[Senate Hearing 111-139]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-139
U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 12, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by:
Senator John F. Kerry.................................... 35
Senator Richard G. Lugar................................. 41
Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.............................. 49
Senator Jim DeMint....................................... 51
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
(iii)
U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD PAKISTAN
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 12, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Menendez, Casey,
Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, Isakson,
Risch, DeMint, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order.
We were going to have the business meeting as rapidly as
possible at the beginning, but until we have requisite 10
Senators, we are not able to do that. So, what we'll do is
start the hearing component, and as soon as we have 10 Senators
here, we'll do the business-meeting component and then move on.
And, Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for your willingness
to indulge us and allow us to do that.
With its nuclear arsenal, its terrorist safe havens,
Taliban sanctuaries, and a growing insurgency, Pakistan has
emerged as one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges
that we face. We're fortunate to have with us today to share
his views one of America's most accomplished diplomats,
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who will share with us the
results of the now-two trilateral meetings that have taken
place, as well as his own travels to the region and efforts to
revitalize America policy in the region.
Last Thursday, this committee hosted Pakistani President
Asif Zardari along with Afghan President Karzai for a working
lunch. And the trilateral meetings that were held in Washington
last week I think provided the basis of increased cooperation
of some progress.
For most of the past 8 years, just getting Pakistani and
Afghan officials in the same room required, frankly, a
herculean effort. Committee members during this luncheon asked
some very tough questions. It was a very frank exchange; I must
say, a unique exchange, in my experience at luncheons with two
Presidents of countries with different interests, and they were
both very gracious in taking those questions and in providing
the committee and the guests who were there an important
opportunity to be able to really examine American policy and to
hear the leaders of those countries express their views.
We're not looking for perfection, but we do have a need to
make progress and to redefine some aspects of the policy, and
we need to work together--Congress, the administration, the
Pakistanis, the Afghans. And the stakes are really much too
high for anything less than our maximum cooperative effort.
Pakistan today, frankly, has the potential either to be
crippled by the Taliban or to serve as a bulwark against
everything that the Taliban represents. For many of us in
Congress and the administration, recent events have only
reaffirmed our belief that we need a bold new strategy. The
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which I've introduced
with Senator Lugar, is the centerpiece of a new approach
designed to redefine, not only America's policy toward
Pakistan, but also our relations with the Pakistani people. I'm
pleased that the President has asked Congress to pass it.
Ultimately, it will be the Pakistani people, not Americans,
who will determine their nation's future. The good news is
that, for all of its current troubles, Pakistan remains a
nation whose 170 million citizens are overwhelmingly moderate,
whose own soldiers and police have died fighting terrorism and
insurgency, a country that has committed itself to a very
difficult democratic transition, even at a moment of enormous
strain.
I look forward to hearing Ambassador Holbrooke's thoughts
on how we can empower those Pakistanis fighting to steer the
world's second largest Muslim country on to a path of
moderation, stability, and regional cooperation.
Since President Obama called on Congress to pass a Pakistan
aid bill, the dangers of inaction have risen almost by the day.
The government has struck an ill-advised deal that effectively
surrendered the Swat Valley to the Taliban. Predictably, this
emboldened the Taliban to extend their reach ever closer to the
country's heartland. In recent days, we've seen encouraging
signs that Pakistan's Army is finally taking the fight to the
enemy, but much remains to be done.
Even as we help Pakistan's Government to respond to an
acute crisis, we also need to mend a broken relationship with
the Pakistani people. For decades, America sought Pakistani
cooperation through military aid, while paying scant attention
to the wishes and needs of the population itself. This
arrangement is rapidly disintegrating. Today, an alarming
number of Pakistanis actually view America as a greater threat
than al-Qaeda.
Until this changes, there is, frankly, little chance of
ending tolerance for terrorist groups or for persuading any
Pakistani Government to devote the political capital necessary
to deny such groups sanctuary and covert material support.
I've seen, firsthand, how American aid can, in fact, have a
transformative effect. After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake,
America spent nearly $1 billion on relief efforts. I can
personally attest that the sight of American service men and
women saving the lives of Pakistani citizens in places like
Mansehra and Muzaffarabad was invaluable in changing
perceptions of America. Now we have to recreate this success on
a broader scale.
The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is an important
first step. On the economic side, it triples nonmilitary aid to
$1.5 billion annually for 5 years and urges an additional 5
years of funding. These funds will build schools, roads,
clinics; in other words, undertake those kinds of projects on a
regular basis to achieve the kind of connection with the
Pakistani people that we did in the course of the earthquake
relief.
Of course our aid to Pakistan aims to achieve more than
just good deeds. It will empower the civilian government to
show that it can deliver its citizens a better life, but at the
center of any strategy--and I'm sure Ambassador Holbrooke will
underscore this--at the center of any strategy is the effort by
the Government of Pakistan itself to build its own relationship
with its own people.
To do this right, we believe that we have to make a long-
term commitment. Most Pakistani's feel that America has used
and abandoned their country in the past; most notably, after
the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It is this
history and this fear that causes Pakistan and many Pakistanis
to hedge their bets. If we ever expect Pakistan to break
decisively with the Taliban and other extremist groups, then
they need to know that we're not merely momentary friends.
On the security side--and they also need to know, I might
add, unlike the last 8 years, that we are not principally
focused on a relationship with the leader of the country, as
opposed to the people of the country--on the security side, the
bill places reasonable conditions on military aid. It asks the
administration to certify that Pakistan's Army and spy services
have been partners in the struggle against al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and their affiliates, and also partners in the effort
to solidify democratic governance and the rules of law in
Pakistan.
As important as the economic and military components of our
aid to Pakistan are, it is also important how they fit
together. An unequivocal commitment to the Pakistan people will
enable us to calibrate our military assistance more
effectively. For too long, the Pakistani military has felt that
we were simply bluffing when we threatened to cut funding for a
particular weapon system or an expensive piece of hardware. And
up to now, they have been right. But, if our economic aid is
significantly larger--i.e., tripled, as Senator Lugar and I
have proposed--we will finally be able to make these choices on
the basis of both our national interests rather than the
institutional interests of the Pakistani security forces.
Even as we take bold steps, we should realize that our aid
package to Pakistan is not a silver bullet. This bill aims to
increase our leverage significantly, but we need to be
realistic about what we can accomplish. Americans can influence
events in Pakistan, but we cannot, and should not, decide them.
Ultimately, the true decisionmakers are the people of Pakistan
and the leaders of Pakistan, and that's the way it will be,
going forward.
Ask a resident, not even an elderly one, of Lahore or
Karachi or Peshawar, what these places used to be like, and you
will hear reveries of a time that now seems a world away. We
need to help Pakistan once again become a nation of stability,
security, and prosperity, enjoying peace at home and abroad, a
nation, in short, that older Pakistanis remember from their
childhoods. It's this nation that most Pakistanis desperately
want to reclaim.
I'm eager to hear Ambassador Holbrooke's thoughts on how we
encourage the Pakistan people to choose a peaceful, stable
future and offer them the best that we can offer, which is a
helping hand in the effort to get there.
With Senator Lugar's indulgence, I'd now ask that we open
the business meeting portion of the morning.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in welcoming Ambassador Holbrooke. We're grateful that
he's come today to share his insights on Pakistan and the
Kerry-Lugar legislation.
The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 sustains
the objectives outlined in the bill I introduced last year with
then-Senator Biden. Senator Kerry and I have listened carefully
to those conducting a strategic review of United States policy
in South Asia, and we've tried to ensure consistency with the
President's goals.
This hearing gives members an opportunity to review the
situation in Pakistan, as well as United States policy options
and the resources that may be required to achieve them.
The United States has an intense strategic interest in
Pakistan and the surrounding region. The U.S. National
Intelligence Estimate last year painted a bleak picture of the
converging crises in Pakistan. A growing al-Qaeda sanctuary and
expanding Taliban insurgency, political brinksmanship, a
failing economy, are intensifying turmoil and violence in that
country, and these circumstances are a threat to Pakistan, the
region, and the United States.
Our legislation is intended to take advantage of the
opportunity for revitalizing our relationship through greater
diplomatic engagement, as well as a commitment to economic and
political development. It calls for significant increases in
United States and international economic support alongside
relevant military assistance linked to Pakistani performance
against terrorism. We seek strong cooperation with the Pakistan
Government, the continued improvement in Indo-Pak relations,
the secure management of Pakistan's nuclear program, and the
development of Afghanistan as a free and stable country
governed by the rule of law.
While our bill envisions sustained economic and political
cooperation with Pakistan, it is not a blank check. The bill
subjects our security assistance to a certification that the
Pakistani Govern-
ment is meeting--or, is using the money for its intended
purpose; namely, to combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
The bill also calls for tangible progress in governance,
including an independent judiciary, greater accountability by
the central government, respect for human rights, and civilian
control over the military and intelligence agencies.
Our bill also contains provisions to help ensure that
development funds are spent effectively and efficiently. It
stipulates that the administration must provide Congress with a
comprehensive assistance strategy before additional assistance
is made available. And once money begins to flow, the
administration must report, every 6 months, on how the money is
spent and what impact it's having.
In addition, the bill provides that, before the
administration spends more than half of the $1.5 billion
authorized in any fiscal year, it must certify that the
assistance provided to that date is making substantial progress
toward the principal objectives contained in the
administration's strategy report.
We also have asked the Government Accountability Office to
review, annually, the administration's progress on stated
goals, and we authorize $20 million each year for audits and
programs, reviews by the inspector general of the State
Department, USAID, and other relevant agencies, in addition.
The United States should make clear to the people of Pakistan
that our interests are focused, not on supporting a particular
leader or party, but on democracy, pluralism, stability, the
fight against violence and extremism. These are values
supported by a large majority of the Pakistani people.
As I noted when we introduced the Kerry-Lugar bill last
week, any United States policy related to Pakistan will require
the cooperation and active support of both the executive and
legislative branches of our Government. Senator Kerry and I are
trying to play a constructive role in facilitating a consensus
position between branches that will undergird the rational
approach to the region with the best chances of success. With
this in mind, it is vital the administration's message on
Pakistan be clear and consistent. The administration also must
continue to actively consult with Congress on elements of
strategy, not simply lobby us for funds.
The administration has conducted some bipartisan outreach
on this topic already, and I encourage the President to build
on this so we have a truly bipartisan consensus as we grapple
with the spectrum of security challenges the region presents.
I look forward to working with President Obama's
administration and congressional colleagues on a policy toward
Pakistan that builds our relationship with that nation and
protects vital United States. interests.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar, and thank
you for your partnership in this effort to try to weave
together a solid policy.
Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much for joining us
today, and, I think, more particularly, thank you for taking on
this difficult task. It's complicated, and we're very
appreciative that you're bringing your talents to bear here.
If you could perhaps summarize testimony, and then we can
maximize the amount of time Senators will have to ask
questions, and we'd appreciate it. Your full testimony will be
placed in the record as if read in full.
Let me just mention one thing, to all my colleagues. On the
issue that I know is of concern to everybody on nuclear
weapons, that is the one topic we're going to have to take up
in a classified session. So, those questions, if I could ask
you to hold them, we will schedule a classified session with
appropriate folks in order to talk about that.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is an enormous personal honor and privilege to testify
before you for the first time as chairman of this committee.
You are the seventh chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee I've had the privilege of testifying before since I
was first confirmed in this very room by Senator John Sparkman
in 1977.
Your leadership and that of Senator Lugar is absolutely
critical in the highly important issue we're here to discuss
today.
I would like to submit my statement for the record and make
a few brief comments.
And I do want to start with the lunch you referred to at
the beginning. I've been to a lot of lunches up here for
foreign leaders over the last 30 years, but I've never seen one
like that. That was really a lunch that moved policy. Neither
man had ever done that before. By pulling the two men
together--President Zardari and President Karzai--in a serious
forum in which they were required to answer tough, tough
questions, tougher, in many ways, than those asked at the other
end of Pennsylvania Avenue in the State Department, you
encouraged them in the very goal of the trilateral summit,
which is to work with each other.
It is axiomatic that success in Afghanistan, however you
define it, is not possible if Pakistan's western areas remain a
sanctuary for rest, recuperation, recruitment, and then
attacking Afghanistan again. And cooperation between Islamabad
and Kabul is notoriously bad. That goes back into history. And
it's an enormously complicated problem. And, by holding that
lunch and simultaneously make them talk to each other in front
of 27 Senators, and also to hear your views, was, in my
experience on the Hill, unprecedented and unique. And I thank
you and Senator Lugar and your colleagues for it.
That lunch was the last event of a very effective week, and
I wanted to give you a sense, beyond my written statement, of
what we were trying to do and where we think we are.
This was not just a photo-op, it was not just one meeting
between two Presidents. As you saw in the room, you had
ministers in that room from both countries. Most notably, three
of the matched pairs--the Ministers of Agriculture, the
Ministers of Interior, and the Ministers of Finance--had never
met each other. So, we were playing the kind of leadership role
that I think is what the United States, both branches, should
do.
As a result of those meetings--we've agreed to hold four
sets of meetings like this a year, and this was the second, but
the first at the chief-of-state level--as a result of those
meetings, we have set up working groups and task forces on a
whole range of issues, stretching from water resource
management, an issue of enormous political sensitivity, of
course, to negotiating the trade transit agreement between
Afghanistan and Pakistan--a team of ours is on its way to
Islamabad right now to push those negotiations--to perhaps most
the difficult of all issues, intelligence cooperation. You saw,
firsthand, in the room, when you called on General Pasha, the
head of ISA--ISI--the immense complexity in that area. So, we
think that this trilateral process will improve our chances of
achieving our objectives.
But, I would not want to mislead you. What happens in
Washington is only as good as its reactivation on the ground in
the field. We can sit here and pledge and shake hands and sign
agreements, but it only matters if it happens on the ground.
The situation in Pakistan is extremely difficult. And I was
pleased to see, Mr. Chairman, that you began by saying, and I
quote your words because I hope to use them repeatedly, ``We're
not looking for perfection.'' You're not going to find any in
our policies in this part of the world. This is one tough
issue.
For those of us--and I see at least two people on this
podium who served in another war in a distant land, in
another--long ago--this is as tough as anything I've ever seen
before, anything I've ever worked on.
We are in Afghanistan and Pakistan because of 9/11, because
al-Qaeda and its allies are camped out in western Pakistan and
have pledged and promised and predicted and threatened to do it
again to us and other countries. These are the men who killed
Benazir, who did Mumbai, who attacked the cricket team in
Lahore, who attacked the United States. They are--the epicenter
of this area is in western Pakistan.
If it were not for that fact, Mr. Chairman, we would not be
sitting here today asking--supporting your very visionary
proposal to triple aid, nonmilitary aid, and we would not be
having this kind of colloquy. Pakistan would still be a huge
issue, for many other reasons, including the nuclear weapons.
Pakistan would also be an immensely important country because
of its size and its role in the Muslim world. But, the reason
we consider it one of, if not the, highest strategic priority
of this administration is because they directly threaten us.
People ask me if this is another Vietnam, and I would say,
quite frankly to you, that structurally there are many
similarities, including the sanctuaries, including the problems
of governance, including problems of corruption, including
problems of inefficiencies and inadequacies in strategy,
including sometimes our own strategies. That's part of the job
I was given by the President and Secretary of State, is to work
on the civilian side of that problem.
But, I want to underscore the core difference between
Vietnam and Afghanistan-Pakistan. And it is 9/11. There was no
threat from the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army to the
homeland of the United States. They had no interest, no
intentions, and no capabilities. Our enemies now include people
that do--and that's why we're here today--in this historically
troubled area.
The bill you have presented corrects a longstanding
imbalance in our economic assistance. It was too heavily
weighted to the wrong issues, the wrong areas, and too heavily
military. But, I know there are military components to this
that you wish to discuss.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and be honored to
respond to your questions and say, once again, because there
are more friends of mine on this committee than any other in
the Congress, how pleased I am to appear before you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of
the committee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to appear
before your committee again.
When I last testified before you, it was as a private citizen
offering personal views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, I appear
before you as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I deeply appreciate the President's and Secretary Clinton's confidence
in appointing me to this position.
A stable, secure, democratic Pakistan is vital to U.S. national
security interests. We must support and strengthen the democratic
Government of Pakistan in order to eliminate once and for all the
extremist threat from al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.
Yet relations between the United States and Pakistan have been
inconsistent over the years. In Pakistan, many believe that we are not
a reliable long-term partner and that we will abandon them after
achieving our counterterrorism objectives. Many in the United States
question the dedication of some elements of the Pakistani Government to
ending safe haven for terrorists on Pakistani soil. But our engagement
has to be aimed at putting our relationship on a better long-term
footing.
To assure a strong partnership in the fight against extremists,
constancy and consistency must be the hallmarks of our engagement with
Pakistan. This engagement must be conducted in a way that respects and
enhances democratic civilian authority while also engaging the
Pakistani people in our commitment to help them pursue a prosperous
economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.
ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY
In March, President Obama announced the new U.S. strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan which reflected unprecedented input from both
governments. The President's core strategic goal is to disrupt,
dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda and to eliminate the safe
havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President's strategy makes
clear the importance of Pakistan's future and stability to the United
States and the rest of the world, and the need for increased security,
governance, and development assistance to Pakistan.
TRILATERAL ENGAGEMENT
Last week in Washington, we completed the second round United
States-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral engagement, this time at the
summit level. Through this trilateral mechanism, we have advanced
unprecedented cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All parties
involved reaffirmed their shared commitment to combat the spread of
terrorism and extremism and underscored the priority placed on this.
