[Senate Hearing 111-166]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-166
THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 22, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
EVAN BAYH, Indiana, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
MARK UDALL, Colorado JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces
april 22, 2009
Page
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief Of Staff, United States
Army........................................................... 5
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, United States
Marine Corps................................................... 8
(iii)
THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Evan Bayh
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bayh, Udall, Burris,
Inhofe, Thune, and Burr.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker,
security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Peter K. Levine, general
counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, research
assistant; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; David
M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Jon Davey, assistant
to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall;
Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Chris
Joyner, assistant to Senator Burr.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EVAN BAYH, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bayh. Good morning, everybody. The hearing will
please come to order. I'm going to have a brief opening
statement, Senator Burr; then I'll turn to you; and, Senator
Burris, then to you. I understand Senator Udall may be on the
way, and we'll then turn to him.
Gentlemen, I know you have prepared statements, but we'd
love to hear you summarize them in some oral testimony, and
then we'll get to some questions and some answers.
The purpose of today's hearing is to address the growing
strain placed upon our Army and Marine Corps. We will receive
testimony on the current readiness of ground forces with
respect to deployed, deploying, and nondeployed units. We will
also discuss the Army and the Marine Corps' ability to meet the
combatant commander's requirements and to respond to unforeseen
contingencies.
We are particularly interested in your assessment of the
risks resulting from the continued commitment of combat forces
to Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the subcommittee will be
interested to know your views of the current and projected
readiness reporting system used by the Department of Defense
(DOD).
Over the last several years, we have observed total force
readiness decline as a result of combat operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. While our soldiers
and marines continue to showcase their training and valor, the
overall readiness of the Army and Marine Corps has steadily
decreased. Generally, this comes at the expense of our
nondeployed units.
My concern is that in order to fully resource deploying
units, we have chosen to cannibalize our forces at home and
thus face an increased risk of being unable to respond to the
full spectrum of global challenges, including potential
domestic crises. Our current strategy is unsustainable and, if
not properly addressed, we face added risks and serious long-
term implications for our Army and Marine Corps.
Additionally, we must shift away from a strategy that
prioritizes reset only with supplemental funding. It is our
shared responsibility to restore our Army and Marine Corps so
that they can effectively and efficiently meet current and
future threats.
This morning we welcome General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, and General James F. Amos,
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Gentlemen, I sincerely thank you both for your dedicated
service to our country. I thank you for your time in attending
our hearing today. I know that it took some time and
preparation on both your parts and your staffs' parts, so I
want to thank you for that. We look forward to receiving your
testimony. I also want to thank you both for your courtesy in
meeting with me and offering to meet with me before the
hearing, and I look forward to having a very productive
relationship with both of you.
Having said that, Senator Burr, I'll turn the mike over to
you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR
Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me express how I
look forward to working with you on this subcommittee and on
the Armed Services Committee, as do the other members. I thank
you for your hospitality and generosity so far. I think we'll
carry this show on the road some and maybe get out across the
country, and maybe to some of the North Carolina installations
that we take great pride in.
Let me welcome both Generals today.
Senator Bayh. If you feed us, Senator, we will come.
Senator Burr. We will feed you to where you probably won't
be able to leave.
Senator Bayh. Very good. You're going to test our lift
capacity, is that right?
Senator Burr. I do want to thank our witnesses for not only
being here today, but for their dedication and, more
importantly, their service to their country.
Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee held a hearing last year on
the same subject of current unit readiness. At the time, we had
a full range of combat units and support personnel totaling
165,000 engaged throughout Iraq. We had committed to a strategy
of a surge of forces to clear, hold, and build in cities and
towns, to restore a safe environment and prevent a civil war.
At the same time, we were training Iraqi security forces so
they could assume responsibility for the protection and
security of their countrymen against terrorists.
During that time we were working with our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization partners in Afghanistan to bring security
to the eastern provinces and increasing U.S. forces to over
32,000 to respond to an increasingly violent insurgency that
was spreading to other parts of the country. At the time, the
senior American commander in Afghanistan was requesting
additional forces within a year to meet the emerging threats
and Congress was asking military leaders if they had the
available combat units to meet that request. General Cody, then
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, testified before this
subcommittee: ``The current demand for forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply.''
Since then much has changed and yet certain factors remain
the same. The most positive change has been the vastly improved
security environment in Iraq, as a result of the success of the
surge and the rising competency of Iraqi security forces. This
success has given our leaders the ability and flexibility to
begin to responsibly draw down U.S. forces in Iraq, turning
over security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces
under the terms of a new agreement with Iraq that seeks a
peaceful transition without threat to stability to the country.
Because of the security and stability in Iraq, we have
decided to commit additional resources in Afghanistan. The
President recently announced an additional deployment of 21,000
Army soldiers and U.S. marines within the next 8 months. As we
speak, the 82nd Airborne Division out of Fort Bragg, NC, is
assuming command at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan for the next
year, and in the southern part of the country elements of North
Carolina's U.S. marines out of Camp Lejeune will be taking up
the point to conduct operations against the Taliban.
Congress faces critical decisions in the coming months on
emergency supplemental appropriations and fiscal year 2010
defense spending. We cannot afford to delay emergency
supplemental appropriations needed to support that expanded
operation in Afghanistan, the drawdown of forces in Iraq, and
the reset of combat units back home.
Furthermore, we cannot afford to cash our check on success
prematurely by reducing the funds available in the readiness of
our forces. We must remember that our military forces continue
to struggle to restore the balance in long-term readiness
across a full spectrum of threats. In order to respond to their
mission requirements, they need personnel who are ready, with
adequate training, and have combat-ready equipment. They also
need a robust investment in new equipment over the next 5 years
to fully reset combat units with the best available technology
and systems.
I look forward to an update from our witnesses on efforts
initiated last year to improve the readiness of our nondeployed
forces, including the decision in January 2007 to increase the
number of combat ground forces in the Army and the Marine
Corps. In the next 3 years the availability of additional
forces will add time between deployments to allow for full
spectrum training for mission-essential tasks and more time
spent with families, which we all know is lacking.
Another area of interest is our witnesses' plans for the
transfer of units directly from Iraq to Afghanistan, especially
what's being done to ensure that personnel receive adequate
training, intelligence, and equipment for their new area of
responsibility. Given the strain on equipment in recent years,
I'm also interested to know their services' investment strategy
to re-equip forces and to restore prepositioned stocks to
levels required by our operational plans.
Mr. Chairman, I once again thank you for this hearing, and
I thank our witnesses for being here.
Senator Bayh. Senator Burr, thanks to you and to your staff
members. I look forward to working with you to ensure that our
Armed Forces have the equipment, the training, and the troop
strength to carry out the important mission of protecting
America's national security interests. I'm grateful for your
devotion to achieving that result.
Senator Burris, we would welcome any opening comments you
might have.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have very
limited opening comments. I want to thank you and Senator Burr
as ranking member for being a part of this subcommittee. I just
want to thank our military personnel for all that they do for
us. I will have a few questions.
I want all the military personnel to hear this statement:
We are able to do what we do in America because of what you do
across the world for our protection. Just keep that in mind. We
appreciate your commitment and your effort and your dedication
to making us the strongest country in the world.
Every time I see one of you guys, whether you're a private
or a four-star general, I salute each and every one of you. God
bless you, and I'll have some questions for the witnesses
during the question period, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Burris. I believe we all
embrace your sentiments of pride in our Armed Forces. I think
you have someone who's a native of Illinois on General
Chiarelli's staff, so he has very capable staff with him here
today.
Gentlemen, thank you. We look forward to hearing from you.
I think, just to recap, we all recognize the strain that's been
placed upon your brave soldiers by the duration and the pace of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps the changing
nature of the threats that face our Armed Forces. We're here to
make sure you have the tools to get the job done.
So we look forward to hearing from both of you. We will
enter your written statements in the record, so feel free, if
you so desire, to summarize. We are interested in what you have
to say.
General Chiarelli, we'll start with you.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Chiarelli. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Burr, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee: I thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current
readiness of U.S. ground forces. This is my first occasion to
appear before this esteemed subcommittee and I pledge to always
provide you with an honest and forthright assessment and my
best military advice as requested.
I've submitted a statement for the record and I look
forward to answering your questions at the conclusion of my
opening remarks. As you are aware, President Obama is preparing
to submit his fiscal year 2010 defense budget to Congress.
Earlier this month, Secretary Gates outlined key
recommendations and projected changes specific to Army programs
and organizational structure, and I expect you have related
questions. However, I believe it would be premature for me to
provide much of the details ahead of our President, our
Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff of the
Army General George Casey. It would also be inappropriate for
me to speculate on past or future decisions. Given these
constraints, I will respond to your inquiries to the best of my
ability and take the remaining questions for the record.
As all of you know, it's been a busy time for our Nation's
military. We are at war, and we've been at war for the past 7-
plus years. During this period, demand has continued to grow
and the Army's level of responsibility has expanded
considerably. At the same time, our forces became smaller in
terms of the number of available personnel. The combined effect
has been increased deployments, shorter dwell-time, and
insufficient recovery times for our soldiers, their families,
and our equipment.
Today, as has been previously reported to this
subcommittee, the Army remains out of balance. We continue to
be consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and
overall we are consuming our readiness as fast as we are
building it. Unfortunately, the Army cannot influence demand
and the current level does not appear likely to improve
significantly for the foreseeable future.
In order to meet the demand, we are currently staffing many
of the critical functions by reassigning authorizations and
personnel from within our ranks. My concern is we cannot fully
predict what the derivative effects of these decisions will be
in the future.
These are challenging times for our Nation and for our
military, and although, with the support of Congress, we have
deployed the best manned, best equipped, best trained and led
forces in the history of the United States Army, it is my
personal opinion that we simply cannot continue to meet the
current demand, expand our agility and focus, and sustain the
force, including soldiers and equipment, without making some
corresponding adjustments.
I assure the members of this subcommittee that is what the
Army's senior leaders are focused on right now. We are working
these issues and determining the needs of our Army for the
future, and we will continue to coordinate with senior DOD
officials and Congress to identify both short- and long-term
solutions.
Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you again for
your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to
the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and
their families. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, USA
Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Burr, distinguished members of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services. I thank you for the opportunity to
appear here today to provide a status on the current readiness of U.S.
ground forces. This is my first occasion to appear before this esteemed
committee, and I pledge to always provide you with an honest and
forthright assessment.
On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren and our Chief
of Staff, General George Casey, I would also like to take this
opportunity to thank you for your continued, strong support and
demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians, and family
members.
Recently, Secretary Gates publicly presented key decisions that he
will recommend to President Obama with respect to the fiscal year 2010
defense budget. Many of these recommendations concern programs that
have a direct impact on readiness; and, I'm sure you have many relevant
questions. Once the President's budget is released, the Army's senior
leaders will address all of these issues. In the meantime, I will do my
best to answer your questions on the current state of Army readiness
within the limitations imposed by the current budget process. I
apologize in advance for any inconvenience.
As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation's
military. We have been at war for the past 7-plus years, which has
undeniably put a strain on our people and equipment. We have had our
share of good and bad experiences; and, we are continually making
adjustments and improvements to our tactics, training, and equipment
based upon lessons learned.
However, since the very beginning, this war has been in many ways
different and more complex than past wars. We are dealing with less
clearly defined and highly savvy adversaries in two theaters. In order
to remain dominant, we have had to simultaneously and swiftly adapt our
doctrine and organizational structure to effectively span the breadth
of operational environments. It's all part of a changing strategy we
refer to in the Army as ``Full Spectrum Operations.''
Unlike the Army of previous generations--that had essentially a
single mission focus of ground warfare--today's Force has many more
specialized capabilities and a much broader mission span. The
centerpiece of our efforts is a shift to a modular construct focused at
the brigade level. We have also expanded our capability by adding Civil
Affairs, MPs, Special Forces, and other enablers.
This ongoing transformation has greatly enhanced the Army's ability
to respond to any situation, quickly and effectively. However, reaching
this point has not been easy, particularly for a tired and stretched
force. The degree of impact continues to vary, for example, between
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), ``enablers,'' the Reserve components, and
individual soldiers.
The 15 combat brigades in theater understandably get the bulk of
the attention, but when you look across the total Army today, the
number of brigades committed is actually much higher. We have six
National Guard brigades assigned to security forces; one brigade in
Korea; one in Kosovo Force; one committed to the Transition Team
Mission; one serving as the Global Response Force; one tied up as the
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive
(CBRNE) Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF); two tied up in
Relief in Place/Transition of Authority, the approximately 40-day
period when the incoming/outgoing units are either enroute to/from
theater or onsite conducting battle hand-off; and, one battalion
serving in the Sinai.
Additionally, among all the components, there are approximately
30,000+ soldiers that are currently unavailable ( 9,500 are assigned to
Warrior Transition Units (WTUs); 2,300 are assigned as cadre or health
care providers at WTUs; 10,000 are nondeployable (i.e., dwell, injury,
pregnancy); and 10,000 are assigned as individual augmentees).
Also, while we built BCTs to be self-sufficient, in reality there
is still a relatively robust support system that augments them--as well
as other Services, our coalition partners, and host nation forces--in
the environments we fight in today. These ``enablers'' include
engineer, intelligence, fires, logistics, military police, civil
affairs, and aviation. The demand on ``enablers'' is expected to grow
even larger in Afghanistan, a country without the infrastructure and
logistical capability that already existed in Iraq in 2003. The overall
demand will also be further exacerbated by the continued necessity for
a large number of ``enablers'' in Iraq, even as units drawdown to meet
the President's guidance from 27 February 2009.
Other capabilities have also been created out of hide in response
to new requirements or because the appropriate government agencies have
either been unable or unwilling to provide these critical functions--
civil affairs officers, contract specialists, and health advisors are
good examples. A case in point is Afghanistan, where National Guard
AgriBusiness Development teams--made up of farmer-soldiers from eight
States in Middle America--are teaching Afghans how to improve their
farming methods in order to yield more crops and livestock. Agriculture
accounts for 60-70 percent of that country's economy; however, the
``how-to'' knowledge that historically was passed down from generation
to generation has been lost after years of civil war and tribal
fighting.
This nonkinetic piece is critically important, and these farmer-
soldiers are doing an outstanding job. However, the fact is they do not
exist on the National Guard's Table of Organization and Equipment, and
the manning shortfalls they create must then be backfilled from
somewhere else.
Ideally, teams of agronomists from land grant universities
sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development
would take on this particular mission. In their absence, the Army has
had to provide these and other specialized teams.
Over the past 7-plus years, demand has continued to grow and the
Army's level of responsibility has expanded considerably. At the same
time our available Force structure has become smaller as the number of
nondeployables has increased. The combined effect has been increased
deployments and shorter dwell times for our soldiers. The Army is
currently averaging a 1:1.3 ratio (12 months deployed and 16 months
dwell) for our Active component and less than a 1:3 ratio for Reserve
component forces.
People tend to focus on unit dwell time, while failing to
appreciate that frequently a soldier will redeploy with one unit, go to
school enroute to his next assignment, then have to deploy with the new
unit in less than 12 months. The United States Military Academy's
Operations Research Center and the Army G-1 recently completed a very
detailed analysis of unit and individual `Boots on the Ground' (BOG)/
dwell times. They concluded that for every military occupational
specialty (MOS) and grade (rank), more than 50 percent of the soldiers
experience shorter dwell time compared to the BCTs.
The current pace of operations is impacting every segment of our
Force--Active, Guard, and Reserve. While our Reserve components are
continuing to perform magnificently, many of these units have been
assigned missions as an operational force, when they had been resourced
and utilized as a Strategic Reserve for decades. Another challenge we
are still dealing with is the impact of the surge. We are not scheduled
to get our last combat brigade off of a 15-month deployment until June
2009 and our last CS/CSS unit off of 15-month deployment until
September 2009.
As we have previously reported to this committee, the Army remains
out of balance. We continue to be consumed by the demands of the
current fight. Overall, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we
are building it. Soldiers, families, support systems, and equipment are
stretched and stressed by the demands of multiple, lengthy deployments,
and with insufficient recovery time. Equipment used repeatedly in harsh
environments is wearing out more rapidly than programmed. This lack of
balance poses a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Force, and it
affects our ability to provide ready forces as rapidly as we would like
for other contingencies.
Two years ago, the Chief, General Casey outlined a plan to restore
balance to the Force by 2011; it included four imperatives: sustain,
prepare, reset, and transform. Since then, we have made definitive
progress in each of these areas, but there is still much work to be
done. The challenge continues to be complicated by changing
circumstances and increased demand on the force. We simply cannot
achieve desired ``BOG''/dwell ratios until demand is reduced to a
sustainable level. Unfortunately, the Army cannot influence demand, and
the current level does not appear likely to improve significantly for
the foreseeable future. So, the choice we are faced with is to continue
to over-extend some of the lower-density MOSs or create additional
capability. We are currently staffing many of the critical functions by
reassigning authorizations and personnel from within our ranks. My
concern is that we cannot fully predict what the derivative effects of
this will be in the future.
These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our
military. With the support of Congress, we have deployed the best
manned, equipped, trained, and led forces in the history of the United
States Army over the past 7-plus years. However, the fact remains that
we have asked a great deal from our soldiers and their families.
Unfortunately, the prolonged strain is already manifesting itself
in an increased number of soldiers struggling with substance abuse and
mental or behavioral health issues, such as depression, post-traumatic
stress, and other types of anxiety disorders, as well as an increase in
the number of suicides across the force.
We must continue to address these and other urgent problems, and
find ways to relieve some of the stress on the force by increasing the
time between deployments.
I assure the members of this committee--the Army's senior leaders
are focused and working hard to address these challenges and determine
the needs of the Force for the future. As we continue this process, we
will coordinate with senior DOD officials and Congress to identify both
short- and long-term solutions. Your input will continue to be very
valuable to us.
Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for your
continued and generous support of the outstanding men and women of the
United States Army and their families. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, General.
General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Sir, good morning, Chairman Bayh, Senator
Burr, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for
this opportunity to report on the readiness of your United
States Marine Corps.
On behalf of the more than 239,000 active and Reserve
marines and their families, I'd like to extend my warm
appreciation for the sustained support Congress has faithfully
provided its Corps of Marines. I would like to begin by
highlighting a few points from my written statement.
As we sit in this hearing room today, we have over 31,000
marines forward deployed across the globe. Despite high
operational tempo, your marines are resilient, motivated, and
performing superbly in missions around the globe. For the past
7 years, they have been fully engaged in winning in combat
operations as part of a generational struggle against global
extremism.
This sustained effort and performance has not come without
costs to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic
programs, and most importantly to our marines and their
families. Our forward deployed units are manned, trained, and
equipped to accomplish their assigned missions and these units
continue to report the highest levels of readiness for those
missions.
To ensure our deployed and next to deploy forces maintain
this high state of readiness, we have taxed our nondeployed
forces and strategic programs for equipment and personnel. As a
result, the majority of our nondeployed forces are reporting
degraded readiness levels.
Our equipment availability challenge was recently
highlighted with the equipment sourcing effort for the Second
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2nd MEB) that is currently
deploying to Afghanistan. To resource the 2nd MEB with the
required and most capable equipment, we drew equipment assets
from across the Corps. Although a concerted effort was made to
minimize the impact on home stationed unit readiness, we still
needed to draw 14 percent of the necessary equipment from our
home stationed operating forces.
This degraded state of readiness within our nondeployed
forces presents risks to our ability to rapidly respond to
other unexpected contingencies around the globe. To mitigate
this risk posed by our current state of equipment availability,
we have developed a plan for the reset of equipment being
redeployed from Iraq. The Operation Iraqi Freedom reset plan
synchronizes Marine Corps reset efforts to ensure we
effectively and efficiently provide equipment to support
follow-on operations. Equipment being redeployed is inspected
and a decision is then made on whether it will be sorted and
redistributed in theater or redeployed to the continental
United States for rework. Redeployed assets will then be
repaired at maintenance facilities and distributed to fill
shortfalls for established priorities. Equipment determined to
be beyond economical repair will be disposed of and
replacements procured.
Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities
have been necessarily focused on counterinsurgency operations,
we have experienced degradation in some of our traditional core
competencies, such as integrated combined arms, fire and
maneuver, and large-scale operations from the sea. These skills
are critical to maintaining the Marine Corps' full spectrum
capabilities and primacy in forcible entry operations. Although
the current security environment has justified the tradeoffs we
have made to support overseas contingency operations (OCO), we
must maintain a balanced force capable of responding to crises
around the globe and across the full spectrum of conflict.
With your continued and consistent backing, we will no
doubt succeed in current operations, we will take care of our
marines and their family members, reset and modernize our
equipment, and train the Marine Air-Fround Task Forces for the
future security environment. Your support will ensure the
Marine Corps' success as the Nation's expeditionary force in
readiness.
I thank each of your for your faithfulness to this Nation,
your faithfulness to our Corps, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James F. Amos, USMC
introduction
Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of your Marine Corps, I want to thank you for
your generous support and for the opportunity to speak to you today
about the readiness of the United States Marines. Recently, the
Secretary of Defense outlined a strategy to return the Department to a
balanced force capable of prevailing in current conflicts while
preparing for other contingencies.\1\ Consistent with Secretary Gates'
strategy, my statement will address our efforts to achieve that
balance, the readiness challenges facing marines today, and the
critical steps needed to reset and reconstitute our Corps for today's
complex challenges and tomorrow's uncertain security environment.
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\1\ Gates, Robert M. ``A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the
Pentagon for a New Age.'' Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, No. 1, January/
February 2009.
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Despite high operational tempo, your marines are resilient,
motivated, and performing superbly in missions around the globe. They
are fully engaged and winning in combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan as part of a generational struggle against global
extremism. This sustained effort and performance does not come without
costs--to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic programs,
and most importantly to our marines and their families. Continued
congressional investment in our marines and families, resetting and
modernizing our equipment, and training Marine Air Ground Task Forces
for the future security environment are critical to the Marine Corps'
success as the ``Nation's Force-in-Readiness.''
readiness assessment
The Marine Corps is meeting all Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) requirements. In the course of the
last 7 years, your Marine Corps has been battle-tested, combat
hardened, and has accumulated tremendous experience in irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency operations. Forward deployed units are
manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions,
and these units are reporting the highest levels of readiness for those
missions. However, resources are limited and nondeployed units incur
the costs of ensuring deployed and next-to-deploy units have sufficient
personnel, equipment, and training. As a result, our nondeployed forces
are currently reporting degraded readiness levels. This degraded state
of readiness within our nondeployed forces presents risk in our ability
to rapidly respond to other unexpected contingencies.
Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities are
focused on counterinsurgency operations, we have experienced
degradation in some of our traditional, full spectrum, core
competencies such as integrated combined arms operations and large-
scale amphibious operations. These skills are critical to maintaining
the Marine Corps' primacy in forcible entry operations that enable
follow-on joint forces. The OIF/OEF demand for units has also limited
our ability to fully meet combatant commander requests for theater
engagement activities. The current security environment has clearly
justified the tradeoffs we've made to support the Long War, but the
uncertainty of the future makes it prudent to regain our capabilities
to operate across the full range of military operations--to be that
``balanced force'' that Secretary Gates speaks of.
In addressing the challenges facing the Marine Corps, I have
structured my statement along the lines of our key readiness concerns--
personnel and military construction, equipment, training, amphibious
shipbuilding, and caring for our warriors and their families. I will
discuss the positive steps and proactive initiatives we are
undertaking, with your support, to reset, modernize, and reconstitute
the Marine Corps for an uncertain future. Finally, I will conclude with
some of our ongoing initiatives and programs that address the care and
welfare of our marines and their families.
stress on the force: personnel challenges and operations tempo
The pace of operations for your marines remains high, with over
31,000 marines forward-deployed across the globe. In the U.S. Central
Command area of operations, there are over 27,000 marines deployed in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
Despite the recently concluded Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq and
the plans for a drawdown of forces there, the demand and associated
operational tempo for marines will remain high as we transition
requested forces to Afghanistan. Meeting this global demand resulted in
short deployment-to-dwell ratios for many units, with some deployed for
as many months as they spend at home. Some of our low-density/high-
demand units such as Intelligence, Communications, Explosive Ordnance
Disposal, and certain aviation units, remain at or below a 1:1 dwell,
with only moderate relief in sight for the near future. Insufficient
dwell negatively impacts our total force readiness because it leaves
inadequate time to conduct full spectrum training and reconnect with
families.
Another readiness detractor has been the need to task combat arms
units, such as artillery, air defense, and mechanized maneuver to
perform ``in-lieu-of'' (ILO) missions such as security, civil affairs,
and military policing. Shortages of those skill sets created the need
for ILO missions to meet the requirements for counterinsurgency
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although these mission assignments
are necessary, they have degraded our readiness because these combat
units are unable to train to and maintain proficiency in their primary
skill sets.
In addition to unit rotations and ILO missions, the Marine Corps is
tasked to fill a variety of assignments for forward-deployed staffs,
training teams, and joint/coalition assignments that exceed our normal
manning structures. The manning requirements for these Individual
Augments (IAs), Training Teams (TTs) and Joint Manning Documents (JMDs)
seek seasoned officers and staff noncommissioned officers because of
their leadership, experience, and training. We understand that these
augmentees and staff personnel are critical to success in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but their extended absence has degraded home station
readiness, full spectrum training, and unit cohesion.
Personnel Initiatives
In order to better meet the needs of a nation at war, the Corps has
been authorized to grow to an active duty end strength of 202,000
marines. This increase in manpower will ultimately result in a Marine
Corps with three balanced Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and will
help mitigate many of the operational tempo challenges described in the
previous section. A balanced Marine Corps will provide combatant
commanders with fully manned, trained, and equipped Marine Air Ground
Task Forces (MAGTFs) that are multi-capable, responsive, and
expeditionary. Additionally, the end strength growth will increase our
capacity to deploy forces in response to contingencies and to
participate in exercises and operations with our international partners
in support of the Nation's broader security objectives. It will also
allow more time at home for our marines to be with their families, to
recover from long deployments, regain proficiency in core skills, and
prepare for their next mission.
The 202,000 growth plan is progressing well. The Marine Corps grew
by over 12,000 marines in fiscal year 2008 and is on pace to reach an
active duty end strength of 202,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009--2
years ahead of schedule. Thanks to the continued support of Congress,
we have increased our infantry, reconnaissance, intelligence, combat
engineer, unmanned aerial vehicle, military police, civil affairs, and
explosives ordnance disposal communities. Several of these units have
already deployed to Iraq, mitigating the need for additional ILO
missions. We have realized improvements in dwell time for a number of
stressed communities. Although the plan is progressing well, the growth
in end strength will not result in an immediate improvement in reported
readiness because it takes time to train and mature our newly recruited
marines and units.
In addition to our end strength increase, the Marine Corps is
examining other options to keep marines in the fight. For example, we
are hiring over 1,700 civilian police officers and security support
personnel to meet home station policing and security requirements at
our bases and stations. After our first year of implementing this
program, we are successfully blending traditional military police with
Federal civilian police officers at the majority of our installations.
This initiative enables us to free active duty military police for
deployments in support of the MAGTF, further reducing the need for ILO
assignments.
military construction
As the Marine Corps grows to 202,000, military construction is
critical to supporting and sustaining the new force structure and
maintaining the individual readiness and quality of life for our
marines. Thanks to your support, we recently expanded our construction
efforts and established a program that will provide adequate bachelor
housing for our entire force by 2014. In fiscal year 2009 alone,
Congress funded over 12,000 barracks spaces for our marines.
Congressional support is still required to provide additional new
barracks spaces to meet our 2014 goal. Concurrent with our new
construction efforts is our commitment for the repair and maintenance
of existing barracks to improve morale and quality of life.
equipment readiness
Ensuring that our marines are equipped with the most modern and
reliable combat gear is a necessity. However, the requirement to fully
resource deployed forces, often in excess of our tables of equipment,
has reduced the availability of materiel essential to outfit and train
our nondeployed units. Approximately 25 percent of all Marine Corps
ground equipment and 40 percent of our active duty aviation squadrons
are deployed overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out of
theater at the conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in combat,
to be used by the relieving unit.
Ground Equipment Readiness
After 7 years of sustained combat operations, our deployed
equipment has been subject to significant wear and tear, harsh
environmental conditions, and increased operating hours and mileage.
Additionally, the weight associated with armor plating further
increases the wear on our deployed vehicle fleet and accelerates the
need for repair and replacement of these assets. Despite these
challenges and higher utilization on already aging equipment, our young
marines are keeping this equipment mission-ready every single day. The
high equipment maintenance readiness rates throughout the Marine Corps
are a testament to their dedication and hard work.
The policy to retain equipment in theater as forces rotate in and
out was accompanied by increased in-theater maintenance presence; this
infusion of maintenance support has paid great dividends, with deployed
ground equipment maintenance readiness above 90 percent. However, the
Marine Corps is experiencing challenges with the supply availability of
a number of critical equipment items. Equipment supply availability
varies depending on whether units are forward deployed or in dwell at
home station. Supply readiness rates have decreased for home station
units, while we work to meet the demand of deployed forces, and those
next-to-deploy. Shortages of critical equipment limit home station
units' ability to prepare and train to their full core competencies and
present additional risk in availability of equipment necessary to
respond swiftly to unexpected contingencies.
The recent sourcing of equipment for the 2nd Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB) deploying into Afghanistan illustrates our equipment
availability challenge. Equipment assets were pulled from across the
enterprise to accomplish this task. To ensure the 2nd MEB is provided
the newest and most capable equipment, over 55 percent of their
equipment came via new procurement provided by Marine Corps Systems
Command. Approximately 27 percent of the equipment came from within the
Central Command area of operations, including items made available from
units retrograding from Iraq; and about 4 percent of the required
assets were sourced from our Logistics Command and the Marine Corps
Prepositioned Program in Norway. Although a concerted effort was made
to minimize the impact on home station unit readiness, 14 percent of
2nd MEB's equipment needed to be drawn from our nondeployed operating
forces.
Ground equipment age continues to be a top readiness challenge as
well. As equipment ages, more time, money, and effort are expended
repairing it. Ultimately, the answer to achieving sustained
improvements in ground-equipment readiness is to improve logistics
processes and to modernize with highly reliable and maintainable
equipment. The Corps is achieving efficiencies by improving supply-
chain processes, adopting best practices, and by leveraging proven
technological advances to facilitate responsive and reliable support to
the Operating Forces.
Aviation Equipment
Our aviation capability is a critical part of the MAGTF. Just like
our ground forces, deployed Marine aviation units receive the priority
for aircraft, repair parts, and mission essential subsystems such as
forward looking infrared (FLIR) pods. Nondeployed forces, on the other
hand, face significant challenges for available airframes and supply
parts. Exacerbating the readiness challenges in our aviation fleet,
most Marine aviation platforms are ``legacy'' platforms which are no
longer in production, placing an even greater strain on our logistics
chain and maintenance systems.
Our Marine Corps aviation platforms are supporting ground forces in
some of the world's harshest environments: the deserts of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Our aircraft are flying at
utilization rates far beyond those for which they were designed. We are
nearly tripling the utilization rates of our workhorses--the F/A-18 C
and D; the KC-130 cargo and aerial refueling platform; our EA-6B
electronic warfare aircraft; and even the new MV-22 Osprey. Increased
utilization causes aircraft to structurally age faster than programmed.
As our legacy aircraft are lost or damaged in combat, the Marine Corps
is faced with a shortage of available aircraft for training and future
employment. To maintain sufficient numbers of aircraft in deployed
squadrons, nondeployed squadrons have taken cuts in aircraft and parts.
With our current force structure, our aircraft requirement, termed
Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) is short 248 aircraft across all
Type/Model/Series. These shortfalls include all modifications,
intermediate maintenance events, depot maintenance, transition/
procurement aircraft, and aircraft damaged beyond repair.
Maintaining the readiness of aviation assets while training aircrew
is an enormous effort and an ongoing readiness challenge. Our aviation
Fleet Readiness Centers have been able to mitigate degradation of our
aircraft materiel readiness through modifications, proactive
inspections, and additional maintenance actions. These efforts
successfully bolstered aircraft reliability, sustainability, and
survivability. Nevertheless, additional requirements for depot-level
maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment will
continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities. Aircraft undergoing
depot-level repairs are not available for training or combat. We are
simply running short of aircraft on our flight lines due to age,
attrition, and wartime losses.
Prepositioning Equipment and Stores
Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs are comprised of the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF), with three Maritime Prepositioning Ships
Squadrons (MPSRONs), and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
(MCPP-N). Since 2002, we have drawn equipment from our strategic
programs and stocks to support combat operations, growth of the Marine
Corps, and other operational priorities. While the readiness of the
strategic prepositioning programs continues to improve, equipment
shortages in our strategic equipment prepositioned stores have forced
the Marine Corps to accept necessary risk in our ability to rapidly
respond to worldwide contingency operations. With Congress' support,
our end item shortfalls in the MPF and MCCP-N programs will be reset,
in accordance with operational priorities, as equipment becomes
available.
In-Stores Equipment
In-Stores Equipment refers to our pool of assets that serves as a
source of equipment to replace damaged or destroyed equipment in the
operating forces, and potentially fill shortfalls in the Active and
Reserve components. This equipment was used heavily to source equipment
requirements in Iraq and will be used to support our transition to
operations in Afghanistan. The availability or supply rating for In-
Stores assets has been degraded over the past years and limits our
ability to rapidly respond to unexpected contingencies and to replace
damaged equipment in the operating forces.
Equipment Initiatives
To counter the readiness impact of damaged, destroyed, or worn out
equipment, the Marine Corps initiated a program to reset and modernize
our force. The goals of our reset and modernization programs are: to
sustain the current fight by repairing or replacing worn out or
damaged/destroyed equipment while enhancing our support to the
warfighter by reconstituting our force with newer, more capable,
equipment. Over time, these initiatives will help to increase
nondeployed unit readiness by enhancing home station equipment pools
and predeployment unit training requirements.
Equipment Reset
Reset consists of actions taken to restore units to a desired level
of combat capability commensurate with the unit's mission. It
encompasses maintenance and supply activities that restore and enhance
combat capability to equipment that has been damaged, rendered
obsolete, or worn out beyond economic repair due to combat operations
by repairing, rebuilding, or procuring replacement equipment. Our cost
estimate for resetting our force is over $20 billion. As we continue
with Overseas Contingency Operations, we will update this estimate
accordingly. We appreciate the generous support of Congress in
appropriating over $12 billion to date to ensure that marines have the
equipment and maintenance resources they need. We are committed to
managing these resources wisely as we repair, reset, and modernize our
force.
We expect to see reset requirements increase as a result of force
reductions in Iraq and to sustain a growing presence in Afghanistan. To
prepare for the reset of equipment redeployed from Iraq, we have
created an OIF Reset Plan. The plan synchronizes Marine Corps reset
efforts to ensure we effectively and efficiently reset equipment to
support follow on operations. Equipment being redeployed is inspected,
sorted, and redistributed in theater, or redeployed to CONUS to
maintenance facilities. These assets will then be repaired and
distributed to fill shortfalls for established priorities. Equipment
determined to be beyond economical repair will be disposed of and
replacements procured.
