[Senate Hearing 111-118]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-118
DEVELOPING A COORDINATED AND SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Menkhaus, Dr. Ken, professor of political science, Davidson
College, Charlotte, NC......................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Scribner, Shannon, senior policy advisor on humanitarian
response, Oxfam America, Washington, DC........................ 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
(iii)
DEVELOPING A COORDINATED AND SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D.
Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Kaufman, Isakson, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. This hearing will come to order. On
behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African
Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing entitled
``Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable U.S. Strategy for
Somalia.'' I'm honored that I will be joined by the ranking
member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I'll invite
him to deliver some opening remarks in just a moment when he
arrives.
Last month the problem of piracy off Somalia's coast hit
home for a lot of Americans with the attack on the Maersk
Alabama and the capture of Capt. Richard Phillips after his
courageous actions to ensure the safety of his crew. I was
pleased that Chairman Kerry of the full committee quickly
organized a full committee hearing to examine this growing
problem and in addition several other committees held hearings
to assess this problem and also potential U.S. responses to it.
Now, this heightened level of attention to the Horn of
Africa is long overdue. But in order to truly understand and
address the piracy problem we need to know what's behind it. We
cannot ignore the conditions on land that have made the waters
off Somalia a haven for pirates. The recent spike in piracy is
an outgrowth of the state collapse and lawlessness and economic
desperation that have plagued that country for well over a
decade.
That's why I decided to hold this hearing today. I've held
many hearings over the years to examine how we can best address
the crises in Somalia and am hopeful that today's hearing will
look at the situation in Somalia from a new light, ensuring any
short-term measures we may take to eliminate the problem of
piracy are sustainable and coordinated with broader efforts to
establish stability and the rule of law.
We also cannot and should not isolate piracy from the many
challenges the United States faces in Somalia. These challenges
include the growth of the terrorist group al-Shabaab, some of
whose leaders have links to al-Qaeda, the staggering
humanitarian crisis in the country, and the standing problems
of instability and the lack of a central government.
In addition, I've been greatly troubled by reports over the
last 2 weeks of intensified fighting in and around Mogadishu
that has left hundreds of people dead and displaced tens of
thousands of people. Over the weekend there were reports that
al-Shabaab and their allies are gaining momentum and had
overtaken Jowhar, a strategic town in central Somalia. They
pledge to overthrow the government and their ranks reportedly
now include hundreds of foreign fighters.
More recently, the press has reported that some Ethiopian
military forces have crossed back into Somalia. Although the
Ethiopian Government has denied these allegations, the prospect
of a return of Ethiopian forces into Somalia is very alarming
and would greatly change the dynamics of the situation.
For months now I have encouraged the Obama administration
to engage at the highest possible level to help establish
stability and inclusive governance in Somalia. But if these
recent events continue, we may miss a major opportunity. I've
called on the President to personally call Somali President
Sheikh Sharif and to indicate a clear commitment to work with
the new government on security and governance issues. To my
knowledge, though, neither he nor Secretary Clinton have yet
made that call or issued such a statement.
We must take steps now to seriously and consistently engage
at senior levels with the transitional government in Mogadishu.
Now, while I recognize, of course, the fragile nature of this
government, I am concerned by some reports that the government
is losing both popular support and momentum. Helping to build
stable institutions, expand effective, inclusive governance,
and provide economic opportunities must be at the heart of any
truly comprehensive strategy toward Somalia. At the same time,
engagement and support for the government alone does not
constitute a comprehensive strategy. We need a more sustained
diplomatic push to communicate regularly with a wide range of
nongovernmental actors within Somalia and help bring more
groups into the political process. We also need to engage with
stakeholders and partners in the wider region, both across the
Horn of Africa and in the Middle East. It is impossible to
separate Somalia's situation from wider regional dynamics,
especially the historic tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea
and the instability in Yemen. To that end, I have proposed that
the administration consider appointing a senior envoy for the
Horn of Africa. I, of course, appreciate that the
administration has many pressing priorities and also know
there's an interagency policy review process under way, which I
look forward to receiving an update about today.
Now, of course all this is an awful lot to ask for our
first witness today, who has only been on the job as Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs for 2 weeks. Of course I want to
first congratulate you, sir, on your confirmation. But while he
may have only had this position through 2 weeks, I know that
Assistant Secretary Carson has been thinking about, and working
on, these issues for a very long time. In his testimony for his
confirmation hearing he wrote about the need for a
comprehensive U.S. strategy toward Somalia. So I'm very eager
to hear what he sees as the key components for such a strategy,
where the interagency strategy review stands, and how the
administration and the Congress can work together.
Then on our second panel we'll hear from two
nongovernmental experts on the latest developments in Somalia
and how the United States can address the many challenges there
in coordination. We will hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, a
professor of political science at Davidson College and arguably
the most prolific U.S. scholar on Somalia. Dr. Menkhaus is also
a former special adviser to the United Nations in Somalia. He
has testified before this committee before and I welcome him
back.
We will also hear from Shannon Scribner, the senior policy
adviser on humanitarian issues at Oxfam America. Ms. Scribner
has worked on several humanitarian emergencies on behalf of
Oxfam programs as staff on the ground, including in Liberia,
the DRC, Iraq, Ethiopia, and areas affected by the tsunami. She
currently serves as the cochair of the Interaction Somalia
Working Group.
So I want to thank all of you for being here. I look
forward to hearing your brief testimony and ask that you do
keep your oral testimony to 5 minutes so we can have plenty of
time for questions and discussions.
But it's now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Isakson, for his opening comments. Not
only is he a superb ranking member, but his timing is
exquisite.
Senator Isakson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, I apologize for being late. I never
want to be late for anybody named Johnnie Carson, I can tell
you that. Mr. Carson, welcome. We are glad to have you here
today and look forward to meeting with you later today
preceding our trip to Africa.
My opening remarks will simply be this, Mr. Chairman.
Somalia, as I heard you saying as I came in, is a critical
issue before us. It is important that we develop a strategy
with regard to Somalia and, in fact, with regard to the larger
region of Africa in which Somalia lies.
So I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses
today. I appreciate your allowing me a statement, and I would
rather go on and get to the testimony. So thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Johnnie.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
All right, Secretary Carson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Carson. Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson,
members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me
to testify at this important hearing to discuss the development
of a coordinated and sustainable strategy toward Somalia. I do
have written testimony which will be longer than my brief
statement, which I will submit for the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Mr. Carson. This is my first appearance before you as
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and I want to
take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Isakson,
again for showing your strong support for my nomination and
rushing my hearings through to completion. I look forward to
working closely with this subcommittee on the various issues
that fall under your jurisdiction.
Mr. Chairman, you have consistently raised interest in
Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa and the importance of
the health of our relationship with the countries and peoples
in the region. I know also, Mr. Chairman, that you've traveled
in the Horn of Africa extensively and that Ranking Member
Isakson has also visited Djibouti, one of the key capitals in
the Horn of Africa.
Somalia is located in one of the most turbulent, violent,
and complex regions in the world and finds itself embroiled in
a cycle of violence and instability, despite promising efforts
in recent years by the international community and Somali
leadership to create an inclusive and stable government. In the
past 2 weeks, the Somali Government has come under intense
military and political pressure. Despite the best efforts of
the violent extremists to overthrow the Transitional Federal
Government, the TFG, by force, the TFG remains standing and
determined to move forward.
This latest round of fighting occurs as we enter into a new
chapter in the recent history of international efforts to
assist Somalia in solving its longstanding crisis. Since the
overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, there have been
several distinct approaches taken by the international
community to address the many crises that have enveloped
Somalia.
In 1992, the international community authorized the United
Nations Operation in Somalia known as UNOSOM I, in an effort to
prevent starvation and a wider humanitarian crisis caused by a
civil war. This effort proved ineffective and a second U.N.
operation entered Somalia in December 1992. It was called
UNITAF. While this operation successfully restored some order,
UNITAF was eventually replaced by a third mission, also known
as United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. It was
during the United States participation in UNOSOM II in October
1993 that the tragic events described in ``Blackhawk Down''
occurred, leading to an eventual withdrawal of United States
forces and the ultimate withdrawal of the majority of the
international community from Somalia.
To be very blunt, the international community pulled down
the shades, turned out the lights, closed the door, and walked
away from Somalia. United States reengagement with Somalia did
not begin again until 1996, when our policy shifted to one of
containment. For the next decade, United States policy focused
on managing or containing Somalia's problems within the
country's borders so that the instability did not further
destabilize the region.
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union--ICU--defeated an
alliance of militias known as the Alliance for the Restoration
of Peace and Counter-Terrorism and became the first entity
since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime to exert control
over most of south-central Somalia. This change in the balance
of power in Somalia was significant, as we faced a government
in Somalia that was unfriendly to the United States and
provided sanctuary to a number of known terrorists.
Ethiopia's intervention in late 2006 was another turning
point that resulted in increased American interest in Somalia.
Given the threats posed by the ICU's harboring of terrorists,
the U.S. Government's Somali strategy focused on immediate
terrorist threats.
The Djibouti Peace Process began in 2008 and led to the
formation of the current Transitional Federal Government, an
expanded Transitional Federal Parliament that includes members
of the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation
of Somalia, and the election by Parliament of President Sheikh
Sharif Ahmed. These are all significant steps forward for
Somalia. Somalia now has at least the start of a government
that is broadly representative of the Somali clan and societal
landscape.
However, Somalia is clearly in crisis today. Approximately
43 percent of the Somali population relies on humanitarian
assistance to survive and nearly 500,000 Somalis have fled the
country and now live in overcrowded refugee camps throughout
the region. The TFG controls only a small portion of the
territory and the vast majority of Somalia is controlled by
militias, clans, warlords, or terrorist organizations.
The blight of piracy off the coast of Somalia is without
question a symptom of the instability and insecurity within
Somalia. Without stability in Somalia, there can be no long-
term resolution of the piracy problem. Furthermore, al-Shabaab,
a designated foreign terrorist organization--FTO--continues to
harbor terrorists, target civilians and humanitarian workers,
and threatens to overthrow the TFG through violent means.
The resolution of these problems calls for a comprehensive
solution that provides stability and promotes reconciliation,
economic opportunity, and hope for the Somali people.
The Obama administration is working to address these
challenges. The National Security Council has brought together
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the
intelligence community, and a variety of other agencies to work
to develop a strategy that is both comprehensible and
sustainable. Such a strategy must be built around our work with
international partners, including the United Nations, the
African Union, the European Union, the International Authority
on Development, IGAD, and the International Contact Group on
Somalia.
