[Senate Hearing 111-216]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-216
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 7, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-355 WASHINGTON : 2009
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
United States Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan
april 7, 2009
Page
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy. 5
Petraeus, GEN David H. USA, Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 12
Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, United States Special
Operations Command............................................. 34
(iii)
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:27 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall,
Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss,
Graham, Thune, Martinez, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine,
general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
Noblet, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member;
Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican staff director;
Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V.
Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Richard F.
Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L.
Kingston, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant
to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
Senator Udall; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to
Senator Martinez; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator
Burr; and Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
receives testimony this morning on the new strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan announced by President Obama last
Friday. Our witnesses this morning each have contributed to
developing that strategy. Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Michele Flournoy, who will be with us in a few minutes,
was one of three administration officials who led the
interagency panel that examined U.S. policy towards Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Their review drew on and benefited from a number
of earlier policy reviews, including one by U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) led by Commander General David Petraeus, who
also joins us this morning. We have with us Admiral Eric Olson,
Commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Ms. Flournoy, General Petraeus, and Admiral Olson will play
a central role in implementing the President's new strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our thanks go to each of them for
their service and for their being with us this morning. On
behalf of the committee, please thank the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines serving in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility (AOR). America owes them a debt of gratitude for
their willingness to serve in harm's way and for the sacrifices
which they and their families make on a daily basis. General
and Admiral, I hope that you will pass along that appreciation
to the troops.
The President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is on
the right track. The American people recognize that Afghanistan
is the place where al Qaeda laid the plans for the attacks of
September 11 on our homeland and where the training took place
for those attacks. We must do all we can to make sure that this
region never again provides a safe haven or a training ground
for extremists plotting the next attack.
In formulating this new strategy, the administration has
consulted closely with our Afghanistan and Pakistan partners.
Pakistan President Zardari has called the administration's new
approach a positive change. Afghan President Karzai has
welcomed the administration's plans, saying it is ``what the
Afghan people were hoping for.'' This support and buy-in is
important because ultimately it will be the people of
Afghanistan and Pakistan who will be the ones who decide to
reject and defeat the hopeless future that al Qaeda and the
Taliban offer them and the world.
I very much support the President's commitment to greatly
accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
the Afghan National Police. It is important to build up the
Afghan security forces far more quickly than has been the case
up to now so Afghanistan can provide for its own security.
As Afghan Defense Minister Wardak told me, Afghan soldiers
want to provide for their country's security, and our
commanders say that Afghan soldiers have the will to fight and
are respected throughout Afghanistan and the Afghan army has
the recruits to build their forces.
For too long, as Admiral Mullen said some months ago, in
Iraq we do what we must, while in Afghanistan we only do what
we can. With the new strategy, this will no longer be the case.
This committee has heard from witnesses over the last few
weeks that the expansion of the Afghan army has been slowed by
a lack of training teams to work with Afghan units and delays
in getting the basic equipment that Afghan units need to train
and to fight. The President's decision to deploy an additional
brigade of 4,000 soldiers with the almost exclusive mission of
training the Afghan security forces is a major step in the
right direction to moving more quickly to building up the
Afghan army. By helping the Afghan forces as they take the lead
in the fight, we avoid the perception that we are occupiers.
Instead, we'll be supporting them in their struggle for a
better future for their country.
I also welcome President Obama's decision to match this
increase in military forces with an increase in our civilian
resources in Afghanistan. The fielding of up to 500 additional
civilian experts from the State Department, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), Agriculture, Justice, and
other civilian government agencies will bring all instruments
of U.S. power to the task of ensuring that Afghanistan doesn't
serve again as a safe haven for terrorists.
The large majority of these civilians will be posted at
provincial reconstruction teams and elsewhere in the
countryside to promote economic development and good governance
at the provincial and district level. We need to support
programs that empower Afghan communities to set their own
priorities and to take ownership of local development projects.
I hope our witnesses will comment on the Afghan National
Solidarity Program. The National Solidarity Program has funded
thousands of small development projects in nearly every corner
of Afghanistan by providing modest grants of money directly to
locally elected community development councils which plan,
implement, and oversee development projects that they decide
are the most beneficial for their local communities.
The decision to establish benchmarks and metrics to assess
progress towards meeting our objectives is a wise one. Some
indicators of security, such as the number of violent
incidents, roadside bombs, and suicide attacks, have gotten
worse in 2008. At the same time, the Special Representative of
the U.N. Secretary General recently told the Security Council
that he is beginning to see positive trends emerging in
Afghanistan in government competence, in police reform, private
sector development, and counternarcotics. CENTCOM data on
Defense Department-funded reconstruction efforts indicates that
since October 2005 the Defense Department has constructed 96
schools and other education centers throughout Afghanistan and
roughly 6.2 million students were enrolled last year, up from
800,000 students in 2001. Since January 2007, the Defense
Department has completed almost 200 health care construction
projects, funded almost 300 water and sanitation projects, and
funded 115 electricity-related projects, including microhydro
and other generators and solar lighting systems.
We need metrics and we need benchmarks to measure progress
to report to the American people and, importantly, to hold
people accountable. It's about time the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) establishes some benchmarks for itself.
Thus far NATO's performance has been woefully inadequate,
except for some very notable exceptions of some countries. It
is long past time for our NATO allies, friends, and other
stakeholders in the region to step up and do their part. Our
NATO allies need to provide the troops, equipment, and trainers
that they agreed to provide for the NATO mission in Afghanistan
and eliminate national caveats on the use of these forces.
Those who can't provide military resources should contribute
financially to Afghanistan's economic development or to help
build the Afghan security forces, for example through fully
funding the NATO Afghan Army Trust Fund. So far, the commitment
to provide a billion Euros to that fund has fallen short by 90
percent. In addition, countries can share their civilian
expertise to promote good governance and the rule of law.
I welcome President Obama's commitment to robustly fund the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, to
prevent waste and fraud in reconstruction programs.
Relative to Pakistan, the United States should assist
Pakistan in confronting terrorists within its borders and in
building its democratic and economic institutions. Over the
weekend, President Zardari stated that the conflict in the
Afghan-Pakistan border region was Pakistan's fight, not
America's. He said Pakistanis ``are fighting militancy and
extremism for our own sake.'' I sincerely hope that that is the
case.
Pakistani leaders at all levels should need no convincing
from us that extremist groups pose the greatest threat to
Pakistan's survival. If Pakistan's goals are attacking
militants and extremists for the sake of their own stability
and the benefit of the Pakistani people, then we can and should
support their goals. But we can't buy Pakistan's support for
our goals, rather than supporting their goals. If we are
perceived as trying to do that, it will send the wrong message
to the Pakistani people and to the extremists, who will use it
against the Pakistan leadership and against our interests.
Finally, I do not agree with statements by some in the
administration that we cannot make progress in Afghanistan
without success on the Pakistan side of the border. We should
not tie Afghanistan's future totally to the success of efforts
in Pakistan or to Pakistan's governmental decisions. Obviously,
progress in Afghanistan is impeded by the failure of Pakistan
to stop the flow of violent extremists into Afghanistan. But I
remain skeptical that Pakistan has either the will or the
capability to secure their border, particularly between
Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan.
U.S. Brigadier General John Nicholson in Regional Command
South said that that stretch of border is ``wide open'' for
Afghan Taliban fighters streaming across to attack U.S. and
NATO forces. Pakistan leaders have failed to date to take on
the Afghan Taliban in Baluchistan, whose leadership, or shura,
meets openly in the city of Quetta and from there commands
attacks into Afghanistan. News articles reported last week that
operatives in one wing of Pakistan's intelligence service have
been providing direct support, in terms of money, military
supplies, and strategic planning guidance, to the Taliban's
campaign in southern Afghanistan. I hope our witnesses will
address those news reports.
But even though obviously far more difficult, unless
Pakistan stops the flow of violent extremists coming across the
border, an expanding Afghan army with our help can make
progress in providing for Afghan security, including at the
border.
The road ahead is going to be long and costly. I believe we
now have the right strategy. We all look forward to hearing
from our witnesses about the challenges that lie ahead in
implementing the administration's new approach.
Senator McCain is going to join us a little bit later and
he will have an opening statement at that time. So let me start
with our witnesses. We welcome you, Secretary Flournoy. We know
that you were very necessarily detained, as a matter of fact,
at another very important function, and you have your
priorities exactly right. You might just spend a few moments,
if you would, telling us why you're late because I know you're
very proud of the fact.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, thank you very much for allowing me to
do this. My husband is next door as the administration's
nominee to be Deputy Secretary of the Veterans Administration
and I wanted to be there at least for his introduction to that
committee and show my support for him. But I also didn't want
to let you all down and fail to appear here. So I appreciate
you letting me be 15 minutes late so I could join you as well.
Chairman Levin. Well, we thank you for getting here. We
know how proud you are of your husband.
Since a quorum is present, let me now interrupt the flow of
the hearing to ask the committee to consider 3 civilian
nominations and a list of 3,952 pending military nominations.
First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Ashton Carter to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. Is there a motion to favorably
report Dr. Carter's nomination to the Senate?
Senator Lieberman. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay.
[No response.]
The motion carries.
Second, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Dr. James Miller, Jr., to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. Miller's
nomination?
Senator Lieberman. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay.
[No response.]
The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. Is there a motion
to report?
Senator Lieberman. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Any nays?
[No response.]
The motion carries.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 3,952
pending military nominations. Of these nominations, 289 are 1
day short of our 7-day requirement. However, we've checked and
there's no objection that has been raised to these nominations
because of that technical shortfall, and I recommend to the
committee that we waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the
confirmation of the nominations of these 289 officers prior to
the coming recess.
Is there a motion to favorably report the 3,952
nominations?
Senator Lieberman. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Collins. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Any nays?
[No response.]
The motion carries.
Military Nominations Pending With the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 1, 2009.
1. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Scott D. Shiver) (Reference No. 55).
2. MG Michael C. Gould, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy (Reference No. 74).
3. BG Vincent K. Brooks, USA, to be major general (Reference No.
93).
4. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Kathy L. Fullerton) (Reference No. 94).
5. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Emil B. Kabban) (Reference No. 95).
6. In the Air Force, there are 29 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian D. Anderson) (Reference No. 96).
7. In the Air Force, there are 21 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Mark T. Allison) (Reference No. 97).
8. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Tina M. Barbermatthew) (Reference
No. 98).
9. In the Air Force, there are 32 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with James J. Baldock IV) (Reference
No. 99).
10. In the Air Force, there are 67 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Lisa L. Adams) (Reference No. 100).
11. In the Air Force, there are 1,179 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Ariel O. Acebal) (Reference No.
101).
12. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Peter C. Gould) (Reference No. 102).
13. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Garrett S. Yee) (Reference No. 103).
14. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Roy L. Bourne) (Reference No. 104).
15. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Steven A. Khalil) (Reference No.
107).
16. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Miguel Gonzalez) (Reference No. 108).
17. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(David M. Dromsky) (Reference No. 109).
18. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Jed R. Espiritu) (Reference No.
110).
19. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Charles C. Adkison) (Reference
No. 111).
20. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are five appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with David G. Antonik) (Reference No.
112).
21. In the Marine Corps, there are 132 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Kelly P. Alexander) (Reference No. 113).
22. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jonathon V. Lammers) (Reference No. 118).
23. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Gary A. Foskey) (Reference No. 119).
24. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Bryson D. Borg) (Reference No. 120).
25. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Frank Rodriguez, Jr.) (Reference No. 121).
26. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Edward E. Turski) (Reference No. 122).
27. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Joseph R. Krupa) (Reference No. 123).
28. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Kathleen P. Naiman) (Reference No. 124).
29. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Juan G. Esteva) (Reference No. 125).
30. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Robert F. Donnelly) (Reference No. 126).
31. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Richard H. Dahlman) (Reference No. 127).
32. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Julie S. Akiyama)
(Reference No. 128).
33. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Michael L. Nippert)
(Reference No. 129).
34. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Martin L. Badegian) (Reference No. 130).
35. In the Army Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Debra H. Burton) (Reference No. 131).
36. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Paul P. Bryant) (Reference No. 132).
37. In the Army, there are 77 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Robert J. Abbott) (Reference No. 133).
38. In the Army, there are 22 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Vanessa A. Berry) (Reference No. 134).
39. In the Army, there are eight appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with Efren E. Recto) (Reference No.
135).
40. In the Army Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Suzanne D. Adkinson) (Reference No. 136).
41. In the Marine Corps, there are 773 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Derek M. Abbey) (Reference No. 137).
42. In the Marine Corps, there are 464 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Harald Aagaard) (Reference No.
138).
43. Col. Debra A. Scullary, USAFR, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 142).
44. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Roger A. Binder) (Reference
No. 143).
45. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with William B. Binger)
(Reference No. 144).
46. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are two appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Paul W. Brier) (Reference
No. 145).
47. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with George B. Gosting)
(Reference No. 155).
48. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Thomas M. Carden, Jr.) (Reference No.
156).
49. In the Air Force, there are 51 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Richard D. Baker) (Reference No. 158).
50. In the Air Force, there are 15 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jeffrey L. Andrus) (Reference No. 159).
51. In the Air Force, there are 16 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Federico C. Aquino, Jr.)
(Reference No. 160).
52. In the Air Force, there are 148 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joselita M. Abeleda) (Reference
No. 161).
53. In the Air Force, there are 40 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Thomas J. Bauer) (Reference No. 162).
54. In the Air Force, there are 286 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Amanda J. Adams) (Reference No. 163).
55. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Gregory G. Galyo) (Reference No.
164).
56. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Xavier A. Nguyen) (Reference No. 192).
57. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with John M. Beene II) (Reference No. 193).
58. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Laura K. Lester) (Reference No. 194).
59. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Brigitte Belanger) (Reference No. 195).
60. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Mitzi A. Rivera) (Reference No. 196).
61. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Catherine B. Evans) (Reference No. 197).
62. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Victor G. Kelly) (Reference No. 198).
63. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Ryan T. Choate) (Reference No. 199).
64. In the Army, there are nine appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Rafael A. Cabrera)
(Reference No. 200).
65. In the Army, there are 43 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Robert A. Borcherding) (Reference
No. 201).
66. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with James K. Gilman) (Reference No. 218).
67. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with William B. Gamble) (Reference No.
219).
68. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Ryan G. McPherson) (Reference No. 234).
69. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade
of colonel (Mark J. Ivey) (Reference No. 235).
70. In the Air Force, there are 37 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Christopher B. Bennett) (Reference
No. 238).
71. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Victor J. Torres-Fernandez) (Reference No. 241).
72. In the Army, there are 86 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Joseph Angerer)
(Reference No. 242).
73. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Ted R. Bates) (Reference No. 243).
74. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with John M. Diaz) (Reference No. 244).
75. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Luisa Santiago) (Reference No. 245).
76. In the Army, there are 124 appointments to the grade of colonel
and below (list begins with Randall W. Cowell) (Reference No. 246).
77. In the Army Reserve, there are 16 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Albert J. Adkinson) (Reference No. 247).
78. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Christopher G. Cunningham)
(Reference No. 248).
79. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Janet L. Jackson) (Reference No.
249).
Total: 3,952.
Chairman Levin. Now we will start with you, Madam
Secretary.
Ms. Flournoy. Thank you very much, sir, and thank you to
the committee for taking the----
Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt you one more time.
Let me remind everybody, since we do have a good attendance
here, that we will mark up the bill tomorrow which is a very
significant bill, Senate Bill 454, which is the Acquisition
Reform Act. We're going to be marking this bill up. We need
good attendance for that. It'll be at 9 o'clock in this room.
Madam Secretary.
Ms. Flournoy. Let me add my word of thanks to you for
taking the time to have those committee votes. I know that
Secretary Gates is very much looking forward to having some of
his team arrive to help him.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee,
thank you very much for asking me and giving me the opportunity
to testify before you today on the Obama administration's new
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the President stated
last Friday, I think very eloquently, we have a very clear
goal. This strategy really went back to first principles about
our interests and our objectives, and we clarified our goal in
this region as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda
and its extremist allies. To do so, we must eliminate their
safe haven in Pakistan and ensure that such a safe haven does
not return to Afghanistan.
Preventing future terrorist threats to the American people
and on our allies is absolutely vital to our national
interests. We have learned in the past, at too high a price,
the danger of allowing al Qaeda and its extremist supporters to
have safe havens and access to resources to plan their attacks.
This is why we have troops in Afghanistan and why we are going
to heavily engage and intensify our efforts in Pakistan.
To achieve our goals, we need a smarter and more
comprehensive strategy, one that uses all the instruments of
our national power and those of our allies. We need to devote
the necessary resources to implement it. A critical aspect of
this new strategy is the recognition that Afghanistan and
Pakistan, while two countries, are a single theater for our
diplomacy. Al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across
the border into Pakistan, where they are planning attacks and
supporting operations that undermine the stability of both
countries.
Special Representative Holbrooke will lead a number of
bilateral and trilateral and regional diplomatic efforts, and
from the Defense side we will be working to build the
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities of both
countries, so that they can more effectively combat terrorists
and insurgents.
Pakistan's ability to dismantle the safe havens on its
territory and defeat the terror and insurgent networks within
its borders are absolutely critical to the security and
stability of that nuclear-armed state. It is in America's long-
term interests to support Pakistan's restored democracy by
investing in its people and in their economic wellbeing. We
seek a strategic partnership with Pakistan that will encourage
and enable it to shift its focus from conventional war
preparations to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
preparations.
So we will be urging Congress to support a forthcoming
proposal such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation that will
authorize civilian and economic assistance as well as the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund to develop a more
effective military that can defeat insurgent networks. This
support, both military and economic, will be limited if we do
not see improvements in Pakistani performance.
We must also develop a lasting partnership with
Afghanistan. Like Pakistan, Afghanistan suffers from severe
socioeconomic crises that exacerbate its own political
situation. These are the root causes of the insurgency that al
Qaeda and the Taliban are seeking to exploit. Building Afghan
capacity to address these causes, while simultaneously taking
the fight to the enemy, are important components of our efforts
going forward.
So the U.S., along with our Afghan partners, and our
international allies, is fully committed to resourcing an
integrated counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy aims to do
several things:
First, to reverse Taliban gains and secure the population,
the heart of counterinsurgency, in the troubled south and east
of the country;
Second, to build the capacity of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), both the army and the police, to be
able eventually to take the lead in providing the security for
the population in the country. Building the ANSF should enable
us over time to transition from an International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)-led effort to an Afghan-led
counterinsurgency effort. To do so, we have to meet the
requirements of our commanders on the ground, particularly for
trainers, and the deployment that the President announced of an
additional 4,000 troops focused as trainers will be the first
time that this critical need has been addressed or fully met in
several years.
But beyond a strengthened military mission, we will
intensify our civilian assistance and our efforts to better
integrate that assistance to promote more effective governance
and development. Working with the U.N. and our allies, we will
seek to improve coordination and coherence in these efforts in
support of Afghan development priorities. Ensuring a free and
fair and secure election will also be an immediate and
consequential task.
We will also complement efforts at assistance at the
national level focused on building capacities in the ministries
with a much more bottom-up set of initiatives designed to build
capacity at the district and provincial levels, where most
Afghans have their direct experience with Afghan institutions
and government. Combatting corruption will reinforce efforts to
strengthen these institutions, and these methods will address,
we hope, the root causes of the insurgency, build
accountability, and ultimately give the Afghan people more
reason to support their government.
Defeating the insurgency will also require breaking links
with the narcotics industry. We will work very hard to build
more effective Afghan law enforcement, develop alternative
livelihoods to deny the insurgency lucrative sources of
funding, and reform the agricultural sector on which so much of
the Afghan population depends.
As we regain the initiative in Afghanistan, we will support
an Afghan-led reconciliation process that's designed to
essentially flip the foot soldiers, to bring low and mid-level
leaders to the side of the government. If this process is
successful, the senior leaders, the irreconcilables, should be
more easily isolated and we should be better able to target
them.
Our men and women in uniform and our allies have fought
bravely for several years now in Afghanistan. Nearly 700 of our
soldiers and marines have made the ultimate sacrifice and over
2,500 have been wounded. We believe that the best way to honor
them is to improve our strategy and to commit the necessary
resources to bring this war to a successful conclusion. I would
urge all of you on this key committee to provide your full
support.
The strategy aims not to solve the problem with the U.S.
and the international community alone, but, more importantly,
to build a bridge to Afghan self-reliance. Even as our forces
transition their responsibility to our Afghan partners, we will
want to be continuing to help Afghanistan with security and
economic assistance to build their nation over time. I would
argue that our vital interests demand no less.
Although we have not finalized our budget requests for the
2009 supplemental or for the 2010 base budget, I can just tell
you that we will be coming back to you to ask for your
assistance in several areas, certainly funding our additional
troop deployments, accelerating the growth of the ANSF,
continuing to support counternarcotics funding, increasing the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding available
to our commanders, and continuing humanitarian assistance
support in Afghanistan.
In Pakistan, we will be coming to discuss with you in more
detail the security development plan, which will include
funding for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund,
counternarcotics funding, continued coalition support funds,
1206, et cetera. So this is the beginning of our work together
and, while I don't have budgetary details today, we will
definitely be coming back to you to work with you to provide
the necessary resources for this strategy. I would also
encourage you to urge your counterparts on other committees to
support the civilian aspects of this strategy, which will be
critical to its success.
Let me just conclude by saying we understand that this
cannot be an American-only effort. Defeating al Qaeda and its
extremist allies is a goal and a responsibility for the
international community. You will be seeing not only the
President, but others in the administration, engaging our
allies, as we already have been doing in The Hague, now in the
coming days at the NATO summit, at future donors conferences,
to make sure that our allies are alongside with us, putting on
the table what they can provide to make this effort successful.
We believe that keeping the American homeland and the
American people safe is the bottom line goal of this effort and
this is a challenge that we all must meet together.
Thank you all very much for letting me have the opportunity
to testify this morning.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an
update on the situation in the U.S. CENTCOM AOR and to discuss
the way ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan together with Under
Secretary Flournoy and the Commander of the Special Operations
Forces that are so critical to all that we do in our AOR,
Admiral Eric Olson.
As Under Secretary Flournoy noted in her statement and as
President Obama explained this past Friday, the United States
has vital national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These
countries contain the most pressing trans-national extremist
threats in the world, and in view of that they pose the most
urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR.
Disrupting and ultimately defeating al Qaeda and the other
extremist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan and reversing
the downward security spiral seen in key parts of these
countries will require sustained, substantial commitment. The
strategy described last Friday constitutes such commitment.
Although the additional resources will be applied in
different ways on either side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan
and Pakistan comprise a single theater that requires
comprehensive, whole of governments approaches that are closely
coordinated. To achieve that level of coordination, Ambassador
Holbrooke and I will work closely with our ambassadors and our
counterparts from other countries and the host nations.
This morning I'll briefly discuss the military aspects of
the new strategy, noting, however, that while additional
military forces clearly are necessary in Afghanistan, they will
not by themselves be sufficient to achieve our objectives. It
is important that the civilian requirements for Afghanistan and
Pakistan be fully met as well. To that end, it is essential
that the respective Departments, State, and USAID foremost
among them, be provided the resources necessary to implement
the strategy. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, on the value of
the Afghan National Solidarity Program as well.
Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires a
comprehensive counterinsurgency approach and that is what
General David McKiernan and ISAF are endeavoring to execute
with the additional resources being committed. The additional
forces will provide an increased capability to secure and serve
the people, to pursue the extremists, to support the
development of host nation security forces, to reduce the
illegal narcotics industry, and to help develop the Afghan
capabilities needed to increase the legitimacy of national and
local Afghan governance.
These forces will also, together with the additional NATO
elements committed for the election security force, work with
Afghan elements to help secure the national elections in late
August and to help ensure that those elections are seen as
free, fair, and legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people.
As was the case in Iraq, the additional forces will only be
of value if they are employed properly. It is vital that they
be seen as good guests and partners, not as would-be conquerors
or superiors, as formidable warriors who also do all possible
to avoid civilian casualties in the course of combat
operations. As additional elements deploy, it will also be
essential that our commanders and elements strive for unity of
effort at all levels and integrate our security efforts into
the broader plans to promote Afghan political and economic
development.
We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the
past decades and we will continue working with our Afghan
partners to help them earn the trust of the people and with
security to provide them with new opportunities.
These concepts and others are captured in the
counterinsurgency guidance recently issued by General
McKiernan. I commend this guidance to the committee and have
provided a copy for you.
[The information referred to follows:]
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General Petraeus. The situation in Pakistan is, of course,
closely linked to that in Afghanistan. Although there has been
progress in some areas as Pakistan's newly established
democracy has evolved, significant security challenges have
also emerged. The extremists that have established sanctuaries
in the rugged border areas not only contribute to the
deterioration of security in eastern and southern Afghanistan,
they also pose an ever more serious threat to Pakistan's very
existence. In addition, they have carried out terrorist attacks
in India and Afghanistan and in various other countries around
the region, as well as in the United Kingdom, and they have
continued efforts to carry out attacks in our homeland.
Suicide bombings and other attacks have increased in
Pakistan over the past 3 years, killing thousands of innocent
Pakistani civilians, security personnel, and government
officials, including of course former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, and damaging Pakistan's infrastructure and economy as
well.
To be sure, the extremists have sustained losses, and in
response to the increased concern over extremist activity the
Pakistan military has stepped up operations against militants
in parts of the Tribal Areas. However, considerable further
work is required. It is in Pakistan that al Qaeda senior
leadership and other trans-national extremist elements are
located. Thus operations there are imperative and we need to
provide the support and assistance to the Pakistani military
that can enable them to confront the extremists, who pose a
truly existential threat to their country.
Given our relationship with Pakistan and its military over
the years, it is important that the United States be seen as a
reliable ally. The Pakistani military has been fighting a tough
battle against extremists for more than 7 years. They have
sacrificed much in this campaign and they need our continued
support.
