[Senate Hearing 111-198]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-198
THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND CAPABILITIES OF U.S.
MILITARY AIR POWER
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-106 WASHINGTON : 2009
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Airland
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
MARK BEGICH, Alaska RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Current and Future Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of U.S.
Military Air Power
april 30, 2009
Page
Bolkcom, Christopher, Specialist in Military Aviation,
Congressional Research Service................................. 5
Hawley, Gen. Richard E., USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, Air Force
Air Combat Command............................................. 13
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from the State of Florida........ 17
Watts, Barry D., Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments.......................................... 17
(iii)
THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND CAPABILITIES OF U.S.
MILITARY AIR POWER
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THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Hagan,
Begich, Burris, Inhofe, Chambliss, and Thune.
Also present: Senator Bill Nelson.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Paul J. Hubbard,
receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Pablo E. Carrillo, minority
investigative counsel.
Staff assistants present: Mary Holloway and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Michael Harney, assistant to Senator Hagan; David Ramseur,
assistant to Senator Begich; Brady King, assistant to Senator
Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; and Jason Van Beek, assistant
to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Lieberman. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will
come to order.
In this meeting of the Subcommittee on Airland, we're going
to follow on a hearing we held on March 26, in which we talked
about our ground forces. There are two hearings intended to
broadly explore our country's current and future roles,
missions, and requirements for the land- and air-power forces
of our military. Today, we turn our discussion to America's
military air power.
We are now contemplating a number of major decisions that
would affect the organization and capabilities of American
military air power for some time to come. Earlier this month,
April 6, Secretary of Defense Gates announced a series of
recommendations that he would make to President Obama for the
Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Budget, which we'll get in a while.
Those included proposals to end production of the F-22 Raptor
and the C-17 Globemaster, to add funds to procure unmanned
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems,
and to delay the production of a follow-on bomber.
Today, we're privileged to have three informed and
experienced witnesses who I look forward to asking to assess
the recommendations that Secretary Gates made, and, in
particular, to discuss the implications of these
recommendations for the operational capabilities of the air-
power units of our military.
Many of our colleagues here in the Senate, including
myself, have expressed concern about some of the specific
proposals, particularly regarding the F-22, the F/A-18 E/F, and
the next-generation bomber. I believe it's essential that
Congress assess these recommendations against the obvious
reality, which is the immediate budgetary constraints, but also
the less obvious reality, because it's slightly longer
distance, which is the operational requirements for air power
in the years ahead.
I also look forward to hearing from the witnesses an
assessment of the long-term requirements for air power, in this
sense, about how we can better anticipate emerging capabilities
that will affect us in the future. I'm particularly interested
in our witnesses' thoughts about how we should respond to and
anticipate follow-on technologies to the unmanned aerial
systems that are now providing full-motion video surveillance
over the battlefield, something that could not have been
contemplated even a few years ago.
If we look out 10 or 20 years, the composition of our air
forces could be dramatically different than it is today.
Looking to future threats, I'm concerned about the growing
density of anti-access capabilities that are intended to limit
the freedom of maneuver that American air power has enjoyed in
recent times, and I'm concerned about the apparent
vulnerability of U.S. military operations to such threats as
the cyber warriors who attack our computer networks.
In short, I hope this afternoon's discussion will inform
the subcommittee as we go forward, after the President submits
the budget for the Department of Defense (DOD), to make our own
authorization recommendations to the full committee and the
Senate as to how best to invest in capabilities, near-term and
longer-term, that will protect the security of the American
people.
I thank the witnesses for being here. I look forward to
your testimony.
Now, Senator Thune. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this hearing to examine the current and future roles,
missions, and capabilities of U.S. military air power. I want
to thank our esteemed witnesses, as well, for appearing today.
The topic of our hearing today is of the utmost importance to
me.
We're here on the occasion of Secretary of Defense Gates'
April 6, 2009, press conference on recommendations he's making
to the President on the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Budget. I'm a
strong supporter of Secretary Gates and admire his courage to
restructure a number of major defense programs. It's long been
necessary to shift spending away from weapon systems that are
plagued by scheduling and cost overruns to ones that strike the
correct balance between the needs of our deployed forces and
the requirements for meeting the emerging threats of tomorrow.
I also greatly appreciate that Secretary Gates continues to
place the highest priority on supporting the men and women of
the U.S. Armed Forces.
Having said that, I do have some fundamental concerns. One
question I have in terms of military aviation, and from the
standpoint of military necessity, is Secretary Gates' plan on
air power modernization too unbalanced in favor of short-range
fighters versus long-range strike aircraft?
On October 7, 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan started, early combat operations included a mix of
air strikes from land-based B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit, and B-52
Strato fortress bombers, carrier-based F-14 Tomcat, and F/A-18
Hornet fighters and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from both
U.S. and British ships and submarines. During that war, U.S.
aircraft had to operate at far greater distances than they had
in past conflicts. U.S. air power may have to do the same in
future wars.
Furthermore, during the major combat phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, B-1s carrying 24 Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs) provided round-the-clock, on-call, precision-fire
support for coalition ground forces. The integration of JDAM
and laser-guided bombs on long-range bombers has dramatically
increased their effectiveness in conventional operations.
U.S. air forces operating in Asia and the Pacific might
well have to travel several times farther than U.S. forces
typically had to during the Cold War. The need for aircraft
that can loiter over the battlefield for long durations to find
emerging, fleeting, or otherwise time-sensitive targets in
support of ground forces, for example, appears to be growing.
The possibility that, with his proposal, Secretary Gates may
have struck an inappropriate balance in favor of short-range
systems versus long-range strike aircraft is perhaps no better
reflected than in what he wants to do with the next-generation
bomber program.
As part of Secretary Gates' plan to modernize our strategic
and nuclear-force capability, he proposes to discontinue the
development of a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a
better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the
technology, and examine all of our strategic requirements
during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Nuclear
Posture Review, and in light of post-Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) arms-control negotiations.
Aside from the position I laid out just a moment ago, I
have a couple of other questions here. The first is: How does
Secretary Gates reconcile his position on the next-generation
bomber with prior statements he recently made on the military
need to continue that program? Just a few months ago, he wrote
in the Foreign Affairs journal that the U.S. ability to strike
from over the horizon will be at a premium in future conflicts
and will ``require shifts from short-range to long-range
systems, such as the next-generation bomber.'' He made
virtually the same statement during a speech at the National
Defense University, and also in the first-quarter edition of
the Joint Force Quarterly.
Also, as Secretary Gates urged on April 6, there must be a
``better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the
technology.'' The original decision to pursue a next-generation
bomber was already fully vetted in the 2006 QDR. Recognizing
the importance of the evolving strategic requirement for global
strike aircraft based outside the theater, the QDR directed the
U.S. Air Force to field a follow-on to the B-2 by 2018. Until
the 2009 QDR is completed sometime this summer and released
next year, the 2006 document is the only framework we have for
judging how well the military's air-power capabilities meet
national requirements.
Moreover, Secretary Gates' current position on the next-
generation bomber appears undermined by recent statements from
several currently-serving combatant commanders, provided in
response to questions from me, to the effect that it is
important to continue developing that program.
Finally, Secretary Gates' proposal to base decisions on our
current strategic and nuclear-force structure, including the
next-generation bomber and post-START arms-control talks,
appears problematic. While seemingly reasonable on its face,
waiting until a new START is negotiated and ratified by the
Senate could literally take years. Appearing before the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last fall, Secretary
Gates himself expressed concern about how long the original
START negotiations took and what that meant for the follow-on
START about to be negotiated. The lead START negotiator,
likewise, indicated recently that the follow-on treaty could
already be slipping to the right.
Related to my concern on whether Secretary Gates' plan on
air-power modernization may be unbalanced in favor of short-
term fighters versus long-range strike aircraft are questions I
have on his proposal on the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). Under his plans, Secretary Gates is recommending
going from the 14 aircraft bought in fiscal year 2009 to 30 in
fiscal year 2010, with corresponding funding increases from
$6.8 billion to $11.2 billion. The Secretary's proposed
commitment to JSF also requires us to confront serious
questions about that aircraft's high cost and affordability.
The F-35 variants for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
will cost more to procure than the older tactical aircraft each
Service is to replace, and the costs of the F-35 program have
increased 47 percent since 2001, from $65 million to $105
million per aircraft.
To sum up, in terms of military aviation, I, as I'm sure
other members of this subcommittee and the public, have serious
questions about whether we are effectively institutionalizing
and enhancing our capabilities to fight the wars we are in
today and to address the scenarios we are most likely to face
in the future, while hedging against other risks and
contingencies.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today and look forward to the opportunity to ask some
questions.
Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thune, for that very
thoughtful opening statement. I think you framed the questions
very well.
Again, thanks to the witnesses. As is the custom of the
committee, we're going to start with the more-or-less inside
witness, Mr. Bolkcom, a specialist in military aviation at the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), where he conducts
nonpartisan, objective research and analysis for Congress.
Thanks for the work you've done, and we look forward to your
testimony now.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, SPECIALIST IN MILITARY
AVIATION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Bolkcom. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Thune, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thanks for inviting me to speak
with you today about military aviation. As requested, I'll
address DOD's current and projected aviation capabilities and
if they'll ensure that U.S. needs are met.
The only effective way to judge military aviation is in the
context of strategy. What do we want our aviation forces to do?
As you mentioned, sir, on April 6 Secretary Gates stated that
he believes that DOD needs to rebalance its spending to make
military forces more effective against what he calls ``hybrid
warfare,'' a simultaneous spectrum of conventional and
irregular conflict. Fighting terrorists, insurgents, and other
nonstate actors is challenging, and increasing our competence
against threats suggests new tactics and, potentially, new
weapons systems. These weapons systems, in many cases, would
have different capabilities than today's weapons, and their
distinguishing characteristic may be an emphasis on simplicity
and low cost.
Some fear that rebalancing the force toward irregular
warfare will mean reducing DOD's most capable weapon systems,
making us vulnerable to our most proficient adversaries. These
same observers fear that DOD is too focused on the current war
and not sufficiently mindful of the need to sustain
capabilities such as achieving air dominance against modern air
forces. Others embrace Secretary Gates's proposal. They note
that our air forces have dominated every conventional foe that
they've faced over the past 25 years, but have struggled with
irregular warfare. Some argue that the country can't afford
weapon systems we don't need and that our warfighters deserve
weapon systems optimized to the threat that they face.
As a rough blueprint, Secretary Gates suggested that 10
percent of overall defense spending would focus on irregular
warfare, 50 percent on state-on-state conflict, and 40 percent
on what he called ``dual-purpose forces.'' If one were to
rebalance aviation forces, it appears that a different spending
ratio may be in order.
Few aviation assets appear to be unique to irregular
warfare. Very small or nonlethal weapons are perhaps more
germane to irregular than state-on-state conflict. Another
example might be an off-the-shelf lightly-armed turboprop
aircraft. Also, investing in Special Operations forces that
train and advise allied nations on how to better use their air
forces against insurgents is another option.
Boosting irregular capabilities might require 10 percent of
aviation spending. Similarly, there appear to be few aviation
assets unique to state-on-state conflict, and our air power
might be rebalanced by spending 10 percent of the aviation
budget on these assets. Delivering nuclear weapons, prevailing
in aerial combat, and defeating advanced air defenses are
clearly relevant to state-on-state conflict, but have little,
if any, application to irregular warfare.
It would appear feasible to reduce aviation forces unique
to these missions if they were found to be in excess of force
levels dictated by the QDR and other strategy guidance. Savings
from these reductions could be invested in dual-purpose or
counterinsurgency aviation.
Most aviation assets are dual-purpose, and these assets
might consume up to 80 percent of aviation spending. Precision
strike, close air support (CAS), ISR, and airlift are examples
of missions germane to both conventional and irregular warfare.
A review of recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows
that commanders in the field have successfully adapted aircraft
designed for state-on-state conflict to the counterinsurgency
mission.
In conclusion, it appears that the upcoming QDR and
attendant congressional oversight offer an opportunity to
ground our battlefield commanders' adaptations in a coherent
strategy. By considering the projected threat environment and
matching air-power capabilities to national goals, a strategy-
driven process should yield aviation forces that are both
effective and cost-effective.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. It's been a
pleasure to speak with you today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolkcom follows:]
Prepared Statement by Christopher Bolkcom
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for inviting me to speak with you today about military aviation. As
requested, I will address the Department of Defense's (DOD) current and
projected aviation capabilities and whether they will ensure that U.S.
needs are met.
introduction
As a rule, aviation forces are procured and operated as part of a
strategy. Military aircraft are just some of the means, or resources
which DOD employs to achieve its goals. When policymakers ask questions
such as:
Should we buy more bombers?
Is there a fighter gap?
Is DOD aggressive enough in fielding unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs)?
Do we have sufficient long-range cargo and aerial
refueling capability?
the answers should depend entirely on what specific needs military
aviation is projected to meet.
Today, these needs are expressed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Until the 2009 QDR is completed sometime this summer, the
2006 document (and associated strategy guidance) is the only framework
for judging how well DOD's airpower capabilities meet national
requirements. Yet it appears foolish to use the 2006 QDR as a rigid
template, because the 2009 QDR could include new or different national
objectives which would strongly influence military aviation. For
example, one potential change in the 2009 QDR that could strongly
affect judgments on airpower capabilities is the elimination of the
longstanding requirement to successfully fight two simultaneous or
nearly simultaneous major theater wars.\1\ This requirement predates
the QDR process, has been included in every QDR, and has a profound
impact on military aviation force structure.\2\
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\1\ Thom Shanker. ``Pentagon Rethinking Old Doctrine on 2 Wars.''
New York Times. March 15, 2009.
\2\ In 1993, in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin conducted his ``Bottom-Up Review'' of
defense capabilities and found that although the threat from the Soviet
Union had largely abated, the United States still faced noteworthy
military challenges. Among other requirements, the Bottom-Up Review
concluded that DOD must be prepared to defend its Persian Gulf allies
without diminishing its ability to also defend South Korea from a North
Korean attack. When first recommended, the need to prepare for two
simultaneous major theater wars was criticized by many as overly
ambitious and unrealistic. (Andrew Krepinevich. ``Assessing the Bottom-
Up Review.'' Joint Forces Quarterly. Winter 93-94.) Others believed the
two-MTW objective was a rear-guard action to preserve military force
structure at a time when much of the country wished to reduce military
spending to achieve a ``peace dividend.'' (``Financial Realities Drive
Aerospace Consolidation.'' Aviation Week & Space Technology. May 1,
1995.)
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It is difficult, and perhaps not particularly useful to try to
predict all of the 2009 QDR's potential findings. One overarching
trend, however appears to run through a number of high-level DOD
studies and planning documents, and appears highly useful to informing
assessments of DOD's airpower portfolio; namely, the need to rebalance
military acquisition plans to field forces that are as capable against
non-state actors, as they are against conventional foes.
