[Senate Hearing 111-135]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-135
MARITIME DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN EAST ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
JIM WEBB, Virginia Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut Republican Leader designee
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Blumenthal, Daniel, resident fellow, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Cronin, Dr. Richard, senior associate, The Henry L. Stimson
Center, Washington, DC......................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Dutton, Peter, associate professor of strategic studies, China
Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Washington,
DC............................................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Marciel, Hon. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ambasssador for ASEAN
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Scher, Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South
and Southeast Asia, Department of Defense, Washington, DC...... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement.... 1
(iii)
MARITIME DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN EAST ASIA
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Webb.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Webb. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
order.
In this first oversight hearing of the East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, in the 111th Congress, we will
examine maritime territorial issues in Asia, and how
sovereignty issues are impacting the region and United States
interests.
No other topic brings into light the enormous and complex
challenges facing the United States in Asia. At the pinnacle of
this issue is China's growing military, diplomatic, and
economic power, not only in the region, but also worldwide.
China's evolution has changed the regional economic balance,
has enabled China to expand its political influence. Across the
East Asian mainland, from Burma to Vietnam, we have heard
statements of concern about the impact of China's reach.
As the United States continues its attempt to isolate
Burma, due to the human rights policies of its military regime,
China's influence has grown exponentially, including the recent
announcement of a multibillion dollar oil pipeline project that
would enable the Chinese to offload oil obtained in the Persian
Gulf and pump it to Yunnan province without having to transit
the choke point of the Strait of Malacca.
In Vietnam this past January, General Vo Nguyen Giap,
commander in chief of the Vietnam People's Army during the
Vietnam war, and former Defense Minister, sent an open letter
to the Vietnamese Government. He called for a halt to a huge
multibillion dollar Chinese bauxite mining project in Vietnam's
Central Highlands, citing environmental damage, harm to ethnic
minorities, and, most importantly, his view that it was a
threat to Vietnam's national security.
Importantly, China has sought not only to expand its
economic and political influence, but also to expand its
territory. China's military modernization has directly
supported this endeavor. The PLA Navy is developing blue-water
capabilities that will enable it to project power into the
region and beyond. China today has 241 principal combatant
warships in its navy, including 60 submarines, and the
Department of Defense reported earlier this year that the PLA
Navy is considering building multiple aircraft carriers by
2020.
In addition to the construction of aircraft carriers, the
PLA Navy has been rapidly modernizing its submarine fleet and
surface combatants to enhance its ability to project power from
its coast. This poses a significant threat to the current
geostrategic balance in Asia.
Of particular concern are China's sovereignty claims in the
East China Sea and South China Sea. At the forefront of these
disputes is Taiwan. However, the attention to this potential
conflict has obscured attention to other disputes in the
region. China also lays claim to the Senkaku Islands, the
Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands.
Despite Japan's control over the Senkaku Islands since the
end of World War II, and the recognition of others, including
the United States, of Japan's sovereignty over these islands,
China still claims publicly its sovereignty over the Senkakus.
Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party has, to my
understanding, never officially recognized Japan's sovereignty
over the Ryukyu Islands, which includes, importantly, Okinawa.
In the South China Sea, myriad unresolved disputes involve
several island groups claimed in whole or in part by China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. Key
claims focus on the Spratly Islands, composed of 21 islands and
atolls, 50 submerged land atolls, and 28 partially submerged
reefs. Their total land mass is small, but they spread out over
340,000 square miles. China and Vietnam also claim the
Paracels, a smaller group of islands located south of China's
Hainan Island.
These disputes seriously impact third countries in the
region, and it is important to point out that only the United
States has both the stature and the national power to confront
the obvious imbalance of power that China brings to these
situations. And in that regard, we have an obligation to
maintain a geostrategic balance in the region that ensures
fairness for every nation in Asia and protects the voice of
every country seeking a peaceful resolution to their disputes.
The participation of the United States in these disputes
also affects how these countries perceive threats in their
regional environment, and what options they may have available
to them as they seek to protect their interests. China has
demonstrated its willingness to display new military
capabilities, and at times to use force to claim maritime
territory. In response, other countries in the region are
modernizing their naval capabilities, such as Vietnam's recent
decision to purchase Kilo-class submarines from Russia.
Additionally, many observers note that China's pattern of
intimidation may hinder free and fair economic development in
the region. As one example, China's recent detention of
Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands, and its overt
threats to United States oil companies operating in the South
China Sea, highlight the increased risks to shipping and
fishing, and the limited prospects, resource exploitation.
These actions, left unanswered, may threaten the well-being of
the region.
These disputes also significantly affect the United States
by endangering regional peace and security. As the 1995-96
Taiwan Strait missile crisis demonstrates, the United States is
the only world power capable of responding to aggressive and
intimidating acts by China. In looking at recent events, it
appears that the United States is responding to maritime
incidents as singular tactical challenges, while China appears
to be acting with a strategic vision. These troubling incidents
include, but are not limited to, the EP-3 crisis in 2001, the
surfacing of a Chinese submarine in the midst of the USS Kitty
Hawk carrier battle group in 2006, the harassment of the USNS
Impeccable, in March of this year, and the collision of a
Chinese sub with the USS John McCain sonar cable, just last
month.
I'm interested to hear our witnesses' thoughts on how the
United States should be responding to these sorts of incidents.
As a maritime nation, the United States should maintain the
quality and strength of its sea power. The recent trajectory of
American sea power is, quite frankly, not encouraging. When I
first entered the Marine Corps, in 1968, there were 931
combatant ships in the U.S. Navy. When I served as Secretary of
the Navy, 20 years later, this battle force numbered 569 ships.
At present the U.S. Navy has 284 deployable battleforce ships;
42 percent of them underway on any given day. And, although the
quality of China's 241 ships cannot match that of the United
States, that quality gap also is closing.
If the United States is to remain an Asian nation and a
maritime nation, our Nation's leaders have a choice to make.
Our diplomatic corps and our military, and especially our Navy,
must have the resources necessary to protect American interests
and the interests of our friends and our allies.
To reflect the complexity of maritime disputes in Asia,
today's hearing will have two panels. I'd like to extend my
thanks to the administration for having Deputy Assistant
Secretary Scot Marciel, who also serves as the Ambassador to
ASEAN, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Scher, of the
Defense Department, to provide the administration's perspective
on those issues.
In addition, we have three highly qualified witnesses in
our second panel to expound upon the strategic and economic
impacts of these disputes.
I thank all of you for appearing today, and look forward
very much to hearing your remarks, and also having your
insights.
With that, I would like to welcome our first panel, and in
whichever order you gentlemen would like to proceed. I would
ask that you could summarize your remarks in 10 minutes or so,
and your full statements will be entered into the record.
STATEMENT OF HON. SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, AMBASSADOR FOR
ASEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Marciel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, I'm pleased
to testify before you today on maritime and sovereignty
disputes in East Asia. The sea-lanes that run through East Asia
are some of the world's prime arteries of trade. Over half the
world's merchant fleet, by tonnage, sails through the South
China Sea each year, for example.
These sea-lanes are of great strategic importance to the
United States. We have an abiding interest in maintaining
stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful
commercial activity in East Asia's waterways. We've used
diplomacy, commerce, and our military presence, especially that
of the U.S. Navy, to keep the peace and protect our interests.
Our policy has aimed, also, to support respect for
international maritime law, including the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea. As you know, Mr. Chairman, this
administration supports ratifying the Convention, and in
practice our vessels comply with its provisions governing
traditional uses of the oceans.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to focus my remarks on three topics.
First, the multiple sovereignty disputes in the South China
Sea. Second, recent incidents involving China, and the
activities of U.S. naval vessels in international waters,
within China's Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ. And finally,
the strategic contexts of these distinct topics, and how the
United States should respond.
China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Brunei--each claims sovereignty over parts of
the South China Sea, including the 200 small land features that
make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands chains. Despite the
competing claims, the South China Sea is largely at peace and
has avoided sustained military conflict.
In 2002, the ASEAN countries and China signed the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
While nonbinding, it set out some useful principles, such as
peaceful resolution, self-restraint, and freedom of navigation,
and signaled a willingness among claimants to approach this
dispute multilaterally. A multilateral solution that builds on
this agreement could offer the best way to preserve the
interests of all parties.
The United States does not take sides on the competing
legal claims over territorial sovereignty in the South China
Sea. In other words, we do not take sides on the claims of
sovereignty over the islands and other land features in the
South China Sea, or on the maritime zones that derive from
those land features. We do, however, have concerns about claims
to territorial waters or any maritime zone that does not derive
from a land territory. Such maritime claims are not consistent
with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. We've urged all claimants to exercise restraint.
We've made clear that we oppose the threat or use of force, and
any action that hinders freedom of navigation. We would like to
see a resolution in accordance with international law,
including the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
We remain concerned about tension between China and
Vietnam, as both countries seek to tap potential oil and gas
deposits that lie beneath the South China Sea. Starting in the
summer of 2007, China told a number of United States and
foreign oil firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese
partners in the South China Sea, or face unspecified
consequences in their business dealings with China. We object
to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies.
During a visit to Vietnam last September, then-Deputy
Secretary of State John Negroponte asserted the right of United
States companies operating in the South China Sea and stated
that we believe that disputed claims should be dealt with
peacefully and without resort to any type of coercion. We've
raised our concerns with China directly. Sovereignty disputes
between nations should not be addressed by attempting to
pressure companies that are not party to the dispute.
Aside from the South China Sea, there are various other
maritime disputes in East Asia, which, Mr. Chairman, you've
already mentioned. I'd be happy to address these further if you
wish. We continue to monitor all disputes, as quarrels over
sovereignty can escalate quickly.
I would like to briefly discuss the recent incidents
involving China and the activities of U.S. vessels, although my
colleague will go into that in more detail. In March 2009, the
USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent
with international law, in international waters, in the South
China Sea. Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass
the Impeccable put ships of both sides at risk, interfered with
freedom of navigation, and were inconsistent with the
obligation for ships at sea to show due regard for the safety
of other ships. We protested these actions to the Chinese, and
urged that our differences be resolved through dialogue, not
through ship-to-ship confrontations that put our sailors at
risk.
Our concerns centered on China's conception of its legal
authority over other countries' vessels operating in its
Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, and the unsafe way that China
sought to assert what it considers its maritime rights. China's
view of its rights on this point is not supported by
international law. We have stated that clearly to the Chinese,
and underscored that United States vessels will continue to
operate lawfully in international waters.
In closing, I'd like to look at both of these topics, the
EEZ concerns and the overlapping South China Sea claims, in a
broader strategic context. Specifically, what do these issues
signify for international law and for the evolving power
dynamics in East Asia, and how should the United States
respond?
The Impeccable incident and the sovereignty disputes in the
South China Sea are distinct issues that require distinct
policy responses. On a strategic level, however, both issues
highlighted growing assertiveness by China in regard to what it
sees as its maritime rights. In some cases, we do not share, or
even understand, China's interpretation of international
maritime law. We do believe there are constructive ways to
tackle these difficult issues.
On the freedom of navigation in the EEZ by United States
naval vessels, we've urged China to address our differences
through dialogue. China has now agreed to hold a special
session of our military and maritime consultative agreement to
take up the issue. In the case of the South China Sea
sovereignty dispute, we've encouraged all parties to pursue
solutions in accordance with the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, and to build on the 2002 agreement between ASEAN and
China.
There is ambiguity in China's claims to the South China
Sea, both in terms of the exact boundaries of its claims, and
whether it is an assertion of territorial waters over the
entire body of water, or only over its land features. In the
past, this ambiguity has had little impact on U.S. interests.
It has become a concern, however, with regard to the pressure
China has put on our energy firms, as some of the offshore
blocs that have been subject to Chinese complaint do not appear
to lie within China's claim. It would be helpful to all parties
if China provided more clarity on the substance of its claims.
We need to be vigilant to ensure our interests are
protected. When we have concerns, we will raise them candidly,
as we have done over the pressuring of our companies. We know
that China has taken a more conciliatory approach to resolving
some disputes over land borders, reaching a demarcation
agreement last year, for example, with Vietnam. China's
diplomacy toward South East Asia has generally emphasized good-
neighborliness. China's antipiracy deployment to the Gulf of
Aden has been a positive contribution to a common international
concern.
We're encouraged by these steps, and hope that China will
apply a similar constructive approach to its maritime rights
and boundaries. We have a broad relationship with China, Mr.
Chairman, as you know. It covers many issues of strategic
importance to both countries. We agree on some issues. On some
others, we, frankly, have differences. Our bilateral
relationship can accommodate those differences and address them
responsively through dialogue.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Marciel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
testify before you today on maritime and sovereignty issues in East
Asia. The sea-lanes that run through East Asia are some of the world's
busiest and most strategically important. They serve as the prime
arteries of trade that have fueled the tremendous economic growth of
the region and brought prosperity to the U.S. economy as well. Billions
of dollars of commerce--much of Asia's trade with the world, including
the United States--flows annually through those waters. Over half of
the world's merchant fleet by tonnage sails through the South China Sea
alone each year.
The United States has long had a vital interest in maintaining
stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial
activity in East Asia's waterways. For decades, active U.S. engagement
in East Asia, including the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces,
has been a central factor in keeping the peace and preserving those
interests. That continues to be true today. Through diplomacy,
commerce, and our military presence, we have protected vital U.S.
interests. Our relationships with our allies remain strong, the region
is at peace, and--as you know well--the U.S. Navy continues to carry
out the full range of missions necessary to protect our country and
preserve our interests.
Our presence and our policy have also aimed to support respect for
international maritime law, including the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Although the United States has yet to ratify the Convention,
as you know Mr. Chairman, this administration and its predecessors
support doing so, and in practice, our vessels comply with its
provisions governing traditional uses of the oceans.
Issues surrounding maritime and sovereignty disputes in East Asia
are multifaceted and complex. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I am
going to focus on three topics:
--First, the multiple sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea;
--Second, recent incidents involving China and the activities of U.S.
naval vessels in international waters within that country's
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);
--And finally, the strategic context of these distinct topics and how
the United States should respond.
China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Brunei each claim sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea,
including its land features. The size of each party's claim varies
widely, as does the intensity with which they assert it. The claims
center on sovereignty over the 200 small islands, rocks, and reefs that
make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands chains.
Sovereignty disputes notwithstanding, the South China Sea is
largely at peace. Tensions among rival claimants rise and fall. To
date, the disputes have not led to sustained military conflict. In
2002, the ASEAN countries and China signed the ``Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.'' While nonbinding, it set
out useful principles, such as that all claimants should ``resolve
disputes . . . by peaceful means'' and ``exercise self-restraint,'' and
that they ``reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of
navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea, as provided for
by the universally recognized principles of international law,
including the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.''
More importantly, the 2002 document signaled a willingness among
claimants to approach the dispute multilaterally. We welcomed this
agreement, which lowered tensions among claimants and strengthened
ASEAN as an institution. It has not eliminated tensions, nor has it
eliminated unilateral actions by claimants in the South China Sea, but
it's a start, and a good basis on which to address conflict in the
region diplomatically.
U.S. policy continues to be that we do not take sides on the
competing legal claims over territorial sovereignty in the South China
Sea. In other words, we do not take sides on the claims to sovereignty
over the islands and other land features in the South China Sea, or the
maritime zones (such as territorial seas) that derive from those land
features. We do, however, have concerns about claims to ``territorial
waters'' or any maritime zone that does not derive from a land
territory. Such maritime claims are not consistent with international
law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.
We remain concerned about tension between China and Vietnam, as
both countries seek to tap potential oil and gas deposits that lie
beneath the South China Sea. Starting in the summer of 2007, China told
a number of U.S. and foreign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work
with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face unspecified
consequences in their business dealings with China.
We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies. During a
visit to Vietnam in September 2008, then-Deputy Secretary of State John
Negroponte asserted the rights of U.S. companies operating in the South
China Sea, and stated that we believe that disputed claims should be
dealt with peacefully and without resort to any type of coercion. We
have raised our concerns with China directly. Sovereignty disputes
between nations should not be addressed by attempting to pressure
companies that are not party to the dispute.
We have also urged that all claimants exercise restraint and avoid
aggressive actions to resolve competing claims. We have stated clearly
that we oppose the threat or use of force to resolve the disputes, as
well as any action that hinders freedom of navigation. We would like to
see a resolution in accordance with international law, including the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
There are various other maritime-related disputes in East Asia.
Japan and China have differences over EEZ limits in the East China Sea,
and sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. These disputes have drawn
less attention than those in the South China Sea. We continue to
monitor developments on all of these maritime disputes, as quarrels
over sovereignty can escalate quickly in a region where nationalist
sentiment runs strong.
I would now like to discuss recent incidents involving China and
the activities of U.S. vessels in international waters within that
country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In March 2009, the survey ship
USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent with
international law, in international waters in the South China Sea.
Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put
ships of both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and
were inconsistent with the obligation for ships at sea to show due
regard for the safety of other ships. We immediately protested those
actions to the Chinese Government, and urged that our differences be
resolved through established mechanisms for dialogue--not through ship-
to-ship confrontations that put sailors and vessels at risk.
Our concern over that incident centered on China's conception of
its legal authority over other countries' vessels operating in its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the unsafe way China sought to assert
what it considers its maritime rights.
China's view of its rights on this specific point is not supported
by international law. We have made that point clearly in discussions
with the Chinese and underscored that U.S. vessels will continue to
operate lawfully in international waters as they have done in the past.
I would note that there have been no further incidents of
harassment by Chinese fishing vessels since mid-May.
In closing, I would like to look at both these concerns--the EEZ
concerns with China and the overlapping South China Sea claims--in a
broader strategic context. Specifically, what do these issues signify
for international law and for the evolving power dynamics in East Asia,
and how should the United States respond?
The Impeccable incident and the sovereignty disputes in the South
China Sea are distinct issues that require distinct policy responses
from the United States. On a strategic level, to an extent, both issues
highlight a growing assertiveness by China in regard to what it sees as
its maritime rights. In some cases, we do not share or even understand
China's interpretation of international maritime law.
