[Senate Hearing 111-100]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-100, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1390
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 1
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
MILITARY POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
__________
MARCH 17, 19, 24; MAY 14, 19, 21; JUNE 4, 16, 2009
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-620 WASHINGTON : 2009
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
United States Southern Command, United States Northern Command, United
States Africa Command, and United States Transportation Command
march 17, 2009
Page
Stavridis, Admiral James G., USN, Commander, United States
Southern Command............................................... 5
Renuart, General Victor E. Jr., USAF, Commander, United States
Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command........................................................ 16
Ward, General William E., USA, Commander, United States Africa
Command........................................................ 29
McNabb, General Duncan J., USAF, Commander, United States
Transportation Command......................................... 47
United States Pacific Command, United States Strategic Command, and
United States Forces Korea
march 19, 2009
Keating, Admiral Timothy J., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 116
Chilton, General Kevin P., USAF, Commander, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 133
Sharp, General Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command;
Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces
Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea............. 142
United States European Command and United States Joint Forces Command
march 24, 2009
Craddock, General Bantz J., USA, Commander, United States
European Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme
Allied Commander Europe........................................ 218
Mattis, General James N., USMC, Commander, United States Joint
Forces Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme
Allied Commander Transformation................................ 249
Military Posture
May 14, 2009
Gates, Honorable Robert M., Secretary of Defense; accompanied by
Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)....... 323
Mullen, Admiral Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 332
Department of the Army
may 19, 2009
Geren, Honorable Preston M. ``Pete'', III, Secretary of the Army. 429
Casey, General George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army... 452
Department of the Air Force
may 21, 2009
Donley, Honorable Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force......... 508
Schwartz, General Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff................ 517
Department of the Navy
june 4, 2009
Mabus, Honorable Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy.......... 581
Roughead, Admiral Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations........... 585
Conway, General James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps... 599
Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
june 16, 2009
Lynn, Honorable William J., Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense.......................................... 694
Cartwright, General James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff....................................................... 699
O'Reilly, Lieutenant General Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile
Defense Agency................................................. 700
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
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TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, UNITED
STATES AFRICA COMMAND, AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Hagan,
Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune,
Martinez, Wicker, Burr, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Thomas K.
McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican
staff director; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional
staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Christine G.
Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Julie
Hotzhuefer, assistant to Senator Hagan; Brady King, assistant
to Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A.
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh and Erskine W. Wells
III, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Kevin Kane, assistant
to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today we have
before our committee four of our combatant commanders for our
annual posture review to discuss the issues and challenges
confronting each of them. We welcome our witnesses today.
Admiral Jim Stavridis is the Commander of the U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM), and General Gene Renuart, the Commander of
the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). We're joined also, of
course, by General Kip Ward, Commander of the U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM), and General Duncan McNabb, Commander of the
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
Let me first express on behalf of our entire committee our
gratitude for your service and for the service of the men and
women that you lead. I hope, and I know all of us feel the same
way, that you will express to them our enormous respect and
appreciation for their dedication to our Nation and for the
many sacrifices that they are willing to make on behalf of
their fellow citizens.
The issues before the committee this morning run the gamut
from transportation and supply routes to support U.S. and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and
around the world, to the threat posed by narcotics trade within
our hemisphere, to the defense of our homeland, to how to best
engage nations in Africa as they confront threats from non-
state actors and the regional implications of failed or failing
states.
Admiral Stavridis, the challenges that we face in our own
hemisphere are complex. The drug trade in South and Central
America is booming and the violence associated with the drug
trade is migrating northward. President Chavez continues to
work to undermine U.S. interests in the region and to do
everything possible to maintain his own power. Yet we continue
to rely on his country for much of our Nation's petroleum.
We're also confronted with Iran's nascent and growing interest
in the region.
Your command has also seen gains over the past few years.
Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian Government to expand
security and government services to the farthest reaches of
Colombia.
General Renuart, the brutal violence that we see in Mexico
today reminds us of the situation that Colombia faced a decade
ago. Nearly every week we hear a report of a senior official in
Mexico being killed in a brazen attack. The root cause of the
violence in Mexico is the same as in Colombia: criminal
organizations using any means necessary to traffic illegal
narcotics for enormous financial gain. The origin of these
narcotics remains Colombia mainly, but the problems created
from this trafficking run from Lima to Tijuana and America's
southern border and northward. Governors from our southern
border States are calling on the Federal Government to send
troops to help defend against the possibility of this violence
entering American communities.
Following a trip to Mexico earlier this month, Admiral
Mullen talked about a ``shared responsibility'' for the cause
of the crisis and said the United States had a shared
responsibility to clean it up as well. We will be interested to
hear how NORTHCOM is working with the Mexican military to help
address this violence and how NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are working
together along the seam of their respective commands to
mitigate and deconflict our assistance programs.
NORTHCOM also has the responsibility for operating the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system
deployed to defend the United States against a potential
ballistic missile attack from North Korea. The Pentagon's
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation recently wrote that
``GMD flight testing to date will not support a high degree of
confidence in its limited capabilities.'' We are interested to
hear from you, General Renuart, about the testing and the
performance of that system along with a number of other issues.
General Ward, the challenges on the African continent are
staggering, we don't have to tell you, and the conflicts that
rage across borders to fragile governments to nations where
peacekeeping or peace-enforcing forces are the best and
sometimes the only hope for security and stability. The
terrorism threat from Africa, and particularly the potential
for havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists in ungoverned
or undergoverned areas, are cause for deep concern.
Last week before this committee, Director of National
Intelligence Blair described an al Qaeda-affiliated group as
the ``most active terrorist group in northwestern Africa'' and
assessed that it ``represents a significant threat to U.S. and
western interests in the region.''
The situation in West Africa is further complicated by the
increased flow of narcotics from the SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility (AOR) en route to Europe via West Africa. The
consequences of cooperation between terrorists and traffickers
of illegal narcotics are cause for great concern. We need to
look no further than Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in South American and Afghanistan and
the Taliban in Central Asia to understand the importance of
working with our partner nations to confront this threat.
General McNabb, TRANSCOM's planning role and preparation to
support both the drawdown from Iraq and the buildup in
Afghanistan will be critical issues in the coming 12 to 24
months. The committee is eager to hear from you on
transportation and logistics risks associated with this shift
of resources and personnel.
With respect to supply routes into Afghanistan, in recent
weeks we have additional security and political pressure on the
critical supply routes that run from Karachi, Pakistan, up
through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan, as well as the
apparent decision by the Government of Kyrgyzstan to deny U.S.
forces use of their air base at Manas.
The committee would like to hear from you on TRANSCOM's
role in helping to resolve these access and supply route
challenges. Also, tell us if our allies are using or
considering the use of Iran as a supply route. We also hope
that you'll explain to the committee the greatest risks to
completing TRANSCOM's support missions and how you would
propose to eliminate or to mitigate them. Finally, given that
our other witnesses are from geographical combatant commands, I
hope that you will discuss TRANSCOM's support of SOUTHCOM,
AFRICOM, and NORTHCOM.
One last item. During Director of National Intelligence
Blair's testimony before this committee last week, all of us
noted with great interest that he spoke of the risks associated
with the current global economic downturn. We'd be interested
in hearing from each of the witnesses about the impact of the
economic downturn and in which nations you believe the risks to
be most significant.
Our thanks again to each of our witnesses for your service
to this Nation, and for the service of the dedicated men and
women who serve under your command.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses today and I'd like to echo your thanks
to the witnesses and the men and women who serve under their
command for their distinguished service to our Nation.
There's a number of important issues we hope our witnesses
will address in this hearing. General McNabb, as the United
States increases significantly the size of its forces in
Afghanistan, supply lines will obviously become even more
important. It's been reported, for example, that the daily
demand for truck deliveries into Afghanistan will increase by
some 50 percent as an additional 17,000 troops deploy to the
country. This increased demand comes at a time when our supply
routes through Pakistan have grown increasingly dangerous and
the Government of Kyrgyzstan has evicted or announced the
eviction of our forces from Manas Air Base.
Other possible supply routes are problematic, from those
that would rely on Russian goodwill to a route that passes
through Uzbekistan, which evicted our forces from the K2 base
following the Andejan massacre, to an Iranian route which I
understand some of our NATO allies are considering. General
McNabb, I look forward to hearing your views on the viability
of alternate supply routes and how we might deal with some of
the problems they present.
I also hope we will hear about TRANSCOM's plans for
maintaining its air mobility readiness, especially your
thoughts on recapitalization of the current KC-135 aerial
refueling tanker. I'm troubled by recent reports that suggest
some Members of Congress have advocated statutorily directing a
split buy between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The replacement
tanker decision must be based on a competitive process that
provides the warfighter with the best possible tanker at the
best possible cost to the taxpayer. Obviously, splitting this
contract would have a dramatic increase in the cost to the
taxpayer. So we don't need an expedient political decision that
is totally impractical and inefficient.
There are a number of developments in our own hemisphere.
For instance, Hugo Chavez offered an island base for Russian
bombers. Reportedly, a Russian general suggested that Cuba
could host its own Russian bombers. Americans and, frankly,
Members of this committee are not quite understanding exactly
what's going on here. You'll help us separate rhetoric from
reality, I'm sure.
On Sunday, El Salvador elected a new government and, while
President Fuentes has shown so far no affinity for the likes of
Hugo Chavez, change continues to sweep through Central and
South America, change that can have a direct impact on the
security of the United States.
America's future is fundamentally tied to the stability,
prosperity, and security of our southern neighbors. The recent
increase in violence along our southern border is perhaps the
chief example of the interplay between our own security and
that of our southern neighbors. Today Phoenix, Arizona, is the
kidnapping capital of America and gangs that were born in El
Salvador and Nicaragua wreak havoc in our Nation's cities and
towns.
Through the Marita Initiative with Mexico and via our
various security partnerships throughout the hemisphere, we
must help our southern neighbors help themselves in a concerted
effort to fight crime, stop drug trafficking, and provide
security for their people as well as ours.
In Africa, a continent rich in resources and talent and yet
rife with corruption, disease, poverty, and civil unrest,
AFRICOM faces unique challenges. The world and our government
has long considered Africa largely a humanitarian mission, a
matter of charity rather than opportunity. This needs to
change. The 1998 bombings of our embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya did much to remind us that our interests are intertwined
with events in Africa and each year the distance between us
seems to grow shorter.
From the perils of policy in the Gulf of Aden to a
terrorist sanctuary in Somalia, to the numerous conflicts that
rage in Africa, we face real challenges in our security
operations and partnerships there. I believe it's imperative
for the United States to develop a comprehensive strategy
toward the African continent, one that integrates our security
objectives with the development and democratic objectives that
our best partners in Africa wish to attain.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Admiral Stavridis, why don't we start with you.
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Ranking Member, members of the distinguished committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and
talk a little bit about Latin America and the Caribbean, a
region of the world that I think is not America's backyard.
That's probably the wrong expression. It's really part, as
Senator McCain just alluded to, of a home that we share
together here in the Americas. What happens to the south of us
will influence what happens here in our own Nation, as we're
seeing.
I'm very fortunate to be joined by three generals. As a
Navy admiral, I always feel good to have generals around me. I
feel a little safer. So three distinguished colleagues. Thanks
for putting this hearing together, sir.
We had a good week at SOUTHCOM last week, reflecting a good
year. What happened last week was we had three former U.S.
hostages who had been held in Colombia for 5\1/2\ years at
SOUTHCOM. They were there because they were rescued by the
Colombian military in a very daring, audacious raid, which was
a real example of the success of Plan Colombia and 5\1/2\ years
of the building of partnership capacity. So I think Colombia is
on the right track and I'd like a chance to talk about that
today.
Also, last year in SOUTHCOM we had the opportunity to send
ships south to do, not anything combative, but rather to do
medical activities. We did 200,000 patient encounters all over
the region from Kearsarge and Boxer. That builds on Comfort's
400,000 during its voyage the previous year. We did 20,000
patient encounters ashore. This is all indicative of displaying
compassion and competence and conducting great training for us
down south, a way that we can connect with this region.
We had a very robust year in military-to-military
exercises, the largest military exercise in the world in terms
of number of countries participating. It's called Panamax, co-
sponsored by Chile, Panama, and the United States. Twenty
countries participated last year. We had many other exercises
with 15, 17, and 19 different participants, focusing on
everything from special operations to disaster relief. So a
very robust schedule of military-to-military contacts, and I
feel that's a good part of what we need to do in this region to
maintain this positive military-to-military connection wherever
we can.
Of deep concern, both the chairman and the ranking member
have talked about the flow of narcotics moving from the Andean
Ridge of South America, passing through the region that I focus
on, up through Mexico, where my colleague General Renuart
focuses. Last year we were able to stop 230 tons of cocaine,
but the challenges in this narcotics situation are both on the
demand side here in the United States, and also working with
partners like Mexico in Central America through the Menda
Initiative, which I support very strongly and I'm sure General
Renuart does as well.
A particular subset of that I'd like to talk about today
are the rise and the use of semi-submersibles, which are
submarine-like creations built in the jungles of the Andean
Ridge of South America, that can transport up to seven tons of
cocaine, a very difficult target for us. We're seeing many more
of those. I talked about that last year. We're focusing a lot
of resources on interdicting those and working with our
partners to do so.
I want to close by thanking the committee for its support
on our new headquarters building, which is going up next to a
rented facility we've had in Miami for about 10 years. This
committee supported that along with the House and it's going
strong, and we appreciate that very much.
I'll simply close by saying thank you to the committee for
the terrific support on behalf of the men and women of
SOUTHCOM. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be with you
today, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN
Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the
committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the United States Southern Command and our area of focus in
Latin America and the Caribbean. I am happy to report that 2008 was a
productive and positive year for the United States Southern Command,
and we appreciate the support that Congress has shown us over the last
year. With your assistance, we were able to help address challenges and
benefit from opportunities in this dynamic era. With your continued
support, we are already on track to have a similarly productive year in
2009, and anticipate reaching new milestones of security cooperation
with our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.
We are living in an age of rapid change facilitated by advancing
technologies and increasingly networked systems, societies, and
economies. In order for security agencies to be successful in this
complex environment, those organizations must be flexible, open, and
forward-thinking. As globalization deepens and threats emerge and
evolve, security organizations will need to continue fostering and
building relationships with willing and capable partners to face
transnational challenges. The security of the United States and that of
our partners depends largely on our capacity to leverage joint,
international, interagency, and public-private cooperation, all
reinforced by focused messaging and strategic communication.
The old adage that ``change is a constant'' should instead read
``change is constantly accelerating''. Yet, our core mission has been
left unchanged. We remain a military organization conducting military
operations and promoting security cooperation in Central America, the
Caribbean, and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic
objectives.
Last year was a hallmark year for U.S. Southern Command.
Fortunately, we saw the completion of many important milestones:
Safe return and repatriation of three U.S. hostages in
Colombia after 5\1/2\ years of captivity;
Groundbreaking for our new U.S. Southern Command
headquarters in Miami, FL;
Panamax 2008, our largest and most comprehensive
joint, multilateral exercise to date with 20 nations involved;
Harnessing of innovation and new technologies in our
operations and exercises, from unmanned vehicles to high speed
vessels;
Supporting valuable Humanitarian Assistance and
Training operations;
Disaster relief support in a dangerous hurricane
season;
Numerous medical training missions to include a
combined 7-month deployment of two uniquely-crewed amphibious
ships called Continuing Promise 2008 with over 210,000 total
patient encounters;
Interdiction of over 228 metric tons of cocaine;
A robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program
and numerous international exchanges, including 21 major
military-to-military exercises; and
Excellent training and information exchanges on human
rights for Armed Forces.
These milestones were only made possible through the help of
Congress and the hard work and dedication of our Service components,
and their motivated civil servants and servicemembers from the Active,
Reserve, and Guard Force--Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast
Guard, and Special Operations--the professionalism of our Joint Task
Forces, and the cooperation of numerous partners inside and outside
U.S. Government.
This is my third posture statement as Commander of U.S. Southern
Command. My first testimony highlighted the diversity of our assigned
region and outlined the powerful linkages we share with Latin America
and the Caribbean. In last year's statement, I gave an update of our
region and described some innovative approaches that we were planning
to fulfill our mission more effectively.
Today, I would like to update you again on the region, as well as
discuss the threats and challenges that we still face in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Also, I would like to report on the positive results
that we are seeing from the innovative approaches and initiatives
outlined in last year's testimony.
Hemispheric Linkages
Economics: a driving factor
The first few years of this millennium saw world economic activity
at a healthy and robust level, ``with high growth rates, low inflation,
low interest rates, fluid financing, and buoyant international trade.''
\1\ This economic climate allowed Latin America and Caribbean economies
to grow at a level unseen in almost half a century. A key contributor
to this growth--in much of the region--was high global demand for
commodities, such as energy, metals and food staples. This growth,
coupled with improved economic policies, allowed many countries to make
inroads into the challenges of poverty and income inequality that have
long bedeviled economic and political stability.
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\1\ Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy: 2008
Trends, October 2008.
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The economies in Latin America and the Caribbean are increasingly
tied with the global economy--with very close linkages to the U.S. Now,
Latin American economies are beginning to feel the negative impact of
the current economic downturn in the United States and Europe. Although
the duration and impact of these economic problems are difficult to
predict, any global or regional slowdown or reduction in demand and
prices for commodities will naturally have an adverse effect on this
region. Economic data from late 2008 showed commodity prices that had
risen until mid-July 2008, have recently fallen. Wheat and corn futures
are down 70 percent. Oil prices are down 55 percent, and several metals
are down 50 percent.\2\
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\2\ IBID.
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The fall in commodity prices will ease some inflationary pressures,
but combined with other economic factors, will negatively impact the
region's growth and cause near and long-term challenges for the
region's leaders. Near term, they will have to cope with the economic
slowdown and its inherent challenges: reduced exports, tighter access
to financing, stock market devaluation, less foreign direct investment,
and reduced migrant remittances. Long term, if these economies continue
to falter, they will have to deal with the electorate's disappointment,
and in some cases reduced overall security and stability. They will
also face a challenge in fully implementing positive economic reforms
that many of the region's governments have attempted to implement over
the last two decades.
Although 2009 is forecast to be a much more difficult year
economically in our region, each country will vary in performance
depending on its own situation, policies, and political leadership.
Many of the larger countries in our region are well prepared to weather
this adverse economic situation due to recent economic reforms and an
increased integration with the global economy, particularly the U.S.
economy. Our interdependence with the region should, over time, dampen
individual economic shocks, and foster sustained economic growth.
Democracy, liberty, and human rights: desired common ground
Today, every country in our hemisphere is a democracy, with the
notable exception of Cuba. We are fortunate to be united by democratic
principles, the inspiration of liberty, and our populations' desire to
have human rights respected by their governments. Of course, there are
differences in form and style between our governments, and the
democratic scorecard may differ greatly from nation to nation. However,
compared to three decades ago when the form of government in the
majority of the countries was not democratic, our region's similarities
outweigh the differences.
Culture: an integrator
As seen with our economic interdependence, the Americas are an
interconnected system--a very diverse, yet interrelated, community.
This important region is unfortunately sometimes referred to as the
``backyard'' of the United States. That terminology reflects an
inaccurate and inappropriate picture of a region so vitally important
to the future of the United States. It is in every sense not our
``backyard,'' but rather, a home that we share together. We have
tremendous geopolitical, economic, and social linkages that unite us
and act as a foundation for this home. These ties range from our shared
economic activity to our comparative democratic ideals, as well as from
mutual social and cultural appreciation to similar geography and
climatic systems.
A clear indicator of this interdependence is the mixing and
interaction of cultures here in the United States that we see reflected
in the Americas. Currently, about 15 percent of our population traces
its heritage to Hispanic origins. By mid-century, this cultural
influence will increase to almost one third of our total population--a
population of increasing diversity.\3\
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\3\ Source: Pew Research Center, U.S. Population Projections: 2005-
2050: February 2008.
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Military: a robust linkage
Historically, we have had very close military ties with our
partners in the region. For example, Brazil fought with us during World
War II--The Brazilian Expeditionary Force, numbering over 25,000
troops, fought with U.S. forces in Italy from 1944 to 1945. During the
Korean War a Colombian infantry battalion and warship served with the
U.S. led United Nations (U.N.) Command. Beginning in the 1950s, several
Latin American countries contributed military units to U.N.
