag strategy. Indispensable.
Senator Inhofe. Good. We want to just continue to see that
success take place.
General McChrystal, I asked this question when Secretary
Gates was here and I didn't get the answer I felt real
comfortable with. I just would like to have you give me an
idea. You put together threat assessments when you make
recommendations, threats low, medium, high. When you made the
recommendation at 40,000, what was the threat assessment that
you would have said was attached to that?
General McChrystal. Moderate, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Moderate, all right. Then 30,000 would be
what?
General McChrystal. We didn't try to grade it in great
detail.
Senator Inhofe. All right, it would be below that.
General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I think that I would agree with that and I
think that we need to have that for our own use to quantify
some of the successes.
Now, for only the second time since President Obama has
been in office, I want to compliment him and tell him how
pleased I am. I think there have been some unfair questions in
this meeting, concerning the end game, because I was upset with
the end game until West Point. In West Point, the speech that
he made--and I'm quoting right now--the last thing he said in
terms of that: ``Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute
this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on
the ground.''
He said that. That's not you saying it. I know both of you
agree with that, but that's the President saying it. To me,
that means that the conditions on the ground are very important
in any decisions to be made. It's not a calendar decision. It's
a condition.
Do you agree with my interpretation of that?
General McChrystal. I do, Senator.
Ambassador Eikenberry. I do as well, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. You had made the statement, General
McChrystal, ``We are in this thing to''--well, actually it was
Secretary Gates: ``We're in this thing to win. We intend to
partner for a long time to come.'' Keeping in mind, there will
be troops over there for a long--we still have troops in
Bosnia, in Kosovo, and some of these other places.
But he said: ``We are in this to win.'' Would you define
``win"?
General McChrystal. Absolutely, and I absolutely agree with
the Secretary. I would define winning as when we have our
partners in Afghanistan, the government and the ANSF, to the
point where they can defend their sovereignty with very limited
help from the outside; obviously a strategic partnership, but
they can take the strong lead.
What that then does is it allows them to enable the people
of Afghanistan to build the nation, to shape their lives as
they want to do that.
Senator Inhofe. That's good. Do you agree with that, Mr.
Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, I would say that it's very
similar to what General McChrystal outlined: The Government of
Afghanistan has the capacity to take responsibility for its own
security, the Taliban's been degraded to levels that are
manageable by their own security forces; most important, al
Qaeda is prevented from regaining safe havens inside of
Afghanistan.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Ambassador, the last time you and I
talked you were in uniform, and I would just compliment both of
you on the great job that you're doing.
Lastly, because my time is about to expire, as people are
talking about the non-U.S. participants we're going to try to--
the plan is trying to get to the 7,000 figure. As I look
through this thing--and I have a breakdown that at my request I
got--Italy and Georgia are both at 1,000. All the rest of them,
Poland, the rest, are way below that, considerably below that.
If you add them all up, that's 4,300. That was my math, so I
might be wrong on that.
To get to 7,000, what can you do now? Is there any obvious
thing you can do that you haven't done before? Because I know
the effort has been there before, but is there something that's
open to us now that wasn't there before? Perhaps one suggestion
is that when the President made his commitment he first called
the heads of state of our NATO and other allies over there, and
I think that perhaps that might have changed their enthusiasm
for sending troops and participating. What do you think?
General McChrystal. Senator, I believe our level of clear
commitment on the part of the United States is a big part of
the calculus. I think another thing we can do is we can
encourage our partners to contribute where they can most
effectively. What I am doing is asking for additional help, the
training realm is initial entry training and partnering,
because in some cases, that fits very well with what partners
can provide.
Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with the fact that the
President called these other heads of state and told them what
he was going to say and what he was going to do was helpful?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I certainly do, Senator. Secretary
Clinton, several days ago, with General McChrystal and I in
attendance, was at the foreign ministers conference of NATO,
and this was the first foreign ministers conference of NATO in
Brussels since the President made his West Point speech. I
think all of our sense was the reception there with General
McChrystal's articulation of the strategy, understanding of
what our way ahead was, it seemed to resonate well. So we left
Brussels with some confidence.
Senator Inhofe. That's good. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Udall is next.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, gentlemen. As many of us have said up here,
I want to thank you for your service. I look forward as well to
joining Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman in their upcoming
visits to Afghanistan as you begin to implement this important
strategy.
I know that we've all talked about, Secretary Gates and
both of you, the limits of our ability to actually defeat the
Taliban. There's been a lot of talk about reconciliation with
the Taliban and how we drive wedges between those who are
interested in the Taliban and its presence for political
purposes versus those who are eager to push the forces of chaos
and destruction and hatred.
I know that we're not in the best position to pursue
reconciliation right now, given that the Taliban are strong and
they lack an incentive to change sides. But I'd like to think
we're doing more in this area than we have been and that we're
working closely with the Afghan Government. Could both of you
comment on my question?
General McChrystal. I certainly can. I can start. I don't
agree when people say we cannot defeat the Taliban. I
absolutely believe that we--and I mean the Government of
Afghanistan with coalition help--can defeat the Taliban. I
define that by meaning putting the Taliban in a position where
they can no longer accomplish their objective of threatening
the Government of Afghanistan. I believe that's absolutely
achievable.
I believe en route to that, as we reverse the momentum that
they perceive that they have now, we will weaken the resolve of
many of the members of the Taliban. I think it's important in
that process as we talk about reintegration that there be
opportunities for Afghans who might have sided with the
Taliban, whether they fought with them or they just supported
them, to be able to come back under the constitution of
Afghanistan, under a program that must be supervised by the
government, with respect and with honor, not to feel like they
are criminals being brought back in, but instead being brought
into the political fold.
I think giving an opportunity for that if they are willing
to meet the conditions of living under an Afghan Government
with a constitution, I think makes a lot of sense, and we're
working very closely with the government to do that.
Senator Udall. Ambassador Eikenberry?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Again, Senator, I'd share General
McChrystal's assessment that it's going to be important to have
momentum in order then to push those fighters and mid-level
commanders that are out there right now opposing the legitimate
Government of Afghanistan to make the right choice. But with
that momentum, I think that the push won't have to be that
great in many areas.
It was interesting, during this past presidential election
in Afghanistan there were 42 presidential candidates and they
were all unified on one issue: All 42 talked about
reintegration and reconciliation. So there's a desire out there
among the Afghan people to try to find a way to achieve peace.
I know that President Karzai is very committed to it. He
did mention it, again, in his inauguration address. We hope to
soon have the delivery or decision by President Karzai to have
the formal establishment within his government of a
reconciliation, reintegration commission. With that then, I
know that General McChrystal and NATO-ISAF are very prepared to
provide full support in an array of areas in order to help the
reintegration program achieve success.
Senator Udall. Ambassador, if I might follow up on those
comments. There is a perception among many ethnic Pashtuns that
they don't really have a meaningful role in the central
government, particularly in security institutions. Is this
something we're attuned to? Do you agree with that assessment?
Is this something that President Karzai could take the lead on,
given that he is a Pashtun as I understand it?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I would say that if you look at
President Karzai's cabinet, there is a very strong
representation of Pashtuns. For instance, the Minister of
Defense is a Pashtun, the Minister of Interior is a Pashtun.
Separate though from that, is there a feeling of
disconnection from many of the Pashtun population from their
central government? I think that President Karzai would say
that there is. But that's the question of insecurity right now
that exists in the Pashtun tribal areas, and that's a very
important part, if we have success in the year ahead and the
next 18 months of further delivering security, that will have
profound positive political impacts because it will help bring
the Pashtun population then closer to their central government.
Senator Udall. I would note for the record that the three
Senators sitting right here met with you in May when we were in
Afghanistan. We had a chance to meet with both of those
ministers, Minister Wardak and Minister Atmar, and were very
impressed with their plans and with the way they carried
themselves, and we hope that that continues.
General, if I could turn back to Pakistan. For me, my
support is based as much on the fact that Pakistan is
inextricably linked to success in Afghanistan. Pakistan's
reaction, is critical to the President's speech and his new
strategy. I imagine that the comment that Prime Minister Gilani
made last week where he said: ``We need more clarity on it and
when we get more clarity on it we can see what we can implement
on that plan,'' I hope that was for public consumption.
Are either of you concerned by his statement?
General McChrystal. Not by his statement, Senator. I talk
routinely with Pakistan military leadership and I believe that
we always have to work through aligning our campaigns, but I
believe that they have a shared interest in our success in
Afghanistan, as we do in their success.
Senator Udall. Ambassador, would you have any thoughts on
that?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No, I couldn't add to what General
McChrystal laid out.
Senator Udall. Let me move to the concept that the
President proposed, which was to move the bell curve to the
left, in other words get the troops into theater faster and
then leave faster. I have a few questions about shifting the
bell curve. I apologize for throwing them all at you at once.
Maybe some you will have to take for the record.
Are you confident you can expedite the deployment of these
additional 30,000 troops? What sort of challenges would this
pose for you logistically? Does this depend on a timely
withdrawal from Iraq? General Odierno stated if the elections
get pushed back this could make things more complicated in
terms of getting our troops out as scheduled. In other words,
would a slower withdrawal from Iraq impact the troop buildup in
Afghanistan?
I see my time has run out. Gentlemen, if you want to try
and answer one or two of those and maybe field the rest of them
for the record, I'd appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General McChrystal. Senator, I would just say that the
deployment part is very complex, but we have a really good team
working it and I'm very comfortable we're going to get the
forces in as fast as possible.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Ambassador, it's great to see you. Like everyone
else here, I was planning to reminisce about having seen you in
Afghanistan in August. But since I saw both of you yesterday at
the White House, it seems it's been taken over by events.
Let me thank you both for your extraordinary service, which
is so appreciated. I cannot imagine our having better leaders
in Afghanistan than the two of you and I'm very grateful for
your work.
I also would guess, having seen part of your hearing on the
House side earlier today, that you're eager to return to
Afghanistan and get on with the job, rather than appearing here
in Washington before the House and the Senate.
General, you have such great knowledge and deep
understanding of Afghanistan. You mentioned in your statement
today that you were first deployed there in 2002 and that
you've commanded troops there every single year since then,
which is truly extraordinary. I also know that you've studied
closely the history of Afghanistan. In fact, one of the first
times that we met you told me you were reading ``The Great
Game'' and that you were seeking to learn from the British and
the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
At one point the Soviets had more than 100,000 troops in
Afghanistan and yet they did not prevail. Now, clearly our
goals in Afghanistan are completely different from the goals of
the British in Afghanistan--the British and the Soviets. But
still, that history of the British and the Soviet experience
gives me pause, no matter how brilliant our leaders, how brave
our troops, how successful the civilian surge.
Could you share with us what lessons you take away from the
failed British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, and why
you believe that our experience can end up in a more positive
way?