In the spring of 2004, DOD's Strategic Planning Guidance found that
the United States is well positioned to deal with a conventional
military adversary. Increasingly, however, the United States may find
itself facing nonconventional foes, for which it is not well
prepared.\3\
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\3\ ``Building Top-Level Capabilities: A Framework for Strategic
Thinking.'' Briefing to Senior Level Review Group. August 19, 2004.
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The 2006 QDR picked up on this theme. As depicted in Figure 1,
below, the 2006 QDR noted that ``the Department is shifting its
portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and
disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address
traditional challenges.'' \4\
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\4\ 2006 QDR, p. 19.
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[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In a press conference detailing DOD's key recommendations to the
White House on the proposed Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Budget, both
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Gen. James Cartwright emphasized the concept of ``hybrid''
warfare, a mixture of both high-end state-on-state conflict, and
irregular warfare.\5\ DOD's leaders made it clear that they didn't
think in terms of fighting either conventional or irregular warfare but
in terms of addressing a spectrum of simultaneous conflict. Secretary
Gates estimated (admittedly crudely) that up to 40 percent of DOD's
budget would be spent on military forces that are equally pertinent to
irregular and conventional warfare--``dual purpose'' capabilities in
his words. Secretary Gates' and General Cartwright's comments appear to
be completely consistent with the 2006 QDR's findings that DOD must be
positioned to address an increasingly broad array of military
challenges, many of them outside the realm of classic state-on-state
conflict. It is within this context--the balancing of military aviation
to effectively address ``hybrid warfare''--that DOD airpower can be
most effectively assessed.
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\5\ ``DOD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon.''
News Transcript. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs). April 6, 2009.
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the challenges of irregular, non-state actors \6\
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\6\ ``Non-state actors'' is an umbrella term that refers to a
number of armed groups such as political terrorists, narco-traffickers,
paramilitary insurgents, and even international organized criminal
organizations. These terms are not mutually exclusive. Paramilitary
groups can, for example, engage in narco-trafficking, terrorism, and
crime. For example: ``International terrorism is known to be linked
closely with the drug trade and criminal organizations. . .'' (Lt. Gen.
Gennadiy M. Yevstafyev. ``Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Classic and
Terrorist Wars.'' Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol. July 5, 2004. pp. 77-82.)
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Combating non-state actors presents a broad array of challenges to
U.S. military forces. Planners tend to readily grasp the obvious
operational challenges, but shouldn't overlook the need to re-vamp both
tactics and doctrine, and while also being aware of the costs involved.
Operational Challenges
Military planners have a number of tools at their disposal to
attempt to find, identify, track, capture, or kill terrorists,
insurgents and other non-state actors. A survey of counterinsurgency
and anti-terrorism efforts indicates that in general, military aviation
plays a prominent role in performing these tasks. Airpower has proven
very valuable in contemporary (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines)
and historical (e.g., El Salvador) counterinsurgencies. The most
critical missions appear to be persistent surveillance and
reconnaissance, aerial insertion of troops, close air support, combat
search and rescue, medical evacuation, and tactical airlift and
resupply.\7\
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\7\ A more complete treatment of this topic can be found in CRS
Report RL32737.
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Achieving air superiority and attacking military targets on the
ground--missions at which today's aviation forces excel--are also
important to counterinsurgency and other non-state actor operations.
These missions don't however, typically require the high performance
characteristics of the combat aircraft that DOD is currently procuring
and developing. Non-state actors do not have the resources to
effectively challenge even modest air forces. Thus, aircraft best
suited to addressing irregular warfare may emphasize long endurance,
slower speeds, and may often, if not typically, be unmanned.
Compared to the armed forces of a nation state, non-state actors
are relatively easy to defeat in direct combat. Non-state actors
typically lack the equipment, training and discipline that define a
state-based military force. Actually engaging in direct combat with
non-state actors is, however, the core operational challenge. Non-state
actors typically don't wear uniforms. Indeed, they generally strive to
integrate themselves into the local civilian population. Thus, target
identification is very challenging. Non-state actors rarely mass into
easily recognizable formations. They typically lack large
infrastructure or obvious logistics processes. Therefore, non-state
actors present few ``high value'' targets for U.S. forces. This
challenge has not been lost on DOD leadership. For example a former
Commander of Air Force Special Operations notes:
For many years, though, there's been a concern that
intelligence collection capability basically rested in the
ability to find a tank or an artillery piece hiding in a grove
of trees. The problem now becomes how to find individuals
hiding in groups of people. . . This presents a huge problem
for us.\8\
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\8\ Lt. Gen. Michael W. Wooley, Commander, Air Force Special
Operations Command. ``Application of Special Operations Forces in the
Global War on Terror.'' Air & Space Conference 2004. Washington, DC.
September 14, 2004.
The leadership and structure of many non-state organizations are
opaque. Such organizations might be diffuse and operate over long
distances. Al Qaeda, for example, often operates through partner
organizations which might be small and have fluid leadership. One DOD
leader has said ``When we kill or capture one of these leaders, another
one steps in and quickly takes their place.''\9\
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\9\ Ibid.
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Once identified, non-state actors are often difficult to engage due
to concerns over collateral damage. Even conventional state-on-state
conflict presents collateral damage concerns. When one party is
actively trying to shield itself behind noncombatants, however,
delivering weapons with extreme precision and minimum effects takes on
increased importance. A RAND study summed up the operational
challenges:
. . . ferreting out individuals or small groups of
terrorists, positively identifying them, and engaging them
without harming nearby civilians is an extremely demanding
task. Substantial improvements will be needed in several areas
before the Air Force can be confident of being able to provide
this capability to combatant commanders.\10\
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\10\ David Ochmanek. ``Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups
Abroad.'' RAND. 2003.
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Mindset Challenges
Successfully combating non-state actors and irregular warfare will
likely require different training, tactics, doctrine, political
strategies, and potentially rules of engagement, than are optimal for
conventional military warfare. Collectively, these changes may combine
to require a different politico-military mindset for senior
decisionmakers.
The U.S. military, policymakers and the general population, desire
short conflicts, with clear success criteria, exit strategies, and
decisive victories. In a conventional setting, ``victory'' typically
entails an adversary's unconditional surrender. But non-state actors
may define victory as not losing; their continued existence is a
victory. This mindset characterizes several Palestinian terrorist
groups that fought Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. In
most cases, they themselves cannot achieve rapid, decisive victory, so
they follow a strategy of protracted war. According to one scholar ``.
. . insurgent, terrorist and criminal organizations consciously design
themselves so that our military and police forces cannot rapidly and
decisively defeat them.'' \11\ Others note that ``even dying for their
cause intentionally or voluntarily is perceived as a victory (for
terrorists). It's a different paradigm than the traditional military
concern for limiting casualties.'' \12\ This is characteristic of
groups such as Hamas and al Qaeda that employ suicide tactics.
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\11\ Thomas R. Searle. ``Making Airpower Effective against
Guerrillas.'' Air & Space Power Journal. Fall 2004.
\12\ Wooley. Op. cit.
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In a conventional warfare setting, state-based armed forces guided
by the laws of war typically attempt to avoid civilians or shield them
from the war's consequences. When combating non-state actors, however,
civilians may need to be engaged at an unprecedented level. Winning the
``hearts and minds'' of the local population, or at least not
alienating them could become a large part of the overall counter
insurgent, or counter terrorist strategy.
Terrorists and insurgents require at least tacit, if not active,
support from the local population to operate effectively. In the words
of one British general responsible for counterinsurgency operations
``The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble.
The other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us.''
\13\ However, the military activities at which today's Armed Forces
excel, such as precisely destroying buildings or vehicles, may work
counter to this ``hearts and minds'' strategy. According to one study
``counter terrorist military attacks against elusive terrorists may
serve only to radicalize large sectors of the (Muslim) population and
damage the U.S. image worldwide.'' \14\
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\13\ Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner to
Malaya. As cited in David Ochmanek. ``Military Operations Against
Terrorist Groups Abroad.'' RAND. Santa Monica, CA. 2003.
\14\ The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a
Terrorist and Why? A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement by
the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. September 1999.
P.68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Challenges
Almost by definition, non-state actors employ weapons and methods
that are inexpensive, when compared to training, equipping and
employing a military force. However, the cost to defend against non-
state actors, or to combat them, can be high. For example, terrorists
can acquire manportable, air defense systems (MANPADS) for as little as
$5,000. If a terrorist succeeded in shooting down a commercial airliner
with this shoulder-fired missile, the immediate cost of losing the
airplane would be over $100 million, and the indirect costs much
higher. Further, fielding technologies on commercial aircraft to defend
against this threat could cost the United States $10 billion in
acquisition costs alone.\15\ The ``cost-exchange ratio'' of fighting
non-state actors is not in the United States' favor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ A more complete treatment of this topic can be found in CRS
Report RL31741.
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a balancing act
There is a strong consensus in defense circles that airpower is one
of the United States' great military advantages. As mentioned earlier
in this testimony, however, many observers are increasingly concerned
that military aviation is focused too much on the demands of fighting
conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare, and that ``the
challenge for the Air Force is to re-shape its forces to increase their
relevance in small wars, while maintaining the capability to win major
conflicts.'' \16\ In other words, in this view, a balance must be
struck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Thomas McCarthy. National Security for the 21st Century: The
Air Force and Foreign Internal Defense. School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies. Air University. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. June 2004.
p.67. And Thomas R. Searle. ``Making Airpower Effective against
Guerrillas.'' Air & Space Power Journal. Fall 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arguments for maintaining the current focus
Supporters of DOD's current modernization plans--which largely
reflect forces required for state-on-state conflict--say that the F-22,
Joint Strike Fighter, F/A-18E/F, and other ``high-end'' platforms are
still required for state-on-state conflict, despite U.S. preeminence in
this area, and that new concepts of operation, new organizational
schema, or technology upgrades may increase these systems'
applicability to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare challenges.
Those who support DOD's current aviation modernization plans could
argue that fluid threat environments are nothing new. Platforms with
long development timelines and long operational lives often must be
modified and used differently than originally intentioned so as to keep
pace with new threats and military objectives. It is much more
difficult, to take the opposite approach, they could argue. From their
perspective, DOD can't develop technologically less sophisticated
weapons systems to address unconventional threats, and then improve
these systems in the future if more high tech threats arise.
While ``low-tech'' insurgents and other non-state actors appear to
deserve more attention than in the past, the United States shouldn't
slight its traditional military strengths, ``conventional'' aviation
supporters argue. DOD has evolved from a ``threat-based'' to a
``capabilities-based'' planning framework. Threats can change, but the
military capabilities the Nation desires, tend to have a longer life-
span. The ability to achieve air dominance is a key military capability
the U.S. must maintain, supporters of DOD's current aviation plans say,
and the U.S. must be capable of conducting this mission in the most
stressing scenarios; such as a potential conflict with China, for
example. By preparing for the most stressing case, in this view, the
U.S. can more than satisfy lesser included cases, such as air dominance
missions against non-state actors.
Russian SA-10, SA-12, and SA-20 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
(also called ``double digit'' SAMs) are a concern for military planners
due to their mobility, long range, high altitude, advanced missile
guidance, and sensitive radars. The Russian SA-20 has been likened to
the U.S. Patriot PAC-2 missile, but with an even longer range, and a
radar that is very effective in detecting stealthy aircraft. Military
planners are concerned that a country with only a handful of these SAMs
could effectively challenge U.S. military air operations by threatening
aircraft and disrupting operations from great distances. The transfer
of such weapons to countries such as Iran, are particularly
worrisome.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ David A. Fulghum. ``Russia Sells SA-20 to Iran.'' Aviation
Week & Space Technology. December 15, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A variety of new technologies and military systems could exacerbate
the ``double-digit'' SAM challenge. First, commercial information and
communications technologies are enabling adversaries to better network
the elements of their air defense systems. This allows them to disperse
radars, SAM launchers and other associated platforms throughout the
battlespace, and to share targeting information among launchers. This,
in turn, suggests that radars may be used less frequently and for
shorter periods of time, complicating efforts to avoid or suppress
them. Second, terminal defenses are being marketed by a number of
international defense companies. These radar-guided Gatling guns are
designed to protect ``double-digit'' SAMs or other high value air
defense assets. These systems could prove quite effective in shooting
down missiles aimed at enemy air defenses. Third, Russia and other
countries have developed and are selling Global Positioning System
(GPS) jammers. Over varying distances, these low-watt jammers may
degrade the GPS guidance signals used by many U.S. precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) to augment inertial guidance systems, reducing their
accuracy.
If these double-digit SAMs are protected by an enemy air force
equipped with advanced Russian or European combat aircraft, the
military problem becomes dire, say supporters of DOD tactical aviation.
According to press reports, a joint U.S.-Indian Air Force exercise,
called Cope India, illustrates that pilots from non-NATO countries can
receive excellent training and execute advanced air combat tactics.
When flying advanced combat aircraft such as the Russian-designed SU-
30, such well trained pilots could effectively challenge U.S. Air
Forces, some say.
Arguments for Rebalancing
Most would agree that DOD still requires advanced aircraft to deter
and fight tomorrow's potential conventional conflicts. However, many
argue that the efforts and resources expended to develop and produce
these aircraft are not balanced with current and foreseeable
conventional military challenges. The ability to achieve air dominance
is a key capability that DOD must sustain, but against whom? Air
dominance was achieved in about 15 minutes over Afghanistan and Iraq,
some say, and, for the most part, with aircraft designed 30 years ago
(e.g., F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18s).
The stressing air dominance scenario described above may require
some of the aircraft currently being developed by DOD. However, how
many of these scenarios might realistically emerge in the future? Many
would agree that a potential conflict with China could be one such
challenge, but other credible examples are very difficult to imagine.
Those who seek a rebalancing of military aviation argue that the
proliferation of advanced SAMs has not occurred, and will likely not
occur in the future, at the rate predicted by DOD.
Despite being on the market for over 25 years, Russia reportedly
has only managed to transfer double-digit SAMs to six countries
(Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece and Kazakhstan),
three of which were Soviet client states at the time of the sale.
Further, rebalancing advocates would argue, Russia has been threatening
to sell double-digit SAMs to Iran since the early 1990s, in part, to
increase its leverage vis-a-vis the United States in the region. No
deliveries have yet been reported in the open press, and in April 2009,
senior Russian defense officials stated that Russia has not delivered
SA-20s to Tehran.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ ``No S-300 Delivery To Iran'' Moscow Times (as reported by the
Associated Press). April 16, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these weapons are clearly dangerous, they are also expensive,
and require extensive training to operate effectively. This has
arguably slowed the proliferation of these systems, and may also do so
in the future. Russia reportedly attempted but failed to sell SA-10 and
SA-12 SAMs to Chile, Egypt, Hungary, Iran, Kuwait, Serbia, South Korea,
Syria, and Turkey. These countries have opted instead to purchase
either U.S. SAMs, or more modest air defense systems. According to one
well-known missile analyst
Russia has traditionally played a significant role in
worldwide SAM export. But Russian SAM sales have taken a nose
dive since their heyday in the 1970s and 1980s. Particularly
disappointing has been the very small scale of sales of the
expensive high altitude systems like the S-300P and S-300V. The
Russian industries had expected to sell 11 S-300P batteries in
1996-1997, when in fact only about 3 were sold. Aside from
these very modest sales to China and Greece, few other sales
have materialized. Combined with the almost complete collapse
of Russian defense procurement, the firms developing these
systems have been on the brink of bankruptcy in recent
years.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Steven Zaloga. World Missile Briefing. Teal Group. Inc.