Modernization
As the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps
is required to prepare for the unexpected. We are making progress in
repairing and resetting existing equipment, but this effort must be
augmented with continued investment to modernize our capabilities.
Equipment modernization plans are a high priority within our Corps. Our
commandant's recently published Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025
will help guide our modernization efforts as we continue to be the
agile and expeditionary force for the Nation.
Ground Modernization
Prompted by a changing security environment and hard lessons
learned from 7 years of combat, the Marine Corps recently completed an
initial review of its Operating Force's ground equipment requirements.
Recognizing that our unit Tables of Equipment (T/E) did not reflect the
challenges and realities of the 21st century disbursed battlefield, the
Corps adopted new T/Es for our operating units. This review was
synchronized with our modernization plans and programs, and provides
enhanced mobility, lethality, sustainment, and command and control
across the MAGTF. The new equipment requirements reflect the
capabilities necessary not only for the Corps' current mission, but for
its future employment across the range of military operations, against
a variety of threats, and in diverse terrain and conditions. The MAGTF
T/E review is an integral part of the critical work being done to reset
and reconstitute the Marine Corps.
Aviation Modernization
We are modernizing the aircraft we fly; changing the way we think
about aviation support to our ground forces; and changing our
capabilities to conduct operations in any clime and place. To help meet
the growing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements
of our operating forces, the Marine Corps will field three levels, or
``tiers,'' of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Furthermore, we are
committed to an ``in-stride transition'' from 12 type/model/series
aircraft to 6 new aircraft. Programs such as the F-35B Joint Strike
Fighter, the MV-22 Osprey, the CH-53K, and the H-1 upgrades will vastly
increase the Corps' aviation capability and ensure our warfighting
advantage for decades to come. It is critical that these programs stay
on track, and on timeline, with full funding support, due to the
declining service life of our legacy tactical aviation platforms.
training marines to fight
In preparing marines to fight in ``any clime and place,'' the
perennial challenge to our Corps is to attain the proper balance
between core warfighting capabilities and those unique to current
operations. Decreased unit dwell times and shortages of equipment in
our nondeployed forces translate to a limited ability to conduct
training on tasks critical to our core competencies, such as integrated
combined arms, large force maneuver, and amphibious operations. Short
dwell times between deployments and the need for many units to perform
``in lieu of missions'' have resulted in a singular focus on
counterinsurgency training. Our marines continue to be well trained for
current operations through a challenging pre-deployment training
program that prepares them for all aspects of irregular warfare.
Predeployment Training Program
In order to properly train our operating forces for the rigors and
challenges they face in OIF and OEF, we have developed a very
demanding, realistic and adaptive predeployment training program. The
Predeployment Training Program (PTP) contains standards-based,
progressive skills training which is evaluated by commanders and
assessed by our Training and Education Command at the final Mission
Rehearsal Exercise. The PTP includes counterinsurgency combat skills,
as well as operational language and culture skills. Unit after-action
reports and unit surveys conducted by the Marine Corps Center for
Lessons Learned (MCCLL) are shared Corps-wide and have influenced
training changes to keep PTP relevant. For example, the Afghanistan
PTP, while similar in many facets to the PTP for Iraq, includes
mountain warfare training and an increased emphasis on MAGTF combined
arms training.
During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the PTP resulted in over 42,000
marines receiving theater-specific combined arms and urban operations
training at Exercise Mojave Viper at Twentynine Palms, CA. Over 2,800
marines received mountain operations training at the Mountain Warfare
Training Center in Bridgeport, CA. Over 12,000 marines participated in
the aviation-focused Desert Talon Exercise in Yuma, AZ.
While our PTP focuses on preparing Marine units for their next
deployment, we are further enhancing our education and training
programs to respond to ongoing changes in the security environment.
Through the efforts of organizations such as the Marine Aviation
Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Marine Corps Tactics and Operations
Group, the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, the
Advisor Training Group, and the Marine Corps University, we are
providing a holistic education to our marines across the range of
military operations. Based on a continuous lessons learned feedback
process, supported by the MCCLL, we are building an Enhanced Company
Operations capability which will make our smaller infantry units more
lethal, agile, and survivable.
Preparing for Future Conflict
As challenging as it is to prepare marines for the current fight,
our forces must adapt to the ever-changing character and conduct of
warfare to remain relevant. To meet the complex challenges in the
emerging security environment, we are improving training and education
for the fog, friction, and uncertainty of the 21st century battlefield.
We are focusing efforts on our small unit leaders--the ``strategic
noncommissioned officers'' and junior officers--who will operate more
frequently in a decentralized manner and assume greater responsibility
in operations against hybrid threats.
To better prepare our Marine Air Ground Task Force to operate
across the spectrum of conflict, we are developing an improved training
and exercise program. When implemented, this program will increase our
ability to maintain proficiency in core warfighting capabilities, such
as combined arms maneuver and amphibious operations, while continuing
to meet current commitments. Two important training concept exercises
being developed are the Combined Arms Exercise-Next (CAX-Next), and the
Marine Air Ground Task Force Large Scale Exercise (MAGTF-LSE). The CAX-
Next will be a live-fire training exercise aimed at developing combined
arms maneuver capabilities from individual marine to regimental-sized
units. It will incorporate lessons learned from today's conflicts,
while training adaptable and flexible MAGTFs for the future. The MAGTF-
LSE will be a scenario-based, service-level training exercise, scalable
from Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Marine Expeditionary Force levels.
It will develop the Marine Air Ground Task Force's capability to
conduct amphibious power projection and sustained operations ashore in
a combined, joint, whole-of-government environment.
amphibious shipbuilding
The Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps
have determined that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0
Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships.
Due to fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy has agreed to
maintain a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon.
The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat support and
combat service support elements of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Of
that 33 ship Battle Force, 11 aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA/LHD)
and 11 LPD class ships are required to accommodate the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade's aviation combat element and part of the ground
combat element.
caring for our warriors and families
A critical part of our overall readiness is maintaining our solemn
responsibility to take care of our marines and their families. While
marines never waiver in the ideals of service to Corps and Country, the
needs of our marines and their families are constantly evolving.
Marines have reasonable expectations regarding housing, schools, and
family support. It is incumbent upon us, with the generous support of
Congress, to support them in these key areas. Marines make an enduring
commitment to the Corps when they earn the title marine. The Corps in
turn, makes an enduring commitment to every marine and his or her
family.
Putting Family Readiness on a Wartime Footing
Last year, the Marine Corps initiated a multi-year plan of action
to place family support programs on a wartime footing. We significantly
increased training and support staff at the installation level,
expanded the depth and breadth of family readiness training programs,
and authorized full-time Family Readiness Officers in more than 400
units. We improved the command's ability to communicate with marines
and their families with state-of-the-art information technology tools.
We continue to assess the efficacy of our Marine Corps Community
Services programs to ensure that we are empowering our marines and
their families to maintain a state of readiness while caring for their
immediate needs.
These initiatives and others demonstrate the commitment of the
Marine Corps to our families and highlight the connection between
family readiness and mission readiness. We are grateful to Congress for
providing additional funding that enabled the initial set-up of our
improved family readiness program.
Improving Care for Our Wounded Warriors
The Marine Corps is very proud of the positive and meaningful
accomplishments of the Wounded Warrior Regiment in providing recovery
and transition support to our wounded, ill, and injured marines and
sailors and their families. Since the Regiment stood up in April 2007,
we instituted a comprehensive and integrated approach to wounded
warrior care, and unified it under one command. Our single process
provides Active Duty, Reserve, and separated marines with nonmedical
case management, benefit information and assistance, resources and
referrals, and transition support. The Regiment strives to ensure
programs and processes adequately meet or exceed the needs of our
wounded, ill, or injured marines, while remaining flexible to preclude
a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach to care. To ensure effective family
advocacy, we added Family Readiness Officers at the Regiment and to its
two battalions.
While the Marine Corps is aggressively attacking the stigma and
lack of information that prevent marines from asking for help, we are
also being proactive in reaching out to those marines and Marine
veterans who may need assistance. Our Wounded Warrior Call Center not
only receives calls from active duty and veteran marines, but also
initiates important outreach calls. Since November 2007, our call
center has made over 44,000 calls and contacted over 8,800 wounded,
ill, or injured marines and family members.
Our Job Transition Cell, manned by marines and representatives of
the Departments of Labor and Veterans Affairs, has proactively reached
out to identify and coordinate with employers and job training programs
to help our Wounded Warriors obtain positions where they are likely to
succeed and enjoy promising careers. One example is our collaboration
with the United States House of Representatives to establish a Wounded
Warrior Fellowship Program to facilitate hiring disabled veterans to
work in congressional offices.
The Marine Corps' commitment to our wounded, ill, and injured is
steadfast; we are grateful for the support and leadership of Congress
on their behalf. I would also like to extend my personal thanks for
congressional visits to our marines and sailors in the hospitals where
they are being treated and convalescing.
conclusion
This Nation has high expectations of her Corps--and marines know
that. Your marines are answering the call around the globe while
performing with distinction in the face of great danger and hardships.
The Corps provides the Nation unrivaled speed, agility, and flexibility
for deterring war and responding to crises; our ability to seize the
initiative and dominate our adversaries across the range of military
operations requires the right people, the right equipment, and
sufficient time to train and prepare appropriately.
As your marines continue to serve in combat, we must provide them
all the resources required to complete the tasks we have given them.
Now more than ever they need the sustained support of the American
people and Congress to maintain our readiness, reset the force during
an extended war, modernize to face the challenges of the future, and
fulfill our commitment to marines, sailors, and their families.
On behalf of your marines, I extend great appreciation for your
faithful support to date and thank you in advance for your ongoing
efforts to support our brave warriors. The Corps understands the value
of each dollar provided by the American taxpayer, and will continue to
provide maximum return for every dollar spent. Today over 200,000
Active and 39,000 Reserve Force marines remain ready, relevant, and
capable as the ``Nation's Force-in-Readiness''. . . and with your help,
we will stay that way.
Senator Bayh. General, thank you for your devotion to both
your soldiers and to our country.
We've been joined by Senator Inhofe. Jim, thank you for
your presence. He's very graciously agreed to defer any
comments to the question period, which we will now commence.
We're going to have 8-minute rounds. Please let me know when my
8 minutes have expired. I don't want to go on and on.
General Chiarelli, I'll start with you. You mentioned that
we're consuming our readiness as fast as we're rebuilding it. I
think that's what you said. What must be done to change that,
so that we're no longer just kind of treading water? What needs
to be done specifically to actually improve our readiness, so
that we're not in this constant state of tearing it down while
building it up without really making long-term progress?
General Chiarelli. Two things I'd point out, Senator, would
be: first of all, we need to complete the grow-the-Army plan
and, that growth to the 45 brigade mark. We are that.
Senator Bayh. That would be at the top of your priority
list?
General Chiarelli. It is very, very important that we grow
those 45 brigades because this is a question of supply and
demand. I can't control the demand, and the demand right now
shows that I have 26 combat brigades that are currently
deployed. I have a total of 18 Active component brigades and 8
Reserve component brigades. When I have that many brigades
deployed, I have what's called friction, best explained by a
Navy analogy, that when you have----
Senator Bayh. This is a first, the Army referencing the
Navy.
General Chiarelli. I have a rough time explaining friction
if I don't call on my other Services to help me out.
When you have an aircraft carrier that's sitting in the
middle of the Persian Gulf and you want to go ahead and relieve
it, an aircraft carrier casts off from someplace in the United
States and at that particular point in time you have two
aircraft carriers doing the job of one. The same thing happens
with Army brigades. When I have 26 deployed, I have normally 6
that are also doing another job. So that total number goes up
to 32 in a force right now of total brigades in that net 1.1
million force Army of about 70.
That is causing my dwell time to be at about 1 to 3, 1 year
deployed, 12 months, and 1.3 years back at home. I would also
point out to you that the surge for the United States Army is
not over. We won't get our last combat brigade off a 15-month
deployment until June of this year and I won't get my last
combat service support or combat support unit back off a 15-
month deployment until September.
So what has to change for us is the demand, the demand for
forces. Right now it's as high as it has ever been, with our
continued commitment to Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan.
Senator Bayh. I understood your answer to be, General, that
the demand has gone up. Unfortunately, the world has a way of
determining the demand. It's somewhat beyond our control. But I
understood your answer to be that we need to actually deal with
the supply to meet the demand. You can't meet an increased
demand with a constant supply. It's an increase in the force
levels that will enable us to improve the situation.
General Chiarelli. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Bayh. General, you used the term corresponding
adjustments were going to have to be made to reconcile the
different demands that we face. I think that's the term that
you used in your testimony. What did you mean by that? I took
that in layman's terms to be some tough choices we're going to
have to make. Is that a fair translation?
General Chiarelli. That's a fair translation. We're making
tough choices every day. I think you know we've had great
success with retention and recruiting and, quite frankly, the
Army has reached its goal of 547,400, and before we could put
the brakes on we even went a little bit over. So we have met
our grow-the-Army goal of 547,400.
But when you look at that force, I have right now today
9,500 soldiers that are in warrior transition units, soldiers
who have been wounded in battle or in training to a degree
where they are assigned to those units. I have another 10,000
soldiers that are nondeployable in units trying to heal from
past rotations. I have another 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers that
are serving in joint manning documents that aren't necessarily
the unit they were assigned to.
Senator Bayh. That's a total of about 30,000 if you add it
all together.
General Chiarelli. That is, and that creates some real
challenges for us. We're finding that our nondeployable numbers
are going up as we get into successive rotations for
individuals. All that creates a challenge for us. It is a
stretched and sometimes tired force that is meeting all the
requirements, but at the same time it is difficult to get our
units up to the operating strength they need to before
deployment.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General.
General Amos, in your testimony you said that--and I'm not
the best note taker in the world, but I tried--the majority of
nondeployed forces are reporting degraded readiness levels. So
a majority of the nondeployed forces. Then I think you cited a
statistic, I think it was 14 percent of the equipment we've had
to cannibalize away from the nondeployed forces; is that
correct?
General Amos. Sir, we took it from the nondeployed. These
are whole cloth principal end items, but we outfitted the 2nd
MEB with 14 percent of the equipment----
Senator Bayh. My question again for the public that's
interested in this, is to be sure we're giving you what you
need to make sure our forces are prepared: Just how unready are
the nondeployed forces? I know it's a subjective determination.
It's hard to put an exact figure on it. But if we've taken 14
percent of their equipment, is that about how unready they are?
Or is it some sort of----
General Amos. Sir, I would say I think the potential could
be--it's 14 percent of the equipment--there were 41,000 what we
call principal end items that we brought together and deployed
to Afghanistan for the 2nd MEB. So 14 percent of that 41,000
items came from home stationed units. 55 percent came right off
the assembly line as a result of Congress' graciousness to help
reset the force.
Senator Bayh. Maybe I should restate my question. If an
ordinary citizen wants our marines and soldiers to have what
they need to be ready, and they hear a majority of the
nondeployed forces are unready, then I think somebody might ask
you, General, just how unprepared are they? If they were called
upon today to deploy, just what would your response be? What
would it take to get them ready?
General Amos. Sir, I think it would take probably several
months. I think it would take global sourcing for the Marine
Corps. It would----
Senator Bayh. By global sourcing, you mean?
General Amos. I mean going to the western Pacific, bringing
marines and equipment out of the western Pacific, going to
Hawaii, taking them out of the Third Marine Regiment in Hawaii,
coming to the west coast.
Senator Bayh. So at least on a short-term basis, we'd have
to continue to rob Peter to pay Paul?
General Amos. We do, sir. We do. That's why the reset and
the overseas contingency funds and your help to reset the
force--and General Chiarelli talked about it in his statement.
It is critical that we continue to feed the current operations
with the generosity of Congress. You've given us over $12
billion over the last several years and we're estimating today
that our reset cost is probably right around $20 billion total,
to include the $12 billion you've given us.
But as we get these vehicles and equipment that we
purchased last year to reset the force, we are sending those
into Afghanistan, we're sending them into Iraq because they're
being used. All those new up-armored high-mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) that we bought last year to reset the
force at home have been sent and expended and they're en route
right now.
Senator Bayh. It's like being on a treadmill. We're running
faster and faster, but we're staying in place.
General Amos. Sir, we are. But I think there are several
positive notes here. First of all, Congress has been very good
about supporting us. So thank you for that.
But the forces that are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan
are at the very highest state of readiness. So what we do back
at home in the Marine Corps is take those units that are about
to deploy. We've identified them. We know who they are, and
about 6 months out to 4 months out we get the people in there.
We cobble together the equipment into kind of training pools,
and we have enough to train them, but it's not without great
pain.
So when they deploy they fall in on equipment that we have
left there or that we are maintaining in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Bayh. My time has expired, but in the second round
I'd like to follow up on that, because I assume that you're
both doing a great job of making sure the soldiers on the front
line are getting what they need, but that's at the expense of
our preparedness to meet some future unexpected contingency. So
I'd just like to get to that in my next round of questions.
Senator Burr, I'll turn the microphone over to you.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for both Generals about the impact on
military readiness and operations of support provided by
contractors, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few of my
colleagues have pressed this administration to curtail the use
by the military of service contracts for base operating
services, security, supply, and other mission support
requirements.
Can you briefly describe the impact of service support
contracts on readiness and mission capability for the Army and
the Marine Corps? Let me go to General Amos first.
General Amos. Sir, there's no question we have some
contract support in Iraq right now. Too soon for me to tell you
what we're going to have in Afghanistan. I don't think it's
going to be a lot, but I suspect there will be some. We are
just flowing forces in there now.
But we have some in Iraq, and I'll give you a good example.
Honeywell has 100 contractors at Al-Taqaddum, which is our main
logistics hub in the western part of the Al-Anbar Province. All
the equipment comes in to Al-Taqaddum and those 100 contractors
from Honeywell do the triage. They do the preliminary
maintenance on these things, and then they make the
determination, is this something that we need to retrograde
down to Kuwait to send back home or not?
They are critical to our combat support in Iraq. We
certainly have contracting support back home. We have it at our
depot in Albany, GA. We not only have our regular Federal
employees, but we have contract employees, temporary employees,
and we have contracts available that we can call on to speed
this up.
To be honest with you, a little over 85 percent of our
contracts have been competed competitively. So I don't think we
are the target necessarily for perhaps what the President has
talked about with regard to contracting. So I think we're
actually in pretty good shape.
Senator Burr. General, in the context of what you said
about Honeywell and potentially other contractors, is it safe
and correct for me to assume that as we go through the drawdown
those contractors become even more crucial, those that are tied
to the logistics side of it, for our need to assess what we're
bringing home, what is repairable, that type of thing?
General Amos. Sir, they absolutely are, because they will
probably be some of the last folks who will actually retrograde
out of Al-Anbar Province, because what we'd really like to be
able to do is free up as many marines as we possibly can, reset
their clocks so that they can flow through to the next
deployment into Afghanistan.
Senator Burr. General Chiarelli?
General Chiarelli. I would have to totally agree with Jim.
I will tell you the best example that I can give you from my
time in Iraq was the aircraft maintenance contractors that we
had helping to take care of our rotary wing aircraft. Those
contractors just did a magnificent job. They've done a
magnificent job for 7\1/2\ years in providing that kind of
maintenance support and we and our fleet have had unprecedented
high operational ready rates because of the great support that
we've gotten in that one specific area.
I think they're unheard of for equipment that's been flown
as hard as our rotary wing aircraft has been flown, both in
Iraq and Afghanistan. So I would argue that they are essential
for much of what we do, and also provide the opportunity for
our soldiers to get off the forward operating bases and do what
soldiers need to do, and that's getting out among the people as
part of the joint campaign plan in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Burr. Is it safe for me to assume, from what both
of you have said, that if for some reason we eliminated the
ability for the Services to contract certain aspects of what we
need, that we're then required to remove boots from the battle
to handle the logistics and all of these other assessments, and
we strain troop strength even that much more?
General Amos. Sir, that's absolutely correct. They would
then become what we classically call enablers. Those enablers
would then come from marines wearing uniforms like this,
soldiers wearing uniforms like that. A great example is the
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. It's been a
huge success story and we enjoy over 90 percent up-ready or
operationally ready MRAPs across the theater, I think for both
our Services. That's done because contractors are there taking
care of them.
If they are not there, then marines wearing digital cammies
are going to have to be trained and they are going to be out
there turning wrenches, and our deployment to dwell will only
increase.
General Chiarelli. I might add, that's a great example that
Jim just teed up here, and it's particularly important when you
understand that many of those MRAPs have been assigned to units
that aren't used to taking care of heavy equipment. Your light
infantry forces aren't necessarily known for their ability to
maintain heavy armor equipment like MRAPs, and those
contractors who are able to provide that direct support and
maintenance are critical to the high OR rates that General Amos
just quoted.
Senator Burr. Something very quick at this point. Do you
see the MRAP as significant a piece of equipment for use in
Afghanistan as it was used in Iraq, given the difference in
terrains between the two?
General Chiarelli. I would argue yes, sir. In the south for
sure, some of the current variants of the MRAP that the theater
has requested to be sent are doing yeoman's work. I think you
know we're working on an MRAP all-terrain vehicle. That vehicle
is currently in testing. The last I saw, that vehicle will be
ready to begin moving into Afghanistan in the November time
period. I think it's going to be a great leap forward.
We're doing modifications on some of the current MRAPs to
give them independent suspension. The early variants did not
have them. I know the marines are doing this on one of their
variants. But I see the MRAP as playing an important role in
Afghanistan as well as in Iraq, and particularly so once we get
the all-terrain vehicle available for those in the hilly east
portion of that country.
Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, USA Today ran a report in
April titled ``Battalion Shifted to Afghanistan,'' that
described how the Army's Fourth Engineering Battalion, that had
just arrived in Iraq, was now being redeployed to Afghanistan
to perform a vital mission of clearing roads of bombs and other
obstacles.
The article went on to assert that, ``The decision
underscores how military commanders are scrambling to meet
President Obama's order.''
What is the extent to which the Army units currently
deployed to Iraq are in training for deployment--or currently
in training for deployment to Iraq, will be redirected to
Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Senator, we have a total of four of our
combat units that have been redirected. We have the 173rd out
of Italy, but it won't be going until January, so it will have
time to do the necessary training for its new mission. We have
the 5-2 Stryker Brigade out of Fort Lewis, Washington. I will
tell you that was one of the most difficult ones, 5-2 was one
of those units that had taken aboard all the cultural lessons
we've had over these last 7\1/2\ years. I think they had the
highest number of Arabic speakers of any unit.
We were getting ready to deploy to theater and when we
switched their mission to Afghanistan the Arabic was no longer
needed. That was a hard one, but they'll be ready to go.
We have 2-10 Mountain going in October, and the 82nd Cav,
the aviation brigade, will be going in here in the next month.
That was a difficult one because their dwell time was cut and
we had to get them the high altitude training they needed. But
we get all our units the training they need for the different
conditions if they are redirected from Iraq to Afghanistan.
Senator Burr. So you're fairly confident that the training
that we provided is sufficient for these troops either to
transition from Iraq to Afghanistan or to be redirected to
Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. I am, and I know the commanders
downrange, if they get a redirected unit and feel that
additional training was needed before they put them out into
actual operations, would ensure that in theater that training
was conducted.
Senator Burr. I thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Burr.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just for clarification, Generals--and both of you may be
able to respond to this. I just heard General Amos say that the
equipment is coming right out of the factory, being shipped or
being used right as it's coming off. Now, this is really then
going to the contractors to be inspected and they determine if
this equipment is functional and that it will be military ready
or combat ready when that equipment hits the battlefield. Is
that the case?
General Amos. Sir, 55 percent of the 41,000 end items that
I was telling you about that came off the assembly line, that
actually--those were brand new pieces of equipment, and of
course it almost--probably I would assume at all of those
plants we have military contracting officers, we have folks
that are there to keep track of the quality assurance.
So when these things come off, they don't actually just
leave Oshkosh and then arrive into Kandahar. They actually pass
through the Marine Corps. Most of them will end up going
through Charleston, where we put all the electronic
countermeasures (ECM) equipment on it. We will get our hands on
this equipment and verify that everything is there. But it is
brand spanking new equipment, and then we will through military
transportation--Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), will send
this stuff into Afghanistan.
So I don't know if that answers your question.
Senator Burris. So that means that when it hits the
battlefield we don't have our warriors out there with equipment
that's failing or misfunctioning or that hasn't really been
tested, like you get the automobile and----
General Amos. Sir, it's not. It would be if you pick your
nicest car that you have the most confidence in when you buy
it, that's the way the equipment's arriving in theater. That's
my perception.
Senator Burris. Okay, and that's your responsibility, to
make sure that those boots on the ground out in those fields
have the best equipment they can have to protect us.
General Amos. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Burris. Are they dealing with any inferior, broken-
down equipment? Are we sure they are up to date with the latest
weaponry protection? The HMMWVs that you just mentioned,
because you're in Afghanistan where all those Improvised
Explosive Devices are being used there now, are those HMMWVs
transferable to Afghanistan at all now?
General Amos. They are, Senator. They're the ones--in fact,
this has been an iterative--HMMWV is a great example. When we
first crossed the border in March 2003, most of our HMMWVs
weren't armored at all. So now we are doing what we call the
enhanced capability vehicle, which is a HMMWV that has a bigger
motor, bigger suspension, better air conditioning, better
electric bus for all the ECM gear. That's the progression of
the kind of vehicle now that is going into Afghanistan. So this
is absolutely the very best that American money can pay for.
Senator Burris. General Amos, I've been led to believe that
a typical marine infantry battalion deployment is about 7
months on average, as opposed to a marine headquarters unit
whose deployment is about 12 months. General Amos, does this
difference in deployment length between the units cause morale
issues, and would it be realistic to make all deployments for
12 months?
General Amos. Sir, actually the opposite is true. What
happens is----
Senator Burris. Just the opposite is true?
General Amos. Well, the opposite is true from the
standpoint that the morale on the units that are deploying for
7 months are very happy. They're very grateful that the
Commandant of the Marine Corps has said, okay, you're an
infantry battalion or a squadron and you're only going to go
for 7 months. The headquarters, usually made up of older guys
like General Chiarelli and I and colonels and whatever, those
whom we call colonel-level commands, the regimental commands,
they go for 13 months, somewhere between 12 and 13 months
depending on how the rotation goes.
They provide the stability and they provide the continuity
of that operation for that period of time. The operational
units, the ones that are really out there doing the heavy
lifting, the fighting, the flying, the supplying, and the
repairing, they're going on the 7-month rotation. So they're
very happy. Their families are very appreciative of the
Commandant's decision. All us old guys were in those units at
one time, so now it's time for us to go--and to be honest with
you, the 12 to 13 months for the higher headquarters has not
caused a problem in the Marine Corps.
Senator Burris. General Chiarelli, in your statement for
the record you addressed the lack of participation by civilian
agencies in assisting in the nation-building process with these
various commands. You cited the example of the National Guard
farmers teaching farmers. In other words, if you're in Africa
you want farmers teaching farmers, rather than having the
military personnel.
Now, are you aware of any agency refusing a request to
participate, and do you have recommendations regarding this
participation involvement?
General Chiarelli. I would argue that no one has refused to
participate. It's a matter of capability. We took much of that
capability down here in the last 10 to 12 years. A good example
would be U.S. Aid for International Development (USAID). USAID
used to be about 16,000 folks and it's down now to about 3,000
or a little bit more than 3,000. It is really a contracting
agency now that looks for other people to execute contracts.
The specific example I gave you in my statement of our
agricultural teams is a great success story. These are 60-man
teams. I visited one at Camp Atterbury that had worked with
Purdue University. Purdue University had brought these guys on
board. These are National Guardsmen, brought together for this
special agricultural team. They are farmers from Middle
America, who know how to farm. They come to Purdue. Purdue
teaches them the language, the dialect of Pashtun that they're
going to have to learn.
They dumbed down their farming techniques from the
standpoint of, we're not going to go over there and teach them
how we do it here, but what techniques can Purdue give them to
take over to Afghanistan so that they can make use of limited
water and the amount of mechanization they have in farming.
These 60-man teams go over and they're strategic in nature, I
would argue. They've been a great asset to the commanders on
the ground.
But when I take those 60 men out of the National Guard to
form that team, I'm leaving 60 holes in National Guard units
that I have to go ahead and fill. That creates issues for us.
Senator Burris. So they're not drawing down on your numbers
of servicemen because they have to deal with the local
community as we try to do nation building, especially an Africa
man? General William Ward just took over the command of Africa,
and we are now trying to do nationbuilding in some of those
countries over in Africa. I understand you have to use military
personnel to do that rather than civilian personnel that would
be in there contracting to help them do it.
So that's not a problem in your eyes?
General Chiarelli. It does create holes. It is an asset
that I am happy to go ahead and deploy and use. It provides
force protection for my soldiers. Where we do that kind of work
we are safer, and we must do it, albeit it would be good for us
if other people could come to the table and do some of that
work.
Senator Burris. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to run. I have another
committee. I have to go over to another meeting, so I won't be
here in round two. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. Thank you for your line of questioning
Senator Burr.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Generals.
Senator Bayh. Any time a line of questioning brings to
light the contributions of the Indiana National Guard and
Purdue University, the chairman is delighted. So thank you for
that.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to try to get everything in in this first round
because we have our Environment and Public Works Committee
hearing coinciding with this.
General Chiarelli, I appreciate what you said about the
agricultural efforts that are taking place up there on the
border. It started out, I believe it was Nebraska, and then
Oklahoma is actually en route right now. I was over there as
they were making that movement up. They're just getting great
responses.
That's something that really is not out of the conventional
book, but people are having good responses to that.
Mr. Chairman, I chaired this subcommittee many years ago
and I think the Readiness Subcommittee is so incredibly
important. At that time, it was right after the drawdown of the
1990s and I don't want to be overly critical of President
Clinton, but as they were bringing down the forces and delaying
our modernization programs, I was very critical during those
times.
Then, as we moved into the Bush administration,
unfortunately September 11 came along. So we were in a position
of trying to rebuild what should not have been torn down in the
first place while prosecuting two wars at the same time. So
that's why it is incredibly difficult.
I happened to be over in Afghanistan when Secretary Gates
made his announcement 2 weeks ago on Monday. I know I was
overly critical, but when you stop and you think about the
money that is being spent right now, $700 billion for the
bailout and $789 billion on a stimulus program, then our
omnibus of $410--that's $2 trillion. Yet what we really need in
order to stop the things that appear to be true is maybe $25
billion more for the military. I'm talking about things that
are not directly involving you. The F-22, we have to keep that
going. It's the only fifth generation thing that we have out
there. We know both the Chinese and the Russians are making
something that would put our kids at a handicap down the road.
So our modernization has to continue there.
The C-17s the lift capacity, you have to have that. The
National Missile Defense System, and then of course the Future
Combat System (FCS). The word that was used was recocking the
FCS. Well, we've been recocking the FCS for 6 years now, and
when General Shinseki started this thing he was right. It goes
back--and I hate to even say that this happened, but my last
year on the House Armed Services Committee was 1994. We had
someone testify at that time that in 10 years we'd no longer
need ground troops. Now look what happened since that time.
So the ground forces in the marines and the Army have been
neglected in terms of, in my opinion, the modernization
program. We are faced right now, General Chiarelli, with some
of the elements that would have been in the FCS. It wasn't real
clear as to where the administration is going to go with this,
but it is going to be delayed.
You and I both know that one of the greatest weaknesses we
have on the ground is in our artillery. We're working with the
Paladin. That was World War II technology, where you have to
get out and swab the breech after every shot. Now, we've had
some upgrades. We had one scheduled. I hope we can continue
with that, because it's unconscionable to me to think that our
kids are out there on the battlefield against potential
adversaries that have better artillery equipment than we do.
Even South Africa is making a better piece than we have.
So I am concerned about the modernization program. The
first question I would ask you, General Chiarelli, is do you
think we are going to be able to continue while they're
deciding what to do with the FCS, with an increase in our
capability with perhaps the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)
program?
General Chiarelli. I do, Senator. I do. As you well know,
the PIM program is an important Army program to improve the
Paladin and to work off some of the issues with that older
system. We are committed to that program.
I would tell you that the Army is committed to a
modernization program, and we are very pleased with statements
made by the Secretary of Defense as he toured war colleges last
week that indicated that he too is committed to an Army
modernization program. We are going to move out as rapidly as
we can to ensure that we put the pieces in place to use much of
what has been developed over the last years into that
modernization program as we look at it and design it right now.
But we are totally committed to a modernization program.
Senator Inhofe. Let me ask you. You brought up just a
minute ago the 173rd. I've spent some time at Vicenza and I
think we all remember in the early stages of the Iraq war when
we found out we couldn't get across Turkey like we thought, and
so at the last minute the 173rd came in, and did a great job.
I was over there. At that time they didn't really have a
staging area, and we put in the authorization bill money and
resources to give them the staging area that they could have,
where it's on concrete and all of that. Is that now at a point
where it's functional?
General Chiarelli. I'm going to have to take that one back
and make sure I give you a correct answer. I do not have the
specifics on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army has completed the personnel alert holding area and heavy
drop rigging facility for the 173rd in Aviano. These fiscal year 2004
facilities became operational in November 2007 and March 2008
respectively. They will be used by the 173rd's soldiers prior to
loading on planes for deployment.
Senator Inhofe. I think it is. But at that time they were
getting ready in the rain out in the mud and all of that. So
you might check on that. I want to be sure that that's right.
There were some, I think Jim Jones and others, and I was among
them, who felt that we're going to look at a time when our live
ranges are going to have to be moved maybe to Eastern Europe,
where they don't have all the environmental problems and the
restrictions that we have. Perhaps the last thing remaining in
that area might just be Vicenza, and I think that's a very
valuable asset there.
While we're talking about equipment, General Amos, try not
to be a marine for just a minute, because you never complain.
You guys, you're the only ones with retreads, and we know all
that stuff. You're still using the Harrier, the V-22, the CH-
53. What do you think in terms of modernization, equipment, as
you look out in the future, what you'll need?
General Amos. Senator, you've flown on most of those
airplanes, if not all of them, and been in all of our vehicles.
Fortunately, we began a modernization program in aviation about
5 or 6 years ago, and it began with the new Huey Cobra, the
then V-22. We invested money early on, skipped over the F-18 E
and F and decided we would go with the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF).
So we have C-130Js that----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but still, that's out in the future.
General Amos. Some of it is, sir. Certainly the V-22 is
not.
Senator Inhofe. No, I'm talking about the JSF. That is a
great need you have now and you're still using the F-18s, I
guess?
General Amos. We are, sir. If you just look at service
life, we have about 5 or 6 more years left on our single-seat
F-18s and about the same amount on our F-18 two-seaters. So we
began this thing, there is a plan in motion, and it's actually
I think working pretty well for the Marine Corps.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I just want you to know that there
are a lot of us here who are so appreciative of you two guys
and what you're doing with the hand that's dealt you. Our job
is to deal you a better hand.
General Amos, I was fortunate to be in Fallujah for the
first two elections that they had, and I watched your marines.
I watched the door-to-door activity, and it made me very proud.
I would say the same thing, General Chiarelli. I was a product
of the draft and I never believed that an All-Volunteer Force
could do what these guys are doing over there. We're just
really, really proud that they are.