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Recently, in Iraq, troops
from El Salvador served as part of the multinational presence and have
now completed a noteworthy 11 rotations with over 3,000 total troops.
The Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Honduras also dispatched troops
to Iraq.
These are all examples of our partner nations fighting side-by-side
with us in times of conflict. However, we also engage with these
nations continuously during peacetime through various bilateral and
multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements.
One example of this is the daily interaction the U.S. military has with
future senior military leaders from throughout the region at our
military institutions such as the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and the
Inter-American Air Forces Academy. The camaraderie developed among our
military officers at these institutions and the schools' strong
emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights are critical
to creating military establishments capable of effective combined
operations.
Challenges and Accomplishments
U.S. Hostages in Colombia: a success story
It is with great pleasure that I can report the safe return to the
United States of the three American hostages held by a narcoterrorist
group in Colombia. To quote last year's testimony, ``Unfortunately, the
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) are extremely capable and experienced at
holding and hiding hostages in the dense Colombian triple-canopy
jungles. We are hopeful that our efforts and those of Colombia and the
international community will soon see Marc, Keith, and Tom returned to
U.S. soil alive and well.''
Those hopes were realized on July 2, 2008. The Colombian military
deserves complete credit for the final daring raid that freed our
hostages and 12 others. However, it is fair to say that their brilliant
tactical operation was the culmination of almost 10 years of effort
shared by our Congress, Colombia, U.S. Southern Command, and other U.S.
Agencies responsible for resources and capacity building of the
Colombian military. One of the happiest and most satisfying moments of
my career was the moment I received word that Marc Gonsalves, Keith
Stansell, and Thomas Howes had been safely rescued. Seeing the much
sought after freedom of these three United States citizens, after 5\1/
2\ long years of captivity, was certainly a highlight of our year.
Threats
The current challenges and security threats that we face in this
hemisphere fortunately do not involve any imminent conventional
military threat to the United States, nor do we foresee one in the
near- or mid-term future. For the foreseeable future, we also do not
see any major military conflict developing among nations in Latin
America or the Caribbean. Communication has been a strength in our
region, and has proven itself over the last year during some of the
region's political tensions. This is evidenced by the peaceful
mediation and resolution by regional leaders of the crisis between
Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela that occurred in March 2008. The
creation of the new South American Defense Council is yet another
indication of the tendency to create fora to encourage dialogue and
reduce tension.
Despite this ``peaceful'' state of the region from a state-on-state
violence perspective, security challenges undoubtedly do exist.
Narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, crime, gangs, and natural disasters
pose the principal security challenges to the region and to the United
States from the region. Also, the specter of transnational Islamic
terrorism is of concern and bears due vigilance on our part.
Underlying conditions: poverty and inequality
Despite the economic gains of the past decade, poverty and income
inequality remain grave concerns for many people in Latin America and
the Caribbean. These concerns drive social unrest and provide fertile
soil for many of the region's public security challenges. Although
poverty rates have been modestly reduced over the last 15 years--from
48 percent living in poverty in 1990 to an estimated 35 percent in
2007--with increases in population over the years, the absolute numbers
of people living in poverty have risen slightly overall in the region.
The number of people living in indigence--or extreme poverty--has also
climbed, affecting an estimated 12.7 percent of the population.\4\
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\4\ ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2007.
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Combined with this poverty is a disproportionate wealth
distribution that is second only to Sub-Saharan Africa. The richest 20
percent of the Latin American population earns 57 percent of the
region's income, earning 20 times that of the poorest 20 percent. By
comparison, the richest 20 percent in high-income regions of the world
earns only 7.7 times that of the poorest group.\5\ The cumulative
effect of poverty and income inequality in Latin America and the
Caribbean serves as a catalyst for insecurity and instability. Although
these figures vary from country to country in the aggregate, poverty
and inequality make whole regional populations vulnerable to the
influence of illicit activity--such as drugs, crime, gangs, and illegal
immigration.
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\5\ The World Bank, 2008 World Development Indicators, April 2008.
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Earlier, I discussed how our region is united by democracy.
Unfortunately, this continued widespread poverty and inequality in
Latin America and the Caribbean energizes potential political
instability. In fact, recent surveys in the region underscore the
current fragility of democracy. As of 2006, 26.4 percent of the
population of Latin America and the Caribbean would justify a military
coup in the case of high inflation, and 20.9 percent would justify one
in the case of high unemployment.\6\ These percentages tend to be
highest among countries recovering from recent conflict and
instability. With the present economic slowdown, this trend might only
continue and lead to further autocratic problems to the detriment of
democracy in the hemisphere.
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\6\ AmericasBarometer, 2006.
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Public security challenges: narcotics, crime, and terrorism
Narcotics. The global illicit drug trade remains a significant
transnational security threat as its power and influence continues to
undermine democratic governments, terrorize populations, impede
economic development, and hinder regional stability. The profits from
this drug trade, principally cocaine, are an enabling catalyst for the
full spectrum of threats to our national security, and present
formidable challenges to the security and stability of our partners.
Our success--or failure--to address this insidious threat will have a
direct and lasting impact on the stability and well-being of both
developed and developing countries of the world. Innovative approaches
and partnerships are needed to successfully confront this dangerous
threat. It will take a coordinated multi-agency and multinational
strategic approach that brings to bear the strengths and resources of
diverse, capable groups to stem the rising tide of the illicit drug
trade.
There is also a crucial demand-side effort that is continuing here
in the U.S. For example, programs to treat addicts, convince and deter
our children and youth from using drugs, and create community solutions
are supported at a national level.
In U.S. Southern Command's assigned region, the Andean Ridge of
South America is the world's only significant source of coca
cultivation and cocaine production. Each year, cocaine from the region
directly contributes to the deaths of thousands of U.S. citizens, and
has spread its toxic effects to many countries in this hemisphere and
abroad. Narcotraffickers are intrinsically transnational, and they
continue to develop fresh markets, explore alternative routes, and
refine current tactics. They are highly innovative and keep investing
in relatively low cost and unique conveyance and concealment
technologies to counter our detection systems. A vivid example of this
is the self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS)--low riding, low profile
vessels that narcotraffickers use to skim along the water line to avoid
visual and radar detection. These relatively new vessels now bring tons
of illicit cargo to market.
In 2008, we interdicted 11 SPSS vessels at sea on their way to
market, and anticipate roughly 60 similar vessels in 2009 will ply the
waters of our region--with a potential cargo capacity of over 330
metric tons of cocaine, or other illicit and dangerous material. In
2008, we observed that traffickers had expanded their presence in West
Africa as a springboard to Europe, while also exploring new Middle
Eastern and Asian markets. We also noted that traffickers have shifted
from high seas routes to multi-staging tactics along the Central
American littorals, attempting to evade international interdiction
efforts.
One specific area of increasing concern is the nexus of illicit
drug trafficking--including routes, profits, and corruptive influence--
and terrorism. In the Western Hemisphere, the illicit drug trade
historically has contributed, and continues to contribute, significant
financial resources to known terrorist groups like the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia and the Shining Path in
Peru. Another threat to the United States is the nexus with Islamic
radical terrorism. In August of last year, U.S. Southern Command
supported a Drug Enforcement Administration operation, in coordination
with host countries, that targeted a Hizballah-connected drug
trafficking organization in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay. Last October, we supported another interagency operation
that resulted in the arrests of several dozen individuals in Colombia
associated with a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking and money
laundering ring. Identifying, monitoring, and dismantling the
financial, logistical, and communication linkages between illicit
trafficking groups and terrorist sponsors are critical to not only
ensuring early indications and warnings of potential terrorist attacks
directed at the United States and our partners, but also in generating
a global appreciation and acceptance of this tremendous threat to
security.
Since Colombia is the major global source of cocaine, as well as
home to the FARC, a narcoterrorist group, the Colombian Government and
people remain pivotal in the fight to stop illicit traffickers at the
source. As traffickers adapt their product movement tactics, every
effort to interdict them within Colombia or just as they depart
Colombian territory will pay tremendous dividends, as opposed to
dispersing limited interdiction resources across the 42 million square
miles of the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. Providing resources and
investments to improve the Colombian military, along with enhancing our
interagency capabilities, will build the capacity to integrate and
share information with U.S. and international counter-narcotic
organizations. Our interagency support efforts will directly improve
regional and hemispheric security.
Although not part of U.S. Southern Command's regional focus, the
situation in Mexico is also of serious concern with regards to drugs
and narcotrafficking. With over 6,000 violent killings and thousands of
kidnappings in Mexico in 2008, the Merida Initiative (which links to
the rest of Central America and parts of the Caribbean) deserves full
support.
U.S. Southern Command's unique counter-narcotic task force located
in Key West, FL, is a role model for the kind of innovative cooperation
and fusion of capabilities needed to counter this forceful and perilous
threat. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) combines efforts
of international partners, the U.S. armed services, and numerous U.S.
and international departments and agencies to combat the illicit drug
trade stemming from Latin America and the Caribbean. Last year, this
task force stopped more than 228 metric tons of cocaine from entering
the United States or from reaching foreign markets and helped
facilitate the capture by law enforcement or partner nations of 317
drug traffickers.
In 2009, JIATF-S will expand on the 35 planned and successful
operations it conducted last year, and integrate efforts with various
hemispheric initiatives to include interagency, international, and
public-private efforts. With an eye toward innovation and integration,
JIATF-S continues to be a model for the future and will position itself
to tactically identify, engage, and counter asymmetric and dynamic
threats more efficiently across the current and emergent spectrum of
threat conveyances, routes, and concealment techniques. We will
continue to fight this international threat with all available
resources.
Crime and Violence. Over the past decade, about 1.2 million deaths
can be linked to crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. United
Nations data places the homicide rate for this region at 27.5 murders
per 100,000 people--five times that of the United States and three
times that of the world average. A recent study lists Latin America
with the highest global homicide rate for people between 15 and 24,
with a rate 30 times greater than that of Europe.\7\ Moreover, every
year, approximately one-third of the population falls victim to a
criminal act--either directly or indirectly.
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\7\ Latin American Technological Information Network, Map of
Violence: The Young People of Latin America, November 2008
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These statistics are underscored by the growing influence of gangs
in several countries and of delinquent youth in general. Gang
populations have reached over 100,000 in Central America alone, and
there are possibly similar numbers in major South American cities. In
recent surveys of the region, closely aligned with economic concerns,
delinquency and personal security rank as top social ills for the
majority of countries in the region.\8\ This insecurity and its
associated costs--not just human costs, but, on the order of $250
billion annually in economic impact--have become major threats and a
destabilizing factor in many nations in the Western Hemisphere.
Organized crime and some of the more structured gangs routinely cross
borders and operate inside the United States, including near our
Nation's capital in Northern Virginia and of course in Los Angeles.
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\8\ Latinobarometro.
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The primary responsibility for helping our hemispheric partners
solve these challenges resides with the Department of Justice,
Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
We seek to be supportive and helpful where appropriate. The complexity
of the challenges facing these government entities only reinforces the
need for coordinated interagency solutions.
Colombia. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a
crucial anchor for security and stability in this hemisphere. This
beautiful and diverse country is the second oldest democracy in the
hemisphere.
Since the United States and Colombia started working together to
help secure peace with the Clinton administration's Plan Colombia, a
great deal of progress has been made. In the late 1990s, Colombia's
democracy was on the verge of failure. The country was embroiled in an
internal conflict that, by any objective measure, was tearing it apart.
Drug cartels had wide reign and violence was rampant. Today's Colombia
is a completely different story. There is a real sense of hope and
pride in the country and its accomplishments. The Uribe
administration--now leading the follow-on to Plan Colombia, the
``Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development'' and
with support from the United States--has brought the country ``back
from the brink'' and has it poised for stability. Since 2002 homicides
have dropped by 40 percent, kidnappings by 83 percent, and terrorist
attacks by 76 percent.\9\
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\9\ U.S. State Dept brief. Charting Colombia's Progress, available
at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93761.pdf
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The FARC narcoterrorist group has been beaten back with key leaders
at the strategic secretariat level eliminated and more than 50 percent
drop in their numbers. Their communications have been disrupted.
Desertions continue to accelerate, and, morale is at an all-time low.
In addition, most Colombian drug cartels have been significantly
impacted, and Colombia has extradited over 700 drug traffickers to the
United States. Nonetheless, the FARC remains a serious challenge to the
Government of Colombia.
Although cocaine production is still a critical concern,
interdiction and seizures of cocaine headed to the United States and
abroad have more than doubled over the last 10 years. This increase
indicates improved State control, successful governmental strategies,
and an overall better interagency and international coordination and
collaboration.
I highly encourage members of the committee to visit Colombia, as
many of you have already, to experience first-hand the tremendous
overall improvements in this country, and, to gain the sense that
``this is the moment'' for Colombia. This is the time for Colombia and
its friends to make the final push to win true peace in this country--a
peace that will be of great benefit to the region and the United
States. As Colombia wins its peace, narcoterrorists will lose capacity
to grow, process, and transport illicit drugs--directly saving U.S.
lives and resources. Human rights compliance and training are key to
all this.
Over the next 2 years, support for the Colombian armed forces'
campaign to defeat the FARC, as well as for Colombian interagency
efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas
recaptured from the FARC, is essential. Paramount to this support will
be training, mobility, and continuation of key infrastructure and human
rights programs to provide long-term self-sufficiency. Continued U.S.
commitment over the next 2 years will be critical through a
``nationalization'' period, as the Colombian Government assumes
responsibility for funding the majority of current programs through the
development and institutionalization of carefully planned resource
management processes. With U.S. help, a stable and secure Colombia is
very achievable in the near term, and will serve as a democratic model
for the region.
Additionally, the U.S. needs to continue supporting counterdrug and
counterterrorism programs in Colombia's neighboring countries,
especially Peru.
Terrorism. Terrorist networks are active throughout our hemisphere.
These networks include domestic narcoterrorists, such as the FARC, who
mainly reside in Colombia, as well as the Shining Path Maoist-style
narcoterrorists of Peru. Islamic terrorist networks are also active,
primarily involved in fundraising and logistical support for parent
organizations based in the Middle East, such as Hizballah and Hamas.
Individuals with terrorist training and experience who could support or
conduct terrorist attacks in our hemisphere may be present in the
region, and our intelligence has demonstrated that pre-operational and
operational activities have indeed occurred, as exemplified by the
attempt to blow up fuel pipelines at the JFK airport in New York in
2007.
Islamic terrorist networks are present in the Tri-border Area, as
well as several other locations in the region. A robust Hizballah
financial support network exists in the region, as well as an active
group of sympathizers and supporters of Hizballah. Also present are
Sunni groups, including Hamas, whose members possess operational
backgrounds. Moreover, known al Qaeda members have journeyed to Latin
America and the Caribbean and other terrorist-inspired Islamic radicals
have been arrested in the region.
As with all of the Department of Defense and other U.S. departments
and agencies, U.S. Southern Command dedicates significant effort to
remaining vigilant in the struggle against violent extremism. We have a
regional plan to combat this threat through multiple avenues. This plan
includes shaping the strategic environment through support to
interagency humanitarian operations that impede radical organizations
from gaining a foothold in the region, as well as building partner
nation capacity to detect and defeat threats in a cooperative
environment. These efforts will help ensure the forward defense of the
United States and increased security for our partners. We thank
Congress for providing the dedicated resources necessary for this
mission and for providing flexible funding sources to help us rapidly
address emerging capability gaps of our partners as the strategic
situation develops. U.S. Southern Command will continue to work closely
with our interagency and our regional partners to ensure our Nation and
those of our friends remain secure.
Marketplace of Ideas
The Americas are a marketplace of ideas where security, economic,
and political models compete amidst all the linkages and challenges
detailed above. The ideas of personal liberty, electoral democracy,
fair and open markets, and political transparency--are competing
against a variety of other models, some of which are dramatically
different.
Our job at U.S. Southern Command is simply to build cooperative
security relationships and to promote U.S. military-to-military
interests in the region. Unfortunately, some trends in a few countries
hinder security cooperation, and a few leaders have adopted a vocal
anti-U.S. stance, making it more difficult to cooperate on security
matters.
To compete in this marketplace, we engage proactively in the region
and counter anti-U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our
goodwill, competence, and professionalism. The U.S. Government, through
our interagency, needs to be capable of assisting our partner nations
by addressing the underlying conditions of poverty and inequality,
while U.S. Southern Command needs to help build security relationships
and create innovative security initiatives with cooperative partners to
confront transnational security threats.
initiatives
To confront the challenges and embrace the opportunities of this
century in the Americas, U.S. Southern Command has shaped its
initiatives to cultivate innovative ideas and harness integrated
effort. Our mantra has been ``joint, international, interagency, and
public-private.'' The changing global and regional conditions of the
21st century require more of an integrated approach. With the approval
of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Southern Command has realigned our
internal headquarters structure to better support our interagency
partners and to be more agile and comprehensive in our approach to
engagement in the region.
In 2008, we witnessed numerous positive results from integrating
many initiatives that began in 2007. The following three examples
typify the direction our command is taking.
Panamax 2008
Building confidence, capability, and cooperation among partners is
essential to confronting today's security challenges. Our exercise
Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) Panamax has matured over the last 5
years and has become one of our flagship programs. Panamax is a
multinational and interagency exercise that focuses on defending the
Panama Canal from traditional and nontraditional threats. The exercise
began in 2003 as a limited naval exercise with just three participating
nations. Due to past successes and efforts to expand partnerships, the
exercise has grown to include a roster of more than 20 nations, several
U.S. departments and agencies, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and multiple military branches of
Service.
Co-sponsored by Panama, Chile, and the U.S., this year's exercise
formed a truly integrated multinational force--Multinational Force-
South. The force was led by U.S. Southern Command's Army component,
U.S. Army South, but had significant international representation at
all levels of command and control. Each of the Service components
included significant command-level team members from other countries
and agencies. For example, the maritime components were headed by
Admirals from Chile and Brazil.
While the exercise scenario focused on the security of the Panama
Canal, this type of integrated multinational training certainly would
benefit any response to real-world threats in our region--conventional
and unconventional. From responses to catastrophic disasters to United
Nations mandated multinational forces, this type of collaborative
training has already proven to be indispensible.
In addition to the security scenario focused on the Panama Canal,
Panamax also included a multinational humanitarian training and
assistance/disaster-relief training mission, a multinational
peacekeeping battalion training event, and an interagency Proliferation
Security Initiative training event focused on the shipment of weapons
of mass destruction.
This was also the second year that we assisted the Government of
Panama with integrating their interagency homeland security exercise,
Panamax Alpha, with Panamax and facilitated for the first time the
involvement and support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Joint, international, interagency, and public-private is the
essence of Panamax. The collaborative integration of participants and
helpful lessons learned this year were exceptional. The increased
participation and scope of Panamax over the years underscores the
significance the international community places on cooperative efforts
and strong partnerships as pillars of worldwide security and stability.
Continuing Promise 2008
In 2007, for the first time, we sent a U.S. hospital ship--the
U.S.N.S. Comfort--on a 4-month tour of Latin America and the Caribbean
to conduct medical training and to treat patients in 12 countries. It
was a tremendous success. Over 385,000 patient treatments were
completed, along with 1,170 surgeries, more than 20 community-
improvement projects, 17,700 livestock vaccinations, and more than
25,000 dental patients treated. Throughout the deployment, our
personnel received vital training, and our message of positive
commitment to the region and to its peoples penetrated deep and touched
millions. This effort combined multiple military services,
multinational integration, and medical professionals from the private
sector.
The success of the mission, combined with uniquely integrated
medical and construction training for our personnel, spurred the
conception of Continuing Promise 2008. Since the Navy only has two
dedicated hospital ships, the Navy sourced our request to repeat the
Comfort mission in 2008 with two large amphibious ships. Building upon
the lessons learned from the Comfort, we increased the mission duration
from 4 to 7 months, increased contact time in each port, and integrated
more partners for the undertaking.
The two ships carried a mix of military, interagency,
multinational, and even nongovernmental medical and health specialists.