United States Cabinet members also met with their Pakistani and Afghan
counterparts in a broad-based interagency approach to explore new areas
of cooperation on foreign policy, economic policy, agriculture, police
and prison reform, and intelligence. In five high-level breakout
consultation sessions, officials from the State Department, FBI,
Department of Agriculture, USAID, Defense Department, National Security
Council, intelligence community, Treasury, Commerce, and USTR met with
their Afghan and Pakistani counterparts. Through these substantive
discussions, the following practical and concrete initiatives were
delivered.
Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of
understanding committing their countries to achieving a transit
trade agreement by the end of this year.
Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to continue the cross-border
Jirga process to be held after the Afghan elections.
Afghanistan and Pakistan committed to opening two Border
Coordination Centers in 2009, one in Afghanistan and the other
in Pakistan.
The United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan plan to
increase cooperation on agricultural development and research,
as well as launching a Regional Infrastructure and Trade
Development initiative to accelerate needed infrastructure
development.
Afghanistan and Pakistan plan to pursue, with U.S. support,
a Joint Action Plan outlining areas of common concern on issues
of law enforcement, border security and management, and rule of
law.
The next Trilateral Consultations is planned to take place
this fall.
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
A critical objective of the administration's new strategy is to
forge an international consensus to support Pakistan. We will involve
the international community to actively assist in addressing security,
governance, and development goals in Pakistan.
We have already made progress.
At the April 3-4 NATO Summit, allied leaders agreed to build
a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and
Pakistan.
On April 17, the World Bank and the Japanese Government
cochaired a successful Pakistan Donors' Conference in Tokyo
where the international community pledged more than $5 billion
in new support, well above the $4 billion requirement
identified by the International Monetary Fund.
We are also urging allies to work closely with us both
bilaterally and through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to
coordinate development assistance. The Friends held a
successful ministerial meeting in parallel with the Tokyo
Donors Conference, at which Pakistan's international partners
affirmed their political support for the democratically elected
government.
STRENGTHENING PAKISTANI CIVILIAN AND GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
A key aspect to the new strategy is to put more attention and
resources toward Pakistan's economic and governance challenges. By
increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach
of quality health care, reinforcing human rights--particularly women's
rights--and empowering civil society, life for millions of average
Pakistanis will improve. Toward this end, the President has voiced his
support for the congressional efforts to increase nonmilitary
assistance to Pakistan to $1.5 billion per year for 5 years.
Introduction of bills in both Houses demonstrates Congress's support of
our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people.
It is vital that we devote some of these resources to target the
economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more
economic aid. There have often been rebellions in that area
historically, but this is the first time they have been tied to an
international terror movement. Our assistance should support Pakistani
efforts to ``hold and build'' in western Pakistan as part of its
counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the
vacuum once military operations have ended.
We must also do our part to enhance bilateral and regional trade
possibilities by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)
and encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors, such as energy.
The administration supports congressional passage of ROZ legislation as
a key way to boost private investment and sustainable economic
development in targeted areas of Afghanistan and border areas of
Pakistan. I ask for your support in expediting this crucial
legislation.
BUILDING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPACITY
Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists
will require consistent and intensive strategic engagement with
Pakistan's civilian and military leadership. It is vital to strengthen
our efforts to both develop and enable Pakistani security forces--both
the military and law enforcement--so they are capable of carrying out
sustained counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army has
traditionally been arrayed in a conventional deployment in the east,
against India. We must work with Pakistan so that it has the resources
and training to recalibrate from its current conventional threat
posture to one that addresses the insurgent threat on its Western
frontier.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
We are developing a strategic communications plan to counter the
terror information campaign, based in part on a strategy that proved
successful in Iraq. This is an area that has been woefully under-
resourced. The strategic communications plan--including electronic
media, telecom, and radio--will include options on how best to counter
the propaganda that is key to the insurgency's terror campaign.
SUPPORTING LEGISLATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
Security assistance for Pakistan has to show results. In the
President's words, ``We must focus our military assistance on the
tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the
terrorists'' but ``we will not, and cannot provide a blank check.''
Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and
the violent extremists within its borders.
The administration intends to implement measures of performance in
its economic, social, and military assistance to Pakistan. We must
ensure, however, that such tools do not impede the effectiveness of our
assistance or play to the ``trust deficit'' that plagues our bilateral
relationship and promotes distrust among the Pakistani people. Any
legislation should engender the greatest level of cooperation by
winning the trust of our civilian and military partners in Pakistan.
The administration is committed to working closely with the members
of this committee, and Congress, to ensure that together we are able to
provide the resources necessary to carry out our new strategy in
Pakistan.
All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating the
vibrant, modern, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and U.S.
policy envisions as a partner in advancing stability and development in
a key region of the world.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador
Holbrooke. Again, we're delighted to have you here, and
delighted you're tackling this, complicated as it is. And I
agree with you that it's tough.
Why don't we try to sort of establish a baseline, here,
with respect to what we're dealing with. A lot of the news
stories lately have been implying Pakistan is on the brink of
becoming a failed state, or in some of the news reporting you
get a sense that there may be an imminent takeover, so forth,
by the Taliban. My personal view is that both of those
judgments are overblown, that it is not about to be a failed
state and they're not about to take over the whole country.
Nevertheless, they have made very significant gains, and if the
situation remains the way it has been for these last years,
they will continue to.
That said, would you share with us your view about, sort
of, What are we looking at here, in terms of the governance
capacity within Pakistan and the state of the insurgency
itself? Or, insurgencies, because there are criminal efforts,
there are various indigenous-focused insurgencies, and then, of
course, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which took its effort to Mumbai.
Perhaps you could just sort of lay the baseline for the
committee, if you would.
Ambassador Holbrooke. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I agree
with you, Pakistan is not a failed state. But, from its birth,
Pakistan has been under pressure from--based on the ethnic
diversity of its nation and because, although everybody's
Muslim, they have very strong identities with their--Pashtun,
Punjabi, Sindh, and so on. And so, I share your view.
Your question addresses the current situation on the ground
politically? Is that what you'd like me to address?
The Chairman. Politically and the insurgency----
Ambassador Holbrooke. OK.
The Chairman [continuing]. Militarily.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Politically, I think the facts are
pretty well known. We have a democratically elected government,
after a decade of military rule which was excessively
supported, in my view, by the United States. We need, in my
view, to strengthen the democracy in Pakistan. That should be
our core objective.
Another military coup, another military takeover, another
military intervention would be very much against the interests
of the United States, and, above all, the people of Pakistan.
And every public opinion poll shows overwhelming desire for
democracy to succeed, but when you drill down to the next
level, you come up with an anomaly, which is a sharp division
between the two leading political forces, the PPP of President
Zardari, ruling party, and the party of Nawaz Sharif and his
brother, the chief minister in the Punjab. They had formed a
government together, as we all know, in the period that led to
the removal of Musharraf, and then they split apart.
I am very pleased to bring to your attention again a fact
which got relatively little attention in the United States
until recently, and that was that, last week, the week before
last, in the Punjab, the two parties formed a coalition
government. Punjab's 60 percent of the population. I think
that's a big step forward toward the kind of national unity
that's wanted.
I would also draw your attention to the extremely important
statements of Prime Minister Gilani, who, in the last few days,
made a major speech calling for an all-parties conference on
national security, and other leading political figures from
other parties have also endorsed that.
So, before we throw up our hands and assume that Pakistan
is, ``falling apart,'' let's recognize that, with a lot of
encouragement from their friends, including this committee and
other people who were at the lunch last week, you can see the
signs that Pakistan's political effort is knitting together
somewhat, compared to where it was a few weeks ago.
On the insurgency issues, we all know that your
characterization of the Swat deal is one that I also made
publicly, so I'm completely on the same wavelength as you. The
Pakistani people supported that deal very strongly; something
like 74 percent of the population, in a poll taken by the IRI,
the International Republican Institute, and published this
morning--I don't have the exact figure, but I think that poll
is well worth putting into your record--something like 74
percent of the IRI respondents supported that poll when it was
taken. But, the Taliban, as you predicted, as many of your
colleagues predicted, as we predicted--the Taliban violated it,
used it as an excuse to keep moving east, and that created a
kind of a near panic, among some people, that led to the
current attention. Of course, your bill--and it should be long
noted--long preceded that crisis and was not as a result of it.
So, the Pakistani Army began their military operations just
in the last few days. The military operations--I'm not in a
position this morning, Mr. Chairman, to report to you on how
they're going, because the only information I have is
fragmentary; it's more journalist than intelligence. I don't
really--frankly, I don't really trust what I hear, from a
situation like that, until the dust of battle is settled. But,
one thing is clear, 900,000 refugees have been registered with
the U.N. in that area, and we have a major, major refugee
crisis. The executive branch is meeting steadily on this. I
think there's a meeting going on right now about this,
downtown. So far, the United States has provided over $57
million for this crisis, from emergency funds. I would welcome
any suggestions or advice you have on this, because, since our
national security interests are so at stake and we look like
we're heading for about 1 million to 1,300,000 refugees, we
should not ignore that.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, if I can--last question--What
makes you--well, let me go back.
When Pakistan was created, the Pakistanis themselves, and
the British, agreed to create this area called the Federally
Tribal Administered Areas, and they did it in acknowledgment of
the complications of the Pashtun and tribal presence there. Sir
Mortimer Durand drew a line right smack through the Pashtun,
sort of, dividing them, partly in Afghanistan, partly in
Pakistan. And, in effect, the Pakistanis acknowledged, by
omission and commission over the years, what they chose not to
do, that they were sort of happy to leave it be tribally
administered and not essentially integrated into Pakistan.
I remember meeting with President Musharraf a few years ago
and pressing him on the issue of why they didn't go in and
begin to deal with the extremism and, you know, the
insurgencies then. And he talked about the complications and
how difficult it was, and so on, and sort of underscored to me
the reticence on behalf of some folks to deal with that.
Obviously, Alexander the Great, the British, and the
Soviets all found enormous difficulty in trying to tame that
part of the world. Now we are sort of at this crucible, if you
will, where we're trying to get them to do the very thing that
they've never been willing to do and no one's been able to do.
Share with us your thoughts about that. What is needed to
be achieved, here, in order to protect the United States and
our interests? And how do we keep our interests from being
extended beyond what they really are or what is achievable?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman, when I
asked people what books I should read about Pakistan, a lot of
them suggested Rudyard Kipling's ``Kim,'' which is set in what
is now called the FATA. The British set this area up as their
western buffer against the wilds of Afghanistan. Your
historical description is exactly correct. It was--we are--as
in so many other parts of the world--think of Yugoslavia and
Sudan--we've inherited boundaries--the world has inherited
boundaries which leave a perpetual dissatisfaction. The
international boundary is disputed.
Many of us believe that one thing that should be done is to
take the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and incorporate
them into the full political life of Pakistan. President
Zardari has said he'd like to do that. Nawaz Sharif says he
would favor it. I would hope the Pakistani Government would
consider moving on this. It's been out there for many years.
This arrangement you describe began under the British at
the end of the 19th century, and, while it's very romantic for
readers of Flashman novels, it's not a good way to run that
area.
And it has--but, you see, until 9/11, that--the tribal
system kind of ran itself. Then the United States drove the
Taliban east, they nested in this area. The United States and
the government in Islamabad ignored what was happening. And, as
they nested, they festered. And they realized that, not only
did they have a nice sanctuary to counterattack Afghanistan,
they had a nice place from which to recruit and focus on the
east, as well.
Your bill provides more funds in one bill than the United
States has spent in that area since 9/11. That is one of the
reasons we are so enthusiastic about it. It's long overdue. And
I cannot offer you solutions today, Mr. Chairman, but I can
offer you a significant redirection in American emphasis and
focus.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Holbrooke, I want to discuss the legislation
with you for a moment, because it encompasses 5 years.
Obviously, today we are talking about the crisis of today and
the next few weeks, and 5 years seems like a long time away,
through the entire administration, through several different
elections of Congress. This is why, in the bill, we tried to
set up, first of all, the thought that the administration
should have a plan for the 5 years.
Now, as the American people take a look at $7.5 billion
over 5 years for Pakistan, and given the description we've
already heard today of the military activity and the chaotic
difficulties of refugees and so forth, there is not a very
distinct image of what anyone does with the $1.5 billion in any
particular year, quite apart from over 5 years. There's the
thought that somehow, for the first time, schools and health
and civil governments and reform of this sort might be our
objective, as opposed to an in-and-out business with the
military. But, that almost begs the question of who in the
administration sets up some parameters of how the money will
flow, who administers it, and how the interface occurs between
our United States administrators and those in Pakistan.
Further, how the Pakistani administration will, we hope, take
hold of the proper administration to bring about Pakistani
objectives?
And I just add, as a final thought to that question, that
we've asked for a 6-month review--that is a report each 6
months during this 5 years--for a total of 10 reports--
reviewing the progress made as it relates to the original
administration plan provided for in our legislation--asking as
to how effective were the expenditures in meeting what we
thought were our goals. That will require some doing, likewise,
by various persons who come along and who hopefully understand
the whole ethos of the situation.
So, describe the formation of the plan and how quickly that
can occur, given the time limits, as you pointed out, and the
need. And then, it would help if you could provide some
description of what sort of personnel are available, in a
country as large as Pakistan, to begin to implement the plan.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.
First of all, this--the money--if you're asking exactly how
the money will be allocated, I would like to submit in writing
to you a more precise outline of the--of how we would propose
to allocate it.
I think it's a very important question; I don't want to do
it off the top of my head. And we're still----
Senator Lugar. And, furthermore, there's flexibility given
by the bill----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Depending upon the exigencies
of the time.
Ambassador Holbrooke. But, second, in regard to the tribal
areas, the previous commitment from the executive branch was
$750 million over 5 years. As a private citizen, I was briefed
on this in Islamabad, and I, quite honestly, said, and I wrote
at the time in the Washington Post, that I thought it was a
pathetic amount of money, given the importance of this area.
That discussion took place about 14 months ago.
You are now offering us a very significant increase.
According to the notes handed to me, in FY08 there was $187
million provided to FATA. In 2009, the number will increase to
$600 million.
Now, what are we going to do with it? You mentioned
development. Roads are important. Microcredit. I met,
yesterday, with the people from FINCA, a wonderful NGO that
specializes in microcredit and has a terrific program in
Afghanistan. They have nothing in Pakistan. We're going to
allocate some of the money, if you approve it, to FINCA, but
ask them to start working out of Peshawar, because women's
microcredit addresses so many different needs at once--health,
education, livelihoods, the agricultural program I mentioned
earlier, law enforcement.
Quite honestly, although the money sounds like a lot, it
isn't; it isn't, in my view, as much as the problem needs. Some
people worry about capacity, but the Pakistanis have a well-
developed NGO system, they have a government out there, they
need resources. The country is extremely poor. Over half the
people live on less than $2 a day. And, by the way, every time
I go to Islamabad, people say to me, ``Fine to give money to
FATA, but that's only 4 or 5 million people out of 175 million
in the country''--18 million people in Karachi alone, the
world's largest Muslim city, and they have 4 hours of
electricity a day, which is one of the reasons the water
resource management program and the dam--the program for the
Joint Afghanistan/Pakistan Dam, which was just signed in front
of Bob Zoellick last week during the summit--are so important.
The needs there are enormous, and the history of United States
relations with Pakistan has emphasized the wrong kinds of
assistance.
So, with your permission, I will submit a more precise
answer.
[The information was supplied in the written responses to
questions submitted by Senator Lugar. See page 41 in the
``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section.]
Senator Lugar. That would be helpful. And, likewise, would
you provide some idea of this plan that the bill calls for. In
other words, the answers you're going to give will be very
helpful, in terms of your on-the-spot view, but I think what
we're going to be looking at regularly is this plan, because
we're going to be coming back to it every 6 months for how much
of it's being fulfilled.
Ambassador Holbrooke. We would welcome, Senator Lugar, a
continual dialogue, not just every 6 months, but whenever you
want. I would be delighted to travel with you and any of your
colleagues to the region so that we can start with the same
experiential base.
But, let me make a point about the military side of things.
It has been pointed out by a lot of observers that the army is
overwhelming Punjabi and this is a Pashtun area. When Admiral
Mullen and I met with people from the Waziristan area, on our
last trip to Afghanistan--Pakistan--and I wish to emphasize
that those people met with us at the risk of their lives. It
was really dangerous to come into Islamabad. When we met with
them, they told us that Punjabi military coming into a Pashtun
area are as alien as it would be if they were NATO troops. And
we take that point.
So, where do we come out on the security side? There is
this ancient group called the Frontier Corps; again,
Kiplingesque, Kipling-era stuff, very colorful group. We
believe that they can be strengthened into a serious
counterinsurgency force.
Mr. Chairman, I'm just responding on a point I know is of
particular interest to you. The upgrading of the Frontier
Corps.
Senator Lugar. Right.
Ambassador Holbrooke. A lot of the money we're asking you
for is going to go to seriously upgrading their weaponry. Maybe
we think the time for Enfield rifles is over. They still use
them. And, by the way, they still work. We're going to try to
give them better counterinsurgency training. And we think their
size can be increased. We have a very, very small American
contingent out there, doing advice only. And we want to give
them some means.
One last point, Mr. Chairman, and this is the one I feel
most strongly about. Concurrent with the insurgency is an
information war. We are losing that war. The Taliban have
unrestricted, unchallenged access to the radio, which is the
main means of communication in an area where literacy is around
10 percent for men and less than 5 percent for women. And radio
is broadcast from the backs of pickup trucks and motorcycles,
it's from mosques. It's low-wattage FM radio stations. They
broadcast the names of people they're going to behead, just
like Rwanda. And for reasons that are hard to explain, we have
no counter-programming efforts that existed when we took
office. We have a--we don't have jamming, we don't try to
override, we don't do counter-programming.