General McChrystal. One of the things I have learned is to
be very humble about thinking that we have the right idea, the
better idea, and to be very careful as we go forward. I think
the common theme that I see that caused failure in the past is
when the Afghan people come to the conclusion that an outside
force are either occupiers or they are culturally in opposition
to the currents of Afghan history. In fact, Afghan leaders,
Afghans, have been toppled because they went against the grain
of the sense of the people, the social fabric of the people.
My view of both the British experience and the Soviet
experience is, there came a time when there coalesced a sense,
almost antibodies, in Afghan society against their presence. In
the Soviet case, we can't be too superior thinking about this
because they did a lot of things correctly. They did a lot of
tactical things correctly. They did a lot of programs
correctly. But at the end of the day they couldn't change the
perception that they were outside occupiers trying to impose on
Afghanistan a foreign system, a foreign thought process, in
this case it was communism, but it was also a number of other
social changes that just ran against the grain of society.
So I think it's very important that, from an overall point
of view, we understand how Afghan culture must define itself
and we be limited in our desire to change the fundamentals of
it. We have to respect those, and I think that's important.
Then tactically, in the counterinsurgence system, of course
the Soviets became fairly heavy-handed and they killed more
than a million Afghans in the process. Of course, that worked
to cause their defeat. One of the reasons why we're working so
hard on counterinsurgency with and respecting the people is
because we understand it's only with their partnership that we
can be effective here. So it's a very careful strategy, almost
admitting what we don't know. What I tell people is every time
you go to do something in Afghanistan, realize there's a lot of
things going on you don't understand, and don't pretend that
it's more simple than it really is.
Senator Collins. I think those are very wise lessons
indeed.
When I look at the President's plan and his date for
beginning the transition and the withdrawal of forces, while I
share the concerns of some of my colleagues about the signal
that sends, it may in fact be a helpful signal because it shows
that we're not like the Soviets, that we're not trying to stay
there and impose our way of life on them. So it may cut both
ways.
Ambassador, let me ask you about another issue that
troubles me gravely. We know that the Taliban is securing
funding for its operations from the narcotics trade in
Afghanistan. But another significant source is from wealthy
individuals and bogus charitable organizations or charitable
organizations that have two purposes from the Middle East, from
Saudi Arabia, for example.
Do we have a strategy for engaging the countries whose
citizens are funneling money to the Taliban fighters?
Ambassador Eikenberry. In short, yes, we do, Senator. It's
a pretty robust strategy. You're correct, sources of Taliban
funding right now, it comes from profits from narcotrafficking,
increasingly from taxation of areas that they might dominate,
and then the third important source of funding is external
funding coming from cover nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and individuals from the Gulf and Pakistan itself.
Against that, we have a very vigorous law enforcement
effort where we're trying to track finances, and we are working
very closely with countries within the Gulf, to include Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others, in order to try
to get at these sources and find ways to shut it down.
Senator Collins. Are you optimistic about securing full
cooperation from the Gulf countries?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We're making some progress there,
Senator. I wouldn't want to get into the specifics, but if
you'd like for the record perhaps we can submit something to
you. Progress is being made, but it's difficult. Trying to
track finances in any kind of environment is difficult work,
but we are making progress.
[The information referred to follows:]
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Today, Secretary Gates and President Hamed Karzai in
Afghanistan had a press conference. I'm going to read to you
from the Web site of the New York Times: ``President Karzai
said that his country would not have the resources to pay for
its own security for another 15 to 20 years and would remain
dependent on American and NATO financial aid until then.''
So how does that comport with what you have announced,
given that President Karzai has said this today?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, just four points on that.
The first point would be that, as General McChrystal has said,
we have to have a long-term relationship with Afghanistan that
our leadership has talked about, a long-term diplomatic
relationship, an economic and assistance relationship, also a
relationship which is one of providing support for the ANA and
ANP over time, their security organizations. That will be an
effort that we'll do together, we hope, with NATO and with
other countries. We don't know exactly what the cost will be,
but it will have to be long-term assistance.
The second point is, against that, we recognize that this
will be a burden on the Government of Afghanistan. They'll need
assistance. So a lot of our economic programs that we are
emphasizing right now are aimed at the generation of wealth and
at the same time trying to find ways to help the Afghan
Government with revenue collection. So we're looking at that.
The third point would be that, with regard to longer-term
costs, while I don't know what the order of magnitude is for
the cost of an American soldier or marine for 1 year in
Afghanistan compared to an ANA soldier or police, but we know
the orders of magnitude are probably 20, 30 to 1. So it's
clearly, if nothing else, in our own long-term economic
interest and certainly in the Afghan interest to continue to
help the Afghans stand their police up and their army forces
up. That's a pretty good tradeoff. If we're not having to send
more U.S. soldiers and marines, but instead Afghan soldiers are
on the front line taking their own place, that's a pretty good
return.
The fourth point would be, as we move forward and
Afghanistan does gain more security perhaps the army and the
police of Afghanistan, perhaps they won't need very high levels
in the future. Maybe at some point in time 10 years from now
the army of Afghanistan might be a smaller force than it is 5
years from now.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's what Charlie Wilson was arguing
for in 1989, to keep a presence going. But we pulled out and we
made a mistake. Last week I recalled that for Secretary Gates
when he was in front of us and he said we're not going to make
that mistake again.
Let me ask you, General McChrystal. One of the things that
I asked Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton last week, we
have a military force that can be all the more effective, not
in nation-building, but in getting things settled down, if we
use all the other civilian agencies of government along with
NGOs. Do you want to sketch briefly for the committee how we're
doing that and to whom you're listening as you set that policy
as the commander?
General McChrystal. The person I listen to the most is
about 3 feet on my right. What we do is, before we even go into
an area, we work together to figure out what's going to be
required as we provide security to make it durable, because the
governance and development parts need to flow in almost
simultaneously.
Of course, our Afghan partners aren't here today, but
they're in that same meeting as we try to pull that together.
We're working plans for an additional operation in the Central
Helmand River Valley now, which will happen later this winter,
and the idea is as security elements go in every other aspect
is literally waiting to flow in with it and then grow.
It's not easy, so I don't want to paint it as a simple
process. But it's very important.
The harder part is coordinating NGOs and other
international partners. We do that through PRTs in many cases.
We do that through other nations and the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is helpful in doing
that. But that's one of the areas where we need to continue to
seek unity of effort so that every dollar or euro or man-hour
of effort is focused towards a single outcome in Afghanistan.
We are doing a lot of coordination. UNAMA is part of our
planning process. They're in our planning process as we develop
our campaign plan.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, let me recommend something
for you to think about. You have been so successful with your
CERP funds for your commanders. After combat, they have a ready
pot of money that they have the authority to build a bridge or
to repair a school or whatever, and it's been terrific. Don't
we need that same kind of authority for the civilian agencies,
Instead of having to go through this requisition process that
takes months and months, where the people on the ground can
make something happen just like your commanders can?
General McChrystal. Senator, I haven't been a civilian
since I was 17, so I'd probably be out of my lane. But I
absolutely agree that that's the right thing, and I'd defer to
my friend.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, you're correct. We're
taking measures right now to try to be faster, more responsive.
We've gotten great support from Congress. We have what we call
the quick response fund which is available to our DOS officers
throughout Afghanistan. That's more of a quick spending
program.
We're changing the nature of our contracts. Rather than
have long, multi-year contracts, we're shifting to 1-year
contracts. We get better performance from contractors as a
result of that, NGOs that we work with frequently as
implementing partners.
The last point I'd make is, with the reorganization of our
civilian effort as we talked earlier about this concept of
having senior civilian representatives out in regional commands
that have really chief of mission kind of authorities within
the region. They're a counterpart of the military commander.
We're also now looking at ways we might be able to innovate to
push then down more of the decisionmaking and the authorities
for developmental assistance funds down to the regional level
and perhaps even farther down, closer to the district level.
So we are innovating and in certain areas we may be coming
back to Congress and asking for some help.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your outstanding
service to our country. You have what is a very challenging job
on a good day and there haven't been many good days recently in
Afghanistan. But I think the reason that the President and
Members of Congress on both sides and the American people are
willing to commit to this mission, to this effort, is because
they have such a high level of confidence in your leadership.
So thank you for your willingness to take that on.
I guess when you get to this point in a hearing pretty much
all of the questions that can be asked have been asked. But I
want to just touch on a couple of areas that I think are really
important to our success.
By the way, just a clarification, too. There was the
announcement of the additional NATO troops, but there was a
report I think today in The Times of London that more than
1,500 of those extra troops that have been pledged by the
allies to back up our surge there are already in the country
and have been counted before, so that there may be some double
counting going on.
Do you know exactly what that number is and how close that
will bring us to the 40,000 number that you had requested,
General?
General McChrystal. I don't know that right now, Senator.
Senator Thune. With regard to the NATO allies and the
important role that they play in our effort there, one of the
things I think that has impeded and inhibited our ability to
make the best use of our forces has been some of the caveats
that have been attached to some of the troops that have come in
from other countries. Of the 43 countries that are allies in
this fight, how many of them do have caveats and what are you
doing to try and get some of those removed so that we can get
everybody engaged more in the fight?
General McChrystal. The first thing I'd say is when I deal
with it as the coalition commander I'm actually surprised by
how little the limitations are compared to the advantages of
having the coalition. One of the advantages of the coalition is
everybody is a little stronger together, and in the eyes of the
Afghans we are a lot more credible than we would be as a single
country. Even though clearly the United States is a huge
factor, the fact that we are a coalition with the Afghan people
I think is key.
Each of the countries brings different strengths and
weaknesses. Some have caveats that I have urged be adjusted,
give us a little bit more flexibility. Across the force what
I've asked is for all countries to look at the policies that
they have for their people. In some cases, their forces are not
allowed to move out of a geographical area. But if they are
partnered with an Afghan Army battalion and they can't move,
then there's hesitation to let that ANA battalion move and that
takes away from ANA leadership the ability to mass forces for
operations, and it's one of the things that we'd asked people
to work with.
In other cases there are limitations on night operations or
things like that. So what we're doing is asking each of our
partners to move more toward full counterinsurgency, and we do
have progress in that, and then to look at all their caveats.
Some of our partners as well don't have caveats, but they
have limitations in mobility, vehicles, or things like that,
and the degree to which we can help them with that enables them
to do even more.
Senator Thune. Of the Afghan security forces--and there's
been a lot of focus, as there should be, on getting them
trained and ready. That again, I think as we have seen
demonstrated in Iraq, is so critical. Are the Afghan security
forces willing to take on the Taliban?
General McChrystal. They are. The Afghan police die at the
highest rate, then the Afghan Army, before coalition forces.
They absolutely are.
Senator Thune. There has been a lot of discussion about
also integrating, reconciling elements of the Taliban that
might be reconcilable, and I know I think that's been touched
on already. But General Petraeus had indicated previously that
we lack the nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the
Taliban to be able to identify and distinguish between
reconcilable and irreconcilable elements.