Along with this diverse medical team, we embarked military engineers,
construction experts, Navy and Marine Corps helicopters and crews, and
military training experts. This uniquely designed team was tailored to
training and humanitarian missions, but had the flexibility to easily
transition to disaster-relief efforts should the need arise--which it
ultimately did.
One of the ships, the U.S.S. Boxer, completed the Pacific phase of
Continuing Promise with superb results: over 65,000 total patient
treatments, including 127 surgeries, 4,000 optometry patients treated,
14,000 dental procedures, medical and military training for thousands
of host-nation students, and construction projects at almost a dozen
sites. The second ship, the U.S.S. Kearsarge, completed the Atlantic
Phase in November, and its joint, international, and nongovernmental
medical professionals worked alongside host nation officials to treat
more than 145,000 patients in 6 countries. The crew also dispensed more
than 81,000 prescriptions, provided veterinary care to nearly 5,600
animals, and completed various construction and renovation projects in
each of the countries visited during the mission.
As an example of the flexibility of this type of venture deployed
in our region, after Haiti was struck by successive tropical storms and
Hurricane Ike in September, the Kearsarge diverted from its planned
stop in Colombia to respond to this emergent humanitarian crisis.
Supporting relief efforts led by the U.S. Agency for International
Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Kearsarge and
its crew delivered 3.3 million pounds of food, water, and other relief
supplies to Haitian communities devastated by the storms.
Continuing Promise is a perfect complement to our already
established medical readiness training exercises that treated nearly a
quarter of a million patients at 64 remote inland locations throughout
the region. It also complements our humanitarian and civic assistance
programs, as well as our engineering training exercises. Overall,
Continuing Promise 2008 was an incredibly successful mission that
further advanced our strategic messaging and built confidence,
capability, and goodwill in numerous countries in the region serving as
a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-U.S. messaging.
Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible Capture
On September 13, 2008, the U.S.S. McInerney was on a nighttime
patrol in the Eastern Pacific Ocean some 350 miles off the coast of
Guatemala. Unlike during the Cold War, they were not in search of
Soviet submarines. They were, instead, in search of a different type of
threat--a possible SPSS that was detected by a Navy maritime patrol
aircraft. Embarked aboard this U.S. Navy ship was a Coast Guard Law
Enforcement Detachment that has the authority to make arrests--another
example of an interagency approach to combating illicit trafficking.
This integrated team enables Department of Defense assets like the
McInerney and crew to search for illicit traffickers, and then pass off
law enforcement actions to Coast Guard personnel.
The McInerney was one of several assets--air, land, sea, and
space--that were coupled with interagency operatives and partner nation
agents throughout the hemisphere and Europe who were ``on duty.'' In
our JIATF-S headquarters in Key West, 24/7 operators were fusing
intelligence and surveillance information, tracking numerous potential
threats, and vectoring and monitoring interdiction assets onto probable
threats.
McInerney was vectored onto a faint contact that was trying to
evade detection and head north towards Mexico or the United States.
During this nighttime intercept, the crew came across one of the most
sophisticated SPSS vessels to date--capable of carrying a 7-ton cargo
in near silent and radar invisible routes with non-stop ranges from
South America to California. On that night, the payload was a crew of
four and seven metric tons of cocaine. Following deception tactics,
this SPSS crew was traveling at night, far off the coast, and at low
speeds to avoid detection. This pitch-black intercept against an
unknown threat was described by one of the Coast Guard boarding team
members as the ``scariest event'' of his entire career.
Fortunately, the intercept was executed flawlessly, and the
traffickers did not have time to scuttle the vessel fully by using
built in fast-acting drainage valves that allow incoming water to
rapidly sink the vessel to avoid evidence collection. Once again, I
must thank Congress for the passage of the Drug Trafficking Vessel
Interdiction Act of 2008 that allows law enforcement legal indictments
against operators of any submersible or SPSS vessel without
nationality--an act that will certainly reduce risk for boarding teams
and result in greater intelligence gathering and trafficking
convictions.
The story of the U.S.S. McInerney is a successful one. But as
described earlier, we believe other SPSS vessels get through,
accounting for approximately 30 percent of cocaine movement in the drug
trafficking transit zones. As we continue to fight extremism around the
world, we are alert to connections between narcotraffickers and Islamic
radical groups. SPSS tactics and payloads could one day represent an
extreme threat to the United States and our partners.
These three examples illustrate our integrated approach and
demonstrate commitment to our motto: ``Partnership for the Americas.''
Panamax underscores the importance of partnership at the traditional
military level, but with a focus towards supporting multinational,
interagency, and even limited public-private efforts. Continuing
Promise highlights the effectiveness of integrated medical/humanitarian
training missions and of their benefit from a strategic messaging
perspective. The self propelled semi-submersible seizure shows the
importance of an around-the-clock, collaborative effort to stop
specific transnational security threats that could have extreme
consequences if left unchecked.
looking ahead
This year is already shaping up to be a good one for U.S. Southern
Command and our efforts to confront the challenges of this dynamic era.
We have numerous initiatives, programs, and exercises scheduled to
build on the momentum of the last 2 years. The hospital ship Comfort
will return to the region with a program crafted from lessons learned
from our previous training and engagement. Construction of the new
headquarters facility--designed to be a fusion center of integrated
effort--is progressing and is on schedule. We have planned numerous
bilateral, multilateral, and interagency exercises; programmed several
valuable medical and construction training missions; and resourced
exchanges and conferences. We continue to improve upon our model of
interagency, international, joint, and public-private support. With the
ongoing help of Congress, we hope to make 2009 another positive and
productive year for U.S. Southern Command.
As we chart our way into the next decade of this century, we will
hold steady to our course of persistent engagement, partnership
building, enabling understanding, and positive strategic messaging--all
propelled by our interagency-support approach. I take great pride
appearing before you today to represent the tremendous efforts of the
men and women of U.S. Southern Command. I believe our efforts are
making a difference in our hemisphere and for the security of the
United States. I truly feel that our superb soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen--Active, Reserve, and Guard--as well as our
talented civilians are daily living up to the trust the American people
have placed in them. They are all volunteers to serve their country,
and I am honored and blessed to serve with them every day. Our people
are our greatest strength, and I thank you for your continued support
to programs that improve their lives and support their families.
Once again, I appreciate your support to U.S. Southern Command and
am prepared to answer your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Renuart.
STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Renuart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee. It is a treat, it really is a treat,
to be back with you this year. It's especially an honor and a
privilege today to represent the men and women assigned to
NORAD and NORTHCOM. It is important to express our gratitude to
the members of the committee who have been such strong
supporters of the men and women in uniform over the last year.
We continue to serve proudly and we appreciate your support.
As Commander of NORTHCOM, I'm assigned two missions. One is
to defend the homeland against attack, and so topics like
ground-based midcourse interceptors, violence along the border,
partnering with my friend Jim Stavridis in the fight against
narcoterrorism in our region, the movement of drugs, and the
support to law enforcement are all critical parts of our
homeland defense mission, and I'm happy to talk about those
topics with you today.
But also to make mention of our requirement to provide
Department of Defense (DOD) support to civil authorities when
Mother Nature takes a vote in the course of events in our
country. So I'm pleased also to talk about the issues like the
consequence management response force that we put on, funded,
equipped, trained, evaluated, and brought into service this
year. We're part of a combined team. It's a national response.
We coordinate with international, Federal, and State partners,
with the governors, and with the National Guards of each of the
States, as well as the emergency managers. That collaboration
is a real success story this year and I'm happy to talk about
the successes that we've seen there.
We train hard to execute our mission. We exercise with all
of our partners in government, and we must be prepared to
ensure that we never let the country down. Our consequence
management response force is a great example of an interagency
approach and how DOD can provide support in a large-scale
catastrophic nuclear, biological, or chemical event.
Those who wish us harm have not gone away. The threat is
real. It is there. They only have to be lucky once. We work 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, to ensure that does not happen. We
want to keep the momentum that we built. We want to remain
alert because the mission of protecting our families and our
Nation is the most important mission we have.
Chairman Levin, I appreciate the opportunity to spend time
with you answering questions today. I look forward to that
dialogue. Thank you very much for your support and that of the
committee. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Renuart follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee: Homeland defense is the preeminent mission of U.S. Northern
Command (U.S. NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). Our commands are vigilant in protecting our citizens from
threats that exist in the air, space, land, maritime, and cyberspace
domains. As we look to the future, our aim is to secure our environment
by deterring and, if necessary, defeating those who threaten our way of
life. Today, it is my honor to report on the state of the commands.
our missions--protecting what you value most
U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands; neither is
subordinate to the other. However, the commands have complementary
missions, operate within a common security environment, and share an
integrated headquarters staff. U.S. NORTHCOM is committed to the
defense of the United States and NORAD, a binational command, is
committed to the air defense of both the United States and Canada.
U.S. NORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and civil
support operations within its assigned area of responsibility to
defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. The
U.S. NORTHCOM area of responsibility encompasses North America,
Bermuda, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, the Caribbean
region inclusive of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands,
Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, and surrounding
waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles. We execute an active,
integrated, layered defense that allows us to rapidly deploy military
assets needed to defend the United States.
U.S. NORTHCOM provides assistance in support of civil authorities
during natural and manmade disasters and pandemic events. Incidents
begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the State or
local level; however, some incidents require Federal support. When
requested and approved by the Secretary of Defense or directed by the
President, Federal military forces will contribute to Federal support.
On behalf of the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. NORTHCOM employs
forces at the request of civil authorities when approved by the
Secretary of Defense or the President. That said, U.S. NORTHCOM does
not wait for that call to action. Sweeping improvements in pre-event
coordination with interagency partners, the National Guard, and the
Reserves have led to an anticipatory, forward-leaning operational
sequence for expeditious DOD support when requested by civil
authorities.
NORAD, a binational command formed by a partnership between the
United States and Canada, provides aerospace warning, aerospace control
and maritime warning for North America. For more than 50 years, NORAD
has defended the skies of the United States and Canada. Across our two
countries, armed fighters are on alert and ready to fly air patrols to
identify and intercept suspect aircraft. NORAD ensures U.S. and
Canadian air sovereignty through a network of alert fighters, tankers,
airborne early warning aircraft, and ground-based air defense assets
cued by interagency and defense surveillance radars.
U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD work together in defending our Nation's
airspace. While NORAD provides aerospace warning and aerospace control,
U.S. NORTHCOM is responsible for air operations, such as evacuation and
movement of people and high-value cargo via military airlift, within
our assigned area of responsibility. In addition, U.S. NORTHCOM has the
capability to accept control of U.S. air defense alert aircraft to
conduct unilateral operations, as required and directed.
homeland defense is our number one priority
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
U.S. NORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense
operations within our area of responsibility and Hawaii, to protect the
homeland from potentially hostile acts. During 2008, we enhanced our
missile defense capabilities with the incorporation of the Sea-Based X-
Band Radar.
U.S. NORTHCOM is very active in the Missile Defense Agency's ground
and flight testing programs to ensure the tests are operationally
sound. U.S. NORTHCOM missile defense crews are trained and routinely
exercised to ensure we meet the high standards required to defend the
Nation.
To fully ensure U.S. NORTHCOM can perform our missile defense
mission as assigned, our focus is threefold. The first is
sustainability and reliability of the current Ground-Based Interceptor
fleet. Second, U.S. NORTHCOM requires realistic training simulations
that accurately depict Ballistic Missile Defense System operational
behavior. In order to train as we fight, we must develop operationally
viable Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for new capabilities. We
continue to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency and U.S.
Strategic Command on this issue. Lastly, we need a more robust
architecture that enables day-to-day operations to continue
concurrently with ongoing research and development activities. The
Missile Defense Agency's Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and
Simultaneous Test and Operations will help bridge the gap between
operational capability and research, development, test, and evaluation
activities.
The Colorado Army National Guard and the Alaska Army National Guard
are integral parts of our Nation's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
system. The 100th Missile Defense Brigade at Schriever Air Force Base
in Colorado and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion at Fort Greely in
Alaska are under our operational control as U.S. NORTHCOM defends the
homeland from long-range ballistic missile threats. DOD has cooperative
agreements with the States of Colorado and Alaska for manning this
homeland defense mission with their Army National Guard units. When
National Guardsmen enter a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense site or
otherwise commence operational duties, their duty status automatically
transfers from title 32 to title 10. Command and control of these
National Guardsmen requires designation of dual-status commanders when
performing their missile defense mission for U.S. NORTHCOM.
Operation Noble Eagle
Since the attacks of September 11, NORAD has supported the air
defense of the United States and Canada through Operation Noble Eagle
with airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, and the unique
National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. Over 50,000
sorties have been flown in support of Operation Noble Eagle, with the
Air National Guard conducting more than 70 percent of these sorties. In
support of NORAD's missions, Air National Guard units have been
successfully employing instantaneous title 10 orders for several years.
These orders allow an individual to volunteer, with the consent of the
Governor, to be federalized for specific missions prior to execution.
In the National Capital Region, NORAD continues to improve robust
air and ground-based air defense systems. Working closely with the
Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security
Administration, the National Capital Region airspace has been codified
by rule to protect our Nation's Capital. This interagency effort meets
one of NORAD's long-term goals to secure the skies over Washington. In
addition to the alert fighters at Andrews Air Force Base, the U.S.
Coast Guard provides NORAD with alert helicopters to intercept low-and-
slow aircraft in the National Capital Region.
NORAD provides tailored air defense for designated National Special
Security Events. Recently, NORAD completed support of the 2008
Democratic and Republican National Conventions and the 2009
Presidential Inauguration. Working with our interagency partners, NORAD
provided continuous air defense of the National Capital Region during
the event.
Northern Sovereignty Operations
In 2008, the resurgence of Russian Long Range Aviation flights on
NORAD's northern flank continued at the heightened pace initiated in
2007. In 2008, pairs of TU-95 Bear-H aircraft flew into the Air Defense
Identification Zone on seven separate occasions. All but one of these
flights were unannounced. These bomber aircraft were detected and
identified by fighters from the Alaskan and Canadian NORAD Regions,
with critical support from U.S. E-3 surveillance aircraft and air-to-
air refueling aircraft. While foreign aircraft never violated U.S. or
Canadian airspace, expectations for continued activity and growing
international interest in the north demand sustained vigilance and
allocation of resources. NORAD remains vigilant to ensure no
unauthorized, unwanted, or unknown aircraft enter North American
airspace.
U.S.-Canadian cooperation in northern air operations is the
embodiment of the intent of the NORAD agreement. In 2008, Canada relied
heavily on our U.S. aerial refueling tankers to deploy fighters to
Forward Operating Locations and extend their patrols; E-3 Airborne
Warning and Control System supported operations on both sides of the
U.S.-Canada border to expand surveillance; and fighter aircraft of both
nations met the needs of each tactical situation.
In the future, pursuit of natural resources and the potential
increase in traffic of northern waterways will demand increased air and
maritime surveillance, security, and defense in the Arctic Region. A
binational evaluation is underway to improve the quality and coverage
of northern surveillance systems; and Canada is investigating the
expansion of facilities at Resolute Bay, which may provide a more
northern Forward Operating Location than any currently available.
Collectively, we will remain vigilant and continue to monitor the
Arctic approaches to the North American continent.
Southern Sovereignty Operations
During September 2008, NORAD's integrated air defense assets in and
around the Continental United States and Canada detected and identified
a pair of Russian Tu-160 Blackjack heavy bombers participating in
Russian Air Force activity transiting over the Atlantic on their way
to/from Venezuela. Russian air assets at no time violated U.S. or
Canadian airspace. This NORAD operation, in concert with similar
responses by our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies,
demonstrates our continued vigilance and readiness to defend North
American air sovereignty.
Aircraft Recapitalization
Our ability to maintain air sovereignty in the future is at risk.
Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain reliability
and capability as we move into the 2013-2025 timeframe. Recapitalizing
the fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a
challenge given DOD's post-September 11 long-term mission requirements.
NORAD's ability to accomplish its missions will be impacted if
legacy fighters retire without a designated replacement being fielded
in adequate numbers to maintain NORAD's air defense response
capability.
The tradeoff between modernization of legacy airframes and
transformation to fifth generation aircraft could limit efforts to keep
pace with emerging challenges. Currently, legacy fighters, tankers, and
airborne early warning aircraft adequately meet all aspects of the Air
Sovereignty Alert mission. Recapitalization of legacy aircraft is
critical to the future success of the NORAD mission set.
At this time, the Elmendorf Air Force Base F-22s are tasked with
air sovereignty alert missions and future Hickam Air National Guard F-
22s should expect similar taskings. F-22s are also key participants in
Operation Noble Eagle sorties from Langley Air Force Base. The F-35
will play an even larger part in our homeland defense mission due to
their increased numbers and widespread bed down locations of the
aircraft they will be replacing. In light of this, I fully support the
current Air Force program for the F-35. Program numbers will be
reviewed in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review.
civil support operations--supporting americans in crisis
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive
Consequence Management
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosive (CBRNE) incidents will pose a great challenge to the security
of the American people for the foreseeable future. A terrorist attack
on U.S. soil, an accidental CBRNE incident, or one caused by a natural
disaster could create catastrophic conditions likely to overwhelm
response capabilities of civil authorities. As a result, the Secretary
of Defense has established a requirement for three CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Forces (CCMRFs) to be trained and ready to respond
to requests from civil authorities. The DOD, through U.S. NORTHCOM,
currently has one CCMRF trained and ready to support the Federal
response to a CBRNE incident. U.S. NORTHCOM will have a second CCMRF in
2009 and a third CCMRF by 1 October 2010. Each CCMRF is designed to
provide robust command and control and consequence management
capabilities that include aviation, medical, and general logistics
support.
On 1 October 2008, the Secretary of Defense assigned CCMRF 1 forces
to the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM. In September 2008, prior to mission
assumption, CCMRF 1 participated in a Command Post Exercise at Fort
Stewart, GA, during Exercise Vibrant Response to verify operational
capability. The assigned CCMRF will participate in U.S. NORTHCOM-
sponsored joint exercises, and conduct unit training to sustain CCMRF
readiness and requirements, as well as follow-on missions.
While CCMRF 1 is comprised mainly of Active-Duty Forces, the second
and third CCMRFs will be comprised predominately of Reserve and
National Guard forces. We are working closely with the U.S. Joint
Forces Command, the National Guard Bureau, the military Services and
the States on sourcing solutions, training, equipment, readiness, and
exercise of those forces identified to fulfill CCMRF requirements.
2008 Hurricane Response Operations
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
2008 Hurricane Season Recap, there were 16 named storms, of which 8
became hurricanes and 5 became major hurricanes (Category 3 or higher).
There were a record six consecutively-named storms, from Dolly to Ike,
which made landfall on the United States coastline. The majority of DOD
support occurred in the short timeframe of August and September as a
result of the hurricane stream of Gustav, Hanna, and Ike. This severe
impact to several States resulted in civilian agency requests for
Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations by DOD. U.S. NORTHCOM's
support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency was extremely
successful across all areas. Here are just a few vignettes:
In August 2008, through a collaborative effort between U.S.
NORTHCOM and U.S. Transportation Command, DOD and National Guard
personnel evacuated 723 critical care patients out of Louisiana during
the aeromedical evacuation effort for Hurricane Gustav. During
Hurricane Ike, DOD and National Guard personnel moved another 400
patients out of Beaumont, TX. In crisis situations such as these,
hospitals release many of their less serious cases, but it is a more
complex challenge to move the seriously ill and injured. We worked
aggressively and quickly to ensure the right capabilities were in place
to move patients to the appropriate receiving hospitals.
Immediately after Hurricane Ike made landfall, U.S. NORTHCOM
conducted an Incident Awareness and Assessment mission using the U.S.
Navy's Global Hawk system to demonstrate its usefulness for support of
civil authorities. The unmanned aircraft took off with a mission set of
299 locations and was dynamically re-tasked during the mission to add
imagery requirements from the Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
and the U.S. Coast Guard. The radar imaging sensor was used to cut
through the prevalent cloud cover. These medium-resolution images were
sufficient for general damage assessments to infrastructure. Conducted
in accordance with applicable laws and DOD regulations intended to
protect the civil liberties of American citizens, these missions
provided vital situational awareness for DOD forces planning Defense
Support of Civil Authorities operations. The DOD made the imagery
available to the wider interagency hurricane response forces via
dissemination on the Homeland Security Information Network, thus,
enabling DOD to plan better and provided added benefit for our
partners.