One of you said--and I wrote this down, but I'm not sure
which one of you said it--we can't continue to meet the
demands; we have to make corresponding adjustments. Which one
used that term?
General Chiarelli. It was me, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Can you suggest a few corresponding
adjustments?
General Chiarelli. What we have to do is find a way to work
the demand issue. I mean, the demand issue is critical for us,
and if we see the savings in troops if the drawdown in Iraq
occurs as scheduled, we see current demand lasting for the Army
until the middle of fiscal year 2010 and into the fall of 2010.
We can make that, and we should start to see about that time
some corresponding decreases in the requirements in Iraq and
increased dwell for forces back home.
But if something were to happen that caused demand to
remain the same as it is today or to increase in the upcoming
months, it becomes very, very difficult for the United States
Army to meet those requirements.
I just toured six installations in 7 days, from Fort
Jackson to Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, Fort Lewis, Fort Hood,
and Fort Drum. I met with spouses of soldiers who were deployed
and returning. I met with junior noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) and senior leaders. It is a resilient force. It is an
amazing force. But I have to tell you, it's a tired and
stretched force.
To turn around and go back to either Iraq or Afghanistan
just under 12 months or just over 12 months, and have it be
your third or fourth long deployment, is difficult. It's
difficult on soldiers and families. So the key to me as I see
it is seeing demand come down as projected. But if it doesn't,
we'll have some issues.
Senator Inhofe. I know my time has expired. Just one last
question, Mr. Chairman.
On this idea of the brigade combat teams (BCTs), I haven't
really heard specifically. I guess we have 43 now and we were
going to go to 47. Now it's going to be 45. How is that going
to work, and can we maintain our efforts with that change, and
how is that going to work?
General Chiarelli. As Secretary Gates indicated, stopping
at 45 will allow us to thicken our forces. It will allow us to
ensure that forces that are deploying are deploying at their
prescribed strength. But the Secretary did indicate that if
demand changed and went up, that there could be a reevaluation
period down the road.
Stopping at 45, if you just do the simple math, if demand
were to remain the same would cut into dwell time. It's just
simple mathematics. But allowing us to thicken our forces and
use those soldiers to ensure that our units are going out close
to their authorized strength I think is critical. It will also
assist us in January coming off of stop-loss, which we will
begin coming off stop-loss.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I'd like to pick up where Senator Inhofe left off with your
last response, General Chiarelli. The term you used was very
difficult in terms of managing demand. I understood your answer
to say we can make it through the middle or the end of next
year, it's tough but you can make it, but we're looking forward
to the demand from Iraq decreasing even as there's a little bit
of an increase in Afghanistan, but that's then going to give us
an opportunity to really try and regenerate our force
capabilities.
You said that if something happened to keep demand constant
or to increase demand, I think the words you used, it would be
very difficult to meet those demands. You're a good soldier,
you'll follow orders and you'll do your best, you'll try and
get the job done. But the words you used, so the American
public can understand, ``it will be very difficult.''
So that if, God forbid, if there's a confrontation with
North Korea or Iran that would require some commitment from our
Army, or in some other spot that we can't even anticipate, it
would be very difficult, to use your words, to meet those
contingencies. Is that a fair summary of what you've said
today?
General Chiarelli. That's a fair summary. It would be very
difficult on the force. It would be very difficult on families
if we were to see dwell time, the time at home, remain at the
levels it is now and not improve with folks coming off of
three, four, and sometimes five deployments.
Senator Bayh. That affects retention and recruitment,
particularly for some of the NCOs, sergeants, and then even
lieutenants, captains, people like that, does it not?
General Chiarelli. It does. But it's a function also,
Senator, of the economy. I will tell you our retention rates
have never been better than they are right now. Our recruiting
quality points are----
Senator Bayh. We'd prefer that to not be because there are
no good alternatives.
General Chiarelli. We too prefer that to be that way.
Senator Bayh. But the broader point, and one of the
purposes from the hearing, you guys have been doing a great job
under adverse circumstances, but I think the American public
has a right to know that if something else comes along we're
going to have a very difficult time meeting the national
security threat that faces the country. We'll do our best, but
it puts you folks in a very difficult situation. I would assume
that the policymakers understand that, and so that our
responses to some of these contingencies that are out there may
be in some way shaped by our ability or lack thereof to deal
with it.
General Amos, anything you'd like to add to the discussion?
Would you use similar terms, ``very difficult,'' from the
Corps' standpoint?
General Amos. Sir, I think it would be very challenging.
Difficult, challenging, to me they mean the same thing. I don't
think there's any question about it. This is not----
Senator Bayh. It's not an abstract problem we're dealing
with here.
General Amos. It's not, sir, and I think it's a very
worthwhile question. In the case of the Marine Corps, if
something happened in Iran or North Korea, we would end up
freezing the forces in place. You'd freeze the ones you have in
Iraq and Afghanistan, hold them in there, and then, as we said
earlier on in the testimony, you would bring together--you
would build a fighting force that you could deploy. But you'd
have to train it, you'd have to figure out how you're going to
get the equipment.
We in the case of the Marine Corps would emasculate all our
strategic Reserves, which are in our maritime prepositioned
squadrons, whatever is left up in the caves in Norway. We would
pull all that together and deploy that force. But we'd have to
train it, we'd have to figure out what we'd need to do in that
environment that we're not training people for right now,
because we're predominantly a counterinsurgency, irregular
warfare focused Marine Corps right now. So all those other
skills--combined arms, fire maneuver, forcible entry--those
things would have to--we'd have to figure out, okay, what do we
need to do for this new contingency? Is it possible?
The answer is yes. Your military, both your Army and Marine
Corps, Navy and Air Force, would come together and we'd make it
happen, just like we did prior to the onset of Korea. We did
exactly the same thing. But it would be painful.
Senator Bayh. As I recall, in the beginning stages of Korea
it also meant that our performance suffered because we were
just trying to make the best of a bad situation. We shouldn't
consciously put ourselves in that spot.
General Amos. Sir, that's absolutely correct. In the case
of--just instructive for me as I think about this, we went--
after the President and the Secretary of War, after World War
II and the great successes of World War II, emasculated the
Marine Corps--in fact, they even went public and said, we don't
even--we're not even sure we need a Marine Corps any more, and
for certain we'll never do an amphibious operation.
Yet in 1949 we took a 5th Marine Regiment from the west
coast which was down to about 15 to 20 percent of what it
should have been, cobbled together marines from the east coast
all across, brought them into 5th Marines, blew that balloon
up, trained them, and then brought ships together and made the
largest amphibious operation and probably the most difficult
one we've ever done shortly thereafter.
So sir, I think your concerns are very valid.
Senator Bayh. When a marine uses a term like ``emasculate''
the situation must be fairly dire.
General Amos. Well, yes, sir. I think it certainly was
then. I think it was almost on the verge of----
Senator Bayh. It puts you in a position of trying to cut
and paste and make do, and that's certainly not an optimal
situation for us to be in.
I think that's the broader issue here today. Looking out,
if there are threats to our Nation's security, unexpected
contingencies or things that might happen, that we hope don't
happen, that just puts you in a very difficult situation.
You'll try and make do, but that's not really fair to your
forces, and it really in some respects jeopardizes our national
security.
A couple other questions I have, gentlemen. I think,
General Chiarelli, this would be in your territory. A few days
ago, there was an article in the New York Times you're probably
familiar with regarding new body armor that we had hoped would
lighten the load for some of our combat folks. I think we've
all been impressed by the load that our soldiers carry out
there in combat. It might reduce the weight they have to carry
by as much as 20 pounds, which is not insignificant when you're
going up and down hills wearing your hot desert terrain gear.
The article suggested that there were delays that were
keeping that body armor from getting to our troops in the
field. Are you familiar with this issue, and if so can you
address what's going on with that and what we need to do if the
equipment is actually going to be good to get it to the
soldiers who need it?
General Chiarelli. I had a meeting on that yesterday,
Senator, and I will tell you that particular plate carrier--and
that's what it is. The official name is MBAB, and I don't know
what ``MBAB'' stands for. But it is a plate carrier, and it
literally is a carrier made to carry those ceramic plates that
we wear on the front and the back.
It saves 3.77 pounds.
Senator Bayh. 3.77 pounds?
General Chiarelli. 3.77 pounds. It was part of a total
package----
Senator Bayh. So the 20 pounds that was reported was a
little overstatement?
General Chiarelli. It was part of a total package of
equipment, to include lighter machine guns and individual
equipment, that, depending on what position you had in the
unit--from a machine gunner, it would save, this total package
would save 23 pounds; for a rifleman it would save 14 pounds.
Senator Bayh. What are the prospects for getting this done
and how long will it take if we can't get it done?
General Chiarelli. The machine guns have already gone
downrange. They are already in Afghanistan, and more are going
to be shipped to Afghanistan. But we already have the machine
guns down.
The M240 machine gun saved, the lighter model, saved a
total of 9 of those 23 pounds, with 3.77 pounds in the body
armor, and another approximately 10 pounds in individual
equipment. Now, that individual equipment and body armor is
pre-stationed at Fort Carson, CO, and will be distributed from
May 11 to May 15 to the next unit to go into Afghanistan.
This is civilian off-the-shelf individual equipment that we
need to test. The Secretary of the Army directed yesterday we
expand that test, given the 10 pounds of savings. But I think
it was unfair to characterize this as it was characterized.
Senator Bayh. How long do you think the testing process
will take?
General Chiarelli. It's done.
Senator Bayh. Oh, it's done.
General Chiarelli. The testing is done, and the unit has
asked that the equipment be distributed May 11 to 15.
Senator Bayh. So in a matter of weeks.
General Chiarelli. We're meeting the unit's request. We
could do it right now, but based on where they are in their
training phase they've asked to wait until the 11th to the
15th.
But we had to test this integrated system to make sure that
when we put our very good Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI)
plates in this carrier and when we tested that whole system, we
got the levels of protection that we needed to ensure, to make
sure our soldiers were as safe as possible.
Senator Bayh. My time has expired. If I could just slip one
more in, and then Senator Udall has joined us and we're
grateful for his presence here today.
There have been a number of published reports I'm sure
you're both familiar with about some of the difficulties we're
having getting equipment into Afghanistan through Pakistan,
some of the challenges, security challenges that exist in that
arena. Does this concern either of you? There are some
alternative routes we've explored. Either of you have any
thoughts about relying upon, for example, Russia as a place
through which we can ship our equipment to Afghanistan?
General Amos?
General Amos. For the Marine Corps, the equipment will
either fly into Kandahar for what we call sensitive type of
things, things that we would not want to put on a commercial
carrier, or it'll come up through Pakistan, through Karachi,
it'll be offloaded down at the port of Karachi. All that
equipment that flows up, that you see on the television every
now and then when a convoy gets blown up, that's all by
commercial carriers. In other words, there are no U.S. soldiers
or U.S. marines involved in that. They offload it, put it on
the commercial carriers, and they actually drive it up north.
There are two main routes up from that direction coming up
from Pakistan.
Senator Bayh. Do you have concerns about the reliability of
those routes, General, with some of the attacks that have taken
place there, the increasing instability in some parts of
Pakistan?
General Amos. I think the bulk of the attacks have taken
place up in the very northern part of the route. When you enter
Afghanistan, you enter either the southern part, which is
almost adjacent, just due east of Kandahar, and you come across
the mountains that way. That's actually proven to be very safe
thus far. I would suspect that it's only a matter of time when
that starts becoming frisky as well, but right now the bulk of
the stuff that's going up north into that part of Afghanistan,
that's the more dangerous area. It goes across I believe the
Khyber Pass and that area, and that's where the enemy is
focusing its efforts.
This is an open hearing, so I can't tell you, but I saw
some numbers that TRANSCOM, who is responsible for all that
stuff that moves, even when it goes into Afghanistan, and the
numbers are, even though the pictures are dramatic on
television and the papers, the numbers are actually almost
insignificant. Nothing's insignificant when you lose several
hundred million dollars worth of equipment, I understand that.
Senator Bayh. So it's something to keep our eye on, but at
this point not having a material impact on our operations?
General Amos. Sir, it's not. Certainly in the Marine Corps
it's not. I'll let Pete talk about in the Army. But I'll tell
you that General McNabb at TRANSCOM and General McKiernan in
Afghanistan have their eyes on this thing, and they're trying
to work very carefully to try to mitigate that.
Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. From the dramatic pictures you saw in
January, I think things have gotten better, particularly on the
routes coming through Pakistan to Afghanistan. I think our
logisticians have worked miracles to look for other lines of
communication that they can use to continue to supply the
force.
I think that Army Material Command (AMC), TRANSCOM, are all
over this. It is less a worry today than it was a few months
ago.
Senator Bayh. Good, good.
Senator Burr, and then Senator Udall.
Senator Burr. Generals, I thank you both for your comments
on the ability to access Afghanistan for supply or resupply. I
think one of the things that the chairman and I strongly are
concerned with is, as you have this tremendous plus-up of U.S.
presence, the requirements then on the resupply side are
significantly more than what they currently are.
I know there are some great minds working on alternative
routes that come from north, that come from the south. At any
point that you feel that our strategy does not accommodate our
needs, please let us know. We truly look at this with a sense
that we want to make sure that the right decisions are in fact
made, and we believe the planning is in place.
General Chiarelli, let me turn to also a press article, and
I don't want to catch you off guard because it's one from
today. If in fact you're not up to speed on this, you certainly
don't have to comment. But it's an article in Politico that
reports that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs supports a
proposal by his staff to change the method for selection and
timing of Army units deployed to Afghanistan.
The article notes a concern that the current rotation
schedule requires Army units to redeploy back to home stations
just as they're becoming familiar with the terrain and culture
in Afghanistan. The proposed change would have the Army
adopting a shorter deployment tour, similar to the Marines and
Special Forces, but using the same units repeatedly to return
to those familiar areas. This proposal seems to be a
significant change from the Army's traditional generation
process.
Do you care to comment on it at all?
General Chiarelli. Well, I would have to say that one of
the things the Chief of Staff of the Army is trying to get the
Army to is 27 months at home, 9 months deployed. We would like
to go to the shorter deployment schedules that the marines
have. But as I explained earlier today--I talked friction.
Given our requirement for deployment right now, if we were to
go to a 7-month deployment as the marines have now, as many
people have asked, that would double the amount of friction
that we had. Rather than have 31 brigades that are currently
employed with 12-month deployments, I would be up between 35,
36, and 37 brigades needed to maintain that shorter deployment.
So if you're talking about large units with the current
demand, if we were to make deployments shorter it would raise
my friction and demand on the force, which could be an issue
for us.
Senator Burr. I think clearly this article alluded to the
fact that the force size would be much smaller, but it would be
repeated visits. I question, one, if that meets the target time
back home. But two, this is quite a departure from the typical
rotation that the Army's looked at.
General Chiarelli. It would, Senator. I'd really have to
have more details to be able to sit down and analyze it, to
give you the kind of answer that I think would be the Army
position. I'm sure we have people that are looking at it. I'm
just not as familiar with this particular piece as I probably
should be.
Senator Burr. To both of you for a very brief response, if
you will. The second portion of the President's request for
emergency supplementals, which totals $83 billion plus for
overseas contingency, was transmitted to Congress last week.
Understanding that pay, operation and maintenance funding to
support deployed forces are at the top of the priority list,
what other crucial needs are funded in this supplemental?
General Amos. Sir, I'll be able to tell you precisely. We
asked for $4.9 billion. A small portion of that is what we call
blue in support of green, which is Navy. It's money that we
share kind of back and forth with the Navy with regards to
aviation assets, because we share the aviation program with the
Navy. But $4.9 billion.
$1.5 billion of that was for military personnel. Those were
just decremented, special pays, imminent danger pay, family
separation allowance, that kind of thing. It also helps with
the acceleration of our growth to 202,000, and we're just about
there. We'll sustain that for the rest of the year.
$1.1 billion in operation and maintenance (O&M) money to
support those 29,000 marines that are forward deployed in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
An investment of $1.9 billion for equipment; these are
things such as new lightweight 155 howitzers, electronic
organic destruction systems, new HMMWVs, the enhanced
capability variant that I talked about, LAV production
improvement plan, physical security, add-on armor kits,
rockets, and 7-ton Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements.
Finally, the last thing was we actually bought a few
airplanes with this. So four brand new Hueys, which are the new
upgraded four-bladed, two-engine Huey, because we've lost a lot
of those in combat.
So it's those kinds of things that fill out, flesh out that
$4.9 billion.
Senator Burr. Is it safe for us to assume, General, that
any delay by Congress in approving this supplemental would have
an impact on deployment?
General Amos. Sir, well, here's what we would do for the
deployment, and that's what you're specifically asking. We
would end up reprogramming other moneys to pay for that moneys
for those 29,000 forces. We would make that fit, and we would
take that from other pieces of the budget if the OCO fund was
not funded.
Senator Burr. General Chiarelli?
General Chiarelli. We currently project we can make it
through payday July 1. We would like to see the supplemental
approved weeks prior to that, which would ensure that we had
continuity of operations. That's our current projection, payday
July 1.
A majority of that money is not only for operations
downrange--and I totally agree with General Amos, we would make
that happen. We would do whatever we had to to make that
happen. But the supplemental is critical for us, as I know you
know, Senator, for our reset of equipment, which is critical.
When I have to turn around a combat aviation battalion in 11
months 22 days, it's hard on the people, but it's also hard to
turn that equipment, particularly high tech equipment like
helicopters, rapidly through the reset requirements it must go
through.
Senator Burr. The last is not a question; it's an
observation. When you represent the State that has the Pentagon
and the Army, and I think the Pentagon and the Marine Corps,
though California may challenge me on that one--the President's
made it clear that this is the last emergency supplemental,
this is the last war funding outside of the normal budget
process. I think that's been clear.
General Amos, you said in your written statement that the
Marine Corps will need approximately $20 billion for replacing,
repairing, rebuilding equipment to reset Marine Corps. General
Chiarelli, you've been very open on what the needs are going to
be.
It concerns me greatly that at a time we have troops
deployed in two theaters, we have hot spots around the world
that on any given day could reach a heat hotter than where we
currently have forces, that we would limit ourselves to what is
projected to be a 4 percent increase in the normal DOD process
for the foreseeable future. I purposely am not asking this in
the form of a question because I don't think it's fair to ask
you to respond, but there is a disconnect on my part to believe
that we can accommodate all of the things that are outside of
just readiness today, but having a force strength with the
equipment to be able to be trained and respond anywhere they
might be needed if in fact we're trying to do it with the
limitations of an annual appropriations and limited to a 4
percent increase.
I think it is impossible for us to expect that any service
will have the equipment that they need, with the sufficient
training that's required, clearly anything in addition to the
two theaters that we have active engagement in today. It makes
me feel very questionable about just how much training on those
potential other hot spots might be able to be accomplished,
given the need to shepherd the funds and not necessarily devote
them in a way that broadly places those assets there for the
military.
I want to once again thank both of you for your willingness
to come in, but also for the great insight you've provided us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Burr.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was fortunate enough to serve on the Armed Services
Committee on the House side and to serve on the equivalent
subcommittee, the Readiness Subcommittee, on the House side. So
I'm excited to be able to serve in the same capacity over here,
and I look forward to adding hopefully a little bit of value to
the committee's work with the ranking member and the chairman.
Senator Bayh. I'm sure your experience in this area will
prove to be invaluable.
Senator Udall. I appreciate the confidence.
If I might turn to General Amos and General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli, I think the last time I saw you, and I
wouldn't expect you to remember, you were serving a de facto
role as mayor of Baghdad. Thank you for your service in that
situation. I hope we're, as a country and as a military
institution, taking advantage of what you learned about
counterinsurgencies and the nationbuilding, if you will, that
attends the kinds of challenges we face in places like
Afghanistan and Iraq.
If I might, I'd like to begin with a comment and then throw
some questions your way. I understand you're working on energy,
that is the Army, and electricity grid security. I'm pleased to
hear that because of the growing concerns over cyber and
physical threats to the power grid and transformers. I don't
have any questions right now, but I look forward to working
with you and building on the Army's interest in energy
security, and would like to offer my help in that regard.
I know a number of Senators attended a closed briefing
recently about cyber security, particularly when it comes to
our grid. So thank you for that work.
General Chiarelli. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Udall. If I might, let me turn to an interview you
gave to Defense News recently. In it you addressed the
importance of evaluating lightweight equipment, weapons, and
body armor for our soldiers in Afghanistan. Last week I was at
Fort Carson in Colorado Springs, CO, and I heard specifically
about the needs of our soldiers in Afghanistan when I met with
Colonel Randy George, who is the Commander of the 4th BCT, the
4th I.D.
He's preparing to deploy to Afghanistan next month. One of
the first topics we discussed was the need for lightweight
equipment and body armor in Afghanistan. Colonel George and
others with him that day agreed that speed is the best
protection--I think that's exactly how he put it--in a
mountainous environment like Afghanistan, and that we should do
anything we can to lighten our soldiers' loads so the Taliban
can't outmaneuver them.
They noted this debate about light versus heavy vehicles
and body armor can get political, because soldiers' families
and the general public and those of us in Congress push for our
soldiers, our marines, to have the strongest vehicles and body
armor, even as that same equipment makes it more difficult in
some settings for soldiers to get around.
I think the Russians were at some points of that conflict
in the 80s in Afghanistan called ``turtles'' by the Mujahedin
because they were so burdened by their armor. If you could flip
them on their backs, literally and figuratively, they were
helpless.
Could you share your views on how to strike that balance in
Afghanistan, and as a follow-on do you believe the soldiers
going to Afghanistan have all the lightweight equipment they
need? Is the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) helping individual
units deploying to Afghanistan?
Forgive me for throwing three questions at you.
General Chiarelli. I'll take the last one first. I think
the REF has been absolutely critical in the Army's ability to
get lightweight equipment and look for commercial off-the-shelf
solutions to what we're doing. We're getting ready to issue
equipment to Randy's brigade from May 11 to May 15 that will
save anywhere from 13-plus pounds to 23-plus pounds, depending
upon the position that the individual soldier has in the
formation. A heavy machine gunner, 23-plus pounds; a rifleman,
14-plus pounds.
We've made great strides with body armor, and the MBAB
carrier, or the plate carrier that will carry our standard SAPI
accept enhanced small arms protective insert plates, will save
3.77 pounds. Randy's will be the first Army unit that will have
that ability. Now, he will go into Afghanistan with both sets
of body armor. He will have his heavier improved outer tactical
vest, which weighs 3.77 pounds more, and he will have the
lightweight plate carrier.
I would not pretend to try to make the call from
Washington, DC, which he should wear. That'll be up to him
based on the conditions, both friendly and enemy, that he sees
on the ground to make that decision. Our goal is to provide him
with that weight savings as rapidly as we possibly can.
The savings of upwards of 23 pounds I think would not have
been possible without great support from AMC and our REF in
getting commercial off-the-shelf things that we could rapidly
get to soldiers to save weight.
Senator Udall. We talked at some length as well about where
that responsibility lies and where the discretion lies when it
comes to making those decisions. I hear you suggesting he would
have a fair amount of discretion as to what kind of body armor
and protective equipment he requires of his men and women in
the field.
General Chiarelli. That's exactly right. It's our job to
point out to him what the risk factor is, and we've worked
very, very hard to lay that out and show him exactly what it
would mean to go to the lighter body armor. But at the same
time, when you're at 8,000 to 11,000 feet working in the
terrain that he's working in, I don't think any of us down here
near sea level can understand what it means in a soldier's
ability in the 10th month of a rotation to have almost 4 pounds
less weight and agility to be able to fire his individual or
crew-served weapon.
That's what the MBAB with SAPI plates gives him, is an
ability that we had not been able to give him before.
Senator Udall. General, at the risk of sounding immodest, I
would add to your comments. It also may be drawing into
question my own personal judgment, but through the years I've
participated in nine Himalayan climbing expeditions in that
part of the world, and I went there for recreation and for
other reasons. Some people think I killed so many brain cells I
went into politics, at those high altitudes, but that's another
discussion.
But the idea of carrying, as I did, 45, 50, 55 pounds on
your back in those high mountains and being shot at at the same
time is something I don't want to really contemplate. But I
know the effect of even an additional pound on your ability to
maneuver, to stay fit, to stay healthy. So I commend you for
what you're doing.
There was also talk, by the way, about foot gear, and there
are efforts under way to get the best possible foot gear for
mountain environments, which weren't necessarily standard Army
issue. So I would encourage that flexibility as well. The Army
and the Corps move on their feet, and if your feet aren't
healthy, you don't have the right foot gear, you're at a
disadvantage.
General Chiarelli. The boot we're going to be testing with
Randy's unit will save just over 2 pounds. But again, we want
to get some good data on the reliability of that boot and
whether or not soldiers feel that it does the job at 2 pounds
lighter. But again, we're not leaving any stone unturned to try
to get at lighter gear.
Senator Udall. The new materials and technologies in
mountain boots have gone from in the old days of 10 to 12
pounds a pair to a third of that. I think you can find an
excellent pair of heavy duty boots for 4 pounds. They're not
cheap, but I know the Army and the Marines have some elements
to bring to the table, including an interest in volume. So I
would think that we could find a way to provide that great foot
gear.
Colonel George, by the way, is a phenomenal leader. I think
you know that, but I just wanted for the record to note how
impressed I am with him and his grasp of all of what we're
going to ask him to do over there.
If I might, I'd like to turn to some testimony you gave
earlier in the year about the alarming increases in suicides in
the Army and how the Army is looking to address the crisis.
Fort Carson has seen its rate increase and it's a big concern
of mine. You talked in that testimony about comprehensive
soldier fitness, and you mentioned the Battlemind training with
its pre- and post-deployment modules. You said it's the only
mental health and resilience program demonstrated to reduce
symptoms of post-traumatic stress upon redeployment.
I heard last week from General Graham, who by the way as
well is just a phenomenal leader and American, and Colonel
George and other leaders about the importance of this pre-
deployment training. The Fourth BCT as I understand it is the
first major Army unit to get this mental toughness training.
They've received very good feedback. They suggested that such
training might be conducted all the way across the Army,
perhaps expanding the Battlemind program and setting up
traditional pilots all over the country.
Would you care to comment on such training and where else
we might apply it?
General Chiarelli. Brigadier General Rhonda Cornum is
running an effort for the Army, total soldier fitness
resiliency training. Battlemind will be a key and critical
piece of that. In fact, we currently have train the trainers
being trained as we speak to go out throughout the Army to help
provide this as part of her overall program, which we hope to
roll out here in the next couple of months. It is a critical
piece of suicide prevention, as are so many things, as I found
out.
I was not able to visit Fort Carson on my recent trip
because the snow was so bad there that Mark asked me not to
come in because we'd pull in additional soldiers, but I did
meet Mark in Fort Lewis and he briefed me on some of the
efforts that he has going on at Fort Carson. But it is a multi-
disciplinary approach that we have to go after this with.
We just published our campaign plan this week. It's a lot
of process, but it's process that I'm personally driving, 250
taskers that we are driving through the service by 1 September,
some of them very, very difficult things, to get at this
problem. We are committed to driving the rate of suicide down
throughout the Army.
Senator Udall. General, I need to work with you on that.
Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Thune I understand is on a tight time line, so,
John, if there are questions you want to submit for the record,
we'd be happy to take those. I know you're multi-tasking here
today.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. A challenge we can all relate to.
Senator Thune. I thank General Chiarelli and General Amos
for your service to our country. Be sure you convey our
appreciation to all of those that you work with.
Just a couple of quick questions, if I might. It got
touched on a little bit earlier by Senator Burr, but I want to
come back to this whole process now of going away from
supplementals and including everything in the annual defense
budget. Does that create in your judgment concerns about areas
that might suffer without the flexibility that supplemental
funding provides?
I'm sort of curious about your general view of how we have
done this in the past and the way that we've responded to
specific needs that come up, and the way that we have funded
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through supplemental budget
requests, and now trying to absorb all of that in the annual
general budget process. Do you anticipate any issues related to
that in terms of the needs that you have?
General Amos. Sir, I'll take the first stab at it and Pete
can clean up the battlefield after I'm done.
About 2 years ago, the Commandant made a purposeful
decision to try to get as much what we would call things that
would be above the line, things that we would not normally be
able to pay for in what we call the baseline budget, things
that would be in the supplementals--to try to force ourselves
on a diet so that we could bring some of that supplemental kind
of things into the baseline.
We've been successful on things such as manpower. The
typical cost of manpower in this fiscal year alone, when we
finish the end of fiscal year 2009, the 202,000 marines that
Congress has given us authorization to grow to and money to buy
them and all that stuff will in 2010 and beyond be forced into
the baseline. In other words, we will not be trying to pay
manpower bills with supplementals.
So that's what I'm talking about, forcing ourselves to get
on a diet. You can only do that so much when you're wearing
equipment out. If we were in static, if this was 1978 or 1985
and our equipment and our people were static, then we could
probably figure out how to keep everything within a baseline.
But when you're getting it destroyed, you're wearing it out at
seven times the rate that you paid, that you programmed for
that equipment, and you have the extra O&M costs of combat in
two theaters, or one theater but in two major areas of that
theater, it will be difficult. It will be very difficult to do
this and put it in the baseline, unless the baseline itself
increased, if that makes sense.
Senator Thune. It certainly does.
General?
General Chiarelli. I would echo those comments. We've been
able to move our military personnel into the base, but two
things that concern me: the first is one that we just talked
Rapid Equipping Task Force. Their money that they use to go
find these off-the-shelf solutions, to be able to go and
lighten the soldiers' load from 14 to 23 pounds, is directly
out of the supplemental or OCO funding, and I have to find a
place for that in the base because I think they do such
critical work and it moved us ahead so rapidly.
I also worry about reset. So much of what we have in the
supplemental is in fact reset. I think that General Cody and
General Casey have testified long before me that we see that
reset requirement going on for 2 to 3 years after we bring the
last forces back. It just takes time to rebuild that equipment
and get it back. I would only echo Jim's comments about how
difficult that would be.
Senator Thune. I appreciate the answer to that. What I hear
you saying is it's going to be very difficult to do this in the
annual baseline--a question that if I might have him answer for
the record, having to do with the different terrain that you're
seeing in Afghanistan, the way that the infrastructure needs,
the poor roads and everything, unique requirements relative to
Iraq. General Chiarelli, if you could identify additional
equipment requirements that would better serve our forces in
Afghanistan that are currently underfunded or unfunded, I'd be
interested if you would at least furnish that for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bayh. We'll include your questions in the record,
Senator. I would ask, gentlemen, if your staff could prepare
some answers for Senator Thune.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Udall, anything else from you?
Senator Udall. No, thank you.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This is the
first hearing that I've had the privilege of chairing as the
subcommittee chairman, and I want this to be a very cooperative
relationship. Consider us to be your partners, and I am well
aware of the demands on your time that hearings like this
present to both you and your staff, so we will attempt to make
the times we have you up here modest and no more than
necessary. That's number one.
Number two, while there's much too much partisan
divisiveness in Washington, I don't want that to be any part of
this subcommittee. We're not really Democrats or Republicans
here. We're American. We want to make sure that you and your
soldiers have everything that you need to carry out the
missions that our country is asking you to fulfill.
I look forward to working with Senator Burr and members on
both sides of the aisle in cooperation with you to accomplish
that mission.
I'd like to thank you for your and your staffs' time today,
and look forward to working together. Thank you very much,
gentlemen.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
advisory and assistance brigades and security force assistance
1. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month in
his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Petraeus spoke about Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) which will
train the Afghan National Army and Police forces. He specifically
mentioned the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne
Division, and the marines deploying to Regional Command-South area.
What is the additional end strength requirement for your forces as we
see an increasing trend and operations tempo (OPTEMPO) with respect to
AABs and Security Force Assistance (SFA)?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' planned reduced footprint in Iraq
will offset force sourcing stress even with the increasing requirement
in Afghanistan. The authorized 202,000 active duty end strength will be
sufficient to meet 1:2 Active Duty dwell and 1:5 Reserve Force dwell in
the mid-term. The Marine Corps will be challenged to meet these goals
in the near term because of residual Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
requirements concurrent with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) build-up.
However, this would not be mitigated by even immediate additional end
strength authorization because of the training pipeline.
General Chiarelli. There is no impact on the Army's needed end
strength, just some internal organizational changes to meet SFA mission
requirements. Currently, the Army has not formally templated an AAB
augmentation package for OEF. However, we do have a template for Iraq.
Organizational changes needed to mission an Army BCT as an AAB is the
augmentation of 48 field grade officers, the attachment of a 15-Soldier
Facilities Engineer Detachment, and a 16-person interagency Civil
Capacity Team. The specific ranks of the 48 field grade officers is 4
colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels, and 24 majors; and the specifics of
the Engineer Detachment and Civil Capacity Team is yet to be fully
defined. These additions to the BCT will allow the brigade commander to
internally task organize to meet SFA mission requirements. Even though
the Iraq AAB package has not been formally adopted for OEF, the
Afghanistan package will most likely look about the same.
2. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, where is the
SFA or AAB doctrine with respect to specific mission requirements and
characteristics?
General Amos. The baseline of ``advise and assist'' strategy
outlined by General Petraeus in the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual has
been incorporated in the Marine Corps guidance to operational
commanders and the supporting establishment to certify Blocks I-IV in
preparation for deployment to Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR). While ``train and assist'' is not and will not be
a USMC core competency, it is a necessary skill for the current fight.
The Marine Corps will continue to adapt predeployment training to
prepare for the current fight based on lessons learned. Additionally,
at no time in recent history have we had so many staff noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) and officers that have first hand experience in this
type of combat. After 8 years of war, clearly our training commands are
filled with marines that understand these principles.
General Chiarelli. Army Regulation 11-31, Army International
Security Cooperation Policy, establishes policy and prescribes
responsibilities and procedures for the planning, integration,
programming, budgeting and execution of Army security cooperation
activities.
The Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, is the Army
proponent for all doctrine related to SFA and in May 2009 published
Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security forces Assistance to provide a
conceptual framework for Army forces to conduct SFA within the context
of full spectrum operations. It addresses the operational and tactical
levels while focusing on the modular brigade in the conduct of SFA
activities.
The doctrine of FM 3-07.1 is nested within that of FM 3-07,
Stability Operations, published by CAC in October 2008.
CAC is also responsible for the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint
Center for International SFA and, in July 2008, published the
Commander's Handbook for SFA to distill and distribute best practices
and lessons learned from current SFA operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
3. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiareeli, is the SFA or
AAB functions an additional duty or a core competency of ground forces
today?
General Amos. As outlined in question 2 above, ``advise and
assist'' remains a necessary skill-set for both the current fight and
the ``long war'' as outlined by the Secretary of Defense. However, the
Marine Corps fundamentally remains a unique expeditionary force
employable via amphibious shipping or committed in conjunction with a
decision to employ the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) assets. While
the Marine Corps will always adapt to meet the Nations needs, SFA/AAB
functions currently performed do not alter our Title 10 mission.
General Chiarelli. Stability operations are a core competency of
all Army formations and SFA is a component part of stability
operations.
Army FM 3-0, Operations, establishes full spectrum operations as
the Army's fundamental operational concept that Army forces combine
offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations
simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to generate
decisive results.