Senator Kerry and I, in particular, have talked about this,
and I want to state, in front of the full committee, that
Senator Kerry wrote into his bill a special section on this
issue. That's very helpful to us in our internal dialogue,
which is going on as we speak. President Obama has personally
expressed a desire to deal with this. And we shall do so.
And I want to bring to your attention that this particular
issue--we cannot win the war; however you define ``win,'' we
can't succeed, however you define ``success''--if we cede the
airwaves to people whose--who are--who present themselves as
false messengers of the prophet, which is what they do. And we
need to combat it. And I thank you for bringing--for
highlighting that issue in the bill that you and the chairman
have put forward.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you. I appreciate, as always,
your testimony. But, as I say, please get back to us with the
plan, because that will be important, not only for us, but,
likewise, for our colleagues and for those in the public who
are going to be following this for some time.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I will, Senator Lugar. And I
certainly will be responsive, as I've tried to be to you ever
since we first started working together in the 1970s. But, I
would like to underscore that we are--that we did a strategic
review, but that was an overview. We are now drilling down to
the deepest levels.
General Petraeus and I have now operationalized most of the
Afghanistan part. He and I are now turning to Pakistan. As you
know, there's been a very important command change in
Afghanistan yesterday. That doesn't apply directly to Pakistan,
but anything that happens in one country affects the other.
We are in the--we have upgraded our Embassy in Afghanistan
enormously in the last few weeks, not only with Carl Eikenberry
as our new Ambassador, but with Ambassador Frank Ricciardone as
the deputy ambassador, Ambassador Tony Wayne, from Argentina,
former Assistant Secretary of State for Economics, going to be
the field--the boss of the field operations. We now have to do
the same thing in Islamabad. Ambassador Patterson and I have
talked about it, and we welcome your support on that, as well.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Let me just say quickly, as I turn to Senator Feingold,
that the Frontier Corps has been doing some interesting and
surprisingly capable things, and I think there is promise
there. And second, that small unit that you've talked about,
there is just some exceptional people who have a terrific sense
of what reality is on the ground, and we need to listen to them
closely as we go forward
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I thank the chairman very much for
holding this hearing.
And, Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming before the
committee. As you know, I was just delighted when the President
and the Secretary of State had the wisdom to select you to be
the special envoy on this issue. And I give the chairman
enormous credit for that lunch the other day. It was one of the
most unique things in the mere 17 years that I've been watching
these things. And I saw fingerprints of Dick Holbrooke all over
that very unique event that I thought was just excellent.
Now, it has been nearly 8 years since al-Qaeda attacked the
United States. And, while I'm very pleased that President Obama
has unequivocally recognized the need to refocus the
government's attention and resources on this threat, I do
remain concerned that the plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan has
the potential to escalate, rather than diminish, the threat.
Since 2001, as you pointed out, Pakistan has received
billions of dollars from the United States in assistance
packages and reimbursements for security-related
counterterrorism initiatives, and yet, al-Qaeda has actually
reconstituted itself along the border region, primarily because
the last administration focused its attention on Iraq and
relied on a partner in Pakistan who lacked popular support and
whose commitment to fighting extremism was questionable.
Fortunately, President Obama wants to reverse the previous
administration's failed policies.
Good intentions are not enough, however. As the President
and the Secretary of State have made clear, security in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even for us here at home, are
inextricably linked. Adding 21,000 new troops in Afghanistan, I
fear, could further destabilize Pakistan without providing
substantial, lasting security improvements in Afghanistan. Your
very words here this morning, Mr. Ambassador, were, ``We pushed
them to the east.'' The question here is, Are we going to
continue to push more people to the east who may be more able
to do us harm in Pakistan than they're able to do us harm in
Afghanistan?
So, obviously, as you know better than anyone, to succeed,
we must ensure that we have an equal partner in the Pakistani
Government. If we're serious about fighting al-Qaeda and
preventing another generation of bin Ladens from emerging, we
must also ensure that any expanded support for development,
rule of law, human rights, and anticorruption is met with equal
dedication by the Pakistani Government.
And along these lines, Mr. Ambassador, I'm interested to
hear from you today about how we can help ensure a coordinated
and effective response to the rising numbers of displaced
people that have resulted from the recent military offensive in
the western part of Pakistan, which, of course, we all know
we're not talking here about the FATA; we're talking about
Pakistan proper, we're talking about internally displaced
people. And, as you know from our previous conversations, less
than a year ago I had the opportunity to see the good effects
of American aid in both the North West Frontier Province and in
Pakistani Kashmir after the earthquake.
Now, we can't have a foreign policy based on waiting for
natural disasters. However, when one does occur--we've seen,
both in the tsunami incident in Indonesia, in that region, and
also here in Pakistan--that that is something we can do, and do
quickly, that can make a difference. So, I urge you to consult
with people in the administration to help make that happen.
I'm also pleased that Senators Kerry and Lugar have
reintroduced and updated legislation to strengthen Pakistan's
civilian government. That is overdue. And I'm also pleased to
see that the legislation will require the Secretary of State to
be forthcoming on what progress is occurring as a part of our
oversight. After all, this does, obviously, involve taxpayer
dollars.
Now, back to the issue, Ambassador, of what you just said,
that everything that happens in Afghanistan affects Pakistan.
Well, that gets at the core of some of my concerns.
Is the proposed policy sufficiently considering the--what I
like to call the ``balloon effect'' of ``whatever happens in
Afghanistan affects Pakistan,'' or vice versa? You've said that
the impact of our troops in Afghanistan will mean the Taliban
will, ``go east into Pakistan toward the Baluchistan area--an
issue that has to be addressed.'' So, I'm curious, Do you
believe the Pakistani Government is doing everything it can to
capture Taliban leaders, particularly in Baluchistan? And are
we sure that when we put 21,000 more troops in Afghanistan, and
get up to a level of 70,000 troops--are we sure that that isn't
making the situation in Pakistan potentially worse? Or is it
actually making it better? Could it--is it possible that it's
going to be having the kind of negative effect that you've
actually alluded to in your remarks?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
On your first point----
The Chairman. Is your mike on?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator Feingold. On your
first point, you are absolutely correct that an additional
amount of American troops, and particularly if they're
successful, in Helmand and Kandahar, could end up creating a
pressure in Pakistan which would add to the instability. I
raised that issue as soon as the troop discussions began at the
White House, and I was not alone in raising it.
The United States military command, under GEN David
Petraeus, who I think is a great American military leader, is
well aware of it. They have been conducting, and are conducting
as we speak, very intense discussions with the Pakistani Army
to work with them so that they will be prepared this time, as
they were not prepared in 2002 for what happened.
On your key question, Is Pakistan doing everything it can
to capture Taliban leaders, al-Qaeda, and so on?--you heard, as
I did, General Pasha's reply, in closed session, to that
question, in the lunch we discussed earlier. I don't know the
answer to that, because I don't know what it is they're not
doing that they could be doing. They have captured over--and
killed and eliminated over the years a good number of the
leaders of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. But, others have been under no--under less pressure.
There is a history here, which General Pasha spoke very
frankly about at our lunch, when he said, quite bluntly to the
Senators assembled and those of us who were privileged to be
there, that we have to remember that this had originally been a
joint Pakistani-American intelligence operation in the 1980s,
and when the United States walked out on Afghanistan in 1989,
which history will record as a very serious error, the
Pakistanis were left with a situation which required them, from
their own point of view, to continue some of these
relationships. It made sense in 1989, it made no sense after 9/
11, from our point of view, but many people think the
Pakistanis are still ambivalent about it. And many people in
the region--indeed, the bulk of the people in the region, as
all of you know--believe the United States will abandon them
again, because of the history.
One of the things that this administration has tried to do
is say, ``We're not going to walk out, this time.'' But, words
have to be measured against history, and the history has left
them skeptical. And we need to show the region, which is,
again, why this legislation has become so important--I mean, I
want to be very frank with you, the phrase ``Kerry-Lugar'' has
a talismanic quality in the Pakistani press now. It's not just
the amount of money, it's the fact that it is now read as a
symbol of our intentions to stick around and be serious about
it. And, of course, the troop commitment in Afghanistan speaks
for itself.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Ambassador, my time is out. I just
want to make sure I get an answer to the larger question. Are
you sure that the troop buildup in Afghanistan will not be
counterproductive, vis-a-vis Pakistan?
Ambassador Holbrooke. No, I am only sure that we are aware
of the problem, that we are working intensely with the
Pakistani Army, that they are aware of it, that the lesson of
2001-02 is--been absorbed. But, everyone who's observed the
situation from the outside has come to the same conclusion,
Senator Feingold, and that is that there are not enough forces
in the west. And this offensive will drive pressure into
Baluchistan, where the fighting now is to the north and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We hope that the
Pakistanis will move more troops into the west, improve the
training of the Frontier Corps. We're ready to assist with all
of this. It is imperative that it be done. It is an
extraordinarily complicated equation.
Why, then, would I still support the troop buildup in
Afghanistan, which I strongly support? For the simplest of
reasons. You could not leave the American, the NATO, and the
ISAF forces in the deployment structure which was inherited on
January 20. We did not have enough forces, ourselves, to do our
own job, so the recommendation of General Petraeus and General
McKiernan for an additional 17,000 troops and 4,000 trainers
was, in my view, absolutely critical.
But, yes, we're aware of the consequence. And I would say,
quite candidly, that wasn't true 7 years ago.
The Chairman. An honest answer. Thank you.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, Ambassador, thank you for your testimony. And I, too,
want to thank you for the lunch meeting that took place last
week. I will tell you that what struck me about it was, it was
the last event with two leaders that were here, and I think
it's very intelligent that you all are having these trilateral
meetings. I thank you for that.
What struck me, though, was, after having these ministerial
breakouts and having days of meetings--and I'm going to ask
some questions about Afghanistan, since it--your term ``AfPak''
is one that's been part of the vernacular here in Washington
now--I was struck by the fact that the President of Afghanistan
could not, in a coherent way, relay what our mission in
Afghanistan ought to be.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And may interrupt to say----
Senator Corker. And then----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. To say----
Senator Corker. Well, not----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Interrupt to say that--
--
Senator Corker. Well, let me finish.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. The President was----
Senator Corker. Let me finish.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Struck by your response.
Senator Corker. Well, his nonresponse----
Ambassador Holbrooke. He was very----
Senator Corker [continuing]. His nonresponse was pretty
stunning to, I think, most people in the meeting. And when I
pushed back in--at his eloquent, long-winded nonresponse, he
then said, ``This is your mission,'' OK? And I was also
struck--I was glad to see the good relations between him and
President Zardari. That was good to see.
But, I guess what I'd like to ask you one more time,
because I've said before, your explanation of our mission there
has sort of rung hollow--and you're a very knowledgeable
person, you're our person as it relates to foreign relations
there--What is our mission in Afghanistan, in your words?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, first let me just clarify my
interjection. You made a big impact on President Zardari. I
don't dispute your characterization of the exchange, but it was
one of the most memorable moments of last week, and he got your
message, which was that you, as a senior member of this
committee, were not satisfied with his answer. And I think it
had exactly the desired effect.
Will it produce the desired outcome? That's another issue.
This dealing with the Pakistani Government, with its
complexities--after all, the Prime Minister has a lot of power,
too--is difficult.
Now, on the question of our mission; our mission was
clearly stated by the President in his speech at the end of
March. It is to defeat, dismantle, and disable al-Qaeda and the
enemies of the United States who directly threaten us.
Now, since those--since the al-Qaeda is overwhelmingly in
Pakistan, not Afghanistan, the question legitimately arises,
Well, why are we fighting in Afghanistan, when the enemy is in
Pakistan? And we spent a lot of time discussing this. And the
answer is, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are so interrelated that
Taliban--you might envisage it as the cordon which surrounds
the hard core. Taliban does the local jihad, al-Qaeda does the
global jihad, and they interact. And we believe strongly--and I
believe all observers would agree--that the enemies of the
United States--Taliban, al-Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud, and
others--who also are enemies of the Pakistan democracy--are
people we must deal with.
I stress again, Senator, the enemies of Pakistan are the
same as the enemies of the United States. Some of them are in
Afghanistan, some of them are in Pakistan. We must help them
win.
Senator Corker. OK.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And by ``win,'' I mean stabilize the
Government in Pakistan and give the Afghans the capacity to
defend themselves.
Senator Corker. So--I have shown support for our efforts in
Afghanistan and our efforts, certainly, in Iraq. You all have
just gone through a strategic review. We are asked to vote on a
supplemental next week. I have to tell you that there is a lot
of moving parts, from my perspective, and I do not think that
we have coherently laid out to this body what our strategy is,
overall. I mean, Senator Feingold had some questions. There are
issues that I think that need to be discussed.
And before I move on to this bill, I would just say that I
really think that it's a mistake to bring the supplemental up
next week. We've talked to the Army; they're not going to be
out of funds until July 1. We just talked with them within the
last hour. And I think, for Members of this body, on both sides
of the aisle, to have the questions that we all have,
especially after meeting with the leaders of these two
countries last week, I think it is a mistake, and I think we
are potentially embarking on a monumental mistake, whether we
end up doing the right things or not, by this body not
discussing this in the way that it should and being fully
bought into something that I think is going to be a part of our
country's efforts for years to come, especially since we are,
in fact, doubling down, if you will, in Afghanistan.
And so, to me, this is something that we should discuss
much more fully, should not rush out a supplemental today.
So, let me just--and especially--I'd love to talk about
just the little things, like corruption. I mean, your
administration has alluded to the fact that, in the poppy-crop
areas, that you feel the government is actually taking more of
the illegal moneys than the Taliban is, that we're supporting
an illegal government action there, that that is of greater
concern than the poppy crop actually going to the Taliban. OK?
In Pakistan, you know, I hate to be pejorative here, but, I
mean, the Leader was formerly called ``Mr. Ten Percent.'' I
know that that may be unfair. But, I do think we need to
understand how these moneys are going to be circulated through
these countries in such a way that they don't end up in a bank
account in Switzerland. I think those are important things to
talk about.
But, let me just say, this bill--to come down to this piece
of legislation, since I have 29 seconds left----
The Chairman. Senator, this is important enough--happy to
give you a little extra time, if colleagues--you know, this is
an important discussion. We're here to have the discussion, so
now is the time to get at it.
Senator Corker. Well, I appreciate the phone call that we
had yesterday, but I really believe that this administration is
making a large mistake asking for this supplemental today, when
our engagement there is going to be multiyeared. You all have
just come in--I'm not criticizing you; you're a man of extreme
knowledge--but, we have not hashed out what's happening, and we
are going to be engaged there for many, many, many years. Many
men and women will lose their lives. We're doubling down--and
we haven't debated this yet. OK? So, I'm going to stop there.
But, on this legislation, just to get to the menial issues
of the day, I appreciate the leadership of our two Senators in
offering this. I do find it similar to what I'm saying about
the supplemental. We are asking you to tell us what you're
going to do with this money after we pass the bill. I just find
that to be really odd. It seems to me that the administration
would come tell us what it is they want to achieve in Pakistan,
and tell us what the benchmarks are; we would look at the
intelligence community's efforts, which I know that is
occurring, and we would look at what we ought to be doing in
regard to that, after you have laid out to us what those
benchmarks are. For us to pass a large amount of funding, and
yet, then ask, later, for you to tell us what you're going to
with it, to me, seems backward. And I would love a response to
that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, I agree it's complicated,
and I agree it's tough, and I think every Senator on all sides
of this issue has made that point, no more eloquently than our
chairman, here, and Senator Lugar.
But, I do not feel that it's quite fair to say that we
haven't outlined what we do with it. I responded to Senator
Lugar's question by listing health, education, livelihoods,
women's microcredit, capacity-building, the Frontier Corps. We
have changed the focus. None of this happened in the past. And,
on your points about corruption and counternarcotics, I'm on
the record as agreeing fully with what you just said.
So, why, then, do I, respectfully--and I mean the
``respectfully'' sincerely--why, then, do I disagree with you
on the issue of delaying? First of all, we're not asking for
money and then we'll decide how to spend it. We're asking for
emergency money at this moment. But, I need to underscore the
following point, particularly given the very high visibility of
this bill in Pakistan.
Senator Corker. We're mixing messages. The supplemental and
this bill are two separate issues, right?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I understand the difference.
Senator Corker. OK.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I understand the--I've testified
before the supplemental people, too. But, the--and this is an
anomaly of the way the press covers it, but the words ``Kerry-
Lugar'' have become a symbol of American support for Pakistan
in the emergency, not something called ``the supplemental,''
which contains a lot of other things. I understand that the
supplemental is necessary for the money. I'm just telling you
facts on the ground.
But, the point I want to underscore, Senator, with great
respect, is simple. The only beneficiary of a delay in this
bill is the enemies of our Nation, the people who are trying to
have the next 9/11, because they will use it, on that radio
that I was talking about earlier, to mislead people as to our
true commitments in the area. So, while I agree with you about
the supplemental----
Senator Corker. That we should put it off?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Sir?
Senator Corker. That we should put the supplemental off and
at least----
Ambassador Holbrooke. No, sir.
Senator Corker [continuing]. Us----
Ambassador Holbrooke. No, sir. I'm in favor--I've supported
the supplemental, as well. But, that--but, we're here to
testify in behalf of your bill, as I--that's why I'm here. And
I----
Senator Corker. Well, the supplemental's coming up next
week. I know my time is up.
Ambassador Holbrooke. But, you're talking----
Senator Corker [continuing]. The----
Ambassador Holbrooke. You asking me about----
Senator Corker. The supplemental's what----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Delaying the
supplemental?