Fairfax, VA. February 2008.
Those who wish to rebalance military aviation also argue that the
proliferation of, and threat from advanced combat aircraft is also
overstated. Building, operating, and maintaining a modern air force is
much more expensive and resource intensive than fielding advanced SAMs.
Few countries have the resources and national will to develop and
maintain an air force that could challenge U.S. airpower, they argue.
Some say that advanced Russian and European aircraft being developed
and fielded today may compare well to 30-year old U.S. combat aircraft,
on a one-to-one basis. But aircraft don't fight on a one-to-one basis.
Instead, they are part of a much larger airpower system. This system is
composed, for example, of combat, intelligence, surveillance, airborne
warning and control, aerial refueling, electronic warfare, and mission
control assets. The importance of well trained pilots and maintenance
personnel, which take considerable time and resources to create, cannot
be over emphasized.
No other country has an airpower system on par with the United
States, nor is one predicted to emerge.\20\ Therefore, some argue,
today's DOD's tactical aviation programs can be safely reduced in order
to free up funds to address other military challenges, and thus bring
scarce resources more into balance. The resources saved from these cuts
to DOD's most advanced aviation programs could be used to invest in
capabilities more applicable to combating terrorists and insurgents, or
to conduct homeland defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ In an April 7, 2009, press conference, Secretary Gates
estimated that ``the intelligence that I've gotten indicates that the
first IOC for anything like a fifth-generation fighter in Russia would
be about 2016, and in China would be about 2020.'' CRS has conducted
numerous studies on the implications of advanced Russian and Chinese
fighter aircraft for U.S. forces. See, for example, CRS Report RL30700
for a more comprehensive treatment of this topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion: what might a rebalanced force look like?
Given the challenges of combating non-state actors, and if it were
agreed that aviation forces should be rebalanced toward irregular
warfare, what capabilities might such a force posses? As a rough
blueprint, Secretary Gates suggested that 10 percent of defense
spending would focus on military forces devoted exclusively to
irregular warfare, 50 percent of the budget on forces focused on
conventional warfare, and 40 percent on ``dual capable'' forces.
In the case of aviation forces, the ratio of capabilities in each
warfare domain might be different than Secretary Gates' suggested 10-
50-40 construct. Owing to their inherent flexibility, and the growing
relative importance of sensors, communications and targeting technology
vis-a-vis aeronautical performance, military aircraft can be
effectively used in a number of different roles. Only the most
specialized aviation assets are likely to be unique to a warfighting
domain, and therefore, a more balanced spending on aviation forces may
look more like the classic bell curve depicted in Figure 2 below, with
aviation forces spending apportioned in a 10-80-10 percent ratio.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Uniquely irregular
A brief review of the use of military aviation against non-state
actors suggests that there are few platforms, weapons, or processes
unique to irregular warfare. Very small munitions that minimize the
chance of collateral damage would arguably be more pertinent to
irregular than conventional warfare. Another example would be an off-
the-shelf, lightly armed turbo-prop aircraft for attacking non-state
actors. Such an aircraft is now being studied by the Air Force's Air
Combat Command.\21\ Reducing the number of advanced combat aircraft in
the Service's inventories and replacing them with some number of these
much less expensive aircraft or with armed UAVs could garner
considerable life cycle cost savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Marcus Weisgerber. ``Air Force Funds Study to Determine Light-
Attack Plane Requirement.'' Inside the Air Force. April 3, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the aviation capability most obviously peculiar to
irregular warfare is an advisory one: the mission of training and
counseling allied and partner nations in the employment of their
airpower against insurgents and non-state actors. This mission, called
Aviation-Foreign Internal Defense (A-FID) is performed by a single
squadron in the Air Force Special Operations Command (the 6th Special
Operations Squadron). According to one expert, ``One of the most
important roles that U.S. forces can play in the fight against
terrorist groups is to train, advise, and assist the forces of other
nations in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations.'' \22\
Yet, the 6th Special Operations Squadron is composed of approximately
125 personnel and operates on an annual budget ranging between $2
million and $5 million. Rebalancing DOD aviation capabilities toward a
more robust counter insurgency role may entail expanding and
strengthening DOD's A-FID capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ochmanek. Op Cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uniquely conventional
There also appear to be few aviation resources unique to
conventional, state-on-state conflict. Delivering nuclear weapons,
penetrating and defeating advanced air defenses, and defeating modern
air forces are missions clearly germane to state-on-state conflict. It
would appear feasible to reduce the aviation forces unique to these
missions if they were found to be in excess of force levels dictated by
the QDR and other strategy guidance, and invest the savings in dual
purpose assets or assets optimized for irregular warfare.
Dual Purpose
Most aviation missions that apply to irregular warfare also apply
to state-on-state warfare: close air support, precision strike,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, medical evacuation,
stealthy insertion of troops, just to mention a few. For some missions,
the requirements for irregular warfare are more taxing than the
requirements for state-on-state conflict, and these requirements will
set the standard for aviation capabilities. In other instances, the
mission requirements for conventional warfare will be the most taxing.
A review of recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that
commanders in the field have been successfully adapting and employing
weapon systems designed for state-on-state conflict in their fight
against insurgents and other non-state actors. For example, large,
``strategic'' bombers have conducted close air support missions.
Electronic warfare aircraft such as the EA-6B Prowler and the EC-130
Compass Call have been used to detect and jam improvised explosive
devices. Air superiority fighters, having no enemy to fight, have been
used as mini-Airborne Warning and Control Systems, providing real-time
coordination and assembly of strike packages to attack time-sensitive
targets.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ CRS interviews with Air Force pilots deployed to Iraq. March
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, it appears that an opportunity exists today, through
the upcoming QDR and concomitant congressional oversight, to ground
battlefield innovation, such as described above, in strategy. This
process is designed to match airpower capabilities to meet national
goals in the projected threat environment, and field an aviation force
structure that is both effective and cost-effective.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. It's been my pleasure to
address you today. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Bolkcom. That's a good
beginning.
Now we'll turn to General Richard Hawley, retired from the
U.S. Air Force after serving as commander of the Air Combat
Command. Since retirement, General Hawley has served in a
variety of advisory capacities, including his work in support
of the 2006 QDR.
General, thanks for being here. We look forward to your
testimony now.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD E. HAWLEY, USAF (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE AIR COMBAT COMMAND
General Hawley. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
it's my pleasure to be here, and I look forward to this
discussion of the future roles, missions, and capabilities of
U.S. military air power.
By way of introduction, I am a graduate of the United
States Air Force Academy and Georgetown University. I served on
Active Duty for 35 years, retiring in 1999, as you mentioned,
as commander of Air Combat Command in Hampton, VA. My combat
experience is as a forward air controller for the 4th Infantry
Division in Vietnam, where I learned something about the
application of air power in irregular warfare. I've accumulated
about 1,000 hours in a multi-role, multi-service F-4 Phantom
II, and a like number of hours in the single-service, single-
mission F-15 air superiority fighter, where I learned something
of those competing concepts of fighter design and acquisition.
I've also flown the A-10, C-130, C-141, C-17, B-52, B-1, and B-
2 as a pilot, and I've flown as an observer in most other Air
Force airplanes.
I served for 2 years as the Principal Deputy to the Under
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and, as you
mentioned, in 2005 as a member of the Defense Acquisition
Performance Assessment Project and the DOD Red Team that
supported the QDR.
Since 1999, my perspective has been broadened through work
as an independent consultant, mostly in support of the
aerospace industry and U.S. Joint Forces Command as what they
call a senior concept developer. So, I hope that my testimony
can be helpful to the committee as you consider the President's
proposed budget for 2010.
In my mind, that budget seems to be more noteworthy for
what it probably will not contain than for what it will. It
will not propose funding, as you mentioned, for additional F-22
air superiority fighters or C-17 strategic airlift aircraft,
and it will not propose funding for development of new combat
search-and-rescue or long-range strike capabilities. These
omissions have major ramifications for the future of U.S. air
power, and the first two will be irreversible. Therefore, I
would like to focus these few comments on the proposal to end
production of the F-22 and the C-17, and hope that your
questions will allow me to address the other major issues.
The Air Force is responsible for development of
capabilities to gain and maintain air superiority over the
battlefield and to provide strategic airlift capabilities that
allow our Armed Forces to respond rapidly to global crises. To
fulfill those responsibilities, the Air Force conducts rigorous
analyses to determine the attributes of these aircraft. They
will need to successfully accomplish their missions over their
expected 30- to 40-year service lives.
In the case of the F-22 and C-17, these analyses were
presented to Congress, and, after long and thoughtful debate,
Congress approved funding to develop and subsequently field
these aircraft. Both are without peer in their respective
mission areas, and are the envy of every air force in the world
today.
Having developed these capabilities, the Air Force is then
charged with advising the Secretary of Defense and Congress on
the number required to successfully support our National
Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies.
The Air Force conducts an equally rigorous analysis to
support its conclusions with regard to this important question.
In doing so, it is guided by direction from the Secretary of
Defense concerning the number and nature of the contingencies
for which it must prepare forces for employment by the
combatant commands. Although that guidance evolves as the
threats to our Nation evolve, it has consistently required
forces able to support more than one major regional contingency
while still defending the Homeland and deterring other would-be
aggressors.
As a participant in those analyses regarding the F-22, I
can assure you that the number required to conduct operations
in two major regional contingencies against adversaries who are
capable of contesting our control of the air is 381. That
number is sufficient to equip 10 operational squadrons with 24
aircraft each, along with the supporting training base, test
aircraft, and some attrition reserves.
Others in the Air Force and the Joint Staff have conducted
mobility studies that set the number of C-17s required to
support our defense strategy at 205. But, those studies did not
consider the planned growth in the size of the United States
Army and Marine Corps.
To my knowledge, there is no analysis that would call into
question these requirements for F-22 and C-17 aircraft, but the
recommendation to the President and Congress is to close both
production lines after building just 187 F-22s and 205 C-17s.
The recommendation on the C-17 seems to be based on a dated
analysis of the requirement, and for the F-22 on no analysis
whatsoever. The F-22 recommendation rests on an assertion that
we cannot afford to equip our airmen, on whom we rely to gain
and maintain air superiority, with the best weapons that our
defense industrial base has developed. Rather, we and they are
asked to accept the risk of sending them into the fight with
weapons designed for an entirely different mission. I find that
logic suspect.
Federal outlays in 2010 will be about $3.5 trillion, while
keeping the F-22 and C-17 lines open, so that a closure
decision could be informed by the QDR, and a review of our
national security strategy, would cost less than $4 billion. In
my view, these recommendations, if implemented, will preempt
the full and open debate that should precede any major change
to the force size and construct. A force of 187 F-22s may be
sufficient for one major regional contingency where our control
of the air is contested by a competent adversary, but there
will be no reserve left to help deter an opportunistic
aggressor elsewhere in the world. Should the President and
Congress conclude that our forces should be sized to deal with
only one contingency where our control of the air is contested,
that will be an appropriate time to terminate production of the
F-22. Until then, in my view, the actual requirement is for 381
aircraft, not 187 or even 243.
As to the C-17, I find it difficult to believe that the
requirement can remain stagnant, even as the forces that must
be deployed and sustained grow substantially in number.
Thank you for this opportunity to share my views on these
important issues, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard E. Hawley, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss future roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S.
military air power. By way of introduction, I am a graduate of the
United States Air Force Academy and of Georgetown University. I served
on active duty for 35 years, retiring in 1999 as Commander of Air
Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, VA. My combat
experience is as a forward air controller with the 4th Infantry
Division in the central highlands of Vietnam, where I learned about the
application of airpower in irregular warfare. I accumulated about 1,000
hours in the multi-role, multi-service F-4 Phantom II, and a like
number of hours in the single service, single mission F-15 air
superiority fighter, so I understand the difference between those
competing concepts of fighter design and acquisition. I have flown the
A-10, C-130, C-141, C-17, B-52, B-1 and B-2 as a pilot, and as an
observer in most other aircraft in the Air Force inventory.
I served for 2 years as the principal deputy to the Under Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition and in 2005 as a member of the Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, studying the problems we
face in that area. Also in 2005, I served as a member of a the
Department of Defense Red Team supporting the last Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Since 1999 my perspective has been broadened through work
as an independent consultant, mostly in support of the aerospace
industry and U.S. Joint Forces Command as a Senior Concept Developer. I
hope that my testimony can be helpful to the committee as you consider
the President's proposed defense budget for 2010.
For the subject of this hearing, that budget promises to be more
noteworthy for what it will not contain than for what it does. It will
not propose funding for additional production of F-22 air superiority
fighters or C-17 strategic airlift aircraft, and it will not propose
funding for development of new combat search and rescue or long range
strike aircraft. These omissions have major ramifications for the
future of U.S. airpower, and the first two will be irreversible.
Therefore, I will focus these opening comments on the proposal to
end production of the F-22 and the C-17, and hope that your
questions will allow me to comment on the other issues.
The Air Force is responsible for the development of capabilities to
gain and maintain air superiority over the battlefield, and to provide
strategic airlift capabilities that allow our armed forces to respond
rapidly to global crises. To fulfill those responsibilities, the Air
Force conducts rigorous analyses to determine the attributes these
aircraft will need to successfully accomplish their missions over their
expected 30- to 40-year service lives. In the case of the F-22 and C-
17, those analyses were presented to Congress and, after long and
thoughtful debate, Congress approved funding to develop and
subsequently field these aircraft. Both are without peer in their
respective mission areas and are the envy of every Air Force in the
world today.
Having developed these capabilities, the Air Force is then charged
with advising the Secretary of Defense and Congress on the number
required to successfully support our National Security, National
Defense, and National Military Strategies. The Air Force conducts an
equally rigorous analysis to support its conclusions with regard to
this important question. In doing so, it is guided by direction from
the Secretary of Defense concerning the number and nature of the
contingencies for which it must prepare forces for employment by the
combatant commands. Although that guidance evolves as the threats to
our Nation evolve, it has consistently required forces able to support
more than one major regional contingency at a time while still
defending the homeland and deterring other would be aggressors.
As a participant in those analyses regarding the F-22, I can assure
you that the number of F-22s required to conduct operations in two
major regional contingencies, against adversaries who are capable of
contesting our control of the air, is 381. That number is sufficient to
equip ten operational squadrons with 24 aircraft each, along with the
supporting training base, test aircraft and some attrition reserve.
Others in the Air Force and the joint staff have conducted mobility
studies that set the number of C-17s required to support our defense
strategy at 205, but those studies did not consider the planned growth
in the size of the United States Army and Marine Corps.
