[Senate Hearing 111-312]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-312
NORTH KOREA BACK AT THE BRINK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 11, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Bosworth, Ambassador Stephen, Sprecial Representative for North
Korea Policy, Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 56
Cha, Dr. Victor D., senior adviser and Korea Chair, CSIS, D.S.
Song Professor of Government and Asia Studies, Georgetown
University, Washington, DC..................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lindborg, Nancy, president, Mercy Corps, Washington, DC.......... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Revere, Evans J.R., president, the Korea Society, New York, NY... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Sigal, Leon V., director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security
Project at the Social Science Research Council, Brooklyn, NY... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 38
(iii)
NORTH KOREA: BACK AT THE BRINK?
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen,
Lugar, Corker, DeMint, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
We're here today to discuss recent troubling developments
in the Korean Peninsula and the road ahead in dealing with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
We're going to hear first from the administration's point
man on North Korea and my friend and constituent, Ambassador
Stephen Bosworth, the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University.
We'll also hear an expert panel of witnesses who together
have more than 100 years of experience dealing with the
challenges that we face in North Korea.
North Korea's test of a long-range ballistic missile last
April, followed by its second nuclear test last month, are,
frankly, reckless and irresponsible acts that do nothing to
advance North Korea's security.
I was pleased to see that last night in New York the
Permanent Five Members of the U.N. Security Council agreed to
speak with one voice and tell North Korea that its conduct is
unacceptable. The Draft Security Council resolution which we
expect to be voted on soon imposes a sweeping new arms embargo
on North Korea and also bans financial transactions linked to
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.
Significantly, it calls upon Member States to inspect all
cargo to and from North Korea on the high seas, at seaports,
and at airports if countries have reason to believe the cargo
contains material related to North Korea's nuclear program or
other weapons programs.
The Obama administration should be commended for this
strong united outcome and China deserves recognition, as well.
As North Korea's ally and largest trading partner, China
can play a decisive role in the peaceful resolution of this
crisis. I was in China when North Korea conducted its second
nuclear test and I am convinced, based on the meetings I had
and the language used as well as the body language interpreted,
that China shares our opposition to the North's pursuit of
nuclear weapons.
We can all be forgiven for feeling that we've been here
before. As one knowledgeable observer wrote to me recently, we
are now ``hip deep into the third North Korean nuclear
crisis.''
The first crisis ended in 1994 with the signing of the
agreed framework which froze the North's production of
plutonium for 8 years. In 2002, the Bush administration
confronted North Korea with allegations that it was cheating on
the framework, but the Bush administration ruled out direct
talks to resolve the issue. The result was the second nuclear
crisis: the demise of the agreed framework itself, North
Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the quadrupling of North Korea's stockpile of fissile
material.
So today, we confront a more dangerous North Korea that
says it is determined to bolster its nuclear deterrent in
defiance of its neighbors and other members of the
international community.
How we deal with North Korea this time around will have
grave implications not just for maintaining peace and stability
in Northeast Asia, for our alliances with South Korea and
Japan, but it will particularly have an impact on our ongoing
nonproliferation efforts with respect to Iran and any other
would-be nuclear power.
Step 1 is to get a unified response from the United
Nations. That result appears to be eminent. But then we must
resist the temptation to go into a defensive crouch. The past
teaches us that benign neglect is not a viable option. America
must lead efforts to stop the current negative cycle of action
and reaction and begin the hard diplomatic work needed to
deliver results.
As we seek to engage, we should remember the counsel of
former Secretary of Defense William Perry who advised us to
deal with North Korea ``as it is, not as we would wish it to
be. We should not assume that North Korea sees the world the
way we do.''
Recent developments should convince us to test our
assumptions about North Korea and its motives. For instance,
when I was in China discussing this with Chinese leaders, it
was clear that there are a number of reasons for North Korea's
current actions. One begs the question, Is North Korea really
just trying to get our attention in a fairly sophomoric but
nevertheless extraordinarily dangerous way?
The fact is they already had our attention. From day one,
the Obama administration made a point of offering to engage
directly and given the events of the past 6 months, it seems
equally possible that North Korea is simply consumed with its
internal leadership succession issues or possibly even simply
responding to its dislike of the policies of South Korea in the
recent period and that has encouraged it to adopt a brash and
defiant posture against external pressure.
The greatest likelihood--I suspect that Ambassador Bosworth
would agree--is that there's some of all of these involved in
the position that they're taking.
Some observers on the outside have concluded that diplomacy
with North Korea is essentially hopeless. Well, I completely
and bluntly disagree with that, as I'm confident Ambassador
Bosworth does. It's an imperfect tool, but the fact is that
even with North Korea, when we engaged in diplomacy, diplomacy
paid some dividends and it could again in the future.
So finally, there's a common assumption that North Korea
will sell anything to anyone. North Korea's export of nuclear
technology to Syria appears to prove that case, but I believe,
and I think many share this and the President included, that
it's worth testing whether a combination of multilateral
enforcement initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security
Initiative, combined with cooperative threat reduction efforts
championed by Senator Lugar, that those could alter the North's
conduct.
As we test our assumptions, and it's important that we do,
and examine our options, we have to consider not only who's at
the table but also whether to attempt to reinvigorate the six-
party talks, launch bilateral negotiations, or devise a new
architecture.
We also have to consider how to prioritize the many issues
that demand attention, including nuclear proliferation, human
rights, regional peace and security, economic development, and
humanitarian concerns.
I personally believe that we can get back to the six-party
talks, that we should get back to them, and I believe we will
get back to them. I also believe that bilateral is an important
route to simultaneously take and I have said so for any number
of years.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on each of
these questions. Let me just say one quick word before passing
it to Senator Lugar.
I know I speak for every single member of this committee
and for every American when we express how deeply concerned we
are on a purely humanitarian basis, the basis of common sense
and decency, how deeply concerned we are for the fate of two
American journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, who are under
detention in North Korea.
We are offended by the severity and excess of the sentence
which was pronounced on them and we hope that common sense is
going to prevail and that North Korea will see this not as an
opportunity to further dig a hole but as an opportunity to open
up and reach out to the world, to suggest there is a better way
to try to deal with all of these issues.
We urge North Korea to do what is right and we urge them to
do it promptly and unconditionally and to release those young
women from custody.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATE FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing to review the present situation in North
Korea.
The recent provocative actions by North Korea that you've
cited are moving that country toward even greater isolation.
Almost universally, the international community has condemned
North Korea's nuclear test, missile launches, detention of
American reporters, and bellicose remarks.
There's wide speculation about the motivations for North
Korea's behavior. Some observers point to dynamics within North
Korea surrounding the eventual leadership transition of
Chairman Kim Jong-il. They suggest that an array of top
security service officials and military leaders are positioning
themselves in the transition entry by pressing for hard-line
actions, from threatening to shoot down aircraft to stopping
the distribution of American food aid by NGOs and even the
World Food Programme.
Regardless of motivation, North Korea has been engaging in
a new level of international provocation. It's urgent that the
United States and its partners develop policies that are clear
and consistent. They should be willing to engage the North
Koreans but there must be greater certainty that provocative
steps by Pyongyang will result in predictable and meaningful
consequences for the North Korean regime.
I support a full review of the United States policy toward
North Korea. Secretary Clinton has said that the administration
is considering all options in responding to North Korea's
latest actions and I look forward to hearing additional details
about this review from our first witness today, Ambassador
Bosworth.
A number of points should be considered by the
administration as it develops a North Korean strategy. Did the
lack of a strong, unified, and persistent response by China,
Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States to past
provocative actions by North Korea factor into Pyongyang's
decision to proceed with the latest nuclear test?
Do North Korean officials believe their country's
relationships with Iran or Syria will be permitted to develop
without consequence if those relationships include cooperation
on weapons of mass destruction?
What is the nature of the cargo in North Korean planes and
ships arriving in Burma which is sometimes a transit point for
further global destinations?
Russia has been transparent in its cooperation with Burma
in the development of a nuclear reactor, reportedly for medical
research purposes.
Is North Korea contributing to the development of Burma's
nuclear program and, if so, in what way?
What level of international cooperation exists to
scrutinize North Korea's global trading network and its
potential proliferation route, and can such cooperation be
improved?
Is there a clear understanding of the efficacy and current
status of agreements related to the six-party talks and the
North Korean nuclear program? In essence, would any new
negotiations be starting from square one?
The United States and China have cooperated closely in the
six-party process but our priorities are not identical with
regard to North Korea. While the United States is focused on
eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons program, China's
primary concern relates to regional stability, a point not lost
on North Korean officials.
Given recent provocations, have the prospects for more
concerted Chinese actions been improved?
To facilitate the broadest possible base of support for
moving ahead, I encourage the Obama administration officials to
actively consult with Congress as they proceed in developing a
comprehensive North Korea strategy.
I join with Chairman Kerry in welcoming our Ambassador
Stephen Bosworth, Victor Cha and Nancy Lindborg, Evans Revere
and Leon Sigal to today's hearing. We look forward to their
insights and hopefully their inspiration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Those are, as
always, thoughtful and important questions you asked and I'm
confident that we'll get the answers to them in the course of
the afternoon.
Let me just say that we do have two panels today and we'll
try to get everybody through here in an appropriate manner.
Victor Cha is the former Director of Asian Affairs at the
National Security Council and he's a professor at Georgetown
University. Evans Revere is the president of the Korea Society
and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the East
Asia and Pacific Affairs. Leon Sigal is a professor at the
Social Science Research Council in New York and author of
``Disarming Strangers'' which is a diplomatic history of the
1994 Agreed Framework, and Nancy Lindborg is president of Mercy
Corps and has worked inside North Korea to help deliver food
aid to women and children in many parts; the poorest parts of
the country.
So we're greatly appreciative for their expertise and for
being here, and I'd just introduce Ambassador Bosworth. As many
people know, he's one of our most distinguished veterans of
diplomacy in the United States, served in many different posts.
I had the pleasure and Senator Lugar did, also, way back
in--now way back in 1986, I worked very closely with Ambassador
Bosworth and Senator Lugar was then chair and worked very
closely with him on the Philippines and we had many meetings
and many visits to the Philippines as we transitioned to the
democracy with Cory Aquino from the Marcos regime and it was
really an astounding transition and I will say again, as I have
said previously in public, that we were lucky, fortuitous, to
have an ambassador of his skill on the ground helping to move
complicated issues as effectively as he did.
It was an enormous privilege to work with him in that
period and I was greatly impressed then and I think we have
been ever since. So we're delighted you're back on the job.
This is a region you know well and you're the right person for
this job.
Thank you for being with us.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEPHEN BOSWORTH, SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH KOREA POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar. It's a pleasure to be here.
I wish I had more positive news to convey, but it is
nonetheless, I think, very important that we be in the process
of consulting with the Congress, particularly with this
committee and other committees, as we try to move forward.
I will not repeat what the two of you have said with regard
to the situation that we face and what has happened to bring us
to the point at which we now stand. I think you've each
summarized that very completely and very accurately.
I've submitted a written statement for the record. I would
note that the international community has in our judgment,
reached an important moment for the security of Northeast Asia.
If North Korea does not heed the unanimous call of the
international community and return to negotiations to achieve
the irreversible dismantlement of their nuclear and ballistic
missile capacity, the United States and our allies and partners
in the region will need to take the necessary steps to assure
our security in the face of this growing threat. In the
interests of all concerned, we very much hope that North Korea
will choose the path of diplomacy rather than confrontation.
We have seriously embarked upon a four-pronged strategy:
regional consultation, U.N. and bilateral sanctions, defensive
measures, and, if North Korea shows seriousness of purpose,
diplomatic engagement.
First, we are consulting with our allies and partners in
Asia, especially those who have been involved with us in recent
years in the six-party talks to ensure a denuclearized North
Korea. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have been in the
forefront of this effort, reaching out to leaders in Japan,
South Korea, China and Russia, to emphasize the importance of
the international community, conveying a desire for a strong,
unified response to Pyongyang that it will suffer consequences
if it does not reverse course.
Last week I participated in a mission to Japan, the
Republic of Korea and China, led by Deputy Secretary of State
James Steinberg, where we reiterated this point.
I can say that our partners share our view that North
Korea's nuclear and missile threat is a challenge to the
international order and a hindrance to lasting stability in
Northeast Asia that must be addressed.
We found that our Asian partners agree that North Korea's
provocative behavior is changing the security situation in
Northeast Asia, and we agreed to take coordinated steps to get
North Korea to reverse its latest provocative steps.
China obviously has an important role to play in
influencing the path North Korea follows. On our recent trip,
we found that China shared a deep concern about North Korea's
recent actions, and a strong commitment to achieve
denuclearization.
Our challenge now is to work with China to turn that
commitment into effective implementation of the U.N. Security
Council resolutions.
Second, we are responding to North Korea's actions with new
measures designed to raise the cost to North Korea of going
down this dangerous path. We are working with other Security
Council members on a range of measures to prevent North Korea
from engaging in the proliferation of dangerous technologies
and to dry up the funding for its nuclear- and missile-related
entities and other companies.
Third, we are, in conjunction with our allies, taking
prudent steps to implement defensive measures aimed at
enhancing our military capacity and our extended deterrence in
the region.
On our recent mission, we began to outline a future plan of
responses and defensive measures that the United States and its
allies will take should North Korea refuse to adjust course and
should it continue to implement its announced plans for
provocative behavior, including future missile or nuclear
tests.
We are committed to do what is necessary to protect the
American people and to honor our commitments to our treaty
allies.
Fourth and far from least important, we remain willing to
engage North Korea to resolve our differences through
diplomacy. A central tenet of the Obama administration's
foreign policy approach to date has been a willingness to
engage in dialogue with those with whom we have had
differences, sometimes very serious differences.
From the beginning, this has been the approach we have
pursued with North Korea, but so far North Korea has not
responded in kind.
On our recent trip, we made clear that the United States
remains open to bilateral dialogue with North Korea in
conjunction with a multilateral effort to achieve the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As we have stated
repeatedly, the United States has no hostile intent toward the
people of North Korea, nor are we threatening to change the
North Korean regime through force. We remain committed to the
September 2005 Joint Statement from the six-party talks, the
core goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula through peaceful means.
We believe it benefits North Korea's own best interests to
return to serious negotiations to pursue this goal. The United
States position remains unchanged. We will not accept North
Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
In short, Mr. Chairman, diplomatic outreach will remain
possible if North Korea shows an interest in abiding by its
international obligations and improving its relations with the
outside world. If not, the United States will do what it must
do to provide for our own security and that of our allies.
We will work with the international community to take
defensive measures and to bring pressure to bear on North Korea
to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The choices for
the future are North Korea's.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. Before I
respond to any questions you might have, I would like to
mention an important humanitarian matter that is unrelated to
the political and security issues I have just addressed, the
conviction and sentencing this past Monday of two American
journalists in Pyongyang.
As Secretary Clinton has said, we appeal to North Korean
authorities on humanitarian grounds to release these two women
and return them to their families.
Due to Privacy Act considerations, I am not able to answer
questions about our detained citizens in this public hearing,
but the Department of State and the Secretary of State
appreciates the interest we have received from Members of
Congress.
I can assure you we are pursuing every possible approach in
order to persuade the North Koreans to release them and send
these women home.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
questions of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bosworth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, Special
Representative for North Korea Policy, Department of State, Washington,
DC
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify today about one of our most
important foreign policy challenges, that of North Korea's nuclear and
missile threats.
background
North Korea's April 5 test of a Taepodong-2 missile and its May 25
nuclear test were serious and unacceptable threats to international
peace and security that violated existing Security Council resolutions
and raised questions about North Korea's intentions to honor its
commitments to achieve complete and verifiable denuclearization. After
the April missile test, the U.N. Security Council condemned the launch
and tightened sanctions against North Korea's missile and military
programs. In response, North Korea then threatened other dangerous and
provocative measures, including conducting another nuclear test, if the
Security Council did not ``apologize'' to North Korea. On May 25, North
Korea conducted what it announced to the world as an underground
nuclear test. In immediately condemning this behavior, President Obama
noted that North Korea's actions pose a ``direct and reckless
challenge'' to the international community.
As a result of North Korea's actions, the international community
has reached an important moment for the security of Northeast Asia. If
North Korea does not heed the unanimous call of the international
community and return to negotiations to achieve the irreversible
dismantlement of their nuclear and ballistic missile capacity, the
United States and our allies in the region will need to take the
necessary steps to assure our security in the face of this growing
threat. In the interest of all concerned, we hope that North Korea will
choose the path of diplomacy rather than confrontation.
u.s. responses
To meet the challenge of North Korea's recent actions, the United
States is acting promptly and seriously through a four-pronged
strategy: Close regional consultation and cooperation, U.N. and
national sanctions, appropriate defensive measures and, if North Korea
shows serious willingness, diplomatic engagement to negotiate a path to
denuclearization.
First, we are consulting with our allies and partners in Asia,
especially those who have worked in recent years through the six-party
talks to ensure a denuclearized North Korea. President Obama and
Secretary Clinton have been in the forefront of this effort, reaching
out to leaders in Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia to emphasize
the importance of the international community conveying a strong,
unified response to Pyongyang that it will suffer consequences if it
does not reverse course. Last week, I participated in a mission to
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China, led by Deputy Secretary of
State James Steinberg, where we reiterated this point. Our partners
share our view that North Korea's nuclear and missile threat is a
challenge to the international order and a hindrance to lasting
stability in Northeast Asia that must be addressed. We found that our
Asian partners agree that North Korea's provocative behavior is
changing the security situation in Northeast Asia. We agreed to take
coordinated steps to get North Korea to reverse its latest provocative
steps.
As North Korea's neighbor, traditional ally, and primary aid and
trade partner, China has an important role to play in influencing the
path North Korea follows. On our recent trip, we found that China
shared a deep concern about North Korea's recent actions, and a strong
commitment to achieve denuclearization. Our challenge now is to work
with China to turn that commitment into effective implementation of the
UNSC resolutions.
Second, we are responding to North Korea's provocative actions with
new measures designed to raise the cost to North Korea for going down
this dangerous path. We are working with other Security Council members
on a range of measures to prevent North Korea from engaging in the
proliferation of dangerous technologies and to dry up funding for its
nuclear and missile-related entities and other companies.