My understanding is that you have selected retired British
General Lamb to head a program of reconciliation with members
of the Taliban based on some of the success that he had in
Iraq. I'm just wondering if you could provide some of the
details of those efforts or at least maybe some of the broad
features of the program?
General McChrystal. Senator, it's a partnered program,
first. It has to be an Afghan program. It has to be under the
Government of Afghanistan. So what we'd be doing is empowering
them as much as we can with resources, some expertise and
experience, and things like that.
What we've stood up with General Lamb is a section in my
command. He also has now an additional British two-star general
that has been provided, and we have a full element that works
with the Government of Afghanistan to help craft their policy,
help work this forward, partner with not just the U.S. embassy,
but other embassies as well, so that as we go forward we have a
program that is not only effective, but it's also understood by
people.
Reintegration is really a question of confidence, and it's
confidence on multiple levels, as we remember from Iraq. It's
first the confidence of the individual who's going to
reintegrate, that has to believe that as he comes back in he
will be protected from his former Taliban partners, he'll also
be protected from anyone in the Government of Afghanistan who
might target him or throw him in jail or something.
It's also a question of confidence on the part of the
government that the people they bring in are genuine, that
they're not seeding the Taliban inside their ranks as well.
Then the last part of the confidence is it's to undermine the
confidence of the Taliban. So to the degree to which we can
start to pull people out and they start to look at each other,
it has a very good effect.
But for this reason, it's very important that this program
be very carefully thought out and coordinated, because as soon
as somebody loses confidence in it, it boomerangs on us.
Senator Thune. Ambassador, do you have anything to add?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No, Senator. We're fully engaged
with General McChrystal's program. We have a DOS officer that
serves as one of General Lamb's staff, and we're optimistic
about the potential. It will certainly be predicated upon
having some momentum, though, against the Taliban. With that
momentum, with a good reintegration program, I think it will be
a very important tool.
Senator Thune. General, one last question--my time's
running out. Over the past few years, the demand for persistent
ISR capabilities has spurred the Air Force to field unmanned
aerial systems (UAS) more rapidly than originally planned. The
Air Force now has a goal of fielding enough Predator and Reaper
drones by 2012 to man 50 orbits around the clock. The majority
of this new capability has been dedicated to Iraq.
As we begin this drawdown in Iraq, the persistent ISR
requirement there is not likely to decrease. So with fewer
soldiers and marines on the ground that are gathering
information, the joint forces are going to rely more heavily on
the air component to provide intelligence.
Meanwhile, with the increasing troop presence in
Afghanistan, you're going to have the need for persistent ISR
in that area of operation, too. So I guess the question is, are
you comfortable with the Air Force's current plan to operate 50
of those round-the-clock orbits by 2012 in order to meet the
requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, or do we need to
invest in a UAS capability over and above the current plan to
ensure that those requirements are addressed?
General McChrystal. Senator, I haven't looked at exactly
how they're going to break out around the world. I have looked
at the balance between Afghanistan and Iraq. Secretary Gates
leads a very focused effort.
The one thing I would say is almost everything we do to
increase our ISR capacity, not just the unmanned, but also
there's a number of manned aspects, and then there's what we
call the part that digests it, or PED. It's people and it's
information systems. It takes what we get and turns it into
real intelligence. Those programs are expensive, but they are
extraordinarily effective and extraordinary value added,
because they allow us to operate with smaller numbers of our
forces on the ground. The more we have those, we can go after
IEDs, we can go after terrorist leaders, we can protect our
forces.
So there's almost no amount of ISR in my view that would
not be value added to my effort in Afghanistan.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, I welcome
your testimony and I want to thank you for your sacrifice and
your extremely hard work that you do every day on behalf of all
of us. As Senator Udall said, Senator Begich and I and others
visited Afghanistan and Pakistan back in May, Ambassador
Eikenberry, just several days, I think, after you had taken
over the post. I wanted to thank you for your hosting us, but I
also want you to give my best wishes to your wife. I think the
fact that she is there touring the country with you by your
side in a war-torn country says a lot about her character. I
also think it speaks volumes to the Afghani women and in
committee the Afghani men. So please give her our best wishes.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Hagan. We've had some questions concerning the
Pashtuns. My understanding is that currently Pashtun
recruitment to the ANSF is difficult along the Pashtun tribal
belt that, General McChrystal, you mentioned, the southern and
southeastern Afghanistan, because the Pashtuns would run the
risk of having their families subjected to Taliban retribution.
General McChrystal, can you describe the ethnic composition
of the ANSF?
General McChrystal. Yes, ma'am. I can get it to you for the
record in exact numbers, but we're about 42 percent of the
population is Pashtun and almost exactly that is the
representation in the army. So Pashtun participation in the
army matches it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The objective is to closely match the composition of the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) with the country's ethnic breakdown.
Pashtuns represent 42 percent of the Afghan population and comprise
41.83 percent of the ANSF (41.32 percent in the Army and 42.36 percent
in the Police). Tajiks comprise 27 percent of the population, but
represent 38.10 percent of the security forces (34.06 percent in the
Army and 42.33 percent in the Police). Uzbeks and Hazaras each
represent 9 percent of the Afghan population. Uzbeks comprise 6.19
percent of the ANSF (7.23 percent in the Army and 5.09 percent in the
Police) while the Hazaras represent 8.17 percent of the ANSF (11.69
percent of the Army and 4.48 percent of the Police). Afghanistan's
seven other ethnic minorities--Turkmen, Pashayee, Balooch, Bayat,
Sadat, Arabs, and Nooristani--round out the remaining 13 percent of the
population. These minorities comprise 5.71 percent of the ANSF (5.70
percent of the Army and 5.73 percent of the Police).
General McChrystal. However, I would say that is Pashtun,
but it is not represented from the south, as you mentioned.
Kandahar and Helmand and those areas which have been under
Taliban either control or threat are very underrepresented. So
it's important to us that we be able to recruit from there.
But what we have to do first is get security there. So the
effort now is to increase security, make their families feel
comfortable, and then go.
The rest of the breakdown of the ANA falls pretty much
along ethnic percentages in the country writ large, except for
the Tajiks are slightly overrepresented in the army.
Senator Hagan. Does an ethnically unbalanced ANSF pose
linguistic and ethnic barriers within the local Afghan villages
along this Pashtun tribal belt, as well as the legitimacy
concerns and securing the local population and, as you
mentioned, in the Helmand Province how does that affect our
marines and allies? I understand the Tajiks speak actually a
different language or a different dialect.
General McChrystal. It's a challenge. There are two parts
to this. First, every Kandak or Afghan battalion that we field
is ethnically balanced as it comes out of training. So we field
the force so that it has a mix. We don't field a Tajik
battalion or a Hazara battalion or a Pashtun battalion, for the
obvious reasons.
Senator Hagan. But do you have enough of the different
ethnicities to do that?
General McChrystal. We have enough of the ethnicities. What
we don't have enough of is southern Pashtuns. So we have to
recruit better.
So the things that you said about a battalion operating in
Helmand, we would like to have more representation in that
battalion of people from that area. But we wouldn't want to
create again southern Helmand kandaks.
Senator Hagan. How do you recruit these individuals?
General McChrystal. The first thing we have to do is
establish security there.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Pakistan continues to pursue a dual-track policy of
disrupting the Pakistani Taliban in its tribal areas, most
notably in South Waziristan, while elements of Pakistan's
military support the Afghan Taliban networks also in its tribal
areas, most notably in North Waziristan, and the Afghan Taliban
high command in its Baluchistan Province. The key question is
if elements of Pakistan's military can be persuaded to change
this dual track policy. In order to do that, we have to address
Pakistan's regional concerns, taking into account its
relationships with Afghanistan and India.
The Durand Line cuts across the Pashtun tribes and reduced
the Afghanistan Pashtun territory and, as you mentioned, the
Pashtuns comprise about 15 percent of Pakistan's population, or
close to 26 million people, whereas, in Afghanistan it's about
12 million Pashtuns.
Despite Pakistan's attempt to permanently demarcate its
border with Afghanistan, the Afghans claim Pakistan's Pashtun
areas on the ground that Afghanistan is the home to all of the
Pashtuns. Ever since the partition of India, Islamabad has
attempted to utilize its proxies, I believe, to install a
friendly Pashtun government in Afghanistan that would preserve
the de facto border and prevent Pashtun aspirations of a
homeland and prevent Indian involvement in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Eikenberry, in the interest of Afghanistan's
stability, how are you working with the U.S. Ambassador to
Pakistan, and our Indian Ambassador Tim Romer, as well as
Ambassador Holbrooke, to facilitate positive relations between
Islamabad, New Delhi, and Kabul?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, let me concentrate on
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Holbrooke is the special
representative that has responsibilities for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Clearly the security relationship between India and
Pakistan has consequences for Afghanistan, as you've
articulated. But more specifically, with our efforts in Kabul
have a very strong relationship with our embassy down in
Islamabad. At the level of Ambassador Holbrooke and General
Petraeus, they have a close civil-military partnership
themselves and provide overall policy direction and have sets
of programs that they've set into motion.
Then between Ambassador Patterson and myself, we take that
direction. We are looking and continuously searching for ways
to facilitate political dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad.
They're leading. We try to facilitate wherever we can. We have
an array of programs to try to develop mutual trust and
confidence, anywhere between the law enforcement area, where
Director Mueller from the FBI hosts trilateral initiatives led
by himself, but partnered with the Ministries of Interior of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have programs to help both sides
to improve their customs programs along the border. We have a
very promising initiative in which we're hoping to see further
progress between Afghanistan and Pakistan to reach an agreement
for transit trade.
So it's a comprehensive effort that gets into improvements
in law enforcement, trade, economics, and diplomacy, and then,
of course, General McChrystal has a very robust program with
the military tripartite between Afghanistan and Pakistan and
NATO.
Senator Hagan. That was my next question: What are you in
CENTCOM doing to facilitate military-to-military confidence-
building between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and then I threw in
India too?
General McChrystal. At our level what we're doing is, as
Ambassador Eikenberry mentioned, we have a series of tripartite
meetings at the principals level, myself, General Kiyani, and
General Bismullah Mohamedi for the Afghans. But then we also
below that have operational lower levels that happen very
regularly. We have a series of border coordination centers.
There's one in operation. There's a second one just moving
toward that. There'll be a total of six.
We also have--for example, about a month ago we went over
and briefed our full campaign plan to General Kiyani and his
staff. They did the same back to U.S. forces some time back.