Army organizations assigned to operational missions will, as part
of their preparatory training in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
model, be organized, trained, and equipped to perform these missions.
Brigades assigned SFA missions will be fully prepared for that mission
prior to deployment.
end strength
4. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month,
both of you testified at a Personnel Subcommittee hearing on suicides.
There, you both noted that one significant contributing factor to the
rise in suicides in your Services is the stress on the force caused by
lengthy and frequent deployments. That same day, the Secretary of
Defense announced he had approved a plan to end the Army's practice of
stop loss. I think we can all agree that mobilization and dwell time
goals are very important to the overall health of the force--but we are
still falling short of meeting those goals. In your statements today,
you acknowledged that until the demand for forces decreases, these
challenges will remain. General Chiarelli, the target end strength of
547,400 by fiscal year 2011 is projected to be achieved 2 years earlier
than expected, and some in Congress are even calling for an additional
30,000 beyond the currently authorized 547,400. General Amos, similarly
in your opening statement you spoke of the Marine Corps also achieving
its end strength goal of 202,000 2 years ahead of schedule. What is the
total number of troops necessary to reduce the operational demand upon
the Army and Marine Corps, and what is the estimated cost of rebuilding
and transforming both Services?
General Amos. The Commandant continues to stress that the growth to
202,000 active-duty marines will enable the Corps to meet current and
future challenges in an increasingly demanding operational environment.
As stated before, the Marine Corps is 2 years ahead of schedule with
the aggregate increase in end strength growth to 202,000. This growth
can be attributed to three factors: quality recruiting, exceptional
retention levels, and reduced attrition. The accelerated growth in
aggregate numbers has met the end strength requirement; however, time
is still needed to implement the original 202,000 build plan.
Specifically, time is required for procuring equipment, building
permanent facilities and shaping the inventory of the force. A standing
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel and Facilities Working Group is overseeing the implementation
and synchronization of this plan. This working group which consists of
a cross section of the Commandant's staff and Marine forces commanders
continues to seek efficiencies in accelerating the build plan.
The Marine Corps estimates that it will cost approximately $33
billion between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2013 to fund the
incremental costs of growing the force.
General Chiarelli. The Army does not have control over operational
demand, but has improved our ability to meet the demand we are
experiencing now and anticipating in the future. With national
leadership support, our Army has achieved our manpower growth goals in
all components during 2009, although we will not complete growing the
number of brigade combat teams (BCTs) to 73 (45 Active component (AC)
and 28 Reserve component (RC)) until 2011. This growth in the force,
combined with reduced operational deployments from 15 months to 12
months, has eased some of the strain on soldiers and families. The
current AC BCT boots on the ground to dwell ratio is about 1 year
deployed to 16 months at home or 1:1.3. This is based on an OIF/OEF
demand for 15 BCTs (AC). Based on the Grow the Army objective of 45
BCTs (AC) and a reduction in global demands, we anticipate reaching a 2
year dwell in 2011. So long as we continue the trend of increasing
dwell, stress on the Army will stabilize and diminish over time.
To rebuild our force, we are providing additional support to
soldiers and families; repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing
equipment; and retraining soldiers. In the effort to transform our
force, we have converted 83 percent of our units to modular formations,
accelerated delivery of advanced technologies, kept Base Realignment
and Closure and restationing on schedule, and developed relevant
doctrine for leaders to operate effectively in joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environments. We are continuing
efforts to build and sustain Reserve component readiness and to
increase predictability of deployments for soldiers, their families,
employers, and communities.
The Army has sufficient support in the fiscal year 2010 President's
budget to meet projected operational demand and to rebuild and
transform the force--all while preserving our All-Volunteer Force.
5. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how will the
Army balance near-term operational risks with the need for prudent
long-term investments?
General Amos. The OPTEMPO of OIF and OEF has stressed the Marine
Corps. The land-based nature and irregular warfare (IW) environment
increased the operational risk that the Marine Corps had to accept in
its core competencies of amphibious operations, high-end combined arms
capability, and MPF operations in support of contingency operations.
Those factors degraded our ability to source combatant commander
requirements, particularly in shaping operations and contingency
response outside the CENTCOM area of operations. To mitigate near-term
risks of the current fight while developing the Marine Corps of the
future, the Commandant is addressing three areas to ensure a Marine
Corps which will engage in the full range of military operations
whenever the Nation calls.
First, we are successfully right-sizing the force with an
authorized end-strength expansion to 202,000. A right-sized Marine
Corps not only reduces the stress on the individual marine and sailor
by increasing time between deployments, but it also reduces the stress
on the Marine Corps as a whole and enables the second area: providing
high-end unit and individual training.
We are initiating the Combined Arms Exercise Next program at Marine
Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, CA, which
integrates COIN specific skills with intensive combined arms training,
significantly enhancing core warfighting functions for all elements of
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). We are revitalizing our naval
amphibious competency which will lead to full scale Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-level amphibious exercises. We are
developing the capability to conduct large-scale MAGTF exercises within
a joint, interagency, and coalition context. We are engaged in training
and education programs to build the capacity of allied and partner
nations, as well as developing the cultural and language ability of our
own force, which allow us to shape the environment and execute our
mission more effectively. The Marine Corps is enhancing training
capabilities gained for the current fight in COIN Operations, Civil-
Military Operations, Advisor Training, Urban Operations, Intelligence
Fusion, and Information Operations in order to better employ our forces
across the full range of military operations.
The third area, modernization of the force, speaks more directly to
the question of prudent long-term investment. We are committed to
providing marines and sailors with the very best warfighting equipment
and capabilities with which to train and fight so that they are ready,
relevant, and capable. Sustaining current operations requires the
Marine Corps to ``modernize on the march'' by replacing gear consumed
in combat while fielding next-generation technology. We are providing
our warfighters with the best personal protective equipment--including
light body armor, lightweight helmets, and flame-resistant
organizational gear--and continue to procure Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles and up-armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) for current operations while investigating
lighter weight MRAPs and Light Tactical Vehicles (LTVs) to better
support our expeditionary posture. We are moving ahead with programs to
improve our fire support; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR); and command and control capabilities. The
majority of Marine Corps aviation assets are legacy airframes that are
no longer in production, and aircraft procurement programs for the MV-
22, KC-130J, F-35B, UH-1Y, AH-1Z, and CH-53K are critical to the MAGTF
of the future.
Right-sizing, training, and modernization are mitigating our near-
term operational risks while providing for the long-term investment
that will build the balanced MAGTF--America's 911 force--to meet the
demands of the future security environment.
General Chiarelli. The Army does not have control over operational
demand, but has improved our ability to meet the demand we are
experiencing now and anticipating in the future. With national
leadership support, our Army has achieved our manpower growth goals in
all components during 2009, although we will not complete growing the
number of BCTs to 73 (45 Active component and 28 Reserve component)
until 2011. This growth in the force, combined with reduced operational
deployments from 15 months to 12 months, has eased some of the strain
on soldiers and families.
To rebuild our force, we are providing additional support to
soldiers and families; repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing
equipment; and retraining soldiers. In the effort to transform our
force, we have converted 83 percent of our units to modular formations,
accelerated delivery of advanced technologies, kept Base Realignment
and Closure and restationing on schedule, and developed relevant
doctrine for leaders to operate effectively in joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environments. We are continuing
efforts to build and sustain Reserve component readiness and to
increase predictability of deployments for soldiers, their families,
employers, and communities.
The Army has sufficient support in the fiscal year 2010 President's
budget to meet projected operational demand and to rebuild and
transform the force--all while preserving our All-Volunteer Force.
strategic depth
6. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, General Schoomaker used to talk
a lot about restoring the strategic depth of the Army. He first spoke
of it several years ago and I wonder if we are any closer today than we
were then. For example, a field artillery unit could feasibly report
C4, yet then deploy to conduct convoy security operations. While they
will likely perform that mission with success, it is a directed
mission, not their core function. Is it possible to achieve given the
current pace of deployments? If so, how?
General Chiarelli. Strategic depth is the Army's ability to
prosecute another contingency operation. This requires the force to be
full spectrum capable. Currently, demand is exceeding the Army's supply
and we are consuming readiness as quickly as we can provide it to the
force. Additionally, unit dwell time has only permitted time for units
to train on COIN or their directed mission. The Chief of Staff of the
Army's guidance is that units with at least 18 months of dwell utilize
90 days to focus on conventional tasks-combined with the COIN skill
sets enable units to be full spectrum ready. Units with less than 18
months of dwell remain focused on training to their COIN/directed
mission. Rebalancing the Army, coupled with a decrease in global demand
will provide units and soldiers more dwell time to train for full
spectrum operations, thus restoring the Army's strategic depth-enabling
the Army to meet the challenges of the uncertain future. In order to
meet the dwell requirement that will allow us to rebuild strategic
depth, boots on the ground (BOG) to dwell will need to be 1:3 for the
Active component and 1:5 for the Reserve component.
7. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, if the
preparedness of our forces has come at the expense of strategic depth
for some potential future missions, how does this affect our National
Military Strategy (NMS) and our ability to respond to various operation
plans and unforeseen domestic disasters? What level of risk are we
accepting by doing so?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' ability to respond to other
contingencies outside of the CENTCOM area of operations is facing
increased risk due to degraded home station readiness and a limited
ability to adequately train for the full spectrum of operations due to
the demand for Marine forces. The military risk to our NMS is that the
Marine Corps may not have the people, equipment, or training at the
right place and time to meet combatant commanders' needs. The Marine
Corps' ability to meet operational plan timelines could be delayed,
possibly resulting in an increased loss of life to friendly forces.
General Chiarelli. Preparedness or readiness for full spectrum
operations provides our strategic depth. The Army ascribes to creating
general purpose combat forces that can operate across the spectrum of
conflict from disaster relief and peace keeping operations to general
war. Currently, unit dwell time is only sufficient for units to train
on COIN/directed mission and not conventional tasks. Although the
required tasks we ask of our soldiers in irregular warfare and COIN
operations are applicable across the spectrum of conflict, there is
some conventional training not being conducted for other operational
themes on the spectrum of conflict. The Chief of Staff of the Army
guidance is that units with less than 18 months of dwell remain focused
on training to their COIN/directed mission. Units with at least 18
months of dwell utilize 90 days to focus on conventional tasks and
remainder on the COIN/directed mission. The Army maintains a global
reaction force that could be committed to an emerging contingency.
Rebalancing the Army, coupled with a decrease in global demand will
provide units and soldiers more dwell time to train for full spectrum
operations, thus restoring the Army's strategic depth and increasing
our ability to respond to an uncertain security environment. Until
then, given the lower readiness of our next-to-deploy forces in full
spectrum operations, it could take longer to execute contingency plans
in accordance with planning timelines. In such cases, joint
capabilities will mitigate those ground force capabilities delayed by
force generation timelines. The Army can respond to domestic disasters
and has designated units prepared to execute this mission.
8. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, given the
current operating environment and focus of training on preparing for
ongoing operations, how does the Army and Marine Corps plan to maintain
the full spectrum of combat skills that could be needed if it was
called upon to respond to a crisis outside of Iraq or Afghanistan?
General Amos. Our Training and Education Continuum for both current
and future operations begins with entry level training, ascends through
formal schools, home station training, Professional Military Education,
and culminates with a final unit Pre-Deployment Training Program
assessment. This ascending-levels-of-competency approach allows marines
of all ranks to be trained at the right level, at the right time, and
the right place. To maintain the full spectrum of combat skills, the
Marine Corps is developing a MAGTF Training Program that includes
individual, unit and MAGTF component training, and integration with
joint, interagency and multinational organizations in order to prepare
multi-capable MAGTFs for expeditionary operations against hybrid
threats in complex environments.
General Chiarelli. The Army has adopted a warfighting doctrine (FM
3-0, Operations) that recognizes contemporary operations require a
balance of offense, defense, and stability operations, regardless of
where they occur along the spectrum of conflict. At the same time, the
Army has re-designed our approach to training so that units build
general proficiency in the fundamental tasks required of full spectrum
operations (i.e. offense, defense, and stability operations).
Proficiency in full spectrum operations conducted in Iraq or
Afghanistan provides a foundation from which units will be able to
quickly prepare for full spectrum operations in another theater or for
different points on the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, the Army
has published training guidance which, as time between deployments
increases, requires units to initially spend time training on
fundamental tasks for full spectrum operations focused more broadly
than the specific mission they have been given. Furthermore, the scope
of Army professional military education continues to prepare leaders
for operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. Finally, the
Army has embraced adaptability as an important capability of our force
generation process. Once a mission requirement is identified the Army
works diligently to support unit preparations by using mobile training
teams and distributed learning to fill any locally unavailable
shortcomings.
9. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, have you
analyzed the extent of skill degradation given the shift in focus and
the time it will take to rebuild and retrain?
General Amos. Yes, our Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) has
conducted a study analyzing the extent of core skill degradation and
time to retrain for several unit types. Currently, our Training and
Education Command is sponsoring a Training Reset Study, which, when
completed in February 2010, will provide a recommended training posture
for the future.
General Chiarelli. Yes; our analysis was based on interviews and
feedback from officers and NCOs, and senior leaders in the field. It
has been a number of years since our forces have had the time to train
on the broader range of operations across the spectrum of conflict,
rather than only on the current fight. force modularity has contributed
to the broader capabilities of our units. As the Army continues to
reduce forces in OIF, we eventually expect to realize a modest increase
in time that units have for training between deployments with
corresponding improvement in skill degradation. As units experience
more time between deployments they can address skill degradation
through reinvestment of our combat experienced soldiers and leaders, a
doctrine that instills the broader focus associated with full spectrum
operations, and a progressive combined arms training strategy that
rapidly rebuilds and retrains our units following combat rotations.
department of defense performance report
10. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month
the Department released the Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Report where
it assessed the strategic goals and objectives of the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review. Of the five goals, goal #3, reshape the defense
enterprise, evaluated the readiness of the Armed forces. The report
rated Army land forces readiness as ``effective, last evaluated in
2004'' while Marine Corps expeditionary warfare was rated as only
``moderately effective, last evaluated in 2006''. Do you have any
updates to this report and how it affects your overall readiness?
General Amos. The Marine Corps is based on an expeditionary
mindset--providing MAGTFs that are fast, austere, and lethal. The
ability to deploy rapidly to any clime and place and commence
operations with minimal existing infrastructure is one of the primary
reasons the Marine Corps is ideally suited for the Afghan theater.
Seven years of sustained land combat have degraded the Corps'
critical core competencies. The Marine Corps expeditionary capability
depends upon our amphibious nature and combined arms integration as
much as our ability to deploy via strategic lift. Our readiness levels
in our traditional core competencies have clearly decreased, primarily
driven by the high OPTEMPO and demands of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It is accurate, then, to describe our expeditionary
warfare capabilities as `moderately effective' since two key pillars of
that capability have been severely limited.
The Marine Corps maintains amphibious capability primarily through
the regular deployment of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). This
trains one battalion, squadron, and logistics combat element at a time,
but does not provide the same experience needed to coordinate a
brigade, or larger, sized amphibious assault. We have attempted to
maintain a core of trained leaders via professional military education,
and through involvement with amphibious exercises and studies sponsored
by the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Atlantic. With a decrease
in demand in CENTCOM and an increase in dwell time, the Marine Corps
will be able to provide amphibious operations training to those units
and higher headquarters organizations that have not had those training
opportunities in the recent years.
As we accomplish the Corps' end strength growth, continue the reset
and modernization initiatives, and achieve balance across our three
Marine Expeditionary Forces, our ability to train and regain our core
competencies will be enhanced. This in turn will improve the readiness
of the Marine Corps.
General Chiarelli. The 2004 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
evaluation of Army Land forces Readiness was the source for the fiscal
year 2008 Performance Report effective rating. The PART was developed
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2002 to assess and
improve program performance so that the Federal Government can achieve
better results. A PART evaluation helps identify a program's management
strengths and weaknesses to inform decisions to make the program more
effective. The PART looks at all factors that affect and reflect
program performance including purpose and design, strategic planning,
program management, and program results.
The 2004 assessment was the last full PART evaluation completed by
OMB for Army Land forces Readiness. The Army provides semi-annual
updates to the budget and performance results for this program. The
semi-annual updates do not include updates on program purpose and
design, strategic planning, and program management. OMB is currently
revising guidance on performance measurement and the use of PART
evaluations of Army programs.
The Army Land forces Readiness program contributes to the live and
virtual training that units complete at home station and combat
training centers. The primary PART performance measure tracks the
OPTEMPO program execution. Execution of OPTEMPO enables units to
achieve a high level of readiness, sufficient to prepare them for COIN
operations. OPTEMPO is measured using an annual mile metric for
training performance and establishes the baseline metric (miles) units
execute each year in order to maintain combat proficiency.
The Army continues to train effectively to meet current operational
requirements, as reflected in the fiscal year 2008 Performance Report
rating as ``effective, last evaluated in 2004.''
funding reset operations
11. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, I believe our
depots and arsenals are a national treasure and provide with a truly
unique capability critical to our national security and the workers
there continue to do a tremendous job. Since the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have begun, reset operations have been funded mainly in the
supplemental. This trend frankly disturbs me because for several years
now the Services have underfunded their annual depot maintenance
requirements and punted them to the supplemental. We will need to fully
fund reset for years after we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan. When
will the Army and Marine Corps fully fund reset operations into the
base budget request?
General Amos. Reset costs have not been in the baseline budget
because both Congress and OSD have generally agreed that war related
costs should be a part of supplementals. As part of that trend, our war
related cost depot maintenance funding requirements for fiscal year
2010 are included in our fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) request. Because we are resetting equipment to support
current and future combat needs we're committed to fully funding our
depot maintenance requirements to ensure that we Reset and Reconstitute
the force as quick as possible. I would strongly advise against trying
to fund both our Rest and Modernization effort within the current
baseline budget funding levels, especially while we're still fighting.
To do so would put at risk our ability to recover from this conflict at
the expense of modernization necessary to meet future threats.
General Chiarelli. The Army expects that our reset requirements
will be in the range of $13 to $14 billion per year as long as we have
forces deployed and for 2 to 3 years thereafter to ensure readiness for
the future. Reset is a cost of war and therefore we expect that our
reset requirements will not integrate into the base budget until 2 to 3
years after the end of the war and forces redeploy. Beyond that
timeframe, the extent to which reset will be funded in the base budget
will be determined through future administration and congressional
guidance.
12. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, are the Army
depots and Marine Corps logistics bases operating a full capacity and
are they experiencing any backlogs or constraints with respect to their
throughput capability to repair equipment?
General Amos. We're not operating at full capacity, but that's
mostly because we don't have all our equipment back yet. We're prepared
and committed to ensuring that the depots are funded to meet the
increased demand caused by the coming retrograde of our equipment from
Iraq.
We do have several constraints that we've addressed in our fiscal
year 2010 Unfunded Programs List. These include our capacity to offload
equipment at Blount Island Command and process it for transportation to
our depots. There are four projects worth $40 million that would help
us increase capacity and speed this transition effort. In addition,
we've highlighted one vehicle repair facility in need of improvements
at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow that could also expand our
capacity to quickly repair combat vehicles.
General Chiarelli. None of the Army's depots are operating at full
capacity. The depots' current production rates are based on the rate of
return of equipment from theater and the Army's need to equip units for
training and deployment. The depots can increase production if the rate
of equipment return accelerates.
The only above normal depot maintenance backlog is approximately
500 Medium Tactical Vehicles. This backlog is not due to depot
capacity; it is due to repair parts shortages. The repair parts issues
are being worked with the manufacturer and the backlog will begin to
reduce starting in June 2009.
13. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, recently
Congress received the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request which asks
for $11.6 billion to reconstitute the force in addition to the $11.6
billion from the fiscal year 2009 bridge appropriation. Are the amounts
requested by the Army and Marine Corps sufficient and executable by the
depots and logistics bases or do you require additional resources?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' reset and reconstitution funding
requests in the fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 OCO are
sufficient and executable by our depots.
General Chiarelli. The Army's fiscal year 2009 supplemental request
of $13.3 billion is sufficient and executable. Our industrial base,
depots and original equipment manufacturers have the capacity and
resources to accomplish our Reset requirements.
The Army requested $13.3 billion for Reset as a part of the fiscal
year 2009 Supplemental Request. This is comprised of $7.9 billion for
Operations and Sustainment funds as well as $5.4 billion for
Procurement. As part of the fiscal year 2009 Bridge Supplemental, the
Army received $9.8 billion for Reset; $7.9 billion for Operations and
Sustainment, but only $1.9 billion for Procurement.
The Army has requested the remaining $3.5 billion for Reset
Procurement in the fiscal year 2009 Main Supplemental. This request
funds the remaining procurement of battle losses/washouts.
reset pilot program
14. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, last year the Army began the
Reset Pilot program which aimed to validate the reset process and
restore capabilities of eight Active component BCTs and five Reserve
component BCTs returning from deployment. Last year, Daniel Egbert, the
force Management Program Manager for G-3 and lead integrator for the
reset pilot said, ``Standardizing the reset processes is key to
restoring balance in the Army and maintaining the quality of
capabilities the Army provides the Nation.'' Has the Reset Pilot
program succeeded in this regard, and what is the standard for reset?
General Chiarelli. The Reset Pilot has been a success. The Reset
Pilot was established in order to implement a process Army-wide to
restore deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness
that permits resumption of training for future missions and identify
how the Army institution needed to adapt to support units in ARFORGEN.
The Army developed a set of metrics to track execution of tasks while a
unit is in Reset. The fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 pilot units
have demonstrated that accomplishing reset tasks sets the conditions
for unit manning and equipping and affords time for the soldiers to
begin to focus on individual and collective training. The Reset Pilot
efforts continue to focus on sustaining the supply of ready forces to
the combatant commanders while the Army adapts our institutional
systems and processes to make future reset efforts more effective and
efficient.
15. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, how will the Army plan and
implement reset as a standard practice?
General Chiarelli. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)
established a Reset Pilot to implement a process Army-wide to restore
deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that
will permit resumption of training for future missions. The success of
the 30 units in the fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 Reset Pilots
has demonstrated that reset tasks can be accomplished, and that
execution of those tasks facilitates the building of unit readiness.
Many of the ``best business practices'' realized by the pilot units
have already been applied to the rest of the Army through publication
of follow on HQDA directives, effective on January 15, 2009. Soon the
Army will publish its new Readiness regulation which will codify reset
reporting requirements for all Army units.
16. Senator Bayh. General Chiarelli, has the pilot program been
independently certified or was this purely an Army decision?
General Chiarelli. General Casey began his tenure as the Chief of
Staff, Army by identifying four imperatives by which the Army will
achieve balance by 2011. The Reset Imperative was independently
developed by the Army Staff as a mechanism to prepare our soldiers,
families, units, and equipment for future deployments and other
contingencies. Reset Pilot efforts continue to focus on sustaining the
supply of ready forces to combatant commanders while the Army adapts
institutional systems and processes to make future force Generation
efforts more effective and efficient.
17. Senator Bayh. General Amos, as you know the Marine Corps takes
almost an entirely opposite approach from the Army when it comes to
reset, favoring approximately a 90 percent procurement and replacement
strategy versus a 10 percent reset strategy. Does the Marine Corps
intend to continue in this manner of procurement versus reset strategy?
General Amos. The Marine Corps does have a different approach to
reset (repair/replace) than the Army as a result of the service's
employment of forces. When OIF began, the Marine Corps ground equipment
inventory was not designed to equip or sustain the unique demands of a
7-year land war. As a result, the Marine Corps efficiently managed
inventory by maintaining unit sets of equipment in theater at the
expense of home station units and strategic programs. There was not
enough equipment to rotate 100 percent of the forward deployed
inventory, therefore the service relied upon unit maintenance,
contractor support, Army maintenance capabilities in theater, and
selective rotation of equipment for depot maintenance. As a result, the
bulk of equipment deployed to OIF has been in combat for an extended
period of time.
Initially, the Marine Corps relied more heavily on procurement for
reset. Today, as the Marine Corps continues to execute reset, every
piece of equipment redeploying from OIF is deliberately inspected to
determine the appropriate reset action. Once inspected, equipment is
repaired, replaced, or in some cases, receives no reset at all. The
Marine Corps reset strategy remains flexible in order to maintain and
sustain the demands for equipment and ensure that we are postured for
the uncertainty of the future.
18. Senator Bayh. General Amos, what is the strategy with respect
to forces in Afghanistan?
General Amos. The Marine Corps will continue to rotate our forces
in Afghanistan and fall in on equipment sets maintained in theater. Our
force deployment and equipping strategy is no different in Iraq, and
will be even more appropriate in Afghanistan. The logistics of moving
equipment in and out of Afghanistan is much more challenging than Iraq,
since Afghanistan is a land locked country with a primitive
infrastructure, extreme weather, and difficult terrain. Combined with a
highly kinetic environment, we believe this strategy is the right
approach to managing our forces and equipment.
afghanistan agriculture and counter-drug operations
19. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month in
his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Petraeus commented on the importance of the National Guard agricultural
teams operating out of Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. Their mission to
provide Afghan farmers with alternatives to poppy is critical to
success there. How are these teams structured, trained, and supported
in order to fulfill CENTCOM's requirements?
General Amos. The Marine Corps does not have agricultural teams in
its inventory.
General Chiarelli. The primary mission of the Afghan Agri-business
Development Teams (ADTs) is to bridge to future expanded interagency
support, from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). The teams partner
with USDA, USAID, and other agencies to ensure maximum use of resources
and deconfliction of projects. Teams are composed of 34 security forces
soldiers, 10-person agriculture teams with specialties in marketing,
soil, agronomy, horticulture, animal husbandry, and food processing.
The rest of the team is a headquarters element with combat medics,
mechanics, and engineers. The teams train in their home State then
deploy to Camp Atterbury, IN, for more formal training prior to theater
deployment. The ADTs are operationally-controlled by the brigade level
task force with administrative control by the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT).
20. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is their
operational footprint and how do they fit into CENTCOM's increase of
forces and what resources do they require?
General Amos. The 2nd MEB has requested a National Guard ADT in
order to assist in the development of licit crops and a robust
agribusiness in Helmand Province. The development of a robust and licit
agriculture sector is essential to the long-term success of our efforts
in Regional Command-South. MEB operational planning identified this
need and articulated it in message (S) DTG 281442Z Apr 09.
General Chiarelli. There are currently six operational teams
deployed in Regional Command-East and Central with three in each
command. Two additional teams will deploy and become operational this
fall. One of the two new teams is designated for Regional Command-
South, while the other is slated for Regional Command-East. Each ADT is
comprised of 58 soldiers and airmen from a particular State, and all
are volunteers. The team is commanded by a Colonel. However, the ADT is
operationally controlled by the BCT Task Force (TF) Headquarters in
that region. Each ADT is assigned to a particular province to support
the BCT TF's area of responsibility and works out of a designated
Forward Operating Base (FOB). The ADT is usually collocated with a PRT
and together these teams share in the day-to-day routine of securing
the FOB, maintaining vehicles and equipment, and synchronizing their
efforts to ensure mission success. The ADT requires similar resources
as the PRT, to include various classes of military supply from food to
fuel and ammo to medical and Close Air Support on call when required.
21. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, since poppy
plants themselves are not illegal, would these teams ever consider
buying them directly from Afghan farmers instead of the Taliban drug
trade, thus cutting off their supply source?
General Amos. We recommend that this answer be referred to the
Joint Staff.
General Chiarelli. A decision to directly purchase poppy plants
from Afghan farmers should be addressed by other Federal agencies. The
National Guard Afghan ADTs are not involved in the direct Poppy
Eradication mission in Afghanistan. The mission of the ADT is to
provide Afghan farmers with alternative livelihoods. The ADT
operational objectives are: to improve access to technology, capital,
market access, and to restore irrigation and crop land capacity. Other
key objectives include food storage, food supply and conservation
practices. It is imperative for the long term success of the teams that
we focused on this mission.
22. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what
alternatives to poppy are they providing Afghan farmers?
General Amos. USAID reports cumulative results from 2002-2008 as
follows:
Over 1,500 Metric tons of fruit and vegetable exports valued
at $6 million in sales
Over 30,000 farmers under legal farming contracts
Over 300 rural farm stores/Agricultural depots established
National and regional market information system established
Over 3.2 million forestry cuttings, saplings, and fruit trees
planted
58 Kabul university students involved in masters degree
programs
Over 240,000 Afghan farmers trained benefitting 90,000
families
Almost 300,000 Afghans paid cash-for-work programs totaling
$37 million
Over 5700km of irrigation and drainage canals rehabilitated
benefitting 250,000 hectares
977km of rural roads constructed
Over 414,000 farmers have received improved seeds and
fertilizer
These are interesting statistics that show promise given security
and stability but do not address the untamed Regional Command-South
battlespace where the Marine MEB will operate. A good example is the
2008 deployment of 24 MEU and 2d Bn 7th marines. While 2/7 was brought
to Afghanistan to ``train and mentor,'' neither environmental
conditions nor density of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)/Awami
National Party (ANP) allowed them to execute this task; they conducted
a combat mission. Twenty four MEUs were brought for combat and
conducted combat until conditions allowed for community outreach at
which time traditional COIN principles applied including a civil
military operations center and opportunity for USAID engagement. This
is how we see the next year in Regional Command-South. Security must
come first concurrent with adequate numbers of partnered ANSF and
mentored ANP, then relationships with local leaders, then we'll be able
to address alternative crops. After action from 24 MEU, 2/7, and now
Special Purpose MAGTF Afghanistan all point towards a willingness by
the local Afghan population to accept alternative crops once the threat
of retribution from autonomous Taliban and narco-traffickers subsides
due to coalition operations and continued presence.
General Chiarelli. The ADTs deploy out to provincial level to
identify and promote access to local and regional markets. The ADTs
successfully provide the Provincial Agri-business extension agents with
structured agricultural technical advice establishing a functional
extension based service to the local farmers, plan, build, and provide
sanitary livestock slaughtering facilities. Additionally, the teams
expand irrigation capacity and technology in the local river basins
within assigned provincial areas. Each team establishes a demonstration
farm showcasing advanced farming techniques, equipment and technology.
Utilizing these methods provide Afghan farmers different livelihoods
and the potential to increase efficiency and profit.
23. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what about
the possibility of introduced biofuel crops or establishing an industry
that could grow and boost the Afghan economy?
General Amos. We would support any viable crop program or industry,
endorsed by the interagency, that could grow and boost the Afghan
economy.
General Chiarelli. The goal of producing bio-fuel crops or
establishing a bio-fuel industry in Afghanistan is a worthwhile goal.
The production of petroleum fuels from biomass from agricultural and
forest resources have potential, but there are many obstacles must be
overcome. The farmers of Afghanistan face incredible challenges:
soaring or fluctuating prices for food, seeds and other supplies;
outdated technology; unfavorable or limited access to markets and
financial services; and poor soil and water resource management.
The establishing of viable genomics platforms and conversion
technologies for bio-fuel crops is now being done in the United States.
However, essential elements needed for the large scale production of
biomass from agriculture have yet to be addressed: the logistics of
producing, harvesting, transporting, and storing this material require
significant improvements in the infrastructure of Afghanistan. Issues
such as electricity, road networks, land availability, equipment
technologies, seed stocks availability, logistics, producer acceptance,
and progress on cellulose conversion technologies will determine if
bio-fuel crops are a viable alternative for agriculture in Afghanistan.
In addition, dedicated energy crops compatible with sustainable
agriculture practices must be identified. Research would be required to
optimize production and logistics capabilities for dedicated nonfood
bio-energy crops, as well as agricultural residues, forest products,
municipal waste, and other sources. Small scale bio-fuel projects done
as a cooperative effort between groups of agriculture producers might
be a viable alternative at this time.
use of reserve component
24. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, as I
understand, land and space for military training ranges remain at a
premium. How will the Army and Marine Corps handle this constraint in
the context of the growth of our ground component forces?
General Amos. The Marine Corps relies on an extensive portfolio of
range resources to meet its training needs. This portfolio includes our
major training bases at its core. We also rely extensively on other-
Service ranges for training, and as appropriate make use of land
managed by other Federal agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). Increasing demands are, in fact, being placed on available
training land. Over the last several decades, the operational
capabilities and reach of our forces have evolved significantly with
the introduction of new doctrine, weapons and systems, and associated
tactics, techniques, and procedures. This has resulted in a steady
expansion of the training footprint necessary to provide realistic
training. At the same time, requirements to utilize Marine Corps
installations land for infrastructure development such as housing and
facilities, and external constraints on land uses due to encroachment,
have continued to reduce available training land. Marine Corps
installations are managed to maximize efficient use of training land
and resources. In the past decade, the Marine Corps has made
unprecedented investments in range sustainability programs, to ensure
our lands remain available and accessible for training. We have also
continued to invest in range modernization programs to ensure our
marines are trained using state-of-the-art ranges and training
technologies. However, deficits in available training land currently
exist at many of the Marine Corps' operational ranges, as well as at
ranges of other Services that are used by the Marine Corps. These
shortfalls present important challenges that remain to be addressed.
Many of our installations cannot be expanded, due to surrounding
development. These geographical constraints, as well as fiscal
constraints will prevent the Marine Corps from addressing shortfalls in
training land. The Marine Corps will continue to rely on the resources
it has and access to other Services' and allied nations' ranges to meet
most of its training needs. We will also examine opportunities to
acquire the additional resources needed to accommodate planned growth.
General Chiarelli. The Army continuously evaluates its land
requirements against doctrine, force structure, and unit stationing.
Units at most Army installations are currently training across areas
that are considerably smaller than the areas they might be assigned for
operations based on doctrine, or that they are required to operate
across in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an attempt to improve training
capabilities, the Army seeks opportunities to acquire land where it
appears feasible to do so. Feasibility is based on the availability of
large, contiguous parcels adjacent to, or near, major Army training
installations, low land costs, low population density, and few
environmental issues. However, the Army's existing lands are
increasingly encroached upon, further reducing the usefulness for
training. External urban growth often comes up to installation
boundaries. Internal environmental compliance reduces land available
for training. Therefore, in addition to acquisition, the Army also
implements other strategies to handle these constraints:
Focused management
Land shortfalls can be addressed using internal Army or Federal
Government mechanisms. An example of this approach can be seen at Fort
Bliss, where the Army reassessed the traditional relationship between
the Fort Bliss mission and the White Sands Test Range mission to enable
more training activities on the White Sands Range, and thereby mitigate
training burdens on Fort Bliss lands.
Buffering through Partnerships
Army Compatible Use Buffers (ACUBs) allow the Army to preserve or
enhance an installation's current training land capabilities by
minimizing encroachment. This is accomplished through partnerships that
secure off installation land-use agreements that are compatible with
Army training mission. ACUBs serve to insulate Army training from
encroachment and can be used to reduce environmental restrictions to
training.
Utilization of other Federal lands
The Army examines the land status of other Federal entities to
mitigate land deficits at Army installations. Land that borders Army
installations, and is held by the BLM, Department of Energy or Forest
Service, may be transferred or made available to the Army after a
comprehensive approval process that includes National Environmental
Protection Act and other public reviews. Both Fort Carson and Fort Polk
utilize U.S. Forest Service lands under a special use permit.