Third, we are, in conjunction with our allies, taking prudent steps
to implement defensive measures aimed at enhancing our military
capacity and our extended deterrence in the region. On our recent
mission, we began to outline a future plan of responses and defensive
measures that the United States and its allies will take should North
Korea refuse to adjust course and should it continue its announced
plans for provocative behavior, including future missile or nuclear
tests. We are committed to do what is necessary to protect the American
people and to honor our commitment to our treaty allies.
Fourth and finally, we remain willing to engage North Korea to
resolve our differences through diplomacy, including bilaterally,
within the framework of the six-party process. A central tenet of the
Obama administration's foreign policy approach to date has been a
willingness to engage in dialogue with those with which we have had
differences, sometimes very serious differences. From the beginning,
this has been the approach we have pursued with North Korea. But North
Korea greeted the open hand of the new administration with preparations
to launch a ballistic missile. When I was appointed by the President
and Secretary Clinton, I proposed to the North Koreans a visit to
Pyongyang, in the spirit of engagement, rather than threat. To this
day, I have received no response.
On our trip, we made clear that the United States remains open to
bilateral dialogue with North Korea in conjunction with the
multilateral effort to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. As we have repeatedly stated, the United States has no
hostile intent toward the people of North Korea, nor are we threatening
to change the North Korean regime through force. We remain committed to
the September 2005 Joint Statement from the six-party talks, the core
goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula through peaceful means. We believe it benefits North Korea's
own best interests to return to serious negotiations to pursue this
goal. The United States position remains unchanged: We will not accept
North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
In conclusion, diplomatic outreach will remain possible if North
Korea shows an interest in abiding by its international obligations and
improving its relations with the outside world. If not, the United
States will do what it must do to provide for our security and that of
our allies. We will work with the international community to take
defensive measures and to bring significant pressure to bear for North
Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The choices for the
future are North Korea's.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. Before I take
your questions, I would like to mention an important humanitarian
matter that is unrelated to the political and security issues I have
just addressed--the conviction and sentencing Monday of two American
journalists in Pyongyang. As Secretary Clinton has said, we appeal to
North Korean authorities on humanitarian grounds to release these two
women and return them to their families. Due to Privacy Act
considerations, I am not able to answer questions about our detained
citizens in this public hearing, but the Department of State
appreciates the interest we have received from Members of Congress. I
can assure you we are pursuing every possible approach that we can
consider in order to persuade the North Koreans to release them and
send these young women home.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator.
Senator Wicker. Will there be an opportunity for the
committee to be briefed in an executive session with regard to
the two detainees?
The Chairman. Sure. Absolutely. If you want a briefing, I
think the easiest thing would be if you just want to get on the
telephone and call Secretary Steinberg, I'm confident that
you'll get your briefing or call the Ambassador outside of this
proceeding and he'd be happy to brief you.
Ambassador Bosworth. Certainly.
Senator Wicker. Thanks.
The Chairman. I see we have a vote that has started. What I
think we'll do, Senator, if you're willing, I'll ask--if you
run over and vote, you'll probably get back here in time and
that way we cannot interrupt the proceedings. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, you used some appropriately strong language
and I want to see if we can flesh this out a little bit. You
talked about the consequences. You talked about the challenge
to order. You talked about how this must be addressed. You
talked about how these are provocative steps, several times
using the word ``provocative'' steps. You said they must
reverse their actions and our policy is a verifiable
denuclearization.
I think you've been very clear about how we react to this,
what our goal is, but I want to try to understand a little
better what the range of consequences might be.
I mean, what is coming together--maybe you could even share
with us some framework of these discussions in New York and
give the committee and those listening a sense of what we're
anticipating.
Ambassador Bosworth. I will certainly be happy to try, Mr.
Chairman.
With regard to the discussions in New York, as you can
appreciate, this has been a primary focus of our efforts. The
Security Council is now considering a new resolution that, if
adopted, would impose unprecedented new measures to address the
threat posed by the DPRK's missile and nuclear proliferation
activities and to compel that country to commit itself to
political dialogue and denuclearization.
These measures will give the international community some
new tools to work with on the problem of North Korea. It would
include, if adopted, first a total ban on arms exports and a
major expansion of the ban on arms imports, new financial
sanctions to limit the ability of DPRK to fund its WMD and
ballistic missile-related activities, enhanced Inspection Act
provisions for ships suspected of carrying proscribed goods,
such as weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile parts,
designation of new entities and goods for sanctions, and within
the U.N. Security Council itself improved mechanisms for
monitoring the implementation of these sanctions, which I think
is very important.
That outlines a range of the actions that will take place
and from which, in order to obtain relief, the North Koreans
will have to begin to comply with their earlier commitments and
obligations.
The Chairman. And if they don't?
Ambassador Bosworth. These measures will go forward. As I
stressed, our strong preference is to engage in serious
effective diplomacy with North Korea, and this is not something
that the United States is doing on a unilateral basis. We are
acting very much in concert with our two treaty allies, Japan
and the Republic of South Korea, and in concert with our
partners in the six-party process, namely China and Russia.
The Chairman. What restraints are there at this point on
the diplomatic route being pursued? Has there been a rebuffle--
a rebuff of that? Is there a lack of communication in response
or is there some indication of this opening in the near term?
Ambassador Bosworth. I think there has been no lack of
communication of our concern and what we are prepared to do.
North Korea has been listening. We have some degree of
confidence. So far we've had no effective response from North
Korea, other than their assertion about a month ago before
their nuclear test that they were going to test another nuclear
device because the U.N. Security Council had failed, as they
had demanded, to apologize to North Korea for its earlier
actions.
But so far there has not been any demonstrated willingness
to engage with the international community, either through the
U.N. or directly through the six-party process.
The Chairman. What if this particular round of sanctions
elicits even further provocative response?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, obviously we are prepared to
respond appropriately, and I'm really not at this time able to
go much beyond that.
As I said in my prepared remarks, the United States will do
what is necessary to defend U.S. national security and the
security of our allies in the region.
The Chairman. Have the Chinese--I know from my
conversations when I was there that they've been in touch, but
has there been any visit or any kind of high-level personal
diplomacy in this effort at this time?
Ambassador Bosworth. The Chinese have been engaged in
various kinds of diplomacy over the last several months with
the North Koreans. I'm not at this point prepared to comment on
what they might have done recently or might be doing in the
future, only to say that I think we and the Chinese agree that
we each have respectively a very important role to play in
trying to defuse the situation through diplomatic interaction.
The Chairman. Would you concur that the Chinese response
with respect to this particular test was both quicker and more
intense and palpable than it has been in the past?
Ambassador Bosworth. Yes.
The Chairman. Would you further characterize the Chinese
concern in any way that might help us understand the options as
we go forward?
Ambassador Bosworth. I think it is very fair to say that we
found on our trip to the region and in bilateral consultations
here and elsewhere with the Chinese that they are deeply
concerned about the prospect of North Korea continuing forward
with its nuclear program and with its ballistic missile
program.
The Chairman. Have there been conversations similarly--
obviously there have been in terms of the resolution, but in
terms of various other potential options and attitudes with
respect to Russia?
Ambassador Bosworth. Russia, too, has shared that deep
concern and has been actively collaborating and working
together with us in the U.N. Security Council.
The Chairman. Is it fair to say that the P5 is probably
more focused and energized and united on this than it has been
in the past?
Ambassador Bosworth. I'm not a veteran of U.N. activities,
but I could say that I'm impressed by the degree of focus that
the P5 has brought to this particular problem, including, of
course, the other two members who are actively engaged in this,
namely Japan and the Republic of Korea.
The Chairman. What would it take--is there some
precondition under--that is not public--I'm not asking you to
make it public, but is there any precondition with respect to
how the United States gets back to the table or if North Korea
came back tomorrow and said you want to have six-party talks,
fine. Would we be there? Would they start?
Ambassador Bosworth. We have made it very clear that we are
prepared to go back to the table any time the North Koreans
are. We are not the ones who have announced their withdrawal
from the six-party talks. That has been the North Koreans.
The Chairman. And would it be bilateral and multilateral
that we would do that?
Ambassador Bosworth. The President and the Secretary have
made it clear that we are prepared to engage bilaterally within
a multilateral context and multilaterally, and I think we are
prepared to be quite ambitious in both areas.
The Chairman. In the past, those talks were, I believe,
unifocused on the nuclear issue.
Would there be a willingness this time to be more diverse
with respect to the topics that might be discussed? Would it be
all topics open?
Ambassador Bosworth. I think in fact all topics would be
open. The nuclear issue remains the core from our point of view
and from that of our partners in the six-party process, but my
own strong belief is that to deal in the long term with the
problems that North Korea poses requires that we broaden our
focus beyond the nuclear question alone.
North Korea is a very weak state, despite its boisterous
activities in the area of nuclear technology and missiles, and
in order to achieve the kind of stability in Northeast Asia
that is important for not only the countries of that region
but, indeed, the countries of the world, including specifically
the United States, I think we have to address how we can help
North Korea achieve greater economic success. As long as it
remains as weak as it is, there is a risk that it will generate
instability throughout the region.
We're also prepared, as we have indicated in the past, to
talk with the North Koreans about the normalization of our own
relationship with them and we're prepared to talk with them,
together, of course, with our partners in the region, about our
new arrangements that might be put in place to replace the
Armistice of 1953.
All of these things are effectively interlinked, but again
the core of our concern and the sine qua non of making progress
is serious engagement by the North Koreans on the issue of
denuclearization.
The Chairman. And in my opening comments, I observed the
sort of multiplicity and motives with respect to Kim Jong-il's
choices here. I wonder if you might comment on your perceptions
as a veteran of this.
Ambassador Bosworth. I have, at my pain, learned not to
project my views of why North Korea does things very actively.
I think sometimes it's very difficult for people on the
outside, including myself, to understand their motivations.
I would only say, Mr. Chairman, that I think the various
motivations that you put forth all make sense to me.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that. Senator Wicker, did
you already vote?
Senator Wicker. I haven't. I thought I might try to squeeze
a question or two in, if you'll walk slowly, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let's find out how much time there is on the
vote----
Senator Wicker. Well, I understand the clock is----
The Chairman [continuing]. And we'll see how slowly I'll
walk. We'll try to figure that out. I've certainly gone over my
time. So I'm happy to--we only have 2 minutes on the vote. I'm
happy to--as you know, there's always a little----
Senator Wicker. Sure. I will risk it, if you don't mind,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I'm delighted. So if you would turn it over
to Senator Lugar when he gets here and I'll go vote and come
back and we'll just try to keep going.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. And I'll tell him you're on your way.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Please.
The Chairman. Are you going to vote against him? No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. I'm going to vote ``yes,'' as a matter of
fact.
The Chairman. We're saved by Senator Wicker.
Senator Lugar. Let me mention that there are other
countries that are involved that we haven't touched upon, at
least I have not heard them in the course of our talks thus
far, such as Germany and Italy, others who are involved in the
commercial relations, even among our NATO alliance.
As I recall, and this may be an oversimplification of
affairs, but at another juncture, with difficulty in
negotiations, maybe before progress in the six-party talks,
there were measures taken through the banking systems of
various countries in the world in which apparently North Korea
assets, deposits, perhaps of the leadership or others, were
obstructed from being of value to them. That seemed to have a
greater effect at that point than many of the threats or
pressures that were coming through diplomacy, whether it be
through the U.N. or through other nations.
Can you give us some insight as you take a look at that
particular method with regard to the current North Korean
financial situation or that of its leadership as to what kind
of pressure is involved in these determinations in the banking
system of the country?
Ambassador Bosworth. That is a subject that we continue to
examine. It is a subject which is covered in part at least in
the U.N. Security Council resolution which is now pending
adoption in New York, and it is one about which we are
exchanging views with our partners and allies in the region.
Beyond that, I'm really not able to go very far at this
point, Senator. Obviously, we're looking at all mechanisms
which would enable us to help to persuade North Korea to come
back to a negotiating framework.
Senator Lugar. Not belaboring the issue, can you describe
from your own experience or your own history of this situation
really how those financial instruments work?
In other words, as the public takes a look at this hearing
and tries to understand something of that complex nature, why
was this effective, if you believe it was, in the past with
regard to North Korea?
Ambassador Bosworth. I can't really go into much detail on
this, not because I'm reluctant to comment but because I was
not involved in these efforts at that time.
But I think we are looking at the possibility of additional
measures which will be very carefully targeted and which would,
as you suggest, address the issues posed by specific North
Korean deposits and holdings outside of the country.
Now obviously this becomes very complicated because North
Korea would have relationships with banks and financial
institutions of other countries, and we have to be sure that we
are coordinating this with those governments, but, particularly
under the pending U.N. Security Council resolution, this is an
area of activity that we are going to look at very seriously.
Senator Lugar. Is it your judgment that if the Security
Council resolution that currently is being discussed were, in
fact, to be favorably voted upon, that other countries, such as
the ones I've mentioned or other European countries, and others
who have these dealings, would feel bound to observe that?
In other words, could they find exceptions that would allow
their commercial interests, their banking interests to proceed?
Ambassador Bosworth. On the whole, my view is that they
would be inclined to cooperate very strongly with the U.N.
Security Council resolution, and as I mentioned, the new
resolution would, if adopted, create new enforcement
opportunities within the Security Council itself.
Senator Lugar. In recent days, it has appeared that after
threats to South Korea, that commercial establishments, 6 miles
we're told from the DMZ, would be shut down, with cooperation
on both sides. The North Koreans have relented in that
pressure.
Is that your observation or what information can you give
us in terms of the South Korean/North Korean commercial
situation?
Ambassador Bosworth. I'm not sure I understand exactly what
you're referring to, Senator. If it's with regard to the
industrial zone at Kaesong, then there have been a number of
conversations between the North and the South underway for some
time. We follow those with interest and I think we would be
happy to get back to you as to where we think those are going.
Senator Lugar. I mentioned that because it appeared that at
a moment in which the North Koreans certainly have been very
aggressive with regard to the South Koreans, even threatening
military action, there so appeared to be some talks or
negotiation proceeding which was interesting in view of all the
other provocative activities.
Ambassador Bosworth. My impression is that is correct, and
I, too, find it of some interest, and I think it hopefully will
demonstrate a willingness on the part of North Korea to look at
its own self-interests and make decisions based on that.
Senator Lugar. What is your impression, still following the
economic sanction activity, about the economy of the country?
Normal reports are that obviously many people throughout the
country are sorely deprived and many may be near starvation or
sorely in malnutrition much of the time, and this has led the
international community to be cautious about economic
sanctions, particularly when they came with humanitarian
situations, such as food, basically.
But in the event that economic sanctions were to become
complete, what is the likely course of activity in the country
at that point? Is there an economy that is sufficient to at
least prevent revolt or others, before they die, at least
having something to say about it?
Ambassador Bosworth. As you suggest, Senator, the North
Korean economy is in a desperate condition. It has been
steadily going downhill since probably the early 1990s and its
industrial output, for example, is now only a fraction of what
it might have been, what it was in the late 1980s.
Its agricultural output is also very, very poor and has
been inadequate to meet the needs of its own citizenry, and
North Korea has depended heavily on international contributions
of food stuffs to feed its own people.
Now, as I know you are aware, North Korea about 2 months
ago asked our humanitarian agencies and organizations who were
there to deliver the food that the United States had agreed to
make available, were asked to leave by the North Korean
authorities. So that quantity of food is no longer being
provided.
We remain concerned on humanitarian grounds about the
condition of the North Korean population, which is not good.
Now, the country is covered by such secrecy that one doesn't
know exactly what the condition of all the population might be,
but it is clear that diet is inadequate in terms of caloric
intake, and if they have a harvest that, for example, is not as
good as it should be or as they hope it would be, then the
conditions deteriorate even further.
So we and our partners and other countries in the U.N.
Security Council are very conscious of the need not to further
punish the people of North Korea. That is very much one of the
things that guides us as we try to shape a policy that will
both respond to what the North Korean Government is doing and
give us some possibility for improvement.
Senator Lugar. Thank you. I would note the presence of
Senator DeMint.
In the absence of the Chair, I recognize the Senator for
his round of questions.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Bosworth, thank you for being here.
I would like to ask some questions specifically about the
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism for North Korea and
what that designation might do to leverage some American goals.
As you know, the new administration has now hesitated to
point out mistakes of the last administration, yet when asked
about reinstating the designation of a terrorist nation, the
administration has appealed to the decision that Bush made last
year about this time.
As you know, the Bush administration, in an attempt to
entice North Korea back to the negotiating table, took North
Korea took off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and I
think, I'm sure as you know, that designation allowed us to
freeze assets and pressure them in other ways.
Since then, it's been very obvious the North Koreans have
not honored that in any way and in fact they have expedited,
expanded their development of nuclear weapons. They've tested
large nuclear weapons, tested more missiles and have promised
to test a missile that could reach our shores.
Last week, about eight Senators sent a letter to Secretary
Clinton asking her to put North Korea back on the state
sponsors of terrorism and we've yet to receive an answer. One
that we heard in the press was that there is no evidence that
there has been new terrorist activities since they were taken
off the list, but the point is, is they never cease their
terrorist activities.
The most recent Congressional Research Service pointed out
that North Korea has and continues to collaborate with Iran,
Syria, as far as weapons distribution and supporting terrorism.
Nothing has changed about North Korea, except that we've taken
the pressure off of them.
It does appear that one of our best sources of leverage at
this point is to put that pressure back on them and to do it
quickly because North Korea has not responded to our talk,
about goodwill, in any way, except to expedite their whole
mission of being able to threaten most of the world.
So what is the hesitation to put North Korea back on that
terrorist list?
Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you very much, Senator.
As Secretary Clinton has said, we take very seriously the
calls by Members of Congress to redesignate North Korea as a
state sponsor of terrorism. As a legal matter, in order to be
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Secretary of
State is only authorized to make a designation based on a
determination that the government of a given country has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
Now I can say unequivocally we will follow the provisions
of that law completely.