The U.S. military thus will focus on two main areas. First,
we will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and
help build its counterinsurgency capabilities by providing
training, equipment, and assistance. We will also expand our
exchange programs to build stronger relationships with
Pakistani leaders at all levels. Second, we will help promote
closer cooperation across the Afghan-Pakistan border by
providing, equipment, facilities, and intelligence
capabilities, and by bringing together Afghan and Pakistani
military officers to enable coordination between the forces on
either side of the border. These efforts will support timely
sharing of intelligence information and help to coordinate the
operations of the two forces.
Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will of course continue to support
the targeting, disruption, and pursuit of the leadership bases
and support networks of al Qaeda and other transnational
extremist groups operating in the region. We will also work
with our partners to challenge the legitimacy of the terrorist
methods, practices, and ideologies, helping our partners
address legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements
of the population and supporting promotion of the broadbased
economic and governmental development that is a necessary part
of such an effort.
As we increase our focus on and efforts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other important missions in
the CENTCOM AOR. There has, for example, been substantial
progress in Iraq, but numerous challenges still confront its
leaders and its people. Although al Qaeda and other extremist
elements in Iraq have been reduced significantly, they pose a
continued threat to security and stability. Beyond that,
lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between
political parties, the return of displaced persons, large
detainee releases, new budget challenges, the integration of
the Sons of Iraq, and other issues indicate that the progress
there is still fragile and reversible, though less so than when
I left Iraq last fall, especially given the successful conduct
of provincial elections earlier this year.
Despite the many challenges, the progress in Iraq,
especially the steady development of the Iraqi security forces,
has enabled the continued transition of security
responsibilities to Iraqi elements, further reductions of
coalition forces, and steady withdrawal of our units from urban
areas. We are thus on track in implementing the security
agreement with the Government of Iraq and in executing the
strategy laid out by the President at Camp Lejeune.
A vital element in our effort in Iraq has been
Congressional support for a variety of equipment and resource
needs, and I want to take this opportunity to thank you for
that. In particular, your support for the rapid fielding of
Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles and various
types of unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as for important
individual equipment and the CERP has been of enormous
importance to our troopers.
With respect to CERP, we have taken a number of steps to
ensure proper expenditure and oversight of the funds allocated
through this important program, including procedural guides,
instruction of leaders, and an audit by the Army Audit Agency
at my request when I was the Multinational Force Iraq commander
in 2008.
Iran remains a major concern in the CENTCOM AOR. It
continues to carry out destabilizing activities in the region,
including the training, funding, and arming of militant proxies
active in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq. It also continues its
development of nuclear capabilities and missile systems that
many assess are connected to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and
delivery means.
In response, we are working with partner states in the
region to build their capabilities and to strengthen
cooperative security arrangements, especially in the areas of
shared early warning, air and missile defense, and
establishment of a common operational picture. Iran's actions
and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the Gulf to
seek closer relationships with us than we have had with them in
some decades.
We are also helping to bolster the capabilities of the
security forces in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf
States, and the Central Asian states, to help them deal with
threats to their security, which range from al Qaeda to robust
militia and organized criminal elements. In addition, we are
working with partner nations to counter piracy, combat illegal
narcotics production and trafficking, and interdict arms
smuggling, activities that threaten stability and the rule of
law and often provide funding for extremists.
Much of this work is performed through an expanding network
of bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements
established to address common challenges and pursued shared
objectives. As we strengthen this network, we strive to provide
our partners responsive security assistance, technical
expertise, and resources for training, educating and equipping
their forces and improving security facilities and
infrastructure. We believe significant gains result from these
activities and we appreciate your support for them as well.
Finally, in all of these endeavors we seek to foster
comprehensive approaches by ensuring that military efforts are
fully integrated with broader diplomatic, economic, and
developmental efforts. We are working closely with former
Senator Mitchell and Ambassador Ross as they undertake
important responsibilities as special envoys, in the same way
that we are working with Ambassador Holbrooke and the U.S.
ambassadors in the region.
In conclusion, there will be nothing easy about the way
ahead in Afghanistan or Pakistan, or in many of the other tasks
in the CENTCOM area. Much hard work lies before us. But it is
clear that achieving the objectives of these missions is vital,
and it is equally clear that these endeavors will require a
sustained, substantial commitment and unity of effort among all
involved.
There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and coastguardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR.
Together with our many civilian partners, they have been the
central element in the progress we have made in Iraq and in
several other areas, and they will be the key to achieving
progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in the other locations
where serious work is being done.
These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around
the world constitute the most capable military in the history
of our Nation. They have soldiered magnificently against tough
enemies during challenging operations, in punishing terrain,
and extreme weather. They and their families have made great
sacrifices since September 11.
Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense
that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice. In
view of that, I want to conclude this morning by thanking the
American people for their extraordinary support of our men and
women and their families and by thanking the members of this
committee for your unflagging support and abiding concern for
our troopers and their families as well.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, the
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is now in its eighth
consecutive year of combat operations in an area of the world critical
to the interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners.
CENTCOM seeks to promote cooperation, to respond to crises, to deter
aggression, and, when necessary, to defeat our adversaries in order to
promote security, stability, and prosperity in the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Typically, achieving U.S. national goals and
objectives in the CENTCOM AOR involves more than just the traditional
application of military power. In many cases, a whole of government
approach is required, one that integrates all tools available to
international and interagency partners to secure host-nation
populations, to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency and security
operations, to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental and
institutional capacity, and to promote economic development.
These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics
shaping the region's security environment are constantly evolving.
Major changes in just this past year include: increased violence in
Afghanistan and Pakistan; transition of authority to elected civilian
leadership in Pakistan; progress against extremists in Iraq; expiration
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790; damage to still resilient al
Qaeda and other extremist elements; continued Iranian intransigence
over its nuclear program and continued support to proxy extremist
elements; increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of
Somalia; and the global financial crisis and accompanying decline in
oil prices. These developments, as well as recent events on the borders
of our AOR, particularly in Gaza, India, and Somalia, demonstrate that
the dynamics shaping regional security will continue to evolve,
presenting both challenges and opportunities as we seek to address
insecurity and extremism in the AOR.
Following conversations with our coalition partners and a recent
comprehensive review of our AOR by members of CENTCOM, interagency
partners, and academic experts, we have identified the following
priority tasks for the coming year:
Helping to reverse the downward cycles of violence in
Afghanistan and Pakistan;
Countering transnational terrorist and extremist
organizations that threaten the security of the United States
and our allies;
Helping our Iraqi partners build on the progress in
their country while reducing U.S. forces there but sustaining
hard-won security gains;
Countering malign Iranian activities and policies;
Bolstering the capabilities of partner security forces
in the region;
Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal
narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and proliferation of the
components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
Working with the U.S. military Services to reduce the
strain on our forces and the cost of our operations; and
Supporting new policy initiatives, such as the
establishment of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan and efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace
Process.
The intent of the remainder of this posture statement is to address
these priorities and the broader, long-term solutions they support by
providing a more detailed overview of the AOR, assessments of the
situation in each of its major sub-regions, brief descriptions of the
approaches and techniques for improving security and preserving our
national interests, and comments on the programs and systems needed to
implement and to support these approaches.
overview of the centcom aor
Nature of the AOR
The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and
distinct regions. Stretching across more than 4.6 million square miles
and 20 countries, the AOR contains vital transportation and trade
routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the
Arabian Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez
Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. (With the
establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the realignment
of the Unified Command Plan, on 1 October 2008, AFRICOM assumed
responsibility for U.S. operations in the six countries of the Horn of
Africa and the Seychelles, countries previously in the CENTCOM AOR.)
The CENTCOM AOR encompasses the world's most energy-rich region, with
the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together accounting for at
least 64 percent of the world's petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its
crude oil production, and 46 percent of its natural gas reserves.
Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout
the region. The region is home to some of the world's wealthiest and
poorest states, with per capita incomes ranging from $800 to over
$100,000. Despite scattered pockets of affluence, many of the more than
530 million people living in the AOR suffer from inadequate governance,
underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption, and high
unemployment.
As a result of this diversity, many people in the AOR struggle to
balance modern influences with traditional social and cultural
authorities and to manage change at a pace that reinforces stability
rather than erodes it. For the past century, the sub-regions of the AOR
have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have
struggled to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of
traditional empires. These conflicts have intensified in the past three
decades with the emergence of extremist movements, nuclear weapons, and
enormous wealth derived from oil. Today we see stability in the AOR
threatened by interstate tensions, proliferation of ballistic missile
and nuclear weapons expertise, ethno-sectarian violence, and
insurgencies and substate militias, as well as horrific acts of
terrorism and extremist violence.
Most Significant Threats to U.S. Interests
The most serious threats to the United States, its allies, and its
interests in the CENTCOM AOR lie at the nexus of transnational
extremists, hostile states, and WMD. Across the AOR, al Qaeda, and its
extremist allies are fueling insurgency to reduce U.S. influence and to
destabilize the existing political, social, and economic order.
Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a dangerous game of allowing
or accepting extremist networks and terrorist facilitators to operate
from or through their territory, believing that their own people and
governments will be immune from the threat. Efforts designed to develop
or acquire WMD and delivery systems magnify the potential dangers of
the marriage between some states and their extremist proxies. Indeed,
the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or terrorist organizations
would constitute a grave threat to the United States, our allies, and
the countries of the region, and it likely would spark a destabilizing
arms race. In the near term, the greatest potential for such a threat
to arise is found in the instability in South Asia and the activities
and policies of the Iranian regime.
Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan and
Afghanistan pose the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM
AOR. Destabilization of the nuclear-armed Pakistani state would
present an enormous challenge to the United States, its allies,
and our interests. Pakistani state failure would provide
transnational terrorist groups and other extremist
organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a
safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks. The Pakistani
state faces a rising--indeed, an existential--threat from
Islamist extremists such as al Qaeda and other transnational
terrorists organizations, which have developed in safe havens
and support bases in ungoverned spaces in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border regions. Nevertheless, many Pakistani leaders
remain focused on India as Pakistan's principal threat, and
some may even continue to regard Islamist extremist groups as a
potential strategic asset against India. Meanwhile, al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and other insurgent groups operating from the
border region are engaged in an increasingly violent campaign
against Afghan and coalition forces and the developing Afghan
state.
Iranian Activities and Policies. Iranian activities
and policies constitute the major state-based threat to
regional stability. Despite U.N. Security Council resolutions,
international sanctions, and diplomatic efforts through the
P5+1, Iran is assessed by many to be continuing its pursuit of
a nuclear weapons capability, which would destabilize the
region and likely spur a regional arms race. Iran employs
surrogates and violent proxies to weaken competitor states,
perpetuate conflict with Israel, gain regional influence, and
obstruct the Middle East Peace Process. Iran also uses some of
these groups to train and equip militants in direct conflict
with U.S. forces. Syria, Iran's key ally, facilitates the
Iranian regime's reach into the Levant and the Arab world by
serving as the key link in an Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas
alliance and allows extremists (albeit in smaller numbers than
in the past) to operate in Damascus and to facilitate travel
into Iraq.
The situation in Iraq, lingering Arab-Israeli tensions, and
arms smuggling and piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the
Somali coast also pose significant challenges to the interests
of the United States, its allies, and partners.
Iraq. The situation in Iraq has improved significantly
since the peak of violence in mid-2007, but the gains there
remain fragile and reversible, though less so than last fall.
In Iraq, a number of factors continue to pose serious risks to
U.S. interests and have the potential to undermine regional
stability, international access to strategic resources, and
efforts to deny terrorist safe havens and support bases.
Internally, fundamental issues such as the distribution of
political power and resources remain to be settled. The Iraqi
state is still developing, and various issues pose serious
impediments to development. Integration of the Sons of Iraq and
the return of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis will
strain governmental capacity. Externally, Iraq's position with
its neighbors is still in flux, with some playing a negative
role in Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian tensions persist, and if
large-scale communal conflict were to return to Iraq, violence
could ``spill over'' into other states. Such violence could
also enable terrorist and insurgent groups to reestablish
control over portions of the country, which would destabilize
Iraq and the surrounding region. To further complicate matters,
the decline in oil prices and the resulting cut in the Iraqi
budget are likely to delay Iraqi security force modernization
and security initiatives, programs for the revitalization of
the oil and electricity sectors, and improvements in the
provision of government services.
The Arab-Israeli conflict. The enduring Arab-Israeli
conflict presents distinct challenges to our ability to advance
our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often
flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The
conflict has created a deep reservoir of anti-American
sentiment, based on the perception of U.S. favoritism for
Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the
strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and
peoples in the AOR and threatens the continued viability of
moderate regimes in the Arab world. Extremist groups exploit
that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran
influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese
Hizballah and Hamas. The attention to this issue in recent
months and the appointment of Senator Mitchell have generated
positive reactions.
Other Challenges to Security and Stability
While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics
and challenges in the subregions of the AOR, there are a number of
crosscutting issues that serve as major drivers of instability, inter-
state tensions, and conflicts. These factors can serve as root causes
of instability or as obstacles to security.
Extremist ideological movements and militant groups.
The CENTCOM AOR is home, of course, to important transnational
terrorist networks and violent extremist organizations that
exploit local conflicts and foster instability through the use
of terrorism and indiscriminate violence. The most significant
of these is al Qaeda, which, along with its associated
extremist groups, seeks to undermine regional governments,
challenge U.S. and western influence in the region, foster
instability, and impose extremist, oppressive practices on the
people through indiscriminate violence and intimidation.
Proliferation of WMD. The AOR contains states and
terrorists organizations which actively seek WMD capabilities
and have previously proliferated WMD technology outside
established international monitoring regimes.
Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively
governed spaces. Weak civil and security institutions and the
inability of certain governments in the region to exert full
control over their territories are conditions extremists
exploit to create physical safe havens in which they can plan,
train for, and launch terrorist operations or pursue narco-
criminal activities. Increasingly we are seeing the development
of what might be termed substates, particularly in Lebanon,
Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories, which are part of an
extremist strategy to ``hold'' territory and challenge the
legitimacy and authority of the central government.
Significant source of terrorist financing and
facilitation. The AOR, particularly the Arabian Peninsula,
remains a prime source of funding and facilitation for global
terrorist organizations. This terrorist financing is
transmitted through a variety of formal and informal networks
throughout the region.
Piracy. The state collapse of Somalia has enabled the
emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of
Somalia. Since the August 2008 spike in piracy acts, we have
worked in close cooperation with the international community to
counter this trend by focusing on increasing international
naval presence, assisting the shipping industry with improving
defensive measures, and establishing a sound international
legal framework for resolving piracy cases. With United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolution authorities, over twenty
countries have since deployed naval ships to conduct counter
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. In January 2009, we
stood up a Combined Task Force (CTF-151) for the specific
purpose of conducting and coordinating counter piracy
operations.
Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries. Within
certain countries, the politicization of ethnicity, tribal
affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the
development of national civil institutions and social cohesion,
at times to the point of violence. Between countries in the
region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve
as catalysts for conflict and insurgency.
Disputed borders and access to vital resources.
Unresolved issues of border demarcation and disagreements over
the sharing of vital resources, such as water, serve as sources
of tension and conflict between and within states in the
region.
Weapons and narcotics trafficking. The trafficking and
smuggling of weapons and narcotics and associated criminal
activities undermine state security, spur corruption, and
inhibit legitimate economic activity and good governance
throughout the AOR.
Uneven economic development and lack of employment
opportunities. Despite substantial economic growth rates
throughout much of the region over the past few years,
significant segments of the population in the region remain
economically disenfranchised, uneducated, and without
sufficient opportunity. The recent economic downturn has
heightened these problems. Without sustained, broadbased
economic development, increased employment opportunities are
unlikely given the growing proportions of young people relative
to overall populations.
Lack of regional and global economic integration. The
AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce
between and among countries, which diminish prospects for long
term economic growth, as well as opportunities to deepen
interdependence through private sector, social, and political
ties between countries.
major operating concepts
Implementing Comprehensive Approaches and Strengthening Unity of Effort
Addressing the challenges and threats in the AOR requires a
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach that fully integrates our
military and nonmilitary efforts and those of our allies and partners.
This approach puts a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with
all participants. At the combatant command level, this means working
with our interagency and international partners to develop joint action
or campaign plans that establish appropriate missions and objectives
for our subordinate elements, from major commands such as Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to country-based offices of military
cooperation. To effectively carry out these plans, the military
elements must be coordinated carefully with the corresponding State
Department envoy or ambassador.
CENTCOM also strives to help subordinate command efforts and to
address areas and functions not assigned to subordinate units or that
are crosscutting, such as combating the flow of foreign fighters.
Nesting Counterterrorism within a Counterinsurgency Approach
Success against the extremist networks in the CENTCOM AOR--whether
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon, or elsewhere--requires
all forces and means at our disposal employed in a strategic approach
grounded in the principles of counterinsurgency. Our counterterror
efforts, which seek to dismantle the extremist networks and their
leadership, often through the use of military force, are critical.
However, it is also important to eliminate these networks' sources of
support. Often this support comes from sympathetic populations who
provide financial support and physical safe haven or who simply turn a
blind eye to extremist activities. At other times, support comes from
populations directly subjected to extremist intimidation and extortion.
Eroding this support, eliminating these safe havens, and ultimately
preventing networks from reconstituting themselves requires protecting
populations, delegitimizing the terrorists' methods and ideologies,
addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of
the population, and promoting broadbased economic and governmental
development. Defeating extremist groups thus requires the application
of basic counterinsurgency concepts. We cannot be just ``hard'' or just
``soft''--we must be both.
This does not imply, however, that U.S. forces must conduct
counterinsurgency operations everywhere in the AOR where there are
extremist groups. Rather, this demands an approach in which the U.S.
primarily provides support to our partners in their own counterterror
and counterinsurgency efforts. We should help nations develop their own
capacity to secure their people and to govern fairly and effectively,
and we should build effective partnerships and engage with the people,
leaders, and security forces in the AOR. Whichever forces are involved,
ours or our partners', their actions and operations must adhere to
basic counterinsurgency principles, with the specifics of the
operations tailored to the circumstances on the ground.
Strengthening and Expanding the Regional Security Network
A new architecture for cooperative security is emerging in the
region from what in the past has been a relatively loose collection of
security relationships and bilateral programs. Conflicts in recent
decades have demonstrated that previous security paradigms and
architectures for the region, those which focused on balancing regional
blocs of power or solely on combating terrorism, have been insufficient
to ensure regional stability and security in the globalized, post-Cold
War environment.
From these unsatisfactory paradigms, we are now seeing that a model
characterized by a focus on common interests, inclusivity, and
capacity-building can best advance security and stability in the
region. This network of cooperation is both effective and sustainable
because it creates synergies and, as it grows, strengthens
relationships. Each cooperative endeavor is a link connecting countries
in the region, and each adds to the collective strength of the network.
The mechanisms put in place to coordinate efforts in one area, such as
piracy, smuggling, or littoral security, can often be leveraged to
generate action in other areas, such as a rapid response to a major oil
spill in the Gulf or in the aftermath of a typhoon or earthquake.
Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation in a set of issues
can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby
promoting greater interdependence. As a result, a growing network not
only works to improve interoperability and overall effectiveness in
providing security; it also builds trust and confidence among neighbors
and partners.
The foundation of this network consists of a focus on common
interests, an atmosphere of inclusivity, and efforts to build security
capacity and infrastructure.
Common interests. The security challenges we face
together can be a unifying force for focusing regional
attention and increasing cooperation. We all have an interest
in preventing terrorism, reducing illegal drug production and
trafficking, responding to environmental disasters, halting the
proliferation of WMD and related technology, countering piracy,
and deterring aggression. However, no nation can protect itself
from these threats without cooperation from others. Collective
action and comprehensive approaches are required to address
these issues. Therefore, nations must work to build the trust
and confidence required to pursue these common interests.
Inclusivity. An atmosphere of broad inclusivity
expands the pool of resources for security issues and allows
partnerships to leverage each country's comparative advantages,
from expertise and facilities to information or even geography.
The network is not an alliance or bloc, and countries link into
this network to address issues as they desire. This suggests
that there may be room for cooperation between countries inside
and outside the region and even some who may have been seen as
competitors. Security initiatives start out as bilateral
partnerships and then expand to multilateral ones as
cooperation improves. Ultimately, broad participation in the
network is an important means to promote security and stability
in the region.
Capacity building. Improving the overall effectiveness
of our security efforts requires strengthening each country's
ability to maintain security inside its own borders and to
participate in joint endeavors. This capacity building includes
collective and individual training programs, educational
exchanges, and the development of security-related facilities
and infrastructure, as well as equipment modernization efforts.
These programs benefit from the talents and resources each
partner brings to the network, and they can be tailored to the
nature of each country's participation. In addition to military
programs, this also will require increasing the civilian
capacity in the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
Already, there is great breadth and depth to the cooperative
activity that is underway, and there is more design and coherence to
this network than is commonly understood. In addition to our ongoing
partnerships with the Iraqi security forces and the Afghan National
Security Forces, numerous multilateral counterterrorism, maritime, and
coastal security initiatives are ongoing in the region. Additionally,
many countries participate in an extensive array of combined ground,
maritime, aviation, and special operations exercises, each designed to
respond to different types of threats. There are partnerships in the
region for improving coordination and information sharing through, for
example, air and missile defense initiatives with several Gulf
countries and border cooperation programs with Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Lastly, many countries are working together to fund or
provide military equipment to underdeveloped security forces, with our
own Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Funding (FMF)
programs playing a large role in these efforts.
critical subregions in the centcom aor
The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM
AOR defy attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation
that can address, with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent
issues. The boundaries of the AOR are a U.S. organizational construct
that does not encompass a cohesive social, cultural, political, and
economic region. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges in the
AOR is through a disaggregation of the problem sets into six sub-
regions, described as follows:
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India is not
within the boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR)
Iran
Iraq
The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen
Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan (as well as Israel and the Palestinian territories which
are not within the CENTCOM AOR)
Central Asia, comprised of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan
Afghanistan and Pakistan
The United States has a vital national security interest in the
stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan pose
the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. The Taliban and other
insurgent groups are growing in strength and waging an increasingly
violent campaign against coalition forces and the Afghan state.
Pakistan, too, faces an existential threat from Islamist extremist
groups such as al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which enjoy the benefit
of safe havens and support bases in Pakistan, particularly in the
rugged region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Additionally, the
possibility, however remote, of serious instability in a nuclear-armed
Pakistan would pose a serious danger to the United States, its allies,
and its interests.
Reversing the cycle of violence, defeating the extremist
insurgencies in these countries, and eliminating safe havens for al
Qaeda and other trans-national extremist organizations require a
sustained, substantial commitment. Afghanistan and Pakistan have unique
internal dynamics and problems, but the two are linked by tribal
affiliations and a porous border that permits terrorists and insurgents
to move relatively freely to and from their safe havens. Although our
presence, activities, and rules of engagement differ on each side of
the Durand Line, Afghanistan and Pakistan represent a single theater of
operations that requires complementary and integrated civil-military,
whole of government, approaches.
In accordance with the administration's new strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are substantially increasing our forces in
Afghanistan. However it is important to note that military forces are
necessary but, by themselves, are not sufficient to achieve our
objectives. We will foster comprehensive approaches by ensuring our
military efforts reinforce U.S. policy goals and are fully integrated
with broader diplomatic and development efforts. In fact, it is
critical that the complementary efforts of other departments and
agencies receive the necessary support, manning, and other resources.
The United States must have robust and substantial civilian capacity to
effectively complement our military efforts.
Afghanistan
In parts of Afghanistan, the situation is deteriorating. The Afghan
insurgency has expanded its strength and influence--particularly in the
south and east--and the 2009 levels of violence are significantly
higher than those of last year. The Taliban have been resilient, and
their activities are fueled by revenues from narcotics-trafficking, the
freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and the ineffective governance and services in parts of
the country, as well as by contributions from groups outside the
Afghanistan/Pakistan area. Indeed, insurgent successes correlate
directly to the Afghan people's growing disenchantment with their
government due to its incapacity to serve the population and due to
their doubts regarding the competence and honesty of public officials.
In order to address the situation in Afghanistan, we will implement
a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that works to defeat
existing insurgent groups, develops the institutions required to
address the root causes of the conflict, maintains relentless pressure
on terrorist organizations affiliated with the insurgency, dismantles
illegal drug networks, and prevents the emergence of safe havens for
those transnational extremist groups.
This campaign has several components, but first and foremost is a
commitment to protecting and serving the people. We and our Afghan
partners must focus on securing the Afghan people and building their
trust. As part of this focus, we will take a residential approach and,
in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people, understand their
neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. The recent commitment of
additional forces by the President will allow us to implement this
strategy more effectively, because we will be able to expand the
security presence further into the provinces and villages. With these
additional forces we will be better able to hold areas cleared of
insurgent groups and to build a new level of Afghan governmental
control. We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past
decades, and we will continue working to build the trust of the people
and, with security, to provide them with new opportunities.
As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to
develop the capabilities of the Afghanistan National Security Force,
including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Police, the Afghan
National Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border Forces, specialized
counter narcotics units, and other security forces. We recognize the
fact that international forces must eventually transfer security
responsibility to Afghan security forces. To do this we must
significantly expand the size and capacity of the Afghan forces so they
are more able to meet their country's security needs. A properly sized,
trained, and equipped Afghanistan National Security Force is a
prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of international forces from
Afghanistan.
In addition, we will bolster the capabilities and the legitimacy of
the other elements of the Afghan Government--an effort in which, in
much of Afghanistan, we will be building not rebuilding. We will do
this through our support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and
through civil-military and ministerial capacity building efforts,
empowering Afghans to solve Afghan problems and promoting local
reconciliation where possible. Moreover, we will support the Afghan
Government and help provide security for the Presidential elections
later this year to ensure those elections are free, fair, and
legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people.
Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics
trafficking, which has provided significant funding to the Taliban
insurgency. This drug money has been the ``oxygen in the air'' that
allows these groups to operate. With the recent extension of authority
granted to U.S. forces to conduct counternarcotics operations, we are
better able to work with the Afghan Government more closely to
eradicate illicit crops, shut down drug labs, and disrupt trafficking
networks. To complement these efforts, we will also promote viable
agricultural alternatives, build Afghan law enforcement capacity, and
develop the infrastructure to help Afghan farmers get their products to
market.
Executing this strategy will require clear unity of effort at all
levels and with all participants. Our senior commanders in Afghanistan
will be closely linked with Ambassador Holbrooke, the U.S. Ambassador
to Afghanistan, and the Afghan leadership. Our security efforts will be
integrated into the broader plan to promote political and economic
development, with our security activities supporting these other
efforts. Additionally, we will continue to work with our coalition
partners and allies to achieve progress, in part by refining our
command and control structures to coordinate more effectively the
actions of U.S. forces working for NATO ISAF and with Afghan forces.
These cooperative relationships have proven extremely helpful, and we
have benefitted from the Central Asian States' recognition of the
importance of international success in Afghanistan and their granting
us overflight and transit rights to support our operations there.
Pakistan
Pakistan is facing its own insurgency from militants and extremists
operating from the country's tribal areas. As in Afghanistan, violent
incidents in Pakistan, particularly bombings and suicide attacks, have
increased over the past 3 years. Most of these have targeted security
personnel and government officials, but some have intended a more
public impact, as we saw with the tragic assassination of Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto and the more recent attacks in Mumbai. In
response to this extremist activity, the Pakistani military has stepped
up operations against militants in parts of the tribal areas, expanding
a campaign that the Pakistani military has been prosecuting against
extremists for more than 7 years. The Pakistani military has sacrificed
much during this campaign, and we will support their efforts in two
ways.
First, we will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military
and Frontier Corps. We will provide increased U.S. military assistance
for helicopters to provide air mobility, night vision equipment, and
training and equipment--specifically for Pakistani Special Operations
Forces and their Frontier Corps to make them a more effective
counterinsurgency force. We will also expand our outreach and exchange
programs to build stronger relationships with the Pakistani leadership.
Second, we will help promote cooperation across the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border by providing training, equipment, facilities, and
intelligence. These efforts will promote sharing of timely intelligence
information, help to deconflict and coordinate security operations on
both sides of the border, and limit the flow of extremists between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will of course continue to target,
disrupt, and pursue the leadership, bases, and support networks of al
Qaeda and other transnational extremist groups operating in the region.
We will do this aggressively and relentlessly. We will also help our
partners work to prevent networks from reconstituting themselves,
assisting them with delegitimizing the terrorists' methods and their
ideology, addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable
elements of the population, and promoting broadbased economic and
governmental development.
Iran
The Iranian regime pursues its foreign policies in ways that
contribute to insecurity and frustrate U.S. goals in the CENTCOM AOR.
It continues to insert itself into the Israeli-Palestinian situation by
providing material, financial, and political support to Hamas and
Hizballah; it remains in violation of three U.N. Security Council
Resolutions regarding its nuclear program; and it still provides arms
and training to militias and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iran continues to use Hizballah as a proxy to assert its influence
in the region and to undermine the prospects for peace in the Levant.
Despite Hizballah's participation in the government, the group
continues to undermine the Lebanese state's authority and remains a
threat to Israel. Hizballah's military support from Iran moves mainly
through Syria, and thus is dependent on a continuation of the Syria-
Iran alliance.
Iran's nuclear program is widely believed to be a part of the
regime's broader effort to expand its influence in the region. Although
the regime has stated that the purpose of its nuclear program is for
peaceful, civilian use, Iranian officials have consistently failed to
provide the assurances and transparency necessary for international
acceptance and for the verification required by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory. The regime's
obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran's neighbors and the
international community to conclude the worst about the regime's
intentions. As a result, other regional powers have announced their
intentions to develop nuclear programs. This poses a clear challenge to
international non-proliferation interests, in particular due to the
potential threat of such technologies being transferred to extremist
groups. Moreover, the Israeli Government may ultimately see itself so
threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would
take preemptive military action to derail or delay it.
The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and
international efforts to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan. In
Afghanistan, Iran appears to have hedged its longstanding public
support for the Karzai Government by providing opportunistic support to
the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the Iranian regime has experienced a
recent setback. Iraqi and coalition forces have succeeded in degrading
Iranian proxies operating in southern Iraq, and, during January's
provincial elections, the Iraqi people voiced a broad rejection of
Iranian influence in Iraqi politics.
Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key
relationships within and outside the AOR help to limit the negative
impact of Iran's policies. A credible U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli
issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to
achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut the
idea of militant ``resistance,'' which the Iranian regime and
extremists organizations have been free to exploit. Additionally,
progress on the Syrian track of the peace process could disrupt Iran's
lines of support to Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our cooperative
efforts with the Arab Gulf states, which include hardening and
protecting their critical infrastructure and developing a regional
network of air and missile defense systems, can help dissuade
aggressive Iranian behavior. In all of these initiatives, our military
activities will support our broader diplomatic efforts.
Iraq
The situation in Iraq has improved dramatically in the past year.
Where security incidents once averaged well over 1,500 per week in the
early summer of 2007 when sectarian violence raged at its peak, there
have been less than 150 incidents per week for the past 5 months,
including criminal violence. These improvements in security and the
increasing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces have allowed for a
drawdown to 14 Brigade Combat Teams, with 2 more to be reduced this
year along with thousands of ``enabler'' forces. We remain on track to
end our combat mission in Iraq by the end of August 2010.
After almost 6 years of war, the fundamental causes of instability
and violence have diminished, and they are now kept largely in check by
a number of factors. The security effort in Iraq has put an end to
large-scale violence, while increasingly capable and trusted Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) have taken on an expanded role. The Iraqi
Government's moves toward reconciliation have helped lessen some of the
tensions in Iraq's communal struggle for power and resources, as
formerly warring groups have turned increasingly to political
participation rather than violence as a means of achieving their goals.
Moreover, the results of the January 2009 provincial elections indicate
a rejection of the Islamist parties seen as the most under the
influence of Iran.
Though the trends in Iraq have been largely positive, progress has
been uneven, and the situation still remains fragile and reversible. A
return to violence remains an option for those who have set aside their
arms. Enemy organizations, especially al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and
Iranian-backed Shi'a extremist groups, remain committed to narrow
sectarian agendas and the expulsion of U.S. influence from Iraq. These
enemy organizations will undoubtedly attempt to disrupt or derail
several key events during the next year, including the national
elections scheduled for December. However, the most difficult and
potentially violent problem may be the Arab-Kurd-Turkmen competition in
disputed Iraqi territories. Beginning this spring, Iraqis will take up
the long-deferred, contentious question of Iraq's internal boundaries,
which has fundamental implications for the role of the Kurds in the
future Iraqi state and for the likelihood of Sunni Arab and Turkmen
insurgent groups returning to large-scale violence.
The central questions for the United States as these events develop
are how to help the Iraqis preserve hard-won security gains as U.S.
forces withdraw and how to further develop U.S.-Iraq relations that
best enable regional stability. The fact that the 2009 provincial
elections were conducted successfully showed that the checks and
balances of the Iraqi constitution and professionalism of the ISF act
as a brake upon any party's ambitions to control the Iraqi state.
However, the Iraqi Government has much work to do to develop the
essential services the Iraqi people expect and to perform the functions
necessary to achieve full support over time. The Iraqi Government in
2009-2010 will be under great popular pressure as the Iraqi
electorate's expectations will be high after electing new provincial
and national governments.
U.S. forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams are still an
element that helps hold the security, governance, and development
effort together. In some areas, U.S. military and civilian officials
are still important mediators in local conflicts or disputes and key
interlocutors between local communities and higher levels of the Iraqi
Government. Prior to disengaging from those roles, U.S. forces and
civilian officials must ensure certain conditions prevail, including:
A security force capable of coping with current and
intensified enemy action;
An Iraqi Government capable of meeting basic needs and
expectations and delivering services on a nonsectarian, non-
ethnic basis; and
Adequate rule of law and sufficiently stable civil
institutions.
The Arabian Peninsula
The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus
because of its importance to our interests and the potential for
insecurity. These Arab states on the Peninsula are the nations of the
AOR most politically and commercially connected to the U.S. and Europe.
They are more developed economically and collectively wield defense
forces far larger than any of their neighbors, and they are major
providers of the world's energy resources. However, many Gulf Arabs
suffer from degrees of disenfranchisement and economic inequity, and
some areas of the Peninsula contain extremist sentiment and
proselytizing. As a result, the Peninsula has been a significant source
of funding and manpower for extremist groups and foreign fighters.
These internal troubles are often aggravated and intensified by
external factors, such as the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior,
instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon, the
conflict in Iraq, and weapons proliferation.
Because of the Peninsula's importance and its numerous common
security challenges, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are key
partners in the developing regional security network described above.
CENTCOM ground, air, maritime, and Special Operations Forces
participate in numerous operations and training events, bilateral and
multilateral, with our partners from the Peninsula. We help develop
indigenous capabilities for counterterrorism; border, maritime, and
critical infrastructure security; and deterring Iranian aggression. As
a part of all this, our FMS and FMF programs are helping to improve the
capabilities and interoperability of our partners' forces. We are also
working toward an integrated air and missile defense network for the
Gulf. All of these cooperative efforts are facilitated by the critical
base and port facilities that Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and
others provide for U.S. forces.
Yemen stands out from its neighbors on the Peninsula. The inability
of the Yemeni Government to secure and exercise control over all of its
territory offers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region,
particularly al Qaeda, a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and
support terrorist operations. It is important that this problem be
addressed, and CENTCOM is working to do that. Were extremist cells in
Yemen to grow, Yemen's strategic location would facilitate terrorist
freedom of movement in the region and allow terrorist organizations to
threaten Yemen's neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
States. In view of this, we are expanding our security cooperation
efforts with Yemen to help build the Nation's security,
counterinsurgency, and counterterror capabilities.
Egypt and the Levant
The Levant and Egypt subregion is the traditional political,
social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and has historically
been the primary battleground between rival ideologies. The dynamics of
this subregion, particularly with regard to Israel and extremist
organizations, have a significant impact on the internal and external
politics of states outside the region as well. In addition, U.S. policy
and actions in the Levant affect the strength of our relationships with
partners in the AOR. As such, progress toward resolving the political
disputes in the Levant, not to mention the prevention of conflict, is a
major concern for CENTCOM.
Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a stabilizing influence in the
Middle East, and a key actor in the Middle East Peace Process. In
recent years, however, the Egyptian Government has had to deal with
serious economic challenges and an internal extremist threat; as such,
U.S. foreign aid has been a critical reinforcement to the Egyptian
Government. At the same time, Egypt has played a pivotal role in the
international effort to address worsening instability in Gaza. CENTCOM
continues to work closely with the Egyptian security forces to
interdict illicit arms shipments to extremists in Gaza and to prevent
the spread of Gaza's instability into Egypt and beyond.
In Lebanon, Lebanese Hizballah continues to undermine security
throughout the Levant by undermining the authority of the Lebanese
Government, threatening Israel, and providing training and support to
extremist groups outside Lebanon. Syria and Iran continue to violate
U.N. Security Council resolutions and provide support to Hizballah--
support which allowed Hizballah to instigate and wage a war against
Israel in 2006 and reconstitute its armaments afterward. Stabilizing
Lebanon requires ending Syria and Iran's illegal support to Hizballah,
building the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and assisting
the Lebanese Government in developing a comprehensive national defense
strategy through which the government can exercise its sovereignty,
free of interventions from Hizballah, Syria, and Iran.
The al-Asad regime in Syria continues to play the dangerous game of
allowing or accepting extremist networks and terrorist facilitators to
operate from and through Syrian territory, believing incorrectly that
their people and government will be immune from the threat. Whether
hosting Hamas leadership, supporting the shipment of armaments to
Hizballah, or cooperating with AQI operatives, the al-Asad regime has
used its support for its neighbors' opposition movements as strategic
leverage. However, unlike Iran, Syria's motives probably stem from
short-sighted calculations rather than ideology. It is possible that
over time Syria could emerge as a partner in promoting security in the
Levant and in the region.
Jordan continues to be a key partner and to play a positive role in
the region. Jordan participates in many regional security initiatives
and has placed itself at the forefront of police and military training
for regional security forces. In addition to its regular participation
in multi-lateral training exercises, Jordan promotes regional
cooperation and builds partner security capacity through its King
Abdullah Special Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training
Center, International Police Training Center, and Cooperative
Management Center. These efforts will likely prove critical in the
continued development of legitimate security forces in Lebanon and the
Palestinian territories and, as a consequence, in the long-term
viability of the peace process.
Through capacity building programs, joint and combined training
exercises, information sharing, and other engagement opportunities, we
will work with our partners in Egypt and the Levant to build the
capabilities of legitimate security forces, defeat extremist networks
and substate militant groups, and disrupt illegal arms smuggling. In
addition, we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and
confidence building to support the Middle East Peace Process.
Central Asia
Though Central Asia has received relatively less attention than
other subregions in the AOR, the U.S. maintains a strong interest in
establishing long-term, cooperative relationships with the Central
Asian countries and other major regional powers to create a positive
security environment. Central Asia constitutes a pivotal location on
the Eurasian continent between Russia, China, and South Asia; it thus
serves as a major transit route for regional and international commerce
and for supplies supporting Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring
stability in Central Asia requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum
paradigms of international politics associated with the so-called
``Great Game,'' as well as the adoption of cooperative approaches to
combat the common enemies of extremism and illegal narcotics
trafficking. The United States, Russia, and China need not court or
coerce the Central Asian Governments at the expense of one another.
Instead, there are numerous opportunities for cooperation to advance
the interests of the all parties involved.
However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still
developing after decades of Soviet rule, and they present challenges to
efforts to promote security, development, and cooperation. Although
there is interdependence across a broad range of social, economic, and
security matters, these nations have not yet established a productive
regional modus vivendi. Overcoming these challenges requires gradual,
incremental approaches that focus on the alleviation of near-term
needs, better governance, the integration of markets for energy and
other commercial activity, and grassroots economic development.
As a part of a broader U.S. effort to promote development and build
partnerships in Central Asia, CENTCOM works to build the capabilities
of indigenous security forces as well as the mechanisms for regional
cooperation. Besides providing training, equipment, and facilities for
various Army, National Guard, and border security forces through our
Building Partnership Capacity programs, we also work with the national
level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and emergency
response issues. For example, in February 2008 and again this past
March, CENTCOM hosted Conferences for the Chiefs of Defense from the
Central Asian States to discuss regional security issues. CENTCOM also
co-hosts the annual Regional Cooperation Exercise, which is designed to
improve regional coordination on issues such as counter-terrorism and
security and humanitarian crisis response.
CENTCOM is also working to ensure continued access to Afghanistan
through Central Asia. With great support from the U.S. Transportation
Command, we have established a Northern Distribution Network through
several Central Asian States to help reduce costs of transporting non-
military supplies to support NATO, U.S., and Afghan security
operations, while decreasing our exposure to risks associated with our
supply lines running through Pakistan. On a related note, we are also
pursuing alternatives to the use of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. A
decision by the Krygyz Government to restrict U.S. and Allied access to
the base would be disappointing but would not constitute a serious
impediment to coalition operations in Afghanistan.
critical mission enablers
Success in our ongoing missions and maintaining a credible,
responsive contingency capacity in the AOR require the support of
several key mission enablers. The impacts of these capabilities range
from the tactical to the strategic, and CENTCOM fully supports their
continuation, expansion, and improvement.
Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)
Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are
critical to improving security and stability in the region. They help
strengthen our relationships and build the security capabilities of our
partners in the AOR. Increases to global train and equip resources,
coalition support funds, and the State Department's foreign military
sales (FMS) and counternarcotics security assistance and reimbursements
programs are essential in generating comprehensive and cooperative
solutions to defeat insurgent and extremist groups. Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and FMS remain our mainstay security assistance tools
and are reasonably successful in meeting needs in a peacetime
environment. The International Military Education and Training program
is also an important contributor to developing partner nation
capabilities and enduring ties. However, in the face of enduring,
persistent irregular warfare, we look to expanded special authorities
and multi-year appropriations to quickly meet the emerging needs of
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and Foreign Internal Defense
operations. Multi-year programs of record that provide training,
equipment, and infrastructure for our partner security forces enabled
our successes in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve
comparable progress in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our
commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most
efficient and effective means to address a local community's needs, and
where security is lacking, it is often the only immediate means for
addressing those needs. CERP spending is not intended to replace USAID-
sponsored projects but rather to complement and potentially serve as a
catalyst for these projects. For this reason, CENTCOM fully supports
expanded CERP authorities for its use in other parts of the CENTCOM
AOR. CENTCOM has established control mechanisms that exceed those
mandated by Congress, to include having the Army Audit Agency review
programs in Iraq and a command review to ensure CERP funds projects
that advance U.S. goals and are of the most benefit to the targeted
populations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will continue to seek
innovative mechanisms and authorities to create similar
counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host nation partners.
These tools should allow for a variety of funding sources, to include
contributions from nongovernmental organizations, international
government organizations, and partner governments.
Adaptable Command, Control, and Communications Systems
Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust,
interoperable, high-volume Theater Command, Control, Communications,
and Computers Infrastructure. CENTCOM currently utilizes available
bandwidth to capacity, and theater fiber networks are vulnerable to
single points of failure in the global information grid. Military
Satellite Communications capabilities are critical to theater
operations, and the acceleration of transformational upgrades to these
systems would reduce our reliance on commercial providers.
We aggressively pursue means to extend Joint Theater Expeditionary
Command, Control, and Communications support and services to
disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these include Radio
over Internet Protocol Routed Network, which provides critical radio
retransmission services to remote users on the move; the Joint Airborne
Communications System, which provides a flexible aerial platform-based
radio retransmission solution that can be shifted to extend services to
disadvantaged users; and the Distributed Tactical Communications
System, which leverages new technologies to deliver reliable, critical
communications capabilities to the most remote users. Overall, we
require a fully integrated space and terrestrial communications network
and infrastructure that support all Joint and potential partner nation
users.
Intelligence and ISR
We continue to refine our techniques, procedures, and systems to
optimize our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
efforts and to improve our battle space awareness, seeking greater
specificity, detail, and timeliness of intelligence whenever possible.
We aggressively seek out ways to execute the entire Find, Fix, Finish,
Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate intelligence cycle. However, this
requires improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor
integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered
ISR architecture and management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence,
and human collectors. In particular, the acceleration of ISR Unmanned
Aerial Systems procurement is crucial to our success. There is also a
requirement for greater sea-based ISR. CENTCOM also supports DOD's
planned growth in intelligence specialists, interrogators,
counterintelligence, and human intelligence personnel capabilities.
Moreover, we have learned the critical importance of a host of other
specialized capabilities that have been developed outside traditional
military specialties, such as terrorist threat finance analysts, human
terrain teams, and document exploitation specialists.
Joint and Multinational Logistics
The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely
deployment, equipping, and sustainment of units engaged in combat
operations. Working with our multinational partners, we have instituted
an efficient and effective logistics architecture that supports our
forces and operations, while constantly reducing costs. Our logistics
posture consists of prepositioned inventories, strategic air and
sealift capabilities, and access to bases with critical infrastructure,
all of which are key logistics components that support operational
flexibility. Our logistics processes center on the Global Combat
Support System-Joint portal, which provides a theater level logistics
common operational picture and supports theater-wide logistics unity of
effort.
A significant asset recently added to CENTCOM's logistics
capabilities has been the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and
Afghanistan, which supports CENTCOM, MNF-I, and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
by providing responsive contracting of supplies, services, and
construction, and which also supports capacity building efforts within
Iraqi and Afghan Ministries. The Joint Contracting Command recently
established the infrastructure to transition from a manual to an
automated contract writing system and to a Standard Procurement System
across Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, in fiscal year 2008, the
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan was able to execute over
41,000 contract actions and obligate a total of $7.5 billion, and over
45 percent of this funding went to Iraqi and Afghan firms. The Joint
Contracting Command also teams with Task Force Business Stability
Operations (TFBSO) and provides contracting support executing
Congressional resources to revitalize Iraqi State Owned Enterprises. We
estimate that TFBSO's $100 million total in fiscal years 2007 and 2008
revitalization efforts generated employment for 24,500 Iraqis.
Our logisticians are also focusing on other key initiatives
supporting our forces and operations, while minimizing costs. We are
now moving an increasing amount of non-military supplies into
Afghanistan via a Northern Distribution Network across the Central
Asian States, with the cooperation of Russia and other European
participants. As mentioned above, these new lines of communication
(LOCs) will help reduce costs while decreasing our exposure to risks
associated with our supply lines running through Pakistan. Reliance on
these LOCs will be further reduced by our Afghan first initiative,
which increases our use of Afghan producers and vendors for products
such as bottled water.
Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices
Initiatives focused on countering the threat of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) are of paramount importance to our operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs continue to be the number-one threat to
ground forces, and efforts to expedite the fielding of personal
protective equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles and
equipment, and most recently, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicle have saved countless lives. Because of the MRAP's
importance, we have more than tripled our MRAP fielding capacity and
more than doubled the number of MRAPs in Afghanistan over the past 8
months. Because we expect IEDs to remain a key weapon in the arsenals
of terrorists and insurgents for years to come, CENTCOM urges continued
support for the Joint IED Defeat Organization; the Services' baseline
sustainment for MRAPs, base defense initiatives, and C-IED efforts; and
Research, Development, Test, and Experimentation funding and
procurement to counter IED tactics and networks.
Overseas Basing and Theater Posture
CENTCOM's overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas
military construction projects at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense-approved Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security
Locations are developing the infrastructure necessary for global
access, projection, sustainment, and protection of our combined forces
in the AOR. Fully functional sites are essential to our ability to
conduct the full spectrum of military operations, engage with and
enable partner nations, and act promptly and decisively. Prepositioned
stocks and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy
but require reconstitution and modernization after having been
partially expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even with global war-on-terror budgets, military construction
timelines are too long to respond to changes in a combat environment.
Major events such as the approval of the Strategic Partnership
Agreement with Iraq and the recent decision to send additional forces
to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing requirements can change.
Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made available across the
entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim solutions because they
push construction decisionmaking authority to our engaged commanders in
the field. Increasing the Operations and Maintenance construction
threshold for minor construction in support of combat operations across
the AOR would also increase the ability of our commanders to quickly
meet mission requirements and fully support and protect our deployed
forces.
Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes
The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to
addressing non-counter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations,
and we will continue to use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON)
process to support our warfighters. However, because the JUON process
requires execution year reprogramming by the Services, we found in the
past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful JRAC tool for
supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC used
the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for
Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured
in less than 4 months from the initial identification of the need. The
JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical
biometrics equipment until the JUON process could further source the
program, significantly reducing the time required to deploying the
technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the
JUON process would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter
needs. In addition to the JUON process, CENTCOM leverages Department of
Defense programs like Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD)
to rapidly field capability for the warfighter. Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles, intelligence collection and analysis tools, and limited
collateral damage weapons are examples of recent JCTD successes.
Additionally, DOD currently has authority to spend up to $500,000
in Operations and Maintenance funds for procurement investment line
items to meet the operational requirements of a Combatant Command
engaged in contingency operations overseas. Our immediate mission
requirements frequently call for equipment which exceeds this cost
threshold, such as water filtration equipment, generators, information
technology/fusion systems, and heavy lift equipment. An increase of
this threshold and a delegation of authority down to at least the
theater level would allow commanders to address critical equipment
shortfalls using commercially available systems, which in many cases
are essential for mission accomplishment.
Personnel
Having sufficient and appropriate personnel for our commands and
Joint Task Forces is critical to accomplishing our assigned missions
and achieving our theater objectives. This is true at both the
operational and strategic levels. Our headquarters require permanent,
rather than augmentation, manpower for our enduring missions, as well
as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary manpower for contingency
operations. At the unit level, there continue to be shortfalls in many
skill categories and enabling force structures that are low density and
high demand. Intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and human
intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation
specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military
police are just a few of the enablers needed in greater number for
current and future operations. As operations continue in Afghanistan,
we also see critical need for Public Affairs and Information Operations
personnel to improve our Strategic Communications capabilities.
Similarly, as we draw down combat forces from Iraq, we will need
enablers beyond the typical high-density/low-demand organizations,
including such elements as leaders to augment advisory assistance
brigades, counterterrorist threat finance cells, and critical logistics
units. At the same time, I would also request that Congress recognize
the vital importance of increasing civilian capacity, particularly in
the Department of State and the USAID.
Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain
vital to our operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation program
continues to be a success, having served more than 135,000 troopers in
2008 and over 710,000 since its inception in September 2003. We also
depend heavily on entitlement programs such as Combat Zone Tax Relief,
Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual for deployed
servicemembers.
conclusion
There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and Coast Guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM region. Together
with our many civilian partners, they have been the central element in
the progress we have made in Iraq and several other areas, and they
will be the key to achieving progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
the other locations where serious work is being done. These wonderful
Americans and their fellow troopers around the world constitute the
most capable military in the history of our Nation. They have soldiered
magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations in
punishing terrain and extreme weather. They and their families have
made great sacrifices since September 11.
Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that
those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice.
In view of that, I want to conclude by thanking the American people
for their extraordinary support of our military men and women and their
families--and by thanking the members of this committee for your
unflagging support and abiding concern for our troopers and their
families as well.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. Thank you again
for your tremendous leadership.
Admiral Olson.
STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Olson. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the invitation to appear before this committee and to
represent the United States SOCOM. I'll focus on the roles of
our headquarters and joint special operations forces in
addressing the current and potential threats posed by
extremists and their allies and networks in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. I'm pleased to join Secretary Flournoy and General
Petraeus here this morning.
The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al
Qaeda's surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding,
communicating, and inspiring. Operating in and from remote
sites in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, al Qaeda remains a draw
for local and foreign fighters who subscribe to its extremist
ideology and criminality.
The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive
and brutal. Operating in the guise of both nationalists and
keepers of the faith, but behaving in the manner of street
gangs and mafias, they have forced and intimidated a mostly
benign populace to bend to their will. Their methods run the
relatively narrow range from malicious to evil.
The President's strategy announced last week is one we
fully support. We have contributed to the review of the past
several months and are pleased to see that the strategy
includes a clear focus on al Qaeda as the enemy and that a
whole-of-government approach is directed.
We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will
be neither quick nor easy. We as a Nation and the international
community must be prepared for an extended campaign, a campaign
that must go well beyond traditional military activities.
Increasing the presence and capacity of civilian agencies and
international organizations, to include sufficient funding and
training, is essential to help develop and implement the basic
functions of credible government in Afghanistan and to assist
Pakistan's efforts to dismantle safe havens and displace
extremists in its border provinces.
Also essential is robust support to the military, law
enforcement, border security, and intelligence organizations of
Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, as it is ultimately they
who must succeed in their lands.
United States SOCOM has a major role as a force provider
and the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces it
trains, equips, deploys, and supports have key roles and
missions in this campaign. With a long history of
counterterror, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare
operations in many of the Earth's crisis and tension spots, the
capabilities, culture, and ethos of Special Operations Forces
are well suited to many of the more demanding aspects of our
mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing interaction with
Pakistan's military and Frontier Corps forces.
Right now in Afghanistan, as for the last 7 years, special
operations activities range from high-tech manhunting to
providing veterinary services for tribal livestock. The direct
action missions are urgent and necessary as they provide the
time and space needed for the more indirect counterinsurgency
operations to have their decisive effects. Undertaken in proper
balance, these actions address immediate security threats while
also engaging the underlying instability in the region.
In Pakistan, we continue to work with security forces at
the scale and pace set by them, and we are prepared to do more.
With our Pakistani partners, Special Operations Forces are
currently helping to train Pakistani trainers in order to
enhance their counterinsurgency operations. While we share much
with them, our forces are in turn learning much about our
common adversaries and the social complexities of the region.
We stand ready to continue to work with Pakistani forces and to
stand by Pakistani forces for the long term.
While certain units of the Special Operations Force are
leading high-tech, high-end efforts to find and capture or kill
the top terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan,
fundamental to most of the deployed Special Operations Force is
our enduring partnership with our Afghan counterparts. Under a
program that began over 3 years ago, United States Special
Forces at the 12-man team level have trained Afghan commandos
in the classrooms and on the firing ranges and then moved with
them to their assigned regions across the country. Living
remotely with them on small camps, continuing the training and
mentoring, and integrating with them on day and night combat
operations has had great effect. Supporting their local
development and assistance efforts has had perhaps even a more
powerful impact.
This program was recently expanded to formally partner
United States Special Operations Forces with noncommando Afghan
battalions, a program that will consume most of the additional
Special Operations Force that will be deployed as part of the
21,000 troop increase.
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component
commands of United States SOCOM use authorities and a budget
granted by legislation to the United States SOCOM Commander to
organize, equip, train, and provide their forces to support
operational commanders globally. When outside the United
States, all Special Operations Forces are under the operational
control of the appropriate geographic combatant commander.
United States SOCOM's budget, which is historically
slightly under 2 percent of the total defense budget, is
intended to fund materials, services, equipment, research,
training, and operations that are peculiar to the Special
Operations Force. It primarily enables modification of service
common equipment and procurement of specialized items for the
conduct of missions that are specifically and appropriately
Special Operations Force's to perform. In general, this has
been robust enough to provide for rapid response to a broad set
of crises. But we rely on each of the services to provide for
our long-term sustainment in wartime environments and to
develop and sustain the enabling capabilities, and we rely on
operational commanders to assign these capabilities to their
special operations task forces.
We can serve in both supported and supporting roles at the
operational level and special operations effects are actually
core elements around which key parts of a strategy can be
based.
While more than 10,000 members of our Special Operations
Forces are now under the command of General Petraeus in the
CENTCOM AOR and around 100 more are working in Afghanistan
under NATO's ISAF command structure, about 2,000 others are in
65 countries on an average day. Their activities, fully
approved and coordinated, cover the broad spectrum of
traditional military activities, well beyond the stereotypical
one-dimensional gunslinger, to encompass the three-dimensional
warrior, adept at defense, development, and diplomacy. Special
Operations Forces bring soft power with a hard edge.
The employment of Special Operations Forces will actually
not change much as a result of a revised overall strategy. Our
units have been conducting both counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency for several years.
We will continue to provide our broad capabilities to our
fullest capacity in order to meet the needs of our elected and
appointed civilian leaders and our military operational
commanders.
Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban
areas and main routes so that life and legitimate business can
begin a return to normalcy. But Afghanistan is not Iraq. Most
of the population is not urban. Security must be felt in the
hinterland, provided by Afghan forces supported by small teams
of U.S. and NATO troops, and enhanced by civilian agencies in a
manner that improves local life by local standards. I am
encouraged by the prioritization of this approach in the new
strategy.
Inherent to our success and to the defeat of our enemies is
the realization that this is a real fight as long as al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and associated extremists want it to be. Civilian
casualties are mostly the result of their tactics, not ours.
The operational commanders I hear from are doing all they can
to minimize the number of noncombatant deaths because they both
abhor the reality of civilian casualties and they understand
the negative strategic impact of such deaths. They know that as
long as our enemies force noncombatant women, children, and
others to support their operations or remain on targeted
facilities after warnings have been issued, some will die. They
also know that the conditions, numbers, and severity of the
casualties will be highly exaggerated and quickly communicated.
We must acknowledge the seriousness of this challenge and find
ways to mitigate its effects, especially as we increase our
troop presence in the coming months.
I will conclude with a simple statement of pride in the
Special Operations Force that I am honored to command. Created
by a proactive Congress and nurtured by your strong support
over the last 22 years, United States SOCOM headquarters has
brought together units from all four Services to develop and
sustain a truly magnificent joint capability. Special
operations forces are contributing globally, well beyond what
their percentage of the total force would indicate, and in
Afghanistan and Pakistan under General Petraeus's operational
command they are well known for their effectiveness.
I stand ready for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN
Good morning. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members
of the committee.
Thank you for the invitation to appear before this committee to
represent the United States Special Operations Command. I will focus on
the roles of our headquarters and joint special operations forces in
addressing the current and potential threats posed by extremists and
their allies and networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda's
surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating and
inspiring. Operating in and from remote sites in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, al Qaeda remains a draw for local and foreign fighters who
subscribe to its extremist ideology and criminality.
The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and
brutal. Operating in the guise of both nationalists and keepers of the
faith, but behaving in the manner of street gangs and mafias, they have
forced and intimidated a mostly benign populace to bend to their will.
Their methods run the relatively narrow range from malicious to evil.
The President's strategy announced last week is one we fully
support. We have contributed to the review of the past several months
and are pleased to see that the strategy includes a clear focus on al
Qaeda as the enemy and that a whole-of-government approach is directed.
We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be
neither quick nor easy. We, as a Nation and international community,
must be prepared for an extended campaign--a campaign that must go well
beyond traditional military activities. Increasing the presence and
capacity of civilian agencies and international organizations, to
include sufficient funding and training, are essential to help develop
and implement the basic functions of credible government in
Afghanistan, and to assist Pakistan's efforts to dismantle safe havens
and displace extremists in its border provinces. Also essential is
robust support to the military, law enforcement, border security and
intelligence organizations of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves--as
it is ultimately they who must succeed in their lands.
United States Special Operations Command and the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps forces it trains, equips, deploys and supports have
key roles and missions within this campaign. With a long history of
counterterror, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare operations
in many of Earth's crisis and tension spots, the culture and ethos of
Special Operations Forces are well suited to many of the more demanding
aspects of our mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing interaction
with Pakistan's military and Frontier Corps forces.
Right now in Afghanistan, as for the last 7 years, Special
Operations activities range from high-tech man-hunting to providing
veterinary services for tribal livestock. The direct action missions
are urgent and necessary, as they provide the time and space needed for
the more indirect counterinsurgency operations to have their decisive
effect. Undertaken in proper balance, these actions address immediate
security threats while also engaging the underlying instability in the
region.
In Pakistan, we continue to work with security forces at the scale
and pace set by them, and we are prepared to do more. With our
Pakistani partners, Special Operations Forces are currently helping
train Pakistani trainers in the North-West Frontier Province in order
to enhance their counterinsurgency operations. While we share much with
them, our forces are in turn learning much about our common adversaries
and the social complexities of the region. We stand ready to continue
to work with Pakistani forces, and to stand by them for the long term.
While certain units of the Special Operations Force are leading
high-tech, high-end efforts to find and capture or kill the top
terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan, fundamental to most of
the deployed special operations force is our enduring partnership with
our Afghan counterparts. Under a program that began over 3 years ago,
U.S. Special Forces, at the 12-man team level, have trained Afghan
Commandos in the classrooms and on the firing ranges, and then moved
with them to their assigned regions across the country. Living remotely
with them on small camps, continuing the training and mentoring, and
integrating with them on day and night combat operations has had great
effect. Supporting their local development and assistance efforts has
had perhaps even a more powerful impact. This program was recently
expanded to formally partner U.S. Special Forces with non-Commando
Afghan battalions--a program that will consume most of the additional
special operations force that will be deployed as part of the 17,000
troop increase.
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component commands of
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) use authorities and
a budget granted by legislation to me as the USSOCOM commander to
organize, equip, train and provide their forces to support operational
commanders globally. When outside the United States, all Special
Operations Forces are under the operational control of the appropriate
Geographic Combatant Commander.
USSOCOM's budget, which is historically slightly under 2 percent of
the total Defense budget, is intended to fund materials, services,
equipment, research, training, and operations that are peculiar to
Special Operations Forces. It primarily enables modification of
Service-common equipment and procurement of specialized items for the
conduct of missions that are specifically and appropriately Special
Operations Forces' missions to perform.
In general, the SOCOM budget has been robust enough to provide for
rapid response to a broad set of crises. We rely on each of the
Services to provide for our long-term sustainment in wartime
environments and to develop and sustain the enabling capabilities, and
on operational commanders to assign it to their Special Operations Task
Forces. We can serve in both supporting and supported roles at the
operational level. Special operations' effects are actually core
elements around which key parts of a strategy can be based.
While more than 10,000 members of our Special Operation Forces are
now under the command of General Petraeus in the Central Command area
of responsibility and around 100 more are working in Afghanistan under
NATO's ISAF command structure; about 2,000 others are in about 65
countries on an average day. Their activities, fully approved and
coordinated, cover the broad spectrum of traditional military
activities--well beyond the stereotypical one-dimensional gunslinger to
encompass the Three-Dimensional warrior, equally adept at defense,
development and diplomacy. Special operations bring soft power with a
hard edge.
The employment of special operations forces will actually not
change much as a result of a revised overall strategy--our units have
been conducting both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency for several
years. We will continue to provide our broad capabilities to our
fullest capacity in order to meet the needs of our elected and
appointed civilian leaders and our military operational commanders.
Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban areas and
main routes so that life and legitimate business can begin a return to
normalcy. But Afghanistan is not Iraq, and most of the population is
not urban. Security must be felt in the hinterland, provided by Afghan
forces supported by small teams of U.S. and NATO troops and enhanced by
civilian agencies in a manner that improves local life by local
standards. I am encouraged by the prioritization of this approach in
the new strategy.
Inherent to our success, and to the defeat of our enemies, is the
realization that this is a real fight as long as al Qaeda, the Taliban
and associated extremists want it to be. Civilian casualties are mostly
a result of their tactics, not ours. The operational commanders I hear
from are doing all they can to minimize the number of noncombatant
deaths because they both abhor the reality of civilian casualties and
they understand the negative strategic impact of such deaths. They also
know that, as long as our enemies force noncombatant women, children
and others to support their operations or remain on targeted facilities
after warnings have been issued, some will die. They also know the
conditions, numbers and severity of the casualties will be highly
exaggerated and quickly communicated. We must acknowledge the
seriousness of this challenge and find ways to mitigate its effects,
especially as we increase our troop presence in the coming months.
I will conclude with a simple statement of pride in the Special
Operations Force that I am honored to command. Created by a proactive
Congress and nurtured by your strong support over the last 22 years,
United States Special Operations Command headquarters has brought
together units from all four Services to develop and sustain a truly
magnificent joint capability. Special Operations Forces are
contributing globally well beyond what its percentage of the total
force would indicate, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan they are well
known for their effectiveness.
I stand ready for your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
We'll try a 6-minute round for our first round.
First, as I indicated in my opening statement, I'm
concerned about statements by some administration officials
that success in Afghanistan is not possible, to use the word of
Admiral Blair, unless we solve the challenges in western
Pakistan. Now, there's obviously a link between the failure of
the Pakistan Government to take on religious extremists,
particularly those that are crossing the border into
Afghanistan, and the situation in Afghanistan. No one denies
that link. The problem that I have is that to make the kind of
statement that Ambassador Holbrooke made over the weekend that
``You can't succeed in Afghanistan if you don't solve the
problem of western Pakistan'' puts the future of Afghanistan
too much in the hands of events in Pakistan and decisions in
Pakistan.
Let me start with you perhaps, General. I'm wondering
whether or not you would agree that you can make some progress
in Afghanistan even though Pakistan does not succeed in
addressing their religious extremist problem; it's much more
difficult, but that you can make progress and the Afghans can
make progress?
General Petraeus. I do agree with that, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The Afghan-Pakistan strategy did not
include a new target end strength for the ANA. It remained at
134,000, and that's even though Defense Minister Wardak of
Afghanistan has recommended that the Afghan army go to
somewhere between 200,000 and 250,000. I'm just wondering why
we did not change that end strength goal for the Afghan army,
Secretary Flournoy?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, we certainly wanted to start by
going after the near-term goal of accelerating the growth of
the ANSF by bringing the target dates forward to 2011. We also
left open the notion of assessing whether we need a larger
ANSF. We did not feel that the analysis had been done to really
arrive at a number of what that larger force should look like.
So we wanted to take some time to look at this with the
commanders on the ground, with the Afghans, in greater detail.
But the door is definitely open to the idea of a larger force
over time.
Chairman Levin. The long poles in the tent to get a larger
Afghan Army faster have been identified as the following. One
is lack of trainers. We're sending namely 4,000 additional
trainers. That should address that problem or that challenge.
Second is the lack of equipment, and I would think that we
ought to make a crash effort to get some additional equipment
to Afghanistan. Perhaps for the record, because of the time
shortage here, you could identify, either one of you, what
we're doing in that regard.
[The information referred to follows:]
We are providing equipment quickly to Afghanistan to help
accelerate Afghan National Army growth to 134,000 soldiers by December
2011. Multiple communications avenues keep all stakeholders engaged in
the dynamic support of the Afghan forces. For example, the biannual top
to bottom program management reviews hosted by general officers and
senior executive service representatives from the Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, and the United States Army Security Assistance Command ensure
all commands are inline with current Afghan fielding priorities. Also,
Security cooperation community members meet weekly via secure video
teleconference and unsecure teleconference. In addition, an Office of
the Secretary of Defense-led tiger team is applying Lean-Six Sigma
principles to the program to streamline equipment acquisition and
delivery to the Afghan National Army. These are just a few of the
examples of the proactive engagement all levels are applying to this
critical arena. This has enabled us to project shipment of all critical
rolling stock by December 2010. Other initiatives such as the transfer
of M1151 Uparmored Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
displaced by U.S. forces receiving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles in January 2010 to the Afghans will ensure the Afghan Army has
the right equipment to fight the insurgency.
I believe, General, that you have indicated to me
personally that developing the Afghan leadership among officers
and noncommissioned officers is also a major challenge in
accelerating the expansion of the Afghan army. Could you just
briefly comment on that?
General Petraeus. In fact, we had a session here this past
Saturday, Mr. Chairman, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral
Mullen, General McKiernan, General Craddock, the Supreme Allied
Commander, NATO Commander, and myself, with some staff
officers, and walked through again what are the critical paths,
if you will, to accelerating the growth of the ANA in
particular.
In fact, the critical factor in General McKiernan's mind is
the development of those leaders. We can train recruits. They
have even now have not just the Afghan version of West Point,
but the Afghan version of Sandhurst or Officer Candidate
School. Even young leaders they can produce. The challenge is
finding and developing those company commanders, battalion
commanders, and brigade commanders, and their staffs to support
them, and those are very challenging to find.
Frankly, this is the same experience that we had in Iraq,
as you'll recall, and some of this just flat takes time. I
agree with General McKiernan very much on that, that that is
the big limiting factor.
Chairman Levin. Now, General Petraeus's prepared statement
and his oral testimony here said that ``Iranian activities and
policies constitute the major state-based threat to regional
security.'' I don't know of too many people would disagree with
that. I surely fully agree with that. You indicated also that
pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key
relationships within and outside the AOR helped to limit the
impact of Iran's policies.
Let me ask both of you whether or not, if we could work
with Russia on missile defense against an Iranian missile
threat, whether or not that cooperation between the United
States and Russia could contribute to our security? Madam
Secretary, let me start with you.
Ms. Flournoy. Absolutely, Senator. I think this is one of
the topics that President Obama will be engaging with his
Russian counterpart on, actually today.
Chairman Levin. He'll be exploring that possibility?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, absolutely.
Chairman Levin. That's good.
General, do you agree with that?
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, I do think that's worth
exploring. There are a number of areas in which, if there were
Russian cooperation with respect to the Central Asian states
and Afghanistan and the effort there, with respect to
activities surrounding Iran, and even others, where Russian
cooperation could make the situation much more doable, if you
will, and would help enormously.
Chairman Levin. On the economic side, the National
Solidarity Program inside of Afghanistan has established
community development councils in about 21,000 villages
throughout every province. I have spoken to both of you--and I
don't know, Admiral, if I've ever asked you about this, but
I've spoken to both Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus
about the National Solidarity Program and you both have
expressed to me your belief that it is one of the real success
stories in the economic development inside of Afghanistan. I
want to ask a question about that, but I don't want to misstate
anything. Is that true, that you both feel that that is a
success story?
Ms. Flournoy. I do. I think it's one of the examples of the
kind of bottom-up approach that we need to be doing more of in
the Afghan context.
General Petraeus. It is, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Then my question, General, is to you. It
has to do with the wonderful capability that's provided to us
with these CERP funds. I agree with you very much in terms of
what you said about those funds, those commanders' funds that
are basically in the authority of commanders to spend, but with
great flexibility and speed, a lot of them being for economic
development purposes.
Could and should that funding be coordinated, at least,
with these community development councils, so that they at
least have a voice, suggestion perhaps, as to where these CERP
funds are used for economic development, as to what would be
the most effective use? I'm not giving them a veto. I'm not
suggesting they control. Obviously, these are going to be
commander-controlled. But would it be worthwhile to have an
input from those councils?
General Petraeus. Our experience, Mr. Chairman, has always
been that the more that you can get locals involved in the
decisionmaking process within reason--and there are limits, but
within reason--that that is absolutely what we want to do. What
of course we're trying to do is build their capacity and
capability, and that is one way of doing that.
We did, in fact, do that extensively over time in Iraq as
we were able to transition from us funding programs over time
to Iraqis funding programs.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, and I'll now call on Senator
McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I join you in welcoming our witnesses
here today.
Last week, I welcomed the President's announcement of a long
overdue change of course in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is one
that we can win and that we must win, but for years now we have been
fighting without a clear strategy and with insufficient resources.
The approach outlined by the President last week has the potential
to be the first step on the right path in what will be a difficult and
costly effort in Afghanistan. The broad components of this new
strategy--including an emphasis on counterinsurgency and population
security, a significant increase in our military and civilian
resources, and an acknowledgement that we must view the complex nature
of the mission in Afghanistan through a regional context appear sound.
It is, however, only one step. The announcement of the new strategy
must be quickly followed by the development of an integrated civil-
military campaign plan for all of Afghanistan, which does not exist
today. I hope that we will hear from our witnesses today that the
administration is committed to write just such a detailed campaign
plan, and the timeframe they envision for its development. We will also
be interested in learning how the administration intends to mobilize
greater support from the non-military departments and agencies of the
Federal government.
A critical component of this new strategy is to increase the target
end strength of the Afghan National Army and accelerate progress toward
that goal. While the target currently remains 134,000, I believe that
we should significantly increase our goal to approximately 250,000 and
accelerate progress toward that goal. The deployment of approximately
4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces is a welcome step, as
is the commitment to ensure that every American unit in Afghanistan
partners with an Afghan unit. The committee will want to know, however,
if the witnesses believe this commitment is sufficient, if we will
request additional trainers from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies in order to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition
partner unit, and whether plans and processes to provide equipment to
the Afghan security forces are adequate. In addition, while we train
the military, we must not do so at the expense of the police, which
remain poorly paid and trained. There is a desperate and immediate need
to employ more police trainers in Afghanistan.
The members of this committee should know that the additional troop
deployments announced by the President thus far are unlikely to be the
last. General McKiernan, the ground commander, has already requested
three additional brigades, or approximately 10,000 troops, that would
deploy to Afghanistan in 2010. I believe the President should have used
the opportunity last week to commit to the commander's request. We
cannot fail in Afghanistan due to a lack of troops. The American people
need to understand the scale of our required commitment. The committee
will want to know how and when this request will be evaluated by the
Department of Defense, as well as any plans for periodic reviews of the
strategy as a whole, and of how well matched our troop levels are to
the mission.
The mission in Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO and the
international community. For several years, our Government has made a
significant effort to gain greater contributions from our allies. Our
efforts to build a shared understanding among our allies and the
international community of what is at stake in Afghanistan have had
only mixed success. I encourage the witnesses to speak about how the
administration's new strategy intends to address the need to mobilize
greater international support for our objectives in Afghanistan,
including support to training and other non-combat areas.
I share the President's conviction that the war in Afghanistan is
one we can and must win. I also believe that the President and other
political leaders must tell the American people, today and in the
future, that the path to success will be long and arduous, that the
violence is likely to worsen before it improves, and that this war will
entail greater expenditures of American blood and treasure. The stakes
are enormous, and we must do everything we can to ensure that the
public stands firmly behind the courageous efforts of our fighting men
and women.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses today.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
the witnesses. I'd like to repeat again, I believe that the
strategy that the President and his team have developed for
addressing the enormous challenge of Afghanistan is a good one
and I think it has every chance of success, and I'm very
pleased with the leadership that we have, like General Petraeus
and General McKiernan and others.
General Petraeus, just for a second, are you worried about
the continuing level of violence in Diyallah Province in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Certainly there are concerns in Diyallah
Province and in Ninewah Province as well, Senator McCain. There
are other concerns. Frankly, there are latent capabilities. We
see some activity by Iran to continue to develop again proxies,
now called Khataib Hezbollah, Asaib-al-haq, Promise Day
Brigade. We have to keep a very close eye----
Senator McCain. So the Iranians continue to try to meddle
and interfere and harm our efforts in Iraq, including taking
American lives?
General Petraeus. They do, and there is a continued
residual Sunni extremist element as well. Certainly al Qaeda
worldwide if they could would try to provide additional
reinforcements to that.
Having said that, the level of violence is significantly
lower, somewhere between 10 and 15 attacks per day compared
with say 180 attacks per day back in the late spring of 2007.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Secretary Flournoy, as I said, I support the strategy. I
think it would be far, far better to announce that we will have
the additional 10,000 dispatched. They will clearly be needed.
It is obvious that the Afghan army would have to be around
250,000. It's a big country. We know that that was a vital
element to our success in Iraq, and to dribble out these
decisions I think can create the impression of incrementalism.
We all know what's needed. I would have made these
announcements at the time.
General Petraeus, we've seen now in Mumbai and now in the
attack on the police academy a change in tactics on the part of
al Qaeda or Taliban in this case. Instead of just walking into
a place with a suicide vest on, they have teams of well-
trained, professional, well-armed people who go in and kill a
hell of a lot of people before they either surrender or kill
themselves.
Two questions. One is, isn't that basically true in this
change in tactics that they're employing? Is it of great
concern, should it be of great concern to us, that the
Taliban's reach has now extended to the police academy in
Pakistan?
General Petraeus. It is of big concern. It underscores the
fact that the extremist threat inside Pakistan is indeed the
existential threat, the most important existential threat to
that country, we believe more than the traditional enemy of
Pakistan, India. There appears to be a growing attraction among
the extremist elements for Mumbai-like attacks. They saw the
impact that that had. They saw the degree of coverage, the
sensational aspects to that.
There is some positive aspect to the attack in Lahore in
that indeed the Pakistani security forces did respond and over
time did kill or capture what appear to be a substantial number
of those that carried out the attack on the police academy.
Senator McCain. It took a heck of a long time as you well
know.
General Petraeus. It did.
Senator McCain. Secretary Flournoy, Pakistan obviously is
very critical. I don't think it's the determinant, but we can
discuss that at a later time. Pakistan concluded an agreement
with some Taliban elements in the Swat Valley that allowed for
full adoption of sharia law. Do you believe that this
arrangement supports our objectives in the region?
Ms. Flournoy. I do not, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you think that the government--and this
is the conundrum of Pakistan--and the military are so closely
tied to ISI that it prevents us from having the degree of
effectiveness and cooperation from the Pakistani Government
that we need?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I think parts of ISI are certainly a
problem to be dealt with. But I think we have a new democratic
government and I think you have strong parts of the military
who see the extremist threat, who want to deal with that
extremist threat. Part of our policy challenge is to empower
them to be more effective in doing that.