To my knowledge, there is no analysis that would call into question
these requirements for F-22 and C-17 aircraft, but the recommendation
to the President and Congress is to close both production lines after
building just 187 F-22s and 205 C-17s. The recommendation on the C-17
seems to be based on a dated analysis of the requirement, and that for
the F-22 on no analysis whatsoever. The F-22 recommendation rests on an
assertion that we cannot afford to equip our airmen, on whom we rely to
gain and maintain air superiority, with the best weapons that our
defense industrial base has developed. Rather, we and they are asked to
accept the risk of sending them into the fight with weapons designed
for an entirely different mission.
I find that logic to be suspect. Federal outlays in 2010 will be
about $3.5 trillion, while keeping the F-22 and C-17 lines open, so a
closure decision could be informed by the QDR and a review of our
national security strategy, would cost less than $4 billion. In my
view, these recommendations, if implemented, will preempt the full and
open debate that should precede any major change to the force sizing
construct. A force of 187 F-22s may be sufficient for 1 major regional
contingency, but there will be no reserve left to help deter an
opportunistic aggressor elsewhere in the world. Should the President
and Congress conclude that our forces should be sized to deal with only
one contingency where our control of the air is contested, that will be
an appropriate time to terminate production of the F-22. Until then,
the actual requirement is for 381 aircraft, not 187 or even 243. As to
the C-17, I find it difficult to believe that the requirement can
remain stagnant even as the forces that must be deployed and sustained
grow substantially in number.
Thank you for this opportunity to share my views on these important
issues. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, General. That's what, in our
world, we tend to call straight talk. I appreciate it, and
we'll have some good questions for you.
Senator Bill Nelson has stopped by, which I appreciate. He
is a member of the full committee, not a member of the
subcommittee, but asked if he could make a statement and leave
some questions. I'm happy to recognize you now.
Senator Bill Nelson. I just have two questions, Mr.
Chairman. I'll leave them with you, and I appreciate your doing
this hearing.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. The bombers, long-range strike
aircraft, fall within the jurisdiction of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, which I have the privilege of chairing, and we're
going to look at this issue of the next-generation bomber and
Secretary Gates' decision to postpone or cancel the goal of a
next-generation bomber by 2018. We're going to look at it in
detail during the course of our Strategic Subcommittee
hearings.
So, thank you for letting me come, and thank you for
letting me submit a couple of questions to you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Nelson. I think you're
technically right about the jurisdiction. Obviously, we may get
into the bomber question here because of the expertise of the
people who are before us.
Let's turn now to Barry Watts, who's a senior fellow at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), and
served in the United States Air Force and as Director of
Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Mr. Watts, thanks for bringing all your experience to the
committee today.
STATEMENT OF BARRY D. WATTS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Watts. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee.
I'm going to focus my remarks on the subject that was just
mentioned, the bomber issue. Perhaps it would be useful to
begin with just a historical observation that speaks to
context.
When the first President Bush, in 1992, shortly after the
end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
made a decision to end B-2 production at 20 airplanes, as best
I can understand the underlying rationale, it was looking at
the platform strictly as a nuclear delivery system; and that's,
indeed, what it and the B-1 and the B-52 had been designed
primarily to do.
The conventional utility of the platform, I don't believe,
was really taken into account, and the jurisdictional division
between the other subcommittee and this one emphasizes the
degree to which bombers tend to fall, conceptually, between the
cracks for us.
The B-1, B-52, and B-2 have never dropped a nuclear weapon
in anger, but they have been used in every war since Vietnam to
deliver conventional munitions. As Senator Thune pointed out,
starting in 1999, when we brought the JDAM onboard the B-2 and
integrated it for the campaign against Serbia, adding
conventional precision to those platforms, it increased their
utility, in the long-term, significantly.
Senator Lieberman. So, let me just clarify what you're
saying. You're saying that the bombers don't have just
strategic value to us, but conventional, as well.
Mr. Watts. We've used them primarily in a conventional role
even though the three that we still have in inventory were
designed exclusively for nuclear roles.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Watts. So, it's a very flexible platform. It has, if
you will, dual utility. We seem to have trouble making
decisions based on both ends of the spectrum, rather than just
one or the other.
Senator Lieberman. So, you're making a case that this
subcommittee actually does have jurisdiction here.
Mr. Watts. I think so, sir, yes. [Laughter.]
You should.
Senator Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Senator Thune. I really like this witness, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Just based on what you said, maybe both
subcommittees have jurisdiction. But, don't spend your time on
that. Go right ahead with your statement.
Mr. Watts. I was just going to go back to the decision to
defer a next-generation bomber, and not just production, but
even development of the platform.
When I was running PA&E back in 2001 and 2002, I tried to
get some traction in the Pentagon for making trades across the
Service boundaries that balanced capabilities, in the very
sense that Secretary Gates is advocating. I must say that, in a
general sense, I can only applaud what he's trying to do, and
perhaps add the comment that I think it's about time somebody
tried to make those kinds of balanced decisions across a lot of
different programs.
With respect to the next-generation bomber, my divergence
of opinion with the Secretary has to do with the rationale that
was stated on April 6, which was that the need, the
requirement, and the technology need to be better understood.
My position, simply put, is we've studied that issue to death
for the last decade--the Air Force, OSD, and everybody else
under the sun--and I think, if you look to a rather stealthy
platform that operates at high altitude, high subsonic mach,
and perhaps is armed, in addition, to give it the survivability
that it might need against advanced air defenses to get in and
out, that the need, the requirement, and the technology are all
pretty much in hand and reasonably well understood. I certainly
can elaborate on all three of those.
With respect to the need, my basic feeling is that this
country, because of its global responsibilities, does need a
credible capability to hold targets at risk anywhere on the
globe. If you give me a platform that has a 2,500- to 3,000-
nautical mile combat radius from the last air refueling, you
indeed can reach any point on the globe.
If future targets happen to be in defended airspace with
advanced air defenses, the only platforms that we have today
that have a serious capability of being able to execute those
missions would be the 20 remaining B-2s. They are getting a
little long in the tooth. They were originally designed back in
the early '80s. Steps have been taken to enhance their
capabilities. But, I think the time is due to look to a new
platform and move ahead.
I just remind you, we actually built 21 B-2s, and we lost 1
on takeoff at Guam last year. That's a reminder of something
that I think we've lost track of in our thinking about
operational requirements. Attrition occurs even in peacetime,
much less in wartime. That suggests that residual 20-airplane
fleet is very thin.
With respect to requirements, I've looked at a number of
conventional scenarios. Most of them emphasize the need for
long reach. For example, you just don't get forward air bases
or you encounter the kind of anti-access-area denial
capabilities that the People's Liberation Army 2nd Artillery
Corps is developing, and those kinds of challenges mean you're
probably going to need much longer range than we have with the
short-range fighters, even with air refueling.
The other requirement that I want to touch on is the need
to deal with time-sensitive targets, targets that are emergent,
that are fleeting, that are only there for a short period of
time. Our adversaries now understand pretty clearly that if the
U.S. forces know where a particular target or aim point is, we
can put a precision weapon on it very quickly and efficiently.
So, the name of the hider-finder game in this context
becomes, over time, the natural thing for our adversaries to do
is to try to deny the precision targeting information to us.
So, a classic example would be a hidden mobile missile
launcher. You really can't find it until it comes out into the
daylight or nighttime, tries to go to a predetermined launch
site, launches its missile, and then runs back to hide and
rearm. That suggests a need to be able to persist inside
defended airspace and wait for those targets to reveal
themselves. That's the core design requirement that I have
gotten to in trying to think about this weapons system.
Lastly, as far as the technology is concerned, I believe
most of it really is in hand. An awful lot of the avionics, the
low observability technology, and things like it, can be found
in the JSF today, in the F-22, and other fifth-generation
platforms that we've been building.
Let me end by just saying I strongly agree with and support
Secretary Gates' repeated pronouncements, up until April 6,
that we need to begin moving more in the direction of long-
range systems and away from short-range systems. But, the
obvious point that I think has to be made is, if we are only
going to be buying JSFs for the foreseeable future, it's hard
for me to understand how we're going to start to make that
shift towards longer-range systems. I think the time is really
here to go ahead with a new long-range strike system of some
sort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Barry D. Watts
introduction
On April 6, 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced eleven
programmatic decisions he planned to recommend to the president for
inclusion in the Pentagon's fiscal year 2010 budget. These decisions
represented an attempt to reshape ``the priorities of America's defense
establishment'' via a ``holistic assessment of capabilities,
requirements, risks and needs.'' Gates' stated goal was to shift the
Defense Department's strategic direction.
Having failed to generate momentum for a similar rebalancing of
priorities across the boundaries of the military Services during my
brief tenure directing the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in
2001-2002, I applaud what Secretary Gates is trying to do. In fact, I
agree with all his programmatic choices save one: the decision not to
pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber at this
time. Even in this case, my disagreement is not over the decision
itself but the reasons given for it. If Secretary Gates had said that
developing a next-generation long-range strike system (LRSS) is simply
unaffordable at this time in light of more pressing needs and
priorities, I would have been inclined to defer to his judgment. But
the rationale Secretary Gates offered was that the Pentagon needed to
wait until there is ``a better understanding of the need, the
requirement, and the technology.'' My view is that the need,
requirement, and technology are all reasonably well understood. Indeed,
all three have been quite clear for some years.
the need
What is the need for a new long-range strike system? Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the United States has
been--and remains--the world's only global military power. At the core
of the U.S. position is the capability to hold at risk, or strike,
targets anywhere on the globe within hours-to-days. Currently, this
capability is widely understood to mean primarily the capacity to do so
with conventional precision munitions. However, it need not be limited
to non-nuclear weapons. While the B-2 has, thankfully, only delivered
conventional weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),
the aircraft also has a nuclear mission.
With regard to conventional long-range strike, the United States
first demonstrated a genuine global reach on January 17, 1991, the
opening night of the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm). As part
of the initial Air Tasking Order for the air campaign, 5 B-52s launched
from Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB) in Louisiana and delivered 35
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles against targets in Iraq.
Since then, the B-2 has demonstrated the same global reach. During
Operation Allied Force in 1999, B-2 bombers, launching from and
recovering at Whiteman AFB, MO, mounted 45 successful sorties against
Serbian targets. These sorties delivered some 1.3 million pounds of
precision munitions, mostly JDAMs.
The other significant change in the utility of the older B-52 and
B-1 since Allied Force in 1999 has come from equipping both bombers
with inexpensive precision munitions. During the major combat phase of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, B-1s carrying 24 JDAMs provided round-the-
clock, on-call precision fire support for coalition ground forces. The
integration of JDAM and even laser-guided bombs (LGBs) on heavy bombers
has dramatically increased their effectiveness in conventional
operations.
However, for targets located deep in enemy territory--meaning more
than 1,000 nautical miles from the last air-to-air refueling--the only
air-breathing strike platforms the United States possesses today with
reach and survivability to have a chance of successfully executing such
missions inside defended airspace are the 20 surviving B-2s. But even
with upgrades to their signatures, how survivable will these 20 B-2s be
in coming decades against advanced air defenses? The B-2, after all,
was designed in the 1980s and achieved initial operational capability
(IOC) over a decade ago. Moreover, the crash of the 21st operational B-
2 during takeoff at Guam in early 2008 is a reminder that attrition can
and does occur even in peacetime.
Global strike is a critical mission for the U.S. military--a
strategic ``business'' in which the United States needs to retain a
credible and dominant capability. Long-range, penetrating strike
systems provide, among other things: a hedge against being unable to
obtain access to forward bases for political reasons; a capacity to
respond quickly to contingencies such as the failure of a nuclear-armed
state; the ability to base outside the reach of emerging adversary
anti-access/area-denial capabilities; and the ability to impose
disproportionate defensive costs on prospective U.S. adversaries, as
the bomber leg of the nuclear triad did on the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. Addressing these needs constituted much of the rationale
behind trying to field a next-generation bomber by 2018. Granted, the
2018 IOC was ambitious. The early or mid-2020s would probably have been
adequate. But to end the 2018 bomber development effort at this time
appears to be a short-sighted decision.
The need to move ahead with a penetrating, follow-on LRSS to the B-
2 has historical roots that reach back to the early 1980s. At White
Sands in 1982, the Assault Breaker program demonstrated the feasibility
of combining wide-area sensors with missile-delivered terminally guided
submunitions to attack tanks and armored fighting vehicles deep in an
enemy army's rear echelons. This demonstration argued that, sooner or
later, military systems exploiting Assault Breaker technologies--
``reconnaissance-strike complexes'' as the Soviets called them--would
be able to dominate large areas from long ranges with precision fires.
This prospect, in turn, posed a long-term challenge to U.S. power
projection capabilities based on short-range strike platforms and
forward bases. In the hands of prospective U.S. adversaries,
reconnaissance-strike complexes offered the possibility of holding at
risk American forward bases such as Kadena AFB on the island of Okinawa
and even carrier battle groups operating in the Western Pacific.
When the Office of Net Assessment's 1992 preliminary assessment of
the late 20th century military-technical revolution--more widely known
as the ``revolution in military affairs''--appeared in 1992, even the
U.S. military could not claim to possess the kinds of reconnaissance-
strike complexes Soviet military theorists had been forecasting since
the 1970s. Today, however, China's 2nd Artillery Corps is developing
area-denial/anti-access capabilities that could compel U.S. power
projection forces to operate from distances of 1,000 nautical miles or
greater from the Chinese mainland. Granted, from the Korean and Vietnam
wars to the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S.
military has been able to rely primarily on in-theater bases and short-
range strike systems to project power in distant overseas theaters.
Looking ahead to the second decade of the 21st century, however, it
seems clear that the era in which the United States could get away with
forward basing for power projection by short-range systems is coming to
a close. As Secretary Gates himself stated in an article in the
January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese military,
among others, is fielding a range of disruptive systems to blunt the
impact of U.S. power, narrow the United States' military options, and
deny the U.S. military freedom of movement and action.
The force-structure implications of these developments for the
United States are also clear. China's growing anti-access/area-denial
capabilities will, as Gates wrote in his Foreign Affairs article, ``put
a premium on the United States' ability to strike from over the horizon
. . . and will require shifts from short-range to longer-range systems,
such as the next-generation bomber.'' Moreover, this article does not
constitute the only occasion when Secretary Gates articulated the need
to shift from short-range to long-range systems. In a speech at the
National Defense University in September 2008, he used virtually the
same language to support the need for a follow-on LRSS. It is
difficult, therefore, to see why, in April 2009, a better understanding
is suddenly needed of a ``need'' that appeared clear as recently as
January is suddenly called for.
