[Senate Hearing 111-302]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-302
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SUDAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Eisa, Mohammed Ahmed, M.D., Sudan Organization for Rights and
Peacebuilding, Washington, DC.................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Gast, Earl, Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S.
Agency for International Development, Washington, DC........... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Response to question submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr 63
Gration, Maj. Gen. Scott, USAF (Ret.), Special Envoy to Sudan,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Russell D.
Feingold................................................... 59
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer.... 60
Response to question submitted by Senator Roger Wicker....... 62
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey,
Jr......................................................... 62
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Page, Susan D., regional director, Southern and East Africa,
National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC.................. 48
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Shinn, Hon. David, adjunct professor, Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University,
Washington, DC................................................. 38
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 58
Save Darfur Coalition, Washington, DC, prepared statement........ 64
Save Darfur Citizen Letter to the President...................... 66
Testimony by John Prendergast, cofounder, Enough Project, before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
and Global Health ``Sudan: U.S. Policy and Implementation of
the CPA,'' July 29, 2009....................................... 67
Testimony of John Norris, executive director of the Enough
Project, before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2009.................................. 70
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, prepared
statement...................................................... 73
Mercy Corps, Portland, OR, prepared statement.................... 78
(iii)
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SUDAN
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THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Shaheen,
Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, Isakson, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Good morning to all. I appreciate our two panels that we
have here today. We have a lot of distance to try to cover, and
so, we're going to see if we can move relatively rapidly.
As everybody knows, today's hearing explores America's need
to craft a comprehensive strategy for Sudan. For years, the
urgency of either the situation in Darfur or the long war
between the North and the South Sudan drove United States
policy in one direction or another. Many people are not aware--
because when they hear the word ``Sudan,'' they automatically
think Darfur, and there are obvious and justifiable reasons for
that--but many people are not aware that the longest war in the
history of Africa, and one which took the lives of over 2
million people, occurred between the North and the South in
Sudan.
Over time, the fact that either Darfur or the long war
between the North and the South has driven our policy has
really resulted in a bifurcated policy. Today, I think most
people understand that we cannot and should not pursue either
of these challenges, North/South or Darfur, as if they exist in
a vacuum. As the Save Darfur Coalition affirmed in a statement
for the record, ``Policymakers have too often focused on the
South, to the detriment of Darfur, or Darfur, to the detriment
of the South.''
At the same time, many discussions of United States-Sudan
policy here in Washington continue to center on the question of
whether we should use carrots versus sticks, rewards or
punishments, to influence Sudan leaders in Khartoum. When I
visited Sudan in April of this year, I came away convinced that
we need to build a broader strategic framework that moves
beyond simple oppositions, like carrots versus sticks, or
North--or South versus Darfur. Instead, we need--that dreaded
word, ``nuanced''--a comprehensive strategy for Sudan as a
whole.
We should begin by identifying our objectives. Our primary
goals in Sudan are: Helping to achieve peace and security in
Darfur and the surrounding region; maintaining and
strengthening peace between North and South Sudan; expanding
cooperation on counterterrorism; and promoting democracy and
conflict prevention throughout the country. These are our
objectives, our principal objectives, and the question is how
best to achieve them.
I believe that the ongoing consequences of the genocide in
Darfur--and I called it such way back in 2004, as a candidate
for President--and the onrushing potential tragedy of a renewed
North-South war together create a dynamic that demands high-
level and sustained engagement.
As the President's special envoy, Gen. Scott Gration has
already traveled to the region multiple times, and he comes to
this task with a long understanding of the region, and a
passion for the region, I might add.
Last week, General Gration was in Abyei, Sudan, at the
center of North-South tensions. His presence on the ground,
when the Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration announced a
decision on Abyei's borders, symbolized America's recommitment
to the peace process. We need to make the same commitment to
finding peace in Darfur.
Almost 5 years ago, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
testified before this committee that the United States had
found a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities that
constituted genocide. He recommended that America increase the
number of African Union monitors, and today the African Union
monitoring mission has been merged into the United Nations
peacekeeping mission, UNAMID. I can tell you from firsthand
visit, as well as from the data that we get, UNAMID is making a
difference, but it has yet to be fully deployed or to acquire
full tactical mobility.
Millions of people remain in camps under conditions made
even worse when Khartoum expelled 13 humanitarian
organizations, placing over a million people in potential
jeopardy. General Gration was right to make his first priority
as special envoy the restoration of lifesaving assistance, but
we need to go further.
When I was in Khartoum, I emphasized to the Sudanese that
restoring lost aid was imperative, but also insufficient. Our
goal should not be to recreate the conditions that existed
before the NGO expulsion, it should be to move beyond those
conditions. Maintenance of a miserable status quo is not a
solution. I strongly support the efforts of the African Union,
the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and others, to bring the voices of
civil society into the discussion, and particularly to ensure
that women are heard.
At the same time, we need to recognize that, even as we
work toward peace in western Sudan and in eastern Chad, the
clock is relentlessly ticking down the hours between now and
2011. And 2011 is a critical date. That is when the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement allows Southern Sudanese to vote
on the question of unity or separation from the North. If the
people of Sudan are to transform a cease-fire and an uneasy
power-sharing agreement into lasting peace, we need to think of
the CPA as the ongoing process stretching into the future, not
as an event in the past. Today, crucial elements remain
unresolved, including borders, citizenship, and revenue-
sharing. A central focus of my visit to Sudan was to convince
both sides to embark on a series of tripartite discussions with
the United States to tackle these remaining challenges.
Rising violence in the South is also a matter of growing
concern, and underscores the need for tangible peace dividend.
But, even as we move forward, we must not fix our gaze on the
2011 referendum alone. We also need to consider what Sudan
could look like in 2012, in 2015, and beyond.
All of these issues and more, including complex regional
forces, need to be balanced within a comprehensive United
States strategy for Sudan.
Today, we have an impressive array of witnesses to help us
explore these issues. Gen. Scott Gration serves as President
Obama's Special Envoy to Sudan. Before that, he served as a
major general in the U.S. Air Force. And we're eager to hear
his insights on the situation in Sudan, and the direction that
our policy will take.
Earl Gast is the Acting Administrator for Africa for the
U.S. Agency for International Development, and he, too, has
traveled to Sudan to advance humanitarian access.
On our second panel, former Ambassador David Shinn is
currently teaching at the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University. He served in the U.S.
Foreign Service for 37 years, including 3 in Sudan, and he was
also Director of East African and Horn of African Affairs in
the State Department.
Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Eisa is a physician with the Sudan
Organization for Rights and Peace-Building. In 2007, Dr.
Mohammed was named the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award
laureate. And in addition to his work as a physician, he is a
respected community leader, peace negotiator, and human rights
advocate.
And finally, Susan Page is the regional director for
Southern and East Africa for the National Democratic Institute.
From 2005 to 2007, Ms. Page directed the Rule of Law Program
for the United Nations mission in Sudan, and she has advised
those involved in both the CPA and the Darfur peace process.
Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this hearing and for your very thoughtful opening statement,
which, in a comprehensive way, sets forward many of the
problems. I join, also, in welcoming our distinguished
witnesses.
I appreciate that General Gration has taken time to join us
today. I know that he understands Congress's deep interest in
this issue. And I applaud the appointment of a special envoy,
underscoring the President's intention to provide international
leadership on the Darfur crisis.
But time is perhaps not on our side. The Darfur crisis now
in its sixth year, prospects for peace in the region appear to
be little better than they were when the international
community first responded with a massive humanitarian
intervention. In the face of direct obstruction and willful
delays by Khartoum, these humanitarian efforts probably saved
hundreds of thousands of lives. But, millions of refugees
continue to be at risk of violence, malnutrition, and disease.
The Khartoum Government's expulsion of 13 humanitarian
organizations that were providing for roughly a million people
has exacerbated conditions for the displaced.
The safety net of organizations now operating in Darfur is
doing its best to shoulder more responsibility, but the sheer
number of displaced, and the difficulties presented by the
rainy season, are straining their capacity.
In July 2007, hopes for security were raised by U.N.
Security Council approval of an enlargement of the peacekeeping
force in Darfur to 26,000 troops. Unfortunately, 2 years later,
the peacekeeping force still lacks elements key to its success.
The force does not have sufficient helicopters, other types of
equipment that are essential to achieve mobility and to deliver
humanitarian supplies. And moreover, the overall stability of
the region depends on full implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan.
With a referendum on independence of the South due in 2011,
most indicators are that voters will choose to separate. Unless
some formula for stability can be constructed, the tensions
between North and South will be highly volatile, and could
inflame the entire region.
General Gration is charged with one of the most difficult
diplomatic assignments in our Government. Given that President
Bashir has been indicted for war crimes and his government has
demonstrated little interest in resolving the political
situation, the Darfur problem does not lend itself to
straightforward diplomatic negotiation.
Any successful strategy is likely to involve building broad
international support for measures that pressure the Khartoum
Government to accept a settlement to the Darfur crisis. And
such a settlement should allow refugees to return to their
homes, establish procedures to guarantee their security, and
extend some level of autonomy to Darfur.
The United States must lead in finding ways to address
these political and logistical shortcomings. The Obama
administration is conducting an ongoing review of Sudan policy.
And I'm hopeful this review will soon yield a plan that
clarifies and galvanizes U.S. policy and encourages far greater
multilateral support for a resolution of a crisis that has
produced immense suffering.
I'll look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how
U.S. plans and efforts are progressing and what more we can do.
And I thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
General and Mr. Administrator, thank you for being here
with us.
General Gration, would you lead off, please?
And your full statements will be placed in the record as if
read in full, so if you could give us summaries, I think that
will help the committee members to be able to get a chance to
have a dialogue with you.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. SCOTT GRATION, USAF (RET.), SPECIAL
ENVOY TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Gration. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, I want to thank you for this
opportunity to discuss our strategic objectives in Sudan and to
outline what we're doing to make them a reality.
Mr. Chairman, we greatly appreciate your leadership on
these issues, your commitment to resolving the significant
challenges that we find in Sudan. I know this commitment is
shared by all members of this committee. We sincerely
appreciate the dedicated efforts of Senator Feingold, chairman
of the Africa Subcommittee, and Senator Isakson, the ranking
member of that committee.
I just returned, as you noted, from Sudan last week, and as
I visited Darfur, Abyei in the South, I was reminded again of
the great humanitarian tragedies that have occurred in that
country. Many people in Sudan have suffered terribly from the
pain and loss that conflict brings. It's for these people, for
future generations of Sudanese, that we are striving to make a
difference.
Let me tell you what we want to achieve. We want a country
that's governed responsibly, justly, democratically; a country
that's at peace with itself and its neighbors, that's
economically viable; a country that works together with the
United States with common interests. We want an inclusive and
durable peace in Darfur. We want full implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We want a peaceful post-
referendum period, whether a single, stable, and united Sudan,
or a Sudan that divides, peaceably and orderly, into two
separate states. We want only what's best for the Sudanese
people.
That's our vision. And to make it a reality, we're using
all elements of national power: diplomacy; defense; and
development. We're currently engaging with all relevant parties
inside of Sudan to bring peace and stability to that country.
We have weekly discussions with leaders from the two parties of
the Government of National Unity, the National Congress Party
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, as well as regular
talks from representatives from critical parties--the other
parties--and movements and civil society.
To accomplish our goals, we're also engaging with Sudan's
neighbors and the international community, and that's why I've
traveled to Chad, to China, Egypt, France, Libya, Norway,
Qatar, and the United Kingdom to meet with key leaders who
share our common concern, who want to work together with us on
shared objectives. We're dedicated to carrying out our vision
of success.
I report regularly to the President and to Secretary
Clinton about the progress that we've made, and I've visited
Congress to exchange views with you and members--and a number
of your colleagues. I look forward to speaking with you many
more times in the weeks ahead.
Now, let me detail some of the specific aspects of our
strategic approach. Most urgently, we seek a definitive end to
the conflict and the gross human-rights abuses in Darfur, and a
justice for its many victims. We can never forget the lives
needlessly lost over the last 5 years, the millions who
continue to be displaced. Families still crowd into makeshift
housing in IDP camps. Women continue to gather firewood in
fear. Children are growing up without a hope for a better
tomorrow. That must end.
To resolve the humanitarian tragedy, we're striving to
facilitate and negotiate a political settlement between the
Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict. Our goal
is to conclude an agreement that will bring a sustainable peace
to Darfur, that will allow people back to their home villages
or places that they desire to move to, to resume their lives in
safety and stability and security.
The second aspect of our strategy focuses on sustaining
that fragile peace between the North and the South. Sudan, as
you said, will hold elections in 8 months, and the referenda,
in January 2011. Our timeline is so very tight, our task is so
very great, but we have no option but success.
The third aspect is to prepare the Government of Sudan and
the Government of Southern Sudan for the post-referenda period,
in unity or in peaceful coexistence. Our strategy seeks to find
a delicate balance between improving security forces and
developing the social governance and economic infrastructure
required for growth.
The last aspect of our strategy seeks to increase and
enhance cooperation with the Sudanese Government, to
counterterrorism and to promote regional security. I believe we
have a golden opportunity now to make a big difference in
Sudan. As you can see, we're aiming high, we're thinking big,
and we're expecting much. Failure cannot be an option. We must
proceed with boldness, with hard work to make this proactive
and preventative approach work right now.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for
your leadership, for your support to end the suffering in
Sudan. And thank you again for allowing me to be here today to
discuss these issues, concerns that need our urgent attention,
critical problems that must resolve--be resolved--for all the
people of Sudan.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Gration follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan S. Gration, Maj. Gen., USAF (Ret.), the
President's Special Envoy to Sudan, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
discuss our strategic objectives in Sudan and to outline what we are
doing to make them a reality.
Mr. Chairman, let me begin by acknowledging your leadership on
these issues. We greatly appreciate your commitment to finding
solutions to the many challenges confronting the people of Sudan. That
commitment is widely shared by the members of this committee, including
Senator Feingold, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, with whom I have
recently met, and Senator Isakson, ranking member of the subcommittee.
We are especially grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators Corker
and Isakson for participating in the State Department's Forum for
Supporters of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which we held
here in Washington last month. I will say more about those proceedings
in a few moments, but I want to thank you now for your support.
The great human tragedies that have occurred in Darfur and the rest
of Sudan are deeply embedded in our memories. Many people in Sudan
suffer terribly from the pain and loss brought by conflict, and it is
these people who deserve our support.
We have made progress in recent months, but we have much work
ahead. From my visits to Sudan, the region, and throughout the
international community, I have found the challenges in Sudan to be
complex and our timeline compressed. Because of the complicated nature
and urgency of the tasks at hand, we have helped to
craft a strategic approach that blends all elements on national power
and a methodology that is integrated, comprehensive, and based on a
policy of dialogue and engagement.
I want to take a moment to discuss our engagement. Engagement is
not something we pursue for its own sake, and it is not about
accommodating the status quo. Engagement does not mean the absence of
pressure, or doling out incentives based on wishful thinking. On the
contrary, it is about working to change conditions on the ground.
Engagement means frank dialogue about what needs to be accomplished in
the months ahead, how we can help make those accomplishments happen,
how the bilateral relationship could improve if conditions on the
ground transform, how the Government of Sudan could become even more
isolated if it does not act now, and how we ensure that all parties are
held accountable.
First let me tell you what we want to achieve. We want a country
that is governed responsibly, justly, and democratically; a country
that is at peace with itself and with its neighbors, that is
economically viable; and a country that works together with the United
States on common interests. We want an inclusive and durable peace in
Darfur. We want full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and a peaceful post-referendum period whether as a single,
stable, and unified Sudan or a Sudan that divides peacefully and
orderly into two separate states. We want only what is best for the
Sudanese people.
This is our vision. Now let me tell you how we're going to make it
a reality. We are using diplomacy, defense, and development--all the
elements of national power--to achieve our strategic objectives.
We are engaging directly with all of the relevant parties inside
Sudan to bring peace and stability to the country. This includes the
two main parties of the Government of National Unity (GNU)--the
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM), as well as other political parties and movements and
civil society. We have traveled to the country three times since my
appointment in March, and returned just a few days ago from our last
trip. We were in Khartoum to facilitate trilateral talks to advance
timely implementation of the CPA and in Darfur to review our progress
on facilitating humanitarian assistance and to promote the Doha peace
process. I visited several camps for internally displaced persons, met
with camp leaders, and saw firsthand the day-to-day struggles these
Darfuris must face. Ultimately, the Government of Sudan must be
accountable to its people and bear responsibility for peace within
Sudan's borders.
To achieve our goals, we must also engage with Sudan's neighbors
and the international community. This is why we have traveled around
the world to Chad, China, Egypt, France, Libya, Norway, Qatar, and the
United Kingdom to meet with key leaders who share our common concern
and want to work together toward shared objectives. This is why, at the
end of June, we convened the Forum for Supporters of the CPA here in
Washington to bring together representatives from over 30 countries and
international organizations to renew the global commitment to seeing a
peaceful and stable Sudan. We are confident that this multilateral
group will work closely together to achieve a lasting peace in Sudan by
keeping Sudanese parties positively engaged in implementing the peace
agreement and preparing for the future, increasing the capacity of the
Government of Southern Sudan, and helping to keep all Sudanese
Government institutions accountable to their people.
We are dedicated to carrying this vision to success. I have built a
team of sharp and dedicated individuals who, along with our colleagues
based in Sudan, are working tirelessly to achieve our objectives. My
role is to guide our vision, and I will do all that is in my power to
see this vision come to fruition. I report regularly to President Obama
and Secretary Clinton about our progress and have visited Congress to
exchange views with you and a number of your colleagues. I look forward
to speaking with many more of you in the weeks ahead. We are committed
to working together as a strong and united team to achieve our
objectives of a politically stable, physically secure, economically
viable, and peaceful Sudan.
Now let me tell you more about the four pillars required to support
this vision of Sudan. Most urgently, we want a definitive end to
conflict and gross human rights abuses in Darfur and justice for its
many victims. We can never forget the lives needlessly lost in the last
5 years, and the millions who continue to be displaced. As I witnessed
last week, families still crowd into makeshift housing in IDP camps,
women continue to gather firewood in fear, and children grow up without
hope for a better tomorrow.
To resolve this humanitarian tragedy, we believe only a negotiated
political settlement between the Government of Sudan and all parties to
the conflict will bring sustainable peace to Darfur. Our goal is to
conclude an agreement that will allow people to go back to their home
villages or a place of their choosing to resume their lives in safety,
stability, self-sufficiency, and security.
Past peace negotiations have faltered, and we have learned from
these experiences. We are collaborating with the African Union and
United Nations joint chief mediator, Djibrill Bassole, to ensure that
the peace process is inclusive and that it adequately addresses the
grievances of the people of Darfur. We are engaging with the fragmented
movements in Darfur to help them unite and to bring them to the peace
table with one voice. We are working with Libya and Egypt to end the
proxy war between Chad and Sudan that has ignited further conflict. We
are supporting the full deployment of the African Union-United Nations
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as a critical mechanism for protecting
Darfuri civilians. We are determined to work toward a peaceful Darfur
where displaced families can resettle and reestablish their homes. We
must act without delay--innocent Darfuris have suffered for too long.
Our second pillar focuses on sustaining peace between the North and
the South. In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
ending a 22-year war. Four and a half years after the signing of the
CPA, peace remains fragile. In just 8 months, Sudan will hold national
elections in April 2010 and referenda in Southern Sudan and the Abyei
region beginning 9 months later in January 2011. Our timeline is so
very short; it is urgent that we act now to support the full
implementation of the CPA.
This will not be easy. Just over a week ago, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague announced its arbitration decision on the
Abyei border delineation--a highly sensitive and emotional issue for
both parties to the CPA. Before the boundary decision was handed down,
we spent a significant amount of time with the parties, working to
ensure the decision would be accepted and fully implemented. Tensions
in Abyei remain high and the international community must continue to
be vigilant. As we have seen before in that area, tensions between the
Ngok Dinka and Misseriya can quickly erupt into violence, resulting in
a conflict that could bring the SPLM and NCP into direct confrontation
and threaten to derail the CPA.
We will also need to continue support for the U.N. Mission in
Sudan, help the parties prepare for elections in April, and ensure
legitimate popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile
states. Collectively, we must assist the parties as they prepare for
the January 2011 referenda and their consequences. These are just a few
of the major challenges ahead as we help the parties implement the
remaining milestones in the CPA.
It is critical that we work with the parties to begin the process
of democratic transformation and decentralization, so that in January
2011, the voices of the people of Southern Sudan will be heard and we
can witness a unified and peaceful Sudan or a Sudan that is on an
orderly path toward becoming two separate and viable states at peace
with each other. Resolving the issues of North and South is critical to
tackling challenges in Darfur and other parts of the country. These
twin challenges must be addressed with equal attention and vigor.
The third pillar calls for a functioning and stable Sudanese
Government, and one that will either include a capable Government of
Southern Sudan or coexist peacefully with an independent Southern
Sudan. Our strategy seeks to help the South improve its security
capacity to defend against external and internal threats while striving
to ensure a potentially independent Southern Sudan is politically and
economically viable.
Our fourth and final pillar is to seek increased and enhanced
cooperation with the Sudanese Government to counter terrorism and to
promote regional security, consistent with--and not at the expense of--
our overall objectives of peace and security in Sudan. We also seek an
end to Sudan's efforts to weaken or marginalize opponents abroad or
align with negative state and nonstate actors.
Our whole-of-government approach is integrated and comprehensive.
It is firmly founded in the belief that engagement with all of Sudan,
the region, the international community, and civil society is essential
if we are to secure our vision of a Sudan that is ruled more justly and
democratically, is at peace with itself and with its neighbors, is
economically viable, and works together with the United States on our
shared interests. Further, our strategy is deeply rooted in a
conviction that we must do all we can to end the human suffering in
Sudan.
As you can see, we are aiming high, thinking big, and expecting
much. We do so because we believe innovative concepts and ideas,
coupled with detailed planning and sufficient resources, are the only
way to achieve big results. Big results are exactly what we need in
Sudan at this critical moment.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to thank
you for your leadership and support on efforts to end the suffering in
Darfur and the rest of Sudan. Again, thank you for allowing me to be
here today to discuss these issues that are so important to us all, and
especially to the Sudanese people.
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Mr. Administrator.
STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Gast. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar,
and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
update you on our support for comprehensive peace and stability
in Sudan, and on humanitarian issues.
The United States Government has provided more than $6
billion in assistance to the people of Sudan since the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Our overarching
goal in Sudan has always been to help those affected by
conflict, and to establish a just and lasting peace. We have
saved lives, and we have improved conditions for millions of
Sudanese, but with less than 24 months left in the CPA's
roadmap for consolidating peace, and with the continuing
challenges of Darfur, our most critical tasks lie ahead.
USAID is doing what it can to help support the
establishment of just, accountable, democratic governments that
are able to deliver basic services, whether the people of
Southern Sudan and Abyei choose unity with the North or
independence in the 2011 referendum. However, the time for
achieving substantive improvements in governance is running
out, and the critical window during which we can contribute to
genuine transformation via the CPA roadmap will soon close.
In Southern Sudan, development gains have been slow, and a
recent fiscal crisis has highlighted that many fundamentals of
good governance still need to be established. Infrastructure
remains extremely undeveloped, and the burden is on
international donors to foot the bill. Four years after the
CPA's signing, our collective contributions are a drop in the
bucket of what is needed. But considering the state of
development in the South in the Three Areas when the war
finally ended, our work has just begun, and it will take
decades to cement our progress.
Meanwhile, the situation for the 4.7 million persons
affected by the conflict in Darfur remains intolerable.
Although we have managed to fill many of the gaps left by the
expulsion of 13 international NGOs in March and avert an even
greater humanitarian crisis, these measures are temporary. They
rely on temporary staffing and strain already limited
resources. They are not sustainable.
Compounding the situation, carjackings, staff abductions
and assaults, break-ins targeting NGO facilities, and ongoing
military campaigns still impede the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Darfur. Constant insecurity and violence continue
to be the primary factors limiting the effective delivery of
humanitarian assistance. We must institute a sustainable long-
term strategy for Darfur that is finally accompanied by
sustainable long-term peace.
We look forward to the day when the 2.7 million persons who
were driven from their homes by this conflict can voluntarily
return safely to their villages. USAID will not deviate from
its responsibility to safeguard the rights and protection of
displaced persons, and we call upon the Government of Sudan to
support the operations of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and the International Organization for Migration so
that they can undertake the vital task of certifying any
returns as appropriate and voluntary.
The violence we've seen recently in Darfur, Abyei, and more
recently in pockets of the South, are a jarring symbol of the
legacy of negative trends that developed during Sudan's
conflicts, and persist to this day: The absence of the rule of
law; a dearth of good governance; an abundance of weapons; and
unresolved grievances. We must strengthen governments' and
communities' ability to deal with tension constructively and
nonviolently. The alternative is a failed state, where chaos
will reign.
Before concluding, on behalf of USAID I want to express our
appreciation to Senator Kaufman, a member of this committee,
who recently, in a statement on the Senate floor, paid tribute
to John Granville, one of 91 agency employees who have lost
their lives in the performance of their duties overseas. In
honor of John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, USAID is
establishing the Granville-Rahama Staff Care Award, which will
recognize USAID employees who make significant contributions to
the morale and well-being of agency staff.
In addition, the John Granville Secondary School is due to
open this fall in Sudan's Blue Nile state. John had a special
attachment to the Blue Nile state. And the fact that a school
is being built in his name, with the support and cooperation of
the United States Government, the Sudanese Government, and the
Government of Southern Sudan, is a fitting memorial to a man
who dedicated his life to helping Sudan's people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, for giving
me the opportunity to speak on behalf of USAID. We certainly
appreciate your continued dedication to the Sudanese people and
your commitment to peace and stability throughout the
continent.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Acting Assistant Administrator Earl Gast, Bureau
for Africa, USAID, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to update you on the humanitarian situation in
Darfur and our support for comprehensive peace and stability in Sudan.
I am pleased to join my colleague, Special Envoy Scott Gration, on this
panel and would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the
excellent cooperation and coordination between USAID and the Special
Envoy's office.
The U.S. Government has provided more than $6 billion in assistance
to the people of Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) in 2005. We have helped to stand up a new regional
government tasked with rebuilding and governing the war-torn South. We
have conducted wide-ranging civic education programs and immunized
children. We have supported life-saving humanitarian and peacekeeping
operations. We have worked to improve economic opportunities and public
infrastructure. We have provided food aid, and we have supported
Sudan's farmers and entrepreneurs.
We have saved lives, and we have improved living conditions for
millions of Sudanese.
But with the continuing challenges Darfur and with less than 24
months left to follow the CPA's roadmap for consolidating peace, our
most critical tasks lie ahead.
The situation for the 4.7 million people affected by the conflict
in Darfur remains intolerable. While we have managed to fill many of
the gaps left by the expulsion of 13 international NGOs in March, these
measures are temporary and must be replaced by a more sustainable,
long-term strategy that is finally accompanied by sustainable, long-
term peace. Compounding the situation, carjackings, staff abductions
and assaults, break-ins targeting NGO facilities, and ongoing military
campaigns still impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to
Darfur and have resulted in both temporary and permanent suspensions of
life-saving programs. Constant insecurity and violence continue to be
the primary factors limiting the effective delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
Meanwhile, Sudanese expectations that they would benefit from the
peace that came in 2005 remain high--and often unmet. The frustration
of many Sudanese is summed up by what a Nuba man from Southern
Kordofan, told a USAID partner not long ago: ``The peace is now 3
years, and there are supposed to be tangible things. The government
should have expressed its presence; but for us here, there is no
government.'' The time for achieving substantive improvements in
governance is running out, as the national elections and the referenda
on unity draw near. The critical window during which we can contribute
to genuine transformation via the CPA roadmap will soon close.
As the Special Envoy has noted, the U.S. Government approach to
Sudan's multiple challenges requires complex and creative solutions,
implemented in cooperation with government officials, tribal leaders,
and civil society representatives throughout Sudan. And it requires us
to make a political commitment that matches the enormous financial and
human commitment that we have dedicated to the Sudanese people over the
years.
expulsions
Even before the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international aid
organizations in March, there were significant assistance gaps across
Darfur. The upsurge in fighting in South Darfur in early 2009, for
example, displaced over 30,000 people, and in February, the U.N. World
Food Programme (WFP) was unable to reach over 500,000 people in need of
food aid.
The NGO expulsion significantly increased the humanitarian
challenges and drastically reduced USAID's ability to deliver
assistance to people in need; both in Darfur and in the Three Areas.
Darfur
In Darfur, the expulsions jeopardized food aid to more than a
million people and health services to more than 650,000 Sudanese,
according to a March 24 assessment conducted jointly by the United
Nations and the Sudanese Government. More than half of USAID-funded
humanitarian programs in Darfur closed, and 40 percent of the delivery
capacity of our main food aid partner, the U.N. World Food Programme
(WFP) was lost. In just one day, much of Darfur's humanitarian
infrastructure, which took years to establish and thousands of people
to staff, was wiped out.
From the moment the Sudanese Government announced the expulsions,
we have worked with our partners to mitigate the impact. NGOs stocked
health clinics and nutrition centers with months of supplies. WFP
conducted a 2-month food distribution through remaining NGOs and local
food committees. To ensure that services continue, agencies have
shifted existing operations, are providing supplemental assistance, and
are relying on community members to provide food, safe drinking water,
health care, and shelter to the most vulnerable people. Remaining NGOs
have scaled up their services and expanded their areas of operation to
address gaps in assistance, and Sudanese Government officials have
staffed some health clinics.