Our effort is to achieve our foreign policy goals, which
are to establish political and economic stability, eliminate
the terrorist threat, address the dire humanitarian situation,
and eliminate the threat of piracy. We're also working with
other states in the region as Somalia's challenges are
intertwined with other regional conflicts throughout the Horn.
But to make it clear, our comprehensive strategy is to promote
a stable and peaceful Somalia, to support regional peacekeeping
efforts, to create a functioning and effective central
government capable of delivering services to Somalia's
citizens, administering its territory, and providing security
to its people, and finally to create a country that is at peace
with its neighbors and does not harbor rebel groups from
neighboring countries or regional or international terrorists.
The core of this policy effort is based on internal
political reconciliation. The United States continues to assist
the TFG in the development of a Somali security sector, which
is crucial for the success of governance efforts throughout
Somalia. With Congress's assistance, we are already committed
to providing $10 million to support the creation of a national
security force in Somalia, and we are also working to
strengthen the TFG's capacity so the United States and others
in the international community can provide additional
assistance.
We're also the largest supporter of the African Mission in
Somalia, AMISOM, which facilitates the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Somalia, protects key installations in Mogadishu,
and provides political space for a Somali-led reconciliation
process.
Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, the United States
has provided $130 million for logistical and equipment support
and predeployment training for Burundian and Ugandan forces on
the ground. We plan to continue this level of support in the
future. Additionally, the United States remains the largest
bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, having
provided more than $137 million in emergency food and nonfood
assistance to date.
Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time in
Somalia. In the past 2 weeks, violent extremists, including al-
Shabaab and a loose coalition of forces under the banner of
Hizbul al-Islam have been attacking TFG forces and other
moderates in Mogadishu in an attempt to forcefully overthrow
the transitional government. We have clear evidence that
Eritrea is supporting these extremist elements, including
credible reports that the government of Eritrea continues to
supply weapons and munitions to extremists and terrorist
elements. We have publicly warned Eritrea to desist and stop
its illegal arming of terrorists immediately, as such support
threatens the stability of Somalia and the wider region.
There is also clear evidence that there is an al-Qaeda
presence in Somalia. In 2008, East African al-Qaeda operative
Saleh
al-Nabhan distributed a video showing training camp activity in
Somalia and inviting foreign fighters to travel there for
training. A small number of senior al-Qaeda operatives have
worked closely with al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia, where they
have enjoyed
safe haven. We have credible reports of foreign fighters with
al-Shabaab. This further underscores the importance of urgent
and decisive support to the TFG and engagement with states
across the region and beyond to help stabilize Somalia.
The collapse of the TFG would be detrimental to the long-
term stability of Somalia and it would negate the tremendous
progress that has been made to date in the Djibouti Peace
Process and in restoring a semblance of normalcy and peace in
Somalia. The administration is considering ways in which we and
other international partners can continue to help and support
and bolster the Transitional Federal Government, and we will
continue to support AMISOM.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify at
this important hearing to discuss the development of a coordinated and
sustainable strategy toward Somalia. This is my first appearance before
you as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I thank
you for expeditiously holding a hearing on my nomination and for
supporting my full Senate confirmation. I look forward to working
closely with this subcommittee on the various issues that fall under
this one subcommittee's oversight. Of these numerous concerns, Mr.
Chairman, you have consistently raised our interests in Somalia and the
greater Horn of Africa and the importance of the health of our
relationship with the countries and peoples in the region. I also note
that Senator Isakson's first trip to Africa as the ranking member
included Djibouti. I join this subcommittee in its interest.
As you know, Somalia finds itself embroiled in a cycle of violence
and instability despite promising efforts in recent years by the
international community and Somali leadership to create an inclusive
and stable government. I would like to note, though, that despite the
best efforts of violent extremists to overthrow the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) by force, the TFG remains standing and
determined to move forward.
This latest round of fighting occurs as we enter a new chapter in
the recent history of international efforts to assist Somalia in
solving its longstanding crisis. Since the overthrow of the Siad Barre
regime in 1991, there have been several distinct approaches taken by
the international community to address the many crises that have
enveloped Somalia. In 1992, the international community authorized the
United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM I, in an effort to stave
off starvation and a wider humanitarian crisis caused by civil war.
This effort proved ineffective, and a second U.N. operation, the
Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, entered Somalia in December 1992 under
the name Operation Restore Hope. While this operation successfully
restored some order, UNITAF was eventually replaced by a third mission,
also known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM II. It
was during the United States participation in UNOSOM II, in October
1993, that the tragic events described in ``Black Hawk Down'' occurred,
leading to an eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces, and ultimately, the
withdrawal of the majority of the international community from Somalia.
United States reengagement with Somalia did not begin again until
1996, when our policy shifted to one of containment. For the next
decade, United States policy focused on containing Somalia's problems
within the country's borders so the instability did not further
destabilize the region.
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated an alliance of
militias known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counter-Terrorism and became the first entity since the collapse of the
Barre regime to exert control over most of South-Central Somalia. This
change in the balance of power in Somalia was significant, as we faced
a government in Somalia that was unfriendly to the United States and
harbored and provided sanctuary to a number of known terrorists.
Ethiopia's intervention in late 2006 was another turning point that
resulted in increased American interest in Somalia. Given the threats
posed by the ICU's harboring of terrorists, the USG's Somalia strategy
focused on the immediate terrorist threats.
The Djibouti Peace Process began in 2008 and led to the formation
of the current Transitional Federal Government, an expanded
Transitional Federal Parliament that includes members of the Djibouti
faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and the
election by Parliament of President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. These
are all significant steps forward for Somalia. Somalia now has at least
the start of a government that is broadly representative of the Somali
clan and societal landscape.
However, Somalia is clearly in crisis. Approximately 43 percent of
the population of Somalia relies on humanitarian assistance to survive,
and nearly 500,000 Somalis have fled their country and now live in
overcrowded refugee camps throughout the region. The TFG controls only
a small portion of the territory and the vast majority of Somalia is
controlled by militias, clans, or terrorist organizations. The blight
of piracy off the coast of Somalia is without question a symptom of the
instability and insecurity within Somalia; without stability in
Somalia, there can be no long-term resolution of the piracy problem.
Furthermore, al-Shabaab, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO), continues to harbor terrorists, target civilians and
humanitarian workers, and attempt to overthrow the TFG through violent
means.
The resolution of these problems calls for a comprehensive solution
that provides stability and promotes reconciliation, economic
opportunity and hope for the Somali people.
The Obama administration is working to address these challenges.
The National Security Council (NSC) has brought together the Department
of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the intelligence community,
and a variety of other agencies to work to develop a strategy that is
both comprehensive and sustainable. Such a strategy must be built
around our work with international partners, including the United
Nations, African Union, the European Union, Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), International Contact Group on Somalia
(ICG), and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, among
others, to achieve our foreign policy goals in Somalia of political and
economic stability, eliminating the terrorist threat, addressing the
dire humanitarian situation, and eliminating the threat of piracy. We
are also working with other states in the region, as Somalia's
challenges are intertwined with other conflicts and issues throughout
the Horn of Africa.
The United States continues to assist the TFG in the development of
a Somali security sector, which is crucial for the success of
governance efforts in Somalia. With Congress' assistance, we have
already committed to providing $10 million to support the creation of a
National Security Force as part of this effort, and we are also working
to strengthen the TFG's capacity so the United States and others in the
international community can provide additional assistance. We are also
the largest supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
which facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia,
protects key installations in Mogadishu, and provides political space
for a Somali-led reconciliation process. Since the deployment of AMISOM
in 2007, the United States has provided $135 million for logistical and
equipment support and predeployment training for the Burundian and
Ugandan forces on the ground. We plan to continue this level of support
in the future. Furthermore, the United States remains the largest
bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, having provided
more than $137 million in emergency food and nonfood assistance to date
in fiscal year 2010.
Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time in Somalia. In the
past 2 weeks, violent extremists, including al-Shabaab and a loose
coalition of forces under the banner of Hizbul al-Islam, have been
attacking TFG forces and other moderates in Mogadishu in an attempt to
forcefully overthrow the transitional government. We have clear
evidence that Eritrea is supporting these extremist elements, including
credible reports that the Government of Eritrea continues to supply
weapons and munitions to extremists and terrorist elements. We have
publicly warned Eritrea to stop its illegal arming of terrorists
immediately, as such support threatens the stability of Somalia and of
the wider region, as well as creates a serious obstacle to the
possibility of a new Eritrean relationship with the United States.
There is also clear evidence of an al-Qaeda presence in Somalia. In
2008, East Africa al-Qaeda operative Saleh al-Nabhan distributed a
video showing training camp activity in Somalia and inviting foreigners
to travel there for training. A small number of senior al-Qaeda
operatives have worked closely with al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia,
where they enjoy safe haven. We have credible reports of foreigners
fighting with al-Shabaab. This further underscores the importance of
urgent and decisive support to the TFG, and engagement with states
across the region and beyond.
The collapse of the TFG would be detrimental to the long-term
stability of Somalia, and it would negate the tremendous progress that
has been made to date in the Djibouti Peace Process and in restoring a
semblance of normalcy and peace in Somalia. The administration is
considering ways in which we and our international partners can help to
support and bolster the TFG, and we will continue to support AMISOM.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir. We'll do 7-minute rounds.
Thank you for your testimony. I wanted first to ask you
about our public diplomacy efforts in Somalia. As you know,
there's a growing mistrust and even resentment of U.S.
intentions that has developed among Somalis over the last 2
years. In my view this lingering mistrust undermines our
ability to engage constructively with different parties there
and of course can be easily manipulated by al-Shabaab. I have
encouraged, as I said, the President to consider some kind of
public statement to indicate his intention to break from past
policies toward Somalia, a move which I believe could make a
tremendous positive impression on ordinary Somalis.
In your thinking, how serious is this mistrust of U.S.
intentions in Somalia and what public diplomacy efforts are
being made or could be made to address this problem?
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question.
There is no doubt that al-Shabaab and others have helped to
generate the distrust that some Somalis have of the United
States. We are working very hard to improve our image and to
give Somalis a more comprehensive understanding of what the
United States is doing and wants to do in Somalia.
I have myself spoken to a number of media groups that have
access to Somalia in order to indicate to them that our primary
goal is to promote political reconciliation, peace, and
stability, and that our desire is to see a strong, stable
Somalia that we can work with.
Through our public diplomacy efforts we continued to reach
out to the media to talk to people, to issue press statements.
