[Senate Hearing 111-291]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-291
COUNTERING THE THREAT OF FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Craddock, GEN John, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Supreme Allied
Commander-Europe, Myrtle Beach, SC............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Crocker, Hon. Ryan, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Pakistan,
U.S. Charge d'Affaires to Afghanistan, Department of State,
Spokane, WA.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hosseini, Khaled, U.S. Envoy for the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), San Jose, CA................................. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lockhart, Clare, cofounder and director, Institute of State
Effectiveness, Washington, DC.................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 52
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
(iii)
COUNTERING THE THREAT OF FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Casey, Webb, Shaheen,
Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, Isakson, Barasso, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Let me explain to folks that originally this hearing had
been set for 10 o'clock today. It is our hope that somewhere
around 10 o'clock we will have a quorum so that the Foreign
Relations Committee can conduct its business meeting. We have
some nominations business to report out. So, I hope colleagues,
and their staffs particularly, can ensure that if we aim for 10
o'clock, it can be a very, very minimalist requirement on
everybody's time.
Meanwhile, we will go into the substance of today's
hearing; the second in a series of hearings that we're going to
have with respect to Afghanistan. Yesterday was the first
hearing. We heard three compelling cases, each of them making
strong arguments, individually, for how America should proceed.
And the prescriptions ranged from dramatically reducing the
footprint to expanding our commitment of troops and money to a
level that would basically constitute pretty significant
nation-building.
John Nagl, a coauthor of the military's counterinsurgency
manual--who worked very closely with General Petraeus--argued
that victory could require as many as--according to the Field
Manual for standard counterinsurgency operations--600,000
troops and a commitment of at least 5 years. The bulk of those
troops--up to 400,000--would eventually be Afghan. But, it was
clear, and stated, that United States forces would be needed
for years as trainers, as combat mentors, in order to fill the
security gap before the Afghans were able to take over.
Stephen Biddle argued that the benefits of a stepped-up
counterinsurgency campaign outweighed the costs, but that it
was a very close call. He acknowledged both the need for more
troops and the genuine possibility of failure, even if we do up
the ante. In his view, there could be no effective
counterterrorism without an effective counterinsurgency. And he
agreed with Dr. Nagl about the need for significant United
States military involvement in Afghanistan to help prevent the
destabilization of the country--of Pakistan.
Finally, Rory Stewart challenged key assumptions of the
administration's policy. Instead of escalation, he recommended
that we maintain a small counterterrorism capacity to deny a
safe haven to al-Qaeda, and continue providing development aid
on a low-key, but long-term, basis. He argued that we need not
physically block al-Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, we
just have to keep Afghanistan from providing al-Qaeda with
conditions of security and operational ease that they couldn't
get in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, or elsewhere. He argued that
Pakistan would stand or fall on its own, regardless of events
across the border.
Listening to these distinguished experts argue their cases,
and listening to the important and, I think, very penetrating
questions of my colleagues, it was obvious that there are
fundamental disagreements that need to be resolved in order to
try to build a consensus around a policy for going forward in
Afghanistan. Despite the differences, I believe there are some
central truths on which we can all agree.
First, we need a winning civilian strategy. I've said
repeatedly that we will not force the surrender of the Taliban
by military force alone. Therefore, any strategy that lacks a
strong civilian component is doomed.
Second, our greatest national priority here is to ensure
that Afghanistan does not destabilize Pakistan. As we debate
how to succeed in Afghanistan, we must evaluate the impact of
every decision on our beleaguered allies in Islamabad.
But, history tells us that the challenge is not only from
the East. Afghanistan shares a 1,300-mile northern border with
Central Asian countries that have suffered from instability
themselves. Iran and Russia have also--have vested interests in
Afghanistan. Unless we find common ground with them, I would
think that we will continue competing instead of cooperating.
Third, we need to counter the growing narcotics problem. As
we described in a committee report released last month, senior
military and civilian officials believe it will be extremely
difficult to defeat the Taliban and establish good government
without disrupting Afghanistan's opium trade. Afghanistan
supplies more than 90 percent of the world's heroin and
generates about $3 billion a year in profits; money that helps
to finance the Taliban and other militant groups.
We need to be realistic and pragmatic. Unlike Iraq,
Afghanistan is not a ``reconstruction'' project. It is a
``construction'' project in one of the poorest and most corrupt
countries in the world. We have to come up with concrete goals,
and be clear about what and how much we are prepared to do to
achieve them.
I might add, there may well be a fourth thing on which we
can agree, and that is that the problem of governance may even
be in fact, more serious than the challenge of the Taliban. And
many people suggest, and I'm not sure it isn't now becoming
more clear, that the absence of governance, the inadequacy of
governance, the corruption of the governance in Afghanistan is
perhaps one of the most demoralizing and defeating components
of what may drive some people to the Taliban or elsewhere. And
that is something we need to address.
Today, we welcome four witnesses who will take us deeper
into this debate by sharing their ideas for what should change
on the ground in order to succeed in Afghanistan. I might say
three of them have traveled a very long distance, and we are
very, very appreciative. Dr.--the Honorable Ambassador Ryan
Crocker flew from the west coast to be here just for this. And
General Craddock drove all the way up from North Carolina to be
here. And I'm not sure of everybody else's travel arrangements,
but we're enormously appreciative for everybody being here.
We're going to hear from General Craddock first. He was the
Supreme Allied Commander-Europe until a couple of months ago,
when he retired from the Army. He will be followed by
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, our former Ambassador to Iraq and
Pakistan, and Charge in Kabul. And there are probably very few
people who have as much understanding and experience in this
region and in these challenges as Ambassador Crocker. Ms. Clare
Lockhart, the coauthor of ``Fixing Failed States,'' and a
former adviser to the Afghan Government, will discuss her
recommendations for a successful civilian strategy. And
finally, Dr. Khaled Hosseini, the well-known author of ``The
Kite Runner'' and ``A Thousand Splendid Suns,'' who has just
returned from Afghanistan as U.N. Special Envoy for Refugee
Issues.
And we're delighted that each of you could be here with us
today. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Since President Obama's inauguration, his administration
has taken a series of steps to reorder American foreign policy
priorities. The President identified the war in Afghanistan as
his administration's highest combat priority, and has thus
shifted emphasis and resources from Iraq to Afghanistan and
Operation Enduring Freedom. He argued that the United States
effort in Afghanistan had been neglected in favor of our
intervention in Iraq. President Obama made an important effort
to sustain continuity of command and control of our Defense
Department at the highest levels by retaining an effective and
respected Secretary of Defense and promoting General Petraeus
from Commander of United States forces in Iraq to Commander of
Central Command, where he heads our military efforts across the
region. Both men have identified civil-military coordination as
essential for progress toward U.S. goals in the region.
At a more operational level, President Obama named
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as special representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. He leads our strategic engagement
with the governments of the region while our able Ambassadors,
Ann Patterson in Pakistan and Karl Eikenberry in Afghanistan,
work tirelessly in carrying out their respective duties.
The U.S. diplomatic effort is joined in cause by ADM Mike
Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Beyond his responsibility
for assuring the fitness and readiness of our fighting forces
worldwide, he is closely engaged in the delicate and essential
security discussions across South Asia. In his many visits to
Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan Admiral Mullen has worked to
forge a closer, more confident relationship between our
Government and each of theirs. These leaders are seized of our
commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and strengthening the
foundations for stability. They, along with Secretary of State
Clinton, National Security Advisor James Jones, and Vice
President Biden, are together in the final stages of a crucial
review of our strategies and policies in the region.
But, the President is the Commander in Chief and he is the
one who will make the final choices from the options he is
presented. It is widely hoped that he will produce a coherent
operational strategy for United States engagement in
Afghanistan. Such an integrated strategy has yet to be
unveiled, despite the many high- and low-level reviews, and
none has been described by the President with the force and
conviction necessary to persuade the American people to endorse
what will likely be a much longer, albeit necessary, commitment
to achieve stability in the region.
As he formulates his new strategy, I strongly urge the
President to make a concerted effort to work personally with
the Congress, which will control the purse strings for our
endeavors in the region. We in Congress have heard of general
outlines of an approach to the region, highlighted by the
President and his senior advisers in March of this year, namely
that we intend to, ``disrupt, dismantle, and defeat'' al-Qaeda
and their allies.
We have also received extensive requests and notifications,
through several supplemental appropriations and the fiscal year
2010 budget requests, identifying billions of dollars in
assistance and operations funding for Afghanistan and the
region. But, many questions have arisen surrounding troop
levels, civilian force levels, and contractor roles and
behavior. And considering the important role of development for
the region, I'm troubled that there is still no USAID
administrator. As a member of both this committee and the
Agriculture Committee, I'm concerned about reports that $170
million in USAID money will be transferred to the Department of
Agriculture to develop an expeditionary agricultural
development capacity for Afghanistan. This, I believe, is
normally the job of USAID.
For the moment, the committee has been informed that
General McChrystal's suggestions for a future strategy and
tactics are being studied in the administration. We are led to
believe that after the administration has studied the
McChrystal report for an indefinite period of time, the General
may suggest appropriate troop levels for the United States and
our NATO allies necessary to achieve the administration's final
decision on objectives.
The committee hearings this week offered the administration
an opportunity to explain the challenges and difficult
decisions to be made after nearly a year of study. Invitations
were issued, but they were declined. Thus, we have turned today
to key actors and former officials experienced in government,
war zones, Afghanistan, and the region, to provide their
insight and recommendations. We are deeply grateful they have
accepted our invitation to present timely information to our
committee and to all Americans in an extensively covered public
forum. I hope that the administration will soon decide on the
time for its views to reach the American people.
In any event, it is critical that the full force and voice
of the President lead the discussion around this national
strategic priority with so many American lives and hundreds of
billions of dollars at stake. Only he can lay the foundation
that will gain the confidence of Congress and our soldiers,
development experts, diplomats, and partners.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
We're going to begin with General Craddock and run right
across the table. So, General, if you would be good enough--
your full testimonies will be placed in the record as if read
in full, so if you could summarize in approximately 5 minutes
or so, it would be helpful, and then we could have more time
for discussion.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER-EUROPE, MYRTLE BEACH, SC
General Craddock. Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar----
The Chairman. Let me just comment, we need five more
Senators, if we can get them here, for the quorum, and we'll be
in good shape.
Thank you, General.
General Craddock. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you here today. I think the focus of this hearing--
Afghanistan--is important, timely, and essential. As I've been
requested to provide insight on the counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan, I will focus my short opening remarks in that
area.
Before exploring the counternarcotics challenge, I would
like to emphasize that the NATO commitment to Afghanistan, as
an alliance, is strong. I would also point out that the
commitment differs among individual NATO members. Continued
U.S. leadership in this mission is essential to both deepen the
level of support of NATO and to ensure continued participation
of all alliance members.
With regard to the issue of counternarcotics in
Afghanistan, may I preface my comments and responses to your
later questions with the understanding that my perspective is
from my last assignment on Active Duty with the United States
Armed Forces, that of the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe: a
NATO perspective.
In October 2006, NATO assumed responsibility for the
security for the entire country of Afghanistan. The authority
to do so was provided to the Supreme Allied Commander by the
North Atlantic Council. The means of granting that authority
was through the Council's approval of the NATO military
operations plan for Afghanistan. The strategic operations plan
contains specific instructions, to all subordinate commands
responsible for conducting operations in Afghanistan,
concerning counternarcotics operations. Specifically, NATO
forces were not to conduct counternarcotics operations or
activities, to include eradication of poppy crops. What was
permitted was support to the Afghan counternarcotics forces.
Support in terms of information, intelligence, logistic
support, and, if required, in extremis support and medical
support for Afghan counternarcotics forces, all upon request by
those forces.
In February 2007, the current intelligence assessments,
discussions with Afghan authorities, and consultations with
United Kingdom and United States counternarcotics authorities
all combined to establish a strong link between the narcotics
traffickers and the Afghan insurgents, particularly the
Taliban. A growing body of evidence indicated that much of the
funding of the Taliban insurgency was being generated by the
narcotics industry in Afghanistan. U.N. experts estimated
upward of $200 million narcodollars going into insurgent
coffers. It was at that point, as the strategic commander, I
began to urge for the approval of additional authorities for
NATO forces in Afghanistan to conduct operations against both
narcotics facilities and facilitators. Our assessment was that
reducing the money available to the insurgents would make it
more difficult for them to hire soldiers, pay bomb and
improvised explosive device--the IED makers, and buy weapons
and materiel. All were essential in reducing the level of
violence and providing enhanced security. And it was not until
November 2008, some 18 months later, that NATO, via a defense
ministerial meeting, approved these additional authorities. The
ministers concluded, the preponderance of evidence to that date
supported the assessments that the narcotraffickers were
providing support to the insurgency. Subsequent guidance and
orders were issued, and NATO forces began using these expanded
authorities. As of mid-June this year, some 25 counternarcotics
operations have been conducted, either by NATO forces alone or
in conjunction with Afghan counternarcotics forces, with
favorable results.
Many processing facilities, the laboratories, have been
destroyed, precursor material confiscated and destroyed, opium
paste and refined heroin confiscated, and personnel
apprehended.
While much has been accomplished, much more remains to be
done.
First and foremost, NATO ISAF forces must continue to
conduct operations against the facilities and the facilitators,
not only to reduce the money available to the insurgents, but
also with the secondary effect of reducing the level of
corruption countrywide.
Second, NATO and NATO Member Nations, on a bilateral basis,
must continue to partner and support the development of the
Afghan security and counternarcotics forces. The end state for
this effort are fully competent, capable Afghan security forces
that minimize the impact of narcotics on the Afghan society.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity to appear before
this committee, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN John Craddock, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former
Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Myrtle Beach, VA
Chairman, ranking member, may I first thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you here today. The focus of this hearing--
Afghanistan--is important, timely, and essential. As I have been
requested to provide insight on the counternarcotics (CN) efforts in
Afghanistan, I will focus my short opening remarks in that area.
Before exploring the counternarotics challenge, I want to emphasize
that the NATO commitment to Afghanistan--as an alliance--is strong. I
would also point out that the commitment differs among individual NATO
members. Continued U.S. leadership in this mission is essential to both
deepen the level of support and to ensure continued participation of
all alliance members.
Wth regard to the issue of counternarcotics in Afghanistan, I must
preface my comments and responses to your later questions, with the
understanding that my perspective is from my last assignment on active
duty with the United States Armed Forces--that of the Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe. In that capacity, I was the commander of all NATO
operational forces including those in Afghanistan. Therefore, my
observations and assessments will be from a NATO perspective.
In October 2006, NATO assumed responsbility for security for the
entire country of Afghanistan. The authority to do so was provided to
the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, by the North Atlantic Council.
The means of granting this authority was through the NAC's approval of
the NATO military operations plan for Afghanistan.
The strategic operations plan contained specific instructions to
all subordinate commands responsible for conducting operations in
Afghanistan concerning counternarcotics operations. Specifically, NATO
forces were not to conduct conternarcotics operations or activities--to
include eradication of poppy crops. What was permitted was support to
Afghan counternarcotics forces. Wthin means and capabilities, NATO
forces could provide information and intelligence on narcotics
activities to Afghan CN forces, they could provide transportation and
logistical support, they could provide operations planning support, and
they could provide in extremis and medical support--all upon request by
the Afghan counternarcotics forces.
In February 2007, the current intelligence assessments, discussions
with Afghan authorities, and consultations with United Kingdom and
United States counternarcotics authorities--all combined to establish a
strong link between the narcotics traffickers and Afghan insurgents--
particularly the Taliban. A growing body of evidence indicated that
much of the funding for the Taliban insurgency was being generated by
the narcotics industry in Afghanistan--all the way from the poppy
farmer to the movement of refined heroin through and out of the
country. United Nations experts estimated upward of $200 million
narcodollars going into insurgent coffers. It was at that point, as the
strategic commander, I began to urge for the approval of additional
authorites for NATO forces in Afghanstan to conduct operations against
both narcotics facilities and facilitators. Our assessment was that
reducing money available to the insurgents would make it more difficult
for them to hire soldiers, pay bomb and improvised explosive device
(ied) -makers, and buy weapons and materiel--all essential in reducing
the level of violence and providing enhanced security.
It was not until November 2008--some 18 months later--that NATO,
via a defense ministerial meeting, approved these additional
authorities. The ministers concluded that the preponderence of evidence
to that date supported the assessment that the narcotraffickers were
providing material support to the insurgency--and that based on the
original operations plan which directed action by NATO forces against
the insurgents and those who supported it--adequate authority was
provided without any revision or amendment to the existing plan.
Subsequent guidance and orders were issued over the following 2
months and by early spring of this year, NATO forces began using these
expanded authorities. As of mid-June, some 25 counternarcotics
operations had been conducted either by NATO forces alone or in
conjunction with Afghan counternarcotics forces with significantly
favorable results. Many processing facilities (labs) have been
destroyed, precursor materiel confiscated and destroyed, opium paste
and refined heroin confiscated, and personnel apprehended.
While much has been accomplished, much more remains to be done.
First and foremost, NATO/ISAF must continue to conduct operations
against the facilities and the facilitators--not only to reduce money
available to the insurgents--but also with the secondary effect of
reducing the level of corruption countrywide. Second, NATO and NATO
Member Nations, on a bilateral basis, must continue to partner and
support the development of the Afghan security and counternarcotics
forces. The end state for this effort are fully competent, capable
Afghan security forces that minimize the impact of narcotics on the
Afghan society.
The Chairman. Thank you, General Craddock.
Ambassador Crocker.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN CROCKER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
AND PAKISTAN, U.S. CHARGE d'AFFAIRES TO AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, SPOKANE, WA
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
members of the committee.
It's an honor to be before you today. I have had that honor
a number of occasions in the past as a witness for the
administration. Today is the first time I can honestly say that
in addition to it being an honor, it's also a pleasure.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a critical national security
interest for the United States, for the region, and for the
international community. General Craddock has addressed some of
the NATO perspective. I would comment briefly on a regional
perspective, focusing particularly on Pakistan, where I was
Ambassador from 2004 to 2007, and Iran, where I was involved in
direct discussions with the Iranians on Afghanistan, from 2001
to 2003.
Mr. Chairman, as you know so well, our relationship with
Pakistan is vital for our Nation's national security, as well
as for stability in Afghanistan. We were closely allied with
Pakistan in the effort to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan
in the 1980s, but once the Soviets were out, so were we, and
Pakistan went from being the most allied of allies, to being a
sanctioned pariah. After 9/11, we are back. Pakistanis welcome
that renewed engagement, but they ask, again, ``For how long?''
We have an urgent need to build a stable, sustained
relationship with Pakistan. And, Mr. Chairman, you, Senator
Lugar, and this committee have shown the way, through your
sponsorship of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. It's
precisely the type of long-term undertaking both our nations
need.
Pakistan today faces an interrelated set of insurgencies.