We have, so far, averted a greater humanitarian crisis.
However, these measures are merely stopgaps. They rely on temporary
staffing and strain already limited resources. They are not
sustainable.
We must focus not simply on the quantitative aspects of filling
assistance gaps, but the qualitative aspects that make programs
effective and allow them to continue. This means ensuring that programs
meet technical quality standards, that they are adequately managed and
staffed, and that assistance meets international norms and standards
for humanitarian action. Although immediate gaps have been addressed
through the extraordinary efforts of the United Nations, NGOs still
operating in Sudan, and parts of the government, the expulsion severely
impacted the quality of programming and the ability to accurately
monitor the distribution and impact of assistance. Despite our best
efforts, many basic humanitarian needs remain unmet. Even before the
expulsions, NGO access to affected populations in Darfur was limited
and inconsistent. Simply restoring assistance to preexpulsion levels
would still leave many people in need.
In the immediate aftermath of the expulsions, the United States
sent a clear message that the ultimate responsibility for the well-
being of the Sudanese people solely rests on the shoulders of the
Sudanese Government. In coordination with USAID, Special Envoy Gration
successfully negotiated with the Sudanese Government to allow new NGOs
to fill gaps in assistance, which is enabling USAID and its partners to
begin the process of rebuilding humanitarian operations. Some new
projects are already underway. These efforts will reintroduce lost
capacity and program quality to Darfur.
However, bureaucratic obstacles and insecurity continue to hamper
our efforts to rebuild the humanitarian infrastructure. The
registration of new NGOs has been time-consuming, and many Sudanese
Government commitments remain unmet or only partially implemented. For
example, the Government of Sudan has yet to return USAID-funded assets
that were confiscated from our partner NGOs when they were expelled.
Three Areas
There has also been a marked lack of progress in enhancing the NGO
operating environment in the Three Areas, where the NGO expulsions
significantly altered
the humanitarian, recovery, and development landscape. The expulsion of
leading USAID partners and subsequent seizure of their program assets
and equipment severely undermined the operating environment and has
threatened the stability of these war-torn areas. Due to the unique
nature of the Three Areas' governance systems, humanitarian programs in
the parts of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile controlled by the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) went largely uninterrupted.
However, many assistance programs in Northern-controlled areas were
halted. This dynamic has created an imbalanced distribution of
assistance, which only reinforces conflict lines rather than fostering
integration. Although two new organizations have recently started work
in the Three Areas, the current lack of capacity and loss of confidence
among remaining NGOs, coupled with the likely delays to reestablishing
programs now that the rainy season has begun, will further exacerbate
the risk for conflict. The Government of Sudan and the United Nations
have yet to finalize joint communiques that will formalize operating
procedures for programs in the Three Areas--and which are vital to
safeguarding the conduct of programs in this critical region.
The U.S. Government has worked closely with the Government of
Sudan, the United Nations, other donors, and humanitarian agencies to
increase their access and capacity to address the gaps created by the
expulsions. We must continue to coordinate and engage with these
entities to ensure that humanitarian, recovery, and development
programming proceed without impediment, and that aid agencies are able
to operate freely.
Darfur IDP Returns
We have recently received reports that some of Darfur's displaced
people have returned home. While we believe that some of these returns
are seasonal in nature, we look forward to the day when the 2.7 million
people who were driven from their homes by this conflict can return
safely and securely to their villages. While not all of them will
choose to return home, we are prepared to shift our assistance to
support voluntary returns, and as elsewhere around the world, the
international community will look to ensure that those returns are
certified as voluntary by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or
the International Organization for Migration. We call upon the
Government of Sudan to support the operations of these organizations in
Darfur so that they can undertake this vital task. USAID will not
deviate from its responsibility to safeguard the rights and protection
of displaced people.
cpa implementation
At the same time, we must leverage our coordination and engagement
to prepare for the upcoming historic milestones of holding national
elections and referenda on self-determination for Abyei and Southern
Sudan, which could result in the creation of a new independent country.
The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) did not exist before 2005.
Every government structure and system has had to be crafted from
scratch. The committed men and women who serve in the government are
not career politicians, nor have they benefited from the lessons of a
life lived in a democratic, transparent state. That's why building the
capacity of the GOSS is a cornerstone of USAID's strategy in Sudan, and
central to the successful implementation of the CPA.
Initially, the GOSS had no offices, no pens, no paper, and no staff
to undertake the most basic tasks needed for a government to function.
But with our assistance, the key GOSS ministries have established
systems for hiring people, for formulating budgets, and for
establishing office systems. This has required tremendous dedication on
the part of GOSS officials, who have been willing to roll up their
sleeves and persevere through each one of these processes.
Considerable progress has been made in establishing functioning
institutions where there previously were none. Ministries are
functional, revenue is coming in, payments are being made, and a legal
framework is being built. But development gains have been slow, and a
recent fiscal crisis has highlighted that many fundamentals of good
governance need to be improved. International NGOs are still the
primary providers of basic services. Few roads have been paved and
other infrastructure remains equally underdeveloped. Government at
every level still needs to forge stronger, more consistent linkages
between policy priorities and development, legislation, and budget
capacity. High expectations for tangible benefits of peace remain
unmet, especially in communities most affected by the war, where
tensions and instability continue to threaten progress. Episodes of
clan violence, as well as violence committed by the Lord's Resistance
Army along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, have
increased, taking scores of lives in recent weeks alone.
To bolster investments in strengthening the Government of Southern
Sudan, USAID has launched a program that enhances the ability of local
governments to provide peace dividends, defuse conflict, and promote
stabilization in the Three Areas and key Southern states. USAID also
played a key role in a joint donor--GOSS compact to strengthen the
government's fiscal responsibility and financial management,
representing a renewed commitment and redoubled cooperation to deliver
the peace dividends promised by the CPA. We all are seeking to help
support the establishment of a just, accountable, democratic government
able to deliver basic services, whether the people of Southern Sudan
and Abyei choose unity with the North or independence in the 2011
referendum.
And we cannot speak of the CPA without noting the precarious
footing of elections. Elections were designed to be a central component
of the broader strategy to transform Sudan democratically under the
CPA, and our support to the national election process remains firm. But
the hurdles are daunting.
As you likely know, the date for elections has been pushed back
several times from the CPA-mandate of July 2009. While the
postponements were intended to allow for adequate preparation, ongoing
delays pose increasing risks. Just 9 months remain until the designated
polling date, yet there is no public budget for the elections. The
electoral law--which establishes an electoral system that would be
highly complicated, even in countries with a long democratic
tradition--was passed more than 2 years after the deadline specified in
the CPA. The National Election Commission (NEC) still hasn't fully
established its 26 subsidiary commissions throughout the country, nor
has it received its full operating budget. In addition, the failure to
resolve technical questions related to Northern census data spurred key
Southern political leaders to reject the census results, making the use
of those results to delimit electoral constituencies highly sensitive.
Finally, the logistical and political challenges of implementing
credible elections in Darfur cannot be understated. Massive civic and
voter education will be required to engage Darfur's displaced people
and the vast populations in the South that have low levels of literacy
and little or no experience with past elections.
So, given the current status of election preparations, are our
expectations too high? Do we believe it is too late to have credible
elections in Sudan? No. It is too early to predict whether or not these
elections will be credible, when so many administrative decisions are
outstanding. Until key decisions are made, the ability of our central
election administration program to move forward as intended will be
severely limited. However, our programs to increase civic participation
and observe the entire electoral process will continue, in coordination
with the National Election Commission. We are coordinating with the
United Nations and other international partners to bolster a credible
outcome to this daunting but historic election for Sudan.
Before concluding, on behalf of USAID, I want to express our
appreciation to Senator Kaufman, a member of this committee, who
recently in a statement on the Senate floor, paid tribute to John
Granville, one of 91 agency employees who have lost their lives in the
performance of their duties overseas.
In honor of John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, USAID is
establishing the Granville-Rahama Staff Care Award, which will
recognize USAID employees who make significant contributions to the
morale and well-being of agency staff. Our staff work in some of the
most difficult, dangerous environments in the world, and the tragedy of
John and Abdelrahman's deaths reminded us of how important it is to
promote a caring work environment and to help our staff cope with
stress in the workplace.
In addition, the John Granville Secondary School is currently under
construction and due to open this fall in Sudan's Blue Nile State. John
had a special attachment to Blue Nile, and the fact that a school is
being built in his name with the support and cooperation of the U.S.
Government, the Sudanese Government, and the Government of Southern
Sudan is a fitting memorial to a man who dedicated his life to helping
Sudan's people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to speak on
behalf of USAID. We certainly appreciate your continued dedication to
the Sudanese people and your commitment to peace and stability
throughout the continent.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Administrator Gast.
General, share with us, if you will, your perceptions of
the situation on the ground, the dynamics on the ground in
Darfur now, and particularly the current status of activities
of the principal rebel groups.
General Gration. Yes, sir. What we're doing right now is
trying to cope with a situation that is very dire and very
severe. Obviously, the camps continue to have grave problems,
and we're trying to ensure that they have the basic necessities
to ensure the essentials of life.
On the ground, we still see instability and insecurity, and
what we're trying to do right now is achieve a lasting and
durable peace. To do that, we've gotten agreements from the
Government of Sudan to put a unilateral cease-fire in. We're
trying to reduce the tensions between Chad and Sudan, and
reduce the cross-border rebel activities that has continued to
stir instability. And we're working with the Government of
Sudan to come up with a plan to disarm militias that have been
put along the border by the Government of Sudan, and we're
working with UNAMID, and we're coming up with a plan--a law-
enforcement type of plan--to ensure that warlords who sponsor
Janjaweed, autonomous Janjaweed, and other people that continue
to terrorize populations, are dealt with. This is a tough
problem and needs to be done comprehensively, and that's why
your statement about UNAMID is very important.
The Chairman. JEM, I take it, is still receiving support
from Chad, and still--across the border--and operating in a
cross-border fashion?
General Gration. They are currently operating out of Sudan,
but it's true that they get medical support and other support
still from within Sudan. What--I mean in Chad--what we're
working with is the Government of Chad to reduce overt support,
and even quieter support, in terms of logistics, to this
movement.
The Chairman. Well, the Government of Chad would argue that
part of their support stems from the fact that the Government
of Sudan has been supporting efforts against them, and you get
this back-and-forth. Can you comment on that?
General Gration. Yes. It's very true that JEM has been as
far as Omdurman and threatening Khartoum. And it's also true
that Sudanese-backed Chadian forces have been close to
N'Djamena. What we're trying to do, in working with the Libyans
and other leaders around the region, is to reduce the support,
to stop that proxy war, to get rid of the surrogates that are
destabilizing. We're also working with MINURCAT and UNAMID to
come up with a monitoring agreement, so that the cross-border
areas are monitored, so that the forces can't go back and
create damage.
The Chairman. And what conclusions have you been able to
draw about the current relationship and support structure
between the Government in Khartoum and the Janjaweed?
General Gration. It is very clear that, in the beginning,
the Government of Khartoum used the Janjaweed to destabilize
the population, to wreak havoc. It is now my view that some of
these groups have gone autonomous, some are not totally
controlled by the government, although I believe that there are
still linkages that we have to pursue. We're taking a look at
this problem in a comprehensive way, to take a look at what
motivates them and how can we stop them, both from government
support and also local law enforcement.
The Chairman. And what happens as you raise that issue with
Khartoum officials?
General Gration. Initially there was denial that they had
anything to do with them. Now we're getting more acceptance
that they have a role in fixing this problem, and we're making
progress on working together with the Government of Khartoum to
stop their support.
The Chairman. What would you say, to the committee, is the
level of violence in Darfur itself today? How would you
describe the on-the-ground situation with respect to killing
and raids and so forth?
General Gration. It's getting significantly better, but
that doesn't mean we have to stop our efforts. It appears, last
month, that there were 16 people that died a violent death, and
12 of them were from criminal kind of things, so we need to
keep working it. One death is too many, from violence. And
we'll continue to work with law enforcement agencies. But, we
have been able to reduce the violence because we've been able
to turn off, to a large degree, the proxy war. And some of that
happened when the Government of Sudan bloodied the nose of JEM
at Umm Baru. So, that resulted in a decreased activity.
The Chairman. It was my perception, as I met with and
listened to Minni Minnawi, and as I talked to the various
representatives and just looked at the situation on the ground,
that some of the rebel groups have, sort of, withdrawn from
major activities, that over the last year or more, there has
been a significant reduction in their activity.
And I think the leaders that I met with in El Fasher were
saying to me that there were maybe a total of some 500 folks,
over the course of an entire year, that had lost their lives,
and many were in criminal activities, as you've described.
So, where does that put us, in the context of debate that
people have about the events of 2004 and 2005 and the genocide
that Colin Powell, myself, and others, and all of us have
referred to, the atrocities that took place, and the sort of
status that we find today? Is there a distinction? Is it a
distinction without a difference? Or does it affect our policy,
in your judgment?
General Gration. Yes, sir. I believe that, just looking at
the facts, there's significant difference between what happened
in 2004 and--2003, which we characterize as genocide--and what
is happening today. We are working very hard to make sure that
we can close the gap, though, and end that violence. Right now,
currently, as we speak, we're working to reunify rebel groups
from Abdul Wahed's people, from Yahya. We're bringing in other
people to come together and work for a comprehensive peace and
to be part of the solution. There's more that can be done, but
you're exactly correct, the level of violence that we're seeing
right now is not a coordinated violence, but it is violence
that we must end, and, in fact, as there's other areas of Sudan
where the violence is considerably greater.
The Chairman. Which raises, obviously, our deeper concerns
about the North-South peace and the CPA.
Just a last question, quickly; my time is up. Well, I'm
going to--I won't ask it. We have a lot of Senators here, and
we need to get through.
So, Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. General Gration, the Sudan Program Group was
created at the State Department to deal specifically with the
complex issues associated with Sudan, and originally was
focused on the 30-year North-South conflict. Now it appears to
be focused on the whole of Sudan. Now, I have three or four
questions, which I'll ask, and ask you to bring us up to date.
First of all, is the Sudan Program Group still independent
of the African Bureau at the State Department? And, if so, what
rationale is there for the continued independence?
Second, what role does your staff play in the Sudan Program
Group? Are you adequately staffed?
And third, what bureau and office handles the day-to-day
diplomatic affairs for the United States with regard to Sudan?
General Gration. Yes, sir. We are now separate from AF,
although Johnnie Carson and I work very closely together. We're
very close friends, we coordinate all the time, and we make
sure--because we bump up against Chad, and we bump up against
everything else that Johnnie's working--we have to be in very,
very close coordination. And we are.
But, we are the Sudan desk. We've taken over the
administrative responsibilities, we've taken over all those
kinds of things where we support the State Department.
And so, yes, we are independent. And I think, right now,
until we get the situation stabilized--and I believe that'll
probably be into 2011--I believe we should remain as the Sudan
desk in the State Department, focusing on a comprehensive
approach, but integrated with Johnnie in a way that makes
sense.
We are working to get more staff. Right now I believe that
we need to have more presence on the ground in Sudan. Our
activities in Darfur are four-pronged, with the rebel
unification, with the political process, with pulling together
civil society, with working with UNAMID. We need more staff
there. In the South, you probably know we've been working on 12
areas, and we reached agreement between SPLM and NCP on things
like border demarcation and Abyei and wealth-sharing and those
kind of things. We need somebody on the ground to make sure
that those things don't fall apart and that we meet the
deadlines.
We also need somebody in Khartoum to help us out. And then
if we go to Doha, we're probably going to need a presence in
Doha to make sure that that stays on track. We need more
people, and we're asking the State Department to help us get
more people.
Senator Lugar. So, you have made that request within the
Department. And have you outlined, really, how many persons,
or, sort of, a battle plan for what's required now?
General Gration. Yes, sir. We've gotten through detailees
and secondments. I think we've filled up our personal staff and
our office staff OK. We've made a request for three more full-
time equivalents, and we also made a request, if we couldn't
get that, to use contractors. Both of those were turned down,
but we're in the process of raising them to the next level.
Senator Lugar. Well, I appreciate that. And that's one
value of these hearings, to sort of raise to the next level
that consideration generally, because we all describe the
comprehensive dilemmas, but you have to get into the nitty-
gritty of who does the job, really
--who, physically, is there, and how many persons, in a vast
area, quite apart from the variety of topics.
So, we would like to be supportive, and I raised the
question just to make certain we all understand requests that
you've made, and the importance of that.
Now, second, getting outside the United States, for the
last few years we've had close coordination with Great Britain
and France on Sudan issues, but much poorer coordination with
China, Russia, the Arab League, the African Union. And these
latter actors in the drama have considerable opportunity,
obviously, for influence with the Sudan Government. What
additional policy tools are available to us in diplomacy--that
is, working with these actors, who may have disparate views of
this and of their role with regard to Sudan--so, describe the
international situation and its promise or difficulties.
General Gration. You're exactly correct. We have to get
unity there, and that's what we've tried to do.
We have several initiatives, before I go into the specific
ones that you talk about. We've reactivated the troika. And I
was just in Oslo in the--2 weeks ago, to meet with the U.K. and
with the Norwegians. That was a very important process in
bringing about the CPA. We have a contact group in Europe that
we've elevated up to, again, give us inputs and to help us work
issues. But, more specifically, I was in Beijing, a month and a
half ago, and Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong is a great friend, we've
served in Africa together in the early 1980s, and we've been
able to work that. And now the Chinese are working with us. So,
we're not building roads in parallel, but we're putting one on
front of the other one. We're actually coordinating our
humanitarian assistance.
Russia--Markelov and I are working on a conference,
possibly in the first part of October, where we'll get together
in Moscow.
But, there is an effort to bring these players in. We now
have what we call the ``Envoy Six,'' where countries that have
permanent envoys get together on a routine basis. We actually
have a bigger group, where countries that have representatives
in addition--and so, we have 15 people that get together
periodically to try to work these issues. We've shown support
to the Doha process. All the envoys showed up, all the envoys
came here to Washington when we had our forum. So, we continue
to build that team in the international community.
But, you're exactly correct, that is so important that we
do that together.
Senator Lugar. What is the situation, at this point, of oil
deliveries to China? In the past, allegations have been made
that the Chinese were less interested in cooperation because of
the unusual ties they had for energy needs in China. Presumably
those needs continue, and perhaps the flow of oil, but can you
describe what the situation is on that front?
General Gration. Yes, sir. They only get about 6 percent of
their oil from Sudan, but it's significant. The converse is
really where it's significant, as the South gets all their
income from oil proceeds. And so, oil is significantly
important to the South, and even to the North.
And so--but, China and the United States and other members
of the international community who have investments or
responsibilities in Sudan have exactly the same agenda. We want
security. We want stability. They want it to protect their
investment, we want it because of the people and the future of
that region, and the security and prosperity of that region.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for calling this hearing today. And I also want to note the
trips that you took, and Senators Corker and Isakson have
recently taken to the region. It's been very helpful to the
overall effort of keeping this critical country on the agenda.
And I've felt for a long time, and been saying for a long
time, as you know, sir, that we needed a coordinated approach
toward all of Sudan, and shoring up the CPA must be a central
component of our policy. I'm very pleased that the
administration has made this a priority.
At the same time, Special Envoy Gration, as you know from
our meeting and my letter, I do have some concerns and
questions about the administration's strategy. Thus far, in
your public statements, you've pushed a relatively new approach
toward the Government of Sudan, emphasizing engagement and
incentives. I'd like to know if this approach is linked to a
more detailed strategy that's been agreed to by the
interagency? And has this approach been selected because
Khartoum has demonstrated actual willingness to cooperate and
live up to its commitments, or is it more because there just
aren't alternative options?
General Gration. We have been in a process to come up with
a comprehensive and an integrative strategy. The National
Security Council is leading that process. Of course, we've had
input, as have other agencies in the Department.
We anticipate that, within the next few weeks, that we'll
be able to have a rollout of this strategy, and I think you'll
see from this strategy that it is very comprehensive, and it's
based on what we're trying to achieve, which is a better life
for the people there. We're trying to achieve a peace and a
security and a stability and economic viability, and the things
you talked about--the CPA, peace in Darfur, making sure that
the whole region is secure. And the strategy includes both
incentives and pressures. And it includes ways to judge if
we're making the progress that we all want to make.
This isn't about just my judgment. This is about coming
together and making sure that the United States objectives are
being met and that we're doing it in a way that makes sense for
our country.
And we'll continue to coordinate with the command process,
the interagency process, to make sure that we stay on track,
and we'll certainly consult with Congress to ensure that your
views and inputs are incorporated.
Senator Feingold. Well, I'm pleased that an attempt is
being made to create a real interagency strategy, but it does
appear to me that the constructive-engagement approach was
engaged in prior to this process being over, or being done and
being ready to go. So, I have some concerns about, sort of,
leading with that before the interagency process is complete.
So, I'd like to know, specifically, what tangible evidence
have you seen that Khartoum is actually acting in good faith?
General Gration. Let me just step back and explain what
happened, and why we started this process.
When I became the special envoy, the NGOs had just been
kicked out. But my mandate was to get those 13 NGOs back in. It
was very clear that we weren't going to be able to do that.
But, the President also gave me the mandate to save lives, and
in an effort to save lives, we worked to get new NGOs in, to
restore that capability, but not only to restore, but to create
an environment that would actually be significantly better than
it was on the 4th of March.
But, this meant two things. If we were going to get this,
we needed to have a relationship so we could discuss with
Khartoum. Also, as I went to Juba, I realized if we were going
to solve the CPA issues we had to have a relationship with both
Juba, which we had, and Khartoum; we had to have a foot in both
camps. If we were going to solve the problems along the border
with Chad, we had to have a foot in Khartoum and a foot in
N'Djamena. So, it became very clear that at some point we had
to have a relationship so that we could discuss options. And
that's what we did early.
But, that doesn't preclude or negate anything that the
strategy is trying to do. In fact, it is--it gives a foundation
for the strategy, and the strategy builds on having
relationships, not only within Sudan, but with its neighbors
and the international community.
Senator Feingold. I understand that rationale, but, of
course, the concern is that the message is possibly given to
Khartoum that they don't have to do much at all in order to
have that kind of constructive engagement. So, I'd like you to
say more--you've alluded to this--about the stick side of this,
not just the carrot side. I realize you might not be able to go
into specifics in an unclassified setting, but can you assure
this committee that the administration is actively assessing
the viability of meaningful punitive actions, and preparing
them, in the event that the Government of Sudan continues its
historic footdragging? And, of course, that has been the
hallmark of their record.
General Gration. There's no question. I'd be happy to come
up and brief you, in a more secure environment, on what those
are. But, I believe we have a very balanced approach that
includes both incentives and includes pressures. And in many
ways, the lack of incentives is turning out to be also a
pressure. We will continue to use all methods, all incentives
and pressures, in a balanced way.
But, one thing I would like to say as a caveat to this is
that what we're finding out is that--as you already know--that
this is a very complex issue, and there's a lot of multiple
things happening at the same time. And so, we're having to take
a look at this, not in terms of specific actions, and sticks
and carrots, and things like that, associated with specific
actions, but them in concert with everything else that's going
on in the country.
So, we're looking at an integrated approach that looks at,
What is the actions that are being done on the CPA? What are
the actions that are being done on the humanitarian front? What
are the actions that are being done to put together a political
process so people can have their will known and carried out?
And what is being done to increase security for the whole
region? And that's what we're judging this on--not specifics,
but more of a general way----
Senator Feingold. Well, I--and I agree that that should,
ideally, be the approach, but will you commit to briefing us on
the sort of punitive or stick side of this, in the appropriate
setting?
General Gration. I'll be happy to.
Senator Feingold. Well, I think it's very important. We're
on a tight timeline, as you said, with Southern Sudan's
scheduled vote on secession just 18 months away, and we have to
make sure that those mechanisms are as much, or more, in place
as the other things you've mentioned, or I'm quite sure
Khartoum will follow their historical pattern.
General Gration. I totally agree. Be happy to come and
brief you on these.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having the
hearing. And, General and Mr. Gast, thank you for what you do.
I am very appreciative that we've heightened our efforts.
Senator Isakson, I know, as has been mentioned, were in
Khartoum, and also in the Darfur region not long ago, and I--I
want to get to Darfur in just one second--but, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement seems to be the most crucial
issue that exists there now, because if we, in fact, are not
successful--all of us, Sudan and all those who care about that
region--it seems to me that all the gains, the minor gains,
that have taken place in Darfur, are out the window, because
the CPA reaching a not good end is something that, I think,
causes the entire region, possibly, to implode. So, I
appreciate you putting effort there, I appreciate the efforts
of our chairman and others.
There's been discussion about the humanitarian efforts,
already, so I won't go into that, and the 13 NGOs that have
been expelled.
One of the things, though, that I think is most striking in
the IDP camps there in Darfur is the lack of security for
women. Here, they exist in a home that none of us would call a
home, a little area on sand, and yet they're confined to those
areas because of the gender-based violence that's taking place.
And we're talking about an area smaller than the area between
you and I right now, where sometimes cattle is kept; they
themselves are there. They cannot wander outside of that area,
especially if they're a young woman, without being concerned
about gender-based violence. And I wonder if there are security
measures that we might change inside these camps, which are
already unbelievably undesirable places to be. Is there
something there that we might do that is more tangible than
what is occurring today?
General Gration. You're exactly correct. And it's something
that really bothers me. And fact is, when I was at Kalma and
Kass, I learned that the Sudanese can't even go in those
camps--I mean, the government and security--and the security is
inside.
We--there's--I think there's one ultimate answer, and that
is to be able to have security over the country and stability
over the country, and so these people can return to their homes
and live in dignity with respect. But, how do you draw the dots
between where we are right now and where we're trying to
achieve? And that's very, very tough.
And so, what we've been doing is working with UNAMID to
come up with a plan for security sectors. That's underneath the
overall cease-fire, cessation of hostilities that we're trying
to get. We're trying make concentrated cease-fire zones and
corridors so that people will be able to go out and collect
firewood, so they will be able to go out and start farms, so
they can start an alternative form of getting food, as opposed
to just getting the handouts. And it's going to start by moving
in concentric rings or along corridors that start where these
camps are, so people can start moving out in safety.
But, you're exactly correct, the situation that we face
today is unacceptable. The gender-based violence is
unacceptable. And we are working very hard, with our
humanitarian groups, NGOs, to stop this, because it's not
right, and it has to end. And that is a high priority for me.
Senator Corker. The UNAMID forces were able to accompany us
inside these camps. And yet, when we went out to actually meet
with them at their headquarters, to talk about their mandate,
which I know their efforts are really more out in the region,
trying to control the rebel groups--I know their mandate is
being reviewed right now. And in listening to them regarding
their mandate, one would have to say that it is an incredibly
weak mandate. The things that they have to do to counter the
rebel activity out there--you know, by the time they get
through going through all their protocols, the rebels are gone.
OK? It just seemed like a no-brainer that that mandate would be
changed to allow them to be far more productive, to do the
things you just mentioned.
And I want to ask one more question. If you could briefly
respond to that, I'd appreciate it.
General Gration. We've submitted our suggestions to the
UNAMID mandate. That was in July. And we're now working with
MINURCAT and UNAMID to come up with a better mandate, in
anticipation of a political process that ends up in a
comprehensive cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. At
that point, the mandate's going to have to include more things,
like monitoring that cease-fire, like working the borders, and
working these zones.
And you're exactly right. As currently written, I don't
think it's strong enough, and we need to fix that. And then we
also need to ensure they have the capabilities, which may mean
more aerial assets to do surveillance, and it may mean a new
command-and-control system that allows UNAMID to work with
local law-enforcement agencies, to work with the local
government, and rebel forces that exist in that region, to have
a comprehensive law enforcement and the cover that we need to
do exactly what you're talking about, which is that security
piece.
Senator Corker. Unless the mandate is changed.
Even--getting back, though, just to the protocol. When they
encounter a rebel group out in the desert, by the time they go
through the things they have to do--which basically are waving
at them, almost--the rebel groups are gone. And again, it seems
to me that that's something, regardless of the other things
you're talking about, that everyone would acknowledge is a
problem and could be changed. Otherwise, getting back to these
camps, they're going to become permanent cities, because no
one's going to go out--back to their homeland, as long as the
type of security that we're not providing continues to exist.
And I know you know that. But, I just hope that you will
work stringently with the United Nations to get that changed,
and I hope all of us will, too.
The final point. We met with a central banker while we were
there, and they talked about the various issues our sanctions
are creating for them. And again, I'm going back to the CPA,
because, again, if we end up having the train wreck that, on
the present course, will occur, OK, Darfur, as terrible as it
is, is going to get far worse, and it's going to spread to
other areas.
So, we met with our intelligence agencies there, and I know
many folks here have done that here. The fact is, there's no
evidence today--in spite of the atrocities that we all are
aware of--there's no evidence that Sudan is involved as a state
sponsor of terror. None.
So, the unintended consequences of that defined term
existing, I think, may be hurting us, as it relates to these
other efforts. And I just wonder, since there's no evidence of
that, and since we understand the importance of this
comprehensive peace agreement achieving its desired end in
2011--I'm wondering if we're, again, on one of those paths on
unintended consequences, and would like for you to respond to
that.
General Gration. Yes sir, you're exactly correct. There's
no evidence, in our intelligence community, that supports being
on the state sponsor of terrorism. It's a political decision.
What we have found, though, is the consequences of the
sanctions that have resulted from that, and other sanctions,
are preventing us from doing the development that we absolutely
need to do. The heavy equipment that must come in to build
railroads and roads has to come in through Port Sudan or
Khartoum; it is sanctioned.