I would note that a redesignation of North Korea as a state
sponsor of terrorism would not result in any new material
penalty to the North Koreans, since many of the activities that
we're talking about are covered under other sanctions applied
to North Korea under other provisions of U.S. law, including
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for
delivering them.
Senator DeMint. It does send a message to them and the
world and I think highlights what we know has been going on;
continues to go on. There appears to be little doubt, as I look
to the Congressional Research Service report, that whether it's
supporting activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard or
material support to the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Shia
militants in Iraq, that this is a serious provocation, and it
seems that we're holding our punches by not calling it what it
is and my encouragement would just be for us to take this
seriously because when we lighten up on North Korea by taking
them off the list, we did lighten up on them.
We in a sense rewarded bad behavior, hoping we'd create
good behavior, and we got worse behavior than we had before. It
makes absolutely no sense to continue with this and I think it
basically amplifies a growing sense of Americans are a paper
tiger, full of talk, and no action.
It appears that this is maybe one of the few things we
could do at this point that could actually put some pressure on
them and if you say we're already doing all of the things, such
as freezing their assets and the other economic sanctions that
go along with this, the message it sends to the world is that
we're getting serious, at least in my mind.
Ambassador Bosworth. I appreciate your thoughts, and we
will reflect on that and get back to you.
I think, as I said earlier, the question is based on a
legal determination as to whether a given country has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
Now, we don't like in any way what many of the things that
North Korea has done, and we will continue to object to and
sanction those as appropriate under United States law.
Senator DeMint. Well, I appreciate you bringing up the law
because that threshold of law was met by North Korea in both
the Bush administration and the Obama administration. It meant
that nothing ever changed, that this was only changed as an
enticement and not because they ceased any of the activities.
The legal threshold for being on the state sponsor of
terrorism was met. They've been on that list since 1988 and
there has never been any reason to take them off from a legal
perspective. It was a diplomatic move to take them off. So I
hope we don't use that as an excuse not to move on this but I
will yield to your research on the issue.
I'm just looking, as I'm sure you are, as a way to appear
more serious than rhetoric, that what they're doing is a danger
to the whole world right now.
Thank you again for being here with us. I yield back.
Senator Lugar. In the absence of the Chair, I recognized
Senator DeMint, but I'll yield the Chair now to Senator
Feingold and recognize him for his questions.
Senator Feingold. Well, I thank you, Senator Lugar.
Let me just do a round here myself. I'm very pleased that
this hearing is being held. It's been quite some time since the
committee has explored this issue and one that I think we can
all agree remains one of the greatest challenges to our
national security.
Although we did appear to make some initial headway at the
end of the last administration, it's clear from North Korea's
recent provocations that we have not yet found a lasting
resolution.
As the situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to
deteriorate, the United States needs to take a central role in
determining how best to engage Pyongyang and also send a clear
message that North Korea cannot use illicit weapons programs to
demand concessions from the international community, nor can it
arrest American citizens on apparently trumped-up charges and
then find them guilty in a closed-door trial. These actions
will only invite further isolation, greater hardship for the
North Korean people, and, of course, continued rejection by the
international community.
I'm pleased that President Obama is seeking to engage
meaningfully on this issue, that the administration is working
with many of our friends and allies in the region and at the
United Nations to craft a strong multilateral response. The
stakes are far too high for an ad hoc, uncoordinated policy,
and we must make clear that violations of international law and
basic human rights actually have serious consequences.
Ambassador Bosworth, I believe North Korea continues to be,
of course, a critical threat to our national security and to
the security of our friends and allies in the region.
Accordingly, we have to prioritize this issue as long as North
Korea continues these provocative and dangerous actions.
Noting that you were recently quoted as saying, ``I don't
think it's useful to try to persuade [the North Koreans] to do
what they don't want to do'' and that ``in the end they will
see that having dialogue is in their interest,'' how do we
drive negotiations forward in a way that is genuinely appealing
to Pyongyang without simply waiting for the North Koreans to
rejoin the talks while they may well be continuing to produce
nuclear weapons?
Ambassador Bosworth. First of all, our best hope of making
progress on these issues is as you suggest, to work jointly
with the major countries of the region and our principal allies
in the region, and this is not a unilateral American effort.
Through the frequent consultations with the other parties to
the six-party talks and through the U.N. Security Council, we
have made multilateral action the centerpiece of what we are
trying to do with the North Koreans.
As for how one makes progress over time, I would counsel
only patience and perseverance, and I think we have to remain
steady. We have to continue to indicate that some of the things
that North Korea is doing are dangerous and unacceptable to us,
and we have to be prepared to respond, as we are now
responding, through the U.N. Security Council resolution,
through bilateral sanctions, and through consultations with our
partners in the region.
We must also continue to indicate that for us, engagement
and dialogue and diplomacy remain the only real way to solve
this problem. Now that does not mean that you acquiesce in
everything that North Korea wants--far from it--but if we
remain patient and persevere in our policy, the chances of
eventual progress are good.
Senator Feingold. There have been numerous press reports
that Kim Jong-il has selected his youngest son to be his
successor, and some analysts speculate that the recent nuclear
and missile tests were part of an effort to ensure a smooth
transition of power to his preferred heir.
Do you think our ability to move forward with the
negotiations is limited while Kim Jong-il remains in power and,
more specifically, what impact do you think an impending
transition of power would have on North Korea's nuclear
development program and willingness to participate in
negotiations--and also in this regard, if Kim Jong-il's
youngest son has, in fact, been selected as the heir, give me a
little sense of what you think it might mean for our policy
toward North Korea.
Ambassador Bosworth. First, I would note that there's been,
as far as we are aware, no formal designation of anyone as Kim
Jong-il's heir. So to some extent, this is a reflection of
speculation in the press which may or may not prove to be
founded.
In the meantime, what I would say in response to your very
good questions is to quote someone who was quoted earlier by
the chairman and that is Secretary Bill Perry when he was
Secretary of Defense, who advised that ``we should deal with
North Korea as it is, not as we would wish it to be.''
So regardless of who is in power in North Korea, who is the
President, who is the leader, I think we have to deal with
North Korea on the basis of what it does and not what we think
would be a likely alternative.
Senator Feingold. I understand that up at the United
Nations, a draft resolution has been agreed to that would
expand and toughen multilateral sanctions toward North Korea. I
recognize you're probably able to share very little of that
because they are ongoing discussions, but I'm interested to
hear what specific mechanisms, existing or otherwise, will be
used to enforce both new and existing sanctions.
I'm raising this concern because U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1718, which passed in 2006, appeared to be a strong
multilateral tool in that it banned atomic explosions and long-
range missile launches by North Korea and imposed limited
financial sanctions, as well as a partial trade and arms
embargo on Pyongyang. However, as you well know, the measures
have been widely ignored and unenforced, and thereby basically
rendered the multilateral effort rather toothless.
Ambassador, what steps are being taken to ensure that this
new resolution, if it does pass, does not have essentially the
same fate?
Ambassador Bosworth. One of the things that would be
provided by this new resolution, assuming it is adopted, is
that the DPRK Sanctions Committee will have an enhanced mandate
to focus on compliance, investigations and outreach, and also a
panel of experts would be established, as under other sanction
regimes, to support the committee's effort to monitor and
improve implementation, and I think it is obvious that for the
United States Government, a position of urging all U.N. members
to comply fully with this new resolution will be a very
important part of our response to what North Korea is doing.
Sanctions resolutions are useful and important, largely to
the extent to which they are implemented, and I very much
believe that we will push to ensure that other countries
implement these resolutions as fully as we do.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here. You certainly
have your work cut out for you.
In your testimony, you mentioned your findings on your
recent trip, include that China shares a deep concern about
North Korea's recent actions and a strong commitment to achieve
denuclearization.
There's a widely held view, Mr. Ambassador, that if China
really had the resolve to squeeze their North Korean neighbor
on the issue of denuclearization, they could accomplish this in
a way that really no other country on the globe can do.
Did you find their concern to be deeper and their
commitment to be stronger than before the missile test and the
nuclear test, and would you speak to this widely held view that
I mentioned, that China really could accomplish this if they
were of a mind to?
Ambassador Bosworth. First, it's very fair to say that we
found China very concerned, acutely concerned about what North
Korea has done and is doing, both in the nuclear field and in
the area of missile technology.
They recognize, perhaps more than anyone else, that these
moves by North Korea can have a very deleterious effect on
security arrangements throughout Northeast Asia and
specifically on the Korean Peninsula, and they realize that
this is not in their interests.
Now I can't speak for the Government of China obviously,
only to say that our impression when we came away from these
very intensive consultations in Beijing was that China sees the
current situation and the evolution of that situation in very
much the same way that we do.
With regard to what China is or is not prepared to do and
what its potential for action might be, I'm very reluctant to
comment in a public forum about that. I think that's largely up
to China, and I would say we'll have to judge China on the
basis of what it does over the next several months.
But China is also a country which has grave concerns about
instability in the region, and I think we'll continue to work
with them very closely and to try to ensure that we continue,
as we have to date, to operate very much on a common front and,
indeed, with our other partners in the region.
Senator Wicker. Apart from multilateral approaches to
China, can you tell us specifically--are you able to tell us
specifically at this open hearing what bilateral actions China
has already taken before these tests to resolve this situation
with regard to the nuclear weapons, nuclearization?
Ambassador Bosworth. I really am reluctant to get into that
because it has to do with what China is doing as a sovereign
country in its own interests, but I would say that we are
satisfied that China is moving in all of its connections within
the region, specifically in its connections with North Korea,
to give focus and reality to this effort. This is a subject on
which there are bilateral communications, but beyond saying
that in a general sense, I really don't want to become too
specific.
Senator Wicker. OK. Do you reject the assertion by some
that in some respects, North Korea serves as a counterbalance
for China and that it's not all negative with regard to China?
Ambassador Bosworth. Again, I can only comment on the basis
of what we learn when we talk to the Chinese, and in that
sense, I think I am convinced that they are acutely concerned
about what North Korea is doing and see no advantage to them or
anyone else from what North Korea is doing.
Senator Wicker. It's clear to me that you're quite
satisfied at this point with the response of the Chinese
Government in response to these two tests.
Ambassador Bosworth. We are very committed to continuing
our close consultation with the Chinese as we move forward, and
I think we each are of the belief that that kind of
consultation and coordinated action is essential if we're going
to bring about the kind of solution to this problem that we
think is desirable and needed.
Senator Wicker. We're--the third option we have as a United
States is enhancing our military capacity.
What are our options for doing that? Can you discuss those
publicly?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, we already have a very strong
defense posture in the Western Pacific.
Senator Wicker. How will we enhance that?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, again, I don't mean to be
evasive, but I'm not going to get into the business of my
colleagues in the Defense Department, and, of course, the
President's business ultimately to decide how we might do that,
if it's so desired.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Ambassador, are we taking any small
steps or have we taken any small steps over time that have
improved the United States-North Korean relationship in any
respect?
And I ask you about employment across the border. In my
home State of Mississippi, we've entertained medical doctors
from North Korea and I don't know if that accomplishes much,
except for an exchange of ideas.
It seems that those are two small steps that we're taking,
and is there any reason for us to be encouraged at all by some
other things that are going on?
Ambassador Bosworth. I think, Senator, that one of our
strengths as a nation is our willingness to engage in
humanitarian activities, aside from political considerations.
So I would applaud the efforts of any American entity to
try to bring about some improvement in the very desperate
condition of the North Korean people. That's the basis on which
the U.S. Government has provided food aid over the last several
years. It's the basis on which a number of private
nongovernmental organizations have operated within North Korea,
and we have never, and I don't believe we'll ever in the
future, tried to use these activities as leverage for political
ends.
We deal with North Korea on an official government-to-
government basis, but I personally, and I think I can speak for
everyone in the administration and, indeed, in the United
States bureaucracy. This willingness to engage in humanitarian
activities is one of the hallmarks of our country and one that
gives me a great pride.
Senator Wicker. If I might, Mr. Chairman, we would no doubt
engage in humanitarian efforts for the sheer good that it does.
Do you have any information that you could share with the
committee about who gets the credit among the North Korean
people?
Ambassador Bosworth. I have no specific information. It's
mostly anecdotal. I have reason to believe through my
conversations with some of the United States organizations that
have been doing this over the years that, by and large, the
North Korean people understand from where this assistance is
coming and in some cases I think in recent years the food that
we've provided even comes with an American flag on the bag
which is still there when it's distributed to the people of
North Korea.
So I think that the North Korean people probably understand
better than we may expect the humanitarian impulses of the
United States and its people.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for being here.
I just want to underscore the point that Senator Wicker
made at the beginning of this hearing about the two
journalists, and I understand the limitations of this hearing.
I think most of us believe this is just another example of
the gross human rights violations by North Korea in taking
human pawns to use in some way for negotiations with the United
States in regards to their other issues. This is something that
we just need to continue to raise, to point out how outrageous
that type of action is.
Now, North Korea's human rights record is deplorable
generally. The State Department's 2008 Human Rights Report
documents a laundry list of the regime's oppressive practices.
I have the opportunity to chair the Helsinki Commission and we
deal on a regular basis with human rights. One of our points is
how we can use those reports in a more effective way to try to
help the people of these repressive regimes.
I just want you to perhaps share with us what we can do to
try to advance human rights in North Korea. I know we have a
long list, but I hope part of it is to try to improve the
government's functioning as it relates to basic rights of the
people of North Korea.
Ambassador Bosworth. I can assure you, Senator, that human
rights concerns remain very much on the agenda of our
prospective relationship with North Korea, and in the case of
the detained journalists, we are exploring all possible ways to
bring about their release on humanitarian grounds.
Beyond that, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, I
really am not able to comment further, given Privacy Act
considerations and other things.
Senator Cardin. My question was more general than just the
two journalists. I certainly want you to do everything you can
to secure their releases and I think most of us have expressed
our views on it.
But it goes beyond just these two journalists. I mean, the
human rights record of North Korea is just outrageous; one of
the worst countries in the world.
Ambassador Bosworth. Without question.
Senator Cardin. Yes.
Ambassador Bosworth. And we are moving under legislation
that was, I believe, passed last year, to designate a new
special envoy for North Korean Human Rights and I would expect
and hope that that could be done in the next several weeks.
Senator Cardin. Let me raise one more issue in my time and
that is, obviously, the risk of North Korea becoming more
sophisticated in nuclear weapons and testing to try to deliver
that type of a nuclear weapon. This is a major concern.
But it's also the transfer of that technology or weapons to
terrorist organizations or to nonstate actors that have to be a
major concern.
Now, I heard you, in response to Senator Kerry's question,
talk about potential sanctions that would block the export of
weapons. I just really want to get a sense from you as to how
effective we can be to make sure that that type of technology
is not exported to terrorist organizations or nonstate actors.
Ambassador Bosworth. We will do everything possible to
monitor that situation and if we believe that there is evidence
or that there is an indication of proliferating activities, we
will respond in a very strong fashion.
I would note that this is a very difficult thing to do,
obviously, and it is one of the major reasons, not the only
reason, but one of the reasons why, for the Obama
administration, the ultimate goal remains verifiable
denuclearization because if the Korean Peninsula is
denuclearized, then there is really no risk of proliferation.
But we're not prepared and never will be prepared to settle
for a policy which only concentrates on proliferation and
ignores the root cause which is the nuclearization of North
Korea.
Senator Cardin. Well, I certainly agree with that. If they
have the capacity, the proliferation issue is going to be
there, and we know that. The best way to deal with that is the
stated policy of the peninsula being without nuclear weapons.
So I fully agree with you. I just wanted to underscore the
point. It's not only the direct threat of North Korea having
nuclear weapons capacity but what it could be as a supplier to
other regions and other organizations, including terrorist
groups.
We know that there's already been some smoking guns here,
and we just need to understand the risk factors and need to
take the appropriate actions. I think proceeding through the
United Nations Security Council makes a great deal of sense,
and working with our partners and trying to get more effective
help from the major countries in the region, including China,
is our best chance to secure an effective policy to accomplish
our goals of removing this threat.
Ambassador Bosworth. I agree with that.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Ambassador, we're grateful for your service and
grateful for your testimony today.
I wanted to raise primarily two issues, maybe three, but
the first one centers on China. I was noting in a pertinent
part of your statement, that you said China has an important
role to play in influencing the path that North Korea follows.
You spoke of your trip and that China shared a ``deep concern
about North Korea's recent actions.'' Our challenge now is to
work with China to turn this commitment into effective
implementation of the various Security Council resolutions.
I was going to ask you about Resolution 1718 passed in
October 2006 and the enforcement thereof.
Since Resolution 1718 passed, as you know--and we can
easily track this--China's aid, trade, and investment in North
Korea has expanded.
How can the Obama administration, and you're playing a
central role in this, encourage China to enforce U.N. sanctions
and take a more assertive posture toward North Korea? Any
thoughts on that?
Ambassador Bosworth. What happened with regard to 1718, and
this is no excuse, but what happened was that soon after that
was passed, we found ourselves back in multilateral
negotiations with the DPRK.
Now, I think as we go forward, in fact as has already been
the case over the last few months, the subject of
implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, both the
existing one, 1718, and now, of course, prospectively the new
one, it's very much a subject of active consideration in our
relationship, not only with the Chinese but with all other
countries of the region.
So I think you can expect that as we move forward, we're
going to continue to be very concerned about implementation,
and I would expect that other countries will be, as well.
Senator Casey. Anything that you would recommend? I know
you're not in this business of recommending what Congress
should do, but any suggestions about how Congress can be
helpful on that narrow question of the enforcement of that
resolution?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I think I'm never hesitant to
recommend what Congress should do, but I do think----
Senator Casey. That's OK for today.
Ambassador Bosworth. I do think that Congress has a role in
this and that as the Congress expresses its views, those can
hopefully reinforce the positions that we're taking in
bilateral government-to-government relationships with our
partners.
Senator Casey. Well, let's move on. I wanted to move to the
question of the six-party talks.
What's your sense of the likelihood of the six-party talks
being reengaged in the near term (a) and then (b) if you'd
comment on--I know in the statement, you talked about this--
that it was helpful for us to have a four-pronged strategy. The
fourth prong being if North Korea shows a serious willingness
for diplomatic engagement.