Senator McCain. So you see progress in trying to reduce the
cooperation that exists between the Pakistani military and the
ISI, which has been significant and deep?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I don't see adequate progress at this
point. But I think one of the things we're trying to do with
the strategy is provide additional incentives for that progress
to take place.
Senator McCain. General Petraeus, an individual who is I
understand a young Taliban leader named Mahsoud--is that the--
--
General Petraeus. Baitullah Mahsud, a Pakistani Taliban
leader.
Senator McCain. He said that he would orchestrate, or
arrange an attack on Washington, DC. How seriously do you take
that threat?
General Petraeus. Well, I think any time there is any
threat that could be against the homeland I think you have to
take it seriously. We are doing what the intelligence circles
call a deep dive to determine the possibility of that, if you
will. There are some questions about capacity of that
organization in terms of trans-national activities, but I can
assure you--and I just talked to a senior member of the
National Security Council staff this morning about that, and
obviously everyone is quite riveted on analyzing that and
seeing what further we can find out about that.
Senator McCain. Well, we certainly wouldn't want to call it
a global war on terror.
I thank you. I thank the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the three of you for your service and for the
service of all those who work under your leadership. It's
really quite extraordinary.
I appreciated very much the President's announcement of
policy with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan on Friday. I
think particularly our effort in Afghanistan has really been
under-resourced for too long, and the commitment of additional
resources, both military and civilian, is very significant to
our success there. Just as importantly, I think, was the
President's unambiguous political commitment to defeat the
Islamist extremists of South Asia and to relate that to our
security.
Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask you first, as the
representative of the civilian side of the Pentagon and the
administration, to answer a question about South Asia that was
once asked not so long ago about Iraq, and that I suspect some
Americans are asking now and maybe more will ask as we send
more of our troops there, our best, and they suffer more
casualties, which is: What is the relationship between what is
happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the security of the
American people, the security of the United States of America?
In other words, is it necessary to succeed in Afghanistan
for America to remain safe in the world and here at home?
Ms. Flournoy. The short answer is yes. But I believe the
link is that in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region you have
continued safe haven for al Qaeda and other extremists who we
know are actively plotting against American interests, American
allies, and the American homeland. So this is a matter of vital
national interest. It is something that we must deal with
effectively. It's going to take time. As General Petraeus said,
it's not going to be easy. But I think part of the strategy
review was refocusing on that objective and on the core
interests that are at stake in this campaign.
Senator Lieberman. General Petraeus, is it fair to say that
we're focused clearly on al Qaeda, but that the success or
failure of allied groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as
the Taliban and the Mehsud group and others, Haqqani, is also
relevant to our security in the world and the stability of the
region on which we depend?
General Petraeus. It is, Senator. In fact, I think a good
way to describe the extremists is a term that General McKiernan
uses. He calls them ``the syndicate.'' It's al Qaeda and the
syndicate of elements, plus of course the Afghan Taliban. All
of them together represent a threat, not just in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, but certainly a regional extremist threat, and in
certain cases a truly global extremist threat.
Senator Lieberman. One of my impressions on both visits to
the region and talking to people from Afghanistan and Pakistan
here is that there is an unsettling perception in Afghanistan
and Pakistan that the U.S. is not in this for the long haul,
that we are making a temporary commitment to them.
Unfortunately this is based on some history not so long ago--
that we will leave before the job is done. No one wants to stay
there forever, but the question is will we leave before the job
is done.
That perception has really counterproductive effects and a
lot of hedging behavior in both countries, the worst being the
excuse given--that being given as an excuse for ISI-terrorist
linkages.
So I want to know if you agree with that concern and
whether you feel that we're turning it around now, most
significantly by the announcement by President Obama last
Friday of our new commitment?
General Petraeus. I strongly agree with that, Senator. In
fact, that's why I've repeatedly used the term ``sustained
substantial commitment.'' In fact, it's important in both
countries. There is history there. Pakistan will quote that
history to you in the first paragraph of any conversation.
There is a 12-year period where Pakistani officers, for
example, did not come to the United States. There are some
understandable reasons for this, but the fact is that there's a
lost generation and the entire military remembers the very much
up and down relationship that we have had over the years.
If I could, the Kerry-Lugar bill that is I think being
considered by the Senate represents the kind of sustained
substantial commitment that we're talking about--I think it's 5
years, $1.5 billion--as do some of the DOD requests that will
be coming up with the budget.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you a different kind of
question, about the command structure in Afghanistan. In Iraq
it seemed to me that you helped to put together and we had a
superb command structure, with yourself as the four-star in
strategic command in Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and then a
three-star operational commander, previously General Odierno
under you--now he's obviously a four-star--and General Austin
doing an extraordinary job, both of them as three-star. I think
that worked and I assume you agree, and continues to work.
In Afghanistan, we have the four-star in General McKiernan,
but no three-star operational commander. It sure looks to me
anyway from here that underneath General McKiernan we have an
unfortunately balkanized structure, with regional commanders
and not the kind of line of authority that we'd like.
I will tell you that we had some witnesses before this
committee in the last couple of months who made clear that as
we increase our resources in Afghanistan it would be a mistake
not to tighten up the command structure and add a three-star
operational commander. I wanted to ask you what you think about
that idea and my assessment of where we are currently?
General Petraeus. Well, the first step, frankly, to achieve
greater unity of effort and a cleaner command structure, if you
will, was the step that we took a few months ago to dual-hat
General McKiernan as the commander of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, as well as the NATO ISAF commander. That was very
important.
Senator Lieberman. I agree.
General Petraeus. We have then begun the process of
building a pretty substantial U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff to
support him and to take the burden off what currently is the
Combined Joint Task Force 101, that's typically the division
that has been in Regional Command East, which has also had a
command line that used to go directly from CENTCOM to them
directly to CSTC-A, directly to the Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force and some other elements. We have now
cleaned that up. It all now goes through General McKiernan,
supported by this growing U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff, which
is also a place that we can build up the strategic
communications, information operations task force, and a host
of other activities that can support him in a way not quite
like the operational headquarters certainly in operational
terms, but in some of, if you will, the important additional
enabler duties.
We talked about in this past Saturday's session that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs hosted here with General
McKiernan, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and myself, we
talked about the wisdom of an operational headquarters. For the
time being, that is not something that we're going to recommend
or go forward with, but it's something that we'll certainly
continue to assess as we go along.
There are other areas as well, Senator, if I could, in
which we need to make some additional changes. We think we need
to achieve greater unity of effort in the special operations
arena, and in fact Admiral Olson provided us a brigadier
general on the U.S. side that we think over time perhaps could
be joined together with the NATO SOF. That would also help.
There's a thought of making CSTC-A also perhaps a NATO element,
and there are some other measures in the counter-improvised
explosive device (IED) world and others that we can clean this
up and improve it over time, and we're intent on doing that.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you very much for that answer.
My time is up. I just want to read one sentence from your
statement that I think we all should think about, which is:
``Iran's actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our
partners in the Gulf to seek closer relationships than we have
had with some of these nations in some decades.'' So threats
often strengthen alliances and in that sense can help us
strengthen our own security, and I thank you for pointing that
out.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sometimes in these hearings we get bogged down in a lot of
details that are very, very significant and we need to get into
them. But I know when I go back to Oklahoma and other places
the first question always is: Why is it we're not as successful
as we should be in getting NATO to come up? I notice this
morning in the Early Bird, and I think this came out of today's
New York Times, it makes an issue of the fact that France will
send 150 paramilitary police officers to Afghanistan as a part
of--and it goes on and on--and then some of these other NATO
countries that are talking about this, as if that's a great
contribution.
Well, first of all, anything further that you haven't
already stated in terms of what we might do on this side of the
dais or what you might do to encourage more of an involvement
of NATO over there?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would just let you know, we spent
a lot of time in the development of the strategy consulting
with allies to try to create a sense of ownership on their
part. One of the things we've done is to broaden the nature of
our requests, not only for military troops and capabilities
where they can provide them, but to things like police
trainers, where a number of our European allies have national
police forces--gendarmerie, carabinieri, et cetera--who are
actually quite good at police training. We don't have a
national police force. That's not an area of particular
strength for us. So we're asking them to step up on trainers
for the army, trainers for the police, contributions to the ANA
Trust Fund, the Law and Order Trust Fund, sending civilian
advisers, civilian assistance, and so forth.
So we've tried to broaden the aperture, with the
expectation that everyone will step up in some meaningful way
to support a comprehensive approach.
General Petraeus. Senator, as part of the consultation
phase of this, as the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review was
launched, I went to the Munich security conference, to NATO
headquarters, EU, addressed all the EU delegates, and also went
to London, Brussels, and Paris and talked with each of them.
There have been and there will be some more contributions made.
We'll see what happens at the summit in the coming days. There
are some that still may be forthcoming that people are reticent
to talk about right now.
I would stand very much with what Secretary Gates has noted
about NATO contributions and his concerns about NATO being
almost also a two-tier alliance in which some will fight and
others may not. So this is a challenge for the alliance without
question.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, and I agree with all that.
Madam Secretary, I appreciate your phrase, ``create a sense
of ownership.'' That seems to be what needs to be done.
Each one of you--General Petraeus, you mentioned the CERP
program, and of course Secretary Flournoy mentioned the 1206.
Of course, I always try to get on the record on these just
briefly the value of the International Military and Education
Training (IMET) program, the CERP program, the Combatant
Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF) program, and in your case,
Admiral Olson, the 1208 program. Do you have any comments to
make on those programs?
General Petraeus. With respect to CERP, again I think it's
of enormous importance. Actually, I would support very strongly
1206, 1207, and 1208. Again, I don't want to get ahead of a
budget submission, and with the next one there is something out
there that you may hear--may have heard about, we've discussed
with the chairman and Senator McCain, called the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. This will be coming along
with this package. It is something that we believe in CENTCOM
is of enormous importance, to be able to target assistance that
will help them develop the capabilities for those who are truly
conducting counterinsurgency operations.
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I would just echo that. These tools are
generally very important throughout the AOR and globally in
many cases, but they are absolutely critical to the success of
the strategy. If we don't back up the troops we're deploying
with these additional authorities and funding streams, we can't
reach our goals. They're absolutely critical to the success of
the strategy.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Olson, you would agree with that
with 1208?
Admiral Olson. Absolutely, sir. I have more responsibility
for 1208, but the Special Operations Forces are also customers
of 1206, IMET, and some others. I think we can point to many
examples of progress that was enabled by those programs.
Senator Inhofe. Seeing Senator Ben Nelson here, I had the
occasion to talk to some of the Nebraska Guard on what they're
doing up on the Pakistani border. They're up there now and we
had an opportunity to talk to them, and the value of that
program, crop substitution and this type of thing, working with
them. It happens the Oklahoma Guard will be going up to relieve
them, I think in October some time. Would you make any comments
about that program?
General Petraeus. I can't say enough about that program.
Actually, this is a case where the National Guard, individual
States, have pulled together agriculture teams, and these are
individuals of course that are serving in the National Guard,
but either are farmers or farm experts, agriculture experts.
They've even been doing the rotation system themselves.
Frankly, the more of those that we could get the better at this
stage, as we expand the areas in which our forces are
operating, and we've conveyed that to the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau.
Senator Inhofe. They seem to be getting good results.
General Petraeus. They get very good results. They have all
the attributes of soldiers in terms of being able to secure
themselves, communicate, move, shoot, and communicate; and yet
they're also experts in agriculture.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. I was going to get
into this, and there's not time, but just very briefly on the
fact that I didn't learn until this morning that the solution
has come from the supreme court over there in terms of Karzai's
term ending in May and then of course the elections in August.
But I guess that's resolved now by the supreme court, is my
understanding, that he will remain there during this timeframe?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, we hope so. We've thought at many points
that this was resolved before. But we'll hope that this interim
arrangement will stick. Our interest is having secure, free,
fair elections. We're not backing any one candidate.
Senator Inhofe. I understand.
Ms. Flournoy. We just want to make sure a peaceful and
legitimate process moves forward.
Senator Inhofe. My time is up, but lastly, Admiral Olson,
you mentioned just a few minutes ago that you represented 2
percent of the budget. I have read your background and some of
the great heroic things that happened in Special Operations. I
would just have to ask you, if this is the right forum to get a
response, do you think that 2 percent is adequate?
Admiral Olson. I obviously don't want to get ahead of the
budget discussions that are taking place now, but I do want to
fully credit the investment that the Services each make in
Special Operations capability.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Admiral Olson. We depend heavily on them, and each of the
Services carves out a portion of their budget to pile on top of
that 2 percent that's peculiar to the Special Operations.
Senator Inhofe. Well, you're doing great work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. Admiral, the MRAP vehicle is not necessarily
well adapted to the terrain in Afghanistan. What would you like
for your special forces troops over there in developing a
vehicle for that terrain?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the laws of physics work against us in
Afghanistan. Protection requires mass and mass doesn't work
well in the bridges and the roads and the terrain of especially
the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. So I support the full
range of vehicle development activities that are occurring
across the services. We are tied into all of them, I believe,
contributing our particular needs to the development process.
I don't know what the outcome of that will be, but
certainly a more agile protective vehicle is something that we
all are striving for.
General Petraeus. Senator, if I could on that----
Senator Bill Nelson. Please.
General Petraeus. There is in fact a very urgent effort
ongoing to let a contract for what's called currently I think a
light MRAP. In the mean time, what we have done is we have sent
the lightest of the existing MRAPs to Afghanistan. We've
diverted some, in fact, from the flow into Iraq and from Iraq.
Those work much better on the roads, but they defy the laws of
physics on some of these roads, as my swim buddy pointed out.
But there is an urgent effort in this light MRAP arena, and
I think the contract is literally to be let within a month or
so, was the latest that I saw on this. We appreciate--I believe
that's something that was very strongly supported up here,
because it was again a very significant effort.
Senator Bill Nelson. Last week the President stated:
``Going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead,
we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold
ourselves accountable.'' He was talking about Afghanistan. So,
General, what metrics do you want to see that we will use to
evaluate our progress?
General Petraeus. Well, in fact there's an effort, actually
an interagency effort that even includes the intelligence
agencies right now, and obviously those who are out in the
field, in the embassy and the military forces, to develop those
kinds of metrics. There are the existing metrics, frankly,
right now that exist, that show attacks by region, by day, by
type, that capture a host of the kind of data points that the
chairman mentioned during his opening statement.
But over time we have to expand these more and more into
the development of the--that capture the legitimacy of the
government, the development of capability and capacity by
Afghan authorities, and so forth.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are those metrics--you mentioned the
Intelligence Community (IC). Are these metrics such that we'll
be able to discuss them in public?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I think we are in the process of
developing them to complement the sort of tactical metrics the
commanders on the ground are using, a strategic set of metrics
that we can use in an ongoing assessment process. We do want to
be able to make as many of those public as possible, and we'd
like to actually have a conversation with you, getting your
input on what meaningful metrics would look like.
There's a real commitment to continue to reevaluate the
situation, evolve the strategy, build on what's working,
correct when something's not working. So it's going to be a
dynamic process going forward.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, let me follow up on the essential question
that Senator Nelson just asked you. He's really asking a
fundamental question and that is: How will we assess whether
the new strategy is working? How will we know if we're winning?
It seems to me that prior to going forward with the
commitment of additional troops, that the administration should
have already established specific benchmarks that it's going to
use to measure whether or not the new strategy is successful.
So I want to press you further on the question that Senator
Nelson asked you: How will you know whether or not this new
strategy is working? It seems to me that you need a set of
clear benchmarks, clear metrics, going in and that we should
not be committing additional troops until we have a means of
measuring whether or not this strategy is successful.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would just say that I think we
have some very broad metrics on the Pakistani side looking at
measures of their cooperation on the counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency fight, as well as in terms of support for
other common objectives. I think on the Afghan side there are a
whole host--a much more developed set of inherited metrics,
given that we've been conducting these operations for a long
time.
What we're trying to do is sort through those more
carefully. Some of them are more input-related and what we're
really trying to focus on is outcomes and actual impact. So we
aren't starting with a blank sheet, but we are in the process
of refining the metrics that have been being used in
Afghanistan.
The decision to deploy the additional forces was driven--
there was a sense of urgency by our commanders on the ground
that, with the fighting season coming, the need to reverse
momentum, the need to get in there and begin protecting the
population and secure things for the elections, and not lose
ground. There was a sense of urgency that we needed to go
forward even as we were refining our metrics, and so forth.
But I can promise you we will in a very short amount of
time be able to come back and talk to you in detail about
metrics. I just don't want to get out ahead of my interagency
colleagues and make sure that we're all willing to back the
same--or sing off the same sheet of music, before I come back
and talk to you.
Senator Collins. General, I testified this morning that it
is in Pakistan that al Qaeda's senior leadership and other
trans-national extremist elements are located. Similarly,
Ambassador Holbrooke has said that western Pakistan and the
Swat region is the chief concern, and I agree with both of
those statements.
To address this threat, you've testified that the United
States will provide additional intelligence capabilities to the
Pakistanis. However, there have been numerous reports that the
Pakistani military officers have very close and troubling ties
with the Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's some
military officers in Pakistan and the ISI.
Isn't there a considerable risk that if we provide
increased intelligence capabilities to the Pakistan military
that those capabilities will fall into the hands of the wrong
individuals and end up actually helping the Taliban to avoid
attacks?
General Petraeus. Well, again, the effort in Pakistan,
Senator, absolutely has to be one that they take forward and
one that we do everything we can to enable to assist, and
indeed to provide intelligence capabilities as part of all of
that. How we do that has to be done very carefully, and we will
have to go through a process, I think, where we literally do
build some of the trust, because there are both troubling
events in the past and there are troubling accusations out
there.
Some of these, frankly, when you dig into them are a bit
more ambiguous than they seem to be on the surface, although
some are not. It is difficult in some cases to sort out what is
an intelligence agency contact that is trying to develop a
source or on the other hand what is an intelligence agency
contact that is warning them of an impending operation. There
have been examples of the latter. Those are troubling. We have
discussed those with the head of Pakistani intelligence, of the
ISI, Lieutenant General Pasha. I have done that, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, others. Ambassador Holbrooke and I had a
session with him together.
The Pakistani military, again we have had these same
conversations with them. There is going to have to be a process
of building trust. This starts, frankly--all of this in
Pakistan begins with them embracing the idea that the biggest
threat to their country's very existence is the internal
extremist threat, rather than the threat to their east. That is
a recognition that they have stated verbally. The chairman
quoted it in his opening statement. We have heard it privately.
We now need to help them operationalize that, to watch
them. Among, again, the metrics need to be measures of their
commitment to truly go after this threat that could literally
take down their state if it's allowed to creep out and to grow,
and certainly to cause bigger problems regionally and
potentially globally.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Let me now call on a Senator who's had the foresight and
persistence for many, many years of focusing on the importance
of milestones and metrics, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. I am encouraged by the suggestion, Madam
Secretary, that you would be willing to work with Congress in
establishing the benchmarks that could be transparent. I
suspect that it's true that there are some pieces of the
mission that would require classification because of the very
sensitive nature of the operation. But I would hope that most
of the benchmarks could be public, transparent metrics to
measure progress.
I assume that they could range from measuring our
capabilities in intelligence-gathering on the ground. It could
be how the country is doing economically. I would hope that we
might have a metric, which might be difficult in some respects,
but not certainly in the contributions to the trust fund, of
how the NATO countries are doing in terms of their response.
I was saddened by how small the contributions were by
comparison to what our expectations were recently, when some
numbers were shown. I would hope that the effort that you've
made, General, will result in perhaps the better response than
we'd received at that time.
In establishing the benchmarks, what it truly enables us to
do, and the American people, is to gauge how we are doing in
our efforts. In the past it's been somebody from one party, the
same party, somebody saying we're willing, others saying we're
losing, and anecdotal responses of that type are not
particularly helpful. As a matter of fact, they're confusing to
the American public. I think they confuse Congress as well if
we're not able to be on the same page with the same approach.
We may question whether it's 20 percent or 30 percent, but we
wouldn't be questioning whether it's 0 or 100, I would hope.
I also want to thank my friend from Oklahoma for mentioning
the Nebraska Guard and the efforts that they're undertaking. We
have the agribusiness development team, 52 members, stationed
at Bagram. Probably it's not surprising that there would be
people from Nebraska that would understand agriculture, given
the fact that we're the Cornhusker State. But we're very
pleased and we're very proud of this team that's there and with
the work that they're doing, because overcoming narco-terrorism
is critically important and probably not much better a way to
start than directing away from the production of poppies, poppy
crops, to legitimate agriculture that can help feed and in some
instances clothe and perhaps even ultimately power with
biofuels their operation, improve their economy.
My question is: In looking at the ability of Pakistan to
deal with the Swat, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) that are under attack, I guess the basic question is: Is
there a general willingness from the top to deal with the
insurgents in that area?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, let me start, and I know that
General Petraeus may want to weigh in on this as well. I think
the leadership in Pakistan is not a monolith. I think there are
some who do understand--many who understand the problem and who
want to get after it. Pakistan has been a victim of terror and
these extremists in many ways. Recent attacks attest to that.
There are many who want to do the right thing.
I think part of the equation here is reassuring them that
they have a strategic partner, they have someone who's trying
to reduce other threats that they're concerned about. They have
a partner that will help them gain capability to be more
effective when they do take on these extremists and so forth.
So I think we need to lean forward and try to provide that
reassurance and those capability enhancements, but then we also
need to expect performance, and we need to measure performance
and we need to follow up on that, to see if they are doing
their part of this important work.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, former Ambassador and
former National Security Adviser to the Pakistan Government,
Mr. Durrani, told me some time ago, on at least one occasion,
that the difficulty that they had in being able to deal with
the largely unregulated and ungoverned area is that they didn't
have the equipment. They had gotten money from us, but they
didn't have the equipment to do the kind of job that they
wanted to do.
So, General Petraeus, I know I've communicated that to
Admiral Mullen and I wondered if we're not going to turn over
all of our best equipment and our trade secrets and what have
you to somebody else, but are we in a position and have we
begun to give them the kind of equipment that we would expect
them to use to be successful in that area?
General Petraeus. We have begun that, Senator. But this is
why the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund is so
important. Their military operations at the end of the day come
down to will and skill. In the will category, the will is
growing, but the will is also helped enormously by a sense that
we are going to be with them, because if they don't sense that
they will cut another deal. They'll have a short-term
perspective that says, let's get no car bombs for a few months
and that's worth another deal, but then the deal allows the
insurgents to expand their area of control.
When it comes to skill or capability, there is some,
certainly, resident. Admiral Olson's special operators are
doing a terrific job, but in small numbers. As he noted, we are
doing as much as they in a sense will allow us or facilitate us
in doing. That is gradually growing and in truth it is growing
based on trust at small units going all the way up to the level
of the Frontier Corps and the 11th Corps out in western
Pakistan. Again, this is where that resource provision is so
important.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service, particularly Admiral Olson
and General Petraeus. All those under your command have done a
great job, and I do appreciate what the administration's trying
to do in Afghanistan. I think you're generally on target and
want to give you all the support I can to continue to win this
fight.
Admiral Olson, the likelihood of fighting going up in
Afghanistan this summer and spring is great, is that correct?
There'll be more fighting?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The likelihood of foreign fighters coming
to Afghanistan, is that going to increase also?
Admiral Olson. There is potential for that, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Would you consider someone captured
on the battlefield in Afghanistan an enemy combatant to be held
by our forces, if we capture somebody involved in the
insurgency?
Admiral Olson. Sir, it depends on who that is and what he
was doing in Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. Well, he's over there trying to kill us.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. If he's a lawful combatant and a
declared hostile person, then certainly, yes.
Senator Graham. General Petraeus, we have foreign fighters
in detention now in Afghanistan, is that correct?
General Petraeus. It is.
Senator Graham. What are we going to do with these people?
General Petraeus. I am not sure about that right now. I'd
like some policy guidance here, if I may.
Senator Graham. Madam Secretary. Is that still a work in
progress, I take it?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, Senator. I think the record has been
that many of these we have to turn over within a certain period
of time to the Afghans. Some of those are further detained,
some of them are prosecuted, some of them have been released.
General Petraeus. Well, and we have also returned some to
their home country, when you're talking about international
fighters.
Ms. Flournoy. I'm sorry, I thought you were talking about
Afghans.
General Petraeus. But the challenge is what to do about
those who----
Senator Graham. Who are not going to be turned over, right.
General Petraeus. Well, or who we can't return to a foreign
country because the country doesn't treat them humanely.
Senator Graham. Right.
Ms. Flournoy. With the closure or the planned closure of
Guantanamo Bay, I think the administration's in the process of
figuring out exactly what do we need to do with those who are
too dangerous----
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I think that this committee
could be helpful. We need to get ahead of this problem. There
are some that will not be repatriated to their country. There
are some that we're not going to turn over to the Afghan legal
system because that would be a disaster, and we need to find
out as a Nation what to do with these folks because I think
they're very dangerous just to let them go.
From the 30,000 foot level here, General Petraeus, due to
the success in Iraq would you now consider Afghanistan the
central front in the war on terror?
General Petraeus. I think you'd have to take Afghanistan
and Pakistan together.
Senator Graham. Okay, those two together.
General Petraeus. But as a problem set, those two together,
yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Would you consider that now the central
front?
General Petraeus. In fact, our focus is truly shifting to
that front.
Senator Graham. The Kerry-Lugar legislation, how empowering
would that be to our efforts in Pakistan if Congress would pass
that?
General Petraeus. It will be of enormous importance, not
just because of the tangible resources that it provides to
Pakistan, but also because of the sense of commitment that
stands behind it as well and the sustained nature of it.