The pre-April 2009 Secretary Gates is right. The U.S. military
needs to begin shifting its force structure more in favor of long-range
systems. However, investing exclusively in short-range systems such as
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in the near term is not going to
bring about the needed shift.
the requirement
What would we want a new long-range strike system to do? What would
be its primary mission requirements? In 2008 the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments took another look at these questions. The
resulting report identified six generic scenarios for conventional
operations that a new LRSS should be able to address. Of these six
scenarios, four appear to be the most important in defining the
requirements for a new LRSS. They are:
(1) Situations requiring a sufficient radius of action from
the last air-refueling point to reach targets deep in defended
airspace;
(2) Conflicts in which there is a need to strike targets at
intercontinental distances from the continental United States
because in-theater bases are not available;
(3) Missions requiring the survivability to persist in
defended airspace in order to prosecute emergent and time-
sensitive targets; and
(4) Operations in which U.S. forces must have the radius of
action to be able to operate from beyond the reach of anti-
access/area-denial capabilities.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Barry D. Watts, ``The Case for Long-Range Strike: 21st Century
Scenarios,'' CSBA, 2008, pp. 19-30. This report is available online at
http://www.csbaonline.org, as is CSBA's 2005 report on the same
subject, ``Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and Options.''
The first, second, and fourth of these scenarios emphasize the range or
reach of the platform. For these scenarios a straightforward design
goal would be a combat radius of 2,500 nautical miles from the last air
refueling at altitude in benign airspace.
The third scenario, by contrast, arises from the natural responses
of intelligent adversaries to U.S. precision engagement capabilities.
Since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, American adversaries have become
acutely aware that if U.S. strike platforms can locate a target, they
can hit it with conventional guided rounds such as JDAM or a LGB. The
logical response has been to use hiding, concealment, movement, and
relocation to deny U.S. forces the precise targeting information
weapons like JDAM require--or at least limit the amount of time their
high-value assets would be exposed to American precision fires. A
mobile missile launcher that moves rapidly from a concealed location to
a firing position, launches its missile, and then returns to a hidden
position is a classic example of a time-sensitive or emergent target.
It is this problem that leads to the requirement that the next LRSS be
able to persist or loiter inside defended airspace so as to be nearby
when such targets do expose themselves. Thus, the basic requirements
that a new long-range platform should meet for conventional operations
do not appear to be particularly mysterious. Without the reach and
survivability inherent in the four generic scenarios, one could not
justify the likely costs--at least $15 billion--of developing a new
LRSS.
Additionally, CSBA's 2008 report argued that the platform should
also have some capability for delivering nuclear weapons. The B-52, it
is worth remembering, was designed exclusively for nuclear operations.
Like the B-2, the B-52 has never delivered a nuclear weapon in anger.
Since the late 1960s, however, B-52s have delivered conventional
munitions in every major conflict in which the United States has been
involved. If the next long-range LRSS can meet the range and
survivability requirements for conventional operations outlined above,
there seems no compelling reason to make the platform conventional
only, so long as the costs of hardening against electromagnetic pulse
are kept under control. After all, some electromagnetic hardening of
the platform will be needed in any case. Again, the core need that a
new LRSS must meet is to be able to hold at risk, or strike, targets
anywhere on the globe with whatever weapons the contingency requires.
the technology
How mature are the technologies that would be needed to develop a
new LRSS able to satisfy the generic scenario requirements just
described? If the system is optimized for high-altitude penetration at
high subsonic cruise speeds, the requisite aerodynamic, structural, and
low-observables technologies already exist in B-2 and fifth-generation
fighters such as the F-35. Only the engine technology to achieve both
long range and a supersonic dash capability to avoid being run down by
enemy interceptors is not yet in hand. This vulnerability to enemy
fighters is the main reason why the (now retired) F-117 and B-2 have
operated exclusively at night when inside enemy airspace.
How might this vulnerability be addressed in a new LRSS lacking a
supersonic dash capability? The logical answer is to equip the platform
with advanced air-to-air missiles and the sensors to provide sufficient
situational awareness for the LRSS to be able fight its way into, and
out of, defended airspace. Much of the required sensors and other
avionics already exist in the JSF.
Another major design choice is whether to make a new LRSS manned or
unmanned. Given the current state of the art, one suspects that
situations could arise in which a manned platform would be preferable.
On the one hand, a manned platform would enable strike execution to be
aborted right up to the very last moment. On the other, an important
vulnerability of an unmanned LRSS would be the possibility that
sophisticated adversaries could interfere with the data links used for
oversight and remote control of the platform. Such interference has
not, so far, emerged as a serious problem with intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance platforms such as Predator, Global
Hawk, and Reaper in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, both the Russians
and Chinese are not only well aware of this vulnerability, but have the
technical potential to exploit it themselves or sell the capability to
others. Thus, one would want to think twice about making a new LRSS
exclusively unmanned.
conclusion
The need for a need for a new LRSS has been fairly clear for some
years. Up until April 6 of this year, this need appears to have been
understood by Secretary Gates. Equally clear are the operational
requirements that a follow-on LRSS would need to meet and the maturity
of most of the requisite technologies. As with a new tanker for aerial
refueling, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
have, for one reason or another, been unable to reach a firm decision
to move ahead with a new LRSS for nearly a decade now. This is a
strategic choice that cannot, and should not, be deferred any longer.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Watts. It was very
interesting testimony.
Let's do 7-minute rounds of questioning. A vote may go off
around 2:45 p.m., but if we do it right, I'll ask my questions
and run over and vote, and we'll keep this going.
Mr. Watts, let me ask you to develop the argument for not
agreeing with Secretary Gates to really push off investments in
a long-range strike-plane bomber. Develop, a little bit more,
if you will, as you have somewhat in your testimony, the
argument for what Secretary Gates calls hybrid warfare and give
us a little history for the extent to which the bombers have
been used in hybrid/conventional warfare or as compared to
strategic conflicts.
Mr. Watts. In general, starting with Operation Desert
Storm, you had very small numbers of bombers delivering
proportionately larger amounts of the ordnance. As we've moved
into precision conventional munitions, the weight of the number
of tons of ordnance delivered has become less important than
the number of aim points you could cover. I've had no success
predicting the contingencies that we end up facing as we go
into the future. We've spent a lot of time and energy
projecting future scenarios and future contingencies, but, in
general, long-range platforms, particularly ones with a fair
degree of survivability, are just very flexible things. You can
use them to support ground forces.
This occurred very dramatically in 2003 during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. If you go back and review the 3rd Infantry
Division's after-action report, I think it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the people on the ground loved the
JDAM. It was there, on call, when they needed it, and it
provided the kind of precision fire support that the Army did
not possess at that point in time.
Now, guided Multiple Launch Rocket System and other
precision munitions have finally started to enter the Army's
inventory, so they have their own precision organic indirect-
fire support, in addition to the airplanes. But, the ability of
those B-1s, with 24 JDAMs, to just hang out overhead and drop
on Global Positioning System (GPS) aim points on call was
really important and impressive. That was high-tempo combat
operations, but that capability can be used day-in and day-out,
even in hybrid conflicts.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you to come at this in a
slightly different way. In your testimony you specifically say,
``missions requiring the survivability to persist in defended
airspace in order to prosecute emergent and time-sensitive
targets.'' What new technologies would have to be developed to
make this possible? Are they in reach?
Mr. Watts. I think the sensing technology and the
computational capabilities you would need onboard the platform
are being put into the JSF as we speak. So, I don't think
there's a great stretch, in terms of the technology that would
be required.
If you go back in the history of the JSF, there was a
discussion early on about simply relying on offboard sensing
for finding targets.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Watts. We ended up going in almost the opposite
direction in providing a very sophisticated or all-the-way-
around the airplane sensing capability and advanced
electronically scanned radar, with the underlying computational
capability onboard that airplane and the ability to be able to
upgrade that capability incrementally over time. I think the
technology's here, sir.
Senator Lieberman. If you were writing the defense budget
for next year, understanding that you disagree with the
recommendations of Secretary Gates, what would you put in for
the long-range strike systems for the bombers?
Mr. Watts. An amount of money, sir?
Senator Lieberman. No, that's an unfair question. What
would be your goal? By when would you like us to be able to do
what?
Mr. Watts. The 2018 goal was very ambitious.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Watts. If you stick with the kind of high-subsonic,
high-altitude platform that I've describe, and you run a very
disciplined development program, I think in another 10 to 12
years you ought to be able to reach initial operational
capability. The problems of mission and requirements creep in
the programs are certainly an issue.
One of the alternatives to what I've described, that the
Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
have talked about, would be a hypersonic cruise vehicle, mach 6
to 8. There, you are stretching all kinds of technologies--
material technologies, engine/propulsion technologies--and at
best, people have discussed being able to get there by the
2030s or maybe even as late as 2040. But, if you don't do that
kind of development, if you focus on the kinds of mission
requirements I've described, I think, by the early- to mid-
2020s, you could field something. I have talked to some of the
companies about, ``Tell me how much the development costs for a
very disciplined system might be.'' Most of the voting seems to
be under $10 billion.
Senator Lieberman. Over what period of time?
Mr. Watts. The development period of the airplane would be
8 to 10 years.
Senator Lieberman. That's very interesting. I invite you to
give us more detailed information afterward.
General Hawley, do you have a quick response to this Gates-
Watts debate on the bombers?
General Hawley. Yes, sir. I would share an anecdote that
occurred late in my Active Duty career. I was having a
discussion about bombers with the Commander at Training and
Doctrine Command, my Army colleague across the river, and he
was wondering about their capability to drop these precision-
guided munitions we were then calling JDAMs. I said, ``Bill,
one of these days, bombers are going to be providing CAS to
your troops on the ground.'' It was not long afterward, in
Afghanistan, when bombers were providing CAS to our Army forces
on the ground and to that outfit we called the Northern
Alliance.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Hawley. So, this idea that they're only useful in
strategic contests is very dated. In my view, we've come full
circle. At the beginnings of modern air power in World War II,
bombers were the platforms we used to destroy targets on the
ground and fighters were the things that got them to the target
and back. In between, we went through a period where bombers
couldn't survive against terminal defenses; and so, we used
fighters to get into the target, destroy the target, and then
get out. We've now come full circle. We're at a point where the
primary role for our fighter force should be to get the bombers
to the target, because of the payload advantages that have
already been mentioned, their ability to loiter over the
target. As a fact in Vietnam, the most valuable thing I could
get was time on station from somebody with a bomb because
that's what my forces on the ground needed. They needed the
bomb to come down at the right time and the right place.
Today's bombers can do exactly that. So, they are certainly
high-utility systems across the full spectrum of modern
warfare.
Senator Lieberman. Excellent. Thank you very much.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I might come at that question a slightly different way,
and this would be to Mr. Watts or General Hawley. In your view,
is the present bomber fleet sufficient to hold targets deep in
defended airspace at risk over the next 25 to 30 years? Because
absent a commitment to any kind of a next-generation long-range
strike capability, that's what we're talking about doing.
General Hawley. Senator, I think your question gets to the
heart of the issue that Congress is going to have to wrestle
with as they consider these proposals, which is: What kind of a
future should we prepare our forces for? You cite the timeframe
of 25 or 35 years. That's a long time. As my colleagues have
said, we've never been very successful at predicting what kinds
of engagements we will find ourselves in, 20 or 30 years hence.
In my view, those 20 remaining B-2s are the only part of
the bomber force that is likely to be able to penetrate and do
the job that we expect of this class of weapon systems against
any serious adversary, 20 or 30 years hence.
The challenge for Congress, I think, and for DOD, is to
balance this vision of the future and what kind of adversaries
we may face against the cost to mitigate that risk. That's a
difficult issue. In my view, we are out of balance in the
current proposal, and we are underestimating the seriousness of
the threats that we might face in that timeframe.
Senator Thune. My assumption is that if, in fact, this
decision with regard to the next-generation bomber were to
stand, we would have to do significant upgrades, probably, to
both the B-2 and perhaps the B-1. The Sniper pod that was added
to the B-1 has even improved the targeting and the capability
of that aircraft to provide the CAS that you talked about
earlier to our troops in places like Afghanistan. But, what
kind of investments would you expect to see in all of our
current platforms in light of this announced decision on the
next-generation bomber? What is our alternative plan to upgrade
the existing capabilities that we have? I think what you were
probably getting at is the stealth capability of the B-2. But,
are there things that can be done to the B-2 and the B-1 that
make them capable of survivability into that 25-year timeframe
I mentioned?
General Hawley. Certainly, there are continuing
improvements to the B-2, and my understanding is that Congress
and the Air Force have been together on developing programs to
continue to modernize the B-2 and the B-1. It's not that these
airplanes aren't going to be useful, it's just, will they be
what we need against a very competent adversary? The assumption
that I think is underlying many of these decisions is that
there isn't going to be a really serious adversary out there;
therefore, what we have will be useful in the vast majority of
contingencies that we're likely to face. There are many things
that can be done to make all of those platforms more capable
and more survivable in some set of circumstances.
But, if we, as a Nation, believe that we need to be
prepared for the more difficult challenge of a serious
adversary with well-funded and well-planned forces, then we
need something beyond the current bomber force, and that's the
next-generation bomber that has just been put on hold.
Senator Thune. Do you think the assumption is that the
threat matrix that we face in the future is going to consist
more of a low-end asymmetric type? The assumption underlying
this recommendation, if we are going to have a high-end
conflict/threat out there in the future, would seem to make a
pretty compelling argument for at least the development of this
next capability. So, is your view that the assumption that is
being made is that we aren't going to need that type of
capability because the threat's not going to require it?
General Hawley. Yes, sir. In my view, these decisions
reflect an assumption that anticipates an outcome of a QDR and
a national review of our strategies that forecasts a future in
which we will have few, if any, adversaries who are near peer
or can field near-peer forces.
Senator Thune. How does that square with the well-
documented belief that countries like China are developing more
sophisticated air defense systems? It just seems to me that if
you look out there in the future, and I think most of our
combatant commanders would tell you the same thing, that we're
going to need this long-range strike, because some countries
are developing air defenses that are much more sophisticated
than anything that we've encountered in the past, and the
ability to penetrate those and to have the kind of range and
persistence to loiter over targets seems to be almost a given.
I guess I'm trying to figure out where are the recommendations
coming from, based on what I think most people see over the
horizon.
General Hawley. You probably have access to even better
intelligence than I do on where some of these nations are going
with the forces they're developing. So, let me share a little
experience with you from my past. Vietnam was the theater in
which I was a participant, and I would just remind the
committee that in Vietnam we faced a third-rate adversary
fielding an air force of about 200 airplanes at any given time,
and we lost over 2,200 fixed-wing airplanes in that contest.
If you go into one of these fights unprepared, you are
going to suffer horrendous losses. We suffered horrendous
losses in Vietnam, and we did so because we went into that
fight ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and ill-trained. As a result,
we wound up with a lot of good people who were held as
prisoners of war for a long period of time. My fear is that we
are so confident of a future absent a serious adversary who is
willing to either field those kinds of forces, or sell them to
someone else who we wind up being engaged with, that we'll pay
that kind of price again.
Senator Thune. Mr. Watts, anything to add in that
discussion?