The idea is confidence-building. It's to get on the same
page, but then also to have the mechanics in place for things
like cross-border incidents, so that they don't become
something that's a negative. There's a whole series of
activities.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, also if I could add one
important area that has been underway for several years. That
is efforts to improve intelligence exchanges and cooperation
between the United States and Afghanistan and Pakistan. Those
efforts are led by CIA Director Leon Paneta and his
counterparts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's been a very
robust program as well.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
My time is out. Godspeed.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our distinguished gentlemen testifying, General
McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, I want to congratulate
you also, as my colleagues have done. I just want to say most
all the questions have been asked and I don't know what else
you have to answer. I hope to be on a trip next month to
Afghanistan. I just came back from Iraq and had a very
interesting visit there, and I'm encouraged by what has taken
place in Iraq and the confidence that the Iraqi Government
officials--we didn't see too many Iraqi personnel because it
just wasn't safe. But I was very encouraged by what the
officials are saying, that the Americans are carrying out what
they promised to do, and that is key.
So just permit me, gentlemen, to try to get some
clarification, because the questions have been answered; so if
I repeat some of these and you want to make your answers short,
I would appreciate it because I have several clarifications to
make.
Number one, how effective have the efforts been to
reintegrate the former Taliban and the Northern Alliance and
the mujahedin fighters so that they will no longer fight for
the insurgency? How is reintegration going?
General McChrystal. Senator, in the case of the Taliban,
that effort is still very young and has not yet, in my opinion,
been effective. But we are posturing ourselves to do that.
Senator Burris. Ambassador, in terms of understanding that
Kabul and President Karzai and the central government only
control so many of those 37 provinces there in Afghanistan,
what is taking place in the local provinces and working with
the local tribal leaders to try to understand the issues that
are taking place?
Are we working, not only on the military side, but also on
the resource side, with the locals where, because of the
divisions of that country and all the different ethnicities,
the locals are really in charge?
So do we have a specific program that's working with the
local provinces, with the governors that are there or the local
councils that are there?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, our principal voice is
working through the Government of Afghanistan.
Senator Burris. The central government?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Working through the Government of
Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan, of course, it
appoints at the national government level, it appoints
provincial governors. It appoints district chiefs. So when I
say ``district chiefs,'' district governors. The police force
of Afghanistan, it stretches down to the district level. The
district level of Afghanistan is at the county level.
What I want to say first and foremost, though, is that our
programs that we're delivering do work through the Government
of Afghanistan. What we're trying to do in partnership with the
Government of Afghanistan is help them get their reach down
further, down to that local level. We do that through
reinforcing what have been some very promising programs that
have developed over the past 3, 4, 5 years.
An example of a program that has worked well, a
developmental program, is called the National Solidarity
Program. It's run by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and
Development and it's a program in which a community, a village,
will elect for a particular small developmental project to
benefit that particular community or village--it may be wells,
it may be a road that connects them to the district center. But
it's a program which empowers the community then through
electing or voting on developmental projects.
So we have programs like that, that we're partnering with
the Government of Afghanistan to try to extend further and
farther across the country, that delivers security. Also, we're
working right now with key ministries to see over the next
year, the next 18 months, how more progress can be made in
strengthening government at the local level and developing
capability to deliver a very basic set of services, education,
health, and so forth.
Senator Burris. Mr. Ambassador, Senator Hagan just raised a
question about languages. Are we trying to teach them English?
Are we trying to learn their dialect and their native tongue?
The American personnel that's there or any foreign personnel in
any of those various provinces, whether it's British, German,
or Polish?
Are we trying to teach them English or are we trying to
learn their language so we can communicate with them in their
language?
Ambassador Eikenberry. First of all, let me say, Senator,
the most popular foreign language on demand right now within
Afghanistan in all the schools is the English language.
Senator Burris. Unfortunately. Mr. Ambassador, we must
learn the language of the natives and they will accept us
better when we can speak their language. As a student who
studied abroad and speaks another foreign language, which was
German, the fact that I could speak German, I was very well
received. That is what we must do as Americans, is to learn the
language there. I hope that we'll learn it.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Senator, you had asked about the
English language. Your separate point here about our need to
develop better language skills inside of Afghanistan--I know
General McChrystal said earlier about the Afghan Hands Program
being developed by DOD and the military. We're doing better on
the civilian side. Many more of our political officers being
assigned to Afghanistan are coming in now with a year of Dari
language training or some Pashtun. We need to do better,
though.
Senator Burris. Let me ask the General. Now, in terms of
just for clarification, General, on the drawdown dates, what
little I know about the military, I heard one of our
distinguished Senators ask about whether they were going to
start withdrawing the first troops on that date. There are
rotations regularly in and out of Afghanistan, are there not?
So I don't think we're going to be able to really zero in on
whether on July 1 the first soldier is going to be withdrawn
from the area. Am I correct in that assessment, General?
General McChrystal. Sir, the way we are interpreting the
President's guidance is we would do troop rotations, but not
count them in that drawdown. In July 2011 we believe--I am
comfortable it is his intent we start to reduce the overall
number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But the rate and pace of
that reduction will be based upon conditions on the ground at
that time.
Senator Burris. I see my time has expired, but you also
indicated to another Senator--and I think it's a clarification,
and please correct me--that on July 1 we will make the first
withdrawal. That's what I understood you to say.
General McChrystal. In July 2011, that's correct, Senator.
Senator Burris. But how do you reconcile that with, we will
begin to assess it? As Secretary Gates said, he'll start
assessing it in January 2011, and they're going to start the
assessment, and if the assessment is not right and the ground
is not right we may not withdraw a troop on July 1, 2011. Is
that possible?
General McChrystal. Senator, we will be making constant
assessments, with a formal assessment a year from now, and then
in July 2011, I believe that the President has given us
instructions to start to reduce U.S. force numbers, but that
the pace and scope of that, how fast that happens, would be
based upon the assessments and the conditions at the time.
Senator Burris. I see. So you could then withdraw one
battalion or a squadron can go home and say, ``well, now we've
started our withdrawal,'' and then we halt it to see because we
don't know what the conditions are?
General McChrystal. Senator, we would coordinate that with
our entire chain of command up to, obviously, the President to
meet his intent. We would have no intent not to do that.
Senator Burris. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I hope to
see you all next month, and if everything goes well, I'll
celebrate New Year's with you over there.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. You have been so patient and what you have
seen is a slow withdrawal of the Senate from this committee
room. So it's all how we measure things in withdrawal.
Let me say thank you for enduring 3 hours or so of
questioning, comments, and commentary from us. But it is an
important issue. Again, I want to thank you both for your
service to our country. Thank you both.
I want to follow up, in seriousness, about the transition
and withdrawal. This is just for clarification, but I know some
continue to bat this around, what is withdrawal, what is not
withdrawal. Really, probably the proper word would have been in
July 2011 we're going to start a transition, because a
withdrawal could be 5 people, it could be 5,000 people; it
could be 1 day, it could be 10 years. That's a determination
that will come over time, not July hits and suddenly
everything's starting to move out. It's a process, and
transition is really what it's about. Is that a fair statement?
General McChrystal. Senator, I want to make sure that I'm
clear. I think that is. I think transition is also a process. I
think we'll be transferring to Afghan lead in areas across the
country as conditions permit, and I think that will occur. It
may not wait until July 2011.
Senator Begich. Right.
General McChrystal. I do believe that the President wants
us to understand that we are absolutely going to start a
reduction in forces in July 2011.
Senator Begich. Right. But that will all be determined on
the quantity and the timing of that, in the sense you may start
it, but it may be a short period, it may be a long period, it
may be large numbers, it may be small numbers. Is that a fair
statement?
General McChrystal. Exactly, Senator.
Senator Begich. I know I hear from others sometimes--and
Senator Inhofe was very good in repeating the President's words
that it's not a sudden, July hits and our enemies know exactly
what we're doing. They'll know no matter what, whenever we do
withdrawal, because everything we do is very transparent. They
will notice that and they'll have their own decisions as to
what they will do or not do, and hopefully we'll be successful
and they won't be doing much. So I want to make sure that's
clear.
The other thing, I want to really echo what some other
members said. I think what you've been able to do with the CERP
monies has been very powerful, very positive. Are there always
rooms for improvement on accountability? Absolutely. I don't
care how much money you have, if you have $10 or one point some
billion dollars. There's an option, an opportunity to continue
to improve, and it sounds like you folks have been doing that.
But I would also echo what Senator Nelson said, that I
agree that the DOS should have as much flexibility in those
dollars. I assume, Ambassador, you will agree with that. But
I'm curious from the General's perspective: Would you agree
also that the DOS should have some more flexibility with their
dollars to do very similar activities, so you can join these
resources together? Is that a fair statement?
General McChrystal. I absolutely would agree.
Senator Begich. I again want to echo that anything, and I
know you heard a couple Senators here, very aggressive about
this: Whatever we can do to help streamline the rules, the
regulation, and/or statutory issues, please let us know. We are
motivated. We recognize there will be a little tug-of-war here
on this committee, but I think there's a sizable majority that
recognize the success you've had with the CERP funds and we
should see the same with the DOS, rather than going through
this maze that you have to go through to access their money and
then access your money. So anything we can do, please feel free
as we move through this process.
Mr. Ambassador, do you have any comment you want to add to
that?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No. We'd welcome that support,
Senator.
Senator Begich. Okay. The other one I want to clarify--and
Mr. Ambassador, I know it seemed like you wanted to go a little
further in clarifying this--on do I think that going from 300
to 900-plus individuals from your operation is a great move?
Absolutely. You're tripling it. Some will argue it's only 1
percent of the total force, but if I took both of your total
workforces, the majority of what the military does is deploy
people. You don't necessarily have that luxury. You have a huge
number of people to deploy at any given time. You have to pick
and select and be very selective.
So I understand the differences. I'm sure we would love a
higher percentage, but that's not realistic based on the
capacity that the DOD has in the sense of deployment between
the military.
In your 2011-2012 budget process, 2011 that's moving
forward, and you may not be able to tell us here, but are you
looking at additional resources that could be added to your
budget to create a more robust deployable force in the sense of
what you need on the ground to assist the military in the
civilian activities?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Indeed we are, Senator, both in
terms of the personnel and in terms of our development
programs. We're doing now a very careful analysis against
General McChrystal's military campaign. In order to support
that, we are going to need more civilians out in rural areas,
out in different population centers to support. As he clears
and holds areas, then it shifts on the civilian side to the
building. So we're looking at additional civilians and
development programs in order to support that. So there will be
increases, yes.
Senator Begich. Would it be fair to say that----
Chairman Levin. Senator Begich, if I could interrupt you
for a moment. I'm going to have to leave for a few moments.
Senator Begich. I'll close it off.
Chairman Levin. I don't want you to close it, because I
have some additional questions. If you are finished before I
get back, which will just be a few moments, would you just
recess for a couple minutes.
Senator Begich. Sure, I'd be happy to do that, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Begich [presiding]. Boy, I get the whole--this is a
good opportunity. It's always good to be last.
I want to make sure one other piece in your allocation of
resources for those people. Again, I'm not in your business,
but my assumption is your people will need also longer-term
potential with the country of Afghanistan because of the work
you'll be doing.
It's not just you'll be doing the water lines, sewer lines,
governance, and be done. You'll actually be moving through.