Senator Corker. Yes. I mean, this bill is a----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Oh.
Senator Corker [continuing]. Is a--the Army does not need
those funds until----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes----
Senator Corker [continuing]. July 1.
Ambassador Holbrooke. The----
Senator Corker. And we have not, in any--you've had a
strategic review. We had two leaders come up here that had no
earthly idea what our mission is in their countries. OK? And
the fact is that I don't think we, as a body, have talked about
Afghanistan in the proper way yet.
The Chairman. Well, let me--can I intervene here, just if I
can, because I want to--I want to give you some leeway, but I
also--we have colleagues who are waiting. But, I want to try
to--let me cover a couple of things quickly.
First of all, Senator, I think it is entirely appropriate,
particularly given the change of command that has just taken
place, in our Secretary of Defense's own judgment that there
needs to be a transition, it's very appropriate to be asking
some questions about Afghanistan and the supplemental. I think
a lot of us have some questions.
But, let's separate that out for a moment from this, and
also separate out the--I want to speak to this question of the
two Presidents' definitions. You and I heard that answer
differently. I heard President Karzai very clear say that, ``If
your definition of the mission was what the prior
administration said it was''--i.e., the building of a
government, democracy, you know, putting in place X, Y, Z,
schools, et cetera--he tipped his hat to that administration
and basically absolved us of that responsibility for that,
saying, ``You've accomplished it. You gave us a national
government, you gave us a process. We have an election coming
up. We've built X number of schools. We have X number of women
going to school,'' as he described it. I forget the percentage.
He was very clear about that part of it. But, he said, what is
unfinished--he was very clear--``Your mission is to fight al-
Qaeda and to prevent them from retaking over the--you know, the
areas of Afghanistan where they can then launch strikes against
the rest of the world.'' That's what he said. Now, that is, you
know, basically what President Obama and others have defined
it.
Now, I still think we need to flesh out the how of some of
that, personally. And we're doing that, here. I mean, the fact
is that, when I was in Peshawar just a few weeks ago, and the
Frontier Corps was telling me how they went into Bajaur,
cleared it out, but it had been 7 weeks and nothing, absolutely
nothing, had come in underneath it. That's the purpose of this
bill. I mean, the whole purpose of this is to empower the
civic, both in FATA and nationwide, that provides an
alternative to what the Taliban are offering.
What's interesting is, the Taliban, unlike Hezbollah or
Hamas, who have mastered providing services and directly
engaging in the, sort of, day-to-day life of citizens, Taliban
don't do much in the way of service apart from meting out their
rough version of justice; they just scare people and kill
people and intimidate them. And so, they've actually left open
an enormous opportunity, which is what the urgency of this bill
is, is to be able to come in and empower some governance that
actually makes a difference in the lives of people. That's the
only way that we have a prayer, here. We, they, whoever--
however you link it.
And so, I'd say to the Senator, we're happy to spend a lot
of time on this, and we're going to spend some time on
Afghanistan, because it's a tricky, long-term deal. And we need
to do that. But, I do not think it's fair to say that President
Karzai didn't define the mission in--as he sees it, in
Afghanistan. And I said, afterward, that he, in effect, has
given us a very much more limited, narrower mission than we've
had for the previous 7 years.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, thank you for your long-term service to our
country, and this present assignment, as well.
You know, I have supported, both in the House and the
Senate, these efforts with Pakistan, but I have real concerns.
I have to be honest with you. It's those concerns that led
Senator Harkin and myself to ask for a Government
Accountability report that came out that's called ``Securing,
Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with
Afghanistan.'' And basically, that report said that, after 6
years of efforts by the United States and Pakistani
Governments, and over $12 billion in military and development
assistance, al-Qaeda had, ``regenerated its ability to attack
the United States, continues to maintain a safe haven in the
FATA region.'' It noted that an integrated, comprehensive plan,
including all elements of national power--diplomatic, military,
intelligence, development, economic, and law enforcement--had
not yet been developed for the FATA, despite that fact that it
was called for in the 2003 national strategy for combating
terrorism, the 9/11 Commission report, and the implementing
legislation of the 9/11 Commission.
So, the question is, one: Do we not need a comprehensive
strategy, as the Government Accountability Office called for?
And second, What is it? And third, Do we not, after--you know,
the Pakistanis have, in my mind, a series of one step forward,
two steps backward. The Pakistanis rush their troops to the
Indian border when their own sovereignty is being besieged by
the elements within their country. They make a deal in the Swat
region, which I believe is in their interest, not ours. You
have our Director of the CIA going in what was supposed to be a
private, secret meeting, having a videotape released of him.
You wonder whether the Pakistanis are on the same page as us,
or they're only there when, in fact, pressure is exerted, in
their own national interests, as well as ours.
So, do we need a comprehensive plan? What is it? What is
our strategy--our comprehensive strategy? And should we not
have benchmarks to make sure that we don't continue in the one-
step-forward two-steps-back?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator.
I believe we do have a comprehensive strategy.
Senator Menendez. What is it?
Ambassador Holbrooke. And we have--the President laid it
out in his speech, in the end of March. We laid it out to our
allies. We've briefed the Hill repeatedly and in detail.
Senator Menendez. Well, what is it? Give me the elements of
it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. The key elements are, No. 1, to
defeat the people who pose a direct threat to our homeland--al-
Qaeda and its supporters; to stabilize the Government of
Afghanistan and give it the ability to be self-sufficient in
defense of its--in its own security so that eventually the
American combat troops and the NATO combat troops can leave;
to----
Senator Menendez. I'm talking about Pakistan, though, for
the moment.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, these two are completely
related, Senator.
Senator Menendez. But, when you're asking money----
Ambassador Holbrooke. And in----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. When you're asking money for
Pakistan, specific, I'd like to understand what our strategy is
in the context of Pakistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I need to stress again, as I have for
years as a private citizen and in the government, that the
ignoring of Pakistan, the complete ignoring of Pakistan, in
terms of these issues over the last few years, significantly
contributed to the current crisis in Afghanistan, as well as
Pakistan.
As for Pakistan itself, how can we ignore that area of
western Pakistan which contains the people sworn to destroy
America? So, we need to strengthen and help stabilize this
government.
It begins with strengthening democracy. After a 10-year
military rule which was very bad for our strategic interests
and, I believe, for Pakistani people, particularly the latter
part of it.
There are many parts--the previous Senator spoke about the
many moving parts here; there are many moving parts, and I'd be
happy to go back over them again at any time you wish. But, I
want to underscore that to strengthen Pakistani democracy will
take resources, which is why we strongly support this bill.
We need to--before you came in, we had extended colloquy on
the Frontier Corps. Well, the Frontier Corps are from the local
areas of the west, whereas the regular army are mainly
Punjabis. It's been pointed out repeatedly that Punjabis are
regarded as an alien force in the western areas. So, we want to
strengthen the Frontier Corps.
We want to build roads, help them build roads, clinics,
education, jobs. There's another bill in the Congress on the
opportunity zones, sponsored in the Senate by Senator Cantwell,
which is a very important job-creation bill, which I hope will
also get passed.
Our role here--we can't run Pakistan; it's the second
largest Muslim country in the world, it's a vast and
complicated country. But, we can do more to help the civilian
development and economic issues and help them strengthen
democracy.
Senator Menendez. Let me say that I don't believe that--$12
billion later, that we are ignoring or have been ignoring
Pakistan. If, $12 billion later, you were telling a United
States taxpayer that we have been ignoring Pakistan, they would
probably bristle at the idea. The reality is, is that when I
talk about strategy--and I appreciate the development efforts
that you just talked about; I support those--but, I'm talking
about a strategy that brings in the military element, that
brings in the diplomatic element, that brings in the economic
element, that brings in the intelligence element, that brings
in the law enforcement element, that brings in the rule-of-law
element. And I don't get the sense that we have that.
Now, as someone who has continuously voted for this, I'm
reticent to continuously vote without knowing that there is a
strategic plan. I don't have the sense of that. And so, I'd
like--you know, I look at what the GAO report said about our
ability to validate funds that have gone there in the past. I
don't know that we have a better structure today to validate
the funds; we don't even know where significant parts of this
money went to. That's $12 billion later. You're asking us to
vote for a whole new set of money without knowing whether there
are going to be benchmarks, without knowing whether we have a
better system of accountability. I personally can't continue
down that road, as much as I think this is critical.
So, there's going to have to be some give-and-take here if
you want the support of some of us, who have been supportive
along the way, but are just not here for a blank check. I said
that in the previous administration; and, as much as I respect
this one, I believe the same standards have to be applied.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, Senator, I am deeply troubled
by what you said, because that----
Senator Menendez. I'm deeply----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. The GAO----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Troubled by where we're at.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well----
Senator Menendez. I'm deeply troubled by where we're at----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. And I get no sense of
reassurance, from what I hear so far.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, I'm sorry you don't get a sense
of reassurance, but let me say that that GAO report arrived on
my desk as I arrived at my job, and let me share with you a
fact. The people who were in the Department wanted to write a
point-by-point rebuttal to it, and I put a complete hold on
that and said, ``On the contrary, that's going to be one of our
guides for our policy.'' And if you feel that you should
penalize this administration for the mismanagement that you've
described accurately in the GAO report, I can't do anything
about it. But if----
Senator Menendez. No, I don't want to penalize--Mr.
Ambassador, I don't want to penalize this administration for
anything that, in the past, happened. But, I do believe that
the past is prologue, unless we change it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, we are changing.
Senator Menendez. And so, what I'm looking for is a sense--
a certainty of a strategy that will take this money and put it
to good use between both the Kerry-Lugar bill and the
supplemental and future moneys, as well as a sense of
accountability and benchmarks, so that we don't continue the
history that we've seen here. And so, I don't want to belabor
the point. I would be happy to talk to you at length in my
office at some point, if you want my support, because right now
it is not there, based upon what I----
Ambassador Holbrooke. I would be honored to come to your
office and talk to you about it. We do have benchmarks. The
Congress has asked for them. They're being worked out in detail
now, in conjunction with the staffs in both houses, under the
direction of Admiral Blair, the Director of National
Intelligence. We are going to respond to any requests you have
for benchmarks and metrics. We agree with everything you've
just said.
Having said that, I believe very strongly that the
Pakistani people and their new democratic government deserve to
have our support. You talked about the waste of the $12
billion. I wrote about that, as a private citizen. I thought it
was a waste, a lot of it, because it went to conventional
military support. And I'm not going to detract what I said as a
private citizen, but I'm here today, Senator, to underscore to
you that we have a different strategy. We've laid it out in
public, we've laid it out in private. I would be happy to come
up to the Hill with General Petraeus, if you wish, and we'll
come up and have more private meetings. I've met with--I would
say I've met with half the Senators in this body personally
since I started this job, in only 3 months, and--probably more
than anyone else except Secretary Clinton--and I am committed
to working with you.
But, we do have a strategy, and it is still being refined
at the tactical and operational level. We discussed a lot of
this earlier this morning here. And if there's any specific
issue you want to cover, I'd be delighted to do so.
But, we cannot walk away from Pakistan now without damaging
our own most vital national security interests.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez, if I can just--first of
all, your questions refer to the Coalition Support Funds rather
than programs run through State. These questions are very well
put and important, and--we have a record here of not having had
that accountability. And again, we're not trying to go
backward, but we did find out where the money went in the last
years, because we thought it was going in one place, and, in
fact, regrettably, it went to the general treasury of Pakistan.
That's where it was spent. So, we gave significant billions of
dollars to Pakistan for one purpose, and it was spent for
another.
Now, with that knowledge, we drafted this legislation, and
this legislation is very specific in saying that the President
has to submit to us, as well as to the Appropriations
Committee, the amounts of funds that are going to specific
projects and programs, a description of the specific projects
for which the money is going to go, a list of the criteria used
to measure the effectiveness of those projects, systemic
qualitative basis for assessing whether the outcomes are
achieved, a timeline for each project and program, a
description of the role played by the Pakistani national,
regional, and local officials in identifying and implementing
each of those programs, and all of the amounts of money that
are going through it. So, those are some of the benchmarks and
requirements that we've set out here specifically in response
to what's promoting your concerns, and the administration has
worked with us very closely in laying those out.
So, we, I think, are going to have a direct track on each
and every dollar here, which is the intent and purpose of
this----
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may, very briefly,
because I know my colleagues----
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Senator Menendez. I just--I appreciate what you're trying
to do in the bill. And what I want to see is, even giving those
metrics, which I applaud, how does that fit into the strategy,
which I'm still not quite sure is----
The Chairman. That's fair. And I think that Ambassador
Holbrooke has said he's spent time--and we'll have another
hearing, if we need to, in the next days in order to make sure
that we thoroughly answer all these things.
Ambassador Holbrooke.
Ambassador Holbrooke. May I add one more point before the
Senator leaves, and that is that the Congress created, I think,
a year or two ago, the special inspector general for Afghan
Reconstruction, SIGAR, which is now headed by a retired major
general named General Fields, Cyrus Fields. We have been
working very closely with them. Their responsibility, of
course, is solely to the Congress, and we understand that and
respect it. But, I want to say that I believe they have
tremendous potential, Mr. Chairman, to help in the fight
against corruption if you would consider--and I'm speaking way
out of previously thought-through guidelines here, but I wanted
to bring it to your attention--the Afghan Government and the--
has specifically asked SIGAR to help it in the anticorruption
efforts. And I think this would be very valuable. It may
require some consultations or legislative adjustment.
And I also think that, as we expand our efforts in
Pakistan, you may wish to consider whether they have an
oversight role. There are something like six different
inspectors general and oversight committees in the executive
branch and reporting to the Hill. You mentioned one of the most
important: GAO. But, there are also the SIGAR group, there's
the inspector general of the State Department, there's the
inspector general of AID, and there are several other oversight
committees. SIGAR is the one that seems to be most actively on
the ground, because of the authority you gave them. And I
wanted that to--I wanted you to reflect in the record how much
we value them, while respecting their independence. And to the
extent you wish to expand their mandate or expand their
resources, we would strongly support that.
The Chairman. Well, that's something we should talk about
in the next days.
And, Senator Menendez, we might add, there's a GAO report
required here within 1 year of the strategy report being
submitted to us. So, within 1 year of that, we have an
independent assessment of everything that the strategy report
laid out. So, we're working at it, and we'll work closely with
everybody here to do it.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming today. And let
me say, you can put me in the same column as Senator Corker and
Senator Menendez, as being less than enthusiastic at this
point. I'm really concerned about Afghanistan. It seems to me,
in Iraq, we're winding down, there's going to be problems there
as we leave; we're going to have to deal with those as we
leave.
Pakistan, you know, you've got the government--the people
themselves fighting for control of their government. We've
chosen sides. I think it's going to be somewhat easier to make
decisions there as to how we support the side that we've
chosen.
The Afghanistan problem--I was there last month. I've met
with the President. I was at the same lunch. And, Mr. Chairman,
I can tell you, I think you were a lot more articulate than the
President was about describing the progress there.
I've got to tell you, I was--I have been stunned by the
lack of progress in Afghanistan. When you go there and you look
at what's happening, and you look at what has happened, it is
just breathtaking the amount of money, the American lives we've
spent there, and you have a government that has control maybe
to the outskirts of the capital. You've got a population that
has, really, no sense of nationalism. You've got an economy
that's based on a product that is illegal in virtually every
country in the world. And the corruption, everybody admits that
nothing happens without bribery and corruption there. It is
terribly depressing.
And this--to me, until somebody gets a handle on stopping
the poppy production, all of this stuff is--goes by the by. To
me, trying to say, ``Well, we don't want any corruption in the
country'' is kind of like telling the Mafia, ``Well, OK, you're
in charge of prostitution, gambling, and drugs, but we don't
want any corruption with you.''
You stand on the abyss and look into that black hole, and
that's about all you see, is a black hole. You just don't see a
bottom.
Now, I just heard you articulate what our objectives are
there, and that is to decimate the bad guys. You just don't
have the country itself having the willpower, the political
willpower, to join us in that. In fact, I heard the President
say--and he didn't say it directly, but if you read between the
lines--that, yes, we stood up their government; yes, we've
stood up their military; yes, we've stood up their police,
``But you guys--America--need to continue this fight with the
Taliban and al-Qaeda.'' You know, I wanted to jump at that
point and say, ``Well, what are you going to do about this?''
because that enthusiasm--I just don't see it.
And I've got to tell you, the Afghanistan thing is very,
very depressing. And I'd like to--with the money we're putting
in there, we need to have--we need to have something much, much
more concrete than what we have. I'd like to see an end game,
but I don't know who's smart enough to develop an end game for
us in that country. It's very depressing.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Ambassador Holbrooke. That's pretty close to the view I had
when we entered the government. I don't mean to be facetious
about it, but your description is--I would quibble with some of
the details. There are areas of progress, real areas of
progress. But, the overall situation has deteriorated since
2004--there's no question about it--in Afghanistan. And that,
in turn, has increased the pressure in Pakistan, and vice
versa. We all understand that, Senator. That's why we're here.
We're trying to turn around the situation, which was clearly in
decline when the administrations changed. And I'm very grateful
to the support--for the support and advice of this committee,
and of the Senate in general, because we have a common enemy
and a common threat and a common mission here.
And I really don't agree with the previous Senator that we
don't have a strategy, but I do agree with you that the
situation is extraordinarily serious, and that's why we sent
additional troops, that's why we're asking for additional
funds, and that's why we want to work with you to fashion a
bipartisan policy that can be sustained in our national
security interests. And I welcome comments like yours, although
I think we could quibble on some of the details of what you
said.