Our goal for the 2009 hurricane season focuses on anticipating
Federal and State requirements to ensure timely and efficient DOD
assistance. We are working closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
improve U.S. NORTHCOM authorities and capabilities in the Joint Staff
Defense Support of Civil Authorities Execute Order. We continue to
engage our Federal, State, and local partners to enhance DOD
augmentation of civilian disaster response efforts.
Additionally, we are identifying gaps and seams in mass fatality
management between current mortuary affairs capabilities in DOD and
local, State, and Federal capabilities. Our activities have been geared
toward integrating efforts that will enhance civil-military
understanding and collaboration.
Our mission remains to ensure DOD is prepared to support a timely
and effective response to catastrophic conditions. We continue to work
with the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response to develop a mass
fatality concept of operations in accordance with the National Response
Framework's Emergency Support Function #8--Public Health and Medical
Services. These efforts will develop fatality management awareness,
prevention, preparedness, and recovery operations strategies among
Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and non-governmental
agencies/associations.
Additionally, we have consulted with Scotland Yard in London,
England, to ascertain how the British plan and prepare for mass
fatality incidents. Closer to home, we partnered with the New York City
Office of Chief Medical Examiner on a regional mass fatality management
plan, which leverages the expertise and assets currently existing in
the New York City metropolitan area to ensure maximum coordination
among relevant stakeholders.
Wildland Firefighting
During wildland firefighting operations, DOD, through U.S.
NORTHCOM, supports the National Interagency Fire Center and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. U.S. NORTHCOM provides a variety of
capabilities including Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS)-
capable C-130s, rotary wing aircraft capable of water bucket
operations, ground crews for fire fighting operations, and incident
awareness and assessment capability. There are a total of eight MAFFS;
six are National Guard assets and two are assigned to Reserve units.
The new MAFFS II capability will be used by the C-130H/J aircraft
beginning this year and will provide greater capability to distribute
fire suppression retardant. I am particularly pleased that the C-130Js
of the California Air National Guard have been added to the MAFFS fleet
this year.
U.S. NORTHCOM is also working with the National Guard Bureau to
create a trained cadre of National Guard ground fire fighters that is
pre-identified and ready pre-fire season to rapidly respond around the
country.
Civil Support Operations
Beyond disaster response, U.S. NORTHCOM provided DOD support to
five National Special Security Events over the past year: The
President's 2008 State of the Union Address, 2008 Democratic and
Republican National Conventions, the 2008 G-20 Global Financial Summit,
and the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. For each of these events, U.S.
NORTHCOM provided unique Secretary of Defense-approved DOD capabilities
to enhance the security of the event.
Support to Law Enforcement Agencies
Through our subordinate unit, Joint Task Force North (JTF North),
we continue to sustain important relationships with Federal law
enforcement agencies and National Guard counterdrug task forces engaged
in securing our nation's borders against drug traffickers and their
associated activities. JTF North collaborates with operational-level
leaders in U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; U.S. Coast Guard; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms;
National Guard Bureau; and State Joint Force Headquarters leadership in
the States where JTF North operates. These relationships foster timely
and responsive military support to law enforcement and provide greater
interagency synchronization to deter and prevent drug trafficking and
associated transnational threats.
JTF North coordinated 55 missions in support of Federal law
enforcement agencies during fiscal year 2008. In accordance with
applicable law and DOD policy for supporting law enforcement's
counterdrug efforts, JTF North employed joint air, ground, and maritime
sensors along the Nation's southwest and northern borders and coasts;
conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats;
provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement
agencies; supported the U.S. Border Patrol's requests for enhanced
tactical infrastructure along the southwest border; and provided
Federal law enforcement with other support such as transportation,
tunnel detection capabilities, and basic military skills training.
Counter-Tunnel Initiative
More than 99 cross-border tunnels have been identified by U.S. law
enforcement agencies, in many cases with DOD support. While illegal
drugs constitute the vast majority of illicit cargo transported through
these tunnels, they could also be used to smuggle terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction into the country. U.S. NORTHCOM is
examining enhanced tunnel detection capabilities with the lead Federal
partner, the Department of Homeland Security, other combatant commands,
and international partners. Among these enhanced capabilities are
seismic-acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, other technologies,
and robotics. The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center
(ERDC) is the technical lead for these capability development efforts.
ERDC has worked on tunnel detection in Iraq and provided subject matter
expertise to U.S. NORTHCOM in support of U.S. law enforcement agencies.
Northern Border Security Operations
During fiscal year 2008, U.S. NORTHCOM, through JTF North,
conducted 12 counterdrug/counter-narcoterrorism missions along the
northern border including aviation reconnaissance, ground-based radars,
mobile training teams and intelligence analysis support. During fiscal
year 2009, U.S. NORTHCOM has nine counterdrug/counternarcoterrorism
missions scheduled through JTF North. These missions, in support of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard, will
employ aviation reconnaissance, ground and maritime radars, and mobile
training teams in Washington, Vermont, Montana, and New York against
illicit trafficking along the northern border. In all these operations,
JTF North works with Canadian law enforcement and military via U.S. law
enforcement agencies, as well as the U.S.-Canada Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams. JTF North also participates in military-to-military
activities to foster greater security cooperation between the United
States and Canada to improve our collective security situation along
our northern border.
the national guard and reserves--vital components of our nation's
defense
The National Guard and Reserve Forces are fundamental to the total
force and essential to our homeland security and defense. U.S. NORTHCOM
is committed to working with all stakeholders to implement the
Secretary of Defense's 24 November 2008 direction in response to
recommendations in the Final Report of the Commission on the National
Guard and Reserves.
U.S. NORTHCOM seized the opportunity and responsibility to advocate
for the Reserve component in support of homeland defense and civil
support missions. Leveraging opportunities to fix National Guard and
Reserve shortfalls is critical to the success of the U.S. NORTHCOM and
NORAD missions. In an environment of constrained budgets and multiple
priorities, we need to determine where these requirements converge and
give equal deference to materiel and non-materiel solutions alike.
U.S. NORTHCOM is a strong advocate for Reserve component resourcing
for the capabilities needed by National Guard and Reserve Forces in
support of U.S. NORTHCOM missions. In each of our annual Integrated
Priority Lists and Program Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD,
U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD advocate for and support National Guard and
Reserve capability shortfalls. We also advocate for and support
National Guard Bureau efforts to validate key initiatives such as Joint
Continental United States Communications Support Environment and Beyond
Line-of-Sight communications for our Air Sovereignty Alert fighters.
In June 2008, U.S. NORTHCOM hosted the second Reserve component
Advocacy Conference wherein over 50 senior leaders discussed how best
to advocate for the capabilities needed by Guard and Reserve Forces in
support of U.S. NORTHCOM missions. We are advocating for change to DOD
policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper
resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units' equipment, personnel,
and training for homeland defense and civil support operations.
Since testifying last year, we have successfully partnered with the
National Guard in support of several planned and unplanned civil
support and homeland defense events. Every operation strengthens our
ability to collaborate effectively and I am proud to report that while
we still have work to do, our relationship with the National Guard
continues to mature and has never been better. Today, my senior leaders
meet regularly with their National Guard Bureau counterparts to
identify and resolve issues in advance of an emergency. Additionally,
our action officers coordinate daily on a variety of deliberate and
crisis action planning requirements. Our watch centers are in constant
communication with one another to ensure shared awareness. Finally,
U.S. NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau partner to conduct training
and exercises for all State Joint Force Headquarters Joint Task Force
Commanders and their staffs.
U.S. NORTHCOM directly supports the National Guard Bureau
initiative to establish the Defense Readiness Reporting System in all
54 States and territories. This is a 5-year effort and once completed,
asset availability, capabilities, and readiness information will be
available to Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD for all homeland
defense and civil support operations. To date, initial assessments are
complete in 45 of the 54 States and territories and are currently
visible in the Defense Readiness Reporting System.
It is notable that nearly 10 percent of U.S. NORTHCOM's current
full-time military manpower is drawn from the Reserve component. This
is the highest percentage of Reserve component manning of the ten
combatant commands. We have benefited from the full-time National Guard
and Reserve expertise and look forward to full manning of our
authorized full-time positions. I am very pleased to have ten flag
officers from the National Guard and Reserves among my 21 total flag
leaders in Headquarters NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM and our subordinate
commands.
plans--the foundation of our response
U.S. NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support plans are vital
to the Nation's ability to deter, prevent and defeat threats to our
security, and support civil authorities when called upon by the
President or Secretary of Defense. They provide a template for U.S.
NORTHCOM responses and are continuously updated to reflect evolving
national security requirements. NORAD's plans similarly ensure timely,
effective responses to threats to the security of the United States and
Canada.
With regard to homeland defense and civil support, the Department
of Homeland Security and the interagency community use the 15 National
Planning Scenarios as a vehicle to shape nation-wide planning efforts
for terrorist attacks and natural disasters. U.S. NORTHCOM plans, such
as Concept Plan 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, address all
of the National Planning Scenarios that may require U.S. NORTHCOM
support.
With the recent development of the Department of Homeland
Security's Integrated Planning System, there is now a formal process to
link and integrate Federal plans across departments and agencies and in
the future with State governments and local partners. Leveraging the
Integrated Planning System will allow U.S. NORTHCOM planners to gain
fidelity on Federal planning, refine potential support requirements,
and advocate for essential capabilities and resources.
U.S. NORTHCOM civil support planners work closely with their
counterparts at the National Guard Bureau. In addition to formal
coordination at every stage of plan development, and regularly
scheduled meetings conducted with web-based conferencing tools, U.S.
NORTHCOM and National Guard Bureau planners have begun meeting during
planning conferences every 6 months. In December 2008, National Guard
Bureau planners, and several State National Guard planners, met to
discuss the status of U.S. NORTHCOM plans and National Guard Bureau
initiatives. In February 2009, interagency planners attended the U.S.
NORTHCOM Civil Support and Homeland Defense Planners Conference where
U.S. NORTHCOM component planners presented their supporting plans to
U.S. NORTHCOM overarching strategic plans. These meetings foster the
working relationships that are so vital to synchronize our national
response in times of crisis.
In September 2008, I signed our U.S. NORTHCOM Theater Campaign
Plan, a first for the command. This campaign plan synchronizes day-to-
day operations, placing strong emphasis on three focus areas:
anticipating threats to our continental security, improving our
homeland defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and
strengthening relationships with our mission partners, including the
interagency community, Canada command and the Mexican military.
interoperable communications
U.S. NORTHCOM communications efforts are focused on ensuring a
prompt, coordinated response with our mission partners in the
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
the National Guard, States, and local organizations. In partnership
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Guard, we
maintain a combined total of 25 Deployable Cellular-Based Suites which
include cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land
Mobile Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices for emergency
responders. Several of these systems were deployed during Hurricane Ike
and supported the response efforts in Galveston, TX. We have also
worked to upgrade DOD Satellite Communications Facilities within the
United States. These upgrades enable DOD units to provide much sought
after Internet and telephone connections to civil authorities during a
crisis.
exercises
Each year, U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD sponsor two large-scale
exercises (Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield) and participate in over
30 smaller regional, State, and local exercises, along with exercises
with Canada, such as exercises in preparation for the Vancouver 2010
Olympics. We continually review lessons learned from past exercises and
real-world events (such as Hurricanes Gustav and Ike) and take
corrective action by incorporating identified best practices. These
actions are an integral part of our exercise program.
Over the last several years we have collaborated closely with the
Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security, other Federal departments and agencies, and States
to develop and refine the National Exercise Program. Our civil support
exercises are now fully integrated with the National Exercise Program
and are often linked with the Tier I National Level Exercise and
several Tier II or III Federal-level exercises, mutually supporting our
own exercise objectives and those of our partners in the Federal
Government, State and regional organizations, local and tribal
governments, and the private sector.
In conjunction with the National Guard Bureau, U.S. NORTHCOM
sponsors Vigilant Guard, a joint regional exercise program for the 54
State National Guard Joint Force Headquarters and their Joint Task
Forces and Field Units, to improve command and control and operational
relationships with internal, regional civilian, Federal, and other
military partners. The Vigilant Guard team works side-by-side with our
NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM exercise planners to coordinate and synchronize
our training efforts. Two of the four annual Vigilant Guard exercises
are linked with major NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM exercises, like Ardent
Sentry and Vigilant Shield, or the annual National Level Exercise.
To date, 14 Vigilant Guard exercises have been conducted, with
participation from 39 States and territories (representing more than
8,000 National Guardsmen) and scores of Federal, State, and local level
government agencies and first responders. The Vigilant Guard program
exemplifies the successful partnership among uniformed defenders of the
homeland--NORAD, U.S. NORTHCOM, and the National Guard Bureau--and
helps assure the American public that we are ready for the mission.
partnerships
Canada
The NORAD binational defense agreement is a tremendous example of
the closeness and richness of our defense relationship with Canada. The
bilateral relationship between U.S. NORTHCOM and Canada command also
continues to mature. On 14 February 2008, I joined my counterpart,
Lieutenant General Dumais from Canada command, in signing the United
States-Canada Civil Assistance Plan. The Civil Assistance Plan is the
framework under which military forces of one nation support the
military forces of the other nation to provide timely, effective, and
efficient support to their respective civil authorities.
Since then, the Civil Assistance Plan has been used once during
real-world operations and several times during exercises. Following the
appropriate exchange of diplomatic notes, we successfully executed this
plan during the 2008 hurricane season when a Canadian C-17 aircraft
assisted us with aeromedical evacuation operations during Hurricane
Gustav. As we look to the future, the Civil Assistance Plan provides a
framework for collaborative planning, training, and exercises in
preparation for events such as the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.
Last year I reported that U.S. NORTHCOM, NORAD, and Canada Command
initiated a study to examine future roles, missions, and relationships
for the three commands, with a desired end state of strengthening North
American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship
between Canada and the United States. The study continues, and we have
made significant progress in maturing our relationships and promoting
enhanced military cooperation among the commands, including work on a
proposed framework which will assist in clarifying how the three
commands operate and interact, highlight fundamental relationships, and
underscore individual command responsibilities concerning mutual
support and cooperation.
In an effort to advance our partnership with Canada Command toward
enhanced continental defense and security, our commands are also
jointly developing various plans to provide a strategic framework for
the bilateral defense and security of the United States and Canada,
building on the existing U.S.-Canada Basic Defense Document and NORAD
Agreement. These plans will, if required and authorized by our
respective governments, provide a bilateral construct for employing the
military forces of the United States and Canada in coordinated or
combined operations, when not already covered by the NORAD Agreement.
Mexico
Our relationship with Mexico has never been better and continues to
strengthen every day. Over the past year, we have advanced our
relationship from one of introductions and orientation visits to one of
open, frequent, and frank discussions on how we can improve our
collective security from common threats. The Government of Mexico is
engaged in a difficult campaign against organized violent criminal
networks that claimed over 5,000 lives in 2008. Your support of the
Merida Initiative and DOD counternarcotics programs is helping to build
the Mexican military's ability to counter threats to our mutual
security. We especially thank Congress for approving our request for
critically needed equipment under fiscal year 2008 Section 1206
authority. This enabled us to coordinate the first U.S. military
equipment support to Mexico since the command was activated in 2002.
This equipment, all of which is non-lethal, includes personal
protective equipment, digital media forensics equipment, night vision
devices, and equipment needed to board suspect vessels at sea. We are
now finalizing the requirements for delivery of transport helicopters
and maritime surveillance aircraft to the Mexican military under the
Merida Initiative.
U.S. NORTHCOM has teamed with the Department of State, the U.S.
Geological Survey, Agency for International Development, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency to
execute Building Partnership Capacity and Humanitarian Assistance
programs within our area of responsibility. One example of our efforts
includes cooperation exhibited by Mexico's first acceptance of large-
scale, DOD-provided civil material assistance consisting of 100,000
personal protective ensembles from the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency excess property program. Because Mexico is our neighbor and
disasters do not respect national boundaries, we are focused on
developing and improving procedures to respond to potentially
catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza outbreak, mass exposure
to dangerous chemical and materials, and natural disasters. It is
important to note that some of our international partners in these
endeavors include domestic agencies such as Proteccion Civil in Mexico,
who is responsible for consequence management response.
U.S. NORTHCOM representatives recently participated in a Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) Board of
Visitors curriculum review; the first such participation by U.S.
NORTHCOM. Our review helped ensure WHINSEC training supports Mexican
efforts against Drug Trafficking Organizations while simultaneously
emphasizing human rights. In both areas, WHINSEC has performed superbly
in support of our Theater Campaign Plan. Last year, Admiral Stavridis
and I wrote a letter of support to Congress expressing the importance
of safeguarding the privacy of WHINSEC students and staff.
Caribbean Islands, The Third Border
The 2008 Unified Command Plan shifted the U.S. NORTHCOM and U.S.
Southern Command boundaries in the Caribbean. U.S. NORTHCOM's area of
responsibility now includes Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and
the sovereign islands of the Bahamas, and two dependencies of the
United Kingdom (the Turks and Caicos and British Virgin Islands).
Admiral Stavridis and I proposed this change for a number of
reasons. First, it simplifies the homeland defense and civil support
missions with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Second, because the
Bahamas are just 90 miles from the United States and considering its
close relationship with our Federal interagency partners as well, we
enhanced our capabilities in this critical sector.
As we have with Canada and Mexico, we will develop a theater
engagement strategy for our ``Third Border'' with the Bahamas, Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, and the British
Virgin Islands. Our strategy will build on existing relationships
established by U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task
Force South to strengthen our Nation's counterterrorism and
counternarcotics capabilities in the Caribbean.
Interagency Community
For U.S. NORTHCOM to be successful in protecting the United States
and its interests, we must support other agencies in working toward
common objectives and building the capacity of partners. Our U.S.
NORTHCOM and NORAD Interagency Coordination Directorate and the
Commander's Joint Interagency Coordination Group integrate and
synchronize information and activities among multiple civilian,
Federal, State, and private sector organizations. This interagency
Group is comprised of full-time professionals representing 40 agencies
resident at U.S. NORTHCOM Headquarters or in the local area. Some of
the Federal departments and agencies represented are the Department of
State; the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal
Emergency Management Agency), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard;
Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Transportation;
Federal Aviation Administration; Central Intelligence Agency; FBI; U.S.
Geological Survey; and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
U.S. NORTHCOM's planning and operations staffs collaborate with our
interagency partners to integrate and synchronize plans, security and
emergency response activities. We host an informal Interagency Planner
Synchronization Working Group at the national level on a biweekly
basis. This type of collaboration has enabled us to execute a ``whole-
of-government'' approach to planning, and has significantly improved
cross-agency collaborative planning between the Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Health
and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.
Army Corp of Engineers, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, National Guard Bureau, U.S. NORTHCOM and component command
planning staffs. We continue to see this collaborative effort expand as
additional agencies choose to join.
U.S. NORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center North invests
heavily in the Intelligence Community networks established to improve
analysis and warning of international terrorist threats to North
America. Working with the Defense Intelligence Agency, we have assigned
a senior terrorism analyst to work in the National Counterterrorism
Center Defense Intelligence Unit. The Defense Intelligence Unit serves
as a critical information-sharing advocate for all commands and DOD
stakeholders. Defense Intelligence Unit analysts work within the
National Counterterrorism Center with full access to both widely
disseminated and more sensitive Intelligence Community information on
terrorism.
We also continue to grow our critical information-sharing
partnership with the FBI. The focal point for this relationship is our
intelligence liaison officer assigned to the FBI's National Joint
Terrorism Task Force. Additional analyst-to-analyst collaborative
efforts regarding specific threats of mutual concern are robust and
growing. In a step that will immeasurably benefit our preparedness and
collaboration on shared threats, the FBI embedded one of their
experienced terrorism analysts within U.S. NORTHCOM's Joint
Intelligence Operations Center North Terrorism Analysis Division in
February 2009.