Mr. Watts. To go back to your earlier question, which was,
``Do you think the existing bomber force can be confidently
relied upon to carry us through the next 20 or 30 years?'', my
answer would be no, I don't think so.
Senator Thune. Okay. My time is up, thank you.
Senator Hagan [presiding]. I know we all need to scoot and
vote in a minute, but I did want to ask a question along the
same line. I agree with Secretary Gates' insight to leverage
the capabilities that are conducive to our ever-changing
operational environment; specifically, counterinsurgency
operations, the high- and low-intensity asymmetric warfare, and
the other types of irregular warfare. We need to continue to
augment ground operations with effective air support, unmanned
aerial and ground vehicles, and reconnaissance capabilities
that are flexible to conduct across the full spectrum of
operations.
General Hawley, going forward, what air platforms do you
think are best suited for the operational requirements that
we're talking about, now and in the future?
General Hawley. You need a range of platforms, in my view.
We have always fielded a mix in forces with capabilities to
allow us to accomplish our missions in a variety of scenarios.
We've never had the luxury of saying, ``We're only going to
fight one kind of war.'' So, we've fielded a mix of systems,
and I think we should field a mix of systems, going forward. We
need some that are optimized for that ground fight, Air Force
support of the ground fight, which is the role I played as a
forward air controller in Vietnam. That's the role of the A-10
today. That's what we buy Predator airplanes for, in order to
provide the forces on the ground with that staring view of the
target that has proven so valuable in the current fights. Then
you need another set of capabilities to guard against the war
that you hopefully want to deter.
I would put a high premium on conventional deterrents. I
think we're in a pretty good place today. We've been through
the years when we were threatened with nuclear annihilation. We
are now at a point where no serious country is willing to take
on our military, because of our dominant conventional
capabilities. The only people who can threaten us are
terrorists on the ground with roadside bombs. In my view,
that's a pretty good place to be. I'd like to not reverse our
course and get back to the point where people are willing to
take us on in a conventional fight, because that's the most
expensive kind of fight we can get into.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Watts and Mr. Bolkcom, any thoughts?
Mr. Bolkcom. I agree with the General. We clearly want to
field a range of forces. I want to point out, relative to the
conversation we just had about bombers, I think the important
thing is replacing the capability, augmenting the capability,
sustaining the capability, and not necessarily a particular
platform. We do tend to forget about the Navy in these sorts of
discussions. I don't understand why we aren't seriously looking
at a long-range naval-based airplane. Bombers fly from this
great sanctuary called the United States. Fighters are
vulnerable, as we heard this morning in the full committee, to
this anti-access threat. Certainly, carriers may be vulnerable
as well, but they have the freedom of movement and standoff.
As we think about long-range airplanes, one advantage of a
long-range naval aircraft is a higher sortie generation rate
than flying all the way from the contiguous United States to
combat.
So, I'm not advocating that, but just trying to plant the
seed in your mind as we think about these long-range standoff
anti-access capabilities, it's not necessarily just fighters
versus bombers, but maybe fighters and bombers and carrier-
based aviation.
Mr. Watts. If I could just add to that, Steve Kosiak, one
of my CSBA colleagues, and myself looked at the JSF, in
particular, a few years ago, and with respect to the carrier
version or the carrier variant, it really wasn't going to
extend the legs off the deck of the strike capability by adding
an F-35. Something like that in the Unmanned Combat Air Systems
program looked very attractive to me on the ground, so that if
you could get 1,500 nautical miles out and back, as opposed to
500. That would preserve the value of those large aircraft
carriers and all of the supporting ships that go with it a lot
more than just fielding another short-range fighter that's more
low-observable, certainly, than the FA-18E/F.
So, there are clearly options on the Navy side that could
be very usefully explored.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Hagan.
That worked well. I'll proceed until someone else comes
back.
General Hawley, you made a very strong case against the
recommendations to basically terminate production of the F-22s
and the C-17s. It seemed to me that you were making two big
points. First, is that those recommendations are not supported
by the analysis presented. Second, it would be more advisable
to wait until the QDR was completed before making those
judgments. Go back, if you would, and just spend a little more
time making the case that there's not really analysis that
Secretary Gates presented, at least on April 6, that supports
the termination of the production of the F-22 and C-17.
General Hawley. Yes, sir. As I told you, I participated in
the original analysis that arrived at the 381 figure; 381 is
the number that would equip 10 squadrons with 24 airplanes
each, and it would provide a sufficient force to deploy for 2
nearly simultaneous major contingencies where we faced an
adversary with a significant air-to-air and surface-to-air
capability. That was the threat that we were supposed to plan
for at the time.
Since that time, there have been a lot of studies that
looked at how many F-22s we needed. I know the committee is
aware of many of them. I think the most recent one was done by
W.W. Brown; and I believe that number came out at 260. Clearly,
that's less than my 381 number, but they had different
assumptions. As the Chairman knows, the outcome of any study is
dependent upon the assumptions upon which it was undertaken.
But the lowest number, that I'm aware of, that anyone has
arrived at through serious threat-based analysis is 260, well
in excess of the 187 that we're being asked to accept.
That's why I say there is no analytical underpinning to the
number. As you say, I think it preempts any subsequent analysis
that will be done in support of the QDR, which is just
beginning, for delivery to Congress about this time next year.
So, we're making an irrevocable decision in advance of the
analysis that Congress requires DOD to undertake each 4 years
in order to support our ongoing strategy for the new
administration, and it occurs in advance of what I'm sure will
occur over the next number of months as the new
administration's review of our National Security Strategy and
the supporting National Defense Strategy and National Military
Strategy. To make an irrevocable decision which does not rest
on any known analysis appears to me to be imprudent. It would
be prudent to continue production and give ourselves the option
to make that decision a year hence, when it will be much better
informed by both analysis and a new strategic formulation.
Senator Lieberman. Do you assume, in light of what you've
just said, that the decision on the F-22 and C-17 were really
made for budgetary reasons?
General Hawley. I do think that's a major part of it, that
there was a budget ceiling that people had to live within. Of
course, we've all been part of that drill.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Hawley. I certainly have. But, I do think there's a
little more to it. I think there's also an issue involved in
these escalating prices for all the things we buy, our
acquisition problems, where we have encountered a total failure
to be able to develop and deliver weapon systems on time,
within budget. I think DOD has concluded that, in order to make
the F-35 affordable to three Services, it must be produced in
large quantities, and that every F-22 that we buy is an F-35 or
so that we won't buy, and that that will increase the unit
cost. So I think we're sacrificing operational capability for
acquisition efficiency.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. I have more questions, but I
welcome Senator Chambliss back, and I call on him at this time.
Senator Chambliss. I kind of like that line of questioning
you were on, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. I just was setting it up for you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. General Hawley, what priority would you
give to the ability of the United States Air Force to maintain
air superiority and air dominance for our ground troops?
General Hawley. Given my background, I'm probably biased,
but, in my view, it is the top requirement for the Air Force.
It is the first thing that the Air Force is asked to do for the
Joint Forces Commander. In any contest that we were involved
in, in my Active Duty career or since, the first things that
are required to go forward are air superiority platforms. The
last time we faced an adversary where we thought we might
encounter a serious air-to-air threat, I was in the Pentagon as
the Deputy Director for Operations. The first platforms we sent
forward were F-15s, which were only capable of air superiority.
Why? Because that's what the Joint Forces Commander asked for.
Central Command Commander wanted to make sure that he could
defend his airspace.
So, it is the highest-priority mission that the Air Force
can do for Joint Forces Command.
Senator Chambliss. Has the F-22 been pointed to, over the
last decade, as the next-generation fighter that was going to
allow us to maintain air dominance and air superiority?
General Hawley. People call the F-22 program a Cold War
relic. The program began in 1991, coincident with the first
Gulf War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. DOD and
Congress supported development fielding of this program
throughout the post-Cold War period. It is the platform that
was designed to assure this country's ability to provide air
superiority over any battlefield, and it is the envy of every
air force in the world, at this point in time.
Senator Chambliss. Was not the JSF intended to complement
the F-22, rather than replace the F-22?
General Hawley. I was also involved in the decisions to
design the F-35 and establish its requirements, and that's
exactly right, sir. The F-35 was conceived as a
complementary system to the F-22, with the F-22 providing
the capabilities to ensure that the F-35 could penetrate,
survive, accomplish its mission, and return to base.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Watts, you're a former fighter
pilot. You were PA&E in, I guess, 2000, when you left there?
Mr. Watts. It was 2002, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Excuse me, 2002. That was the point in
time when the F-22 buy was set at 183. Do you know of any
analytical reason that that 183 number was arrived at then, or
was it purely budget-driven?
Mr. Watts. My understanding was that it was purely budget-
driven. The Air Force was essentially told, ``Given the cap on
the program, the total acquisition program, you can produce as
many as you can under that cap.'' Early on, they thought they
were going to get a lot more, up in the 220 range, but it's
turned out to be 187. So, yes, sir, it had nothing to do with
requirements.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
General Hawley, do you know of anything, based upon your
contact with DOD during your years on Active Duty, which I
understand ended around 1999, but you've remained in close
contact with the Pentagon since that time; has there been any
discussion or confirmation, from an analytical standpoint, with
reference to arriving at the military requirement of 183
aircraft, now 187, for the F-22?
General Hawley. No, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Now there appears to be another budget-
driven question about the termination of the line. Is it not
normal to have some analysis for terminating a line, versus
deciding to terminate the line and then do your analysis after
the fact, which appears to be what the Secretary is doing here?
General Hawley. In my experience, when we have terminated a
production line, it has always been the result of some kind of
analysis. Seldom has it been purely a budget-driven decision.
Senator Chambliss. Are you familiar with the Secretary of
the Air Force's continual statement over the last several weeks
and months that the new military requirement for the F-22 is
243?
General Hawley. Yes, I am.
Senator Chambliss. Do you know of any analysis that went
into arriving at that number?
General Hawley. I know that the Air Force arrived at that
number because they thought they could support the current
strategy with 243 airplanes at a moderate risk level, as the
current chief of staff has described, but it provides no
attrition reserve capability. So, over time, that capability
would erode to a high-risk force.
Senator Chambliss. Dr. John Hamre, whom all of you know,
testified this morning in another hearing that with a
contingent of 187 F-22s, by the time you take out planes for
testing, by the time you consider planes that are in depot
maintenance, you're going to wind up with combat-coded
airplanes roughly in the range of 125 to 135. Is that a fair
assessment, General Hawley and Mr. Watts?
General Hawley. The formula for sizing the force is, it
takes about 100 airplanes to field a wing of 72 operational
airplanes, so that's a pretty close number.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. He also said that, over the course
of the next 30 years for which this plane is going to be called
on to give us air superiority and air dominance, we're going to
lose about a plane a year. That's the norm that you can expect.
So, we're looking at, long-term, having somewhere around 100 F-
22s that are going to be combat-coded, that are going to be
expected to fill the role within the air expeditionary units.
What kind of risk is that going to place us in?
General Hawley. In my view, it's a high risk. Given that
that's likely the number, about 100, we must understand that
you never are able to deploy all of those airplanes. In my
experience, you shouldn't expect to be able to have more than
about 75 percent of that force available in a surge basis to
support a combatant commander who faces a serious threat. So,
it's even less than 100.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
Good line of questioning.
Senator Burris, welcome back. Do you want to proceed now?
Senator Burris. Give me a couple of minutes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. I had a few minutes left over, so I'm
going to tide over.
Let me approach this F-22 decision from this point of view.
We've been talking the terms that insiders, people who live
with this, talk about whether this is a wise decision, to
terminate the line, or not. But, I think, in terms of the large
canvas and the broad paintbrush, the explanation given, or at
least heard from Secretary Gates' decision, was put in the
larger context of we have to support the fight we're in. The
fight we're in is irregular, it's a hybrid, we can't do
everything, and we have some pretty good tactical air fighters,
and we have the F-35 coming on. The F-22 isn't really related
to the hybrid fight. Give me your reaction to that. Maybe we'll
start that argument, Mr. Watts. In a sense, we've touched on
it, but I wanted to just clarify and ask you to respond.
Mr. Watts. A comment that has circulated around Washington
about the F-22 is, ``Well, we haven't deployed it in any of the
current fights.''
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Watts. The implication is, that shows that it just is
irrelevant to the current fight. But, I don't think we're
building it to deal with nonexistent air forces in Afghanistan,
for example. I think we're looking further downstream into the
future, at emerging threats. There was an Air Force exercise
called Cope India, a few years back, where we took some of our
better F-15s out there to do some training against the Indians
and discovered that they had taken some older Soviet airplanes,
made some local improvements to them that were very effective,
and they had really trained their pilots up to a very high
level of proficiency. My impression--I'm sure General Hawley
could add to this--was that we were surprised at how good they
turned out to be in that particular exercise. It's those
higher-end problems that I think we ought to be thinking about
and focusing on when we discuss both the F-22 and the F-35.
Senator Lieberman. Is it an investment we are making now
primarily against the rise of a high-end or major peer
competitor like China or a resurgent Russia?
Mr. Watts. The Russians have done an awful lot to
incrementally improve the Flanker over the years, and it's a
fairly formidable adversary, right now, today if you had to
face it.
Senator Lieberman. General Hawley, how about this, fit
the F-22 decision into what seems to be the overview that
Secretary Gates presented us about the budget recommendations
he made.
General Hawley. It's clear that the F-22 isn't going to be
very useful in an irregular-warfare fight.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Hawley. But, while we're in the irregular-warfare
fight, we also need to maintain our deterrent posture to make
sure that somebody doesn't take advantage of our preoccupation
with that fight to threaten our interests elsewhere. That's
where the F-22 comes into play. By the way, the F-22 isn't the
only thing we buy that isn't suitable or tailored to an
irregular fight; there are lots of other things, as well. We
need those things to make sure that we continue to maintain a
credible deterrent posture to keep people from taking advantage
of us when we're preoccupied with situations like Iraq and
Afghanistan.
We are a global power, and we have global interests, and
that means we have global vulnerabilities. These investments in
systems like the F-22, in my view, are investments in
deterrents, just like we invested in our nuclear capabilities
throughout the Cold War that successfully deterred adversaries
from ever attacking us with nuclear weapons or engaging our
interests with nuclear weapons around the globe. It is the same
equation.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Bolkcom, do you want to get into
this?
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir, I'd love to, thank you. I think
that, in terms of the risk question and trying to keep it at a
big-picture level, General Hawley outlined what he sees as an
operational risk of not buying more airplanes. Others share
that view. I think there are a couple other risks, and
actually, Senator Chambliss touched upon one. Another risk is
creating another high-demand/low-density asset. If we have only
100-odd of these airplanes, do they become another very
expensive aircraft to operate and maintain? The Air Force is
trying to avoid small fleets of expensive airplanes.
This morning we heard at the full committee, another risk,
as Dr. Krepinevich sees it, of wasting assets. On the other
side of the equation, do you potentially risk buying more
airplanes that are overdesigned for the threats you face? He
saw that as, potentially, a strategic risk.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hawley, are you also saying that we should not
complete the C-17?