Senator Risch. Well, Ambassador, one of the difficulties I
have is, you like to see a political will amongst the people,
or a--some willpower, some ``We can get this done.'' And the
difficulty I'm having is, I'm just wondering whether we have
enough troops and whether we have enough money to convince the
general populace in that country that they need to change the
way they've been living for centuries. And that--you just don't
hear it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Here's an interesting statistic from
this morning's International Republican Institute, IRI, poll.
In June 2008, 9 percent of the Pakistani people wanted to
cooperate with the United States against terrorism. In March,
the number had gone up to 37 percent. I would wager a great
deal that today that number is even higher, because there's a
huge backlash going on against the Taliban.
Similarly, on the question of democracy, in today's IRI
poll, 77 percent of the Pakistani people are prodemocracy, but
81 percent think the country's headed in the wrong direction.
So, there's a clear indicator of what has to be done. Seventy-
four percent think religious extremism is a very serious
problem for Pakistan, but the government is not very popular.
So, I think the ingredients of a strategy are there, but
the military--the Pakistan military has to take back the west.
And that's where we are today as we hold this important
hearing.
The Chairman. Let me--I'm sorry, go ahead, Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. No, thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I was just going to suggest, Ambassador
Holbrooke, I think the administration has a tremendous
opportunity staring it in the face, with these tens of
thousands of people being displaced as a consequence of Taliban
excess. There is an opportunity, actually, to provide services,
much as we did with the earthquake relief, which had a profound
impact on the perception of America. And I would urge us to
take advantage of that in the next days, because that can help
to rapidly change opinion and, in fact, provide you with an
opportunity we haven't had in Swat, North West Frontier
Province, et cetera. If we did that, and did it well, it could
change the game for the government, too, I think. So, I would
urge that.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I am--I could not agree more. I'm
glad you said it in public. Many of us have been saying it for
the last few days, in private. We are looking for how to act on
that. And we will----
The Chairman. Well, I'd bump it----
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. Carry your----
The Chairman [continuing]. Into part of the----
Ambassador Holbrooke. We will----
The Chairman [continuing]. Supplemental or do something.
But, I think the administration's got to come up here and seize
this opportunity----
Ambassador Holbrooke. We----
The Chairman [continuing]. The strategy that's been written
for it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I share your view, and I will relay
your views immediately to the executive, my colleagues.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you for appearing today.
The Chairman. Can I just interrupt you for 1 second?
Senator Casey. Yes.
The Chairman. I have President Carter coming in, because
he's coming to testify to us this afternoon. I need to go to
meet with him. But, if, Senator Kaufman, you could close out
again? You're getting good at that. I appreciate it.
Thank you very much, and I appreciate it.
And, Ambassador, if we could follow up, perhaps afterward,
we can detail how we approach some of the issues that have been
raised here today.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving
us this opportunity to lay out our strategy.
The Chairman. Thanks so much for coming today. Very
important. Appreciate it.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, we're honored by your presence here. I
didn't realize the first time that you appeared here was 1977.
Through the work you did in the 1970s, the 1980s, the Dayton
Accords, and the conversation we have had, you have a great
sense of the gravity of the challenge, the gravity, in terms of
our national security ahead of us.
So, these are difficult issues, but I was struck by a line
from your written testimony, when discussing the overarching
priorities of the Kerry-Lugar bill. And I think this one
sentence sums up why, not only it's a good piece of legislation
that I and others have cosponsored, but that we need to move
quickly to get it passed. And I'm quoting, ``By increasing
economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of
quality health care, reinforcing human rights, particularly
women's rights, and empowering civil society, life for millions
of average Pakistanis will improve.''
Just by way of a statement, a good summation of why we need
to pass the legislation.
And then, finally, one other statement, and then I want to
get to at least one major question. I was struck by a statement
in yesterday's New York Times story about al-Qaeda and the
threat posed in Pakistan, by Bruce Riedel--a man you have
worked so closely with--who led the administration's review of
the policy. I was struck by the intensity or the gravity of
this statement. Bruce Reidel said, ``They''--meaning al-Qaeda--
``They smell blood and they are intoxicated by the idea of a
jihadist takeover in Pakistan.''
When I read a statement by Bruce Reidel, and the threat
posed in Pakistan by al-Qaeda, and juxtapose that information
with the supplemental request for not only the $497 million in
emergency funds that Department of State has asked for, but
also with the $400 million requested for the Pakistan
counterinsurgency capabilities fund asked for Secretary Gates
and General Petraeus, Secretary Gates noting that these funds
are needed to be in place by Memorial Day to ensure that we
don't run out of funding for counterinsurgency prior to
September 30--when I juxtapose those two, I have to say, we
need to not only pass the supplemental, but act with a sense of
urgency and dispatch. This is needed right now.
I also believe we should attach the same sense of urgency
to the Kerry-Lugar legislation. I say that by way of--just by
way of a statement. But--I don't know if you want to add to
that. And I want to get to a fundamental question.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Hard to add to answer that. I agree
with it completely. Thank you for that statement.
Senator Casey. With regard to what a lot of us know, and
it's not written about as much, but it underlies all these
discussions when we talk about just Pakistan for a moment, but
it obviously affects the strategy for--in both countries--and
that is India. We know that there is an obsession there with
regard to the Pakistani military. I think most Americans can
understand or appreciate some of that obsession. Every country
has its focus. We had a threat, over many generations, posed by
the Soviet Union. We understand that.
But, it's becoming an increasingly difficult problem to
solve, because if the Pakistani Government and their military
forces are focused only, or largely, on India, it's going to be
very difficult to make it work, militarily.
I ask you this, and I say this as someone who was in all
three countries last May, and, at one point, sitting with the
national security adviser of India, I said in reference of
Iran, ``Look, I know that India has a lot of ties to Iran, and
I know that you have some--you have strong relationships. But,
you've got to help us with this nuclear threat posed by Iran.''
We've asked a lot of countries, and countries have asked us, to
set aside, or to move to one side temporarily, a rivalry or a
concern.
I ask you this--and I know it's a long lead-up--I ask you
this with regard to India. Are there steps that India can take,
in the context of this whole discussion, to help lower the
temperature or create an environment where Pakistan can ease up
a little bit, as they have already? I know; they've moved some
of their military forces from the border, but are there efforts
that India can undertake, not just on its own, but by our
urging, that would help, here?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, I appreciate the question.
It's of the highest importance. With great respect, since we're
in the final days and hours of an election in India, where 700
million people are voting, and since any comment I would make
might be misunderstood in that context, I would rather just
simply restrict myself to saying that my job is Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but at all steps in the process, we keep the Indians
fully informed. They are not only an interested party, they are
arguably the interested party, although many other countries,
including most notably China and Iran, have borders with
Afghanistan and also have interests.
But, India's interests are very high. India is the great
regional power. And I have great personal respect and affection
for India. And I keep Indian--India--they have a new
ambassador, who just arrived; I met with her as soon as she was
in Washington. And we will keep India fully informed. And the
issues you raise are of great concern to us, but I'd--if you'll
permit me, I'd like to stop at that point.
Senator Casey. Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much.
Senator Kaufman [presiding]. Mr. Ambassador, I've made it a
policy, since I've been here, not to have long statements, but
to just ask questions, but I think I've got to break that
policy. Every policy should be broken. I think your patience,
to listen to my colleagues this morning, has been exemplary. I
mean, just absolutely exemplary. I think, to sit here and
criticize what's gone on, the last 8 years, as if you were
responsible for it, and how much time you and the President
spent articulating what the plan is in Afghanistan and what the
plan is in Pakistan, shows patience of Job, frankly, to do it.
I think it's quite clear what's going on, and that's what I'd
like to confirm some of this.
No. 1, we had--in Afghanistan, I don't know how we could
have a more specific plan in what it is that we're going to be
doing, in terms of--I agree with the comments about--there
could be problems with the Taliban and al-Qaeda moving over to
Pakistan, but we have to go into Helmand and Kandahar provinces
in order do it, and we have a plan to do it. So, I think the
plan that you and David Petraeus--and when Ambassador
Eikenberry gets there--I think we've got the right people on
the ground, new people on the ground, to do that job.
Pakistan, I think people are not reading the newspaper the
last month. I really think that--and I--you know, I just don't
think they've read what's happened in the Pakistan--I was in
Pakistan, and it was quite clear to me that there was a sea
change going on over there. Essentially, in the past we've gone
to them and said, ``Would you please help us in the FATA areas?
Would you please help us, because it's in our interest?'' I
think what's happened in the Swat Valley is, they now
understand it's in their interest to do this, they now are the
ones challenged. That is a world-class difference. And to talk
about Pakistan without realizing or discussing the fact that
there's been a change of will in the government, I think, just
doesn't deal with the reality of the situation on the ground.
So, the first thing I want to say is, my discussions with
President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, I came in with a
much altered understanding of what their problem is and what
their will was to actually deal with that problem. Is that a
fair summation?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes, it is. And I appreciate your
comments about patience.
I've testified a lot, and I'm perfectly comfortable
receiving the views of the people elected by the population to
represent them. But, what is frustrating, frankly, is to be
held accountable for a GAO report which I happen to agree with.
That is--that's a little bit difficult, because we're using
that GAO report as one of our guides, and because I stopped a
kind of an automatic pilot. They--when I came into office, that
was the first issue that came to me, Senator Kaufman, ``Hey,
we've got--we have this terrible GAO report. We've got to rebut
it, point by point.'' I said, ``Why? Why should we rebut it?
Why don't we learn from it?'' And that happened on the second
day I was in the job. So, I want to put that on the record,
because we want to work with you.
And I want to reiterate my strong view that SIGAR, a very
little-known creation of the Congress, either last year or
2007, I don't remember when, is a great potential tool for us
to work together in an organization which is essentially the
legislative branch's presence in Afghanistan. And if you expand
its geographic scope or you expand its mandate to help the
Afghans fight corruption, you will be helping our nation and--
while keeping the separation of powers. I want to respect that,
because every time I see General Fields, he says, ``I don't
work for you.'' And I said, ``I know, but we all are
Americans.'' He's a retired major general. He's a very
patriotic man. But, I hope you will look carefully at SIGAR.
Senator Kaufman. The other question is, when I went to
Pakistan, 3 weeks ago, I was concerned about their will, that
basically, you know, they had the troops up along the Indian
border, FATA had never been an area they were concerned about,
it doesn't really affect them, their lives, it hasn't affected
them for hundreds and hundreds of years. The people in the FATA
have further been difficult to control. So, I went with kind of
a will problem. After the--what occurred in the Swat Valley, I
became concerned about a capability problem.
What do you think the capability of the Pakistan military
to actually deal with the Taliban is and what the Taliban is
doing now?
Ambassador Holbrooke. We don't think they have enough
forces in the west. We've said so publicly. We're glad that
they're starting to focus on that issue, but it's not enough,
it's not fast enough.
Second, their training has been excessively for a
conventional war against the east, and not enough for
counterinsurgency.
Third, the ethnic issue I addressed earlier is a concern.
Fourth, we think the Frontier Corps deserves much more
attention, and I think your chairman made it clear he shares
that view.
So, we have a lot of work to do here.
But, I do want to address one point that was stated earlier
by one of your colleagues. I don't think we're looking at a
takeover of Pakistan by religious extremists from the Pashtun
belt. The Pashtun are a minority in Pakistan, and the
overwhelming majority of people do not want that to happen. It
would be much more dangerous if the militancy became embedded
among the Punjabis.
Senator Kaufman. I traveled up to the FATA and met with
the--and saw what--the training for the Frontier Corps. How--if
we appropriate this money, how soon do you think we can
actually have an effect on the Frontier Corps, expanding the
Frontier Corps and increasing their training?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Immediately, because it would be our
highest priority to get that money through the pipeline and
into the hands of the Americans and the Pakistanis on the front
lines in Peshawar and west of Peshawar.
Senator Kaufman. Finally, I served on the Broadcasting
Board of Governors for 13 years, and, the answer to your
question about strategic broadcasting, I can't pass by saying--
without saying we--we have a 71-percent listenership in Iraq to
Broadcasting Board of Governor broadcasts. We have a 56-percent
listenership in Afghanistan, and we have about 10 percent in
Pakistan. The biggest single problem is getting the government,
which I now think is ready to do it, and you could help,
allowing us to be on the air on the services--the distribution
of what our programming is.
So, I was in the FATA. I know about--we're putting FM
stations in there. The big problem you're going to find, which
we found out in Kosovo, we found out in Serbia, is finding
programming that will really affect the people. We threw away a
considerable amount of money in Iraq trying to do what I hear
the Defense Department's trying to do now in Pakistan. You
might want to go back and see how that worked. And, as I say,
we've ended up now with a 76-percent broadcasting.
So, I say--I would look to the Broadcasting Board of
Governors as a way to--what they're doing, and see how we can
expand the programming and the distribution in Pakistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you for that. I did not know
you served on the BBG----
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. And I'm very pleased to
hear it. I believe that a meeting is going on right now at the
White House about this subject. The BBG was in the list of
items I sent down there to be discussed. What I'd like to do
is--if you would agree, Senator, would be to send our team up
here to the Hill to talk to you about how you think we could
get this going. It's very important. And it also involves Voice
of America.
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Ambassador Holbrooke. But, in the end, the primary vehicle
should not be American radio, it should be local radio. But,
Americans should support it.
Senator Kaufman. Yes. The problem you're going to find with
local radio is getting the programming.
Anyway, thank you very much for your comments.
And, with that, I will adjourn the hearing today.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador Holbrooke to Questions Submitted
by Senator John Kerry
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES
Question. Is the amount of funding authorized in S. 962 for
operational and auditing expenses ($10 million per year and $20 million
per year, respectively) adequate to the expanded scope of the mission?
If additional resources are required--particularly in the area of
operating expenses--please provide a detailed explanation of how the
additional funds will be used. [Note: If any adjustment from the
figures contained in the bill is deemed necessary by the
administration, it is very important that this explanation be as
complete and transparent as possible.]
Answer. The best way to ensure that the Department of State and
Mission Pakistan will have the operational and auditing resources for
administering and implementing Foreign Assistance programs would be for
Congress to enact the Pakistan FY 2010 request of $76.2 million for
State operating expenses and the request of $30.8 million for USAID
operating expenses for Pakistan. We hope that Congress will also move
expeditiously to approve the FY 2009 supplemental including the
requested amounts for State and USAID Operating Expenses, as well as
$806.2 million requested by State for secure and upgraded facilities,
all of which will enhance the capacity of our diplomatic and
development efforts in Pakistan.
That said, the authorization to use up to $30 million of Foreign
Assistance annually to cover unexpected or incremental operating and
auditing costs associated with S. 962 would seem sufficient.
Separately, I reiterate our support for the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR is Congress's
representative on the ground and we would like to see SIGAR deployed in
every province in Afghanistan to assist with oversight of our
assistance programs. We value SIGAR and respect its independence. To
the extent that Congress is willing to expand its mandate and
responsibilities, I have made clear we would very strongly support
that.
LINKING MILITARY AND NONMILITARY AID
Question. Do you believe (as advocated by President Obama in his
championing of the Kerry-Lugar bill, and his cosponsorship of S. 3263
in 2008) that military aid should be de-linked from development aid--
with development aid as a long-term commitment to the Pakistani people,
and military aid carefully calibrated to the requirements and the will
of the Pakistani military? Or do you believe that military and
nonmilitary aid should be authorized in the same piece of legislation?
Answer. Our development and security assistance programs are two
pieces of the same strategic goal--to help Pakistan become a secure,
stable democratic partner. Both types of assistance are crucial to
support the people of Pakistan and defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Our
development assistance and our military assistance must be integrated
and complementary.
I agree that development aid should be a long-term commitment to
the Pakistani people. Development programs to enhance Pakistan's
capacity to provide improved health, education, and other basic
services to the Pakistani people will require patience and commitment
to have an impact. Our military assistance to Pakistan demonstrates our
long-term commitment to helping Pakistan confront the threat of
terrorism and extremism. Both are necessary tools but should not be
limited by being inappropriately tied together.
The question of whether authorization for development and military
aid should be in the same piece of legislation is for Congress to
determine.
What we seek is the flexibility to be able to apply the appropriate
resources at the appropriate time depending on specific needs or unique
opportunities.
LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Question. Do you believe that the level of military assistance
channeled through the State Department should be locked in place now
for the next 5 years, or (as advocated by President Obama in his
championing of the Kerry-Lugar bill, and cosponsorship of S. 3263) that
it should be authorized on an annual basis, depending on the actions,
needs, and commitment of the Pakistani military?
Answer. The President expressed support for the Kerry-Lugar bill as
originally proposed. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan perceive the United
States as having previously abandoned them during their times of need
and so it is important that our military assistance to Pakistan
demonstrate our long-term commitment to helping Pakistan confront the
threat of terrorism and extremism, and also include mechanisms to
maximize effectiveness.
The situation on the ground in Pakistan is quite fluid, with the
needs of the Pakistani military evolving with its response to the
threat posed by insurgents. Locking in specific levels of authorized
military assistance would limit our flexibility in response to the
situation on the ground. A strategic commitment to provide ongoing
assistance is, however, important.
Question. Do you believe that the Pakistani military will be more
cooperative with U.S. efforts or less cooperative if they know that
they will receive exactly the same military aid authorization every
year for the next half-decade, regardless of their actions?
Answer. Again, year-to-year authorization levels are appropriate to
the fluid nature of the security situation in Pakistan. However, a
strategic commitment to provide ongoing assistance is important. That
said, better cooperation with Pakistan is not contingent exclusively on
funding levels, but also depends on building relationships and breaking
down misconceptions. These efforts help overcome the trust deficit and
help Pakistan follow through on the changes needed to confront our
common threat.
LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Question. Do you consider the limitations on military assistance
contained in section 6 of S. 962 (and the waivers provided) to be a
reasonable compromise between setting no conditions on security aid and
setting overly restrictive limitations on such assistance?
Answer. We agree with Congress that an increase in security
assistance for Pakistan should take into account Pakistan's progress in
preventing al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating in
Pakistan and using Pakistan as a safe haven to launch attacks. We are
committed to providing Pakistan with the assistance it needs to wage
the counterinsurgency campaign, as long as its concerted efforts toward
these goals continue.
While we are committed to accountability and partnering with the
Congress in our efforts to ensure that assistance is used effectively
and is making progress, we appreciate ensuring that flexibility be
preserved to provide economic assistance, as needed, on a continuous
basis, and also appreciate efforts to facilitate the accountability as
well as flexibility with regard to furnishing military assistance.
Question. What do you think would be the impact of conditioning
military aid on issues of great political sensitivity in Pakistan, such
as F-16 transfers and the fate of A.Q. Khan? What would be the impact
of providing the President with only a highly restrictive level of
waiver (``vital to the national security'')?
Answer. Our security assistance to Pakistan, which has included
support for Pakistan's F-16 program, is a tangible symbol of the United
States-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan cannot regain control of its
border region absent a robust counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
capability, which includes the use of a targeted close air support
capability. Upgraded F-16s, in conjunction with appropriate training,
provide Pakistan with this capability. Thus, overly restrictive
conditionality on military aid to Pakistan could compromise our efforts
to assist the Government of Pakistan as it seeks to dismantle terrorist
networks in Pakistan. The highly restrictive waiver of ``vital to the
national security'' would limit the President's authority and
flexibility.
However, we are not considering the use of additional foreign
military financing (FMF) for the Pakistan F-16 program at this time. To
date, the Government of Pakistan is current on its F-16 payments for
the new aircraft and for related weapons systems.
Regarding A.Q. Khan, we believe that conditionality of military aid
would not be an effective or appropriate means of influencing the fate
of A.Q. Khan. We appreciate Pakistan's efforts in shutting down the
proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation
Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the
Khan network. Key people involved with the network have been put out of
business or are facing prosecution. We believe diplomatic means are a
more effective tool in this case.
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. AID: ENSURING WE DO NOT REPEAT MISTAKES OF
AFGHANISTAN
Secretary Clinton has been forthright about the unacceptable levels
of waste and mismanagement in United States aid to Afghanistan over the
past 7 years. Critics charge that USAID's contracting system relies too
much on private contractors, there is a tendency for measuring outputs
instead of outcomes, security restrictions distance U.S. aid
practitioners from the locals they hope to support, and development
projects often do not fit into a larger, comprehensive strategy. For
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, concerns have been raised about the
absorptive capacity and security challenges--particularly (in Pakistan)
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and parts of Baluchistan
and NWFP.
Question. Given the Secretary's concerns, how will the
administration assure us that a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan
will be well spent and directly used to serve the interests of the
Pakistani people?
Answer. I have committed to reviewing every USAID contract and
program in Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that our reinvigorated
assistance is aligned with the President's new strategy and that
assistance is reaching the Afghan and Pakistani people, instead of
foreign contractors. USAID is revisiting its operational models and
hiring additional staff in Afghanistan and Pakistan to implement much
larger development assistance programs. Specifically, USAID is expected
to increase staffing in Pakistan, as well as support staff in
Washington, to allow more rapid and effective implementation of
assistance, by permitting USAID to effectively manage greater numbers
and larger development assistance programs. The State Department will
also boost support staff, primarily in Washington, in order to increase
its reporting and coordination capacity for Pakistan.
USAID has designed a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system
specifically for the nonpermissive environment in the frontier region,
which can be applied to other parts of the country. USAID's M&E system
uses overlapping, multitiered checks and balances which reinforce the
Government of Pakistan's (GOP) own M&E efforts. The system utilizes a
range of actors including local program staff, GOP interlocutors at the
FATA Secretariat, community members, and independent monitors to follow
the process from project development through implementation to provide
overlapping layers of oversight. Oversight feedback is provided back to
U.S. personnel and implementing partners from a variety of sources
allowing them to identify and verify where there might be issues.
Question. How will the administration use the funds for nonmilitary
assistance to Pakistan--as laid out in the Kerry-Lugar bill (S. 962)?
Please be as specific as possible.
Answer. Nonmilitary assistance funds will go to a wide array of
projects. These include: Law enforcement reform, training, and
equipment provision; law enforcement aviation support; judicial reform;
antimoney laundering efforts; counternarcotics alternative development
projects; interdiction; and drug demand reduction programs. In terms of
governance and human rights projects, we will: Educate the public about
and develop Election Commission of Pakistan adjudication procedures;
build the capacity of the independent media; increase voting and civic
participation among women; consult residents of the FATA on their
political future; train journalists in the FATA, NWFP and Balochistan;
and combat gender-based violence.
USAID assistance will focus on: Rehabilitation of water and
irrigation systems, bridges, roads, markets, health clinics and
schools; improving rural electrification/power distribution;
strengthening health and education services; improving community
infrastructure; providing job skills training; and generating
employment.
For areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment are creating
breeding grounds for radicalism, we will improve the Pakistani
Government's ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient
governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young
people--all of which increase satisfaction with civilian government and
decrease the appeal of extremist groups.
We will target agricultural interventions at both unstable and
vulnerable areas. Programs will help small producers organize into
groups which will be integrated into commercial value chains generating
substantial income gains. We will make women's participation a priority
in all agricultural activities. Our priority goals in basic education
are to dramatically increase access to schools, significantly raise
chronically low enrollment rates, especially for girls, and improve
educational quality. We will dramatically strengthen primary health
care services, concentrating on priority geographic areas. A focus will
be placed on maternal and child health, and prevention and treatment of
major infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/
AIDS.
DISPLACED CIVILIANS
The latest wave of violence in the Swat Valley is expected to
displace up to 800,000 people--which would put the total number of IDPs
in the North West Frontier Province at 1.3 million people. As you noted
at the hearing, the U.S. Government may have an opportunity to
demonstrate our commitment to the Pakistani people by stepping up our
humanitarian efforts: Such as the humanitarian aid following the
Kashmir earthquake of 2005 was seen as a vital sign of friendship and
support.
Question. What is the U.S. humanitarian response in terms of
financial and human resources? What additional resources do you
envision bringing to the table in the near future--and would the
funding authorized by S. 962 facilitate such efforts?
Answer. We are closely following developments in conflicts around
the world. Based on current assessments, our budget request includes
the funding needs we anticipate for FY 2010. The United States is
building the Government of Pakistan's capacity to respond immediately
to the growing crisis by providing direct assistance, supporting the
local economy through indirect purchases and helping the Pakistani
Government publicize its ability to protect its own citizens. As
Secretary Clinton has frequently noted, we are continuously reassessing
the need for additional assistance and will help lead diplomatic
efforts to encourage greater international assistance for Pakistanis
displaced during the crisis.
We have already mobilized several agencies and bureaus to respond
to this crisis. USAID has deployed a six-person Disaster Assistance
Response Team to Pakistan to lead our efforts on the ground. In FY 2008
and to date in FY 2009, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) has provided nearly $60 million in humanitarian assistance to
conflict-affected populations in Pakistan. USAID/OFDA is supporting
health, nutrition, humanitarian coordination and information
management, economy and market systems, risk reduction, shelter and
settlements, and water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, as well
as the provision of relief supplies and logistical support. To date in
FY 2009, USAID's Office of Food for Peace has provided 39,670 MT of
Public Law 480 Title II emergency food assistance, valued at more than
$36 million, to World Food Programme (WFP) emergency operations. USAID
has also provided 20 generators and 20 transformer sets for pumping
water and providing lighting.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has
contributed $14.6 million to address the crisis, in addition to over
$50 million in regional humanitarian assistance, with additional
contributions to follow. State/PRM contributions to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the
Red Cross support camp management, protection, shelter, water and
sanitation, and health interventions conducted by these two
organizations. In response to State's request for assistance, DOD
approved $10 million in aid and dispatched three C-17 flights to
deliver 50 tents and 120,000 halal meals to Islamabad. U.S. Central
Command purchased 2 water trucks, 50 environmental control units for
tents, and 25 generators. To bolster the U.N.'s capabilities to
coordinate the aid effort, Ambassador Rice is urging senior U.N.
officials to deploy a permanent humanitarian coordinator. The State
Department has also spearheaded a campaign for donations from the
international community.
Due to the ongoing military operations we do not have a full damage
assessment and rebuilding estimate. We are continuing to monitor the
situation and are in constant consultations with the Pakistani
Government and donor countries. The displaced population could reach 3
million or more should the Pakistan military proceed with operations in
Waziristan, as they have stated they will do in the coming weeks. Our
response to this humanitarian crisis will require significant
resources.
Question. What is the administration doing to ensure that the
Government of Pakistan is taking every precaution to minimize civilian
casualties and displacement?
Answer. The Department of State and the Department of Defense have
strongly urged the Pakistan military to avoid civilian causalities. We
are developing a longer term assistance package to help facilitate the
``build'' and ``hold'' phases. Pakistani political and military
officials have repeatedly assured us that holding areas and
facilitating reconstruction so that people displaced during this crisis
can return home is a top priority.
Relatedly, the Pakistani Government has attempted to mitigate
civilian casualties by encouraging the population in affected areas to
evacuate their homes prior to commencement of operations. Also, the
Pakistan military has taken the lead to provide relief support with the
appointment of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad and his use of 1st Corps as the
command element for humanitarian operations.
Question. In recent months, we have seen a growing number militant
attacks on law enforcement targets, including the April 5 bombing in
Chakwal, the seizure of the police academy on the outskirts of Lahore,
and the ambush on the Sri Lankan cricket team and its police escort in
Lahore. The primary victims of these attacks were Pakistan's
undermanned and underequipped police, a militant strategy that appears
designed to expose state institutions as weak. I am particularly
concerned about the Pakistani police and have allocated up to $100
million in the Kerry-Lugar bill (S. 962) for police reform, equipping,
and training.
What type of strategy would the administration pursue to
help the Pakistani Government enact serious and comprehensive
reform of the police and law enforcement agencies? How much
money and time will it take?
Answer. Supporting civilian law enforcement and security
organizations is critical to our comprehensive strategy to support
Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts; this is particularly the case as
conflict has spread from tribal areas to settled areas of the North
West Frontier Province (NWFP) and cities across Pakistan. We must
assist in ensuring that the police have the tools to detect,
investigate, and arrest insurgents and build their abilities to deter
and, where necessary, confront and defeat these elements. The
Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) FY 2010 budget request reflects our growing
support for the important role of civilian law enforcement,
representing more than five times the FY 2009 INCLE request.
Moving forward, we have several ongoing law enforcement assistance
programs that we seek to expand. The first is INL's Law Enforcement
Reform program, which was established in 2002 and has trained over
8,000 law enforcement officers nationwide in a variety of law
enforcement competencies, including management, investigations, human
rights, and tactical training in improvised explosive device
recognition, post-blast investigation, and civil disturbance
management. This year, new courses will be added in crime and
intelligence analysis, police command and control, and police
communications management.
If approved, INL's FY 2009 supplemental and FY 2010 funding
requests will advance efforts to build more capable police and SWAT-
like capabilities in the most vulnerable areas, starting with the NWFP
Police Elite Force and continuing in Balochistan. This training and
equipping effort aims to prepare these forces to prevent and respond to
the types of contingencies they face on a routine basis, including
suicide bombings, improvised explosive device detonations, kidnappings,
and targeted killings.
To serve as a force multiplier, INL seeks to increase its
helicopter fleet to help civilian security elements under Ministry of
Interior (MOI) authority, including provincial police and the Frontier
Corps, to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, resupply, and transport
of law enforcement personnel to remote areas quickly and safely.
Additional air assets will allow MOI personnel to more efficiently
launch operations that support the ``hold'' mission of law enforcement
in areas along the border with Afghanistan. The operational tempo of
INL's air assets in 2008 and early 2009 was the highest in the history
of the INL aviation program in Pakistan and will continue to increase
as law enforcement capabilities improve.
While improving the capabilities and equipment of law enforcement
personnel is of critical importance, public trust in the police must
also be addressed. We are currently consulting with the Government of
Pakistan on proposals for pilot projects that can improve the delivery
of policing services and improve public perception of civilian law
enforcement. The administration has requested $155.2 million in FY 2010
INCLE in order to address these challenges.
COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS (CSF)
Question. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars in CSF to
reimburse Pakistan and other countries for their operational and
logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. Much of
this money appears to have gone for purposes other than those intended
by Congress, and this committee has yet to receive a full and current
information on the CSF program.
Do you consider existing oversight and accountability
procedures for Coalition Support Funds to be adequate?
Will you insure that this committee is, in future, given
full access (in classified or unclassified form) to all
documents necessary to understand and evaluate the
effectiveness of the CSF program in Pakistan?
In rough terms, what percentage of CSF payments over the
past 7 years have reimbursed costs incurred in the battle
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as opposed to other missions
of the Pakistani military or redirection to the general budget?
Answer. Coalition Support Funds are administered by the Department
of Defense (DOD). DOD would be in a better position to provide specific
details regarding CSF procedures.
IMPROVING PAKISTAN'S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES
The administration has requested $400 million for PCCF in the FY09
supplemental to build the capacity of Pakistan's security forces to
combat insurgents in Pakistan. The traditional State Department-guided
security assistance framework has built up protections to prevent the
supply of U.S. arms and training to military forces that have engaged
in human rights violations, to help ensure that the system is not
abused by bribery or other procurement irregularities, and to prevent
the diversion of equipment to unauthorized recipients. Many of the
purchases envisioned for the PCCF seem compatible with that traditional
security assistance framework.
Question. What are the specific constraints imposed by the
traditional security assistance framework that would hinder the work
you think is needed in Pakistan?
Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) was
not requested because of specific constraints on the security
assistance framework, but rather to address the exceptional situation
in Pakistan where there is an urgent need to allow the Combatant
Commander to accelerate, enhance, and resource Pakistan's
counterinsurgency operations and capabilities.
Question. If PCCF is routed through the Department of Defense
(either for 1 year, or longer), what steps will you take to ensure that
the safeguards of the traditional security assistance framework are
used to prevent predictable problems from arising in the PCCF?
Answer. State and DOD have a strong, longstanding relationship as
DOD is the executive agent for State's security assistance programs.
The implementation of PCCF will build upon this framework. PCCF
requires Secretary of State concurrence and both State and DOD are
committed to working closely together to ensure that this concurrence
is exercised in a meaningful and substantive way.
COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY
You noted the need for a communications strategy, particularly in
FATA and parts of Baluchistan and NWFP.
Question. Do you feel that there is a role for the Broadcasting
Board of Governors' services, such as VOA and RFE/RL in Pakistan? If
so, what is that role, and how are you cooperating with the BBG to
incorporate their broadcasting services into your overall strategy in
Pakistan? Do you feel that BBG is sufficiently resourced to accomplish
the mission?
Answer. Winning the information war is critical to the success of
our overall effort. To that end, I am working closely with General
Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry, and my interagency team here in
Washington to overhaul our strategic communications efforts and form a
fully integrated, civilian-military effort that will broadcast our
message.
BBG's services have an important role to play in Pakistan. Along
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the scope of government and
commercial radio broadcasts is extremely limited, and where extremist
groups actively utilize the airwaves to propagate their message,
developing credible, accurate, moderate broadcast alternatives is
essential. The BBG and the State Department have cooperated in
organizing a series of strategic communications research seminars on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the BBG participates in interagency
strategic communication planning sessions.
Question. Please provide as much detail as you wish on the
communications strategy you envision, particularly in the areas of
provision of cell phone coverage, radio broadcasting (equipment vs.
content), and possible distinctions between activities traditionally
conducted by the State Department (public diplomacy) vs. those
conducted by the military or intelligence agencies (jamming of hostile
broadcasts).
Answer. We must undertake a major new integrated civilian-military
program on strategic communications in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Three
simultaneous projects are essential: We must redefine our message; we
must connect to the people on the ground through cell phones, radio,
and other means; and we must identify and support key communicators who
are able, through local narratives, to counter the militants' fear-
mongering, propaganda and information domination. Additional personnel
and structures in Kabul and Islamabad/Peshawar are essential.
Mobile phones are a vital tool for counterinsurgency and a mobile-
equipped population is one that can be more effectively engaged and
empowered to circumvent and challenge the militants. In FATA, we must
push for greater cell phone penetration throughout the different
agencies.
Radio is a particularly effective means of reaching tribal
populations because it is the most pervasive media. We propose to: (1)
Expand radio production capacity through a training and on-the-job
mentoring program for local radio staff members; (2) support locally
developed, cross-border radio programming; (3) help to develop
community-based radio stations; (4) establish public-private
partnerships; and (5) develop programming that fosters interaction and
participation.
Broad interagency participation will be key to developing and
implementing our communications strategy. In April, we cohosted with
DOD an interagency meeting attended by over 50 representatives from
State, DOD, USAID, and the intelligence community, to discuss current
strategic communication activities within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
the urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated Strategic
Communications plan for the region. It is also vital that we bring in
experts and engage the private sector. We are actively engaged with a
variety of partners.
We are currently in the process of identifying resources for these
various elements in support of our strategy and will remain in close
consultation with the Congress on this effort.
______
Responses of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard Lugar
LEGISLATION--S. 962, THE ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN ACT OF 2009
Question. You stressed on several occasions during your testimony
the administration's strong support for the Kerry-Lugar legislation, S.
962.
How does S. 962 specifically support or encumber U.S. policy
initiatives and goals in Pakistan and in the region?