I certainly will take into account and consult with whether it
is feasible for the Secretary of State to make a statement that
can be used on VOA, can be used on Al Jazeera and other media
groups in Somalia. That sounds like a good idea and something
that we should certainly consider.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that and look forward to the
results. I appreciate the efforts you've described, but what
I'm also talking about here, in addition to what you've said,
is high-level public diplomacy. My sense is that well-timed
statements and phone calls and engagement from senior
government officials, be it the President, Secretary of State,
or even Members of Congress, could help bolster ongoing United
States efforts in Somalia.
I wrote the President about this. I spoke directly to the
Secretary of State about this. I spoke directly to the
Ambassador to the United Nations about this. No one has given
me a reason why this wouldn't be a good idea, nor suggested
anything with regard to any intelligence which suggests this
would be a bad idea. I've seen nothing in my work on the
Intelligence Committee suggesting this isn't a good idea.
So I'm wondering what the holdup is in terms of reaching
out to this government that is trying to stabilize Somalia and
that is under siege.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, I think those are all good
suggestions and I certainly will pursue them. But let me also
say that we are in contact with President Sheikh Sharif's
government, have reassured him of our support. We have
underlined this to others. Our Ambassador in Nairobi, Mike
Ranneberger, has been in regular contact with Sheikh Sharif. I
myself last week met with the TFG Foreign Minister, who was in
town. One of my deputies met with him on Monday of this week. I
have been in direct consultation with the U.N. Secretary
General Special Representative Ould Abdallah to reaffirm our
commitment to support the TFG. We have provided financial
assistance in the last 2 weeks to the TFG and we continue to do
as much as we can to assure governments in the region that we
support them.
Senator Feingold. Have you spoken to Sheikh Sharif?
Mr. Carson. I have not spoken directly with Sheikh Sharif.
Senator Feingold. If you do, I think obviously that would
be one step. I've spoken to him. Ambassador Ranneberger, who I
have enormous regard for, has spoken to him. But there are
actually people at higher pay grade than all of us who I'm
talking about, and I believe not only do you need to reach out,
but people at that level as well.
Secretary Clinton has announced several new measures to
combat piracy off Somalia's coast, which I strongly support.
However, how can we ensure that these measures are coordinated
within the overall Somalia strategy and do not somehow exist in
a vacuum?
Mr. Carson. I think that's excellent. I think in my
statement I noted that the National Security Council is
undertaking a comprehensive review of Somali policy. That
review has not been completed, but I can assure you, Mr.
Chairman, that the issue of Somali piracy has been folded into
that review and does not in fact stand out alone. It is
subsumed under a broader strategy toward Somalia.
I underscore that our overall policy efforts are aimed at
promoting political reconciliation in Somalia, political
stability in that country, which will generate a functioning
and effective government capable of delivering services to its
people, administering the central government, and providing
security.
We don't have a separate strategy on piracy that is
distinct from the issue of where we're going on Somalia. It is
being wrapped into the review that is under way.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
As part of a comprehensive strategy for Somalia, I know you
and I agree that we have to reexamine our relationships with
regional players. These press reports of Ethiopian troops
crossing back into Somalia are very alarming to me and I've
been concerned for quite some time by Eritrea's unconstructive
behavior in the Horn, whether it's in Somalia or along the
Djiboutian border. How can we better engage the Ethiopians so
they play a constructive role in Somalia and what about our
relationship with Eritrea? What direction do you see that
moving in?
Mr. Carson. First of all with respect to the presence of
Ethiopian troops, we have no formal confirmation that Ethiopian
troops have actually gone across the border. There have been a
number of press reports suggesting a small incursion. We are
asking our Embassy in Addis to determine what the Ethiopians
are doing there.
We agree with you, Senator, that the return of Ethiopian
troops inside of Somalia will only inflame and worsen the
situation, rather than lead to an early resolution of the
problem. We hope that the Ethiopian Government will not in fact
do anything which will further complicate the effort to find a
solution to Somalia's problems. We are engaged actively in
Ethiopia and our Ambassador is in constant contact with Prime
Minister Meles, warning and expressing our concerns about the
possible repercussions of Ethiopia's action inside Somalia.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm going to
turn it over to Senator Isakson now, but I'll have a couple
more questions for you.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since you
mentioned that subject, I traveled to Ethiopia in 2002 and
spent a good deal of time in both Addis Ababa as well as Awasa,
south of there.
Do the terrorist-related organizations or terrorist-
supported organizations in Somalia pose a threat to the
Ethiopians? Is one of
the reasons for the Ethiopian concern the fact that there are
terrorist organizations in Somalia which they fear might come
into Ethiopia?
Mr. Carson. No question that one of Ethiopia's concerns is
support that Somalia or Somali groups might provide to groups
in the Ogaden. They are concerned that weapons and support
might flow from Somalia into the Ogaden.
Senator Isakson. My experience there, if you look at a map
for a second, is that between Eritrea, the Sudan, and Somalia,
Ethiopia is in a very difficult neighborhood. The country has
tried for improvements and over the last decade has made many.
So I am sure part of the Ethiopian concern is that they do not
want to regress, nor do they want to experience what happened
in Somalia, in terms of the breakdown of the countryside.
In terms of Sheikh Sharif, is he as strong a leader as we
perceive him to be, or is he kind of battened down in Mogadishu
with the Parliament trying to protect itself?
Mr. Carson. Sheikh Sharif was elected as the President of
Somalia through the Djibouti Process. We think that he was a
compromise candidate who represented the views of the largest
number of clan participants in that election. We think that he
offers the best chance for possible reconciliation and peace in
Somalia that we have seen over the last decade. He is not a
warlord. He is not a militia man. He is from a rather humble
background, an educator, and is a man who has sought to unite
the various clans in Somalia in a more inclusive government.
We believe that it is important to do as much as we
possibly can to support this TFG government as one of the last
opportunities for bringing about stability in that country.
Senator Isakson. And he was elected by the Parliament, not
by the people.
Mr. Carson. That's correct.
Senator Isakson. But the Parliament was elected by the
people, is that correct?
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Senator Isakson. So you believe him to be a pretty
representative compromise candidate between all the factions?
Mr. Carson. Yes. But, sir, it is a very divided society and
divided deeply along clan lines. The success of any leader is
based on his or her ability to bring in clans and subclans into
the central government.
Senator Isakson. In your testimony you made reference to
the fact that we have credible reports of foreign fighters
fighting with al-Shabaab, is that correct?
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Are those foreign fighters by chance
Iranian or in any way affiliated with Hezbollah or Hamas?
Mr. Carson. We don't know the precise nationalities of
these foreign fighters. We don't know their political
affiliations. But we do have a growing body of information
passed on to us that there clearly are foreign fighters
operating in Somalia. This information comes to us via the
Ugandan military, which is a part of AMISOM. It comes to us via
the U.N. It comes to us via Sheikh Sharif's government. It
comes to us via observations by the media.
But yes, a growing body of information. We do not know how
many people, how many foreign fighters there are. There have
been claims of upward of 400 people. We think that these are
probably a significant exaggeration, but there are clearly non-
Somalis who are there.
Senator Isakson. We do have evidence that al-Qaeda is there
as well, correct?
Mr. Carson. We know that individuals who are directly
affiliated with al-Qaeda have been in Somalia. These
individuals are principally Fizul Harun and Nabhan Mohamed.
These are individuals who were responsible for the destruction
of the U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 and
the destruction of the Paradise Hotel in 2002. They clearly are
the leaders of the East Africa al-Qaeda cell. They have been in
Somalia, but they have also been in and along the northeastern
coast of Kenya as well.
Senator Isakson. We are assisting the African Union troops
at AMISOM with regard to the distribution of humanitarian aid
into Somalia's countryside, is that correct?
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Senator Isakson. We are doing the same thing in the Sudan,
but we have had great difficulty. A month ago, two NGO workers
were killed in the Sudan. What is the activity against AMISOM
troops and the humanitarian aid personnel? Are the troops, the
African Union troops, able to protect those NGOs?
Mr. Carson. No. Let me just correct. The AMISOM troops are
there to carry out several missions. The first is to protect
key installations, the airport and the harbor in Mogadishu; to
provide security to key government buildings, the Presidential
palace and the Parliament; third, to protect key TFG government
ministers; and last, to do limited training of TFG security
forces.
Senator Isakson. So there is no protection effort for the
NGOs that are there?
Mr. Carson. No, there is not.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
I'll start another round. Mr. Assistant Secretary, when can
we expect the interagency review to be completed, and will
Congress be notified when that happens?
Mr. Carson. I can't predict a precise time. I know that the
process is being carried out in an expeditious manner. I would
hope that we would see something in the next 30 to 60 days. And
yes, I would recommend that we brief you and other members of
the committee once that review is completed and carried out.
You have clearly demonstrated an interest in seeing the
strategy and learning what it is. I think that we will share
that with you, and I will certainly encourage it.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary.
Just to add a point to the very effective questions by the
ranking member, fleshing out the background of Sheikh Sharif, I
certainly can't vouch for this man nor would I attempt to, but
to have an accurate picture, this is the man who was the head
of the Islamic Courts, which we identified as being obviously a
problematic entity, who has now taken on the task of trying to
unify the various elements within Somalia at enormous risk,
because al-Shabaab is, I'm sure, outraged that he has done
this.
So it's an interesting aspect of what he's done that I
think should help inform our view of him and our willingness to
work with him.
The State Department's report issued this month on the
implementation of our strategy toward Somalia describes the
importance of providing operational support to Somali security
forces loyal to the transitional government, and I agree that
building the security sector is important and the United States
should have a role in this. We have to ensure that steps are
taken to improve accountability and the human rights record of
the security forces. Obviously, the past record of those forces
is pretty appalling.
How can we ensure such steps are taken as we provide any
assistance to a security sector in Somalia?
Mr. Carson. We are doing as much as we can to vet the
individuals who are a part of the Somali security force
leadership. This is an ongoing process. It is a difficult
process given the fact that we are not present on the ground.
But we consider this to be extremely important and we are
attentive to it and trying to do as best we can to ensure that
any assistance that we give is given to individuals who have
not, in fact, engaged in atrocities, war crimes, or any
violations of civil rights.
Senator Feingold. I'm also very concerned by these reports
that al-Shabaab and its allied militias are gaining momentum
and territory, including strategic towns in central Somalia.
Beyond simply arming them, are there specific ways we can help
the transitional government to peel off moderates and fracture
the insurgency? And what about the foreign fighters that
Senator Isakson was talking about that are being reported? What
can be done to confront their role in the insurgency?