And so, what's happening is, we're hurting, not only at the
local level, the humanitarian level--the people, because they
can't download educational programs and that kind of thing--
but, in addition to that, we're actually hurting the very
development things we need to do to help the South become able,
if they choose, to secede, a viable economic state; those
things are now sanctioned.
And so, you're exactly right. At some point, we're going to
have to unwind some of these sanctions so that we can do the
very things we need to do to ensure a peaceful transition and a
state that's viable in the South, should they choose to do
that.
Senator Corker. So, we're cutting our nose off to spite our
face, today.
General Gration. I'd say that that's probably a fair
analysis.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this timely
hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm not sure which of you would like to address this
question. I'd like to follow up a little bit on Senator
Corker's questions about what's happening with women in Sudan
and the gender-based violence that's been going on there.
When the government expelled those 13 NGOs, there was--the
programs that they were doing, including many that address
sexual and gender-based violence, were lost. Can you address
what the current status of those are? Have any of them been
restored? And is the Government of Sudan obstructing efforts to
restore those gender-based-violence programs?
Mr. Gast. Thank you for your question, Senator. You're
absolutely right. When we lost 13 NGOs during the expulsion, we
lost our capacity and the international capacity to support
gender-based programs, including prevention of violence and how
to deal with gender-based violence.
What we are doing now is working with existing NGOs on the
ground to expand their capacity so that they can expand the
women's programs into other areas. It's slow in coming back. In
fact, if one were to look at the various sectors that we lost
when the NGOs were expelled, that is probably the slowest one
in coming back onstream. But it is critical, and is something
that we're very mindful of.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, I appreciate that. Senator
Feingold and Senator Boxer held a hearing earlier, several
months ago, where we heard directly from women who had been--
and people who had been working with women in Darfur, who
talked about the deliberate effort to use sexual violence as a
substitute for genocide. And I think whatever we do can't come
fast enough and be important enough to address the very
difficult issues that women and families on the ground there
are facing. So, I would urge you to continue in every effort
possible. And if we, on this committee, can be helpful, we
would--I certainly stand ready to do that.
You talked about the UNAMID mission in Darfur, and I know
that it was authorized in 2007. We still aren't--supposed to be
one of the biggest peacekeeping forces ever assembled,
particularly in Africa, and yet we've seen real delays in its
deployment. So, can you talk about the gaps in their capacity,
about how we're working to address those gaps, and what the
prospect is for increasing their capacity to address the
challenge on the ground there?
General Gration. Yes. Let me just touch back on the women
thing. What we've found is that if we're going to fix the
problems in Sudan, we have to start with the women. If we start
with the women, the communities come along. And so, you're
totally right, we have to restore their respect, their dignity,
and their safety, and we have to use them as the centerpiece
for really working the humanitarian and the development things
that will come later.
But, on UNAMID, we're at about between 65 and 67 percent
right now. And in talking to the United Nations while I was
there on the field, they basically said that by the end of the
year they should be at 92 percent of pledged forces. As you
know, we've been working very hard trying to facilitate the Mi-
35s coming in from Ethiopia, but they still have significant
gaps. And, I would say, an area that's affecting us--in
addition to the mandate that needs to be adjusted, as was
pointed out--command-and-control elements, strategic planning,
logistics planning, are probably things where we need to help
beef up the support. In terms of soldiers, I think we're
beginning to see a fill there.
But, in the technical piece, if we have to get into this
monitoring piece, if we start doing intel-sharing on border
activities between the two groups, we're probably going to need
more analysis and more work on the intelligence side. And
certainly if we start the monitoring, and we use either
overhead aerial platforms for reconnaissance and surveillance,
we're going to need more of the high-tech piece.
But, those things--it's probably too premature to ask for
them right now, but I believe we need to start planning now so
that we can get these elements in if we're successful in the
peace process.
Senator Shaheen. So, what's our plan to do that?
General Gration. Our plan is, we're looking at AFRICOM
coming up with eight individuals that fit that billet of
planners, and also helping with the command-and-control
element. And we--as we continue on in the peace process and
define the requirements better--I'll be very honest with you,
in the past we had not defined the requirements. It was just,
``Send us six helicopters, send us eight people, send us a
regiment.'' And you'd ask why, and that really wasn't very
clear. ``Just send them. We got to get up to 26,000.''
And so, right now I think we've reached the point where
we've got the bulk of people lined up to come. Now we have to
be specific to tailor the needs--tailor the requirements such
that the people that come in now really fill the niches,
because what we have there now is good, in the general sense;
we need to really add on to the specific side.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Gration,
welcome.
General Gration. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Gast, welcome.
It should be pointed out that you brought charts and didn't
refer to them. I want to--if I'm reading the charts right--I
want to compliment you, because I believe you were appointed in
April, is that not correct?
General Gration. March, yes.
Senator Isakson. March?
General Gration. Yes.
Senator Isakson. In March, we were at less than 50-percent
capacity in food, medicine, water, nonfood items, if I read it
correctly. Now, by August we'll be at 100 percent in everything
but nonfood items. Is that correct?
General Gration. That's correct. But, there's a caveat
there--there's two of them. One is, we've been able to do that
because Earl and his team have put together some stopgap and
emergency measures to make that happen. And the other part is,
is that we haven't really been able to take that capacity and
fill all the gaps.
First of all, there was a lot of preexisting gaps that were
there. Second, just because of the way the distribution has
been, there are still gaps that exist. The good part is, is
that that is the current capability that we have, and we have
four new NGOs coming back in. And as we continue to work this--
what I'm trying to show is that we're going to fix the
emergency stopgaps, and make them more permanent--that's our
effort, and that's what Earl and I work on, on a daily basis--
but, two, we're going to try to get back in and, through
efficiencies that we've gotten with the--working with the
Sudanese, and the additional capacity of new NGOs coming in, I
believe we can have a significant impact, and that the future
is significantly better, and that we've averted what we thought
was going to be a major crisis in the rainy season. I think
we've been able to avert that.
Senator Isakson. Well, you and Mr. Gast are to be
commended. I was there in May, when you were probably somewhere
in that 80-percent range of capacity, and recognizing the
abject, deplorable circumstances there, you're to be
complimented on making up that gap, both of you.
On the question of the four goals for the Khartoum
Government, the fourth one being cooperation in the
counterterrorism effort, and following up on what Senator
Corker said, regarding the designation as a state sponsor of
terrorism, isn't it true--not only is there not any evidence
that they're cooperating with terrorists, but, in fact, they
were helpful in stopping the flow of some weapons that were
coming through the Sudan into Egypt, later to Gaza, most
recently?
General Gration. That is true, and they've helped us with
some key members of al-Qaeda.
Senator Isakson. Well, I think it's important to know, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Lugar, that it is one thing to not have
any evidence of cooperation, but then to have an overt act
where, in fact, they were helping in counterterrorism, begs the
question that Senator Corker asked with regard to the state
sponsor of terrorism list. Are our sanctions counterproductive
to our goals? And so, I just wanted to follow up on that point.
Next, one of the keys to the CPA is for legitimate
elections to take place in Sudan in 2010. I think originally it
was scheduled for February 2010. I know that's now been pushed
back to April 2010, is that right?
General Gration. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Will it be pushed back any further, or are
they legitimately moving forward with the elections?
General Gration. We are trying very hard to hold to April,
but both sides are reluctant, in some ways, to have elections
then. But, we believe--and the international community supports
us--that those elections are so important, not only for who
gets elected, but the processes.
If we can push through election laws, if we can push
through the voter registration and education programs, if we
can push through the administrative processes of ballots and
security and getting people to the polling stations, if we can
do all that, that gives us a jump on making sure that the
referenda in Abyei and Southern Sudan have a chance of being
fair, free, and credible. If we skip the election, I think it's
going to be very difficult to have free, fair, and credible
referenda.
Senator Isakson. Not only if we skip it, but if we have an
illegitimate election; it will ensure that the February 2011
referendum in the South will be a secession vote, I would
think.
General Gration. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. So, I commend you on continuing to push on
that as fast as you can.
Last, with regard to what Senator Shaheen was talking
about, I find it interesting that in your other graph over
here, of levels of influence, in the fourth--kind of looks like
Dante's levels in Hades, but anyway, in your fourth level----
[Laughter.]
Senator Isakson [continuing]. There is the United Nations.
I don't know if that depicts the level of which their influence
is, or you just put it out there, but it does seem that having
been in Darfur as recently as 2 months ago, having seen what
deployment is there, and seeing the expanse of the Darfur
area--I think a lot of people don't realize how big the Sudan
is; it is huge--we don't seem--they don't seem to have the
tactical or the infrastructure support to carry out the mission
that I think the U.N. intends to have there. Is that the U.N.'s
fault, or is that a fault of participating U.N. nations, in not
following through on a U.N. plan?
General Gration. I think it's a combination of a lot of
issues. And I would just say, in speaking for the U.N.--and
while there's things that they probably could do better, I've
got to tell you that, without the U.N. and without the support
to this mission for security and without the U.N.'s
participation in food programs and in NGOs and the support
we're getting from Ameera-Haq, we wouldn't have been able to do
half the stuff we're doing.
U.N. can be looked at as a glass half full and a glass half
empty. I look at them as a glass half full, and I'm a big
cheerleader for the U.N., and I think we need to work hard to
help them get the capacity that they need, as opposed to
tearing them down when they don't measure up.
So, I think that we're working hard to ensure that they get
the capability. I think that they're a capacity that can be
used very productively, both on the humanitarian side and on
the security side. They're not there yet, but I believe that
they can be.
Senator Isakson. Well, I didn't--my statement was not to be
critical of the U.N., per se--I'm not a U.N. basher--but it is
to make an observation that, 15 years ago in Rwanda, a failure
to act in a timely basis to make a difference, a tragedy took
place. And we're on the cusp of a tragedy again if everything
falls down in Darfur and in the South and with the elections.
So, it is critical, I think, that the U.N. forces, in concert
with the African Union, get the manpower there, but also have
the tactical and logistical equipment. To secure the routes of
those women to go get firewood is going to take the high-tech
things you were talking about, as well as aerial support
through at least helicopters, if nothing else.
So, continue to work to push them, because if that thing
does fail in 2011, in the Southern Referendum, or we have a
breakdown before then, it could be a catastrophic situation for
Africa, and really for the whole world.
General Gration. There's one thing I'd like to add to that.
You're exactly correct, but the fact that UNMIS and UNAMID
can't cooperate is disastrous. If there's a problem in the
Three Areas, if there's a problem in Southern Sudan, those
forces in Darfur can't come over to assist. That is something
that has to be changed, and we need to start working
interoperability between the U.N. commands in a more effective
way.
Senator Isakson. I appreciate your hard work very much.
And, Mr. Gast, thank you for what you're doing with the
humanitarian effort.
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I'm going just to--I will recognize you momentarily,
Senator Kaufman--just for a very quick comment, I'm going to
recognize Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I asked you and
asked Senator Kaufman for the courtesy of just 10 seconds to
just respond to the statements, both by Senator Corker and
Senator Isakson, with regard to Sudan's counterterrorism
cooperation.
I think these sort of characterizations are overstated and
do not state the actual situation. I've laid out my concerns in
a classified letter, and I'd be happy to repeat them in the
appropriate setting. I just would like the record to be clear.
And I look forward to dialogue with them on this.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, let me just say that it's a very
important issue with respect to any kind of policy
determination that we make, and the committee will have a
classified session in order to explore this so that we can make
an intelligent set of judgments. And I appreciate your raising
the issue, and it's one that we need to go at anyway, so we
will. And we'll do it in the right setting.
Senator Feingold. Good.
The Chairman. I was struck by your notion that this was not
the most secure setting in the world, I just----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. Can't imagine why you thought
that. [Laughter.]
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing. It's--this is really an incredibly
important, but difficult, problem, and I want to thank both of
you for working on this problem.
And I thank you, Mr. Gast, talking about my comments on
John Granville, who died in the Sudan, and the 91 employees
we've had. I mean, I was--I, myself, was not aware that it was
91. It--I mean, this is a very dangerous place, and people die
there almost in anonymity. And it is, as I said in a speech on
the floor in which I say, time and again, our Federal employees
that are doing this kind of work are just incredible people
doing an incredible job, for all the right reasons.
But, John Granville, when he died, was distributing radios
to try to better improve communications in the area. What are
we doing in terms of communications in the area?
Mr. Gast. One important part of our program, especially in
the South, is education, and education by radio. The newest
shift in our assistance now is civic education, and getting
prospective voters ready for elections over the next year--over
next 8 to 9 months. So, voter education and civic education are
critical components. And obviously a lot of people in the South
don't have access to schools, and so, we're--we have devised
radio instruction programs.
Senator Kaufman. Great. Is that the sum and substance of
it, in terms of communications? That's it. In other words,
basically--what we're basically doing is trying to educate
folks in preparation for the elections.
Mr. Gast. And general civic education programs, and
education programs.
Senator Kaufman. What are we doing in--prepare--you know,
the rainy season's coming--what are we doing to prepare to have
food there? Because usually that is an area of time when we
have famine. What's AID doing about that?
Mr. Gast. We do have preposition of stocks. The rainy
season is coming up. However, we've had experience, over the
last 4 or 5 years, in how to operate in the environment. We--as
the General mentioned earlier, a number of the interventions
that we've had to take, the international community--mainly WFP
and ourselves--are not fully sustainable. And so, with regard
to food assistance, there are some things that aren't
sustainable. For example, instead of relying on NGOs to deliver
food, and being able to monitor that, we're relying on local
relief committees. And so, we're trying to analyze the impact
that the rainy season will--might have on the local relief
committees that are distributing aid.
Senator Kaufman. Great.
General Gration, Senator Kerry, at the beginning of the
hearing, talked about, we just not have to meet the amount of
humanitarian aid, we have to surpass what we're doing in
humanitarian aid. Is Khartoum willing to cooperate with us in
increasing the amount of humanitarian aid?
General Gration. Yes, Senator, we have been taking a good
hard look at this, and we have a stoplight chart that evaluates
what they've said and what they're turning into deeds. And we
look at that every week to make sure that they are indeed
holding up to the agreements that they've made.
For example, they said they would hold up to the 2007 joint
communique, which meant that they--we only need notification,
as opposed to permission, to travel. And they're--and we're
seeing evidence that that's working.
We--they made an agreement that they would start issuing
multiple entry and exit visas, and they are starting to do
that.
We have reached other agreements, in terms of technical
agreements. We had a backlog of up to 6 months in some
technical agreements. They've signed about 98 percent of all
the technical agreements.
And so, we are now working the details--like, right now,
just this thing that was brought up about the organization--
International Organization for Migration--we know that if we
are going to get peace, if we're going to be able to start
thinking about people moving out, we've got to do this in a way
that their human rights are guaranteed, and that this is not an
involuntary return, but it is a voluntary return in stability
and security. So, we're working now with the government to
actually work those kinds of aspects.
We're working with the World Food Programme to start
thinking about, How will we move from humanitarian assistance
into development, so we can start putting in the social
networks of waters, and schools, and health, so that people can
move back into these areas where they want to make their homes
in a secure and stable--and with the human rights that come
along with that?
So, I see a lot of positive change. But, we have a program
that says, not ``trust but verify,'' but ``verify, then
trust.'' And right now we're in the verification mode. And when
we see more and more things happening--and I've got to tell you
honestly, it is now very positive. But, we also know what we're
up against, and so, we're making sure that these are verified
and that continue to be verified. But, as words turn into
deeds, there is more trust and there is more confidence, and we
can build on that confidence, not only on the humanitarian
side, but on the security side, on the political process side,
and also in the South.
Senator Kaufman. You also mentioned the need to expand the
UNAMID mandate and the need for additional training. What role
is the United States going to play in additional training?
General Gration. We have a meeting scheduled in AFRICOM to
discuss this very issue. Right now, I'm not sure. I know what
our requirements are. Our military, as you know, is strapped,
in not only what we have going on in Iraq, but also the plus-up
in Afghanistan and other missions around the world. So, I don't
speak for them. But, we will lay out our requirements, things
we need to do, and then we'll try to do this in the most
effective way, recognizing that they have commitments that they
have to do.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you. And thank you for all that both
of you are doing. I'm looking forward to that briefing;
security briefing.
General Gration. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very----
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. Much, Senator Kaufman.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing. And thank you, to both of our witnesses.
I think it's a testament to bipartisan concern about this
issue that eight Senators have spent most of the hearing
listening to the testimony and have taken a considerable amount
of our time today to stick around.
I'm sure you're aware, General Gration, that there is a
concern that the administration is not speaking with one voice
on the issue of Sudan. As you know, during the campaign last
year, Senator Obama vehemently denounced the Sudanese
Government as practicing genocide. Ambassador Susan Rice
stated, on June 15, that genocide is ongoing. However, you've
stated that the situation in Darfur was, at worst, the remnants
of genocide. I'd be interested in you commenting about ``at
worst.'' That seems to indicate that you're doubtful that there
was ever a genocide. So, it does seem that, in that respect,
our U.N. Ambassador and Presidential candidate Obama were
taking one position, and you're taking the other.
Also, Ambassador Rice praised the International Criminal
Court's issuance of an arrest warrant for President Bashir, and
that is a statement that seems at odds with the
administration's engagement strategy that you've outlined
today. So, I'd like for you to comment about that.
General Gration. Yes, thank you very much.
The President has referred to the genocide that is taking
place in Darfur, and that's very clear to me. And he's also
directed----
Senator Wicker. Indicating that it's ongoing.
General Gration. You can read that how you need to read it,
but that's his statement. And what he's directed me to do is to
reverse the dire ongoing consequences of genocide. And that
means to ensure that militias are disarmed and that displaced
people--persons--can return to homes when they want to and
where they want to, and that the people of Darfur, who have
suffered so much, can continue to live in--or, can live in
peace and security and dignity.
Senator Wicker. But, don't you think it's important for us
to know, to the best of our ability, whether there is a
continuing genocide, ongoing, as Ambassador Rice stated?
General Gration. Yes. This is a definitional issue, and
what I can do is only describe what I see.
Senator Wicker. Have you and the Ambassador had a
conversation about this seeming difference?
General Gration. I will tell you in public that Susan Rice
is one of my dear friends. There's few women in the world that
I say ``I love you'' to. Susan's one of them. I love Susan.
[Laughter.]
And Susan and I talk, and we disagree on some issues, but
it is not a personal thing. And there is not space----
Senator Wicker. Well, no one is suggesting that. But, it's
fair to say----
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker [continuing]. I'm heartened that people in
the administration are fond of each other.
General Gration. We are. [Laughter.]
And by that--and I just say that to say that, you know,
there's been characterizations of Susan on one side and me on
the other side. There has been honest debate, but that's why we
had the debate, so that we could come up with a strategy that
reflected a comprehensive and integrated approach to ensure
that all elements were taken care of.
And right now, as I--as you know, we're focusing on saving
lives, on making sure that people that live in those IDP camps
can live as best they can, and that they have a future.
Senator Wicker. In your opinion, are we dealing now only
with the remnants of a genocide that is over?
General Gration. I'm not saying the genocide's over. What
I'm saying, though, is that my focus is on recovery. Sir, I've
been a refugee myself. We lost everything we owned when we left
Congo. I've lived in an attic while waiting to try to find a
house. I've lived in people's clothes. I don't want people to
go through that kind of situation. I don't want people to live
in that environment. I understand it, and I'm passionate about
changing it, and it really doesn't matter what we call it, in
my view. What matters is that we have people living in dire,
desperate conditions that must end. We have women that fear for
their lives, and they have their souls ripped out of them--and
that has to stop--as gender violence continues.
My view is that to get involved in a debate that is not
required is not as important to fixing the situation, which is
required. That's my mandate. That's what the President has
asked me to do. And that's why I've dedicated 24/7 to do that.
Senator Wicker. Well, let me move, then, to another line of
questioning.
Senator Feingold asked you specifically what tangible
evidence we had that Khartoum is acting in good faith. I'd like
for you to elaborate on that. As you know, a number of Senators
have expressed their concern about this policy of national
engagement. And I guess we could talk about carrots and sticks,
as opposed to a comprehensive approach, but it seems to me that
any comprehensive approach is going to have a combination of
carrots and sticks.
Senators have advocated a plan of asking for concrete
progress on a number of fronts, and they've called for
benchmarks, a timetable to hold the government accountable, and
they've asked the administration not to rule out further
punitive actions and more muscular steps in our approach to the
national government.
So, what is your response to that, sir?
General Gration. I'll just give you an example. When I took
over, we had 12 areas where we had major gulfs in
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We started
with 12-hour-a-day meetings here in Washington; four of them.
We started with 2 days and expanded to another 2. We then went
to Khartoum. We were able to reach agreement on every single
one of those 12, except the census. And I've talked to the
leadership on both sides, and we'll probably resolve that at a
political level.
There is benchmarks, there is timetables, and I'll be very
happy to share with you all those agreements that were made,
not because of us, but because we create the environment so
that the two parties, NCP and SPLM, could make the agreements.
That's the way I see our role right now, to be able to
create the environment, to help push in areas that we can push,
to help use the leverage of the international community; to
push, not for the United States to make policy there, but to
create the environment so those different views, from the South
and the North, can be rationalized and problems resolved.
We will go out there next month, to raise that agreement
that we got at the working level, with 15 key leaders of both
parties, we'll raise that up to the two Vice Presidents.
In Darfur, we're doing the same thing. We're not pushing
the rebels to unite, we're creating an environment so that they
can unite. The same with civil society in diasporas around the
world. We're creating environments where they can come
together, identify their issues, identify their leaders, and
then we facilitate them going to Doha, where we can end up
building the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that's required to
bring peace to Darfur.
So, what I see is, we're not giving anything. We haven't
given anything yet, and we've got an agreement, 12 pages worth,
of things that they've agreed to, not necessarily with us, but
things that will move our shared vision, of what Sudan should
be, forward.
That's what----
Senator Wicker. I'd appreciate it----
General Gration [continuing]. We're trying to achieve.
Senator Wicker [continuing]. If you would respond on the
record about those specifics which you just alluded to.
General Gration. The specifics? OK.
Senator Wicker. Yes.
General Gration. First of all----
Senator Wicker. No, for the record.
General Gration. OK. I'll turn them in to you.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
General Gration. Yup, no problem.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
As a witness to and significant force behind the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the United States was uniquely
positioned to encourage the parties to return to the table to negotiate
their way out of the current impasse. With this encouragement, the
parties have been able to chart a path forward for implementation of
many remaining CPA milestones. In conjunction with these trilateral
discussions, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the National
Congress Party negotiated an agreement during the past 2 months
covering 10 remaining implementation points between the two parties to
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. United States efforts will be
crucial to the success of this process in areas such as providing
technical expertise to help demarcate the boundaries of Abyei and along
the North-South border, facilitating International Monetary Fund and
other International Financial Institutions greater involvement in
Sudan, and orchestrating robust support for elections, popular
consultations, and the referenda.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank you, General, for your service. But, I
have to be--and I had a meeting in the office, so I was partly
listening to some of your answers, what I don't understand,
what I fail to glean from what I've heard, is, your the third
or fourth special envoy we've had----
General Gration. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. To the Sudan. We have real
engagement by citizens here in this country on this issue--my
home State of New Jersey, but, for that fact, across the
country. We have thousands of letters of engagement by people.
We have the political engagement at the highest levels of our
government. We have funding for humanitarian programs. I listen
to us and our efforts, working here multilaterally. So, I have
real difficulty understanding what is missing that we cannot
move forward.
If I am sitting in a camp, still facing pretty dismal
conditions and worried about my security and/or my life, the
counsels of patience and delay do not satisfy me. And if it was
one of us sitting in those camps, I don't think we'd be
satisfied by what we hear.
So, I'm trying to grasp what is it--what is the elements
that we are missing here that, despite everything that we hear,
and now the third or fourth special envoy and the commitments
of Presidents and the greatest country on the face of the
Earth, leading with others--what is it that we are missing,
here, that we can't reach the conclusion--successful
conclusions we want, in turning the tide on the lives of these
people?
General Gration. Very difficult question. I don't know. All
I know is that we have a plan to try to make a difference. That
plan includes five tracks in Darfur, which is the political
process, the security elements that I've spoken to, the
humanitarian assistance in solving the problem between--the
proxy war between Chad and Sudan. We have an integrated,
comprehensive way to fully implement the CPA. We have--are
thinking about what we can do to stabilize the eastern security
pact and the NGOs that are sitting there on the eastern side.
All I can do is work all these problems together as hard as
I can. We've assembled the best team that I can. We have
bright, bright people that are helping us. We are pulling in
expertise from the whole international community. We are
building international organizations to help us do this.
We don't say that the United States can solve this problem.
But, we believe there is a solution, and we also believe that
we cannot fail. There's too many people whose lives are
depending on our success. And that's why we're putting together
every effort we can, and that's why President Obama has given
me the support he's given me and Secretary Clinton has been
totally supportive, because we all understand that this is the
one where we have to----
Senator Menendez. What's our timeframe?
General Gration. Our timeframe is, is that we have an
election in April of next year, and we have a referendum in
June. The number of days left, working days, is 174 until the
election, 362 until the referendum. That is almost ``mission
impossible.'' But, I believe that there's hope. I believe that
we can succeed, and that's why I get up every day, and I'm at
work at 6 o'clock, 7 days a week, to make this thing happen. We
have a terribly compressed timeline, we have an almost
impossible job to do, but if we sit back and do nothing, we
will certainly fail. I'm giving it everything I can, because I
believe that there's hope.
Senator Menendez. Well, I have no doubt you're giving it
what you can, and I certainly am not an advocate of nothing. I
have been an advocate on this committee of quite more robust--I
included legislation--in one of our previous legislation,
giving the U.N. resources from the Federal Government, because
genocide doesn't have an offset, as I was asked on the floor,
``Where's the offset for this?''
The reality is, though--I'm trying to get a sense--what is
it that you don't have that you need, if anything? Or do you
have everything that you need, now----
General Gration. No, I don't.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. To do what the--OK, then
what is it that you don't have that you need, outside of it
sounds like time?
General Gration. Time is a big one. The second thing is, we
need some space on sanctions. There are things that we are
doing and sanctioning that are hindering me from being able to
bring development to the South. There are things that are
hindering me because of sanctions that are keeping the people
of Sudan from getting the education they need.
I have a simple radio that's a doctor and a BlackBerry that
connects up to five leading institutions so that doctors in
Darfur and the South and around can call in and get the latest
medical help, and I can't even distribute them, because of the
sanctions.
The trains, the very elements that we need, and equipment
that we need to develop the South, can't come through Port
Sudan or Khartoum because it's all sanctioned. We have to take
a good look and say what can we do to ensure that the Southern
Sudanese have every opportunity to be birthed as a nation
that's not in an incubator, but one that can survive on its
own?
And I will tell you that there--we have worked issues and
put ourselves in the proverbial box in some areas. We're going
to need some help from the Congress in those areas.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you one other set of
questions. What does this say--you know, we are talking a lot
about the intelligent use of our soft power. But, what does it
say about our ability to succeed with soft power, in terms of
trying to get--the goals of saving these people's lives and
changing their lives?
General Gration. Well, obviously all the elements of soft
power are things that we're trying to use. But, what it really
comes down to is making a difference with the NGOs that have
the capacity--I mean, increasing the capacity for the NGOs to
work, it means bringing more development in, and it means
having a more integrated development program--rural development
programs, poverty reduction plans--that the Sudanese themselves
come up with. And that's what we're asking people in Juba to
do, is come up with their plan and then figure out how we can
work with them on their plan to make them successful.
It really isn't about us doing it, it's about us helping
them help themselves, and the African region to help itself.
And that's what we're trying to do.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Gast, one last question for you.
Women go out to get firewood, and end up getting raped in
the process. There's a lot of promotion of alternative stoves,
solar, gas, et cetera. Has AID looked at this in the thought
of, ``What is the best alternative?'' so that we can better
secure those who are in the camps?
Mr. Gast. Thank you for your question, Senator. Earlier we
did have a discussion of women's issues, especially in Darfur.
And you're absolutely right, if there were good, effective,
fuel-efficient stoves, it would reduce the exposure of women
outside of the camps.
What we have found, though, is some of the early models
that we have of fuel-efficient stoves, they haven't been living
up to their promises. They've oversold them. They're not as
efficient as they led us to believe. So, we are now working on
a study to help identify ways of improving them so that we come
up with a better design and a stove that truly is fuel
efficient and energy efficient.
Senator Menendez. And what's your timeframe for that?
Mr. Gast. It's in progress now. And I can't give you, with
any definition, when it will be concluded, but we will
certainly work with you and your staff on that.
Senator Menendez. We'd like to know your progress on that.
Mr. Gast. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
We're going to move, in a moment, to the next panel.
Let me just share with you, Senator Wicker--I think there's
a debate that is important, obviously, with respect to our
policy and the choices that we have available to us. It's also
a debate that is fraught with some difficulties, at this point
in time, which is why intelligent and committed people can have
differences of opinion.
According to Article 2 of the Genocide convention, genocide
means any of the following five acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group: One, killing members of the group; two,
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
three, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or
in part--obviously, there could be significant debate about the
camps and people's ability to move back to where they ought to
be, and the lack of provision by the government of adequate
protection, and so forth--imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; and forcibly transferring the children
of the group to another group.
Now, international law includes, within genocide, this
issue of the creation of physical conditions that lead to the
destruction of the group, and so forth. There's a lot of room
for argument, here, right now. I think what General Gration is
saying to us in this debate is that there are ongoing impacts.