How do you see that playing out or how would you like it to
play out in terms of the role that any further or near-term
six-party talks reengagement would take on as well as any kind
of bilateral strategy?
Ambassador Bosworth. Optimally, I would like to see the
North Koreans signal strongly that they're prepared to return
to----
Senator Casey. Right.
Ambassador Bosworth [continuing]. A negotiating mode. The
other members of the six-party process, including very
importantly the United States, are all prepared to go back to
the six-party process.
I think it has proven to be an effective mechanism. Now,
it's not perfect and anyone who has been engaged in
multilateral diplomatic efforts will tell you that as you
expand beyond two, the process becomes ever more complicated by
a quantum factor.
But, nonetheless, the six-party process provides a platform
within which each of us can examine what the others are doing,
where we can resolve issues, where we can coordinate efforts
with regard to a common purpose and with regard to North Korea,
and so I am hopeful that at some point, preferably not in the
too-distant future, North Korea will come back to the table,
and I think I can say that all other members of the six-party
process share the desire of the United States to see that
happen as soon as possible.
Senator Casey. And getting back to a question Senator
Cardin raised about the selling or exporting of technology that
relates to nuclear weapons, do you have any sense--I know we
all have a concern, that's obvious--that the North Koreans at
this moment are engaged in any kind of a strategy to sell that
technology?
Do you think it's mostly about what they're doing
internally?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I think that there's no question
that the North Koreans are aware of our attitude on this
subject, and beyond saying that I believe that they know there
would be consequences for any such activity, I really don't
want to go much further in my statements.
Senator Casey. Fair enough. Finally, I know I have a minute
left, I'll be real brief on this, the North Koreans, recently
announced that they've suspended the 1953 armistice that ended
the Korean war.
Is there any practical effect to that? What--how do you see
that?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, first of all, it's not--it is
not welcomed news, obviously, but the practical effects of it
at this point are not vast.
We would like to see them come back into the armistice
framework. There are some mechanisms provided by the armistice
that will be very helpful, and I have no reason to at this
point believe the North Koreans are going to reject those
mechanisms.
As I indicated earlier in response to a question, looking
out beyond where we are now and in a broader focus, I think the
Obama administration believes that it is time to begin talking
seriously with the affected countries about a permanent
replacement for the armistice of 1953. That was a long time ago
and it is in some ways concerning and lamentable that a state
of war still technically and formally exists on the Korean
Peninsula.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Before Senator Shaheen, I just want to say, committee
process, we have Prime Minister Tsevangirai, the Prime Minister
of Zimbabwe, coming at 4:30. So we're going to try to compress
this after your questioning.
Ambassador, we're going to switch the panels. I want to
particularly have time to hear from the second panel of
experts, and if I could ask you, Ambassador, to pass by the
dais on your way out so we can just grab you for a moment, we'd
appreciate it.
And finally, Senator Boxer asked me to mention that she
shares the concern about the imprisonment of Laura Ling and
Euna Lee and she will be circulating a letter among Senators
that she invites them to join in signing with respect to the
administration's approach and we look forward to that.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Bosworth, thank you for being here and for your
service.
To be parochial, I would point out that you're a graduate
of Dartmouth and you do us proud in New Hampshire.
Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you.
The Chairman. You can't steal him. He still lives with us.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. We're working on that.
According to recently released reports, North Korean
exports jumped 23 percent last year compared to the previous
year and imports jumped 33 percent.
To follow up a little bit on what Senator Casey was
referencing with respect to China, what do these statistics say
about our ability to isolate North Korea economically and what
effect have sanctions really had on the country?
Ambassador Bosworth. First of all, Senator, it's important
to note that those are percentage increases off very low base
levels. I haven't personally analyzed the data sufficiently to
be able to tell you exactly what it means.
I think one thing that it probably reflects, particularly
on the import side, is a very high price for oil over most of
2008, and I think that probably has inflated the figures.
I would say that in all likelihood, as we go forward, and
particularly as the new U.N. Security Council resolution comes
into force, as we continue our efforts to coordinate with China
in particular but also with other countries in the region, that
I would be surprised to see those rates of increase continue in
2009 and beyond.
But it is true, nonetheless, that North Korea has an
economy which in many ways is only barely above the level of
subsistence. So that makes it difficult to change its behavior
through the use of economic sanctions, although not impossible,
and certainly carefully targeted sanctions are a very important
part of, if you will, our toolkit in dealing with North Korea.
But we should not be under any illusions that these in and
of themselves are going to bring about a sharp reversal of the
current situation.
Senator Shaheen. Well, you talked about the effort to get
North Korea to come back to the table. What's it going to take
to do that, and is there any reason to believe that there is an
interest or a willingness on their part to come back to the
table, to want to engage again in any kind of discussions or
negotiations?
Ambassador Bosworth. I think that at the moment there is no
evidence that they are prepared to do that now. I am, however,
as I indicated earlier, of the belief that they eventually will
come back to the table.
Then the challenge is in part for us to ensure that we
engage with them in a realistic fashion and that we begin
considering negotiating measures which will in fact be much
more irreversible than some of the measures that have been
negotiated with them in the past.
Now I don't underestimate the difficulty of doing that. It
is going to be very difficult, indeed, but we need a greater
sense of irreversibility and a greater sense that the things
that they agree to now, they're not going to fall away from in
the future.
As some of us have indicated, we have no desire or
willingness to pay twice for things that North Korea is willing
to do.
Senator Shaheen. So how do we enforce that kind of
irreversibility?
Ambassador Bosworth. Enforcement is largely through the
negotiating process itself and what we are willing to provide
in return, and we'll have to see. There is no magic process by
which you do this. It's all very hard work and I think in this
case, it all requires very close coordination with the other
affected countries of the region.
The United States really can't do this on its own. We can
be a leader in the process but we very much need the active
collaboration of the other countries involved, our allies South
Korea and Japan and our partners China and Russia.
Senator Shaheen. Is there any reason to believe that, if
the leadership mantle passes to Kim Jong-il's son, that it will
result in any kind of a change in the leadership there with
respect to decision-making?
Ambassador Bosworth. I have no reason to speculate one way
or the other on that. As I said earlier, quoting former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, I think we have to deal
with North Korea ``as it is, not as it might be at some point
in the future.''
Senator Shaheen. And is there any information to suggest
that there might be disagreements within the North Korean
Government regarding their nuclear policy?
Ambassador Bosworth. No.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Corker, welcome. I know he's already indicated to
me he's not going to ask questions.
So we thank you, Ambassador Bosworth, very, very much, wish
you well in the days ahead. We want to stay in close touch and
I know we will. I look forward to chatting with you for a
moment.
Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If we could ask the second panel to quickly
come up and take their seats, so we can have a seamless
transition, that'd be terrific.
I would ask each of the following panelists if they would
try to summarize the comments in 5 minutes or less. Your full
statements will be placed into the record as if read in full
and this way the committee will have more chance to be able to
explore the previous panelist with you and your own thoughts.
We're going to lead off with Victor Cha and then Mr.
Revere, Leon Sigal, and then Nancy Lindborg.
So, Victor, if you'd begin, that'd be terrific.
STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR D. CHA, SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA CHAIR,
CSIS, D.S. SONG PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND ASIA STUDIES,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of
the committee.
It's a pleasure to appear before you again to talk about
North Korea.
I've submitted a statement for the record which I would
like to be part of the record, and I wanted to focus my
comments more on some of the discussion that took place during
Ambassador Bosworth's testimony, in particular some of the
questions I think the committee members were asking.
The first was that the committee members were asking how
the financial measures worked that were used in 2005 and there,
essentially what we did was the Treasury Department issued a
financial advisory--something called a section 311--to U.S.
financial institutions, to beware of doing business with a
particular bank in Macau that was thought to be holding North
Korean accounts that were dirty.
That was a very isolated action but it had the effect of
causing many other banks around the world and regulatory
agencies to ask why is the Treasury Department doing this? And
when they understood the reason for it, they then under their
own initiative started to either freeze North Korean accounts
or ask that these accounts not be held in their banks, such
that you had a tremendous ripple effect in the world that
greatly impeded North Korea's ability to do business.
Now this isn't the average North Korean because the average
North Korean does not have an ATM card that they can take money
out of the local Citibank. This affects largely the elite and
the leadership.
The second thing I would mention with regard to these
financial measures is that when the Bush administration did
them, they were largely a U.S. action where the United States
was then going to other countries and regulatory agencies in
Europe and elsewhere asking them to take certain actions.
The big difference now is that a U.N. Security Council
resolution that calls for the designation of certain entities
for financial sanctions makes this much more of a multilateral
effort, and I think it becomes much easier to gain cooperation
among other countries, regulatory agencies and banks.
The second point that I want to make, again addressing some
of the questions in the earlier session, is this whole question
of the inspections.
To me, although we don't know everything about the U.N.
Security Council resolution, to me what's most interesting is
the effort, the very strong effort by the administration and by
the Perm-5 to develop an inspection regime to counter the
proliferation potentially of weapons or fissile material by
North Korea.
This is a very important step and institutionalizing some
sort of inspection regime would, I think, even have more value
added on account of proliferation side than the financial
measures themselves.
You assume that the financial measures would be taken after
the nuclear tests, but to ramp up a strong inspection regime
and counterproliferation regime that the Chinese and Russians
would cooperate with would be a very useful thing for the world
and for United States security interests.
The big question of how North Korea reacts to these sorts
of things--I think clearly when the Bush administration
undertook some of these financial measures, many people argued
it led to North Korea's first nuclear test and the question
arises whether these financial measures will then lead North
Korea to their third nuclear test, and I don't think we know
the answer to that.
We do know that they need to face consequences, as
President Obama said, for their actions and this appears to be
the best way to do it.
I would agree with the points that were made earlier about
China. I think China is very important on the pressure side to
get the North Koreans to return to the negotiating table. There
are all sorts of pressure that China can put on North Korea
that are not reported in public trade figures. There's a wealth
of interaction that takes place between the militaries and the
parties of these two countries, between the leaders,
individuals in both the militaries and the parties, where they
can do things and send very clear messages that are effective
in terms of persuading the North Koreans to come back to the
table, but at the same time don't look like the Chinese are
kowtowing to the United States--because the Chinese never want
to be seen as kowtowing to the United States.
Finally, in the few seconds that I have left, while I was
part of an administration that took North Korea off the
terrorism list, I do think that the administration should
seriously consider putting them back on the terrorism list.
We've had ballistic missile tests, a second nuclear test,
and then, most recently, the taking of these two American women
as detainees in North Korea, and I think that we should do
whatever we can, the U.S. Congress, the administration, to get
these two women out of the country because no American should
be imprisoned in North Korea.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Victor D. Cha, Senior Adviser and Korea
Chair, CSIS, and D.S. Song Professor, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC
Senator Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is my distinct honor to appear before you again to
discuss the topic of North Korea. I offer my personal thoughts to you
today based on my experience working this issue for the White House as
deputy head of delegation to the six-party talks, and based on my
research on the country as an author and academic.
The latest statements out of North Korea appear to be telegraphing
their next set of provocative moves. They have threatened everything
from further ballistic missile tests, another nuclear test, withdrawal
from the armistice, and cyber warfare. They demand that the U.N.
``apologize'' for its punitive statement against the April missile
launch. They have threatened to retaliate against any actions taken by
the U.N. Security Council in response to their May 2009 nuclear test.
They refuse to return to six-party talks. And in an unprecedented act,
the North Koreans have sentenced two American journalists, Euna Lee and
Lisa Ling, to 12 years of hard labor and reform. Should these two women
be sent to labor camps in North Korea, they would be the first civilian
American nationals ever to suffer such a fate.
In the past, this litany of DPRK threatening actions was always
understood as a tactic to get the attention of the United States and to
draw Washington into bilateral talks. Indeed, this was often the
argument that the Bush administration had to contend with whenever the
North undertook provocative actions. And quite frankly, a very
unhelpful dynamic developed in which the causes for North Korean bad
behavior were pinned on U.S. diplomatic inaction rather than on North
Korean intentions.
The Obama administration managed to correct this vicious cycle. It
came into office signaling its willingness to have high-level
negotiations with Pyongyang through Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth's
trips to the region. It has made clear to six-party members its
commitment to the talks and to moving forward with the September 2005
Joint Statement. Yet the North continues to threaten and refuses to
come to the table.
So what do they really want?
I think the North wants three things. First, the North wants
agreements with the United States that are ``election-proof.'' In other
words, they want agreements that will outlast a change of presidencies.
From their perspective, they have been victimized once before, when in
2000 Pyongyang's leadership viewed themselves at the threshold of a new
relationship with the United States that dissipated quite rapidly when
the Bush administration took office. Arguably (and ironically), the
Bush administration ended its 8 years in office trying to make
agreements that were permanent, including the removal of the DPRK from
the state sponsor of terrorism list. I believe the administration is
correct to consider list reimposition for North Korea after the second
nuclear test, but it is more complex to put a country back on the
terrorism list than to take them off it.
Second, the North wants arms control negotiations with the United
States, not ``denuclearization'' negotiations. Their model is to turn
the six-party talks into a bilateral U.S.-DPRK nuclear arms reduction
negotiation, in which the North is accorded a status as a nuclear
weapons state. The outcome of such negotiations, in Pyongyang's view,
should be ``mutual'' nuclear arms reductions (i.e., not elimination of
DPRK nuclear weapons) and confidence-building measures. During six-
party talks, the North Korean negotiators periodically referred to the
United States-Soviet strategic arms control negotiations as their
empirical referent. The ideal outcome of this negotiation, in the
North's view moreover, is a situation like that of India. That is, an
agreement in which the North is willing to come back under
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and monitoring, but it is
also assured of a civilian nuclear energy element. Most important, they
would want to control a portion of their nuclear programs outside of
international inspection, which in their eyes could then serve as their
nuclear deterrent. They would certainly want a great deal in return for
these ``concessions'' including energy assistance, economic development
assistance, normalized relations with the United States, and a peace
treaty ending the Korean war. But on the nuclear side of the equation,
they want the rules of the nonproliferation treaty regime essentially
rewritten for them as they were done for India.
Third, the North wants a special type of ``regime security
assurance'' from the United States. This stems from the fundamental
reform dilemma that the DPRK faces, which I wrote about in Foreign
Affairs in 2002: It needs to open up to survive, but the process of
opening up leads to the regime's demise. Thus, what Pyongyang wants is
an assurance from the United States that it will not allow the regime
to collapse during a reform process.
This is different from a negative security assurance. The negative
security assurance was given to North Korea in the 2005 Joint Statement
when the United States agreed ``not to attack North Korea with nuclear
or conventional weapons.'' This statement--astounding on its own
merits--led the Russian delegation to pull aside the North Koreans to
tell them they believed that the United States was serious, based on
their own cold war experience when Moscow could not get such an
assurance from Washington. But this is not what the North wants. They
want an assurance that the United States will support and bolster the
regime in Pyongyang as the Kim Jong-il (or post-Kim Jong-il) regime
goes through the dangerous and potentially destabilizing effects of a
reform process.
This type of regime assurance must be an even more prescient
concern for the North Korean leadership given Kim Jong-il's
deteriorating health condition. The likely leadership transition to Kim
Jong-un, the youngest of his three sons who lacks any experience or
revolutionary credentials, would be an inherently unstable process in
the best of times. The fluidity created by this process in combination
with the imperative for reform probably makes regime assurance an
topline preoccupation.
The first of these North Korean desires is certainly plausible for
the Obama administration to do. If negotiations resume in the future,
then North Korea's desires for ``irreversible'' steps by the United
States would be met by our own desires for irreversible steps on their
nuclear and missile programs. The second and third, however, are more
problematic. An India-type deal for North Korea would create a crisis
of confidence in the alliance with Japan as well as with the Republic
of Korea. Any outcome that even hinted at U.S. tacit acceptance of a de
facto residual nuclear capability in the DPRK could potentially
undercut the credibility of American extended deterrence to its allies.
The secondary and tertiary consequences of self-help action by Tokyo or
Seoul would then have unhelpful ripple effects in the region. A
guarantee of U.S. support for a crumbling Kim Jong-il regime would run
anathema to every American value and human rights principles. Without
any significant improvement in human rights in the country, it is
difficult to imagine any President agreeing to proactively support the
Kim family's continued rule.
The recent presence of Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Special Envoy
Bosworth in the region is commendable. The period afforded by
Pyongyang's boycotting of the talks is a good opportunity to
demonstrate continued American political commitment to the negotiations
and to demonstrate squarely that a failure of the process rests at the
feet of Pyongyang and not at those of Washington.
Finally, the human rights abuses of North Korea have become even
more clear given North Korean treatment of the two American
journalists. Pyongyang may be trying to send a message with their harsh
sentencing that they do not want world media drawing attention to or
encouraging the outflow of refugees from the country. But Pyongyang has
made their point with the sentencing and now needs to release the women
as a humanitarian gesture. The longer they hold them, the harder it
will be for Pyongyang to release them given the insulated leadership's
concerns about not being seen as pressured by the outside world.
The administration and Congress must exhaust every avenue of
diplomacy to see to the release of these two women. If necessary, a
high-level envoy should be sent to negotiate their return. Given North
Korean negotiating habits, this envoy may have little transparency in
advance whether his/her mission would be successful. An envoy of
sufficiently high level must try, nevertheless. No American should be
subject to imprisonment in North Korea.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Cha. We appreciate it. We'll
get back to you on those.
Mr. Revere.
STATEMENT OF EVANS J.R. REVERE, PRESIDENT, THE KOREA SOCIETY,
NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Revere. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm deeply honored to appear before this committee today.
I'm here as somebody who has spent much of the last 40 years
working on the Asia Pacific region, much of that on the two
Koreas, China, and Japan.
I'm also here today as someone who's been a long-time
advocate of diplomacy with North Korea, and through several
United States administrations during my career as a diplomat, I
made the case that diplomacy, dialogue and mutual respect are a
lot more likely to yield the results that America sought and to
yield them at a more acceptable cost than were policies based
on confrontation, and I base this judgment on years of studying
North Korea and on hundreds of hours over some 12 years of
negotiating with North Koreans.