We believe that there are constructive ways, however, to tackle
these difficult issues. With respect to freedom of navigation in the
EEZ by U.S. naval vessels, we have urged China to address our
differences through dialogue. Last month at the Defense Consultative
Talks in Beijing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele
Flournoy raised this issue, and the Chinese agreed to hold a special
session of our Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (signed in
1998) to take up this issue and seek to resolve differences.
In the case of the conflicting sovereignty claims in the South
China Sea, we have encouraged all parties to pursue solutions in
accordance with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and other
agreements already made between ASEAN and China.
The assertions of a number of claimants to South China Sea
territory raise important and sometimes troubling questions for the
international community regarding access to sea-lanes and marine
resources. There is considerable ambiguity in China's claim to the
South China Sea, both in terms of the exact boundaries of its claim and
whether it is an assertion of territorial waters over the entire body
of water, or only over its land features. In the past, this ambiguity
has had little impact on U.S. interests. It has become a concern,
however, with regard to the pressure on our energy firms, as some of
the offshore blocks that have been subject to Chinese complaint do not
appear to lie within China's claim. It might be helpful to all parties
if China provided greater clarity on the substance of its claims.
We need to be vigilant to ensure our interests are protected and
advanced. When we have concerns, we will raise them candidly, as we
have done over the pressuring of our companies.
We note that China has taken a more conciliatory approach to
resolving some disputes over its land borders. Last year, for example,
China and Vietnam concluded a land border demarcation agreement.
China's general diplomatic approach to Southeast Asia has emphasized
friendship and good-neighborliness. Likewise, China's antipiracy
deployment to the Gulf of Aden has been a positive contribution to a
common international concern. We are encouraged by these steps, and
hope that China will apply the same constructive approach to its
maritime rights and boundaries.
We have a broad relationship with China, Mr. Chairman, which
encompasses many issues of vital strategic importance to both
countries. We agree closely on some issues; on others, we frankly have
differences. Our bilateral relationship can accommodate and respect
those differences, and address them responsibly through dialogue.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Ambassador Marciel.
Mr. Scher.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT SCHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Scher. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to
appear before your subcommittee today to provide testimony on
maritime territorial disputes and sovereignty issues. I'm
honored to be here with Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot
Marciel.
As you have noted, I've submitted written testimony for the
record, so I will try to keep my opening remarks relatively
brief, to just highlight some of the key issues.
I do want to commend the subcommittee's continuing interest
in this important topic. These issues are central in the Asia-
Pacific security equation, and ones that we, in the Department
of Defense, are paying very close attention to. I look forward
to sustaining an ongoing dialogue with you as dynamics evolve.
The Asia-Pacific region, for the past two decades, has
largely been at peace. It has been stable, and that stability
has redounded to the benefit of all. Despite this stability,
one of the factors that we see potentially challenging the
Asia-Pacific security environment--and it is, in fact, the
subject of today's hearing--is a series of persistent
territorial disputes, particularly disputes over maritime
territories in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.
As I note in my written testimony, the sources of the
rising frictions are varied. But clearly China has played a key
role in this evolving strategic environment. In analyzing
China's activities, I think it's important to draw a
distinction between the harassment of United States naval
auxiliary vessels near China and, by extension, China's
interpretation of the rights of vessels in Exclusive Economic
Zones, and China's behavior as it relates to the sovereignty
disputes in South China Sea, in general. While it's important
to draw this distinction in China's behavior, the basis for the
United States response applies equally to both.
As I've noted in the written testimony, the Department of
Defense views Chinese behavior in its EEZ, and more broadly in
the South China Sea region--an area, by the way, claimed as
China territorial waters, but not recognized as such by the
international community--as having two basic premises. First,
there's the strategic issue of China's claim to sovereignty
over the entire South China Sea. This plays out mainly in
political and economic fronts, which have been discussed in
detail by Scot, and involve many countries within the region.
Many, if not most, of these claims are conflicting, notably in
areas around the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
Second, to support the growing strategic and political
emphasis in this region, China has increased, and is likely to
continue to increase, its force's military posture in the South
China Sea. As the PLA has upgraded its facilities on Hainan
Island, for example, we see a direct correlation with PRC
assertiveness in its reaction to U.S. surface and air activity.
It is this issue I'd like to address first.
To be clear, the Department strongly objects to
provocative, reckless, and unsafe behavior that puts at risk
the safety of our vessels and is a clear violation of
international norms of behavior in ocean waters outside of
territorial seas. Our concerns have been raised at multiple
levels, and we continue to leverage all available channels to
communicate this position to our PLA counterparts. I will note
that, since we have raised these concerns, there have been, in
fact, no additional incidents of the kind we saw earlier this
year.
We will continue to reject any nation's attempt to place
limits on the exercise of high-sea freedoms within Exclusive
Economic Zones. Customary international law, codified in the
U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, guarantees to all
nations the right to exercise high-seas freedom of navigation
and overflight, as well as the traditional uses of oceans,
related to those freedoms within the EEZ.
Our military activity in this region is routine and in
accordance with this customary international law. We will
continue to conduct operations in the South China Sea, and
United States activity will be based on our interest in the
region and our desire to preserve security and stability
throughout the western Pacific.
Overall, we do recognize that China is taking an assertive
position in regard to their rights in Exclusive Economic Zones
which they have been projecting through their recent actions.
Our policies have not changed, and we will continue to operate
our forces based on what we believe is needed to address our
interests and the interests of stability in the region. We will
look for ways to work with Chinese authorities to minimize
tensions around these operations and, as I said, have had
discussions that have resulted in better communication between
our nations.
Taken together, these events also demonstrate the rightful
importance we place on solidifying our military presence in the
region and working with our friends and allies to ensure we
address and promote our shared interests.
In terms of the South China Sea sovereignty disputes, ably
covered by my colleague, I will note that Secretary Gates has
said, as recently as the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2009, that
the United States does not take sides in the sovereignty
disputes, and supports a peaceful resolution that protects
freedom of navigation.
In addition, however, Secretary Gates stated, ``Whether on
the sea, in the air, in space, or cyberspace, the global
commons represents a realm where we must cooperate, where we
must adhere to the rule of law and other mechanisms that have
helped maintain regional peace.'' The United States clearly has
an interest in keeping sea lines of communication open,
avoiding being drawn into regional conflict, encouraging
resolution of territorial disputes through multilateral
frameworks, and protecting the United States reputation in
Southeast Asia.
In support of our policy, the Department has embarked on a
multipronged strategy that includes clearly demonstrating,
through both word and deed, that United States forces will
remain present and postured as the preeminent military force in
the region, conducting deliberate and calibrated assertions of
our freedom of navigation rights by United States Navy vessels,
building stronger security relationships with partners in the
region--at both the policy level, through strategic dialogues,
and at the operational level, by building partner capacity--and
strengthening the military diplomatic mechanisms we have with
China to improve communications and reduce the risk of
miscalculation.
As I know you have discussed on other occasions, we see the
movement of Marines, and the soon-to-come installations on
Guam, as a key part of solidifying our presence in the western
Pacific, as I noted in my written testimony. All of this effort
is designed to reduce volatility. We believe that the South
China Sea claimants assess that the United States is a
stabilizing regional influence. While we do not propose to
arbitrate or remediate the underlying conflicts between
competing claims, our presence does provide a sense of
stability, and a modicum of breathing room for the claimants to
pursue political means to resolve these issues.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I am prepared to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before your
subcommittee today to provide testimony on Maritime Territorial
Disputes and Sovereignty. These issues are central in the Asia-Pacific
security equation, and ones that we in the Department of Defense are
paying very close attention to. I commend the subcommittee's continuing
interest in this important topic and I look forward to sustaining an
on-going dialogue with you as these dynamics evolve.
In a speech that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered on May
30, 2009, at the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS)
annual defense conference in Singapore, he outlined the remarkable
changes that have taken place in the Asian security environment since
the end of the cold war. More specifically, in highlighting the growing
wealth and improving living standards of the peoples of Asia, Secretary
Gates stressed the correlation between stability and economic
prosperity, one of the defining characteristics of Asian security
dynamics during this period. The Asia-Pacific region for the past two
decades has largely been at peace; it has been stable, and that
stability has redounded to the benefit of all.
Despite this stability, one of the factors that we see potentially
challenging the Asia-Pacific security environment--and the subject of
today's hearing--is a series of persistent territorial disputes,
particularly disputes over maritime territories in Southeast Asia and
the South China Sea, among a number of regional actors. In recent
years, we have observed an increase in friction and tension over these
disputes, frictions that stand in contrast to the relatively peaceful
and cooperative focus on diplomatic solutions that characterized the
issue following the landmark 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea.
The sources of the rising friction are varied--increased demand for
oil and natural gas naturally increases the perceived stakes among
claimants in securing resource rights; increased attention to the
question of sovereignty claims in the runup to the May 2009 deadline
for filing extended continental shelf claims under the U.N. Convention
on the Law of Sea; rising nationalism, which increases the sensitivity
among governments and peoples to perceived slights and infringements
related to territory and sovereignty. In addition, China's growing
military capabilities have become a factor affecting the tone and tenor
of dialogue on regional maritime disputes.
In analyzing China's maritime activities, I think it is important
to draw a distinction between the harassment of U.S. naval auxiliary
vessels near China and China's approach to its South China Sea claims
in general. While it is important to draw this distinction, the basis
for the U.S. response applies equally to both.
Harassment by Chinese fishing vessels of United States naval
auxiliary ships conducting routine and lawful military operations in
China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) reemerged this year as an
irritant in the United States-China relationship. I will note, however,
that since May, there have been no further incidents of PRC-flagged
fishing vessels harassing U.S. naval vessels.
While any incident at sea is of concern, the decline of these
incidents after a brief spike underscores the commitment of the
leadership of our two countries to deal with these issues peacefully
and through diplomatic channels.
The Department of Defense views Chinese behavior in its EEZ and
more broadly in the South China Sea region--a large section of which
China claims--as having two basic premises.
First, there is the strategic issue of China's assertion of
sovereignty over the bulk of the South China Sea. This plays out mainly
on the political and economic fronts which have been discussed in
detail by my colleague from the State Department, but suffice to say
that China actively opposes any activity by other claimants to assert
their own sovereignty claims. Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei each claim sovereignty over portions of
the South China Sea (SCS); many of these claims are conflicting--
notably in areas around the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
Second, to support the growing strategic and political emphasis in
this region, China has increased, and will continue to increase, its
force posture in the South China Sea. As the PLA has upgraded its
facilities on Hainan Island, for example, we see a direct correlation
with PRC assertiveness in its reaction to U.S. surface and air
activity.
Understanding the strategic premise does not imply that the
Department accepts the manner in which China has asserted itself in
this region. We strongly object to behavior that puts at risk the
safety of our vessels and is a clear violation of international norms
of behavior in ocean waters outside territorial seas. The Department
will continue to leverage all available channels to communicate this
position to our PLA counterparts. Indeed, at the recent Defense
Consultative Talks in Beijing held on 23-24 June, this topic was on the
agenda. The two sides agreed to convene a Special Meeting under the
provisions of the United States-China Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA) (1998) in the coming weeks to review ways to
invigorate the MMCA process, improve communications, and reduce the
chances of an incident or accident between our two forces as they
operate near each other.
Further, we reject any nation's attempt to place limits on the
exercise of high seas freedoms within an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Customary international law, as reflected in articles 58 and 87 of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, guarantees to all
nations the right to exercise within the EEZ, high seas freedoms of
navigation and overflight, as well as the traditional uses of the ocean
related to those freedoms. It has been the position of the United
States since 1982 when the Convention was established, that the
navigational rights and freedoms applicable within the EEZ are
qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those rights and freedoms
applicable on the high seas. We note that almost 40 percent of the
world's oceans lie within the 200 nautical mile EEZs, and it is
essential to the global economy and international peace and security
that navigational rights and freedoms within the EEZ be vigorously
asserted and preserved.
As previously noted, our military activity in this region is
routine and in accordance with customary international law as reflected
in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. We have consistently reiterated
our basic policy toward the competing claims in the South China Sea--
most recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2009, where Secretary
Gates stated that the United States does not take sides in the
sovereignty disputes and supports a peaceful solution that protects
freedom of navigation. In his speech at that event, Secretary Gates
stated, ``whether on the sea, in the air, in space, or cyberspace, the
global commons represents a realm where we must cooperate--where we
must adhere to the rule of law and other mechanisms that have helped
maintain regional peace.''
As Secretary Gates has said, ``we stand for openness, and against
exclusivity, and for common uses of common spaces in responsible ways
that sustain and drive forward our mutual prosperity.'' The United
States has an interest in keeping sea lines of communication open;
avoiding being drawn into a regional conflict; encouraging resolution
of territorial disputes through a multilateral framework that avoids
any precedent setting acquiescence; and protecting the United States
reputation in Southeast Asia.
In support of our strategic goals, the Department has embarked on a
multipronged strategy that includes: (1) Clearly demonstrating, through
word and deed, that U.S. forces will remain present and postured as the
preeminent military force in the region; (2) deliberate and calibrated
assertions of our freedom of navigation rights by U.S. Navy vessels;
(3) building stronger security relationships with partners in the
region, at both the policy level through strategic dialogues and at the
operational level by building partner capacity, especially in the
maritime security area, and (4) strengthening the military-diplomatic
mechanisms we have with China to improve communications and reduce the
risk of miscalculation.
Force posture is perhaps the most important component of the first
element of our policy outlined above. In this regard, the military
buildup on Guam is viewed as permanently anchoring the United States in
the region and cementing our ``resident power'' status. We believe this
will have a stabilizing influence on the policies and strategies of
South China Sea claimants. The alternative--a power vacuum caused by a
U.S. security withdrawal from the region--would leave very little
strategic maneuver room for the least powerful among them.
As for the second element of our strategy, U.S. Pacific Command
will continue to assert freedom of navigation rights in the region. U.S
Pacific Command will continue to conduct operations in the South China
Sea, in strict compliance with customary international law as reflected
in the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea. The United States activity
will be governed by our interests in the region, and our desire to
preserve security and stability throughout the western Pacific.
The third element of our strategy will focus on expanding and
deepening our defense diplomacy and capacity-building programs in the
region as important supporting efforts to prevent tensions in the South
China Sea from developing into a threat to U.S. interests. To that end,
we have recently established high-level defense policy dialogues with
Vietnam and Malaysia that complement our already strong consultative
mechanisms with Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Through a variety
of security cooperation activities ranging from seminars to
multilateral exercises, we are also helping the countries of the region
overcome longstanding historical and cultural barriers that inhibit
multilateral security cooperation.
Finally, we need to invigorate the mechanisms that we have in place
to engage China on this and other security issues, namely the United
States-China Defense Consultative Talks, the United States-China
Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and the United States-China Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement process. These mechanisms provide open
and sustained channels of communication to build greater confidence and
mutual understanding, discuss candidly our differences, and improve
understanding and application of safety standards and rules of the road
for operations that improve the safety of sailors and airmen of all
countries in the region.
All of this effort is designed to reduce volatility. We believe the
South China Sea claimants assess that the United States is a
stabilizing regional influence. While we do not propose to arbitrate or
mediate the underlying conflicts between competing claims, our presence
does provide a sense of stability and a modicum of breathing room for
the claimants to pursue political means to resolve these issues.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Scher, for those comments.
I want to start just by asking for one clarification from
your written statement, then I'd like to go to this chart and
ask both of you some questions that you might react from.
When you mention the relocation of American military from
Okinawa to Guam in your statement, you say in your statement,
``This military buildup on Guam is viewed as permanently
anchoring the U.S. in the region, and cementing our resident
power status.''
We've been in this region for a very long time and, in
fact, the relocation, should it fully occur, actually will be
downsizing, in terms of the number of Americans in the region,
although centrally locating. I wrote about this, 1973, as I
recall--1974. But, how, in your view, would that change our
status in the region?
Mr. Scher. I think--we believe that the movement to Guam
solidifies our presence from a couple of respects. One, it does
more centrally locate our presence, and shifts our presence out
of simply a northeast Asia presence, and makes it more
appropriately positioned for the entirety of the East Asia-
Pacific region. Also, the movement has to be seen, I think, as
part of the continuing alliance with Japan, and putting that
alliance on the right footing, so that we can continue to
maintain our close cooperation in Japan, with the forces we
have there, and the security presence, as well.
Those two pieces, I think, are the center of that. The
resident remark, obviously, is building upon Secretary Gates'
remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue last year, making the point
and trying to reassure our allies--that in fact we have been
resident in the western Pacific, and have territory in the
western Pacific, and have been there for, as you say, for an
extended period of time.
So, we see that movement helping in those respects.
Senator Webb. Would you say that the idea that Guam is
American soil is a part of this permanent anchoring? I'm not
quite sure where you're going in your statement, here.
Mr. Scher. Absolutely. I think we're trying to draw
attention to counter an argument that, I think--I know I hear
occasionally in East Asia, the fact that we aren't a part of
East Asia, and so it is too easy for the United States to pull
back from East Asia. And, in fact, while that was never our
intention, regardless, Secretary Gates was trying to make the
point that, in fact, we are a resident--a territorial--we have
territory in the western Pacific, and we are a resident power.
And so, there's not a question of pulling back. It is
impossible for us to do so. And Guam is one clear manifestation
of that.
Senator Webb. Plus, I would venture, an appropriate sea
power presence that comes from a properly configured navy.
Mr. Scher. Without a doubt, sir.
Senator Webb. Gentlemen, I don't know if you can see this
map. Are you able to see this map?
I had my staff put this together, there are lines on it--we
may have to pull it further forward. But, the purpose of the
map, was to, in the first instance, illustrate the region, and
second, through the red lines, to show what happens when you
combine, on the one hand, sovereignty claims, with, on the
other, the concept of the EEZ, which is basically rights of
control in terms of movement. And when you put the two together
on the map, what you basically have is a pretty good percentage
of the South China Sea that would be under some sort of claim
by China. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Scher. I would agree that that is a reasonable
representation of what the effect might be if you agreed with
all of the----
Senator Webb. The situation in the region, as it respects
the current Chinese claims is to the effect that almost all of
the South China Sea is in some way claimed by China.