25. Senator Bayh. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how has the
Active component of the Army and Marine Corps leveraged training ranges
in the Reserve component, especially for urban training?
General Amos. The Reserve component of the Marine Corps does not
have its own range inventory. Marine Corps Reserve units utilize the
same Marine Corps installations used by their Active component
counterparts to meet training requirement. Marine Corps units in both
the Active and Reserve components also make extensive use of other-
Service training ranges (including training ranges of other Services'
Reserve components). Reserve units also access training opportunities
afforded by local law enforcement facilities, or allied nations' ranges
in the course of major exercises. Many of these ranges provide
facilities for training in Military Operations in Urban Terrain which
are generally available to the Active component and Reserve component
on the same basis.
General Chiarelli. The Army's urban training strategy is focused on
providing a home station capability that enables individual and
collective skills. The term ``home station'' includes local training
sites for Reserve component units as these units do not typically
conduct maneuver training and live fire qualifications at home station
armories. Along with home stations, the Army must modernize its Combat
Training Centers and power projection/mobilization centers to provide
critical urban training capabilities for the appropriate levels of unit
readiness.
Training ranges and urban facilities are critical to mission
readiness as the Army transforms. Since 2000, the Army has embarked on
a basic facility construction plan to create a minimum set of urban
conditions at Army home stations that will prepare soldiers to conduct
missions in urban environments. The Army provides three standard urban
training facilities at home stations: Shoot Houses (SHs), Urban Assault
Courses (UAC), and Combined Arms Collective Training Facilities
(CACTF). These three types of facilities provide the necessary
conditions to train soldiers individually and collectively on the
fundamentals of operating in an urban environment. Since 2000, the Army
has constructed 26 SHs, 24 UACs and 24 CACTFs at 30 installations.
An example of a converted urban training facility in the Reserve
component is the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC). Muscatatuck
was developed in conjunction with the State of Indiana as a large urban
training site that leveraged existing buildings that were once a large
hospital complex. The Muscatatuck site supports Camp Atterbury Reserve
component urban training requirements while also providing a unique
training venue for other Army units, joint exercises, and other Federal
and local agencies. Using careful planning, Muscatatuck illustrates how
Army can fulfill Reserve component home station and mobilization
requirements while leveraging a unique infrastructure opportunity. The
Army has nominated the MUTC as a DOD Regional Training Facility in
accordance with OSD's Urban Operations Training Strategy.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
afghanistan security force assistance and core capability
26. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, it is my understanding that
General Casey has recently halted the Army's plan to replace the
percent Effective (PCTEF) level with Directed Mission Level, or D-
Level, and Core function reporting, or C-Level. Additionally,
Lieutenant General Caldwell recently announced eight Army brigades will
be tapped to become AABs under the umbrella of SFA. Do you believe we
have the right mission essential tasks lists (METLs) in keeping with
full spectrum operations, and what is the SFA and AAB doctrine with
respect to specific mission requirements and characteristics?
General Chiarelli. Plans to implement Army unique D-level reporting
requirements that would translate into the PCTEF levels required by the
Joint Staff have been placed on hold until the relation and linkages
between operational doctrine, training doctrine, and readiness
reporting policy can be reexamined during a series of senior leader
conferences this summer. Army doctrinal METLs enable units to perform
fundamental tasks associated with full spectrum operations (offense,
defense, and stability tasks) to provide the foundation for successful
execution of any mission, to include BCTs that are to serve as AABs.
Training doctrine requires unit commanders to adjust their doctrinal
METL, if required, to zero in on specific requirements and conditions
of an assigned operational mission. SFA/AAB units are no exception.
Army Regulation 11-31, Army International Security Cooperation
Policy, establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and
procedures for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting and
execution of Army security cooperation activities.
The CAC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, is the Army proponent for all
doctrine related to SFA and in May 2009 published FM 3-07.1, Security
Forces Assistance to provide a conceptual framework for Army forces to
conduct SFA within the context of full spectrum operations. It
addresses the operational and tactical levels while focusing on the
modular brigade in the conduct of SFA activities.
The doctrine of FM 3.07-1 is nested within that of FM 3-07,
Stability Operations, published by CAC in October 2008.
CAC is also responsible for the DOD Joint Center for International
SFA and, in July 2008, published the Commander's Handbook for SFA to
distill and distribute best practices and lessons learned from current
SFA operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
27. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, I am also concerned that we
have not made any adjustments with respect to overall end strength to
accommodate the new mission of SFA on by these AABs. For example, do
you envision needing more than eight AABs?
General Chiarelli. The combatant commander determines the
appropriate number of Advise Assist Brigades (AABs) required for the
theater. However, because the AAB is built using the modular BCT that
is simply augmented for stability operations, the Army can create more
with proper levels of augmentation and resourcing. The Army's BCTs are
designed specifically to adapt to a changing security environment
rather than specialized for a single point on the spectrum of conflict.
Growing the Army for a specific mission limits the Army's ability to
operate across the spectrum of possible operations. However, a BCT
augmented for SFA retains the capability to conduct full spectrum
operations--offense, defense, and stability operations. Any of the
three modular BCTs--heavy, infantry, or Stryker, can support SFA. The
Army's success in adapting BCTs for stability operations is evident in
BCT employment in Afghanistan versus Iraq. In Afghanistan, with the
high threat and nascent ability of the Afghan Security Forces (ASF),
commanders employ the BCT widely throughout the southern provinces to
train and mentor the ASF below the brigade-level together in combat
operations. These BCTs with their organic leadership are sufficient
(primarily company grade officers and NCOs) to meet mission
requirements, train and conduct combat operations, with the ASF. In
Iraq, commanders are employing six modular BCTs augmented for stability
operations to continue training and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces
at brigade-level and above. The brigades in Iraq are augmented with
additional field grade officers to provide greater flexibility for the
BCT commander to mentor more Iraqi leaders at the more senior levels.
28. Senator Udall. General Amos, how has the Marine Corps
coordinated with the Army with respect to advisory units as our mission
shifts from combat operations to an advisory role?
General Amos. The U.S. Army has considerably more ``train and
assist'' experience in Afghanistan as a whole than the Marine Corps.
Marine Forces deployed in support of ``train and assist'' missions, to
date, have operated under the mentorship if the Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan. The experience of 24 MEU and 2/7 led to
the crafting of RFF920 for the MEB which includes both COIN and ``train
and mentor'' in its mission statement and the MEB commander has planned
for both these requirements accordingly. However, the U.S. Army
experience and continued coordination serve as the baseline for Marine
Corps planning in preparation for this part of the mission.
army brigade levels
29. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, last February General Casey
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that ``15 deployed
Active component brigades'' are required to stay at 12-month
deployments. Does that statement still hold true given the changes in
force levels as we withdraw from Iraq and increase in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Since General Casey's testimony in February
2008, force demands in Iraq have decreased from unsustainable surge
levels, which necessitated 15 month deployments, to a more sustainable
surge level of 12 Active component BCTs. Therefore, the Army has
returned to 12 month deployments, although the last BCT on a 15 month
deployment will not return until June 2009 and the last enabling
brigade will not return until October 2009.
Presently, there are 3 Active component BCTs in Afghanistan;
combined OIF/OEF Active component BCT totals equal 15 Active component
BCTs that represent a BOG to dwell ratio of 1:1.3. Later this summer,
the Army will deploy an additional BCT to OEF which pushes the Army
above 15 BCTs deployed and drops the BOG to dwell ratio to 1:1.2
reversing the positive trend of improving dwell for soldiers and
families.
Proactively, the Army has taken steps to mitigate a return to
longer deployments, primarily by using in-lieu-of sourcing from other
Services and selectively employing the Reserve component to fill Active
component missions. These steps, buttressed by the Army completing our
personnel growth, will maintain deployments of 12 months, provided
global demand does not increase.
30. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, is 15 BCTs still the
requirement?
General Chiarelli. The current global requirement is 37 BCTs. The
current global commitment of BCTs stands at 28 BCTs which includes both
the Active component and Reserve component supporting COIN operations,
security forces, Global Response Force/Rapid Response Force, Homeland
Defense, Korea, Kosovo Forces/Multi-Force Observers, and training
teams.
Since General Casey's testimony in February 2008, force demands in
Iraq have decreased from unsustainable surge levels, which necessitated
15 month deployments, to a more sustainable surge level of 12 Active
component BCTs. Therefore, the Army has returned to 12 month
deployments, although the last BCT on a 15 month deployment will not
return until June 2009 and last enabling brigade will not return until
October 2009.
Presently, there are 3 Active component BCTs in Afghanistan;
combined OIF/OEF Active component BCT totals equal 15 Active component
BCTs that represent a BOG to dwell ratio of 1:1.3. Later this summer,
the Army will deploy an additional BCT to OEF which pushes the Army
above 15 BCTs deployed and drops the BOG to dwell ratio to 1:1.2
reversing the positive trend of improving dwell for soldiers and
families.
Proactively, the Army has taken steps to mitigate a return to
longer deployments, primarily by using in-lieu-of sourcing from other
Services and selectively employing the Reserve component to fill Active
component missions. These steps, buttressed by the Army completing our
personnel growth, will maintain deployments of 12 months, provided
global demand does not increase.
31. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, does this account for the
eight AABs?
General Chiarelli. The combatant commanders will provide the
required number of AABs needed for the operation, but yes, the Active
component BCT demand in OIF and OEF includes the current requirement
for AABs.
32. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, when will we allow our
soldiers to maintain a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio (2 years at home
for every 1 year deployed)?
General Chiarelli. The only way the Army can achieve this goal
within the current force structure is the global demand must decrease.
The deployment length versus home station time, or the BOG to dwell
ratio, is driven by global demand versus the supply of available
forces. The Army's long-term sustainable goal is to allow Active
component units and soldiers three times the amount of time home as
they are deployed (1:3 ratio), but demand and available forces
ultimately drives dwell.
On average, Army Active component BCTs currently deploy for a year
and receive approximately 15 months at home, although dwell will
slightly decrease due to an additional Army BCT deployment to
Afghanistan prior to further reductions in Iraq in fiscal year 2010. By
the end of fiscal year 2010, given projected demands, the Army
anticipates average Active component BCT dwell improving to
approximately 20 months at home, improving to 24 months early in fiscal
year 2011. By the end of fiscal year 2011, the Army expects the average
Active component BCT dwell to improve to about 29 months.
33. Senator Udall. General Chiarelli, how long can we sustain these
commitment levels for BCTs?
General Chiarelli. The BOG to dwell ratio of 1:2 is sustainable
over the short term, although the long term goal for the Army is to
reach an Active component BCT BOG to dwell of 1:3 and Reserve component
BCT BOG to dwell of 1:5. While 1:2 enables a more balanced Army, it
still presents challenges to readiness. This high demand shortens dwell
time for units, consumes equipment at a higher than programmed rate,
and stresses all components of the All-Volunteer Force.
Truncated dwell times negatively impact training of core
competencies to conduct missions across the spectrum of
conflict and shorten the time available to properly reset
personnel and equipment to be ready for the next deployment or
provide strategic depth.
Transition Teams, unprogrammed Joint Headquarters positions,
security forces, and other nonstandard formations exacerbate
stresses on the All-Volunteer Force, particularly for the mid-
grade officers and NCOs.
Reserve component access within the context of current 12
month mobilization policy stresses the National Guard and
Reserve and creates uncertainty in sourcing to meet the high
rotational demand.
The OPTEMPO in theater, coupled with the high demand for
forces, is stressing the Army's ability to equip the force by
accelerating the aging of material above programmed lifecycles,
lengthening reset, and incurring battle losses that must be
replaced.
readiness reporting systems
34. Senator Udall. General Amos and General Chiarelli, the decision
was made to switch from Status of Resources and Training Systems
(SORTS) to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) back in 2002,
yet it still has not been fully integrated and implemented by the
Services. What constraints and obstacles have you faced with DRRS and
why do you believe it has taken so long to implement?
General Amos. The Marine Corps supports the development and
implementation of DRRS. In an effort to speed implementation of the
DRRS Enterprise, we are working closely with the Army to develop a
DRRS-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) which will leverage the successful fielding
of DRRS-Army--saving time and development dollars. DRRS-MC will
expedite the implementation of the DRRS Enterprise and will meet the
needs of the Service, and the readiness stakeholders throughout the
Department. We anticipate our units and installations will be reporting
in DRRS-MC before the end of 2009.
Each readiness reporting system has its own advantages and
disadvantages. The Global Status of Resources and Training System
(GSORTS) remains the readiness reporting system of record. GSORTS does
the better job, from the Service perspective, of reporting the Service
Title 10 responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping ready
forces for their designed missions in support of combatant commanders.
However, GSORTS does not give us the degree of clarity we desire to
assess a unit's capabilities for specific missions and mission
essential tasks--particularly if the missions assigned are not the same
as the units' designed missions-for example, an artillery battalion
assigned a civil affairs mission.
DRRS is still in development and we are working closely with the
rest of DOD and the readiness community to help it meet its
requirements to provide:
Business tools that support data analysis for readiness
management, planning, Title 10 functions, data sharing, and the
integration of readiness information for resources and mission
essential tasks.
Aggregated DRRS readiness data and easy access to archived
readiness information, which is retrievable via the business
tools identified above.
Near real-time information data feeds from Service
authoritative data sources that have been tested and validated.
The integration of GSORTS mission and resource information.
General Chiarelli. The Army supports the DRRS. However, since the
system is still under development and has not been fully implemented,
the Army chose to refine and improve its existing readiness reporting
system. It did this by developing an advanced web-enabled reporting
system to meet the reporting requirements for the Chairman's Readiness
System, as specified in DOD Directive 7730.65 ``Department of Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)'' and all serial guidance
requirements issued by OSD. This system is called DRRS-Army. Its
development and implementation was accomplished through internal
program management/funding and achieved full operational capability in
October 2006. DRRS-Army ensures the Army is able to meet the Joint
Staff and OSD requirements, yet preserves the capability to effectively
measure and manage unique Army readiness equities. DRSS-Army meets the
Army's readiness reporting needs; it feeds more data into DRRS than
that system can absorb.
With respect to how long it has taken to implement DRRS: we believe
one major drawback is the absence of a Program Management Office to
provide oversight. Currently, the program is internally managed by OSD
Personnel & Readiness.
Another issue is that the Joint Staff has not published a
Chairman's Joint Chief of Staff Instruction or Manual for DRRS. The DOD
instruction lacks detail for a project of this size and scope. DRRS is
an emerging system and will require validation and testing for full
integration into the Global Force Management processes. To date, most
baseline assessment and performance milestones have not been achieved.
35. Senator Udall. General Amos and General Chiarelli, is our
visibility with respect to readiness reporting diminished in any way by
reporting against directed mission readiness rather than core
functions?
General Amos. No. The Marine Corps reports on designed and assigned
(directed) mission readiness per the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs'
Instructions.
General Chiarelli. Commanders of Army units continuously assess and
report the readiness of their units to accomplish their core functions
and also, when applicable, their directed missions. Hence, having units
report directed mission readiness when operational requirements are
formally assigned and while operational requirements are under
execution does not diminish the visibility of the unit's readiness
status to perform core functions, since both of these discrete
assessments are reported concurrently. Army doctrine in FM 7-0,
Training for Full Spectrum Operations, establishes that units train on
only one mission essential level task at a time--the one for the unit's
directed mission or, if none, the one for the unit's as-designed
mission. While it is logical to presume that the readiness assessments
reported by commanders will be most accurate for those missions on
which their units currently are training or that currently are under
execution, the readiness reporting requirements of Army units are
established via Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, to comply
with DOD and Joint Staff policies and to satisfy Congressional
mandates. Army unit status reporting requirements that commanders
continuously assess and report the status of their units to execute
their core functions also facilitate effective assessments of strategic
risk and strategic depth and provide the basis for various sourcing,
resourcing and funding decisions.
36. Senator Udall. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how has U.S.
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) responded to this change in readiness
reporting?
General Amos. We are confident that the policies and procedures
established by U.S. JFCOM regarding readiness reporting will result in
the most efficient and effective system possible.
General Chiarelli. Senator, this question would be better addressed
by U.S. JFCOM.
37. Senator Udall. General Amos and General Chiarelli, commanders
are allowed to subjectively upgrade their unit's overall readiness by
one level and two with general officer approval. Are you concerned at
all that this ability obfuscates a unit's true readiness status,
specifically, if a unit operates with a limited amount of equipment or
people?
General Amos. No. To accurately assess the unit's level of
readiness, the commander must consider both the measurable and
intangible components of readiness. Commanders take into account
morale, leadership, sustainability, and a variety of other factors,
which are not always measurable by the metrics built into our readiness
systems. Through the daily monitoring of SORTS reports and recurring
education the Marine Corps is able to guard against capricious
adjustments. Most Marine Corps commanders do not subjectively upgrade
or downgrade their C-levels in the Global Status of Resources and
Training System (GSORTS) or their mission and mission essential task
assessments in the DRRS.
General Chiarelli. No, I am not concerned that this ability
obfuscates a unit's true readiness. The Army's readiness reporting
system (DRRS-Army) combines the benefits of both quantitative
measurements for people and equipment with the commander's best
professional judgment and experience in determining training and other
overall assessments.
Army units report readiness in accordance with Joint Staff
regulatory requirements as well as serial guidance from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Included in the Joint Staff's guidance
are procedures that allow commanders to provide their best military
judgment during the monthly assessment of the unit.
Current readiness metrics support both quantitative measurements--
i.e. the amount of people and equipment available to the unit, combined
with training assessments; with qualitative and or subjective overall
assessments. These policies and procedures are routinely updated and
incorporate input from subordinate commands, units, as well as periodic
reviews from outside agencies. Currently, we believe we have the
optimum mixture of subjective and quantitative assessments in our unit
status reporting system.
The Army remains committed to providing detailed, accurate, and
commander-centric assessment of unit capabilities. Our readiness
reporting procedures will continue to measure the core functions of
Army units to meet the wartime requirements. Additionally, Army units
will report readiness assessments to complete assigned missions when
directed by combatant commanders.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
usaid foreign service officers increases
38. Senator Burris. General Chiarelli, in your testimony, you
pointed to the success of the National Guard's AgriBusiness teams. At
the same time, you note that ``teams of agronomists from land grant
universities sponsored by the United States Agency for International
Development'' are best suited to teach Afghans to improve their farming
methods, thus contributing to stability operations in Afghanistan. You
noted that your teams were successful, but stated that the use of
soldiers for AgriBusiness teams caused holes in various units.
The Senate is currently considering the Increasing America's Global
Development Capacity Act of 2009, legislation that would increase
significantly the number of Foreign Service Officers at USAID. In your
opinion, if the USAID is increased, how would an increase in USAID
Foreign Service Officers best be used to help the Army conduct its
ongoing stability operations?
General Chiarelli. An increase in USAID Foreign Service Officers
could best assist in the conduct of stability operations thru
assignment to teams whose principal mission is development of host
nation government capability and capacity at national, provincial, and
local levels. Examples of USAID competencies include advice and
assistance to host nations in developing capacity for economic
development, humanitarian response, agriculture, health and human
services, democracy and governance, and conflict management and
mitigation.
39. Senator Burris. General Chiarelli, what other civilian agencies
do you think have an appropriate role in stability operations?
General Chiarelli. Any number of Federal agencies could contribute
to stability operations but the determination of the best way to
organize to provide that support should be determined by the Department
of State including USAID, which has been assigned the lead role for
coordinating reconstruction and stabilization efforts of the U.S.
Government.
There are broad range of capabilities required to enable these
efforts--and a number of options for the State Department to execute
this role. One option could be to rely on the full range of Cabinet-
level agencies for direct support. Another viable option would be for
the State Department to develop internal capacity for that effort. A
third option would be for the State Department to contract for that
support.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Burr
body armor
40. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, a recent New York Times
article from April 18 reported on the Army's delay in testing a new,
lightweight body armor that could reduce a soldier's load by nearly 20
pounds, a potentially significant improvement for those serving in the
harsh, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, where mobility is at a
premium. The Modular Body Armor Vest (MBAV), already in use by Special
Operations Command, uses smaller bulletproof plates on the chest and
back, making it significantly lighter than the current Army-issue
Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV). An Army research team was sent to
eastern Afghanistan in early March to field test this new body armor
with a unit of 500 soldiers, only to be ordered back to the United
States shortly after their arrival, leaving nearly $3 million worth of
this new body armor sitting in a warehouse in the United States. Can
you please explain the decisionmaking process on field testing of the
MBAV?
General Chiarelli. The safety of our soldiers is paramount in our
decision-making process to provide them with new equipment and this is
especially true when it comes to Personal Protection Equipment such as
body armor. Soldiers can focus on their mission because they are
confident the body armor they depend on has been thoroughly tested and
evaluated for safety, effectiveness and suitability.
In the specific case of the MBAV, although it had been tested by
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to SOCOM requirements and standards
and was in use by Special Operation Forces, it had not been tested to
Army requirements and test standards. This is not to suggest that the
SOCOM requirement and testing standard is worse or that the Army's is
better, it is recognition that they are different. Having multiple test
standards for body armor is an acknowledged problem that is being
addressed by OSD DOT&E. We anticipate a DOD-wide standard will be
issued for testing body armor by the end of this year. Until then, out
of an abundance of caution, the prudent action for the Army is to
adhere to its current testing standards, which to date, have produced
body armor that has never failed to perform to required standards
during the entire time of OIF and OEF.
Subsequent to the hearing on April 22, 2009, Aberdeen Test Center
has completed the ballistic testing of the MBAV. The Rapid Equipping
Force (REF), in conjunction with Program Executive Office soldier, has
begun conducting a limited fielding to an Army Infantry BCT selected to
deploy to Afghanistan in support of OEF. The MBAV plate carrier is one
of 14 equipment items that comprise the REF's Lightening the Soldier's
Load Project.
In parallel with the Lightening the Soldier's Load Project, the
Army is assessing several ``plate carrier'' designs to include the
MBAV. The results of the assessment will inform the Army's decision for
a plate carrier design to be fielded on a larger scale that will
provide commanders on the ground another option for tailoring Personal
Protection Equipment.
41. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how does the Army assess risk
when fielding new technology, specifically body armor?
General Chiarelli. Composite Risk Management (CRM) is the Army's
primary process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across
the full spectrum of army mission, functions, operations, and
activities. The CRM is used to mitigate risks associated with all
hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or
destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness.
Body Armor is the critical personal protective equipment for the
soldier. Fielding of equipment designed to protect human life from
injury or death is a deliberate process that is driven by requirements,
understanding of the threats and emerging technology. At every decision
point in the process to develop new technology and then field and
sustain equipment, risks are identified and are mitigated to an
acceptable level.
For fielding of new technology relating to Body Armor, the primary
risk mitigation tool is live fire ballistic testing. This is conducted
prior to production as part of First Article Testing and also at Lot
Acceptance Testing during production. This constant vigilance is the
primary means to maintain high confidence in the body armor fielded and
is the main reason the body armor fielded in OIF and OEF to date has
never failed to perform 100 percent of the time and has on many
occasions exceeded the approved requirements.
42. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how does the Army weigh the
tradeoffs between the need for greater protection and the need for
greater mobility?
General Chiarelli. Soldier survivability is a function of mobility,
protection, lethality and leadership. Within this context, commanders
must weigh the trade-offs between mobility and protection based on
factors such as mission, enemy, troops, time, and terrain. In
recognition of this fact, the Army must provide commanders with the
tools necessary to make those decisions such as armored vehicles and
personal protection equipment.
In the case of the MBAV with Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert
(ESAPI) plates, the Army responded to commander requests for lighter
body armor in Afghanistan so that soldier survivability could be
enhanced though greater mobility and lethality with minimal, if any,
reduction in protection in the face of extreme mountainous terrain and
a lightly equipped and unencumbered enemy.
43. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, are you concerned that a one-
size-fits-all approach to equipping our soldiers doesn't take into
account the drastically different environments our soldiers face in a
country like Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. We recognize varying environments our soldiers
experience requires that we relook how we are equipping our soldiers.
Specifically, we are focusing on two main efforts to reduce the
soldier's load: reducing body armor weight and reducing equipment
weight. These two efforts will inform the Army as to the optimum body
armor configuration for use in Afghanistan.
In May, the Maneuver Battle Lab conducted a Soldier Plate Carrier
Demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, to test the performance of
lighter ballistic plate carrier vests against the current IOTV. The
plate carrier candidates are currently undergoing ballistic and burn
testing by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. The results of the
assessment will be used to recommend the best commercial off-the-shelf
or Government off-the-shelf lightweight plate carrier for fielding to
soldiers.
In addition, the Army's Rapid Equipping Force is teaming with the
Asymmetric Warfare Group to conduct a soldier load assessment in
Afghanistan. This assessment will evaluate 14 lighter items of
equipment including the MBAV (plate carrier). The Army seeks to achieve
significant weight savings with the continued acquisition of lighter
weapons, night vision devices and soldier clothing items.
44. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, please provide an update on
the Army's body armor testing and acquisition program.
General Chiarelli.
Body Armor Testing:
All body armor passes stringent First Article Testing (FAT) and Lot
Acceptance Testing (LAT) before being issued to soldiers. Along with
those two levels of testing, there is a third level of evaluation,
Soldier Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) and a
fourth level, Non-Destructive Test Equipment (NDTE). NDTE utilizes
digital X-ray to determine the serviceability of fielded hard armor
plate inserts. All of these evaluations (FAT & LAT Testing, PMCS and
NDTE) ensure that the Army's body armor meets or exceeds performance
standards.
Body Armor Acquisition:
(1) X-Small Arms Protective Inserts (XSAPI):
The current Army requirement for XSAPI is 120,000 sets, designated
as a Theater contingency stock. XSAPI is designed to meet current and
emerging small arms ballistic threats. As a result of the increased
ballistic protection provided by XSAPI as compared to ESAPI, an XSAPI
plate is 6-11 ounces heavier than ESAPI depending on plate size.
120,000 sets of XSAPI were ordered in March 2009.
(2) Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV):
In May 2007, the Army introduced the IOTV to replace the 966,000
fielded Outer Tactical Vests (OTVs). The IOTV is 3lbs. lighter,
provides increased coverage and offers improved performance and
comfort. The IOTV also offers a one stage quick release and a medical
access system not previously available on the OTV. To date, the Army
has procured 455,000 IOTVs. The procurement of the balance of IOTVs is
scheduled for award in July 2009.
(3) Long Term Strategy for Body Armor Improvements:
The long-term strategy for body armor is to continue the research
and development of materials at the Army Soldier Systems Center,
Natick, MA, with support from the Army Research Laboratory and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Institute for Soldier
Nanotechnologies, which will reduce the overall weight of the system
while achieving the same or better ballistic protection. As improved
material technologies become available, the Army will rapidly
transition the technology into body armor production.
45. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, with a possible delay in the
acquisition of the next generation of body armor, do you foresee any
risk or the possibility of an inability of the Army to provide adequate
body armor to deploying forces?
General Chiarelli. No, the Army will provide adequate body armor to
deploying forces. The currently fielded ESAPI worn with the IOTV
protects against the current Theater threat and provides an increased
area of coverage over the OTV with a weight reduction of greater than
three pounds. We have fielded 966,000 OTVs, 268,000 IOTVs, and 891,000
ESAPI sets. We are now procuring additional IOTVs to replace OTVs on a
one for one basis. The long term acquisition strategy for body armor is
to continue the research and development of materials that will achieve
better ballistic protection while reducing the overall weight of the
system. As improved material technologies become available, the U.S.
Army will rapidly transition the technology into body armor production.
At this time, current materials technology is challenged to achieve
significant weight savings for the same or better level of performance.
transition from iraq to afghanistan
46. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, a recent press report (USA
Today, April 17, 2009 titled ``Battalion Shifted to Afghanistan'')
described how the Army's 4th Engineering Battalion that had just
arrived in Iraq, was now being redeployed to Afghanistan to perform
their vital mission of clearing roads of bombs and other obstacles. The
article went on to assert that ``the decision underscores how military
commanders are scrambling to meet President Obama's orders.'' What is
the extent to which Army units currently deployed to Iraq, or in
training for deployment to Iraq, will now be redirected to Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. The Army continues to meet Secretary of Defense
requirements with trained and ready forces. Given the OIF drawdown and
the continued need for enabler forces there, and the burgeoning
requirements in Afghanistan, the Army has re-missioned some units to
maintain the flexible and adaptive capacity to meet Commander, CENTCOM
requirements. CENTCOM has currently re-missioned 3,990 Army Combat
Support/Combat Service Support Soldiers deploying to or in Iraq to
Afghanistan. The Combat Support/Combat Service Support enablers include
Engineers (1,557), Military Police (837), Transportation (501), Signal
(332), Ordnance (302), Quartermaster (268), Civil Affairs (102),
Command and Control (89), Fire Support (6), and Medical (1). The need
for additional forces in Afghanistan combined with shortfalls in
external sourcing solutions requires internal sourcing of specific
Combat Support and Combat Service Support enablers. This enabler
repositioning is to support increased presence of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and CENTCOM's force requirements. The Army cannot clearly
state the extent to which this re-missioning effort may continue given
the dynamic nature of the counter-insurgency fight in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Army will continue providing trained and ready forces
to meet the challenges faced by ground commanders in both combined
Joint Operational Areas.
47. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how has the Army modified
training for units being diverted from Iraq to Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. The Army prepares units to conduct missions
based on established conditions and standards and then adapts to a
given environment as required. If a unit is given a new mission then
training will shift to focus on that new mission. For units executing
the same mission, the differences encountered in executing these
missions in Afghanistan instead of Iraq is the operational environment
where they are being conducted. All soldiers receive a country
orientation brief prior to deployment that includes a general overview
of military, political, cultural, religious, and economic conditions;
receive rules of engagement training/rules for use of force training
specific to that area of operations; and complete basic language and
culture training specific to the area they are being deployed.
Additionally, though high-altitude oxygen levels are difficult to
replicate prior to arriving in theater, soldiers adjust their physical
fitness training activities before deploying and upon arrival in
theater to ensure they are in the best physical condition.
48. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, are you confident the training
provided to these soldiers for the Iraq mission will be adequate for
service in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. Yes, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
coordinates with U.S. CENTCOM to identify theater-specific training
requirements. These are published in pre-deployment training guidance
for units sourced to deploy to either Iraq or Afghanistan. However,
important to note, the operational conditions in which units operate in
Afghanistan are significantly different than those in Iraq. Therefore,
regardless of whether a unit is deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan, it
receives all theater-specific training prior to deployment. In all
cases, FORSCOM validates units for deployment.
49. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, does the Army have the
resources necessary to augment the forthcoming troop increases,
particularly in the case of linguists, etc?
General Chiarelli. INSCOM has existing linguist contracts in both
theaters. Currently there are 9,445 linguists in OIF and the
requirements will be adjusted downward as the force structure changes
over time. In OEF, we have programmed future requirements based on
approved additional forces. Currently there are 3,546 linguists on the
ground and a plan is being implemented to increase the linguist force
capacity in stages for a requirement of 5,133, in concert with the
troop flow.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cat I--No Cat II--Secret Cat III--TS/SCI
clearance Req't/ Req't/Fill/Percent/ Req't/Fill/Percent/ Total Req't/Fill/
Fill/Percent/Fill Fill Fill Percent/Fill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total OEF Support \1\ 4,393/3044 574/550 166/66 5,133/3,660
(69 percent) (96 percent) (40 percent) (71 percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ OEF has an ongoing revalidation which is expected to result in increased linguist requirements. These
figures include backend support.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cat I--No Cat II--Secret Cat III--TS/SCI
clearance Req't/ Req't/Fill/Percent/ Req't/Fill/Percent/ Total Req't/Fill/
Fill/Percent/Fill Fill Fill Percent/Fill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total OIF Support \2\ 7,585/7,652 1,859/1,608 341/293 9,785/9,553
(100 percent) (86 percent) (86 percent) (98 percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Includes backend support.
50. Senator Burr. General Amos, the increase in ground forces in
Afghanistan announced last month by President Obama falls heavily on
the Marine Corps. As I understand it, the Marine Corps will provide
about 10,000 of the roughly 21,000 additional forces that will begin to
arrive in Afghanistan in May. Last year at this hearing, your
predecessor, General Magnus, described a much smaller increase of
marines in Afghanistan as a difficult proposition, saying it was like
``having a foot in two boats.'' I am particularly concerned about not
only the combat forces that will flow to Afghanistan as part of the 2nd
MEB, but also their critical enablers because those capabilities will
also be in high demand as we drawdown in Iraq. What are the greatest
challenges you see in accomplishing this transition?
General Amos. Last year we were operating with different
priorities. Secretary Gates stated ``In Iraq we do what we must, but in
Afghanistan we do what we can.'' The Commandant has always maintained
that increases in Afghanistan must come with commensurate reductions in
Iraq. However, the President's strategy articulated this year clearly
shifts our operational priorities; the timeline laid out for complete
marine withdrawal from Iraq mitigates mid-term concerns over force
tempo. Our greatest challenge currently is managing deployment to dwell
of critical enablers (rotary wing assets and their pilots/crews and
well as intelligence and explosive ordnance marines) during the
transition from Iraq to Afghanistan.
51. Senator Burr. General Amos, what sort of forces and
capabilities will the Marine Corps bring to Afghanistan?
General Amos. The Marine Corps is currently deploying a 10,000
Marine MAGTF built around a Headquarters, Regimental Combat Team,
Marine Air Group, and Combat Logistics Regiment complete with all the
enabler augmentation learned from 6 years of combat in Iraq and three
deployments of Marine units to Regional Command-South.
52. Senator Burr. General Amos, what is the plan for sourcing the
enabling capabilities in Afghanistan when those forces will also be
needed in Iraq to support the drawdown of forces there?
General Amos. Last year we were operating with different
priorities. Secretary Gates stated ``In Iraq we do what we must, but in
Afghanistan we do what we can.'' The Commandant has always maintained
that increases in Afghanistan must come with commensurate reductions in
Iraq. However, the President's strategy articulated this year clearly
shifts our operational priorities; the timeline laid out for complete
marine withdrawal from Iraq mitigates mid-term concerns over force
tempo. Our greatest challenge currently is managing deployment to dwell
of critical enablers (rotary wing assets and their pilots/crews and
well as intelligence and explosive ordnance marines) during the
transition from Iraq to Afghanistan.
support for marine corps units in theater
53. Senator Burr. General Amos, the plan for deploying Marine Corps
forces calls for them to be highly decentralized, meaning that the
integrated Marine Corps unit structure will be stretched to cover more
ground with smaller units. This presents special challenges in terms of
supporting those combat forces with logistics, intelligence, and
supporting arms. What special demands do you foresee to support this
decentralized deployment plan?
General Amos. The terrain and relative lack of infrastructure
development in Afghanistan compared to Iraq calls for the ability of
operational units to operate with relative autonomy in the near to mid-
term, particularly in Regional Command-South. This was highlighted by
the demand for rotary wing assets in the last year but less visible is
the density of communications and intelligence resources (both
personnel and equipment) to be sourced down to the company and platoon
level that were previously at the battalion and regimental level. Part
of the solution is manpower (special skills) enablers and the other
part is rapid procurement of these assets. Both are being addressed
from a service perspective. Additionally, skills such as air delivery,
expeditionary airfield construction and management, contingency
contracting, and heavy engineering capability resident in other
services (USN Construction Battalion and USAF Red Horse) are critical
to our near term success in Regional Command-South. All of these are
part of the planning, execution, and enabling of the current MEB
deployment. None of these are foreign to the Marine Corps and all were
part of success in Anbar but they are more acute in Afghanistan because
it is a landlocked country complicating logistics support and because
Iraq was far more developed in 2003 than Regional Command-South is
today.