Kashmiri militants to the east, al-Qaeda and Taliban to the
west, and an internal insurgency that targets Pakistan's
principal cities. It can be argued that much of this insurgency
is of Pakistan's own making. But there is also a Pakistani
narrative that says, in the case of support for the Taliban,
they had no choice, after we withdrew in the 1990s.
Mr. Chairman, during my time in Pakistan, I came to know a
large number of mainstream political figures and senior
military officers. None of them share the Taliban's vision for
Pakistan and Afghanistan, yet many remain uncertain over the
long-term prospects for our relationship. We need to learn from
our past experience, and build for a better future; and your
legislation, Mr. Chairman, shows us all the way.
Afghanistan's western neighbor, Iran, poses a very
different set of challenges. The multiple differences between
the United States and Iran need no elaboration from me. On
Afghanistan, however, we have at times found room for
cooperation. In the wake of 9/11, when I sat down with Iranians
under U.N. auspices, I found them fully supportive of United
States military action to bring down the Taliban. United
States-Iranian agreement on the Afghan interim authority was at
the core of the success of the U.N.-sponsored Bonn Conference.
And after I reopened our Embassy in Kabul in January 2002, we
discussed with the Iranians, again under U.N. auspices, ways to
strengthen the interim administration and to reduce the power
of warlords.
The Iranians hedged their bets, however, also providing
sanctuary for al-Qaeda figures later implicated in attacks in
the Arabian Peninsula that brought to an effective end that
dialogue with Iran.
Mr. Chairman, the administration has stated its willingness
to engage in a dialogue with the Iranians. I think this is a
positive step. I certainly support it. And I hope Afghanistan
will be on the agenda, that the Iranians will take a strategic
look at their own interests, because I think those interests
also lie in a stable Afghanistan.
Mr. Chairman, I would offer just a couple of thoughts based
on my experience in Iraq. And one must be careful, as you note,
not to draw too many parallels. Construction in Afghanistan,
reconstruction in Iraq, I think, is a very good point. It is
going to be very hard in Afghanistan. That does not mean
hopeless. We have some very fine people in the fight. General
McChrystal, Ambassador Eikenberry in Afghanistan, Ambassador
Patterson in Pakistan, and my old comrade from Baghdad, General
Petraeus, now overseeing both wars, I think, can give all
Americans confidence that the right people are in the right
place.
It is the President, as Senator Lugar said, who must show
the way. When he does, I hope that this committee and
counterparts in the Senate and the House will seek from my
former colleagues that irreplaceable perspective which is the
view from the field.
The stakes are very high, indeed, in Afghanistan, and, Mr.
Chairman, I think all of us in America are indebted to you and
the committee for helping us illuminate these issues.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, Former U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq and Pakistan, U.S. Charge d'Affaires to Afghanistan, Department of
State, Spokane, WA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you
for the honor of appearing before you today. Afghanistan is a critical
issue for America's national security. Eight years ago this week, we
paid a horrific price for allowing a strategic enemy the freedom to
operate in Afghanistan. We are engaged against the same enemy today in
the same area. That enemy is hoping that our patience will wear thin,
that we will decide the cost is too high, that we will give them back
the space they lost after 9/11. Mr. Chairman, that must not happen.
Al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters are a threat not to the United
States alone but to the region and the entire international community,
as the sad record of their terrorist attacks makes all too clear. It is
a threat that requires an international and a regional response.
General Craddock is addressing the NATO perspective. On the basis of my
experience as Ambassador to Pakistan from 2004 to 2007 and my
involvement in discussions with the Iranians on Afghanistan from 2001
to 2003, I offer a few thoughts on the regional environment.
Mr. Chairman, our relationship with Pakistan is vital for our own
national security and for stability in Afghanistan. We understood this
clearly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Our efforts
against the Soviet occupation were largely staged from Pakistan. But
once the Soviets were out so were we, and Pakistan went almost
overnight from our most allied of allies to a sanctioned pariah. After
9/11, we were back and major military and economic assistance programs
were resumed. Pakistanis welcome our reengagement. They also wonder how
long we will be around this time. We need a long-term, stable
relationship with Pakistan, one in which both nations and peoples can
have confidence. Such a relationship can only be built up over time,
overcoming past suspicions and mistrust on both sides.
Mr. Chairman, you, Senator Lugar, and this committee have shown us
all the way forward through your sponsorship of the Enhanced
Relationship with Pakistan Act. This is precisely the type of long-term
undertaking we both so badly need.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistan today faces a triple set of interrelated
insurgencies: Kashmiri militants to the east; the Taliban, its
supporters and the al-Qaeda terrorists it shelters to the west; and an
internal militancy that strikes at the heart of Pakistan's principal
cities. Some of this militancy is of Pakistan's own making. In the
Pakistani narrative, some of it, like Pakistani support for the Taliban
in the 1990s, grew from a lack of other options based on our
estrangement. The history of that estrangement, and fear of its
repetition, drives some in Pakistan to continue to hedge their bets.
Mr. Chairman, during my time in Pakistan I came to know a large
number of mainstream politicians and senior military officers. None of
them share the Taliban's vision for Afghanistan or Pakistan. Yet many
remain uncertain over the long-term prospects for our relationship. We
need to learn from our past experience and build for a better future.
Your legislation, Mr. Chairman, charts the course.
Afghanistan's western neighbor, Iran, presents a very different set
of challenges. The multiple and profound differences between the United
States and the Islamic Republic need no elaboration from me. On
Afghanistan, however, we have at times found room for cooperation. The
Taliban in Afghanistan was an enemy to both of us--Iran almost went to
war with the Taliban-led Afghan Government in 1999. In the wake of 9/
11, I found Iranian negotiators fully supportive of U.S. military
action to bring down the Taliban. United States-Iranian agreement on
the Afghan Interim Authority was at the core of the success of the
U.N.-sponsored Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001. And
after I reopened our Embassy in Kabul in January 2002, we discussed
with the Iranians ways to strengthen the interim administration, to
reduce the power of the warlords, the handover of al-Qaeda operatives,
and even coordination of assistance projects. But the Iranians hedged
their bets, also providing sanctuary and support for al-Qaeda
terrorists who were later linked to lethal attacks in the Arabian
Peninsula, actions that effectively ended our 18-month dialogue.
Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration has stated its willingness
to engage in talks with the Iranians. The Iranians have signaled a
positive response. I support this initiative, and believe it offers an
opportunity to reengage with Iran on Afghanistan. Iranian support for
the Taliban, its existential enemy, is purely tactical, a weapon in
their confrontation with us. A renewed dialogue on Afghanistan could
afford Tehran the opportunity to think strategically on an issue of
great importance to its own long-term national security.
Mr. Chairman, I am no expert on Russia or Central Asia. But these
states, too, play an important role in Afghanistan. The previous and
current administrations have worked to foster trade and communication
links between Afghanistan and the former Soviet Republics. It is
important these efforts continue, and it is important that Afghanistan
continue to be a part of our dialogue with Russia. We have no desire to
repeat the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Neither is there anything
in our current effort in Afghanistan that is inimical to Russian
interests. To the contrary, the defeat of an Islamic militancy close to
Russia's borders should be very much in Moscow's interests.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I offer a few thoughts based on my
experience in Iraq from 2007 to 2009. One must be very careful in
attempting to draw connections. They are very different countries with
different histories. Iraq is largely urban; Afghanistan predominantly
rural. In many respects, the challenge in Afghanistan is even greater
than in Iraq. Thirty years of conflict have devastated an already poor
country, leaving few services, virtually no middle class and no
functioning state institutions. But hard does not mean hopeless,
neither in Afghanistan nor in Iraq. Where I do see similarities is in
how the United States approaches the challenges. We cannot get to the
end in either fight on half a tank of gas. In Iraq, we went all in, and
it made a difference. The President must lead. We have our finest
people in the fight--General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry in
Afghanistan, Ambassador Patterson in Pakistan. General Petraeus, my
comrade in Baghdad, now oversees both wars and there is simply no one
in uniform more qualified to do so. Under their charge are the
thousands of committed Americans, military and civilian who are putting
their lives on the line. But it is the President who must make the
commitment and show the way. When he does, I hope that this committee
and counterparts in the Senate and the House will seek from my former
colleague that irreplaceable perspective, the view from the field.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the privilege of testifying on
this critical issue. The American people have consistently shown a
willingness to make great sacrifices when they understand the stakes
and have confidence in their leadership. The stakes are very high
indeed in Afghanistan, and all of us are indebted to you and the
committee for illuminating the issues.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
I don't think I did justice, in introducing you, to the
outstanding service that you provided us in Iraq and in
Pakistan and through your career, and we are very, very
grateful. I know how much value two Presidents had in your
advice, and we're very grateful to you.
Ms. Lockhart.
We--I think we have two Senators?
Voice: Two more, one's on the way.
The Chairman. OK. We're two Senators away from an
interruption.
STATEMENT OF CLARE LOCKHART, COFOUNDER AND DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE
OF STATE EFFECTIVENESS, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Lockhart. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the
committee, I thank you for the opportunity to address you.
There is now an emerging recognition that there is no
purely military resolution to the situation in Afghanistan, and
that governance and development are as, if not more, important
tools. I believe that the establishment of Afghan sovereignty,
by which I mean enabling Afghans to exercise self-rule through
Afghan institutions that can provide their own security,
governance, and revenue-raising capability, provides the
framework that we need. And it will provide, first, a means of
stabilizing Afghanistan and critically denying space for the
Taliban, who, as Senator Kerry recognized, derive their
strength primarily from the weakness of Afghan institutions.
Second, it provides basis for an exit--an honorable exit--
for American forces and presence on the ground, or a transition
strategy, if we don't want to call it an ``exit strategy.''
And third, it demonstrates to the Afghan population that
the United States and allied presence is not an occupation.
It's not an occupation at all, nor is it open-ended occupation.
The military have now articulated a clear strategy for
building up the Afghan security forces and protecting the
population. And I believe we now need a similar articulation of
a strategy for governance and development that matches the one
the military's put forward in rigor and detail.
First, I'd like to reflect on the mistakes made. I think
that over the last years we have not had a clear strategy for
the civilian component--for governance and development. Afghan
institutions have been catastrophically underresourced. When I
was on the ground in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, the
first Afghan budget for a civil service that had 240,000 civil
servants in 2002, was resourced to the level of $20 million.
And this was enough to pay fuel for a month, but not to pay the
doctors, teachers, and policemen, even salaries of $50 a month.
And much activity from the aid system has been
counterproductive. The provision of billions of dollars, with
very little accountability, particularly to U.N. agencies and
NGOs--not underestimating some of the great work that many U.N.
agencies have done--and from the perspective of an Afghan
citizen with no hope for a job or an education, there has been
little outlet but to join the narcotics industry or sign up
with the Taliban, in many parts of the country.
Moving forward, I think the first question to address is,
What does good-enough--or appropriate--governance look like?
The first component is certainly security; building up the
Afghan National Army, the police force, the Afghan intelligence
services, and justice institutions, law enforcement
institutions.
But, security institutions alone won't make an Afghan
Government capable of exercising authority and maintaining
stability in the country. This will allow the drawdown. It
requires, in my view, three other components. The first of
these is rule of law; the decisionmaking institutions across
the Cabinet and across the levels of Afghan governance--the
capital city Kabul, but at province level, district level,
municipalities and villages.
The second component is public finance. We hear a lot about
corruption, and I think we need to take a clearheaded look at
the other side of that coin. How do we build the systems of
accountability in revenue-raising and public expenditure that
will allow Afghanistan to raise its own revenue and expend its
own resources on its institutions for the decades to come?
And the third component is basic services. And we're not
talking, here, about a Valhalla or a Switzerland, but the basic
services at the village level, in irrigation, to allow for
agriculture, livelihoods, health, and education that will allow
Afghans to live lives with dignity. And this will require
investment in education. Another critical lacuna has been only
to educate Afghans up to the age of 11; and if one only
educates up to the age of 11, we're not going to have a civil
service or a market economy capable of being self-sufficient.
I think we have grounds for optimism. I question the myth
of Afghanistan as an inherently corrupt culture full of
warlords. There is an Afghan demand for rule of law rooted in
their culture. There was a reasonable standard of governance in
the middle decades of the 20th century. When I arrived in
Kabul, there were 240,000 civil servants in place across the
country, administering the country fairly well. I think the
culture of corruption has been one that's been allowed to
fester in recent decades, but is not of the culture.
And finally, there was a series of successes between 2001
and 2005, where a political framework, articulated through
Bonn, allowed for a number of governance initiatives to be
successful; most notably, the creation of the Afghan National
Army from scratch and a number of national programs, including
the National Solidarity Program that saw block grants issued to
every village in the country, now across 23,000 villages, that
allows villages to maintain their own affairs.
I think we also have grounds for pessimism. There is a
legacy of decades of war and a lost generation. And corruption
was allowed to set in at the heart of government institutions.
Back in 2004, the group of us who were assisting the government
realized that it was probably inevitable in those circumstancs
that this corruption would continue to fester and allow the
country to fall back to the Taliban. I don't think this was
inevitable, had a different approach been taken, and I don't
think it's too late to put it right.
I'll conclude with some short reflections on the emerging
strategy. I think we can be encouraged to see that there is a
strategy emerging from Kabul under the leadership of Ambassador
Eikenberry and his excellent team, and in coordination with
General McChrystal, to put in place a strategy that will
support the creation of the adequate and necessary Afghan
institutions. And I think this is balanced with understanding
that we can't just focus on state institutions, we must also
allow the space for Afghan civil society to hold that
government accountable and invest in market institutions to
create, in the short term, jobs that will pull people away from
illicit activities and, over the medium term, lay the basis for
an economy that will make Afghanistan self-sufficient.
And I think we face two immediate challenges. Very sadly,
the elections recently held did not renew the governance
settlement in the country. And this is tragic, I think, because
it was avoidable. And I do think some questions need to be
asked of the way that the election was managed by the U.N., so
that those mistakes can be avoided in future in Afghanistan and
in other countries.
But, we now face a paradox, because the COIN strategy
requires there to be a host-nation government with a vision
that the people can sign up to, and that government is not yet
in place. I think we have different options for how a
government that is good enough can be put in place. And once
that political settlement is in place that will allow for the
process of reconciliation with groups across the country, then
I think the second key need is to articulate the governance and
development strategy that is necessary. It is possible to put
it into place, and then it must be resourced with the adequate
resources that have been so sorely missing the last few years.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lockhart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clare Lockhart, Cofounder and Director, The
Institute for State Effectiveness, Washington, DC
introduction
The central foundation for stabilizing Afghanistan is the
restoration of Afghan sovereignty. The current imperative is to
identify a framework and process to rebuild the legitimacy and
credibility of Afghanistan's institutions so that Afghans can govern
themselves, maintain security, and raise their own licit revenue. This
will in turn provide a viable exit strategy for foreign forces and
allow for lessening dependence on financial support. Exiting
responsibly depends on the increase in capability of both Afghan
security forces and public finance institutions. Credible governance is
also the means by which the Taliban will be reduced and eliminated, as
it is widely agreed that it is the vacuum of governance that provides
their space of operation.
Governance is currently in crisis in Afghanistan. A combination of
two decades of war, followed by international actors' lack of focus and
unquestioning support have allowed corruption and the illegitimate
economy to expand unchecked. The elections have not produced a
legitimate winner, and rather have laid open to global public scrutiny
the flaws in the conduct of elections and the organization of
governance in general. It is not Afghan governance alone that is to
blame. To date, much international activity and assistance has been
misdirected and even counterproductive, often undermining rather than
working to build up Afghan capability and sovereignty. Now that the key
problems of governance by both Afghan leaders and their international
partners are widely recognized, we have one final and precious
opportunity to address the fundamental issues of how to restore Afghan
sovereignty.
There is now the making of a good civil-military strategy on the
ground. It is clear that the new administration, across military and
diplomatic arenas, recognizes the depths of the problem and has
identified what needs to be done. The new plans emerging from the field
articulate exactly the type of actions and approaches that have been
sorely missing to date to achieve stabilization. The type of
initiatives that the Bonn team never saw resourced in 2001 to 2005 are
now finally being supported. Realizing their objectives now requires a
clear step-by-step plan for operationalizing these goals, and making a
set of realistic targets clear to Congress and the American public.
Recognizing that development and governance are key foci means
almost a reversal of what we have done in previous years. Whereas our
large civilian institutions have been geared toward replacing native
capacity, they now must be turned toward building it; the civilian
actors require the same internal reflections and overhaul of
instruments and policies that the military has undertaken, having
arrived at the reformed counterinsurgency doctrines through much loss
of life and treasure. I will focus on what standards of governance and
development are realistic to aim for, the mistakes that we must learn
from, and some suggestions for moving forward.
There has been much discussion about what will qualify as the
United States reaching its strategic objectives. Denying al-Qaeda
sanctuaries is a clear goal, but the question of how that is done
remains. To do so will require an Afghan Government that is functional
and legitimate enough to be able to hold the country together as the
United States drawsdown, as it eventually must. I propose as a starting
point, that a criterion for success could be that momentum is turned
decisively against the Taliban, by use of military force, economic
development, building of civilian institutions, and by strengthening
the Afghan National Security Forces to the point where they can hold
their own against the insurgents. We do not need a perfect Afghan
Government; just one that is stable enough. Leaving behind a failing or
failed state will certainly lead to civil war and probable eventual
Taliban victory. Given what has happened in this last election, the
goal of an effective Afghan state may seem a tall order, but I remain
convinced it can be done.
It should be stressed that billions of dollars have been wasted on
futile and ineffective measures, and that one cannot judge state-
building in the future by what has happened in the past. Real focus on
letting Afghans do the work of building their own future, except for
some sputtering and inconsistently supported efforts, has only just
begun. Stereotyping Afghans as somehow incapable of living in a modern
state is only an excuse for our previous, misdirected policies. The
Afghans I know are proud, practical people who, despite all their
frustrations, are still willing to give us a chance, and certainly
desperately wish to avoid the fate of living either under an oligarchy
of violent drug lords or the Taliban.
what is good enough governance in afghanistan?
There is a much-touted myth that justice and public administration
are an elusive dream in Afghanistan, with corruption endemic to the
country and its people. This narrow view overlooks four factors.
First, central to Afghan culture is an ancient appreciation of
justice and fairness. The concept of the Circle of Justice emphasizes
the need for a ruler to rule justly in order to raise revenue from
citizens to pay for the army. Afghan villagers and townspeople I have
met across the country complain bitterly about the repressive
corruption that they insist is alien to their culture, which puts their
families constantly at risk of kidnapping and intimidation.
Second, through much of the 20th century, Afghanistan had a
reasonable standard of public administration. A manual from the 1950s
shows Afghan professionals running schools, clinics, and road and
irrigation projects. When I traveled across Afghanistan in January
2002, in most provinces there were functioning provincial offices, with
trained civil servants successfully carrying out their work.