We're living with it. Darfur is living day-to-day hell in terms
of the impact of what happened in 2004 and 2005. But, obviously
the kinds of activities of 2004 and 2005 that led to how many
people is the accurate figure were killed?
I mean what's the best judgment about that?
General Gration. The numbers fluctuate between 175 and
300,000.
The Chairman. Correct. And today, we have largely criminal
activity as a result of the conditions people are living in,
which takes some additional lives, but serious questions about,
sort of, whether it's the remnants of that orchestrated
violence or independent acting, or otherwise, versus a
government-driven effort, in the way that it was in 2004 and
2005.
So, these are things we can argue about. The critical thing
is, folks, if we sit around and just do that all the time,
we're not going to get those camps taken care of.
And, Mr. Gast, in his testimony, talked about the
unsustainability of the current situation. And I want you to
just sort of paint that picture for a minute. What do you mean
by ``unsustainability,'' in the context of the post-March 4
events?
Mr. Gast. When we refer to ``unsustainability,'' what we've
done is, we've had to ask actors to take on roles that they're
not used to doing. And so, it means that they're not
implementing programs that meet acceptable international
standards.
I mentioned, for example, the delivery of food aid. We have
a monitoring element--monitoring element--built in all along
the way. We can't do that now. We don't have the resources.
The Chairman. Let me ask you bluntly. Can the Government of
Khartoum facilitate our ability to do that better?
Mr. Gast. The Government of Khartoum can facilitate that
ability to do it better by doing what it is doing now, and that
is----
The Chairman. So, you feel that now there's been----
Mr. Gast [continuing]. Technical agreements----
The Chairman [continuing]. A turn, since General Gration's
visit, my visit, other visits--there's a sense that they're
more engaged in----
Mr. Gast. Absolutely. And now----
The Chairman. And do you feel----
Mr. Gast [continuing]. The problem is--excuse me, Senator--
--
The Chairman. Sorry.
Mr. Gast. The problem is--of course, is rebuilding that
capacity. There is--we talked about all the progress that the
government has made, and that is in issuing technical
agreements, in issuing visas, not requiring travel permits. The
one area that they have not fully implemented is the return of
assets. And so, assets that were seized, post-March 4, they
have not been returned, for the most part.
We are rebuilding capacity, and we're rebuilding capacity
to a point where we'll have full sustainability and greater
coverage than we did prior to March 4. And we're doing that by
expanding the presence of existing NGOs. Eight NGOs were
currently expanding their programs. They will be able to bring
in more international staff, hire more local staff. And then
the General also mentioned four NGOs that are coming back to
Sudan, three of which will work in Darfur.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Gast and General, there's more to
be covered, but we don't have time. We need to get to the next
panel.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, sir?
Senator Wicker. I wonder if I might have another moment or
two?
The Chairman. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Clearly, the chairman's comments are well
taken. However, if Ambassador Rice is correct, and if there is
an ongoing genocide, then clearly the Congress's--and the
United States--approach to dealing with the government should
be different.
I wanted to ask one question about the secession vote. I
would be surprised, General, if the South did not vote to
secede, under any circumstances. Do you expect the Khartoum
Government to honor this vote? And what are the implications of
that?
General Gration. Yes, I believe that they will honor the
vote, and I believe that--the agreements that we've made right
now, the North and the South have agreed to delink
legislations, such that the vote will take place with or
without the required legislation.
So, I believe that the vote will happen. And what we
understand, that if the vote happened today, they would
probably vote to secede, but we'll see what happens in 2011.
But, I think that they will allow it to happen.
Senator Wicker. And Khartoum will allow the seceding South
to go quietly and peacefully and orderly.
General Gration. That's what we're working for. We're
working for full implementation of the CPA that will allow, at
the vote, for there to be unity or a peaceful coexistence.
That's what we're striving for with our negotiations and the
work that we're doing.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just say, Senator Wicker--that was a
very important line of inquiry. I want to be declarative, here,
because I think it's important.
I believe that General Gration is on the right track. And I
think his engagement has saved lives, and it has advanced our
ability to be able to advance the peace process, both in Darfur
and for the CPA, North and South. And I think the consequences
of not doing both would be disastrous. So, we are presented
with a difficult situation. I also believe that what was
happening in the overt manner of 2004 and 2005 is not happening
today.
Now, I'm not going to get caught up in the argument of
semantics, General Gration has appropriately said, ``You know,
we can spend our time doing that.'' The key here is, Is the
Government of Khartoum moving to address the critical
humanitarian concerns and advance the peace process itself? If
it is, and we have to rely on our experts, we have a very
different situation confronting us. And I think that is the key
thing we have to look for in our policy, that there are real
asks, real measurements of what they're doing, and that we
advance that process, and I think that's exactly what General
Gration is doing. This timeframe is critical, and it's going to
take heavy-lifting by heads of state and by special envoys and
others to advance this.
So, with that said, let me invite a seamless transition,
hopefully, to the second panel. I need to meet with some folks
from the NSC just for a minute. Senator Lugar is going to
chair, in my absence, momentarily.
So, General Gration and Administrator Gast, thank you for
being here.
We will leave the record open for a week. I know there will
be additional questions that will need clarification.
Particularly, Mr. Gast, I know you didn't--we just didn't have
chance to get to some of the things we need to know about the
USAID program, and we look forward to doing that.
Thank you for being here.
The Chairman. We invite the second panel to come right up
and take their seats. And, Senator Lugar, if you'd chair, I'd
appreciate it.
[Pause.]
Senator Lugar [presiding]. May we have order now so that we
are able to progress with our distinguished panel.
And I'll call upon you in this order: First of all,
Professor Shinn, then Mohammed Eisa, and then Susan Page.
Would you please proceed, Mr. Shinn?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, ELLIOTT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Shinn. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
I want to emphasize that the situation existing in Sudan
today very much involves the surrounding region. I would also
suggest that most of Sudan's nine neighbors would prefer to see
problems between Northern and Southern Sudan ultimately
resolved, with Southern Sudan remaining united with the rest of
Sudan, even though that is not the way it seems to be headed
today; with Egypt perhaps most forcefully taking that position.
I think it's clear that a geographically unified Sudan is
clearly dependent on the willingness and the ability of
Khartoum to make unity attractive to Southern Sudan, and
Southern Sudan's willingness to leave the door open to that
possibility. Some observers might argue that a breakup of
Sudan--and I would suggest that a breakup might very well go
beyond just a Northern Sudan and a Southern Sudan, but possibly
the breaking off of parts in the North and in the South--some
would argue that might be a good thing. I respectfully
disagree, so long as Khartoum can make unity attractive to the
South. And that is the big question. Should that fail, of
course, it is incumbent upon Khartoum to allow the CPA to move
forward and the referendum on independence to proceed.
There is a lot to criticize in Sudan. But, I want to focus
on a few things--a few areas where there has been progress.
One has been talked about already today; whether Sudan
should be left on the list of state supporters of terrorism. I
would argue it should not; it should be removed from that list.
It is often said that if you remove Sudan from that list, then
you remove sanctions on Sudan. That is a misnomer. The web of
sanctions against Sudan is so long and so entangled, it would
take years to undo that jungle, even if you remove Sudan from
the state sponsors of terrorism list.
We've talked a lot today about the highly emotional charge
of genocide. I happen to be in the camp that would argue that
today what is happening in Darfur does not meet the definition
of ``genocide'' as defined by the 1948 Convention. And I think
it does not serve U.S. policy well to continue to call it that,
because of the heavy emotional baggage this brings to the
question.
I've suggested a series of very specific policy
suggestions, some of which have been alluded to earlier today.
Just to mention a few of them, I would try to make one last-
gasp effort to make unity attractive in Sudan, perhaps by
pulling together a small group of international experts that
could sit down with both the SPLM and the National Congress
Party and try to identify an agenda where that might still
happen. The odds are not good, but nevertheless I think the
effort is worth trying.
I think that a much greater effort should be made in
resolving the internal difficulties in Chad, working closely
with both France and Libya, and that plays out very heavily
upon what is happening inside Sudan itself.
I think that United States policy would be well served if
what is going on in Sudan involved, more directly, some of the
international key actors. And General Gration indicated that
may, in fact, be underway now. I think that is a positive move.
I think it's also important that the international
community press hard on both the SPLM and the Government in
Khartoum to demarcate the border in Abyei that has just been
adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal.
And finally, I would suggest that there ought to be
pressure on both the SPLM and the NCP to reduce the amount of
money they're spending on the military. And I would urge both
of them to rebuild their agricultural sectors.
Just very briefly on one or two operational considerations,
I would make the argument for upgrading United States
representation in Khartoum to the ambassadorial level, from the
charge level. More importantly, I would agree with General
Gration that there must be more on-the-ground ability to
monitor what is happening in Sudan, and I would try to make a
case for the American Presence Program of assigning one person,
one American officer, to cities scattered around various
locations in Sudan, with maybe one or two local nationals. I
think that would give a great advantage to understanding the
situation.
Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]
Prepared Statement of David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School
of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC
I thank the chairman and members of the committee for inviting me
to provide a strategic overview and perspective on U.S. policy toward
Sudan.
sudan and the region
The conflict in Darfur, the longstanding war between northern and
southern Sudan, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) and even the quiescent problems in eastern Sudan are related. The
linkages may not always be thoroughly understood, but there is an
effort to consider all these issues when formulating policy toward
Sudan.
The conflicts in Sudan also impact the wider region. Geographically
the largest country in Africa, Sudan has a border with nine other
countries. Darfur has had a dramatic effect on Chad-Sudan relations. It
has also complicated the situation with Libya and the Central African
Republic. Earlier unrest in eastern Sudan had an impact on relations
with Eritrea and to a lesser extent Ethiopia. While all of these
neighbors would prefer that these problems in Sudan did not exist, they
have contributed at different times both positively and/or negatively
toward their solution. When Khartoum believes the contribution has been
negative as in the case of Chad, Sudan has responded in kind.
Most of Sudan's nine neighbors would prefer to see the problems
between northern and southern Sudan ultimately resolved with southern
Sudan remaining united with the rest of Sudan. Egypt is the most
committed to this position because it receives 95 percent of its fresh
water from the Nile, all of which passes through northern Sudan and
some of which transits southern Sudan. It does not want to negotiate
with another state in southern Sudan on differences over allocation of
Nile water. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Libya have traditionally expressed a
preference for a united Sudan. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Central African Republic have been generally silent on the question.
They probably do not want to see the precedent of redrawn boundaries in
Sudan that may impact their own future. Uganda and Kenya seem to be
ambivalent about an independent southern Sudan. They may have concluded
that they could benefit economically from a new southern Sudan that
looks south rather than north. Chad would normally support a united
Sudan so as not to have a precedent that has negative implications for
its own political future. The troubled relationship between N'Djamena
and Khartoum in recent years concerning Darfur has complicated matters.
Both countries have charged the other with supporting opposition groups
across the border. These differences may cause Chad to prefer an
independent southern Sudan even if it is not in its long-term interest
and encourages a similar division in Chad.
A geographically unified Sudan is dependent, of course, on the
willingness and ability of Khartoum to make unity attractive to
southern Sudan and southern Sudan's willingness to leave the door open
to the possibility of unity. The record has not been good on this score
so far and time is running out. Darfur and eastern Sudan have not, at
least not yet, been pressing for independence. This could become an
issue, however, if their grievances are not resolved and if southern
Sudan opts for full autonomy in the 2011 (or later) referendum.
Finally, should southern Sudan decide to vote for independence and
Khartoum allows the separation to occur, there is no guarantee that
southern Sudan would remain one geographical entity. There are
significant regional differences today that if managed poorly could
result in serious pressure for further divisions.
What happens in Sudan in the coming months and years will have
important implications for a large chunk of Africa. As a result, it
will also impact the United States and the international community
generally, especially the donor community. Although some observers may
argue that a breakup of Sudan and even splits in an independent
southern Sudan are a good thing, I respectfully disagree so long as
Khartoum can make unity attractive to southern Sudan. A balkanized
Sudan would increase the number of relatively poor, land-locked
countries that have a highly questionable economic future. They would
still lack truly meaningful boundaries because ethnic groups do not
live in clearly demarcated areas and a pastoral lifestyle is common.
The existence of oil, although providing badly needed revenue for some,
would exacerbate tension among the new political entities. In the worst
case scenario, this means more conflict, internally displaced persons,
refugees and requirements for emergency assistance.
All of the parties, but especially the government in Khartoum, to
these existing conflicts has an enormous responsibility to make every
conceivable effort to avoid the worst case scenario. The first step is
working much harder to make unity attractive to southern Sudan. Should
that fail, it is incumbent on Khartoum to implement the CPA, including
the referendum on independence. While it is important to maintain
efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur and not to forget about the
fragile situation in eastern Sudan, the priority should be making unity
attractive to southern Sudan. Agreement by most southern Sudanese to
remain part of Sudan, even with substantial local autonomy, would go a
long way toward preventing the eventual unraveling of the country.
Khartoum's past record for accommodating southern grievances going back
to the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement does not encourage optimism.
This is probably Sudan's last chance to avoid putting in motion events
that could result in additional divisions.
acknowledging and responding to change in sudan
While there is still much to criticize in Sudan, it is important to
acknowledge progress when it occurs. I have followed United States-
Sudan relations since I served at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum from
1983 to 1986. Sudan continues to make some decisions that almost seem
designed to poke a finger in Washington's eye. At the same time,
however, the United States has a propensity to move the goal posts when
there is positive movement on the Sudanese side. This has not built
confidence over the years.
There is the issue of Sudan's continuing inclusion on the U.S. list
of state sponsors of terrorism. The United States appropriately put
Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993. The situation
has changed. Sudan began even before 9/11 to cooperate with the United
States on counterterrorism. It significantly expanded that cooperation
after 9/11. The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism for
2006 described the Sudanese Government as ``a strong partner in the War
on Terror.'' The report for 2007 reaffirmed the cooperation and added,
``While the United States-Sudanese counterterrorism relationship
remained solid, hard-line Sudanese officials continued to express
resentment and distrust over actions by the USG and questioned the
benefits of continued cooperation. Their assessment reflected
disappointment that Sudan's counterterrorism cooperation has not
warranted rescission of its designation as a state sponsor of
terrorism.''
The most recent State Department report covering 2008 stated:
``Sudan remained a cooperative partner in global counterterrorism
efforts. During the past year, the Sudanese Government continued to
pursue terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S.
interests and personnel in Sudan. Sudanese officials have indicated
that they view their continued cooperation with the United States as
important and recognize the benefits of U.S. training and information-
sharing.'' The 2008 report added: ``With the exception of HAMAS, whose
members the Sudanese Government consider to be `freedom fighters'
rather than terrorists, the government does not appear to openly
support the presence of extremist elements.''
There is no logical justification for leaving Sudan on the U.S.
list of state sponsors of terrorism. In my discussions around
Washington on this subject, I sometimes hear the response that removing
Sudan from this list would end sanctions against Sudan, and until there
is more improvement in Darfur, there is no willingness to end
sanctions. This is an inaccurate analysis. The United States has a
tangled web of sanctions against Sudan tied to the list of state
sponsors of terrorism, debt owed the United States, military coup
provisions, religious freedom sanctions, trafficking in persons
sanctions and Arab League and boycott sanctions. Removing Sudan from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism would end many impediments to
providing assistance to Sudan, but other provisions would remain in
effect that effectively bar U.S. assistance to Sudan. It would take
years to untangle this legal jungle and in some cases require action by
Congress. (For those interested in this topic, I commend to you the
March 2004 report published by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies by Bathsheba Crocker entitled ``Addressing U.S.
Sanctions Against Sudan.'')
There is also the highly emotional charge of continuing genocide in
Darfur. Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide identifies two elements that constitute the
crime: (1) The mental element, meaning the ``intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such,'' and (2) the physical element which includes five different
acts. A crime must include both elements to be called genocide. The
five acts are: (1) Killing members of the group; (2) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (3) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; and (5) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
Secretary of State Colin Powell declared in September 2004 before
this committee that the actions of the Sudanese Government and its
proxies amount to genocide against the people of Darfur. That was
almost 5 years ago when the Sudan Government supported the Janjaweed,
which killed tens of thousands of persons. The situation in Darfur has
changed significantly. In all of 2008, UNAMID reported there were about
1,550 violent deaths in Darfur. Less than 500 were civilians. More than
400 were combatants of various rebel groups and about 640 died in
intertribal fighting. The Sudan Government armed the militia involved
in the intertribal fighting and is ultimately responsible for these
deaths. This was and continues to be a deplorable situation, but it
does not meet the definition of genocide. I have not seen the figures
for 2009 but doubt that killings have increased. Nor is there any other
new evidence to suggest the situation in Darfur continues to meet the
definition of genocide in the 1948 Convention.
When I made this assertion before groups in Washington this year,
it was often met with derision. A few senior people in government even
responded what difference does it make what you call it. In view of the
emotional baggage that accompanies the charge of genocide and the
implications that it has for taking remedial action, the distinction is
very important. Those who continue to say there is ongoing genocide in
Darfur should at a minimum make the case why they believe it merits
being referred to as genocide. To the best of my knowledge, no other
nation has identified what is happening in Darfur as genocide. The
United Nations and most other countries have called it crimes against
humanity. While the United States should do everything within its power
to end the death and displacement in Darfur, it is time to drop the
genocide label.
some specific policy suggestions
On the assumption that it is still possible to achieve an
outcome in the referendum on the future of southern Sudan that
results in a unified Sudan, the United States and the
international community should recommend to the Government of
Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
that they agree to work with a small international group of
experts who would try to design an agenda that makes unity
attractive to southern Sudan.
A lasting regional peace requires a strategy that takes into
account the internal governmental weaknesses and instability in
Chad. I endorse the suggestion by Project Enough in its July
2009 ``Chad's Domestic Crisis: The Achilles Heel for
Peacemaking in Darfur'' that the United States should become
more actively engaged in efforts to obtain genuine political
reform in Chad. This can only be accomplished in close
collaboration with France and Libya and perhaps several others.
The Obama administration is in a strong position to forge these
partnerships and to work toward progress on Chad's internal
weaknesses.
The talks on Sudan that took place in Washington in June
2009 were largely tripartite in nature involving the United
States, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. There were
observers from key countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, China,
and Norway. Moving forward, U.S. policy would be well served if
the process had more direct involvement by other key actors in
the international community.
The Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A said they will accept
the binding arbitration decision on Abyei announced in July
2009 by the Arbitral Tribunal. In discussions with both
parties, the United States and the international community
should impress upon them the importance of implementing this
decision. In this regard, the international community should
work with both sides to help establish a joint survey team that
begins demarcation of the border.
The sharp drop in the price of crude has significantly
reduced revenue in both northern and southern Sudan. The
Government of Sudan recently sent a letter of intent to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) requesting help in monitoring
Sudan's economic performance and policies. Sudan also asked the
international community to help with debt relief, which is
estimated at $30 billion. The United States and the
international community should support Sudan's request to the
IMF for assistance in monitoring its economic performance. The
international community should also begin the process of
looking at Sudan's debt, especially if Khartoum makes progress
in ending the Darfur conflict. The United States will not be
able to take any action until the broader question of sanctions
is resolved.
Northern and southern Sudan are currently spending the
single largest percent of their budgets on the military and
security. The United States and the international community
should engage both sides in a dialogue that encourages them to
reduce the percentage of their budgets devoted to military
expenditures.
In concert with the international community, the United
States should urge the governments of northern and southern
Sudan to rebuild their agricultural sectors. Civil war in
southern Sudan caused significant deterioration of agriculture.
The reliance on oil revenue led to a ``Dutch disease'' syndrome
in northern Sudan that has severely set back agricultural
production. Oil revenue has the potential to do the same thing
in southern Sudan. The international community should also be
prepared to help revive the agricultural sector.
operational considerations
The official U.S. presence in Sudan is inadequately staffed and
organized to cope with the plethora of issues confronting it,
particularly if the United States retains a lead position in helping to
resolve these problems. The United States should upgrade its
representation to ambassador from charge d'affaires. It may not seem
like an important change, but it is. Representation by a charge limits
the ability to accomplish as much as it otherwise could with an
ambassador. The United States should also reciprocate by allowing Sudan
to upgrade its representation in Washington to the level of ambassador.
Equally important is the need to provide sufficient numbers of
reporting staff so that the embassy can provide up-to-date and accurate
information on political and economic developments throughout the
country. As the embassy staff moves from the dilapidated building in
downtown Khartoum to its new fortress structure in the suburbs,
American personnel will become even more isolated. A new embassy is
fully justified because of the inadequacy of the current one, but the
new structure will change the American presence in Khartoum from
overexposure to underexposure. These fortress embassies are so
inhospitable and difficult to enter that they virtually cut off contact
with host country nationals inside the embassy. The burden is then on
embassy staff to move around the capital and the country. To its
credit, the United States was one of the first countries to open a
consulate in Juba in southern Sudan. Embassy officers also make regular
visits to Darfur.
In view of the complexity of the problems looming in Sudan,
however, there is no substitute for an on-the-ground American presence
that provides continuity and the ability for an officer to travel
regularly throughout all parts of the country. Sudan is an ideal
candidate for several ``American presence'' posts. They would consist
of only one American officer and perhaps one or two local nationals
hired on a contract basis. Armed with appropriate language skills, a
healthy travel budget and the latest in mobile communications gear,
this is the only way I know under the current fortress embassy concept
to ensure a good understanding of developments in a country as large
and complex as Sudan.
Launched by former Secretary of State Rice, the ``American
presence'' concept has not taken hold in Africa, apparently due to lack
of assigned positions and concerns by State Department security. This
should change. Three or four ``American presence'' positions in some
combination of the following locations make eminent sense: Nyala and El
Fasher in the west, El Obeid and Kadugli in the center, Wau and Malakal
in the south and Kassala and Port Sudan in the east. The ``American
presence'' post has one significant bureaucratic advantage. It involves
so few people and administrative support that it can, if requirements
demand, be shut down or moved to another location without much
difficulty.
Creating ``American presence'' positions in Sudan or many other
parts of the world raises staffing and funding issues and the concerns
of State Department security. There are, however, certain risks that
come with a Foreign Service career and the time has passed since it
should assume a few more risks in countries that are not part of a war
zone. All ``American presence'' positions in difficult environments
should be filled by volunteers. I think you will be pleasantly
surprised at how many junior Foreign Service officers would like to
show what they can do on their own initiative.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Eisa.
STATEMENT OF MOHAMMED AHMED EISA, M.D., SUDAN ORGANIZATION FOR
RIGHTS AND PEACEBUILDING, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Eisa. Honorable members of the United States Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, my name is Mohammed Ahmed and I am
a native of Darfur, Sudan.
First, let me thank you for the invitation to address you
today. I also want to publicly thank the Robert Kennedy Center
for Justice and Human Rights for their support.
I am honored to testify today before you on an issue so
dear to my heart, yet I am saddened by the events which have
brought me here today. I am of the Fur tribe, and a leader in
my community. In preparing for this testimony, I consulted with
a number of Darfur leaders in the ground and in the diaspora,
and I stand here today representing many of their views.
I am a medical doctor and have worked in Darfur since 1989.
Since the genocide started in 2003, I have personally provided
medical treatment to hundreds of civilians injured as a result
of the conflict. The injuries have come in various forms:
gunshot wounds, rape, torture, beating, and other forms of
violence. We are particularly concerned about the deplorable
humanitarian situation in the displaced camps which have been
aggravated by the expulsion of the 13 international and 3
national organizations by the Sudanese Government--there is a
shortage of food and clean water, deterioration in sanitation,
and continuation of violence, such as rapes and killing.
The few aid organizations which have been allowed to return
to Sudan have not been able to start operating on the ground,
because of the lengthy bureaucratic redtape. Further, local
activists, such as myself, are being targeted by the
government, making it impossible for us to provide much-needed
service to our people back at home.
Many of us live outside of Sudan and fear for our lives if
we were to return to Sudan. For more than 6 years, we have been
crying for peace in Darfur. Peace is urgently needed in Darfur.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005 between the
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and the Government of
Sudan, sets a good precedent for the type of negotiable peace
agreement needed in Darfur. The CPA paves the way for
democratic transformation, provides for equitable wealth and
power-sharing, freedom of religion, and the right to one's own
cultural identity. These are the same issues we are fighting
for in Darfur. A similar peace accord is needed in Darfur.
Further, any peace agreement for Darfur must address the issue
of accountability for crimes committed by all parties to the
conflict.
But, a conducive environment for peace in Darfur must first
be created. Land owned by people in the displaced camps have
been occupied by settlers coming in from Mali and Chad. These
lands must be returned to their rightful owners in order for
this to happen. The Janjaweed Arab militia must be disarmed,
and the UNAMID force must be strengthened. This will create a
safe environment for the people in the displaced camps to
return to their homes.
For sustainable peace in Sudan, we recommend the following:
The United States should urge the Government of Sudan to
allow the return and functioning of the humanitarian
organizations expelled in March 2009 and remove the
bureaucratic redtape which is preventing few aid organizations
in Darfur from commencing operations.
The United States should ensure the inclusion of civil
society groups, including representatives from the leadership
of the displaced and refugees and women organizations in any
peace process.
As a key player in the peace process, the United States
should call for the timely implementation of provisions in the
CPA. We appreciate the priority which the United States has
given to Sudan. We hope to continue working with the United
States, and we are counting on the United States, as a world
leader, to play a key role to bring about peace in Darfur and
in Sudan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Eisa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mohammed Ahmed Eisa, M.D., 2007 Robert F. Kennedy
Human Rights Award Laureate, Sudan Organization for Rights and Peace-
Building, Washington, DC
I would like to thank the committee and particularly Senator Kerry
and Senator Lugar for the opportunity to appear here today and to speak
about the conditions in Darfur and my hope for peace.
background
I was born and raised in Darfur and have lived in Darfur for most
of my life. I am a medical doctor and also serve as a professor of
medicine at Al-Fashir University in Darfur in Sudan. I received my
medical degree from the University of Khartoum Medical School in Sudan
in 1976 and I am a specialist in internal medicine.
I am of the Fur tribe, the largest of the African tribes of Darfur
and I am also a community leader in Darfur. In this capacity, I have
addressed major community problems in Darfur and have engaged in peace
negotiations on behalf of people in Darfur for the past 20 years, since
1989.
In preparing for this hearing, I spoke and consulted with many
Darfuris on the ground and in the diaspora as well as leaders of
Sudanese civil society groups. Many of their views are represented in
this statement.
In the interest of time, I will only focus on a few key issues
facing Darfur. However, I welcome questions on other areas not covered
in my testimony. Today, my testimony will focus on the humanitarian
situation on the ground, particularly in the Internally Displaced (IDP)
camps, the targeting of local civil society leaders, and the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between North and South Darfur.
Finally, I will share my recommendations for the United States
Government.
situation on the ground
Humanitarian Conditions and Situation in the Camps
When the genocide in Darfur erupted in 2003, I was living in Darfur
and have lived there ever since. I personally have provided medical
treatment to hundreds of civilians injured as a result of the conflict.
The injuries have been in various forms: gun-shot wounds, rape,
torture, beatings and other forms of violence.
From 2004-2007, I worked as the Director of Medical Treatment at
the Amel Center for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Victims of
Torture (the Amel Center) in Darfur. The Amel Center provided medical
and psychosocial services to victims of rape and torture and also
documented human rights abuses taking place in Darfur. Most of the
cases referred to the Amel Center were from the camps. I regularly
treated several victims of rape, torture, and other forms of violence
on a daily basis. The victims comprised men, women, and children and
they ranged in age from a boy of 3 years old to an elderly man who was
80 years old. The Amel Center was the only organization on the ground
providing medical treatment and psychosocial services to victims of
rape and torture.
Many of the civilians who fled their homes as a result of the
conflict live in camps in Darfur and Chad. I visited several of the
camps in the Darfur area, and worked mainly in three of them: Kalma,
Dreij, and Otash in Southern Darfur, providing health care services to
the men, women, and children living there.
There are more women than men living in these camps. A typical camp
is composed of about 65 percent females; 25 percent children; and 10
percent men, mostly elderly. Thirty percent of children under the age
of 5 in these camps are malnourished. Since the escalation of the
conflict in 2003, several of the women and girls living in these camps
have been raped and subjected to other forms of sexual harassment.
Reports of threats of violence and rape in these camps persist today.
In June this year, two girls from Hamdya Camp in West Darfur were
attacked, raped, and beaten by six Janjaweed militia. On the same day,
another girl from Abusorroge Camp in West Darfur was kidnapped by armed
men in military uniforms. In July this year there have been four cases
of rapes in Nyretti Camp in West Darfur. Also in July, an elderly man
was killed, and four children were slaughtered in Tawila Camp in North
Darfur, by the Janjaweed militia. Four young men from Abokaro Camp were
also killed by the Janjaweed militia when they left the camp to collect
firewood and straw.
The expulsion on 9 March 2009 of 16 aid organizations (13
international and 3 national) by the government following the issuance
of the arrest warrant for President al-Bashir by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) has worsened the deplorable humanitarian
conditions in camps in Darfur. Reports from my fellow community leaders
on the ground indicate that as of June 2009, no one was providing
health care services in Kalma and only two organizations were supplying
food there. Kalma is one of the largest camps in Darfur with a
population of about 100,000 people. Shadad Camp in Northern Darfur,
which previously received food and water supply from the expelled
organizations, is also experiencing a severe shortage of food and water
supply.