DOD liaison officers from U.S. NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the
National Guard Bureau are assigned to Headquarters, Federal Emergency
Management Agency to facilitate information sharing, coordination, and
planning efforts for contingency response. These postings help to
maintain effective coordination of plans and activities, enhance
exchange of knowledge and advice, and facilitate effective relationship
building. We maintain visibility of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's logistical preparations and Defense Logistics Agency-sourced
deliveries. This improves situational awareness, helps reduce the need
for short-notice airlifts, and improves our ability to anticipate and
rapidly respond to emerging requirements during defense support of
civil authorities missions.
U.S. NORTHCOM has assigned Defense Coordinating Officers, supported
by Defense Coordinating Elements, to each of the ten Federal Emergency
Management Agency Regions to ensure close coordination in planning and
operations. U.S. NORTHCOM and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
also co-sponsor an annual Federal Coordinating Officer--Defense
Coordinating Officer Conference designed to maintain and enhance civil-
military understanding and support for disaster response planning
activities.
U.S. NORTHCOM has made considerable progress in developing
appropriate planning relationships between the Department and Private
Sector/Non-Governmental Organizations (PS/NGO) entities (business,
nonprofit, nongovernmental, faith-based, and academia). We teamed
recently with the Federal Emergency Management Agency Private Sector
office to cohost a first ever ``Public/Private Sector Collaboration in
Disaster Preparedness and Response'' Conference. This conference
significantly enhanced DOD and U.S. NORTHCOM collaboration with PS/NGOs
who own or manage some 85 percent of our Nation's critical
infrastructure and play a major part in disaster response. It's
important to note that we are not attempting to take over or direct the
private sector; however, we do believe we should be an active member of
the overall preparedness and response community.
In coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
the National Guard Bureau, U.S. NORTHCOM continues the deliberate
development of relationships with State governments and organizations
that represent constituencies. As a primary example of our State
engagement efforts, we have teamed with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the National Guard Bureau to develop and execute
internal and tailored training for requested States. We continue to
work in partnership with the National Guard Bureau, with State
Adjutants General, and State Joint Force Headquarters to identify gaps
and shortfalls, specific all hazard events, and other critical issues.
Our State engagement outreach also includes the Adjutants General
Association of the United States and National Governors Association.
U.S. Coast Guard
The operational relationship between U.S. NORTHCOM and the U.S.
Coast Guard provides a flexible, time-critical response, and immediate
access to the full spectrum of capabilities and forces to ensure
maritime security and defense of the United States. U.S. NORTHCOM and
the U.S. Coast Guard coordinate for operations in multiple national
defense mission areas: maritime intercept operations, rotary wing air
intercept operations, mine countermeasures operations, maritime
security and defense, counterdrug operations, migrant interdiction,
theater security cooperation, and military environmental response
operations. U.S. Coast Guard personnel are fully integrated within the
U.S. NORTHCOM staff, and the U.S. NORTHCOM staff is fully engaged with
U.S. Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic Area Commands in maritime
planning and execution.
enhancing our capabilities
United States-Canada Defense Surveillance Gapfiller Strategy
U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-
domain surveillance and command and control capabilities for North
American defense. Wide Area Surveillance capability is critical to
development of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense of the Homeland;
however, existing surveillance assets are inadequate and aging.
Gapfiller is the U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD Family-of-Systems strategy
to improve command and control and wide area surveillance of the North
American continent and enable the engagement and defeat of missiles
prior to impact in the homeland. Current gaps in the Joint Engagement
Sequence (i.e., kill chain) leave our countries vulnerable to attacks
in multiple domains. To address these gaps, we are conducting two
technology demonstrations.
Gapfiller will integrate currently disparate command and control
surveillance systems including those of other agencies and will
integrate an advanced surveillance capability for initial improvement
of homeland defense and security initiatives. Doing so will provide
ground truth information to DOD, the Department of Homeland Security,
and other civilian organizations.
The second effort is a Technology Risk Reduction Initiative for the
Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar. Leveraging existing U.S. and
Australian collaboration, this Technology Risk Reduction Initiative
should greatly improve our ability to surveil the approaches to the
homeland. The command and control JCTD will provide the Over-the-
Horizon Radar picture to all mission partners. Together, these
initiatives lay the foundation for improved integrated wide area
surveillance around North America and a coherent, shared operational
picture that allows us to detect, respond to, and prevent asymmetric
attacks against the homeland.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
During 2008 in response to requests from U.S. law enforcement
agencies, U.S. NORTHCOM employed Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) along
the U.S. southwest border. A Global Hawk was employed during the
Southern California Wildfires to provide State and local officials with
imagery to assist in firefighting efforts. As previously stated, U.S.
NORTHCOM employed a Global Hawk to obtain pre- and post-landfall
imagery of coastal areas in the path of Hurricane Gustav.
U.S. NORTHCOM is fully engaged with the UAS community through our
membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence Advisory Council and
our participation on the Policy Board for the Federal Aviation UAS
Subgroup. We are eager to team with our partners at the Department of
Homeland Security as they expand their UAS operational capabilities to
achieve synergy with our homeland defense and homeland security
efforts. We will be hosting a National Summit for UAS stakeholders this
spring to help determine the best way forward on employing UAS
capabilities in the national airspace.
Arctic Policy
The law of the sea, as reflected in the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea, is the foundation of the extensive international legal
framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean. Although all other nations
bordering the Arctic are parties to the Convention, the United States
has yet to join the treaty. Becoming party to the Convention would
protect and advance
U.S. interests in the Arctic by bolstering our national security
(including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces), securing U.S.
sovereignty rights over extensive marine areas (including the valuable
natural resources they contain), and giving the U.S. a seat at the
table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.
The State Department leads U.S. Arctic policy and, together with a
number of Federal agencies, implements the policy through the Arctic
Council and bilaterally with other Arctic states. National Security
Presidential Directive-66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) advocate for increased United States regional
presence, maritime domain awareness, freedom of navigation, and the
ratification of 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. NSPD-66/HSPD-25
also states that the United States ``is prepared to operate either
independently or in conjunction with other states'' to safeguard its
Arctic interests. Through NORAD, we have an opportunity to work closely
with Canada in enhancing aerospace and maritime domain awareness in the
Arctic. There is also potential for significant bilateral cooperation
with Canada, through collaboration with Canada Command.
Transformational Communications
NORAD requires survivable, protected, and dynamic satellite
communications capabilities throughout our area of operations and among
all of our assets. At the same time, U.S. NORTHCOM requires dynamic
satellite communications for capacity and coverage throughout the
entire area of responsibility that will support real-time joint force
networking, battle space awareness and land-, air-, and sea-borne
command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
For both commands, the current and emerging missions within the Arctic
region require the expansion of current and planned polar satellite
communications capabilities. Our networks must seamlessly bridge with
Federal, State, and local agencies. In my view, transformational
satellites continue to offer the most viable course of action to
satisfy our requirements for high-speed, secure, protected,
dynamically-allocated and efficiently-utilized communications.
Biometric Access Control Enterprise
Biometrics is increasingly important in many areas of security.
U.S. NORTHCOM plans to capitalize on this technology by fielding a
networked, interoperable, biometrically-enabled installation access
control enterprise for military installations in the United States.
Biometric access control systems are already in use overseas and we
believe now is the time to apply the same vigilance here at home to
protect our people, installations, and critical infrastructure from
obvious threats.
Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense
One of the more stressing challenges U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD will
face in defense of the homeland in the near future is emerging air
threats to include low flying aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned
aircraft systems, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The
United States lacks an integrated air and missile defense capable of
defending against these threats. As the threat of terrorism looms and
the proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities grows, it becomes
increasingly important to develop a truly integrated air and missile
defense system-of-systems tailored to meet the unique needs of the
homeland.
In the past year, U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD have made significant
strides toward protecting the homeland against these threats by
developing a viable Integrated Air and Missile Defense Concept of
Operations. To prepare for future homeland threats, U.S. NORTHCOM and
NORAD worked closely with the Joint Air Defense Operations-Homeland
Joint Test Team and participated in the Defense of the Homeland Against
Asymmetric Missile Attack experiment. As the operational sponsors of
Joint Air Defense Operations-Homeland, U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD assisted
in developing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for a Deployable
Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense capability. This mobile
capability could be used to protect a particular venue or city which
may be threatened or at risk. Participation in the Defense of the
Homeland Against Asymmetric Missile Attack experiment provided an
excellent opportunity to test the draft Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Concept of Operations and to validate the command and control
relationships.
Wind Farm Interference
NORAD faces a unique challenge as the United States seeks greater
energy independence. We must continue to work closely with the
Department of Energy laboratories and the alternative energy industry
to ensure our technologies do not render each other's technology
useless. We need to identify mitigation techniques that will allow wind
turbines and radars to coexist.
Cyberspace Infrastructure
Cyberspace attacks on our information infrastructure can adversely
impact our national security posture. Our opponents in this domain are
sophisticated, well-resourced, and persistent. Their objectives are to
disrupt operations, deny service, and exploit information and
technology. To effectively execute assigned missions, U.S. NORTHCOM and
NORAD must ensure the uninterrupted use of the Internet as well as
commercial and DOD communications systems. We partner with U.S.
Strategic Command, the military Services, DOD agencies, and the
Department of Homeland Security to reduce cyberspace vulnerabilities
and defend against information infrastructure attacks. While this
partnership is sufficient, more coordination and cooperation is
required to ensure we operate effectively during major cyberspace
incidents.
Maritime Domain Awareness
The maritime domain enables our Nation's growth. In order to ensure
freedom of movement for all law abiding entities while identifying
threats prior to realization, it is imperative that we have a picture
of the maritime domain and its relationship to activities in other
domains. Maritime Domain Awareness represents a global challenge
requiring focused efforts. U.S. NORTHCOM has a fundamental requirement
for maritime domain awareness in order to execute our missions.
However, we need to develop a common operational picture based on a
common system architecture between the United States and Canada. This
will result in enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness to predict, identify,
and intercept vessels of interest as well as enhance and formalize
information sharing between partner agencies and departments. In this
regard, we will continue to work closely with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast
Guard, as well as our Canadian and other international partners.
U.S. NORTHCOM has also partnered with U.S. Pacific Command to
develop a Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept. It
describes how the joint force will conduct future (2016-2028) maritime
operations to understand the maritime domain and will help identify
requirements to achieve maritime domain awareness. This document will
be completed in summer of 2009 and will lead to the development of
processes necessary for Maritime Domain Awareness, a key enabler for
the range of military options in the maritime domain across the
Department of Defense. It will help shape DOD's contribution to global
Maritime Domain Awareness.
Finally, Maritime Domain Awareness is a critical enabler for the
execution of NORAD's maritime warning mission. A major milestone
occurred in November 2008 during Exercise Vigilant Shield when NORAD
issued its first series of Maritime Warning Messages which validated
procedures and confirmed the ability to provide strategic warning of a
maritime threat to the Governments of the United States and Canada.
Despite this success, seams and gaps in process, policy, documentation,
classification and releasability, as well as technical impediments to
cross-border information sharing in the maritime domain, persist.
conclusion.
Today, our team of Active Duty members, Reserve Forces, National
Guardsmen, Canadian servicemembers, and civilians are trained and ready
to defend the United States and Canada and support civil authorities in
times of crisis. With Congress' sustained support, U.S. NORTHCOM and
NORAD will continue to anticipate our Nations' needs and be ready to
protect and defend our fellow citizens and the freedoms they enjoy.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
General Ward.
STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
AFRICA COMMAND
General Ward. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide this overview of your Nation's newest geographic
command, AFRICOM.
Also with me today are Mary Pleffner from the Department of
Commerce, who is a member of my staff, as well as Jerry Lanier
from the Department of State. I'm also honored to appear
alongside my distinguished colleagues who provide such great,
great collaborative efforts as we pursue our Nation's security
objectives.
Last year, I talked to you about our plan to put a
headquarters together. Today, AFRICOM is executing our mission
of conducting sustained security engagement through military-
to-military programs and military-sponsored activities that are
designed to promote a more stable and secure African
environment. We work in concert with other U.S. Government
agencies and international partners to ensure that our
activities are harmonized. Our strategy is based on military-
to-military efforts to enhance the security capacity and
capability of our African partners.
In many engagements with African leaders during my time as
Commander, AFRICOM, and previously as Deputy Commander for
United States European Command (EUCOM), the consistent message
they give me is their intent for their nations to provide for
their own security. Most welcome AFRICOM's assistance in
meeting their goals for security forces that are legitimate and
professional, have the will and means to dissuade the terror
and defeat transnational threats, perform with integrity, and
are increasingly able to support the missions in support of
international peace.
We work as a part of an overall U.S. Government effort. We
work closely with the Department of State, the chiefs of
mission and country teams, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Departments of Treasury,
Commerce, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and other agencies
doing work on the continent, and I fully support enhancements
to the capabilities of our interagency teammates.
Similarly, we reach out to international partners,
including Europeans, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, private enterprises, and
academia. Their perspectives on the situation in Africa are
valuable.
AFRICOM is involved in military training, education,
sustainment, and logistics support, among other activities,
throughout our AOR. The combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa, headquartered in Djibouti, conducts training,
education, and civil-military assistance that helps prevent
conflict and promote regional cooperation among nations of
eastern Africa. Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara is the
military component of the Department of State's
counterterrorism partnership with north and west African
nations. Africa Endeavor is an annual communications and
interoperability exercise that this year will include 23
African nations.
We support the State Department's Africa Contingency
Operations and Training Assistance Program that trains roughly
20 battalions of peacekeepers per year. The peacekeepers have
been deployed on United Nations and African Union missions
across the continent. We helped the Rwandans deploy some of
their cargo to the United Nations mission in Darfur. Continuing
deployments of the Africa Partnership Station provide training
to the navies and coast guards of the maritime nations in the
Gulf of Guinea and the coast of East Africa, helping them
better secure their own territorial waters.
Given the lack of infrastructure within Africa and the
island nations, our sustainment infrastructure, forward
operating sites, and en route infrastructure are vital. I
endorse upgrade projects supporting these key infrastructure
nodes. The enduring presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti makes
possible our engagement in East Africa and other parts of the
continent and supports our U.S. security goals in the region.
It is my honor to serve with our uniformed men and women as
well as our civilian men and women of DOD, including our
interagency teammates, who are making a difference on the
continent each and every day. Their dedicated efforts are a
testament to the spirit and the determination of the American
people and our commitment to contributing to the well-being and
security of our Nation and the people of Africa.
I thank you for your support for this endeavor and I too
look forward to this opportunity to provide you with additional
information. Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Ward follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN William E. Ward, USA
introduction
It is my privilege as Commander of United States Africa Command to
present to Congress our Posture Statement for 2009. The men and women
of U.S. Africa Command have ensured the successful, rapid, and on-
schedule activation of our Nation's newest Unified Command--the sixth
geographic command within the Department of Defense (DOD). The
establishment of U.S. Africa Command provides a single focus for all
DOD activities in Africa, and today we conduct sustained security
cooperation programs in support of U.S. foreign and national security
policy on the African continent and its island states.
Unified Command Status (UCS) on 1 October 2008 was possible due to
the extraordinary efforts of our impressive team. By UCS, a total of
172 missions, activities, programs and exercises were effectively
transferred to U.S. Africa Command from U.S. European Command, U.S.
Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. I am grateful for the
sustained congressional support to U.S. Africa Command during its
formative time, and I thank you for your continued support as we
prepare to meet future challenges.
Development, diplomacy, and defense programs are integrally linked,
and U.S. Africa Command is implementing the National Defense Strategy's
vision of a new jointness by supporting and improving collaboration
with other agencies and departments across our Government, as well as
improving coordination with international, intergovernmental, and
nongovernmental organizations. We achieve the greatest effect for our
Nation when we coordinate and harmonize our collective efforts in
support of our common objectives.
Africa is on a positive course in reducing conflict, building
democratic institutions, and promoting sustainable livelihoods for its
people, but in each of these areas, the hard-won gains are fragile.
Strengthening African security, both in individual nations and
regionally, is necessary for its communities to flourish. I am
convinced that building African security capability and capacity is the
best path to assisting the people of Africa to achieve long-term
stability and security.
In the months since UCS, U.S. Africa Command has been serving the
interests of our Nation, while also addressing the security and
stability challenges confronting our African partners. In this report,
I provide a brief overview of the strategic environment in Africa,
explain our strategy, and underscore how our coordinated security
assistance efforts are promoting stability in Africa in support of U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
strategic environment
The U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility (AOR) presents
difficult security challenges that should be viewed along with the
opportunities available to the people of Africa. These challenges are
juxtaposed against abundant natural resources that, if properly managed
by African states and institutions, can provide great economic and
social benefits to all Africans. Our task is to assist our African
partners so that they can provide for their own security in ways that
permit realization of their capacity and potential.
Africa is a complex environment requiring a new and different
approach. Its unique challenges demand a long-term rather than a near-
term focus. For example, two of the most demanding challenges for
African coastal nations are the security of their territorial waters
and the regulation of their fishing industries. Today, the waters off
Africa's west coast are being over-fished at an alarming rate by a
variety of entities aware of Africa's inability to monitor and regulate
this activity in their economic zone. If this continues, some
forecasters predict that the ecological system that supports the fish
population, the primary source of protein for many African states,
could fail by 2045. Without the ability to secure their maritime spaces
and regulate fishing, the Nations of Africa will lose this important
source of food and revenue for their people. The United States must
adopt a long-term view towards creating programs that will help solve
such problems. Failing to do so today means our activities will only
produce short-term effects.
Political Geography
The greatest security threats facing Africa include enduring
conflicts, illicit trafficking, territorial disputes, rebel
insurgencies, violent extremists, piracy, and illegal immigration.
While rich in both human capital and natural resources, many African
states remain fragile due to corruption, endemic and pandemic health
problems, historical ethnic animosities, natural disasters, and
widespread poverty. Compounding these challenges, difficulties imposed
by geography, climate, and a lack of infrastructure are hindering
states' efforts to develop in an ever-globalizing international
environment.
Despite these difficulties, a holistic picture of Africa taken over
time shows some progress and significant promise. Six major wars have
ended in the past 7 years (Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and the North-South conflict in
Sudan). Democracy is growing in Africa, with more than 60 elections in
the past 6 years. Almost three-quarters of Sub-Saharan nations are now
classified by Freedom House as ``Free'' or ``Partly Free''--up from
less than half in 1990. Though the global economy is enduring a down-
turn, previous economic growth on the African continent was at an 8-
year high, and 20 countries have registered positive growth for each of
the past 5 years. Growth in real per capita income was over 3 percent
in 2008--a marked change from the declines in growth across the
continent in the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the amount of human suffering
directly attributable to conflict on the African continent is
unacceptably high, and the 2009 Freedom House report on Sub-Saharan
Africa notes that, ``[O]verall, Africa has seen notable increases in
freedom over the past generation, but has experiences some troubling
setbacks in recent years.''
In addition, African states are working hard to develop their own
ability to deal with security challenges. Today Africans are sharing
the burden of international peace and security by supplying 32 percent
of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces worldwide. As of March
2009 there are more than 33,000 African peacekeepers deployed in
support of U.N. and African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions. Five
African countries--Nigeria, Rwanda, Ghana, Ethiopia, and South Africa--
rank amongst the top 15 U.N. troop contributing nations.
Although Africa is on a positive trajectory, progress remains
fragile and easily reversible.
Demographic Trends
Africa has the world's highest birth rates and the largest
percentage of projected population growth. The continent's population
of over 900 million is growing by approximately 2.4 percent annually
and is projected to double by 2050. Today, 43 percent of Sub-Saharan
Africa's population is below the age of 15. Rapid population growth and
this ``youth bulge'' exceed most governments' ability to provide basic
services and the capacity of their growing economies to provide jobs.
This pool of undereducated and unemployed youth present a potential
source of social and political instability.
Africa has experienced large migration flows in recent decades,
often in response to economic problems, civil unrest, or natural
disasters. Africa generates 49 percent of the world's internally
displaced persons (IDPs). Many migrants settle in urban slums, further
straining government services and contributing to the spread of
infectious disease. Rapid urbanization also increases competition for
limited jobs, housing, food, and water.