Mr. Carson. Well, with respect to foreign fighters, we are
working with neighboring countries to encourage them to make
sure that their capitals and their airports, are not used as a
conduit for foreign fighters going in. We have strongly
encouraged the Eritrean Government to cease providing any
support to al-Shabaab, to stop foreign fighters from coming
through their territory to enter Somalia, and to play a more
constructive role in trying to find a solution to Somalia's
problems.
We will continue to work with neighboring states, including
countries like Kenya, to make sure that they are not
unwittingly used as way stations for people coming in from
outside, transiting their airports, going into Somalia to work
for al-Shabaab.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Anything further, Senator Isakson?
Senator Isakson. Just a question out of curiosity. We talk
about a coordinated policy for us to support the temporary
government that has been formed in Somalia. Is there a
coordination of all the factions outside of Mogadishu? You
referred to the clans, you referred to al-Shabaab, and you
referred to some al-Qaeda influence and foreign fighters. Do
these people have different and separate interests in the
country, all of which are disruptive, or is there some degree
of coordination between them against the government?
Mr. Carson. Well, over the last 2 weeks and certainly
beginning around May 8 and 9, there appeared to be a concerted
effort by
al-Shabaab and a number of groups to work together to unseat
the TFG. That degree of coordination seems to be fading away as
the TFG has been able to maintain its control over most of
Mogadishu.
The core element of unity inside of Somalia is clan and
subclan. Clan and subclan interests over time appear to trump
everything else in terms of loyalty. It's more important than
religion. It's more important than politics. It is frequently
more important than the central government and the state.
What we have seen over time is that some issues will bring
clans together, groups together, to work against an issue, and
then they will fall apart once that threat and issue has been
resolved.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Johnnie.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Mr. Assistant Secretary, thank you. It's a pleasure to be
working with you. We can now go to the second panel.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Dr. Menkhaus, would you like to begin. Again, I'd ask that
these witnesses limit your remarks, oral remarks, to 5 minutes.
Of course, we will put your full statement in the record. Go
ahead, doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
DAVIDSON COLLEGE, CHARLOTTE, NC
Dr. Menkhaus. Good morning, Senator Feingold, Senator
Isakson. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this
discussion on United States policy in Somalia.
This hearing has been convened at a moment when Somalia is
undergoing yet another dramatic political crisis, the latest in
a long 20-year history of state collapse, warfare, and human
suffering. Whatever the outcome of this latest round of
fighting, Somalia will very likely remain a front-burner
foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration.
We're very fortunate to have the experienced leadership of
Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the new Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, at this time of crisis in Somalia. He
understands the intricacies of the Horn of Africa better than
anyone in or out of the U.S. Government, possesses invaluable
diplomatic experience in the region, and has the leadership
skills to help forge and maintain interagency consensus, which
is essential for a coordinated United States strategy toward
Somalia.
In recent years the United States and its regional and
global allies have struggled to forge a coherent and effective
strategy for Somalia. In part, this has been a function of the
uniquely complex problems associated with the Somali crisis. As
the crisis has lengthened, the difficulties have grown.
Reliable information on which to build policy is scarce. The
resilience of internal spoilers has increased while many of the
country's most dedicated civic leaders and peace-builders have
been silenced, killed, or forced to flee the country. External
actors have created additional impasses by playing out proxy
wars in Somalia or funding jihadist violence.
In this increasingly complex environment, external state-
building, peace-building, and counterterrorism initiatives have
at times been based on flawed analysis and have produced
unintended consequences which have left Somalia and its
regional neighbors even more insecure.
The United States also faces the challenge of deconflicting
its multiple objectives in Somalia. Over the past decade,
American counterterrorism, state-building, and humanitarian
initiatives have generally been unintegrated and have at times
worked at cross-purposes.
The impact of the 2007-08 Ethiopian military occupation of
southern Somalia has created still more challenges. That
occupation and the destructive insurgency and counterinsurgency
violence that it triggered helped to fuel an unprecedented
level of radicalism in Somali society. Because the United
States is widely blamed by Somalis for backing the Ethiopian
occupation, anti-Americanism has been very high in the country
and trust of American motives and policies low.
This has been ameliorated somewhat by the January 2009
Ethiopian withdrawal, the establishment of a more broad-based
transitional government, and Somali expectations of a shift in
United States policy under the Obama administration. But there
is still a high level of mistrust of American policies and
residual anger at the United States.
In addition, formulation of a coherent strategy toward
Somalia is complicated by the fact that the Somali crisis is
entangled in a regional conflict complex which includes the
Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, the insurgency and counter-
insurgency in Ethiopia's Somali region, and the long-running
tensions between Ethiopian and Somali security interests and
territorial claims. Stand-alone strategies to deal with Somalia
have been repeatedly undermined by these other regional
dynamics.
A final challenge to creating an effective and coherent
strategy is the fact that Somalia is currently in the midst of
a major crisis which could result in one of several very
different scenarios. The U.S. Government can and must
prioritize its broad objectives and desired outcomes in
Somalia, but in the face of considerable uncertainty about the
political trajectory of the country in the weeks and months
ahead a fully developed country or regional strategy may
currently be beyond reach.
In weeks and months to come, one of several scenarios could
emerge. In a best case outcome, the TFG will succeed in
rallying support and pushing back the Islamist insurgency,
negotiating with some insurgents and marginalizing or defeating
the rest. This outcome would open the door to a U.S. strategy
privileging timely and well-targeted state-building support to
the TFG as a means of consolidating those gains. It would also
produce improved security for delivery of badly needed
humanitarian assistance.
In a worst case outcome, the Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya
defeat the TFG and take control over most or all of south-
central Somalia and the capital. Because of Shabaab's ties to
al-Qaeda and the presence of foreign advisers and fighters in
Shabaab, this scenario promises to draw Ethiopian forces back
into Somalia and will create pressure for the United States to
privilege counterterrorism interventions into Somalia as well.
Somalia could then become the site of regional or even
globalized armed conflict.
An insurgency victory over the TFG could also produce a
different outcome, one in which two rival Islamist groups begin
fighting among themselves. There are sharp tensions over
leadership, ideology, foreign patronage, clan interests, and
tactics both between and within Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya
and many Somalis anticipate a battle between them. Armed
clashes pitting Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya would present
the United States with no obvious protagonist to support and
would instead place emphasis on the need to avoid taking
actions which would bring the two warring parties' hard-line
groups together.
A final scenario is the reversion to status quo ante, in
which no one side consolidates control over the country, which
is left divided up into a variety of warring fiefdoms, some
controlled by the TFG, others held by Shabaab, Hizbul al-
Islamiya, clan militia, warlords, armed business groups,
independent city-states, and others. This outcome would pose a
major problem for U.S. state-building initiatives and would
tempt counterterrorism operations to forge alliances with local
nonstate actors, as was the practice in the past. That policy
came at some cost and was in many respects counterproductive,
however, and would need careful scrutiny.
In the interest of time, I won't share some of the remarks
that I had which I hoped would contribute toward a discussion
of United States strategy toward Somalia, but I refer you to my
written remarks.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Menkhaus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ken Menkhaus, Professor of Political Science,
Davidson College, Davidson, NC
introduction
Senator Feingold, subcommittee chairman, and Senator Isakson,
ranking member, I thank you for the opportunity to participate in this
discussion of United States policy on Somalia. This hearing has been
convened at a moment when Somalia is undergoing yet another dramatic
political crisis, the latest in a long 20-year history of state
collapse, warfare, and human suffering. Whatever the outcome of this
latest round of fighting, Somalia will very likely remain a front-
burner foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration.
We are very fortunate to have the experienced leadership of
Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the new Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, at this time of crisis in Somalia. Ambassador Carson
understands the intricacies of the Horn of Africa better than anyone in
or out of the United States Government, possesses invaluable diplomatic
experience in the region, and has the leadership skills to help forge
and maintain interagency consensus which is essential for a coordinated
United States strategy toward Somalia. Ambassador Carson and his
colleagues may face only poor options in Somalia, but I feel confident
that the administration has assembled an excellent team on Africa
policy.
challenges
In recent years, the United States and its regional and global
allies have struggled to forge a coherent and effective strategy for
Somalia. In part this has been a function of the uniquely complex
problems associated with the Somali crisis, which has proven impervious
to two decades of external efforts to bring an end to its state of
collapse and armed conflict. As the crisis has lengthened, the
difficulties have grown. Reliable information on which to build policy
is scarce, a function of extraordinarily high levels of insecurity in
the country. The resilience of internal spoilers has increased, while
many of the country's most dedicated civic leaders and peace-builders
have been silenced, killed, or forced to flee the country. External
actors have created additional impasses by playing out proxy wars in
Somalia, or funding jihadist violence. In this increasingly complex
environment, external state-building, peace-building, and
counterterrorism initiatives have at times been based on flawed
analysis and have produced unintended consequences which have left
Somalia and its regional neighbors even more insecure.
The United States also faces the challenge of deconflicting its
multiple objectives in Somalia. Over the past decade, American
counterterrorism, state-building, and humanitarian initiatives have
generally been un-integrated and have at times worked at cross-
purposes.
The impact of the 2007-08 Ethiopian military occupation of southern
Somalia has created still more challenges for effective strategy. That
occupation, and the destructive insurgency and counterinsurgency
violence it triggered, helped to fuel an unprecedented level of
radicalism in Somali society. Because the United States is widely
blamed by Somalis for backing the Ethiopian occupation, anti-
Americanism has been very high in the country, and trust of American
motives and policies low. This has been ameliorated somewhat by the
January 2009 Ethiopian withdrawal, the establishment of a more broad-
based transitional government, and Somali expectations of a shift in
United States policy under the Obama administration. But there is still
a high level of mistrust of American policies and residual anger at the
United States that poses additional obstacles to effective strategies.
In addition, formulation of a coherent strategy toward Somalia is
complicated by the fact that the Somali crisis is entangled in a
regional conflict complex which includes the Ethiopian-Eritrean
impasse, the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Ethiopia's Somali
region, and the long-running tensions between Ethiopian and Somali
security interests and territorial claims. Stand-alone strategies to
deal with Somalia have been repeatedly undermined by these other
regional dynamics.
scenarios
A final challenge to creating an effective and coherent strategy is
the fact that Somalia is currently in the midst of a major crisis which
could result in one of several very different scenarios. The United
States Government can and must prioritize its broad objectives and
desired outcomes in Somalia, but in the face of considerable
uncertainty about the political trajectory of the country in the weeks
and months ahead, a fully developed country or regional strategy may be
beyond reach.