Senator Graham. Do you believe we should pass that as soon
as possible?
General Petraeus. I hate to intrude in your affairs, sir,
but----
Senator Graham. Well, I ask you to.
General Petraeus. If you're asking my best professional
military advice----
Senator Graham. Yes, I am, I am.
General Petraeus. Yes, that's correct.
Senator Graham. But it would help the effort?
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Madam Secretary?
Ms. Flournoy. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. This idea of repatriating or absorbing some
Taliban members back into the Afghan society, do you support
that generally as a policy, General Petraeus?
General Petraeus. I do. Again, it's one that has to be
applied--in fact, as you recall in the Munich security speech,
it is something that has to be applied with a very nuanced,
thorough understanding of local situations. This is the case of
trying to identify and separate from the population those who
truly are irreconcilable, who have to be killed or captured or
run off, and then allowing those who are reconcilable to rejoin
society, if you will, and to become part of the solution
instead of a continuing part of the problem.
Senator Graham. In a recent poll, 42 percent of Americans
surveyed on that particular day said it was a mistake for the
United States to have gone into Afghanistan. What would you say
to those Americans who believe that, General Petraeus?
General Petraeus. Well, I think it's very important to
remember where all of this started, and it started with al
Qaeda, trans-national extremists who were based in Afghanistan,
and of course who carried out the September 11 attacks.
Senator Graham. Do you believe it's in our national
interest not only to defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but to make sure that the Taliban do not come back in
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator. The Taliban were in
power when al Qaeda was allowed and invited in to establish the
sanctuaries in Afghanistan from which the September 11 attacks
were launched.
Senator Graham. When it comes to Iran, what role are they
playing, if any, regarding our efforts in Afghanistan? Are they
supporting the Taliban insurgency, al Qaeda elements?
General Petraeus. There is a very small level of support
that has been provided over the years by Iran to the Taliban
that we have seen. There was a period a couple of years ago
where they provided some explosively formed projectiles and
others. We think there's a case recently where they provided a
small amount of arms, ammunition, and explosives as well, but
it has not been a significant or a strategic factor in
Afghanistan.
They are also working to increase their influence, some of
that understandably, in Afghanistan, to establish relationships
with the leadership of the Afghan Government, and also of
course locally out in Herat in the western portions of the
country as well.
Senator Graham. One final question. Is it fair to say,
General Petraeus, that the American public can expect
casualties to go up this year in Afghanistan, that there will
be more fighting? Madam Secretary, can American taxpayers
expect that the expense of operations in Afghanistan will
dramatically increase in terms of dollars to be appropriated?
To both of you, is it worth the cost of injured American
military members, lives lost, and money spent?
General Petraeus. Senator, I think that Vice President
Biden had it exactly right when, after his last trip to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, he said that this is going to get
harder before it gets easier. That is correct. That is our
assessment, and it is worth seeing this through to conclusion.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would say there will be higher
human costs and higher financial costs to this effort. Those
facts were considered very carefully before the President made
his decision, and we're going forward with the strategy because
we believe that it's vital to the safety and security of the
American people.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Good morning, General. Good morning, Madam
Secretary. Good morning, Admiral.
General, I read with real interest that David Kilcullen has
written a book about his experiences and insights, and he draws
a number of conclusions I think would be useful to us as we
move forward. One comment that he makes is that we should be
careful about lecturing Islamic countries and countries in
other spheres about terrorism and about the dangers of it. It
piqued my interest and curiosity.
In that spirit, I heard you and I think Madam Secretary say
that you believe the Pakistani Government now does really see
the Taliban as their enemy. I also hear you say that we need to
give them a clear sense that we will stay until the job is
done. Furthermore, in that spirit--and I wonder what Rudyard
Kipling would write in this era, probably much of what he wrote
over 100 years ago--much of Pakistan's focus is to the east and
to Kashmir. Is there any discussion about urging India and
Pakistan to continue finding a way forward on Kashmir? Perhaps
all three of you might comment.
General Petraeus. If I could just start with that, Senator.
Together with my great diplomatic wingman Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, this effort actually has started. I met together
with him with the Indian national security adviser, for
example, at Munich. We had what we thought was a very good
talk. That was followed up when the foreign minister of India
came to Washington recently. When Ambassador Holbrooke went out
on his maiden trip through the area, my deputy went with him
and they were joined by the Pacific Command deputy for a swing
into India as well, after having been in Pakistan.
It would be of enormous importance were the tensions to be
reduced sufficiently between the two countries to where
intellectually as well as physically Pakistan could focus more
on what we again see as a much more important existential
threat to Pakistan in the internal extremists than continuing
to have that massive face-off against India to their east.
One of the many tragedies of the Mumbai attacks, which of
course were a September 11 moment not just for India, but even
for Pakistan, I would argue, was that the Pakistani military
once again focused on India for a period, and that continues to
some degree. There has been again a diminution of the tension
between the two countries over time, but it literally took
their eye off the ball, one that they were really starting to
focus on with the operations in the FATA and Bajaur and Mohmand
and others developing, and even actually shifted forces. Only
about 6,000 or so, not hugely significant in their number, but
it was almost the intellectual shift of focus that was as
concerning to many of us as was the physical shift.
Senator Udall. Madam Secretary?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I think you put your finger on a
really critical matter. This is the issue, one of the issues
that really drives a more regional approach in our strategy,
that part of helping Pakistan to shift its attention and its
resources and its efforts is reducing the tensions it has with
India. If you look historically about why Pakistan helped to
fund some of these militant groups who have now become
extremists or terrorists in their orientation, part of it was
to try to drive the Soviets out of their neighborhood, but part
of it was also as a hedge against India.
So I think to the extent we can reduce those tensions, we
will help shift their attention and resources towards the
really urgent threat, which is the extremist threat from
within.
Senator Udall. Admiral, do you care to comment?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I think I would just agree that it's
very important to recognize the impact of India on the
Pakistani psyche. It's important to recognize that the
capabilities of the Pakistani military were built to address
the threat they felt from India. That's primarily a
conventional army focused to the east. In order to reorient
that army to a more counterinsurgency army focused to the west,
any reduction of the tensions on the Indian border would be
very helpful.
Senator Udall. There are certainly parallels between the
shift we've had to make and other militaries have had to make.
The preparations we made for the Fulda Gap scenario, of course,
we've had to now set aside and actually face the 21st century
as it presents itself to us.
General, you talked about the greater military-to-military
contacts between the Pakistani and Afghani militaries. Do you
see a similar dynamic emerging--and this would also be directed
to the Secretary--between the civilian leadership in those two
countries? Because of course you have to mirror those contacts
for them to be effective overall.
General Petraeus. In fact, as President Zardari assumed
office there was really an unprecedented number of backs and
forths between the heads of government and some of their
ministers. As you may know, Senator, we hosted here in
Washington 3 weeks ago it was, now I think perhaps 4 weeks,
what was called the Tripartite. It was delegations from
Afghanistan and Pakistan led by their foreign ministers, with
other ministers present as well, and then very high level on
this side as well with the Secretary of State in the lead.
There will be further tripartite meetings like that, so
that will continue to foster the growing relationships between
those two countries. Candidly, we have to do a great deal of
work in the intelligence arena. The relationship between the
intelligence services of Afghanistan and Pakistan is--it would
be an understatement to say that it is not cooperative. There
is an enormous amount of suspicion and really outright enmity
that's built up over the years.
So we have a lot of work to do there. The efforts to build
the joint coordination center at Torkum Gate at the western
edge of the Khyber Pass are among a variety of different
initiatives that are being taken at the military level, as well
as again there's a military tripartite group that meets also.
Senator Udall. Madam Secretary, I see my time's run out,
but if you could answer shortly that would be good.
Ms. Flournoy. I would just add, the trilaterals will
continue. One of the most important byproducts that we've seen
from that process is that it's encouraged a host of interim
bilateral meetings between the Afghans and the Pakistanis and
their various counterparts that are ongoing between the
trilateral meetings. So I think the level of dialogue and
constructive interaction is increasing.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Chambliss, to be followed by Senator Webb.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank all of our witnesses again for your great
service, be it military or public service. We appreciate you
very much.
General Petraeus, there has been some comments coming out
of the administration over the last several days with respect
to the so-called new strategy in Afghanistan that have been a
little bit troubling to me. The statements concern the fact
that it's being said that we have been operating in Afghanistan
on the cheap. Obviously, it's of concern to all of us as
policymakers that we provide our military with whatever they
ask for. Now, I understand you obviously were the commander in
the Iraqi theater and you've only been at CENTCOM now for a few
months. But are you aware of anything that has been asked for
by either CENTCOM or by General McNeil or General Eikenberry or
anybody else in Afghanistan that has not been given to them in
the way of resources or commitments on the part of the Pentagon
to that theater?
General Petraeus. Throughout 2008, all the way out through
2009, the requests that were made by General McKiernan that I
supported and sent forward have all been approved. There are
requests that are still out there and, frankly, we think it's
prudent to do some assessments, see how this moves forward.
There's certainly no need for decisions on that right now.
Senator Chambliss. I understand going forward, but I'm
talking about previous requests that may have come from former
commanders in theater or commanders at CENTCOM that weren't
positively addressed.
General Petraeus. I can only talk about the period in which
I've been in command since October 31 of last year, I'm afraid,
Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Secretary Flournoy, do you have
any comment on that?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I do believe that there have been some
requests that have not been fulfilled, and the one that we
looked at very closely in the review was the one for trainers.
We were over I think 1,300 short for trainers for the ANA, over
a thousand short for trainers for the police. That's one of the
reasons why the President agreed to deploy the additional
brigade, and that request for forces had not been fulfilled for
quite some time. As we put greater emphasis on building the
Afghan forces, we felt it was very important to fully resource
that request, which had been on the books for a while.
So I think there are some examples that we found, looking
at it from an historical perspective.
Senator Chambliss. Secretary Flournoy, General Petraeus
made a statement, and I want to make sure I'm quoting you
right, General, so if I say anything incorrect please correct
me. But in talking about what's going on in Iraq in response to
Senator McCain, you said that the Iranians are still aiding our
enemies in Iraq with respect to providing munitions or whatever
to those who are attacking American soldiers. They are still
part of the process that's being addressed in Iraq today.
What concerns me, Secretary Flournoy, is that we have the
Iranians, who we know have provided munitions to our enemy in
Iraq and who have--that enemy has sought to do harm to American
soldiers on a daily basis, and yet beginning yesterday at The
Hague we have invited the Iranians to sit down at the table and
discuss Afghanistan and the way forward in Afghanistan.
So what's puzzling to me and what concerns me is, are we
engaging the Iranians with respect to just Afghanistan or are
we going to talk to them about Iraq and try to move the peace
process forward in that respect? Or is this just with relation
to Afghanistan this discussion is taking place right now?
Ms. Flournoy. The meeting at The Hague was really to bring
them into the discussion of Afghanistan, because they have been
part of the problem in Afghanistan and we believe that they
actually have interest in Afghanistan becoming stable over time
and we want them to change their behavior and become more a
part of the solution by ceasing some of the more troublesome
activities they've exhibited there.
I do think that over time we want to make clear to Iran the
full range of behaviors that we find problematic, that we would
like to see change. I know that in Iraq in the mean time we've
continued to put military pressure on them where possible to
try to prevent them from continuing those unhelpful activities.
Senator Chambliss. Picking up again on Senator Graham's
question with relation to the prisoners in Afghanistan that are
there today and ones that may be taken over the next several
weeks or months or whatever period of time we may be there,
General Petraeus, is it the intention now to keep those
prisoners in Afghanistan for some indefinite period of time or
is that part of the policy decision that is outside your realm
that you mentioned?
General Petraeus. That is part of the review that's
ongoing, sir.
Senator Chambliss. If we should pick up a high-value target
in Afghanistan, what would happen to that high-value target?
Where would they go?
General Petraeus. They would go to the theater internment
facility at Bagram.
Senator Chambliss. Secretary Flournoy, is there any
potential for any of those prisoners to be transferred to U.S.
soil? Is that under contemplation?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I know this is a policy that is under
review and I am not aware of the details of where this is
coming out, but I can get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
In accordance with the January 22, 2009 Executive orders, the
Department of Defense is working with departments and agencies across
the U.S. Government to conduct a comprehensive review of our detention
policy. The Attorney General heads these efforts, which are currently
ongoing, and is considering all relevant courses of action. At this
time, no formal decisions have been made, but the Department will keep
Congress informed of developments.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Flournoy, let me start by asking you a question.
First I would say that I appreciate what the President was
saying when he talked about focusing this strategy more
directly toward countering insurgency and eliminating the
presence of the Taliban. At the same time, I'm a little
concerned with how we're going to pull this off with respect to
cooperation of Pakistan, whether there really is a true
incentive at the right levels in the Pakistani Government and
military to strongly cooperate with NATO in this effort.
I think Arnaud de Borchgrave is probably the most
comprehensive, does the most comprehensive reporting in terms
of the situation in Pakistan. He has a piece actually this
morning on this, pointing out that Pakistani intelligence
inspired and nurtured the Taliban movement with a view of
taking over Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet defeat in
1989; that there are currently, according to Mr. de Borchgrave,
Pakistani intelligence agents operating in Afghanistan to
support the Taliban.
How are we going to address that situation?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I think it is an open question. I
think we need to test the proposition. I think one of the
things that is changing in the Pakistan context is the degree
to which the threat is manifesting itself within Pakistan at a
level that is really affecting public attitudes, that is
affecting leadership attitudes, et cetera. So I think we need
to test the proposition--and the way we do that is to put a
substantial offer of assistance and a substantial commitment to
work with them to take this on, to reduce tensions elsewhere in
the region so they can refocus and take this on.
I think we need to test the proposition, but I also think
this is where the metrics become very important. We need to
monitor their performance, their actual track record in
implementing the necessary steps. I think that's the point
where we are and that's what the strategy recommends going
forward.
Senator Webb. I would also submit that there should be ways
to try to measure the true incentive, not simply from the
current top leadership in Pakistan, but from other elements
that have considerable power in Pakistan. This is a situation
that we have been monitoring for some time at a committee level
rather than at an operational level, but there's been
considerable reporting that, for instance, the Pakistani
military operating in these tribal areas has had a fairly soft
hand when it comes to the Taliban, as opposed to al Qaeda, the
apprehensions that they've made and the operations that they've
conducted.
So I think this clearly should be on our radar screen in
terms of truly measuring the incentives and the intentions in
Pakistan.
How are we going to know when our national task is
finished? I would ask Secretary Flournoy to answer that and
then, General or Admiral, if you'd like to add. How are we
going to know? What is the end point? Actually, I think General
Petraeus is kind of famous for having asked this question at
the very beginning of the Iraq war to a reporter: How are we
going to know when this is over? How does this end?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, I'll give you my answer and then let the
person who asked the question try to give his. I think that a
key point of defining success is when both the Afghans and the
Pakistanis have both the capability and the will to deal with
the remaining threat themselves; that the period of
extraordinary intervention and assistance comes to a transition
point and we go to a more long-term, normal development
assistance relationship with both countries.
To me, it is when we have reduced the threat and built that
capacity locally to the point where they can be much more self-
reliant in managing this problem.
Senator Webb. That puts us sort of at the mercy of their
policies.
General, can you give me a more practical response--or
maybe more mechanical? Basically, how are we going to know?
General Petraeus. Well, I think again, frankly, in Iraq we
have known when we were able to transition responsibilities to
not just the Iraqi security forces, but to other institutions
of the Iraqi Government. Now, Afghanistan's a very different
country. It does not have some of the blessings certainly that
Iraq has when it comes to oil and revenue. But nonetheless, the
task will be for them to shoulder the responsibilities of their
own security and other responsibilities of governance.
Senator Webb. When is the last time that Afghanistan had an
actual functioning national army that could clearly be said to
be in control of operations inside its own country?
General Petraeus. Probably more than 30 years ago, I think,
Senator.
Senator Webb. At least, if then.
General Petraeus. In the 1970s, in that period, and
certainly it was a combination of security arrangements. But I
think that, as a student of history as well, that you would
agree that between the period most recently, for example, of
say 1900 and again in the 1970s, that there was in Afghanistan,
there was a conception of a nation state and that there was the
exercise of governance within an Afghan model that did exist.
Of course, it's been the intervening more than 3 decades of war
that have done so much to damage all that.
Senator Webb. I would say perhaps a brief period more than
30 years ago, for about 30 years, you could say that there was
some sort of a functioning national army in Afghanistan, not
previous to that and not since. It's a little bit different in
terms of the challenge even that we were facing in Iraq.
My time is up, but I would like to ask one other question
that goes along with this. When you're talking about this
policy of living among the people, holding areas that have been
cleared, who do we anticipate are actually going to hold these
areas?
General Petraeus. Well, it will literally vary from
location to location. The options of course are local police,
their version of national police, the national civil order
police can assist with that, and then the ANA, as well as now
the Afghan public protection force, which is a pilot program
just concluded the first iteration of this. About 240 or so
members graduated. They'll be partnered with special forces.
We'll learn undoubtedly some hard lessons from this effort and
apply them as we carry out subsequent of these.
This is not quite a Sons of Iraq. In fact, it's actually a
more institutionalized and frankly more rigorous Sons of Iraq
program, because it included weeks of training, specific
equipping, and then a specific partner force. But that is how
we would see that.
If I could also, Senator, there is also a difference in the
way we literally live with the people in Afghanistan. As in
Iraq, where we plunked ourselves down, as you know and your son
did, that is not as likely here, given the much greater rural
population than urban population. It will be probably even more
likely that, in coordination with tribal elders and the local
mullahs, that we'll actually occupy on the edge of a community,
not literally right in the center of it.
Senator Webb. So it largely will depend on the competence
and the willpower of the local Afghanis?
General Petraeus. Exactly.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I asked Secretary Gates about what kind
of unease he had about moving this additional troop level there
in light of his strong comment that we wanted an Afghan face on
the situation. Would you just share with us the tension between
greater American involvement, greater activity, and the need to
have the Afghan army and police and government be the force
that saves that country?
General Petraeus. Senator, the concern there is that,
taking into account Afghanistan's history and a people who have
never looked kindly on those who are seen as invaders or would-
be conquerors, that the additional forces have to be seen by
them to be there for them, to help secure them, to serve them,
to be good guests, good neighbors, good partners. That's why I
mentioned that piece in my statement and pointed out the
counterinsurgency guidance that General McKiernan has published
that gets at the heart of this as well.
The additional forces can't be seen as coming in and taking
over a country that has never accepted that kind of activity.
It has to be seen as a force that is coming in to be their
partners and to help them against a common threat.
Senator Sessions. You're satisfied that's given enough
attention in your plans?
General Petraeus. I am. It is something we will need to
continue to work on, as with civilian casualties, as with a
number of other activities.
Senator Sessions. We do have this shortage of trainers
still, do we not, to reach the level of training the Afghan
army that we'd like it to reach?
General Petraeus. We do, and I actually made a note that I
want to see what that will be when we project out with the
addition of the 4th Brigade of the 82nd, the elements that will
provide the additional trainers and advisers. I should point
out that there really has been a shift, that General McKiernan
has asked that all of the additional forces that are provided--
and it actually started with the marines that went into the
Regional Command South area--that they be dual-capable or dual-
missioned, if you will; that they could partner with Afghan
forces and provide advisory and assistance tasks in that
regard, even as they are also conducting their own operations.
This is a shift that we're also going to make in Iraq over
time as we move away from combat brigades and to advisory and
assistance brigades. That's the concept. This will be the
biggest force that we have sent in by far that will have that
capability, but we've already been experimenting with this with
the initial elements of the marines, and the other marine units
that go in will have this same kind of capability and
preparation. Again, we'll keep learning about this as we do it.
Senator Sessions. We learn as we go. I think the reason we
have to learn and change is because the enemy does not desire
to be defeated, captured, or killed, and they change. As soon
as you confront one of their tactics, they will develop another
one. Wouldn't you suggest that for all of us and the American
people to understand that when tactics change it's because
often the enemies' agenda has changed?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator. You'll recall in the
counterinsurgency guidance that you read that we had in Iraq
that the final bullet on there was: Learn and adapt. The enemy
does change. This is a thinking, intelligent enemy, and we must
adapt. Ideally, you try to get ahead of the enemy, of course,
in what it is we're doing.
But what works today won't necessarily work tomorrow and
what works today in one place won't work necessarily in the
other.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, I won't repeat
questions about the Pakistan situation, but Pakistan has been a
long-time ally of the United States. This is a very important
nation. It has a history of democratic leadership. It waffles
back and forth over time, but we can hope it would continue to
maintain its democratic traditions. I just believe we need to
be respectful of them, not lecture them, and see if we can't
find common interests that represent their interests and to
acknowledge some of the difficulties they may be facing
internally on some of these issues.
Ms. Flournoy. I couldn't agree more, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Sometimes I hear our talking heads and
our politicians talk about Pakistan like we can order them
around. This is a sovereign nation and an important nation and
I hope that we can all remember that.
I would share that I think Senator Webb's comments about
the difficulty of creating a fully functional government in
Afghanistan are correct. This is a long time and they've never
really had that to any sophisticated degree, and we don't need
to be too optimistic in our abilities.
Admiral Olson, the Special Operating Forces were the key to
the fall of the Taliban originally. How many forces did we have
in Afghanistan when the Taliban collapsed, when we partnered
with the Northern Alliance, and how many of those were Special
Operations Forces?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I'll ask those who have a better
knowledge of the total count to weigh in if they disagree. But
I believe the total number of U.S. forces the day that the
Taliban abandoned Kabul was on the order of 8 to 10,000. About
2,000 of those had been provided by United States SOCOM. It was
essentially a Special Forces group of operational detachments
of Green Berets that was the core of that.
Senator Sessions. Well, they did a fabulous job. 2,000 are
not able to run the whole country of Afghanistan or help it be
secure. But I do hope that your budget is sufficient to meet
the needs for the future of the Special Operating Forces within
the entire military defense establishment that we have. Are you
comfortable you have enough there?
Admiral Olson. Sir, again I'm not going to get ahead of the
budget discussions in this forum quite yet. But as I said
earlier, we are robust enough to meet the requirement to
respond to crises, but we depend heavily on the services, on
each of the armed services.
Senator Sessions. Do you feel that your people are stressed
to a level that they can't sustain now? Of course, one would
hope there was some reduction in deployments, but what is your
basic feeling to us today about the stress level of your
fabulous troops?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I think we're operating at a pace that
we can sustain. There is unmet demand for special operations
capability around the world, but we are settled into a
sustainable pace at this point with the force we have.
Senator Sessions. That's good.
General Petraeus, I would just say thank you to your
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines. I know that I remember so
vividly when President Bush had to ask them to extend their
tour. Some of them had already reached Germany and they said
``Yes, sir,'' and they went back and served their country.
Things were dark in those days, and it's improved so much. I
just think we need to thank the men and women in uniform who
made that happen. They are the key people.
General Petraeus. I agree, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus or Secretary Flournoy, either one, can you
give me an estimate of how many contracting personnel you're
going to expect in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. I cannot, Senator. We can do a scrub of
that and see what the projection is, but I cannot give that to
you right now.
Senator McCaskill. I think you probably understand,
Secretary Flournoy, why I'm concerned. As we moved into Iraq,
if somebody would have told us in the early days of that
conflict that we were going to end up with 140,000--well, even
worse, that we weren't really sure ever at any given time
exactly how many contracting personnel we had engaged in the
conflict--I want to make sure that we're not going down this
same road without having a very clear view of what the
contracting needs are going to be, how many people are going to
be involved, and what it's going to cost.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I can assure you Secretary Gates has
asked the same question. He wants to understand what the
contractor support footprint is going to look like for this
larger force.
I think the other thing that we're looking at is not only
the numbers and the costs, but also the composition. Can we
place an emphasis on indigenous contractors, so that when we do
have to rely on contractors, we're actually contributing to the
Afghan economy and creating job possibilities for Afghans? So
there's at least an additional benefit there when we do have to
rely on contractors.
I do think that historically that has been more the case in
Afghanistan. There has been a higher percentage of the
contractors that we have used that have been indigenous.
Senator McCaskill. Is there an operational plan for the new
strategy?
General Petraeus. There is an existing military campaign
plan, Senator, that incorporates already these forces, because
these requests were made and have been approved over time. So
that strategy exists. We are obviously working very hard to
establish the infrastructure in terms of bases, logistical
support systems, command and control structures,
communications, and all of the rest. That is ongoing.
A substantial amount of that work certainly is being done
by contractors. The creation a few years back of the Joint
Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan has improved, we
believe very strongly, the conduct of these different contracts
and so forth.
I should also add that we have certainly all tried to learn
lessons from the findings of the Special Inspector General in
Iraq and the establishment of former General Fields as Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is a very good
move in our view, as are the other oversight mechanisms that
the Secretary and the President mentioned.
Senator McCaskill. I would like to deprive him of as much
work as possible.
General Petraeus. So would we.
Senator McCaskill. I would like us not to have 400 or 500
different reports on how badly we have handled contracting in
Afghanistan, like we do, candidly, with what happened in Iraq.
I just want to emphasize that the time to deal with this is
now, the time to get on this and have a very good view, because
here's what our military does so well, better than anybody on
the planet, and that is going after the mission. With honor,
integrity, and leadership, we go after the mission, and
contracting has been an afterthought, and we can't afford it.
I don't want to cut you off, Secretary Flournoy, but I do
want to get to one other area, and then we can come back to
what you wanted to say. That is how we're transitioning out of
Iraq with contracting personnel. I do have a very clear
organizational chart now, General, about the contracting
command in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the most recent report
from the Government Accountability Office says that there is no
unified structure that exists to coordinate the teams and units
engaged in efforts to manage and execute the return of material
and equipment from Iraq. We're talking about 170,000 pieces of
equipment, worth $16.5 billion, and of that $3.5 billion is
within the control of our contractors.