The rainy season in Darfur which normally lasts from June to
September poses serious challenges for humanitarian workers providing
aid to the Darfuri people in the camps. Even with a full complement of
aid organizations providing health services, health problems generally
increase during the rainy season. As pit latrines become flooded during
this period, there is an increased incidence of diseases, such as
diarrhea and cholera. During this month of July, there have already
been three reported cases of cholera in displaced camps in Nyala in
Southern Darfur. There are no good roads leading to the camps; there
are only feeder or dirt roads. During the rainy season these roads
become flooded, making it difficult to access the camps. Conditions
such as these will place heavy constraints on the remaining aid
organizations on the ground or on any new agency at this stage given
that the rains have already started.
As we know, in March 2009, the Sudanese Government expelled 16
humanitarian organizations, including my former organization, the Amel
Center. The shutdown of the Amel Center in essence means there is no
organization on the ground providing both medical treatment and
psychosocial support to women and girls who are victims of rape or to
victims of torture.
Although the government has allowed a few aid organizations to
return to Darfur, reports from my colleagues on the ground indicate
that the organizations have not yet started operations in the camps as
a result of lengthy bureaucratic processes locally. Thus the sufferings
in the camps continue.
In addition to the problems within the camps, there are long-term
problems in West Darfur which need to be addressed today. Supported by
the Sudanese Government, newcomers, from Chad and Mali, are settling on
land belonging to the displaced African groups who now live in the
camps. Even if conditions finally improve in Darfur and people are able
to return home to their villages, they will have nothing to return to
and nowhere to go. Any solution for peace must seriously address these
issues.
Finally, the continued and prolonged existence of Darfuris in the
camps contributes to a serious deprivation of the educational rights of
Darfuris. Educational facilities are lacking in the camps. Even before
the conflict, the education level of Darfuris lagged far behind that of
other groups in Sudan, due to the limited number of schools in Darfur,
compared to the rest of the country. The enrollment of Darfur children
in elementary school, for instance, was only 40 percent, compared to 90
percent in North Sudan state. The limited education in the camps will
stunt the educational development of Darfuris, denying them access to
positions in key sectors in the country.
Targeting of Civil Society and Local Activists and Organizations
Those of us who try to address the deplorable conditions in Darfur
that I just outlined, face constant intimidation by authorities of the
Sudanese Government.
In late 2008, we became aware that our operations at the Amel
Center were no longer secure as information was being leaked to the
Government, thus endangering the lives of the survivors of the
Government-sponsored violence. Six of us from the Amel Center therefore
started the Sudanese Organization for Rights and Peace Building
(Sudanese Organization). The Sudanese Organization provided legal
support for those whose rights had been violated, such as victims of
illegal arrest and detention and police brutality, and also provided
support to victims of rape and torture. In late November 2008, three of
my colleagues were illegally arrested and detained for days. They were
severely beaten, tortured and denied access to lawyers and visits, even
from family members. The incident forced my colleagues and I to keep a
low profile.
On March 9, 2009, during my absence from Darfur, national security
officers went to the hospital where I worked and to my house looking
for me. They inquired about my whereabouts and conducted a search of my
home. Fortunately, they took nothing from my house and no one in my
household was harmed. On that same day, the national security forces
also went looking for Massad Mohamed, Director General of the Sudanese
Organization. They went to his home, but did not find him; when they
left Massad's home, they left with his brand new car. Personally, I
fear that if I return home I will be arrested. The five of my other
colleagues who ran the Sudanese Organization with me have also left
Darfur and fear for their lives should they return. In effect, this
means that the Sudanese Organization is no longer functional and
victims of crimes and Government abuse are left without much-needed
support services.
The Government of Sudan has also prevented civil society groups
from traveling outside of Sudan to participate in peace-building
efforts. In May 2009, about 300 people representing different groups of
civil society members in Darfur were to travel to Addis Ababa in
Ethiopia to meet with other civil society groups in the diaspora to
formulate a unified vision for peace. The Government denied exit visas
for these members of civil society. As a result, the meeting in Addis
Ababa never took place.
United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
The presence of UNAMID forces has not stemmed the violence in
Darfur due to lack of adequate manpower and equipment. From the
inception, UNAMID has lacked sufficient number of troops, logistical
supplies, including critical aviation capabilities and communication
equipment, rendering it feeble to stem violence in the region of
Darfur. The Security Council Resolution authorized 26,000 troops, but
only about 17,000 have been deployed. The required number of
helicopters has also not been provided, and with Ethiopia's pledge to
deliver five in October, a shortage of 19 still remains. An empowered
UNAMID will result in effective partnerships with local village police
who can be trained to help provide additional security. It will also
increase the effectiveness of UNAMID troops in protecting the camps and
enable them to assist with the voluntary return of the civilians in the
camps back to their homes when conditions in Darfur improve. However,
as long as the Janjaweed militia remains armed and UNAMID is
inadequately manned and equipped, the prospect of people returning home
from the camps remains unrealistic.
The people of Darfur continue to suffer and there seems to be no
end in sight. There is an urgent need for peace in Darfur. We are
counting on the United States, as a world leader, to play a key role to
bring about peace in Darfur and in Sudan.
comprehensive peace agreement
The United States and the international community has focused a
great deal of attention on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
signed in 2005. I welcome the CPA and the international attention on
the agreement, as do many people in Darfur. It provides a framework to
bring about the necessary changes that must occur to effectively
address the root causes of the problems in Sudan as a whole and has
relevant application to the conflict in Darfur as well. Although the
CPA does not address the issue of accountability and issues unique to
the Darfur conflict, such as land resettlement, it nevertheless
encompasses many of the principles that we in Darfur want: freedom of
religion; equality of all Sudanese citizens; the right to one's own
cultural identity, etc.
However, a number of provisions called for in the CPA, such as the
review and amendments of national laws to make them compatible with the
CPA agreement and the 2005 interim constitution of Sudan, have to date
not been implemented. Further, the result of the 2008 census conducted
pursuant to the CPA has been rejected by stakeholders in Southern Sudan
and Darfur. We in Darfur and South Sudan are of the view that the
census does not reflect the true population of the people of Southern
Sudan and is less than the actual number of Southern Sudanese people.
These issues must all be resolved within the shortest delay. Failure to
do so would have disastrous consequences for the elections scheduled
for 2010 and ultimately for the 2011 referendum. The people of Darfur
are closely watching the implementation process of the CPA and with
keen interest. If the CPA is successfully implemented, it will be a
major sign of hope for peace settlement in Darfur. However, if it
fails, it will threaten the prospects of peace in Darfur.
It must be emphasized that the situation in Darfur presents
pressing needs which must first be addressed before some of the
provisions of the CPA, elections, for instance, can be effectively
implemented. There must be peace first, before elections are conducted.
Further, a sizeable number of the Darfur population lives outside of
Darfur as refugees. Without peace, their participation in an election
is severely restricted, if not completely impossible.
Solutions to the conflict in Sudan must take into account all of
the above factors which threaten to weaken peace. I would like to
outline some recommendations to the United States for sustainable peace
in Darfur.
recommendations
(1) The United States should urge the Government of Sudan to allow
the return and functioning of the 16 humanitarian organizations
expelled in March 2009 and remove the bureaucratic redtape which is
preventing the few aid organizations in Darfur from commencing
operations.
(2) The United States should ensure the inclusion of civil society
groups, including representatives from the leadership of the displaced
and refugees and women organizations in any peace process. The
Government of Sudan should provide requisite documents for
international travel and permit civil society organizations to
participate in peace-building activities.
(3) As a key player in the peace process, the United States should
call for the timely implementation of provisions called for in the CPA
such as the review and amendments of national laws, in particular
national security laws and laws guaranteeing freedom of press, in
accordance with the CPA agreement and the 2005 interim constitution of
Sudan.
(4) The United States, through the Security Council, should take
measures to strengthen the joint United Nations/African Union
peacekeeping force, UNAMID.
(5) The United States, working with the Security Council, should
demand that the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitment to disarm
the Janjaweed militias, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1556
adopted on 30 July 2004.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, sir.
Now I'd like to call upon Ms. Page.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN D. PAGE, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN AND
EAST AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Page. Thank you very much, Senator Richard Lugar,
ranking member, and honorable members of the committee. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify.
As you know, 4 years after the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement the agreement is holding but remains very
fragile and full-scale war between the North and South is
always at risk of erupting.
Interethnic violence in South Sudan has increased. In
Darfur, violence continues, and in Eastern Sudan a shaky peace
deal holds.
On June 28, the National Elections Commission postponed
elections, for a second time, from February 2010 to April 2010.
Political tensions rose in the South when former SPLM Foreign
Affairs Minister Lam Akol created a new political party called
the SPLM for Democratic Change. Despite these challenges,
important progress was made. The Government of National Unity
agreed to allow four international nongovernmental
organizations into the country to replace the NGOs that had
been expelled after the ICC indictment of President Bashir.
Significant advancement toward peace was made in Abyei, as
has already been alluded to. Following last week's ruling by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, respect for the tribunal's
decision and the newly drawn map has been agreed to, and, I
think, in part is a testament to the presence in Abyei of
General Gration and to the senior leadership of the two parties
when the ruling was announced.
NDI has worked in Sudan since 2004. Our focus-group
research represents the most extensive qualitative information
on the opinions of the Sudanese people. NDI has completed 10
focus-group studies, including 6 in Southern Sudan, 2 in the
Three Areas of Abyei--Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan--and 2
in Northern Sudan. As part of these studies, focus-group
discussions have been held in 71 locations across the country.
NDI is assisting and developing the capacity of over 75
Southern nonpartisan civil-society and faith-based
organizations to serve as domestic election observers through a
network called SuNDE, the Sudanese Network for Domestic
Elections. The organizations have stressed the importance of
working together across regions and to coordinate efforts with
the North with those of the established network in the South.
Amidst the numerous challenges in Sudan, such expressions
exemplify a desire for collaboration, regardless of the
outcomes of the elections and the referenda, to build a just
and accountable government at all levels.
Our focus-group research in the North, South, and the Three
Areas show that the Sudanese strongly support elections as the
best way to choose their leaders. They are strongly committed
to participating in elections--and expressed a deep desire to
hold their elected officials accountable, something they cannot
currently do with appointed officials.
Interestingly, while many people expect cheating to take
place, a number of participants stated that they would,
``accept the bribe, yet still vote for the candidate of their
choice.''
Nonetheless, misinformation is widespread, including the
number of positions for which people will be voting. And in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, a number of people erroneously
believe that they will also participate in a referendum.
NDI's research raises important points and demonstrates
Sudanese citizens' frustration with the incomplete
implementation of the CPA. Increased technical assistance and
governance capacity-building toward electoral implementation,
including the two referendums, are crucial ways to support the
Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan,
and the 25 states of Sudan in implementing the next critical
phase of the CPA.
Additional support for civic and voter education programs
is crucial. In order for elections and the referendums to be
viewed as credible, the electoral framework must be understood
and regulations put in place as soon as possible. Donors should
continue to support the National Elections Commission to ensure
that it remains an independent and viable body. Political
parties must be able to compete and campaign freely, and media
must be permitted to provide equal access to all competing
interests. Additionally, domestic observation of the process--
of the electoral process provides Sudanese citizens the
opportunity to participate in the democratic life of their
country, and to make informed decisions about their future.
Collectively, an independent electoral commission, adequate
citizen education, responsible media coverage, political
tolerance for campaigning, and the freedom for domestic
Sudanese organizations to observe the electoral process will
contribute to minimizing the risk of pre- and post-election and
referenda violence, as well as help to ensure respect for the
will of the Sudanese people as expressed through the ballot.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Page follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan D. Page, NDI Regional Director for Southern
and East Africa, National Democratic Institute
Senator John Kerry, committee chairman, Senator Richard Lugar,
ranking member, and honorable members of the committee, thank you for
this opportunity to testify.
background
As you are all aware, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended
Sudan's civil war on January 9, 2005. Today, the agreement is holding
but remains very fragile. New conflicts emerged, and existing ones
changed. Full-scale war between the North and South is always at risk
of erupting.
Interethnic violence in South Sudan has increased. In one case,
armed Jikany Nuer men attacked an aid caravan going to a Lou Nuer area,
cutting off food supplies for nearly 20,000 displaced people. In June,
the U.N. noted that ``the death rate in Southern Sudan from violent
conflict has been higher than in Darfur.'' In Darfur, violence
continues and two aid workers were recently kidnapped. In eastern
Sudan, a shaky peace deal holds.
On June 28, the National Elections Commission (NEC) postponed
elections for a second time from February 2010 to April 2010. In
response to the Government not holding elections by July 9, 2009, as
called for in the CPA, the Darfuri rebel group Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) allied with some Northern opposition groups and called
for a new democratic, transitional government to be formed. Political
tensions rose in the South when former (SPLM) Foreign Affairs Minister
Lam Akol created a new political party called ``the SPLM for Democratic
Change.''
Despite these challenges, important progress was made. The
Government of National Unity (GoNU) agreed to allow four international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) into the country to replace the
NGOs that had been expelled after the International Criminal Court's
(ICC) indictment of President Omar al-Bashir on March 4, 2009.
Other important progress was made in Abyei. The National Congress
Party (NCP) and SPLM publicly reiterated their agreement to be bound by
The Hague's July 22nd ruling on Abyei's boundaries. Following last
week's ruling, the parties released a joint statement and both hailed
the agreement. To date, no violence has erupted in the area, which is a
major achievement. However, recently, both sides have begun to trade
accusations over the status of the oil fields based on the ruling by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
abyei
While violence has not erupted, it is important to note that the
reaction may simply be delayed because all the details of the ruling
are not fully understood on the ground and the Misseriya have not yet
returned to Abyei for grazing because of the rains. Furthermore, the
location of the oil wells and final revenue-sharing during the course
of the life of the CPA are likely to be drawn into the broader North/
South border demarcation process currently underway by the Ad Hoc
Border Commission. Respect for the Tribunal's decision and newly drawn
map is, in part, a testament to the presence in Abyei of General
Gration and the senior leadership of the two parties when the ruling
was released.
views from the ground
NDI has worked in Sudan since 2004, before the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement was signed. Our focus group research represents the most
extensive information on the opinions of the Sudanese people since
then.
NDI has completed 10 focus group studies, including 6 in Southern
Sudan, 2 in the Three Areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan,
and 2 in Northern Sudan. As part of these studies, focus group
discussions have been held in 71 locations across the country. Research
consistently found that people do not feel the CPA has yielded a
significant peace dividend. One southerner explained this common
sentiment by noting, ``Peace is just like a slogan. Most of the things
in the CPA are not being implemented.'' Another woman from the Three
Areas said, ``We have seen very little [improvement in development
post-CPA] . . . they should have done many schools and hospitals, that
would have been enough for us.'' In the North, one man told
researchers, ``Before the peace agreement, the war was sucking our
blood because a high percentage of the budget went to the war for
weapons and [a] very little of the budget went toward serving social
needs.''
Many people who participated in our study in the South and Three
Areas feel their lives have not significantly improved since the CPA
was signed; they link this to an expectation that war will return. A
man from the Three Areas explained, ``We will return to conflict
because now there is no development.'' Northerners also expressed
uncertainty about the current stability, although there was a sense
that development has increased somewhat. ``We cannot say everything is
at the right direction, despite the fact that there is a positive side
like development projects, roads construction,'' a northern woman said.
NDI is assisting and developing the capacity of over 75 southern,
nonpartisan civil society organizations to serve as domestic election
observers through a network called SuNDE. The organizations have
stressed the importance of working together across regions and to
coordinate efforts with the North with those of the established network
in the South. Amidst the numerous challenges in Sudan, such expressions
exemplify a desire for collaboration regardless of the outcome of the
elections to build a just and accountable government.
Focus group research in the North found some variation in opinions
about democracy, but those who participated in the study strongly
supported elections as the best way to choose their leaders. Similarly,
Southerners are strongly committed to elections, and expressed a deep
desire to hold their elected officials accountable, something they
cannot do with appointed officials. Interestingly, while many people
expect cheating to take place, a number of participants stated that
they would ``accept the bribe yet still vote for the candidate of their
choice.'' Misinformation is widespread, including the number of
positions for which people will be voting; in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile, a number of people believe erroneously that they will also
vote in a referendum. Without this option, a number of participants
claimed they would ``join the South, declare independence, or go back
to war.''
NDI's research on the 2011 referendum for South Sudan consistently
found that southerners plan to vote for independence. Within the first
year after the CPA was signed, and despite Dr. John Garang's call for
unity based on a new model for Sudan, southerners responded, ``We will
vote for separation and John Garang will have to get a passport to
visit us.'' Another noted, ``We will be divided, even children know
that.''
toward a comprehensive strategy
NDI's research raises important points and demonstrates Sudanese
citizens' frustrations with the incomplete implementation of the CPA.
Increased technical assistance and governance capacity-building toward
electoral implementation (including the two referenda) are crucial ways
to support the GONU and GOSS in implementing the next critical phase of
the CPA. Additional support for civic and voter education programs is
crucial.
In order for elections and the referenda to be viewed as credible,
the electoral framework must be understood and regulations put in place
as soon as possible. Donors should continue to support the National
Elections Commission to ensure that it remains an independent and
viable body. Political parties must be able to compete and campaign
freely and the media must be permitted to provide equal access to all
competing interests. The media can also be an important source of
information for Sudanese citizens in this process. Additionally,
domestic observation of the process provides Sudanese citizens the
opportunity to participate in the democratic life of their country and
make informed decisions about their future.
Collectively, an independent electoral commission, adequate citizen
education, responsible media coverage, political tolerance for
campaigning, and the freedom for domestic, Sudanese organizations to
observe the electoral process will contribute to minimizing the risk of
pre- and post-election and referenda violence as well as help to ensure
respect for the will of the Sudanese people as expressed through the
ballot.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Page.
Let me just commence the questioning by following up on
your suggestions.
Clearly, the information that could come from the focus
groups--perhaps already has--as well as the findings, as you
will publish them and discuss them, are critical for these
referendums. As you suggest, this information should help to
bring about decisions in which citizens have confidence, or
even more importantly, that informs them so that they do not
engage in violence because of what they perceive to be either
incompetence in administration or fraud and abuse.
The National Democratic Institute and the Republican
Institute have cooperated for many years in Latin American in
the elections, and I can recall vividly the attempts made,
really just to help print ballots that were clear, or signals
of signs to persons who were illiterate as to what the choice
might be, in terms of movements or political parties, quite
apart from the counting suggestions of people sitting around a
table with each ballot being raised and everybody examining it,
procedures that we would find, in the United States now, to be
very tedious and beyond the point. But, in the case of first
elections in many Latin American countries, this was critical
in terms of the credibility, because all of us are looking
toward those elections as indicators. Clearly the amount of
education about the numbers of positions to be filled, and who,
in fact, is going to be up for election--and so, I ask you,
what sort of resources do you or other groups have to make that
kind of information available in the 25 states of Sudan? Even
that is a daunting figure as one considers all the
differentiations.
Ms. Page. Thank you very much, Senator.
NDI has received a lot of funding, actually, from USAID,
who has made civic education, and now voter education, really
quite a priority. So, we do have quite a lot of resources. Our
research from the focus groups are consistently published. We
publish them, we do briefings in the field, not just for the
political leaders, both North and South, and at the state
level, but also for citizens, so that they understand where--
what people are saying, in terms of the elections.
I don't think that--in a country the size of Sudan, that,
frankly, the resources are ever enough, but in order to get to
some of those actions, we need clear regulations passed by the
electoral commission. They need--people need to be educated,
but we can't do all of the educating until we know exactly what
we need to tell people. So, that, I think, is a--first and
foremost, is that the National Elections Commission is also
understaffed and has been slow to publish the regulations to
implement the electoral act.
Senator Lugar. Well, I think this is an important part of
this hearing, to illuminate that process, because these are
action steps, finally, and decisions to be made by citizens.
And the information they have, opportunities they have for
choices, integrity of the process, is just tremendously
important.
Mr. Ahmed, let me ask you--as so many Americans appreciate
your own contribution and humane services to people as a
physician, likewise your observations about Darfur, what are
the prospects for the many groups within Darfur? Many of them
have been involved in contests of their own for authority, or
at least for turf, as the case may be. Leaving aside the rest
of Sudan, within Darfur, what are the prospects for unity and
for at least a healthy Darfur, even if the rest of the world
would leave it alone at this point?
Would you respond?
Dr. Eisa. Yes. To me--I have been working as a medical
doctor and as activist, and we--as a group of Darfurians, we
are working with different affiliations and different groups
and private groups to come together. And we have formulated
what's known as Civil--Darfur in Civil Society, which, almost
even the Janjaweed groups find they are incorporated within
this civil society, because we think that we are living in the
same atmosphere, and we'll continue living in that--in the same
Darfur. So, that's our vision, to face the problem of Darfur
together, and then, to go further, to find a solution of peace
in Darfur as a group, as a civil society, and not just as a
question of tribal parties or political parties. So, that's the
civil society we are now building in.
But, we are finding difficulties from the government. Our
meetings are prohibited, our movements are restricted, and
that's one of the problems. We are looking for the peace, and
we are trying to persuade everybody that peace is the only
solution for Darfur and Sudan.
Senator Lugar. But--that's encouraging, the progress among
groups in Darfur to look for unity, but you're suggesting, on
occasion, this is obstructed by the government----
Dr. Eisa. Yes.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. And these meetings and these
reconciliation attempts are frustrated.
Dr. Eisa. That's what we are trying to do----
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Eisa [continuing]. Because even the people in the
displaced camps and the refugee, they have their leaders, and
we always negotiate together to pave the way for peace process,
because that's the ultimate result. And that's our ultimate
goal for the people in Darfur. And we are really crying for
peace.
Senator Lugar. Professor Shinn, I was intrigued with your
thought that neighbors of Sudan, even recognizing the
referendums that are about to occur, as well as other
phenomenon, all things considered, would like to see one Sudan,
one united Sudan, as opposed to a Southern faction or some
other split-up. And you even suggested, in the worst-case
analysis, I suppose, that there might be more than two Sudans,
there could be a fractionated country.
First of all, I'm just curious, why would other countries
worry about that? Why does this affect their foreign policy,
one way or another? And furthermore, is this a unified feeling
of the neighbors, or do other countries have various agendas,
perhaps, that work better with a fractionated Sudan? Can you
illuminate that situation a bit more?
Ambassador Shinn. Yes. Of the nine countries that border
Sudan, I think I could make a strong case that at least six of
them would prefer a unified Sudan, when all of this is over
with. I would have some question marks on Kenya and Uganda, who
may see some economic advantages in having a Southern Sudan
that looks South. The situation in Chad is so confusing now
that it's hard to decipher what they might want. Normally they
would want a unified Sudan, because you have the same problems
of bifurcation in Chad, potentially, that you have in Sudan,
and that's not a good precedent for them. But the bad relations
between Khartoum and N'Djamena complicate that position.
In some cases, it's a very practical consideration. With
Egypt, it's Nile-water related. They simply don't want to deal
with one or more additional countries that they have to
negotiate quotas for use of Nile water. They'd rather just deal
with Khartoum and be done with it.
In the case of a country like Ethiopia, they just find it
easier to deal with one neighboring capital, not two or three
or more. I've had these conversations a number of times with
Prime Minister Meles, and he has made very, very clear that the
preference is for a unified Sudan. They will obviously accept
independence if that comes.
The more interesting part of the question that you raised
is perhaps: are some countries interested in having a division
in Sudan in order to make Sudan weaker, which might work to
their advantage? That is a possibility, and that's why I leave
Chad, particularly, in a separate category. I would argue that
Chad is the one country that might fall into this situation.
I'm not sure that would be the case anywhere else, even
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Central African
Republic. I think the precedent of division along ethnic lines
is more overriding than wanting to take advantage of smaller
entities. And in terms of U.S. interests, I think the last
thing we would want to see is a series of countries that are
landlocked and poor and dependent upon outside aid, even those
that may have oil.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Thank you all for being here. Appreciate it very, very
much.
Dr. Mohammed, what--how would you describe--we were--we had
that little discussion here about, sort of, what's going on in
Darfur today, and what the situation is on the ground. You may
have already addressed this, and I apologize if so. But, I'd
like to hear your description of that. How would you describe
what is happening on the ground today in Darfur?
Dr. Eisa. Thank you. I think what's happening in Darfur--
and I have been living there from--for more than 20 years, in
Darfur--it is a question of oppression of one culture, African
cultures are denied. Second, the Darfurians are not--don't have
equality in sharing in power or wealth. And they are really
marginalized. And with all indicators which show the situation,
I think it's a very dire situation.
Now, what's happening after the war, I think the people are
now crammed in more than 100 displaced camps, and you have
seen--you have seen what's happening in the--that's not a camp,
for me that's not a camp. Anyhow, they are living in that very
dire situation. But, the question is that--everybody in Darfur
wants to go home. That's a very vital--even if no compensation
are given. But, there are preconditions which should be
fulfilled. The question of the land which is occupied by the
other settlers--the government brought other settlers and they
now occupy the land of the displaced people. Even if they try
to go home, they can't go there, because they are armed and
they are--they have settled in----
The Chairman. The government----
Dr. Eisa. Yes, the Government of Sudan.
The second problem is that we need UNAMID to be empowered
and to take--to implement its mandate in the Sudan and the
Janjaweed militia should be disarmed and demobilized so that it
will produce a conducive environment for people to go home and
start their normal life in their home. I know they are coming
from very fertile land in very good areas, and nobody's liking
to live in that difficult situation.
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Eisa. So, to me, I think it is very difficult to see.
And I have seen catastrophes. But, let me say that, within
today, the rape is continuously going on, killing is
continuously going on. And you can't get out from the camps, go
to anywhere. And the problem with that, the--we want the
international community to understand that in Darfur we don't
have infrastructures. And the mechanism of----
The Chairman. You don't have what, sorry?
Dr. Eisa. Infrastructures.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Eisa. So, we need that. That's very basically needed.
And we think that the question of helicopters or----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Eisa [continuing]. Other mechanism should be more--
should have the upper hand to control the situation than just
by normal----
The Chairman. In terms of the current dynamic of the
principal rebel groups, they're certainly not engaged the way
they were in the kind of confrontation that was going on. But,
the question I'd ask you is--I think one Senator, Senator
Menendez, mentioned we've had three or four envoys; we've gone
through a number of ``getting close to agreements''; we've gone
through a number of agreements; and within hours, or days even,
of the agreement, people have walked away, and it's fallen
apart, and so forth. Is there something that is alive today, in
this moment, that you think is different, that we can
capitalize on? Or, are we stuck in the same sort of dynamic
where we go around, we'll get--you know, we'll go through this,
sort of, meaningless agreement process?
Dr. Eisa. I think it's a question--it's not a matter of how
much agreements people are--do. It's a question of, Is there a
political will to implement and to make things easy?
The Chairman. And the political will has to be by all the
parties.
Dr. Eisa. The Sudan Government. Because--the rebel
factions--if this--and this is what I stated, because the
implementation of CPA is very mandatory, so that it gives us
the trust and the confidence----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Eisa [continuing]. That the coming peace will be
implemented.
Now, the rebel factions----
The Chairman. What's your judgment about that will? Is the
will there now, in your judgment?
Dr. Eisa. To me, I know what's happening in the Sudan
Government is still--the Sudan Government had never made--
determined to make a political will for--to solve the problem
of Darfur, and a political mechanism, but it wants to continue
the military-option phase than any other option.
The Chairman. Ambassador Shinn, what do you say about that?
Ambassador Shinn. It's very hard to read, obviously, the
minds of the people who are running the Government in Khartoum.
I do see, however, a willingness to reach out to governments,
like the American Government, for perhaps the first time in a
long time, and I think that ought to be pursued rather than
rejected.
It may not lead anywhere, and it will be unfortunate if it
doesn't, but I think that General Gration is essentially on the
right track by reaching out, seeing what is there, and seeing
if there can't be further moves by the Government in Khartoum
to do what has to be done to resolve, not just the problem in
Darfur, but implementing the CPA.
I am a little bit optimistic on this, not real optimistic,
but a little bit.
The Chairman. So am I, actually. I think it is possible to
put the dynamics together. Very, very tough, big issues.
Ms. Page, maybe you want to comment on the--how you see the
North-South process within CPA, and the biggies of citizenship,
borders, and wealth-sharing.
Ms. Page. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
I believe, actually, that some of the suggestions outlined
by Ambassador Shinn are quite right. I think the region really
has to be considered. Africa does not have a long track record
of appreciating other independent states on its borders, and
especially the fact that Sudan--if the South votes to secede,
we need to have a process of how we're going to help both the
Government of National Unity, which, of course, is an
integrated government, but to help the North and the South put
in place the mechanisms that would make that happen.
So, what General Gration talks about, whether it's unity or
a peaceful coexistence, a peaceful separation, how do we do
that? And I think that we have to help--it's partly through
elections and the other political processes. But we have to
make it less of a zero-sum game, so that it's not only a winner
and a loser. And that's what they saw with the Abyei ruling,
that both sides saw that they won something. And that's part of
why it has been accepted without any violence, so far.
The Chairman. But how do you explain the rise in violence
in the South? I mean, there is increased violence there in
certain areas. Do you view that as localized tribal
confrontation, or is it North-South?
Ms. Page. I would say it's a little bit of both. But,
ethnic tensions are very much on the rise. I mean, one quote
states that they were--there was--there were more deaths in
Southern Sudan from ethnic violence than there was in Darfur.
The Chairman. Right.