At present, the U.N.-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
is under siege by a loose coalition of hard-line Islamist insurgencies,
most notably Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya (the latter led by Hassan
Dahir Aweys, a designated terror suspect). Several months ago, when
Ethiopian forces departed and a new government in the TFG was formed
featuring moderate Islamist leadership, there was real hope that
Shabaab was in trouble. It had thrived mainly as a resistance movement
against Ethiopian occupation and the unpopular leadership of then-TFG
president Abdullahi Yusuf. With those two nemeses out of the picture,
Shabaab had much less appeal to Somalis, who find its radical
application of sharia law, its desecration of sufi tombs, and its close
links to al-Qaeda very disturbing. The hope was that Somali
communities, clans, and factions would rally in support of the new TFG.
But the TFG's ability to stand up a government has been disappointing,
and Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya have drawn on external support from
al-Qaeda, Eritrea, and other sources to launch an offensive that has
captured strategic real estate in Mogadishu and southern Somalia and
which threatens to drive the TFG out of the capital.
In coming weeks and months, one of several scenarios could emerge:
1. In a best-case outcome, the TFG will succeed in rallying support
and pushing back the Islamist insurgency, negotiating with some
insurgents and marginalizing or defeating the rest. This outcome would
open the door to a U.S. strategy privileging timely and well-targeted
state-building support to the TFG as a means of consolidating those
gains, and would produce improved security for delivery of badly needed
humanitarian assistance.
2. In a worst-case outcome, the Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya defeat
the TFG and take control over most or all of south-central Somalia and
the capital. Because of Shabaab's ties to al-Qaeda and the presence of
foreign advisors and fighters in Shabaab, this scenario promises to
draw Ethiopian forces back into Somalia and will create pressure for
the United States to privilege counterterrorism interventions into
Somalia. Somalia could then become the site of regional or even
globalized armed conflict.
3. An insurgency victory over the TFG could also produce a
different outcome, one in which the two rival Islamist groups begin
fighting among themselves. There are sharp tensions over leadership,
ideology, foreign patronage, clan interests, and tactics between and
within Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya and many Somalis anticipate a
battle between them. Armed clashes pitting Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiyya
would present the United States with no obvious protagonist to support,
and would instead place emphasis on the need to avoid taking actions
which would bring the two warring hard-line groups together.
4. A final scenario is a reversion to status quo ante, in which no
one side consolidates control over the country, which is left divided
up into a variety of warring fiefdoms--some controlled by the TFG,
others held by Shabaab, Hisbul Islamiyya, clan militias, warlords,
armed business groups, independent city-states, and others. This
outcome would pose a major problem for U.S. state-building initiatives
and would tempt counterterrorism operations to forge alliances with
local nonstate actors, as was the practice in years past. That policy
came at some cost and was in many respects counterproductive, however,
and would need careful scrutiny.
toward a somalia strategy
I would like end my remarks by sharing several observations and
recommendations toward the development of a Somalia strategy:
In the short run, there is little the United States can do
to shape the outcome of the current fighting between Islamist
insurgents and the TFG. This ball is in play, and while some
timely financial support to the TFG could help shore it up,
direct external military interventions are likely to play into
the hands of Shabaab and undermine rather than strengthen the
credibility of the TFG.
A regional rather than country-based strategy is more
difficult to devise but ultimately more likely to bear fruit.
This must include close scrutiny of the points of convergence
and divergence in U.S. interests and the interests of regional
allies, and a willingness to address those points of divergence
frankly.
U.S. strategy in the region must harmonize to the maximum
extent possible its counterterrorism, state-building, and
humanitarian objectives and programs. And harmonization must
not come to be synonymous with counterterrorism objectives
simply subsuming other policies.
United States strategy must be informed by more accurate,
nuanced assessment of both Somali actors and foreign interests
in the country. Oversimplified analyses have at times led to
serious errors by external actors. The fact that Somalia is a
very complex crisis it is not a license to simplify, it is an
obligation to take the time to understand.
The United States currently enjoys a good position in the
Somali political debate. We support the moderate Islamist
governance of the TFG, a broad-based and inclusive government
coalition, a negotiated end to the current fighting, an end to
foreign interference in Somalia's internal affairs, peaceful
coexistence with regional neighbors, and peace. These are very
much shared values with the vast majority of Somali people. By
contrast, al-Qaeda is urging Somalis to kill one another in the
name of a radical, Wahhabist interpretation of Islam, and
because the current government is too willing to seek
coexistence with Ethiopia and the West. Al-Qaeda's position is
quite unpopular with Somalis, who deeply resent foreigners
imposing their ideological wars on the Somali people. This is a
big advantage for the United States and one we must not
squander.
United States interests are best served by maximizing the
extent to which the current conflict in Somalia is defined as
an internal Somali affair. By contrast, Shabaab and Hisbul
Islamiyya's interests are served when the conflict can be
regionalized or globalized, framed as a ``Somali versus
foreigner'' clash. This puts a premium on strategies which work
to keep the Ethiopian military out of Somalia.
Piracy off the coast of Somalia must be understood and
treated as a second order security threat, one that
international shipping companies consider manageable.
Antipiracy efforts must not be allowed to compromise policies
designed to address the first order security concern in the
country, which is the increased activity of al-Qaeda in support
of Shabaab in southern Somalia. Antipiracy initiatives which
feature capturing or killing of Somali youth risk inflaming
anti-Americanism in Somalia, which will play into the hands of
the Shabaab.
United States policies which maximize political space for
Somalis to negotiate--especially the space for the TFG to reach
deals with more pragmatic elements of the Islamist insurgents--
will be of great assistance in promoting an end to the crisis.
Conversely, United States policies which ``redline'' Somali
groups and movements as terrorist reduce negotiating space for
the moderates. Somali political affiliations are much more
fluid and pragmatic than we usually presume.
In the event of a worst-case outcome, in which the capital,
Mogadishu, and most of Somalia falls into the hands of hard-
line Islamists with ties to al-Qaeda, the most effective short-
term policy may simply be to wait rather than rush to a
military or political response. Somalis have a long history of
using, and then discarding, foreigners and their ideologies
once they are no longer of use, and there are reasons to
anticipate sharp differences between al-Qaeda and its globalist
agenda and the more nationalist agenda of the Somali hard-line
Islamists. Somalia's hard-line Islamists will face the
country's many faultlines--clan tensions, leadership rivalries,
and ideological splits--and could well be pulled down by those
centrifugal forces. Put another way, in the face of a worst-
case scenario, Somali society may possess its own self-
correcting mechanisms to deal with foreign and local radicals,
and those mechanisms should be given a chance before we rush
into risky military solutions. It is worth recalling that in
the early 1990s al-Qaeda attempted to make inroads into Somali-
inhabited East Africa and, like so many foreigners bringing
ambitious political projects to Somalia, got its fingers burnt.
If al-Qaeda does attempt to exploit Somalia as a new base or
safe haven, we should work to ensure that the country becomes
as much a quagmire for al-Qaeda as it has been for everyone
else.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, doctor.
Ms. Scribner.
STATEMENT OF SHANNON SCRIBNER, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR ON
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, OXFAM AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Scribner. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Isakson, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
developing a coordinated and sustainable United States strategy
toward Somalia. Oxfam is grateful for the work this committee
has done and in particular you, Senator Feingold, for your
leadership in drawing attention to the humanitarian situation
affecting almost half of the country.
Oxfam has been working in Somalia since the 1960s. Since
the start of 2008, we delivered aid--we have been delivering
aid to over 400,000 Somalis. Through a network of Somali
partner organizations, we provide over 80,000 hot meals a day
to people in Mogadishu, water and sanitation services to over
200,000 people in the Afgooye Corridor, which is about 18\1/2\
miles southwest of Mogadishu, and we are helping 70,000 people
rebuild their livelihoods in central and southern Somalia.
In my testimony today, I will be focusing on the
humanitarian situation and making recommendations on steps the
U.S. Government can take to address the situation as part of a
coordinated U.S. strategy.
Somalia is the site of world's worst humanitarian crisis.
The combination of conflict and drought has led to the
displacement of up to 1.8 million Somalis and more than 3
million people are dependent on aid. Somalia is also one of the
world's most challenging environments for aid workers. Forty
aid workers have been killed since the beginning of 2008 and
most of them have been Somalis.
Half a million Somalis are finding refuge outside Somalia's
borders and approximately 250,000 of these refugees now inhabit
the overcrowded Dadaab camps in northern Kenya. The withdrawal
of Ethiopian troops at the beginning of this year initially
improved civilian safety in some areas, evidenced by the
tentative return of up to 65,000 people to Mogadishu, and
marginally improved access for aid workers. But over the last
few weeks, as we have heard, recent fighting between the
Transitional Federal Unity Government and opposition groups in
Mogadishu has claimed civilian lives and sparked a new wave of
displacement.
Beyond the obvious humanitarian impact of the ongoing
conflict, the country faces drought conditions unseen since the
1991 famine, which is killing livestock at an alarming rate.
Despite the many operational challenges and the shrinking
operational space, Oxfam is still responsibly delivering aid
programs. We work through proven and trusted local Somali NGOs,
which come from the beneficiary communities, making them
accountable not only to us, but also to their communities.
These communities are often involved in the design,
implementation, and monitoring of programs and as a result they
protect their programs from third parties vying for control
over territory.
It is critical to underscore that in order to successfully
continue our work aid agencies must be perceived by communities
and the warring parties as neutral and impartial. As the United
States sets out a new strategy for Somalia, it is important
that the strategy does not undermine aid operations and
preserves at a minimum the limited operating space that we
have. In the past, air strikes in Somalia have negatively
impacted humanitarian access by casting suspicion on aid
workers, which is often followed by threats and retributions.
Likewise, restrictive Office of Foreign Asset Control licensing
could slow down the delivery of urgently needed aid.
It is important to note that there are a range of actors--
al-Shabaab, which there are many factions within al-Shabaab;
the foreign fighters that have been mentioned; clan militias
and criminal groups--fighting for control of territory. While
conflict over who is in control is negatively impacting aid
operations, the control over day-to-day administration of aid
is to the most part done through local clan structures.
My submitted testimony touches on other issues affecting
humanitarian response, such as widespread abuses by all
parties, security sector reform, peacekeeping, and the
importance of a regional approach. But with the minute I have
remaining I would just like to make six recommendations on how
a coordinated and sustainable United States strategy toward
Somalia can improve the humanitarian situation.
As mentioned, it must preserve the limited humanitarian
operating space. It should address the serious public health
crisis unfolding in Dadaab by pressing the Kenyan Government to
authorize UNHCR to start work on a new refugee camp and ensure
that the border remains open to those that are fleeing the
conflict.
We need to hold parties accountable for abuses. All parties
have committed abuses and acted with impunity on the ground.