I am worried that we are not paying enough attention on
that front as we transition out of Iraq and into Afghanistan,
and that there's not any unified effort coordinating these two
entities as to all this equipment and material and contractors.
Are they just disbanding? Are we drawing contracts to a close?
We know the men and women are moving out in some kind of
timetable for that. But we don't really know much about the
contractors.
General Petraeus. Well, first of all, we actually have a
plan that is to bring down the numbers of contractors, and I
can share that slide with you, in fact, because we've put a
great deal of emphasis on this.
[The information referred to follows:]
Central Command and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are
developing plans for the drawdown of forces which includes the
reduction of contractors. In fact, since December 2008, the contractor
footprint decreased by approximately 19,000 contractors. The current
ratio of contractors to military in Iraq is approximately 1:1. Until
approval of the force reduction plan, MNF-I's target is a 5 percent
monthly reduction of contractors. This is represented by the trend line
on the slide below. The planning guidance is to reduce the number of
U.S. and Third Country National contractors, while increasing the
reliance on Iraqi contractors-Local Nationals.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific.
General Petraeus. Also, to a point that the Secretary made,
we have had an effort ongoing for some time to give Iraqis a
shot at the contracts. There was a period, frankly, where we
lacked trust in our own ability to vet and so forth, so we used
a very large number of third country nationals in addition to
the smaller number of U.S. contractors. So the Iraqi First
effort has gone quite well, actually, and so with the Iraqi
transportation network and a whole host of other initiatives.
But those numbers literally are coming down. As that does
happen, there is a process to account for the equipment that
contractors have that was purchased for tasks they're
performing on our behalf or on behalf of other U.S. Government
agencies there, to get a handle on that and then to bring that
out with us as well or to dispose of it in some other manner
that is legal and appropriate.
But also, our logisticians are doing a tremendous amount of
work, not just to build up the infrastructure and so forth for
an effort that more than doubles what we're doing in
Afghanistan. The surge in Iraq logistically was a miracle of
modern military activities, but it was a surge that was only
30,000-plus on top of what was already 133 or something
thousand, in a country that had a great deal of infrastructure.
In Afghanistan we're pushing over 30,000 in, more than
doubling, in a country that does not have the infrastructure.
So the absorption is a big challenge, and that is one reason
that we have to space this out and we have to build this up.
But your points are very well taken about getting a grip on
that. In fact, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq and
Afghanistan has helped a great deal. So also has Congress' and
the Department's focus on increasing literally the number of
contractors that we had in uniform. There was a period where
the Army had no general officers in the contracting ranks
whatsoever.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
General Petraeus. I think there are now going to be five,
but I don't want to speak for the Army on that. But again, all
of these efforts are hugely important, given the reliance on
contractors that we have had, we think in general for good
reasons, although there are also going to be some initiatives I
think coming out of the Department in this area. But I don't
want to get ahead of the Secretary on that.
Senator McCaskill. Secretary Flournoy?
Ms. Flournoy. I think actually General Petraeus covered a
lot of the ground I was just going to add. But the one thing I
will say on the issue of revising the operational plan or the
campaign plan, if we are successful in really plussing up the
civilian side of the effort I think the President will be
asking the ambassador, the new ambassador and General McKiernan
to put their staffs together, to come up with a civil-military,
sort of whole-of-government campaign plan, and to work that
very closely with the U.N. and with other international
partners, to really get more synergy in our civil-military
efforts.
General Petraeus. If I could add to that, Senator. In fact,
there is an existing military campaign plan, but the piece that
very much needs to be added now is a much more robust and
complete joint campaign plan along the lines of what Ambassador
Crocker and I were able to do there in Iraq. That is the full
intention. In fact, Ambassador Holbrooke has some instructions
for that as the new team goes into the embassy in addition.
For what it's worth, in a few weeks from now he and I are
going to host an onsite, actually in Washington on a Saturday,
to bring together civil and military and to talk about the
kinds of policy guidance that is needed to help that effort
move forward.
Senator McCaskill. Well, in the contracting area
particularly, we had a little bit of this always going on.
USAID said, ``well, they aren't letting us do enough,'' and
State said, ``well, the military took it away, and the military
said, ``well, we have to have more CERP funds.'' Then meanwhile
we had the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) going
to heights that no one ever anticipated that LOGCAP would go to
in terms of the amount of money the American taxpayer spent.
So cautionary warning that some of us are paying very close
attention to how we do contracting in Afghanistan to see if
we've learned any lessons.
Thank you all very much for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Welcome, Admiral Olson, Secretary, and General Petraeus. I
wanted to thank you for hosting me on Monday at CENTCOM.
General Petraeus. Great to have you, sir.
Senator Martinez. General Hood and General Allen were very
kind and we had a very good briefing, and I appreciate that
very much. We continue to be very proud to have CENTCOM in the
State of Florida.
General Petraeus. Proud to be there, Senator.
Senator Martinez. Glad to have you, sir.
I know that some of this has perhaps been asked, but I
wanted to just go a little bit more into the area of fully
resourcing the effort in Afghanistan and whether or not, in
addition to those I guess 17 plus 4, 21,000 troops that are
moving into the theater or have begun to move into the theater,
the additional 10,000 I guess which have been talked about by
General McKiernan--and I realize that those might not be
immediately needed.
I wanted to ask, when will we know where we are in the
fully resourcing of that additional 10,000?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, the way this was presented to the
President was sort of on a time line of when decisions would
have to be made in order for troops to deploy to meet the
requirement. My understanding is that the remaining brigade
decision and the headquarters decision are for troop arrivals
in 2010. So those decisions will have to be made some time in
the fall.
At the same time, because we are redoubling our effort in
Afghanistan and we expect to be making progress throughout this
year, we also expect the commander to be reassessing his needs
over time, and we expect that new or different requests may be
put on the table over time. So that's part of this commitment
to continuing to measure progress, continuing to evaluate how
we're doing to see that.
But I think that the President made every decision that he
needed to make at this point in time, and I think those other
decisions will be made at the appropriate time when the
commander needs to know.
Senator Martinez. I guess what I'm trying to understand is
the level of commitment. If the troops were needed, would they
be sent?
Ms. Flournoy. I think this President has demonstrated with
not only the troops you mentioned--there are also some
additional enablers. We've gone from a posture of about 38,000
to now projected 68,000. I would never have used the phrase
``incrementalism'' to describe this. This is a very strong
commitment on the military side and on the civilian side and
the economic side by this President to try to make this mission
successful.
Senator Martinez. I don't underestimate the importance of
the civilian and economic side, which I think are tremendously
important in this effort, as they have been in Iraq as well,
here even more so because, as I think is very clear, we're not
talking about a rebuilding effort in many instances. It's
building in the first instance, which I think is very
dramatically different.
With regards to our NATO partners, the words of Secretary
Gates continue to haunt me about the two-tier alliance, those
that might fight and those that might not, and the continuing
caveats with the NATO partners. How and when will we be
approaching NATO? Do we continue to be committed to their
participation in the fight, as opposed to just civilian and
support participation?
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, we have been in consultation with NATO
and with many of our NATO allies bilaterally in the development
of the strategy. I will be going, on behalf of Secretary Gates,
to the summit along with the President on Friday and Saturday
to really try to secure those commitments, and then following
on in April we will have donors, further donors conferences,
one for Pakistan, and we're hoping to schedule one for
Afghanistan, to try to actually nail down exactly.
But I think many of our allies have been waiting to be able
to come to the summit with their commitment as a deliverable
for what they've promised to do. So I expect by next week we
should have a much better sense of who is going to step up with
what type of contribution.
Senator Martinez. That's great. Good luck on that, and I
appreciate your efforts in that regard.
General Petraeus, I was going to ask you regarding Iran.
There seem to have been some statements as recent as the last
day by Iran indicating some willingness to combat drug
trafficking and developing and some reconstruction assistance
to Afghanistan. Do you perceive that there's opportunity for
Iran to become a more helpful partner in the Afghanistan
effort, understanding that they share a long border and that
the issues of drugs as well as refugees are of internal
interest to them?
General Petraeus. Well, there certainly are some shared
concerns, Senator. In the beginning they did play a part in the
process. They also do not want to see the Taliban return to
control Afghanistan. As a Shia nation, the last thing they want
to see is a Sunni ultra-fundamentalist group that allows
extremists to have sanctuaries on their soil.
So there are some very good reasons why they should want to
see the effort in Afghanistan succeed. But there are times when
it appears that they are conflicted in their views of
Afghanistan because there's a sense at times that they don't
want an enterprise that we're part of to succeed. So you have
that dynamic.
Of course, you also have overshadowing that some pretty
serious differences over other issues as we look to the other
side of the CENTCOM AOR, into some of their activities in the
nuclear realm.
Senator Martinez. Right, understand.
I suppose we don't have a really clear indication. It's
always difficult to read where they may be coming from, and I
guess that continues to be part of the haze that we have that
relates to Iran and their intentions.
One last question in the moment I have left. Madam
Secretary, China's participation. I'm intrigued as to how we're
approaching China as perhaps of some help in the Afghanistani
theater, their economic participation in the country, and how
do you view the potential for that to develop over the months
ahead?
Ms. Flournoy. I think it's a very important development
that we're engaging them, we're bringing them to the table.
They have a longstanding historical relationship with Pakistan.
They have longstanding interests in the region. I think they
are coming to the table sort of open to exploring ways that
they can be helpful.
Obviously, they're going to do it in ways that try to
safeguard their interests, but I think where we can find common
interests we should explore that as fully as possible.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just in closing, General Petraeus, say a word of
thanks to you and your leadership, as well as your troops for
the tremendous success, I know fragile and I know reversible.
But I continue to believe that it is hopefully a lasting
success in the Iraqi situation, and you deserve great credit
and congratulations on that. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Martinez. I guess, Admiral Olson, I shouldn't
overlook the very great contribution of the special forces to
this effort as well.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I echo those comments that the Senator just said and I
really appreciate the work you all have done.
It's been actually an interesting couple hours here
listening to all the questions. The good news is most of my
questions were answered, so you're lucky about that. But I do
have some very specific ones, and I want to kind of rapid fire
if I can.
First, General, in regards to Iraq. As we start to draw
down and turn efforts over to the Iraqi Government, are there
any one or two things that really stand out that could become
show-stoppers or issues that we just have to keep our eye on as
this process starts?
General Petraeus. Actually, there are several, Senator. The
residual capacity that, as I mentioned, Iran does continue to
provide support for in terms of what essentially are proxy
extremist elements. We still see those. By the way, the Iraqi
Government is watching that very carefully and in fact their
security forces will go after them when they have the
intelligence to do that. I should note that our Special
Operations Forces have trained those individuals and still do
provide a variety of support and assistance, although the Iraqi
forces take the lead against the former militia and the other
elements that used to be called the special groups.
There are residual al Qaeda, and it's more than residual.
It's still a force to be reckoned with. It is the al Qaeda and
other extremist allies that continue to carry out the suicide
attacks that we have seen periodically. Touch wood, those have
generally been spaced out farther, but we have seen some very
tough ones in recent weeks nonetheless. Again, Iraqi forces
very much going after those as well, but they do require
continued assistance in certain areas, as we discussed,
Diyallah and Ninewah Province in particular and certain parts
of Baghdad.
Of big concern is the bundle of issues that is wrapped up
in what's called the disputed boundaries issues. Some of these
are Arab-Kurdish issues. Some are Sunni-Shia issues. They are
potentially very dangerous and we're quite worried about the
developments in some of these areas, although the United
Nations element there is about to make an announcement we hope
that will start the ball moving forward in resolving, at least
for the near term, some of these different issues.
Then you have a host of other issues wrapped up in
politics. Interestingly, the constitution as it has played out
has an enormous amount of safeguards. You actually see the
council of representatives, their congress, executing its
prerogatives and checks and balances on the power of the
executive branch. You see this play back and forth, efforts by
one to centralize, by others to hold that in check. But some of
that can result in actual security challenges and that's
something else that we have to keep an eye on.
Finally, the budget pressures because of the reduction in
the price of oil have dramatically reduced the size of the
budget that they have available to them, the revenues available
for them for this year. That has caused some very painful
decisions for them. They're working their way through that. A
related one of those is the integration of the Sons of Iraq. It
truly is an oversight. We do believe that that money was moved
and then came off the plate. It's back on the plate, and they
keep finding short-term solutions to what could be a long-term
problem if not resolved properly over time. But the vast
majority of the Sons of Iraq are now being paid by the
Government of Iraq, although each monthly payroll has certain
degrees of emotion and tension connected with them.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
I have another quick one, a follow-up to Senator
McCaskill's question regarding the contractors and the
equipment they maintain and handle and how that gets
transferred to you. Do you feel confident that you are
resourced enough to handle that process? When I mean
``resource,'' dollars supporting your staff and other
activities to make sure that that process goes forward in a way
that has limited missing equipment and other types of things.
General Petraeus. I believe that we are. We have learned
some tough lessons in this arena, and in other accountability
arenas, frankly, over the years. We believe that we have
implemented safeguards and properly resourced. I do believe
that there is still progress required in terms of increasing
our capability broadly in the field of contracting in general.
That process has begun, and it's a little bit like training
leaders or developing leaders for the ANSF. You just don't have
those to pull off the bench and throw in at more senior levels.
But the momentum has shifted in that regard and I think
that's a positive direction.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
I'm going to shift now if I can to Afghanistan, and I'd
like toward any one of you, but I'll start with you, General.
I'm going to read a comment. We did some analysis, but
according to the Field Manual 3-24, which I know you had some
involvement in developing and authoring that, it talks about
the density that you need to have and the ratio of 20 to 25 per
thousand. When you look at Iraq, which again I want to echo the
comments throughout the day here that have talked about the
work that you have done there and the success that we have had
there, the ratio when you look at that is 28 to 1,000 based on
our troops, coalition, Iraqi security forces, the army. With
all those pieces all added in, it's about 28 to 1,000.
When you look at Afghanistan and where we are today and
where we will be in 2011 based on the numbers, as well as again
the same kind of analysis, apples to apples, today we're about
7 to 1,000 and in 2011 we'll be at 9 to 1,000--dramatically--
it's half of what the manual talks about.
So I'd be interested in your comment. This is one area of
concern to me. I recognize that we may reevaluate in 2011, but
in 2011 we're still at 9 to 1,000, based on all the training
that we do for their troops and other activities.
General Petraeus. It is a concern, Senator. For what it's
worth, not only did I obviously oversee the production of that
manual and actually got into some serious editing, I personally
made the decision to put that ratio in there, because there was
a dispute about whether it should go in and so forth. I have
heard about it at almost every hearing that I've had since
then. But I stand by that because I think intellectually it was
absolutely the right thing to do in terms of integrity that we
require that.
Now, one area where, believe it or not, we actually have to
get some more work by the IC is literally how large is
Afghanistan, because there is a dispute right now as to whether
it is 30 million or perhaps even as low as 23 or 25 million,
and the IC is working on that. That affects, of course, the
ratio.
But the bottom line is your point is exactly right, that
even at the end of the additional coalition forces, the
accelerated development of the ANA and the other ANSF, that
certainly according to that ratio, if you assume that there's
an insurgency throughout the country, which is not necessarily
the case, and that's another important factor, that you need
more forces.
Again, I think that's something that as the assessment goes
forward--and I'd defer to the Under Secretary on that.
Senator Begich. Madam Secretary?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, this actually, there were several
faithful students of General Petraeus' Counterinsurgency manual
involved in the strategy review.
General Petraeus. She was present at the very first seminar
we had to develop that manual.
Ms. Flournoy. We actually had several discussions on this
very issue, and what I will tell you is we asked the IC to give
us their best assessment of where the sort of insurgency had
its deepest roots, where it was really focused and concentrated
geographically in the country. While there are pockets in the
north and west that are important, the concentration really is
in the south and up into the east.
So when we were looking at the troops required on our side,
by our allies, the Afghan troops, Afghan police, Afghan local
security forces, the sum total of all, we were trying to
concentrate our efforts in that sort of insurgency belt in the
south and the west, to try to get to those kinds of ratios in
those geographic areas where the insurgency is strongest.
So we actually did take that into account, not so much in a
countrywide fashion, but focused on the areas where the
insurgency really has taken root.
Senator Begich. Thank you.
My time is up but let me ask you if I could if you could
prepare or share at whatever level you can how those ratios
look in those areas of concentration? As a former mayor, I
always had my police department tell me what the ratio should
be and then we had to manage based on situations throughout the
city. So we always had a ratio. But I want to make sure that's
the one area--and to be very frank with you, I want to make
sure you're resourced properly here and be aggressive about it,
so we're not kind of three-quarters of the way in.
So let me end there. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
the opportunity to ask some questions.
[The information referred to follows:]
Consistent with historical experience, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
calls for a force density ratio of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1,000
people, or 1:50. The necessary force density ratio, however, remains
very dependent upon the situation on the ground (FM 3-24, paragraph 1-
67).
Estimates of Afghanistan's national population vary widely, ranging
from about 24-32 million people. There are perhaps 10-14 million people
in the Pashtun belt where the insurgency is most concentrated.
Current force-to-population ratios (Afghan national security forces
(ANSF) plus International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) in the
Pashtun areas of Regional Command-East and Regional Command-South range
from 1:150 to 1:110 (depending on the population estimate used).
If all additional planned ANSF (including ongoing increases in Army
and police) and ISAFs go to these areas, the ratios could improve to a
range of about 1:80 to 1:60 by 2011. This is much closer to the
historically-derived ratio of 1:50. Whether this force ratio will be
adequate will depend on a number of factors including the quality of
ANSF training and the degree of progress in Pakistan as well as
Afghanistan. Monitoring the situation and making necessary adjustments
is a top priority for the Department.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
We'll just have a 3- or 4-minute second round. There's only
a few of us here, so hopefully you'll be able to get some lunch
before your next appearance.
First on this 10,000 troop request, is there a pending
request that is unfilled at this point for those 10,000
additional troops?
General Petraeus. There is a request for forces for those
elements, Senator. It did move through me. My understanding is
that it has not been sent beyond the Pentagon at this time.
Chairman Levin. I should look to you, Secretary Flournoy.
Has that been sent by Secretary Gates? Has that request been
made by Secretary Gates?
Ms. Flournoy. The request was laid out along with all of
the others on a time line, and what the President was told is
that that request is out there, but he doesn't have to make it
until----
Chairman Levin. Make the decision?
Ms. Flournoy. Make the decision, until the fall, so that
the troops would arrive as planned in 2010. So that--I think
the President was focused on making every request he needed to
be made in the current timeframe, and I think he wanted to
reassess where we are at the time the decision has to be made.
Chairman Levin. So that decision will be made in a timely
way so that the troops, if the President so determines, can get
there on the time line that General McKiernan has requested
them; is that a fair statement?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with that, General Petraeus?
Ms. Flournoy. But they also may be changing.
General Petraeus. Well, again, that's certainly our hope.
Again, it's up to them to make the decision, so to speak.
Chairman Levin. I said that. The President will decide
whether or not to do it.
General Petraeus. Right.
Chairman Levin. If he decides in the fall to approve those
10,000, they would then arrive in a timely fashion, according
to a timetable which General McKiernan, more importantly I
guess you--you're the Commander, CENTCOM--have approved?
General Petraeus. That's correct, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Okay. So it's not like it's rejected or
deferred. It's just that the decision will be made in a timely
way one way or the other, and if it's made in a positive way in
the fall that would then respond positively to the current
request for 10,000?
General Petraeus. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Just one, sort of a comment and a
question on this aid for Pakistan, the money which has been or
will be requested. I guess it's called Kerry-Lugar money. My
own feeling is that I'm willing to support that if I think it
will be effective. Whether it's going to be effective will
depend on whether or not the Pakistanis have adopted the goals
of dealing with the religious extremists in their midst and to
do forcefully, where necessary. We have ambivalent evidence as
to whether or not they're committed to that goal.
So I need to, as far as this one vote is concerned, to
believe that those goals not only are at the top, but have
sufficiently permeated the down-below elements of the Pakistani
Government and military so that the aid would be effective.
Would you think that's a fair position to take? Maybe that's an
unfair way to state it, but do you think that that is a fair
view to take on my part?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I think we're all looking for those
indications that the intent of the assistance would be met.
What I can tell you in this intensive dialogue and trialogue
we've been having in the development of the strategy is that
the Red Mosque attack, the assassination of Bhutto, the attack
on the cricket team, the attack on the police station, these
are really starting to have an impact on both average
Pakistanis, but also the leadership.
The problem is making itself very much felt. So I do think
we are at a different moment of opportunity now.
General Petraeus. Senator, could I just note, by the way,
that comments similar to that were in the newspaper, I think it
was yesterday, the comments that you made. I shared those
with--there's a senior Pakistani officer here right now, in
fact for a conference. In fact, the Under Secretary addressed
all the Central and South Asian chiefs of defense staff and
other senior officers. I will also share those with the
Pakistani ambassador, who I'm meeting tomorrow night.
Chairman Levin. Now, finally, it's a different aspect of
the same problem. We cannot appear to be buying support for our
policies. It has to be that we are supporting Pakistan
policies, because if we appear to be buying something they
otherwise would not pursue it is counterproductive in terms of
the reaction of the Pakistan people, who want to believe that
we're supporting their goals, not that we're buying something
they otherwise wouldn't do, because that is a domineering kind
of a position to take if we're buying something.
Money can be used for two different purposes. One, you go
to the store and you buy something; or you can use money to
support something, like something you believe in, like your
family's goals. It's a subtle difference in a way because it's
still money, but it's a critical difference. It may be too
nuanced for public consumption, I don't know. But it's a
critically important difference, I believe.
How then, if there is a difference, if you accept that
difference, could we make it clear that it is our goal to
support a Pakistan Government which has the goals of a stable
Pakistan without religious extremists dominating or controlling
things, without the down side possibility that it would look
like we're trying to persuade them to do something they
otherwise wouldn't do?
If you can follow that distinction, how would we pursue it?
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, in fact in all of the
recent studies there has been a recognition of the importance
of moving from what we have termed a transactional relationship
with Pakistan to a partnership. I think that captures exactly
what you are getting at.
But as you also rightly note, there is nothing easy about
this. This is about relationships. It's about building of trust
and confidence. It's about their recognition of the existential
threat, that it's a threat to them, not just a threat to us and
the rest of the world, and all the rest of that.
Admiral Olson. Senator Levin, I think a point worth making
is that as we strive for an increased and enhanced
relationship, partnership with Pakistan, that we do recognize
the sacrifices and contributions that they've made to date.
They have been a strong ally and I think the forces that I
provide feel that because they have been working one on one at
a unit level in a training relationship with Pakistani forces,
who have captured thousands, killed hundreds, and lost numerous
lives in the border region, and they've fought--there was a
serious fight in Bajaur before a successful outcome there, and
there was a serious fight in Swat before an unsuccessful
outcome there that they still hope to reverse.
So at the unit level and where I've been able to visit the
Americans and the Pakistanis working together in a training
relationship, there is a solid statement of partnership. I know
we're looking for a much more overt demonstration of commitment
by the Pakistani Government, but I would like to be on record
as saying that the soldiers themselves, many of them have
fought hard in the western regions of Pakistan.
General Petraeus. I would echo that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you. I want to make two quick statements
and ask one question. The first statement is to thank you for
the exchange that you had with Senator Levin about that pending
request for 10,000 additional troops and the answer that the
door is essentially open and a decision has not been made at
the highest levels of our Government.
I say that for the obvious reason, one of the lessons we
learned painfully in Iraq is that numbers matter. It's not
numbers alone of troops. As you always remind us, General
Petraeus, it's how they're used; and also that military
strength is a necessary but not sufficient basis for achieving
our objectives.
But the lesson that I think should be with all of us from
the time, the resources, the lives that were lost over a period
of time when we inadequately resourced that war is that
sometimes those short-range decisions really cost you in the
long run. I appreciate the fact that the request is pending and
that the administration has not made a decision on it and is
open to it this fall.
Second, it may sound a little odd, but I want to say a word
on behalf of the Afghan people. There were some questions
raised that I think you've answered well, General Petraeus.
This is a remarkable people, with a remarkable history. I'm not
closing my eyes to any of the problems we have now, but they
have survived a lot in their history. They have a real sense of
nationhood. One might argue in fact that, though there are
Pashtuns and Tajiks there, that the divisions between them are
actually much less than we found in Iraq between the Shias and
the Sunnis and the Kurds. The comparisons are not exact.
As we know and as you know greater than I--two things. One
is their fighters are really committed, most of them. They've
now held an election and the people have showed in great
numbers that they want a better future. Some of the people--a
lot of the people at the top of that government are really
quite impressive.
They seem quite supportive, comparatively speaking, of our
presence there and what we're trying to do for them.
So I understand all the problems, but I think not only do
we have a security interest in how this comes out, ends in
Afghanistan; the people want it to end well. Why wouldn't they?
Look at, every time there's a poll there the Taliban comes out
about at the bottom, lower even than numbers Congress had a
short while ago. That's how bad the Taliban is doing in
Afghanistan.
Okay, now to my question----
Chairman Levin. Your time is up. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. My question is this. I thought the
President spoke very eloquently on Friday about the fact that
there hadn't been adequate civil-military cooperation,
partnership, in Afghanistan, about the need to make that
happen. So I wanted to--and of course, we know during a period
of time, particularly when Ambassador Khalilzad and General
Barno was there, it certainly seemed like their offices were
together. They were working together. The model that you built
in Iraq with Ambassador Crocker.
So what are we doing to try to create that here? I know
some people laugh at plans, but is there a coordinated civil-
military plan being written for the war in Afghanistan?
Ms. Flournoy. I would just say we're working it at multiple
levels. At the sort of operational level, if you will, or the
strategic operational level, General Petraeus and Ambassador
Holbrooke are leading the effort that he mentioned. We will be
tasking our current commander and the new ambassador to put
together a campaign plan that's truly joint at their level.