Third, to the extent that a culture of corruption has set in, this
was in large part a result of empowering militia commanders with
weapons and money to pursue the jihad and then failing to bring them
into the fold of rule of law once the Russians withdrew, resulting in a
massive assault on the country's peace, women, and assets throughout
the 1990s. Warlords are not the product of Afghan traditional society,
but rather, the product of the decimation of traditional Afghan tribal
governance through Afghanistan's role as a proxy for struggle by
foreign powers on its soil, and, more recently, by Afghanistan having
being abandoned once the short-term security goals were achieved.
Between 2001 to 2004, there were a series of examples of success in
building institutions in Afghanistan, led by Afghans in partnership
with small teams of international experts. The word ``partnership''
must be emphasized, as all too often various international actors have
simply imposed their own formulas upon Afghans. On the other hand, the
cooperative efforts between Afghans and mentoring organizations, with
the emphasis on empowering Afghans to take over their own future as
soon as practicably possible, succeeded then and efforts like them can
succeed now. These include efforts to build the Afghan National Army,
the National Health Program, and the National Solidarity Program (NSP),
which enabled the creation of Community Development Councils in 23,000
villages, and which now will expand to the remaining 9,000 villages,
many in the southeast where security and lack of funding had prevented
the expansion of the program. Other successful reforms during the 2001
to 2004 period included the public finance system and currency exchange
which saw the creation and countrywide acceptance of a new currency in
4 months, the GSM telecoms licensing which created 7 million mobile
phones and now more than $lbn (USD) in investment, and an
infrastructure program that laid a template for reconnecting Afghan
markets and people internally and regionally.
what should we be aiming for?
To say that Afghan governance is central to stability is not to
argue for an impossible goal, whether Switzerland or Valhalla. Rather,
it recognizes that the way that rule of law is enforced is critical to
the daily lives of Afghans and whether they choose to live within, or
challenge, the sitting authority. Naturally, our goals must be
realistic and attainable. Choice in standards will depend on four
factors: The type of Afghan leadership in place, the strength of U.S.
commitment, the agreement reached with Afghan stakeholders regarding
redlines and goals, and the choice in the toolbox employed for
implementation. While a team of reformers might be able to achieve one
set of goals even if the leadership is not committed to reform, there
is the possibility of getting governance in certain areas right,
especially if a tough approach to benchmarks and conditionalities is
used and if the right instruments are implemented. To recognize that
governance is central also means understanding that the most critical
factor is not what we, as outsiders, do but how the Afghans are
organized to govern themselves, even if financing, advice, and
benchmarks from the United States and its allies are key.
It is important to start discussion from an understanding of how
the Afghan state is actually set up and how it functions. At least for
now, Afghanistan is a unitary state, with all provinces governed
according to the same legal framework. A provincial and district
education or health officer reports to Kabul through the line
ministries, not to a local governor. Many efforts now take place
without understanding the set of Afghan laws and organizations that
already exist. Unless and until the Afghan Constitution and legal
framework change, efforts should work within this framework of laws and
procedures. A ``light touch'' form of governance is possible, where
formal structures, including line ministries, can ``mesh'' with local
and traditional networks and social organizations. The National
Solidarity Program, which feeds block grants to the local level from
the center, but lets the village organize themselves how they wish, is
one such example. Networks of traditional birth attendants, hawala
dealers, traders, ulema and teachers can all be mobilized or partnered
with for different tasks.
What type of Afghan governance will permit the stabilization of the
country and provide the foundation for allocation of troops and money
to be drawn down? It is necessary to articulate an ``exit strategy'' to
demonstrate to the American public that the effort is not open-ended
and to the Afghan population that the presence is not an occupation.
However, an exit strategy must not be conveyed as abandonment of the
country to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A ``transition strategy'' might be
a more appropriate term.
The components of appropriate governance in Afghanistan can be
roughly characterized by five pillars. The first pillar certainly is
the provision of security, through the operation of Afghan Security
Forces. This will involve expanding and strengthening the Afghan
National Army and the Afghan Police Force; reforming the National
Directorate of Security and Afghanistan's intelligence service; and
provision of law enforcement through courts, judges, and prisons.
Provision of security must be embedded within a concept of rule of law
and justice, otherwise this can lead to a repressive regime, thus
fueling the insurgency.
The second pillar is the creation of structures and processes to
ensure fair and accountable decisionmaking within a framework of rule
of law. The Constitution for Afghanistan agreed upon in 2003 provides a
workable basis to build upon. However, much work needs to be done to
improve the functioning of the Presidency and the Cabinet, as well as
to ensure appropriate selection criteria for the appointments in key
personnel including mayors, governors, and district heads. A series of
checks and balances from Parliament and civil society, particularly
over revenue-raising and budget allocations, are also needed.
The third pillar is to build systems of accountability in public
finance, across revenue and expenditure. Afghanistan will improve its
ability to function when it can raise its own revenue and spend it
justly and in a way that satisfies the population. Afghanistan has the
potential for wealth, most notably with its mineral wealth documented
in the recent U.S. Geological Survey. This, together with customs
revenue as well as land and large taxpayer revenues would provide
Afghanistan with revenue many times today's figures. Reaching the
revenue potential will reduce the cost of intervention and act as a
forcing function to grow the economy and create jobs. Currently, much
of Afghanistan's revenue is leaking, either by not being collected or
by being illegitimately collected. Licensing and procurement are areas
where much corruption occurs and are areas where more robust systems of
transparency and oversight could bring significant financial gains.
Finally, ensuring that Afghanistan's budget resources--both from
domestic revenue and from international donations--are well spent
across the services the population so desperately need, is key to the
stability and development of the country. The State Department's
efforts to ensure more funding is spent through Afghan institutions is
centrally important: Not only is it much more cost efficient, an Afghan
teacher costing less than two hundredths of a foreign project worker,
but only by using the system will it begin to function. The Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund contains a set of benchmarks and transparency
and audit requirements that make the budget function like a dual key
system. American funds should either be channeled through this vehicle,
or another similar mechanism should be established directly with each
line ministry. Already ARTF, through its leverage over the Afghan
budget, has brought about major increases in transparency in the
Ministry of Water and Power and in the Ministry of Education.
The fourth pillar is basic services for the Afghan population.
Roughly, a village can reasonably expect five sets of services:
Irrigation, that allows them to grow their crops and sustain their
livelihoods; access to transportation (a road), to permit movement to
the nearest town to access markets and health care; basic health and
education; access to water for drinking, and electricity. Villages are
capable of organizing many of these services themselves, and the
National Solidarity Program was set up in 2002 as the vehicle to
channel funding and technical support to the villages in order to
support these efforts. This program allows the villages to choose,
design and implement projects that suit their own needs. A set of
National Programs which complement National Solidarity Program now need
to be created and implemented--including those for agriculture, power,
education and skills, and water. Each of these will set out a national
framework of policy and a package of basic services for each district,
to be implemented through the most efficient mechanism whether through
local government, private sector or NGO. Existing National Programs
currently function effectively, but all will need constant review and
adjustment.
There is often debate about whether the ``central government'' can
carry out the services discussed and whether decentralization is
necessary. This is a false debate. The real question is for each
function, who needs to do what and at which level, across the five
levels of Afghan governance--capital, province, district, municipality,
and village. For example, in health, the capital city will monitor
disease and provide the large specialized hospitals, but every district
requires its own hospital and villages will need basic clinics so that
travel times can be reduced. This is especially necessary as
Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world
for a woman to give birth, and much of this problem has its roots in
the long distances that must be traveled. NSP can build the clinic
building, but the Ministry of Public Health will have to provide the
staff. Tightly coordinated ministerial actions are needed. In public
finance, only the capital is authorized to issue money supply, but
every province has a finance office to collect and distribute revenue.
With National Solidarity Program, each village designs and manages its
own project, but engineers are available at the district level and the
accounts are kept at the capital level. In the original terminology,
``national'' means countrywide, not confined to the capital city.
To enable the Afghan civil service to carry out these functions, we
will need to invest significant sums in education as this sector has
been severely neglected. You cannot transition a handoff of governing
authority if there is no professional class and no trained middle
class. There is a crisis of education and training, owing to the lost
generation of the 1980s and 1990s and the failure to invest in Afghan
education and training post-2001. There is an urgent need for a
properly resourced Civil Service training school, with branches across
the country. However, if basic education only reaches to age 11, it is
just as important to ensure that the pipeline of education from age 11
up to professional age exists. It is just not possible to train a
doctor, engineer or accountant without proper institutional resources.
If sufficient skills are to be created to manage Afghanistan's civil
service, private sector and civil society, we need an urgent inquiry
into the degree to which Afghanistan's secondary and tertiary education
and vocational training system is functioning and where the gaps are. I
might mention finally that building up the ANSF, both ANP and ANA,
requires the formation of officer classes, and so few are literate that
this is an immediate bottleneck on our ability to put an Afghan face on
security operations.
Last, building the state cannot be seen as the total solution. As
in any society, the key is the balance between the state, market, and
civil society institutions. Significant attention is required to
nurture Afghanistan's market institutions, to help create the space for
the vibrant civil society and public discussion that will hold the
government accountable, and to allow for infusions of foreign and
domestic capital and the building of sustainable economic growth.
the extent of the challenge
To express guarded optimism is not to underestimate the challenges
in building governance. The legacy of three decades of war has left an
entrenched set of actors and networks deeply embedded in flows of
illicit trade. While there was considerable progress in building
legitimacy and foundations for institutions after 2001, to such an
extent that key powers could claim in 2005 that the country was stable
and plan for troop withdrawals, after 2005, stability in Afghanistan
began to decline. In 2004, a memo (the ``Cairo memo'') was discussed by
the key ground representatives of the United States, the United
Nations, and Afghanistan, detailing the growing factors of disorder and
corruption in the governance arrangements that would lead to the
revitalization of the Taliban and loss of trust of the Afghan people.
This was primarily owing to the failure to adequately resource
legitimate institutions. The memo documented how supporting the
``reform team'' to continue an agenda of institution-building would
have required an urgent financial commitment of $200m and/or
facilitating control of two border posts and their customs revenue to
pass to the national treasury. As support for this agenda nor funds for
it could be found, the reform team left office in 2005, recognizing
that the internal systems of governance would most likely begin to
collapse.
Back in 2002, during the preparation of Afghanistan's first post-
Bonn budget, Afghanistan required a budget of $500m for the year to be
able to pay its 240,000 civil servants (including doctors, teachers,
and engineers) their basic salaries of $50 per month and to cover
essential running costs. As the Treasury was empty, assistance was
required. Unfortunately, donors initially committed only $20 million to
the 2002 Afghan budget, meaning that Afghanistan's leaders could never
in the 2002-2004 period meet the basic costs of sustaining services. At
the same time, $1.7 billion was committed to an aid system to build
parallel organizations, which ended up employing most of the same
doctors and teachers as drivers, assistants, and translators to operate
small projects at significant multiples of their former salaries. While
some additional funds were later committed to the World Bank-run Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund, this was never enough to sustain basic
governance, and the civil service atrophied.
Rather than support the essential nationwide services and programs
within a framework of rule of law and policy, donors launched thousands
of small, badly coordinated projects. Billions of dollars were spent
through the aid complex, resulting in little tangible change for most
Afghan citizens. Their perception of aid projects was most vividly
captured for me in a story told to me by villagers in a remote district
of Bamiyan, who described their multimillion dollar project to provide
wood to build homes literally going up in smoke.
The prescriptions of the ``aid complex'' not only bypassed, but
actively undermined Afghan capability: For example, it was the aid
donors who forbade any investment in the Afghan budget for education or
training over the age of 11, citing the overriding imperative of
investing in primary education. Similarly, a $60 million provincial and
district governance program designed to restore policing and justice
services was turned down for funding in 2002 on the basis that
governance was not ``poverty-reducing.''
At the same time, regional strongmen were strengthened over the
last 8 years. This was a way of ``solving'' the vacuum of power left by
the exit of the Taliban, but this solution has led to the arbitrary
exercise of authority, predation, and fantastic levels of corruption
which, by preventing the government from functioning, have left an
opening for every possible destabilizing element, from cartel members
to simple criminal gangs to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A strategy for
negotiating with them is necessary in order to bring them within the
rule of law through a combination of sanctions, the application of
justice, and incentives to cooperate with legitimate state and market
activities.
Partly as a result of the underfunding of Afghan institutions, the
failure to build a robust enough set of accountabilities for either the
government or the aid system, the reempowerment of jihadi commanders to
whom operations were farmed out, and the failure to set out a
comprehensive water and agriculture policy to restore what the Russians
destroyed, narcoinfluence and other forms of corruption set in at the
heart of government institutions. This was most clearly manifested in
the police, customs and the way that government assets were stripped,
ranging from land and mines through to licenses for a range of the
country's assets. It is no wonder that the two top concerns of Afghans
all over the country are insecurity and corruption. Often they are more
afraid of the police and the judiciary than they are of the Taliban.
what will it take
The U.S. Embassy team on the ground under the leadership of
Ambassador Eikenberry has moved rapidly to develop approaches and
strategies to support good governance and deliver development. Under
current plans, ministries will be held to standards with funds
conditional upon performance, as was done successfully with
Afghanistan's health program. Accountability systems are going into
place. There are large-scale plans for the rapid delivery of basic
services to cleared villages, through the National Area Based
Development Program, which involves the cooperation of key ministries
to get basic services down to the district level, and the National
Solidarity Program, which gets basic means of life all the way to the
village level. Delivery is planned in such a way that Afghans are
actually asked what they want (and this is the most crucial change of
all: Consultation is security) and are employed to build it.
Participation of the populace and the building of civil society go hand
in hand with economic aid. Employment is crucial, and the new model of
assistance being put into place emphasizes keeping money flowing in the
local economy, rather than exporting funds as subcontracting
percentages to Washington and Brussels. If young Afghans have
legitimate opportunities for employment, recruitment opportunities for
the Taliban can be rapidly reduced. The very formation of competent
village councils and the existence of district councils immediately
allow opportunities for reconciliation. Once a new Afghan Government is
in place and agreement can be reached on a roadmap for governance and
development, it will be vital to finalize and resource these plans for
governance and development.
A robust plan for building the capability of the Afghan National
Army now exists. The same type of rigorous plan needs to exist for each
of the other key ministries, including Finance, Education, Health,
Water, Power, Agriculture and Mining. This does not mean that the
United States needs to resource trainers or funding for each of these.
On the contrary, for many of these ministries, resourcing should come
from domestic Afghan revenue and only a small number of advisers will
be necessary. However, if governance and development is to be taken
seriously, it is necessary for each ministry, its laws, policies,
personnel and organizational maps to be understood. All too often in
the past, aid planning has completely bypassed these existing
structures and built thousands of small projects in parallel, ignoring
for example that there is already a health or education service in
place that requires strengthening.
The key steps for supporting each function are first to understand
the existing context, including the organization, and then to agree
upon a plan for strengthening its capability with the relevant
officials, whether through financing, technical expertise, or other
resources. The concept of the ``National Program'' harnesses such
inputs into actual delivery of services, so that accountability for
outcomes is built into the system. As Afghans need to see results
broadly, at scale, national programs allow for implementation at scale,
rather than boutique projects that, while in certain cases desirable,
will not have the impact in a short timeframe. This approach will allow
for progressive ``Afghanization,'' while making resourcing dependent on
meeting standards of accountability, transparency, and delivery. The
face that delivers development must be Afghan, even if actual delivery
takes place from whoever can get things done. Planning must start from
the outset for what and how will be handed over. This means train up
and mentor, rather than build big operations that cannot be maintained.
Such plans for reconstruction and development can only work if the
military provides security. Insecurity has now spread across much of
the country and additional forces will be required to protect the
population. Accordingly, resourcing the military plans is central to
the success of efforts in governance and development.
On the civilian side, changes in how aid is designed and spent are
needed. The models of the National Health and Solidarity Programs
should be generalized. Greater commitments to ARTF are needed, or
adoption of a ``ministry certification scheme'' whereby funding to a
ministry's national program can flow, dependent on certain standards
being reached in phases. At the moment, there appears to be a greater
focus on sending in consultants and experts, rather than focusing on
how we can equip Afghans to make Afghan institutions self-sufficient.
Our experience in designing national programs has shown that the most
successful programs often involved thousands of Afghans but only a
handful of foreign experts. It will be a considerable task for the
United States to unite the thousands of fragmented aid agencies--many
of which it finances--behind one coherent, rule-based, restructured
delivery system.
Changes are required in the way that foreign assistance is
delivered, but also in the leadership style and policies and priorities
of the Afghan Government. It can be debated whether governance and
development initiatives will succeed if there is not an Afghan
Government in place that is sufficiently committed to serving its
citizens and building its own capability. It is certainly evident that
the more committed and competent the government leaders are, both at
the top, and throughout the system, the more effective development and
governance initiatives will be. Therefore, current discussions to form
a new Afghan administration are critical. Use of strict
conditionalities and benchmarks can help to incentivize this new
administration and encouraging the new administration to include
competent and honest leaders in key positions will be fundamental to
the ability to make core government services work. Where there are
reformers in place, allowing them the space to formulate and execute
their own programs, rather than substituting for them, is desirable.
As described above, concrete plans are also required to grow the
economy and create jobs, and to open the space for public discussion
and civil society. Afghanistan does not have to be poor. It has an
abundance of natural gas, lapis lazuli, copper, lime, and wonderful
agricultural land along with some of the most plentiful water resources
in the world. With the right system Afghanistan could become a net
exporter of electricity. Building value chains and webs around key
assets including agriculture, fruit and vegetable processing and
livestock; mining and jewelry; textiles production; and urban services
will create jobs and revenue. To support these activities, new
instruments are required. OPIC has run a very successful program
offering risk guarantees to investors. This program should be expanded.
Other, similar, programs are required to provide small- and medium-
sized loans, risk guarantees and insurance. We should also look to
using bond financing, enterprise funds and other vehicles, in
conjunction with careful examination as to how key assets and licenses
should be allocated. A regional perspective for investment in key
economic assets, including water, power, transportation and trade,
could catalyze economic growth and build incentives for political
cooperation.
who does what?
A joint civil-military plan is needed to reflect these plans. The
plan should be in the nature of a ``sovereignty strategy'' designed to
restore Afghan institutional capability for each key function. The
strategy should be negotiated with the new Afghan Government, and have
clear commitments, benchmarks and redlines for the short and medium
term. Clear mechanisms of accountability on use of financing should be
agreed upon, especially regarding collection of revenue, licensing, and
procurement. Efforts should be made to ensure that the military and
civilian components fully understand and are satisfied with each
other's plans, and that the means to coordinate at all levels are in
place.
While the United States has the clear lead in the Afghanistan
effort, choices as to how to build partnerships with other countries
and multilateral organizations must be made. For a narrative of a
global partnership, a U.N. mandate, as obtained in late 2001, is
important, and can provide the basis for partnership with China,
Russia, Japan and the gulf, each bringing important contributions. NATO
is clearly critical to the security effort, but to avoid a West-East
narrative, NATO's efforts should be embedded within a U.N. mandate.