It must prevent security sector reform and peace-building
from becoming part of the problem. While efforts to bolster
security are necessary, support to security forces must be
transparent and accountable to prevent abuses.
And any U.N. peacekeeping force should have wide acceptance
by Somalis and a peace to actually keep. Otherwise they risk
being drawn into the conflict.
It should foster credible Somali-led political and
governance processes. This means doing things the Somali way
with their consensus-building and power-sharing. The United
States should not support specific individuals or factions.
Finally, ensure that any strategy for Somalia has a
regional approach. Somalia shouldn't be dealt with in
isolation, as peace in Somalia means engaging and resolving
issues with the neighboring countries.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I'm happy
to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Scribner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shannon Scribner, Senior Policy Advisor on
Humanitarian Response, Oxfam America, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on the humanitarian situation
in Somalia and the importance of a coordinated and sustainable United
States strategy. Oxfam is extremely grateful for the work this
committee has done, in particular you, Senator Feingold, in drawing
attention to the humanitarian situation affecting almost half of the
country.
Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency
committed to developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and
social injustice. We are part of a confederation of 13 Oxfam
organizations working together in more than 100 countries with over
3,000 local partners around the globe.
oxfam's response in somalia
We have been working in Somalia since the 1960s, providing
humanitarian and capacity-building assistance. Since the start of 2008,
we have spent more than $7 million on emergency programs delivering aid
to over 400,000 Somalis with a network of Somali partner organizations.
In Mogadishu, we are part of a consortium working with a local partner
to provide over 80,000 hot meals a day to the most vulnerable people.
Together with the same partner, we have just finalized the design phase
of a community therapeutic care program for severely malnourished
children. In the Afgooye Corridor, about 18.5 miles southwest of
Mogadishu, we are providing water and sanitation services to over
200,000 people displaced from Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. In
central and southern Somalia, we are assisting 70,000 people to rebuild
the livelihoods they have lost as a result of the crisis in their
country.
In my testimony today, I will be focusing on the humanitarian
situation inside the country and in the region and making
recommendations on steps the U.S. Government can take to address the
situation as part of a coordinated U.S. strategy.
current humanitarian situation
Somalia remains the site of the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
The combination of conflict and drought have led to more than 3 million
Somalis dependent on aid within the country and the displacement of up
to 1.8 million. Somalia is also one of the world's most challenging
environments for aid workers and 40 of them, mostly Somalis, have been
killed since the beginning of 2008. Half a million Somalis are finding
refuge outside Somalia's borders in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and
Yemen. Over 250,000 of these refugees now inhabit the overcrowded
Dadaab camps in northern Kenya. While the northern regions of Puntland
and Somaliland have both achieved relative degrees of stability and
security, the south and central regions in Somalia remain unstable and
access for aid organizations extremely difficult.
latest humanitarian development
The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 initially
improved civilian safety in some areas--evidenced by the tentative
return of up to 65,000 people to Mogadishu between January and April of
this year. This marginally improved the ability of humanitarian actors
to access people in need with the removal of roadblocks on major axes.
But, over the last few weeks, recent fighting between the Transitional
Federal Unity Government (TFG) and opposition groups erupted in the
Somali capital of Mogadishu claiming the lives of civilians, and
sparking a new wave of displacement. Hospitals in central Mogadishu are
overwhelmed and among the newly displaced are families that had
recently returned home following a period of relative peace in
Mogadishu. Many of the displaced are heading toward the Afgooye
Corridor. As of yesterday, it has been reported that there are close to
60,000 new displacements into the corridor.
Beyond the obvious humanitarian impact of the ongoing conflict, the
country faces drought conditions unseen since the 1991 famine and
meteorologists are warning of an 80-percent chance of drier than normal
conditions in the Horn of Africa through 2009. Drought conditions
continue to ravage livelihoods, particularly among pastoralist
populations as livestock are dying and wasting at an alarming rate.
Despite the operational challenges, it remains possible to
responsibly implement aid programs, and it is crucial that aid
operations continue, and even expand where possible. Being able to
operate within an insecure environment is largely based upon the
perceptions of communities and warring parties as to whether we are
operating neutrally and impartially. Oxfam works with proven and
trusted local Somali NGOs which come from the beneficiary communities
so they are accountable not only to us but to their communities. We
also have a team of high-qualified Somali engineers and other technical
experts who visit and monitor the programs we are funding.
humanitarian obstacles
While our reach is limited due to security, aid is saving lives and
livelihoods in Somalia. Aid agencies have access at the neighborhood,
district and camp levels but this access must be protected. As the
United States sets out a new strategy for Somalia, it is critical that
the strategy does not undermine aid operations and preserves the
limited operating space. In the past, United States airstrikes in
Somalia have negatively impacted humanitarian access by casting
suspicion on aid workers, followed by threats and retributions.
Likewise, restrictive Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing
could slow down the delivery of urgently needed aid, and so it is
important that a workable middle ground be found on the OFAC issue that
enables exemptions for those aid agenices working in al-Shabaab
controlled territory (similar to the OFAC exemption granted to
organizations working in Hezbollah territory in Lebanon). It is
important to note that no matter who is in control of areas where we
work, Oxfam's partners work directly within local clan structures,
which continue to exercise effective control over day-to-day
administration of aid.
It is also important to point out that there are a range of
actors--al-Shabaab, foreign fighters, militias, and criminal groups--
impacting our work on the ground. In Oxfam's case, it is our community-
based approach that allows our partners to deliver aid because they
involve the communities in the design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of programs and as a result, the communities protect the
program from parties vying for control of territory.
refugee flows to neighboring countries
The humanitarian challenges are not limited to Somalia. Kenya's
northeastern province, Dadaab, is host to three refugee camps
established in 1991. Originally designed to accommodate 90,000
refugees, Dadaab now constitutes the largest refugee site in the world
with 250,000 mostly Somali residents. In January 2007, the Kenyan
Government closed its border with Somalia but more than 100,000 have
nonetheless arrived in Dadaab over the past 2 years, mostly from the
conflict-affected areas of Mogadishu and Lower Juba. The high number of
refugees in recent months has stretched resources and infrastructure
beyond capacity and there is a lack of space on which to build a new
camp unless the Kenyan Government authorizes new land to build an
additional camp. In March, an Oxfam assessment report showed a lack of
basic services, severe overcrowding leading to more than 20 cases of
cholera, and a lack of funding. Half of the people in the camps do not
have access to enough water and women and children--who make up over
half Dadaab's population--rarely have accesss to adequate latrines.
the need for accountability
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 there have been
widespread abuses against civilians. The lack of accountability for
past and current crimes, reinforce a sense of impunity and further
fuels conflict.
Since early 2007, there have been reports of widespread and
systematic attacks on civilians, journalists, aid workers and human
rights activists by all of the warring parties. The failure of the
international community to hold these parties accountable for serious
breaches of international humanitarian and human rights laws has
contributed to a climate of impunity in Somalia.
Somalia is at a pivotal transitional moment and there is an
opportunity for the new Transitional Federal Unity Government to draw a
line with the past, demonstrate genuine willingness to end the
prevailing climate of impunity, and gain the confidence of the Somali
people.
security sector reform and peacekeeping
At the donors' conference last month in Brussels, the United States
and others pledged increased resources for the TFG and more than $250
million for security efforts to bring order to the country. While
efforts to bolster security are necessary, there needs to be
recognition that recent international interventions in Somalia's
security sector have exacerbated problems rather than eased them. For
example, the United Nations Development Program gave direct financial
support for police salaries and some of these police were implicated in
serious human rights abuses.
A key component of the international community's engagement in
Somalia is the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
AMISOM's mandate is to protect key TFG officials and infrastructure,
support the training of Somali security forces, and create security
conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The
force has never been adequately staffed or resourced but in January
2009, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of U.N.
assessed peacekeeping contributions to fund a U.N. support package,
including medical and communications support, and the creation of a
trust fund to marshal voluntary contributions to the force. Discussion
has been underway of deploying a multidimensional peacekeeping
operation.
regional stability
The situation in Somalia acts as a destabilizing force within the
greater Horn region. Until there is some level of peace in Somalia,
more Somalis will cross over the Somalia-Kenya border into Dadaab and
piracy will continue. The major supply ports in Mogadishu, Kismayu, and
Merka are major supply ports for the rest of the Horn of Africa. As
these ports are disrupted, so is the distribution of aid and commercial
traffic all up and down the roads that criss-cross from these ports.
Somali-Ethiopian tensions continue to simmer as ethnic Somali rebels
battle the Ethiopian Government in the Ogaden and Somalia serves a
proxy battlefield for ongoing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
All of these problems are symptoms of the same underlying cause--the
perpetual challenge of weak governance in Somalia.
recommendations
Following are steps Congress and the Obama administration should
take to address the humanitarian situation in a new comprehensive and
sustainable strategy toward Somalia:
1. Preserve the limited humanitarian operating space--humanitarian
needs remain paramount and of such scale that anything that jeopardizes
the humanitarian relief operations will by extension threaten regional
stability.
2. Take urgent steps to deal with the serious public health crisis
unfolding in Dadaab--press the Kenyan Government to authorize UNHCR to
start work on a new refugee camp at Dadaab and ensure that its border
remains open to those fleeing the conflict.
3. Hold parties accountable for abuses--the international community
should use their diplomatic, financial, and political leverage with all
parties to demonstrate that violations of international humanitarian
and human rights law will not be tolerated, and that perpetrators will
be held accountable.
4. Prevent security sector reform and peacekeeping from becoming
part of the problem--any support to security forces must be transparent
and accountable and any U.N. peacekeeping force should have wide
acceptance by Somalis and a peace to keep. Otherwise they risk being
drawn into the conflict.
5. Foster a credible, Somali-led political and governance process--
this includes consensus-building, power-sharing, and moderation, but
not supporting specific individuals or factions.
6. Ensure any strategy for Somalia has a regional approach--Somalia
shouldn't be dealt with in isolation as peace in Somalia means engaging
and resolving issues with neighboring countries.
Senator Feingold. I thank both of you.
I thank Senator Kaufman for his attendance. Also Senator
Risch has joined us, members of the subcommittee.
Let me start a 7-minute round for this panel. Dr. Menkhaus,
I'll start with you. No one will dispute, I don't think, that
the situation in Somalia is far worse than it was 2 or 3 years
ago, and that the threat posed by terrorism as well as piracy
is far greater now. Looking at the previous administration's
approach, as well as that of the international community, what
lessons do you believe can and should be learned so we don't
repeat the same mistakes again?