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, let me try to respond.
Senator Webb. Would you push the button?
Ambassador Marciel. I'll try to respond and hopefully
address this.
Part of the problem here is that this so-called ``cow's
tongue'' that's been on maps since, I think, the 1940s. On
Chinese maps, it shows the nine dashes going around most of the
South China Sea. The Chinese have not really firmly delineated
the proposed boundary or explained exactly what their claim is.
They've referred to it as a ``territorial sea.'' But, there is,
I think, still a lot of questions about exactly what that claim
is. China has, as I said, never formally explained the basis of
its claim, nor delineated its boundaries, other than by this
referent. So, it's one of the reasons we've asked the Chinese
to clarify, what do they mean by this, what exactly are they
claiming here in terms of this so-called ``cow's tongue''?
Because it's not 100 percent clear to us, and, I think, to
other parties.
Senator Webb. But if you proceed from the sovereignty
claims that are current, from the Chinese perspective, and the
delineation and EEZ, et cetera, you would pretty much have that
``cow's tongue,'' would you not?
Ambassador Marciel. I think that's right, sir.
Senator Webb. And I appreciate the observation that both of
you made several times that the United States does not take
sides in issues of sovereignty for many, many reasons. And
also, there was a phrase in one of your testimonies, we don't
propose to arbitrate or mediate in these instances. But, on the
other hand, there is a question as to whether neutrality, in
and of itself, is a position that might encourage greater
activity, simply because of the imbalance in power between
China and some of these countries, particularly when you look
at the Spratlys and the Paracels.
So, what signals should we be sending? How should we be
reassuring these other countries, that may be feeling
intimidated by this increase in activity, that we actually are
being neutral?
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I think there's a couple
things that we are doing, and that we should continue to do.
One, as Bob Scher said, our naval activities are continuing
normally through these international waters, and we've made it
clear that they will continue, based on our interpretation of
international law.
Two is, although we've been neutral in the sense of not
taking sides, saying, ``Yes, this country is right and this
country is wrong,'' we can still be active diplomatically. Not
as mediators, so much, but in terms of, certainly, discouraging
any provocative acts, or any acts that increase tension, but
also, urging that China sit down with ASEAN as a group to
resolve this.
I mean, I think, it would be sort of logical to assume that
the Chinese would prefer to deal one on one with individual
members of ASEAN. I think, for the ASEANs, it makes sense to
deal more as a group, for obvious reasons. And, the third point
I would make is that, although it's not directly tied to
disputed areas, part of what we need to do is to show that we
remain very committed and engaged in this region, overall.
We're not doing it, as I said, for the purposes of dealing with
these disputes, but the fact that we remain engaged, committed,
very active, I think, is very important, and something that the
countries of Southeast Asia very much want.
Senator Webb. Mr. Scher, would you have anything----
Mr. Scher. Absolutely. And I would only add that I think
part of our alliances and friendships in the region help to
bolster the ability of countries to feel as if they are
playing--potentially that they have the ability to play--on a
somewhat more even playing field. Although we obviously agree
that multilateral action, and unity of action amongst the ASEAN
claimants, is probably the best way to approach it.
Senator Webb. Would you agree that the response of the
United States to incidents in this region that we've been
discussing is heavily tactical, while Chinese activities are
arguably strategic?
Mr. Scher. I won't venture a guess as to China's tactics
and desires and interests. I think we have a clear strategy and
what we are trying to achieve with our operations, our
alliances, et cetera, given that we are seeing tactical efforts
to harass--or, did see tactical efforts to harass our--those
operations, we have responded tactically, and think that's
appropriate. I'm not willing to venture a guess as to,
necessarily, broader strategic vision for China, but I know
that--I don't think that we may be reacting tactically, but we
have a strategic view as to what we need to do to ensure peace
and stability in the region, and maintain our----
Senator Webb. But here's the actual observation. Just as, I
think, Ambassador Marciel's comment was, ``Things have been
quiet since May.'' We tend to take these incidents as isolated
incidents, and we resolve the incident, and then we dismiss it,
and we say things are fine. And yet, if you tie activities
together--not only with respect to the United States--if you do
the datapoints, and put it over a timeline, what you have is a
clear example of incrementalism, which has not been properly
responded to. That's the difference between tactical resolution
of a specific problem, but a continuum over time that actually
enlarges the problem.
Mr. Scher. I take your point, Senator. I think that we are
willing to see, and to accept for now, until proven otherwise,
that the issues that we've discussed with China, we have a
reasonably effective resolution, and are not willing to say
that they'll necessarily occur again, obviously.
From our strategic point of view, what we are trying to do,
we are continuing to do. And no action that China has taken
will stop us, or has stopped us, from continuing to pursue
those activities that we see in our strategic interests. So, I
certainly accept that we are responding tactically to
operations that, from the Chinese, that are intended to change
what we are doing and--but I think that strategically we have
not adjusted what we've--the overall purpose--in our
operations. We may have adjusted some of how we've done them,
but we're maintaining that which is part of our long-term and
strategic efforts.
Senator Webb. Have we had any clear indications that
China's been willing to compromise on any of these sovereignty
issues? Have there been any signals from them to that effect?
Ambassador Marciel. As I think I mentioned in my testimony,
there have been some--particularly on the land border with
Vietnam--where they have worked out agreements with the
Vietnamese. And I think they've been willing to have more
serious discussions and some compromises also in the Gulf--
parts of the Gulf of Tonkin.
In the dispute over the so-called ``cow's tongue,'' or the
Spratly Islands and the Paracels, I don't--the closest you
could--one could suppose--I make the argument that their
proposals for joint development could be seen as a compromise.
I think, as you know, the Vietnamese don't really view them as
compromises by the Chinese, but generally less willing to
compromise in those areas.
Senator Webb. Has there been a collective viewpoint, from
the ASEAN countries, on these activities in the South China
Sea?
Ambassador Marciel. Not that I've heard. The Vietnamese, as
you know, are the most focused, as they've been facing the most
pressure. There have been discussions in ASEAN meetings about
this. It's not clear to me that--as you know, in ASEAN, you
require all 10 countries to have a consensus to take any
action. I haven't seen any indications that there's a
consensus.
We have suggested to the ASEANs that them working together
on this makes a lot of sense, following up on the 2002
Declaration of Principles. But I think there may not be
consensus yet.
Senator Webb. Gentlemen, I appreciate your coming today,
your testimony was very valuable, and we will be following this
issue very closely over the coming months. Thank you for
coming.
Ambassador Marciel. Thank you, sir.
Senator Webb. We'll now go to the second panel. Let me see,
here.
We'll have the second panel: Professor Peter Dutton, Mr.
Daniel Blumenthal, and Dr. Richard Cronin.
Mr. Dutton is associate professor of strategic studies in
China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College.
In 2006, he retired from the U.S. Navy, having served as a Navy
judge advocate, and naval flight officer. His current research
focuses on American and Chinese views of sovereignty, and the
strategic implications to the United States and the U.S. Navy
of Chinese legal and policy choices regarding sovereignty. He
has published a wide variety of articles on this subject.
Daniel Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, and is a current commissioner and former
vice chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission. Previously he was senior director for China,
Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of
International Security Affairs.
Richard Cronin heads the Southeast Asia Program at the
Henry L. Stimson Center, where he's currently researching
China's relations with the Mekong Basin countries, United
States-ASEAN relations, and issues concerning Japan and
Southeast Asia. Dr. Cronin joined the Stimson Center after a
long career with the Congressional Research Service, as a
senior Asian affairs specialist in the Foreign Affairs Defense
and Trade Division, and also was a United States military
veteran of the Vietnam war.
Gentlemen, I appreciate all of you coming today. We have
some extraordinary breadth of experience at the table. And
again, I would ask you to summarize your--don't feel like you
have to summarize it too far, but take 10 minutes or less to
summarize your statements. Your full statements will be entered
into the record.
And, let's see. Mr. Dutton, welcome.
STATEMENT OF PETER DUTTON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC
STUDIES, CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, DC
Professor Dutton. There we go, thank you. Thank you very
much, Senator, and thank you for inviting me to appear today.
I do have to say two things first. One is that I actually
retired as a commander. And second, that I am speaking in my
personal capacity, and not necessarily for the Department of
Defense or the Department of the Navy.
Senator Webb. The record will so note.
Professor Dutton. Thank you.
With my testimony today, I'd like to make the following two
points. I've elaborated more in my written testimony. Be happy
to answer any questions you have, related to that. The first
essential point is that China's East and South China Sea
territorial claims are weakly grounded in international law, as
they--as it exists today, as are China's antiaccess legal
perspectives. And together they pose a challenge to America's
regional and global maritime interests, in my view.
The second is that China sees its sovereignty claims in the
South China Sea as fundamentally nonnegotiable, yet they seem
to feel they are close to being able to grasp and consolidate
those claims. In the East China Sea, China appears to be
willing to wait for more favorable circumstances in order to
press its claims more assertively.
Concerning China's official claims in the South China Sea,
I have a different perspective from some of those who have
testified already today, which is that they do not actually
claim sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea, per
se. Their claim is based on an assertion of territorial
sovereignty over the islands, themselves, in the South China
Sea, which is articulated in China's law on the territorial sea
and contiguous zone. They're very specific in enumerating the
islands in the South China Sea that they claim.
Additionally, China's EEZ law asserts its claim to an EEZ
extending 200 nautical miles from all of its coastlines. Since
all the islands in the South China Sea are claimed as Chinese
territory, the effect of the combination of these laws is to
claim a Chinese EEZ covering nearly the entire South China Sea.
This is problematic for all maritime user states because of
another set of Chinese domestic laws, and their perspective on
some international law, that expresses the right to limit, or
prohibit, foreign military activities in their EEZ. Such
control becomes tantamount to the control a sovereign exercises
over its zones of maritime sovereignty, but not an actual claim
to sovereignty.
While pointing out this distinction may seem like splitting
hairs, it's important for a fuller understanding of the broader
implications of China's policies for international Law of the
Sea, generally. Had China claimed the right to exercise control
over military vessels because it claimed sovereignty over the
South China Sea, the legal impact of the dispute would have
been limited to the waters of the South China Sea, as was the
case with Libya's claim to the authority to control foreign
military activities in the Gulf of Sidra, based on it's
excessive claim of sovereignty over those waters.
What makes the Chinese case so significant for United
States interests is that, because of the nature of
international law, the impact of China's somewhat unique
characterization of its EEZ could affect how all EEZs are
characterized around the world. Thus, inasmuch as EEZs cover
more than one-third of the oceans--world ocean space, China's
legal perspectives undermine the interests of all maritime
powers and the United States, as a primary guarantor of
maritime security, in particular.
America's determination to protect traditional freedoms of
navigation for military purposes by maintaining a commitment to
globally dominant sea power will have important consequences
for the East Asian region and beyond. Indeed, in my view, a
maritime arc of antiaccess is developing across the Southern
Asian land mass from the Arabian Sea to the Sea of Japan. Of
the handful of remaining states that officially maintain legal
perspectives that challenge traditional military freedoms of
navigation in and above the EEZ, a concentration of these
states is situated along the southern coast of Asia astride
some of the most critically important sea lines of
communication in the world. In this region, Iran, Pakistan,
India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, China, and North Korea all
maintain laws that assert some right of control over foreign
military activities in the EEZ. I would add that there are
more, but they're just not on the Asian Continent.
Vietnam, too, can be added to this list, although it has
chosen to draw grossly excessive baselines rather than assert
EEZ control as its antiaccess legal method of choice.
This is, in addition to the occasional tacit approval that
I personally have heard from representatives of the governments
of other countries in the region, that is somewhat approving of
the antiaccess approach to the Law of the Sea in the region, in
part because it would enable them to keep China at bay.
Some of these countries have been building strong regional
navies, while others have been actively seeking nuclear
capacity or conventional antiaccess technologies similar to
China's in order to provide teeth to their legal perspectives.
China's territorial claims over all of the islands in the South
China Sea is weak, in that it actually controls relatively few
of them and may never, in its long history, have actually
maintained effective administration and control over most of
them.
While effective administration and exclusive control over
territory are the two elements international law generally
requires to recognize a sovereign's authority over territory,
Chinese scholars also assert a historical right to the islands
of the East and South China Sea, based on a longstanding
historical perspective. For various reasons, historical claims
to sovereignty are legally much weaker than the current
occupation and control.
Thus, to the extent that Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam,
and Malaysia all occupy islands over which the Chinese claim,
``indisputable sovereignty,'' international law tends to
strengthen the hands of the occupier.
Accordingly, China is building a maritime force structure,
including its aircraft carrier program, which is shifting the
balance of military power in the South China Sea. This may soon
effectively prevent its neighbors, many of them U.S. friends
and allies, from protecting their own island claims. At the
same time, China has become emboldened to use its increasing
military and naval power to attempt to disrupt United States
naval operations in and above the South China Sea.
Why is China pursuing this course? In my view, China sees
itself as on the verge of achieving its long-sought
geostrategic dominance of the South China Sea. Perhaps one of
the reasons China has increased its activities against American
naval vessels in the South China Sea is that it considers among
the few things to be standing in its way of consolidating its
island claims to be the United States Navy and the American
political will to support freedoms of navigation, and the
claims of American regional friends and allies.
I suspect that China has identified the latter as the most
vulnerable and susceptible to its influence, especially during
these challenging economic times, a national military focus,
which the United States has, on ground wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This, in my view, is one of among several reasons
that China has embarked on its recent campaign to harass United
States naval operations in the region. If they can undermine
the political will to continue active United States naval
operations in the South China Sea, they do not need to confront
the power of the American Navy head-on in order to achieve
their objectives. They can erode the American Navy's
effectiveness indirectly and achieve the same result. This
would be in keeping with China's military doctrine of the three
new warfares: Legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and
psychological warfare.
Indeed, some thoughtful analysts and academics have
suggested that Chinese calculations of American power determine
how aggressively it pursues its claims in the South China Sea.
According to this line of thinking, China has, for decades,
taken advantage of small shifts in their favor in the local
power dynamics in the South China Sea. Some Chinese actions can
be characterized as opportunistic, such as China's sea battle
in 1974 with the Republic of Vietnam beleaguered naval forces
to wrest control of several of the Spratly Islands as the
United States was completing its withdrawal from South Vietnam.
And again in 1976, when China took control of the Paracels from
a recently united Vietnam. Then in the spring of 1988, when, in
the midst of the tanker wars, American naval power was
primarily focused on escorting oil tankers safely through the
Strait of Hormuz. China, at that time, engaged in naval battles
with Vietnam in the Spratlys and won control of several more
islands. Finally, in late 1994, nearly 1995, about 2 years
after the United States withdrew its forces from nearby Subic
Bay Naval Base in the Philippines, China quietly occupied
Mischief Reef, a small coral feature in the South China Sea,
close to the Philippine Islands of Palawan, that had previously
been administered by the Philippine Government. Chinese naval
vessels remained in the vicinity of Mischief Reef long enough
for China to consolidate its gain by building military
reinforcements on the small island.
More recent shifts in the South China Sea power dynamics
could not be characterized as opportunistic. Instead, they are
the product of years of Chinese research, development, and
investment in military technologies designed to challenge
outside access--outside naval access, in particular--to East
Asian waters. China's submarine force is steadily improving, as
we've mentioned, and augments China's already substantial sea-
mine antiaccess capabilities. Additionally, China appears to be
developing an antiship ballistic missile program. Thus, given
the strength of China's antiaccess technologies and the
intensity of its campaign against the legitimacy of four naval
activities in the East and South China Sea, China probably
perceives that its opportunities for a settlement of the South
China Sea claims are in its favor and increasing.
In its maritime dispute with Japan in the East China Sea,
China seems to be willing to live with the ambiguity generated
by Japanese control over the Senkaku Islands, even as China
occasionally takes provocative actions designed to maintain its
claim of sovereignty and to wait for some future circumstance
in which China is in a stronger position in relation to Japan
to press its claim. Additionally, China has made a continental
shelf claim that extends to the footsteps of Japan's
southernmost island chain near American bases in Okinawa and
Sasebo. This claim has many facets. It is, in part, based on
Chinese nationalism, partly it is based on international law
that allows coastal states to claim the entire continental
shelf as a matter of coastal state sovereignty, and partly it
is based on the desire to assert military control over the full
extent of these waters in time of conflict or crisis. In any
case, China's claims are of deep concern to Japan, and China's
intentions regarding its claims are of deep concern to American
forces in the Pacific.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Professor Dutton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Dutton, Associate Professor, China Maritime
Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Washington, DC
I would like to thank the chairman and this committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
With my testimony today I hope to make the following points:
1. China's South China Sea legal claims and the activities it has
undertaken to enforce them pose a challenge to America's regional and
global maritime interests.
2. China sees its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea as
fundamentally nonnegotiable, yet close to being within its grasp to
consolidate.
3. China is a developing maritime power, but its maritime
development is best characterized as a maritime enhancement to China's
continental strategic focus, rather than as a rising expeditionary
maritime force.
4. The United States should exercise renewed maritime leadership to
ensure the regional and global access necessary to our national defense
and to the security of the global maritime system generally.
Beginning with China's actual claims in the South China Sea,
contrary to what some commentators have suggested, the Chinese
Government has not claimed sovereignty over the water space of the
South China Sea per se. China's claims of legal control over the sea
space of the South China Sea are based in part on its assertion of
territorial sovereignty over all of the islands in the South China Sea
articulated in China's 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone--under which China claims sovereignty over Diaoyu (Senkaku)
Islands in the East China Sea, and in the South China Sea, China claims
sovereignty over the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, the Xisha (Paracel)
Islands, the Zhongsha (Macclesfield Bank) Islands and the Nansha
(Spratly) Islands.\1\ Added to the claims of sovereignty over the
islands themselves, China's 1998 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) law
asserts its claim to an ``exclusive economic zone . . . extending 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.'' \2\ Since all of the islands in the
South China Sea are claimed as Chinese territory and included in the
baselines section of the 1992 Territorial Sea Law, the effect of the
1998 law is to claim an exclusive economic zone around each of them. In
combination, therefore, the two Chinese laws effectively claim a
Chinese EEZ covering nearly the entire South China Sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, February 25, 1992.