While the United Nations is clearly important for its mandate, and
in carrying out some key tasks, its operational capability--
particularly in management and financial accountability--is very
questionable. If it had one task to carry out over the past 2 years, it
was to manage the recent election, and it spent more than $250m on a
badly organized process. In my view, 80 percent of the flaws in the
process were avoidable, with simple planning and design and these same
flaws were evident and documented during the 2004 elections and had all
been pointed out to the United Nations in advance in a letter to the
Secretary General. Back in 2001, when a small team (of which I was a
member) were preparing for the political framework and reconstruction
process in Afghanistan, U.N. agencies claimed that they would use the
appeals for Afghanistan to generate the funds to pay off their arrears
from the 1990s, and much money remains unaccounted for. U.N. agencies
still for the most part refuse to share their accounts and audits with
their governing boards. Therefore allocating operational tasks to the
U.N. and its agencies, especially in the area of aid coordination,
should be done with great caution. The U.N. mandate could cover the
international presence, but tasks will be better allocated to other
groups best suited for each task.
Alternative mechanisms should be found for key tasks. The Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, is an important
coordination mechanism that is already in place and that backs the
Afghan budget. This mechanism ensures transparency in audit reports and
in the review of the Afghan budget. This mechanism should be
strengthened. An additional possible mechanism would be a World Bank/
IMF plan for accountability, which could certify accountability on a
regular basis. Dedicated agencies could be established for two
activities: The first, the establishment and oversight of
reconstruction plans and activities. Such an agency existed in
Afghanistan 2001-04, called the Afghan Assistance Coordination
Authority, which served to design and launch the key National Programs.
A similar entity could be established, perhaps as a Joint Commission
between the United States and Afghanistan. PRTs could then report to
such a structure. Another entity dedicated to planning and supervising
education could be established to train and mentor Afghans across its
civilian institutions.
A strategy for Afghan civilian institutions could be, but does not
necessarily need to be driven by foreign civilian actors: The important
factor is that there is a plan. A mistake in logic is often to assume
that because Afghans need a functioning polity, government and
institutions, it is going to be foreign aid bureaucracies that will
deliver this to them. This is a fatal flaw in logic as these
organizations themselves are broken and often make the situation worse.
A clear strategy and process for rebuilding legitimate Afghan
governance, regardless of who delivers it, is required. From there,
functions and tasks can be allocated to different actors.
conclusion
Getting Afghanistan right rests fundamentally on establishing good
enough governance. Gearing the international presence to partner with
Afghans in their attempt to stabilize their country through reclaiming
their sovereignty, only for as long as this is required, will reset the
partnership and lay the basis for exit of the United States and its
allies. Now is the time to finalize such a plan, set benchmarks for its
realization, and ensure it is resourced and supported to enable its
implementation.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Lockhart. An important point
of view, and I'm confident people will want to follow up on it.
Dr. Hosseini, again, thank you very, very much for being
with us and sharing your very important and, you know, on-the-
ground vision here. We appreciate it.
[Business meeting takes place from 10:04 a.m. to 10:06 a.m.]
STATEMENT OF KHALED HOSSEINI, U.S. ENVOY FOR THE U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), SAN JOSE, CA
Dr. Hosseini. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
On behalf of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, I would like to express my
appreciation for this opportunity to appear before you and to
offer my perspectives and concerns on the Afghan refugee
situation and the overall conditions in Afghanistan.
In the way of background, UNHCR currently has 12 offices
inside Afghanistan, and it's had a presence in Afghanistan
since the late 1980s, and maintained an office in Afghanistan
during the Taliban rule in the 1990s. At the peak of the Afghan
displacement crisis in the mid-1990s, some 8 million Afghans
fled home and went to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. And after
the fall of the Taliban in 2001, UNHCR began the largest
repatriation operation in the history of the agency,
repatriating, since 2002, some 5 million Afghans. UNHCR also
has offices in Iran and Pakistan, through which it assists some
2.6 million Afghan refugees who have yet to return home.
I came back yesterday from a 5-day trip to Afghanistan,
where I met with ordinary Afghans, where I met with refugees,
displaced people, aid workers, and officials. And I will focus
my comments today first on the needs of the Afghan refugees,
particularly those who have recently returned to Afghanistan
from neighboring countries, and then on the needs of the Afghan
people, in general.
On the issue of refugees, some have reintegrated
successfully and have resumed relatively settled lives. But
many that I met continue to struggle. It has been a major
challenge, to say the least, for many returnees to restart
their lives in a country where basic services have collapsed.
Some of the returnees that I met last week lived in squalid,
abandoned public buildings or in tents or on government land in
dry, remote, and inaccessible areas. They complained to me of
the lack of basic services, like water, food, schools, clinics,
and, most importantly, jobs. Some had a great fear of the
coming winter.
Given these difficult realities, maybe it's not surprising
that 2.6 million Afghans still live in exile in Iran and
Pakistan. Eighty percent of them have lived there for more than
two decades, and half of them were born there. And after 30
years of living in exile, and giving the difficult conditions
inside Afghanistan and the state's low absorption capacity,
many of them may not wish to ever come home.
It is important, however, that return and reintegration be
made as attractive as possible to Afghan refugees. And for that
to happen, existing conditions inside Afghanistan have to be
remedied so the environment within the country is more
conducive to the social and economic well-being of refugees.
That means Afghan authorities, in partnership with the
international community, have to work on critical pull-factors
like security, employment opportunity, access to land, water,
shelter, education, and health facilities, in order for
repatriation to become a more attractive option, and for
refugees to become self-sufficient and reintegrate
successfully. The needs of returning refugees and IDPs have to
be included in national programs.
UNHCR can help, but its expertise lies in emergency
response and in legal, physical, and material protection. As
part of the initial reintegration process, UNHCR provides
shelter, water, transport and family grants. But, returning
refugees need more. They need security, they need stability,
they need economic and social opportunities. And though UNHCR
can certainly act as a partner and as an advocate for these
needs, it cannot provide them, and it has to rely on
reconstruction and development partners to create the
socioeconomic conditions and opportunities that are required
for durable return. And so, to that end, donor support and
continuing engagement of the international community is
indispensable.
On a broader front, let me say that Afghanistan has been in
a state of conflict for almost 30 years. The country and its
population made huge sacrifices during the Soviet occupation.
Every family that I met and that I spoke to had been touched by
tragedy, tragedy on a scale that few of us here can imagine.
Many Afghans believe that the final and violent chapter of
the cold war was inked with their blood. Today, my impression
is that Afghanistan faces yet another critical and pivotal
moment in its recent unstable history. I believe there's an
opportunity in Afghanistan--an opportunity to build on the
progresses that have been made since 2002. And despite the
sobering realities, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that
there has been progress. For instance, 6 million children are
enrolled in some 9,000 schools around the country. Afghans have
greater access to the health sector. Millions of kids have been
vaccinated. Commerce and enterprise inside Kabul are
appreciably increased. Infrastructure is booming. And
technology, especially telecommunication, appears poised to
leapfrog Afghan business development. There's free press and
greater personal freedom.
But, progress hasn't been fast enough or deep enough, and
all of us would like to see it reach more Afghans. And there
are many challenges that can undermine the progress that we
have seen. The decline in refugee repatriation this year, for
instance, is an indicator that security remains a major
obstacle, and that the economy has not grown quickly enough,
especially in rural areas. Afghanistan remains one of the
poorest countries in the world. Poverty, in fact, is the No. 1
killer in Afghanistan. Average life expectancy is one of the
lowest in the world. Twenty-five-thousand-plus women die every
year during childbirth. That's more deaths than those caused by
all the suicide bombs, IEDs, and airstrikes combined. And
though, historically, there is no tradition of extremism in
Afghanistan, poverty can make people--especially unemployed,
aimless, young people--more vulnerable to exploitation by
extremist groups.
Military intervention is an important part of
counterinsurgency, but it's only part of it. Counterinsurgency
has to include social and economic intervention, as well. When
people have a roof over their head, food on the table, and a
school to send their kids to, they're less likely to be
influenced by extremist forces.
These are huge challenges to be addressed, and they
shouldn't be minimized. During my visit, all the Afghans that I
encountered expressed their concerns about the future and some
disappointment about the present. They clearly expected more
from their government, but none of them wanted to go back to
the past. And I see no reason why we should allow ourselves to
be defeatists and let the country slide back toward its
troubled past. The Afghan people don't want the moon, and we
should secure the modest levels of improvements in people's
lives that will earn us such good will and make such a
difference in Afghanistan's stability.
There are opportunities to be seized, then, if all parties
accept the responsibilities. That begins, first and foremost,
with the Afghans themselves. They have to do their part. This
is their country, after all. Afghan leaders have to acknowledge
that their people expect more from them, and rightfully so.
They have to restore people's faith in governmental
institutions.
But, I stress this, that the international community, for
its part, must maintain its continued support for the Afghan
people, and it has to be patient. I'm aware of the current
debate in this country about the Afghan war, and I feel deep
empathy for the families who have lost loved ones in
Afghanistan. I know I speak for most Afghans when I say how
grateful Afghans are for their service and sacrifice. And
contrary to what some have said, Afghans are not an ungrateful
people. But, let's not let the sacrifices of our
servicepeople--men and women--be in vain. Let's be patient.
Let's consider that no country in history has been able to
establish a functioning state, a performing government, a
strong economy, and a stable society in just a handful of
years.
Afghans are a proud people, and they don't want to be a
source of regional and international instability. They don't
want to be known for producing refugees and economic migrants
around the world. They want no more and no less than other
people in developing countries want for their children and
themselves. If the basic essentials can be provided--housing,
education, and health care--I truly believe that this closure
can be brought to this dark chapter of the country's recent
history.
Mr. Chairman, I again appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you, and I'm happy to answer any questions that you or
other members of the committee may have.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hosseini follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Khaled Hosseini, U.S. Envoy for UNHCR, San
Jose, CA
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) I would
like to express our appreciation for the opportunity to appear before
you today to offer our perspectives and concerns regarding the Afghan
refugee situation.
My name is Khaled Hosseini, and I am the U.S. Envoy for UNHCR, a
position that I have held since 2006.
UNHCR currently has 12 offices inside Afghanistan. It has been
working inside Afghanistan since 1989 to support the return and
integration of Afghan refugees. Since 2002, more than 5 million Afghans
have returned to their homeland, including more than 4 million with
UNHCR's support. UNHCR also has offices in Pakistan and Iran, through
which we continue to assist some 2.6 million Afghan refugees.
I returned yesterday from a 5-day trip to Afghanistan, where I met
with returned refugees, ordinary Afghans, aid workers, and officials. I
will focus my comments today first on the needs of Afghan refugees,
particularly those who have recently returned to Afghanistan from
neighboring countries, and on the needs of the Afghan people in
general.
In a nutshell, my impression is that Afghanistan faces yet another
pivotal moment in its recent, unstable history. There is an opportunity
to consolidate the clear progress that has been made since 2002 in a
number of areas--education, health, energy, trade, communications, and
construction. Progress in these sectors has assisted one of the largest
repatriation movements in history.
No country in history has been able to establish a functioning
state, a performing government, a strong economy, and a stable society
in just a few years. After the level of conflict that a poor country
like Afghanistan has suffered for three decades, we should not be
surprised that recovery and development will take some time.
To address these issues, my strongest recommendation is that the
international community maintain its continued support for the Afghan
people. During my visit, all the Afghans that I encountered expressed
their concern about the future and some disappointment about the
present. They clearly expected more from their government and more from
the international community. But none of them wanted to go back to the
past. And I see no reason why we should allow ourselves to become
defeatists and let the country slide back toward the past. I see no
reason why we cannot secure the modest level of improvement in people's
lives that would earn us some good will and make such a difference to
Afghanistan's stability.
In my judgment, the international community--not just the U.S.
Government--must press the Afghan Government to demonstrate greater
commitment to improving the lives of its citizens. But we, the
international community, must also hold ourselves accountable. Could we
have organized ourselves more coherently? Could we have worked more
cost-effectively? Could we have prioritized our support more logically
to address the most pressing needs? I believe the answer to all these
questions is ``Yes.'' I am nevertheless convinced that the challenges
Afghanistan faces can be overcome, difficult though they may sometimes
appear.
background
UNHCR is charged by the international community with ensuring
refugee protection and identifying durable solutions to refugee
situations. The agency's mandate is grounded in the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (hereinafter
``the Refugee Convention''), which define a refugee as a person having
a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group.
UNHCR has had a presence in Afghanistan since the late 1980s and
maintained an office during the Taliban rule in the 1990s. At the peak
of the Afghan displacement crisis in the mid-1990s, some 8 million
refugees had fled their homes to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. After
the fall of the Taliban in 2001, UNHCR began the largest repatriation
operation in the history of the agency. Since 2002, UNHCR has
repatriated more than 5 million Afghans. Despite such a large number of
returns, approximately 1.5 million Afghans remain in Pakistan and
approximately 1 million in Iran. In recent years, there has been a
decline in returns, which peaked in 2006. Security remains of great
concern to Afghans residing in the surrounding region, and surveys
demonstrate that the major additional challenges to return are
primarily social and economic in nature.
unhcr activities
Upon returning to Afghanistan, families face difficulties
establishing a new home and securing employment. The single most
pressing need of the returnees is shelter. UNHCR has established a
shelter program in Afghanistan in close cooperation with the Afghan
Government. Since 2002, we have built close to 200,000 houses for
returning refugee families in rural areas. The government's own
National Land Allocation Scheme offers the potential to assist landless
returnees who so far have not been able to benefit from UNHCR's shelter
program. To date, more than 300,000 plots of government land have been
identified in 29 provinces.
UNHCR focuses its efforts in helping the Government of Afghanistan
and local communities develop strategies to address the reasons for
displacement. In addition, the office assists the government in
strengthening its capacity to plan, manage and assist the return,
reintegration, and protection of refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs).
UNHCR also provides protection and assistance to IDPs. The
displacement situation inside Afghanistan is highly complex, with
factors such as insecurity, economic hardship, and cultural traditions
providing a backdrop. In 2008, more than 235,000 IDPs were identified
throughout the country. The majority of these individuals were
displaced due to protracted conflict, poverty, and livelihood failure
in the southern region of Afghanistan.
Any refugee or IDP return and reintegration operation is a complex
process. Afghanistan's is perhaps the most challenging of all. It was
clear on this recent visit that security and employment are the most
essential requirements. It was also evident, however, that resolving
land and property issues in rural areas is assuming greater importance
as enlarged families return to their places of origin.
After 6 years of some of the highest levels of return ever achieved
by a UNHCR operation, signs of limited absorption capacity were
apparent. As such, continued high levels are unlikely until greater
security allows a more stable government and a more vibrant economy to
take root. Overloading the fragile reintegration conditions would be
counterproductive and could generate internal displacement and even out
migration. It will require the coordinated interventions of assistance
actors and government authorities to build greater absorption capacity
in the future.
observations and recommendations
Although I met with some refugees who have reintegrated
successfully and have resumed relatively settled lives, many continue
to struggle. It has been a major challenge for many returnees to
restart their lives in a country where basic services have collapsed.
The returnees that I met lived in squalid, abandoned public buildings
or in tents, or on government land in dry, inaccessible areas. They
complained to me of the lack of basic services like water, food,
schools, clinics, and jobs. They had a great fear of the coming winter.
This isn't entirely surprising. Afghanistan's population increased by
20 percent in a mere 6 years. This would be a huge challenge for any
country, even a developed one. For a poor nation like Afghanistan,
decimated by 30 years of war, this is an absolutely enormous figure.
Given these difficult realities, maybe it's not surprising that 2.6
million Afghans still live in exile in Iran and Pakistan. Eighty
percent of them have lived there for more than two decades, and nearly
half of them were born there. After 30 years of exile, and given the
difficult conditions inside Afghanistan and the state's decreased
absorption capacity, many of them may not wish to return home.
It is important, however, that return and reintegration is made as
attractive as possible. For that to happen, existing conditions inside
Afghanistan have to be remedied, so that the environment within the
country is more conducive to the social and economic well-being of
refugees. That means that Afghan authorities and the international
community have to work on critical pull factors like security,
employment opportunities, and access to land, water, shelter,
education, and health facilities, in order for repatriation to become
an attractive option and for refugees to become self-sufficient and
reintegrate successfully. The needs of returning refugees and IDPs have
to be included in national programs.
It is also important that UNHCR continue to view repatriation and
reintegration as an important and achievable solution for as many
Afghans as possible who wish to return. This will have the additional
virtue of addressing the concerns expressed by the neighboring asylum
countries that repatriation receives insufficient support.
To that end, it is essential that both the Afghan authorities and
the international community provide both political and financial
support to Afghanistan's National Development Strategy for the return
and reintegration of refugees and IDPs.
UNHCR's expertise lies in emergency response and legal, physical,
and material protection. Returning refugees also need security,
stability, economic, and social opportunities. UNHCR can act as the
advocate for these needs. However, beyond the initial reintegration
assistance that UNHCR provides in shelter, water, transport and family
grants, we depend very much on our reconstruction and development
partners to create the socioeconomic conditions and opportunities
required to sustain return. To that end, donor support and the
continued engagement of the international community and the Government
of Afghanistan will be critical to sustaining refugee repatriation in
the years to come.
I believe there is an opportunity to build on the progress that has
been made since 2002. And despite the stream of negative news, we
should not lose sight of the fact that there has indeed been progress,
in a number of areas. For instance, over 6 million children are
enrolled in some 9,000 schools around the country. Afghans have greater
access now to the health sector; millions of children have been
vaccinated against preventable illnesses. Commerce and enterprise are
appreciably increased. Infrastructure is booming in cities like Kabul,
and technology, particularly telecommunications and wireless
technology, appear poised to leapfrog business development in
Afghanistan. There is free press and greater personal freedom.
But progress has not been as fast and as deep as all of us here
would like, and it has not reached as many people as we would like. And
there are many challenges that can undermine the progress that we have
seen. The decline in refugee repatriation this year, for instance, is
an indicator that security remains an obstacle and that the economy has
not grown quickly enough, especially in rural areas. Afghanistan
remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty is in fact
the No. 1 killer in Afghanistan. More than 25,000 women die during
childbirth every year. That's more deaths than those caused by all the
suicide bombs, IED attacks, and air strikes combined. And although
historically there is no tradition of extremism in Afghanistan, poverty
can make people, especially young people, more vulnerable to
exploitation by extremist groups. It has been stated many times that
improved security alone will not end the insurgency. Investment in the
political, economic, social, and cultural spheres is also necessary.
There are opportunities that can be seized if all parties accept
their responsibilities. The Afghans, certainly, have to do their part.
This is their country after all. Afghan leaders have to acknowledge
that their people expect more of them, and rightfully so. They have to
restore the people's faith in the state institutions, and demonstrate
leadership, vision, and a greater commitment to improving the lives of
the population. For its part, the international community will need to
organize its assistance more coherently around commonly agreed
objectives.
conclusion
Afghanistan has been in a state of conflict for almost three
decades now. The country and its population made huge sacrifices during
the Soviet occupation. Almost every family has been touched by tragedy
on a scale that few of us can imagine. Many Afghans believe that the
final violent chapter of the cold war was inked with their blood.