Transnational Threats and Crime
The United States and many of our African partners face a number of
transnational threats in Africa. Violent extremism, piracy, and illicit
trafficking are enabled by or directly contribute to instability.
Somalia, Sudan, and vast open areas of countries across the Sahel
region provide sanctuary for violent extremists. Al-Qaeda increased its
influence dramatically across north and east Africa over the past 3
years with the growth of East Africa al Qaeda, al Shabaab, and al Qaeda
in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At the same time, the
general level of support for violent extremism among most Muslims in
Africa remains very low.
Other trends pose serious challenges to U.S. interests. Foreign
fighter recruitment and support networks are present across northern
and eastern Africa, assisting extremists fighting coalition and
government forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Vast coastal
areas provide havens for smuggling, human and drug trafficking, illegal
immigration, piracy, oil bunkering, and poaching of fisheries. For
example, large-scale oil theft by disparate groupings of armed
militants in the Niger Delta is a significant problem. Observers
estimate that Nigeria's oil exports have been reduced by 20 percent due
to banditry fostered by lingering societal and political grievances.
Theft of oil within the country costs the state untold revenues that
could be used to improve services for the population.
Africa is a piracy flashpoint, with incidents occurring in Somali
waters, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. In the first 9 months
of 2008 alone, paid ransoms may have exceeded $30 million. Maritime
security will remain a challenge, particularly along the Horn of
Africa, Swahili Coast, Mozambique Channel, and, to a lesser extent, in
the Gulf of Guinea, where littoral nations continue to lack the ability
to patrol and protect their waters.
According to a recent U.S. Department of State (DOS) report,
trafficking in persons is a significant and widespread problem
throughout Africa. Especially prevalent are trafficking in children
(including child military conscription), women for commercial sexual
exploitation, and males for forced labor. As of 2008, there was only
one African country in compliance with the U.S. Trafficking Victim's
Protection Act of 2000.
Illicit trafficking of narcotics poses a significant threat to
regional stability. According to the DOS International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report 2008, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
Western Africa has emerged as a critical trans-shipment point for South
American cocaine destined primarily for European markets. The presence
of drug trafficking organizations in West Africa as well as local drug
use create serious security and health challenges. The strong Euro
currency, increased European cocaine demand, and successful
interdiction in the Americas contribute to West Africa's place in the
narcotics trade. The UN estimates that 27 percent of all cocaine
annually consumed in Europe transits West Africa, with trends rising
significantly. In addition to the health and medical problems resulting
from the distribution and spread of narcotics along the trafficking
routes, the presence and influence of traffickers in the West African
region has had a profoundly corrosive effect on the rule of law in many
West African states. It must be noted that the narcotics trafficking
from Southwest Asia through the islands into East and Southern Africa
also remains a significant a concern. Although there is a degree of
political will within many African states, efforts to combat narcotics
trafficking are hampered by resource shortfalls, law enforcement and
judicial capacity, and corruption.
Other Nations and Organizations Operating Within the AOR
As Africa's importance is recognized, more non-African countries
and international governmental organizations seek to develop, maintain,
and expand relations with African states. China, India, Brazil, Turkey,
Japan, Russia, European states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU) have all focused increasingly on
Africa's potential and its strategic significance.
European leaders remain committed to working with their African
counterparts on a broad range of developmental issues. Specifically, in
the peace and security arena, the EU has mounted several security
sector reform operations in Africa, including in the DRC, Guinea
Bissau, Chad, and the Central African Republic. NATO airlifted AU
peacekeepers into Darfur and Somalia and NATO supports development of
AU peacekeeping capability with U.S. and other NATO officers embedded
into AU Peace Support Operations Division. Recently, both NATO and the
EU initiated Horn of Africa counterpiracy operations and they
coordinate their counterpiracy efforts with U.S Central Command's
Combined Task Force-151.
Other European nations without historic ties with Africa, such as
Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, have increased their
support for U.N. operations, and have bilateral assistance efforts that
contribute to capacity building. U.S. Africa Command continues to build
cooperation with European partners to coordinate programs and
contribute to a focused, collaborative approach to capacity building.
Additionally, it is important to note China and India's ongoing
efforts in Africa. Over the last 10 years, China's interests in Africa
have increased significantly. China is the world's leading consumer of
copper, steel, cobalt and aluminum, and is second only to the United
States as an importer of African oil. India, as of April 2008, pledged
to invest $500 million over the next 5 years in development projects in
Africa, and also pledged to double financial credit to African
countries from $2 billion during the past 5 years to $5.4 billion over
the next 5 years. The actions and contributions of both of these
nations demonstrate the active role they play in Africa today.
u.s. africa command strategy
U.S. Africa Command's strategy of sustained security engagement
focuses our military-to-military programs on conflict and crisis
prevention rather than reaction. The command, in accordance with U.S.
foreign policy and national security objectives, creates, sustains, and
supports opportunities to assist our African partners in their efforts
to build enduring security capacity to prevent or mitigate the
catastrophic effects and costs associated with instability, conflict,
transnational threats, and humanitarian disasters.
Interests, Endstates, and Objectives
The National Defense Strategy objectives of defending the homeland,
promoting security, deterring conflict, and winning our Nation's wars
define U.S security interests in Africa. U.S. Africa Command, in
developing its command strategy, identified the following as our
theater strategic interests:
Prevent attacks against Americans by transnational
threats emanating from Africa;
Prevent acquisition, transfer, or transit of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) material or expertise;
Maintain our freedom of movement into and through the
AOR;
Foster the prevention, mitigation, or containment of
conflict;
Foster sustained stability;
Mitigate the effects of significant humanitarian
crises or natural disasters;
Deter and contain pandemic influenza in the AOR.
The DOD Guidance for Employment of the Force specifically directs
three strategic endstates as guidance for U.S. Africa Command's
activities. These are:
Endstate 1: African countries and organizations are able to provide
for their own security and contribute to security on the
continent.
Endstate 2: African Governments and regional security establishments
have the capability to mitigate the threat from organizations
committed to violent extremism.
Endstate 3: African countries and organizations maintain professional
militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the
rule of law, and abide by international human rights norms.
U.S. Africa Command's primary effort is building African security
capacity so our partners can prevent future conflict and address
current or emerging security and stability challenges. This approach
reinforces African states' gains in improving governance, and enables
the United States to help improve the effectiveness of current African
supported U.N. and AU peacekeeping missions.
The command-developed theater strategic objectives are designed to:
1) support the achievement of the theater strategic endstates, 2)
protect or advance U.S. interests in Africa, and 3) provide focus for
the command's engagement activities. The primary mechanism for meeting
the following objectives is building African security capacity.
U.S. Africa Command theater strategic objectives are:
Defeat the al Qaeda terrorist organization and its
associated networks;
Ensure peace operation capacity exists to respond to
emerging crises, and continental peace support operations are
effectively fulfilling mission requirements.
Cooperate with identified African states in the
creation of an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned
possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities and expertise;
Improve security sector governance and increased
stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic,
and enduring U.S. Government efforts in designated states;
Protect populations from deadly contagions.
U.S. Africa Command's strategy of security capacity building will
support long-term African stability, while also fostering the
development of African forces that can address contemporary and future
conflicts. Our strategy allows the Command to provide support to
efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies responsible for
development and diplomacy. Most importantly, this strategy allows U.S.
Africa Command to defend the Homeland and secure U.S. interests abroad.
Continent Wide Programs, Activities, and Plans
To meet our theater strategic objectives, U.S. Africa Command
implements and supports programs that span the whole of Africa, as well
as programs specific to regions and countries.
Support to the Fight Against Violent Extremism
Combating violent extremism requires long-term, innovative
approaches, and an orchestration of national and international power.
By strengthening our partners' security capacity, we will deny
terrorists freedom of action and access to resources, while diminishing
the conditions that foster violent extremism.
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) is the DOD
contribution to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
This partnership uses the capabilities of U.S. Government agencies to
counterterrorism in North and West Africa. The OEF-TS component of
TSCTP is designed to assist participating African nations as they
improve control of their territories and thus deny safe havens to
terrorist groups. Cooperation strengthens regional counterterrorism
(CT) capabilities and reduces the illegal flow of arms, goods, and
people through the region. The military train and equip component of
TSCTP is primarily funded with DOS Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds.
PKO funds for TSCTP are a critical component of the long-term strategy
for OEF-TS and TSCTP.
Our partners' enthusiasm and support for these efforts was evident
during Exercise Flintlock in November 2008, when nine African and four
European partners came together to conduct a CT exercise spanning an
area larger than the continental United States. The principal purpose
of the Flintlock exercises is to improve military interoperability, and
strengthen regional relationships.
Combined Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is the second
named operation ongoing in Africa. Discussed in greater detail in the
Component and Subordinate Command Section, CJTF-HOA employs an indirect
approach to counter extremism. Through a strategy of Cooperative
Conflict Prevention, the task force builds security capacity, promotes
regional cooperation, and protects coalition interests.
Operation Objective Voice (OOV), known previously as Operation
Assured Voice--Africa (OAV-A), is an operation that strikes at the
heart of violent extremist efforts--ideology. OOV is a proactive effort
where multiple agencies partner with African Governments to broadcast
messages to counter extremist propaganda. Military Information Support
Teams, in conjunction with DOS public diplomacy, have demonstrated
success in several countries including Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya. We
continue to work with participating nations, Embassy Country Teams, and
DOS to enhance this program.
Security Assistance
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs remain the cornerstone
of our persistent, sustained engagement. These programs build lasting
relationships, promote common interests, and enhance partner
capabilities to provide safe and secure environments. Our military-to-
military programs assist our allies and partners in maturing their
capabilities to conduct operations with well-trained, disciplined
forces that respect human rights and the rule of law. Our cooperative
security efforts provide essential peacetime and contingency access and
infrastructure, improve information sharing, and are vital to U.S.
Africa Command's support of U.S. foreign policy and national security
objectives.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs
provide education and training to foreign military and civilian
personnel. IMET is a critical form of security cooperation in theater.
A robust IMET program is a long-term investment in the future and
directly supports U.S. interests.
The target audience of IMET is future military and civilian
leaders. IMET provides education and training for both military and
civilian personnel to help militaries understand their role in a
democracy. IMET exposes countries to our democratic principles, but
achieving long-term results is impeded if these programs are not
sustained over a long period. If we are perceived as unreliable,
African states may pursue training with countries that do not share our
values, including our commitment to respect for human rights, good
governance, and transparency, and this could impact our relationship
with a state's security forces--a relationship that might not recover
for a generation. The long-term benefit of IMET cannot be overstated.
Forty-six of 52 African states and 1 organization (Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS)) are expected to have IMET programs in
fiscal year 2009.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical U.S. military
equipment and services to partner countries. U.S. Africa Command seeks
to align FMF programs to enhance security capacity building by
including FMF as part of our long-term strategy to procure compatible
systems that increase interoperability, effectiveness, and efficiency
of training. Fiscal year 2008 FMF numbers were approximately $18.7
million for 53 countries, with most of this going Tunisia and Morocco.
If we are to achieve our endstates and avoid undesirable strategic
consequences, we must continue to closely monitor our strategic use of
FMF and cooperatively work together to ensure its distribution
contributes directly to our long-term goals.
IMET and FMF are critical to accomplishing the United State's
mission in Africa and constitute long-term investments in critical
relationships. Both programs are fundamental to our strategy of
preventative rather than reactive response.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Goods bought through FMS have
improved interoperability with countries that benefit from the program.
Vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, and equipment purchased through the
program are often the same materials currently being used by U.S.
forces. Countries that are eligible to receive FMS are eligible to
receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) as well. Trucks supplied to the
Senegalese military through the EDA program will be instrumental during
the deployment of Senegalese Battalions in support of their
peacekeeping operations in Darfur.
Continental peace support operations and military-to-military
programs
The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a U.S. State
Department-led initiative to enhance global capabilities to conduct
peace support operations, with a particular emphasis on building
African capacity. This program is expected to train 75,000 peacekeeping
troops worldwide by 2010, develop a transportation and logistics
architecture to facilitate peacekeeping deployments, and establish an
international training center for the training of formed police unit
trainers. In Africa, GPOI funds are primarily used to support and
expand the pre-existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program. Since fiscal year 2005, ACOTA has directly
trained more than 68,000 African soldiers, including approximately
3,500 military trainers. U.S. Africa Command supports the ACOTA program
by providing military mentor teams. The U.S. military has provided
approximately 350 mentors over the life of the ACOTA program, and we
are actively seeking ways to provide additional support.
In 2009, the GPOI program is expected to support and expand our
communication initiatives on the continent. In West Africa,
specifically, GPOI will expand the ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange
System (ERIES) satellite network enabling its 15 partner countries to
communicate and exchange information.
GPOI programs such as ACOTA and ERIES are critical to our efforts
to develop and improve our African partners' security capacity.
The Military-to-Military Contact program is a pillar of U.S. Africa
Command's security cooperation activities in African countries. Since
2003, over 400 military-to-military events have helped host nations
address such fundamental topics as integration of women in the
military, civilian control of the military, establishment of military
legal codes, and programs to develop professional officer,
noncommissioned officer (NCO), and chaplain corps. Funding for
military-to-military operations uses Traditional Combatant Commander
Activities (TCA) funds. In fiscal year 2008, $3.3 million of TCA monies
were spent on Africa military-to-military activities. We plan to expand
this critical program, with $6.1 million in TCA budgeted for fiscal
year 2009.
The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) remains a
superb, effective TSC program. Linking U.S. states and territories with
African countries, the SPP helps build long-term relationships,
promotes access, enhances African military professionalism and
capabilities, interoperability, and promotes healthy civil-military
relations. U.S. Africa Command currently has seven state partnerships:
Tunisia-Wyoming; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North Dakota; South Africa-New
York; Nigeria-California; Senegal-Vermont, and Botswana-North Carolina.
The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard enables it to
interact consistently, over time, with all security forces, and, when
appropriate, African civilian officials. We are seeking support from
Adjutant Generals to expand this valuable program.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(HIV/AIDS) Programs and Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
U.S. Africa Command's Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program is a
successful program focused on a source of suffering and a hindrance to
sustained development and stability in Africa--the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
HIV/AIDS is a military force generation and sustainment problem for
African forces and is a risk to African security and stability. The
Command addresses HIV/AIDS in the military context through technical
program assistance and implementation from the Department of Defense
Executive Agent (DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office) and the Office
of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator using three funding sources: the
DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office using a congressional
supplemental provided via the Office of the Secretary of Defense Health
Affairs Defense Health Program; the DOS Office of the U.S. Global AIDS
Coordinator using the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR); and the DOS, using the HIV/AIDS Military Health Affairs FMF
program. The Command's Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program implemented
and executed by the DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office in
collaboration with PEPFAR, provides strategic direction and oversight
for designated countries to further U.S. Africa Command strategic
objectives.
DOD activities supporting African Military's fight against HIV/AIDS
have been very successful and now reach 39 countries in Africa. When
DOD's program began in 2001, few African militaries had yet tested
their forces for HIV infection, and only a small number had programs or
policies addressing HIV/AIDS. Today, as a result of past joint efforts
between DHAPP, PEPFAR and U.S. Africa Command, many militaries in
Africa now test their forces for HIV and have active programs for HIV/
AIDS prevention, care, and treatment. In the past year, U.S. Africa
Command's programs have reached 497,000 African troops and family
members with prevention messages, and provided testing and counseling
and testing services for 102,000 service members and their families. In
addition, 800 senior military leaders have been trained on HIV/AIDS
policies in their countries, and 7,000 peer educators and 5,000 health
care workers received training. About 19,000 individuals are on
antiretroviral treatment as a result of these collaborative efforts.
These programs and voluntary counseling and testing are helping to
affect behavioral change by reducing the stigma often associated with
HIV/AIDS in Africa.
Humanitarian Assistance Programs. Interagency coordination
multiplies the effectiveness of Humanitarian Assistance (HA) programs.
U.S. Africa Command coordinates its humanitarian efforts with those of
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DOS to ensure
its HA efforts on the continent complement and support USAID's lead on
development initiatives in a country. U.S. Africa Command Humanitarian
and Civic Assistance (HCA) events are undertaken when they support the
security and foreign policy interests of the United States, the
security interests of the country in which the activity is performed,
and promote the specific operational readiness skills of the U.S.
forces that participate. Humanitarian Assistance-Other (HA-O) programs
are another means for the Command to complete projects that benefit the
civilian population of a host nation and support overall development
priorities. The command's fiscal year 2008 projects included providing
veterinary and medical care, building and furnishing schools and
clinics, digging wells, providing clean water in rural and austere
locations, and help in delivering disaster relief. Such activities have
proven successful in the Horn of Africa.
A variety of innovative HA activities support our long-term
interests by building partnerships with African nations and
establishing good working relations with international and
nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners. In Tunisia for instance,
the HA program funded architectural and engineering services and
partial construction of a new educational facility for marginalized
autistic children, while French partners supported construction and
training by an international NGO for special educators. In Burkina
Faso, from August to October 2008, both the Humanitarian Civic
Assistance (HCA) and Excess Property Programs were used in combination
to conduct a three-phased Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) to
combat eye disease. The Burkina Faso Ministry of Health and Ministry of
Defense, with support of the U.S. Embassy, and the Burkina Faso
Ministry of Defense, worked jointly to achieve this mission. In another
program, fully adjustable, self-prescribing glasses--fine tuned by U.S.
military personnel--have been distributed during U.S. military medical
outreach projects. In Botswana, HA funds doubled the size of a facility
used by an international NGO to provide after-school services for
orphaned children. All of these activities contribute significantly to
well-being while complementing development efforts that serve the
interests of our Nation and U.S. Africa Command.
Over the next year, U.S. Africa Command will work closely with
country teams to ensure HA resources are used to complement other U.S.
Government funding and achieve overall U.S. Government foreign policy
objectives while continuing to further American and African security
objectives. HA resources are a flexible tool to complement larger
humanitarian and development programs implemented by USAID, PEPFAR, and
Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Pandemic Response Programs
In light of the important role national militaries are likely to
play in pandemic response globally, Congress provided fiscal year 2008
funds to enable USAID and the U.S. Africa and Pacific Commands to
partner to develop host nation militaries' pandemic response capacity.
Our Pandemic Response Program will help develop and exercise African
military pandemic response plans that compliment civilian activities
during a pandemic. Our assessment teams are beginning to work in East
and West Africa to develop national and regional activities that focus
the military role on maintaining security and communications, providing
logistic support for provision of food, medicine, and other
commodities, as well as providing augmented medical care. This program
will build local capacity to respond to other disasters as well.
Interagency Cooperation and Partnership
U.S. Africa Command's interagency efforts are of critical
importance to the command's success. The command has three senior
Foreign Service Officers in key positions as well as numerous personnel
from other U.S. Government agencies serving in leadership, management,
and staff positions throughout our headquarters. From piracy off the
coast of Somalia to supporting the UN Africa Union Mission in Darfur,
embedded interagency personnel are involved in the earliest stages of
U.S. Africa Command's planning. These invaluable experts help the
Command ensure its plans and activities complement those of other U.S.
Government agencies.
The Command's development of its Theater Strategy and supporting
campaign plan is another example of its extensive interagency
cooperation. Through collaboration among departments and Federal
agencies, we strive to ensure that our collective activities are
integrated and synchronized in pursuit of common goals. In developing
the U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), a plan that
accounts for peacetime activities over the next 5 years, the command
has involved interagency experts from the very beginning of the
planning process. In the summer of 2008, U.S. Africa Command planners
met in Virginia with representatives from 16 agencies in a series of
workshops designed to gain interagency input on Africa Command's
Theater Strategy and TCP. Representatives from other agencies have also
participated in Theater Strategy and TCP discussions and most remain
involved in a planning effort designed to complete the TCP by the
spring of 2009.
The growth and development of our interagency team depends on the
human resources of our partner agencies. U.S. Government agencies and
departments have been supportive of our requests to fill our
interagency billets, and we remain flexible in defining the role and
participation of these agencies as we continue to grow and evolve.
Today, all senior executive interagency positions at U.S. Africa
Command have been filled, and we continue to work with the interagency
to fill additional positions. A total of 27 interagency personnel are
assigned to Africa Command from the Department of State, Department of
Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury,
USAID, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Open Source Center. The
Department of Energy and Department of Justice both have pending
assignments. Other agencies, such as U.S. Geological Survey and the
Department of Agriculture, have sent representatives to U.S. Africa
Command to examine the possibility of placing people at the command
permanently.