Dr. Menkhaus. First, I would argue for a more nuanced
analysis and understanding of the political dynamics in
Somalia. I think there's a great temptation on the part of
decisionmakers across the world, when confronted with the
extraordinary complexities of Somalia, to oversimplify them,
and that usually comes at a cost in terms of effectiveness of
policy.
Second, I would caution against careless use of state-
building initiatives to a transitional government in the
context of a war. This needs to be very calibrated assistance.
To the extent that security forces of the Transitional Federal
Government are controlled by the transitional government
authorities, to the extent that there is a local ownership of
those security forces, and to the extent that those local
security forces are accountable to both the people and the
government, that opens the door toward external assistance.
But in conditions where the security forces are essentially
a paramilitary, a law unto themselves, and are a source of
insecurity and predation against the local community, our
assistance--``our'' meaning international assistance--in the
past essentially meant we were taking sides in an open civil
war. That was one of the reasons why the U.N. and international
aid agencies became targets in this insurgency and
counterinsurgency.
Senator Feingold. As you know, I'm very concerned that the
fledgling transitional government is losing support, as well as
losing ground with this recent fighting I described. In your
view, Doctor, what specifically does the government need to
regain support and momentum toward uniting the country? Are
there important groups or clans or constituencies that should
be engaged more and who would make a big difference if they
were brought into the government?
Dr. Menkhaus. I share your concern about the loss of ground
that the TFG has experienced. The insurgents' offensive in
recent weeks has been alarming. I don't know that there is a
lot that the international community can do to shape the
outcome of this current crisis at this time. There may be some
calibrated financial support, there may be some diplomatic
initiatives, that would facilitate the TFG's current effort to
negotiate with some elements of the armed insurgency, those
that we consider groups that are not in any serious way
indoctrinated, committed jihadists. Bringing as many of those
into the TFG is certainly a viable strategy on their part, and
if there are things we can do to facilitate that we should.
I would caution against an impulse to provide direct
military support at this time because that would play into the
hands of the Shabaab. The Shabaab have every interest in
framing this current fight as Somalis versus foreigners. They
would love to attract Ethiopia back in. They would benefit
enormously from U.S. air strikes were that to happen.
To the extent that this is a Somali internal political
struggle, Shabaab actually faces real challenges, because what
they stand for is very unappealing for the vast majority of
Somalis.
Senator Feingold. Your view specifically about a sort of
pivotal figure here, Sheikh Hassan Aweys, who recently returned
to Somalia? How do you assess his role in all of this and what
are his intentions?
Dr. Menkhaus. Hassan Dahir Aweys is on our list of
designated terrorist suspects, and that's very problematic when
it comes to efforts on the part of the Transitional Federal
Government to dialogue with him as a potential partner in this
government. He is actually of greater concern to Ethiopia than
he is to us, because he was in the group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya
in the mid-1990s when
al-Itihaad launched several terrorist attacks against the
Ethiopian Government. That may well make him a nonstarter for
Ethiopia were he to be brought into discussions.
He is currently leading----
Senator Feingold. A nonstarter for Somalia?
Dr. Menkhaus. For Ethiopia. Ethiopia would reject----
Senator Feingold. Would reject it out of hand.
Dr. Menkhaus. Exactly. And we have to take careful account
of Ethiopia's legitimate security concerns in this.
Aweys is currently heading up the Hizbul al-Islamiya
faction, which is a hard-line Islamist group, but which tends
to embrace more nationalist, rather than globalist, agendas,
and therein lies the tension, I think, between Hizbul al-
Islamiya and Shabaab, Shabaab having forged closer links to al-
Qaeda.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Scribner, I'm glad you're here to
give the humanitarian perspective and to highlight the great
constraints which agencies like Oxfam are facing. As the U.S.
Government considers a new strategy for Somalia, how can we
ensure that we're not further impeding humanitarian access and
independence? In your view how should addressing the
humanitarian situation in Somalia connect with the efforts
we've been talking about to support political reconciliation
and governance?
Ms. Scribner. I think in terms of things I mentioned in my
testimony that one thing would be air strikes on the ground
have really impacted aid operations on the ground, because that
only casts suspicion on NGOs in terms of their alliance with
the West, with the government, or with the U.S. military. And
we've had aid organizations that had to suspend operations in
some of those areas. So that would be really--that is one thing
that's very critical for operating space on the ground.
Then the other thing is just holding parties accountable on
the ground. There is really lack of holding anyone accountable
for abuses that have been documented by human rights
organizations and groups on the ground. So if we could somehow
start holding people accountable that would be helpful to our
access on the ground as well.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Menkhaus, you include bullet points toward the end of
your printed remarks, which you did not really discuss. The one
I am reading seems to sum up everything we have been talking
about. It is on the next to the last page. You write: ``U.S.
interests are best served by maximizing the extent to which the
current conflict in Somalia is defined as an internal Somalian
affair. By contrast, Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islamiya's interests
are best served when the conflict is regionalized or
globalized, framed as a Somali versus foreign fighter
situation.''
I am going to get to Ms. Scribner on the issue in a second.
She has a statement that's interesting.
So I take it when we talk about a coordinated effort in
Somalia that this effort must be coordinated in part with
Ethiopia and with Ethiopian cooperation, is that correct?
Dr. Menkhaus. That's correct. We've spent a lot of time
this morning talking about coordinated strategy just within the
U.S. Government, and that's not an easy thing to do. When you
add all of the external actors whose interests matter,
including western states, Islamic and Arab states, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Kenya, this gets to be even a greater challenge.
The key with bringing Ethiopia in as a full partner to a
solution in Somalia is, first, the very high levels of distrust
between Somalis and Ethiopia. This is a long historical issue.
Yet they do have common ground. When you talk to them
privately, they do see opportunities for coexistence. Somali
business people would benefit enormously from access to such a
large internal market. Ethiopia would benefit, obviously,
enormously from having a stable country on its long border.
But they haven't gotten to that point yet. So trust-
building, confidence-building measures are really critical.
The other aspect of bringing Ethiopia more fully into these
discussions is recognizing that, while our interests overlap
closely with Ethiopia's and we are allies with them, our
interests are not identical. They have different sets of
security concerns and different ways of going about them, and
we have to be frank with one another about those differences.
Senator Isakson. Ethiopia's difficulty with Eritrea was
primarily over their border, if I'm not mistaken. Is there a
border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia?
Dr. Menkhaus. Yes. That border has never been formally
recognized by Somalia. It was the source of a major war, the
Ogaden war in 1977-78. Periodically Somali groups, including
al-Itihaad
al-Islamiya, embrace irredentist claims, territorial claims, on
the Somali region in Ethiopia, where about 4 million ethnic
Somalis live. So this remains a source of enduring concern for
Ethiopia.
Senator Isakson. So would a coordinated strategy require
some settlement of that border dispute?
Dr. Menkhaus. Absolutely. At a minimum, what we would have
to start off with by way of confidence-building measures would
be to ensure that any new government in Somalia and any partner
in a new government in Somalia accept the premise of peaceful
coexistence with Somalia's neighbors. That is a bitter pill to
swallow for some Somali nationalists who continue to embrace
the notion of a greater Somalia. But under the circumstances,
that's going to have to be one of the things they're willing to
concede on the table if Somalia is going to get out of this 20-
year impasse.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Scribner, in point six, you said,
``Ensure any strategy for Somalia has a regional approach.
Somalia shouldn't be dealt with in isolation, as peace in
Somalia means engaging and resolving issues with its
neighbors.''
So I am getting the drift that you both agree, from two
different perspectives which ultimately arrive at the same
conclusion, that a coordinated strategy must be coordinated
with Ethiopia and with Somalia. Is there another bordering
country with which coordination is needed, or is it primarily
the Ethiopian-Somalian difficulty?
Ms. Scribner. Definitely the Ethiopians, the Eritreans, but
also the Kenyans as well, and that has to do a lot with the
refugee flows into Kenya and the Dadaab camps, and also the
closing of the border off and on, but the Liboy reception
center, which is where refugees go to be registered. That
center has been shut down, so there's no process to register
Somalis that are fleeing into Kenya at this point. So Kenya is
also a very important country in terms of coordinated strategy.
Senator Isakson. Is the Transitional Federal Government
actually stable enough to sit down at the table with those two
neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, in order to reach an agreement,
in your judgment?
Ms. Scribner. I think that there is an effort by the new
President to reach out to all parties on the ground. I think
right now the focus has been on parties within Somalia, so the
different warring parties. But I think as a next step
definitely reaching out to the other, to Kenya and to Ethiopia.
But I think right now on his plate is reaching out to the
different groups on the ground.
Senator Isakson. I take it that the two organizations--the
two terrorist organizations, al-Shabaab and the other that you
mentioned--really play on the nationalist pride of the Somali
people. And, in doing so, they create an ``it's us versus
Ethiopia'' mentality, in order to whip up the locals and to
keep the uncertainty going on. Is that correct?
Dr. Menkhaus. That's exactly what Shabaab's successful
formula was in 2007-08. They conflated a radical Islamist
ideology with a nationalist, anti-imperialist, liberation
ideology against the Ethiopian occupation, and that won them a
lot of support, at least passive support, from Somalis who
didn't accept some of the elements of their Islamist agenda,
but who saw them as a legitimate leading freedom fighter force
against the Ethiopian occupation.
Now that the Ethiopians are out and now that there is a
new, more broad-based government that's actually led by their
former leader and a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif, Shabaab
doesn't have anything to fight against. They have been trying
to use the African Union forces and their presence in Mogadishu
as the one remaining rallying point of the Somalis versus the
foreigners, but that doesn't have as much traction in Somali
society.
Senator Isakson. Is al-Shabaab's ultimate goal sharia law
and control of Somalia? Is that what they really want?
Dr. Menkhaus. It's difficult to say what Shabaab wants
because it's actually quite internally divided.
Senator Isakson. Shabaab is?
Dr. Menkhaus. Yes. What it certainly wants is to block and
prevent the Transitional Federal Government from becoming
operational. It wants to take control. It is definitely a
power-seeker in that sense. What its policies would be beyond
that we can only speculate.
Senator Isakson. Thank you both very much for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Ms. Scribner, you made reference to the fact
that you--I think you said that you would like to see those who
have committed human rights violations or other violations held
accountable. How do you do that under present circumstances?
Certainly everyone would agree with that, but pragmatically
that seems like a difficult thing.
Ms. Scribner. What a lot of human rights organizations have
been calling for is a commission of inquiry. You could do that
through the U.N., where you have people going in to investigate
abuses on the ground. A lot of those investigations could be
done in the bordering countries where refugees have flown, so
talking to people in Dadaab camps. Most of those people in the
camps are from Somalia. So you could actually get a lot of
information.