\2\ Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf, June 26, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the Chinese Government does not claim that these waters are
territorial seas, internal waters, or archipelagic waters, or any other
sort of coastal state zone that would confer the rights of sovereignty
over broad swaths of the region's oceans. That said, the combination of
their territorial claims over the islands of the South China Sea and
China's ``unique'' interpretation of international Law of the Sea
relating to coastal state authorities to limit or prohibit foreign
military activities in the exclusive economic zone,\3\ does appear to
be part of a Chinese plan to achieve in the South China Sea exclusive
military control over the water space within their
U-shaped, nine-dashed line. Such control is tantamount to the control a
sovereign exercises over its zones of maritime sovereignty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Peter Dutton, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, June 11, 2009, www.uscc.gov/hearings/
2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_06_11_wrts/
09_06_11_dutton_statement.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pointing out this distinction may seem like splitting hairs, but it
is important to a full understanding of the broader implications for
international law generally of China's policies. China does not claim
sovereignty over the water space of the South China Sea and the
concomitant right to exercise control over foreign military activities
as the prerogative of a sovereign--China claims the right to restrict
and even to prohibit foreign military activities in these waters as a
matter of a coastal state's right to make laws governing its EEZ, which
is a nonsovereign zone of special jurisdiction over resources and
environmental preservation. Had China claimed the right to exercise
control over military vessels because it claimed sovereignty over the
South China Sea, the United States would certainly have objected to the
claim, primarily on factual grounds, but we could both agree upon the
general legal proposition that only with full sovereignty over water
space comes the right to control foreign military activities. As such,
the legal impact of the dispute would have been limited to the waters
of the South China Sea, as was the case with Libya's claim to the
authority to control foreign military activities in the Gulf of Sidra
based on its excessive claim of sovereignty over those waters.
What makes the Chinese case so significant for U.S. interests is
that the impact of our dispute with China over characterization of its
EEZ could affect how all EEZ's are characterized everywhere around the
world. By tying their legal perspective to the legal characterization
of the EEZ generally, were China's perspective to become accepted, it
could affect the way international law views EEZ's everywhere. Thus,
inasmuch as EEZs cover more than one-third of all the world's oceans
and, of course, 100 percent of all coastal regions, island regions, and
many of the world's strategic chokepoints and sea lines of
communication, China's legal perspectives undermine the interests of
all maritime powers and the United States, as the primary guarantor of
maritime security, in particular.
China's territorial claims and its claim to possess EEZ rights over
nearly the entire South China Sea is alone controversial enough, since
at least four other countries plus Taiwan also claim sovereignty over
at least some of the islands, but even more so because many of the
islands in the South China Sea are too small to legitimately claim an
EEZ under the rules and terms as laid out in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, in addition,
through its domestic law and interpretations of international Law of
the Sea China claims the legal right to broadly limit or regulate
foreign military activities in and above its EEZ.\4\ That, for the
United States, is the most problematic and challenging aspect of
China's legal claims, since China is building a maritime force
structure that will soon effectively prevent its neighbors--many of
them U.S. friends and allies--from protecting their own island claims
and because China has become emboldened to use its increasing military
and naval power to attempt to disrupt U.S. naval operations in and
above the South China Sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, e.g., ``Surveying and Mapping Law of the People's Republic
of China,'' August 29, 2002, and ``Regulations of the People's Republic
of China on the Management of Foreign-Related Marine Scientific
Research,'' October 1, 1996. For an authoritative articulation of the
Chinese perspective on the legal rationale for coastal states to limit
foreign military activities in the EEZ, see Ren Xiaofeng and Cheng
Xizhong, A Chinese Perspective, 29 Marine Policy (2005), p. 139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my view, China sees itself as on the verge of achieving its
long-sought dominance over the South China Sea. Perhaps one of the
reasons China has increased its activities against American naval
vessels in the South China Seas is that it considers among the few
things to be standing in its way of consolidating its island claims to
be the United States Navy and the American political will to support
freedoms of navigation and the claims of American regional friends and
allies. I suspect that China has identified the latter as the most
vulnerable and susceptible to its influence, especially during these
challenging economic times and national military focus ground wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. This, in my view, is one among several reasons
that China has embarked on its recent campaign to harass U.S. naval
operations in the region: If they can undermine the political will to
continue active U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea, they do
not need to confront the power of the American Navy head on in order to
achieve their objectives. They can erode the American Navy's
effectiveness indirectly and achieve the same result.
Indeed, some thoughtful analysts and academics have suggested that
Chinese calculations of American power determine how aggressively it
pursues its claims in the South China Sea. According to this line of
thinking, China has for decades taken advantage of small shifts in
their favor in the local power dynamics in the South China Sea.\5\ Some
Chinese actions can be characterized opportunistic, such as China's sea
battle in 1974 with the Republic of Vietnam's beleaguered naval forces
to wrest control over several of the Spratly Islands as the United
States was completing its withdrawal from South Vietnam, and again in
1976 when China took control of the Paracels from a recently united
Vietnam. Then in the spring of 1988, when in the midst of the Tanker
Wars American naval power was primarily focused on escorting oil
tankers safely through the Strait of Hormuz, China engaged in naval
battles with Vietnam in the Spratlys and won control over several more
islands. Finally, in late 1994 and early 1995, about 2 years after the
United States withdrew its forces from nearby Subic Bay Naval Base,
China quietly occupied Mischief Reef, a small coral feature in the
South China Sea close to the Philippines Island of Palawan that had
previously been administered by the Philippines Government. Chinese
naval vessels remained in the vicinity of Mischief Reef long enough for
China to consolidate its gain by building military reinforcements on
the small island.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, e.g., Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, ``Chinese
Perceptions of U.S. Decline and Power,'' Jamestown Foundation, July 9,
2009 (on line); and Richard Fisher, Jr., ``South China Sea Competition:
China Contemplates More Mischief,'' International Assessment and
Strategy Center, June 28, 2009 (on line).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recent shifts in South China Sea power dynamics could not be
characterized as opportunistic. Instead they are the product of years
of Chinese research, development, and investment in military
technologies designed to challenge American naval access to East Asian
waters. The work of Lyle Goldstein and William Murray documents China's
steadily improving submarine force and substantial sea-mine
capabilities,\6\ for instance, and Andrew Erickson and David Yang's
research documents China's developing antiship ballistic missile
program.\7\ In addition to changing the military balance, China's
sustained campaign to try to undermine the legality and legitimacy of
routine U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea also appears to be
an attempt to change the regional political dynamics. This observation
is made with China's doctrine of ``Three New Warfares'' in mind. The
three new warfares articulated under this Chinese military doctrine are
legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare. The
focus of each of these activities is fundamentally to create and to
advance international and domestic legitimacy for China's viewpoint of
its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and its authority to
control military activities throughout the South China Sea. An article
in Renmin Haijun (People's Navy) a couple of years ago stated that the
purpose of legal warfare, for instance is to ``be far-sighted . . . to
discern any problems before they actually arise,'' in order to
``provide a legal pretext for military action,'' and to ``engage in
legal contests to vie for the legal initiative'' in order to
``safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.'' \8\ Thus,
these ``new'' methods of warfare are designed to achieve strategic
objectives without having to actually use force by leveraging public
opinion alongside the implied threat posed by China's growing military
power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, ``Undersea Dragons, China's
Undersea Submarine Force,'' International Security, Vol. 28., No. 4,
Spring 2004, pp. 161-196.
\7\ Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, ``On the Verge of a Game-
Changer,'' Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, May 1, 2009.
\8\ Jin Hongbing, ``Legal Warfare: Sharp Tool to Seize the
Opportunity to Grab the Initiative,'' People's Navy [Renmin Haijun, in
Chinese], May 29, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China appears to perceive its opportunities to be increasing for a
favorable settlement of its South China Sea claims. The one existing
bilateral dialogue on South China Sea disputes of which I am aware
seems to be making no progress. The China-Vietnam Steering Committee on
Cooperation released a statement after its second meeting in 2008 that
both sides had ``agreed to solve disputes through negotiations and
safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea.'' This statement,
however, remains at odds with China's repeated insistence that it has
``indisputable sovereignty'' over the South China Sea Islands,
including as recently as May 2009 when it submitted a statement to the
United Nations in response to regional claims by the Philippines and
Vietnam.\9\ If China remains unwilling to concede any of the islands to
other claimants, it is hard to imagine what there is to negotiate. In
its maritime dispute with Japan in the East China Sea, China seems to
be willing to live with the ambiguity generated by Japanese control
over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, even as China occasionally takes
provocative actions designed to maintain its claims to sovereignty, and
to wait for some future circumstance in which China is in a stronger
position in relation to Japan to press its claim.\10\ In my view, China
is likely to take the same approach to its claims in the South China
Sea. If it is not in a strong enough position today to gain acceptance
of its sovereignty over the islands, rather than negotiate a partial
result China will likely wait until such future time as its position is
suitably strengthened to finalize all of its claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Brian McCarten, ``Roiling the Waters in the Spratlys, Asian
Sentinal,'' February 4, 2008; and ``China Tells Neighbors to Keep Off
Disputed Islands,'' Reuters, May 12, 2009.
\10\ Xiong Qu, ``China Starts Examination of Navigational Safety of
East China Sea,'' CCTV, July 3, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, with active U.S. involvement it may be possible to
bring together all parties to at least open multilateral discussions to
manage friction and prevent escalation of competing sovereignty claims,
EEZ and continental shelf claims, security claims, and access rights.
In the context of such discussions, it might be helpful for the United
States to make clear that it supports peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes as provided for in the South China Sea Code of
Conduct, that we will honor our commitments to our friends and allies
in the region by supporting them in case of attack, and that recent
increases in Chinese military and armed maritime law enforcement
patrols are not helpful. Likewise, all sides must be expected to
exercise restraint. The end result could be a historic opportunity for
China to demonstrate that its military buildup is indeed part of its
larger policy of Peaceful Development and that its intentions toward
its neighbors are indeed benign.
On this latter point, there is some regional skepticism, especially
in Japan. Indeed, there exists a robust debate within academic and
analytical circles in China itself concerning the extent to which
China's growing navy should strive to develop ``blue water''
capabilities. However, in my view there is no indication that Chinese
decisionmakers have been persuaded to create a Navy that will challenge
the U.S. Navy for command of the seas in the near to medium term. The
inevitable result of China's rapid military development over the past
two decades, and especially after a Chinese flotilla deployed to the
Gulf of Aden to support regional antipiracy operations, is concern that
perhaps China's naval buildup could portend Beijing's intention one day
of moving beyond development of a maritime defense zone in East Asia to
challenge America's global command. However, in my view this would be a
highly unlikely development for three reasons.
First, China is unlikely to build a large, expeditionary navy
because it is not in the geostrategic interests of a fundamentally
continental power to put too much attention and resources into global
control of the seas, especially when a maritime superpower exists and
provides the service free of charge.\11\ Second, others have suggested
that China has too many internal economic, political and demographic
challenges that will compete for resources and political attention
during the remainder of this century for China to be able to afford
such an undertaking.\12\ To these observations I add a third reason why
I do not foresee China becoming an expeditionary sea power: If China
intended its growing naval capacity to be used to challenge American
sea power outside of the East and South Chinese Seas, a leading
indicator of this intention would be a shift in perspective on
international Law of the Sea from antiaccess to access, because the
capacity to wield naval power without the international law authorities
to use it would be an expensive investment with little practical
utility. As such, paradoxically, it may be in America's best interest
to accept the friction that attends our differing perspectives on
international Law of the Sea as one of the manageable costs of
separating the fundamental interests of a strong continental power from
the fundamental interests of a strong maritime power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See, e.g., Robert S. Ross, ``The Geography of the Peace: East
Asia in the 21st Century,'' International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4,
Spring 1999, pp. 81-118.
\12\ See, e.g., Susan Shirk, ``Fragile Superpower: How China's
Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise,'' Oxford University
Press (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is not to say that the United States should in any way
compromise its values or perspectives related to the international law
rights to naval access to the world's oceans for missions related to
international peace and security or to missions related to security of
the seas from nontraditional threats. Although American perspectives on
the Law of the Sea are shared by approximately 140 of the current 157
members of UNCLOS, with the remainder agreeing with China to one degree
or another that as coastal states they have the right to impose legal
restrictions on foreign military activities in their EEZ's, we cannot
take the current state for granted. Indeed, the Chinese perspective
holds some attraction even among China's neighbors. Despite the fact
that their governments remain among those that are on record as
accepting traditional military freedoms in the EEZ, representatives
from the Philippines, Indonesia, and other regional states sometimes
quietly express general support for the Chinese perspective, if for no
other reason than it could help them hold rising Chinese naval power at
bay. This unsettling development suggests that our regional partners in
Asia also sense the shift in power dynamics in the South China Sea and
may need more reassurance than we are currently giving them that the
United States remains fully committed to our regional security
commitments and to maintaining a dominant naval presence in the region.
Protecting traditional freedoms of navigation for military purposes
by maintaining a commitment to globally dominant sea power will have
important consequences for the East Asian region and beyond. An arc of
antiaccess is developing across the southern Asian landmass from the
Arabian Sea to the Sea of Japan. Of the handful of remaining states
that officially maintain legal perspectives that challenge traditional
military freedoms of navigation in and above the EEZ, a concentration
of these states is situated along the southern coasts of Asia astride
some of the most critically important sea lines of communication in the
world. In this region, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma,
Malaysia, China, and North Korea all maintain laws that assert some
right of control over foreign military activities in the EEZ. Vietnam
too can be added to this list, although it has chosen to draw grossly
excessive baselines, rather than to assert EEZ control as its
antiaccess legal method of choice. This is in addition to the
occasional tacit approval for antiaccess perspectives sometimes
expressed by scholars and officials from the few remaining regional
states not already listed here. Some of these countries have been
building strong regional navies, while others have been actively
seeking nuclear capacity or conventional antiaccess technologies
similar to China's in order to provide teeth to their legal
perspectives.
In countering the antiaccess concerns of these coastal states, the
United States will need to make it a priority to promote and
demonstrate the maritime security benefits that can be provided by
strong sea-power capacity combined with broad authorities to access
ocean space. Specifically, the United States will need to find
opportunities to undertake with China and other in the region
cooperative international action to secure the seas from both
traditional and nontraditional destabilizers. Additionally, since China
clearly aspires to play a more important role in global leadership, as
evidenced for instance by its increased commitment to international
peacekeeping efforts, working together with China on an equal footing
wherever possible will be helpful to the overall relationship.\13\
Inviting Chinese naval vessels to participate in future maritime
security operations--even as we disagree about some of the applicable
legal authorities--should become routine. Achieving a common maritime
objective by either operating in separate sectors or operating in the
same sector while performing different tasks are approaches
demonstrated in current Gulf of Aden operations that deserve close
study as models for future cooperation at sea where parties do not
necessarily agree on the relevant authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Peter Dutton, ``Charting A Course: U.S.-China Cooperation at
Sea,'' China Security, March 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, China's decision to participate in antipiracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden has been an encouraging opportunity to demonstrate the
power of a global maritime partnership to bring about the order and
stability necessary for the well-functioning of the global system on
which the economic health and political strength of all major countries
relies. Additionally, such operations enable China to participate
meaningfully in the provision of the ``global goods'' that come from
maritime humanitarian and constabulary operations, which are supported
by reasonable, access-oriented interpretations of international Law of
the Sea.
A final point about United States-China cooperation at sea: Because
the East and South China Seas represent strategically important zones
for both China and the United States and friction in the region is
therefore likely to continue, cooperation is more likely to occur
between Chinese and American naval forces the further away they operate
from the East Asian coastal regions. The challenge for the United
States in interacting with China will be to manage tensions in East
Asia while encouraging greater global cooperation. China's aspirations
to play a global role as a responsible major power and its willingness
to undertake security operations in parallel, if not exactly in direct
cooperation, with the United States and other maritime states in the
Gulf of Aden suggests that future such opportunities will present
themselves and should be welcomed. The more that China works with the
United States and like-minded states away from East Asian shores, the
greater the chance that the essential factor of trust will begin to
enter into the equation of United States-China relations in East Asia.
Should opportunities arise for cooperation in East Asia, such as
humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, China should be welcomed as
a partner. China's new hospital ship may provide opportunities in this
regard, and joint regional deployments of U.S. and Chinese hospital
ships should be considered in order to bring the benefits of modern
medicine to underserved areas of Southeast Asia. Ultimately, such
activities could begin to build the essential factor of trust, based on
increased military to military contacts, which will help develop the
strategic stability that all parties desire.
In conclusion, perhaps the two most important leadership actions
the United States could undertake to preserve the navigational freedoms
that are of strategic importance to U.S. national security, are first
to reassert our position as the global advocate for access-oriented
approaches to international Law of the Sea. For too long we have
neglected this fundamental pillar of American security. We have either
taken for granted that the benefits of our perspective are self-evident
and expected that other reasonable state actors would be eventually
persuaded to our perspective, or we have simply relied on the strength
of our national power to do what is in our maritime interest to do
without much regard for what others thought. Today, however, there is
not even complete unity of perspective across the various federal
agencies that have a hand in oceans policy. The Federal Government
would benefit from a comprehensive national oceans policy, and flowing
from that policy, a comprehensive strategic communications plan to
explain the benefits and strengths of the American perspectives on the
oceans.