U.S. Africa Command is aggressively pursuing new, innovative
processes and relationships to improve DOD collaboration with other
U.S. Government agencies in order to maximize the effectiveness of all
U.S. activities in Africa.
Regional African Programs, Activities, and Plans
Many of the programs we are currently implementing were transferred
from the commands previously responsible for portions of U.S. Africa
Command's AOR. As we move forward, we will synchronize this collection
of programs across the five regions of Africa so that, together, they
enable us to implement the coherent approach outlined in U.S. Africa
Command's Theater Strategy. The command's definition of the five
regions of Africa mirrors that of the AU. The regions are: North
Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa.
North Africa
While Egypt remains within U.S. Central Command's AOR, we recognize
the importance of Egypt's influence throughout the continent. Egypt's
partnerships with other African nations contribute to their stability
and the professionalization of their militaries, and Egypt has
expressed a desire for a close relationship with U.S. Africa Command.
As a result, we participated in the U.S.-Egypt defense talks in 2008,
and we have concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with U.S
Central Command that ensures synchronization and coordination between
commands whenever U.S. Africa Command missions require engagement with
Egypt.
Regarding Libya, the lifting of Section 507 sanctions and the
recent signing of a MOU on defense contacts and cooperation provide a
solid foundation upon which we can build our bilateral military
relationship. My staff is diligently preparing a proposal for
engagement activities with the Libyans. In February 2009, we conducted
a site visit to determine ways to assist Libya's Coast Guard, advise
them on the procurement of English Language labs in preparation for
attendance in our professional schooling, and to conclude a foreign
military sales contract enabling Libya's purchase of border patrol
vehicles. We approach this new relationship carefully, deliberately,
and with the intention to improve military relations consistent with
U.S. foreign policy guidance and national security objectives.
U.S. Africa Command will seek opportunities in this region for
increased collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, border, and
maritime security. The U.S. Sixth Fleet, along with several European
and North African navies (Malta, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Mauritania, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), conducted
Phoenix Express 2008, a multilateral naval exercise. Phoenix Express
concentrates on operations that directly contribute to safety and
security in the maritime domain, focusing on maritime interdiction,
communications, and information sharing. U.S. Africa Command's naval
component, U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) will expand Phoenix
Express 2009 to include navies from Algeria, France, Greece, Italy,
Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Senegal, and possibly
others.
In June 2008, the marines that have since become U.S. Marine Corps
Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) conducted exercise African Lion in Morocco.
This annual bilateral exercise focuses on small-unit infantry tactics,
staff training, and humanitarian assistance. In 2009, U.S Africa
Command's Army component, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), will support the
joint exercise, African Lion, in Morocco.
U.S. Africa Command's air component, Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA),
is responsible for four exercise-related construction projects in
Morocco totaling over $1.2 million. These projects will improve runway
capability and construct exercise reception facilities to support
current and future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises in
Africa. Additionally, AFAFRICA HCA programs in Morocco have awarded
contracts for veterinarian clinic supplies, water wells and school
construction.
An excellent model for future U.S. Government whole-of-government
cooperation can be found in North Africa. In October 2008, one of
Africa Command's senior USAID representatives traveled to Morocco to
help integrate DOD HA activities into the U.S. Embassy's Country
Assistance Strategy (CAS). Working closing with the Embassy team, a MOU
between U.S. Africa Command's Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) and
USAID's Mission Director was completed. This MOU is designed to align
and focus programs and activities to provide for a coordinated,
consistent U.S. Government response in pursuit of shared policy goals.
As strategic partners, U.S Africa Command and USAID are implementing a
program that targets the number one goal of the U.S.-Embassy's CAS--
``Mitigating the factors of youth disaffection and marginalization.''
This coordinated interagency approach facilitates a whole-of-
government, preventative approach to the problem of disaffected youths,
with each agency working closely together, within their mandated areas
of responsibility, to achieve a greater effect than had they acted
alone.
This project serves as an interagency model for other U.S.
Embassies while reemphasizing that, while U.S. Africa Command does not
have the lead in the development sphere, it plays an important
supporting role to U.S. Mission Strategic Plans.
West Africa
As with much of Africa, West African states are confronted with
porous maritime and territorial borders contributing to illegal
trafficking in narcotics, persons, and counterfeit goods, illegal
fishing and extraction of resources, and other criminal activities.
There is also ethnic, religious, and social strife, and a lack of
adequate infrastructure to support populations and foster economic
development. Often, a crisis in one country affects surrounding
countries; likewise, a threat to one country often emanates from or
rapidly proliferates to neighboring countries. This requires a
multilateral approach to improve security, stability, and development.
Despite the success achieved by ECOWAS and the ECOWAS Standby Force,
various threats continue to inhibit the sustainment of security and
prosperity in West Africa. U.S. Africa Command is working with
bilateral partners, ECOWAS, U.S. Government agencies, and non-African
nations active in the region to address these threats for the mutual
benefit of West Africa, the United States, and the international
community.
U.S. Africa Command has partnered with several countries in West
Africa to develop plans to counter regional threats. In Mali, Niger,
Senegal, and Nigeria, the TSCTP and its military element, OEF-TS, are
the U.S. lead programs in countering violent extremism in the Sahel.
U.S. Africa Command cooperates with the British in their efforts to
develop the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, and, through
MARFORAF, also supports the Security Sector Reform program to mentor
and develop the new Armed Forces of Liberia.
We have seen significant progress in Liberia during its transition
to peace and stability following a 14-year civil war. The Armed Forces
of Liberia are completing basic training of their new 2,000 soldier
army, but the work here is far from finished. We must continue to
provide adequate IMET for officer and non-commissioned officer
development, and we must provide additional FMF and Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) funding if we are to sustain the SSR program,
military-to-military engagements, and develop the Liberian Coast Guard.
Additionally, the other security sector elements, police and judiciary,
will need significant assistance if they are to successfully replace
the departing U.N. Police Units and improve their legal system. In
recognition of the pending U.N. withdrawal, Liberia was our number one
Security and Stabilization Assistance request for West Africa in fiscal
year 2008. DOS requested funds to support the restructuring of the
Liberian National Police. Security Sector Reform, supported by IMET and
FMF along with persistent and sustained engagement are essential if we
are to secure the gains made in establishing peace and security--the
essential foundation for national reconstruction and economic
development.
In Ghana, the professionalism of its armed forces demonstrated
during the December 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections is to
be noted. The planning, coordination, and exercises conducted with the
Ghana Police and other security forces during the run up to the
election were critical to its success. While there were a few instances
of election related violence, the security forces quickly and
professionally restored order. While domestic security is a police task
in Ghana, the military is tasked to provide support when requested, and
their recent performance was a positive example of what we intend to
support when we work with a partner as they seek to professionalize
their military forces. Ghana provides a clear example of an African
military force respecting and supporting civil authority.
NAVAF's focus on security cooperation activities in this and the
Central Region has been through its key initiative, Africa Partnership
Station (APS). In recognition of this important effort, both the
Senegalese Minister of Defense and the U.S Ambassador attended the
opening meeting of the APS-hosted Oil Spill Prevention Workshop in
Senegal. In Liberia, 15 U.S. marines along with 5 soldiers from USARAF
and a U.S. Navy corpsman are working with the new, U.S.-trained Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL). They are training 350 AFL members on basic
officer and noncommissioned officer leadership, logistics and vehicle
safety, martial arts, and nonlethal weapons and riot control
procedures. Other U.S. Marines, along with their Spanish and Portuguese
counterparts, are in Ghana providing similar training there. Our
African partners see APS as a successful maritime initiative and are
eager to participate and improve this valuable program.
Also in the maritime domain, joint Law Enforcement Detachment
operations were conducted to enforce maritime law within the Cape Verde
waters in 2008. This was done with support of the host nation, our
State Department, the French Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. In 2009, we
hope to continue to build these capabilities with other interested
countries, such as Senegal.
Additionally, MARFORAF conducted the bilateral exercise Shared
Accord in Ghana in June 2008. This annual U.S. and West African
exercise focuses on small-unit infantry tactics, staff training, and
HA. In July 2008, exercise Africa Endeavor 08 in Nigeria improved
communications and information systems interoperability between U.S.
and African partner nation militaries. Exercise Medflag 08, a joint
medical exercise with the Malian Armed Forces that included HA to the
Malian people, was conducted during July in Mali.
Throughout 2008, MARFORAF African Logistics Initiative events
provided Senegal, Ghana, and Liberia with an array of logistics
training. In May 2008, MARFORAF Intelligence conducted the Military
Intelligence Basic Officers Course for Africa. MARFORAF also provided
military mentors in support of the ACOTA program and expanded military-
to-military programs in Senegal and Ghana
One of AFAFRICA's key programs for all of West Africa is the Air
Domain Safety and Security program. The Air Domain Safety and Security
program is a long-term, steady-state, general purpose Air Force Program
of Record. Utilizing general purpose air forces, AFAFRICA is working
together with interagency and host nation representatives to enhance
the safety and security capacity of civil and military air domains
comprising four mutually supporting elements of infrastructure,
personnel, situational awareness, and response.
Additionally, AFAFRICA supports an exercise program that included
Shared Accord 08 in Ghana and Liberia. One of the highlights of Shared
Accord 08 was the treatment of 2,323 pediatric, 961 optometry, 558
dental care, and 2,686 adult care patients. AFAFRICA also participated
in MEDCAP, DENTCAP, and Civil Affairs outreach projects in Ghana in
February 2008. Over 758 dental screenings with 361 patients receiving
treatments and 666 child preventative dentistry screenings were
conducted.
Central Africa
The Central Region is rich in natural resources. However, resource
wealth has brought corruption and the misuse of government funds, which
in turn can lead to weakened government institutions, and thereby
hinder growth and prosperity.
Active rebel movements persist in the DRC, Burundi, Chad, and the
Central African Republic. Despite years of efforts for a negotiated
settlement in Northern Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army, operating
out of Eastern DRC, threatens the subregion. Additional areas of
concern include movement of transnational terrorist organizations and
drugs, as well as the flow of refugees, IDPs, and arms from conflict
zones.
The DRC, due to its immense size and strategic location, is a focus
of effort because instability there has wider regional implications. An
OSC was opened in DRC in the fall of 2008 to manage and coordinate
growing theater security cooperation activities. One of our security
cooperation focus areas is the Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies, which works to develop a viable and transparent military
judicial system. We have a great deal of work ahead of us in DRC, and
we are taking steps to address the security issues of this important
region.
Regarding other U.S. Africa Command efforts in the Central Region,
MARFORAF is expanding military-to-military programs in Cameroon.
Likewise, AFAFRICA has been instrumental during the initial planning
for Exercise Africa Endeavor 2009, which will bring together 37
countries and 2 international organizations in Cameroon, Gabon, and
Senegal.
In 2008, APS featured the successful deployments of U.S.S. Fort
McHenry and HSV-2 Swift with an international staff comprised of
representatives from 10 countries (United States, United Kingdom,
France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Gabon and
Cameroon) that engaged 14 West and Central Africa countries, conducted
35 port visits, and engaged more than 1700 African maritime
professionals in courses custom-tailored to each nation's maritime
governance needs. In 2009, the centerpiece of APS engagement is the
deployment of U.S.S. Nashville. France, United Kingdom, Germany,
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Nigeria and
Ghana are providing staff members and training teams, complemented by
participation or support from the U.S. Coast Guard, embarked Department
of State Political Advisors (POLADS), and other governmental and
nongovernmental organizations.
MARFORAF also supported the 2008 APS deployment aboard the U.S.S.
Fort McHenry. Throughout the APS deployment, U.S. and Spanish Marines
conducted noncommissioned officer leadership training with African
military personnel from Liberia, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria Cameroon,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe.
The Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) Project serves as
another excellent example of interagency coordination. RMAC provides
awareness of maritime threats to the Coast Guard of Sao Tome and
Principe. This project has become the catalyst for other assistance,
including U.S. Navy Seabee construction of a pier next to the RMAC
facility, U.S. Navy mapping of the port, Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies assistance in developing maritime laws, and
U.S. Treasury Department and Customs assistance in developing laws
against money laundering.
East Africa
East Africa includes the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region,
portions of both the Swahili Coast and Mozambique Channel, and regional
island nations. Kenya is returning to stability and economic growth
following the aftermath of the post-election turmoil of December 2007.
Ethiopia, host of the AU and a key U.S. Government CT partner, faces an
unresolved border dispute with Eritrea and continues to conduct counter
insurgency campaigns in the Ogaden. Situations in Sudan and Somalia
destabilize the entire region. The Government of Sudan has been
implicated in genocide in Darfur and continues to pose a threat to the
Government of Southern Sudan despite the conclusion of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) following 20 years of civil war.
Somalia, a weakly governed state, provides a haven for extremists and a
base for piracy operations. However, we are fortunate amongst the
problems of this area, to have a solid and reliable partnership with
Djibouti. With accepted presence and mature relationships, Djibouti is
invaluable as we conduct our Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
activities with our African partners. A stable friend in a fragile
region, Djibouti provides the only enduring U.S. military
infrastructure in Africa.
In recent years, incidents of piracy on the high seas off the coast
of Somalia have received global attention. In 2008, over 120 attacks
occurred off Somalia, which has a long and sparsely populated coast
that poses challenges to international counter-piracy operations.
Approximately 10 percent of the world's shipping passes through the
Gulf of Aden or into and out of the Red Sea. While most of the
incidents here have occurred in the eastern Gulf, pirates have struck
as far as 450 nautical miles off the Horn of Africa. Crew abductions
are common, and ransoms are generally paid within a month of capture.
The average ransom has tripled since 2007--as has the number of ships
seized.
To address regional instability, the U.S. Government, with U.S.
Africa Command's support, is leading an international community effort
to conduct an effective Security Sector Reform program for Southern
Sudan. The goal of U.S. Africa Command's support to the Sudanese
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is to professionalize their
army and increase their defensive capabilities. These improvements are
intended to help facilitate implementation of the requirements of the
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Also, our Air Force component
continues to provide transport support to peacekeeping forces destined
for Darfur.
Despite the security and humanitarian challenges facing East
Africa, our military-to-military professionalization efforts,
bilaterally and through our support to ACOTA, have enabled Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and soon Tanzania to contribute to
peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere. Also, USARAF
will conduct a multilateral, regional, disaster relief exercise with
Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (Natural Fire) in 2009.
Increasing the capabilities of our partner nations allows them to
address instability and the enabling effects it has on piracy and
violent extremism.
Additionally in East Africa, and as part of our overall
professionalization efforts, U.S. Africa Command works with partners to
promote stability and security through support to professional schools.
Five U.S. military instructors currently teach and assist in curriculum
development for Ethiopian senior officers at the Ethiopian Defense
Command and Staff College. In Kenya, we are supporting Kenyan efforts
to develop a professional NCO corps. In Uganda, CJTF-HOA provides 12
instructors for their NCO Academy, as well as guest lecturers at the
command and staff college in Jinja.
CJTF-HOA conducts security cooperation programs throughout the Horn
of Africa, East Africa, and the regional islands. The CJTF focuses its
operations on building regional and bilateral security capacity to
combat terrorism, deny safe havens and material assistance support to
terrorist activity, and prepare for other challenges such as natural
and manmade disasters. The effect of CJTF-HOA is maximized by close
coordination with our OSCs, coalition members, partner countries, other
U.S. Government agencies, and NGOs operating in the region.
Military-to-military engagement is the foundation of building
security capacity in the East African Region. CJTF-HOA military-to-
military activities includes Staff Officer and NCO mentoring, ACOTA
mentors, counterterrorism training, Peace Support Operations, Maritime
Engagement Team activities, disaster response, and Standard Operating
Procedures development. CJTF-HOA invests in regional institutions to
ensure Africans are on the leading edge of solving their own
challenges.
Civil-military activity and development are also pathways to
security capacity building for CJTF-HOA. The presence of Civil Affairs
(CA) teams in the region help partner nations improve their civil-
military relations with local communities. These teams provide CJTF-HOA
the ability to access high risk areas, thereby helping advance U.S.
Government and host nation development priorities. In coordination with
USAID and DOS, civil affairs activities help mitigate the stresses that
contribute to regional instability.
CJTF-HOA is a model for multinational and interagency
collaboration, and its presence in the region is critical to
accomplishing U.S. Africa Command's mission.
Southern Africa
With the exception of Zimbabwe, the southern African countries are
relatively stable but face significant challenges in improving living
standards, reducing government corruption, and developing strong
democratic systems. The political and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe
has had spillover effects on the region, with refugees and disease
moving across borders. While HIV/AIDS afflict the entire continent,
Southern Africa has the highest infection rates in the world. Security
forces across this region are compromised by the disease, which reduces
their ability to conduct operations.
Additionally, with the exception of South Africa, coastal countries
here lack the ability to monitor and control their territorial waters.
As a result, the region is vulnerable to illicit trafficking and
continues to lose important economic resources through illegal fishing.
Despite these regional challenges, South Africa remains the
economic powerhouse of Sub-Saharan Africa, producing over 40 percent of
the subcontinent's gross domestic product and exporting strategic
minerals throughout the world. South Africa's contributions to Africa's
stability are not only economic; its professional and capable military
provides over 3,000 soldiers to U.N. and AU missions. U.S. Africa
Command is developing a growing and improving relationship with the
South African National Defense Force (SANDF). We had a productive pre-
planning meeting with SANDF in November 2008 as we worked together to
prepare for the upcoming U.S.-South Africa Defense Committee meetings
scheduled for this summer. We look forward to co-chairing the military
relations working group with SANDF during these bilateral Defense
Committee meetings. In addition, NAVAF completed staff talks in
February 2009, and we have a Medflag scheduled by USARAF in Swaziland
for this year.
Botswana is also one of Africa's success stories, rising from one
of the world's poorest countries at independence to middle income
status, and it recently celebrated 40 years of uninterrupted democratic
governance. Botswana's military is professional and capable, but
remains focused on potential regional instability that may arise from
the collapse of the Zimbabwe Government. Namibia and Malawi also
contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and states such as
Mozambique and Swaziland have also expressed an interest in
contributing forces to U.N. peacekeeping operations. At the request of
the Chief of Staff of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), Colonel Martha
McSally, my Joint Operations Center Chief, has been assisting the BDF
for 18 months as they integrated the first female officers into their
force. She has led seminars for senior BDF leaders on good order,
discipline, and professionalism in a male-female integrated military,
and has also conducted seminars in Swaziland and Lesotho.
Advancing the U.S.-South Africa relationship and expanding military
cooperation to focus on regional and continental security challenges is
extremely important. NAVAF, expanding its maritime safety and security
(MSS) program, deployed the U.S. aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore
Roosevelt to South Africa this past year in an historic visit--the
first U.S carrier visit since the end of apartheid.
u.s africa command component and subordinate commands
U.S. Africa Command is comprised of four component commands, one
subunified command, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
The Service components currently have no assigned forces and rely on
forces provided through the Global Force Management and Request for
Forces system.
U.S. Army Africa
In January 2009, U.S. Africa Command gained operational control of
U.S Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF), which now, as U.S. Army
Africa (USARAF), serves as U.S. Africa Command's Army component.
USARAF, in concert with national and international partners, conducts
sustained security engagement with African land forces to promote
peace, stability, and security in Africa. As directed, USARAF deploys
as a contingency headquarters in support of crisis response. USARAF is
currently manned at 67 percent of its approved personnel strength for
military and civilian positions, with 244 of its 318 military positions
and 44 of 110 civilian positions filled. USARAF capabilities center on
planning, directing, and providing oversight of security cooperation
activities and stability operations.
Recognizing the Army's important contribution to U.S. Africa
Command's Theater Strategy, USARAF continues to execute engagement and
exercise programs on a bilateral, multi-lateral, and regional basis.
These programs are designed to help our African partners develop
capable security forces that respect the rule of law, abide by human
rights norms, are accountable to legitimate civilian authorities, and
contribute to internal security and external peace operations.