Then when the situation or security on the ground allowed,
go into the country and do some of the investigation, which
would be helpful in terms of moving toward reconciliation,
holding parties accountable, and also looking ahead at any
further abuses that are committed, set up a system on the
ground.
Senator Risch. I guess I apologize for my parochial view of
holding people accountable, but to me holding people
accountable is dragging them into court and inflicting
punishment on them for what they've done. I gather that's not
what you were referring to. You're more of a--you're referring
more to an inquiry and then a publication of the bad things
that someone did, but not necessarily a punishment or something
along those lines.
Ms. Scribner. I don't think we can get to that yet. But
yes, exactly, something similar to what's been done in Burundi
or Rwanda or East Timor even, where it's more of a publication
of kind of the wrongdoers on the ground, just to give people a
sense that you cannot act with complete impunity, that people
are watching, that people do care about the abuses being
committed on civilians and aid workers, journalists, and human
rights defenders.
Senator Risch. I guess it depends on your point of view,
but from my point of view it's almost counterproductive. If you
do publish this and say, look, this is what these bad guys did,
and then don't do anything about it, it doesn't--it's not the
kind of thing that helps in the future. That is, people say,
who cares? They discovered all this and then did absolutely
nothing about it. These people did act with impunity. They're
still walking down the street. They're still doing whatever.
So I guess that--I just need help here understanding this.
I understand what you're saying and I think the frustration is
you want to do something about it, but yet just investigating
it and then publishing the results of the investigation it
would seem to me is not a good deterrent, either individually
or from a general deterrence standpoint.
Ms. Scribner. But it does set up a system for people to
feel like their concerns are being heard, they're taken into
consideration. It also depends on who is committing the abuses.
If it's within the police that are part of the Transitional
Federal Government--and that's something we talked about with
security sector reform--in terms of holding people accountable,
you can hold those people accountable because you can fire
them.
So there are certain parties that will be held more
accountable than others and that actions could be taken. But in
places where there is conflict it does serve as a forum for
people to have grievances and also just to have their voices
heard and the problems that they've experienced at the hands of
different parties heard as well. But again, very complicated
and not an easy thing to do, but a first step toward actually
holding people accountable. More needs to be done in the
future, but we need to take that first step.
Senator Risch. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Menkhaus, I was fascinated by your comment about some
people have a vision for a greater Somalia. Could you expand on
what you meant by that?
Dr. Menkhaus. This is part of an old Somali desire to re-
unify ethnic Somalis who were divided by colonialism into five
different colonies in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, British
Somaliland, Italian Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Two of those
five did unite, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, at
independence. Now, of course, Somaliland has issued a
unilateral secession or a termination of the unity between the
two.
But it's a core belief in Somali nationalism, which is,
paradoxically, very, very strong despite the fact that they're
internally riven by clan and other divisions.
Senator Risch. Does that go away over a period of time or
does it get worse?
Dr. Menkhaus. It's been around since the 1950s. It's far
less significant today than it has been in the past, when it
drove wars in the 1970s, but it's still there, not so much for
the Somali Kenyans, who really have no interest in re-uniting
with Somalia, nor with Somali Djiboutians, who are enjoying all
of the fruits of having an independent state. But it's the
Somali Ethiopians, who are treated as second class citizens in
Ethiopia, frankly, and who are currently bearing the brunt of a
very heavy-handed counterinsurgency campaign by the Ethiopian
Government.
Senator Risch. What percentage of the population is that in
Ethiopia?
Dr. Menkhaus. It's about 4 million of a population of
roughly 80 million in Ethiopia, if I'm remembering my numbers
correctly.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I'll ask some more questions. Ms. Scribner, I'm glad that
you raise the problem of refugee flows to neighboring
countries. I've been worried specifically about the
overcrowding and lack of adequate resources in Dadaab, which
you mentioned, in Kenya, one of the world's oldest, largest,
and most congested refugee sites. Earlier this week Doctors
Without Borders said that hundreds of thousands of Somali
refugees at this camp are finding the camp conditions so
unbearable that some are considering returning home.
I know that there's been an effort over the last year to
work with the Kenyan Government to secure some new land to
accommodate the refugees, but it's my understanding that a
solution still hasn't been reached. What is a workable solution
to this situation and what's the greatest obstacle? Lack of
leadership, resources, or something else?
Ms. Scribner. In terms of the Dadaab camps, there are three
camps--existing camps right now. The negotiation right now is
to build a fourth camp. While the Kenyan Government has agreed
with UNHCR in principle, they've announced that they would
actually authorize land for this fourth camp, they haven't
officially authorized it. They haven't given it up to them as
of yet.
It's going to take about 6 months to construct that fourth
camp. So in the mean time, as Doctors Without Borders and even
Oxfam did an assessment report of the camps, we're finding
there's not enough latrines, the latrines aren't separate
between women and men, so a lot of the women and children
aren't using the latrines because of cultural sensitivities of
using the same latrine. There's not enough water for people.
So those demands need to be immediately met. Then that
fourth camp needs to be up and running as quickly as possible.
There's also an appeal--I believe it's $91 million UNHCR
appeal--and that's really important to get funding for the
existing camps and then this fourth camp as well.
Senator Feingold. Do you expect this fourth camp will be
available in 6 months or is that not clear?
Ms. Scribner. It's going to be 6 months from the time the
Kenyan Government actually authorizes the land. As we hope--
they've agreed in principle, but again they haven't given that
specific authorization as of yet.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, in terms of the piracy off
Somalia's coast, you said previously that naval operations
might help, but they cannot possibly stop this piracy when
``the risks are so low, the rewards so high, and
alternatives,'' in your words, ``so bleak in desolate
Somalia.'' That was very well put and I want to ask you
specifically about possible alternatives and the importance of
economic opportunities and, thinking about United States and
international assistance to Somalia, how important is economic
revitalization in promoting livelihoods?
Obviously, some of this is very difficult with combat
violence going on in some regions of Somalia. But I'm thinking
here also about Puntland or even Somaliland.
Dr. Menkhaus. In the long term, economic revitalization to
provide opportunities, alternative opportunities for pirates
and their financial backers are the solution. In the short to
medium term, though, the on-land solution can also and must
also come from political authorities that are both willing and
able to stop the piracy, which I would add is a second order
security threat for us compared to what's going on in
Mogadishu. I think we have to be careful not to allow any of
our antipiracy efforts to compromise our policies toward
counterterrorism and state-building in the south.
We do have two instances in Somalia where piracy has been
prevented or stopped by local political authorities because
they had a political interest in demonstrating their utility to
the international community. One is Somaliland. Somaliland has
the ideal coast along the Gulf of Aden for pirate lairs, and
yet when pirates have attempted to use those shores Somaliland
has prevented it, and that's again because they are trying to
demonstrate their legitimacy and their utility to the
international community in a bid for international recognition.
The other instance was the Islamic Courts Union in 2006,
which put a quick end to piracy along the Indian Ocean coast.
Again, that was in part because the pirates and their financial
backers were political rivals of the Islamists, so they had
incentive to put an end to it, but also because they wanted to
demonstrate that they were a source of rule of law, someone
that we would want to work with.
For me that's instructive. It means that they don't have to
have a large coast guard. It means that they don't have to have
the immediate economic revitalization. What they have to have
is the political interest, the will, to put an end to it on
shore, and if they have that they will do it.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, I particularly appreciate your
candor and your directness. It's exactly what you said, the
piracy, as important as it is, is not the first order security
risk here. Of course, we don't have a full room here, just a
few weeks after the piracy. We don't have the heroes here who
saved the people. So we revert back to the sort of, OK,
Somalia's a terribly difficult place, and we forget the most
elemental thing, which is that the pirates do not live in the
water; they live on the land.
And if we're foolish enough to just let this go and move on
to other things, the next crisis of the day, we will seriously
involve ourselves in, I think, one of the greatest crises in
the world. There's a tendency for people to say, well, the
President's got so many things on his plate, how can he
possibly have Somalia be at this level? Well, the fact is it
may well be at that level, and it requires that kind of
attention. It requires that attention now. So I greatly
appreciate your comments.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have just one question for Ms. Scribner. I am going to be
in Kenya next week, so I need a little education. From what I
understand, the Dadaab camp is there under the auspices of the
Kenyan Government allowing it to be there. Who operates he
camp?
Ms. Scribner. UNHCR does, so the U.N.
Senator Isakson. So it's under the auspices of the U.N?
Ms. Scribner. I believe it is under the auspices of the
U.N. They're the ones in charge and operating those camps
there, but with the permission of the Kenyan Government.
Senator Isakson. And there are half a million refugees, you
said, in that camp?
Ms. Scribner. There are 250,000 refugees in three camps.
Senator Isakson. In three camps?
Ms. Scribner. Yes. So there are 500,000 refugees in
surrounding countries and half of those, 250,000, are in the
Dadaab camps.
Senator Isakson. Which U.S.-based NGOs are providing
assistance in that camp?
Ms. Scribner. I believe Doctors Without Borders;
International Rescue Committee is also in the camps. And Oxfam
has done assessments in the camps and we've agreed with the
government that if a fourth camp is opened that we would
provide water and sanitation for that fourth camp.
Senator Isakson. The Kenyan Government?
Ms. Scribner. Yes.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much. Thanks to both of you
for your testimony today.
Ms. Scribner. Thanks.
Senator Feingold. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. In the camps themselves, who provides the
security? Is it the Kenyan Government or the U.N. that provides
security in the camps, local policing, if you would?
Ms. Scribner. I think it's the Kenyan police. But there
have been some allegations of abuse by the police on the
population within the camps, and I think it was Human Rights
Watch in particular did a very detailed report of abuses within
the camps and the problems, not just with the humanitarian
situation, but with the security situation.
Senator Risch. Is it the result of ethnic prejudice or that
sort of thing? What's the source of that?
Ms. Scribner. I think it's many issues, many different
issues. Part of it is maybe the police not making enough money,
so it's preying on the population. It may be that they are
Somalis and not Kenyans. But I don't know specifically all the
different issues of it, but I know that there has been a lot of
reports and concerns about the treatment.
Half of those 250,000 people are women and children, so
that's really important to point out.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. I want to thank the panel very much. I
particularly want to thank my colleagues for their diligence on
this and other issues relating to Africa. It really has made
the work on the subcommittee so far this year a pleasure. I
want to thank everybody who was involved in the hearing. That
concludes it.
[Whereupon, at 10:27 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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