Second, since October 2007 the United States Navy has been
operating under a maritime strategy that reflects international
cooperation as one of the most important foundations of global maritime
security against both traditional and nontraditional threats. As
Admiral Willard recently testified, ``our current nonparty status
constrains'' us in forming partnerships to achieve national and
international security. Admiral Willard also observed that UNCLOS is
important because it provides a ``robust legal regime for global
operations'' to counter both traditional and nontraditional threats. To
these reasons I would add that China's active promotion of its
antiaccess perspectives--and the receptive audience the message is
reaching in some critical parts of the world--reminds us that the
current level of freedoms of navigation for military purposes that we
currently enjoy cannot be taken for granted. Additionally, China is
exercising leadership on these issues from institutional positions
inside the Convention. The United States is not. A Chinese judge sits
on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. There is no
American judge. When negotiations are undertaken to consider changes to
the Convention, China will have a seat at that table and a vote; the
United States will not. In order to enhance our global leadership
position on Law of the Sea issues, and to preserve our national
security interests in the oceans from encroachment, it is my view that
the United States should join the 157 other states that are currently
members and accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea at our earliest opportunity.
In conclusion, international Law of the Sea is important and the
United States needs to be vigilant to see that our interests in access-
oriented approaches to Law of the Sea are preserved. However, strength
speaks louder than words. In my view it is essential to our own
national security and to the security of many other states that our
maritime power be protected from erosion. Power is currently shifting
in East Asia, not equalizing, but shifting. America's best chance to
preserve peace in the region is to show respect for China's newfound
regional position by extending the hand of maritime cooperation.
However, in order to preserve our own fundamental interests and those
of our friends and allies, we must also retain our dominant maritime
strength.
Senator Webb. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Do you prefer ``Professor'' or ``Commander''?
Professor Dutton. Professor is fine.
Senator Webb. Professor. OK, fine. Thank you very much,
Professor Dutton.
Mr. Blumenthal, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL BLUMENTHAL, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. And it's
very much my honor to appear before you today and applaud you
for holding this important hearing, paying attention to China's
rise and growing assertiveness along its maritime periphery.
It has been well over a decade--I understand you've been
writing about this for longer than a decade, but writings I've
seen a decade ago, when you started writing about this topic,
and Chinese naval modernization has outpaced even the most
extravagant predictions within that decade.
I think--at the risk of boring some people, I think it's
useful to go through some of the details of this modernization
program up front, because it's actually quite alarming.
In the past decade, China has deployed 38 new diesel and
nuclear submarines at a deployment rate of 2.9 subs per year.
It has also deployed about 10 new classes of indigenously built
destroyers and frigates equipped with lethal antiship cruise
missiles. And very germane to what we're discussing here today,
it has, in addition to the over 1,000 ballistic missiles its
deployed across from Taiwan to the Nanjing military region, it
is getting ready to deploy and innovating a land-based antiship
ballistic missile equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles
whose sole purpose could be to hit our mobile surface ships,
including the very symbol and cornerstone of our power, the
carrier battle group. And I believe they will probably test
this capability in the next couple of years.
The reason that I ran through some of these details is
because we haven't seen anything like this naval--a naval
buildup of this kind since the early cold war, nor has our Navy
ever faced a threat of ballistic missiles capable of hitting
mobile targets at sea.
And I think you are quite correct when you wrote recently
that the Communist Party is making a concerted and calculated
attempt to expand China's regional strategic space. This is not
just tactics or--it's incrementally doing so, but it is doing
so.
One has to question what drives this military buildup,
since, indeed, China faces no military threat that anyone can
discern. In fact, since the end of the cold war and in the past
30 years since the end of the Sino-Vietnamese war, the region
has been, by and large, at peace. Instead, I think that the
drivers of this military buildup are very much domestic, a
desire for national prestige, and an insecurity by the Chinese
Communist Party. Beijing wants to make good on unsettled
territorial claims, push out its maritime periphery, and
develop alternative pathways to break out into the open ocean.
China is behaving exactly as one might expect of great
powers. The only surprise is that anyone thought they would do
otherwise. But, that doesn't make their actions any less
destabilizing. And here's why. Since the end of World War II,
Asia has enjoyed relative security, underwritten, in large
measure, by our own military power and set of security
commitments. It is within that security cocoon that most Asian
nations, including China, have enjoyed peace, prosperity, and
increasing internal development.
Asia, by any measure today, is fast becoming the center of
gravity of international politics. Yet, China's rise is
beginning to change the sense of stability and security that
has allowed all of these positive changes to take place.
I will note that, just recently, our great Australia ally
issued a defense white paper that, not only raised concerns
about China's rising power, but also about our staying power in
the region. We, as a nation, want to see an Asia that continues
to grow and prosper peacefully, and our allies are looking to
us, as they always have, to ensure the peace, given the
potential for intense regional security competition. We must,
then, I think, not for any reasons of wanting to be overly
dominant, but we have to remain Asia's chief guarantor of
security for the near future.
And I think we have to view the disputes we're talking
about in this context, because both the dispute with the
Japanese, which I'll start with, and with the ASEANs, is about
much more than just commercial energy interests, although
energy interests come into play. This is about great power
competition, historical animosity, and the strategy of the
Chinese to find alternative resources and alternative supply
routes for energy, as well as breaking out into the open ocean.
First, national pride and suspicion of the United States
drive China to seek alternative sources and routes of oil
supply, preferably closer to the mainland in areas where China
can project military power. They no longer want to, over the
long term, rely upon our goodwill to protect their sea lines
that supply so much of their oil and gas.
Second, the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain resides within what China
calls the ``first island chain,'' a demarcation that runs from
the Yellow Sea near South Korea, through the South and East
China Seas, an area that includes Taiwan, the Ryukyu, as you
mentioned, and waters near Vietnam. China increasingly acts, at
least, as if they want to dominate this island chain for
defensive and offensive purposes--defensively, because they
don't like the activities of the United States and Japan so
close to their shorelines, offensively in the sense that they
want to--they see that as a way to break out into the Pacific.
Many Chinese believe that the United States-Japan alliance
operates too close to the PRC shoreline and is a part of a
containment strategy. This partly explains China's recent
harassment of the Impeccable, as well as its downing of the
United States surveillance aircraft at Hainan Island, that you
mentioned. Basically, China is asserting expansive territorial
claims as a part of a strategy to push us back. And I think
geopolitics and Chinese maritime strategy hold greater purchase
in China over the law. This is only adding to the Japanese
sense of security and a sense that they'll be economically
strangled and isolated.
Finally, I would say, about the Senkakus, that the dispute
over the EEZ claims also shed some lights about Japanese
concerns over the final disposition of Taiwan. For Japanese
strategists, Chinese control over Taiwan would put--potentially
put Chinese bases even closer to Okinawa and the Ryukyu
Islands, and extend the Chinese EEZ out even further, only
heightening Japan's sense of insecurity.
The South China Sea, I think, can be viewed in similar
ways, geopolitically. Also, it impinges on the interests of the
three great Asian powers--Japan, India, and China.
Let me move--since I'm running out of time, let me move--we
know Japan's concerns--let me move to India.
I think, last year, when it was revealed that China, in
fact, had built a base at Hainan Island that can both support
submarines, as well as surface combatants, and provide stealthy
outlet to the waterways, particularly the Strait of Malacca,
the Indians were very vocal, and have been very vocal since
then, that the Chinese are trying to find ways to enter into
the Indian Ocean and constructing a string of maritime bases
and facilities that include Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. So,
in my view, at the core of these disputes are the growing
Chinese might. In many ways, the disputes are a symptom of that
and a strategy to push out their maritime periphery.
We've talked a little bit about the U.S. position. I think
it's fine to stick to general principles regarding peaceful
resolution of territorial disputes and freedom of navigation,
it--even prudent, given that we want a cooperative relationship
with China, and the historical sensitivities involved. But, we
also have to be aware of the apparent desire of China to
dominate these seas and extent out its freedom--and extend its
freedom of action and impede our own. We must ensure that our
allies and friends have the strength and backing to stand up
against potential coercion. And we, ourselves, have to make
good on our diplomatic commitments. While we should intensify
our alliance to diplomacy and our diplomacy with China to
reassure them about our own intentions, there is no getting
around the fact about something that you mentioned in your
opening remarks, which is, we must properly resource our
military. There's almost a perfect symmetry between the Chinese
naval buildup and our own--that I described before--and our own
naval drawdown.
I have been asked to say a few words about the role of U.S.
sea power in maintaining the balance of power, and I do so
humbly, speaking before a former Secretary of the Navy and
entering into debates about force posture, which are always
contentious. But, let me first make this point, and that is,
our defense strategy in the Pacific should not be solely
focused on futuristic warfighting scenarios, or thought of even
as some kind of science-fiction scenario. Rather, given that
China has already changed the regional balance of power,
rebalancing should be a day-to-day task of our forces in the
Pacific.
One way to conceptualize this is, we need a force--a more
robust presence and engagement force in the region, and then a
surge force in case of conflict. And I'll speak about the
former, because I'm running out of time.
Our fleet, as you mentioned, has not been this small since
the early 20th century. While our capabilities are better than
the Chinese are, fleet size, given the tasks we have in the
region, everything from responding to humanitarian disasters to
building up partnership capacity to balancing China, our tasks
are just great.
Let me give a rough estimate of some naval requirements
that may be necessary in the Pacific, as we move forward.
Certainly, an increase in our submarine force so we can
maintain a near-constant presence in the East and South China
Seas, as well as the Sea of Japan. More submarines are
necessary to protect our carrier strike groups and patrol and
conduct ISR, as well as other types of antisubmarine warfare
capabilities.
Our missile and fleet defenses are currently inadequate, in
my view, to the growing Chinese innovations and ballistic
missile production, over-the-horizon targeting. Unfortunately,
we have come to a point where, if we want to keep our forward-
deployed carriers relevant, we need to focus more on protecting
them; and for that, we need all sorts of ISR assets in space,
as well as on board. While we need a layered missile defense,
the most promising defense in this regard is the directed-
energy type of weapons. Littoral combat ships can potentially
play an important role in maintaining a robust ASW presence, as
well as antisurface warfare capability in the littorals.
I'd close by saying you were quite correct when you noted
that we are in an odd position--you said this in some
statements I saw earlier--where the defense budget
announcements have been made before the administration has been
able to undergo its Quadrennial Defense Review. My fear--and I
urge the Congress to take a look at this--is that the
Quadrennial Defense Review will become just a matter of fitting
into the already-decided-upon budget cuts and program cuts.
Finally, I'd say I'm confident that diplomacy can succeed
in Asia and we can enjoy 30 more years of peace and prosperity,
as long as everyone knows that we can back up our commitments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blumenthal follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dan Blumenthal, Resident Fellow, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
Senator Webb, members of the committee, it is my honor to appear
before you here today. You should be applauded for holding this
important hearing and for paying attention to China's rise and growing
assertiveness along its maritime periphery.
It has been over a decade since you, Senator Webb, began writing
about this topic, and Chinese naval modernization has outpaced even the
most extravagant predictions. In the past decade, China has deployed 38
new diesel and nuclear submarines, a deployment rate of 2.9 subs per
year. In addition to its purchase of four Russian Sovremenny-class
destroyers it has deployed nine new classes of indigenously built
destroyers and frigates, equipped with lethal antiship cruise missiles.
Moreover, in addition to its extant deployment of over a thousand
ballistic missiles, the PLA has been developing a land-based antiship
ballistic missile equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles whose
purpose is to hit our own mobile surface ships, including the linchpin
of our power projection capability--the carrier battle group. We have
not seen anything quite like this naval buildup since the early cold
war. Nor has our Navy ever faced the threat of ballistic missiles
capable of hitting mobile targets at sea. And you are quite correct
when you write that the Chinese Communist Party is making concerted,
calculated attempts to enlarge China's ``regional strategic space.''
What drives this military buildup? It is not driven by threats to
China--by any objective measure, China does not face a military threat.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, China no longer must concern itself
with protecting its land borders from invasion. Since the end of the
cold war the region has, by and large, been at peace.
Instead, I would argue that China's military buildup is driven by
domestic factors, the desire for national prestige, and the insecurity
of the Chinese Communist Party. China is exhibiting behavior that we
would expect from a rising great power. The only surprise is that we
expected them to behave differently. The American public has been told
time and again by successive administrations and many experts that
China's rise would differ from the rise of all other great powers in
history. But this is simply not happening.
As China grows stronger and dedicates ever-more resources to its
military forces, Beijing wants to settle territorial disputes in its
favor, push out its maritime periphery, and develop alternative
pathways to break out into the open ocean. Indeed, one of the more
interesting developments within Chinese strategic circles is the
ongoing debate about the importance of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the
theorist of our own rise to international prominence, about which Mr.
Dutton's colleagues at the Naval War College have written so much.
Chinese navalists are beginning to grapple with how such concepts
as ``command of seas'' and the link between maritime power and
international commercial interests apply to the People's Republic.
We should not be comforted by the fact that China is behaving as
all rising powers do. Here is why: Since the end of World War II, Asia
has enjoyed relative security, underwritten in large measure by our own
military power and set of security commitments. It is within that
security cocoon that most Asian nations have enjoyed peace, prosperity,
and increasing democratization. Asia today, by almost any measure--
economic, political, demographic, and military--is fast becoming the
center of gravity of international politics. Yet China's rise is
beginning to change the sense of stability and security that has
allowed for increasing peace, prosperity, and democratization. As a
resident Pacific power, we want to see an Asia that continues to grow
and prosper peacefully. An Asia in which the United States is not seen
as the clearly predominant military power will inevitably be a less
stable Asia. An insecure region will be more concerned with security
competition than with trade, internal reforms, and regional
cooperation.
It is within that context that I wish to speak about the maritime
territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. Let me begin
with Japan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, since Japan has long
been, and remains, our key ally in the region.
Of all the regional territorial disputes, the Sino-Japanese quarrel
in the East China Sea is the most vexing, and perhaps most dangerous.
The dispute is grounded in great power competition, historical
animosity, the desire to exploit potential energy resources beneath the
sea, and concerns over the ultimate disposition of Taiwan. This
combination of issues is particularly volatile.
Both countries claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
and both include the islands in their EEZ/Continental Shelf claims.
From the Chinese perspective, the islands are important for reasons of
energy security as well as their expanding maritime ambitions.
Let me begin with energy security. Both countries make claims to
the Chunxiao gas field which China claims is 5km away from the Japanese
median line in the East China Sea. Currently, the Chinese energy
company CNOOC is the operator of the field, and energy experts estimate
that the Chunxiao could have as much as 250 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas and between 70-160 billion barrels of oil.
Since both Japan and China are committed to diversifying their
sources of their energy supplies, the natural gas and oil in the East
China Sea is of utmost importance to both.
An additional concern for China is the maritime distance between
its ports and its main oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf. Beijing is
increasingly uncomfortable about relying on U.S. goodwill to patrol
those waters. Both national pride and suspicion of the United States
drive China to seek alternative sources and routes of supply,
preferably closer to the mainland in areas where China can project
military power. The Chunxiao field is thus an important piece of
Chinese energy security strategy.
Another concern for Chinese strategists is that the Senkaku/Diaoyu
chain resides within what the Chinese call the ``first island chain,''
a somewhat arbitrary demarcation that runs from the southern Japanese
island of Kyushu, through the East and South China Seas. This area
includes Taiwan, the Ryukus of Japan, and virtually all of the South
China Sea. The Chinese increasingly act as though they want to dominate
this island chain. For Chinese strategists, there are defensive and
offensive purposes behind these claims.
The Chinese write of being boxed in by a United States-Japan
alliance that operates too closely to their own shoreline. Once
designed to hem in the Soviet Pacific fleet, the alliance is now,
Chinese strategists believe, part of an active containment strategy
aimed at China. This partly explains China's recent harassment of the
USNS Impeccable, as well as its downing of a U.S. surveillance aircraft
at Hainan Island in 2001. While the United States and China dispute
provisions of the Law of the Sea and what constitutes lawful operations
in China's EEZ, I doubt these issues will be resolved in the near
future. Geopolitics and Chinese maritime strategy hold greater purchase
over China's position than the law. Simply put, China wants to push the
United States back further and further away from its shoreline and its
claimed spheres of influence.
Many Chinese strategists believe that the PRC cannot be a great
power as long as the country is held within the maritime box
constructed by Tokyo and Washington. The alliance, which also protects
Taiwan, prevents the Chinese from projecting sea power into the Western
Pacific. From a defensive perspective, Chinese strategists are
committed to impeding U.S. access to this ``first island chain'' should
there be a conflict over Taiwan.
From the Japanese perspective, the Senkakus have been part of Japan
throughout modern history--Tokyo never ceded that territory, including
after losing World War II when it ceded much territory under the San
Francisco Treaty. As it stands, Japan administers the Senkakus--while
both China and Taiwan claim the island grouping to be theirs.
Japan has leased part of the island grouping from private owners,
intending to control any sale of territorial rights. Both Taiwan and
China protested this action. Around the same time in 2003, CNOOC
entered into a partnership to produce natural gas at Chunxiao.
Japan protested and demanded China turn over seismic data. While
Beijing remained intransigent, Japan granted the right to one of its
own oil companies to begin drilling in the East China Sea. China
responded by sending a naval flotilla, including a Soveremmeny to the
site and issuing a stern warning to Japan to stop any energy
exploration within ``China's'' territory. Japan did cease its work.
The Chinese flotilla sent to the East China Sea in 2005 has not
been the first show of China's maritime might. The Japanese
declassified documents demonstrating that Chinese military and civilian
research vessels and submarines had entered the Japanese EEZ over a
dozen times in 2004 and 2005. The purpose of these maritime incursions
included mapping for oil and gas exploration in disputed areas, showing
force to pressure Japan in the ongoing dispute, and conducting research
on submarine routes into and out of the Pacific.
We and the Japanese were quite concerned as well when a Chinese
Song-class diesel submarine surfaced a little too close for comfort
near the USS Kitty Hawk during an American exercise near Japan in
2007. The submarine had apparently been shadowing the Carrier Strike
Group undetected.
From the Japanese perspective, then, the Senkaku/East China Sea
dispute is about much more than energy interests and international law.