And through this experience, I came to understand what
motivates the North Korean regime, its strengths and its
weaknesses. My advocacy of negotiations with Pyongyang has
always been based on two principles: The first is that North
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons represents a direct
threat to United States national security interests; and the
second is that eliminating this threat requires a concerted
diplomatic effort aimed at determining whether North Korea was
prepared to make a strategic decision to give up its nuclear
weapons ambitions in return for things that the United States
might be prepared to offer.
In the past, there were many times when American diplomats,
including me, had very serious reason to believe that such an
arrangement was possible and today, I am disturbed to report,
this may no longer be the case.
Today, there are disturbing signs that North Korea may
finally have made a strategic decision about its nuclear
weapons and that decision may be that Kim Jong-il intends to
keep its nuclear weapons and that the North will seek
recognition by the United States and the international
community that it is now a nuclear weapons state.
I'm drawn to this conclusion because of statements that
North Korean officials have made to me over the last year and
to virtually every American visitor to Pyongyang in recent
months. It's also based on the DPRK's public utterances and
actions with respect to its nuclear weapons capability.
I am delighted to have heard so many references to former
Secretary of Defense Perry's comment with respect to dealing
with North Korea as it is. I accompanied Dr. Perry to Pyongyang
on his historic visit in 1999 and I could not agree with that
assessment more. Dealing with North Korea as it is, we are
faced with the following facts:
Just since the beginning of this year, North Korea has
abrogated the 1991 North-South Denuclearization Accords. It has
ousted IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon. It has walked out of the
six-party talks. It has begun to restart its nuclear facilities
at Yongbyon. It has conducted yet another nuclear test and it
has done so in contravention of its own formal commitment to
denuclearize.
The Obama administration's response to all of this has been
measured and calm but firm. Early on, President Obama appointed
Ambassador Bosworth, my distinguished colleague of the last 30
years, as his Special Representative, and for anyone who knows
Ambassador Bosworth and his reputation, that appointment
clearly signaled a United States intention to deal with
Pyongyang at a high level and in a positive and pragmatic way.
And many Americans who deal with North Korea, including me,
were deeply impressed by President Obama's commitment to
diplomacy and to resetting relations with adversaries. As a
result, we conveyed to our North Korean interlocutors in the
strongest possible terms in recent months that the arrival of
this new administration was a historic opportunity to put the
U.S.-DPRK relationship back on track.
Unfortunately, North Korea has thus far rejected these
overtures. In my longer statement, which I respectfully request
be made a part of the formal record, I discuss what may be
behind Pyongyang's actions and many of those points have been
made earlier in this hearing.
But to summarize, I think North Korea's recent behavior may
have much more to do with its internal agenda than with its
external relations. Whatever the reason, Pyongyang's actions do
suggest that North Korea is seeking to establish a troubling
and unacceptable new paradigm in relations.
So where do we go from here? I think many of the steps that
the administration has taken so far are right on the mark,
including closer consultations with allies, and the other steps
mentioned by Ambassador Bosworth. Taking all of those steps
that have been mentioned by Ambassador Bosworth will exert
clear pressure on North Korea, maximize solidarity with our
allies and drive home the message to the DPRK that the path it
is on will lead only to further isolation and suffering.
Let me also say that I would strongly recommend that the
United States keep the door open to people-to-people cultural
and other exchanges with North Korea. These are important ways
of exposing North Koreans to the truth and the truth is
something that we can employ at great advantage in bringing
about future change.
Let me wrap up my comments by just saying it is not too
late for North Korea to halt this free fall in relations with
Washington and its neighbors. Pyongyang can still choose to
accept the outstretched hand that has been offered to it. The
United States is prepared, as it should be, to build a better
bilateral relationship with Pyongyang based on mutual respect,
nonhostility, and the complete end of the North's nuclear
weapons program.
In fact, those very principles used to form the core of the
DPRK's own negotiating position. I would strongly urge
Pyongyang to return to those principles.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Revere follows:]
Prepared Statement of Evans J.R. Revere, President, The Korea Society,
New York, NY
Karl Marx, who was not right about much, managed to get one thing
right when he declared that things occur twice in history, the first
time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Both tragedy and farce have
characterized America's troubled relationship with the DPRK over the
years. Today, there are signs that a new tragedy in this relationship
may be in offing, this time of Pyongyang's making.
In 1999, the DPRK left the four-party talks involving the two
Koreas, China, and the United States, preferring instead to focus on
bilateral dialogue with the United States. Pyongyang also slowed the
pace and the productivity of U.S.-DPRK talks that had grown out of
Presidential Special Envoy William Perry's historic effort to improve
relations between the United States and North Korea.
Both these moves severely reduced the chance that the United States
and North Korea would be able to fulfill the potential of the U.S.-DPRK
dialogue before the Clinton administration came to a close. The North
Koreans were told as much by American officials, including me, at the
time.
After a long hiatus in senior-level bilateral talks, the North
Koreans reengaged with the United States in October 2000 in a dramatic
fashion. A senior officer of the Korean People's Army and First Vice
Chairman of the DPRK's ruling National Defense Commission, Marshal Cho
Myong Rok, came to Washington and met with President Clinton and his
National Security team. In those talks, Cho and his American
interlocutors made remarkable progress, reaching understandings on
anti-terrorism cooperation and other issues and laying out the basis
for a fundamental redefinition of the United States-North Korea
relationship.
This visit was followed less than 2 weeks later by Secretary of
State Madeleine K. Albright's historic meeting with North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, where the two conducted far-reaching
discussion on the nuclear and missile issues that were at the heart of
the United States concerns vis-a-vis North Korea.
Following that meeting, however, an inconclusive and disappointing
set of U.S.-DPRK negotiations on missiles in Kuala Lumpur in November
2000 quickly sapped the momentum of the dialogue process. North Korean
representatives insisted that only a visit by President Clinton to
Pyongyang could resolve the missile issue. That idea was met with
skepticism by many U.S. officials, including me, who were unwilling to
risk such a visit out of concern that President Clinton could return
from Pyongyang empty handed.
As a result, the intense U.S.-DPRK engagement of late-2000 ground
to a halt. As many on the U.S. side had feared almost a year earlier,
the Clinton administration ran out of time to pursue further diplomacy
with Pyongyang, and the press of other priorities, including the Middle
East, compelled the President's attention elsewhere.
Seen in retrospect, North Korea's decision to reengage so late in
the Clinton administration was a major miscalculation. It meant that a
process which had generated considerable hope and optimism would fall
short. It also required the Clinton administration to pass the baton on
this issue to the next administration--a step that had tragic (or, some
would say, farcical) results.
The story of U.S.-DPRK relations under the 8 years of the Bush
administration is a familiar one and need not be repeated here. It was
a period marked by mutual hostility and suspicion, broken agreements,
lost opportunity, empty threats, miscalculation, and misperception.
What little trust that had been built between Pyongyang and
Washington quickly dissipated with the discovery that North Korea was
secretly developing an alternative path to nuclear weapons development
through uranium enrichment.
Pyongyang's perceived perfidy opened the way for Bush
administration figures to dismantle key agreements reached during the
Clinton administration. One prime target was the 1994 Agreed Framework,
which had successfully capped and frozen the North's known nuclear
weapons program, but which was deeply opposed by some critics.
On top of this, a belief by some senior Bush administration
officials that the United States should not negotiate with ``evil''
virtually guaranteed that any serious effort to use diplomacy to
resolve differences with Pyongyang would be dead on arrival.
The predictable result of this policy approach was to open the door
to North Korea's resumption of its nuclear weapons development and
missile programs (it is often forgotten that, among the agreements
abandoned by the Bush administration, was the one that had prevented
the North from launching medium- and long-range ballistic missiles for
7 years between 1999 and 2006).
The eventual, tragic outcome of this approach was the October 2006
nuclear test which, as a North Korean official told me last year,
``changed everything'' in terms of how the DPRK viewed itself and its
relations with the United States, and made it almost certain that the
North would never agree to give up its nuclear weapons.
Seen in retrospect, it is one of the ironies of history that a
group of determined ``true believers'' who helped shape and promote the
early Bush administration's North Korea policy effectively served as
the handmaidens of Kim Jong-il's nuclear weapons program.
The waning years of the Bush Presidency saw the administration
adopt a radically different approach to dealing with Pyongyang, both
out of necessity and a search for legacy. Aware that its policy on
North Korea had produced only one substantial outcome--the creation of
a new nuclear weapons state in Asia--the administration reversed
course. And having little to show for its tenure other than years of
unilateralist, confrontational, and divisive foreign policy, the
administration tried a radically different approach on North Korea to
score at least one ``win.''
The Bush administration's 180-degree shift on North Korea left
heads spinning and allies (particularly Japan, but South Korea, as
well) dismayed and feeling betrayed. The Bush administration adopted a
secretive, compartmentalized approach to diplomacy and policy
formulation that kept allies, partners, and elements of the U.S.
bureaucracy in the dark about the U.S. game plan.
Ironically, this approach drew on the playbook developed in the
first 4 years of the administration, when Secretary of State Powell and
other moderates found themselves undermined and outflanked thanks to
the work of what one former Bush administration official called a
``secret cabal'' operating a parallel foreign policy.
The opaque machinations of the late-Bush administration's North
Korea policy even puzzled one senior North Korean diplomat, who used a
meeting with visiting Americans in early 2008 to convey his own
incredulity about the quiet assurances he was receiving from the United
States.
During this period, an administration that had once declined even
to meet with the ``evil'' DPRK began to make major concessions to it.
It opted to put off until the future the serious task of getting to the
bottom of North Korea's proliferation of nuclear technology to Syria
and its uranium enrichment efforts. Such was the extent of the
administration's policy turnabout that it left even moderates and
proengagement advocates worried.
In the end, this approach produced a fragile freeze on the North's
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the (readily reversible) destruction of
the reactor's cooling tower, and a shaky verbal understanding on
verification that began to unravel quickly as the Bush administration
drew to a close.
This was the situation that the new American President inherited in
January 2009. Despite this flawed legacy, President Obama, who has a
natural instinct for smart diplomacy and for putting the pressure on
the other side to make the mistake of rejecting outreach, deserves
credit for managing the North Korea issue well.
Pyongyang, on the other hand, has played things terribly.
Miscalculation, misperception, and internal politics appear to be
driving the DPRK's policy in a dangerous and self-destructive
direction.
The Obama administration's rhetoric on North Korea has been
generally measured, careful, and calm, with none of the empty threats
and posturing that used to characterize United States statements on
North Korea.
The Obama administration reached out, both publicly and privately,
to Pyongyang and clearly conveyed the United States intent to use both
multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address the nuclear and other
core issues. President Obama appointed Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth
as his special representative to deal with North Korea--a step that
signaled the United States intention to deal with Pyongyang at a high
level and in a pragmatic way.
The fact that Ambassador Bosworth is one of the few American
officials ever to have negotiated successfully with North Korea and to
have concluded agreements that actually worked should have been seen by
the North Koreans as evidence of United States willingness to deal
positively and constructively with them.
During the Presidential campaign, throughout the transition, in his
inaugural speech, and subsequently, President Obama has signaled an
approach and direction to diplomacy with adversaries markedly different
from his predecessor. At some political risk, he has reached out to
Iran, Cuba, and to Venezuela.
Listening to the President's rhetoric and observing his
followthrough, there is no doubt in this observer's mind that the Obama
administration was prepared to deal with Pyongyang in the same way, and
the diplomatic signals reflecting this were all blinking green. Based
on this, I and many other Americans conveyed to our North Korean
interlocutors in the clearest possible terms our sense that the arrival
of the Obama administration presented a historic opportunity to put the
U.S.-DPRK relationship on the right track.
Regrettably, North Korea seems to have a different agenda for the
bilateral relationship. Its actions and response thus far suggest that
it is not interested in the diplomacy of reconciliation and cooperation
that President Obama seeks to pursue.
The DPRK has responded to the Obama administration with an
escalation of its rhetoric, including threats of war. Pyongyang has
told visiting Americans that the DPRK should now be acknowledged as a
nuclear weapons state and that even normalized relations with the
United States will not change its nuclear status.
The North Koreans have said to American interlocutors that the only
price it might consider acceptable in return for the elimination of its
nuclear weapons program would be the dissolution of the U.S.-ROK
security alliance, the removal of United States troops from the Korean
Peninsula, and the withdrawal of the United States ``nuclear umbrella''
from our Korean and Japanese allies.
A senior Bush administration official was once quoted as saying
that, as an empire, America was able to ``create its own reality.'' In
making some of its recent demands, North Korea appears to be suffering
from the same delusions.
As if to confirm its intransigence in even more egregious ways, the
DPRK welcomed the inauguration of the Obama administration and the
outstretched hand mentioned in President Obama's inaugural address with
an announcement of its preparations for a ``satellite launch.'' The
DPRK delivered on its threat and conducted a launch, despite clear
warnings from the PRC, the United States, and other members of the
international community.
The DPRK walked out of the six-party talks and threatened the ROK
with war if Seoul joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Pyongyang called for the United Nations to apologize for the Security
Council President's statement issued after the missile test, and
threatened to conduct additional nuclear tests, launch more missiles,
and begin a uranium enrichment program if there was no apology. North
Korea has now carried out a nuclear weapons test, making good on its
promise to do so.
The reasons behind Pyongyang's new belligerence remain unclear.
There are signs that the DPRK's behavior may have a lot more to do with
its complicated internal politics than with its international agenda.
But whatever the cause, the DPRK has adopted a disturbingly hard-line
approach toward the United States and others and has embarked on a
course of escalating rhetoric and intensified hostility.
On the core issue of whether it will ever give up its nuclear
weapons, the DPRK's rhetoric suggests it has finally made a ``strategic
decision'' regarding its nuclear program. Regrettably, that decision
appears to be that it will keep its nuclear weapons and seek to have
the United States and the international community recognize it as a
nuclear weapons state. If that is indeed Pyongyang's goal, it raises an
important question about what the purpose of renewed multilateral or
bilateral talks would be if they are not aimed at eliminating the
DPRK's nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, the DPRK has announced it is resuming operations at the
Yongbyon reactor and nuclear weapons facility. It has ousted IAEA
inspectors and American technicians from Yongbyon. This follows North
Korean statements to an American visitor earlier this year that the
DPRK had ``weaponized'' all of its existing plutonium.
Faced with this grim situation, the camp of ``optimists'' in the
United States, particularly those who still believe that the DPRK will
ever give up its nuclear weapons at the bargaining table, has seen its
ranks depleted.
The North's actions and rhetoric have alienated many United States-
based Korea hands who had dedicated themselves to the cause of deeper
and more comprehensive engagement with Pyongyang. North Korea has
always found it easy to anger its enemies. Tragically, it is now
perfecting the technique of alienating many of those who aspired to be
its friends.
Even in China, one can now hear voices saying that North Korea is
increasingly seen as being a net liability for China. Yet the PRC
remains hamstrung by its aversion to applying too much pressure on the
North, lest it induce collapse.
As suggested earlier, Washington has responded to the DPRK with
calm and with a determination not to be provoked. It would seem that
the days when bombast and brinksmanship could bring the United States
and its allies scurrying to the negotiating table may be over.
Washington has also made it clear to Pyongyang that the door to
multilateral and bilateral negotiations remains open if the North
wishes to walk through it. That is smart; it will serve to underscore
that it is Pyongyang, alone among the six parties, which is rejecting
dialogue.
At the same time, the United States has intensified bilateral and
trilateral consultation and coordination with its Japanese and South
Korean allies; reassured them of United States commitments to their
security; and obtained unanimous approval of a UNSC President's
statement that reaffirmed sanctions on the North and declared
Pyongyang's missile launch a contravention of UNSC Resolution 1718.
Pyongyang's missile launch has stimulated even stronger interest in
missile defense in Japan. Even South Koreans are beginning to talk
about the need to build their own such defenses. The North's recent
nuclear test has given rise to a debate in the Japanese and Korean
media about pursuing the ``nuclear option'' in those countries.
These developments have caught Beijing's attention. The PRC cannot
be pleased that its North Korean neighbor and ``ally'' is compelling
other countries in the region to reassess their defense options and
take steps that could eventually undermine the effectiveness of China's
strategic missile forces.
So where are we now?
The next move is Pyongyang's. If the North's recent rhetoric is any
guide (and it should be), we are in for a very difficult period.
Military incidents, more missile launches, and even another nuclear
weapons test cannot be ruled out, especially since Pyongyang has ruled
them all in. Whatever happens, the patience and solidarity of the
United States and its allies and partners will be tested in the months
ahead.
All of this could be avoided if Pyongyang were to choose another
path. However, there are worrisome signs that, for domestic political
reasons, Pyongyang either cannot or will not do so.
Regrettably, the DPRK has clearly misread the Obama administration,
mistaking a sincere offer of a new relationship and a comprehensive
dialogue as a sign of weakness. Instead of agreeing to work with a new
American President clearly committed to a refreshing, new approach to
international diplomacy, they have sought to test him.
Pyongyang is probably surprised that the Obama administration has
not risen to the bait of the North's provocative behavior. North
Korea's leader also cannot be pleased that the DPRK's rhetoric and
actions have not only failed to divide the United States from its
allies, but on the contrary have helped the United States, South Korea,
and Japan work more closely together than they have in 8 years. And the
unanimous support in the U.N. Security Council for the recent
President's statement probably cannot be sitting well in Pyongyang.
Despite the dark place it finds itself in, there is still time for
North Korea to repair the damage. Perhaps the DPRK's leader can begin
to extricate his country from the box it is in by questioning the
advice he is getting.
One question he might ask his subordinates is: Why did you have me
pursue policies which have angered the Obama administration, made the
DPRK look like a international pariah, united America and its Asian
allies as never before, driven food aid workers and their assistance
out of the country, prompted China to support a UNSC statement, shaken
the PRC-DPRK alliance relationship, and made Cuba, Venezuela, and even
Iran look more reasonable in the eyes of the world than the DPRK?