Answer. This legislation's authorization of $1.5 billion in foreign
assistance to Pakistan, every year for 5 fiscal years, underscores our
long-term commitment to Pakistan and its people. Many Pakistanis
believe that the United States is not a reliable long-term partner and
will abandon Pakistan after achieving our counterterrorism objectives.
Our engagement has to be aimed at building a long-term strategic
partnership and must be conducted in a way that respects and enhances
the Pakistani people's pursuit of a prosperous economy, a stronger
democracy, and a vibrant civil society. If enacted, S. 962 would be a
critical demonstration of our commitment.
The Kerry-Lugar legislation's emphasis on economic and governance
challenges reinforces a key aspect to the President's new strategy on
Afghanistan and Pakistan. By increasing economic and educational
opportunities, expanding the reach of quality health care, reinforcing
human rights--particularly women's rights--and empowering civil
society, we will increase the opportunities for millions of Pakistanis
to improve their lives.
The administration shares Congress's concern that security
assistance for Pakistan must show results. As the President has noted,
``We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training, and
support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists'' but ``we will
not, and cannot, provide a blank check.'' Pakistan must demonstrate its
commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within
its borders.
We are committed to accountability and partnering with the Congress
in our efforts to ensure that assistance is used effectively and is
making progress. At the same time, we appreciate ensuring that
flexibility be preserved to provide economic assistance, as needed, on
a continuous basis, and also appreciate efforts to facilitate the
accountability as well as flexibility with regard to furnishing
military assistance.
STRATEGIC REVIEW AND OPERATIONAL PLAN
Question. Our legislation expects a fulsome operational plan for
Pakistan and the cross-border region with Afghanistan to follow from
the President's important ``strategic review.'' This plan has certainly
been under consideration since at least late last year given the Biden-
Lugar Pakistan legislation introduced in July 2008 authorizing $1.5
billion a year over 5 years in foreign assistance.
When will the administration provide Congress with a broad,
coherent, operational strategy for our engagement with
Pakistan, which utilizes all of our foreign policy tools and
provides a clear delineation of goals and expectations over
time?
The committee looks forward to the report you said you would
provide on all intended allocations associated with the new
policy approach to Pakistan. This will serve to inform Senators
of a part of the operational plan as it is defined by
allocations.
Answer. The Strategic Review approved on March 27 articulates not
only the administration's core goal in Pakistan and Afghanistan--to
disrupt and dismantle
al-Qaeda and its safe havens, and prevent its return to either
country--but also our supporting objectives and recommendations for
action. Congress has been fully briefed on the review.
Through an interagency process, we are also developing
comprehensive measures of effectiveness, which establish goals in
Pakistan over time and indicators of our progress toward those goals.
This process will be completed soon, at which time we will be pleased
to brief Members of Congress.
To match our resources to our goals and objectives, we will provide
the Congress a report--as you note--on all intended allocations
associated with the new policy approach to Pakistan. The report will
delineate how these allocations support our overarching objectives.
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND 25 DISTRICTS PLAN
Question. Our legislation is intended to provide the Obama
administration with the flexibility to add significant new economic
assistance for Pakistan in order to enhance our bilateral partnership
over the long term. Pakistan remains one of the poorest countries in
the world and is confronting a daunting security threat.
How will the bulk of the proposed assistance be used? What
sectors will be prioritized?
Answer. Our economic assistance strategy for Pakistan focuses on
areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment come together to create
breeding grounds for radicalism. We are focused on improving the
Pakistani Government's ability to provide basic services, fair and
efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for
young people--all of which are intended to increase satisfaction with
civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups.
Our programs are designed to provide agricultural assistance to
both unstable and vulnerable areas. Programs will help small producers
organize into groups that will be integrated into commercial value
chains generating substantial income gains. We are also making women's
participation a priority in all agricultural activities.
Our economic development assistance will focus on providing job
skills training; generating employment; rehabilitating water and
irrigation systems, bridges, roads, and markets; improving rural
electrification/power distribution; and improving community
infrastructure.
In basic education, our priority goals are to dramatically increase
access to schools, significantly raise chronically low enrollment
rates, especially for girls, and improve educational quality.
Our priority in health is to strengthen primary health care
services, concentrating on priority geographic areas. A focus will be
placed on maternal and child health, and prevention and treatment of
major infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/
AIDS.
In terms of governance and human rights projects, we will: Educate
the public about and develop adjudication procedures for the Election
Commission of Pakistan; build the capacity of the independent media;
increase voting and civic participation among women; consult residents
of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on their political
future; train journalists in the FATA, North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) and Balochistan; and combat gender-based violence.
Finally, our rule-of-law programs will focus on: Law enforcement
reform, training, and equipment provision; law enforcement aviation
support; judicial reform; antimoney laundering efforts;
counternarcotics alternative development projects; interdiction; and
drug-demand reduction programs.
Question. Describe the intended regional plan, focused on some 25
districts, associated with your strategy.
Answer. Pakistan's needs exceed the capacity of even a
significantly expanded U.S. assistance program. We intend to focus U.S.
assistance on critical needs in specific geographic locations with the
greatest poverty levels, making them most vulnerable to militant and
extremist recruitment. Affected districts are in the North West
Frontier Province, southern Punjab, northern Sindh, Baluchistan, and
the city of Karachi, as well as the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas.
We will provide assistance to unstable areas where there is active
conflict with militants and vulnerable areas of extreme poverty and
lack of opportunity that are fueling the growth of extremism. It will
target the short- and medium-term needs of local communities, using
quick-disbursing assistance linked to local governments. Assistance
will involve local leaders and community organizations and include
activities such as: Rehabilitation of water and irrigation systems,
bridges, roads, markets, health clinics and schools, providing job
skill training, and generating employment.
In vulnerable areas where poverty, disease, and unemployment are
creating a breeding ground for radicalism, we will strengthen the
Government of Pakistan's ability to provide basic services, fair and
efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for
young people. All these activities are intended to increase
satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of
extremist groups.
Question. How will U.S. assistance be used in a cross-border
strategy to effectively engage homogenous populations on both sides of
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border?
Answer. We strongly believe that a cross-border program is merited
and necessary to carry out elements of the ``one-theater'' approach
outlined in the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Such funding
would allow us to plan regional development projects without being
limited by the political boundary between the two countries.
The following are examples of areas that could be targeted with
this funding:
Border crossing points/transit corridors;
Bilateral exchanges (i.e., government, educational,
vocational, sporting, media, and cultural programs, etc.);
Joint capacity-building exercises;
Trans-boundary humanitarian assistance for refugees;
Cross-border infrastructure (i.e., roads, irrigation/water,
power, telecommunications, rail, etc.);
Health initiatives (i.e., polio eradication, etc.).
In order to effectively implement a cross-border program that
reflects a unique ``one theater'' approach, we would require adequate
funding with adequate flexibility.
NUNN-LUGAR AND PAKISTAN WMD SECURITY COOPERATION
Question. In a May 9, 2009, Washington Post article, President
Zardari indicated that no one in the U.S. Government had asked him for
more information about the location and security of Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal. Given the evident concerns surrounding Pakistani stability and
the limited effectiveness of the Pakistan military in counterinsurgency
and counterterror operations, our cooperation in this area would appear
to be an easy prospect for bilateral cooperation.
What is the status of United States efforts with Pakistan on
strengthening security cooperation?
What funds has the administration requested in the
supplemental or FY 2010 budget request to further assist
Pakistan in securing the storage and accountability for its
WMD?
What assurance can you provide the Congress that Pakistan
WMD elements and systems are secure from capture or control by
militants?
Answer. Pakistan's security forces are professional and highly
motivated. They understand the importance of nuclear security and it is
our understanding that they have taken significant steps to enhance it.
We welcome Pakistan's efforts in this area. The President has said
that he feels confident that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will remain out
of militant hands.
The United States has provided assistance for these purposes, with
the full cooperation of the Government of Pakistan. I cannot comment
further on the details of this assistance in an unclassified setting.
Question. As the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan you control a significant number of resources and personnel on
a limited time basis. It is important that the skills and mechanisms
essential to effective USG response in emergent and ongoing crises
globally are retained in the standing institutional structures at the
State Department and USAID, as elsewhere, over the long term. It is
also critical to exercise and build the capacity within our agencies to
be more responsive and ensure efficiency.
How will you ensure that your office does not make the
mistake of so many previous offices on ad hoc assignments by
building a parallel, one of organization in response to your
mission?
How do you intend to integrate your office's work with
existing State Department and USAID programs and offices
directed toward Pakistan and Afghanistan?
What steps does the Department plan to take to ensure that
expertise and resources committed to your office are integrated
into the Department's permanent structures for responding to
global crises?
Answer. My office is not a permanent organization, but rather is
designed to respond to a unique foreign policy and national security
challenge at a time of heightened engagement. I have been directed by
the President and Secretary of State to lead a coordinated, civil-
military effort to achieve our goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To do
so, I have brought together experienced civil servants, Foreign Service
officers, Intelligence officers, military officers, and well-known
outside experts to create one unified team. My staff consists of senior
representatives from the State Department, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Department of Defense (Joint Staff and
Office of the Secretary of Defense), Department of Agriculture,
Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community and other agencies.
They serve as key conduits to their home agencies and ensure that we
remain connected and coordinated on an hourly basis. Virtually all have
extensive field experience, including working closely with our military
counterparts in various settings. Our outside experts provide essential
advice and also help keep us connected to the NGO, think tank, and
academic communities.
Far from a parallel organization, my office is fully integrated
with key, permanent offices of the State Department and other agencies.
My deputy, Paul Jones, is dual-hatted position both as the Deputy
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and also as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this way,
he serves as a critical coordination point between my office, the
Afghanistan and Pakistan desks in the Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, and other offices in the State Department that work on aspects
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan challenge. Additionally, we recently
requested and received approval for five new Foreign Service officer
positions on each of the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks.
This new interagency model has already delivered excellent results.
In numerous situations, we are able to move quicker and have better
access to top level of multiple government agencies than if we were not
collocated. We will continue to apply this whole-of-government approach
to contingencies and our daily work, and we look forward to additional
agencies--including Treasury and Homeland Security--sending
representatives.
This is the most diverse team of experts that I have worked with
during my government career and its agility in implementing policy will
be critical to delivering the results that I know the President and
Congress expects.
office of the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization
Question. The resources your office employs include civilians
deploying to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Your staff has indicated that
your office will coordinate such civilian deployment.
How are you utilizing the longstanding, albeit still
growing, capacity within the State Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization?
Answer. S/CRS recently helped establish the Integrated Civilian
Military Action Group (ICMAG) at Embassy Kabul. It facilitates joint
planning and problem-solving at the national level and across specified
lines of operation (e.g., rule of law), and also helps develop
integrated civil-military guidance at the regional, provincial, and
district levels. Through the ICMAG structure and processes, S/CRS
planners have helped enable a whole-of-government approach. S/CRS also
played a role in developing civil-military predeployment training for
Regional commands, Brigade task forces, and PRTs. Further, newly
offered courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute in Foundations
of Reconstruction and Stabilization, hostile environments (security and
medical), and whole-of-government planning for the Civilian Response
Corps will provide additional training opportunities for personnel
going to Afghanistan.
At my request, S/CRS has fielded an interagency team--led by
Ambassador Tim Carney--to support the Afghan Government's efforts to
conduct free and fair elections in August.
The CRC ``active component'' will have over 100 interagency members
by summer 2009, and by 2010 will become fully staffed at 250 with an
additional 1,000 Standby Corps members identified from within the USG.
I have asked that the CRC contribute to the civilian increase by
nominating well-qualified individuals to serve for 1 year in the field.
As the CRC grows, I expect its personnel to be in a position to support
the significant increase in civilian deployments required for
Afghanistan over the next few years to further ensure the whole of
government planning, assessment and field operational capabilities
required.
Question. How do you intend to build S/CRS institutional capacity
for the long term?
Answer. The Secretary is committed to supporting the development of
the Civilian Response Corps and to ensuring S/CRS has the capacity to
provide core staff to key planning efforts for reconstruction and
stabilization operations. S/CRS is able to provide support to regional
bureaus and embassies with additional, trained personnel who can
augment regional knowledge with planning and conflict specialties and
who can assist in the management of coordination with the full range of
USG actors required in R&S operations. This capacity is available to
support Washington-based planning and operations management as well as
field deployments.
This capacity is online and available and has been utilized in a
range of operations including Sudan, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It
is not in competition with the implementation bureaus and departments/
agencies, indeed, it serves to ensure all capabilities are brought to
the table, integrated and made available immediately to support foreign
policy goals of the Secretary.
Long-term capacity development for surge operations will require
continued congressional support for the involvement of partner agencies
and for the baseline steady state staffing of State and USAID.
Question. The Office of the Inspector General for State Department,
the Office of Inspector General for USAID, and other agency IG provide
ongoing essential oversight of their respective agency programs and
projects upon which the respective agencies and Congress greatly rely.
Although Afghanistan and Iraq present massive cross-agency programming,
the resident tools and authorities of standing IG offices are capable
of incorporating the necessary means to meet expectations in such
circumstances.
What role do you see for the IGs at the State Department and
USAID in promoting the effectiveness of your office's programs
with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Answer. The State Department OIG has increased, and is planning a
further increase in, oversight activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
OIG is currently engaged in a number of reviews relevant to South Asia
stabilization and to other department programs now underway in the
South Central Asia region. State OIG is primarily responsible for
oversight of State Department programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
coordinates regularly with USAID OIG, the DOD OIG and the Special IG
for Afghanistan Reconstruction for all aspects of oversight work in
South Central Asia. The newly created Pak-Af Sub-working Group, formed
by all of the relevant inspectors general working in the region,
facilitates this effort.
Question. What recommendations do you have with regard to
strengthening existing inspector general offices? Would you support
providing additional authorities to State and USAID IG offices?
Answer. We urge the Congress to fund State Department OIG's current
request in the FY 2009 supplemental bill and the FY 2010 appropriations
request, both of which contain requests for additional oversight
funding in South Central Asia. We also support the State Department
OIG's request to the authorizing committees for additional hiring
authorities which provide flexibility in the hiring of onsite oversight
personnel in the South Central Asia. Finally, while we know State OIG
has been conducting oversight in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we strongly
support the September 2009 planned opening of the State OIG field
office in Kabul and support their current effort to open a field office
in Islamabad in the near future.
OPERATING EXPENSES
Question. S. 962 seeks to ensure that the executive branch will
have the resources necessary to implement the expanded foreign
assistance programs for Pakistan provided for in the bill. To this end,
the bill authorizes $10 million to be made available for administrative
expenses of federal departments and agencies in connection with the
provision of assistance authorized by the bill. This $10 million would
be in addition to other amounts already available to implement such
assistance programs through the existing operating budgets of the
Department of State, USAID, and other relevant agencies.
What amount(s) are available from existing resources to
implement and administer the programs authorized by S. 962?
Does the administration believe that the $10 million authorized
will be sufficient to cover any additional administrative
expenses it anticipates incurring to implement the expanded
foreign assistance programs to Pakistan provided for in S. 962?
Answer. Funds appropriated for FY 2009 Operating Expenses, via the
Omnibus Appropriations Act and pending supplemental legislation, will
cover current funding gaps. We plan to implement and administer the
programs authorized by S. 962 using funds appropriated for FY 2010.
The best way to ensure that the Department of State and Mission
Pakistan will have the resources for administering and implementing
Foreign Assistance programs would be for Congress to enact the Pakistan
FY 2010 request of $76.2 million for State operating expenses and the
request of $30.8 million for USAID operating expenses for Pakistan. We
hope that Congress will also move expeditiously to approve the FY 2009
supplemental including the requested amounts for State and USAID
operating expenses, as well as $806.2 million requested by State for
secure and upgraded facilities, all of which will enhance the capacity
of our diplomatic and development efforts in Pakistan.
That said, the authorization to use up to $10 million of Foreign
Assistance annually to cover unexpected or incremental administrative
costs associated with S. 962 would seem sufficient.
Question. If the administration believes that additional resources
are needed beyond this extra $10 million, please identify the
additional costs the administration expects to incur and indicate how
much additional money the administration believes is needed to meet
them.
Answer. At this time we believe that the amounts requested in the
President's FY09 supplemental and FY10 request are sufficient to meet
our needs, but will consult closely with Congress if additional needs
are identified by our Embassy teams in Kabul and Islamabad.
Question. Please explain in detail the nature of any such costs,
why they are required, and why they cannot be met through the existing
operating budgets of relevant federal agencies.
Answer. At this time we do not anticipate requiring additional
resources beyond those amounts requested in the FY09 supplemental and
FY10 request, but will consult closely with Congress if additional
needs are identified by our Embassy teams in Kabul and Islamabad.
PAKISTAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND (PCCF)
Question. The President requested $400 million in the supplemental
appropriations request for the purposes of immediately supplying an
effort to train and equip Pakistani security services for
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
What agreements have been made with the Pakistan Government,
and specifically with the military and security services, with
regard to PCCF funding?
Answer. No formal agreements have been made with Pakistan about the
PCCF since it has not yet been approved by Congress. Embassy Islamabad
and U.S. Central Command have spoken with senior Pakistani officials
about building Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities, as well as
how the specific equipment/training that PCCF (if enacted) is intended
to provide could be used to assist in current operations.
Question. What specific forces and what command and control
structures will benefit from this program?