So that resource is not just about a 1-year, but a few
years out. Is that how you look at it? That's how I look at it.
I just want to make sure I'm on the same page.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Yes, Senator, absolutely, multi-year
and the whole of government. We'll have to be looking then at
the sustainment of our civilian force. There'll be changes in
the composition, but it'll still be a sizable presence, and it
will be multi-year. So it's not only the challenge of getting
it there over the next year, year and a half. We would
anticipate this to be a multi-year requirement and have to
think through how we'll sustain that kind of presence.
Senator Begich. I guess I'm supportive of that. I just want
to warn you ahead that's some of the questioning I'll have as
we move down that path, and I just wanted to convey that to
you.
Ambassador Eikenberry. If I could, Senator, though, a point
of emphasis here. More civilians needed, but to continue to
emphasize that as our civilians move forward they're
multiplying their effects through Afghans.
Senator Begich. Correct.
Ambassador Eikenberry. As we now are starting to reach a
point in Afghanistan where you had 7, 8 years after the fall of
the Taliban more children, more young adults starting to
graduate from high school, vocational schools, universities,
the pool out there of talented people is starting to enlarge,
and our civilians as they come in, they're going to be able to
leverage that in increasing numbers. You can reach a point
where it's starting to get diminishing returns, too costly, and
also the possibility of dependency building up.
Senator Begich. I agree. I think that's a great outcome, if
you have more of a larger Afghan pool.
General, you reminded me of this and I'm just trying to
remember from our briefings when I was there and some of the
folks you had on the ground. We have in Afghanistan, I want to
say, ``West Point Lite'' for officer training--explain what we
have there in regards to trying to do what we can to ensure
that we have an officer corps within the Afghan Army that's
well trained? Remind me of that just so I'm clear on that?
General McChrystal. Senator, they have stood up a military
academy.
Senator Begich. That's right.
General McChrystal. They are expanding the size of that
military academy in the next year or so. So that will provide a
corps. But then they also have other commissioning entry ways
as well. For their noncommissioned officer corps, which is
critical, they have a sergeants major academy and then a series
of stairstep professional development programs for their
noncommissioned officer corps as well, and I think that's going
to be very important for them.
Senator Begich. How involved are we now with that and how
long before they take a very sizable role in managing those
academies? Or are they doing it now?
General McChrystal. They really do it now. They get
assistance on many of the courses, but they really do it now.
Senator Begich. They manage it with their own teaching aids
and all the other aspects of it?
General McChrystal. That's correct. Again, we assist, but
they run it.
Senator Begich. One last question I think I'll have time
for, and that is, the efforts of their national security force
and their police force, what do you think is the major change
that can move them into these higher numbers that we want to
get them to in short order? What's the one or two things that
you think is going to make the difference, or that you believe
is making the difference now?
General McChrystal. Senator, it's partnering. It's where we
put our units with them and operate, often colocated in the
same outpost together, and then as we go together. It's that
shoulder-to-shoulder partnering that I think's going to help
increase their professionalism and development most rapidly.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much.
I know, Mr. Chairman, you were very generous with allowing
me more time as you vacated. So thank you very much.
Thank you again for your service.
Chairman Levin. Actually, Senator Begich, your last
question segues perfectly into the first question I was going
to ask. It goes back to this question of partnering. Our
understanding is that we have about 19,000 U.S. troops now in
RC-South. We have about 11 combat battalions in RC-South, with
perhaps 40 companies, more or less. My question is: How many of
those 11 U.S. battalions in RC-South are actually partnered
with, colocated with, as you just put it, shoulder-to-shoulder
now with Afghan units?
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, I would say I don't know
the number that are colocated on the bases, but in terms of
partnered, 100 percent.
Chairman Levin. What I'm talking about is colocation,
actually physically with, eating with, living with, colocated
with. How many of the 11 battalions or approximately 40
companies are physically actually colocated with Afghan units?
General McChrystal. I'll have to take that for the record,
Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
Although the percentage of companies physically colocated with
Afghan units varies daily, all of the U.S. battalions in Regional
Command-South are partnered with the Afghan National Security Forces.
Chairman Levin. Could it be few? Might the answer be few?
General McChrystal. I do not believe so, but I'd like to
take that for the record and make sure it's accurate.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
When General Jones tells us that we have to get more Afghan
troops out of their garrisons, that's to me a major challenge.
It's something that I think needs to be our mission. This
partnering needs to be our mission to the same extent that it's
a British mission or an Australian mission. We had a little
discussion about this before, but I want to be more precise.
Our COIN doctrine is that our partnering strategy is aimed at
achieving a ratio of one U.S. company--leading to three Afghan
companies for every one U.S. company as their partnering
progresses.
Is that your understanding?
General McChrystal. It is.
Chairman Levin. Those ratios that you gave us that we
currently have and that we hope to have will ideally lead up to
that. But we're nowhere near one to one, quite the opposite in
Helmand, from everything we can understand.
There was an article in the Washington Post this morning
which described the increasing influence of Taliban shadow
governments. I don't think anyone's asked you about this today
here. If not, I would like to just quickly ask you this. Our
votes have begun, so you're almost free.
These shadow governors establish Taliban governors, police
chiefs, administrators, and judges in nearly all the Afghan
provinces. Did you see the article this morning? Did you read
the article, and do you agree with that report? Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I did see the article and, Mr.
Chairman, what I'd say is that this growth of parallel
governance, in some provinces of Afghanistan effective shadow
governance with real consequences and real capabilities--when I
came into Afghanistan on my third tour of duty in May of this
year and did my own assessment of the security situation, for
me the development of this shadow governance was the most
striking change that I had seen since early 2007 when I last
left.
In that regard then, when General McChrystal did his
security assessment and highlighted the deterioration of the
security situation in important parts of the country, I had
keyed in on that and that was one of the factors that led me to
be in absolute concurrence with his own analysis of the
deterioration of security.
Chairman Levin. Would you say it's as extensive as the Post
article suggested? Is that about accurate in terms of its----
Ambassador Eikenberry. I'd defer to General McChrystal for
specifics.
Chairman Levin. General, have you had a chance to read the
article?
General McChrystal. I did.
Chairman Levin. Is the shadow government's existence by the
Taliban as extensive or approximately as extensive as the Post
article stated?
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, it is, but I'd like to
provide some wider context.
Chairman Levin. Sure.
General McChrystal. They have established shadow governors
in 33 of the 34 provinces. In some areas those shadow governors
can do what was outlined in that article and have an awful lot
of influence. In other areas it's more aspirational. They have
a shadow governor, but the individual doesn't have that kind of
reach or control. Even within a province where they have a
shadow governor, they will typically have areas where they have
a tremendous amount of influence--south primarily, some in the
east.
So what was described in the article was accurate, but not
for everywhere.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
On the reintegration initiatives, you were both, I think,
extremely clear about the importance of these initiatives
taking place and that the Afghan Government is going to have to
lead those initiatives. General, you talked about keeping open
the door to reconciliation. General, you said there are some
important opportunities--it's important that there be
opportunities for Afghans to come back under government rule,
and that they be treated when they do so, providing they abide
by the rules, treated with respect when they do that.
Ambassador, you also felt that we have to try to find a
way; more importantly, the Afghan Government has to try to find
a way for this reintegration; and that there's a commission
which is going to be created, you indicated.
Have we been supportive of that reintegration effort?
Whenever I talk to President Karzai he says: ``You know the
reason we haven't gone ahead with this; your guys don't want us
to.'' Have we been an impediment to this in any way? Or to put
it positively, are we clearly supportive of this effort,
whether it's a reintegration commission or whether it's a plan
for reintegration? Is it clear to President Karzai that we're
supportive of that effort?
Ambassador Eikenberry. It's absolutely clear.
Chairman Levin. Have we not been supportive over the last
year, say?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Mr. Chairman, the efforts up until
today have been very uneven, very uneven success by the
Government of Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Is that partly our fault, that we've sent
signals that we have some reluctance in this area?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I don't know going back to 2004 and
2005. I was not in a position at that point----
Chairman Levin. How about in the last year?
Ambassador Eikenberry. In the last year, it's been very
clear. I would say since the arrival of General McChrystal and
myself it's been crystal clear, absolutely clear to President
Karzai and the Afghan leadership that we would be in full
support of their efforts.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Would you agree with that, General?
General McChrystal. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Okay. That's fine. Thank you.
Can you get us that figure which I asked you about? Can you
get us that, if possible, overnight?
General McChrystal. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you. I would really appreciate
it.
We all very much appreciate your staying power, not just in
Afghanistan, but your steadfastness through this process of
ours. I know you're committed to the process in Afghanistan. We
all wish you, obviously, godspeed and good luck in that regard.
Your answers today, I think, have been clear. Your
understanding of the President's directives, it seems to me, is
clear. You both indicated you not only support them, you agree
with them. I think that's clear and it's important, because the
clarity of our mission is essential as well as the resources to
accomplish it.
I know I'm speaking on behalf of everybody, everyone but me
who is now voting in the Senate, that we're grateful again to
you, your families, your troops, the people who work with you
on the civilian side. Just pass along our thanks if you would
and our gratitude and support for this effort.
Thank you. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
TROOP INCREASE
1. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, do you believe that the
President's new strategy of quickly deploying 30,000 additional troops
will be sufficient to stop the insurgency within the timeframe to begin
transition and withdrawal in July 2011?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, what is the timeline for the
deployment of all 30,000 troops?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, regarding logistics for
deploying these 30,000 troops quickly, please explain the challenges
associated with a less than robust theater logistics and throughput
infrastructure?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how are you mitigating any
major shortcomings to ensure that quality is not sacrificed for speed?
General McChrystal. I have been given great flexibility by the
President and the Secretary of Defense in determining the composition
of the additional 30,000 forces. While these forces will deploy on an
accelerated timeline, I am confident that I am getting the force
structure I need to be successful.
The reality, however, is that requirements will continue to change
commensurate with conditions on the ground. I will consistently review
our progress towards meeting our military objectives to ensure that we
have the right mix of forces.
5. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, is there sufficient air and
sealift assets to meet the troop deployment timeline?
General McChrystal. Yes, we currently assess air and sealift assets
as adequate to meet troop deployment timelines. We will further refine
this assessment during the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)/U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) Force Flow Workshop, which will directly
address this assessment.
6. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how will this troop increase
affect the ongoing drawdown of troops in Iraq?
General McChrystal. As the Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan, I
do not make decisions on resource requirements across different
theaters. As such, it would be improper of me to speculate on how
future changes in General Odierno's area of operations (AOR) may affect
the flow of forces into Afghanistan. As Commander of U.S. CENTCOM,
General David Petraeus is best suited to answer this question.
7. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how is the normal force
rotation and dwell time affected by the troop increase given the
planned rapid pace of deployment of additional troops?
General McChrystal. Our men and women in uniform and their families
continue to bear a significant burden. The issues of force rotation and
dwell time are best answered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the individual Service Chiefs, executing their duties under title
10. I am confident that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff closely monitor the health of the force and are taking active
measures to address and mitigate risks.