Yes, Afghans do not want to be a source of regional and
international instability. They do not want to be known for producing
refugees and economic migrants around the world. They want no more and
no less than other people in developing countries want for themselves
and their children. If the basic essentials can be provided--housing,
education, health care, and job opportunities--I sincerely believe that
a new chapter of hope and happiness can be brought to the Afghan
people.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
And thank you, all of you, for helping to set the stage.
There are a lot of questions that flow out of your testimonies,
and I'm confident that colleagues here will pursue them.
What's interesting to me is--I was sitting here thinking--I
was listening to your testimony, Dr. Hosseini, and to you, Ms.
Lockhart--both of you describing, obviously, an urgent
humanitarian need, an urgent challenge, in terms of nation-
building--state-building--the challenge of governance. On the
other hand, we've had troops on the ground and we have been in
Afghanistan for 8 years now--we're nearing the 8-year
anniversary right now--and the test for us, in terms of
policy--I mean, if you took away the al-Qaeda, and you took
away the attacks, then there would be a challenge to us as to
what our foreign policy aid program ought to be and what the
levels of assistance we might give are. But, right now, our
challenge is also to try to figure out what the level of
military involvement--troop involvement--ought to be; indeed,
what our security interests are, and how they can be furthered
with respect to Afghanistan.
The President of the United States has defined the mission
in a more limited fashion, really, by saying that our goal is
to take on al-Qaeda, dismantle them and/or eliminate them, and
to prevent them from having a safe haven and a sanctuary from
which they can attack the United States, and to prevent the
destabilization of Pakistan, where we have an even larger and
more vital interest.
So, the test for us, here, as we think about our policy,
going forward--and we need to ask you questions about the
nation-building and the relationship of it to those interests--
but, the key here is really to try to hone in, I think, on
those interests, and how we best serve them.
One of the essential questions we need to get at--I think,
Ambassador Crocker, you can, perhaps, help us do that--is, sort
of, you know, while you were there for a period of time, the
Pakistanis proved themselves capable of living pretty
comfortably, with a pretty awful Taliban regime. It didn't end
Pakistan's capacity to govern, it didn't threaten them
existentially. Now, today that's changed a little bit,
obviously, because of the Haqqani network, the Baitullah Mehsud
network, the presence of al-Qaeda, and other things. But, the
question for us--and I want to ask you to begin here--is--help
us to understand--define for us what the real impact of the
Taliban is today, and might be, on the stability of Pakistan.
And would it, in fact, be an existential challenge to them if
the Taliban took over in Afghanistan today?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you Mr. Chairman. That is,
indeed, a key question. And, as you rightly point out, we've
seen an evolution. During the 1990s, Pakistan did, indeed, work
out a modus vivendi with a Taliban-led government in
Afghanistan, and had relative stability at home. But, that has
changed. We have seen the evidence--you pointed to the Haqqani
network, the efforts of the now late Baitullah Mehsud, the
developments in the Swat Valley. We have seen an increasing
militancy within Pakistan, not restricted just to the border
areas, that is growing to the point where, for many Pakistanis,
it does raise at least the question of an existential threat.
Now, I think there are other questions in Pakistan--again,
about our staying power--that still cause some hedging of bets
there. The ultimate nightmare in Pakistan would be to see us
once again decide we're done--we're done in Afghanistan and
we're done in Pakistan, a repeat of the 1990s--leaving them
with what, by that point, may be a truly dangerous enemy. So--
--
The Chairman. Let me--can I just interrupt you for a moment
there? I don't think--I mean, let me make it clear, from my
point of view, Senator Lugar's point of view--I think, the
committee--there's no talk, here, and there is--I don't want
anybody even beginning to think that there is a contemplation
of not being committed to Pakistan, or of understanding the
challenge of Pakistan. And there--the legislation we passed,
which you referred to, states that commitment, and we
understand the importance of Pakistan. There's no talk of
diminishing that.
What the question really begs is this, To what degree is
Afghanistan, in fact, left to its own devices or with a lesser
footprint, at jeopardy? Are our interests, in fact, challenged
if we had a different approach to Afghanistan?
Ambassador Crocker. I think they would be challenged.
Simply put, Mr. Chairman, I see reciprocity, here. I don't
think long-term stability can be brought to Afghanistan without
Pakistan also stabilizing. But, the reverse is also true. I
don't think that Pakistan can face up to the challenges of
militancy--not just on its western borders, but in the center
of the country--if that militancy succeeds in Afghanistan. We
all know the history of the Durand Line, its porosity, its
artificial nature. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than
there are in Afghanistan. So, a militant ascendency in
Afghanistan, I think, will be severely destabilizing for
Pakistan.
The Chairman. And is there any degree--yesterday it was
suggested by Rory Stewart that perhaps the presence of troops
and the manner of the mission in Afghanistan is, to some
degree, destabilizing Pakistan, that it's adding to the
capacity--coupled with the corruption of the governance, it's
adding to this ability of the Taliban to, kind of, you know,
find recruits and make mischief.
Ambassador Crocker. My experience is now somewhat dated. I
left Pakistan in 2007. But, as of that time, I knew of no
senior Pakistani figure, military or civilian, who was
advocating a United States withdrawal from Afghanistan. There
was lots of criticism over how well we were prosecuting the
mission, but it was taken as a given--it--in my contacts
there--that that mission needed to be prosecuted; perhaps in
better or different ways, but that we needed to stay engaged
there.
The Chairman. Well, I'm not suggesting--I mean, I think,
just a plain old withdrawal would be disastrous on any number
of different fronts. I think what we're trying to figure out is
how to accomplish the mission, what level of mix of military
and governance improvement and nation-building, et cetera, is
appropriate. I think some people are very fearful that right
now there's sort of this nondescript, you know, loosey-goosey,
``We've got to do this here and do this here and build this,
and we're going to train the military, and we're going to do
this and that,'' and--we heard, yesterday, that to properly
effect a counterinsurgency--which has grown--I mean, the
Taliban are now in control of 37 percent of country; whereas, a
year ago, they were in control of 20-something percent. And
that growth, you know, has to make you pause and say, ``OK, you
know the western part, the northern part haven't yet reached
it,'' but we heard fears expressed that that may happen.
Therefore, to be successful, you have to begin to think about
what's the real troop ratio that you need to provide the
security for adequate counterinsurgency. And counterinsurgency,
we heard yesterday, is a distinctly different mission from
counterterrorism.
The mission, as I understood it from the President, was
more counterterrorism in Afghanistan and stabilization with
respect to Pakistan. So, we've got to figure out if we're, sort
of--you know, is there a--automatic and unavoidable mission
creep, here? Or is there an inadvertent mission creep, here? Or
is there something in our automatic response to how we protect
Pakistan that requires us to, you know, sort of feel that you
have to do the counterinsurgency? That's the--I think the
biggest tension here is, What level of counterinsurgency do you
need to support the counterterrorism effort and the
destabilization piece? And we need to, you know, kind of,
obviously, pursue it further.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to explore this thought the chairman has
mentioned, which came up in our hearing yesterday, that--
essentially, as one witness said, the major reason why we ought
to have stability in Afghanistan is to help perpetuate
stability in Pakistan, that one reason for having troops in
Afghanistan is simply because Pakistan has nuclear weapons. In
the event of the disintegration of governance in Pakistan,
various factions might take hold of the weapons. The threat of
al-Qaeda, or whatever the group it may be, gaining control of
warheads or other instruments that change the situation a great
deal is more harrowing than anything we've discussed.
Now, this is sort of a change in context from most of our
discussions of Afghanistan. Of course, we've looked at
Afghanistan in terms of how villages could become more
sufficient, how agriculture yields might rise, how drug abuse
might be curtailed; in essence, how more children could go to
school and how women's rights would be fostered. This is the
nature of the sort of discussion we've been having. The notion
that Afghanistan is important strategically to the United
States because of Pakistan is a different twist.
Furthermore, there have been discussions in the press--even
in today's press that the stability in Afghanistan may be
threatened if the people do not accept President Karzai as
their leader. It's not farfetched, some would say, that, given
that next door in Iran, people continue to take to the streets
to protest the results of the June 12, 2009, elections. There
is a situation in which, even with our government, we want to
have dialogue with Iran, as you've suggested, but the question
remains as to with whom it should be conducted. Furthermore, if
we reach an agreement, are the internal conditions there stable
enough to ensure it is implemented given the situation I've
described?
What I want, I suppose, from each of you is some idea of
the stability of potential governance at the highest levels,
quite apart from the regional levels and so forth, in
Afghanistan? And what would it mean for this stability in the
event of, as the Europeans are quoted in the press today as
saying, a third of the votes for President Karzai possibly
being invalid? That is a very significant charge, and it
suggests that the ballots that we heard, yesterday, that have
been prepared for a runoff, might be used. But, then others
say, ``Well, no, you don't understand. The weather gets bad.
The difficulties of conducting a November election in
Afghanistan are not the same as they are in the United
States.'' And furthermore, the whole thing might get shifted
into next year, which would lead to continued discussion about
stability in Afghanistan, when we were originally talking about
how Afghanistan helps Pakistan remain stable.
Now, finally, in preface, people are saying Pakistan, all
things considered, has been pretty stable this past year.
Despite the predictions that President Zardari might have grave
difficulties after 3 months, he seems to be sailing along.
However, we may have to worry much more about stability in
Afghanistan. So, no wonder, perhaps the President says, ``OK,
we'd better hang on for a while before we get into a
recommendation of troop levels, and a national debate with the
public opinion in this country that seems to have a different
timeline.'' And what I'm wondering is if we're not kicking the
can down the road, even in our decisionmaking. I did not want
to be hypercritical in my opening statement, but I just
observed that General McChrystal's report always seems to be
there. We going to discuss and discuss and discuss it, and
digest it, and all sorts of people are going to look at it, and
so forth, and then suddenly we come along, after an indefinite
period, and begin to talk about troop levels.
Now, does anyone have any comment? General Craddock, do you
have any thoughts about these ruminants that I have suggested?
General Craddock. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.
Indeed, it's a bit of a conundrum; there's no doubt. I
think Senator Kerry's opening comments, ``This is not winnable
by military means,'' absolutely; I have said that for the past
several years. The military--the security effort will set the
conditions, then, for good-enough governance, as Clare Lockhart
said, for investment, for development, for the creation of
jobs.
As you go about the country--and I also have gone about--
it's about clean water, education, a job, electricity. How hard
can that be? Obviously, it takes some security to do that.
I think, from the security perspective--and this is, again,
a NATO perspective--security and stability--there are two
fundamental issues there. One is the funding the insurgency,
whether it be the Taliban, HIG, Haqqani, whatever the case may
be. And that's largely--and has been largely; it's down
somewhat--from the narcotics business, and it has to be
addressed, and it continue to be addressed, and we have to take
away the wherewithal, the contributions, from that, after the
value is added, and that's in the processing from the raw opium
paste into the heroin, and that's why the facilities are so
important to be attacked.
Senator Lugar. General, let me interrupt that point,
because many would allege that, in addition to the insurgents
getting the money, the government is getting the money, that
the----
General Craddock. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. There are two great recipients.
General Craddock. And that--that's in my opening statement,
and indeed, it fuels the corruption. Now, I know the numbers
are down. Right now, the latest estimates--a $3 billion
industry, of which some $1 billion stays in country and $200 to
$300 million to the insurgents. Where does the rest go?
Corruption. Private and public. Has to be addressed.
But, the security will only create the conditions, then,
for what Rory Stewart says the Afghan people are morally bound
to do for themselves, which is govern better.
Senator Lugar. So, that's the basis for our security, then,
to give----
General Craddock [continuing]. It is. We----
Senator Lugar [continuing]. A framework for Afghan people
to progress.
General Craddock. I think it is protect the people, put an
umbrella--a security umbrella around the municipalities, around
the villages and towns, so that there can be investment,
development, jobs created. And when the people get that, they
will push the insurgents out.
Senator Lugar. Well, my time is completed, but I appreciate
that answer.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for holding all
these hearings on one of the most important questions facing
our Nation at this time, and we're honored to have all these
distinguished witnesses here.
These hearings have contributed to a much-needed debate
regarding our efforts in Afghanistan. And while there may be
disagreement on some issues, one point of consensus that has
clearly emerged, and that the chairman just restated, is that
no one thinks we should abandon Afghanistan. The United States
must remain engaged in helping the Afghan people resolve the
many difficult issues facing their country, through diplomatic
means and through ongoing assistance.
However, I do believe that we need to examine whether the
current military strategy may potentially be counterproductive.
I'm concerned that our massive military presence may be
contributing to instability in the region, and could be
unwittingly undermining our chief national security priority,
which is, of course, relentlessly pursing al-Qaeda's global
network.
Helping the Afghan people build a stable nation for
themselves is an important long-term goal. We must consider how
best to achieve this and whether this requires a departure from
our current, overly military-centered approach.
Ambassador Crocker, Admiral Mullen, and Special Envoy
Holbrooke have acknowledged at these hearings that there is a
danger that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan could drive
militants into Pakistan and further destabilize that nuclear-
armed country. And the DNI--Admiral Blair--has testified that,
``no improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan
taking control of its border areas and improving governance,
creating economic and educational opportunities throughout the
country.'' Do you agree that the key to preventing the spread
of militancy in the Afghan-Pakistan border region is improved
governance and effective counterterrorism in Pakistan, as
opposed to our military operations in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I would certainly join General
Craddock--and, I think, most of the members--in the strong view
that there is no purely military solution to problems in
Afghanistan, or, indeed, in Pakistan. There is a military
component to a broader solution. The military--and I apologize
for treading in General Craddock's area--talks about ``troops
to task.'' Defining the task, I think, is absolutely essential
at this point. And again, Mr. Chairman, I commend the committee
for its focus on this. What is it that we believe needs to be
done to bring, as Ms. Lockhart puts it so well, good-enough
governance to Afghanistan or to allow the Afghans that
opportunity? That is where long-term stability will lie. The
military then becomes a component of that. We need to define
our goals, our end states, the milestones along the road to
that end state, if you will, and then--but, I think, only
then--can we really talk in a coherent way about force levels
and force composition.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Hosseini, recent polls have shown the majority of
Afghans oppose an increase in U.S. troops. Do you think there's
a danger that our disregard for this preference could provoke
more militancy?
Dr. Hosseini. I think there's no question that there's a
shade of public opinion in Afghanistan that is beginning to see
the security forces in Afghanistan as an occupation. My sense
is that, compared to a few years ago, there are more people now
who view the security forces in a negative light. And the
civilian casualties have a very, very significant impact on
that public opinion.
That said, on balance, I think most Afghans know that if
the security forces were to leave, things would be a whole lot
worse. And this is because they understand that the Afghan
institutions and the Afghan security forces are not strong
enough to assure the country and its people of a normal, or
even seminormal, state of existence. At the end of the day, you
know, any state has to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate
use of force in the greater interest of the civilians at large.
And the Afghan state, at this point, is not in the position to
do that.
So, do the Afghans want foreign troops on their land? No. I
mean, they really would prefer that there not be. They're, you
know, independent, sovereign people. But, do they see it as a
necessary thing still today? I think most Afghans would concede
that point.
Senator Feingold. But, as to the question of an increase in
troops?
Dr. Hosseini. I think, when you speak to Afghans on the
ground, their fear is not more engagement, their fear is that
there will be less engagement. There is a fear of abandonment,
in Afghanistan. People have a very long memory, and they
remember back to what happened at the end of the civil--I'm
sorry--the Soviet invasion, where, for what--as you can put it,
we've decided that it was no longer in our strategic interest
who ran Afghanistan. At this point, I think the Afghan concern
is with less engagement, not with more engagement.
That said, Afghans do have a concern with how troops do
behave. You know, that's not to say that they approve of
everything. You take an 18-year-old from this country and send
them to Afghanistan, and what seems like a rudimentary and poor
and unsophisticated society is, in fact, very nuanced and
sophisticated in the way in which customs, manner, speech,
posture is transmitted and understood. So, there's a steep
learning curve for the troops there, but I think the current
leadership is addressing that.
Senator Feingold. Of course, I have tremendous respect for
your knowledge and views on this. All I can say, for the
record, is that these polling numbers, that may or may not be
accurate, certainly reflect a view against our troops staying
there for too long, and certainly against an increase.
General Craddock, in a recent letter to President Obama,
the heads of state of Great Britain, Germany, and France said
it was time to discuss metrics and timelines for international
activities in Afghanistan. And while I understand that you
favor staying the course in Afghanistan, do we at least agree
that, by making clear that we do not intend to occupy the
country indefinitely, we may be better able to build support
among the American and European people for our efforts in that
country?
General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, I would definitely agree with that. I don't believe
the intent there is to ever occupy and stay. The key, as has
been pointed out, is the enabling and development of the Afghan
national security forces. As the SACEUR for the last 2\1/2\
years, I repeatedly told NATO nations, the very first thing we
need are more trainers for the army and the police,
particularly the police. The issue is more a public security
issue than a national security issue for the people of
Afghanistan. And a competent, trained, noncorrupt police force
is important.
So, I think that what we have to do is to lay out, then, a
timeline for development of the Afghan security forces, and
hold both international support to that and the Afghans to
that, so that we can, one, establish some parameters, some
milestones--and meet them--and then measure effectiveness.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And thank each of you. I think this is an outstanding panel
and--as we had yesterday--and each of you have unique
contributions.
Ambassador Crocker, I want to thank you, especially, for
your tremendous service. And I think the testimony that you and
General Petraeus gave as we looked at a new strategy in Iraq
was most important. And I think you alluded, in your opening
testimony, how having people from the field here may be the
most important thing we can do to actually ascertain what is
the next best step.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that's going to happen soon. I
hope it's going to happen in the next few weeks. I notice
there's a resistance, for some reason, for that to happen, but
I could not agree more.
I would also say that the themes that--before you move to
our strategic interest in Afghanistan--seems to me there are
two themes that--sort of underneath that. One is that we're
there; meaning that--something for us, I think, to remember
into the future--once we put our flag up in a country, our flag
is up, and we're very resistant to ever leaving. So, that's an
underlying theme; and, No. 2, that we're sort of trying to
prove to Pakistan and Afghanistan that we're not fair-weather
friends. So, there are, sort of, two underlying themes that
make--that I know weigh much of what's happening, before you
even get into the strategic-interest piece, and that's pretty
prevalent in both countries when you're there.
So, let me just ask you this, Ambassador Crocker. What
expectations should we have in Afghanistan? What worries me, to
some degree, is, we had a success in Iraq, based on a surge; we
had a political movement, that you helped create with the Sunni
Awakening and getting them working on our side. There have been
discussions about doing the same with the Taliban. We're
obviously talking about additional troops. What are the things
that we should expect in Afghanistan? And what are the lessons
that are not necessarily transferable, and those that are?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, sir.