It is a manifestation of growing Chinese strength and assertiveness.
Japan has a long history of fearing economic strangulation and
isolation. Growing Chinese maritime power and shows of force are only
heightening these fears.
Finally, the dispute over EEZ claims and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
sheds some light on Japanese concerns over Taiwan. For Japanese
strategists, Chinese control over Taiwan would put China's naval bases
even closer to Okinawa and the Ryuku Island chain, and extend the
Chinese EEZ even further out toward the Pacific. The Japanese sense of
insecurity--already high given the instability on the Korean
Peninsula--would only heighten.
While the two sides came to some agreement in 2008 to jointly
explore for energy resources and shelve territorial disputes for the
time being. But given the dynamics I just explained, both sides are
keeping their powder dry.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The South China Sea disputes, including those over the Spratleys
and Paracels, must be similarly analyzed in a geopolitical context. The
dispute impinges upon the security interests of three great Asian
powers--Japan, India, and China--as well as some of our less powerful
allies and partners such as Vietnam and the Philippines.
In essence, China claims sovereignty over all of the South China
Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan dispute such claims,
particularly those of sovereignty and rights of exploration over the
islets around the Spratleys and the Paracels. As in the East China Sea,
all claimants to territory within the South China Sea believe that it
also holds significant oil and gas reserves. China has sparred with
Vietnam and with the Philippines over islands in the Spratlys and with
Vietnam over the Paracels. While China signed the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, regional actors do
not trust that China will abide by its commitments. Arguably, growing
Chinese power and assertiveness in this area were major drivers behind
Vietnam's desire to build closer security ties with us, and the
Philippines' desire to sign a Visiting Forces Agreement with us in
1999.
The South China Sea is also a pathway to the all-important Strait
of Malacca, considered to be one of the world's most important maritime
choke points and waterways for seaborne trade. Some 50,000 ships
carrying a quarter of the world seaborne trade, and half of the world's
seaborne oil pass through Malacca annually. Since 90 percent of China's
and most of Japan's oil comes by sea, it is natural that both countries
have abiding interests in their own definition of security in the
strait and the South China Sea.
Last year anxiety heightened in Southeast Asia, Tokyo, and Delhi
when the press reported on a new naval base that the Chinese have
constructed at Hainan Island; the base can accommodate attack and
ballistic missile submarines as well as a variety of surface
combatants. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can use the base
to deploy stealthily into the South China Sea and access international
waterways.
Southeast Asians are concerned about the potential for China to put
military pressure on them to settle their territorial disputes. Tokyo
is concerned about the Chinese potential to dominate the waterways and
coerce and isolate Japan.
The Indians are concerned for two reasons. First, the discovery of
the Hainan Island base adds to a growing Indian perception that the
Chinese are finding ways to enter the Indian Ocean and constructing a
string of maritime bases and facilities along the Indian Ocean--in
Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan--that it will use to project power
closer to what India defines as its own sphere of influence.
Second, India has been playing a larger economic role in Southeast
Asia in particular and wants unimpeded maritime access to the region.
It is concerned that what we are seeing develop for the region is the
Chinese-equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine.
REGIONAL REACTIONS
For now, all the concerned parties are attempting to balance
against China's growing power. Both Hanoi and Manila have sought closer
ties with us. Tokyo, a great power constrained in military matters only
by its pacifist constitution, has also energetically sought and
received an upgraded bilateral alliance. The breakthrough with India
was in no small part driven by shared Indian-American perceptions of
the maritime security environment.
In short, we share with our regional partners a desire that China
not become the hegemonic power. The question that many in the region
are beginning to have is whether we have the long-term will and power
to match China's rise.
And that leads me to my concluding remarks.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have not had a clear policy on competing claims within the South
and East China Seas, nor have we taken a clear position with respect to
the disposition of disputed islands. What we have said is that we will
protect freedom of navigation and rights in EEZs consistent with
international norms.
Sticking to general principles regarding peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes and freedom of navigation may be prudent given the
historical sensitivities involved and our desire to have a cooperative
relationship with China.
But at the same time we must be aware of China's apparent desire to
dominate the South and East China Seas, extend its maritime periphery
and freedom of action, and impede our access to these seas.
We must also ensure that our friends and allies have the strength
and backing to stand up against potential coercion, and that we
ourselves can make good on our diplomatic commitments.
We neither want to see a costly arms race in Asia nor an Asia
dominated by China to our exclusion. To accomplish these objectives we
should intensify our alliance diplomacy to reassure our allies that
they will not be coerced. We should demarcate clear redlines to China
regarding core principles of maritime behavior.
But there is no getting around the fact the we must properly
resource our military.
There is an almost perfect symmetry between China's naval buildup
and our own drawdown. China has deployed dozens of new submarines just
as we let our Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities atrophy. As China
deployed dozens of new subs we reduced our submarine force by about 25
boats.
The Chinese have not only noticed the imbalance, they are counting
on a continued decline in our naval power. China's Rear Admiral Yang Yi
gloated that ``China already exceeds the United States in [submarine
production] five times over . . . 18 [U.S. submarines--the amount
resident in the Pacific] against 75 or more Chinese submarines is
obviously not encouraging [from a U.S. perspective].'' The Chinese
admiral is spot on. U.S. boats are superior, though the quality gap is
closing. And the gap in quantity makes keeping track of the Chinese
fleet even more difficult.
I have been asked to say a few words about the role of U.S. sea
power in maintaining the balance of power. I do so humbly, both because
I am speaking to a former Secretary of the Navy and because I am aware
that entering into force posture debates is a perilous endeavor.
My institute convened a group of security and military experts to
take a close and comprehensive look at our global force requirements
ahead of the administration's QDR.
We examined Pacific requirements, and let me share some of our
findings.
First let me stress that our defense strategy in the Pacific should
not be solely focused on possible war-fighting contingencies. Given
that China has already changed the regional balance of power,
``rebalancing'' should become a day-to-day task of our forces. One way
to conceptualize our Pacific force requirements is to think about a
more robust presence and engagement force, and a surge force in case of
conflict. I will speak mostly about the former.
Our fleet size has not been this small since early in the 20th
century. While we have better capabilities and seamen, given the vast
expanse of the Pacific, fleet size matters. Our Pacific forces have
many tasks besides maintaining the balance of power--they build
partnership capacity, respond to natural disasters, and conduct
antipiracy missions, for example.
But let me focus on the China mission. A very rough estimate of
naval requirements in the Pacific would include an increased presence
of fast attack submarines (SSNs) to maintain a near constant presence
in the East and South China Seas as well as the Sea of Japan. More
submarines are needed to protect our Carrier Strike Groups, monitor
Chinese submarines on patrol, and conduct ISR operations. Additional
capability requirements include P8s and undersea sensors.
Our missile and fleet defenses are inadequate to the growing
Chinese innovations in ballistic missile production and over-the-
horizon targeting. Unfortunately, we have come to a point where, if we
want to keep our forward deployed carriers relevant, we need to focus
more on protecting them.
Useful capabilities to protect maritime assets include satellite-
launched detection systems linked to tracking radar; a near constant
presence of forward deployed ships capable of ballistic missile
defense; and intelligence capabilities to provide to at-risk ships
real-time indication and warning of anticarrier missile launches.
While we need a layered missile defense system, directed energy
remains the most promising means of defeating these threats,
particularly the ASBM. More forward deployed Littoral Combat Ships can
potentially play an important role in maintaining a robust ASW
capability and Anti-Surface Warfare capability in the littorals.
All of these capabilities will help us surge if we need to. If our
forces need to send more carriers to the region, measures to enhance
their survivability will render them more effective. More robust ASW
capability will provide us better freedom of action to execute
operations. I would say that we should equally emphasize the
survivability of our fixed land bases. We should create more logistical
hubs in more friendly countries to enable our air forces to surge into
the region. And, we must ensure that we have adequate stealthy aircraft
and tankers for missions that are sure to be some of the most complex
and stressing that we have ever faced.
You were quite correct, Senator Webb, when you noted that we are in
an odd position: Our defense budget has been announced before the Obama
administration has undergone its own QDR. I would urge the Congress to
make sure the administration's defense review is not simply a budget
cutting exercise.
Finally, I am confident that diplomacy can succeed and Asia can
enjoy more peace and prosperity as long as everyone knows that we can
back up our commitments. What is required is good old fashioned
American statecraft--speaking softly but carrying a big stick.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Mr. Blumenthal.
Dr. Cronin, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cronin. It's a privilege to address the committee--the
subcommittee on this issue, which is very close to my own work
and interests.
I would just preface my remarks with a point, after hearing
the discussion, that I'm suggesting a kind of two-pronged
approach. And one, of course, is military preparedness and
being ready to deal with whatever China has militarily, but
also that there is a need to engage with China and in a way
that tries to persuade China that its own long-term self-
interest is in playing by the rules of the game.
I think the Vietnam war, United States policy, United
States decision to get into Vietnam, did--it should have taught
us a lesson that we need to understand the psychology of our
adversaries, if you want to put it in that way, if we want them
to--and particularly if they want to change--we want them to
change their own behavior.
Now, that said, China's unilateral assertion of its
maritime claims that are contrary to principles of Law of the
Sea and its willingness sometimes to resort to force and
intimidation to achieve its goals have, indeed, become matters
of serious concern in Asia and the Pacific.
In terms of understanding where China may be coming from,
you know, and psychologically and otherwise, it is important, I
think, to keep in mind that, first, China does still feel the
humiliation of how the Western powers--Russia and India and
Japan occupied and alienated Chinese territory, and even some
of its South Asian--smaller Southeast--China Sea neighbors
encroached on China's position during the chaos of the Mao's--
Chairman Mao's cultural revolution.
But then, second, we should see China's actions in regard
to its--the spillover effect of being, until recently, the
fastest growing economy in the world, and its seemingly
insatiable demand for raw materials and energy.
I should also add that China's approach to territorial
disputes in the South China Sea follows the same pattern as in
disputes with Japan and its current moribund disputes with
North and South Korea. And I would like to add, for a personal
note, the same attitude also drives China's determination to
exploit the hydroelectric potential of the Mekong River without
regard to the interests of 60 million people, or more, in five
downstream countries for whom the river is their lifeblood and
main source of food security. That happens to be the main focus
of my work right now at the Stimson Center.
The United States isn't a party, of course--and we've gone
over this already, that--not a party to any of these
territorial disputes, but it does have strong interests at
stake.
The other--most of them have been mentioned, but I'd
particularly--I think you're interested--or expressed an
interest in issues like our commercial interest in regional
trade and investment, as well as just for general desire to
support peace and security--peace and stability in the region.
Also, the USA has other important interests in the region
that don't, sometimes, get mentioned, but in which China is a
real factor, and they include issues of climate change, global
warming, cooperative and environmentally sustainable
exploitation of migratory fish stocks, the protection of coral
reefs.
The fish-stocks issue is critically important, because it
affects food security, it has provoked clashes at sea, in some
cases, and it's very hard to have any kind of regional
agreement on managing fisheries, so long as the territorial
claims are unresolved.
The other witnesses have already talked about the Law of
the Sea Convention and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones
and the problems that are caused by China's not playing by the
same rules in this regard.
What I would like to mention, primarily, in terms of the
Law of the Sea Convention, is that there was a deadline of May
13, this year, for countries to submit claims. And there was a
land rush, or a sea rush, if you will. Everybody jumped in with
their claims. And that has put a higher--generated a higher
level of interest and tension about these issues.
The most controversial Chinese actions have been in the
Gulf of Tonkin and neighboring parts of the South China Sea,
where China repeatedly has drilled for oil and gas in areas
claimed by Vietnam, by historical occupation--which are
likewise claimed by Vietnam, both by historic occupation and
under the Law of the Sea rules.
Chinese ships also have forcefully prevented Vietnamese and
other neighboring countries' fishing boats from operating in
waters claimed by China.
We've talked about the challenge to the U.S. Navy. I won't
get into that, the incident with the Impeccable. But, obviously
that's an important issue for us.
I do want to mention other Southeast Asian disputes--
maritime disputes, which also use competing--also involve
competing claims. Thailand and Cambodia are now very active--in
a very active dispute over ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple
on a mountain that straddles their mutual border, as well as a
dispute over the boundaries of each other's territorial waters.
Troops of both countries have been involved in armed clashes.
The maritime disputes involves overlapping claims to oil
and gas reserves that Chevron and ConocoPhillips, among others,
are seeking to develop.
Thailand and Vietnam also have conflicting claims to parts
of the Gulf of Thailand, which is rich--has rich oil and gas
deposits. The gulf is particularly difficult to delineate
because it is bounded by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Vietnam. Everybody can't have a 200-mile EEZ in a curving
coastline.
Malaysia, on Borneo, also has a claim to part of the South
China Sea that is also claimed by Thailand, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and China.
A joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Law of
the Sea--we call it UNCLOS, for short, the U.N. Convention on
Law of the Sea--earlier this year provoked an angry response by
China and a counterclaim, which, however, was not supported by
reference to the provisions of the Law of the Sea, but, again,
by China's historical claim.
So, thus far, the direct and indirect impact of China's
behavior has mainly affected the opportunities for American and
other multinational countries for oil and gas exploration and
development, and blocks--and particularly blocs offered by
Vietnam.
Numerous claims report that China has--reports claim that
China has told American and other multinational companies that
if they want to do business with China in their oil and gas
business, they should not drill in areas in the Tonkin Gulf and
South China Sea that are claimed by Vietnam. This is a real
issue, as you know, in China-Vietnam relations.
For understandable reasons, United States multinational
energy companies are reluctant to publicize the problems
created by China's attitude toward contested claims. But, there
have been reports that in 2007 and 2008, China coerced
ExxonMobil, as well as BP, to suspend drilling in waters
claimed by Vietnam.
Part of my--important part of my testimony, I would say,
deals with environmental, social, and economic impacts, but I'm
going to skip by those to just try to identify some things that
the United States might do in regard to this issue and in
support of our allies and friendly countries.
There are several ways that the United States could serve
its and Southeast Asia's interests, especially through
diplomacy, science, and technology support, and capacity-
building to deal with the rising destruction from storms,
climate change, and climate change adaptation.
But, to pursue these issues in the context of China's
claims and role, it's important for the United States to be on
the scene, again. And I won't go into the long story of at
least the perception that the United States has been absent
from Southeast Asia for a long time, but it has come back, even
during the George W. Bush administration. In fact, Ambassador
Scot Marciel--or Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel was our
first Ambassador appointed to ASEAN back in 2007. And it
apparent--at present, the Obama administration, and especially
the State Department, appear to be stepping up the pace of
constructive U.S. involvement in the region. All Southeast
Asian capitals will be listening closely to what Secretary of
State Clinton has to say when she attends the ASEAN post-
ministerial conference between ASEAN and its dialogue partners
and the ASEAN Regional Forum in just a couple of days.
The United States would also help the region and itself by
responding to requests for material support to ASEAN's Coral
Triangle Initiative. I won't get into that now, but it's
another issue where ASEAN has had a lot of talk and no action.
But, part of that problem is a lack of financial resources and
other resources.
Just to conclude, I'd like to say that, at the end of the
day, China can't be pushed around. We have to engage with
China, and we are engaging with China, including at this high-
level United States-China Strategic Economic Dialogue issue.
And the important thing for us, I think, is to provide moral
support to our friends and allies in the region, but also,
again, to work on China to try to make China realize that we
can't be pushed around, either, and that its long-term
interests lie in the kind of neighborly relations that it
always insists that it desires with the ASEAN countries.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cronin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard P. Cronin, Director, Southeast Asia
Program, The Stimson Center, Washington, DC
Senator Webb and other members of the Subcommittee on East Asia and
Pacific Affairs, I thank you for this opportunity to address the
subcommittee about some issues in East Asia and the Pacific which are
critical to peace, stability, and balanced development in a part of the
world that matters greatly to the United States. For reasons you have
implied in your invitation to testify at this hearing, China's
unilateral assertion of maritime claims that are contrary to the
principles of the Law of the Sea, and its willingness sometimes to
resort to force and intimidation to achieve its goals, have become
matters of serious concern in Asia and the Pacific.
Nonetheless, if we hope to gain greater Chinese acceptance of the
rules and principles of global governance--none of which are completely
embraced by any major economic power--we should keep in mind at least
two important factors that have influenced China's approach. First,
China still feels the humiliation of how the Western colonial powers,
Russia, and Japan occupied and alienated Chinese territory. Even some
of its South China Sea neighbors encroached on China's position during
the chaos of Mao's Cultural Revolution, when Chinese attention was
focused inward. Thus, China remains determined to redress what it sees
as past injuries and reclaim what it views, rightly or wrongly, as its
own. This includes the position it once held as the dominant power in
what the world still calls the South China. Second, much of China's
assertive behavior is a spillover effect of what until just recently
had been the world's fastest growing economy.
Among other goals, China seeks to make its energy and mining
companies global players in terms of capitalization, technology, and
access rights to important national resources. It would be better for
China and its trading partners and competitors if its leaders
understood the efficiency of global markets and were not wedded to a
mercantilist approach to locking up energy and other natural resources
through long-term contracts, but China is not alone in this
competition.
Still, China's recent behavior does affect legitimate American and
Southeast Asian interests, including freedom of navigation, access to
rich undersea oil and gas deposits, and the cooperative and sustainable
development of other seabed resources, fisheries, and estuaries. The
consequences of China's behavior in the South China Sea in particular
jeopardize regional peace and stability, economic development,
traditional subsistence livelihoods, and food security among the other
countries of the littoral.
China's approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea
follows the same pattern as in disputes with Japan and its currently
moribund disputes with North and South Korea. The same attitude also
drives China's determination to exploit the hydroelectric power
potential of the Mekong River without regard for the interests of 60
million people or more in five downstream countries for whom the river
is their lifeblood and main source of food security. From its own
developmental perspective, Chinese policymakers appear to believe that
the outward expansion of the Chinese economy is beneficial to all, but
in this case the reality is far different. In any event, its behavior
toward its downstream neighbors is cavalier and unilateralist. I would
be glad to address those issues if you wish, but for now I will
concentrate on the South China Sea.