54. Senator Burr. General Amos, how are Marine Corps units adapting
their training, tactics, and command and control in order to address
this employment plan?
General Amos. Adaptation of training, tactics, and command and
control has been focused in two basic areas:
The first focus area has been the increase in command and
control capabilities of lower echelon units (i.e., companies
and platoons) required to execute decentralized operations.
This training revolves around command and control systems
training and staff training. Under the Enhanced Company
Operations concept, specific training has been developed to
provide lower echelon units with the capabilities that
previously resided at the battalion and above.
The second focus area revolves around the preparation of unit
leaders to execute decentralized operations. The Marine Corps
is currently developing a plan to improve their intuitive
ability to assess, decide, and act while operating in a more
decentralized manner across the MAGTF. This plan will address
virtual and physical methods for developing unfamiliar training
environments, physical and virtual, which expose junior leaders
to uncertainty, fog, and friction. In addition, the Marine
Corps is developing training devices and systems that enhance
our ability to immerse marines in time-constrained scenarios
that closely replicate combat situations as well as
professional military education initiatives that will enhance
the junior leader's ability to more effectively operate and
lead in complex environments with hybrid threats.
equipment in theater
55. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, the
mountainous terrain, poor road infrastructure, and size of Afghanistan
in comparison to Iraq require equipment that is unique from Iraq. Do
you have the right types of equipment and in sufficient quantities to
fully equip our forces for success in Afghanistan? If not, what
shortfalls exist?
General Amos. Yes. We have upgraded our MTVRs (7 ton trucks). We
possess all categories of MRAPs and have provided our requirements for
the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (MATV). These assets enable us to
compensate for the poor road conditions in Afghanistan. Communications
are very difficult in mountainous terrain and we require more
sophisticated radios to enable our forces to communicate. We can field
more radios, but at the expense of radios needed by CONUS Operating
Force units. This also applies to increased requirements for vehicles
and weapon systems. Due to the enormous weight of armor and stress on
equipment frames, we cannot readily move from location to location
unless it's on a tractor trailer. As you know, there is no mature
infrastructure in Afghanistan, so the communications, expeditionary
airfield, tent camps, camp protection, and all that goes with these
things must be brought in and/or built. MILCON will play a large role
in how quickly our tent camp support (ablution plants, bottled water
plants), maintenance facilities for aviation (props) and ground
equipment, communications infrastructure, etc. are built and placed in
service. Sir, you asked if we can fully equip our forces for success in
Afghanistan and the answer remains ``yes,'' but at a cost to CONUS
units and with congressional support for MILCON projects.
General Chiarelli. Yes, we have the right type equipment or actions
in place to address units' equipment requirements for Afghanistan. We
conduct weekly video teleconferences with Theater to set conditions for
success in support of equipping our forces in Afghanistan. Efforts have
resulted in a significantly reduced amount of last minute equipment
sourcing issues. The Army equips units based on their theater assigned
mission--Mission Essential Equipment List. Commanders can also request
additional equipment based on unit-specific needs in an Operational
Needs Statement. Finally, the Army is building an Afghanistan Theater
Provided Equipment set to resource unit equipment requirements in
Afghanistan. These collective efforts will ensure that units have the
best available equipment, in sufficient quantities, for success in
Afghanistan.
Because of the rugged and mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, we
will place a greater reliance on aviation to conduct combat operations.
Based on the current Improvised Explosive Device threat, we will
continue to use Mine Resistant Ambush Protective vehicles (MRAPs) to
protect soldiers as they travel around the country. However, the areas
in which these vehicles operate are limited by their size and weight.
In an effort to overcome these challenges, the Army is pursuing the
MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles to provide the off-road capability necessary
for combat operations in the rugged Afghanistan terrain. The unique and
austere environment will also require a greater quantity of select
equipment (mortars, precision fire artillery, blue force tracking, and
machine guns) for specific combat and support forces. The Army has the
necessary equipment to sustain the higher quantities in select units.
The short-term impact will be on the readiness of nondeployed
units. This redistribution of equipment from nondeployed units will
reflect in the readiness reporting of those units until replacement
equipment arrives in conjunction with a responsible draw down of
equipment from Iraq.
56. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, have you
identified any additional equipment requirements that would better
serve our forces in Afghanistan that are currently unfunded?
General Amos. We have noted several specific items on our Unfunded
Programs List that can help us in the future. That includes engineering
equipment, reliability and maintainability and equipment upgrade
funding for the MV-22, and more intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance equipment. We'll continue to monitor the urgent need
requests of our operating forces as we executed fiscal year 2009 and
fiscal year 2010 to adjust for emerging requirements.
General Chiarelli. As mentioned previously, we have the right type
equipment or actions in place to address units' equipment requirements
for Afghanistan. We conduct weekly video teleconferences with Theater
to set conditions for success in support of equipping our forces in
Afghanistan. Efforts have resulted in a significantly reduced amount of
last minute equipment sourcing issues. The Army equips units based on
their theater assigned mission--Mission Essential Equipment List.
Commanders can also request additional equipment based on unit-specific
needs in an Operational Needs Statement. Finally, the Army is building
an Afghanistan Theater Provided Equipment set to resource unit
equipment requirements in Afghanistan. These collective efforts will
ensure that units have the best available equipment, in sufficient
quantities, for success in Afghanistan.
marine corps air assets in theater
57. Senator Burr. General Amos, in view of the limitations on the
legacy Marine Corps helicopter assets such as the CH-46 and CH-53, will
the MV-22 be deployed to Afghanistan?
General Amos. The answer is yes. However, the deployment of the V-
22 is not related to the limitations of legacy platforms. MV-22 is the
most capable platform for an austere, widely dispersed theater of
operations, and its speed, range and altitude capabilities mean our
Marine commanders will be able to maximize the MAGTF.
58. Senator Burr. General Amos, what other aviation assets do you
believe will be in high demand?
General Amos. We believe all our assets will continue to be in high
demand, as they have been over the last several years. Communities in
the highest demand categories will likely be H-1s, V-22, VMU, and EA-
6B. That said, all of our platforms are deploying at a significantly
increased tempo than that of prior to September 11.
59. Senator Burr. General Amos, do you have adequate aviation
resources considering the challenging environment and the plan to
spread the forces out to cover large amounts of territory?
General Amos. In the short term, we rely on our commanders in the
field to determine the aviation requirement. The Marine commanders in
both Iraq and Afghanistan believe we have adequate aviation resources
to accomplish the mission. We also maintain the ability to surge more
assets to those commanders if required. A ``surge'' would likely result
in the further degradation of readiness and operational flexibility
among the units left behind.
In the long term, our acquisition programs must remain intact in
order to reset the force and fulfill our anticipated global
commitments.
60. Senator Burr. General Amos, Congress just approved a
reprogramming request to add a long-duration ISR and close air support
(CAS) capability to a limited number of KC-130J tankers to support
operations in Afghanistan. What is the plan for employing that
capability?
General Amos. Mission kit-configured aircraft will address the
urgent requirement to provide extended-duration ISR and aviation fires
as an added measure of force protection for ground forces. Their
ability to provide suppressive area fires and low-magnitude precision
fires affords the MAGTF commander with additional means to counter
enemy ambush operations and provide covering fires in mountainous
terrain. In the ISR role these airframes can provide counter-IED
support with persistent surveillance coverage and reactive fire
support. Mission kit-configured KC-130Js have the potential to fill a
number of other roles for the MAGTF; however, the intent of the mission
kit is to provide a tertiary mission-set capability for the KC-130J,
which also supports the MAGTF with aerial refueling (primary) and
assault support (secondary).
The KC-130J with mission kit was conceived as a means to provide
support to ground forces in two specific scenarios--operations in
mountainous terrain and operations which required extended periods of
continuous over-watch support.
The extreme elevations in Afghanistan preclude the use of rotary-
wing platforms in support of ground operations. Specifically, rotary-
wing attack aircraft that normally provide fire support and aerial
reconnaissance for ground forces are unable to conduct these missions
at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL).
However, the KC-130J can operate easily in these elevated areas but
does not have the requisite tools to provide ISR and fire support to
ground forces. The ISR/Weapons mission kit provides an efficient and
quick resolution to this shortfall. Kit-configured aircraft can provide
reactive fire support to forces operating at these elevations, while
on-station in over-watch as an ISR platform.
Operations in Afghanistan require aviation support that rotary-wing
assets have difficulty fulfilling in terms of capacity. Traditional
fixed-wing aircraft are helpful in fulfilling some of these
requirements, but they are also incapable of satisfying the MAGTFs
requirements for persistent ISR and fire support. The KC-130Js inherent
capability to fly for extended periods enables it to support ground
operations at extended ranges and for extended periods of time, a
desired attribute for aviation support in both AOs.
The integration of armed KC-130Js into the MAGTF's arsenal of
aviation weapons will require deliberate thought, but not great effort.
Mission kit-configured aircraft will be tasked and employed in the same
manner as other aviation platforms that have multiple mission sets.
Assignment of ISR/CAS missions to the KC-130J will be weighed carefully
against use of the platform as a force multiplier for the ACE in the
aerial refueler role or as an intratheater lift asset.
The MAGTF commander will provide clear guidance for tasking of
these limited assets. In sourcing joint tactical airstrike requests,
both preplanned and immediate, mission kit-configured KC-130Js would be
used as an alternative, not a primary option. Most requests for fire
support can be met with the use of traditional fire support assets such
as Marine TACAIR and H-1 helicopters--assets specifically designed for
those missions. For preplanned missions, KC-130J aircraft would only be
employed to support the niche requirements for long-duration over watch
and/or fire support when it cannot be met by primary ISR and CAS
platforms. Similarly, fulfillment of immediate requests would use the
normal MACCS processes for diverting aircraft that are best suited to
provide the support required; kit-configured KC-130J will normally be a
last resort in these scenarios as well.
reset costs and the shift of war funding to the base budget
61. Senator Burr. General Amos, the President has made clear that
he intends this to be the last supplemental budget request to support
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan outside the normal DOD budget. Your
written statement indicates that the Marine Corps will need
approximately $20 billion for replacing, repairing, or rebuilding
equipment to reset the Marine Corps equipment stocks to acceptable
readiness levels. Your statement also says that the Marine Corps will
need depot-level maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and
support equipment well beyond the conclusion of hostilities in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you believe that we know what our reset costs
actually are at this point, or will that depend on how quickly we are
able to draw down in Iraq and the extent and length of combat in
Afghanistan?
General Amos. It is hard to predict what the Marine Corps reset
costs are going to be because it is unknown how long the Marine Corps
will be fighting in Afghanistan and it is difficult to estimate the
cost of reset for our gear returning from Iraq until that evolution is
complete. The most important thing is that or marines are equipped with
the best gear that the Marine Corps can provide. To do this, additional
funding will be required as new threats arise on the battlefield. We
know in the near term that we need an additional $8 billion in Reset
funding. This includes the elements of Reset in our fiscal year 2009
and fiscal year 2010 OCO requests. However, as long as the war
continues, our costs will continue to grow.
62. Senator Burr. General Amos, how will the Marine Corps be able
to meet these extensive and costly war-related funding needs within the
normal DOD budget which is only projected to grow about 4 percent in
fiscal year 2010?
General Amos. The Marine Corps would not be able to meet its all
its war-related funding requirements within the normal baseline budget.
Our fiscal year 2009 OCO request was 32 percent of our total fiscal
year 2009 baseline budget and is a critical to supporting the
operational needs of our marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without the
OCO the Marine Corps would be hardpressed to continue its mission in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
63. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, what steps is the Army taking
to ensure its true budgeting requirements for contingency operations
and reset are adequately addressed in the base budget?
General Chiarelli. In the fiscal year 2010 President's budget
request, the Army realigned enduring missions to the base budget that
were previously executed in the OCO. Those missions include the family
support programs (with the exception of the Yellow Ribbon Program which
remains in OCO for the USAR and is split between base and OCO for the
National Guard) and transportation costs for Combat Training Center
rotations. The extent to which reset will be funded in the base budget
will be determined through future administration and congressional
guidance. Contingency operations and reset will continue to be
accounted for in the OCO budget until that time.
marine corps readiness standards
64. Senator Burr. General Amos, Marine Corps unit readiness has
normally been rated in terms of the ability of units to perform full-
spectrum combat operations in a high intensity conflict. For the last 7
years, we have been engaged in a counterterrorism and COIN fight. As
discussed in last year's hearing, the Marine Corps rates the readiness
of its deployed units against the missions they are assigned, but rates
its nondeployed units against their ability to execute their
traditional full-spectrum missions. Explain this difference in
evaluating readiness.
General Amos. The Marine Corps assesses the readiness of all of its
units for both their designed missions (full spectrum operations) and
assigned missions (upon receipt of a mission). This is an effective
approach for our deployed forces that enables us to analyze their
readiness and resource levels for any potential reassignment. Our
nondeployed forces are the primary units that will be called upon to
respond to contingencies, hence the emphasis on reporting their
designed readiness for full-spectrum missions.
65. Senator Burr. General Amos, do the different ways of expressing
unit readiness adequately convey the true readiness of our forces?
General Amos. Yes. In coordination, we believe they do. This is a
primary reason why the Marine Corps has supported the implementation of
the DRRS, but insisted on retaining the readiness resource ratings
provided by the Global Status of Resources and Training System
(GSORTS). This combination of readiness information, in conjunction
with the commander comments that quantify and clarify their readiness
report, will be included in the implementation of DRRS-MC, scheduled
for initial operational capability by fall of this year.
66. Senator Burr. General Amos, how much risk are we taking in the
full-spectrum mission?
General Amos. The risk is significant. We have not had sufficient
time, equipment, and continuity of personnel to fully train to some of
our critical Marine Corps core competencies. We have not trained to the
full extent of our doctrinal amphibious capabilities in years, nor have
we conducted the type of large-scale integrated combined arms exercises
we used to do before 2002. Certain low-supply, high demand units and
personnel are routinely deployed to support OCOs which preclude them
from being available for other contingencies. Additionally, the
requirement to assign combat and combat support units to provisional/
in-lieu-of missions has also degraded designed training proficiencies.
Our end strength growth coupled with the retrograde from OIF will help
to minimize this challenge.
67. Senator Burr. General Amos, as highlighted in your written
statement, I am concerned that the Marine Corps has now, through
necessity rather than by choice, developed a generation of mid-grade
officer and enlisted leaders who have had to sacrifice training in
combat specialties such as artillery, air defense, amphibious
operations, and mechanized maneuver in order to provide other
capabilities in high demand in a COIN war, such as security, civil
affairs, and military police. I believe you share this concern. How do
we rebuild 7 years of lost training and experience in our mid-career
leaders?
General Amos. The Marine Corps has continued to provide our leaders
with core competency training in our schoolhouses during the post-
September 11 era. While we have added emphasis on irregular warfare, at
the same time we have maintained a balanced emphasis on conventional
warfare. The 202,000 end strength increase that was authorized by
Congress will allow the Marine Corps to reduce the number of personnel
that are applied to operational requirements which are outside of their
combat specialties. For example, the addition of civil affairs
personnel to the structure of some artillery units will allow the
Marine Corps to retain the civil affairs capability in the Active
Force, while not compromising the training of the unit in its core
competencies. As dwell time increases to a ratio of 2:1, units will
have a greater ability to conduct sustainment training in both core
competency skills as well as those mission specific skills which may be
outside of their core competencies.
future of mraps
68. Senator Burr. General Amos, in order to provide the maximum
protection for our forces, the Marine Corps requested and Congress
provided extensive funding for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles to defeat the threat of Improved Explosive Devices in Iraq.
Such a heavy vehicle is not as well-suited for the poor infrastructure
and more rugged, mountainous terrain in Afghanistan. What is the future
of the MRAP within the Marine Corps?
General Amos. The Marine Corps currently plans to use a number of
MRAPs in AFG to the greatest extent possible and practical, to maximize
upon the protected mobility they provide. MRAP vehicles are already
integrated into the equipment density list that will be used in the
theater. Current planning figures for the MEB and Regimental Combat
Team (RCT) being introduced during early 2009 is 473 MRAPs of all
categories, and an additional 273, likewise representing all
categories, upon the addition of a second RCT planned during early
2010. A recent upgrade to the suspension of the Cougar Category I is
expected to significantly improve the vehicles off road performance and
durability, and in doing so the usefulness of these vehicles in the
demanding Afghan terrain. Likewise a number of MAXXPRO Dash variant
vehicles (category I) have been allocated to the Marine Corps by recent
Joint Allocation and Distribution Board actions. These vehicles have
proven to handle the Afghan terrain well.
A number of MRAP vehicles will remain in Iraq to support Marine
Units throughout the duration of their presence in that theater. This
number will be drawn down appropriately based on threat and on site
commanders desires as units depart. As these vehicles are drawn down,
each will be assessed and repaired as required in existing facilities
in Kuwait. Once completed these vehicles will either be deployed to AFG
to meet the requirement there, maintained in a theater Reserve most
likely located in Kuwait for the near term, or returned to CONUS and
other locations in accordance with the Marine Corps Enduring
Requirement plan for MRAP vehicles which will be presented to the
senior leadership of the Marine Corps during June 2009 for approval.
The recommended Course of Action that will be presented to the
senior leadership of the Marine Corps for approval in June 2009,
proposes that all MRAPs presently allocated to the Marine Corps and
determined to in an appropriate operational condition, will be retained
and designated for one of three locations. (It is assumed for planning
purposes that approximately 2000 MRAPs will remain in serviceable
condition upon the completion of hostilities.)
A small portion, 745 vehicles, will be maintained in the
operating forces to support home station training ( 145),
vehicles for the Route Clearance Sets ( 140), Explosive
Ordnance Disposal vehicles ( 86), and the Combat Engineer
Vehicle ( 374) missions.
An addition number of the remaining MRAPs ( 733) equal to a
MEBs requirement will be placed in prepositioned short-term
storage (accessible within 30 days worldwide). This would
potentially place MRAP vehicles on Maritime Preposition
Shipping ( 48), as well as War Reserve, Albany, GA, ( 642) and
Depot Maintenance Float Allowance ( 27), and Norway ( 16).
The remaining MRAP vehicles ( 710) will be placed in long-
term storage (accessible within 90 days worldwide) at existing
Marine Corps Depot locations, most likely Barstow, CA, based on
cost and climate.
The final distribution and location for these vehicles is presently
being examined and a recommendation will be presented to the senior
leadership in June 2009, in conjunction with the recommendation to
retain the entire Marine Corps fleet of MRAP vehicles.
Though Foreign Military Sales is always a consideration and
possibility, the current Marine Corps plan (pending approval) has all
serviceable MRAP vehicles being retained for at least the near-term
years.
69. Senator Burr. General Amos, what alternatives are being sought
to provide a lighter vehicle and how well-protected would such a
vehicle be?
General Amos. In the near-term MATV is being procured in support of
an approved Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement from CENTCOM. The
MATV requires effective force protection (MRAP level protection) and
mobility performance (comparable to the HMMWV) for off-road missions.
The lack of established roads in the OEF AOR requires the MATV be
moderately lighter than current MRAP vehicles. The vehicle will include
integral and/or removable kits for both EFP and RPG protection. There
are currently five vendors competing in a selection process. Under this
best value MATV acquisition, vendors are expected to maximize both
protection levels and off-road mobility attributes and balance the
effects of size and weight in support of stated requirements.
In the longer term, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which
is currently in the technology development phase of the acquisition
cycle, is a key component of the Marine Corps' ground combat tactical
vehicle strategy. The program is driven by the need to reduce weight of
our tactical vehicle fleet in order to regain expeditionary
capabilities, particularly shipboard compatibility and rotary wing
transportability. Another goal of the JLTV program is to regain payload
capacity lost in our current HMMWV fleet due to the installation of
heavy armor kits that have taken the HMMWV past its gross vehicle
weight rating. At the same time, the JLTV program will capitalize on
lessons learned during OIF and OEF and by our experience with the MRAP
vehicles to incorporate armor and other protective features into the
vehicle design. The JLTV will include integral and/or removable kits
for both EFP and RPG protection. The JLTV will provide marines with a
very high degree of protection on all aspects of the vehicle against
many of the most prevalent mines and improvised explosive devices.
end strength growth
70. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, Secretary
Gates strongly endorsed increasing the Army and Marine Corps end
strength during his discussion of priorities for the fiscal year 2010
budget. Some view this as too expensive, and others are concerned that
large ground forces will not be needed once we withdraw from Iraq and
Afghanistan. Does the Army and the Marine Corps need the additional
forces regardless of the duration of our commitments in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
General Amos. While force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan may
occur in the future, no decisions have yet been solidified. After we
reduce our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that the
realities of the Long War will continue to keep marines and soldiers
deployed around the globe at an increased level. The Nation is
currently accepting risk through our inability to meet the other
combatant commander's theater engagements and shaping requirements
outside of CENTCOM. To build security cooperation relationships across
all theaters and prepare for contingencies outside of CENTCOM, the
increased endstrength is critical to accomplishing Combatant Commander
Theater Security Cooperation activities.
As America's expeditionary ``force in readiness'' the Marine Corps
must remain fast, austere, and lethal, capable of responding with
extraordinary speed and versatility to contingencies across the range
of military operations, against a variety of threats, and in diverse
operational environments. This ability requires a forward presence in
peacetime and in times of conflict. Our 202,000 force provides the
capacity to deploy forces for operations, broadens the engagement
options available to national leadership, and improves overall
readiness.
General Chiarelli. While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will
continue at a significant level for the foreseeable future, the Army
will need to reach and maintain its projected end strength regardless
of the duration of our OIF/OEF commitments. Currently, the global
demand for Army forces exceeds the supply. This demand includes
combatant commander requirements to conduct security cooperation
activities and SFA missions that have consistently gone unfulfilled due
to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we draw down forces
in OIF/OEF, these manpower-intensive requirements will gain in
importance, supporting the Secretary of Defense's objective of building
ally and partner capacity. Therefore, regardless of our commitment in
Iraq and Afghanistan, demand for forces will remain high for the
foreseeable future as the U.S. remains persistently engaged around the
globe.
71. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what do your
Services gain from this increase in terms of skills and capabilities,
units, and increased dwell time between deployments?
General Amos. See attached slide for 202,000 build.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Chiarelli. Increasing the Army end strength improves our
strategic depth. It enables the Army to rebalance by fiscal year 2011
and achieve a BOG to dwell ratio goal of 1:2. Rebalancing the Army,
coupled with a decrease in global demand will provide units and
soldiers more dwell time to train for full spectrum operations while
timely and consistent funding assists in resetting war worn equipment.
Full Spectrum Readiness requires 18 months dwell for units to train
beyond COIN mission requirements before their next deployment. The
Chief of Staff of the Army's guidance is that units with less than 18
months dwell before their next deployment will stay focused on the COIN
mission. Units that have 18 months or longer before their next
deployment are to focus on conventional skills training for 90 days.
72. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, do you see a
reduction in demand over the near-to-long term for Individual Augment
assignments, training teams, and other joint requirements for mid-grade
officer and enlisted leaders?
General Amos. Since 2007 the Marine Corps equity in ordered JMD
requirements has increased by 81 requirements. Growth for majors and
lieutenant colonels has increased by 15 percent with 28 new
requirements. For SSgts and Gunnery Sgts it has increased by 22 percent
with 19 requirements. These figures are based upon snap shots taken
from May of each year (2007, 2008, 2009). Demand is anticipated to grow
with the USMC contribution to the Regional Command-South JMD and the
AF/Pak strategy. There is a reconciliation plan with Iraq but the
savings is still to be determined with the formation of the USFI JMD.
The four pay grades represented above make up 55 percent of JMD
requirements for each calendar year.
General Chiarelli. Army sees a potential reduction in Training Team
requirements beginning in the October/November 2009 timeframe for Iraq
Transition Teams as we convert to the Advise and Assist BCT concept.
The Advise and Assist BCT concept yields a reduction in NCO
requirements in support of OIF but field grade officer requirements
will remain about the same. For Afghanistan, we do not see the
transition team requirements decreasing. Given the change in priorities
to OEF, it is anticipated transition team requirement there will
increase as we build Government of Afghanistan capacity to provide for
their internal and external security. Army will see a 17 percent
reduction in individual augmentee requirements in Iraq. However, this
savings will not be a reduction in CENTCOM manpower requirements for
the Army as it is anticipated the reduction will be applied to the
currently identified additional requirements in Afghanistan. US Forces-
Afghanistan and its subordinate commands currently require 556
individual augmentees of which 354 are mid-grade officers and enlisted
leaders. Again, it is anticipated individual augmentee requirements
will increase during fiscal year 2010.
preposition stock replenishment status
73. Senator Burr. General Amos, the Marine Corps has had to draw
heavily from its afloat preposition equipment in the three Maritime
Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadrons and the Marine Corps Preposition
Program-Norway to meet its equipment needs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This has increased the strategic risk if a major commitment of Marine
Corps forces were required elsewhere. What is the status of
replenishing our strategic stores of equipment on our MPS ships and in
Norway?
General Amos. Withdrawal of equipment from our strategic programs
has been a key element in supporting combat operations, growth of the
Marine Corps, and other operational priorities. Generous support from
Congress has enabled long-term equipment solutions, and as a result,
shortfalls within our strategic programs will be reset as equipment
becomes available from industry.
Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRON)
Our MPSRONs will be reset with the most capable equipment possible,
and we have begun loading them with capabilities that support lower
spectrum operations while still maintaining the ability to generate
MEBs capable of conducting major combat operations. The MPSRONs are
currently rotating through Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
Maintenance Cycle-9. MPSRON-1 completed MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 in
September 2008 and is currently at 86 percent of its full equipment
set. As I addressed in my 2008 report, equipment from MPSRON-1 was
required to outfit new units standing up in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
year 2008 as part of our end strength increase to 202,000. MPSRON-1 is
expected to be fully reset at the completion of its next maintenance
cycle in 2011.
MPSRON-2 is currently undergoing its rotation through MPF
Maintenance Cycle-9. Equipment from MPSRON-2 was offloaded to support
OIF and much of that equipment still remains committed to forward
operations today. With projected deliveries from industry, MPSRON-2
will complete MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 in June 2009 with approximately
90 percent of its planned equipment set. Our intent is to fully reset
MPSRON-2 when it completes MPF Maintenance Cycle-10 in fiscal year
2012. MPSRON-3 was reset to 100 percent of its equipment set during MPF
Maintenance Cycle-8 in March 2007 and remains fully capable.
We are currently in the process of replacing the aging, leased
vessels in the MPF with newer, larger, and more flexible government
owned ships from the Military Sealift Command fleet. Two decades of
equipment growth and recent armor initiatives have strained the
capability and capacity of our present fleet--that was designed to lift
a Naval Force developed in the early 1980s. As we reset MPF, these
changes are necessary to ensure we incorporate hard fought lessons from
recent combat operations.
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) was also
used to source equipment in support of current operations in both OIF
and OEF and to provide humanitarian assistance in Georgia. The Marine
Corps continues to reset MCPP-N in accordance with our operational
priorities while also exploring other locations for geographic
prepositioning that will enable combat and theater security cooperation
operations in support of forward deployed Naval Forces.
74. Senator Burr. General Amos, does the Marine Corps have an
investment strategy in the defense budget to fully restore these stores
of equipment? If so, please provide a review of this investment
strategy.
General Amos. Our baseline budget is structured to support the
stock replenishment plans outlined in answer #73. For the distribution
of equipment however, our deployed warfighters still get first
priority, so we may have situations where we're delayed in restocking.
These costs will be covered by both our baseline budget and our
supplemental requests. Over the long term, the Marine Corps will
continue to incorporate our prepositioning equipment sets into our
modernization plans and our acquisition objectives. As an element of
the USMC Approved Acquisition Objective, MPF is modernized along with
the rest of the force to ensure the equipment aboard MPF is as capable
as possible given other operational priorities.
movement of marines from okinawa to guam
75. Senator Burr. General Amos, during one of her first
international trips after being confirmed as Secretary of State,
Secretary Clinton, signed an agreement with the Government of Japan
regarding the relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam.
What is the status of crucial decisions, such as the environmental
assessment needed to build an airfield for the marines to replace the
existing runway at MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, and funding by Japan to
support this move?
General Amos. [Deleted.]
76. Senator Burr. General Amos, what is your level of confidence
that the move to Guam can be completed on schedule?
General Amos. While we are committed to the relocation to Guam, we
foresee significant challenges with meeting the completion timeline of
2014. Of note, the original concept for the Guam buildup was a 7 year
construction schedule to begin in 2007. We are currently on a 4-year
construction schedule to begin in 2010. Issues that impact the 2014
timeline include Japanese construction of the FRF, the Guam
Environmental Impact Statement, the physical movement of 8,000 marines,
and programming. However, perhaps the key issue with the 2014 timeline
is construction capacity on Guam. A completion timeline of 2017 or
beyond is more realistic based on an assessment of equipment, material,
workforce, infrastructure, and transportation requirements available on
Guam.
77. Senator Burr. General Amos, what is being done to ensure that
Guam has adequate resources to make the necessary infrastructure
improvements to its port and roads to support the buildup of marines
and other U.S. forces?
General Amos. [Deleted.]
78. Senator Burr. General Amos, given the current plan, do you
believe the marines stationed on Guam will be able to fulfill the full
range of training requirements? If not, what shortfalls exist and what
arrangements will need to be implemented to satisfy training
requirements?
General Amos. Without CNMI ranges and training areas, Marine Corps
units stationed on Guam will not be able to maintain operational
readiness along their core competencies without extensive travel to
other Marine Corps, DOD or allied nation ranges.
Current NEPA efforts and other key elements such as funding do not
include all Marine Corps training-range requirements for units to be
relocated to Guam. Specifically absent are the facilities to support
enhanced unit-level, live-fire training.
Training facilities on Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern
Mariana Islands would reduce our dependency on foreign training
facilities, which is often complicated by status-of-forces agreements,
quarantine procedures, and political sensitivities
The Marine Corps continues to work with the Secretary of the Navy
and DOD to address our training requirements.
changes to the marine corps' tables of equipment
79. Senator Burr. General Amos, what has the Marine Corps learned
about needed changes to its unit Tables of Equipment over the course of
the last 7 years?
General Amos. We have rigorously reviewed our tables of equipment,
using feedback received from our Urgent Universal Need Statements, our
Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, and the results of a Corps-wide
evaluation of all Tables of Equipment by our own subject matter experts
who have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of this review,
we have revised our tables of equipment to reflect the capabilities
required for success in the missions we are assigned today, as well as
the full range of missions we anticipate in the future.
While our new tables of equipment provide for increased
capabilities in many areas today--particularly protected mobility,
tactical level communications, and crew-served weapons--they also serve
as the basis for future force development. We continually refine our
requirements to exploit new technology and to continue to adopt new
lessons. As a result, we see trends reflective of irregular warfare,
such as requirements for increased capabilities in command and control
and persistent ISR, as well as requirements to further enhance the
organic ability of small units to perform a wide array of missions
traditionally associated with higher echelon headquarters.
The Marine Corps recently completed an initial review of its
Operating Forces' ground tables of equipment (T/E) requirements, which
took into account the changing security environment and hard lessons
learned from 7 years of combat. This review was synchronized with our
modernization plans and programs, and addressed for enhanced mobility,
lethality, sustainment and command and control needed across the MAGTF.
The MAGTF T/E review was also an integral part of the critical work
being done to reset, reconstitute and revitalize the Marine Corps. The
resultant T/Es reflect the capabilities required not only for the
Corps' current mission, but for its future employment across the range
of military operations, against a variety of threats, and in diverse
terrain and conditions.
80. Senator Burr. General Amos, how are these changes being
implemented and funded?
General Amos. We are in the process of conducting a detailed
comparison of our new tables of equipment with our equipment stocks
currently on hand or contracted and the equipment that is currently
programmed for procurement in future years. This will provide us a
complete picture of our equipment shortfalls in all categories,
including our actual unit table of equipment requirements, as well as
our requirements for prepositioned stocks, training, war reserve, and
rotational stocks to support our depot level maintenance programs. At
the same time, we continually assess our procurement priorities to
ensure that our resources are being applied wisely.
When our detailed review is complete, we will apply the results to
our planning processes for near-term reset and reconstitution, as well
as our far-term force development planning processes. This will enable
informed decision-making with regard to future programming,
prioritization, and acceptance of risk.
training range adequacy
81. Senator Burr. General Amos, do the existing Marine Corps'
training ranges provide sufficient land area and capability to conduct
realistic predeployment training for the proposed increased end
strength of Marine Corps units?
General Amos. The Marine Corps has identified Service-level
deficits in its ability to train to the many missions that it faces.
Continued analysis and the fielding of new systems may cause other
requirements to surface in the future, but today the projected
operational range requirements at the Service level focus on the
following critical deficiencies.
The inability of Marine Corps ranges to fully exercise a
large MAGTF in a realistic, doctrinally appropriate training
scenario.
Inadequate training opportunities for the Marine units
stationed in the western Pacific and Hawaii.
Inadequate aviation training facilities on the east coast of
the United States with range capabilities such as those
provided by MCAS Yuma on the west coast.
As noted, increasing demands on training ranges and risks of
constrained access to the existing range inventory from encroachment
pressures present complex challenges. In the future, the Marine Corps
expects these challenges to increase, resulting in additional
deficiencies to the three critical shortfalls identified above.
82. Senator Burr. General Amos, are you seeking to make any changes
or expansions to training ranges?
General Amos. As noted, the Marine Corps has identified three
critical deficiencies in available land area to support required
training.
To address the inability of Marine Corps ranges to fully
exercise a large MAGTF in a realistic, doctrinally appropriate
training scenario, the Marine Corps is evaluating the potential
expansion of Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at
Twentynine Palms. MCAGCC is the center of excellence for
developing and executing combine-arms live-fire training of the
MAGTF; however, MCAGCC cannot accommodate a full-scale, live-
fire MEB exercise. Expansion of MCAGCC would significantly
enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to continue to provide
trained marines, Marine units, and MAGTFs in furtherance of
national security objectives. Having obtained necessary
authorizations from DOD, the Marine Corps is proceeding with
analysis and assessments in support of land expansion.
To address inadequate training opportunities for the Marine
units stationed in the western Pacific and Hawaii, the Marine
Corps is engaged in the planning initiative to relocate units
from Okinawa to Guam, in order to influence that initiative to
include development of training ranges and infrastructure on
Guam and selected islands of the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands. Development of adequate range facilities for
the conduct of enhanced small-unit live-fire training will help
alleviate training-related deficits experienced by marines
stationed in Okinawa and Hawaii.
To address the need for an aviation training range on the
east coast of the United States with range capabilities such as
those provided by MCAS Yuma on the west coast, a preliminary
study of the Marines Corps' Townsend Range in Georgia is
underway. This study is assessing the feasibility of expanding
Townsend to support aviation training utilizing current and
emerging weapons, systems and platforms in a doctrinally
appropriate training environment.