The North can still choose to respond positively to the
conciliatory diplomacy of the Obama administration. Inviting President
Obama's Special Representative for North Korea Policy to Pyongyang
would be a good start. Perhaps the North's leader might also consider
dispatching a high-level representative to Washington to shake
President Obama's outstretched hand. Such a bold step has the potential
to yield a better future for North Korea than will slapping that hand
away. It will also help us avoid another tragic turn in U.S.-DPRK
relations.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Revere.
Mr. Sigal.
STATEMENT OF LEON V. SIGAL, DIRECTOR, NORTHEAST ASIA
COOPERATIVE SECURITY PROJECT AT THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
COUNCIL, BROOKLYN, NY
Mr. Sigal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Pull the mike down and a little closer.
Mr. Sigal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members
of the committee.
You have my written statement which I'd like entered into
the record. It can be summed up in three very short points and
leave lots of room for questions.
First, we do not know many things we need to know about the
North's nuclear program or about the way the regime works. We
do not know what many people assert which is that the North
won't give up its nuclear weapons.
The fact is the more we say they won't, it only encourages
our allies to fear that we are not trying to get the North to
give them up through serious negotiations. So I would say that
the only way we can find out what we need to know is sustained
diplomatic give and take and we do not know whether the North
is ready for that, but we've got to find out.
Second, with respect to change inside North Korea, collapse
is certainly a hope but hope is not a strategy. It seems to me
the only strategy that can bring about much-needed change
inside North Korea, however gradual and grudging, is sustained
engagement and people-to-people exchanges, like the New York
Philharmonic that the Korea Society arranged, where the North
Korean people were exposed to something that undercut years of
North Korean propaganda of hostility to the United States.
There was the Philharmonic playing and there were tears in
the eyes of some of those North Koreans in the audience and
everybody in North Korea was exposed to it on their own
television sets. It's an interesting way, however gradual,
nothing grand, to bring about change.
Finally, it seems to me the heart of our problem is that
despite all the talk about sanctions and military possibilities
and all options remain on the table, the sad fact is that we
lack leverage to force the North Koreans to do what we want
them to.
The only way I know to get leverage is through engagement
that gets them dependent on us over time and then if they don't
live up to their obligations, those things can be stopped or
withdrawn. I know of no other way to get leverage. It is a
terrible fact that we're at the mercy to some extent of a
regime that is hateful but we have to learn how to deal with it
and a diplomatic strategy seems to me the only one that has a
realistic chance of getting anywhere.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sigal follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leon V. Sigal, Director, Northeast Asia
Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council,
Brooklyn, NY
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
to appear before you today. I have been involved in the North Korean
nuclear and missile issue for the past 15 years, including conducting
Track II meetings with senior North Korean officials, as well as with
senior officials of the other six parties.
I would like to address three issues today: (1) What we know and
don't know about North Korea's intentions and the future of the current
regime in Pyongyang; (2) our desire for change in North Korea and how
to bring it about; and (3) our lack of leverage over North Korea and
how to increase it. To address these issues, we need a new strategy.
uncertainty
When we look at North Korea, we are rightly repelled by goose-
stepping troops and gulags, a regime motivated by paranoia and
insecurity to dig tunnels and menace its neighbors, a command economy
that makes little for the world to buy except missiles or other arms, a
leadership that mistreats its people, a state that committed horrific
acts in the past like its 1950 aggression and the 1983 Rangoon bombing
that barely missed South Korea's President and killed 17 members of his
entourage. It is one of our core beliefs that bad states cause trouble
in the world. North Korea, with its one-man rule, cult of personality,
internal regimentation, and dogmatic devotion to juche ideology is a
decidedly bad state. That's what we know about North Korea.
A wise analyst once wrote, ``Finding the truth about the North's
nuclear program is an example of how what we `know' sometimes leads us
away from what we need to learn.''
What do we need to learn?
There are widespread doubts about the accuracy of North Korea's
nuclear declaration. We do not know with any precision how much
plutonium North Korea has produced. Nor do we know the extent of its
uranium enrichment effort. Nor are we sure whether North Korea has
deliverable nuclear weapons or not. It says it does but its 2006 test
did not demonstrate that. We do not yet know if its recent test did,
either.
What has North Korea been up to in nuclear and missile diplomacy
with the United States? Again, we do not know. The prevailing
assumption in Washington is that Pyongyang has always been determined
to arm. Such an aim seems understandable enough for a militarily weak
and insecure state, but it fails to explain two significant anomalies
in its nuclear and missile activities over the past two decades:
(1) As of today, the only way for North Korea to make the fissile
material it needs for weapons is to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from
its reactor at Yongbyon and extract the plutonium it needs for nuclear
weapons. Yet North Korea stopped reprocessing in the fall of 1991, some
3 years before signing the Agreed Framework, and did not resume until
2003. It stopped again in 2007 and did not resume until now. It thereby
produced significantly less plutonium for nuclear warheads than it
could have.
(2) The only way for North Korea to perfect ballistic missiles for
delivering nuclear warheads is to keep testing them until they work
reliably. Yet the North has conducted just three sets of medium-range
missile tests and three tests of longer range Taepodong missiles in 20
years.
The timing of when it started and stopped its nuclear programs and
conducted its missile tests suggests it has been pursuing a two-track
strategy to ease its insecurity: On the one hand, arm to deter the
threat of attack, and on the other hand, restrain arming as inducement
for a fundamentally new political, economic, and strategic relationship
with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. We do not know if that
strategy has changed.
Pyongyang's basic stance is that as long as Washington remains its
foe, it feels threatened and will acquire nuclear weapons and missiles
to counter that threat. But, it says, if Washington, along with Seoul
and Tokyo, moves to end enmity and reconcile with it, it will no longer
feel threatened and will not need these weapons.
Does Pyongyang mean what it says? Most observers doubt it, but the
fact is, nobody knows, with the possible exception of Kim Jong-il. We
need to find out. And we need to find out exactly what he wants in
return. The only way to do that is to probe through sustained
diplomatic give-and-take--offering the DPRK meaningful steps toward a
new political, economic, and strategic relationship in return for steps
toward full denuclearization. All the speculation that it will never
give up its weapons only encourages Pyongyang to think it won't have
to--and worse, encourages our allies to think we are abandoning our
goal of complete denuclearization.
A second major source of uncertainty is the future of the North
Korean regime if Kim Jong-il should die or be incapacitated. One thing
is clear, whatever happens to him will make the North's nuclear and
missile programs more of a risk. Why take the chance that his successor
might be less able to make and keep a nuclear or missile deal or
control North Korea's nuclear weapons and material? Doubts about Kim
Jong-il's health make diplomatic give-and-take more urgent. Managing or
ignoring North Korea, as some in Washington favor, is not a prudent
policy, especially if the North becomes more unmanageable.
change in north korea
Some believe that the collapse of North Korea is the only way to
capture the North's nuclear and missile programs. When and if that
might happen is unknowable. Waiting for its collapse while it adds to
its nuclear and missile capacity is not prudent. Even worse, collapse
would run serious risks that fissile material and missile technology
end up in the wrong hands. Collapse is certainly a hope, but hope is
not a strategy.
Nor is regime change a credible strategy because none of North
Korea's neighbors seem willing to run the risks of collapse. The only
strategy that can bring about needed change inside North Korea, however
gradual and grudging, is sustained engagement and people-to-people
exchanges. That will require support for NGOs to work on the ground in
North Korea and to bring North Koreans here and send Americans there
for cultural, scientific and educational exchanges and business,
agricultural, legal, financial, and other training.
A good example was the concert given by the New York Philharmonic
in Pyongyang, which received a warm, at times emotional reception that
was broadcast nationwide in North Korea--a useful counterpoint to the
steady diet of anti-United States propaganda Pyongyang usually feeds to
its populace.
Instead of encouraging expanded access, however, we have tried to
withhold such exchanges for leverage, for instance, holding up a return
visit to New York by North Korea's state symphony orchestra. Doing so
gives us little leverage while denying us the benefit of engagement
that can stimulate change inside North Korea.
leverage
That example illustrates a larger point. The DPRK has nuclear and
missile leverage. We are reduced to withholding visas for a symphony
orchestra. That underscores just how little leverage we have to punish
North Korea or compel its compliance. Military action has always been
too risky because Seoul remains hostage, within range of North Korean
artillery. Sanctions have never caused Pyongyang enough economic pain
to make it yield to our will because none of the North's neighbors have
been willing to impose stringent enough sanctions to risk collapse. And
the North regards sanctions as confirmation of its conviction that we
remain its foe, giving it a pretext to continue arming.
While China will support tougher U.N. sanctions, Chinese officials
have repeatedly stated that it has no interest in seeing either nukes
or collapse in North Korea. Those who seek to induce or pressure China
to cut off all food and fuel to the North want it to act contrary to
its interests. This is hardly the time to put our relations with China
in jeopardy over North Korea.
The only way to stop North Korea from testing nuclear weapons and
missiles and making more plutonium is diplomatic give-and-take, whether
bilateral or six-party. That was what President Bill Clinton decided
after the North launched its Taepodong-1 in 1998 in a failed attempt to
put a satellite in orbit. Talks in 1999 led the North to accept a
moratorium on test launches. When Kim Jong-il met with Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright in October 2000, he offered to end not only
tests, but also deployment and production of longer range missiles.
President Bush also opted to negotiate in earnest after North Korea
conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Just 3 weeks
later, on October 31, U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill met bilaterally
with his DPRK counterpart and proposed a compromise end to the
financial sanctions imposed in 2005. Negotiations yielded agreements
that put Pyongyang on a path to disable its plutonium facilities at
Yongbyon.
In neither instance, however, did we sustain our promising
diplomatic course, so we do not know how far we could have progressed
toward our goal of eliminating North Korea's nuclear and missile
programs and weapons.
We do not know now, either.
The step-by-step approach we have taken in six-party talks so far
has failed to build much trust or give either side much of a stake in
keeping any agreement, leaving Pyongyang free to use its nuclear and
missile leverage. And use that leverage it has: Whenever it believed
the United States was not keeping its side of the bargain, North Korea
was all too quick to retaliate--in 1998 by seeking the means to enrich
uranium and testing a longer range Taepodong-1 missile, in 2003 by
reigniting its plutonium program and giving nuclear help to Syria, and
in 2006 by test-launching the Taepodong-2 along with six other missiles
and then conducting a nuclear test.
The lesson that North Korea learned from 1998, 2003, and 2006, but
we have not, is that we lack the leverage to coerce it to do what we
want or punish it for its transgressions.
It is applying that lesson now. On June 26, 2008, North Korea
handed China a written declaration of its plutonium program, as it was
obliged to do under the October 2007 accord. North Korea reportedly
declared it had separated 38kg of plutonium, a total that was within
the range of United States estimates, though at the lower end. In a
side agreement with Washington, Pyongyang committed to disclose its
enrichment and proliferation activities, including help for Syria's
nuclear reactor. Many in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul questioned
whether the declaration was ``complete and correct,'' as required by
the October 2007 agreement. The crux of the dispute is how much
plutonium the North had separated before 1991. Here again, we do not
know for sure.
The United States decided to demand arrangements to verify the
declaration before completing the disabling and moving on to the
dismantlement phase of talks. The trouble was, the October 2007
agreement contained no provision for verification in the second phase
of denuclearization. The day the North turned over its declaration, the
White House announced its intention to relax sanctions under the
Trading with the Enemy Act and to delist the DPRK as a ``state sponsor
of terrorism''--but with a caveat. As Secretary of State Rice told the
Heritage Foundation on June 18, ``[B]efore those actions go into
effect, we would continue to assess the level of North Korean
cooperation in helping verify the accuracy and completeness of its
declaration. And if that cooperation is insufficient, we will respond
accordingly.'' She acknowledged Washington was moving the goalposts:
``What we've done, in a sense, is move up issues that were to be taken
up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactor, into
phase two.''
In bilateral talks with the United States, North Korea then agreed
to establish a six-party verification mechanism and allow visits to
declared nuclear facilities, a review of documents, and interviews with
technical personnel. These commitments were later codified in a July 12
six-party communique. Undisclosed at the time, the North also agreed to
cooperate on verification during the dismantlement phase.
That was not good enough for Japan and South Korea. They demanded a
written protocol, and President Bush agreed. The United States handed
the North Koreans a draft on intrusive verification and on July 30 the
White House announced it had delayed delisting the DPRK as a ``state
sponsor of terrorism,'' until they accepted it.
North Korean reaction was swift. Retaliating for what it took to be
a renege on the October 2007 accord, it suspended disabling at its
plutonium facilities at Yongbyon on August 14. It soon began restoring
equipment at its Yongbyon facilities. On October 9 it barred IAEA
inspectors from its Yongbyon complex.
Disabling was designed to whittle away North Korea's nuclear
leverage by making it more time-consuming and difficult for it to
resume making plutonium. With the disabling in jeopardy, Hill met his
DPRK counterpart Kim Gye Gwan in Pyongyang October 1-3, armed with a
revised draft protocol. Stopping short of accepting it, Kim agreed to
allow ``sampling and other forensic measures'' during the dismantlement
phase at the three declared sites at Yongbyon--the reactor,
reprocessing plant, and fuel fabrication plant--which might suffice to
ascertain how much plutonium the North had produced. If not, he also
accepted ``access, based on mutual consent, to undeclared sites''
according to the State Department announcement.
President Bush's decision to proceed with the delisting angered the
Aso government. Japan and South Korea insisted on halting promised
energy aid without more intrusive verification arrangements. In the
face of allied resistance, the Bush administration backed away from the
October 2007 six-party accord. On December 11, the United States,
Japan, and South Korea threatened to suspend shipments of energy aid
unless the DPRK accepted a written verification protocol. In response
to the renege, the North stopped disabling. In late January it began
preparations to test-launch the Taepodong-2 in the guise of putting a
satellite into orbit.
We then imposed new sanctions, giving Pyongyang a pretext to
demonstrate its nuclear and missile leverage and add to it. It is doing
just that by reprocessing the spent fuel unloaded from the Yongbyon
reactor in the disabling process. Extracting another bomb's worth of
plutonium put it in a position to conduct another nuclear test without
reducing its small stock of fissile material, which it has now done. It
is also threatening to restart its uranium enrichment effort, which
could take years to produce significant quantities of highly enriched
uranium. Much worse, in just a matter of months, it could also restart
its reactor to generate more spent fuel for plutonium. That would give
it what it does not yet have--enough plutonium to export. That could
also trigger a nuclear arms race in Asia.
The experience of the last 8 years makes North Korea far less
confident about its effort to reconcile with us and our allies and much
more confident about acquiring additional nuclear and missile leverage.
That makes it much more difficult for us to get Pyongyang to reverse
course. In short, we do not know if we can get Pyongyang back on the
road to denuclearization or how far down that road we can get. We need
sustained diplomatic give-and-take to find out.
a new strategy
The current crisis prompts a troubling question, how can Washington
avoid having to react under pressure from Pyongyang, especially when
the process of denuclearization could take years to complete?
Accusing a self-righteous North Korea of wrongdoing and trying to
punish has been tried time and again by the last three administrations
over the past two decades. That crime-and-punishment approach never
worked then and it won't work now.
We need a new strategy, one that focuses sharply on the aim of
reducing North Korea's leverage while adding to our own by easing its
insecurity and expanding engagement and exchanges. Deeper engagement
not only encourages change in North Korea. It is also our only way to
enhance our leverage. North Korea may be willing to trade away its
plutonium and enrichment programs brick by brick. We should be willing
to give it some of what it wants in return. That would reward good
behavior. It would also give us leverage to withhold if the North does
not follow through on its commitment to disarm.
To probe with an open mind what North Korea wants and what it will
do in return, we need an internal policy review that crafts a roadmap
to put more for more on the negotiating table--not a grand bargain, but
a comprehensive list of sequenced reciprocal actions to normalize
relations, sign a peace treaty, end enmity and reconcile with North
Korea, easing its insecurity and isolation. In return for steps toward
a new political, economic, and strategic relationship with Washington,
Pyongyang needs to satisfy international norms of behavior, starting
with a halt to exports of nuclear and missile technology--along with
nuclear and missile tests--and then move to eliminate its nuclear and
missile programs. In negotiating, we need to be clear about what we
want at each step and honor the terms of any agreements we reach with
Pyongyang.
One possible roadmap of more for more might look like this:
Send a high-level emissary, someone with the stature of
former President Bill Clinton or former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger who can get access to Kim Jong-il, and propose
a little more for more:
Complete the disabling of the plutonium facilities and the
disposal of replacement fuel rods in return for delivering
promised energy assistance on schedule and move on to
permanent dismantlement.
Begin verification of its plutonium production in return for
additional energy aid.
As inducement to a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests
and exports, begin a peace process on the Korean Peninsula
with a declaration signed by the United States and North
Korea, along with South Korea and China. In that
declaration Washington would reaffirm it has no hostile
intent toward Pyongyang and formally commit itself to
signing a peace treaty ending the Korean war when North
Korea is nuclear-free. It would then commence to negotiate
a series of peace agreements on confidence-building
measures.
After consultations with South Korea and Japan, propose a lot more
for a lot more:
Deepen economic engagement with agricultural, energy and
infrastructure aid bilaterally, multilaterally and through
international financial institutions as inducement to an
agreement to dismantle its nuclear facilities and its medium
and longer range missile programs along the lines of October
2000.
Begin constructing powerplants as North Korea dismantles its
nuclear programs and begins to turn over its nuclear material
and weapons.
Establish full diplomatic relations as Pyongyang dismantles
its fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing facility, and reactor
at Yongbyon with the aid of Nunn-Lugar funding, carries out the
verification of its plutonium production, adopts a plan for
verification of its enrichment and proliferation activities,
and holds talks with the United Nations on human rights issues,
such as opening its penal labor colonies to visits by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and makes progress on
allowing free exercise of religion.
Commence a regional security dialogue that would put North
Korea at the top table and eventually provide negative security
assurances, a multilateral pledge not to introduce nuclear
weapons into the Korea Peninsula (a nuclear-free zone), and
other benefits to its security.
Complete powerplants, perhaps including a replacement
nuclear reactor, and sign a peace treaty once the North gives
up all its nuclear material and weapons.
Hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in return for its
disposal of some plutonium--at a minimum the spent nuclear fuel
removed during the disabling process. At that meeting conclude
agreement on the above roadmap, which would then be subject to
six-party approval.