Ms. Page. That's a scary statistic. I don't think that--I
think if we--if the international community doesn't, sort of,
rally around to try to take out some of the--again, that zero-
sum game, the--making it an all-win-or-lose, or, you know, all-
or-nothing situation, then we don't take away the incentives
for the government to put spoilers in the mix. That's how
governments around the world--it's nothing unique to the
Government of Sudan. But, if we don't take away some of those
possibilities by giving them some real thoughts of how they can
work through some of these processes so that the outcome of the
elections will be respected, the outcome of the referendums,
the two, for Southern Sudan, as well as for Abyei--will be
respected, and respected without violence.
So, I think if we could get international supporters
together, people with different experience, as Ambassador Shinn
has suggested, I think that that--it's worth a try to, again--
you know, what do you do, the pipeline is not in Southern
Sudan? The oil is there, but the pipeline isn't. So, there has
to be some sort of mechanism. What are they going to do with
the revenue, post-2011?
The Chairman. Unfortunately, we are running up against the
clock, here, folks, which I regret enormously, because we could
obviously go on publicly here for some time. We're going to
need to, again, leave the record open so we can follow up with
you.
But, let me just try to close out a couple of quick
questions, if I can.
Dr. Mohammed, the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as the
CPA, many people felt, lacked a sufficient civil-process input.
Could you just share with me, very quickly, what--how can we
make sure that the civil society is properly heard in the
process of this initiative, or effort, with respect to Darfur?
Dr. Eisa. I think the----
The Chairman. Ambassador Shinn, I'd like you to also----
Dr. Eisa. Yes. I think the Darfur Peace Agreement failed
because the civil society was not incorporated, and other
things. But, we think now the civil society is almost ready,
and--apart from the obstruction made by the Government of
Sudan. But, we think that the situation is more there now, and
everybody is longing for peace. That is a good momentum; we
have to make use of it.
The other things are--even the rebel factions, I think they
are just waiting to see a suitable momentum, where they can
just push in and continue the negotiation. And Doha may be a
good momentum, but we need that--there must be a--the feel that
the Government of Sudan is really determined to find a solution
for the problem of Darfur. Let them give their hope that--let
the international organizations go back to help the IDPs. Let
the civil society move together, so that--to find a solution
for, and to make their position for, the peace and--come
together to peace. Let the rebels--if the civil society is
ready, and those in the displaced are ready, then they have no
choice, except to accept that thing.
And I think the--we and the United States, as a trusted
country, with the aid, with the international community, for
sure will reach a peace very soon.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Shinn. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to sound too
Pollyannaish on this, but the key clearly is the Government in
Khartoum, and particularly the National Congress Party, in
having a change of approach to what it does, or how it receives
Darfurian civil society, in terms of bringing them into the
process. They have to be convinced that this is in the interest
of Sudan and in the interest of Darfur, generally.
I think that it is incumbent upon the international
community--certainly including the United States, but not just
the United States--to use this opening that the United States
and the international community seem to have, to press this
point and to make it clear to Khartoum and the NCP that this is
the occasion to turn a new leaf, to bring more Darfurian civil
society into this. I agree with you wholly, it's critical to do
that.
I don't think the other groups would disagree with this,
and the SPLM component of the Government of National Unity
would probably be supportive of this. So, I think there's an
opening to do something here.
The Chairman. Well, I think that's a good note, both of
you, in your comments--unless, Ms. Page, you wanted to add to
that--but I think that's a good note to pull this together on.
A little optimism, and a sense of what is possible. I
personally believe that.
I think some of those rebel groups, frankly--it was my
perception over there--are taking advantage of their Toyota
Land Cruisers and their guns and some money that flows their
way, and there's not a lot of liberation theology driving many
of them these days. [Laughter.]
So, I think we need to really call things as we see them,
and press the opportunities here to bring people together to
try to resolve this.
And we are greatly admiring, Dr. Mohammed, as you know, of
your efforts over all these years. Thank you so much for your
courage and your leadership.
And thank you, all of you. The National Democratic
Institute, Susan, we greatly appreciate what you're doing.
As I said, we will leave the record open. I know there will
be some questions submitted, and if you could help us complete
the record, that would be terrific.
So, thank you. It's been very helpful to everybody.
Senator Lugar, do you have any other----
We thank you, and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on U.S.
policy toward Sudan. This past month U.S. diplomats hosted a forum in
Washington to bring together representatives from dozens of countries,
NGOs and other Sudan experts to discuss the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and develop an effective multilateral way to proceed on
Sudan. Positive signals emerged from this meeting, but North-South
relations still remain tense, and the ongoing violence in the Darfur
region continues unabated. The policies of Sudanese President Omar
Bashir in Darfur have led to the murder of hundreds of thousands of
innocent people, which is why I hope that the President will continue
to apply forceful pressure on the Sudanese Government to end the
violence in Darfur and hold those accountable for the atrocities
committed there.
I want to take just a moment to discuss the Sudan Accountability
and Divestment Act of 2007, which I authored along with my colleague
Dick Shelby in the Banking Committee. This bill empowered our country's
State and local governments to divest from companies with business
operations in Sudan. The international community has condemned
President Omar Bashir for his role in authorizing this genocide, and he
has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for these crimes.
Given the worsening situation in Sudan, we thought it was imperative
that we help strengthen the growing movement in the United States of
those interested in divesting from Sudanese businesses whose presence
serves to bolster and support Sudan's Government, enabling its security
forces, and those militias responsible to them, to continue to commit
these atrocities.
To that, we were deliberate in targeting four specific economic
sectors widely recognized as key sources of revenue for the Sudanese
Government: oil, power production, minerals, and military equipment.
According to one former Sudanese Finance Minister, 70 percent of the
Khartoum Government's share of oil profits was spent on military
equipment used to bolster militias like the Janjaweed.
This legislation represents part of the wide-ranging effort being
made to maintain pressure on the Sudanese Government and to effect
positive change. But, Major General Gration, as you know, much work
remains to be done. A more forceful international diplomatic effort
must be made to ensure that violence stops in Darfur, that humanitarian
aid begins flowing again and that NGOs expelled from the country after
the ICC indictments were issued, be allowed to reenter. I want to thank
Major General Gration for his hard work so far in striving to ensure
that the implementation of the CPA continues to in peaceful and stable
ways and for his close work with regional and international allies in
achieving a positive outcome in Sudan. That is no small task, indeed it
might be one of the toughest challenges we face, but it is absolutely
critical that we and the international community bring relief to the
people of Darfur and a stable and lasting peace to Sudan.
______
Responses of Special Envoy Scott Gration to Questions Submitted by
Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. In your written testimony, you said that engagement means
frank dialogue about ``how the bilateral relationship could improve if
conditions on the ground transform.'' What specific steps would we take
to improve our bilateral relationship with Sudan and under what
conditions would you recommend we take these steps?
Answer. We believe that steps to improve our bilateral relationship
should be linked to specific actions by the Sudanese, such as meeting
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation goals, implementing
a sustainable solution for the Darfur crisis, refraining from further
regional destabilization, and improving and sustaining counterterrorism
cooperation. We are currently taking several steps to open dialogue
with actors in the Sudanese Government and in the wider region to help
facilitate these outcomes. Commencing a constructive dialogue is the
first cautious step toward improved bilateral relations. Real
improvement and actions on the part of the USG to acknowledge this
improved Sudanese behavior should only occur after we have seen a
tangible, irreversable improvement of conditions on the ground in
Darfur, serious engagement in a Darfur peace process, and important CPA
benchmarks being met. The nature of the steps we could take will depend
entirely on Sudanese actions and would need to be coordinated on the
U.S. side through the interagency process and in close consultation
with Congress.
Question. Can you comment on the cohesiveness of the National
Congress Party right now, particularly given press reports that Vice
President Taha has been out of the country for a month amid rumors that
he's had a falling out with President Bashir? Are there signs of cracks
within the regime, or major differences on policy approach to Darfur or
CPA implementation that have led you to believe a strategy of bilateral
engagement will bear fruit?
Answer. We are not in a position to speculate with any confidence
about internal relationships within the Bashir government. It does
appear, however, that National Congress Party (NCP) actors have begun
behaving more consistently with regard to Darfur and Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation since the ICC indictment of
President Bashir; perhaps the indictment prompted Bashir to tighten his
inner circle of confidantes. We are anxious to see if the increased
consistency might help achieve a lasting resolution of the Darfur
conflict and full implementation of the CPA. In any event, we will
continue to strive to extract commitments from Khartoum that can be
verified by tangible, positive action on the ground.
Question. As you know, more than 2 million people have been
internally displaced in Darfur by the fighting and instability there.
What do you see as the conditions for the sustainable return of these
IDPs to their villages and do you think we are at that point?
Answer. In order for voluntary returns to take place, increased
security must be a fundamental precondition. I have taken several trips
to Darfur since I began as the Special Envoy to Sudan, and I have seen
that security conditions on the ground appear to be improving.
While IDPs continue to cite insecurity as the primary obstacle for
return, additional deterrents include uncertainty of compensation if
they leave the IDP camps, unavailability of former homes and farms
(some have been occupied), lack of livelihood opportunities, the desire
by some to continue the ``urban'' lifestyle, and some dependency on
humanitarian assistance in the camps. The majority of ``returns'' to
date have been seasonal in nature and linked to agricultural
production. A tremendous amount of work still needs to be done in order
for people to be able to appropriately, voluntarily, and sustainably
return to their villages with their dignity and human rights intact.
I would like to stress that any return needs to be voluntary,
appropriate, and in accordance with international norms and standards.
The Government of Sudan holds the primary responsibility for
establishing and ensuring adequate, appropriate, and sustainable
conditions for IDP return and settlement. The international community
stands ready to support Darfuris willingly returning to their villages
when an independent body has verified that they are indeed returning
willingly, and confirmed appropriate conditions in areas of return.
Specific care should be taken to avoid the creation of inappropriate
pressures to return, or a false sense of safety, and to uphold the
principles of impartiality and neutrality.
I also believe that despite ongoing instability and other issues,
we must start to plan for the day when significant numbers of voluntary
returns can occur. USAID already programs significant funding for
assistance outside of IDP camps to address the key vulnerabilities
caused by the conflict, including reduced access to health facilities,
limited availability of agricultural inputs, disruption of agricultural
and market systems, and strained resources among communities hosting
displaced populations. During small scale and larger scale returns,
USAID humanitarian assistance will continue to be based on assessed
needs, not on population categories such as IDPs, pastoralists, or
returnees.
Conditions are slowly improving, and we continue to push resumption
of the Doha peace process. We would be doing a disservice to the people
of Darfur if we did not begin to think ahead to future needs, such as
assistance for agriculture or development, when significant voluntary
returns do take place.
Question. I regularly hear from people across Wisconsin, many of
them involved with Darfur Action Coalition Wisconsin, who want the
United States to do more to end the crisis in Darfur and help build
peace in Sudan. Because of the President's and Vice President's
statements during the campaign, many of them expected that this would
be a top priority for the administration. As you pursue your strategy,
what are you doing to draw upon the widespread public interest in this
issue and involve Wisconsinites and other Americans who care deeply
about Sudan in your efforts?
Answer. We are very interested in public outreach and are working
on several levels to expand our communications and to engage with the
large community of Americans who are deeply passionate about the issues
facing Sudan. Recently, we developed a listserv that enables us to
regularly send out updates, and to date nearly 8,000 people have
registered through the link on the special envoy's Web page
(www.state.gov/s/sudan) for these regular e-mail updates. We hope to
build on this and explore more avenues that will facilitate getting the
message out about our efforts in Sudan.
Additionally, we are engaged in active and ongoing discussions with
key organizations in the advocacy community. We consider it crucial to
actively engage this very large constituency and to keep them informed
about our activities and progress in Sudan and to help give them a
voice in our discussions with the Government of Sudan. To this end, our
office and the NSC recently convened a meeting at the White House with
many of the leaders of the advocacy community to continue this dialogue
and to discuss ways that the advocacy community and ourselves can
collaborate and work together to further advance the goals of peace and
stability in Sudan. We will continue this outreach and appreciate that
many of your constituents are so actively supporting peace in Darfur.
Question. I strongly believe that a lasting political solution in
Darfur also requires attention to the instability and internal causes
of conflict within Chad. Do you consider Chad part of your mandate and
if so, how does it interlink with the Sudan policy under development
and what steps are you taking to address the political and security
situation there?
Answer. Ending the ongoing proxy war between Chad and Sudan is
essential to ensuring a lasting peace in Darfur and the region. While
Chad is not officially part of my mandate, I am working closely with
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson and the Office
for Central African Affairs on issues related to Chad. I have visited
Chad twice since being appointed Special Envoy to Sudan, and I continue
to maintain close contact with President Deby as well as several other
important Chadian leaders.
Bringing peace to Sudan is very clearly part of my mandate, and in
order to do this we must strive to end the cross-border conflict
between Chad and Sudan. This requires an internal Chadian political
reconciliation process, which is part of the broader Chad-specific
strategy being implemented by the Bureau of African Affairs. Therefore,
while I consider it within my mandate to work on issues related to the
improvement of bilateral relations between Chad and Sudan, I do this in
very close coordination with and in a supporting role to the Bureau of
African Affairs.
______
Responses of Special Envoy Scott Gration to Questions Submitted by
Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. During the last week's hearing, you said that the
consequences of the U.S. designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of
terrorism and the sanctions linked to it are hindering the United
States ability to rebuild Sudan and contribute to its development as a
viable nation.
But I remain very concerned that simply lifting sanctions could
reward Sudan without securing assurances that the Sudanese Government
will take steps to end conflict in the Darfur region and in the South.
Furthermore, as I understand, the United States is able to provide
foreign aid to Sudan through nongovernmental organizations for
humanitarian purposes and existing sanctions have been lessened in
Southern Sudan.
If you believe that sanctions are impeding development in
Sudan, have you explored additional exemptions or the proper
administration of existing exemptions until the Government of
Sudan proves itself a good faith actor?
Answer. The administration is not currently considering the removal
of existing domestic sanctions against the Government of Sudan or any
named individuals or entities. I would be strongly opposed to lifting
sanctions against the Bashir regime or the sanctions that prohibit the
procurement of military equipment by Sudan. Our goal is to keep
pressure on the Khartoum government. However, I am very concerned about
how the broad array of U.S. sanctions against Sudan may hamper
development in conflict-ridden regions, specifically in the South and
Darfur. Congress did ease certain financial sanctions on the South and
Darfur, but many restrictions remain in place.
We are undertaking a thorough review of all U.S. sanctions in place
against Sudan in order to develop a comprehensive picture of all our
options. We have not completed this assessment yet, but I would be
pleased to share our findings when the assessment is completed to
determine how we might work together to develop the tools we need to
expedite humanitarian assistance and to facilitate needed development
in Southern Sudan.
Question. As you well know, Sudan's recent national census has been
largely contested by officials in Southern Sudan and Darfur. The census
is an important step leading up to the 2010 elections.
On July 24, Alain Le Roy, the Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations, said that, ``the
contested census, large-scale displacement and volatility--particularly
in the area bordering Chad--create enormous risks that the people of
Darfur will not be in a position to participate in the electoral
process.''
In view of the concerns surrounding the accuracy of the
census, and the possibility that Darfuris may not participate
in the upcoming elections, do you believe the elections will be
fair?
How will the outcome of the 2010 elections affect the Darfur
peace process and the representation of Darfuris in the
Government of Sudan?
Answer. Sudan's national elections, scheduled for April 2010, are a
key milestone in implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
and, we hope, a positive step toward democratic transformation in
Sudan. The United States continues to support and encourage credible,
peaceful, nationwide elections in Sudan, including in Darfur. We are
working with all parties to ensure that the peace process and elections
in Darfur complement each other. We believe voting should take place in
all parts of Sudan unless legitimate security concerns prevent voting
in certain places at that time, and we believe it is far too early to
make any such determination. The upcoming elections provide a rare,
nonviolent opportunity for Darfuri civilians to make their voices heard
about issues that affect their lives and we are encouraging Darfuris to
get involved in electoral preparations and in the elections themselves.
However, we recognize that the absence of a viable peace settlement
that genuinely addresses Darfuris' underlying concerns magnifies the
current challenges to electoral preparations and the process itself.
With less than 9 months to go, these elections face many
challenges. Political challenges, logistical hurdles, limited
infrastructure and, security risks in southern Sudan, Darfur, and other
areas continue to hamper preparations. We are pushing all parties to
complete the necessary legal reforms and resolve the ongoing dispute
over the use of census results to allow for an open campaign
environment. The United States is providing a significant amount of
technical expertise to assist Sudanese authorities to prepare for and
undertake this landmark national process. We are working with Sudanese
authorities to ensure that all Sudanese have access to, and are
educated about, the electoral process and have the tools they need to
make informed electoral decisions. We are also providing support to
facilitate international and domestic monitoring, to build voter
confidence and technical competence to help ensure credible elections.
Question. Could you please share with me your detailed plan to
ensure implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)? What
specific benchmarks and deadlines have you laid out and what progress
would you like to see within the next year?
Answer. Efforts to support implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) will continue to be our focus. We are at a
critical point in the implementation timeline as we enter the final
stage of the Interim Period. It is with a renewed sense of urgency that
we are pushing for the parties to fulfill their responsibilities under
the CPA. We are working directly with the two parties to the
agreement--the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM)--to overcome roadblocks to implementation.
We hosted the Forum for Supporters of the CPA in Washington--an
event that brought together high-level representatives from more than
34 countries and organizations to pledge their renewed support to
ensuring full implementation of the CPA. We also used the opportunity
to encourage the international community to deliver on commitments they
have made on resources that will aid CPA implementation. Together, the
forum participants agreed on coordinated action plans to ensure the
international community stays on the same page over the next several
months. We intend to hold another forum before Sudan's national
elections in April 2010 to ensure the momentum continues.
In the context of a trilateral dialogue, we are encouraging the two
parties to work with each other directly. Through this process of
dialogue, the NCP and SPLM have moved to resolve many of the disputes
that have been hindering full implementation of the CPA. We have
charted a path forward for 10 of 12 issues identified by the parties as
potential obstacles, including acceptance and implementation of the
Abyei arbitration decision, demarcation of the North-South border,
improvement of security and wealth-sharing arrangements, and some
arrangements related to elections. Only two issues remain outstanding;
how to utilize the census results and the structure and process for the
January 2011 referenda. The trilateral process is ongoing, and I will
return to Sudan in mid-September to meet with the leadership of both
parties to finalize the points of agreement.
Already we have witnessed the peaceful rollout of the Abyei
decision, acceptance of the decision by both parties, and moves to
begin its implementation. And in the last few weeks, the North has
returned funds owed to the South and allowed Southern inspectors to
audit its oil-related records. With less than 18 months until the
referenda on self-determination for Southern Sudan and Abyei, the
parties must achieve significant milestones, including national
elections in April 2010, popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile states, and preparations for the referenda and post-referenda
era. While I expect significant progress in the coming months, I know
there are many challenges ahead, and the U.S. Government, in
cooperation and coordination with other members of the international
community, will continue to work with the parties to address and
resolve new issues as they emerge.
______
Response of Special Envoy Scott Gration to Question Submitted by
Senator Roger Wicker
Question. What is the official administration position with regard
to whether a genocide has occurred in Sudan? If so, is the genocide
currently underway? Who does the administration believe is guilty of
genocide?
Answer. The President has made it clear that Sudan is a priority
for this administration. The President has referred to ``genocide
that's taking place'' in Darfur. My focus is now on reversing the dire
ongoing human consequences of genocide--ensuring that the militias are
disarmed, displaced persons can return to their homes, and the people
of Darfur who have suffered so much can live in peace and security.
In light of ongoing court cases, it would be inappropriate for my
office to speculate on the guilt or innocence of any party.
______
Responses of Special Envoy Scott Gration to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. As we plan and conduct our foreign policy in Sudan, it is
essential that we are clear about our goals and objectives. Equally as
important is the ability to react to the ever-changing circumstances on
the ground. We only acquire this ability by planning for a range of
scenarios and outcomes in advance. The next 18 months in Sudan are
critical. Within this time period, national elections are scheduled for
2010 and a referendum on separation for 2011. These two dates are
potential flashpoints for conflict.
General Gration, do you believe that Southern Sudan will
have the ability for self-sustaining rule by 2011?
Answer. It is possible for Southern Sudan to achieve self rule by
2011, but it should be noted that an underlying element of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is to make unity attractive. We
will continue to do all we can to help prepare Southern Sudan for a
possible vote for secession. However, in tandem with this effort we
need to work with both the North and the South to help them resolve
their differences and create a more peaceful and stable coexistence.
While much has been accomplished since the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, Southern Sudan has much to do
before the 2011 referendum if it is to self-govern. Most notably,
Southern Sudan needs to continue to improve governance, professionalize
its armed forces, and establish a sustainable and diversified economy
which is not totally dependent on oil revenues. Southern Sudan remains
challenged in attracting investment and developing economically, in
part because of the array of sanctions placed on Sudan by the United
States, which affect both North and South Sudan. Congress has provided
authority to provide certain types of assistance to South Sudan but
other sanctions (e.g., certain export restrictions) that impact the
South remain in place.
Question. General Gration, if Southern Sudan were to vote for
secession, what type of assistance would be required from the United
States and what type of assistance is the administration ready to
provide?
Answer. Should Southern Sudan vote for secession in 2011, USG and
international assistance would be vital to ensure that it does not
become a failed state. Our existing nonemergency programs are focused
on building and strengthening the South's economic, governance, health,
education, rule of law and security capacities, and these types of
programs will likely remain critical beyond the 2011 referendum whether
the outcome is unity or secession.
In order to be prepared for any scenario, we are studying recent
examples of newly independent states, such as Kosovo and East Timor, to
better understand the process, as well as actors, of state-building in
post-conflict settings. This will help inform the development of
appropriate U.S. and international responses. These analyses, however,
should be carefully balanced and reconciled with the outcomes of
current negotiations being undertaken between the Government of Sudan
and the SPLM to resolve post-2011 concerns not addressed in the CPA.
This framework would provide a foundation upon which targeted
assistance could be designed and planned.
I would note, though, that while the United States is committed to
supporting a peaceful and democratic implementation of referendum
results, the Southern Sudanese must take the lead in ensuring a stable
and prosperous future.
______
Response of Acting Assistant Administrator Earl Gast to Question
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. As we plan and conduct our foreign policy in Sudan, it is
essential that we are clear about our goals and objectives. Equally as
important is the ability to react to the ever-changing circumstances on
the ground. We only acquire this ability by planning for a range of
scenarios and outcomes in advance. The next 18 months in Sudan are
critical. Within this time period, national elections are scheduled for
2010 and a referendum on separation for 2011. These two dates are
potential flashpoints for conflict.
Mr. Gast, what programs is the United States currently
undertaking to strengthen Southern Sudanese governance
capabilities and democratic institutions?
Answer. The U.S. Government's objective in governance is to promote
transparency, accountability, and participation in government
institutions. These elements are especially critical in post-conflict
environments, such as Southern Sudan, where government must have the
capacity to deliver public goods and peace dividends in order to
maintain legitimacy, consolidate peace established under a negotiated
peace agreement, and ultimately sustain democratic reform. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department
coordinate closely to achieve these objectives through a variety of
programs.
Building the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) is
a cornerstone of U.S. Government strategy. Since 2004, prior to the
formation of the GOSS, the U.S. Government, through USAID, has been
providing assistance to build capacity, transparency, and
accountability of governance structures in the South as a central tenet
for successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). Our assistance initially aimed to enable the GOSS to perform the
essential tasks of government at a basic level.
Our strategic focus has been on establishing core public sector
executive functions, through support to key GOSS Ministries, Cabinet
Offices and independent Commissions. This includes developing sound
financial management systems, sound budget formulation practices,
stable executive decisionmaking structures and processes, policymaking
processes, a professional civil service, human resource systems, and
institutional management systems. As a result, these new institutions
are now functioning at a basic level. Revenues are coming in, payments
are being made, and a legal framework is being built. Nevertheless,
development gains have been slow, and many fundamentals of governance
continue to need improvement.
USAID has also supported improvements in the technical capacities
of GOSS institutions critical for implementation of specific CPA
milestones. Technical assistance and commodities support to the nascent
South Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics, and Evaluation enabled
it to successfully conduct the recent census in Southern Sudan. USAID
is also currently providing technical assistance to the National
Election Commission and its constituent bodies, which include the South
Sudan Election High Committee, to help them design and implement
credible national and state-level elections in 2010.
USAID has also expanded this type of targeted assistance to
Southern state and local governments along the North-South border and
in the Three Areas to support the CPA's decentralization agenda and
promote stabilization in these areas at high risk of conflict. In the
short term, USAID assistance will assist local government to deliver
basic services and peace dividends, and in the long term will build
local capacity to assume this role.
USAID assistance has also flexibly responded to emerging needs of
the GOSS. For example, in response to the recent financial difficulties
faced by the GOSS, the USG played a critical role in developing a GOSS-
donor compact to strengthen fiscal sustainability within the GOSS in
preparation for the referendum in 2011. In support of this initiative,
USAID and other donors are designing a program that will provide
support for the compact's three pillars: Enhanced Fiscal
Responsibility, Strengthening Public Financial Management, and
Accelerating Private Sector-Led Development.
In rounding out the nongovernmental dimensions of good governance,
USAID has provided support to develop and strengthen citizen
participation in governance, including civil society organizations,
political parties, and media, and access to information, civic
education, and enhanced dialogue between government and citizen groups.
Looking toward the future, USAID is now working with the GOSS and
other international donor partners to assess the GOSS' current
capabilities to provide for basic citizen needs and carry out key
functions, and to prioritize the GOSS core functional capacities that
are deemed essential to ensure that the GOSS functions effectively as
it prepares for 2011 and beyond.
______
Prepared Statement of Save Darfur Coalition, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Save Darfur Coalition
appreciates the opportunity to comment on the critical issue of peace
in Sudan.
The Save Darfur Coalition represents over 180 faith-based,
advocacy, and human rights organizations that all support an end to the
genocide in Darfur and a comprehensive peace for Sudan.
Sudan policy is at a critical juncture. With the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the Sudanese People's Liberation
Movement fraying, with the date for national elections in Sudan
nearing, and with no demonstrable progress being made in Darfur on
peace, protection, or justice, the United States must decide whether it
is willing to invest the time and effort into developing and
implementing a comprehensive strategy for Sudan that has a reasonable
chance of success.
Let us be clear on the facts. The humanitarian situation in Darfur
remains dire. Over 2.7 million Darfuris reside in internally displaced
persons camps and another 300,000 reside in refugee camps in Chad and
the Central African Republic. Over 4 million people in Darfur are
reliant on humanitarian assistance.
While the security situation in Darfur has improved from the
systematic destruction of villages in the 2003-2005 period, the people
of Darfur remain extremely vulnerable in a lawless, dangerous
environment, lacking the most basic human rights. On March 4, the
Sudanese Government demonstrated its ability to cut off humanitarian
aid at any moment from the 4.7 million Darfuris who depend on it. Rape
continues to be a daily terror as the Sudanese Government refuses to
take the most basic actions to end impunity for the perpetrators of
gender-based crimes.
The mass violence perpetrated by the Sudanese Government several
years ago has been replaced with the harassment, detention, torture,
and murder of Darfuri and Sudanese human rights and civil society
leaders. This violence led a significant number of Sudanese human
rights defenders to flee the country shortly after
March 4.
The African Union-United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNAMID)
remains woefully underresourced and largely unable to fulfill its
mission. Meanwhile, impunity reigns throughout Sudan despite the
International Criminal Court's indictment of three Sudanese for war
crimes, including President Omar al-Bashir.
The situation in the South is no better. Political and economic
pressures have led to increasing intertribal violence, and some
humanitarian organizations have said the number of deaths directly
caused by violence is actually higher in the South than in Darfur. The
Government of South Sudan is increasingly seen by its constituents as
ineffective and budgetary pressures have left it at times unable to pay
its soldiers and civil servants.
With national elections now scheduled for April 2010, all of these
elements could quickly explode into a Sudan-wide conflagration.
We are concerned that over 6 months after his inauguration,
President Obama has yet to release the results of the administration's
Sudan policy review. The appointment of Special Envoy Scott Gration was
a welcome development, but without clarity on the policy he is supposed
to implement, both he and the international community are at a
disadvantage when negotiating with the Government of Sudan.
Moreover, we have expressed concern at some apparent disconnects
between various actors within the Obama administration on Sudan policy.
While we understand that the interagency process is inherently messy
and that there are many strong opinions about the best approach to
take, President Obama must ensure that his administration speaks with
one voice by enunciating its policy for Sudan at the earliest
opportunity. Division within the administration, or even the perception
of division, simply plays into the hands of the Government of Sudan and
its defenders.
We have seen no evidence to date that the Government of Sudan is
any more willing to make the necessary concessions to achieve peace
than it has been at any point since the conflict began. Allowing some
humanitarian organizations to reenter Darfur wearing different hats
after the Government expelled them on March 4 is not a sign of an
increasing willingness on the part of the Sudanese Government to
cooperate. It is an admission that they cannot sufficiently address the
humanitarian situation on their own and did not want the situation to
spiral out of control to point where the international community would
be compelled to act. Such ``concessions'' on the part of the Sudanese
Government are hollow.
President Bashir's favorite tactic is to delay true reforms by
creating crises that distract the international community, allowing him
to never actually fulfill any of his promises. The March 4 expulsions
are one such example. The international community rewards this tactic
by focusing on the crisis of the moment rather than a comprehensive
solution. This is partly why the national elections originally
scheduled for 2009 have been twice delayed, and many speculate that
credible elections may never take place. Bashir is using cooperation on
the implementation of the CPA as leverage to resist international
pressure on Darfur. And it is working.