In addition to these focused initiatives, at the direction of the
Commandant, an initiative is underway to establish an overarching land
acquisition strategy addressing current, emerging, and future training
requirements and associated land and airspace needs (through 2060) to
ensure the Marine Corps remains fully mission-capable.
83. Senator Burr. General Amos, what additional investments are
required to improve training for Marine Corps forces?
General Amos. The Marine Corps has made unprecedented investments
in its training infrastructure during the past 5 years. The primary
focus of this modernization effort to date has been to meet the
training requirements emerging from the theaters of operation,
particularly those relating to urban and counter-IED tactics. As we
look to the future, the Range Modernization Program will shift some of
its emphasis to increase investment in providing realistic, immersive
training environments for our marines using integrated systems for
tactical engagement, range instrumentation, inter-active targetry,
threat simulators, and after-action review. The program is funded
through the Future Years Defense Program in a manner that will allow us
to address many of our deficiencies and improve training at all of our
home stations.
adequacy of amphibious shipping
84. Senator Burr. General Amos, during his discussion of the fiscal
year 2010 budget, Secretary Gates indicated that the issue of
amphibious shipping and sea-basing programs, such as the 11th Landing
Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship,
will be delayed until fiscal year 2011 in order to assess the costs and
analyze the amount of these capabilities the Nation needs. What are
your views on the steady-state requirements for amphibious shipping?
General Amos. The MPF (Future) (MPF(F)) program is a critically
essential element of the Marine Corps warfighting capability, and the
Corps cannot withstand any additional shipbuilding programmatic delays.
The Marine Corps requires three MEB's worth of expeditionary
warfighting capability and lift. We have already accepted risk in our
amphibious lift capacity by agreeing to fiscally constrain shipping
availability for each of our 2 MEB assault echelons from 17 to 15
ships. And, the fiscal year 2009 30-year shipbuilding plan does not
provide the exact mix of required LHA/LHDs, LPD-17s, and LSD-41/49
equivalents, which further amplifies the risk we're taking in our
amphibious forcible entry capabilities.
The Marine Corps intends to fight any major contingency operation
as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), which consists of three
Regimental Landing Team (RLT)-size operational maneuver elements. The
first two of those RLTs are intended to be employed from the amphibious
Assault Echelon shipping described above, and the third RLT maneuver
unit will operate from MPF(F) to reinforce and support the amphibious
Assault Echelon units.
The 30 operationally available amphibious ships required for 2.0
MEB Assault Echelon, coupled with MPF(F)s 1.0 MEB-level reinforcing and
support echelon, and the Assault Follow-On Echelon (lifted by Military
Sealift Command black-bottom shipping) provide the 3.0 MEB necessary to
enable a sea based, MEF-level warfighting capability.
family readiness initiatives
85. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, in your
opinion, how are military families handling the extremely intense
deployment schedule in support of overseas contingencies?
General Amos. There can be little doubt that nearly 8 years of high
OPTEMPO have put stress not only on our forces but on our families as
well. The Commandant and all Marine Corps leadership remain concerned
about the impact on our families, and we have committed unprecedented
resources to putting our family readiness programs on a wartime
footing. In fiscal year 2010, many of the initiatives and improvements
that were funded in supplemental budgets are now sustained in our
baseline funding. We continue to carefully monitor our family health
indicators.
To mitigate the stress on military families and children facing the
multiple challenges of having a loved one at war, the Marine Corps is
partnering with the U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)
and UCLA's Center for Community Health and the National Center for
Child Traumatic Stress to sponsor a program called Project FOCUS,
``Families OverComing Under Stress,'' at our major deploying bases. The
family-oriented program is designed to work with marines, spouses and
children to improve family communications post deployment through
specialized resiliency training. Working with the existing teams of
dedicated military family services personnel, FOCUS staff will assist
families to better understand how combat operational stress affects
them and their service family member, how to manage it, and how to
strengthen themselves and their children in readiness for tomorrow.
FOCUS is currently being provided at Camp Pendleton, Twentynine Palms,
Camp Lejeune, MCB Hawaii, and MCB Okinawa. Next year, it will be
expanded to include MCB Quantico, the Wounded Warrior Regiment and
Battalions, and Marine Corps Reserve units in the Los Angeles Basin.
We also know from our last Quality of Life Study (2007) that
despite the global war on terror and the high OPTEMPO, marines and
their families are generally pleased with the program services and
support they are receiving from the Marine Corps. The study also found
that there was an increase in overall and specific satisfaction across
the board for spouses when compared with the results from the pre-OIF/
OEF 2002 study. In fact, the overall Quality of Life score for the
spouses was the highest seen for any of the respondent groups (marines
assigned to an installation, independent marines, and recruiters)
considered in this study. Spouses greatly appreciate the health care
benefits provided by the Marine Corps, the quality of professional
child care they receive, and the educational opportunities for their
children. These factors and others had a positive impact on the family
decision to remain part of the Marine Corps.
General Chiarelli. Army families are feeling the impacts of
persistent conflict, but remain resilient in the midst of extraordinary
sacrifices as their loved ones advance the cause of freedom around the
world. Family members have set aside careers, interrupted their
education, and when living far from a military base, struggled to
locate child care equal to the price and quality available at military
installations. Quality of life programs continue to contribute to
soldiers' and families'sense of belonging to a caring military
community, mitigate stress, and assist geographically dispersed
soldiers and families which all reinforce their desire to remain in the
Army as a way of life despite the serious military stressors and
strains they experience.
86. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, are you
seeing any trends that would point to changes in the overall health and
support of our Marine Corps families?
General Amos. There were year-on-year increases for 2008 in suicide
incidents, sexual assault incidents, substantiated child maltreatment
incidents, and domestic abuse incidents. We also know that divorce
rates have increased. When we did a ``Financial Health Quick Poll''
last summer to determine the level of financial stress among marines
and their families as a result of recent economic changes, we learned
that our Marine Corps families, like families in the civilian world,
were experiencing some financial stress.
The survey indicated that of those who responded to the Quick Poll,
15 percent of enlisted marines and 5 percent of Marine officers were
classified as being in ``financial distress.'' Respondents reported
that the most frequent financial problems experienced within the past
year were utility rate increases, rent increases, and property tax
increases. Over half of enlisted marines respondents stated they have
borrowed money from family or friends, and 38 percent have skipped
payment on their bills.
To alleviate stress on marines and their families facing financial
difficulties and help them develop financial management skills, we are
providing personal financial management (PFM) counseling services and
workshops. To date, 7,228 marines and 2,077 family members have
received one-on-one financial counseling, while 115,993 marines and
5,055 family members have attended our PFM workshops/classes.
General Chiarelli. Never before in the history of our Army have we
asked so much of our families, who make incredible sacrifices and
remain steadfast while enduring the stress of almost 8 years at war. In
response, the Army continues to enhance programs and services to enable
soldiers and families to become resilient and ready to address the
challenges of deployment and separation.
From 2001 to 2008, overall soldier satisfaction with the quality of
Army life rose from 63 percent to 79 percent for officers and from 52
percent to 65 percent for enlisted (fall 2008 Sample Survey of Military
Personnel). We measure the effectiveness of Army support programs by
surveying soldiers and families on a regular basis to seek their
opinions, assess their satisfaction, and most importantly, monitor
their adaptation to the unique challenges of Army life. These trends
help us match the capabilities of Army programs to the expectations of
our soldiers and families--keeping the Army strong, ready, and
resilient.
In 2007, the Army unveiled the Army Family Covenant, a commitment
to provide soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with
their level of service and sacrifice to the Nation. In the 2 years
since the Covenant was unveiled, the Army has moved out with aggressive
improvement strategies that have reaped significant improvements in
soldier and family quality of life including family programs and
services, increased accessibility to health care, improved housing,
excellence in schools, youth and child services, and expanded education
and employment opportunities for family members. We believe the Army
Family Covenant is making a difference, and while we are moving in the
right direction, there is still much work to do.
87. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what has the
Marine Corps done to improve and invest in family readiness programs
given the enormous strain the force has been under?
General Amos. Over the past year, the Marine Corps initiated a
multi-year strategy to transition family support programs to a wartime
footing, per the Commandant's directive. To achieve this, we conducted
a series of assessments and received feedback from our marines, their
families, and our commanders to measure the effectiveness of our
services and family support programs.
As a result, we implemented key reforms at every level of command
and aboard each installation. Central to our transformation efforts, we
expanded the depth and breadth of our family readiness training and
support programs and established the Unit Personal and Family Readiness
Program to educate our marines and their families and to empower them
to achieve and maintain a high state of personal readiness and
resiliency. Specific program enhancements:
Unit Personal and Family Readiness Program
Authorized full-time civilian Family Readiness Officer
billets in more than 400 units, who serve as the focal point
for families of our marines;
Redesigned Marine Corps Family Team Building to focus on the
development and promulgation of high-quality training that
supports the life cycle of marines and their families through
mission, career and life events in support of the Unit Personal
and Family Readiness Program;
Developed comprehensive training for pre, during, and post-
deployment to address the increased demands and potential
impact of multiple, sustained deployments on marines and their
families;
Developed an inventory of Lifeskills training courses that
address the specific challenges of military life, as well as
those of personal and family life;
Expanded family readiness support to include parents of
single marines as we acknowledge the role extended family
members play in fostering personal and family readiness;
Utilized the Mass Communication Tool to enable Family
Readiness Officers to expand communications between marines and
their families through simultaneous broadcast of communication
via email, text messaging, or telephone;
Initiated the Family Readiness Assessment Tool to provide
unit commanders with the ability to assess the resiliency of
their marines and families;
Conducted research and analysis to assess the effectiveness
of current communication methods, to identify communication
needs of marines and their families, and to develop a formal
organizational communications system that will facilitate
three-way communication: commands to marines and families;
marines and families to commands; and marines and families to
each other;
Initiated substantial infrastructure and quality of life
programming improvements at remote and isolated commands to
promote the sense of community required to form strong bonds
among our marine families; and
Installed wireless networks and access points at over 230
facilities across the Marine Corps to better connect marines
and their families, as well as enhance morale and recreation
capabilities on installations. We are also testing a Morale-
Portable Satellite Communications Suite that provides an
internet and web-cam capability to FOBs in Afghanistan where
traditional ``Internet Cafes'' are unavailable.
Exceptional Family Member Program
Restructured the program and established a continuum of care for
our Exceptional Family Member Program families. Specifics:
This program, which is fully staffed at both the installation
and headquarters levels, is helping nearly 6,500 families gain
access to medical, educational, and financial services that may
be limited or restricted at certain duty stations.
A Marine Corps-funded Respite Care Program provides up to 40
hours of care per month to all enrolled families, and can be
used in conjunction with the TRICARE Extended Care Health
Option benefit.
We are working with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and
TRICARE to resolve health care access and availability issues
at several bases.
Legal counsel is now on staff to advise our exceptional
family members on State and Federal entitlements and processes.
School Liaison Program
Established a school liaison capability at every Marine Corps
installation to help parents and commanders mitigate education
transition issues by interacting with local schools and advocating for
school-age children to insure access and availability to quality
education and special needs services. In addition, the Marine Corps
supports the DOD effort to develop an ``Interstate Compact on
Educational Opportunity for Military Children'' with states to enable
reciprocal acceptance of entrance, subjects, testing, and graduation
requirements. To date, 18 States have passed the Interstate Compact,
which accounts for 62 percent of all military children. Other states
are moving toward passing the compact as well.
Children, Youth and Teen Programs
Adopted multiple strategies to increase our child care capability:
Expanded hours to address increased OPTEMPO;
Developed partnerships with organizations on and off base,
such as the National Association of Child Care Resource &
Referral Agencies, to provide long and short-term support for
marines and their families who are geographically dispersed,
deployed, and severely injured; and
Started providing 16 hours of reimbursed respite care per
month for families with a deployed marine.
Currently, we are providing 11,757 child care spaces and
meeting 63.6 percent of the calculated total need. It is
important to note that the Marine Corps has initiated rigorous
data collection and analysis improvements. As a result, it will
be necessary to correct the 2007 annual summary due to
identified reporting errors. Our reported rate of 71 percent of
calculated total need last year is more accurately stated as
59.1 percent.
To meet the DOD standard of 80 percent of potential need, we
would require slightly over 3000 additional spaces. To address
this requirement, Congress has funded 915 additional spaces in
fiscal year 2008/2009. The ARRA and 2009 Overseas Contingency
request would provide an additional 1,700 spaces. We are also
considering additional modular Child Development Centers,
subject to more detailed planning and availability of funds. As
the needs of our families change, our program is committed to
grow and adapt to meet these needs.
These initiatives and others not only demonstrate the commitment of
the Marine Corps to our marines and their families, but also underscore
the significance of Marine and family support to mission readiness.
General Chiarelli. Under the Army Family Covenant, the Army began
to implement aggressive improvements to a broad range of family-
oriented quality of life programs and services to standardize and fund
existing family programs and services; increase accessibility to health
care; improve soldier and family housing; ensure excellence in schools,
youth, and child services; and expand education and employment
opportunities for family members.
Since the Covenant's inception, the Army has made significant
progress and improvements in quality of life programs including
implementation of the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program to minimize
the stress of military service, deployed 200,000 training products to
strengthen resilience in military children; increased staff for the New
Parent Support Home Visit Program; added additional respite care
funding for Families with Exceptional Family Members and those with a
deployed sponsor; established soldier and Family Assistance Centers;
and placed thousands of spouses in jobs--just to name a few.
While we are moving in the right direction with the Army Family
Covenant, there is still much work to be done. The Army remains
determined to provide a strong and supportive environment where
soldiers and their families can thrive.
recruit quality
88. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, both the Army
and the Marine Corps have surpassed all expectations by achieving its
growth targets as it expands respective end strengths. How has this
expansion impacted recruit quality?
General Amos. The quality of our recruits is at a historical high.
The Marine Corps has been and remains committed to recruiting only the
most highly qualified young men and women into our Corps. We continue
to believe, and the evidence bears out, that recruiting high quality
applicants results in decreased attrition from recruit training during
the marine's first term. High quality applicants become high quality
marines, who perform well during all aspects of their military careers
and maintain the high standards our Nation expects from her marines.
Because of this commitment to quality, the Marine Corps has not, and
will not, reduce our quality standards or enlistment criteria.
General Chiarelli. The performance of young soldiers in combat and
reports of their performance from leaders in the field attest to the
fact that the quality of the young men and women volunteering to serve
in America's Army remains of the highest caliber. The recruiting
environment--which in previous years yielded recruiting cohorts that
significantly exceeded the Army's and the DOD's recruiting quality
standards--has impacted our ability to meet DOD quality mark goals for
the past 5 years. However, despite these shortfalls, we are now
experiencing a return to favorable conditions and the result is a
marked increase in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 recruit quality. The
Army's percentage of new enlisted soldiers considered ``high quality''
with a Tier 1 education (high school diploma) increased by 2.1 percent
in 2008. Additionally, recruits who scored highly (50 percent to 99
percent) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) increased 1.6
percent; and recruits who scored poorly (30 percent and below) on the
AFQT decreased 1.2 percent. The Army is expected to meet every DOD
quality mark goal in all components for fiscal year 2009 and remains
committed to recruiting the best qualified volunteers who desire to
serve our Nation as soldiers.
army noncommissioned officer and mid-level officer shortfall
89. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, as a result of nearly 7 years
of war, multiple deployments, and increasing strain on military
families, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of young officers and
NCOs--positions that many consider the backbone of the operational
military. In an attempt to address this shortfall, the Army began in
2005 automatically promoting enlisted personnel in the rank of E-4 to
E-5 without requiring them to appear before a promotion board. In April
2008, the Army extended this policy to include automatic promotions
from E-5 to E-6. While a soldier's name can be removed from the
promotion list by his or her commander, it will be automatically
returned to the pending promotions list the following month. This
change in policy reduced the NCO shortfall by nearly 70 percent;
however, it also led to an influx of unqualified and untested soldiers
filling leadership roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is the current
rate of promotion from E-4 to E-5? From E-5 to E-6?
General Chiarelli. Soldiers previously denied Department of the
Army directed promotion list integration are automatically re-
integrated quarterly, not monthly, in support of Army quarterly leader/
professional developmental counseling requirements. In fiscal year 2009
(year to date), on average, the monthly Army selection rate for
promotion to sergeant is 5.55 percent with a selection rate for
Soldiers automatically integrated to sergeant at 0.34 percent. The
monthly selection rate for promotion to staff sergeant is 4.22 percent
with a selection rate for Soldiers automatically integrated to staff
sergeant at 0.16 percent.
90. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, are you concerned that
soldiers are being promoted based on numerical requirements rather than
on their qualifications and service record?
General Chiarelli. Commanders, Command Sergeants Major, and First
Sergeants throughout our Army are upholding their inherent
responsibility to ensure only highly qualified soldiers remain
integrated onto the recommended list for promotion to sergeant and
staff sergeant. I believe our leaders are taking this responsibility
with the highest regard.
The promotion system, as an administrative process, is designed to
ensure promotion of sufficient numbers of qualified soldiers to satisfy
requirements and it works very well. I trust that commanders are not
allowing integration to promotion lists of any unqualified soldier.
91. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, are there any plans pending to
eliminate the automatic promotion of sergeants and staff sergeants
without requiring them to appear before a promotion board?
General Chiarelli. There are no automatic promotions and there are
no plans to terminate the provisions of the program. We are considering
renaming the program ``Commander's List Integration'' so the term
``automatic'' is not mistakenly applied to a promotion. While the Army
automatically integrates qualified soldiers, they remain on the list
only if the commander approves integration. Soldiers integrated to the
promotion list based on this policy receive the minimum number of
promotion points and they must compete for promotion with those who are
integrated through normal promotion board processes. Consequently, the
likelyhood of a soldier automatically integrated onto the promotion
list is much smaller. Army standards are retained and enforced by
commanders. Automatic list integration does not guarantee automatic
promotion. There is no provision or intent for automatic list
integration to result in automatic promotion.
92. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, these shortfalls extend to the
junior and mid-level officer corps, as well. In recent testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, military analyst Andrew
Krepinevich noted that the Army is projected to experience a shortfall
of approximately 3,000 captains and majors until at least 2013 as the
Army increases its Active-Duty end strength by 65,000. Do you believe
this projected shortfall is accurate?
General Chiarelli. No. The Army currently projects to be at full
strength for captains by fiscal year 2013, but will have a shortfall of
1,355 majors that year. The Army's company grade retention continues to
improve, but our growth in structure and capabilities requires the Army
to retain captains and majors at rates well above historical averages.
93. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, can you elaborate what
consequences this shortfall will have on the Army's ability to meet its
requirements?
General Chiarelli. Our aggressive focus on shortages over the past
several years will allow us to be at or over strength slightly for
captains by fiscal year 2011, but we are likely continue to be short
for majors through fiscal year 2015, barring any subsequent drop in
required force structure.
94. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, can you describe what steps
the Army is taking to address this shortfall through the Captain's
Incentive Program, as well as any other relevant efforts?
General Chiarelli. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, we implemented a
pre-commissioning program, which allows cadets to select a branch, post
of choice, or graduate school for an additional service obligation of 3
years. This program has proved successful over the past 3 years with
over 4,500 participating cadets to date. The Army expects this program
to reduce loss rates among U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship commissioned officers
beginning in fiscal year 2010 when officers from the earliest year
group will have completed their normal active duty service obligation
(5 years for USMA and four for ROTC officers). As a result of this
program, the participating officers will be retained for 8 and 7 years,
respectively.
95. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how do you gauge the
effectiveness of these programs?
General Chiarelli. The Army's Captains Retention Menu of Incentives
program began in September 2007. This program targeted Army Competitive
Category and selected Medical Service and Army Nurse Captains, and
offered officers from year groups 1999 through 2005 the opportunity to
select a branch of choice, post of choice, military school, graduate
level education, or Critical Skills Retention Bonus in exchange for an
agreement to serve 3 additional years past any existing service
obligations. This program closed in November 2008, and has guaranteed
obligations through the beginning of fiscal year 2011 for over 15,300
captains. In 2006, at the beginning of our most significant modular
growth, the Army was projected to be short almost 7,000 captains and
majors in the summer of 2009. The projected shortage for the end of
summer 2009 is now less than 3,000 at these grades. We are confident
that our Menu of Incentives played a significant part in reducing our
shortages.
For the future, The Army is developing nonmonetary retention tools
for commanders at all levels that provide direct comparisons between
the benefits of service careers and careers in the civilian sector, as
well as web based interactive information sites, and personal outreach
tools that enable the direct interaction between senior leaders and
their junior officers to maximize the potential to retain our best and
brightest young officers.
readiness rates of support forces
96. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, much attention has been given
to the current readiness of our combat units. However, can you briefly
comment on the difference between the current readiness rates of combat
units, combat support units, and combat service support units for both
Active and Reserve component forces?
General Chiarelli. FM 3-0, Operations, establishes the Army's six
``warfighting functions'' and no longer uses combat, combat support or
combat service support to categorize forces. There is, however, no
doubt that the readiness of the entire Army has been stretched and the
implications of that stress are available through classified responses
or from the Chairman's Risk Assessment.
The Army closely monitors the readiness of all its forces--movement
and maneuver units as well as intelligence, fires, sustainment, command
and control and protection units. All forces have experienced degraded
readiness ratings due to prolonged rotations resulting from more than 8
years of armed conflict. For units other than movement and maneuver
units, this strain has been more pronounced, particularly in the
Reserve component, where the majority of these units are included in
the force structure.
To remedy this decline and to meet the combatant commander's demand
for forces, the Army has developed the ARFORGEN process. The purpose of
the process is to synchronize resourcing of units to meet routine and
predictable periods of availability and deployment. A major objective
of the process is to accurately track and resource the readiness of all
Army units across all three components (Active Army, Army National
Guard, and Army Reserve). This approach ensures that the Army is
capable of providing the best trained and led formations to meet
current and future demands.
The Army remains committed to providing detailed, accurate, and
commander-centric assessment of unit capabilities. Our readiness
reporting procedures will continue to measure the core functions of
Army units to meet wartime requirements. Additionally, Army units will
report readiness assessments to complete assigned missions when
directed by combatant commanders.
97. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, does the Army's plan to
restore a balance to the force by 2011 include sustaining, preparing,
resetting, and transforming all Army units, or is the Army just
concentrating on major combat units?
General Chiarelli. The Army is committed to providing every
deploying soldier and unit regardless of component, with the best
training, equipment, and formations and ensuring these deployed units
are reset to restore all deployed units to a level of personnel and
equipment readiness to permit resumption of training for future
missions. The Army transformation plan includes all units in all
components-Active, Guard, and Reserve, and is scheduled to be 97
percent complete by the end of 2011.
98. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, is the Army differentiating
between the Active and Reserve components in your rebalancing plans?
General Chiarelli. The rebalance plan is predicated on the assured
access to units and the different ARFORGEN Model deployment rates
utilized by the Active component and the Reserve component. The Army
focuses rebalance plans on ensuring the required forces are available
to the combatant commanders and Governors in a timely manner. The
rebalance plan considers capability placement within components based
on these factors.
Since 2003, the Army has adjusted the mix in combat, combat
support, and combat service support force structure by over 88,000
across all three components, to include reductions in field artillery
and armor units and growth in military police, engineers, civil
affairs, and psychological operations. During the latest Army force
sizing analysis in 2008, no major rebalancing efforts occurred between
components to allow the Reserve component the time needed to build
readiness.
The Army continuously makes adjustments to the balance of
capabilities between components as new requirements emerge. The Army
remains committed to ensuring the interoperability of these units
through standardized design and uniformed fielding regardless of
component.
modular redesign of army
99. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the Army has undertaken a
restructuring of its combat and support forces to a more flexible,
brigade-centric force thought to be better suited for the 21st century
security environment. At the same time, the Army underwent a revision
to Army FM 3.0 Operations, to reflect an increased emphasis on
stability and civil support operations. However, some critics have
raised concerns that these smaller, modular brigades with diverse
mission sets are inadequately designed and ill-equipped to execute the
full range of missions they have been assigned (from testimony from
March 26, 2009, Airland Subcommittee hearing on the Future of U.S.
Ground forces). Please discuss the progress of this restructuring and
describe what changes, if any, you would recommend.
General Chiarelli. Operations today require versatile, well-trained
units and tough, adaptive commanders. There is no set formula for
applying landpower. Each campaign and major operation requires an
original design and flexible execution. Army forces must be able to
operate as part of a joint or multinational force anywhere on the
spectrum of conflict. Army modular elements have the ability to be
organized and scaled to build a task force uniquely tailored to a
specific operation. These modular formations, though some may be
smaller, far outstrip the capabilities from previous organizations.
These capability increases are a direct result of applying lessons
learned from combat operations. The Army will continue to incorporate
these combat insights as well as listening to the concerns and desires
of commanders in the field to ensure future formations are even more
capable.
By the end of fiscal year 2009, the Army will have completed 87
percent of its transformation from a division-centric force to a
brigade-centric modular force. The Army will have transformed 70 of 73
BCTs, 192 of 227 modular support brigades, and increased Special
Operations Forces force structure from 26,000 to 37,000.
100. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, have combat assessments of
modular brigades returning from overseas deployments revealed any
concerns with the structure and effectiveness of these units?
General Chiarelli. The Army assesses force sufficiency based on
lessons learned, requests for forces to meet current operational
requirements, and the analysis of projected strategic demands. The
Army's concept of full spectrum capability requires Army forces to be
prepared to meet the demands of offensive, defensive, and stability
operations. The existing operational environment sets the emphasis for
which capability is needed to meet those demands and refocus Army
design efforts. Employing lessons learned from combat experience and
addresses strategic, operational, and tactical realities has allowed
the Army to better protect and care for soldiers and guarantee mission
success through changes in doctrine, organization, training, and
equipment.
dwell time
101. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, during testimony in February,
Secretary Gates stated the Department's goal for the Army to increase
dwell time to approximately 1 year deployed and 15 months at home by
the end of 2009, 1 year deployed and 2 years at home by fiscal year
2010, and by fiscal year 2011, 1 year deployed and 30 months at home.
Given the current plans for a drawdown of brigades in Iraq and
sustained force in Afghanistan, do you believe this is an achievable
goal?
General Chiarelli. BOG to dwell ratio is driven by global demand
vs. the supply of available forces. The Army's goals for soldier dwell
are consistent with the Secretary of Defense's January 27, 2009,
testimony, but demand and available forces will ultimately drive the
dwell. In fiscal year 2011, the Army will achieve 45 Active component
BCTs. As long as demand does not exceed 11 Active component BCTs, we
will achieve a BOG to dwell of 1:2.5.
The Army's long-term sustainable goal is to allow Active component
units and soldiers three times the amount of time home as they are
deployed (1:3 ratio). The Army's long-term goal for the Reserve
component is 12 months mobilized for every 5 years not mobilized (1:5
ratio). Improving the deployed dwell ratio depends on reducing the
global demand for BCTs which is currently at 27 BCT equivalents. The
Army's current Active component BOG to dwell is 1:1.3.
102. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, besides the current OPTEMPO
and the potential for other contingencies, what factors will affect the
Army's ability to meet this dwell time plan?
General Chiarelli. Demand for Active component BCTs in Iraq and
Afghanistan will continue at a significant level for the foreseeable
future. Additionally, the high global demand for forces also includes
combatant commander requirements to conduct Security Cooperation
activities and SFA missions outside of the USCENTCOM area of
responsibility that have consistently gone unfulfilled due to lower
prioritization compared to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As we draw down forces in OIF/OEF, these manpower-intensive
requirements will gain in importance, supporting the Secretary of
Defense's objective of building ally and partner capacity. Therefore,
regardless of our commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan, demand for forces
will remain high for the foreseeable future as the U.S. remains
persistently engaged around the globe.
medical evacuation policy in afghanistan
103. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, Secretary
Gates testified on January 27, 2009, that in Afghanistan the time
required to move a wounded soldier or marine to a hospital for
definitive care is closer to 2 hours than the ``golden 1 hour''
standard in Iraq.
In a recent interview with CNN, General James Conway, Commandant of
the Marine Corps, predicted that as a result of increasing the number
of marines in Afghanistan, coupled with the increasingly aggressive
actions of the Taliban, ``we are likely to see our casualties rise over
what they have been,'' and went on to express serious concerns on
whether there will be enough helicopters to evacuate wounded marines
quickly off the battlefield. Are you concerned that there will be
insufficient airlift resources to quickly evacuate wounded soldiers and
marines from the battlefield?
General Amos. ISAF/USFOR-A hosted a U.S. Medical Evacuation
(MEDEVAC) bed-down strategy in February 2009 in response to the
testimony referenced above. MEDEVAC is not a Marine Corps capability so
the projected offset was met with U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force assets
that will work in Regional Command-South with no command relationship
to the MEB. However, a COMUSCENTCOM FRAGO immediately transferred
assets from Iraq in conjunction with the SECDEF authorization for a
U.S. Army CAB and the MEB Marine Air Group as part of RFF920. These
assets increase U.S. MEDEVAC and USMC CASEVAC capacity in our assigned
battlespace. The allocation of these resources in conjunction with the
streamlining of request processes and directive from CENTCOM and
COMUSFOR-A for reporting procedures improves the current status from
the January testimony. How much improvement remains to be seen; data
will be taken throughout the early employment of the MEB and other US
Forces operating specifically in Regional Command-South as well as
Afghanistan as a whole.
General Chiarelli. The Army's analysis has not identified any
remaining shortages or inabilities to evacuate wounded soldiers and
marines with current MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan. Although
survivability rates of Afghanistan are higher than those of Iraq, the
Army is implementing several initiatives to improve MEDEVAC
performance. These initiatives include increasing additional assets,
fielding improved aircraft capabilities, improving procedures, and
establishing new data collection and reporting requirements. Additional
Army assets have already been employed in Regional Command-South in
order to support the U.S. troop buildup. These assets include one
forward surgical team, four additional MEDEVAC aircraft and crews from
Iraq, and one 12-ship MEDEVAC company. From the Army's perspective, the
marines deploy with organic capabilities which include Forward
Resuscitate Surgical Systems and rotary wing casualty evacuation
aircraft as an acceptable ``in lieu of'' solution for additional
MEDEVAC aircraft requirements.
104. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is
being done to level the playing field between the Iraq and Afghanistan
theaters with respect to medical evacuation and care of the wounded?
General Amos. See answer to question 103.
General Chiarelli. Since the two areas of operation pose different
challenges and characteristics, Multi National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) and
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Afghanistan until
recently applied different planning standards for acceptable risk. The
differing factors were based on terrain, mission assessment, medical
assets, and maturity of the infrastructure. Additionally, in
Afghanistan, the participating NATO countries operate using their own
country's rules which differ from those in the U.S. military. The Army
is implementing several initiatives to achieve medical evacuation
parity between Iraq and Afghanistan. These initiatives include
increasing medical evacuation assets, fielding improved aircraft
capabilities, improving procedures, and establishing new data
collection, and reporting requirements. The Army's additional assets
include two Army forward surgical teams, a medical brigade command and
control headquarters, four additional MEDEVAC aircraft and crews from
Iraq, and one 12-ship MEDEVAC company, which have already arrived.
These Army assets are part of a joint effort to increase overall
MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan.
105. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, are members
who serve in Afghanistan at greater risk of dying from their wounds
than those who serve in Iraq, because of insufficient airlift
resources?
General Amos. See answer to question 103.
General Chiarelli. Using the Joint Theater Trauma Registry, Army
analysis indicates that survivability rates in Afghanistan and Iraq are
95 percent and 94 percent, respectively. This translates to cumulative
``died of wounds'' rates of 5 percent in Afghanistan and 6 percent in
Iraq. The Army has not identified a link between current MEDEVAC asset
shortages and a greater risk of soldiers dying from their wounds in
Afghanistan versus Iraq. From a medical perspective, our experiences in
both Theaters suggest far-forward resuscitation and stabilization
rendered during the platinum 10 minutes by combat lifesavers, medics,
and corpsmen has contributed significantly to our survival rates.
Although survivability rates in Afghanistan are higher than those in
Iraq, the Army is implementing several initiatives to improve MEDEVAC
performance. These initiatives include providing additional assets,
fielding improved aircraft capabilities, improving procedures, and
establishing new data collection and reporting requirements. These Army
initiatives are part of a joint effort to increase overall MEDEVAC
capability and reduce average MEDEVAC mission response times in
Afghanistan to achieve parity between Theaters.
medical and dental readiness of the ground forces
106. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, according to the DOD's
Individual Medical Readiness data, overall medical readiness of the
Armed forces has seen some recent improvement, but dental readiness of
the ground forces, especially the Army Guard and Reserve, remains low.
In the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, nearly 52 percent of the Army
Guard and Reserve were in dental readiness class III or IV, and thus
technically nondeployable. This situation remains relatively unchanged,
in spite of efforts by Congress and the Department to improve dental
readiness. What is the problem in achieving dental readiness,
especially in the Guard and Reserve?
General Chiarelli.
Army Active Component
The Army Dental Command (DENCOM) provides dental services to the
Army Active component through direct and referred private sector care
options, resulting in a current dental readiness of 88 percent
(percentage of Soldiers in Dental Fitness Classification (DFC) 1 or 2
who are deployable). Our dental readiness goal is 95 percent; however,
the dynamic OPTEMPO across the force, combined with the challenge of
filling contracted dental provider positions at some locations, has
impacted DENCOM's ability to generate higher percentages. In general,
installation dental commanders work closely with unit commanders to
ensure priority of effort and resourcing to support mobilizations/
demobilizations. Two DENCOM initiatives significantly assist in
achieving and maintaining dental readiness in the Active component. The
First Term Dental Readiness (FTDR) program provides Initial Entry
Training (IET) soldiers with dental care to establish baseline DFC 1 or
2 for soldiers before they leave Basic or Advanced Individual Training
(AIT) sites, so they arrive at their first duty station in a deployable
status. The goal of FTDR is 95 percent. Second, private sector care
funding through the Oral Health Initiative leverages the private sector
dental market to expand capabilities to deliver dental treatment as a
supplement to direct care.
The DENCOM is positively affecting the readiness of the Reserve
component through both the Demobilization Dental Reset (DDR) mission
and the FTDR program, which is conducted for all IET soldiers,
regardless of component. In accordance with the Department of the Army
Execution Order for DDR, demobilizing Reserve component soldiers are
reset to DFC 1 or 2 by DENCOM providers at redeployment platforms.
Approximately 35,000 Reserve component soldiers have demobilized
through DENCOM facilities and been reset to deployable standards in
fiscal year 2009, achieving a reset rate of 89.1 percent and assisting
in the overall rise in dental readiness in the Reserve component from
52 percent to 58 percent. Additionally, Reserve component soldiers who
are not on active duty can achieve and maintain dental readiness
through the new Army Selected Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS)
program, which the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs established in September of 2008. ASDRS is the
strategic policy guidance that allows Selected Reserve soldiers to seek
dental readiness care at their ``home station''. Dental Readiness
encompasses a dental examination and the treatment of indentified DFC 3
conditions.