I'm probably the least qualified person in the room to talk
about Afghanistan in that degree of depth. I would say, though,
that I think there is--as the chairman alluded to earlier,
there is a linkage between terror and insurgency. My experience
has been that terror can find a nest within a broader
insurgency. In other words, I cannot see how, if we define our
interests narrowly, as eliminating a terrorist threat--out of
Afghanistan--that we can do that with any real degree of
assurance without also having a successful counterinsurgency
strategy. And that, again, in my not very well informed view,
takes us into the range of issues that Ms. Lockhart and Dr.
Hosseini touched on. I don't think there is much of a record
anywhere in the world of successful counterinsurgencies without
good-enough government--governance.
Now, how far does this go? There, I am absolutely unable to
state, but clearly there is, I think, an obligation for the
administration to so state. That review is obviously underway.
I think the sooner it can be brought to the point of
articulation--again, what are our goals, why they are
important, how they will be achieved, and how the different
components link up--I think, is essential for the American
people.
Senator Corker. I think, in fairness, the administration
has been rhetorical about this narrow mission, to make it sound
good; but, in essence, all the things Ms. Lockhart has laid out
are components of a counterinsurgency.
And so, Ms. Lockhart, I think you did a very--I mean,
basically you're talking about, in some degree, state-building
or nation-building. I mean, I think we all know that those are
the metrics that have been laid out. And so, we have this very
poor country, that's been very poor for a long time. There are
no oil resources, like there were in Iraq. And so, we're
talking about building an education system and a health system,
a water system, an electricity system, a security system, a
police system. What are your thoughts about how we should view
our long-term financial commitments? Because, let's face it, on
the budget they have now, they couldn't pay for even a fraction
of just the police that they have there. I'm just wondering if
you might help us there.
And I'm not sure we see any future for resources to do that
in Afghanistan, for the midterm.
Ms. Lockhart. Certainly. I think, as we've discussed, the
civilian governance effort has been significantly
underresourced, and an increase in resources is certainly going
to be necessary.
I think we probably need to look at two different scenarios
for resourcing. One scenario is, if there is a process for
rebuilding a legitimate government and a team of Afghan leaders
in place who can govern responsibly. And, I think, in that
scenario we're looking at far fewer external resources that
will be needed, because Afghanistan will move more rapidly to
collecting its own revenue.
And while Afghanistan doesn't have oil, it does have the
potential, I believe, to be raising somewhere between $5 to $10
billion a year in its own revenue, because it does have very
rich mineral resources, including copper, gold, lapis,
amethyst, iron. It does have the basis for a successful
agricultural economy. It was the largest exporter of fruits and
nuts to the region, if not the world, in the 1970s. And it has
a hardworking population and the potential for textile
production, urban services, and a construction industry is
certainly there. So, I think we need to move to put in place an
economic strategy that will gear it to collect its own revenue.
To answer your specific question on what resources are
needed, I believe that we need to be looking at a medium- to
long-term commitment of resources of probably roughly a
doubling of existing resources on the civilian and governance
side. But, if we move aggressively to raise Afghan revenue, or
to enable the Afghans to collect their own revenue, that
commitment could taper down in the second 5 years of the
decade.
Senator Corker. If I could ask one more brief question.
Thank you very much.
General Craddock, how many al-Qaeda are there in the world?
General Craddock. Senator, I have no idea. Card-carrying
al-Qaeda? I have no idea. Sympathizers, logistics support,
finance support? I have no idea.
Senator Corker. Card-carrying. Give me----
General Craddock. I don't know. I think that the--one of
the reasons it's so difficult in our search is because of--
there's no hierarchy that we would recognize.
Senator Corker. You know, the number 2,000 has been thrown
out, and people dispute that, and I don't want--I don't know
what the number is.
The reason I asked the question--it's somewhat rhetorical--
our efforts toward al-Qaeda have now created a situation where
we're involved in two major nation-building/state-building
efforts--Iraq and Afghanistan. And--it's just a fact--and I
hope that, somehow or another, we'll figure out a different
strategy, versus going around the world building states and
nations almost out of whole cloth.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Corker.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank our witnesses for your presence here
today, and the contribution you're making to this discussion
and debate. I think we can have a real debate about these
policies, and I think it's critical that we do.
I want to especially thank General Craddock and Ambassador
Crocker for your service to our country under the most
difficult of circumstances.
And I wanted to start with you, Ambassador Crocker, about a
conversation that you and I had. And I don't expect you to
remember any of this--I know a lot of Members of Congress
visited you while you were in Iraq--but this was August 2007.
Senator Durbin and I were with you at that time, and we had a
dinner meeting. And General Petraeus was with us, as well. And
I was very critical at the time--and I still am--about the
language of Washington when we describe the conflict in Iraq,
but also, now, the conflict in Afghanistan. Language like
``victory and defeat,'' ``win or lose,'' which, in my judgment,
is both inaccurate and misleading. And I think it's important,
as we get the policy right on troop levels and on nonmilitary
commitments, as well, that we also get the language right,
because the American people don't have, will not, and should
not, have patience for a political debate in Washington that
doesn't ask and answer some tough questions.
At the time, you said something I'll never forget. I want
to ask you if the language that you used then is still relevant
here, in what you learned from, not just your service in Iraq,
but other service, as well. You said, at the time, that the
words you used to describe success in Iraq were two,
``sustainable stability.'' And I'd ask you, in the context of
Afghanistan and how we deal with this strategy with regard to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, are those words still operative? And
anything else you can tell us about how you think we can
achieve that.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
I do, indeed, remember the conversation, and I would share
your view about the use of language. Language does count. I
think, if anyone ever cared to go through the interminable
records of the testimony that General Petraeus and I provided
to the Congress on several occasions, I don't think you'll find
a single occasion in which either of us used those terms--to
``win,'' to ``lose,'' ``victory,'' and ``defeat''--because, in
many respects, those are not for us to determine, as----
Senator Casey. I said ``Washington'' to leave out some
names. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, I believe the concept of ``sustainable stability'' is
valid, although I may now shamelessly steal Ms. Lockhart's
phrase of ``good-enough governance,'' which I think is another
way of saying much the same thing, of steps taken, measures
taken, that will work, in terms of the society in which it
counts, be it Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. It may not be our
model, and it may be very far from perfect; but, if it provides
a situation in which the security forces of that country are
capable dealing, themselves, with whatever challenges to
stability there are, then I think you've got ``sustainable
stability.''
What that will look like in Afghanistan--and, again, what
the steps are to achieve it--I'm simply not competent to
provide. I do think we've got the people out there who can do
that, and I think, again, that what the administration needs to
do is to lay out that framework. And then, since I had the
experience of testifying before Congress, I would like to
spread the opportunity to my current colleagues in the field to
come and do the same, because I do think that field view is
extremely important.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
And I have questions that I won't get to, for both ends of
the table. But, I probably have time for one more. I wanted to
ask Ms. Lockhart a question about what's sometimes referred to
as a ``civilian surge,'' an increase in the number of
nonmilitary personnel on the ground, which is a low number now
in Afghanistan, and is building.
I was very impressed, as we always are, in August, when I
visited both countries and saw the respect that General
McChrystal had for the nonmilitary folks, but how well-
integrated they were, and how central they are to the mission--
State Department folks, Department of Agriculture, USAID, DEA,
and so many others. I know this is a hard question to answer,
but if you can do your best in the minute or so we have left--
one, how many civilians do you think are needed or, do you have
a sense of those metrics? And, two, how do we get it right with
regard to our international partners, who, candidly, in some
places are helping us a lot, and in a lot of significant parts
of the world they're not doing much at all to help us. So, if
you can address that, in terms of numbers or in terms of
commitment. I know that's a hard one----
Ms. Lockhart. Certainly. I think one of the first
principles to work from is that what we're seeking to build is
the space and tools for Afghan leadership and Afghan ownership.
And I believe that, while the key focus on the civilian side is
institution-building, it actually requires quite a small number
of civilians. Certainly more--we need more civilians than there
are at the moment. I probably wouldn't want to put a number on
it. It probably isn't more than 1,000. But, the key----
Senator Casey. In terms of ``1,000,'' is this what we would
need eventually, or kind of where we are now?
Ms. Lockhart. A total number, particularly if there's going
to be U.S. leadership. There are, actually, tens of thousands
of foreign civilians in the country at the moment, but most of
them are fragmented amongst NGOs, U.N. agencies, and----
Senator Casey. OK.
Ms. Lockhart [continuing]. All sorts of efforts. But, I
think, a total of 1,000.
What is required, though, is a really thorough look at the
skills gap on the Afghan side. And I think we should regear our
focus to, What does it take to build up Afghan capability? And
that does mean vocational training, secondary education, and
tertiary education. Back in 2001, no investment was made in
secondary and tertiary education, and vocational training; and
if you're educating Afghans to age 11, you're not going to get
a competent civil service. So, that's the lacuna I think we
should be looking at.
In terms of getting the international partnership right, I
think that relates to your earlier comment very much, that we
should move away from the language of war, of victory, and of
loss to--back, perhaps, to some of the original language used
in the 2001-02 period of a global effort to assist the Afghan
people establish stability or legitimate governance. And then,
based on that, look at a division of labor and burden-sharing.
I think we need, perhaps, to look more to the economic
multilateral organizations, like the World Bank and the ADB,
that have robust approaches to accountability, while a U.N.
mandate remains important. And then look at a division of labor
with Europe and what countries like China, Saudi Arabia, and
gulf countries and Japan can do to contribute as part of a
global alliance.
Senator Casey. Doctor, I had a refugee question, and,
General, I had a question for you, but I'm out of time.
Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I want to get back to one of the many excellent points that
Senator Lugar mentioned during his extensive question, and ask
about the election.
Now, today is the 17th. We're supposed to hear some
definitive results. I'm told the Afghan Central Election
Commission has released the results, showing that President
Karzai has received 54.62 percent of the vote. Now, the
international community is still waiting for the Independent
Election Commission to make its assessment.
Senator Lugar raised the possibility that as many as one-
third of President Karzai's votes might be invalid. I wonder if
any of you can tell me when we can expect to hear something
from the Independent Election Commission. It seems to me that
in listening to the administration, that there's almost a
resignation that President Karzai is going to be the President
for the next term, and that somehow those results will be
allowed to stand, to the extent that either he will be
reelected on the first go-around or he will win a runoff. So, I
hope several of you can comment on this.
But, let me start with Dr. Hosseini. You're here on behalf
of the UNHCR, I realize. But still, you've been in the area.
You've talked extensively--I assume you've talked across the
spectrum of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan. So, what is your
assessment of the support among the populace for President
Karzai--of their feeling with regard to the validity of the
election results and what might happen?
Dr. Hosseini. Well, I think, when you speak to ordinary
Afghans, there's no question that they express some
disappointment in the performance of the Afghan Government so
far. I think many of them expected more, and I--again,
rightfully so.
As far as the elections, clearly there have been some
irregularities with these elections, and they've been well
publicized. Precise scale of these irregularities, and whether
they will force a second round of the elections, is up to the
ECC and the IEC to determine. And they're, you know, examining
the suspect ballots, and doing a recount.
In my view, it's important, obviously, that this
investigation be thorough, but also that it be relatively
expeditious. And I say this as an individual and not as a--with
my UNHCR hat on. You know, I think it's to the detriment of the
country to have a prolonged period of political paralysis. It's
to the detriment of the legitimacy of the elections, and I
think it would exacerbate the Afghan people's already high
level of anxiety about the elections, and cast doubt on the
credibility of the outcome. So, I think it must be done
relatively quickly. And, of course, the outcome has to be
acceptable to most Afghans, and have at least the semblance of
credibility. A difficult task, indeed.
On the elections, I do want to put the entire process in
some kind of perspective and say that, as flawed as the
elections are--and we shouldn't compare the second-ever
Presidential elections in Afghanistan to a process here in the
States or in France; let's be clear about that--but it was an
extraordinary logistic achievement to even hold these
elections; even more so than the last time around. Three
thousand donkeys carrying ballots; thousands of people who had
to be trained in the middle of conflict in insurgent-wracked
areas, under the threat and intimidation of the Taliban;
hundreds of female searchers that had to pat down anybody in a
burqa, to make sure it's not a man carrying a suicide jacket.
Those are the sorts of logistics we're talking about. So, from
a logistical standpoint, it was an extraordinary achievement.
And the second point of perspective that I would offer is
that, for 30 years now, the traditional means of the transfer
of power in Afghanistan has been through violence, through the
gun. With these elections, the Afghans have an opportunity to
demonstrate that those days are in the past and that they can
effect a peaceful transition of power. And maybe we, the
international community, ought not to rush to judgment, and we
ought to wait and let the Afghans resolve this peacefully.
Senator Wicker. Ms. Lockhart, would you like to comment
about that? And do you believe President Karzai has majority
support among the population of Afghanistan?
Ms. Lockhart. I think that if the European Union's
announcement today is correct, that they suspected a third of
the votes were invalid, then it will be demonstrated that the
incumbent doesn't have majority support. And I would agree with
Dr. Hosseini, that I think there is considerable anxiety
amongst the population, and a loss of trust in their government
over the last few years. What we're seeing at the moment on the
ground is the Electoral Complaints Commission investigating the
irregularities of process that may take several weeks, and I
very much agree that that process should be resolved as quickly
as possible, because the vacuum in leadership will be
problematic on the ground.
I think there are four options, very quickly, from here on:
One is to accept the victory of the incumbent. The risk of
this approach is that given the alliances with illegitimate
forces that have been made, I don't think this will assure
good-enough governance over the coming months and years, and
rather, may see a further deterioration in governance.
A second approach is to accept that and then have a robust
counterinsurgency effort to build good governance, bottom-up.
That hasn't been tried in other insurgencies in the past, and
the jury will be open as to whether it could be successful.
A third option, I think, would be to accept the victory of
the incumbent, but have a robust agreement on benchmarks for
accountability, going forward. And I believe that the Afghan
people will be looking for the international community to take
a robust approach on asking for standards of accountability and
benchmarks of reaching good governance.
And the last option would be to--almost to go back to the
drawing board. If the ECC is to invalidate a sufficient number
of ballots or one or more of the candidates or the process as a
whole, that will open the question of moving to new elections,
a new peace agreement or--a new Bonn-type agreement.
Senator Wicker. Well, I'm sure you agree that it should be
done expeditiously. You have any idea when we might hear
something definitive from the ECC?
Ms. Lockhart. I believe that's specified in the ECC
regulations, that they must report back within a specified
amount of time after the certification of results. I believe
that's a month, but I could check that.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Anyone else on the panel wish to touch on this?
[No response.]
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator Lugar. And I would like to
express my appreciation to the chairman and to you for having
put together this extraordinary variety of expertise in the
panel today.
I don't know any American public servant who has had more
time on the ground, intellectual dedication, and emotional
commitment than Ambassador Crocker, and it's great to see you
here today, sir.
And, Dr. Hosseini, as someone who spent a good part of his
life as a novelist, and also having worked in the dread
Hollywood off and on for about 15 years, I have incredible
admiration for the literary achievement that you were able to
bring in ``Kite Runner.'' I've often said that you can
communicate to people on an emotional level through a piece of
literature in a way that they come to understand things
probably better than any other way, and it's just an amazingly
powerful film, and I congratulate you what it took to put
together all of that. It's so rare to see a piece of literature
that can hit all the issues of loyalty and respect and father-
son relationships and all those sorts of things. It was just an
amazing achievement.
I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation,
actually, for what Senator Corker said, because it does address
the difficulty that we have up here in this particular issue.
And that is, when you look at where we seem to be going, here,
from a national strategic perspective--I mean, from a
perspective of American national interest, in terms of how to
use our assets, where we put our expenditures, and in terms of
national treasure, whether we should build up an infrastructure
to address an enemy that is basically a mobile enemy.
And we saw this in Iraq, quite frankly. You know, we built
up a huge infrastructure to address two different sets of
problems. One was the issue of international terrorism, which
is intrinsically mobile, and decided to relocate, after a
period of time. But then also to have to pick up the pieces of
what we had done following our invasion, and try to repair
relationships and move Iraq forward. In terms of the advantage
that the forces of international terrorism wished to have, that
was pretty good for them, long-term. We spent hundreds and
hundreds of billions of dollars, and they remain active.
We're looking at something similar here in Afghanistan, and
I know we've got national mission creep going on now, you know,
talking about whether we really are going to attempt to,
basically, build a state here. And there's going to be a debate
about this.
And, you know, I look at what happened in Somalia a couple
days ago. You know, if you're really talking about going after
the forces of international terrorism, that was a pretty
effective way to do it--coming over the horizon, hitting an
element of international terrorism, leaving, not leaving behind
an infrastructure, and being able to have the same
maneuverability as your enemy has.
On the other hand, we are moving forward with a different
debate here, and we will have that debate. The question is not
whether there is no military solution, which has sort of been
agreed upon; it is whether the military component of this
solution is one that is going to work. And I say all that
because I would like to ask you, on your panel here, to look at
this from two different perspectives. First, at what point do
we reach a tipping point with the United States military, where
the presence and the operations might actually be
counterproductive? This has been raised before. But, there's an
additional component to this that I have a good deal of concern
on, and that is, to what extent, in Afghanistan, can we
actually build a national army?
I've asked this question to General Petraeus and General
McChrystal. I asked it to Admiral Mullen the other day. This is
not a country that has had experience with a national army.
It's a country with a lot of national pride. But, the best that
I can see is that, at one period in the mid- to late-1900s,
there was a national army of about 90,000. If you take the
police with this, we're talking about 250,000.
So, on the one hand, at what point does our presence reach
a tipping point, where it's counterproductive, where people
believe that we are an occupying force, or whatever you want to
put on it? And then, can we actually do the other piece of
this, in terms of the history of the country?
And, Ms. Lockhart, I'd actually like to get your views on
that, as a starting point.
Ms. Lockhart. I do believe that there is potentially a
point at which presence may be counterproductive, but I don't
believe we've reached that yet; and I think the only way that
can be tested or ascertained is through polling and observation
of the population.
I believe, like Dr. Hosseini, that, on balance, while there
are shades of narrow criticism that the presence is an
occupation, those are very much in the minority, and the
majority of the population seeks very much and hopes very much
that the U.S. commitment remains, and the international
partnership remains, for the long-term stability of the
country.
In terms of the possibility of building national
institutions, whether the army or other institutions, I believe
it absolutely is possible, and the remarkable success of the
efforts since 2001 to build up the Afghan National Army--I had
the honor to observe the first battalion graduate and walk down
the street, and it was welcomed literally with the cheers of
the population. And the pride of the people in that institution
was remarkable, because they deeply understand that it's
through institutions like that that their daily needs, most
basically their security, can be met. And we've seen that in
the Afghan National Army and then across the different
institutions where Afghans, with a minimal commitment to
training and education, do rise to the challenge of managing
their own institutions.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker, I remember you and I had an exchange
several years ago with the situation in Iraq, and one of your
strongly made points was that the Iraqis of all different
ethnicities had come together in a national army. In fact, your
point had been that, I think, more than 200,000 Shia had
actually died fighting in the Iran-Iraq war. What are your
thoughts about the situation with respect to Afghanistan?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, the fortunate thing for me,
Senator, is that I represent no one but myself these days, so
as uninformed as my opinions may be, at least I'm entitled to
have them. And since you asked to express them, I do believe
that what we have seen thus far shows us, with all of the
shortcomings in terms of manpower, materiel, and even
abilities, that the Afghans are capable of developing and
fielding national forces; as I understand it, perhaps the army
more so than the police, but even with the police.