The United States itself is not party to any territorial disputes
in Asia, but we have a strong interest in the issues at stake. Also,
the while the United States has signed the Convention but has not
ratified it. Nonetheless, the United States adheres to the broad
principles of the Convention, which it played an important role in
drafting. Somewhat ironically, China has ratified the Convention but
appears to be seeking to impose its own interpretation as regards its
maritime territorial claims.
U.S. interests include the most basic ones such as regional peace
and stability, the right of innocent passage of U.S. warships, and
important commercial interests in regional trade, investment. China's
rejection of accepted international principles also extends to the air,
and contributed to the 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S.
reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter, and the crash landing of
the U.S. aircraft on Hainan Island.
At the global level we have a very important interest in the South
China Sea with regard to climate change and global warming, the
cooperative and environmentally sustainable exploitation of migratory
fish stocks and the protection of coral reefs. In fact, the U.S.
Government has been deeply and constructively engaged with China on
these issues.
With regard to maritime territorial disputes, I will address
primarily on so-called ``nontraditional security interests'' (NTS) such
as the impact of territorial disputes on economic development, food
security, livelihoods, and on American business interests in the South
China Sea and adjacent Southeast Asian waters.
IMPACT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION OF 1994
The importance and tenaciousness of conflicting claims to disputed
territories has grown steadily since the adoption in 1994 of The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the ``Law of the
Sea,'' which provides for 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) extending beyond a country's shore. The Convention also conveys
exclusive rights to the seabed resources of a nation's continental
shelf, subject to a 350-nautical-mile limit from the ``baseline'' (most
commonly the mean low water line on the shore) and 2,500 meters depth.
The growing tensions over conflicting territorial claims are being
driven by presumed seabed resources such as oil and gas and fisheries.
The energy sources have become increasingly valuable and easier to
extract because of technological advances in drilling and related
activities. The rapid decline open water fish stocks and resultant rise
in prices has threatened food security in some countries and made
jurisdiction over fisheries a source of actual conflict.
Most of the territorial disputes are more heated at this moment
because the UNCLOS required countries to submit formal claims by May
13, 2009. Several countries have already made formal complaints to
other countries' submissions, most notably by China.
Realistically, it is not possible to draw lines that would give
every country a 200-mile EEZ. This means that most of these disputes
will have to be settled by negotiations or unilateral actions.
CHINA AS THE COMMON DENOMINATOR IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND THE
MEKONG DELTA
Beijing has repeatedly asserted its sovereignty over almost the
entire South China Sea, and has acted forcefully to enforce its claims.
In 1974 China took advantage of the failing South Vietnamese Government
to attack islands in the Paracels group, which had been garrisoned by
South Vietnamese troops. The reunified Government of Vietnam maintains
the claims of the former Saigon government. In 1998 more than 70
Vietnamese sailors died in a clash between Chinese and Vietnamese ships
near Johnson Reef in the Spratlys in 1988. The Spratly Islands incident
of 1995 involved China's occupation of small reefs that are 130
nautical miles from the nearest Philippines land mass--well within the
Philippines internationally recognized EEZ, and 620 miles from China.
The 1995 incident at Mischief Reef provoked a collective reaction
among the ASEAN countries that appears to have taken China by surprise.
In response, China proposed joint development of undersea resources
until the issues are resolved. In fact, however, China still resolutely
refuses to enter into substantive multilateral discussions and has used
its superior power to enforce its claims unilaterally.
The most controversial Chinese actions have been in the Gulf of
Tonkin and the surrounding parts of the South China Sea, where China
has repeatedly drilled for oil and gas in areas claimed by Vietnam by
historical occupation and under UNCLOS rules. Chinese ships have also
forcefully prevented Vietnamese and other neighboring countries'
fishing boats from operating in waters claimed by China.
China is now directly challenging the U.S. Navy's rights to operate
in what it considers its EEZ. In March 2009, five small Chinese vessels
interfered with operations of a U.S. Navy survey ship, the Impeccable,
some 75 miles from the shore of China's Hainan Island. China claimed
that the Impeccable was violating its EEZ by conducting seabed survey
operations. Even when the U.S. ship turned fire hoses on the Chinese
boats they kept interfering with its forward movement. China also
threatened to send an armed patrol boat to protect the smaller craft
harassing the U.S. ship and support its jurisdiction over the Paracel
and Spratly islands.
OTHER SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES
A number of unresolved disputes include those between the countries
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Many of these
disputes involve competing claims on both land and sea. Some of the
more contentious ones include:
Thailand and Cambodia, including a now very active dispute
over ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple on a mountain that
straddles their mutual border as well as a dispute over the
boundaries of each other's territorial waters. The Preah Vihear
dispute is on the front boiler in both countries because of
Cambodia's stated intention to unilaterally request the site
and its surroundings as a World Heritage protected site. Troops
of both countries have been involved in armed clashes. The
maritime dispute involves overlapping claims to oil and gas
resources that Chevron and ConocoPhillips, among others, are
seeking to develop. The handling of this issue by the previous
Thai Government played a significant role in Thailand's ongoing
political turmoil.
Thailand and Vietnam also have conflicting claims to the
parts of the Gulf of Thailand, which has rich oil and gas
deposits. The Gulf of Thailand is particularly difficult to
delineate because it is bounded by Cambodia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Cambodia objected to a settlement
between Thailand and Vietnam.
Malaysia (on Borneo) also has a claim to part of the South
China Sea that is also claimed by Thailand, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and China. A joint submission by Malaysia and
Thailand to UNCLOS earlier this year provoked an angry response
by China and a counter claim which, however, was not supported
by reference to the provision of the Law of the Sea.
IMPACT OF CHINA'S BEHAVIOR ON THE ABILITY OF U.S. COMPANIES TO OPERATE
IN CONTESTED AREAS
Thus far the direct and indirect impact of China's behavior has
mainly affected the opportunities for American multinational companies
in oil and gas exploration and development in blocs offered by Vietnam
and other countries. This includes the direct operations of U.S.
multinationals as well as joint ventures with other multinational
companies and national oil and gas companies in Southeast Asia.
Numerous reports claim that China has told American and other
multinational companies that if they want to do business with China
they must not drill in areas of the Tonkin Gulf that are claimed by
Vietnam.
Vietnam's oil and gas production has flattened out and probably
cannot be increased without the participation of multinational
companies. Unless Vietnam and China reach some kind of agreement,
Vietnam has little prospect of exploiting some of the most promising
oil and gas fields in areas that it claims as territorial waters or
EEZs. Beijing has the upper hand, and has been able to pressure
multinational oil companies operating in China to stop their survey and
drilling operations in valuable leases given by Vietnam.
For understandable reasons U.S. multinational energy companies are
reluctant to publicize problems created by China's attitude toward
contested claims, but Beijing reportedly has successfully intimidated
multinational energy companies from drilling in contested areas. In
2007 and 2008 China reportedly coerced ExxonMobil as well as BP to
suspend drilling in waters claimed by Vietnam.
Piracy also remains a problem for U.S. and other countries'
shipping companies. As in the case of Somalia, the destruction caused
to coastal fisheries by large commercial factory-scale fleets may be
contributing to the piracy in the South China Sea and the Strait of
Malacca. In recent years, entire ships with cargoes have disappeared
and reappeared under different names and flags, and pirates have
boarded ships in the Strait of Malacca and held hostages for ransom.
Beginning with a 2004 agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore, and support to sea-lane monitoring by the U.S. Navy, these
incidents have been trending downward in the last few years.
Still, there is a long history of piracy among the Indonesian and
Philippine Islands, and parts of Malaysia's coastline on Borneo. As the
potential for legitimate fishing declines, and as the rampant
destruction of tropical forests reduces valuable timber cargos, groups
with a history of involvement in piracy could return to their previous
occupations.
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIOECONOMIC, AND HUMAN SECURITY IMPACTS
Among many negative consequences of these unresolved territorial
disputes, they pose a significant obstacle to the cooperative and
sustainable management of the resources of the South China Sea. Various
proposals for cooperative efforts to manage fisheries, protect coral
reefs, and control the negative impacts of deforestation, mining and
urban runoff thus far have been nonstarters.
The rampant overexploitation of fisheries throughout the South
China Sea and adjacent waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans
threatens the collapse of important food species. Littoral states
cannot control what happens on the high seas but if these disputes
could be resolved, countries would have at least the right, even if not
the power, to manage their own EEZs.
A number of maritime disputes directly hinder economic development
and, at least the possibility of responsible and environmentally and
sustainable development. The disputes between Thailand and Cambodia and
between China and Vietnam harm the development interests of the weaker
parties. Moreover, if Cambodia, for instance, could develop offshore
and inshore oil and gas deposits, its government might not feel the
same compulsion to resort to destructive hydropower dam projects in
currently protected forests in the Cardamom Mountains and on the Mekong
mainstream. At present, the high cost of electricity in Cambodia is one
of several major obstacles to development.
POTENTIAL U.S. ROLE IN SUPPORTING PEACE AND STABILITY
Even though it is not a direct party to these maritime disputes,
there are several ways that the United States could serve its own and
Southeast Asia's interests, especially through diplomacy, science and
technology support, and capacity building to deal with rising
destruction from storms and climate change adaptation. The means to
pursue these objectives can include:
More regional involvement, especially in support of ASEAN. It is
widely viewed in the region and among observers and policy analysts
both here and elsewhere that with a few important exceptions the United
States has been conspicuously absent from the main currents in
Southeast Asia for several decades. Thanks in particular to the
sometimes unpopular efforts of the officials at our embassies and
consulates in the region to get greater attention from Washington, this
has been changing since the last years of the Bush administration. The
appointment concurrently of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and Pacific Bureau, Scot Marciel, as our first Ambassador to
ASEAN in 2007 is a good example of the positive trend in U.S. attention
to Southeast Asia.
At present, the Obama administration and especially the State
Department appear to be stepping up the pace of constructive U.S.
involvement in the region. All Southeast Asian capitals will be
listening closely to what Secretary of State Clinton has to say when
she attends the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) between ASEAN
and its ``dialogue partners'' and the ASEAN Regional Forum, in just a
couple of days. The expectation is that she will bring a new U.S.
initiative, probably regarding support to climate change adaptation and
related issues that affect human and food security.
The United States could also help the region and itself by
responding to requests for material support to ASEAN's Coral Triangle
Initiative. The ``Coral Triangle'' covers a vast area of sea between
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste,
and the Solomon Islands. Host to thousands of fish species worth many
billions of dollars a year, the Coral Triangle is under increasing
assault from destructive methods used by large commercial fishing
fleets--including those of China, South Korea, and Japan and other
major seafaring countries--as well as deforestation, and pollution
runoff from the land. As with many ASEAN projects, this one has seen
more grand commitments than action, but none of the countries have the
necessary resources to carry out their commitments. This would be an
appropriate project for cooperation with Australia, which has major
concerns about this issue and has special relationships with Papua New
Guinea (PNG), Timor Leste and the Solomons.
The United States can help resolve maritime disputes between
willing nations through support to research on undersea structures and
resources, and the collection of data. Initiatives such as these might
possibly help countries make a better case to China, and even help it
make concessions without appearing to lose face.
Directly Asserting U.S. Rights and Interests. Above all, the Obama
administration should abandon its predecessors' passive attitude since
1995 toward Chinese behavior in the Spratlys and elsewhere that is not
supportable under the principles of the Law of the Sea. The Obama
dministration should lend at least moral support to Southeast Asian
countries which are subject to intimidation, and be resolute in
asserting its own rights to free passage in the face of Chinese
provocations.
It can do this in the framework of the United States-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The upcoming meeting in Washington
during July 27-28 follows closely the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
and the PMC and ARF meetings in Phuket, Thailand, during July 17-23.
Secretary of State Clinton should return from that meeting after
getting firsthand knowledge of the concerns of China's neighbors.
Unfortunately, in regard to maritime disputes in the South China
Sea, Beijing has put itself on the wrong side of international law and
norms. For U.S. and other diplomacy to have any chance of positive
impact, however, China's perspectives on maritime territorial disputes
and its power in most cases to enforce its claims need to be kept in
mind. The only approach that realistically has a chance to succeed is
for China to realize that a more flexible approach is in its own long-
term self-interest as well as that of its neighbors.
The U.S. Congress can play an important and constructive role by
holding hearings such as this one to highlight these issues and by
authorizing and funding, after due deliberation, important new U.S.
initiatives toward ASEAN and Southeast Asia more generally. U.S.
attention need not, and should not, be polarizing, or aimed at
stigmatizing China. That simply will not work. Instead, we should make
every effort to respect China's aspirations for leadership and major
power status, but within the internationally recognized rules and
norms, and support those of our Southeast Asian allies and friends as
well.
Thank you very much for the privilege of testifying at this
hearing. I would be happy to try to answer any questions you may have
or respond subsequently for the record.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Dr. Cronin.
And that was actually a very good way to end the testimony
of all three of the panelists, all of which I appreciate very
much.
I'd like to comment about something you said, about 2
minutes ago, and then clarify my view of what this hearing is
all about, and then maybe we can have a discussion. We've got
three very divergent sets of experience that we can draw on.
One of the worries that I personally have had for a number
of years goes into what you just said, Dr. Cronin, and that is,
if we don't have enough discussion in the United States
Congress about East Asia--whether it's Northeast Asia or
Southeast Asia--in a proactive way--we have fallen into big
notions, either reacting to crises, like we saw in Burma last
year, or talking about the economic relations with China, which
seems to dominate the discussion, and every now and then we
kind of talk around the edges. And it's very important, I
think, to have the kind of discussion we're having today. This
is not a hearing that is designed to bash China; it's a hearing
that is designed to raise issues that aren't being discussed.
And you cannot resolve problems if you don't discuss them. And
that particularly goes for the United States Government in the
situation where we find ourselves in with respect to our
relations with China, and also with East Asia.
And this is more than the situation of the United States
and China, it's very much a question of how we are able to
resolve our relationship in a way that maintains a proper
balance in this region----
Dr. Cronin. Right.
Senator Webb [continuing]. And in a way that all the
countries in the region can have the opportunity to grow at
their own pace and to interact without fear of retribution. And
it's a delicate balance. East Asia has always been a delicate
balance. The interests of China are there, Japan are there, the
United States, and Russia. It's very unique in the world, in
that sense. So, I want to clarify, really, what we're after,
today.
I'd like to throw something to the panel, to have all of
you react to, and I would start by--this is kind of a segue
from what I just said, but it comes from Professor Dutton's
testimony. When you mentioned that, ``With respect to what's
been going on, this unsettling development suggests that our
regional partners also sense a shift in power dynamics in the
South China Sea, and may need more reassurance that we are
currently giving them that, that the United States remains
fully committed.'' This, to me, is sort of a--the jugular
issue, from my perspective, with the subject matter of these
hearings today. And I'd like to hear from all three of you with
respect to that.
And, Professor Dutton, you may as well start.
Professor Dutton. Well, thank you, sir.
In my line of work, I do a fair amount of traveling
throughout East Asia, and we have students of the Naval War
College throughout East Asia. And two things are common in
almost every conversation. One is the sort of dominating
presence of China in all aspects of East Asian society, and
sort of questioning American--the continued American commitment
to East Asia in light of our current challenges--economic and
military--and then also in light of the fact that our
relationship with China is, in many ways, very cooperative. I
want to emphasize that, as well. It's very cooperative and also
very entwined. We are linked in many ways with China, and so,
there--leads, frequently, to questioning whether we would
prioritize the interests of our friends and allies in the
region as highly as they would if chips were down and if we had
to essentially stand behind them in a controversy with China.
That's the kind of talk that I hear in--with relative
frequency.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Mr. Blumenthal.
Mr. Blumenthal. I noted two things in my oral remarks. One
was that possibly our greatest ally in the world, besides
Britain, Australia, is becoming much more public about their
very deep concerns with respect both to China's military
modernization, as well as our staying power and our presence in
the region. And those things came out very clearly in the
Australian white paper. And I would take that as a barometer,
as an indicator, because a few years ago in Australia, things
weren't--things were the opposite, where we were--we were more
concerned about a hypothetical situation in Northeast Asia,
where Australia wouldn't be at our side because of Australian
commercial interests. Again, the change in Canberra is just
dramatic, and, I think, exacerbated by the fact that the head
of Rio Tinto in China has been arrested this week, and I think
you get the same--you get the same reactions in Tokyo. You've
seen the way the Vietnamese--I would say one of the drivers
that lead us back into a Visiting Forces Agreement with the
Vietnamese was Chinese behavior with respect to the Spratlys
and Paracels, as well as--sorry, the Visiting Forces Agreement
with the Philippines and--but, the Vietnamese reach out to us.
But, again, I think that there is a sense--I think there is a
sense, based on looking at our fiscal situation and based--
looking at our budgetary situation, and based on the fact that
we already have had to cut down on some military-presence
activities, there is a sense of who's going to be in the region
longer, China or the United States? And I think countries are
already starting to make that calculation.
And that's why I also wanted to stress that, sometimes when
we talk about China and Chinese military modernization, we talk
about it as if it's some kind of scientific, futuristic
scenario, next-door-itis or something like that. For our allies
in the region, it's very much a today problem, a daily problem.
And therefore, I would start to think about it in terms of what
we need to do day to day to keep the balance of power in Asia
in order to avoid conflict, and then conceptually put aside
what would happen if we actually got into conflict.
So, we do tend to think that it's unthinkable that
something could happen in Asia, and our allies are not on the
same page about that. And I think we really need to start to
show them that, you know, we're serious, and not only through
diplomacy and through other means, but also through the
military presence to back it up.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin.
Dr. Cronin. Yes, thank you, Senator Webb.
Frankly, for openers on this, your question, I don't think
the real issue right now, and even in the fairly distant
future, is about the ability of the U.S. Navy to, you know,
deal with the Chinese Navy, if it comes to that, and as Dan
says, you know, the sort of unimaginable situation. That's not
true of our allies and friends in the region, who are, you
know, much weaker in that particular sphere.