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
8. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, as we work to increase the
capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), can you
please clarify the security force goals? Are we aiming at meeting the
projected March 2009 goals of 134,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) and
82,000 Afghan National Police (ANP)--or levels you recommended of
240,000 ANA and 160,000 ANP?
General McChrystal. We are no longer using the March 2009 goals.
Our current growth objective is to grow to 134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP
by October 2010. Pending approval by the Secretary of Defense, we will
request to grow the ANP to 109,000 by October 2010. We will also
request to continue growth of the ANA to 171,600 and the ANP to 134,000
by October 2011. We will reexamine the need for any future growth based
on security conditions and ANSF performance.
9. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how many U.S. forces are
currently training ANSF?
General McChrystal. The primary means for U.S. forces to train ANSF
is by partnering with them in order to help them build capacity and
assume responsibility for their nation's security as quickly and as
successfully as possible. As of December 2009, 32 of the 44 U.S. combat
battalions were partnered.
U.S. forces also contribute to institutional training. Currently,
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission
Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A), there are approximately 830 U.S. servicemembers whose sole
task is to instruct and advise ANSF in institutions, schools, and other
formalized programs of instruction. These forces instruct ANSF
trainers, coordinate resources exclusively in support of training, and
advise and coach the ANSF on management of institutional training.
10. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, when all of the U.S. troops
are in place, how many of them will be solely dedicated to training the
ANSF?
General McChrystal. Under current plans, there will be in excess of
1,800 U.S. servicemembers whose sole task is to train ANSF forces in
institutions, schools, and other formalized programs of instruction.
These forces advise ANSF trainers, coordinate resources exclusively in
support of training, and advise and coach the ANSF on management of
institutional training.
11. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, for those U.S. troops whose
responsibility is to train the Afghan forces, what portion are/will be
embedded with the Afghan Forces?
General McChrystal. A key tenet of International Security
Assistance Force's (ISAF) strategy is partnering with the Afghan
security forces in order to help them build capability and capacity,
and assume responsibility as quickly and as successfully as possible.
Today, 32 of 44 U.S. combat battalions that are capable of partnering
are fully partnered and conducting daily combined operations with the
ANSF. It is my intent that all U.S. forces will partner with Afghan
units by December 2010.
12. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how long will it take for
American troops to train Afghan forces?
General McChrystal. The process of training the ANSF is a long-term
commitment by U.S. forces that includes three main efforts. The first
is institutional, where soldiers and police receive basic training
through schools and other formalized programs. American forces provide
instructors and advisors to the ANA and ANP training institutions, with
the intention that Afghans take on increasing responsibility for their
own training.
The second training effort for U.S. forces are Embedded Training
Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentor Teams (PMTs), which are provided to
fielded ANA units from the battalion to corps level and to ANP units
from the district to police region level. There are currently two U.S.
BCTs providing ETTs and PMTs: the 48th IBCT and 4/82 IBCT. ETTS and
PMTs will remain with an ANSF unit until that particular unit has
achieved the capability to operate independently.
The third training effort is U.S. partnership with ANSF units. This
partnering is a key tenet of our strategy, and is designed to help the
ANSF build capacity and assume lead security responsibility as quickly
and as successfully as possible. Once units graduate from their
respective institutional training programs, they continue to develop
through their partnership with U.S. and coalition forces.
13. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, when will there be
sufficient and--I stress--fully trained Afghan forces prepared to
protect their own country?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, given the current
proficiency of the ANP Force, will Afghan policemen who were trained
locally--in provinces outside of the new academy in Kabul--be retrained
with the revised law enforcement standards?
General McChrystal. Yes. Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) recruited and
trained locally will complete the ``Basic 8'' 8-week training program.
This program uses a curriculum reviewed by the Department of State's
International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Division and approved by
the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI).
AUP patrolmen are being trained at a Regional Training Center
either individually, or as part of their district through the Focused
District Development Program, or in their home district through the
Directed District Development program. MoI and NTM-A/CSTC-A are
coordinating to maximize the rate of untrained police completing this
reform training.
15. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how effective has the
effort been to reintegrate former Taliban, Northern Alliance, and
Mujahedeen fighters so that they are no longer fighting for the
insurgency?
General McChrystal. The Afghan Government is currently developing
their policy for reintegration, while leveraging lessons from earlier
programs. These previous programs suffered from a shortage of Afghan
political leadership, a lack of fiscal transparency, and deficiencies
in monitoring and accountability of those who joined the program. The
emerging Afghan reintegration policy aims to rectify these problems and
our collaboration with them will help ensure the proper measures are
put in place for a successful program. Once the policy is approved, the
Afghan Government will develop an implementation plan. ISAF is working
with members of the Afghan Government and the international community
on the policy and implementation plan.
WITHDRAWAL
16. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, the President stated that a
responsible withdrawal of troops will begin in summer 2011 but would
also depend on conditions on the ground. What types of conditions would
delay withdrawal or transition?
General McChrystal. The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently
working with our interagency and multinational partners to refine the
benchmarks that we will use to measure progress in light of the
President's new strategy. However, broadly speaking, progress in
Afghanistan will emerge as the ANSF develop the capacity to provide
security for the nation and effective governance and development takes
root. As this happens, the United States and our ISAF partners will
continue to provide overwatch. The pace and locations at which this
process will take place will depend on several factors, the two most
important of which are the performance of the Afghan government at all
levels, and the development of the ANSF. The pace of transition will
occur at a rate consistent with Afghan capacity to manage the security
situation, with requisite support, and preparedness of governance.
A delay in transition could emerge due to any number of factors.
The population is the ultimate arbiter of these conditions based on
their confidence in their security situation. The insurgency is
competing for control of the population through intimidation and
coercion; ISAF and ANSF forces need to provide confidence to the
population. In some areas, the insurgency is sufficiently rooted to a
point where it could take a period of time to generate the necessary
confidence that causes the population to identify and eliminate the
threat. Commensurate with this situation is generation and employment
of ANSF that can effectively maintain security in these areas. Finally,
the pace of transition must be such that there is no deterioration in
the security situation in areas that have undergone the transition
process. Ensuring that the security situation does not regress in areas
that have transitioned may necessitate an adjustment to the pace of
transition based upon conditions on the ground.
17. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, what policy goals and
benchmarks are tied to the withdrawal of forces in Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. DOD is currently working with our interagency
and multinational partners to refine the benchmarks that we will use to
measure progress in light of the President's new strategy. However,
broadly speaking, progress in Afghanistan will emerge as the ANSF
develop the capacity to provide security for their nation and effective
governance and development take root. As this happens, the United
States and our ISAF partners will continue to provide overwatch,
eventually drawing down. The pace and locations at which this process
will take place will depend on several factors, the two most important
of which are the performance of the Afghan government at all levels,
and the development of the ANSF. We will not transfer responsibility to
the Afghans until they have the capacity to manage the situation on
their own.
COST
18. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, the Office of Management
and Budget Director estimated that each additional soldier sent to
Afghanistan will cost $1 million. Is this estimate accurate?
General McChrystal. My staff does not manage the estimate you are
requesting. Those functions are managed by each of the military
departments and then integrated by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
19. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, does this cost estimate
include any contractor support?
General McChrystal. My staff does not manage the additional costs
of contractor support in Afghanistan. Those functions are managed by
each of the military departments and then integrated by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
20. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, I understand that many of
the troop-contributing nations have placed very specific caveats on
what missions and what type of support that they will provide. What, if
any, are the challenges, and do these caveats pose an obstacle to
meeting our stated objectives?
General McChrystal. Military planners consider the constraints and
restraints facing the unit--actions they must do and cannot do.
National caveats are one form of those constraints. They do not prevent
planning or execution, they merely need to be taken into account while
planning.
These caveats do not impact our ability to reach our stated
objectives. Some nations have placed legal caveats, mainly limiting the
use of force by their soldiers, in accordance with their legal system.
Other nations have placed operational caveats, limiting their
operations to a specific area, for instance. We understand these
caveats, put in place by their political authorities, who took into
account their national sensitivities or simply the capabilities of
their forces.
21. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how many ISAF are currently
conducting the mission?
General McChrystal. As of 9 December 2009, coalition forces in
Afghanistan total 109,370.
CONTRACTORS
22. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, will there be an increase
in contractor support based on this troop increase? If so, what
additional costs will be necessary?
General McChrystal. The increase in forces will generate an
increase in contractor support. However, those functions are managed by
each of the military departments and then integrated by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
With the dispersed force laydown throughout the country of
Afghanistan, and the need to ensure the majority of the additional
forces are operators rather than force support personnel, contractors
will be necessary to provide the supplies, services, and construction
needs of establishing new and expanding current base camps; as well as
logistic and other noncombat related services, such as dining
facilities. Contract Support Integration ensures contracted support is
planned, defined, prioritized, and validated prior to being delivered
to the joint force. Contracted support is considered throughout the
planning process to ensure mission success.
With regard to necessary additional costs, this amount is not
readily available as it depends on the timing of both the force flow
and duration of need; the existing capability of facilities at new
beddown locations; and the division of support between the civil
augmentation program contracts and local procurement, among others. I
assure you, our contracting professionals regularly seek more efficient
and cost effective ways to provide support, while the requirement
determination and review processes ensure procurement of only valid
requirements.
23. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, which American contracting
companies are supporting the training of the ANP?
General McChrystal. U.S. Training Center trains the Afghan Border
Police; DynCorps trains the Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan National
Civil Order Police.
24. Senator Burris. General McChrystal, how long have contactors
been assigned this task, and how long will they stay should their
contract be renewed?
General McChrystal. U.S. Training Center has held the Afghan Border
Police contract since September 2008. The contract will expire in
August 2010. DynCorp has held the Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan
National Civil Order Police since August 2008. The contract will expire
in March 2010. The replacement for both contracts is in the award
process with an anticipated award of no later than March 2010.
PRESIDENT KARZAI
25. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, I assume that we have as
part of our goals to address governance and corruption. In his
inauguration, President Hamid Karzai stated that he was going to fight
corruption. What tangible steps has he outlined?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
26. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, what is President Karzai
doing to increase transparency in the appointment of provincial and
ministerial posts?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
AGRICULTURE
27. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, overall development of
the Afghan economy appears to be at a standstill and further
agricultural development is necessary. What is being done to provide
security for farmers who do not grow poppy so that the Taliban does not
intimidate the farmers?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
28. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, is there a comprehensive
agricultural development strategy?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
29. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, diplomatic effort is
essential to the stability and governance of Afghanistan. What is the
division of responsibility between Ambassador Holbrooke, Deputy
Ambassador Ricciardone, and yourself?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
30. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, can you describe how and
the extent of coordination between yourself and Ambassador Holbrooke?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
31. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, what is the overall plan
for reconstruction and who is leading the effort?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
32. Senator Burris. Ambassador Eikenberry, are relief and other
reconstruction efforts aided or hampered by the presence of the
Provincial Reconstruction Team? Does this vary by region?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
ENABLERS
33. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, what is your plan for
and how many enablers are required to support the additional 30,000
combat forces ordered to Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. The 30,000 additional forces include
approximately 12,500 enablers. These enablers include personnel with
expertise in military intelligence, route clearance, aviation, and
numerous other capabilities which allow forces to properly conduct
their assigned missions.
AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES
34. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, what is your
assessment of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and other
local security forces?
General McChrystal. The AP3 is fulfilling its intent of providing
security at the local level with forces recruited from the same
communities they serve. We are beginning to see a reduced requirement
for the presence and employment of coalition forces for security
purposes in areas where the AP3 forces are currently being utilized.
With regards to other local security forces, the Local Defense
Initiative remains in nascent stages of development but has been
operationalized in three communities. The program has had positive
effects in these communities to include increased security, cooperation
with GIRoA, and the beginnings of economic development. However, while
AP3 has shown some small successes, it is important to remember local
security initiatives that work in some regions are not necessarily
transferable to all parts of the country.
35. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, are there plans to
expand this program to other areas of Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. There are no plans to expand the AP3 beyond
Wardak Province at this time.
PAKISTAN
36. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal and Ambassador
Eikenberry, how will the stability of Pakistan be affected by the surge
of troops in Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. Your question would be best served by asking
Admiral Mullen or General Petraeus, both of whom have Pakistan within
their respective areas of responsibility.
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
37. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, what type of border
coordination is taking place between the United States and ISAF, and
the Pakistani military and Pakistani civilian government to ensure that
Taliban fighters are engaged once they cross the border into Pakistan?
General McChrystal. Coordination between ISAF and Pakistan occurs
at a variety of levels. At the tactical level, radios have been
distributed to the Pakistan military (PAKMIL) and Pakistan Frontier
Corps. These radios are used to coordinate and deconflict kinetic
activities. Additionally, computer systems are being added to PAKMIL
and Frontier Corps Battalions that will allow email communication
between units across the border. The radios and computer systems
improve situational awareness and coordination between coalition and
Pakistan units, allowing coalition and Pakistan forces to effectively
execute cross border direct and indirect fires against malign actors.
At the operational level, Border Coordination Centers (BCCs)
improve situational awareness between the coalition and Pakistani
security forces. BCCs are made up of officers from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the coalition that work as a team to deconflict fires and
reduce tension along the border. BCCs have been very successful as a
confidence building measure and have improved coordination and resolved
border issues at the lowest levels.
At the strategic level, ISAF has two organizations that work to
deconflict issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan: the Tripartite
Joint Intelligence Operations Center (T-JIOC) and the Border Issues
Working Group (BIWG). The T-JIOC, established in 2007, brings senior
Afghan and PAKMIL officers together to address border issues and keep
each nation informed of operations and issues that impact the two
nations. Since 2009, the BIWG has brought embassies, international
organizations, GIRoA, and ISAF together to focus on issues that impact
Afghanistan's borders.
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
38. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, how has the
streamlining of your command--overseeing ISAF and U.S. forces in
Afghanistan--affected coordination and cooperation at the tactical and
strategic level?
General McChrystal. The establishment of the ISAF Joint Command
(IJC) and NTM-A has greatly increased the efficiency of command and
control. It is important to understand that prior to the establishment
of these three-star commands, ISAF was providing the direction and
guidance to the five regional commands, coordinating force generation
with the CSTC-A, responding to the NATO command channels via Joint
Forces Command-Brunssum and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,
while also conducting coordination with the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to address issues from the strategic to
the tactical level. Creation of the IJC and NTM-A has allowed ISAF to
focus ``up and out,'' for increased coordination with our partners in
GIRoA and the international community in Kabul and to communicate
ISAF's requirements more clearly to NATO. By providing direction and
guidance to the IJC and NTM-A, ISAF can focus attention on the efforts
that enable the subordinates to accomplish assigned missions. In the
case of the IJC, by focusing ``down and in,'' they are able to provide
greater operational direction and guidance to the regional commands,
coordinating their efforts in a manner that has not occurred
previously.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. General McChrystal, the additional marines
ordered to deploy to Afghanistan will do so as a Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF). Please describe how the Marines' air combat element will
fit into the other air force elements supporting ISAF. Please describe
the command and control plan for combat air support, medical
evacuation, and air transportation and logistics. Will all air elements
fall under the same structure? How are they different?
General McChrystal. The MAGTF Commander retains operational control
of all organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation
combat element is support of the MAGTF ground combat element. U.S.
Marine Corps aviation fits into the Combined Force Air Component
Commander (CFACC) operational design by its inclusion in the Air
Tasking Order and operating under the direction of the Airspace Control
Plan.
The CFACC, as the airspace control authority, directs the
employment of the theater air ground system that orchestrates the
command and control of air operations. The Marines contribute by
executing air command and control within the MAGTF AORs, by providing
the CFACC with a radar control facility, and by providing excess
sorties and theater aviation support as required.
Medical evacuation in RC(S) in Afghanistan is conducted by special
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) crews provided by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air
Force, and the U.K. Royal Air Force. These forces are geographically
distributed throughout the battlespace to meet casualty movement needs.
They launch in support of MEDEVAC missions when notified by RC(S),
though their command relationships vary. All of these commanders retain
launch authority for MEDEVAC missions while RC(S) holds release
authority.
All non-U.S. Marine Corps aviation units fall under the same
structure: the theater air ground system. Marine aviation differs
because they are operationally controlled by the MAGTF when in the
MAGTF AORs.
40. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, in the past, U.S.
Forces in Afghanistan, ISAF, the United Nations, and U.S. Agency for
International Development maintained separate lists of completed and
existing development projects in Afghanistan. What is the status of
effort to coordinate and streamline theses lists between the various
actors?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
41. Ambassador Eikenberry, how is this effort being coordinated
with the various Afghan ministries?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
42. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, what are your
thoughts on the prospects of negotiating with elements of the Taliban?
The Government of Japan has sponsored some discussions along these
lines--would the United States consider playing a larger role in such
discussions?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
43. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, Germany and France
are spearheading an international conference on Afghanistan within the
next several months. Will Iran be included in this conference?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
44. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, can you comment on
Iran's political and economic involvement in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
45. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, General McChrystal
mentioned in his testimony that Iran is providing financial assistance
to the Taliban. Do you share this assessment?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
46. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Eikenberry, what are the main
sources of funding for the Taliban?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
TROOP INCREASE
47. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, a former Commandant of the
Marine Corps once said that ``Amateurs talk about tactics, but
professionals study logistics.'' Unlike Iraq, where U.S. forces surged
with the crucial assistance of neighboring countries and an advanced
infrastructure network, we're about to surge at least 30,000 troops and
their equipment into one of the most austere and undeveloped areas of
the world in the dead of winter. A senior Army logistician was quoted
in the December 7 edition of Defense News as saying, ''Where do you put
all these people? Life is going to suck for the first 30, 60, 90
days.'' The Washington Post reported on Secretary Gates' recent
surprise visit to Afghanistan that ``he would seek soldiers' views on
`the way forward.' That might include issues such as whether their
equipment is adequate and whether they are ready to handle the
difficult logistics of quickly moving 30,000 fresh troops into the
country.'' The Post went on to quote Secretary Gates that ``It is going
to be a heavy lift, there's no question about it.'' I want to ensure
that we have a plan in place to ensure that this surge of forces is
accomplished in a manner that does not present unnecessary risks beyond
what will be asked of them in success of their mission. Are you
currently requesting 30,000 or 33,000 total personnel?
General McChrystal. I did not submit a request for any specific
number of forces. As directed by my U.S. and NATO commanders, I
provided my best military advice as the Commander, ISAF and the
Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan up the appropriate military chains
of command. This advice contained a recommendation for multiple force
levels and their associated risks.
48. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, given the cap on the number
of troops you will receive--what is the right mix of combat forces,
trainers, support forces, and other combat enablers in order to meet
your objectives?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
49. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, as your deployment plan
develops, do you feel you have the flexibility as the warfighting
commander to ask for additional forces above and beyond 33,000 in order
to accomplish your objectives?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
50. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, when do you expect to have
the surge combat forces you have requested on the ground in Afghanistan
and fully operational?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
51. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, how much of the success of
your mission relies on the accelerated flow and onward movement of
these forces throughout Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. As I indicated in my opening remarks, time is
critical. The insurgents have established momentum, particularly in the
south. The rapid deployment of forces to key population centers is the
critical factor in reversing this trend. Introducing additional
coalition troops as a bridging force will buy time and space for the
ANA and National Police to grow in both size and capability.
Additionally, I believe that increased security, combined with a
commensurate uplift in civil capability, will set the conditions for
improved governance and development.
52. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what plans are in place to
ensure that the arriving forces will have the right training (to
include mission rehearsals), equipment, and base support in order for
you to be able to carry out successful missions before the
administration's review in December 2010?
General McChrystal. Each of the Services is responsible for
training their own personnel and I would direct you to them for
specifics. ISAF has a Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan
(CTC-A) where we train and educate coalition forces and Afghan security
forces to enhance their capabilities to defeat the current insurgency
and contribute to the stability of Afghanistan. CTC-A also conducts
mobile training to deployed force elements to meet deployed force
specified requirements as well as conducts a monthly central COIN
leaders course in Kabul. ISAF's Counterinsurgency Advisory and
Assistance Team also visits NATO training centers, coalition forces
combat support units, and key members of the intelligence community to
develop the skills necessary for counterinsurgency operations.
53. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, does the current plan for
the surge of forces ensure that arriving units will have all the
vehicles, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and
equipment they need for missions in high altitude and rugged terrain?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
54. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what risks and challenges
are inherent in an accelerated deployment schedule?
General McChrystal. There are several challenges and risks
associated with a deployment of a force this size in the timeframe
demanded by the current strategic situation. I will focus my answer on
three key factors that may influence the force flow. The first of these
is the ability of Afghanistan's infrastructure to absorb and support a
rapidly deploying force. This requires significant engineering and
construction efforts. For example, we must provide water to our troops
while minimizing the impact on the local population. This will
challenge our engineers and logisticians to develop innovative
solutions to problems that at first glance appear to have simple
solutions. Second, the provision of Theatre Provided Equipment, (i.e
material required for operations in Afghanistan that is not a part of a
unit's peacetime inventory) will test our ability to identify sourcing,
transport these materials, and prioritize our resources. The competing
demands of resourcing a responsible draw down of forces in Iraq and
flowing additional troops into Afghanistan may necessitate a
reapportionment of specialized and low density equipment. Finally,
managing dwell time for our returning servicemembers while
simultaneously responsibly drawing down in Iraq will test our ability
to meet a compressed timeline. Ultimately, I am confident that we will
deliver a force that is appropriately trained, equipped, and ready to
execute the mission.
55. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, how do you plan to mitigate
these risks?
General McChrystal. The ISAF plan, developed in coordination with
CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, and Joint Forces Command, addresses the challenges
of this deployment. We are working to increase the capacity and
throughput of Afghanistan's airfields. The acquisition of land and
subsequent base construction are already underway. Without compromising
force protection, initial modifications of base construction standards
will greatly increase our ability to absorb the incoming forces.
Coordination to increase both production and delivery of theater
provided equipment began in early December. We will address this
challenge by prioritizing equipment flows into theater and by deploying
special teams and leadership to assist in planning and managing the
flow. This will ensure that the troops who need it the most are
provided with required equipment as they arrive. Finally, we are
working closely with CENTCOM and Joint Forces Command to ensure that
our units are appropriately supported by critical enablers.
56. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, if the Services are delayed
in flowing the resources you have requested, do you feel you have the
flexibility to ask for extra time before conducting a formal review of
the benchmarks and indicators?
General McChrystal. My leadership at all levels continues to be
fully supportive of the mission and cognizant of the most critical
aspects of the campaign, including the challenges associated with
flowing resources into the Afghanistan theater.
57. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what will need to be done
to ensure we can adequately resupply 100,000 U.S. troops in a country
with extremely limited infrastructure and limited routes into the
country?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
58. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what will be the most
significant supply challenges?
General McChrystal. The most significant supply challenge will be
ensuring the ground lines of communication allow for the maximum of
throughput at the traditional choke points, mainly the border crossing
points, in a timely, safe manner to get the ground supplies to the
forces beyond our operational logistics hubs. As we improve the Afghan
Border Police and increase partners in these critical areas, we will
implement sufficient control to ensure friendly force throughout
operates at maximum efficiency.
59. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, on the specific issue of
rotary wing assets which seem to be a high demand asset for both U.S.
and coalition forces, the Army's OH-58D Kiowa Warriors have only
limited lift capability in Afghanistan's thin air. Does the current
flow of forces provide for adequate numbers of utility and attack
helicopters and aviation support personnel early enough in 2010 to
support the full range of counterinsurgency operations throughout the
country?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
60. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, please explain why your new
strategy and the many additional troops you will receive can bring
success in Afghanistan when past efforts have not fully done so?
General McChrystal. There are three key aspects of the current
campaign that differentiates it from previous ISAF strategies: (1) A
change in the operational culture; (2) Embedded partnering; and (3)
Adequate resources.
The ISAF counterinsurgency strategy brings with it a clear mandate
to protect the population. This orientation ensures that there is a
distinct difference in how we interact with the population, in both
word and deed, compared to the insurgent. This difference will be
recognizable to the population.
Second, employing embedded partnering is the most expeditious way
to build a competent and confident counterinsurgency capable force.
Embedded partnering differs from past partnering methods in that the
partnership does not end at the gates of the respective force operating
bases. Afghan and ISAF partners live together, plan together, execute
operations jointly, and return to the same location to debrief the
operation. It allows for ISAF to quickly learn the critical cultural
aspects of the counterinsurgency environment while our partners receive
the reciprocal benefits of force professionalization through
observation and imitation.
Finally, the forces directed by the President provide a bridging
force to allow time and space for ANSF growth and a catalyst force that
allows us to partner at substantially improved ratios. Previous
personnel increases have arrived in theater behind the pace of the
insurgency. At best, the previous additional forces were able to
prevent the insurgency's ability to achieve their goals without being
able to reverse the momentum of their growth.
AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
61. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, the Washington Post
reported this morning in an interview with Admiral Mike Mullen that,
``To speed the flow of U.S. troops into Afghanistan, Mullen said the
United States will build at least one new airfield in the land-locked
country to accommodate U.S. cargo planes carrying new mine-resistant
vehicles and weaponry.'' Where are you planning to build this airfield?
General McChrystal. Between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2012,
USFOR-A is planning almost $1 billion in improvements to 15 airfields
across Afghanistan. There are other ongoing airfield projects at
locations such as a $167 million effort to construct a runway,
strategic parking apron, and a rotary wing ramp at Camp Bastion, due
for completion in December 2010.
62. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, when will you need to have
this airfields constructed in order to support surge forces?
General McChrystal. The airfields being programmed and the one
being constructed at Camp Bastion will not be completed in time for the
arrival of the troop increase. These airfields will be used for
sustainment/resupply and to support combat operations.
63. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, will this be the only
significant investment in infrastructure and new bases required to
support the surge? If not, can you provide what other infrastructure
requirements you have identified are needed to support the additional
troops?
General McChrystal. To support the troop increase, USFOR-A
submitted to CENTCOM almost $500 million in other infrastructure
improvements as part of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental MILCON call.
These projects include improvements to airfields, fuel and munitions
storage areas, utility systems, and operations facilities.
DRUG TRAFFICKING
64. Senator McCain. General McChrystal, what are ISAF's common
rules of engagement and/or strategy with respect to interdicting narco-
traffickers?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
CIVILIANS
65. Senator McCain. Ambassador Eikenberry, you have a lot of
experience in Afghanistan. I'm not interested in the number of
civilians we are now fielding, but in what they will do. Please explain
how our current civilian strategy and operations are different than
what we have done before, and why we can achieve success now when past
efforts have not fully done so.
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
66. Senator McCain. Ambassador Eikenberry, the President greatly
accelerated the deployment of U.S. forces to the middle of next year.
Will our civilians be fully in place at that time and able to commit
resources as necessary so that our counterinsurgency operations can be
decisive?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
67. Senator McCain. Ambassador Eikenberry, do you have all the
authorities you need to get our civilians into the field rapidly and to
get our assistance programs implemented in a timely manner, with
sufficient resources and flexibility, to achieve your mission?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
MISSION
68. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, last week you said that
President Obama's plan has provided you with ``a clear military
mission.'' Can you please explain, as specifically as possible, what
you understand that mission to be?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
69. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, do you intend to pursue
victory in Afghanistan, and if so, what must you accomplish there to
achieve that goal?
General McChrystal. Ultimately, we want the Afghan people to win.
We have a mission that we will accomplish, but it is in support of the
Afghan people. We must defeat al Qaeda, disrupt the Taliban, and to
assist with the growth and development of the ANSF.
70. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, do you realistically expect
a significant number of U.S. troops to begin withdrawing from
Afghanistan by July 2011? What is the likelihood of this occurring?
General McChrystal. As the President articulated in his 1 December
announcement, U.S. combat forces will begin the process of withdrawal
in July 2011. I will comply with the President's guidance, but the pace
of the withdrawal is to be determined, as stated by the President, by
conditions on the ground.
71. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, do you consider our
diplomatic and so-called ``capacity-building'' efforts in Afghanistan
to be simply another form of ``nation building?'' Why or why not? If
not, can you please explain the difference between our development
efforts in Afghanistan and ``nation building,'' which the President has
indicated that he does not wish to do?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
AIRSTRIKES
72. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, this summer, you issued new
rules restricting the use of airstrikes in an effort to reduce civilian
casualties. Have these rules in any way increased the danger to U.S.
troops in Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. I do not know of any incidents where these
rules have directly resulted in increasing the danger to our troops.
The Tactical Directive does not prevent troops from protecting
themselves as a matter of self-defense. The restrictions described in
the Tactical Directive create much less risk than the greater longer-
term danger posed to U.S. troops from sustained insurgent
determination, resolve, and recruitment brought about by indiscriminate
use of airstrikes and consequent civilian casualties.
73. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, to your knowledge, have any
troops been killed as a result of delayed or denied airstrikes that
would have been allowed under the previous rules?
General McChrystal. No. The Tactical Directive does not prevent
troops from protecting themselves as a matter of self defense. The
restrictions described in the Tactical Directive create much less risk
than the greater longer-term danger posed to U.S. troops from sustained
insurgent determination, resolve, and recruitment brought about by
indiscriminate use of airstrikes and consequent civilian casualties.
PAKISTAN
74. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, what is the status of your
working relationship with Pakistani military leaders?
General McChrystal. Very good. I regularly meet with General Kayani
and our staffs have a solid working relationship.
75. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, how would you characterize
their support of the President's new plan for the region?
General McChrystal. Pakistan's leaders recognize that extremist
groups pose an existential threat to Pakistan's national security. They
recognize that Afghanistan and Pakistan stability are inextricably
linked as extremist threats transcend regional boundaries.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT FORCE
76. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, what is the status of the
request for additional NATO troops?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
77. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, how many of our allies have
pledged troops since the President's speech last week, and how many
troops do they intend to send?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
CIVILIANS
78. Senator Vitter. General McChrystal, what is being done by non-
military civilian roles to mitigate potential insurgent agendas?
General McChrystal. Civilians in the U.S. Embassy work closely with
the military. I personally meet with Ambassador Eikenberry on weekly
basis to coordinate civil-military issues, and our staffs have multiple
meetings where we communicate. As for their specific roles, Ambassador
Eikenberry is better suited to answer your question.
79. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, does the Civilian
Response Corps have a role to play alongside the military in bolstering
the commitment the United States has in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
AFGHANISTAN'S GOVERNMENT
80. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, what is your status of
the overall stability of the Karzai Government?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
81. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, do you still believe
that it is unwise to send additional American troops until the systemic
corruption is addressed? Why or why not?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
82. Senator Vitter. Ambassador Eikenberry, can you provide an
estimate of how much foreign aid, diplomatic spending, and economic
development money has been allocated to the Karzai Government since
Karzai initially took office? Of that amount, what percentage has
ultimately been spent on the purposes for which it was originally
intended?
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
TROOP TIMELINE
83. Senator Collins. General McChrystal, optimistically speaking,
if all goes as the administration plans, how long do you envision U.S.
troops would be needed in Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. [Deleted.]
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH
84. Senator Collins. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal,
last week, the President announced his decision not only to the
American people, but also to the people of Afghanistan, including
President Karzai. What message do you think President Karzai received
from the President's speech? Did he hear that the United States is
sending more troops to do his job for him or did he hear ``you have
until July 2011 to get your act together?''
Ambassador Eikenberry did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
General McChrystal. The President's speech conveyed a clear message
that we seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect.
In President Obama's words, we will ``forge a lasting friendship in
which America is [Afghanistan's] partner, and never [their] patron.''
The President's decision to deploy additional forces demonstrates
the right level of commitment to reverse the insurgency's momentum, and
build sustainable Afghan capabilities. Rather than do the job for the
Afghans, our approach toward training the Afghan security forces is to
partner with them at every level so that, as the President noted,
``more Afghans can get into the fight.''
Both President Obama's West Point speech and President Karzai's
inauguration remarks indicated a shared commitment to improve
governance and hold those who are ineffective or corrupt accountable.
We stand together with our allies, partners, and the Afghan Government
to help Afghans assume an ever-increasing role in establishing and
maintaining their security.
[Whereupon, at 5:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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