And as you noted, sir, while Afghanistan has a history of
challenges to central governments, it also has a history of a
national military. And my sense is that Afghans are quite proud
of the tradition of that military in the country's history.
So, I think it can be done. I think it is being done. But,
as we saw in Iraq, this takes time. The early tests that--as
you know, that the Iraqi security forces faced almost took them
apart. So, I think that we and the Afghans have to be careful
not to put more of a burden on these developing forces than
they can bear at this time. Like so many things in this part of
the world, whether its Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, this
will take time. And nowhere, I think, is that more the case
than it is in the development of these security forces.
Senator Webb. My time has expired, but I appreciate both of
your answers. And, of course, the difficulty is the other side
of that, that the more time we have with the size of the
American presence, the more risk we have of being viewed in a
different light. But, I thank you for your comments.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Lockhart, thank you for all the work that you've done
in Afghanistan, and especially in the post-September 11th
period, when you were there on the ground, helping to lay out
the foundation on which we can move forward in Afghanistan.
You laid out four distinct options for governance in this
post-election, but you didn't say whether you thought there was
a preferred means of action. Do you think one of those options
is preferable?
Ms. Lockhart. I think the--well, thank you, for your kind
words--I think the first two options I outlined, of letting the
current governance arrangements continue unchecked, or that
plus trying to build governance bottom-up while we have a
vacuum, in essence, at the top, are not going to be desirable,
and probably would not lead to success.
I think the two other options, one of accepting the victory
of the incumbent, but putting in place very strict conditions--
a roadmap and agreeing on benchmarks, particularly on financial
accountability, and asking for some devolution of power, and
putting in place checks and balances--would be one preferred
option; and the other would be to go back to the drawing board,
and putting in place a new transitional authority, which would
probably govern for a 2-to-4-year period, and one of whose
central tasks will be organizing a more robust set of elections
next time, which will require, I think, this inquiry into what
went wrong and what the institutions that are necessary to have
a successful election, one of which will be a census.
Senator Shaheen. And does that run the risk of creating a
perception that the international community is making the
determination about the future of Afghanistan and sort of
erasing the elections, even recognizing that the elections
might be flawed?
Ms. Lockhart. I think that option would only be possible if
the ECC, which is a domestic Afghan----
Senator Shaheen. OK.
Ms. Lockhart [continuing]. Institution would first rule
that either one of the--one or more of the candidates, the
process, or a certain number of the ballots were invalid. So,
it would have to rest on that domestic determination. And then,
a lot of care would have to be taken to ensure that the process
moved forward in accordance with the Afghan Constitution; and
there are provisions within the Constitution that would allow
that to take place.
Senator Shaheen. OK. Thank you for that clarification.
Dr. Hosseini, this question is really both for you and for
Ms. Lockhart, I think. And I, like Senator Webb, very much
appreciate your books, and think that they're wonderful and
have probably done as much as any policy in this country to
make Americans care about what happens in Afghanistan. So,
thank you for that.
What do you see happening on the ground, in terms of
coordination of aid among the international entities that are
in Afghanistan and the United Nations? And several of you have
referenced that. And what should be done better to improve that
coordination and to deal with the corruption and the fraud that
seems to be happening too much there.
Dr. Hosseini. Thank you for your kind words. And I may have
to defer a good chunk of this question to my more qualified
colleagues on the panel. But, there's a perception in
Afghanistan, among civilians, that of the billions of dollars
that have come to Afghanistan, not a whole lot of it has
reached the Afghans themselves. There's a sense of
disappointment, that even though Afghanistan has been the focus
of international attention now for several years, by and large,
for average Afghans, the quality of life has not improved
significantly. Most Afghans are still lacking for basic social
services, the same as they were a number of years ago.
I will just say that, of much of the money that comes to
Afghanistan, only a fraction of it ends up in the pocket of the
Afghans themselves. So much of the money is spent on providing
security for the foreign presence, the--within the aid
organization and the bureaucrats--to paying the salary of, you
know, consultants. Much of the resources and the services that
are utilized in Afghanistan are outsourced and therefore don't
provide opportunity and employment for the Afghans themselves.
And, of course, much of the money bypasses the Afghan
Government itself, kind of reinforcing the image of the
government as sort of being an impotent bystander. And I think
those are all issues that have to be addressed.
But, I'm going to defer to my other colleagues about more
on the issue.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I don't know--Ms. Lockhart, Ambassador Crocker, General
Craddock, who would like to take a shot at that?
Ms. Lockhart. Just a few observations.
I think it's a terribly important point, because I think
the failure to coordinate aid has actually fed into the
corruption within the Afghan institutions.
I think the first requirement is not being afraid of
putting a robust set of conditions for aid, either through a
World Bank IMF program or a U.S. or multilateral agreement. And
central to that will be insisting on transparency, particularly
in licensing and revenue, as well as expenditure and audits
that should be released to the Afghan public.
Second is putting the Afghan budget and institutions
central. The Afghan budget is the policy coordination mechanism
on the ground. I think we're making a mistake when we ask the
U.N. to coordinate. U.N. mandate is important. The U.N. cannot
coordinate; it's the Afghan budget. And we need a roadmap for
each ministry. We've got a roadmap for the Afghan National
Army; we need the same type of roadmap for the other
institutions.
And then, I think, we have got a coordination mechanism;
it's the ARTF, the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is
managed by the World Bank, and it acts as a dual-key system on
the flow of money. And using that, or developing a parallel
type of trust fund for U.S. resources, would be essential.
And then where NGOs, U.N. agencies, or private companies
are contracted, then I think we need to apply the same set of
robust requests for transparency and accountability, which, to
date, have not been in place.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Crocker, do you have anything that you want to
add to that?
Ambassador Crocker. No, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. OK.
Thank you both, Ambassador Crocker and General Craddock,
for your service, as well.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Kaufman?
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the
ranking member for holding these hearings right now, right in--
timely. I mean, I think this decision that's going to be made
right now is one of the most important decisions we're going to
be dealing with in a Senate where we're dealing with a lot of
important decisions. And bringing the light to this thing is
just--and having the panels we did--panels today and the panel
yesterday have been excellent, just the right people. And so, I
just want to--I cannot commend you enough for doing this.
And I want to thank everybody on the panel. I mean, just
having the ability of listening to what you have to say is so
helpful in trying to deal with this.
I just have a few questions. One of them is--it's mentioned
by a number of Senators, and also in the popular press--that
the Somalia raid is kind of a model for United States
operations in Afghanistan. Is the Somalia raid a model for
United States operations in Afghanistan?
General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
A complex question. I'm not sure it's a model. I think it's
a tool. And I think it has already been going on in Afghanistan
over the past several years, through the United States
counterterrorism forces, not so much the NATO counterinsurgent
capability, with significant results. But, again, with a
hierarchy that's amorphous--cells operating, as opposed to a
vertical hierarchy--it's very difficult to be able to make
long-term gains, because someone always then steps up. However,
it is an ongoing, day-to-day operation done very precisely.
It's what you don't hear that's probably more important than
what you hear.
Senator Kaufman. Great.
Anyone else?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I think that's a very
important question, that certainly is beyond my expertise to
adequately answer, but it is, I think, worth posing to those in
the administration more qualified.
My sense is that the Somalia model, if you will, probably
cannot be successfully replicated in Afghanistan. I think the
dynamics there are more complex. I also think, frankly, that
given that the ISAF in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, is
perhaps the most capable special operations commander that this
country has ever produced, that if he thought it could be done
that way, I think we'd be seeing different sets of
recommendations.
Senator Kaufman. Great. Thank you.
There's a discussion about expediting the elections, that
Senator Wicker raised, and I think, obviously, that would be
key to everyone. Does anyone on the panel--I met with Abdullah
Abdullah last--2 weeks ago. I don't think--there's always a
chance that he might throw in with Karzai, but I think it's
remote. But, just for the sake of this question, can anybody
think of any way to expedite the end of this election without
considering that there's a--some kind of a coalition
government?
Ms. Lockhart. Senator, it's a very important question. I'm
not sure there is a way to expedite it. I think there will be a
tendency to allow the ECC to complete its investigations and
then make a determination on whether the process has met the
standards of a ``fair enough'' election. I think the only thing
that could bring it to a resolution earlier would be the coming
together within the Afghan political elite of enough of the
candidates--critically, Abdullah and Karzai, but potentially
others within the political elite and--who would agree to form
a type of unity government.
Senator Kaufman. I mean, I think it's key that--I mean,
this is the worst possible time for this to happen. So, if
anybody comes up with any ideas--I hear a lot of talk about
expediting it, but I've not heard a single person give us a way
to, kind of, get to where we have to get to. So, I'd--if you
come up with anything, I would--I would very much appreciate
it.
Let's talk about the civilian surge for a second, because
Senator Lugar's raised that a number of times, and it's really,
really important. How--one of the problems is recruiting
people--how do we improve recruitment of Civil and Foreign
Service officers, to move away from--as we move away from
reliance on contractors?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, if I could just take one
element of that, that I--drawing from my experience in Iraq, we
need more efficient mechanisms in government to be able to
respond to complex contingencies like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Simply put, there are not enough people, period--not enough
people with the skill sets that are required in these
contingencies--within the Foreign Service, either State or
USAID. It requires a process to bring in able talent from other
agencies and from the private sector. And that still, frankly,
does not work very well. It's the--it's called the ``31/61
process'' and I can tell you that it's painful in the extreme
to make that work--work quickly--getting the right people in
the right places.
I know that the administration has put more emphasis on
building up what's called SCRS within the State Department, as
a means of providing a civilian reserve, if you will. I would
applaud that. But, a great deal more needs to be done to put in
place the structures that will allow an administration to
identify and quickly bring to the field the numbers and the
skill sets that simply do not exist within the established
foreign affairs agencies.
Senator Kaufman. I think it's good you point out the
difficulty of this. People kind of glaze over this. Senator
Lugar's been talking about this quite a while, and this is
really key. If we're going to be fighting wars of
counterinsurgency in the future--we just kind of glaze over
this--it isn't there. You know, we're trying to get people now,
and we're having a hard enough time in Afghanistan. But,
planning down the road is really, really important.
Can I just ask you another question, kind of, on your
experience in Iraq? And it's two things. One is, how is--we're
trying to get the Taliban to come over, kind of like we did
with the Sons of Iraq in Anbar province. Would you comment on
whether you think that's possible in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Crocker. I do think it's possible. Again, I'm
not in a position to comment with any detail on the dynamics
there. But, once again, I think we've got the right people in
this fight. Both General McChrystal, of course, with his
substantial experience in Afghanistan and in Iraq, where I had
the privilege of serving with him; and then General Petraeus--
in many respects, the architect of the Awakening strategy--of
course, now has oversight of both campaigns. So, I have a high
level of confidence that we do have the people engaged on this
that can figure out what can be done and how to do it.
All of that said--and again, my colleagues, Ms. Lockhart
and Dr. Hosseini, are far more qualified to speak to it--it
is--it's going to be a very different and more difficult
process. The Sunni insurgency in Iraq was not deeply rooted in
time or in ideology. The Taliban, of course, are both.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you very much. And I want to tell
you, I think everyone agrees that our success in Iraq was based
on the people we had there, and obviously one of the very, very
best people was you. And the people we have in Afghanistan--
General McChrystal, Eikenberry, Rodriguez, McChrystal--we've
got a good--Holbrooke covering the whole region--we've got a
good team over there, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
Let me follow up on a few things, if I can. The--sort of a
parallel to a couple of questions that Senator Kaufman was
asking--but, on the issue of the Taliban, which is central to
this--actually, before I get to that, I want to ask you,
General Craddock, because it's important to our understanding
of what the options are and the Taliban, as Supreme Allied
Commander you were commanding NATO forces, and you're very
familiar with the tensions within that block at this point. My
sense is that we are losing our allies' enthusiasm for this
effort and that a number of them--I won't go into the details
here, but--have been very reluctant all along to engage. Their
troops don't engage. And looking to them for additional
support, here--I mean, I think, essentially, we're going to
kind of be on our own, here, and I think we've got to kind of--
you know. Is that a fair assessment?
General Craddock. Senator, I think that's a fair
assessment, from a military perspective. I would agree, there
is unequal burden-sharing among the alliance with regards to
those who will and those who won't. I do think, however,
there's opportunity with NATO allies to ask for trainers in
areas where it may not be as risky and they may have some
political viability. I think they should be asked for civilian
surge capability. There's plenty of that in Europe. If you
knock down the wall between NATO and the EU, you might be able
to access a lot of that capability that we need there.
The Chairman. Well, I'd like to examine--that's a good
thought there, but I want to examine this attitude a little
bit. Do they know something that we don't know?
General Craddock. Well, I can't speak for them, in terms of
what they know.
The Chairman. Well, but you've had these conversations.
I've had these conversations, and you have too. There is an
attitudinal difference about the threat. There's a threat-
definition difference, isn't there?
General Craddock. Indeed. They----
The Chairman. But, isn't that important for us to
understand?
General Craddock. Well, I think it's--I think it's been
discussed here. In Europe, terrorism is viewed as a police
issue when it's visited upon their people, and you deal with it
then, as opposed to stopping it before it gets into your
country. So, the military generally does not deal with
terrorism to the extent that we do here because of the attacks.
The Chairman. But, I think their perception goes, actually,
deeper than that; I think there is a sense--there's a different
sense of, sort of, how you manage this over a period of time.
You're nodding your head, Ms. Lockhart. You want to share
your perception, then?
Ms. Lockhart. Um----
The Chairman. Your body language got you in trouble, here.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Lockhart. I think--twofold. I would agree that there is
absolutely a waning enthusiasm amongst public opinion in
Europe. I think that's partly because there has yet to be a
credible articulation of exactly what the strategy is going to
be, and particularly the failures in Helmand, in Britain, is
infecting the public debate. And that's, again, partly because
in Helmand there was not a credible articulation of a
governance and development strategy. So, it remains open to
convince Europe. I do believe the public opinion could be
reconvinced if that strategy was articulated, because the----
The Chairman. Your strategy involves a pretty significant
commitment of resources, investment, personnel, civilian side--
I mean it really is a nation-building strategy.
Ms. Lockhart. It is. And I believe that there will be more
appetite in Europe and other countries for engagement on
training, as General Craddock articulated, and on the civilian
surge elements, particularly in areas like capacity-building
and economic investment. So, a sensible division of labor,
going forward, may be to look to support from allies,
particularly in Europe and Japan, for that civilian type of
assistance, recognizing that the United States will continue to
bear the brunt of effort on the military side.
The Chairman. And, General Craddock, we're going to get
some folks who are more, hopefully, operational, with respect
to Afghanistan itself, as we go down the road, here. But, from
the military perspective, in order to do the kinds of things
that Ms. Lockhart, and others, have talked about doing, in
building the governance, building the--the capacity-building
and so forth--you've got to have some security. But, is it
possible to do the security without the kind of current
engagement in civilian collateral deaths that we currently
have, or is that a--are the insurgents always capable of
guaranteeing that you have that, even if you don't want it? And
is that a great danger, here?
General Craddock. It's my judgment that, in irregular
warfare, and given what we know about the insurgents, that they
were always capable of arranging that situation. I can give you
chapter and verse, over and over again, of operations and
targeting that looked fine, but didn't turn out that way, for
myriad reasons; but, again, the use of civilians as shields is
very difficult to combat.
Now, having said that, I think we can continue to work to
minimize. I think that the tactical guidance put into place by
General McChrystal recently has gone a long way, and will
continue to do that, to minimize that pushback.
If I may, a point that Ms. Lockhart raised. The British
strategy in Helmand; the Dutch strategy in Uruzgan; the
strategy here or there; the United States strategy in Paktika
or in Nangarhar--one of the problems we face is the arrangement
of NATO. Nations view their own provinces as a fiefdom--or
provinces, as the case--unlike the United States which has a
regional command, so they deal with that at the expense of
dealing with the country as a whole. And it has caused us
problems over time.
The Chairman. I agree with that. I think one of the most
significant problems has been the absence, for almost 8 years,
of unified command and a unified strategy. In fact--and people
need to understand this; this is important as we think about
Afghanistan--we have traveled this journey for almost 7 years
without a strategy. There was sort of a--you know, just a
continuum, at the expense of Iraq. And I think most people have
agreed that troops were diverted, resources were diverted,
focus was diverted. So, it has only been in these last months
that people have begun to really hone in and say, ``How do you
adjust?''
The challenge, as I wrote, back last February, is the clock
ticking, the amount of time that's been lost to the corruption,
to the--you know, to the other things--and can you make it up?
And I want to come back to that for a moment, Ambassador
Crocker, if I can. With respect to the Taliban, you made a very
perceptive observation in answer to Senator Kaufman's question,
and you noted the historical cultural depth of the Taliban
versus the insurgency in Iraq. There are different--however, we
keep hearing about, sort of, different shades of Taliban. And
can you share with us, perhaps, you know, to what degree can
the Taliban be sort of divided, in a way, here? Can you--is
there a diplomatic, slash, civilian ability to reach out to
them and, in fact, give them something that they want more than
being Taliban, and therefore isolating the really hardcore
Taliban? Or are we dealing with a monolithic entity?
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, I would make a few
observations on the methodology, if you will, and then perhaps
Dr. Hosseini or Ms. Lockhart could--would have some comments
more on the nature of the Taliban as they see it, because
that's not my area of expertise.
The principle we followed in Iraq was exactly what you
suggest. It was talking to anyone who would talk to us, without
regard to what they may have done to us in the past, trying to
find splits, fissures, differences of view, people who would be
susceptible to whatever blandishment we might offer, to break
up an insurgency, if you will, to pull people either to our
side or at least into the neutral zone. And we did that without
spending a tremendous amount of time trying to figure out what
ideological persuasion might exist here or there. We just kind
of went at it. We--you know, the word--we got the word out that
we're open for discussion.
It seems to me that a similar approach has great potential
also in Afghanistan, because the Taliban is not a monolithic
organization, they are not card-carrying members. There have to
be many different motivations and levels of commitment, so it's
by seeking ways to engage, to discuss--direct, indirect--that I
think will find what the limits are of shrinking an adversary
down to the smallest possible number of irreconcilables. As we
put it in terms of Iraq, you want to reduce the number of
people who absolutely have to be killed to the smallest number
possible. And I think, again, the same methodology will work in
Afghanistan.
But, my colleagues would be far more knowledgeable on the
nature of what we're dealing with there.