But, I want to go back to your issue--the point you made
about the need for balancing. And I think there are two aspects
to this, some of which I think you were perhaps alluding to
already--one is this issue of, you know, maintaining a proper
military balance. And I think--I sort of trust that the U.S.
Defense Department and the Navy and the Obama administration
will take care of that without too much difficulty. But,
there's the other issue of balance, and that has to do with
this economic crisis, the economic crisis, and the need to
rebalance the economies--the United States economy and the
Chinese--China's economy and those of Southeast Asia, which are
more export-oriented, and we're more import-oriented. And we've
now seen that this is an unsustainable kind of situation so
that each side has to make some painful adjustments. And these
adjustments that are needed are going to create difficulties in
our relations with China. But, on the other hand, they will
strengthen us, in time, I believe, if we can make this
adjustment. It's also a problem for our allies and friends,
trading partners in Southeast Asia, a bigger problem, perhaps,
than it is for China, although politically, it's maybe a bigger
problem for China, in terms of internal politics.
So, I think what's--the big picture here is that the United
States and China's roles are--we're still interdependent--
economically interdependent, and actually interdependent in a
lot of other areas; for instance, we need China to help us deal
with North Korea through the six-party talks. We need China to
help keep peace in the Strait of Taiwan. There are a lot of
reasons why China, you know, is an important country to us.
So, it goes back to the issue of engagement, and then it
goes back to the issue of--particularly of rebalancing our
economies and rebalancing our political relations.
And to go back to an issue of my interest, which wasn't
exactly the South China Sea, but--take, for instance, this
Mekong River issue and China's monster dams it is building in
Yunnan, which are very threatening to Vietnam and other
countries in the region. You know, the Chinese need to ask
themselves, and we need to help the Chinese ask themselves,
``If you turn the Mekong into the Yangtze, is that going to
help your interests in the longer term?'' No, I think there's
an enormous prospect for blowback. I just spent 3 weeks--just
came back a week and a half ago from almost 3 weeks in
Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and had a number of high-level
meetings. And I also got down to the Vietnam Delta for the
first time, to Can Tho, where I gave a presentation. And, you
know, this is an issue that is alarming all of these
governments. Maybe the Cambodian Government less so, but there
are people in the Cambodian Government who are quite alarmed
about it. So, it's an issue where we can engage with China, and
we can also engage with these regional countries to help them
in various ways to deal with this concern.
Senator Webb. Let me, if I may, offer a quick reaction to
your comment about balance, because I think that's really what
we need, in many different ways, here. In terms of military
balance, a long time ago, a mentor of mine said that,
``Strategy is like birth control, that the possibility of an
incident increases if you cease to take the necessary
precautions.''
Dr. Cronin. Exactly. [Laughter.]
Senator Webb. And this is really----
Dr. Cronin. Yes.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Where we are with the sizing of
our military. And a big part of a military presence is the
credibility that it implies. It's been written many, many
times, that there's a difference between a maritime presence
and a sea-power presence, which----
Dr. Cronin. Right.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Creates a credible deterrence--
in fact, I see Professor Dutton rolling his eyes. There's a
great piece in the ``Naval Review.'' I'm going to really date
myself here. The ``Naval Review'' in 1972, there was a German
admiral, named Wegner, who wrote a wonderful piece defining
``sea power.'' If you can ever dig back in the archives and get
it, it's one of the best strategic pieces I've ever read.
The other part, in terms of economic balance, we have a
serious vulnerability in our relationship with China that feeds
a lot of the anxieties on these other issues, but there's also
an issue of economic balance in the region. And this is one of
the things that I'm concerned about. And we don't discuss it
enough here in the United States. And we are the only guarantor
to provide some sort of a credible umbrella under which these
other countries in the region can successfully grow their
economies without intimidation. So, that's really one of the
things that has been a concern of mine.
Dr. Cronin, you mentioned in your testimony, ``The United
States is not a party to any territorial disputes in Asia, but
several allies and important friendly countries are.'' Could
you--or, have you covered that in your testimony? If not, I'd
like to hear more about it.
Dr. Cronin. Well, I didn't go into the United States angle,
in particular, but I talked about Thailand----
Senator Webb. So, you're talking about----
Dr. Cronin [continuing]. Cambodia----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Countries in the region----
Dr. Cronin [continuing]. Vietnam----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Rather than----
Dr. Cronin. But, you know----
Senator Webb [continuing]. External----
Dr. Cronin [continuing]. Japan--if you go to Northeast
Asia, Japan and Korea. Thailand's an ally. Australia has an
interest in these issues. But, I'm just saying that the actual
seabed claims are--or, EEZ claims--are of interest--deep
interest to us. But, they're not our claims.
Senator Webb. You're not aware of any of those external
countries having specifically stated a position on issues like
the Spratlys and the Paracels? I'm personally not. I was
wondering if you had heard----
Dr. Cronin. No, I think most countries, apart from the
claimants----
Senator Webb. Right.
Dr. Cronin [continuing]. Take the same position we do. I do
feel, though, that--and I think someone else mentioned this
earlier--that we had been too passive in 1995 about that issue.
We did the same thing with the assertion by Japan, in this
case, that the disputed islands with China were part of
Okinawa. In fact, we handed them back to Japan. Before we
handed back Okinawa, we had to actually use them, ourselves,
for some minor purposes, you know, military exercises, et
cetera. That--when it came down to it, the State Department
initially said, when this came up several years ago, that, yes,
we--we didn't have a--we didn't have an opinion on this issue,
but we actually--in practice, we had actually handed back these
islands as part of the Okinawa return.
I'm not sure if I've gotten to your--all of your question,
but----
Senator Webb. You did. I'm----
Dr. Cronin. OK, thank you.
Senator Webb. I was just curious as to--maybe I was missing
something, in terms of parties external to the conflict----
Dr. Cronin. Yes.
Senator Webb [continuing]. That were allies of ours, that
had taken a specific position. But, I'm not aware that there
are any----
Dr. Cronin. No, I'm not----
Senator Webb. I don't think there are.
Dr. Cronin [continuing]. I'm not, either. Thank you.
And the other thing I should mention, related to this,
though, is that whether you're talking to the Vietnamese or the
Thais or other people--other countries in the--Southeast Asia,
yes, they want the United States to be there, they want the
United States to maintain balance, military balance in the
region, but they don't want the United States to get into a
confrontation with China that leads them to--you know, puts
them in a position of being the mouse that gets trampled by the
elephants. I mean, that's an exaggeration. But, the main point
is, what the Vietnamese are looking for is advice from us,
``How can we engage China in a nonprovocative way and actually
get some headway with them? How do we get their attention in a
way that just doesn't get''----
Senator Webb. I would say that--frankly, I think there's a
great concern in the Vietnam Government about this. It's been--
--
Dr. Cronin. Yes.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Communicated to me directly. And
they believe they have economic issues that are at risk because
of the imbalance. I think that's----
Dr. Cronin. But, if I could----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Something that would be----
Dr. Cronin [continuing]. Mention, also, that--sorry.
Senator Webb. That's OK.
Dr. Cronin. Prime Minister Abhisit, from Thailand, and
Prime Minister Dung, from Vietnam, just met, last weekend, and
one of the main points in the communique was concern about
peace and stability in the region, but particularly, in this
case, the Mekong issue. And I think that there's a growing
concern, both about the South China Sea and about some of the
other areas where China, you know, flexes its muscles in a way
that makes a lot of people worried.
Senator Webb. I don't think there's any doubt about that.
And as Mr. Blumenthal mentioned, the Burma situation--I think
it was Mr. Blumenthal, I think, on the--in testimony, about the
perceived activities of--naval activities of China in the
Indian Ocean and beyond. I mentioned, in my opening remarks,
the more than a billion-dollar oil pipeline deal that the
Burmese just entered into with the Chinese, which would obviate
the need to go through the Strait of Malacca and would increase
an already dramatic economic presence of China in Burma.
At least two of you have something of a disagreement in
terms of future growth of the Chinese Navy. Professor Dutton,
you're--as a naval officer, you basically are fairly saying
what about that? You were saying you don't see that the Chinese
Navy has a reason to expand. And I think, Mr. Blumenthal, you
had a different view. Would the two of you like to clarify
that?
Professor Dutton. Well, it's kind of a qualified statement
that they don't have a reason to expand. But, I--fundamentally,
I see China as what the great geostrategist Mackinder would
call it, an ``inner crescent'' power. And what that means is
essentially a continental power with a naval--with a need for a
navy to support its continental presence. And its naval power
will develop in order to meet the needs of its growing trade
and regional interests, but probably not developed to the
extent to challenge a truly maritime power from the ``outer
crescent,'' like the United States, Britain, Japan once was.
These states, like ours, are fundamentally maritime in nature,
and we must, in order for our security--maintain the size and
quality of the navy to exert global influence in the maritime
commons.
China, because of its continental situation, will always
have weaknesses on its land front. As we've seen recently, some
of them are even internal, others are the potential rise of
other powers on the continent, that they have to be concerned
about. They cannot afford to put the kind of resources into a
navy that we can afford to put into it, we must afford to put
into a navy, in order to maintain our national security, would
be my essential argument in that regard.
Senator Webb. Mr. Blumenthal.
Mr. Blumenthal. One of the most interesting debates going
on in China has been well documented by Peter Dutton's
colleagues at the Naval War College, and that's the fascination
with Alfred Thayer Mahan, which is gaining great currency in
Chinese naval circles. And we can, as Americans, debate what
command of the sea means, or maritime versus sea power, but
more interesting is that the Chinese are debating that. And
what you get out of--what you get out of them on that is that--
for reasons of national prestige and national pride, as well as
deep-felt insecurity, partly for the reasons that Richard
Cronin mentioned about humiliations and depredations of the
past, and a mistrust of the United States, they believe,
however--you can interpret Mahan however you want, but they
believe that they must look seaward. Most of their oil and gas
comes from the sea. Shanghai and so many of the other seas that
are at least close to the sea get most--export and import most
of their goods in and out of the sea. And you'll get writings
that are serious and authoritative from Chinese navalists, that
they must break out of this box that they call the ``first
island chain'' that the United States and Japan are
constructing around them. That's part of the reason driving
them toward their claims on Taiwan. That's part of the reason
driving them toward their claims in the Senkakus. Again,
defensively, they feel boxed in, and they feel that they have
to deny us access to that area, in case of a conflict, Taiwan.
But, there are also offensive purposes behind that.
They have--you mentioned the surfacing of the Song near the
Kitty Hawk. But, there has been mapping and service--and other
oceanographic and maritime activities all the way up to Guam.
Now, again, part of that is defense. I think Admiral Keating,
the head of PACOM, made the comment to you about the Chinese
joking, ``Ha, ha, ha, let's divide up the Pacific. We take up
to Hawaii, and you can have the rest.'' But, you know, the
Chinese Navy aren't a bunch of jokers. I mean, they're serious
people. And this is--you know, this is--at least informs their
decisionmaking.
On the other side, because so much of their--of the other
ocean, the Indian Ocean, because so much of their sea and--so
much of their oil and gas and trade comes from the Persian Gulf
and Africa, they want to--they want to project military power;
meaning being able to protect convoys, if need be, meaning
being able to retaliate, in case their supply is disrupted.
They want to be able to project military power into the Indian
Ocean. And they're actually quite clear about that. And the
Indians--and I'll just conclude by saying that, while the
Indians don't take a particular position on any of the claims
we're talking about, if you believe that these disputes are
symptomatic of a Chinese strategy and a growth in power rather
than the problem itself--and I think the Indians do--then they
do take a position with regard to growing Chinese activity in
the South China Sea. A base at Hainan Island from which--from
where they could get into the Malacca Strait and out into the
Indian Ocean, and these naval facilities from Sri Lanka to
Burma and Guam--to Burma and Pakistan.
Senator Webb. I would say the jury is probably out, but the
data points seem to be there. If you look at other continental
powers that wanted to become world powers--you look at the
German model, you look at the Soviet model--both of those
countries consciously decided to grow a navy, even though all
their lines of communications were internal at the time they
did. The Soviet Union didn't--I think, if you go back to 1946,
and you look at the size of the Soviet Navy, it was basically
whatever they had taken from the Germans at the end of World
War II. They didn't have a navy. And by the time I was
Secretary of the Navy, they had a huge navy, but most of it--
the preponderance of its power being in Northeast Asia. The--I
think, obviously, the thing to watch is whether China intends
to develop a carrier force, the concept of a carrier battle
group, and what it intends to do with it. We can accept the
emerging economy of China, and hopefully deal with that in a
very positive way. They're very active in South America,
they're active in Africa. But, it'll be interesting to watch
that.
Let me ask one final question for the panel. We haven't
really discussed this, but, with the activities of China
recently in the relocation of the United States--or the planned
relocation of much of the United States military into a Guam/
Tinian access, how do you see Japanese defense policy evolving?
We can let Mr. Blumenthal start, and I'd be happy to----
Mr. Blumenthal. Yes. Japanese defense policy is evolving in
a certain direction, for many reasons, the first of which is
probably the failure to resolve to their liking the North Korea
nuclear question and the fact that there's now another nuclear
power close to them. And so, I would point out that there's a
lot of work that went into upgrading the alliance over the last
8 or 9 years, much of it focused on ballistic missile defense.
The Japanese certainly showed that, when the alliance is going
well, they can do things that otherwise they would claim their
constitution prohibits them from doing, whether it was
supporting our forces in Operation Enduring Freedom or
Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the Indian Ocean it's actually
having some troops in Iraq, to doing peacekeeping missions.
But, in terms of the China-North Korea question that they're
very much focused on BMD right now, and they do have a question
of fiscal resources--I would note that, for the first time,
they've openly, inside the Liberal Democratic Party, started a
working group and a study group on independent conventional
strike. It's well known that they're interested in the F-22, if
that remains alive. Obviously, there's a lot of questions as to
whether their system can handle that. But, you know, frankly,
the fact that North Korea's tested ballistic missiles around
them has prompted this.
And the fact--one thing that we didn't talk about is--and
I'll close on this--is the fact that the Chinese have not only
made claims in the Senkakus, but have, in fact, sent maritime
vessels, including a submarine, I believe, a Sovremenny class
destroyer, where the Japanese actually had to chase them out.
So, both of these--the sense of threat is rather high, the
sense of assurance in the alliance is not where it used to be,
and the Japanese can turn, as we've seen, historically, pretty
quickly into a much more militarized country.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin, would you like to----
Dr. Cronin. Well, yes, I actually would, Senator, because I
was in Tokyo in the runup to the first North Korea's missile
launch, and I must say, it reminded me of Henny Penny, ``The
sky is falling.''
Senator Webb. You mean in 1998, you're talking about?
Dr. Cronin. No, the last----
Senator Webb. Oh, this last one?
Dr. Cronin. This last one.
Senator Webb. I was actually there in 1998, when the North
Koreans fired the first one. But----
Dr. Cronin. Yes, OK. And the thing that I found so much
dismaying was to hear Japanese politicians posturing on that
issue, but not really having anything concrete to say. I think
Japan's own defense planning is very reactive, and obviously,
as Dan has already pointed out, you know, BMD will be a big
area that they'll continue to work--to press on in. But, you
know, why they want an F-22, I--it just--it's--it makes you
wonder what the basis for a lot of their planning is.
And I think the bottom line, ultimately, is--well, first of
all, to go to your question, I don't think our moving from--
Marines from Okinawa to Guam will make any difference, in terms
of China's role and perceptions of the alliance, particularly
since those forces were always earmarked for other things, I
think, than that.
But, the other thing is, look at the--you know, I look at--
go look at the money. Where's the money? And----
Senator Webb. If I may, on that point----
Dr. Cronin. Yes.
Senator Webb [continuing]. My point really was to the
effect of how it would impact Japan, the----
Dr. Cronin. Oh, yes.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Relocation, not having the
American forces there, rather than China. But----
Dr. Cronin. I think, in a very mixed way. I mean, the--a
lot of people would be glad to see the Marines go, particularly
in Okinawa. But, at the same time, yes, it does make--it may
make the Japanese more anxious, in general, but I'm not sure,
because of the nature of the forces that are being moved, that
I think the issue for the Japanese now is ballistic missile
defense, air--control of the air, and sea--and defense against
submarines, that sort of thing.
But, the--I guess the dismaying thing is simply that
they're still hovering around 1 percent of GDP. GDP is falling
now. And----
Voice. We're heading there ourselves.
Dr. Cronin. Yes, right. So, they don't seem to be able to
prioritize in a--what I would say is a very systematic way, and
particularly with--in terms of--I think cooperation between the
United States and Japanese military is great. I mean, there's
no question about that. But, in terms of their own planning, in
terms of their own concept of their national defense, I'd defer
to others who have more insight into that than I do. I'm kind
of bewildered.
Senator Webb. Professor Dutton, you get the final word.
Professor Dutton. Yes, I think so, thank you.
I do want to point out that it is the technology edge that
we maintain, both naval technology and airforce, space
technology, et cetera, that is the strategic balancer in East
Asia. And so, to follow up on the point about--it is the type
of the forces that matters, I think, in that it will not be
that big of a strategic shift, from the perspective of the
Japan and China, is important. But, it does underscore our need
to maintain the strength of our fleet, the strength of our air
power, and the strength of our cyber and space power in East
Asia, because technology is our edge.
The strategic balancing is provided by two things, by
strategic mass and strategic maneuver, and the way we do that
in the region is through technology.
Senator Webb. Gentlemen, I thank you all for your
testimony. I think it was a great hearing. And I hope we're all
on the same page, in that what we're after here is the proper
communications in the region and maintaining the kind of
balance that'll allow the United States to remain involved, but
also to allow third countries, who we don't discuss often
enough, to have the right kind of economic growth and balance,
themselves.
And the hearing record will be open until tomorrow night in
case any Senators would like to ask any questions.
Senator Webb. But, now the hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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