By getting Kim Jong-il's signature on such a deal, President Obama
would give Pyongyang a tangible stake in becoming nuclear-free. It
would also give Washington its first real leverage: U.S. steps could be
withheld or reversed if--and only if--Pyongyang doesn't follow through
on commitments to give up its nuclear programs and arms.
Will our allies go along with this strategy? Whatever the allies'
misgivings about United States diplomatic give-and-take with the DPRK,
letting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs run free will only
aggravate alliance relations. United States failure to deal with the
North Korean threat has already sowed unease in some quarters of Tokyo
and Seoul about how much they can rely on Washington for their
security. Their unhappiness with U.S. policy can best be addressed
neither by deferring to their wishes nor by running roughshod over
them, but by frank and thorough consultation. That includes serious
discussion not only about our negotiating proposals but also about
their security needs as long as North Korea remains nuclear-armed.
Above all, it means making clear to our allies that we will not accept
a nuclear-armed North Korea and that we remain committed to our goal of
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thanks for the summary.
Ms. Lindborg, thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Kerry, Ranking
Member Lugar, distinguished members of the committee.
I'm pleased to be here today. We're certainly gathering at
a time of increased tension and I would like to focus my
comments today on a slightly different topic as a
representative of a nongovernmental organization.
I've submitted comments for the record and I'll try to
summarize in a few key points.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Lindborg. The first is that there is an ongoing
continuous engagement with U.S. nongovernmental organizations
on meeting critical humanitarian needs within the DPRK.
I've been involved in working on these issues since the
emergence of the serious famine in the mid-1990s when my
organization, Mercy Corps, responded to those very critical
needs.
There have been a handful, perhaps a dozen, of NGOs that
have stayed engaged since then working on food security,
health, water, sanitation programs, and sponsoring delegations
and exchanges that work on technical, understanding, improved
understanding between our peoples.
This decade-plus of experience has enabled us to understand
the realities, the constraints, the opportunities of how we can
work together, and how we can understand the technical
opportunities for improving the lives of the North Koreans and
improving mutual understanding.
Since the famine of the mid-1990s where estimates of those
who died range from 280,000 to more than 2 million, the acute
famine has definitely subsided. However, chronic food shortages
remain and the U.N. estimated as of November of last year that
there were still approximately a 1.8 million metric ton food
shortfall which would leave 8.7 million of the most vulnerable
without adequate food intake and nutrition.
It's not famine conditions but it's chronic malnutrition.
So my second point is that the need remains.
My third point that I'd like to highlight is a brief
description of the USAID-supported food program that recently
ended. This was a groundbreaking program that shows us a way of
how we can constructively engage on meeting real humanitarian
needs that we understand exist. In 2008, USAID negotiated a
protocol with the DPRK government in which there would be
provision from USAID, 500,000 metric tons of American food. Of
this, 400,000 went through the World Food Programme and 100,000
went to a consortium of five NGOs.
Mercy Corps was the lead. We were joined by World Vision,
Global Resource Services, Samaritan's Purse and Christian
Friends of Korea. All five of us brought more than a decade of
experience in working on the ground in providing humanitarian
assistance to North Korea.
The groundbreaking aspect of this program was that the
agreed-upon protocol between the two governments served as the
basis for the NGO-negotiated agreement with our counterparts in
the DPRK. This enabled us to, in a more accountable way than
ever before, identify the need. We identified 900,000 children,
elderly, pregnant and lactating women in the two provinces of
our designated area as the beneficiaries of the food.
We were able to indicate at all points of the distribution
who the donor was and people were very clear that the food was
a gift of the American people. We had significant levels of
access from the port to the warehouses to the institutions,
including household visits, and we were able to field a team of
16 food monitors in-country for the entire 9 months of the
program.
Most importantly, this program serves how we can
constructively work with our North Korean counterparts to
develop and deliver a program that begins to meet international
standards of food delivery based on needs that we agree upon
and an approach that we jointly implement.
As I note in my testimony, regrettably, this program was
ended early at the request of the North Korean Government on
March 31. However, all five of the participating NGOs as well
as our other NGO colleagues continue our work, meeting
humanitarian needs within North Korea, still focused on the
very real needs around food security, health, water,
sanitation.
We all believe that humanitarian engagement is vital to
maintain. The political tensions between the United States and
DPRK governments remain well known. Humanitarian assistance has
been one of the few areas of continuous positive steps forward
throughout the last decade. We believe these humanitarian
programs meet critical human needs and demonstrate the best of
the American people, maintain open lines of communication with
the North Korean people.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy Lindborg, President, Mercy Corps,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Chairman Kerry and
Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished Senators, thank you for the
invitation to speak today. We are gathering at a time of particularly
high tension between the United States and DPRK governments, as my
expert colleagues will be able to address. I would like to focus my
comments today on the experiences of United States nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in addressing critical humanitarian needs within
North Korea.
I have been working on assistance programs in North Korea since my
organization, Mercy Corps, first became involved in 1996. Even in the
face of shifting political dynamics, humanitarian assistance has been
effective through the last decade at making continuous progress in
meeting real human needs while also promoting constructive
communication with the North Korean people.
In particular, I would like to highlight the recent USAID-supported
food program that fed 900,000 North Korean children, pregnant women,
and elderly who needed food. A precedent-setting agreement between the
United States and DPRK governments gave the NGOs greater ability than
ever before to ascertain need and accountably deliver food to the most
vulnerable through a 16-person in-country team.
This program provided an important model for how we might normalize
humanitarian assistance based on international humanitarian standards.
It also demonstrated the spirit and goodwill of the people of the
United States toward the people of North Korea.
a decade of ngo humanitarian engagement with the dprk
Many U.S. NGOs, including my organization Mercy Corps, first became
involved with the DPRK in 1996 during a time of serious famine. The
NGOs mobilized to provide urgent relief assistance to the people of
North Korea as news of the famine surfaced, with strong support from
private donors.
In 1998, the USG embarked upon its first large food assistance
program in response to the famine, which continued through the year
2000. A group of U.S. NGOs known as the Private Voluntary Organization
Consortium (PVOC) monitored a portion of that food assistance. The
lessons we learned from that 3-year food program proved invaluable for
designing and implementing the most recent food program.
Since those famine years, approximately a dozen U.S. NGOs have
remained continuously engaged in providing humanitarian assistance. We
have worked to build and maintain relationships within North Korea that
have enabled us to work ever more effectively. Our programs address
basic human needs such as health care and disease prevention, water and
sanitation and food security. We have sent and received many dozens of
delegations over the years, providing both technical education and,
importantly, enabling people-to-people connections that seek to improve
mutual understanding and communication.
We have all relied upon private funding and the interest and
support of our communities. For Mercy Corps, dedicated volunteers in
our hometown of Portland, OR, have been steadfast supporters. They have
given technical and financial assistance, traveled to North Korea and
provided hospitality to visiting groups of farmers and members of our
North Korean partner agency.
As a result, many NGO workers have developed an understanding of
the opportunities, constraints and realities of operating within North
Korea. We have been able to work with the Health and Agricultural
Ministries, as well as with provincial and county officials. We have
also helped North Koreans better understand how we operate and deliver
needs-based programming. We are all mission-driven organizations
dedicated to provision of humanitarian assistance as well as to the
importance of building bridges of understanding between people.
usaid food program 2008-2009
The acute famine has subsided since the late nineties, but North
Korea remains highly food insecure. In November 2008, the U.N.
estimated that this year's food gap would equal approximately 1.8
million metric tons. This means that over 8.7 million elderly, pregnant
and lactating women, children in nurseries, kindergartens, and primary
schools, children in residential institutions and in pediatric wards
would require food assistance to meet their basic food needs.
In 2008, officials from USAID, the National Security Council and
the Department of State, working with officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, negotiated a protocol that outlined the
delivery of 500,000 MT of food over 12 months according to
international standards for food programs. This groundbreaking protocol
served to significantly normalize humanitarian assistance programs in
the first USG food program since 2000.
For this program, 400,000 MT of food was allocated to the U.N.
World Food Program, while 100,000 MT were allocated to a consortium of
five U.S. NGOs. All five NGOs--World Vision, Global Resource Services,
Christian Friends of Korea, Samaritan's Purse, and Mercy Corps as
lead--brought more than a decade of experience in humanitarian work
inside North Korea, with significant understanding of the culture and
longstanding relationships.
The U.S. NGOs negotiated a separate Letter of Understanding (LOU)
with the Korea America Private Exchange Society (KAPES), our partner
agency within the DPRK, based upon the protocol agreement between the
two governments. The LOU outlined in much greater detail the specifics
of how the program would operate. The official protocol and resulting
LOU equipped us to mount a program based on identified humanitarian
need and international standards, with significant levels of access to
all points of food delivery.
Key provisions of our LOU included an initial needs assessment
effort, signage at all distribution points that indicated the food was
a gift from the American people and USAID, an agreed upon list of
institutions and individuals targeted to receive food, the ability to
track the food as it went from port to warehouse to distribution point,
all the way to the beneficiary's home with a minimum of 24 hours
notice; and the inclusion of Korean speakers on our team. We
established two offices in the provincial cities of Huichon and Sinuiju
plus a main office in the diplomatic compound in Pyongyang. These
provisions are well in line with international standards.
The program began with a rapid food security assessment in June
2009, conducted over an 18-day period in our two target provinces of
Chaggang and North Pyongyang (see attached map). The 10-person team
interviewed county officials, the heads of kindergartens, nursery
schools, orphanages and warehouses and conducted household visits. This
assessment affirmed chronic levels of malnutrition within the DPRK.
Critical key findings included:
The DPRK public distribution system is the primary source of
food for most North Korean citizens, with a stated provision of
600 grams of cereals per person per day. Rations had been
reduced to 350 grams in April, then down to 250 grams in May
and 150 grams in June, providing each recipient with a handful
of rice or corn per day;
Cereal stocks were anticipated to be exhausted by the end of
June 2008, in 24 of the 25 counties surveyed;
A decade of food insecurity had resulted in chronic low
birth weights, cases of malnutrition among children under 5
years of age and greater vulnerability to other illnesses.
As a result, we identified a group of 900,000 ``most vulnerable''
beneficiaries within the 25 counties where the NGOs would operate,
focusing on children under 5 years of age, pregnant and lactating
women, and the elderly.
Over the next 9 months, we fielded a team of 16 program monitors
who lived for up to 8 months in country, 12 of whom lived in the two
provincial field offices over the tough winter months. This team was
supported with dozens of visits by technical support personnel.
We trained more than 100 provincial and county officials in
handling food as it transited from the port to their areas. We
encountered numerous problems associated with moving large amounts of
food, including bag miscounts, spillage and warehouse storage issues.
Importantly, we were able to work with local officials to remedy these
situations. Our ability to identify and jointly solve problems as they
arose was an important positive feature of the program.
We brought in 12 vehicles for the program, which were plated with
yellow license plates that read AF1 through 12, signifying either
American friends or American food, depending upon the translation--or
both together as we sometimes heard.
Our teams saw undeniable need among the people we served, and they
also heard many thanks from the thousands of North Koreans with whom
they interacted. During household visits, team members were welcomed
graciously and usually offered the warmest seat of the house as a
gesture of respect.
Throughout the program, we frequently had to reaffirm or clarify
key provisions of the LOU. Many times there were differing
interpretations of critical issues. However, we were able to work
constructively with our DPRK counterparts to solve problems as they
arose and, as a result, meet the food needs of nearly a million of the
most vulnerable, with a greater level of accountability and certainty
than ever before.
I would like to share a few critical factors that contributed to
the success of this program--factors that have been the foundation of
most NGO humanitarian programs:
Significant knowledge of the culture and country, including
longstanding relationships with individuals within KAPES,
enabling us to understand and solve problems that surfaced
along the way;
Ability to focus on technical level problem-solving;
Consistency in interaction and focus on humanitarian issues;
Follow through on commitments;
Flexibility when possible, within an overall framework based
on humanitarian need and action.
The food program was, regrettably, prematurely ended on March 31,
2009, at the request of North Korean authorities. The NGOs at that
point had brought in 71,000 MT of the 100,000 MT allocated, with 50,000
MT distributed according to the negotiated agreements. At the time of
the program closure, 21,000 MT had not been fully distributed, with
4,000 MT still at the port and the remainder in transit or in country
warehouses. KAPES has since reported to us that these remaining
commodities have been delivered according to the negotiated
implementation plan with the exception of 4,000 MT that were reportedly
used for food for work activities in the two provinces. We have not
been able to confirm this distribution plan through independent program
monitoring.
The program, despite the disappointing early end and many
challenges, set new precedents for working in the DPRK with normalized
assistance programs that meet international standards. Above all, we
believe we served to demonstrate the compassion and goodwill of the
American people through provision of much-needed food as well as
through thousands of conversations and individual contacts.
All of the five NGOs that participated in the food program continue
to work in the DPRK with ongoing programs focused on health, water
sanitation, and food security. Three of the participating NGOs have
made return visits to the DPRK since the closure of the food program to
move forward ongoing assistance programs, with excellent cooperation
from relevant authorities.
We believe continued humanitarian engagement is vital to maintain.
The political tension between the USG and DPRK governments is well
known. Humanitarian assistance has been on the few areas of continuous,
positive steps forward through the last decade. These humanitarian
programs meet critical human needs, demonstrate the best of American
values and maintain an important channel for people-to-people
connection.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
So, Mr. Sigal, when Kim Jong-il gets his debrief on what
the Americans are saying about him today and they report that,
well, you know, this guy named Sigal went before the Foreign
Relations Committee and said all they have to do is get some
leverage on him and then, you know, make him dependent,
wouldn't they sort of have gamed that out? Isn't that maybe one
of the reasons why they're very content just to remain isolated
and not be dependent and if they went the opposite way,
wouldn't they have offered it a little while back?
Mr. Sigal. That may be, but he's promised his people not
just a strong country but a prosperous one by 2012. He can't do
that on his own. The only way he can do that is with a
political accommodation with us, South Korea and Japan, that
allows him to reallocate resources internally and get aid and
investment from the outside.
If he wants to give up on prosperity, I think that's
trouble for him, and I think there is no sign he has changed
that view. North Korean rhetoric remains the same. So at some
point, I think he will come and want to deal with us.
I also think he needs us for his security. He did not want
to be dependent on China. His father didn't want to be
dependent on China. That's why they reached out to us back in
the late 1980s.
I think those fundamentals don't change. North Korea lives
in a dangerous neighborhood. If it can turn the former enemies
into friends, it is much safer. So I think those things remain
and those things ultimately will make him dependent on us.
The Chairman. Then why do you think he's gone about it the
way he has?
Mr. Sigal. I don't know. I think it is possible to see what
we have as a man who's trying to force us to be his friend,
doesn't trust us, and he has somewhat reasonable grounds for
not always trusting us, he has a much weaker country, and a
Korean tradition where for centuries Korean leaders have made
deals with the key neighbors rather than standing up to them.
What his father did and what he did partly to legitimate
their rule is stand up to all the great powers. That's very bad
if he chooses to do it just with weapons, but as Colin Powell
put it very well, he can't eat plutonium. If he chooses simply
to stand up to the other powers and simply go for strength and
not for prosperity, that's not a very good solution for him and
it's certainly not a good solution for his successor whenever
that person takes power down the road. So Kim Jong-il needs to
move.
The Chairman. So would--any of you can respond to this
question.
Is there any danger at all that in--just going back to the
table and pursuing this route which I think you have to do it
because I don't think you have many choices, but what is the
danger level with respect to the reward of bad behavior
argument?
Mr. Sigal. Well, clearly what we want to do is reward good
behavior and you only do things where, as I suggested, with a
series of reciprocal steps. You only do things for them when
they do things that you want them to and you structure the
deals that way.
The fact is we didn't always do that and that's a sad fact.
North Korea behavior is inexcusable. What they're doing now, I
don't have to tell you, is harmful to them, harmful to us,
above all harmful to our alliance relationships down the road,
which is a very important reason why we have to get back to
this negotiating table and see what we can get.
The Chairman. The flip side of that question, Mr. Cha, is--
sort of goes to your proposal with respect to redesignating
them as a terrorist country.
First of all, are there not specific legal standards that
apply to that designation and do not these steps he's taken
actually fall outside of them, but equally importantly,
wouldn't that designation at this moment in time potentially
just escalate the latter tit for tat and perhaps undermine the
ability to get to the table where you need to do the
constructive work of diplomacy, i.e., premature?
Dr. Cha. Yes. Well,----
The Chairman. If it applies.
Dr. Cha. Right. Well, in terms of getting back to the
table, I think everybody wants to get back to the table. The
only way we get closer to anything resembling a freeze and a
cap on the capabilities is through negotiation. So as bad as
that might seem at the current moment, it's something that we
eventually have to get
back to.
You know, having been part of these negotiations for about
3 years, as our Deputy Head of Delegation, I can tell you, sir,
that I have very little confidence that the North Koreans are
wanting to give up all of their nuclear weapons.
I think they're willing to give up some of them for all the
things that we've talked about, assistance, normalization,
peace treaty, but in the end, they're not willing to give up
all of them and that's a difficult thing for a negotiator to
have to deal with as they go into a negotiation. Yet you still
have to have negotiations because you want to maintain a cap,
freeze, disable and be able to degrade their programs.
On the question of the terrorism list, there are legal
criteria for being put on and taken off this list, but I think
it's also fair to say that it is also--there are also
political--there's a political environment in which discussion
of putting a country on or taking them off the list is quite
relevant. And I think when North Korea was taken off the list,
there were criteria that justified their being taken off the
list, but there was also a broader framework in which that was
happening, in which many people expected the North Koreans
would live up to their end of the second phase of the six-party
agreement, the verification protocol, and they did not.
Since then, as you know very well, they've done a nuclear
test, a second nuclear test, they're threatening a third
nuclear test, and most recently, they've taken these two
Americans and threatened to throw them for 12 years into a
labor camp. That's not the right political environment and so I
would appeal both on legal grounds as well as on the larger
political grounds.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Cha, you mentioned that in 2005, other
countries voluntarily froze North Korean assets. We had the
same situation in Macau. I think that's important because you
point out if in fact we had a Security Council resolution and
clearly a multinational idea here, that the sanctions leads to
that form, it would be much more comprehensive and complete,
and that they affect the leadership which is important.