United States Army Reserve (USAR)
The USAR is very concerned about the dental readiness of USAR
soldiers. The USAR is aware that dental readiness is a commander's and
individual soldier's responsibility. The USAR has worked extensively
with USAR commanders in order to communicate recent initiatives that
will increase overall dental readiness. The ASDRS was a positive step
forward. The USAR is currently working to fund 2 medical/dental
readiness days that were recently authorized. It is expected that these
additional days, in conjunction with ASDRS, FTDR and DDR, will result
in increases in dental readiness as all of the initiatives mature. The
most recent data shows that the USAR has a comprehensive dental
readiness of 55.7 percent, a steady improvement since the inception of
the dental readiness initiatives.
Army National Guard (ARNG)
Currently 57 percent of the ARNG are in DFC 1 or 2, and 43 percent
are DFC 3 (not ready) and 4 (dental status unknown). This is an
improvement from the 45 percent dental readiness rate in May 2008,
which was prior to the approval of the ASDRS. The ASDRS program enables
states to provide dental treatment to guardsmen throughout the ARFORGEN
cycle, and it leverages DENCOM's DDR and FTDR programs. FTDR places
citizen-soldiers in their units at DFC 2 after completing AIT. DDR is
returning 90 percent of our citizen-soldiers to their states as DFC 2
after deployment. ARNG dental readiness will continue to improve with
the ongoing support of the ASDRS program and the other dental readiness
initiatives.
107. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, from a readiness perspective,
are individuals still being found nondeployable for medical and dental
reasons, and if so, why?
General Chiarelli. Soldiers are still being found nondeployable for
medical and dental reasons. Some of the reasons for this include lack
of education on the behalf of commanders and leaders regarding health
and medical issues; the fact that some Soldiers choose not to disclose
health-related issues or attempt to conceal them, so that they can
deploy with their units; late cross leveling of required personnel; and
professional disparities between pre-deployment readiness checks and
the professional interpretation of readiness standards at the Soldier
Readiness Processing (SRP) site. The medical standards for retention
are not the same as the medical standards for deployment. A soldier may
be fit for retention with a certain medical condition, but not
deployable. We increase the likelihood of this scenario by selectively
retaining wounded warriors who do not meet retention standards or
deployment medical standards. When Theater-specific medical deployment
standards change, commanders are often not aware that a retainable
soldier may not be deployable until he is screened at the CONUS
Replacement Center or SRP site.
Based on statistics compiled by Army Medical Command from October
2008 through February 2009, for all components and other military
service personnel undergoing SRP supported by Regional Medical Centers,
approximately 3 percent of service members undergoing SRP for
deployment are found nondeployable for medical reasons. Although
soldiers are deemed nondeployable for various medical and dental
reasons, many issues are corrected at the SRP site, to include drawing
DNA samples, administering immunizations, providing dental treatment,
issuing glasses, etc. Only a small percentage of soldiers are unable to
resolve medical/dental issues identified during the SRP process and, as
a result, are unable to deploy.
mental health concerns in the army
108. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, you mentioned in your opening
statement your concern about trends in mental and behavioral health
issues for our soldiers. A DOD Task Force on Mental Health Report in
2006 asserted the following: ``Every military leader bears
responsibility for addressing (the stigma associated with seeking
mental health care); leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness
of the servicemembers they lead.''
Two years later we still see evidence that military commanders
sometime discourage members from seeking needed care. The Personnel
Subcommittee recently received testimony that in 2008, 780 callers to a
non-DOD suicide prevention hotline identified themselves as Active Duty
military. Thus far this year, nearly three callers a day identify
themselves as being on Active Duty.
This tells me that there is still significant stigma--and fear--
associated with seeking needed mental health care by members of the
Armed forces. What efforts have you initiated within your Service to
address this problem?
General Chiarelli. The Army's approaches to stigma include Senior
Leader messages encouraging help-seeking behavior and assurances that
seeking behavioral health treatment will not interfere with security
clearances, promotions or ratings. We are working to inform soldiers
that seeking care often improves work performance and therefore may
actually help with promotions and ratings. I have sent a message to all
Army activities strongly encouraging all NCOs and officers to address
in their initial and subsequent performance counseling how effectively
the rated soldier addresses behavioral health issues and its impact on
the overall command climate of the unit. I have issued guidance
directly to the field emphasizing the importance of not allowing
soldiers to belittle other soldiers for seeking behavioral health care.
In addition, a council of senior leaders, convened by me, is working to
more fully integrate behavioral health providers into our units. The
goal is to increase informal contacts between the care providers and
soldiers to enhance their communication and emphasize the performance
enhancement aspects of our behavioral health team members.
109. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how are you measuring your
success?
General Chiarelli. We are vigorously developing outcome measures
for existing and new programs to ensure the adoption and expansion of
best practices and evidence based treatments. Surveys will be done to
assess changes in attitudes and programs will be modified as needed to
achieve the desired outcomes. Of course, the rate of suicide is a key
indicator and we will need to carefully watch that number recognizing
that the contributors to an individual's decision to end his or her
life are many and that we as an organization cannot impact all of them.
We recognize that many of the changes we are making will take some
time to show progress. We are determined to stay the course and work in
a holistic fashion to promote health and reduce risk knowing the rates
of suicide will drop as the overall health of our Force improves. The
goal is to improve our soldiers' ability to cope with life stressors
whether those stressors are related to mission, other work stress,
relationships, family, money, health concerns or other areas, by
optimizing current policies and procedures and setting the conditions
for future changes.
contractor support in theater
110. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, I have a
question about the impact to military readiness and operations of
support provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few of my
colleagues have pressed the current Administration to curtail the use
by the military of service contracts for base operating services,
security, supply, and other mission-support requirements. Can you
briefly describe the impact of service support contracts on readiness
and mission capability for the Army and the Marine Corps?
General Amos. Success in Afghanistan is dependent upon service
contracts--whether provided by U.S. or local contractors/personnel.
These personnel bring enduring capabilities that are not resident in
the Services in any significant numbers. Their abilities to build base
camps and provide associated services free the operating forces to
focus on their assigned mission. Equipment Field Service
Representatives assist in removing and/or maintaining specialized
equipment. If we lose these services, our readiness will decline. We
will need to deploy and increase the number of military personnel in
harms way to support these missions.
General Chiarelli. The use of contractors for mission support
services is not only a proven force enabler, but also provides a
significant surge capability during contingency operations. Contractors
at our Forward Repair Activities help to maintain the readiness of
important combat systems. In addition, by leveraging the private sector
for certain activities such as the operation of dining facilities or
laundry services, our soldiers can focus on their core mission--
defending our Nation and its interests. In context, contractor-provided
support services improve readiness because the military can respond
rapidly to insurgencies and in greater numbers with equipment they can
trust. In terms of mission capability, hot meals, a clean uniform, and
other contractor-provided, quality of life services helps to maintain
the strong morale of our Nation's sons and daughters who proudly serve
extended and/or multiple deployments. While difficult to measure,
morale is a fundamental element of military culture, leadership, and
the overall willingness of our All-Volunteer Force to defend their
Country. The military could still perform their core mission without
contractors, though I believe degradation of morale over time could
pose a significant risk to mission capability.
111. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, to what
extent will you be relying on service contracts to carry out the
drawdown of forces from Iraq?
General Amos. We will use service contracts to assist in base
closure and provide long haul drivers thereby eliminating the
requirement for marines to perform these missions. These same service
contracts (LOGCAP 3 and soon LOGCAP 4), currently feed our marines and
perform base support duties. Along with LOGCAP 3 and 4, we also use
Equipment Field Service Representatives on select equipment such as
MRAPs. They will assist in removing or maintaining these items during
retrograde and/or redirection of equipment to Afghanistan. We also have
service contracts at our ports to perform equipment wash down and
clean-up to meet Customs and Agricultural inspections and assist in
loading and unloading trucks and vessels.
General Chiarelli. The Army currently expects to use a combination
of existing service contracts and organic support units to retrograde
equipment and materiel from Iraq. Once we have completed our current
assessment, leadership in theatre will determine if existing contracts
will be augmented, or if additional enabling service contracts will be
required to retrograde out equipment. Should a service contract be used
as part of these efforts, the government will maintain oversight
responsibilities.
112. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, can you
assess the impact to Army and Marine Corps operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan if you were prohibited from using service support contracts
such as the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)?
General Amos. Devastating. We would require a sizeable increase in
forces and associated capabilities. Service support contract personnel
perform a myriad of theater and base support functions from food
service to equipment maintenance to line hall transportation. We would
be hard pressed, if not impossible, to deploy and replicate the support
provided by theater service support contracts.
General Chiarelli. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) has been an effective force enabler for our units in Iraq and
Afghanistan and has provided excellent support to our soldiers. The use
of Operational Contract Support effectively expands the capability of
the deployed forces by reducing the additional work load placed upon
our soldiers. The Army would certainly be able to accomplish its
mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without LOGCAP. However, the loss of
these service support contracts would cause our deployed forces to
operate at a significantly reduced level of intensity, as they would
now have to flex to meet these service support missions. By providing
for the base operations support, trash pickup, laundry and bath
services and other important but ancillary responsibilities, the
soldiers are able to concentrate their efforts on the primary mission
at hand.
113. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how would
you compensate for the loss of the use of these service contracts?
General Amos. We would have to increase the number of military
personnel to perform these Service functions at a reduced level. As an
example, rather than three hot meals a day served by LOGCAP personnel,
we might go to one a day; rather than washing clothes weekly, it might
be biweekly; and, rather than equipment maintenance at/or above 90
percent, we would do the best we could since some of our overflow
maintenance support is handled by LOGCAP. Nevertheless, the Marine
Corps is still an expeditionary force, and we would adapt as required
to meet theater needs and the needs of our forces to enable them to
effectively carry out their missions.
General Chiarelli. While the Army can accomplish its mission
without LOGCAP contractors, the loss of these service contracts would
place a greater demand on our soldiers, of whom much is already asked.
The absence of these capabilities would require the Army to either
place a greater demand on its organic capability or risk a reduction in
the Quality of Life standards for our soldiers operating in an austere
environment.
safety of expeditionary facilities
114. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, one area of concern I have
with the performance of service contractors has to do with the safety
of our military personnel living and working in expeditionary
facilities provided by contractors in theater. The fact that we have
lost military personnel to accidental electrocution is a tragic
circumstance that must not be allowed to persist.
Are you confident that current efforts to provide facilities for
our forces in theater incorporate generally accepted industry standards
for the safety of personnel, including standards for fire protection
and structural integrity, and standards with respect to electrical
systems, water treatment, and telecommunication networks?
General Chiarelli. It is the Army's goal that each contract, task
and delivery order contain all necessary requirements and clauses to
protect the safety of all personnel as well as to ensure that the
government receives the best value for our contract dollars. The Army
works hard to ensure the safety of our personnel in all arenas by
providing them with safe facilities as well as educating our personnel
to observe safety practices on, as well as off, duty. Our people are
our most valuable and important asset.
The award of contracts and task and delivery orders for
construction is a complex process in any environment, and more so in a
warzone with contracts that are often awarded to indigenous contractors
in accordance with the Iraqi First and Afghani First programs. Each
project requires the development of a Statement of Work which must
contain the appropriate safety and construction standards for the
project. The contracting offices do not have construction or safety
expertise and must rely on the project engineers/program managers to
identify all necessary standards that must be met as well as the
development and submission of a comprehensive and appropriate Quality
Assurance Plan for construction oversight. As you know, the contract
award is only the first step. The Army has also been working hard to
develop and deploy qualified Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs)
who are responsible for providing the oversight of the contractor
during the construction, installation, repair, maintenance, or
operation of facilities. While extensive progress has been made in
training and deploying qualified personnel as CORs, the Army is
continuing to work this issue to ensure the safety of our troops.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) requires compliance to
industry standards for the safety of personnel, including standards for
fire protection, electrical, structural, water and telecommunication
networks in all contracts awarded by USACE. Compliance is ensured by
our quality assurance personnel at the project site. Currently,
district commanders are responsible for ensuring compliance. For added
assurance, USACE is in the process of standing up the Trans Atlantic
Division in Winchester, VA, in September 2009 that will have the
responsibility to ensure quality processes and adequate capability is
available at the project sites to ensure compliance to national
standards in the CENTCOM area of operation. This is USACE normal
business model for all USACE operations. It should be noted that USACE
is not the sole design/construction/facility management agent that has
full responsibility for the entire life cycle of all facilities built
in the theaters where our soldiers and Army Civilians live, work, and
train. Other organizations such as the Air Force Center for
Environmental Excellence, the Navy Sea Bees, Red Horse, and Army
Materiel Command assets perform and occasionally NATO Maintenance and
Supply Agency provide a variety of design/construction/facility
management services as well for a variety of reasons.
115. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, can I get your assurance that
each contract or task or delivery order carried out in the future for
the construction, installation, repair, maintenance, or operation of
expeditionary facilities for the Army incorporates generally accepted
industry standards for the safety of personnel utilizing such
facilities?
General Chiarelli. It is the Army's goal that each contract, task
and delivery order contain all necessary requirements and clauses to
protect the safety of all personnel as well as to ensure that the
government receives the best value for our contract dollars. The Army
works hard to ensure the safety of our personnel in all arenas by
providing them with safe facilities as well as educating our personnel
to observe safety practices on, as well as off, duty. Our people are
our most valuable and important asset.
The award of contracts and task and delivery orders for
construction is a complex process in any environment, and more so in a
warzone with contracts that are often awarded to indigenous contractors
in accordance with the Iraqi First and Afghani First programs. Each
project requires the development of a Statement of Work which must
contain the appropriate safety and construction standards for the
project. The contracting offices do not have construction or safety
expertise and must rely on the project engineers/program managers to
identify all necessary standards that must be met as well as the
development and submission of a comprehensive and appropriate Quality
Assurance Plan for construction oversight. As you know, the contract
award is only the first step. The Army has also been working hard to
develop and deploy qualified Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs)
who are responsible for providing the oversight of the contractor
during the construction, installation, repair, maintenance or operation
of facilities. While extensive progress has been made in training and
deploying qualified personnel as CORs, the Army is continuing to work
this issue to ensure the safety of our troops.
future force requirements for the army
116. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, in your written statement
regarding efforts within the Army to restore balance to the force by
2011, you state ``The challenge continues to be complicated by changing
circumstances and increased demand on the force.'' You then state
``Unfortunately, the Army cannot influence demand, and the current
level does not appear likely to improve significantly for the
foreseeable future.''
Due to the success of a surge of Army Brigades and other U.S.
forces into Iraq last year that resulted in a vastly improved security
environment, the President announced on February 27 a plan to reduce
forces in Iraq to commence immediately and be completed by September
2010, with a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 to remain through 2011.
That equates to a redeployment of at least 115,000 troops in the next
16 months.
Since most of those returning forces will be Army combat brigades
and a majority of the forces being deployed to Afghanistan currently
are U.S. marines, do you foresee an overall increased demand on the
Army force in the next 16 months? If so, where?
General Chiarelli. The Army and the Marine Corps presence in
Afghanistan are different in size. In Afghanistan, the Army currently
has 33,563 deployed soldiers compared to 9,211 marines currently
serving there. Growth in Afghanistan requirements will continue to be
largely filled by the Army. In the near term, to include the next 16
months, global demand will increase for the Army because the new surge
of troops into Afghanistan occurs prior to major reductions in Iraq.
Over the longer term, demand will begin to decrease as units are
withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2011.
117. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how would you define a
significant improvement in the current level of demand?
General Chiarelli. A significant improvement in the current level
of demand is a level which allows the Army to meet our long term goal
of Active component soldiers at home station three times as much as
they are deployed (BOG to dwell ration of 1:3). For Reserve component
soldiers, the long term goal is 12 months mobilized for every 5 years
not mobilized (BOG to dwell of 1:5). In terms of BCTs, this equates to
a demand of 11 Active component BCTs and 4 Reserve component BCTs. This
level of global demand will allow units to train for full spectrum
operations to better meet the requirements of the Joint Force.
118. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, in your opinion, will the
Army's share of a residual force of 35,000-50,000 in Iraq continue to
be a significant strain on the Army's ability to restore their balance?
General Chiarelli. OIF demand for BCTs will reduce to the six BCTs
augmented for stability operations. Redeploying BCTs will be reset to
meet global demands, including the expanded Afghanistan commitment and
geographic combatant commander requirements that have previously been
validated but were not sourced. Potentially, the greatest impact on the
Army's share of residual forces in Iraq will be on enabler units which
are currently in low density and in high demand. These units generally
provide theater level support and MNF-I requirements may prevent us
from reaching a favorable BOG to dwell ratio for those type units. The
Army continues to conduct parallel planning with CENTCOM and its
subordinate commands to synchronize drawdown plans with rebalancing the
Army.
119. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, has the Department of the
Army developed a withdrawal and reset plan based on a reduced presence
in Iraq to raise the readiness levels over time for all combat
brigades?
General Chiarelli. Yes. The Army's planning to improve readiness
and reset the force is guided by the ARFORGEN model and informed by
CENTCOM's drawdown planning. However, readiness and BOG to dwell ratios
are driven by the global demand for forces of which Iraq is just one
component. It is important to realize that the global demand for Army
forces is at 37 BCT equivalents while the current commitment of Army
BCTs stands at 28 BCTs equivalents. The global demand for forces
includes units for COIN, training teams, and security forces in OIF and
OEF; Korea, Homeland Defense, consequence management response, global
response force, rapid response force, Multinational Force Observers,
Kosovo, and validated but unmet Global Force Management Board
requirements, most of which are outside the CENTCOM area of
responsibility. Rebuilding readiness in the Army will take time and
resources. Units returning from combat operations will require 24
months dwell and consistent and timely funding to realize full spectrum
training and readiness.
120. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, how many BCTs need to be
rated C-2 or above in order for the Army to declare a restoration of
the desire rebalancing?
General Chiarelli. Achieving an acceptable level of full spectrum
readiness is a necessary part of restoring balance but it is not
sufficient. The Army has accumulated a significant amount of
institutional risk during the past 7 years while operating at a tempo
that requires us to take extraordinary measures to man, equip, and
train our units, usually just in time to deploy. This risk is a
function of the stress on our soldiers and leaders and their families
of multiple deployments. It is also a function of insufficient time for
our units to train on other potential missions and for our soldiers and
leaders to attend professional military education (PME) and gain other
broadening experiences necessary to strengthen the integrity of the
Army profession. To restore balance we need to address all these risks
by balancing the demand for forces with the supply of forces so that we
can operate at a sustainable tempo as measured by the ratio between
time deployed and time not deployed (BOG:Dwell).
The number of units that need to be C2 or above depends the number
of units we are already providing to meet global demand, the number of
units that are required by our high priority contingency plans
(operational depth), and the degree of risk deemed to be acceptable.
These numbers are always changing. For the past 7 years, the Army has
operated at a tempo that required us to use our operational depth to
meet and sustain OIF and OEF demand.
Today the Army is operating at a BOG to dwell tempo of 1:1.3. At a
BOG to dwell tempo of 1:2 for the Active component and 1:4 for the
Reserve component, we believe we cross the threshold from preparing
units just in time for deployment to beginning to be able to train for
other potential missions and get our people to PME. At this tempo we
could provide up to 20 BCTs to meet global demand and up to 20 BCTs
could be prepared to meet contingencies with 90-180 days notice. We
hope to achieve this BOG:Dwell tempo by the end of 2011.
The Army's ultimate goal is to achieve a BOG:Dwell tempo of 1:3 for
the Active component and 1:5 for the Reserve component. At this tempo,
with a 73 BCT force (Active component and Reserve component), we
project we can sustain the All-Volunteer Force, continuously strengthen
the profession, and meet a global demand of up to 15 BCTs, with an
additional 15 BCTs that could respond to contingencies in less than 90
days. Additional strategic flexibility would be provided by another 15
BCTs that could be available between 90 and 180 days with the remainder
of our BCTs requiring greater than 180 days to prepare for commitment
if required.
121. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, furthermore you state ``We
simply cannot achieve desired BOG dwell ratios until demand is reduced
to a sustainable level.'' What do you consider to be a sustainable
level of demand in order to balance the force?
General Chiarelli. A ratio of 1:3 for the Active component and 1:5
for the Reserve component BOG to dwell ratio allows the Army to
maintain full readiness to meet global demands and allows for the
development and sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force. The fiscal year
2010 President's budget request enables the Army to commit over 70,000
enabler personnel at a sustainable BOG to dwell ratio. In fiscal year
2011, when the Army has completed our growth to 45 Active component
BCTs and 28 Reserve component BCTs, at 1:3 Active component/1:5 Reserve
component cycles, we will be able to meet the demand for 11 Active
component BCTs and 4 Reserve component BCTs.
122. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, what impact will the increase
in the end strength of the Army have on dwell time?
General Chiarelli. Increasing the Army end strength improves our
strategic depth and enables the Army to rebalance by fiscal year 2011,
a BOG to dwell ratio goal of 1:2. Rebalancing the Army, coupled with a
decrease in global demand will provide units and soldiers more dwell
time to train for full spectrum operations while timely and consistent
funding assists in resetting war worn equipment. Full Spectrum
Readiness requires 18 months dwell for units to train beyond the COIN
mission before their next deployment. The Chief of Staff of the Army's
guidance is that units with less than 18 months dwell before their next
deployment to stay focused on the COIN mission. Units that have 18
months or longer before their next deployment are to focus on
conventional skills training for 90 days.
suicide prevention efforts
123. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, you
testified recently at a Personnel Subcommittee hearing along with the
other vice chiefs about suicides among soldiers and marines and the
preventative measures your Services were taking. The incidences of
suicides, particularly in the Army, were increasing at an alarming
rate. What are the current trends with respect to suicides in the Army
and Marine Corps?
General Amos. The loss of any marine through suicide is a tragedy
for the marine's family and unit, and can never be accepted. Through
April of this year, there have been 12 suspected or confirmed suicides
and 54 reported suicide attempts. With 42 suicides recorded in 2008,
the Marine Corps experienced its highest suicide rate since the start
of OEF and OIF. Marine Corps leadership is taking proactive action,
focusing on the important role of leaders of all ranks in addressing
this issue. The number of confirmed marine suicides has increased from
25 in 2006 to 33 in calendar year 2007 to 42 in calendar year 2008. Our
suicide rate in 2008 of 19.5 suicides per 100,000 approaches the
National civilian suicide rate for a demographic similar to the Marine
Corps.
General Chiarelli. The Army is continuing to experience an
increasing rate of suicides across the Active, Reserve, and National
Guard. It is expected that the calendar year 2009 numbers and rate per
100,000 will exceed that of calendar year 2008. We are working
diligently to investigate each suicide. I have convened a group of
subject matter experts, which works in tandem with the G-1's Army
Suicide Prevention Program as an integrated operation, to review each
suicide, develop lessons learned and to distribute these lessons to
leaders across the Army.
124. Senator Burr. General Amos and General Chiarelli, please
explain what steps you have taken to better understand how to prevent
suicides among soldiers and marines.
General Amos. Suicide prevention is a high priority. We are
actively engaged in prevention and early identification of problems
that may increase the risk of suicide. Marine Corps leadership is
taking proactive action, focusing on the important role of leaders of
all ranks in addressing this issue. Understanding that there is no
single suicide prevention solution, we are committed to having an
effect on the individual marine through leadership and command
involvement at all levels and we recognize that we must reduce the
stigma sometimes associated with seeking help.
Suicides are monitored monthly and annually for deployment related
trends such as the number of deployments and dwell time. Although it is
not unreasonable to assume that one or more deployments may cause an
increase in suicides, to date we have been unable to establish a direct
relationship between the two. The Marine Corps Combat Development
Command Studies and Analysis Division is conducting further analysis of
the data on dwell time and deployments. Additionally, we will
participate in the Army longitudinal study being conducted by the
National Institute for Mental Health. Regardless of duty station,
deployment, or duty status, the primary stressors associated with
marine suicides are: problems in romantic relationships, physical
health, work-related issues such as poor performance and job
dissatisfaction, and pending legal or administrative action. This is
consistent with other Services and civilian findings. Multiple
stressors are almost always present in a suicide.
The Commandant and Marine Corps leadership are taking proactive
action to address this issue. The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
selected a senior enlisted Marine leader to add unique insight to our
efforts in suicide prevention and, through the Executive Safety Board,
is directing a series of initiatives that are currently in accelerated
development:
Training: Since 90 percent of suicides have tended to occur
in the ranks of E1-E5 marines, a half-day, high impact,
relevant workshop has been designed to reach the NCO/FMF Sailor
community and facilitate their work with junior enlisted
marines. This training is expected to be ready by this summer.
In March, I directed that an all-hands training on suicide
prevention be conducted throughout the Corps.
Leadership Suicide Prevention Video Messages: All O-6 and
higher commanding officers have been directed to produce videos
focusing on leadership and suicide prevention to set the tone
for stigma reduction and an imperative of prevention.
Integration of Suicide Prevention and the Marine Corps
Martial Arts Program (MCMAP): A prevention message was
incorporated in the MCMAP program in a manner appropriate and
engaging to reach all marines.
Relationship Distress Hotline: Relationship problems, both
romantic and marital, remain the number one associated stressor
related to suicidal behavior. Suicide is complex and while this
is not the only problem, it is the most common. A hotline by
phone, email and live internet chat that is marketed
specifically to assist with relationship distress and questions
may reduce risk of suicide related behaviors that result from
this type of stress. In the interim, we have partnered with The
Outreach Call Center of the Defense Center of Excellence on
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military
OneSource to strategically market their relationship building
resources to marines and family members.
The Marine Corps will continue to aggressively pursue suicide
prevention initiatives; reevaluate existing programs designed to reduce
the stressors most correlated with suicidal behavior; develop and
distribute new prevention programs; and refresh and expand training
materials.
General Chiarelli. I have taken several steps to improve my
understanding of how to prevent the tragedy of suicides within our
ranks. In March and April 2009, I conducted an 8-day, six-installation
factfinding visit in order to listen to the voices from the field. I
learned first-hand from discussions with soldiers, mental health
professionals, commanders, and other personnel in the installations and
garrisons that the problem of suicide cannot be addressed solely in
terms of preventing suicides. The Army must address the problem in
terms of mitigating the risk factors contributing to suicidal behavior.
The Army must also foster the mental and spiritual health and
resiliency of soldiers and their families. I decided to enlarge the
aperture of the Army's view of the problem and take a holistic approach
to combating it.
Subsequently, I stood up a multi-disciplinary team of experts in
April 2009 to review my findings and develop a holistic approach. The
team reviewed not only my trip findings, but also Army programs and
policies relating to suicide, behavioral health, and suicide risk
factors. The team developed approximately 250 actions to be taken to
improve existing systems and programs. I reviewed those actions and the
recommendations of my team. The tasks they recommended form the nucleus
of the Army's strategic approach to the suicide issue: the Army
Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide
Prevention. I signed the Plan in mid-April. A senior level council
meets every 2 weeks to review and refine the plans to implement the
action tasks. My understanding of suicide prevention continues to
develop and refine based on what I learn from the council.
I receive daily briefings from my multidisciplinary team and hold
frequent, periodic briefings with commanders and a Senior Review Group
on Army suicides. I have met with the commanders of soldiers who have
died from suicide in an effort to ascertain--to the extent possible--
what went wrong in each case. I am briefed on every soldier suicide.
For the long-term, in October 2008, the Army entered into an
agreement with the National Institute of Mental Health for a 5-year
longitudinal study of suicides, designed to assess factors contributing
to suicide and identify training to reduce suicides and other
mitigation techniques. My team and council inform the intermediate
goals and milestones of that study.
effects of stop-loss cessation
125. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, last month, Secretary Gates
announced that the practice of stop-loss, or involuntarily keeping
soldiers on Active Duty beyond the end of their obligated active
service, would come to an end by March 2011. He based this change on
planned reductions of troops in Iraq and the Army's ability to
accelerate its growth to 547,000 troops. The practice of stop-loss was
used during the first Persian Gulf War and has been a critical element
in being able to achieve unit manning. As of January 2009, according to
Secretary Gates, over 13,000 soldiers were in a stop-loss status. Does
the Army intend to modify its unit manning practices with individual
replacements or cross leveling in order to achieve the goal of ending
stop-loss?
General Chiarelli. Each Army component has a comprehensive plan to
achieve the goal of ending the use of Stop Loss, taking into
consideration the circumstances unique to each component. The intent is
to cut the number of Stop Lossed soldiers in half by June 2010, and to
discontinue the use of Stop Loss by March 2011.
The Active component will begin deploying units without Stop Loss
in January 2010. Some of the manning practices that will be adjusted
include increasing the level of fill for deploying units, adjusting
deployment policies, and adjusting the individual replacement process.
BCT manning will increase from 102 percent to 105 percent. Deployment
policies will be adjusted to permit certain soldiers to deploy for
portions of the unit deployment. Army Human Resources Command will
provide replacements prior to deployment for soldiers who will not
deploy due to insufficient time remaining in service and in-theater
replacements for losses, dependent on unit strengths, available
inventory, and projected redeployment dates. Additionally, the Active
component will implement an incentive program to encourage soldiers to
extend to complete the deployment.
The Army Reserve will begin mobilizing deploying units without Stop
Loss in August 2009. The Army Reserve will increase their use of
voluntary cross-leveling and implement special pay for mobilizing units
to assist in stabilizing units for deployment. Soldiers in units
identified for mobilization who have insufficient time to complete the
deployment will be encouraged to extend. Soldiers who do not commit to
complete the mobilization will be transferred to another unit until
separation, and the Army Reserve will seek volunteers in other units to
replace these soldiers.
The Army National Guard will begin mobilizing deploying units
without Stop Loss in September 2009. The Army National Guard will
adjust mobilization and deployment policies, utilize voluntary cross-
leveling, and implement an incentive program to encourage soldiers to
extend to complete the deployment. For those not extending, soldiers
with an Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) prior to the projected
demobilization date will not be mobilized. Soldiers with an ETS after
demobilization but prior to the post-mobilization stabilization period
(90 days post-mobilization) will be mobilized and deployed, but will be
returned to home station 90 days prior to separation for transition.
Additionally, the Army National Guard will seek volunteers in other
units to replace soldiers not mobilizing; volunteers will also be able
to take advantage of the incentive program.
126. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the Army Reserve has decided
to give extra pay to all soldiers in one of its deploying units rather
than just to those Reserve soldiers who have been stop-lossed. Could
you explain the rationale for this decision and whether the Army will
take this approach in the future in order to avoid disparity of
treatment among soldiers?
General Chiarelli. Each Army component has developed a
comprehensive plan to achieve the goal of ending the use of Stop Loss
that best promotes stability in their deploying formations.
Compensation programs are managed separately by each component, and
they differ to the extent that desired outcomes differ. Each component
must leverage its program to achieve desired effects appropriate to its
circumstances. Perceived disparity of treatment can be attributed to a
lack of understanding of the differences among the programs for each
component.
As part of its program to stabilize deploying units, the Army
Reserve will offer Designated Unit Stabilization Pay (DUSP) under High
Priority Unit Pay authority. This program is a special pay program; it
utilizes existing authority to compensate soldiers in units alerted for
mobilization. Soldiers must commit to complete the mobilization, to
include reenlistment or extension for those soldiers with insufficient
time remaining in service and resolution of any other issues which
would prevent the soldier from being mobilized. Then, all soldiers in
designated deploying units receive DUSP pay at the rate of $50 per
drill period from mobilization minus 6 months to mobilization date.
Soldiers are paid during the pre-mobilization period in order to
stabilize units preparing for mobilization.
The Army National Guard will offer Deployment Extension
Stabilization Pay as part of its plan to man units alerted for
mobilization. This is an incentive program; it utilizes Assignment
Incentive Pay (AIP) authority to incentivize soldiers to extend to
complete a mobilization and deployment. Soldiers with an ETS between
180 days prior to Mobilization Day and Demobilization are eligible to
voluntarily extend their service obligation to complete mobilization
and post-mobilization reintegration requirements. Soldiers receive $500
per month for each month of mobilization if they commit 180-365 days
prior to mobilization and $350 per month if they commit 90-179 days
prior to mobilization. Soldiers must extend their service obligation
for at least 12 months to be eligible. Soldiers are paid during the
mobilization period in order to incentivize soldiers to extend for at
least 12 months and complete a deployment.
As part of its plan to reduce Stop Loss, The Active Army will offer
Deployment Extension Incentive Pay (DEIP). This is an incentive
program; it utilizes AIP authority to incentive soldiers who do not
intend to reenlist to extend in order to complete a deployment with
their unit. DEIP will be offered to units deploying without Stop Loss
beginning 9 months prior to Latest Arrival Date (LAD) at a rate of $350
to $500 per month. Soldiers with an ETS between LAD and return plus 60
days are eligible. Soldiers who commit between LAD-9 months and LAD-6
months receive $500 per month. Soldiers who commit after LAD-6 months
but before ETS-90 days receive $350 per month. Soldiers must extend
their service obligation for the duration of the deployment plus 60
days. Soldiers are paid during the period of extension (original ETS
through separation) in order to incentivize soldiers to extend for the
duration of the deployment.
active-duty army end strength
127. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, the Secretary of Defense
announced on April 6 that the total number of Active-Duty BCTs that the
Army would grow to would be 45 instead of 48, while maintaining the
planned increase in end strength of 547,000. He stated that this was
necessary to ``ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy,
and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss. This step will
also lower the risk of hollowing the force.'' In view of the demand for
combat units, do you think that 547,000 is the right end strength
number, or should it be higher?
General Chiarelli. The right size and appropriate structure of the
Army depends on what our Nation's leaders want the Army to do (the
demand) and what they consider an acceptable level of deployment (BOG/
dwell) while maintaining a quality, All-Volunteer Force. We understand
our Nation's resources are finite, and we are seeking to strike the
right balance between the size of the Army and what the Nation can
afford.
If operational demand on the Army remains at, or near, current
levels (27 BCTs with enablers) and the desired rotation rate was 1:2
for the Active component (1 year deployed to 2 years at home) and 1:4
for the Reserve component (1 year mobilized, 9 months deployed, to 4
years at home), the force would have to grow in order to resolve
existing critical capability shortfalls and increase rotational
capability while achieving strategic depth.
128. Senator Burr. General Chiarelli, what effect will this
decision regarding the number of BCTs have on deployment length and
dwell time, i.e., the number of months spent at home station following
a deployment?
General Chiarelli. With the total supply of Active component BCTs
going from 48 to 45, the Army will reach its Active component BCT
growth in fiscal year 2011. At an OIF/OEF demand for 11 Active
component BCTs, Army dwell will be approximately 30 months. Additional
BCT growth would not have been accomplished by this point, so it would
have had little impact on near-term dwell. Our rotational force
generation readiness model, ARFORGEN, effectively and efficiently
generates trained and ready forces for combatant commanders at
sustainable rotational levels. ARFORGEN also provides ready forces for
unforeseen contingencies. At the Army's long term goal of a BOG to
dwell ratio of 1:3 Active component and 1:5 Reserve component, ARFORGEN
would meet a demand for 11 Active component BCTs and 4 Reserve
component BCTs. BCTs now deploy for 12 months, although there is one
BCT remaining in theater under an extended deployment.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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