General Hawley. To the contrary, I think that the C-17
requirement, as stated, which is 205 aircraft, may be based on
an outdated analysis. The analysis that came to the 205 number
predates the currently planned expansion of both the Army and
the Marine Corps. I find it hard to believe that, with a far
bigger Army and Marine Corps to deploy and sustain, that
wouldn't affect the outcome of a mobility requirements study;
and hence, the 205 number is probably very conservative.
Senator Burris. I was down at Scott Air Force Base, are you
familiar with that?
General Hawley. I am very familiar with Scott Air Force
Base.
Senator Burris. It was a little, small country town, a
suburb of my hometowns of Centralia and Belleville, IL, just by
way of fun. It was just a little Air Force landing field. I
went down to Scott Air Force Base the other day, and it is a
major development down there. So, were you ever at Central
Command (CENTCOM) down at Scott?
General Hawley. I have visited Scott. I've spent time with
the commanders at Scott. I've also flown the C-17. I took
delivery of a C-17 at Long Beach and flew it to Charleston,
some years ago. It is a marvelous airplane.
Senator Burris. It's a major expansion, Mr. Chairman. We're
so pleased to see what they're doing. General McNabb is down
there as commander for U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),
and, I tell you, I had a great experience in visiting that base
and looking at the expansion that's going on there, and I hope
there's something in the budget to keep Scott up and running. I
haven't seen all of the budget, but we have to make sure that
Air Force operation stays there because that's where all the
sorties have flown from for TRANSCOM, coming out of there.
General Hawley. Right.
Senator Burris. I want to ask a question to Mr. Bolkcom, in
your opinion, should we be using some of our other threats as
baseline for the design or for our defense posture? There is
concern that military aviation is focused too much on the
demand of our fighting conventional forces, is that a problem?
Mr. Bolkcom. Sir, I think that what Secretary Gates is
trying to do is position our current and future military, as he
sees it, against the threat environment, as he sees it. He
makes it clear he sees it as a spectrum of simultaneous threats
that require rebalancing, potentially away from conventional
state-on-state conflict towards more irregular conflicts. So, I
think that is a clear direction by the Secretary.
Senator Burris. Would any of that include this high-tech-
type warfare that we're moving to? Is that where we're headed
now, to a technological warfare arrangement?
Mr. Bolkcom. Sir, I think that's not a bad way of phrasing
it. The proliferation of off-the-shelf commercial technology,
like GPS and cell phones and the like, make unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) accessible, not only to state actors, but also
paramilitary groups like Hamas. As General Hawley pointed out,
we've driven even our state actors away from fighting us force-
on-force, and they're resorting to anti-access sort of threats,
trying to keep us out, which oftentimes might include systems
like you're describing.
Senator Burris. So, are we to start budgeting? Are any of
those requests in this 2010 budget that we're looking at?
Mr. Bolkcom. I think all of us are trying to extrapolate
with very little information, but I think the tea leaves
suggest what Secretary Gates called a rebalancing towards some
of these irregular capabilities.
Senator Burris. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Burris.
We're a little out of order, but, Senator Begich, you've
not had a chance yet, and then we'll go back to Senator Thune.
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If these questions have been answered, I apologize. I'll
start with the refuelers.
There is some discussion of having the air refuelers as
kind of multi-role aircraft; some call it ``floors and doors
and everything else included.'' Can you give me just some
comments on that? Are we overbuilding for those refuelers? In
conjunction with that, under Secretary Gates's proposal, we
will not continue adding to the C-17s; is it wise then to have
these kind of multifaceted facilities, or should we be doing
the C-17s and have a more streamlined refueler? These are some
of the multiple questions around those issues. I'll look to the
General and Mr. Bolkcom and Mr. Watts, in that order, if you
don't mind.
General Hawley. Our refuelers have always had multiple
capabilities. They've been able to evacuate medical patients,
and they've been able to carry pilots. To my knowledge, the Air
Force has never paid a lot for those capabilities; they're
relatively modest add-ons to an airplane that is configured and
designed to be a refueler. They're valuable capabilities,
they're very useful in some circumstances, and they can augment
the airlift capabilities that our primary designed airlifters,
like the C-17 and the C-5, give to us.
If we constrain our airlift force to 205 C-17s, augmented
by the surviving C-5s that are going to be modified, then these
multi-role capabilities of the new tanker, if we ever get a new
tanker, will probably prove to be very valuable.
The challenge for our airlift operators has always been to
figure out the operational concept to use the tankers' multi-
role capabilities for those medical evacuation or airlift
purposes. But, the current commander at Scott says that they're
working on that, they know how to do it, and they want these
tankers to have those multi-role capabilities so that they'll
be there to augment their airlift capability.
Senator Begich. But it shouldn't be a substitute for C-17s.
General Hawley. It is not envisioned to be a substitute; it
is strictly a complement, a reserve capability, if you will,
when you're operating in extremis, and your C-17 and C-5
capabilities are completely committed elsewhere.
Senator Begich. Okay.
Mr. Bolkcom. I'd echo almost everything I just heard. They
are different platforms. The C-17 and C-5 provide an outsize/
oversize carrying capability for oddly shaped, large things we
need, like helicopters or small artillery pieces, or even a
tank. There's no way anything else is going to carry that but
the C-17 or the C-5. So, our aerial refueling capabilities
provide a great augment, as the General just mentioned. I think
it's on the order of about 3 percent of our organic million-
ton-mile-per-day capability, so it's a twofer, and it makes
sense.
One thing I just want to point out, and I think the General
made this point, about expanding the Army and the Marine Corps,
and how that could put increasing stress on our C-17 force. I
think that makes a lot of intuitive sense, except I would like
to point out that I don't think the purpose of increasing our
ground forces is because we want to deploy more of them faster,
but to relieve the personnel tempo by creating a larger pool of
these foot soldiers who need to deploy. So, I don't think the
operations plans have changed. I don't think that we are
planning now, because of the growth of the Marines and the
Army, to get them there faster. But, that might be something
worth looking into.
Senator Begich. Thank you.
Mr. Watts, do you have anything to add to this?
Mr. Watts. The only comment I'll make is Jim Roche, who was
Secretary of the Air Force from 2001 into early 2005, is a
former colleague and a long-time friend, and, while he was
Secretary of the Air Force, one of his recurring nightmares
was, ``What if I have to ground the C-135 fleet or the KC-135
fleet?'' All the Services depend on that air-refueling
capability. So, I guess I'm less concerned with the additional
capabilities you might get with those platforms than the fact
that, over the last decade, we have not started recapitalizing
the tanker fleet. I really just think that's an important
issue.
Senator Begich. On the issue of the refuelers and the whole
idea of split purchasing; any feedback that you want to give on
that?
I'll start with Mr. Bolkcom, because he looked anxious, it
was like a test; he pulled out his pen, he's already writing
the answer. So, you're first.
Mr. Bolkcom. Thank you, Senator.
The administration has been pretty consistent that they're
against a split buy. The argument against a split buy is that
it costs more money upfront. You may get savings down the road
through competition. But, you definitely will incur more
operations and support costs by fielding a heterogeneous fleet
with two different kinds of airplanes.
I have heard some interesting arguments for a split buy.
One, of course, is potentially an industrial-base issue.
Senator Begich. You mean in preserving the industrial base?
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Okay.
Mr. Bolkcom. I think maybe an argument with a little more
traction is that, ``Well, if you're in a hurry, you can have
two lines running and procure them faster that way.'' CRS
doesn't take a position, of course, but those are some of the
arguments.
Senator Begich. The arguments.
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. General?
General Hawley. We've operated a multiple number of tankers
for a long time in the strategic role. We have the KC-10 and
the KC-135. The Air Force's tanker plan is to eventually repeat
that. They envision this current round of competition to fill
the kind of medium-sized tanker with a subsequent buy, later
on, of another kind of tanker, which would do the KC-10 end of
that mission. So, there are multiples already. Most of these
things are maintained under contract or logistics support, so I
don't think the argument that they're going to cost more to
support holds a lot of water, because mostly we just use the
existing support capabilities that these things are capable of
in their commercial variants. Both of them have commercial
variants.
To me, the argument for a split buy is merely, ``Hey, we
need to get on with this.'' There seems to be a political
obstacle to getting a tanker in the field, and this would allow
us to get past that political obstruction and begin to build
anything, the warfighter needs these things, and they need them
now. Our tankers are 50 years old. They'll be 75 or 80 years
old before we get to retire them, even if we start building a
tanker today.
The downside of a split buy is that it requires you to fund
two lines of production over a long period of time, and that's
a lot of money each year, because there's a minimum production
quantity. That would require a commitment from DOD and Congress
to maintain that kind of funding support to buy 25 up to maybe
30 tankers a year in order to maintain the 2 production lines.
I think that would be the biggest challenge.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
I've run out of time, but if you have a very quick comment?
Mr. Watts. No, sir.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Thanks for your
answers.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Thune, back to you.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask a little bit about fighters. In a limited
defense budget, would buying more quantities of legacy
aircraft, such as your F/A-18s, F-15s, and F-16s help mitigate
a strike fighter shortfall in our tactical aviation wings?
General Hawley. As you might expect, during my time on
Active Duty, particularly as Air Combat Command Commander, we
examined that a lot. I think, if we had addressed this question
10 or 15 years ago, the answer might be yes. Today, I think
it's no. We're too far down the road. The F-35 is going to be a
great airplane for all three Services. I think it would be a
serious mistake to undercut that program by trying to fill
holes in the forest today with legacy airplanes.
Senator Thune. They're retiring F-16s already, though, and
they're going to be retiring them at an accelerated rate, here
in the next few years. F-35s are probably not going to be
rolling out soon enough to replace those, and we have lots of
installations out there that are going to be probably missing a
mission for a while until the F-35s are there to replace the F-
16s. I guess that was the context of my question; does that, in
your view, not make sense to have that kind of bridge between
the current technology and the legacy aircraft in the next
generation with the F-35?
General Hawley. In my view, the problem is that when you
buy one of these airplanes, you're going to have it for 30
years, maybe 40. It's a very long-term commitment. If we buy
three or four or five or six squadrons of these things, that
means they're going to be in the force in 2050. I don't think
they're the right airplanes to have in the force in 2050.
Senator Thune. Mr. Bolkcom?
Mr. Bolkcom. Sir, I understand the Air Force and the Navy's
calculations for their projected fighter gap. I'll point out
that it's based on some assumptions. One assumption is that we
continue the current utilization rate of the fighter force.
That may or may not come to pass. Another assumption is that
the UAVs that we're buying in large numbers now aren't included
in that mix, when they've mixed those numbers. If one does
believe that Reapers and Predators provide some air-to-ground
capability that would otherwise be provided by fighters,
perhaps the gap would be a little less.
That said, I agree with what the General said about the
length of time in the fleet. I'll just point out that the
fighters we fly today tend not to have active electronically
scanned array (AESA) radars, joint helmet-mounted queuing
systems, and some of the latest-generation countermeasures.
Certainly, adding those to some already very good platforms
would increase capabilities.
Senator Thune. Digressing, for a moment, to the next-
generation bomber; I had an extensive discussion with General
Hawley about that but Mr. Watts, you've written extensively on
that subject, about the need to develop a long-range strike
capability. If I could get you to give your take on the
direction that the President wants to take on that next
generation bomber capability. You mentioned that you didn't
think that the current generation of bombers could fill that
25-year timeframe we talked about earlier. But, maybe just your
view of why they are coming to the conclusions and making the
assumptions they are about delaying the development of this new
aircraft.
Mr. Watts. My impression is that there is still
considerable disagreement about whether to go forward,
particularly within portions of OSD. If I think back about a
lot of the studies that have been done over the last decade,
there seems to be, on the part of some involved in thinking
through what you might really wish to develop and procure, a
tendency to get mesmerized by technology promises further out
on the horizon.
My focus, to go back to the beginning, is that those 20
platforms you have left--the B-2 force--it's just hard for me
to believe that those are going to satisfy, in the long-term,
our requirements to be able to hold targets at risk, even in
defended airspace, over the next 2 to 3 decades.
You did touch on the issue of things that could be done to
improve the existing platforms. I would just add, in the case
of the B-2, the computational capability onboard the airplane
is something that's been debated back and forth, and that would
really provide a significant increase in the capability of that
airplane. The processors that were originally put into the
airplane were basically 286 IBM processors. If you had a 286
laptop and took it to your local lending library, and asked
them if they wanted it, they wouldn't, because it won't even
run Windows. So, that kind of a capability, which you do see in
the JSF is one of the paths in which you could really improve
the utility of that platform, going forward, if you wished.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank the panel for their great testimony.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune.
I have a couple more questions, and if my colleagues,
Senator Begich or Senator Burris, want to, we can go until
about 4 o'clock.
As I indicated briefly in my opening statement, one of the
more important developments in recent years has been the demand
for and capability to provide persistent full-motion video
surveillance to ground commanders from the air. It's quite
remarkable. Some of those systems have not even completed the
normal research and development cycles, although that's
happened before, remembering the contribution that fielding the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) made in
the first Persian Gulf War, even though that technology had not
yet fully completed development at the time it as pressed into
service.
I wanted to ask you, are there broader implications from
these technological developments for the contribution of
aviation to irregular warfare? Related to that, are there
systems that you think we should be developing and fielding
that would take greater advantage of the ability to
persistently see the battlefield?
General Hawley?
General Hawley. You mentioned JSTARS. In addition to full-
motion video being of great value in the theater, we're also
finding, more and more, that the forces on the ground really
appreciate the ground-moving-target indicator capability and
the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability, the high-
resolution SAR that some of these airborne radars, like the
JSTARS, can provide. They're of great value, both in the
realtime application and in the forensic analysis of the
product as they try to track down some of these bomb layers
back to their lairs so that they can get the bombmaker rather
than just the bombplanter. Those capabilities are
extraordinarily valuable to the forces on the ground.
One thing we could do is continue to modernize these wide-
area surveillance platforms, the JSTARS being the primary one
in our inventory today, although the Navy has some very capable
platforms, as well, with upgraded radars and sensors,
communications, and that onboard computational power that Barry
mentioned for the B-2, because these modern radars, the AESA
radars that are now available, form the heart of the F-22 and
the F-35. Those same technologies hold great promise to provide
enhanced capability for our forces on the ground in these areas
of high-resolution SAR, not only for the take that provides,
both the ground-moving target indicator and the radar pictures
that they provide, but also the ability to increase and gain
leverage from these other systems that look at a much smaller
area, like the Predator, because you can provide that broader
situational awareness so that they can be better targeted.
So, that is an area where I think we could focus.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Mr. Bolkcom, do you want get into that one?
Mr. Bolkcom. Thank you, sir.