But even more important or as important, we are engaged in
discussions with Kai Eide, the U.N. representative, and our
allies to try to ensure that we have an overarching sense of
priorities and what we're doing, but that we've really
encouraged Mr. Eide to move the U.N. presence into a provincial
presence, so that province by province we have a much more
coordinated effort on the part of the international community
working hand in hand with the ISAF forces.
So it's complicated, but we're trying to work the problem
at multiple levels that are interconnected.
I don't know if you want to add.
Senator Lieberman. General?
General Petraeus. Well, in fact there was direction already
given to Karl Eikenberry, General Eikenberry right now, who I
think was reported out of committee yesterday. There is every
intention to do just that. In fact, even the new DCM who goes
in may start that process with General McKiernan. It was a
topic that we talked about on Saturday as well.
Senator Lieberman. Excellent, very encouraging. Thank you
all. I will tell you that the three of you, the testimony has
been really excellent, and really the three of you operate at
such a high level that it should give all of us confidence.
Admiral Olson, you were asked a few less questions,
probably inherent in the nature of your covert special
operations. You stayed relatively covert this morning. But I
appreciated your opening statement. You said really quite
directly that the enemy--the behavior of the enemy we're facing
in Afghanistan ranges from malicious to evil, and it's because
I agree with you that I'm so grateful that we have three people
of your caliber leading the effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I think you've heard here this morning a
great deal of support for the President's direction and
strategy. It's cohesive, it's strong, it's clear. Its goals are
important goals. I hope you're all reassured by what you've
heard from this side, but we're reassured from what we heard
from you. Your testimony was very, very helpful. It was
important for the American people that the kind of questions
which were asked be asked. You gave answers which I consider to
be highly reassuring, and we will now stand adjourned with our
thanks.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
afghanistan strategies
1. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, in your testimony, you state,
``our strategic goal is very clear: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al Qaeda and its extremist allies. To do so, we must eliminate their
safe haven in Pakistan and prevent their re-emergence in Afghanistan.''
This statement is clear on the ``what'' that needs to be done, but very
weak on the ``how'' of accomplishing this goal. This and other goals
also seem to be predicated on very tenuous political, diplomatic, and
economic strategies. Does the administration intend to develop tactics
to achieve these strategies that are as rigorous and as urgent as those
developed to achieve military goals?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, our new strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan recognizes the need to increase dramatically our civilian
efforts in Afghanistan and facilitate efforts in Pakistan. As our
strategy stated:
``By increasing civilian capacity we will strengthen the
relationship between the Afghan people and their government. A
dramatic increase in Afghan civilian expertise is needed to
facilitate the development of systems and institutions
particularly at the provincial and local levels, provide basic
infrastructure, and create economic alternatives to the
insurgency at all levels of Afghan society, particularly in
agriculture. The United States should play an important part in
providing that expertise, but responding effectively to
Afghanistan's needs will require that allies, partners, the
U.N. and other international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations significantly increase their involvement in
Afghanistan.''
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead for these
efforts, we strongly support the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and other U.S. departments and
agencies in their political, diplomatic, and economic development
programs within our means and capabilities.
Currently, the administration is examining options to increase the
number of civilians in Afghanistan, as part of our whole-of-government
approach to stabilizing and securing Afghanistan. The DOD will
coordinate closely with other U.S. departments and agencies to support
these efforts.
pakistan strategies
2. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, the United States cannot
currently commit U.S. forces in Afghanistan to attack ``al Qaeda and
its extremist allies'' in their safe havens in Pakistan, where they
plan terrorist attacks and support operations that undermine the
stability of both countries. What is the likelihood of being able to
negotiate access or to get Pakistan to address this threat?
Secretary Flournoy. Pakistan is a sovereign nation that already is
committing more than 100,000 military and paramilitary forces to its
western border regions where they are conducting operations against al
Qaeda and its extremist allies. We are working closely with the
Government of Pakistan to enhance the capability of its security forces
in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The U.S.
Government is engaging with the Government of Pakistan at the highest
levels regarding the existential threat that extremist and insurgent
networks pose to Pakistan. Many of Pakistan's leaders recognize this
threat, but addressing it effectively will require greater Pakistani
will and capability, as well as support from the U.S. and international
partners.
3. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, what is the status of
negotiations?
Secretary Flournoy. The United States is working closely with the
Government of Pakistan to assist it to combat extremists in its
territory. These efforts include train-and-equip programs with the
Pakistani military to enhance its capacity to conduct counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism operations.
4. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, do Pakistani Government and
security forces view the presence of al Qaeda and the Taliban as a
serious threat to their national security?
Secretary Flournoy. Pakistan's efforts and sacrifices to engage
extremist groups--including more than 3,000 security forces killed or
wounded in action since 2001--demonstrate a willingness to engage
extremist groups that pose a threat to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the
Pakistan military continues to view India as its most significant
enemy. The United States is engaging with the Government of Pakistan to
convey our sense of the dire threat Pakistan faces, and is working with
Pakistan's security forces to strengthen their ability to face that
threat.
5. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, according to your testimony,
``Pakistan's ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory and
defeat the terror and insurgent networks within its borders is critical
to its own security and stability. Pakistan faces a severe socio-
economic crisis that enables these extremist groups to flourish and
pose a great threat to this nuclear armed state.'' Describe your
concerns regarding how the political situation in Pakistan might affect
their view of the threat and their willingness to take effective action
against it.
Secretary Flournoy. The United States is committed to empowering
civilian leaders in Pakistan to take effective action against extremist
groups; however, political infighting and instability within Pakistan
are distractions. Strong civilian leadership is needed to address the
threat posed by militant groups and to support the military in taking
decisive action. The United States is very concerned about recent peace
agreements between the Government of Pakistan and militant groups in
Swat and elsewhere, which are a by-product of political weakness.
6. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, you state that initiatives
pursued in the context of a long-term strategic partnership with
Pakistan should be limited if we do not see improvements in Pakistani
performance. If the United States limits those initiatives, however,
what is the impact to efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda and its extremist allies and avoid the further radicalizing of a
nuclear-armed Pakistan?
Secretary Flournoy. It is critical that U.S. assistance to Pakistan
be tied to measures of effectiveness, particularly with regard to
transparency and accountability; however, these measures should be
based on the President's strategy for the region, rather than on
legislation. U.S. provision of additional assistance will require
improved Pakistani performance in transparency and accountability. At
the same time, the United States needs to move away from its past
transactional relationship with Pakistan. We need to develop a
relationship that is based on more than counterterrorism and instead
focuses on the people of Pakistan by providing economic, developmental,
and educational support. Pakistan's growing confidence in the long-term
support of the United States is vital to providing an alternative to
extremists and defeating extremist groups.
afghan national army and afghan national policy
7. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, efforts by the United States
and its allies to build Afghanistan's economy dramatically lag behind
efforts to train and field soldiers and police. Further, many European
nations that have pledged contributions to donor funds have not
satisfied those pledges. What, if anything, is being planned that has
the potential of creating an economy in Afghanistan that is capable of
sustaining the military, police, and civilian bureaucracies?
Secretary Flournoy. The United States is pursuing numerous
initiatives to increase economic growth in Afghanistan within the
framework of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The
ANDS was approved by the Afghan Government in June 2008. It lays out a
long-term vision for the country and specific goals along key lines of
operation (Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and
Economic and Social Development). With time and continued focus and
effort on the part of the United States, the international community,
and the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan economy should reach the
point where it can provide the domestic revenue to support the Afghan
Government, including the security forces. In the meantime, it will be
necessary for the United States and our international partners to
continue our support to Afghanistan.
8. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, is there a unified
international plan to accomplish this goal?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, the United States and the international
community pursue their economic reconstruction initiatives in
Afghanistan under the framework provided in the ANDS.
north atlantic treaty organization
9. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, do the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (U.N.) share the same view
and the same goals in the region?
Secretary Flournoy. We work in full partnership with NATO and the
United Nations as well as regional stakeholders in both organizations.
These partnerships are critical for success. It is important to
distinguish the role of the U.N. in coordinating international civilian
activities from NATO's military role. It is also important to highlight
the need to improve collaboration between U.N. civilian and military
efforts and NATO's efforts. Securing such collaboration among NATO's
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Government in order to implement
an ``integrated approach,'' will improve the focus of collective
efforts and also strengthen synchronized civilian and military efforts
in the country.
10. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, how do their views differ
from those of the United States?
Secretary Flournoy. As the NATO declaration at the April 2009
Summit attests, our Allies largely share our views and objectives with
respect to Afghanistan. However, the United States and its Allies take
on different roles and missions within the larger effort to achieve
those shared objectives. Like the United States, many of our allies and
partners (including the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and
Australia) have demonstrated their willingness and ability to take on
combat missions. Other Allies and partners emphasize peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations, and still others have focused resources on
building Afghan capacity in the security sector and civilian
government. The United States and its allies and partners agree that
each of these areas is a necessary part of a comprehensive civilian-
military strategy.
benchmarks
11. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, as noted by the President in
his speech on this matter, metrics or benchmarks are necessary to
assess performance of efforts. After more than 7 years of committing
``blood and treasure'' in this region, U.S. taxpayers deserve to know
what progress is being made in return for their investment. When can
Congress expect to receive a set of performance metrics from the
administration?
Secretary Flournoy. The administration is working to define
measures of effectiveness to monitor progress towards achieving the
objectives of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The administration will
work with Congress to ensure that our measures of effectiveness are a
useful tool for gauging our progress over time, and enable us to
identify areas where policy and resource adjustments may be needed.
12. Senator Byrd. Secretary Flournoy, will Congress receive regular
reports on progress being made in achieving these metrics?
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, the Department provides Congress a report
on progress in Afghanistan on a semiannual basis titled: Progress
toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Once defined, the
measures of effectiveness will be an integral part of this report.
special operations forces
13. Senator Byrd. Admiral Olson, you state that ``. . . the
situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda's surviving
leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating, and inspiring. The
Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and brutal.'' To
what extent is Special Operations Command (SOCOM) limited in
accomplishing the strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and
defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies in the Swat Valley and
Baluchistan in Pakistan as a result of the inability to commit special
operations forces in this area?
Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Byrd. Admiral Olson, part of your mission in
Afghanistan involves increasing interaction with Pakistan's military
and Frontier Corps forces. What is the nature of that mission?
Admiral Olson. Our enemy is an enemy that knows no boundaries,
borders, and conducts operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In
Pakistan, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducts a variety of
Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Combined Exchange Training events and
counternarcotics training with Pakistan MIL and Pakistan SOF in support
of counterinsurgency operations.
U.S. SOF support is a component of the U.S./Pakistan Security
Development Plan (SDP). SDP is a combined U.S. DOD/Pakistan MoD
security plan coordinated with U.S. Government interagency efforts and
programmed over 5 years. Its main effort is to enhance and expand the
FC, Pakistan Army, and Special Service Group capabilities. U.S. SOF is
the lead U.S. force in this effort.
U.S. SOF overall efforts in Pakistan, especially those training
opportunities with the FC, directly impact and support U.S./ISAF
objectives in Afghanistan.
15. Senator Byrd. Admiral Olson, please provide some examples of
successes.
Admiral Olson. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
new strategy
16. Senator Graham. Secretary Flournoy, the President announced,
and you testified, that this new strategy is designed to defeat al
Qaeda in Pakistan and Iraq. Given that definition, how does this
strategy fit into the global strategy to defeat al Qaeda and who
specifically is the lead for the global strategy to defeat al Qaeda?
Secretary Flournoy. Due to our efforts in Afghanistan, al Qaeda
senior leaders have moved their safe havens into the tribal areas of
Pakistan. The new strategy for the region emphasizes a single theater
construct for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In Afghanistan, our counterinsurgency campaign emphasizes
protecting the population while developing the Afghan National Security
forces and building Afghan governance and economic capacity. These
efforts, in full partnership with the Afghans and our coalition
partners, are designed to defeat the insurgency and to ensure al Qaeda
leadership cannot re-establish a safe haven in that country.
In Pakistan, we must assist the Pakistani Government and security
forces in dealing with the existential threat from al Qaeda and the
insurgents they support or inspire. Strengthening Pakistani will and
capability are central parts of our diplomacy and military assistance.
The Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund and initiatives such
as the Kerry-Lugar legislation are designed to enable the Pakistanis to
defeat al Qaeda in the tribal areas.
Within DOD, U.S. SOCOM has been designated as the military
supported command to plan and synchronize operations to implement the
global strategy to defeat al Qaeda, and the geographic combatant
commands execute the strategy within their respective areas of
responsibility.
At the interagency level, the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) is responsible for conducting strategic operational planning.
The NCTC has developed the National Implementation Plan to combat
terrorism, including plans to defeat al Qaeda.
civilian resources
17. Senator Graham. Secretary Flournoy, you have been quoted in the
press saying that the new Defense budget will include ``a substantial
request for resources on the civilian side'' of the Federal Government.
Can you elaborate on how you will resource Rule of Law efforts and to
what extent that will be part of the civilian resources?
Secretary Flournoy. Assisting foreign governments with
establishing, re-establishing, or strengthening the Rule of Law in
their sovereign territory is often a key component of U.S. Government
stability operations. It is DOD policy, however, that this component of
stability operations is best implemented by other Departments and
Agencies with core competencies and expertise in Rule of Law concepts
and issues. As a result, DOD prefers to support, rather than lead,
whole-of-government approaches to Rule of Law issues, which are
considered part of stability operations and utilize the entire
interagency team. If other Departments and Agencies are unable to lead
these types of efforts, DOD will use its available assets and broad
experience to support U.S. Government national security goals and
objectives. To make the need for DOD to take a leading role less
likely, DOD will continue to advocate for significantly increasing the
capacity of other Departments and Agencies to lead and conduct these
types of operations in an expeditionary environment. The Civilian
Stabilization Initiative (CSI) under development by the Department of
State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
shows promise to provide the whole-of-government stability operations
capability that DOD supports. The CSI includes a Civilian Response
Corps composed of personnel from eight different U.S. Government
civilian departments and agencies and is designed to conduct stability
operations in order to foster foreign nations' self-governance, social
and economic development, and security before, during, or after
conflict. DOD will continue to support the CSI and encourages Congress
to fund the effort fully. Finally, DOD is teamed with the Department of
State and the USAID on mutual policy for Security Sector Reform (SSR).
Although DOD's SSR role is focused on supporting the reform,
restructuring, or re-establishment of a foreign nation's defense
sector, this work is done in coordination with USAID's role in
supporting Rule of Law programs (along with other SSR programs) aimed
at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security
and justice.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
force size
18. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Flournoy, please provide details
regarding what requests were made by U.S. commanders in Afghanistan for
U.S. forces (number and type of forces) from 2002 to the present.
Secretary Flournoy. The decision to deploy U.S. military forces is
a deliberative process, and internal to the DOD. The Department is
unable to share such information in the level of detail requested.
The Secretary of Defense carefully considers the advice and
recommendations of his military commanders, the Joint Staff, and the
Military Departments and Services before making a decision to order the
deployment of U.S. forces.
Most recently, the President and the Secretary approved the
deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), a Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (BCT), a training BCT, special operations forces, and
various enablers that were requested by General David McKiernan. The
approval of these requests was consistent with General McKiernan's
timeline for when these forces were needed. Based on an assessment of
progress in the coming months, the Department will review requirements
for any additional military forces.
19. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Flournoy, were these requests met?
If not, why?
Secretary Flournoy. As stated previously, the Department is unable
to share the details of all requests for forces from 2002 onward. The
President and the Secretary recently approved the deployment of an MEB,
a BCT, a training BCT, Special Operations Forces, and various enablers
that were requested by General David McKiernan. The approval of these
requests was consistent with General McKiernan's timeline for when
these forces were needed. Based on an assessment of progress in the
coming months, the Department will review requirements for any
additional military forces.
20. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Flournoy, what requests currently
exist from U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan for U.S. forces?
Secretary Flournoy. General McKiernan has requested additional
forces for the mission in Afghanistan, including maneuver forces and
headquarters personnel. This request is not for immediate deployment.
The decision on whether or not to meet these requests will be taken at
a later time. When appropriate, the Secretary of Defense will consider
these requests, in consultation with military commanders, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, and the Services.
21. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Flournoy, have these requests been
met? If not, why?
Secretary Flournoy. As stated previously, the request for maneuver
forces and headquarters staff is not for immediate deployment and the
decision on whether or not to meet the requests will be taken at a
later time.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
afghanistan and pakistan economic strategy
22. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, I want to first thank you for
your tremendous leadership and service, and the United States is
fortunate to have you serve in our military. I agree with your
assessment that a contributing factor to insecurity in Pakistan and
Afghanistan was the uneven economic development and lack of employment
opportunities that contribute to the population remaining
``economically disenfranchised, uneducated, and without sufficient
opportunity.'' With some success in Iraq in implanting economic
development strategies to help quell the counter insurgency, how
optimistic are you that an economic strategy in Pakistan and
Afghanistan can be successful?
General Petraeus. There is no question that a sole military
solution does not exist for either Pakistan or Afghanistan; both
require a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.
Pakistan is still recovering from a November 2008 balance of
payments crisis. Its economy is showing signs of progress as a result
of timely assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
IMF recently met with Pakistan officials and was pleased with their
economic performance in meeting benchmarks. That effort won a vote of
confidence from the World Bank. Even small increases of economic
recovery can go a long way in offsetting the challenges that currently
confront the Pakistani Government.
Afghanistan is in the process of making the transition from an
economy dominated by illegal poppy to a legal and more diversified
economy. Frankly, our eradication efforts have not been wholly
effective. In the past year, however, we have seen farmers voluntarily
switch to wheat cultivation based on the increased value of wheat (and
a decline in poppy prices) and on initial alternative livelihood
programs. I think this alternative livelihood program shows some
promise and with the help of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) we can begin to expand it. Taking action with the
USDA while wheat is profitable is an opportunity that doesn't come
around often. There is no doubt that Afghanistan's economic strategy
needs improvement. We are working closely with the Afghan Government to
increase its revenue collection. Our goal is for Afghanistan's
operating budget to be more fiscally sustainable and I believe we are
making progress. Another top economic issue is privatizing the State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The good news is we have strong support from
the Afghan Central Bank and Finance Ministry to improve revenue
collection and privatize the SOEs. The challenge will be in the
sustained execution.
narcotics
23. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, considering that Afghanistan
is one of the biggest narcotic states in the world, is it reasonable to
think that viable agricultural alternatives, improved infrastructure,
and better Afghan law enforcement will be able to realistically move
past their narcotics trade that has been imbedded in their history?
General Petraeus. Prior to the nearly three decades of war and
domestic turmoil, Afghanistan was widely known for its trade in fruits
and nuts and for their rich mineral deposits. In the past 5 years, the
resurgence of the Taliban has been accompanied by a fundamental
increase in the scope of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking.
Improving the quality of the Afghan people's lives through a return to
viable, licit methods of earning a living coupled with access to better
roads and new markets in a secure environment where the rule of law is
uniformly enforced are essential elements for Afghanistan's success.
The United States Government's five-pillar counternarcotics
strategy incorporates all these concepts. The five pillars are a public
information campaign to inform and educate the population about the
dangers of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking; an alternative
development effort to establish economic alternatives to poppy
cultivation; an elimination and eradication program to provide credible
disincentives to growing poppy; an interdiction arm to help the
Government of Afghanistan build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle
drug trafficking operations; and reform Afghan law enforcement and
justice institutions. The United States Special Envoy to Pakistan and
Afghanistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, has initiated a review of
the current strategy to build on lessons learned and rebalance our
efforts in these five strategic areas.
In those areas of Afghanistan where the Afghan Government provides
security, rule of law, and has extended governance, this approach is
working. In north and central Afghanistan where the Afghan Government
is providing some level of security and governance, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime certified 18 poppy-free provinces in 2008.
Their winter opium assessment report also indicates an additional four
provinces in north and central Afghanistan could be poppy free in 2009.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, there is
a clear distinction in Afghanistan between those areas that do not grow
poppy and those that do. Farmers have voluntarily given up poppy
cultivation where effective governance and developmental assistance
exists. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is almost exclusively confined
to seven provinces in the south and southwest. The provinces of
Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daykundi, Zabul, Farah, and Nimruz account
for 98 percent of all poppy grown in Afghanistan. Not coincidentally,
this is the area where the insurgency is strongest.
24. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, what lessons from our efforts
fighting FARC in Columbia do you feel will be useful in our shared
interest of combating the drug trade in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. The foremost lesson learned from Columbia is that
success will take time and patience. Active since the early 1960s, the
FARC began as a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group which transformed into
one of the largest narcoterrorist organizations in the world. United
States Southern Command's recent counterinsurgency conference in
Bogota, Colombia, discussed the Colombian experience and what elements
made it successful. The three elements ascribed as most critical to
success are: counterinsurgency approach containing the elements of
``Clear, Hold, Build''; strategic communications; and a comprehensive,
whole-of-government approach.
A counterinsurgency strategy of ``Clear, Hold, Build'' was critical
to Columbia gradually taking back territory and keeping it under
government control. The U.S. and ISAF-Afghanistan forces employ this
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. It is imperative that when
we push the insurgents and drug traffickers out of an area, we also
bring in those elements of the Afghan Government and other coalition
support to provide some meaningful level of services, security and rule
of law. If this is not done, insurgents and drug traffickers will
return when we leave.
Next, it is important to employ effective strategic communications
to counter the lies and propaganda employed by the insurgents and drug
trafficking organizations. Winning the contest of information and ideas
is paramount to success while always maintaining our values and respect
for the truth. The people must understand the objectives and activities
of the Afghan Government, coalition, and U.S. and believe that these
are in their best interests. The perceptions created by the insurgents
and drug traffickers, if left unchecked, often become reality for the
population. This is an area that must be proactive in and closely
synchronized with ongoing activities as they relate to the U.S.
Government's counternarcotics strategy.
As was done in Columbia, taking a comprehensive government approach
to all activity in Afghanistan requires the United States Government to
leverage best practices to improve agriculture and trade, stimulate
economic development, engender reliable law enforcement, establish rule
of law, develop financial regulation and expand education. The current
U.S. Government's counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan is a
comprehensive approach that leverages the best expertise from:
Department of State for poppy elimination and strategic communications;
USAID assistance with licit trade/livelihood alternatives for the
Afghan people; Drug Enforcement Agency for illicit drug interdiction;
Department of Justice to develop law enforcement and criminal justice
systems; Department of Homeland Security for improved border security;
and DOD assistance in the development of the Afghan security forces.
european allies
25. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, do you think that the
European coalition will be more involved in Pakistan and Afghanistan
both economically and militarily, and what specific, realistic European
involvement should the United States expect from the Europeans?
General Petraeus. European nations have been, and will continue to
be, heavily involved in supporting operations in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan 32 European nations currently contribute troops,
equipment and/or financial aid to the ISAF and 6 European nations are
in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Of the five Regional
Commands in Afghanistan, four are led by European nations.
Seven European nations committed assistance to Pakistan by pledging
$618.4 million in fiscal donor aid at the recent Friends of Democratic
Pakistan and Donors Conference held in Tokyo, Japan. Additionally, the
European Commission pledged $320 million. The Donor's Conference
pledged a total of $5.2 billion in aid over the next 2 years to
Pakistan.
In addition to NATO-led efforts to counter violent extremism and
rebuild the Nation of Afghanistan, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe initiated efforts last year to strengthen their
support. European nations continue to make significant contributions to
Afghanistan via ISAF and donor conferences. As of May 2009, 29 European
nations had pledges of significant contributions for Afghanistan in
many areas including personnel, aircraft, election funding, medical
teams, construction teams and funding for the Afghanistan National
Army. We fully expect these contributions to be fulfilled and/or
maintained so Afghanistan's nation building may continue.
European nations were instrumental in assisting the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan develop the Afghan National
Development Strategy which encompasses long range economic, social, and
governmental development as well as critical reforms in these
disciplines. This strategy will require U.S., European and
international support in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan aid
requests, such as personnel for governance and development programs,
information technology experts, special operations forces and police
trainers are being socialized with the Governments of European nations
via our Department of State. To date, 35 European nations and the
European Union itself have been requested to fill specific economic and
military needs in Afghanistan via the ``Asks List,'' with 29 European
nations having pledged contributions.
israeli conflict
26. Senator Vitter. General Petraeus, a longstanding battle cry for
al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists is that the United States has not
been a true neutral partner in the Arab and Israeli conflict. You
mentioned during your testimony that the United States needs to be
``credible'' in this conflict. Could you please provide your definition
of what ``credible'' means for the United States in the conflict?
General Petraeus. I would define credible as being perceived as a
partner that can be trusted, a partner that is consistently fair and
honest in all relationships with allies and partners. However, we will
work with partners that have different views and function as a
moderator or negotiator in brokering peace and stability in the region.
A major obstacle is the perception of United States credibility in the
region. A recent Saban Center survey of civilians in seven Middle East
nations revealed that the United States is not perceived as a credible,
neutral broker. The worst news out of this survey is that Hezbollah
leadership is perceived more positively than any other leadership in
the Middle East. The President's recent address in Cairo, Egypt has
been well-received, but there is an anticipation in the Middle East
that it be followed up with sustained and substantial actions.
It should come as no surprise that Israel is a close friend and
ally. The United States will remain committed to Israel's security and
simultaneously honor United Nations resolutions to this end. We will
continue to advance the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East
and to move the Israeli-Palestinian parties in the direction of a two-
state solution. However, our adversaries in the region have
successfully parried and marginalized the goodwill of the billions of
dollars that Congress has authorized to support Palestinians needs and
humanitarian requirements. The resulting perception has damaged our
credibility within the Middle East communities. The bottom line is the
United States remains committed to seeking a lasting peace between
Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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