I suspect we can make some headway with some of the
followers, but the leadership is what counts. Unfortunately at
this particular moment, even thinking about negotiations, I'm
really struck by the fact that after the negotiations we've
been involved in, after Yongbyon is partially disassembled and
so forth, this reversal is really striking and then beyond
that, nuclear tests, missiles flying over Japan, and all the
rest of it, we can speculate whether they're having an internal
problem politically, but the effects on the rest of the world
are very severe.
I would be in favor really of moving very strongly toward
the economic sanction route and bank accounts. I think that
made a difference. I think that's where we got to the table to
begin with. In fact, there had not been really much movement
prior to that point.
But I'm also intrigued by your thought about an inspection
regime. Describe really what an inspection regime, a
counterproliferation regime means or how that is set up.
Dr. Cha. Well, I mean, the first point on that, Senator
Lugar, is, as you know well, I mean, for denuclearization, we
need a negotiation. If we don't have a negotiation, we have to
focus on counterproliferation and I think what often gets
missed in the media discussion of the inspection regime is they
focus on the high seas interception where a comprehensive
inspection regime--that would just be one small piece.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Cha. The bigger areas would be the cooperation by the
Chinese and Russians at ports in terms of container cargo, in
terms of the practice of bunkering at third country ports as
vessels that may be carrying bad North Korea things need to
stop on their way to their final destination.
If all of these things become part of a U.N. Security
Council resolution and then, as Ambassador Bosworth said, there
is an enforcement or monitoring mechanism within the U.N.
Security Council of countries who are abiding by it, that would
be a much more effective way of trying to counter proliferation
than if the United States on its own, as we were doing during
the Bush administration, trying to go out individually and
persuade countries to do this.
That was a much harder route and I think this process would
be much more effective and would position the United States
much better.
Senator Lugar. I agree, and it seems to me the essential
diplomacy right for the moment is with all the rest of the
world.
Dr. Cha. Yes, Senator.
Senator Lugar. In due course, we may get into some
diplomacy because the North Koreans do find it necessary, but
our job right now is the Security Council, to make certain that
if we go the economic banking route or if we try to set up a
nonproliferation regime because, after all, the items that the
North Koreans are getting revenue from, their major exports
appear to be through these really dangerous substances,
information, and weapons.
So this is another essential cutoff and a very important
one in terms of the security of the rest of the world, quite
apart from whether we ever get to the table with the North
Koreans, just in terms of our own safety and others in the
process of all of this. That's why it seems to me your idea of
the counterproliferation regime really needs some more
explanation on your part and perhaps some greater information,
if you publish such, or to give us some outlines in terms of
our own thinking of how these things work, so the American
people understand.
Now, at the end of the day, the North Korean leadership may
still say we're simply going to keep threatening the world, as
they are. They're claiming if we put any of these sanctions on,
we can expect war on their part. This is not a regime that
looks to me like it's headed to the table happily and willingly
and as you're saying, even if we got to the table, the
reticence to give up all nuclear weapons, and have some
accountability for this, you think is clearly a place too far.
Why do you reach that conclusion?
Dr. Cha. Well, I just--I feel as though, and this isn't
just the second term of the Bush administration, we've been
negotiating with North Korea for some 16 years and Evans Revere
and others have been involved in this process during the
Clinton administration. There have been several high-level
envoys that have gone to North Korea. And yet this process
still leads us only to the point where we got at the end of the
Bush administration of a freeze and then the beginning of a
process of disablement, in spite of the fact that all the
things the North has asked for have been put on the table:
peace treaty, normalization, economic and energy assistance,
negative security assurance in the 2005 joint statement which
says that the United States will not attack North Korea with
nuclear and conventional weapons.
So if security was driving their need for nuclear weapons,
the negative security assurance and everything that came with
the political and material incentives should at least offer
them enough of an incentive to push harder forward on the
process, yet in our negotiations they continued to falter when
we got to the most crucial moments.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Mr. Sigal. If I might, Senator, without taking issue at all
with port inspections and other things, I think we really have
to keep our eye on the plutonium.
The North has a likely response, although there's nothing
certain about the North or what's going on there right now,
which is to restart the reactor at Yongbyon which would
generate more plutonium. I think we have to try to prevent that
from happening and I don't know a better way than negotiation.
I think we can't risk a war here. We have Seoul as a
hostage and I think if you keep your eye on plutonium, right
now they have a very limited supply, limited enough so that
they had to reprocess in order to have enough for another test.
They're going to have to test some more if they want to prove
their weapons.
I think we have some very serious stakes that go beyond the
narrow issue of the plutonium. Think about an unconstrained
North Korean nuclear program and its effects on the politics of
Japan and how that plays back into the politics of China. That
is the real security risk to the United States of America and I
don't know any other way to stop it--granted it might not
work--than through the negotiating process.
Senator Lugar. I won't exceed my time, but I will say
respectfully, Professor, of course we want negotiations. The
whole point we're trying to make is the North Koreans have
deliberately walked away from it, have shot missiles across
Japan, have done a nuclear test. Of course you want
negotiation, but until we really do something as an
international community, I don't see much movement in that
respect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this most
timely hearing and for all of you being here.
I obviously sense, Mr. Sigal, Professor Sigal, that you
think the outline that Mr. Cha has put forth is
counterproductive to those----
Mr. Sigal. I didn't say that.
Senator Corker. So you think the broadness of sort of
keeping proliferation from occurring is--that's too broad and
we ought to focus only on plutonium? Is that what you're
saying?
Mr. Sigal. No. What I'm saying is you have to do both. We
need to be able to impede the North from getting things it
needs to make more nuclear weapons and missiles and from
sending things abroad. We need to do that, but we can't stop
there nor should we consider that the pressure we're putting on
them now will have the immediate effect of stopping them from
making more plutonium. That's part of our problem.
I have no objection to part of what he said. I think we
have to do that, and I'm glad that the Chinese are willing to
join with us, but we should not see that as a solution and I
think, if I heard Ambassador Bosworth say this, I think that's
his view, as well. I think that's the administration's view, if
I heard it correctly.
I think that's very important here, and it is very hard. We
should not--there's no grounds for optimism. It's just we don't
have an alternative.
Senator Corker. I sense in another breath your concern
about war. You talked about the South. So it seems to me that
there's a slight variation in what you're saying.
I mean, what is it you think--you were talking about Mr.
Cha's efforts or what he's put forth and how you may--you feel
that may lead to war.
So what it sounds like to me, if you----
Mr. Sigal. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to be misunderstood
that way. No, no. I think if you are trying to get rid of the
plutonium facility by attacking it, that's a risk. That's a
different thing from----
Senator Corker. Yes. I would be pretty sure that would lead
to war.
Mr. Sigal. Thank you.
Senator Corker. Let me just ask you this. What is it that
we have specifically that you think they truly want at this
time?
I guess I hear you talking about the security issue.
Certainly it seems to me that their actions do not indicate
creating a partnership with our country as it relates to their
security is what they're trying to achieve. So that doesn't
seem sane that they would take the course they're taking if
that's their objective.
So could you outline what you truly think they're after
that we have today? Maybe they're going a circuitous route and
I'm missing something, but what is it today you think they're
after that we have?
Mr. Sigal. What this has been about, and we do not know if
it is still about that, what they have told U.S. officials, the
earliest I know is 1990, and they told Under Secretary of State
Arnold Kanter that in 1992, was they wanted a strategic
relationship with us--they wanted to be our ally, to put it in
plain English. That was the way for them to get security.
Do they still want that? I do not know. But if you think
about--if you put yourself in--and it's very hard to do--put
yourself in Kim Jong-il's shoes. How can he feel secure? Do
nuclear weapons alone make him secure? I don't think so.
But if he has a fundamentally new relationship with us,
Japan and South Korea, that's a different story, but he can't
count on that and he has seen that we've been reluctant to move
that way and therefore he keeps threatening us with the nuclear
program.
But in the end, if you look, what we can't have a good
explanation of it if we think it's just about nuclear weapons
is why did he limit his production of plutonium over the past
20 years?
It is very hard to understand. It is very hard to
understand why the North Koreans did not in fact test missiles
over and over again until they had reliable missiles. They
certainly have the capacity to do that. Something else is going
on here and what I don't know is, is it still going on, but we
have to find out.
Senator Corker. Ms. Lindborg, you know, the notion of
talking about prosperity in the year 2012 from his point of
view, what was your experiences inside--what was your
experience inside the country and your sense of his desire, if
you will, based on what you saw, what your organization saw, in
working with these other groups that there was a better well-
being, if you will, for the citizens of his country?
Ms. Lindborg. Well, from the perspective of the last 13
years, there's no question that North Korea's better off than
it was in the mid-1990s when they were gripped with a very
serious famine. Things have definitely improved since then, but
as I noted, there's still a significant food insecurity,
particularly when you go into the rural areas, which is what
our programs have focused on.
Senator Corker. But is there any--I mean, this would be--is
there any sense within the agencies that there's any desire on
the part of the leadership of North Korea that the standard of
living, that the quality of life, that the people there who are
living there, that they're even concerned about that? Is there
any sense of that as you deal within that country?
Ms. Lindborg. You know, we are not dealing at the highest
political levels. So I would actually defer to my colleagues
who may have better informed opinions than I do on that.
Senator Corker. Mr. Revere, you want to comment?
Mr. Revere. Over the years, in discussions with fairly
senior DPRK officials, we have repeatedly had opportunities to
discuss the welfare of their people and America's desire to
help. It has been my experience over the years that at least
the people we were dealing with were genuinely concerned about
the welfare of their people.
Many of the negotiations that I participated in in the past
focused on the issue of food and humanitarian assistance and
new projects designed at helping the North Korean people and I
would say I have never encountered a DPRK official who brushed
aside the needs of their people.
The people that we were dealing with, the officials that we
were dealing with, took this very seriously, so seriously that
hours and hours and hours of negotiations were devoted to this
topic of how can we best improve the lives of their people.
Ms. Lindborg. Actually, Senator Corker, if I can just add
on to that, it is undeniable that the recent food program that
we just conducted had very high levels of approval and support
and that was in and of itself, I think, important evidence of
the desire for ensuring that there was well-being.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank each of
you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We need to wrap up in a couple minutes. Just one quick
question.
The proliferation threat is the threat to the United States
of America right now, barring some missile development that
we're not aware of, but even then, strategically,
fundamentally, the proliferation issue is the challenge to us.
China, however, Russia, South Korea, and Japan have far
more immediate and, frankly, pressing strategic concerns.
Why can they not summon a stronger response, given their
surrounding clout and already-existing leverage, particularly
China?
Mr. Revere.
Mr. Revere. Senator, I've been talking with the Chinese
since the late 1970s about North Korea and I find today a
remarkable difference in the tone and content of our dialogue
with the Chinese, in my conversations with the Chinese, from
those days.
I find more and more that Chinese officials, and
particularly senior think tank representatives and former
officials with whom I've had long relationships, are looking at
North Korea in a very different way today.
I've had a couple of Chinese officials actually use the
term ``security liability'' in describing North Korea today.
That's a remarkable thing for even semiofficial Chinese to say.
The bottom line is that I think attitudes in Beijing are
changing. We're starting to see op-eds conveying a more nuanced
view. We're starting to see publications come out very clearly
questioning past policy with respect to the DPRK.
I think we are at an important turning point in terms of
Chinese attitudes toward North Korea. I don't want to overstate
this, but I think we are at a turning point.
One final point on Japan. Japan has been very much focused
on one issue in recent years: the abduction issue. A serious
and emotional and important issue, yes, but I think Japan has
focused to such a degree on that issue, that it has failed to
focus as much attention as it should on other very immediate
and important threats to Japan, such as the North Korean
missiles.
When the United States started to move away from fulfilling
our part of the bargain on the missile moratorium that
prevented North Korea from launching medium- and long-range
ballistic missiles for the better part of 7 years, we did not
hear great cries of opposition and anger from Tokyo that I had
expected we would hear. That was very unfortunate, and one of
the things that I hope we do when we get back to the table with
the DPRK, and I believe we will eventually get back to the
table with the DPRK, is put the missile issue back on the
agenda.
The Chairman. Well, let me--did you have a comment?
Mr. Sigal. No. I just--one thing with respect to China. I
don't think fundamental Chinese interests have changed yet.
Instability in Korea is a problem for China, not simply
nukes, and I think that means that to expect China, for
instance, as some people hope for, to cut off all food and fuel
to North Korea is to make it act contrary to its interests and
I would say I think the chairman and certainly Senator Lugar
knows this is hardly the time to put our relations with China
in jeopardy over North Korea.
The Chairman. Well----
Mr. Sigal. We don't want to push it too hard, but China is
going to do a lot more, I think, to get tough with North Korea
and we will not only see it but they're going to do that. That
I agree with, totally with Evans.
The Chairman. Well, I don't think we're going to put our
relationship in jeopardy over it. I don't think we're going to
need to.
Mr. Sigal. Right.
The Chairman. You know, it's interesting in diplomacy and
international relations, sometimes the biggest of opportunities
are staring you in the face when things look the bleakest.
I do not agree that just because of all this saber rattling
and internal succession game going on and so forth, I'm not--
frankly, I'm concerned about the proliferation issue, but I'm
not concerned that there is an impasse that we can't get over
or there isn't a way to get back here.
I believe ultimately, I think there are mistakes that have
been made on our side of the fence over the last few years,
too, and they don't get heralded enough, but, you know, there
were some promises made about certain things being delivered
and they were never delivered. There were misinterpretations
about communication.
The post-9/11 atmosphere altered, the axis of evil and
other kinds of things, you know, Iraq had perceptions of a
regime change in other countries. A lot of attitudes shifted
and people responded to those things, and personally I believe
that if we behave as confidently as we ought to, given the
superiority of a number of strategic fronts on which we're
sitting here, not to mention the presence of Russia, China,
Japan, and South Korea, and South Korea and China alone are
enormously strong and we will remain committed to Japan's and
South Korea's strength, we got a lot of--you know, we've got a
lot of cards to play here and so I'm really quite confident
that if we play them adeptly and intelligently, I think North
Korea's longer term interests with respect to a security
arrangement, treaty, not an armistice from 1953 but an
understanding of where we go and an economic future, I think
there are ways to get through this.
And so I think the key here is to get back to the table and
not do things that make it harder to get there rather than
easier.
So that's just a quick summary take. I think your views
have been helpful, important. I think it's good to air this and
we have a distinguished visitor coming in about 5 minutes and
so we've got to get over to the Capitol to meet him, and I
apologize.
I will leave the record open for a week for colleagues
who'd like to submit any questions and we will certainly, if
you want to articulate any further in answer to what I just
said or anything any other Senator said, we will invite that
because we'd like to have as complete a record as possible. We
may just follow up with you to that effect.
So thank you very much. I think it's been very helpful.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to Questions Submitted
by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
six-party talks
The six-party talks were initially convened in 2003 to facilitate
the verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. Late last year, North Korea decided to initiate a boycott of
the six-party talks and followed up with the renunciation of a series
of previously made international commitments. Accordingly, the six-
party talks, which some experts viewed as the potential genesis of a
permanent regional security mechanism for Northeast Asia, have been put
on the shelf, despite repeated calls by the other Members for North
Korea to return to the talks.
In its place, a series of bilateral consultations have taken place
in recent months to consider next steps in response to North Korea's
increasingly provocative actions. No regional grouping to bring the
United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia has convened to
specifically address the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Question. Has the administration considered the notion of
reconvening the six-party talks, inviting the North Koreans to attend,
and if they refuse to do so, nonetheless proceeding with the talks
among the five remaining Members--with an empty chair to symbolize
North Korea's boycott?
Would not such a step vividly demonstrate North Korea's self-
imposed isolation and facilitate a multilateral consensus among
interested actors on next steps in response to North Korean
provocations?
Answer. The United States remains actively engaged in discussions
with our partners in the six-party process. Since the last session of
the six-party talks in December 2008, the United States has met and
will continue to meet with each of the other five parties to coordinate
our approach to North Korea. We will maintain our close consultations
with our partners going forward on the best ways to coordinate our
efforts and demonstrate a unified approach to the DPRK.
north korea's npt status
Question. When the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in January 2003, questions were raised over
whether the withdrawal complied with the legal requirements for treaty
withdrawal procedures. Namely, North Korea apparently failed to provide
3 months notice as required under the treaty. However, the previous
administration did not seek to challenge the legality of North Korea's
withdrawal from the NPT.
What is the current view of the U.S. Government on North Korea's
status under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? Is the North Korean
Government bound today by any of the provisions of the NPT?
Answer. We will follow up with additional information in writing at
a later date.
north korea's nuclear programs
Question. How long will it take North Korea to (1) restore its
plutonium reprocessing plant and begin operations, and (2) restore its
5-megawatt reactor and begin operations? Will North Korea require
outside assistance, imported parts, or imported fuel to restore the
disabled facilities at Yongbyon?
Answer. In its letter of September 3, 2009, to the United Nations
Security Council, North Korea declared that ``reprocessing of spent
fuel rods is at its final phase and extracted plutonium is being
weaponized.'' We would refer you to the Intelligence Community for an
assessment of this claim and for an assessment of the status of the
other key facilities at Yongbyon, including the 5-megawatt reactor.
Question. What is the current U.S. assessment of North Korea's
suspected uranium enrichment program? Are there signs that North Korea
has resumed steps in recent months to assemble and/or operate a uranium
enrichment facility?
Answer. On June 13, the day after the adoption of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1874, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement
in which it announced that ``uranium enrichment work will begin. In
accordance with the decision to build a light water reactors on its
own, development of uranium enrichment technology to guarantee nuclear
fuel has successfully progressed and has entered the test stage.''
North Korea's September 3 letter to the Security Council also
claimed that ``experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been
conducted to enter into completion phase.''
Rather than drawing any conclusions on such statements alone, we
would refer you to the Intelligence Community for an all-source
assessment.
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