The United States and the international community have failed to
develop policies suited for dealing with a regime that lacks a
fundamental willingness to transform into the democratic state
envisioned by the CPA. Special Envoy Gration correctly speaks of the
need to create space for the Sudanese to resolve their own issues. But
these issues will not be resolved satisfactorily between just the
ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM or the NCP and the
Darfuri rebels. All of Sudanese civil society must be empowered to
participate in these processes.
The United States must understand that Sudan's crises cannot be
managed forever or resolved individually. Only when the international
community demands serious judicial and democratic reforms which lessen
the grip of the NCP over the entire country will there ever be a chance
to resolve the crises in South Sudan and Darfur and move toward
enduring peace.
Policymakers have too often focused on the South to the detriment
of Darfur, or Darfur to the detriment of the South. As we get closer to
national elections, we are concerned that we are heading down that path
once again. But Darfur and South Sudan are not separate problems; they
are the result of a single problem: the undemocratic, centralized, and
abusive nature of the ruling regime. Only when this problem is
addressed will peace be forthcoming.
There is an urgent need for a coherent and comprehensive strategy
to guide Sudan to a more democratic and prosperous future. Sudanese
must be empowered to transform Sudan. Such a strategy requires that
important and difficult choices be presented to President Bashir and
the NCP. The Sudanese Government must be forced to choose between
cooperation or confrontation.
If they cooperate by ending the violence in Darfur and
democratizing the country through full implementation of the CPA, they
may be allowed to reap the benefits of becoming a responsible member of
the international community. If they continue to delay implementation
of the CPA and continue to attempt to divert and distract the
international community by using one conflict as leverage against the
other, they must face real consequences.
Violence against civilians in Darfur has been fostered in a climate
of impunity; accountability will need to be addressed as part of a
durable resolution. President Bashir and other charged Sudanese
officials must appear before the International Criminal Court, and the
ICC investigation should continue unless and until a final peace
agreement is reached that includes alternative accountability
mechanisms broadly acceptable to the victims of those crimes.
While we here in Washington debate policy, the people of Sudan
continue to suffer. This policy debate should not be complicated. The
United States and its allies must force Sudan's hand and then commit to
seeing this through. We have played Bashir's game too long to be fooled
any longer.
______
Save Darfur Citizen Letter to the President
July 29, 2009.
President Barack Obama,
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear President Obama: We need your continued and urgent leadership
to address the immediate humanitarian crisis in Darfur and to achieve
long-term peace through a political solution for all of Sudan.
According to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Sudanese
regime's March 4 expulsion of 13 international aid organizations has
put ``well over 1 million people at life-threatening risk.'' Even if
this new humanitarian crisis can be averted, a simple return to the
harrowing pre-March 4 conditions in Darfur is simply unacceptable. And
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the devastating
conflict in Southern Sudan is fraying by the day. A return to war there
would be catastrophic. Meanwhile, the Sudanese regime is succeeding in
defying the international community. The United States must seize the
initiative in setting the agenda for peace.
Your administration must lead in constructing a multilateral
strategy for peace in Darfur and all of Sudan by
Establishing an inclusive peace process for Darfur,
Revitalizing implementation of the CPA and the dangerously
neglected Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, and
Ending Sudan's proxy war with Chad.
To that end, your special envoy, General Scott Gration should focus
on building a multilateral coalition of countries with significant
leverage. It is vital that the administration work closely with other
governments in dealing with Sudan; a reliance on bilateral diplomacy
will provide Khartoum the opportunity to play one party off against the
other, as it has historically done with great success.
To do this, General Gration will need your personal and direct
engagement.
Ultimately, a strategy for peace means presenting the Sudanese
regime with a choice:
Behind Door One: If the Government of Sudan permits
unrestricted humanitarian access, secures peace in Darfur,
fully implements the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South
Sudan, ensures free and fair elections in Sudan, and removes
the indicted President, a clear process toward normalization of
relations with the U.S. will be mapped out.
Or
Behind Door Two: If President Bashir and his party renege on
recent humanitarian commitments and continue to undermine
efforts at peace, a series of escalating costs will ensue,
including diplomatic isolation, targeted multilateral economic
sanctions, an effective multilateral arms embargo, and if
necessary to stop massive loss of civilian life, targeted
military action.
If the benefits of Door One and the consequences of Door Two are
meaningful, the chance for peace in Sudan increases dramatically. The
missing ingredients in efforts to date for Darfur and CPA
implementation have been adequate leverage and lack of strategic vision
for resolving comprehensively the country's conflicts.
Mr. President, now is the time for bold agenda-setting leadership
to help ensure that Sudan chooses the most mutually beneficial path,
and to prepare real consequences if it does not.
In either case, you and your administration should work diligently
to effectively mobilize and coordinate the international community in
order to present a united diplomatic front to Sudan.
I know that these efforts will require real political capital, but
the human costs of inaction are far too high to endure. Thank you for
your efforts thus far. I look forward to seeing even more leadership as
conditions in Darfur progress.
Sincerely,
113, 465 Americans.
______
Testimony by John Prendergast, Cofounder, Enough Project, Before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health, ``Sudan: U.S. Policy and Implementation of the CPA,'' July 29,
2009
Thank you Congressman Payne and members of this subcommittee for
the opportunity to testify on a topic that will help determine the
future of millions of people from Sudan and the surrounding region.
At this subcommittee hearing, members will hear a very different
message than that which will be communicated at tomorrow's Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Today, this subcommittee's members
will hear a bipartisan critique of the current direction of U.S. policy
toward Sudan. Rich Williamson, Roger Winter, and I all have negotiated
extensively with the regime in Sudan, have roughly a combined six
decades in working on or in Sudan, and have a very clear idea of what
is required for lasting peace to have a chance in that embattled
country.
This hearing comes at a moment in Sudan's history fraught with
danger and potential. There is no effective peace process for Darfur,
but one could be built with U.S. leadership. The CPA is on the brink,
but could be salvaged if U.S. engagement deepens. Next year's elections
are at risk, but could become an important opportunity to strengthen
opposition parties and democratic structures crucial for the referendum
and for Sudan's political future. The referendum itself is doubtful,
but its prospects could be enhanced with a credible international
roadmap.
The major unknown variable that will help determine whether the
dangers or the opportunities get maximized is the unresolved internal
debate over the direction of U.S. policy toward Sudan. In the absence
of any agreement on the policy, U.S. diplomatic engagement has been
energetic, for which Special Envoy Gration should be credited. But the
substance of this robust engagement has been fraught with missteps,
lack of internal coordination, and an overall aversion to pressuring
the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Sustained pressure leveraged
by meaningful and focused sticks is the principal tool that has moved
the NCP to change its behavior during the 20 years of its authoritarian
rule. This substantial track record of empirical evidence of the value
of pressure makes the direction of U.S. diplomacy all the more
questionable.
There is also a broader inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy when
it comes to Sudan. The Obama administration has resolutely worked to
craft more formidable international coalitions to isolate North Korea
and Iran for important U.S. policy objectives. However, the U.S. is not
doing the same for Sudan, despite the existence of a regime there that
is responsible directly or indirectly for the loss of 2\1/2\ million
lives in the South and Darfur.
U.S. Goals in Sudan and How to Achieve Them
In the context of its policy review, the U.S. should spell out
clear goals:
(1) U.S. leadership in constructing a more effective Darfur
peace process, using as a model the process that led to the CPA
involving a lead role for the U.S. and a multilateral support
structure that provided international leverage, expertise, and
support;
(2) U.S. leadership in supporting the implementation of the
CPA, continuing the trend of deeper engagement over the last
few months but structuring clear penalties for
nonimplementation of any of the key provisions;
(3) U.S. leadership in supporting the democratic
transformation of Sudan by supporting the electoral process,
providing institutional support to opposition parties and civil
society organizations, and building the capacity of the
Government of Southern Sudan;
(4) U.S. leadership in preparations for the South's
referendum in 2011, which will be a make-or-break process for
the future of both North and South.
The essential word that repeats throughout all these goals is
``leadership.'' U.S. leadership--multilaterally and when necessary
unilaterally--will be an enormously influential ingredient in a
successful transition to peace and democracy in Sudan.
But success will require greater leverage than that which presently
exists. The debate internally within the U.S. Government in part rests
on the degree to which incentives or pressures ought to be favored
instruments for changing the behavior of the Sudanese regime, the
Darfur rebels, and the GOSS. It is the view of this panel and the
activist organizations that comprise the Darfur movement that the way
forward should involve deeper diplomatic engagement that is rooted in
multilateral pressures and the credible threat of significant
consequences for policies or actions by Sudanese parties that undermine
peace efforts and lead to worsening humanitarian conditions. In the
absence of these pressures, and if incentives are all that are put
forward, then failure is guaranteed.
Success will also require the construction of credible and
effective processes that allow for the achievement of U.S. policy
goals. First and foremost, the glaring lack of an effective peace
process for Darfur calls out for greater U.S. leadership in
constructing from the existing elements a revitalized process that has
the chance of ending Darfur's war. Secondly, the U.S. should intensify
its early efforts to revive the CPA and back these efforts with the
construction of clear multilateral consequences for violations or
nonimplementation of key elements of the deal.
U.S. policy must be shaped by the fact that these complex conflicts
have a common core: flawed governance by a center that exploits and
marginalizes an underdeveloped periphery. Not only does the CPA provide
a roadmap for resolving the longest and bloodiest of these conflicts,
but it also offers a framework for the kind of democratic, structural
transformation necessary to alter the root cause of Sudan's many
recurring conflicts. The successful model of the CPA could and should
be replicated in a revitalized Darfur peace process. The U.S. cannot
afford to allow the CPA to fail, nor can it allow the continuation of
an ineffective Darfur process that obstructs any real possibility of
peace.
Priorities for CPA Implementation
The troubling reality is that Sudan's North-South peace remains
precarious at best. Given the mounting tensions between the North and
South and the spate of violence in the South in recent months, deeper
international engagement is required. Renewed Sudanese civil war could
bring wholesale violence on a terrible scale while further
destabilizing the entire region. I will focus the remainder of my
testimony on the key priorities for the U.S. Government in CPA
implementation.
I am encouraged by recent positive steps by the Obama
administration to prioritize CPA implementation and to revitalize
international efforts to urge the Sudanese parties to work on an array
of outstanding provisions in the agreement in the remaining year and a
half. These new efforts should be followed up with an approach that
penalizes failure of one of both of the Sudanese parties to implement
key provisions of the agreement. The hard work begins now. It is time
for the administration to pursue specific priorities in order to meet
the key benchmarks in the crucial final stages of CPA implementation.
The U.S. must direct renewed energy and commitment toward the
following strategic priorities:
1. Protect the People: Due to a worrisome upsurge in intercommunal
violence, the death toll in the South this year now exceeds the number
of violent deaths in Darfur in the same period, and as elections draw
closer, instability may well increase. Tribal clashes are occurring
among a heavily armed civilian population that the poorly disciplined
Southern army has proved incapable of securing. Some of the latest
clashes highlight the flaws and dangers of the so-called the Joint
Integrated Units, or JIUs, whose presence has often led greater
violence, instability, and civilian casualties. The U.S. should take
two specific measures to help improve security and decrease the risk of
further violence in communities throughout the South:
Work with the U.N. Security Council to ensure that the
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has the necessary
capacity to fulfill its mandate and protect civilians. The
United States should lead efforts within the U.N. Security
Council to strengthen UNMIS' ability to support the CPA, but
this support must be matched with clearer strategic vision by
UNMIS on how it can best allocate its resources to
operationalize its mandate amidst ongoing security threats
throughout the South. Other guarantors of the CPA can support
UNMIS' efforts by contributing to coordinated programs such as
security sector reform within the SPLA.
Encourage the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to take
leadership in promoting local peace-building initiatives to
defuse tensions between communities that have taken up arms
against each other.
2. Build the ``peace dividend'': Since the signing of the CPA,
progress has been slow in providing basic infrastructure and services
to the peripheral areas of Sudan. Insecurity and underdevelopment
remain a fact of life for most Sudanese. As long as that is the case,
the Southern government will have difficulty consolidating the peace
and holding together an ethnically divided South with competing
political visions. The GOSS has also been hit hard by the financial
crisis, and is in need of significant economic support, but this
support should be aimed specifically at capacity-building efforts that
can strengthen the fledgling government. Additional investments in
agriculture and microcredit would make a difference on the ground for
the people of Southern Sudan, more than 2 million of whom have returned
home to very little after decades of war.
3. Defuse North-South tensions: A number of contentious issues
between the North and South must be resolved in next year and a half,
all of which necessitate robust support from the international
community in order to keep the negotiations and processes on track. The
U.S. should direct renewed energy and commitment toward the following
strategic priorities:
Urge meaningful reforms from the Sudanese parties before the
2010 elections. The United States and other key actors,
operating on a tight timeline, need to lower their expectations
for the election and develop a multilateral strategy to press
the Government of National Unity--the ruling National Congress
Party in particular--to enact meaningful reforms regardless of
who wins in 2010, revitalize CPA implementation, and establish
a framework for talks in Darfur that are consistent with the
power-sharing provisions of the CPA. There also has to be a
clear and unified international posture with regard to
addressing the issue of Darfur, given the near-impossibility of
holding a free and fair ballot there.
Keep the parties on track in the dual processes of
implementing the legal ruling on the boundaries of the Abyei
region and demarcating the North-South border. Two crucial
issues regarding contested borders between Sudan's North and
South need sustained attention from the international
community. The failure to establish clear international
penalties for a failure to implement these key CPA provisions
such as the demarcation of the disputed North-South border has
been a clear drag on the CPA. However, last week's legal
decision on the boundaries of Abyei--an oil-rich, contested
region along the disputed North-South border within Sudan--is a
crucial litmus test of the parties' will to implement the CPA
moving forward. Now that the ruling on Abyei has been accepted
by both parties, the U.S., the U.N., and the rest of
international community must follow through on its commitments
to help implement the ruling and monitor the status of the
demarcation of the Abyei boundaries.
Encourage negotiations between the NCP and SPLM on long-term
wealth-sharing arrangements before the 2011 referendum. Track-
two diplomatic efforts can get both parties to consider various
scenarios for wealth-sharing after the referendum and mitigate
the likelihood that these discussions will short circuit into a
zero-sum game leading directly to conflict after the
referendum. Discussions of access to land for populations with
diverse needs and livelihoods and planning for mutually
beneficial development of oilfields in the contested border
region could ease current tensions over border demarcation and
generate momentum for further cooperation.
Urge passage of the referendum law before the elections.
Applying pressure on Sudan's Government of National Unity to
urge the National Assembly to review and pass the law on the
Southern referendum before the elections could reduce tensions
between the parties after the elections and enable preparations
for the referendum to begin now. Once the law is passed and the
Referendum Commission is created, potential disputes, such as
questions over whether or not certain populations--such as
southerners in Khartoum--are eligible to vote, can be addressed
before tensions escalate in the immediate run-up to the
referendum.
4. Prevent a return to war: The likelihood of a return to war
between the North and South, or of conflict breaking out within the
South, is real. An arms race between the Northern and Southern
government is just one warning sign of a tenuous situation that could
explode into outright conflict. Several preventive measures can
mitigate the risks of violence in the run-up to the 2010 general
elections and the 2011 referendum:
Enhance efforts to professionalize and modernize the SPLA.
The SPLA has struggled to transition from a guerilla movement
to a formal army, a process complicated by attempts to
integrate Southern militias that opposed the SPLA during the
war. To ensure that the South is stabile and the GOSS can
deliver a peace dividend, the SPLA must continue to modernize
through a well-supported process of security sector
transformation that improves discipline, command and control,
capacity, and competency. Toward this end, the Obama
administration should explore the sale of an air defense system
to the GOSS. Although introducing new weapons systems into a
volatile military environment could be interpreted as contrary
to donors' responsibility to make unity attractive, it is in
the interests of lasting stability that the GOSS spend money on
defense wisely. Unlike the aforementioned refurbished tanks, an
air defense is nonoffensive and helps level the playing field
by neutralizing the north's major tactical advantage in the
event of renewed hostilities.
Comprehensive Peace: The Only Option in Sudan
Ending genocide in Darfur and fulfilling the promise of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires a comprehensive approach to
Sudan rather than reactive crisis management. The U.S. must lead the
international community in working now to ensure that the CPA does not
collapse and spark a devastating new round of conflict in Sudan. With a
significant diplomatic reinvestment in the CPA that prioritizes
protecting civilians, building peace in the South, and defusing
tensions between the North and South, the U.S. can help prevent the
catastrophic consequences of a potential collapse of the CPA.
______
testimony of john norris, executive director of the enough project,
before the tom lantos human rights commission, washington, dc, july 30,
2009
Thank you, Cochairmen McGovern and Wolf and members of this
esteemed commission, for the opportunity to testify today. I would like
to congratulate both you and your fellow members for focusing a great
deal of attention this week on Sudan. I think it is of great importance
that the administration hears congressional concerns on this topic, and
that a diversity of views are heard.
The stakes involved right now in Sudan are enormous. President
Bashir is a wanted war criminal. A 2011 referendum will determine
whether Sudan splits into two countries. Millions of people in Darfur
still cannot return to their homes because of fear and violence. The
Obama administration's Sudan policy review is still pending, and, if
anything, tensions will only continue to rise across all of Sudan with
a national election slated for 2010 and the referendum scheduled for
2011. U.S. leadership will be instrumental if the international
community hopes to successfully navigate the treacherous days ahead
without mounting bloodshed.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement was envisioned as a
transformational peace deal. At the time, it was hoped that the hard
fought agreement would pave the way for genuine powersharing that would
not only allow for rapprochement between North and South Sudan, but
also for the development of genuinely inclusive institutions that would
make Sudan's population as a whole feel less alienated from Khartoum's
exploitative governance. The agreement allowed for the independence
referendum in the South, but those who brokered the peace deal hoped
that eventuality would not need to come to pass as southerners began to
feel that they were part of a more unified whole.
At this juncture, it is clear that the CPA has been far less
transformative in practice than on paper and may, in the long view of
history, be seen simply as an awkward calm in the storm or an important
way station on the path to eventual Southern independence and the
creation of a new African state. The actions of this Congress and the
Obama administration may well determine how violent and wrenching this
historical arc is to become.
Where did the CPA go wrong, and what lessons should we learn from
that process? In many ways, it is amazing that so much hope was placed
in the CPA to genuinely transform the institutions of the Sudanese
state given the concurrent events in Darfur. It is hard to imagine that
any government that would so wantonly kill, maim, terrorize and
displace its own people in Darfur would willingly act in good faith to
share power, resources, and the ballot box with average citizens.
Equally clear, many in the international community failed to see
that the CPA was a beginning rather than an end. All peace agreements
are hard to reach and even harder to implement. In 2005, concerted
international diplomacy and leverage drove both parties over 30 months
of tough negotiations to an acceptable deal. International negotiators
were not shy about using both incentives and pressures to get across
the finish line. Yet this concerted, tough and coordinated
international approach largely disappeared when it came to actually
implementing the agreement. There were virtually no penalties for
noncompliance with the agreement, for missed deadlines, for acting in
bad faith, or for undermining the spirit of reconciliation.
The results have been predictable. While some of the key structures
detailed in the agreement have been achieved, such as the creation of
the Government of Southern Sudan, many of the tough decisions have been
put off until the eleventh hour. The people of southern Sudan widely
believe that they do not have a place in Sudan and would be better off
independent. The ruling National Congress Party, realizing it would not
face penalties for undermining the CPA, pushed aside any steps that
would have actually allowed for the right of self-expression or
organization. Instead of a last ditch option, the independence
referendum became the over-arching endgame, with both North and South
arming themselves for a possible return to direct conflict.
It goes without saying that a return to hot war between North and
South would have devastating human costs and implications for regional
security and would severely undermine faith in international diplomacy
to defuse situations such as these.
The Special Envoy for Sudan, Maj. Gen. Scott Gration, appeared on
the Senate side of this august body earlier today. We certainly welcome
the energy with which the special envoy has undertaken his work, and
the administration's emphasis on finding a comprehensive solution for
Sudan--understanding that the situation in Darfur can not be divorced
from considerations of the CPA or powersharing across the country even
more broadly. That said, this week's hearings have also made clear that
there is considerable disquiet about the administration's approach to
Sudan thus far.
These concerns spring from a number of sources. The
administration's policy review on Sudan has been slow to see the light
of day, leading to suggestions that there are some important
differences within the administration on the proper course for Sudan
policy. It is my great hope that the end product of the review produces
a policy that is consistent with President Obama's own very strong
words on the importance of addressing genocide and war crimes, most
recently in his speech in Ghana, and which builds on his consistent
position on this issue as a Senator and Presidential candidate.
As my colleague John Prendergast noted yesterday in testimony, the
administration has been working assiduously to build international
coalitions to isolate North Korea and Iran for their actions, yet this
same approach has largely been missing from discussions on Sudan. Sudan
has one of the worst human rights records in the world. As we have
learned from years of hard, hard experience, if we simply offer
incentives to Khartoum, the National Congress Party will carry on with
business as usual and the people will suffer dramatically as a result.
Do we need to engage with Khartoum? Absolutely. But this engagement
must be tough-minded, and must be built around consistent, moral, and
international pressure as much as any incentive.
In looking at U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan, I think it is most
helpful if we ask ourselves what success would look like, both for the
CPA, and for the country as a whole.
``Day After'' Understandings. The independence referendum for
Southern Sudan is a historical event of enormous importance. If handled
poorly, tensions surrounding the referendum or its results could plunge
Sudan back into a full blown civil war with fatalities even more
numerous than we have seen in Darfur. With a large number of
southerners supporting independence, it is likely that any fair ballot
would see Sudan split in two, with considerable implications for
regional relations and security. Given the already tense relations
between North and South, international diplomats will have their hands
full keeping the existing peace agreement between the two on track and
in responding to the daily fires that will surely mark the period
running up to the referendum. However, it is important not simply to
make it to the referendum with the existing peace agreement intact and
without the resumption of war, but also to have a series of agreements
in place for the day after the referendum--on borders, on revenue-
sharing, on how to treat assets and debts which both North and South
might claim, water rights and the many other factors that could
precipitate a return to conflict. This will also require keeping the
parties on track in the dual processes of implementing the legal ruling
on the boundaries of the Abyei region and demarcating the North-South
border. Discussions of access to land for populations with diverse
needs and livelihoods and planning for mutually beneficial development
of oilfields in the contested border region could ease current tensions
over border demarcation and generate momentum for further cooperation.
Returns. In Darfur, there is probably no better barometer for the
relative success or failure of the international community than the
millions of displaced persons and refugees who have been forced to flee
from their homes by the government-backed Janjaweed militias. Refugees
and the displaced vote with their feet: they are almost universally
desperate to return to their former homes, but will only do so if
security is sufficient. To date, the U.N. force on the ground in Darfur
has been largely ineffective, there has been no credible effort to
disarm the Janjaweed, and peace talks for Darfur have moved forward
only fitfully. In many cases, the refugees and displaced know full well
their lands and villages are still occupied by armed opponents widely
responsible for a host of war crimes. Under such conditions it would be
madness for these families who have already suffered so much to try to
go home, and refugees and the displaced cannot be forced or coerced to
return home to fit the hopes of any diplomat. The answer: a far more
effective and robust peacekeeping force on the ground (with Khartoum's
de facto veto power over U.N. operations taken away); practical steps
to disarm the Janjaweed; and a solid peace agreement between the
government and rebel forces brokered with international oversight and
guarantees.
Powersharing. Conflict recurs in Sudan because power remains held
tightly by a narrow elite in Khartoum at the expense of the country's
broader population. The international community will find that until
they deal with this essential fact there will always be another Darfur
to deal with. Any solution needs to address the problems of Sudan as a
whole. National elections are scheduled for 2010, before the 2011
referendum, but expectations for elections to produce more democratic
governance are slim. In Darfur, it is virtually impossible to imagine
how a free and fair ballot would take place with so many people still
driven from their homes and living in acute insecurity. Any lasting
peace plan for Sudan, regardless of the future of Southern Sudan, needs
to incorporate practical steps forward that create a more inclusive
Sudan--not in rhetoric, but in practice. The United States and other
key actors, operating on a tight timeline, need to lower their
expectations for the election and develop a multilateral strategy to
press the Government of National Unity--both the North's National
Congress Party and the South's Sudan People's Liberation Movement--to
enact meaningful reforms regardless of who wins in 2010, revitalize CPA
implementation, and establish a framework for talks in Darfur that are
consistent with the powersharing provisions of the CPA.
Accountability. As much as some would like to push accountability
for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan aside, to do so
would neither be productive nor right. The International Criminal Court
has found sufficient evidence against President Bashir of Sudan to
accuse him of multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. He should have the soonest possible opportunity to face those
charges in court. With hundreds of thousands dead and millions driven
from their homes in Darfur, it is essential that the people of Sudan
see justice done. If justice is not part of the solution in Sudan, it
probably is not much of a solution at all.
There is ample evidence that international pressure and attention
can and does play a key role in keeping the Sudanese parties to their
promises. This was affirmed in the aftermath of last week's decision by
an independent tribunal in The Hague to redraw the borders of the oil-
rich and contested Abyei region, which also sits astride the equally
disputed North-South border within Sudan. In the spring of 2008, 60,000
people fled Abyei as the Khartoum government's forces burned the town
to the ground. Many feared violence this year as well. Last week,
however, the international community kept close watch on how the
decision was received and reactions from both sides was promising.
There was a strong United Nations presence on the ground and observers
from the European and African Unions, as well as Special Envoy Gration
were present. Both the National Congress Party and the Southern
People's Liberation Movement promised to abide by the ruling--but it is
important for the international community to keep up its focus and not
simply think the crisis is resolved because the situation did not blow
up on the day of the decision. Indeed, there are already signs that
tensions over the decision are lingering.
On balance, the 4\1/2\ years and counting of CPA implementation has
been marked by a combination of deliberate intransigence and unintended
mistakes and delays from both Sudanese parties, and, until very
recently, half-hearted international support. In the few instances that
a provision of the agreement has been fully implemented, this progress
has come months, even years, after the deadlines set in the CPA. The
poor precedents set by piecemeal and stalled implementation of the
agreement will be hard to overcome in the last stages of the
implementation period. However, the ability of the parties to address
the remaining challenges and accomplish the benchmarks outlined by the
CPA will ultimately determine whether or not Sudan stays on the path--
no matter how rocky--toward democratic transformation.
Lastly, I would call on both Congress and the administration to
ensure that the protection of civilians is a top priority. It will be a
disaster for the people of Sudan and for the international community if
peacekeepers on the ground, in both UNMIS and UNAMID, are unable or
unwilling to respond to provocations and threats toward civilians in
the precarious months ahead.
______
Prepared Statement of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom
Sudan was one of the first countries the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom focused on after its creation by the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). For the past
decade, this bipartisan, U.S. Federal Government advisory body created
by Congress has monitored religious freedom conditions in Sudan and has
recommended that Sudan be designated a ``country of particular
concern'' (CPC) under IRFA for its engagement in or toleration of
particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The State
Department has agreed with that recommendation and has so designated
Sudan since 1999. The Commission continues to recommend that Sudan be
designated a CPC pending demonstrated progress in ending abuses,
cooperating with international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
operations in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005.
Since independence (1956), political power in Khartoum has been
dominated by Arabic-speaking Muslims, who have effectively marginalized
members of other groups, including non-Arab Muslims. Successive regimes
in Khartoum have emphasized Sudan's identity as Arab and Muslim, thus
effectively relegating non-Arabs and non-Muslims to a secondary status
in the society.
Resistance to Khartoum's policies of Islamization and Arabization
was a major factor in the North-South civil war (1983-2005). During
Sudan's last North-South civil war the Commission identified Sudan as
the world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion or
belief. The Commission also has drawn attention to the Sudanese
Government's genocidal atrocities against civilian populations in other
regions, such as Darfur. Northern leaders, including Sudan's current
President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, have used religion as a tool for
popular mobilization against both non-Muslim Southerners and Muslims
who opposed the regime's policies. The civil war's civilian victims, 2
million dead and 4 million driven from their homes, were overwhelmingly
Southern Christians and followers of traditional African religions.
Sudan is now in the midst of a historic transition under the terms
of the CPA. Elections are to be held by April 2010 at the national,
Southern regional, and state levels. The 6-year Interim Period, which
began in 2005, is scheduled to end with a referendum on whether the
South will remain within a united Sudan or become an independent
country. Whatever the South's choice, this phase in Sudan's political
development will determine the future of the largest country--in terms
of land mass--in Africa and in the Arab world. Decisions made by the
Sudanese people and their leaders will have potential ramifications
beyond Sudan's borders, as Sudan is only one of several African
countries with large Muslim and Christian populations. Peace, largely
brokered by the United States, has created an opportunity for
significant change.
Although the Darfur conflict has dominated international attention
on Sudan in recent years, the Commission believes that the CPA merits
much attention because it provides a model for ending the deliberate
marginalization of those regions of Sudan inhabited primarily by non-
Arab or non-Muslim populations. The success of the CPA thus is crucial
to achieve lasting peace in Darfur and prevent potential conflicts in
other regions.
Ruling by the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague: The Commission therefore welcomed the initial
positive response by Sudanese, both North and South, to the ruling
issued July 22 by the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal at the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in The Hague. The decision settles a longstanding
dispute over the boundaries of the Abyei region, a crossroads between
North and South and one of the more contested points in the protracted
negotiations leading to the CPA. In 2007, Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP), which is dominant in the
North, had rejected a report by the Abyei Boundaries Commission, a body
established by the CPA, to determine the border, despite the CPA
stating that the decision of the Abyei Boundaries Commission was to be
``final and binding.'' In 2008, the dispute was referred by mutual
agreement to the Permanent Court of Arbitration that issued the July
ruling.