The one thing I'd like to add is, over time, in
conventional state-on-state conflict, we have seen some
friction between the Army and the Air Force over some aviation
capabilities. CAS is one area where there has been some
friction. What I see is, when we need to engage these nonstate
actors, irregular forces, oftentimes the observe, orient,
decide, and act loop is very tight and compressed. I see the
Army moving pretty aggressively towards fielding their own UAVs
that are organic to their small units, that they can control,
and that they can use all the time; they don't have to wait for
an air tasking order. I don't know yet how much encroachment or
friction we'll see with the Air Force, who likes to control
some of the larger UAVs, but I see that a potential area where
Congress might want to keep an eye on that.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Watts?
Mr. Watts. I certainly support what General Hawley said on
the growing utility of these systems. It really does hinge
increasingly on, for example, AESA radars and things of that
sort, and the ability to pull the information into central
command-and-control facilities so you can really integrate it.
We have come a long way over the last decades. Indeed, the
use of UAVs for surveillance and persistent reconnaissance is
really one of the areas in which you could argue Dr.
Krepinevich's revolution in military affairs. The Services
really have gone forward fairly smartly and done what needed to
be done.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. We were talking earlier about
how you can't predict what the next generation of conflict is
going to be; where the enemy's going to be, or the nature of
conflict. But, obviously it was not so long ago, in the 1990s,
when some people were saying that all we needed was air power
to win wars, right? I know that none of you, at this table,
would say that. It was an overstatement. Now, of course,
there's a danger that people will say, ``Oh, this is all boots-
on-the-ground.'' But the truth is that it really is joint
warfighting.
I can tell you, just having heard your answer to this last
question, General, a couple of us went down to visit General
Petraeus in Tampa, CENTCOM, just for a whole review of his area
of responsibility. He went back and showed us a fascinating
diagram of the battle for Sadr City and the different elements
that were involved; U.S. ground forces, Iraqi ground forces. It
was quite fascinating to see. Overhead, there was the JSTARS
aircraft, and there were some drones there, too, that played a
very critical role in a remarkably diverse series of assets
that achieved a great victory for us.
So, I don't know if you want to comment on that.
General Hawley. Well, it is. It wasn't just Fallujah, but
it's increasing since Fallujah, the ground forces' reliance on
these systems, because it gives them the thing that, as a
fighter pilot, I craved most, which was situational awareness.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Hawley. It's hard to appreciate how valuable it is
to know what's going on around you.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Hawley. These systems give those troops on the
ground the ability to have situational awareness about what's
going around, who's moving where, and in the forensic sense,
who moved where, so that they can then go do their job better
on the ground and eliminate some of these threats to the
civilian populations that we're trying to protect, and to our
own forces.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
I agree. I think, too, probably one of the more prominent
conclusions today, and I think you made the case well, is the
role of the long-range strike forces in irregular warfare,
larger than most people would intuitively think. Then, of
course, this tremendous role of ISR on aircraft in the
irregular wars that we're fighting now.
Senator Begich, that's all that I have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
one other area. Let me make sure I do this right.
I'm going to have to flip back and forth between the
report, Mr. Bolkcom, that you had prepared and determined that
it's the Joint Striker Fighter, the F136 alternative engine.
I'm a new member, so I don't know if I'm enjoying the reading
or finding it interesting, but in this one I'm trying to figure
out on the F135, which is the replacement that's been selected
by DOD, from your review, is that engine capable of doing
everything we need, as the replacement? Then it's going to lead
to a couple more questions, so I want to kind of prepare you.
So, keep that answer simple so I can go to the next.
Mr. Bolkcom. The answer is yes.
Senator Begich. Okay. Thank you.
Now, I'm going to lay out what I think I understand of the
facts, and correct me if I'm wrong, then again it leads to
questions. The F136, back in 1996 or 1997, Congress said, ``We
want to have an alternative, we want to have some
competition.'' They funded some development, over $2.5 billion.
DOD's never been a big fan of that, but it's been in there to
create another alternative. Now DOD has made the decision that
we're going with the F135, but we've now invested in this
alternative. Is it fair to say that when you add alternatives
or you have competition like this, of two engines that have the
capacity to do the job, isn't it going to drive down the price?
What was Congress's original purpose in 1996? Wasn't that part
of it?
Mr. Bolkcom. Yes, sir. There's a number of arguments for
the engine. One is the idea that if the fleet is grounded
because of a problem with one engine, you have another. That
may or may not be a strong argument, in one's mind. But the
economic argument has to be the dominating one. You hope, over
time, you will recoup the savings of your upfront investment.
There's been a number of analyses done about how many engines
we're going to buy and how much the upfront investment is going
to be, how much we're going to save through this competition,
and all these thing depend on exactly how we couch the
competition. Is it just for procurement only, or, as in the
Great Engine War, as they call it, do you also compete the
operations and support contracts?
So, a lot of it has to do with how you orchestrate this
competition.
Senator Begich. What's the predominant future utilization
of which engine type by the Europeans and our allies?
Mr. Bolkcom. I don't know if I can answer that
authoritatively. I believe, as the only engine that's part of
the program of record, they plan on acquiring the F135.
Senator Begich. I'm interested in what they're planning
now, but what they're really planning into the future.
These are my words, so you can acknowledge them or just
ignore them, but the way I read this is, Congress set a course
of competition; DOD didn't do it. They did all the money for
planning. They basically said to Congress, ``We're doing that.
We're doing that research.'' But, at the end of the day, they
stuck with the F135 without even competing the development of
it or the building of it. Is that how I read your report, or am
I missing something?
Mr. Bolkcom. No, sir. I think that's exactly the rub. I
think it's the law that they fund this airplane with funds that
are appropriated, and they have not requested that money over
the last couple of fiscal years.
Senator Begich. Okay.
I'll leave it at that, only to say thank you. It's a very
interesting read, and I guess, Mr. Chairman, that's one before
my time. You were here in those years, and I'm just thinking it
seems that, at some point, the competition would make so much
sense, especially on a simple engine design. I say simple, and
it's not simple. But, I mean in the sense that it's an engine,
especially when Congress gave direction, not just 1 year,
because they authorized money throughout the process. It's not
just a 1-year quirk; it's a multiple-year desire by Congress.
It just seems odd that they would just ignore that and do what
they want to do.
So, I'll just leave that. But, I appreciate the
information. This is very good information for me. Thank you
very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Thank you, gentlemen. I want to mention that Senator Bill
Nelson came in and he left two questions. One, we really
covered, which is a comment on your current state of technology
maturity, need, and requirement for long-range bombers. Second,
he talks about the fact that bomber aircraft are the only
recallable nuclear capability. Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles when
launched, cannot be recalled, and he wanted a comment on that
issue, and, generally, your views on maintaining a nuclear-
capable bomber.
If it's okay with you, I think we'll submit that formally
to you, General Hawley and Mr. Watts, and ask for a short
statement, in writing, which we'll add to the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Hawley. The concept of a nuclear deterrent force based on a
triad of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers has been one of
the most enduring and successful strategies ever developed for our
Nation's defense. When combined in a balanced way, the unique
characteristics of each leg of this deterrent triad make it nearly
impossible for any adversary to launch a nuclear attack on the United
States without suffering from a disabling retaliatory strike. The
manned bomber contributes several unique capabilities to this triad,
one of which is the ability to be recalled after launch. Bombers can
also be placed on various levels of alert, to include airborne alert,
an attribute that proved of enormous value during diplomatic
confrontations with the former Soviet Union. Bombers are also able to
locate and attack mobile or movable targets, an attribute that may be
of growing importance when dealing with emerging threats such as those
posed by a nuclear armed Iran or North Korea. Department of Defense
proposals regarding development of a next-generation bomber are likely
to be heavily influenced by the outcome of strategic arms limitation
discussions with Russia. Should those discussions result in a
significant reduction in our nuclear warhead inventories, there may be
no requirement for a nuclear delivery capability in a next-generation
bomber, so long as the B-2 continues to be sustained and modernized.
Mr. Watts. The most obvious situation would be nuclear strike.
ICBMs and SLBMs are not recallable, whereas with a manned bomber the
President could call off the strike within the last few minutes. The
additional time that would be provided for a change of mind is, of
course, limited. For an ICBM it would be a maximum of 20-25 minutes.
But in the latest Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments bomber
paper, I argued that these few minutes might be psychologically
desirable even if the extra decision time they might buy the President
is actually quite limited.
A related observation is that senior military leaders are still
reluctant to unleash armed robots in the battlespace. That's why the
Air Force insisted on adding a data link to the Low Cost Autonomous
Attack System, which was a small lethal unmanned aerial vehicles that
used laser radar to identify targets and attack them on its own with a
conventional warhead within a limited area (roughly 50 to 100 square
kilometers depending on the range to the search area). The idea of a
robotic bomber flying around with a nuclear weapon will probably be
even more discomforting and unacceptable to both military and civilian
leaders. These reservations are cultural and psychological, but they
are real nevertheless.
In the case of an unmanned long-range strike system (LRSS) carrying
conventional precision weapons, a data link enabling human operators to
tell the system whether or not to attack a given target would be highly
desirable. Naturally, a lot of sensor information from the platform
would have to be available before the human could make a go/no-go
decision. Therefore, even this modest step beyond Predator. Reaper, et
cetera, would involve vulnerabilities inherent in the data links
between the remote operator and the vehicle. On the other hand, there
would be no pilots lost if an unmanned LRSS happened to be shot down.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you very much. It's been a very
helpful hearing, from the subcommittee's point of view. As I
said at the outset, I think it will inform our work here on the
authorization bill.
We'll leave the record of the hearing open for 10 days for
additional statements that you may want to submit to the record
and any questions that any other members of the committee have.
You've done us a real service today, and I thank you for
that.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
f-22 and c-17 production
1. Senator Chambliss. General Hawley, you comment in your written
statement that, ``Should the President and Congress conclude that our
forces should be sized to deal with only one contingency where our
control of the air is contested, that will be an appropriate time to
terminate production of the F-22. Until then, the actual requirement is
for 381 aircraft, not 187 or even 243.'' Do you agree that both F-22
and C-17 production should be continued until the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) properly analyzes the future requirement for these
systems, in light of our national security and military strategy?
General Hawley. In my view, ending production of the F-22 and C-17,
when coupled with recommendations to terminate programs to modernize
our long-range strike and combat search and rescue capabilities, and to
cancel the second airborne laser development aircraft, represent a
major change to our national defense strategy. Such major strategic
shifts have historically occurred only after a vigorous public debate
and with concurrence of Congress in execution of its oversight
responsibilities. These decisions do not appear to have been informed
by any public debate. Instead, they are the product of deliberations
conducted entirely within the Department of Defense (DOD) by a small
group of senior officials sworn to secrecy. Notably absent were those
senior military officers currently responsible for executing the
affected missions. Moreover, we should not expect the pending QDR to
produce an objective analysis Congress can use to judge the wisdom of
these changes. It will, after all, be guided by the very same officials
who developed the recommendations you are discussing. Therefore, I hope
Congress will seek a much broader range of opinion and analysis than
that produced by the QDR as it considers these issues.
While some of the changes being contemplated could be reversed in
time, the option to fully secure our ability to provide air superiority
and strategic mobility will vanish when the F-22 and C-17 production
lines are shut down. Therefore, it seems prudent to extend production
of both systems until Congress and the public have had an opportunity
to debate the wisdom of these de facto changes to our national defense
strategy.
unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms
2. Senator Chambliss. General Hawley and Mr. Watts, there is a real
and growing concern that hostile air space could deny access to our
manned and unmanned airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. As we saw in Georgia recently and as is
the case in numerous other countries, air defenses are robust enough to
preclude the use of non-stealth unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Even
against older surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and 3rd and 4th generation
fighters which most all developed nations possess--as well as some
undeveloped nations--most every UAV we have in the inventory is
completely vulnerable. Now and for at least the next several years,
only the F-22 has the ability to ensure access to this type of airspace
and allow our UAVs to operate freely. Both the fiscal year 2009
supplemental and proposed fiscal year 2010 budget request contain
additional funds for UAVs and manned ISR platforms on the order of
billions of dollars. Of the platforms that these budgets would procure,
none of them will be full-fledged stealth platforms comparable to the
stealth capability of the F-22 and F-35.
In your judgment, does the ``UAV surge'' that Secretary Gates is
recommending we undertake make sense given that these systems may very
likely be denied access to key locations outside of our ongoing
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and how does this inform the need
for 5th generation stealth fighter aircraft to ensure access for our
manned and unmanned airborne ISR platforms?
General Hawley. I fully support DOD's proposals to improve our
ability to provide surveillance and reconnaissance of the battlefields.
In fact, they probably do not go far enough in some areas, such as
modernization of our Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS). But as you point out, none of these systems that have proven
so critical to the success of our forces on the ground can operate
effectively against even modest air defenses. That is why production of
the F-22 should not be terminated until Congress has had an opportunity
to examine the implications for our defense strategy and accepts the
assumption that we will not be tested by more than one adversary
capable of seriously contesting our control of the air. In examining
that assumption, I hope Congress will recall our experience in Vietnam,
where we lost more than 2,200 fixed wing aircraft to a fairly modest
deployment of surface-to-air and air-to-air defenses.
Mr. Watts. The current inventory of wide-area, high-end ISR
platforms--primarily Predator, Global Hawk, and Reaper--are not
particularly stealthy platforms. So far as I know, none of the three
just mentioned incorporate low-observables technologies. Consequently,
they are quite vulnerable to modern SAM systems such as the Russian S-
300 and S-400 SAMs. If the United States hopes to be able to operate
these kinds of ISR systems inside airspace defended by current and
future SAMs, there are two options.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
First, we could begin moving toward stealthy unmanned ISR
platforms. Northrop Grumman claims that its X-47B drone (pictured
above) will begin initial flight tests in the fall of 2009. In other
words, DOD is already developing low-observable UAVs. A possible action
for Congress in this regard would be to accelerate fielding these sorts
of ISR platforms. In the long run, it seems likely that the United
States will need to pursue these kinds of ISR platforms in any event.
Second, one could consider using F-22s--or later, F-22s and F-35s--
to eliminate advanced SAMs, thereby enabling U.S. forces to employ non-
stealthy UAVs such as Predator and Global Hawk in enemy airspace, or to
operate manned ISR platforms such as JSTARS close enough to enemy
targets to be useful. My sense is that the appetites of the combatant
commanders for more ISR is insatiable. They will always want more than
they have. Hence, Secretary Gates' ``UAV surge.'' But to use a
temporary, hypothetical ``window of vulnerability'' for non-stealthy
UAVs as an argument for buying more F-22s strikes me as a weak argument
given the ongoing development of UAVs like the X-47B. Frankly, given
all the other priorities, I am inclined to argue that the most sensible
response would be to fully fund programs like the X-47B and ensure that
the Navy presses ahead with the Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS)
program. UCAS would provide the Navy's carriers with a survivable ISR
platform having much longer legs than F/A-18E/Fs, thereby beginning to
address emerging anti-access/area-denial systems aimed at holding U.S.
carrier battle groups at arms' length. So I would recommend patience
rather than trying to solve the vulnerabilities of current ISR UAVs in
the fiscal year 2010 defense budget.
[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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