Answer. PCCF is intended to build the counterinsurgency
capabilities of Pakistani security forces currently engaged in
operations against extremists along their border with Afghanistan. It
is implicit in the concept of PCCF that it remain flexible enough so
the Combatant Commander--General Petraeus--can adapt our security
assistance to changing circumstances, but at present we envision that
the main entities that will benefit from PCCF will include: The regular
forces of the Pakistan Army (including 11th Corps and 12th Corps);
special forces of the Pakistan Army (including the Special Services
Group commandos and their air-lift unit, the 21st Quick Reaction
Squadron); Pakistan Army Aviation (including the helicopter units that
fly Mi-17s, Bell-412s and Cobras); the paramilitary Frontier Corps; and
other enabling units. Other entities will be considered on a case-by-
case basis depending on the role that they play in meeting overall
counterinsurgency objectives.
Question. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton testified to the
Appropriations Committee in April that the PCCF program would initially
fall within DOD and move in a phased process over 2 years to State
Department authority and control.
What are the deficient elements of the current security
assistance programs currently at State Department?
How will the State Department develop the structures and
capacity to manage this program?
How will the State Department participate in the
implementation of this program and in the administrative and
review process associated with it in order to build the
necessary capacity?
Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) was
requested as a Department of Defense authority to address the
exceptional situation in Pakistan where there is an urgent need to
allow the Combatant Commander to provide Pakistan with accelerated and
enhanced counterinsurgency operational capabilities. The new fund
provides for significant State Department input into implementation by
requiring Secretary of State concurrence of DOD's provision of
assistance, and of DOD's transfer of funds to other agencies to provide
assistance. As the Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
provides strategic direction to, and oversight of, the Office of the
Defense Representative in Pakistan for all of its efforts, including
the PCCF. Embassy Islamabad is also structured to manage both the PCCG
and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)--which will continue to be
administered by the Department of State--to maximize the impact of U.S.
military assistance in support of our policy objective of stabilizing
Pakistan.
The State Department is currently undertaking a broad, strategic
review of foreign assistance resources (including security assistance
programs) in order to strengthen its ability to manage and coordinate
programs, and improve the coherence and integration of our foreign aid
programs to achieve unity of effort within the U.S. Government. Part of
this review will include an examination of the appropriate balance of
authorities vested between the Defense and State Departments, as well
as the personnel and resources needed to execute these programs.
regional and international engagement
Question. The committee recognizes your efforts to encourage
cooperation and participation of other countries in providing support
for Pakistan and the region in a more responsible and coordinated
manner.
What other donor nations or organizations whose assistance
and potential are you most encouraged by?
Answer. Fostering international dialogue and coordinating and
integrating international assistance are critical components of the
President's Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy. Our regional and
international engagement furthers several objectives.
First, we seek to vastly improve coordination and integration of
international assistance flowing to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. On
Pakistan we are seeking to increase donations for urgent humanitarian
needs and to begin a coordinated international dialogue on longer term
reconstruction. On Afghanistan, we are working with the international
donor community, increasingly under the auspices of UNAMA, to create a
common assistance framework that can guide and integrate all donors'
assistance to Afghanistan. We are also developing a comprehensive
inventory of all donors' assistance to Afghanistan in anticipation of
supporting UNAMA and the Minister of Finance in its efforts to map all
foreign assistance.
The second element of regional and international engagement
involves developing and strengthening strategic partnerships with the
large number of regional and global stakeholders in a stable and secure
Pakistan. Many of these partners share longstanding historical,
political, and economic ties with Pakistan and recognize that a stable,
secure, and democratic Pakistan is vital to our shared national
interests. By harnessing the capabilities of these current and future
partners, we will greatly increase our ability to address security,
governance, and development goals in Pakistan coherently and
comprehensively.
Question. Your travel to the region has included a number of trips
to India as well. Notwithstanding your deferring comment at the
hearing, how will the U.S. Government ensure India is properly engaged
on the issue of improving relations with Pakistan? What steps does the
administration feel India might make to diminish the perceived threat
to Pakistan?
Answer. India plays a critical role in the region and we will
continue to inform and consult the Indian Government on a regular basis
to ensure that they are properly engaged on the issues. We will not be
able to address regional challenges without India's full involvement.
India is vitally affected by events in the region, and we want to
consult closely with New Delhi as we go forward. The national security
of India, Pakistan, and the United States is clearly at stake as all
three countries now face a common threat from violent extremism.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
Question. Our legislation provides a requirement for a
comprehensive strategy to implement effective counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency measures along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas
that includes elements relating to the use of strategic communications.
What are the parameters of the strategy for such an element
of the assistance effort in Pakistan? What agencies will be
involved in designing and implementing such an effort?
Answer. Under Special Representative Holbrooke's and General
Pertaeus' leadership, we are implementing a new integrated civilian-
military strategic communications effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This effort will focus on three simultaneous goals: Redefining our
message; connecting to the people on the ground through cell phones,
radio, and other means; and identifying and supporting key
communicators who are able, through local narratives, to counter
extremists' propaganda and present a positive alternative. Additional
personnel and structures in Kabul and the Afghan provinces and in
Islamabad/Peshawar will be necessary to implement this new program and
Special Representative Holbrooke is working with our Embassies in Kabul
and Islamabad to identify and address these needs.
Mobile phones are a vital tool for counterinsurgency and a mobile-
equipped population is one that can be more effectively engaged and
empowered to circumvent and challenge the militants. In the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), we will push for greater cell phone
penetration throughout the different agencies.
Radio is also a particularly effective means of reaching tribal
populations because it is the most pervasive media. We will work to:
(1) Expand radio production capacity through expanded training, and on-
the-job mentoring programs for local radio staff members; (2) support
locally developed, cross-border radio programming; ( 3) expand our
efforts to help develop community-based radio stations; (4) establish
public-private partnerships; and (5) develop programming that fosters
interaction and participation.
Broad interagency participation will be key to developing and
implementing our new communications strategy. In April, Special
Representative Holbrooke's office cohosted with DOD an interagency
meeting attended by over 50 representatives from State, DOD, USAID, and
the Intelligence Community, to discuss current strategic communication
activities within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the urgent need for a
comprehensive and coordinated strategic communications plan for the
region. We are also consulting with experts and engaging the private
sector to develop new ideas. We have requested resources in support of
our strategic communications efforts in the FY 2009 supplemental and FY
2010 budget and will remain in close consultation with Congress as we
further define this effort.
Question. What has the Government of Pakistan agreed to with regard
to our efforts to operate in the area of strategic communications?
Answer. Our strategic communications activities support Pakistani
Government. This has included training programs to improve Pakistani
Government communications capabilities, a media cell to support its
Special Support Group for helping internal refugees, and development of
an antiextremism media campaign. Most importantly, however, is our
assistance to help the Pakistani Government empower local people to
communicate messages that compete with extremist narratives. These have
already included student radio programs, support for establishing radio
stations in contested areas, and support for content produced by locals
for broadcast. Going forward, we will seek greater collaboration with
the Pakistani Government in implementing programs and in building its
strategic communications capacity.
Question. Where will authority for such operations reside?
Answer. Authority for such operations will reside with Embassy
Islamabad in the field and with the Secretary of State and me in
Washington.
Question. What will be the role of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty?
Answer. The Broadcasting Board of Governors plays a vital role. The
Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
reach 10 million people weekly in Afghanistan and VOA reaches 11
million weekly in Pakistan. Research in the Afghan-Pakistan border
region is very difficult, but according to available qualitative and
quantitative research, VOA's Pashto-language Radio Deewa reaches
sizable audiences in the FATA and NWFP. In the mix of U.S.
communication initiatives, BBG's reliable news and information programs
are vital to U.S. security interests, especially in tribal areas where
Taliban propaganda is pervasive.
VOA in Pakistan broadcasts over AM transmitters and shortwave (SW)
frequencies as well as on the Internet. FM broadcasts via a leased
network of FM transmitters in Pakistan awaits ratification of a lease
agreement by the Government of Pakistan. Use of an AM transmitter in
Peshawar is pending ratification of a lease agreement by the Cabinet of
Pakistan's President.
Transmitters based in Afghanistan also serve Pakistan. VOA has
expanded from 6 to 9 hours of live programming daily via SW and three
FM transmitters (in Khost, Asadabad, and Gardez), and on the Internet.
A new, high-power AM transmitter in Khost, Afghanistan, is ready to
come online pending resolution of final wording in agreements with the
Afghan Government.
Under provisions of the pending FY 2009 supplemental request,
funding would be available to further expand broadcasts in Pashto by
VOA and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The two broadcasters would
share frequencies and produce complementary programming, as they do in
a joint programming stream now in Afghanistan. They would share a new
bureau in Peshawar.
The single greatest challenge at this time is securing new delivery
of programs on AM and FM to the border region and throughout Pakistan.
______
Responses of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Questions Submitted
by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. As civilians flee the Pakistani Army offensive in the
Swat Valley against Taliban extremists, the seeds of a future crisis
are being planted. Since Thursday alone, 200,000 refugees are estimated
to have poured into four camps set up by the United Nations and the
local administrations of the city of Mardan. As many as 600,000
additional refugees are expected to arrive if fighting continues. The
effects of the crisis are somewhat mitigated as families in Mardan and
surrounding area take in some of the refugees into their homes and
guesthouses--an extension of traditional Pashtun hospitality. But at a
certain point this hospitality will reach its limits.
How is the United States Government working with the
government of Pakistan and international organizations to
address the potentially catastrophic effects of a large-scale
refugee crisis inside Pakistan? We all recognize the potential
for alienation and extremism that can arise when refugee
populations endure for extended time periods.
Answer. As of June 18, Pakistan had verified 1.9 million displaced
persons whom UNHCR had registered. The number is expected to grow to
2.5 million as people flee expected fighting in Waziristan and as more
displaced persons are verified outside of the North West Frontier
Province. UNHCR has raised its planning figure from 1.5 million
displaced people (assumed in the U.N.'s May 19 Pakistan appeal) to 2.5
million. The U.S. Government has responded since early May by
committing over $300 million to relief and reconstruction efforts and
by mobilizing an international response. Secretary Clinton and I have
personally rallied the international community, most recently in Europe
and the gulf, to provide assistance to relieve the suffering of those
displaced in Pakistan.
Our assistance has brought food and nonfood items such as medical
care, water, and sanitation to the internally displaced living in camps
and host communities. On May 15, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) to Pakistan to support relief efforts, manage the
humanitarian response, and coordinate with the humanitarian community.
To support the return of those displaced, the Government of Pakistan is
offering one-time cash payments of $310 to each registered family. We
will continue to work with U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations
and the Government of Pakistan to provide humanitarian relief to those
displaced and to enable their return as quickly and safely as possible
so that they can begin the hard work of rebuilding their lives.
Does the administration foresee the need for additional
assistance in the FY 2009 supplemental bill that is working its
way through the Congress to address this challenge?
Answer. The administration requested an additional $200 million in
the FY 2009 supplemental for displaced persons in Pakistan.
Question. In yesterday's Washington Post, Selig Harrison, an author
and former journalist who is an expert on South Asia, wrote an op-ed
contending that U.S. policymakers are misapprehending the conflict in
Pakistan. Rather than viewing it as a conflict between moderates and
religious extremists, Harrison argues what is happening today in the
FATA and other border regions of Pakistan reflects the age-old struggle
between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and western Pakistan vs. the
Punjabi elites of eastern Pakistan. The FATA and other regions along
the border, including the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan,
have always enjoyed a degree of autonomy from central rule in Islamabad
to account for the ethnic split.
Harrison thus argues that U.S. policy urging the Pakistan military
to go into the Swat Valley and the broader regions with an all-out
military assault is a prescription for disaster--it will only
antagonize the ethnic strife between Pashtuns and Punjabis and bolster
the rise of local Taliban extremists. Harrison urges the Obama
administration to cease airstrikes in western Pakistan and instead
encourage Islamabad to offer greater regional autonomy to these areas,
thus providing an incentive for local Taliban to eject al-Qaeda figures
and focus on their own regional development, as opposed to laying the
seeds for a broader anti-Pakistani and anti-Western crusade.
What do you make of Harrison's argument? Does current United
States policy risk exacerbating ethnic tensions in Pakistan
between Pashtuns and Punjabis?
Answer. We disagree with Harrison's premise that U.S. policy
exacerbates ethnic tensions in Pakistan. The United States supports
Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley and other border
regions as a critical step toward our strategic goal of disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Pakistan and the
United States face a common enemy, and military operations targeting
violent extremists within its borders will demonstrate Pakistan's
commitment to addressing the urgent security threat posed by extremist
safe havens in Pakistan. Successfully neutralizing safe havens for
extremists will require sustained counterinsurgency operations,
followed by coordinated ``hold and build efforts.'' It is also critical
to note that the Pakistani security operations under way in the North
West Frontier Province enjoy unprecedented national support across
almost all political parties, including the main opposition parties.
We are urging Pakistani civilian and military leaders to develop a
coordinated counterinsurgency strategy, which includes military
operations followed by dedicated efforts to reach out to the local
population and reestablish connections with the central government. The
idea is to erase the perceived vacuum in which the extremists have been
operating, so that they do not return once military operations have
ended. It is critical that the current military operations in the North
West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) be followed by reestablishment of civilian security
structures, and a major effort to return those who have been displaced,
as well as help to reconstruct their homes and towns, as quickly as is
feasible. We will support international organizations, such as the
Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and the U.N.'s OCHA, to conduct
damage assessments and compile cost estimates. Already Pakistani
civilians are returning to some areas including Lower Buner and Lower
Dir, and the UNHCR will assist others to return by providing
transportation and supplies of some basic needs.
We understand that ethnic strife has long been a problem in
Pakistan--and that some groups continue to feel neglected, with the
perception that others are more advantaged. We must work with the
Pakistani leadership to ensure that the Pakistani Government provides
security, economic stability and opportunity, and basic services for
all Pakistani citizens. Through our bilateral assistance (security and
nonsecurity), training, efforts to pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
legislation, and engagement with Pakistani leaders across the political
spectrum, we are endeavoring to assist our Pakistani partners toward
those ends.
Initiatives like Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), now
pending in Congress, can provide incentives for the reconstruction and
bring badly needed jobs in some of Pakistan's most vulnerable regions.
We urge Congress to pass ROZ legislation very soon to help foster
legitimate economic opportunity in an area where lack of positive
alternatives has resulted in young men turning to illicit,
destabilizing activities. We are also continuing to encourage other
countries to come together to support Pakistan, as they did at the
successful April 17 donors' conference in Tokyo that raised over $5
billion in social safety net and development assistance. The stronger
the Pakistani Government is, the stronger its capability to establish
its writ in traditionally underserved parts of Pakistan, like the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
______
Responses of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Questions Submitted
by Senator Jim DeMint
Question. The Millennium Challenge Corporation tracks 17 policy
indicators and USAID uses 5 strategic goals and a series of
subcomponents as performance indicators and ratings. Unfortunately,
just using MCC's assessments, Pakistan has retreated on a number of key
indicators. Please identify the specific metrics you intend to use in
order to gauge success with the assistance provided to Pakistan under
S. 962.
Answer. Finding the correct metrics to assess effectiveness is a
vital element of policy implementation. Since the recent completion of
the administration's Strategic Review of U.S. policy on Afghanistan and
Pakistan, there has been an interagency effort to develop specific
plans for implementation, including the preparation of metrics and
conditions.
The U.S. Government is moving forward urgently, but also
deliberately. The administration requires a reasonable amount of time
to assemble its team, get the appropriate people on the ground, assess
the situation, and develop meaningful measures of effectiveness. The
administration is seeking input from across government to reflect the
interagency dimension--the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development, and the Departments of Defense, Justice,
Commerce, Agriculture, to name a few. We also look forward to working
with Congress on these measures.
Question. For roughly 10 years, United States sanctions suspended
IMET funding for Pakistan. However, in our current relations with
Pakistan we have relied on friendships that were established when
Pakistan's future leaders were able to attend military schools in the
United States. In order to confront al-Qeada and eliminate its ability
to operate internationally, the United States must rely on the
Pakistani military and intelligence services. How do you believe we
should move forward with instilling American values and perspectives
and rebuilding relationships with the Pakistani military? What role
should IMET training play?
Answer. The International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program is a critical element of our broad-based security relationships
throughout the world. In addition to the high quality of the education
and training the program provides for foreign military and civilian
members, IMET also plays a vital role in the development of military-
to-military relationships. IMET helps ensure that other nations'
militaries have a cadre of personnel that have trained in the United
States and are familiar with U.S. military doctrine, methods, and
values. This has proven extremely useful over the years in forging
strong military-to-military relationships and promoting key U.S. values
such as human rights and civilian control of the military.
We are currently paying the price for the decade of sanctions
against the Pakistani military under the Pressler amendment. During the
1990s, a generation of Pakistani military officers, who now hold senior
leadership positions, were denied U.S. military education and training
opportunities as well as the exposure to United States culture and
values that such activities provide. A robust IMET program with the
Pakistani military is one of the best tools we have to help shift the
direction of the Pakistani military to a more pro-Western orientation
in both outlook and doctrine, and to help reshape our bilateral
security relationship. It is for this reason that the administration
has almost doubled last year's requested amount for IMET funding for
Pakistan.
Question. Going forward do you support, and will you commit to,
providing a full and detailed list of all U.S. assistance to Pakistan--
not just what may be authorized under S. 962--including a description
of each program or project that receives any U.S. funding?
Answer. I will provide a full and detailed list of all U.S.
assistance to Pakistan, including a description of each program and
project receiving U.S. funding.
Question. After taking appropriate measures to ensure national
security, are you willing to provide this information in a readily
accessible format on the Internet?
Answer. We would be happy to provide such a list available in a
readily accessible format. We would, of course, be required to make
certain exceptions to protect national security and to ensure the
safety and security of assistance recipients and program implementers.
We would, in such instances, be glad to brief Congress on such
programs.
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