Abyei has been particularly problematic as it is home to a volatile
mix of rival ethnic groups with ties to both North and South. Abyei had
provided a disproportionate number of fighters for the Southern-
dominated Sudan People's Liberation Army in the North-South civil war.
In May 2008, units of the Northern-controlled Sudan Armed Forces and
associated tribal militia brutally attacked local residents and
destroyed private property, laying waste to the region's main town,
also called Abyei, and driving 90,000 civilians from their homes.
Deposits of oil in the region, and the economic competition they
engendered, have exacerbated the dispute.
As noted by Commission Chair Leonard Leo in a public statement
issued by the Commission on July 24, ``It is imperative that the NCP
and the SPLM (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement that governs
Southern Sudan) fully support and implement the ruling as they have
promised. It is a cornerstone of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
whose implementation is crucial for building a just and lasting peace
for Sudan. Failure of the CPA could reignite a conflict in which
millions of innocent people have been victimized because of their
religious affiliations and ethnic identities. The parties' honoring
their agreement (to abide by the ruling) would be both a victory for
the rule of law in Sudan and an important precedent for resolving other
conflicts among the region's diverse religious and ethnic groups in a
fair, open, and peaceful manner.''
The Abyei dispute has not been an isolated instance of delay in
implementing the CPA's provisions. These delaying tactics have
established a dangerous precedent that one of the parties to the CPA
can, with impunity, unilaterally refuse to implement provisions. In the
Commission's public statement of July 23, Commission Chair Leo also
stated that ``Further delaying tactics or failure to implement the
remaining CPA provisions, including the elections scheduled for 2010
and the 2011 referendum, are unacceptable. Sudan must be held
accountable to its CPA commitments. The CPA contains specific
protections for religious freedom for all Sudanese. If religious
freedom is going to be protected and respected in Sudan, the country's
leaders, both Northerners and Southerners, must demonstrate their
commitment to international law by accepting and implementing the
Tribunal's ruling.''
Recommendations of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom: U.S. leadership has been crucial to preserve the substantial
gains for peace that have been made in Sudan. Central to these gains is
the CPA. Given this history of U.S. leadership and the importance to
peace of the CPA, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom has made the following recommendations for U.S. policy toward
Sudan.
i. focusing u.s. diplomacy on the successful implementation of the cpa
In order to maintain U.S. engagement, the U.S. Government should:
Ensure that the Special Envoy for Sudan has the bureaucratic
authority, the appropriate personnel, and other support needed
to coordinate successfully U.S. efforts toward the complete and
timely implementation of the CPA and secure a just and lasting
peace for all of Sudan, including in Darfur; and
Build on past efforts by the Special Envoy to enlist
international support for peace in Sudan, including from China
and other nations that have major economic investments in
Sudan, and to press Khartoum to end its delaying tactics on CPA
implementation.
ii. encouraging the parties to implement the cpa fully
The U.S. Government should:
Insist on the full implementation of the CPA (including
power-sharing, wealth-sharing, respect for human rights,
democratic accountability through elections, resolution of the
Abyei issue, the 2011 referendum, and termination of all
support for militias) as the agreed basis for North-South peace
and a model for political accommodation of legitimate
grievances in other regions such as Darfur;
Help ensure that the parties conduct the national, Southern,
and state elections mandated by the CPA; insist that these
elections be free and fair, that adequate security be provided
to enable participation by all eligible voters regardless of
religious or ethnic background, and that the results be
accepted by both the National Congress Party and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement;
Investigate and publicly report to the Congress every 6
months on the status of implementation of the CPA, with a
particular focus on violations, assessing responsibility and
indicating what actions are to be taken by the U.S. Government
in response;
Make clear that the United States expects the choice of the
people of Southern Sudan, as expressed in a free and fair
referendum to be held in 2011 in accordance with the CPA, to be
respected, whether the people of Southern Sudan choose to
remain in Sudan or be independent;
Strengthen the capability of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum to
monitor implementation of the crucial human rights provisions
of the CPA and to report on human rights abuses, including
religious freedom in the North, as well as to advance the U.S.
human rights agenda in Sudan by appointing a ranking official
reporting to the Ambassador and working full-time on human
rights;
Consider new sanctions as needed to respond to noncompliance
with the terms of the CPA, including targeted sanctions such as
asset freezes and travel bans against individuals and
institutions, such as the National Congress Party, identified
as responsible for serious human rights abuses or for impeding
CPA implementation; and
Expand international radio broadcasting to Sudan to provide
objective sources of news and information and to improve
awareness of the CPA and its implementation, including specific
programming promoting grassroots reconciliation and respect for
freedom of religion; support independent television and radio
broadcasting, including in the South, to the same end.
iii. protecting civilians
To prevent violence against civilians (including mass atrocities
and genocidal acts) that would result from renewed conflict, the U.S.
Government should:
Take the steps necessary to make feasible the establishment
of various security guarantees for Southern Sudan in order to
deter Khartoum from renewing the North-South civil war or
otherwise impose its will by force in violation of the CPA;
Provide Southern Sudan with the technical assistance and
expertise or other capacity it might need to bolster
professionalization of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, such
as International Military Education and Training (IMET), and
secure radar, communications, and other passive, defensive
equipment, as appropriate, to improve the South's ability to
detect air attacks and therefore reduce civilian casualties;
and
Support the Government of Southern Sudan's current, active
efforts toward disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
of Southern Sudan's many ex-combatants.
iv. strengthening reconciliation and the rule of law in southern sudan
The U.S. Government should:
Utilize existing social institutions, including indigenous
religious bodies, and strengthen civil society organizations
that have special expertise and a demonstrated commitment in
the areas of interreligious and interethnic reconciliation and
conflict prevention, to promote a peaceful civil society;
Continue and strengthen existing programs through the State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs to improve the professional competence and
human rights performance of Southern Sudan's police and
security forces;
Expand U.S. assistance to the court system in Southern
Sudan, which is in dire need of training, reference materials,
improved court security, and facilities; encourage greater
involvement by the U.S. private sector, including professional
associations, law schools, and corporations, in this effort;
and
Provide scholarships to promising students to attend law
school in the United States under the requirement that they
return home at the completion of their training to build a
modern legal system in Southern Sudan, including a law school
with an advanced curriculum built upon democratic principles,
but targeted to the needs of the area.
v. strengthening human rights protections
The U.S. Government should:
Continue to support and strengthen the Government of
Southern Sudan's institutions and infrastructure, including the
Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, necessary to protect,
monitor, and investigate human rights abuses and promote
respect for internationally recognized freedom of religion or
belief and related human rights;
Improve citizen awareness and enforcement of the legal
protections for human rights included in the CPA, the Interim
National Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern
Sudan, and the international human rights treaties, including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Sudan is a party;
Urge the establishment of an independent and impartial
national Human Rights Commission as called for in the Interim
National Constitution and in accordance with international
standards \1\ for such bodies in terms of independence,
adequate funding, a representative character, and a broad
mandate that includes freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion or belief; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National
Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights,'' found in
the Annex to ``Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights'' (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/
fs19.htm, accessed April 6, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urge the Government of National Unity to cooperate fully
with international mechanisms on human rights issues, including
inviting further visits by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, the U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, and the U.N. Human Rights Council's High-
Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur and
comply with the Mission's recommendations.
vi. building a successful indigenous economy in southern sudan
The U.S. Government should:
Support the creation of an effective banking system in
Southern Sudan, recognizing that such a system is crucial for
the South's economic development and political stability;
Encourage U.S. private investment in Southern Sudan while
ensuring that U.S. sanctions are targeted more effectively in
support of U.S. diplomatic efforts to ensure a just and lasting
peace in all of Sudan;
Alleviate the impact of remaining U.S. sanctions on all
areas under the control of the Government of Southern Sudan and
local institutions in the border areas of Abyei, Southern Blue
Nile, and the Nuba Mountains, including sanctions on
communications equipment;
Expand U.S. educational assistance, including building the
capacity of the University of Juba, to enhance Southern
Sudanese expertise in agriculture, business, law, and other
areas to support development efforts;
Promote agricultural development in Southern Sudan with the
goal of promoting greater food security;
Expand the provision of U.S. assistance to indigenous civil-
society, private-sector groups and provide appropriate
technical assistance to enable such groups to prepare project
proposals for U.S. grants;
Explore providing the Sudan People's Liberation Army with
needed technical expertise and capacity, such as in road
construction and other public works, to assist in creating an
infrastructure that bolsters economic development; and
While recognizing the urgent need for continued U.S.
assistance for returning refugees and internally displaced
persons, begin shifting from humanitarian to development
assistance in order to enhance the economic viability and
political stability of Southern Sudan in anticipation of the
2011 referendum on the South's political future.
vii. expanding u.s. diplomatic capacity in southern sudan
The U.S. Government should:
Enhance the facilities and personnel resources of the U.S.
Consulate General in Juba in order to support increased U.S.
engagement and programming in Southern Sudan.
viii. promoting freedom of religion or belief
The U.S. Government should:
Use U.S. bilateral discussions with Sudan, as well as U.N.
mechanisms and bilateral discussions with third countries with
influence in Sudan, to urge Sudan's Government of National
Unity to:
--Allow all religious groups to conduct their activities without
harassment, discrimination or undue interference, including
publishing or importing religious literature, building,
repairing, and operating houses of worship, and operating
social service programs;
--Repeal laws that punish changing one's religion or encouraging
another to do so and end official accusations of blasphemy,
apostasy, ``offending Islam,'' or similar charges used to
stifle public debate or restrict the right to freedom of
expression;
--Eliminate the bureaucratic obstacles the government places on
international humanitarian assistance and remove the state
security services from their current role in regulating
humanitarian assistance;
--Abandon efforts to force religious organizations to register as
nongovernmental organizations under regulations that give
government officials control over their activities;
--Permit relations between national religious communities and their
coreligionists abroad in accordance with universal human
rights norms;
--Reform the state security services to be representative of all
Sudanese and ensure that all national institutions such as
the military, law enforcement agencies, and the highest
levels of the judiciary are representative and equally
protective of all Sudanese regardless of religious
affiliation or belief;
--End the impunity with which members of the security forces and
others acting as agents of the government have engaged in
human rights abuses; urge the establishment of effective
mechanisms for accountability for past abuses; and in the
absence of such bodies, provide full cooperation with
international institutions, including those mandated by the
U.N. Security Council;
--Cease using government-controlled media for messages of
intolerance and discrimination against non-Muslims; and
--Exclude negative stereotyping in school textbooks; include in
school curricula, in textbooks, and in teacher training the
concepts of tolerance and respect for human rights,
including freedom of religion or belief; and incorporate
into history texts the religious and cultural diversity of
Sudan's past.
ix. assisting refugees and internally displaced persons
The U.S. Government should:
Increase support to U.N. agencies and their NGO partners in
facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and the
internally displaced, including through intensified efforts to
monitor spontaneous or ``self-assisted'' returns to the South,
provide safer modes of transportation, de-mine roadways, and
develop a comprehensive return and reintegration strategy, as
well as development plans, to enhance the capacity of Southern
Sudan to absorb large numbers of IDPs and refugees;
Increase technical assistance programs to assist the
Government of Southern Sudan in providing basic services,
including education, health, and water sanitation, to the
returnees;
Work with U.N. agencies and NGO partners to ensure that the
populations that remain in refugee and IDP camps continue to
receive at least the same level of humanitarian assistance as
before, so they are not unduly pressured into making returns;
and
Work with other resettlement countries, UNHCR, and its NGO
partners to ensure that UNHCR expeditiously identifies those
refugees for whom repatriation is not an appropriate or
imminent solution, including those who have suffered from past
persecution; secure, as appropriate, timely local integration
in countries of first asylum or resettlement to third countries
for such refugees; and promptly devise a strategy to achieve
this concurrent with efforts to repatriate refugees to Sudan.
x. protecting victims of slavery and human trafficking
The U.S. Government should:
Urge Sudan's Government of National Unity to prosecute the
crime of abduction into slavery, most of whose victims are
women and children taken during the North-South civil war or in
Darfur by government-sponsored militias, and ensure the speedy
identification, voluntary return, and family reunification of
victims, as well as measures for their rehabilitation and
reparation.
xi. protecting civilians and promoting peace in darfur
The U.S. Government should:
Support a stronger international presence in Sudan
sufficient to protect civilian populations and to monitor
compliance with the peace accords and U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including by:
--Urging the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID) to protect civilians in accordance with the
highest international standards for peacekeeping
operations;
--Providing resources such as improved communications equipment,
reliable vehicles and helicopters, and logistics assistance
to enable peacekeepers to move quickly to places where
abuses are occurring;
--Bringing in advisers on civilian protection issues in armed
conflict to train and work with international force
commanders;
--Ensuring that there is a secure environment for the delivery of
humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and the
internally displaced and providing an early warning system
with GPS (global positioning system) capability to warn
camps and villages of approaching forces;
--Supporting the assignment of designated protection teams to camps
for internally displaced persons;
--Supporting the active enforcement of the aerial ``no-fly'' zone
already specified in the U.N. Security Council's resolution
of March 29, 2005, which calls for the immediate cessation
of ``offensive military flights in and over the Darfur
region'';
--Taking measures to prevent--and providing aid to those victimized
by widespread sexual violence and rape in Darfur, including
by training advisers for the international forces in Darfur
and by encouraging participating nations to include female
troops and female police officers in their deployment to
handle rape cases effectively; and
--Supporting a substantial increase in the number of human rights
monitors from the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights and in the number of international
peacekeepers deployed in Darfur;
Lead an international effort to pressure the Government of
Sudan to reinstate all international relief organizations
expelled following the International Criminal Court's
authorization of an arrest warrant against President Bashir and
permit unimpeded, safe access by such organizations to the
region so that necessary humanitarian assistance can be
provided to refugees and internally displaced persons;
Work with international partners to end the suffering of the
civilian population of Darfur, including by seeking an end to
killing, ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, and
interference with the distribution of international
humanitarian assistance; by assisting refugees and internally
displaced persons to return home in safety; and by promoting a
cease-fire as well as a peaceful and just resolution of the
grievances that underlie the crisis; and
Use bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to mount an
international campaign to pressure the Sudanese authorities to
cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court.
______
Prepared Statement of Mercy Corps, Portland, OR
Mercy Corps would like to sincerely thank Chairman Kerry and
Ranking Member Lugar for their longstanding commitment to peace in
Sudan, and for holding this hearing. The Congress has a long tradition
of leadership in U.S. policy on Sudan, and it is a privilege to be able
to advise this committee as it carries on that tradition.
Mercy Corps has worked in Sudan since 2004, implementing community-
based relief and development programs in Darfur, South Sudan, and the
``Three Areas'' of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. On March 4 of
this year, Mercy Corps was one of 16 aid agencies--13 international, 3
local--whose permission to operate in North Sudan was revoked. As has
been extensively documented in the international media, these agencies
were forcibly closed down, offices and assets were seized by the
government, and all international staff based in Northern Sudan were
expelled from the country. Mercy Corps' programs in Southern Sudan were
unaffected, as the Government of South Sudan made clear that they would
not extend the expulsions into Southern territory.
Mercy Corps was deeply dismayed by the expulsions. Mercy Corps can
state categorically that we are an apolitical, impartial actor in
Sudan; we have no relations or contact with the International Criminal
Court in Sudan or anywhere else. We strove to the best of our ability
to abide by Sudanese laws and procedures and we believe that our
actions in the country were always lawful. We have, therefore, appealed
our expulsion through official channels and are hopeful that one day we
shall be able to return to North Sudan.
However, as an organization driven first and foremost by the
humanitarian imperative, we also feel obligated to ensure coverage of
the gaps that our departure has left behind in Darfur and the Three
Areas. We therefore began exploring, soon after the expulsions,
possible avenues for enabling coverage of those gaps. We were heartened
when, upon appointing Gen. Scott Gration as special envoy to Sudan,
President Obama directed that the humanitarian situation should be
among the envoy's top priorities. We were further encouraged when
General Gration learned, in his initial negotiations with the Sudanese
Government, that the Sudanese were open to allowing new organizations
to register to work in Sudan. General Gration's efforts to improve
humanitarian access in Darfur--resulting in the issuance of a new
Government decree that streamlines bureaucratic obstacles, and the
creation of a more robust mechanism for monitoring impediments to
humanitarian access--also suggested the Sudanese Government was
signaling its openness toward a more constructive engagement with NGOs.
Given that several of the expelled organizations had international
affiliates working in Sudan--who had not been expelled--we began
exploring whether a similar arrangement might be possible with our
European affiliate, MC Scotland. We, along with several other
organizations, sent senior-level representatives to Khartoum to meet
with the government and explore the possible registration of our
European affiliates. There has been speculation about this process in
the press--much of it ill-informed and inaccurate--and so I would like
to take this opportunity to clarify several points regarding these
discussions:
1. First, Mercy Corps is not reopening in North Sudan, though we
hope that someday we can. MC-Scotland, a registered British charity and
an affiliate of Mercy Corps, has registered and will be taking over
some former Mercy Corps projects. Mercy Corps will provide technical
and financial support to MC-Scotland's efforts, but we have no existing
plans to reestablish our own presence in the areas from which we were
expelled.
2. Second, Mercy Corps and MC-Scotland undertook this process
because of our humanitarian mission. Funding issues were certainly a
concern, albeit a secondary one; our principal concerns were the major
humanitarian gaps in Darfur and the potential harm to the peacebuilding
and development process in the Three Areas.
3. Third, there was no pressure placed on Mercy Corps or MC
Scotland by General Gration, USAID, or any other U.S. Government
representative to force us to pursue this arrangement. Their role in
this process was, essentially, to create an opening for dialog between
us, our colleague agencies, and the Government of Sudan. But the
subsequent negotiations were conducted directly between the NGO
representatives and the Sudanese Government.
4. Finally, there were no special quid-pro-quos between MC-Scotland
and the Sudanese Government, explicit or implicit, in these
negotiations. The government provided MC-Scotland with a standard
registration under Sudanese law. MC-Scotland will operate in Sudan on
the same terms as any other member of the NGO community there.
MC-Scotland is eager to hit the ground running. An advance team of
MC-Scotland representatives is already in Khartoum, setting up a new
country program and planning needs assessments. In the coming months,
MC-Scotland will have several main priorities:
1. Restore Transitional Development Activities in the ``Three Areas''
Prior to the expulsions, Mercy Corps' work in the Three Areas was
by far the largest element of our Sudan country program, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development has strongly supported these
efforts. We are now in the process of transferring management of these
programs to MC-Scotland, which we expect will be a relatively smooth
process. This focus on the Three Areas is the result of a firm belief
that humanitarian and development assistance plays a critical role in
building peace in Sudan. The Three Areas were the front lines during
the North-South conflict, and have a special political status under the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It is widely recognized that these areas
are critical to the larger effort to turn the CPA into a lasting,
permanent peace between North and South Sudan.
Development is a critical component of this effort. As our
colleagues at the National Democratic Institute have shown through
their public opinion research in Sudan, war-affected populations in the
country define ``peace'' as a combination of both physical security and
community development. The challenge in these areas--which is common to
post-conflict societies--is that there is not yet sufficient capacity
amongst local government and civil society to adequately meet urgent
community recovery and development needs. These capacity gaps mean that
NGO interventions must play a fundamental role in catalyzing recovery.
With support from USAID and other donors, Mercy Corps had, prior to the
expulsion, been pursuing a dual-track strategy to jump-start recovery
and development in the Three Areas while also building up strong local
capacity to lead development efforts in the long term.
Toward this end, Mercy Corps had financed and provided technical
support to a range of community recovery efforts--including financial
services and entrepreneurship training to small businesses, enhancing
food security, funding community infrastructure improvements including
critical water resources, and supporting reestablishment of basic
education and health care services. At the same time, Mercy Corps and
its partners had worked closely with local government actors and civil
society groups to provide the training and technical support that they
need in order to lead their communities' development.
These programs were well received by the communities with which
Mercy Corps partnered, and were playing a critical role in addressing
the need for development of these fragile regions. Following Mercy
Corps' expulsion from North Sudan, we feared that an abrupt closure of
these activities could have damaging social and humanitarian
consequences--and would also undermine the population's confidence in
the peace process, with less than 2 years left in the CPA's mandate.
Mercy Corps is therefore pleased--and relieved--that MC-Scotland will
be able to take up and carry forward these activities. Ensuring that
this handover proceed quickly and smoothly is a first-order priority.
2. Assess and Cover Outstanding Humanitarian Gaps in Darfur
Also at the top of the priority list for MC-Scotland are efforts to
conduct needs assessments in Darfur. While many of our colleague
agencies have undertaken heroic efforts to cover the large gaps created
after the 4th of March, significant gaps remain. Much media attention
has been focused on comments by the U.N. and others that a new crisis
has been avoided; unfortunately these statements obscure a more complex
reality. It is important to recall that the humanitarian community's
monitoring mechanisms were greatly disrupted by the expulsions and so
it is much harder now to get an accurate picture of the overall
humanitarian situation across Darfur. Despite the impaired monitoring
capacity, it is fair to say that there have been no indications of
large-scale new mortality or displacement since the expulsions. This
can be attributed principally to urgent efforts taken by the U.N. and
the Sudanese Government, following the expulsions, to meet gaps in two
critical sectors--food distribution and clean water access. Ruptures to
the food pipeline and breaks in water access would have been the most
likely drivers of mass death or displacement, and the swift action
taken in these sectors in March and April has indisputably saved lives.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that these efforts have been
interim, emergency arrangements and are not a long-term solution to the
problems. Likewise, coverage of gaps related to health, sanitation,
education, protection, and shelter has proceeded more slowly and the
shortfalls in these sectors will present expanding risks to IDP
populations as the months pass. In particular, with the onset of the
rainy season, the lack of adequate sanitation, shelter, and health care
services presents a major risk of diseases such as cholera and malaria.
In summary then--the worst-case scenario seems to have been averted for
the moment, but the population of Darfur will continue to feel the
fallout from the expulsions for some time yet to come.
Within this context, MC-Scotland is seeking to assess, identify,
and cover critical remaining gaps as quickly as possible. This will
entail verification of the status of former Mercy Corps activities, but
also a review of sectors and geographic regions where Mercy Corps had
not previously been active. Where possible and appropriate, MC-Scotland
will work to cover gaps that exist, whether or not the needs were
previously being met by Mercy Corps. This will not be an immediate
process--Darfur is a difficult operating environment even under the
best of circumstances. Continuing deterioration in the security
environment for humanitarian actors--highlighted by the recent
abduction of several international NGO staff--poses major operational
challenges. In addition to conducting assessments, MC-Scotland will
need to build up its operational infrastructure in Darfur, hire new
staff, and develop relationships with government officials, IDP
leaders, and community leaders, and design project interventions. All
of these elements take time; it will take 3 to 6 months to initiate
gap-coverage activities in Darfur, and it will be 6 to 12 months before
such operations come fully up to speed.
3. Assess Transitional Development Needs in Darfur and Initiate
Programming
While MC-Scotland will focus on urgent gap coverage in the
immediate term, the focus will shift to transitional activities in the
medium term. This is because it has been clear for some time that
Darfur is moving--or has moved--out of the acute humanitarian emergency
phase and into a phase of protracted displacement. In this protracted
phase, the vulnerability of the displaced population has decreased,
coping mechanisms have begun to develop, and the overall situation has
begun to stabilize. Mortality surveys across Darfur's camps in 2008
confirmed this trend, showing across-the-board reductions in mortality
levels relative to previous years and revealing that the overall crude
mortality rate amongst Darfur's IDPs stood below the standard
``emergency'' threshold of 1 death per 10,000 people per day.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://new.cred.be/what-do-health-indicators-tell-us-about-
humanitarian-crises-2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The mass displacement in Darfur has caused shifts in Darfur's
population distribution, as is illustrated by simple diagrams below.
Prior to the conflict, there were a limited number of large urban
centers, but most of Darfur's rural agriculturalist populations--who
now constitute the bulk of the IDPs--were distributed across small,
rural towns surrounded by agricultural land. Grazing routes used by
pastoralist populations (seminomadic herders) were interspersed between
these settlements, creating many points of contact--and hence, of
potential conflict--between agriculturalists and pastoralists,
especially as climate change reduced the amount of suitable land for
farming and grazing:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Now, 6 years into the conflict, those same urban centers have
undergone a massive expansion, with IDPs encircling them. They are in
turn surrounded by slim bands of agricultural land, where the IDPs can
safely cultivate a limited volume of crops close to their new homes.
The largely vacated countryside is dominated by pastoralist groups, who
can move along their grazing routes unimpeded by agriculturalists
populations.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
While it has long been taboo to look at Darfur's assistance context
as transitional rather than acute, it is now past time to do so. The
reality on the ground is that a significant proportion of Darfur's 2.7
million IDPs will ultimately choose to permanently settle in or around
their camps rather than return to their original homes. Sudan is not
sui generis in this respect--in fact this dynamic is common in cases of
protracted internal displacement. When a largely rural population
becomes displaced into a camp--effectively an urban setting--for a
protracted period of time, many of the displaced permanently adopt an
urban lifestyle. In this sort of context, the distinction between what
is a camp and what is an urban settlement (albeit an extremely poor
one) becomes increasingly arbitrary. Assistance strategies based on an
emergency posture become less appropriate as time passes--and over time
such approaches can actually become harmful, as they dis-incentivize
indigenous coping mechanisms and institutionalize dependence on
international aid.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2745.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the protracted nature of the population displacement
and the likelihood that many IDPs will never fully return home, the
humanitarian problems in Darfur begin to look increasingly similar to a
large-scale, long-term urban development challenge. Prior to the NGO
expulsions, humanitarian service provision has lifted many of the
development indicators in the IDP camps to a higher standard than those
in the towns that they surround. For example, education and child
health indicators in the IDP camps were better on average than in the
rest of Sudan (North and South). While these indicators have
undoubtedly deteriorated since March, they are likely to come back up
as gap coverage efforts gather steam and new organizations enter
Darfur. This disparity between services for IDPs and services available
to the population at large will continue to cause tension between
previously existing urban populations and the IDPs. The emergency
relief posture in Darfur--premised on a dynamic context of fragility
and vulnerability rather than one of emerging stability and protracted
displacement--has been maintained for 5 to 6 years now. This posture is
not indefinitely sustainable and it is time to begin looking at ways to
better link IDPs into the economies and social matrices of their
present urban surroundings.
While it is important to acknowledge the reality that many of
Darfur's IDPs will not ultimately return to their villages of origin,
it is also important to provide support to those who do--or will--
choose to return. There have been a few encouraging signs of this in
South Darfur, where a recent multi-NGO needs assessment found that in
some areas, agriculturalist and pastoralist populations had been able
to negotiate localized peace agreements, enabling several hundred IDP
households to return to their land. However, it should be noted that
the majority of potential return areas in Darfur continue to suffer
from severe insecurity, and the vast majority of the IDPs will be
unwilling to return until security problems are dealt with. There is as
yet little evidence of any substantial IDP returns across Darfur, and
most movements out of the camps seem to be seasonal rather than
permanent.
As MC-Scotland initiates operations, it will seek to engage with
Darfur's needs as they exist today, not as they existed several years
ago. Basic life-sustaining activities in the IDP camps will need to
continue for the foreseeable future, but in the medium term, activities
in Darfur will also begin to focus on durable solutions for Darfur's
IDPs. This will proceed on the basis of firm respect for the principle
that IDPs themselves are best placed to determine what is in their own
best interest. The choice of whether to return, integrate, or something
in between is ultimately up to them, and their right to make this
decision voluntarily and without coercion must be respected. The
widespread insecurity in Darfur is the largest obstacle to IDP return,
and in this context, it is important that all actors adhere closely to
the U.N.'s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The Principles,
which provide a legal framework for international IDP action, state
that:
[IDPs have t]he right to be protected against forcible
return to or resettlement in any place where their life,
safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk. (Principle 15)
Competent authorities have the primary duty and
responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the
means, which allow internally displaced persons to return
voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, (Principle 28)
These Principles provide useful, practical standards for
approaching return-oriented programming. In rural areas where the
voluntary return of IDPs--in safety and with dignity--is possible, MC-
Scotland will seek to adapt IDP return methodologies that have
previously been applied successfully in Southern Sudan and elsewhere.
MC-Scotland will pursue multifaceted programs focused on employment
generation, community economic infrastructure development, and
agricultural inputs. These efforts will initially focus on the
communities where people have actually begun returning, in order to
help them reintegrate socially and economically. This will be
complemented by community safety, reconciliation, and watershed
management components in order to begin addressing some the underlying
structural drivers of Darfur's conflict. As these latter efforts bear
fruit, they will open up new areas for potential IDP return, and MC-
Scotland will expand reintegration services to those areas as well.
Simultaneous to these efforts to facilitate returns, MC-Scotland
will also undertake efforts to enable successful local integration for
those who choose to settle permanently around the camps or other urban
areas. These populations will need support that enables them to
integrate into the local economies and service structures of the cities
they will belong to. This means vocational training for integration
into the urban economy, microfinance for small business development,
the upgrade of both neighborhood services and housing in what will be
their long-term homes. This will be complemented by an effort to
integrate these new urban residents into the taxation and service
regime of the local governments, while providing capacity-building
services to enable the local government structures to manage this
transition.
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