The Chairman. Do you want to comment, either of you, on
what--just quickly? I want to try to----
Dr. Hosseini. Sure. I agree with the Ambassador. The
Taliban are not a monolithic movement, if they ever were. The
term ``Taliban'' now refers to a cluster of different groups
that more or less answer to different leadership. So, part of
the challenge of--and again, I'm sort of out of my element
here, but--just part of the challenge of negotiating with these
people is that there's no--in the absence of clear leadership
structure, it's difficult to determine who exactly you speak
to.
And, in addition, at the present time, it seems to me, the
Taliban have no incentive, really, to negotiate, because the
perception is that they've managed to frustrate the coalition.
In addition, the United States would likely ask the Taliban
to sever their ties to the more radical groups, like al-Qaeda;
and they may be reluctant to do that. And the Taliban, in
exchange, may say to the Afghan Government that, ``We'll
negotiate, but we need the foreigners to leave the country.''
And again, these are very difficult and challenging
preconditions.
That said, I think that there's an opportunity to at least
engage some of the more so-called ``moderate'' members of the
Taliban. These would be the more Afghan, the more reconcilable
elements. If there's a tradition in Afghanistan, it's switching
allegiances. We saw that over and over again during the civil
war in Afghanistan. And, if anything, Afghans are a pragmatic
people, and if certain elements of at least the Afghan movement
can be convinced that it's in their self-interest and in their
pragmatic interest to come over to the other side, they may be
interested in doing that.
But, I will say that, on my recent trip to Afghanistan, I
spoke to a lot of people on the street, and my sense is that,
by and large, a lot of people, although they don't feel any--
necessarily any kinship with the Taliban, they are in favor of
some kind of negotiation between the West and the Taliban.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar, do you have any more questions?
Senator Lugar. No, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, I know we have to move on, but
I felt guilty that I had not asked the doctor and the general a
question. So, at the risk of delaying things--just two quick
questions.
Doctor, I want to commend the work of UNHCR across the
world. We held hearings, at the subcommittee level, on refugees
in both Iraq and Pakistan, and I was very interested in what
you said about the refugee challenge in Afghanistan. I guess
I'd ask you this question: What's the short-term or the near-
term challenge with regard to ``reintegration'' of Afghanis?
Second, what is the likelihood that there's going to be a
dramatic increase in the number of refugees in Afghanistan?
Which becomes, in all refugee situations as I saw this
firsthand on the ground in Pakistan, where I visited an IDP
camp there--internally displace people were for the most part
treated well, and seemed to be moving back to their
communities. But, if it doesn't go well, you have both a
humanitarian and a security problem.
Doctor, what is your sense of the increase that may occur
in Afghanistan, in terms of the number of refugees; and second,
the challenge of reintegration.
The Chairman. I'd just--before you answer, I need to go
down to the Finance Committee for a few minutes on the health
care thing, but I just want to thank the panel for your
contributions today. It's been very, very helpful. We have a
distance to go yet, but I think we're beginning to shed some
light on it, and we're very grateful to you for taking time to
be here today.
And I thank my colleagues.
And whoever wants to be last questioner, just close it out.
Thanks.
Senator Casey [presiding]. Thank you, Chairman Kerry.
Dr. Hosseini. Reintegration of Afghan refugees continues to
be a very difficult challenge. And to put it in perspective,
let's remember that Afghanistan, even in its heyday, ranked at
or very near the bottom of the global index for human
development. Now, put that country through 30 years of
successive civil conflict that saw the destruction of virtually
every meaningful institution, and then increase its population,
in a span of 6 years, by 20 percent. I would propose to you
that if we increased the population of even a developed nation,
like France or the United Kingdom, by 20 percent--How would
they be able to handle it? Frankly, it would be chaotic. But,
in Afghanistan, the lack of public administration and lack of
effective governance has allowed that to happen. And so, what
we're seeing in Afghanistan, in regards to refugee
reintegration, is the stresses and strains of a government that
is sort of more or less buckling under the strain of
reabsorbing the millions of people who have come back.
So, for the refugees who have come back, reintegration in
Afghanistan is a serious challenge. For some, they have more or
less been able to resume their lives in a relatively settled
fashion. But, for many refugees, they continue to face the lack
of basic social services; foremost among those, land, shelter,
jobs, and then water, education, and access to health
facilities.
I believe that the era of spontaneous, voluntary return is
over. We saw 5 million people coming from--since 2002. Last
year, 280,000 Afghans returned home. This year, a fraction of
that; only 50,000. The reasons for that have to do partly with
the low absorption capacity in Afghanistan; partly with
security, particularly the refugees who are in Pakistan or
originate from the Pashtun belt and who have concerns about
returning to the place of origin, where the insurgency activity
is very strong; part of it has to do with lack of employment
opportunity. This is particularly the case for the refugees in
Iran, who have relatively better living conditions, and where
there is--in Iran, they've been able to make a life for
themselves.
So, 2.6 million Afghans remain still abroad; 1.6 million,
roughly, in Pakistan, and 1 million in Iran. And it is far from
clear whether, or if, they will return from Afghanistan. As I
said--to Afghanistan--as I said earlier, 80 percent of those
refugees who remain abroad have lived there for more than 20
years. They no longer feel like Afghans, for many of them. They
feel no personal kinship with Afghanistan, they don't dress
like Afghans, they don't speak like Afghans. And the idea of
uprooting their lives and resettling to a remote region in that
country is not particularly attractive to them. So, it's a
major challenge for the Government of Afghanistan, for UNHCR,
and the governments of Pakistan, but particularly with Iran, to
negotiate and to come to a resolution as to the ultimate fate
of the refugees.
As far as the increased number of refugees, we are seeing
far more displacement than we were a few years ago. We are
now--we have over a quarter of a million Afghans who are
displaced. And the reasons for displacement within Afghanistan
have to do partially with the conflict, particularly in the
south and the southeast, where, again, the insurgency is
strong. But, part of it has to do also with land dispute, with
lack of economic opportunity, and so on and so forth. So, for
the foreseeable future, I think this will be a challenge for
UNHCR.
Senator Casey. One of the more interesting parts of the
challenge--or the results, I should say--in Pakistan was that
you had about 80 percent of the internally displaced people,
who were displaced because of the military conflict in places
like the Swat Valley and other places go into homes. People
would take them in, based upon both, I think, Pashtun tradition
and the welcoming way that they bring people into their homes;
and second, because of the experience of the 2005 earthquake.
So, you had a 2 million-plus in Pakistanis who were displaced,
80 percent of them were brought into homes. So, maybe the
challenge there was a little different than it might be in
other places, including Afghanistan.
I know we don't have a lot more time--but, General, the
last question is for you and then we'll wrap up. And you may
not have an opinion about this yet, because it's about 24
hours--as we do in Washington, we want opinions on something
that's barely out, but the administration has put forth, now, a
draft, or at least a starting point, on metrics, what they call
``evaluating progress'' with regard to Afghanistan, both
military and nonmilitary. I know you may not have had a chance
to review it yet, but do you have an opinion on what they've
produced? And, if not, what's your sense of how we should go
about that? Because we need people that have the kind of
experience you have to weigh in on what metrics are valid, what
metrics are ones that we should use. And we have to have a--I
believe--``we,'' meaning the Congress, the administration,
both--have to give a lot of frequent, frequent, frequent
reporting on progress if we want to sustain support for any
kind of an effort.
General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.
I have not seen the metrics. I know that the--it's been a
work in progress for some time. I am a strong supporter of
metrics. What we have done to date, in my judgment, has been
measure performance. How many miles or kilometers of road, how
many children are in school, how many vaccinations? But, we
haven't measured the effect of the performance. And these
metrics have to go to the next step. What is working? How do we
measure it? Do we measure what we can measure, because it's
easy to measure, even though not relevant, or do we measure
what's important, to determine the effect, and then reinforce
success, stop failure, and find something else? NATO has
struggled with this. They're still working on it. The ISAF
forces are working on metrics.
I think we need to pull together some good analytical minds
and determine--critically determine what it is we'll focus on,
both in security, governance, and this development process.
They all bleed over into each other's field. You can't get one
without the other.
So, I will be looking for this closely. I think that it
will behoove us, in the coming very near term here, to come to
grips with this. The hard part will be going out, getting the
data, and then the critical objective analysis.
Senator Casey. I hope all four of you will weigh in on that
as time goes by. We need your help.
Thanks very much.
This hearing is adjourned, unless Senator Kaufman has
something else. We're all set?
Hearing adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Clare Lockart to Questions Submitted by
Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. Ms. Lockhart, I strongly believe that we should help the
people of Afghanistan combat corruption but it is not clear to me that
our anticorruption efforts require--or necessarily benefit from--a
large foreign military presence. Indeed our historical experience is
that the exigencies created by large military operations, such as the
rush of aid and contracting money, can create a war economy that
actually feeds corruption. Do you agree that this is a possible danger
in Afghanistan?
Answer. Senator, like you, I strongly believe that combating
corruption is a high priority.
When I traveled across the country in 2002, I found a largely
functional civil service (the Taliban had just been the top layer) of
240,000 civil servants, and my and my colleagues' analysis showed that
the standards of accountability were quite high in the culture; at the
same time crime levels in society were very low.
Since then, corruption was allowed to set in and has festered. I
believe this comes from 4 main sources:
First, the decisions in 2002 to 2004 not to ensure the budget of
Afghanistan was resourced: as a consequence, for several years it was
not possible to meet the basic salaries of the Afghan civil service,
even at the base rate of $50 per month. As a result, many key officials
left, leaving the system open to abuse; and others were most likely
forced into corruption in order to survive.
Second, the decision to support the ``regional strongmen'' with
large amounts of funding channeled to them as individuals, without
calling them to account for their actions. This led to the revival of
the 1980s/1990s culture of warlordism, where a small number of men
considered themselves to exist beyond the realm of accountability and
rule of law. I have personally witnessed several events where such-used
intimidation and threats of actual violence, expropriating resources
(usually in multiples of millions of dollars) from officials who were
distressed at the notion of putting national resources in private
hands. The Loya Jirgas of 2002 and 2003 saw the population bitterly
complain about the representation of such people within a national
discussion, given the violations they had committed against the
population in general and women in particular. The commanders have now
been encouraged and permitted to build up a huge power and resource
base, as opposed to 2001 when they were down to their last supplies.
Bringing them within the fold of rule of law is going to be an enormous
challenge.
Third, the massive funding of contractors, NGOs and U.N. agencies,
which create not only a war, but an aid, economy, which channels money
outside the normal governance processes of making decisions through a
budget process. At the same time, this rush creates hundreds of
thousands of positions in parallel organizations for Afghans, usually
as drivers, assistants, and translators, so they are attracted away
from their frontline positions as civil servants, doctors, teachers,
engineers, along with nurses, professors to become support staff. This
wage inflation from overreliance on contracting is one of the primary
causes of undermining Afghan capacity, by creating incentives for
people to leave low-paid public jobs for high-paid private jobs as
translators and drivers. There should be regulations to prevent such
``poaching,'' both in DOD and DOS contracting.
Fourth, the failure to understand systems of accountability
(positively) or systems of corruption (negatively) through the process
of public finance, from revenue collection through to budgeting,
payroll, procurement, payments, accounting and auditing. The World
Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is in my view the main
driver of accountability, as it operates through a dual key system
requiring audit reports before reimbursements for expenditure can be
made, and in my view this should be the main channel for U.S.
assistance. I find that the work of the World Bank in building the
crucial systems of accountability and partnering in the design of the
national programs with the government is not well understood, and I
would encourage the World Bank team urgently to provide information
briefings to key Congress committees, staff, media and the think-tank
community on how this operates.
If the civilian strategy is not firmly oriented around building
Afghan sovereignty, then military operations and the provision of large
funding streams going to thousands of different contractors risk
creating exactly the situation you describe. I think this is what has
happened, especially in the last 5 years, the good news is that I see
real evidence that there is wide recognition of this danger by the
administration, and in Congress, and a real desire to fix it. The
question is, Do we have time to turn it around? I believe we must try.
The plans emerging from the ground team in Kabul seem to be to hold
ministries to strict standards of accountability and transparency, and
to keep flows of money from being expropriated.
In my view, the following steps would be essential and/or helpful:
1. Ensure that the budget of Afghanistan is robust and adequately
funded to meet key expenses (with maximum contribution coming from
Afghanistan's revenue).
2. Request IMF to prepare realistic revenue estimates for
Afghanistan's future revenue, including different scenarios for
different levels of corruption and political will to grow the economy
and reduce leakage in revenue.
3. Ask IMF and World Bank to prepare a plan with strict
conditionalities for fund disbursements based on standards of
transparency and competent execution.
4. Prepare a framework for reducing project funding outside the
Afghan budget, and preventing poaching of government staff. NGOs can be
contracted through the Afghan budget; e.g., the National Health Program
by which NGOs and private companies are contracted province by province
to provide services, but with clear standards for wages and
accountabilities. This model should be generalized.
5. Mandate U.S. contributions to the U.N. be conditional on the
U.N. revising its wage levels for support staff so that they are on a
par with Afghan Government salaries. There is a procedure for doing
this. It is astonishing that much U.S. funding is going to support
programs where drivers, assistants, and translators are paid upward of
$600 per month when teachers, doctors, nurses, and judges are paid a
fraction of this. This must be urgently investigated.
6. Investigate and prepare ways for the CERP/PRT and USAID funding
to be channeled so as to maximize Afghan job creation and the basis for
small- and medium-sized construction industry. There are precedents
from other countries where external financing was channeled to lay the
basis for a construction industry most noticeably in Singapore of the
1960s and Spain of the 1970s. This requires moving to adopt Afghan
Building code and working to nurture increase of the capacity of these
firms. There are often four or five levels of subcontracting, resulting
in very high overhead, with Afghans being the 4th or 5th link. It would
be better for all parties if they were first, and if they do not have
the capacity to do so, to focus on building this capacity. I have a
concrete set of proposals as to how this can be done if there is
interest in following up. Valuable efforts have been made for ISAF NATO
troops would buy their water from Afghanistan. Such programs could be
extended to food and other essential supplies, which could mitigate the
negative effects of troop presence by using them as a market force to
grow the Afghan economy.
Regarding the question of presence of troops; I believe that given
our previous turning a blind eye to the growing power of the ``regional
strongmen'' or warlords, and our previous badly managed campaign which
has permitted the incursions of the Taliban into previously stable
areas, the presence of the threat of force and the actual use of force
is going to be necessary to create conditions of stability and rule of
law. Commanders in the field must use their presence judiciously, not
to ``support the government'' in a blanket way, but rather to
understand which actors are committed to working within rule of law,
and how to move toward reassertion of the culture of ``laws not of
men'' that the population is demanding, which the Taliban, in a brutal
and simple way, is currently claiming to offer, via dangerous parallel
governmental structures (courts and police).
Question. Ms. Lockhart, there is a common assumption that we must
provide security before we can do development. I think this fails to
recognize that our military presence can actually create a violent
backlash that undermines development efforts. Would you agree that this
is a serious concern.
Answer. With regard to the first part of your question, I believe
that ``we must provide security before we can do development,'' is an
assumption that should be challenged. I think this assumption has two
flaws: First, that ``we'' can provide either security or development.
If security or development are to be provided, it is Afghan
institutions and people who will provide their own security, and
development is an endogenous process which must be driven by Afghan
people, processes and leaders. Many of the mistaken policies of the
last years have been driven by the faulty conception that security and
development can be done for a native population by international actors
tout court. Having said that, given the deterioration in the situation
to where we are today, the ANSF are not capable of providing security
for the population, most (but not all) of Afghan ministries are not
funded or equipped to provide social services on a large scale, and the
Afghan political elite has now subverted the civil society that could
have underpinned a vibrant economy. So the question now is this: given
ultimately that there is agreement that it is Afghans and their
institutions that will ensure the level of security and sustained
economic growth, and indeed rule of law itself, how do a foreign
presence, and a foreign exit, and foreign resources and advice, help
establish the conditions for Afghan sovereignty to be responsibly
exercised.
The second flaw in the ``security before development thesis'' is
that security must precede development: in my view, development is
inherently about processes of change--economic, social and political--
through creation of institutions and organizations. Security and
development are thus symbiotic and require each other. For example, to
have an army, one must be able to have finance organizations--that have
a budget and payroll to underwrite the costs--and a basic education and
health system, and proper nutrition, to ensure there are viable
recruits to that army, and a possible officer corps. In some cases,
security can be achieved through societal compacts at the local level
for groups to cooperate. This therefore points again to the need for a
political process to be articulated that frames all efforts made.
I agree that there is a serious concern that military presence can
prompt a backlash, or at least is being portrayed as an occupation by
some actors. This is why it is imperative that the presence should not
be framed as an occupation, nor should the presence be an occupation.
To the extent that presence continues, my view is that the presence
should be framed in line with the Bonn Agreement and U.N. mandates of
2001, which saw the presence of international actors including the
U.N., as a global effort to assist the people of Afghanistan to
establish a sovereign government so they can govern themselves. The
participants of Bonn requested ISAF forces to provide stability while
their own forces were being established. The legal basis for presence
is extremely important as this informs the view of legitimacy of
presence. What we need to do is to examine this basis, and once policy
clarifications are made, to communicate this to the global and Afghan
public. It is more likely that presence would provoke a backlash if
that presence is perceived to be backing up a corrupt and predatory
Afghan Government.
While the overarching framing is the most important factor, the
second factor is the way that any troops actually operate on the
ground. Initially, ISAF forces were strongly welcomed by the
population. I personally witnessed many interactions where Afghans
actively praised them and asked them to stay. Where ISAF, which then
came under NATO command, were initially directed only at stability or
peacekeeping operations, the OEF forces were initially a separate
operation, directed at combating the Taliban. In my view, confusion
came when the two operations were merged in 2006 and 2007, just as the
Taliban reemerged, provoking need for use of force, without explaining
to the population that ISAF/NATO would not only be doing peacekeeping
but would now also be doing heavy combat operations. One option would
be to separate the two missions with a clear demarcation, as it is
indeed bewildering for the Afghan population that the same mission is
engaged both in peacekeeping and offensive operations. The other is to
face a reality that the mission is complex, and mixes various elements,
but to compensate for this by explaining the rules of engagement
clearly to the population. Now, the change in strategy through the
McChrystal doctrine of protect the population and establish ANSF, while
avoiding civilian casualties, is a clear and significant shift in
strategy, matched by tactical guidance. McChrystal has also recently
emphasized the necessity of good communications. If these two
innovations can properly be operationalized, whereby troops win the
trust of the population, then there will not be a backlash, or it will
be small enough to be manageable. This is what has been discovered in
former COIN campaigns. And indeed, if we are to ask Afghans to buy into
a new political settlement, and turn their backs on the Taliban, for
this request to be believable it would be imperative that they would be
protected, either through Afghan or international forces.
Finally, if Afghan forces are to be credible, competent and
trusted, then serious problems with the way they operate must urgently
be addressed. The ANA needs to become more balanced, as it is perceived
by Pashtuns as a northern-dominated institution, and the ANP are
notoriously corrupt and often not aligned to upholding and enforcing
rule of law.
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