U.S. Naval Forces, Africa
U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) primary mission is to improve the
MSS capability and capacity of our African partners. Beyond APS, law
enforcement operations, and TSC activities mentioned earlier, NAVAF is
working to enhance MSS by focusing on the development of maritime
domain awareness, trained professionals, maritime infrastructure, and
response capabilities.
A critical aspect of MSS is awareness of activities occurring in
the maritime environment. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) provides
participating states the capability to network maritime detection and
identification information with appropriate national defense and law
enforcement agencies. A widely accepted first step in achieving MDA is
installation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS is
similar to the U.S. Federal Aviation Association system for aircraft
identification. Although AIS is used around the globe, the data has not
been widely shared to date. In response to NAVAF initiatives, 18
nations in Africa now share unclassified AIS data through the Maritime
Safety and Security Information System.
Partnering with our Reserve components, NAVAF is assigning Maritime
Assistance Officers (MAOs) to U.S. embassies. MAOs assist country teams
in planning for maritime security cooperation activities. They provide
insight into maritime culture, attitudes, and capacity--all of which
are necessary for understanding where we can best assist each country
in building MSS.
U.S. Air Forces, Africa
U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA) is the Air Force component to
U.S. Africa Command. Its mission is to command and control air forces
to conduct sustained security engagement and operations to promote air
safety, security, and development.
AFAFRICA was activated at Ramstein Air Base, Germany on 1 October
2008. AFAFRICA is administratively assigned to the United States Air
Forces Europe for organize, train, and equip (Title 10) support.
However, AFAFRICA reports directly to U.S. Africa Command for
operational taskings and support, and will be organized into an Air
Force Forces staff and the 617th Air and Space Operations Center.
AFAFRICA's current command and control center was established on 1
October 2008 to provide a continuous command and control capability for
all theater security cooperation exercise and engagement activities as
well as ongoing crisis response contingencies such as foreign HA, non-
combatant evacuation operations, and humanitarian relief operations.
Ultimately, this capability will evolve into a tailored air operation
center, the 617th Air and Space Operations Center. Scheduled to reach
full capability in October 2009, the 617th will be the lead command and
control organization for air and space operations and will provide a
common operating picture of all air missions within the AOR.
AFAFRICA's total force partnership coupled with an increased
reliance on technologies and reach-back assets from Headquarters Air
Force and lead major commands will ensure AFAFRICA is prepared for the
challenges ahead.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) was established on 1
October 2008. MARFORAF is currently colocated with U.S. Marine Corps
Forces, Europe, in Stuttgart, Germany. One dual-hatted Marine Corps
general officer commands both organizations. The two Marine staffs, in
addition to sharing facilities, also share common administrative
support elements.
MARFORAF has assumed duties for the conduct of operations,
exercises, training, and security cooperation activities in the U.S.
Africa Command AOR. The preponderance of the Marine Corps' recent
activity has been in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. With the
establishment of U.S. Africa Command, MARFORAF is planning to expand
its activities into other regions of Africa and execute more than sixty
engagement events in fiscal year 2009.
U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa
On 1 October 2008, U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa
(SOCAFRICA) was established as U.S. Africa Command's Theater Special
Operations Command--a functional, sub-unified special operations
command for Africa. SOCAFRICA contributes to U.S. Africa Command's
mission through the application of the full spectrum of special
operations forces capabilities including civil affairs, information
operations, TSC, crisis response, and campaign planning.
In fiscal year 2009, SOCAFRICA plans to conduct 44 engagement
events with 13 countries in Africa. In addition to Joint Combined
Exchange Training and bilateral training, SOCAFRICA will supplement its
efforts by bringing senior officers and civil authorities from partner
nations together to attend seminars and courses to promote exchanges
about military aspects of good governance. In fiscal year 2009,
SOCAFRICA's information operations and civil affairs activities will
focus on eroding popular support for violent extremist organizations--
particularly in countries located within the Horn of Africa, Trans-
Sahara, and Central Region.
Combined Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa
Since conception in 2002, CJTF-HOA's mission has migrated to
building security capacity through cooperative conflict prevention.
During this time, the country of Djibouti has become increasingly
important in terms of significance to the U.S. military due to its
strategic location. Our enduring presence at Djibouti helps build
relationships which are the strongest mechanism for furthering U.S.
objectives on the continent.
Responding to the expressed desires of African states, CJTF-HOA
focuses its efforts with regional militaries on building state and
regional security capacity. Regional security cooperation is fostered
through coalition efforts with member countries of the East African
Standby Force (EASF) (We do not provide direct support to the EASF; we
have bilateral relationships with EASF participating member countries),
International Peace Support Training Center, and the International Mine
Action Training Center--along with Liaison Officer support for ACOTA
training. CJTF-HOA seeks to improve East Africa Maritime Security and
Safety through the expansion of maritime domain awareness and
implementation of an African Partnership Station East. Working with
Partner Countries to develop a professional officer and NCO corps is a
foundational element of CJTF-HOA capacity building. Professional
Military Education development through engagements at Command and Staff
Colleges and various Senior Leader Engagements support
professionalization of militaries, and assist other U.S. Government
agencies in helping partner states diminish the underlying conditions
that extremists seek to exploit.
All of these efforts and activities provide collaborative
opportunities for CJTF-HOA to better understand cultural dynamics and
tailor programming and projects that support partner militaries while
enhancing long-term security capacity building.
theater investment needs
Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements
U.S. Africa Command infrastructure and posture requirements are in
two major areas: headquarters establishment, and theater operational
support. The command's posture plan and facilities master plan are
built around these two requirements.
Infrastructure: Headquarters establishment
For the foreseeable future, our headquarters will remain at
Stuttgart. For the next 5 years, operational factors will be paramount,
and we will benefit from the stability of staying in one location where
we can polish our operational processes, cement relationships with our
partners on and off the continent, and consolidate our gains.
Posture: Theater operational support
U.S. Africa Command seeks to posture itself via its Theater Posture
Plan in a manner that enhances its peacetime mission, ensures access
throughout the AOR, and facilitates the conduct of contingency or
crisis response operations. The command's posture will support U.S.
Africa Command's efforts to integrate and synchronize its theater
engagement activities with the rest of the U.S. Government and key
international partners.
Forward Operating Site (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations
(CSL) in U.S. Africa Command's AOR
The command's two FOSs are Ascension Island (United Kingdom) and
Camp Lemonier (Djibouti). Ascension Island, a major logistic node for
the United Kingdom, is a newly identified node for U.S. Transportation
Command in support of Africa Command.
Camp Lemonier is the enduring primary support location for East
Africa, and is an identified FOS. As U.S. Africa Command matures, Camp
Lemonier remains essential to supporting long-term TSC efforts and
establishing strong and enduring regional relationships. Camp Lemonier
and CJTF-HOA operations have largely been resourced from the global war
on terror emergency supplemental appropriations to establish
expeditionary infrastructure and achieve operational needs. Current and
programmed projects are an integral part of the Camp's installation
master plan. These projects are necessary to support sustained security
engagement activities and their supporting units. Camp Lemonier is a
critical part of supporting and developing regional African capability
and capacity.
Also key to operational support is U.S Africa Command's Adaptive
Logistics Network (ALN) approach to logistics on the continent. Our
goal with ALN is to develop a flexible network of logistics
capabilities that has ability to respond to logistic demands. The heart
of the ALN will be comprehensive, real-time knowledge of available
logistic capabilities and capacities across the continent of Africa.
ALN will be the key to integrate the distributed network of FOS and
CSL.
En-Route Infrastructure outside U.S. Africa Command's AOR
In addition to the facilities mentioned above inside our AOR, U.S.
Africa Command has identified the main operating bases in Rota (Spain),
Sigonella (Italy), and the CSL Cairo West as important logistic support
facilities. Although these sites are located in other geographic
combatant command areas of responsibility, they are critical
intermediate nodes for logistics coming in and out of our AOR.
Transportation Command requires these facilities to support U.S. Africa
Command.
Quality of Life Programs
Africa Command's Quality of Life (QoL) investments affirm our
commitment to our team members and their families. Their sacrifices
deserve our total dedication. The foundation for our success will be
derived from the strength of our families. The command is committed to
providing a strong, supportive environment which fosters growth and
excellence, while providing the highest quality of resources and
services to our Africa Command family.
The command has created a QoL office to manage and oversee QoL
activities both in the headquarters location and on the African
continent. This office will continuously assess the theater-wide
environment in order to identify emerging and unusually sensitive QoL
issues. Additionally, it will serve as an advocate for the well-being
of our team members and families on the continent. Providing for our
service members and their families living on the continent of Africa
and at other European locations remain a high priority for the Command.
In March 2008, we held our first Africa Command Families on the
African Continent meeting to address issues facing families living in
Africa, followed by a second meeting in February 2009. This will be an
annual forum where we can address emerging issues and develop our QoL
Action Plan. This will be particularly important as we incorporate
CJTF-HOA and its mission. We must ensure that the quality of life for
service and family members supporting CJTF-HOA meets their needs as
U.S. Africa Command continues to develop. Our goal working with
Department of Defense Education Activity and the Department of Defense
Dependent Schools--Europe is to provide every student with an
opportunity for a quality education.
To assist our team members and their families in solving problems
resulting from deployment, reunions, and other family changes, U.S.
Africa Command is implementing the Military and Family Life Consultant
Program to support both the command headquarters and the African
continent. The program has obtained funding for fiscal year 2009 which
will provide licensed social workers and psychologists to the
embassies, ensuring services are available as needed.
We must ensure that quality of life for our serving members--
wherever they are posted--remains a priority and is funded properly.
u.s. africa command interagency initiatives
We multiply effects and achieve greater results when we work
closely with our U.S. Government interagency partners. Having
interagency personnel imbedded in our command enhances our planning and
coordination, and the MOU signed between U.S. Africa Command and USAID
in Morocco is a model we hope to replicate throughout our AOR. Also,
the flexibility provided through partner capacity building programs
enabled us to react quickly to provide security enhancing activities
and support to U.S. Embassy plans and operations.
Building Partner Capacity
Partner capacity building programs have provided important tools
for addressing emerging threats. We were able to put these funds to
good use in assisting our partners in Africa in fiscal year 2008, and
sought greater funding--in one case twice the previous years amount--
for fiscal year 2009.
Our previously mentioned contribution to a U.S. Embassy's program
for ``Mitigating the factors of youth disaffection and
marginalization'' is a wise use of capacity building funds in an
interagency fashion that best meets U.S. strategic, security, and
foreign policy objectives. This program will reduce disaffected youths'
exposure to extremist ideologies as well as the recruiters often found
in prisons and elsewhere.
Likewise, use of partner capacity building funds in Liberia is
intended to develop police force capabilities to maintain security and
stability following the pending departure of U.N. police units. Support
to U.S. Government security sector reform and rule of law activities is
particularly important across the continent since personal security and
stability provides the foundation for constructive economic
development, and this development serves the interests of all the
peoples of Africa.
Support for Regional Programs
Many of the security and stability challenges on the continent are
transnational in nature and require regional, rather than national
responses. For example, seasonal droughts and floods usually affect
multiple countries and require regionally-based responses. Programs
such as the USAID's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) provide valuable
data enabling improved preventive and response activities on the part
of both civilian agencies and the U.S. military. FEWS and other
regional programs, including various conflict early warning initiatives
led by other U.S. Government agencies, demonstrate the advantages of a
holistic approach to the problems of Africa.
Foreign language skill, cultural awareness, and regional
proficiency are core competencies for U.S. Africa Command. The many
bilateral and multilateral relationships that U.S. Africa Command
maintains as we work with our partners depend on the language skills,
advanced cultural awareness, and regional expertise of our forces.
Effective interaction with regional partner's governments, militaries,
and populations demands a robust ability to communicate on a face-to-
face level. Growing and enhancing these language and cultural
capabilities is vital for U.S. Africa Command.
conclusion
Today United States Africa Command is serving effectively in
support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives in
Africa. As the newest unified command and the DOD's single focal point
for activities in this important region, we are implementing the
visionary concept of an integrated command, with key interagency
personnel included in our organizational structure, to advance
collaboration between DOD and other U.S. Government agencies to build
greater security with our African partners.
Our priority remains the delivery of effective and sustained
security cooperation programs designed to build African security
capacity. Long-term security and stability in Africa is dependent on
our partners' ability to address their own challenges, so that they can
take action not only against security threats, but also to conduct
regional humanitarian operations.
In this effort, the importance of our interagency partners cannot
be overstated. Diplomacy, development, and defense all require time,
funding, and people if we are to meet our obligations successfully.
Your support to U.S. Africa Command, as well as to our interagency
partners, is critical to our collective ability to meet our national
objectives.
It is my honor to serve with the uniformed men and women, our DOD
civilian employees, as well as our interagency partners who have made
U.S. Africa Command a functioning reality in a very short time. Your
sustained support will allow their good work to continue in service of
our country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Ward.
General McNabb.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McNabb. Chairman Levin and distinguished members of
the committee, it is indeed my privilege to be with you today
representing the men and women of TRANSCOM, more than 136,000
of the world's finest logistics professionals. This total force
team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, contractors, and
commercial partners enables the combatant commanders such as
General Ward, General Renuart, and Admiral Stavridis to succeed
anywhere in the world by providing them unmatched strategic
lift and end to end global distribution.
This committee is well aware that it is our great people
that get it done. It is our logistics professionals, using
newly developed supply routes through the Northern Distribution
Network, supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Senator Levin
and Senator McCain, you both asked me about that and I look
forward to going over that with you.
It is our total force air crews flying combat approaches on
night vision goggles or air dropping supplies to our troops in
Afghanistan. It is our air refueling crews delivering 5 million
pounds of fuel every day and night, extending the reach of our
joint force and coalition partners. With maintenance teams
behind them, these crews execute more than 900 sorties a day.
That's a takeoff and landing every 90 seconds, sometimes in the
most austere places like Antarctica or the most dangerous, like
a forward operating base under fire in Afghanistan.
It is our merchant mariners and military and civilian port
operators loading, offloading, and sailing more than 35 ships
every day in support of the warfighter. It is our terminal
operators moving thousands of containers, domestic freight and
railcar shipments, pushing warfighters and their vital supplies
to the fight. It is our contingency response groups and port
opening experts arriving first to open up the flow in
contingency or disaster relief operations in support of the
combatant commanders.
It is our commercial airlift and sealift partners standing
beside us, opening new avenues of supply into Afghanistan or
supporting the Nation in times of surge. it is our medical
crews and critical care teams tending to our wounded warriors,
rapidly delivering them from the battlefield to the finest,
world-class care on the planet, saving lives and families at
the same time. It is our crews bringing back fallen comrades,
transporting heroes dressed in our Nation's colors, Americans
returning with dignity to our country which owes them so much.
It is this logistics team, working from home and abroad,
that gives our Nation unrivaled global reach, committed to
serving our Nation's warfighters by delivering the right stuff
to the right place at the right time. Whether sustaining the
fight, providing disaster relief to friends in need, or moving
six brigades simultaneously, we are there.
Chairman Levin, your support and the support of this
committee has been instrumental in providing the resources our
team needs to win, and I thank you. You have given us the Large
Medium-Speed Rollon-Rolloff ships and supported upgrades to our
Ready Reserve Fleet, all of which have been key to our success
over the last 7 years, and the new joint high-speed vessels
will give us even greater flexibility.
The C-130J and the C-17 have come of age since September 11
and have allowed us to change how we support the combatant
commanders by air. The current C-5, C-130, and KC-10
modernization programs will also make an enormous difference in
our capability and reliability to support the warfighter.
My top priority remains the recapitalization of our aging
tanker fleet. The KCX will be a game-changer. Its value as a
tanker will be tremendous. Its value as a multi-role platform
to the mobility enterprise will be incomparable. It will do for
the whole mobility world what the C-17 did for theater and
strategic airlift. It will be an ultimate mobility force
multiplier.
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, I'm grateful to you and the
committee for inviting me to appear before you today. I
respectfully request my written testimony be submitted for the
record and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McNabb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF
introducing the united states transportation command
Mission/Organization
The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) operates the
integrated, networked end-to-end distribution system that delivers to
the ``right place,'' at the ``right time,'' for the warfighter and at
the best value for our Nation. As a supporting command, we execute
military and commercial transportation, terminal management, aerial
refueling and global patient movement throughout the Defense
Transportation System (DTS) in a wide range of military and
humanitarian operations. As a combatant command, we have operational
warfighter requirements. As the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) we
have business and logistics enterprise responsibilities.
USTRANSCOM leads a committed Total Force team of Active Duty,
Guard, Reserve, Civilian, contractors and commercial partners. Our
component commands--the Army's Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC)
and the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC)--and our enterprise
partners provide the capacity to deliver logistics and distribution
capability that supports the Joint Force Commanders' ability to project
combat power and national power in peace and war.
Additionally, as the DPO, USTRANSCOM leads a collaborative effort
within the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to
deliver innovative and cost-efficient solutions to increase the
precision, velocity, reliability and visibility of our distribution
network and the overall Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain.
supporting global operations
In support of our warfighters across the globe our components have
delivered those ``right place,'' ``right time'' ``best value''
solutions in staggering quantities. Last year, AMC and our commercial
partners moved more than 2 million passengers and 735,000 short tons
(stons) of cargo, and our aging tanker aircraft delivered 229 million
gallons of fuel to U.S. and coalition aircraft. Equally impressive, MSC
shipped 6.8 million square feet and SDDC moved 3 million stons of cargo
worldwide. Finally, to support global DOD requirements, MSC's point-to-
point tankers delivered 1.47 billion gallons of fuel. Each of our
components individually possesses a tremendous capability. USTRANSCOM
ties these capabilities together using intermodal solutions to maximize
efficiency and best support the combatant commanders (COCOMs).
Support to United States Central Command
USTRANSCOM continued its focus on supporting operations in the
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).
This year, establishing the Northern Distribution Network (NDN),
alternative routes to Afghanistan through the Caucasus and Central
Asia, has become a high priority. And we have made significant progress
in partnership with the Department of State, DOD, USCENTCOM, U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) to
establish these new routes. The NDN--along the historic Silk Road--will
leverage the existing commercial distribution networks to move non-
military commercial cargo using our U.S. Flag commercial carriers. The
NDN also provides additional cargo throughput capabilities vital to
support the increasing forces in Afghanistan.
Another top priority is working Gulf of Aden piracy issues with our
commercial shipping partners. Recognizing that significant interagency
and multinational actions are underway to address this growing problem,
we held discussions with U.S. commercial carriers servicing DOD sealift
transportation requirements to solicit their concerns. In collaboration
with the Maritime Administration, USTRANSCOM served as a conduit to
enable U.S. Flag carriers to develop tactics, techniques and procedures
to minimize the piracy risk.
In direct support of USCENTCOM force flow, we deployed and
redeployed 41 Brigade Combat Teams, 37,000 Air Expeditionary Forces,
and 3 Marine Air Ground Task Forces and executed several short fuse
deployments such as the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit to Afghanistan.
And to ensure warfighters in theater received the latest advances in
vehicle protection, we delivered over 11,000 mine-resistant ambush
protected vehicles and more than 8,300 improved vehicle armor kits. We
also airdropped 8,000 stons of cargo in Afghanistan. This widespread
use of our improved and precision airdrop capability is evidence of our
promise to the COCOMs that we will take the supply chain vertically and
as far forward as necessary to support them.
Support to Other Combatant Commands
The USEUCOM AOR was also very active. When Russia invaded Georgia,
USTRANSCOM moved Georgian troops serving in Iraq back to defend their
homeland. In less than 92 hours, AMC crews flew 14 C-17 missions, each
averaging 31-minutes on the ground in Tblisi to deliver 1,700 troops--
the entire Georgian First Brigade. Additional C-17 sorties delivered
over 350,000 humanitarian rations as part of Operation Assured
Delivery, providing hope and sustenance to the Georgian people.
As U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) grows and expands its mission,
USTRANSCOM will leverage our resources and expertise to support this
new command.
In the U.S. Southern Command AOR, we conducted detainee movement
operations from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At the same time, our defense
couriers transported attorney-client material in support of High Value
Detainee litigation. Elsewhere in the region, we provided air refueling
and aeromedical evacuation support for the repatriation of three U.S.
hostages rescued in Colombia and moved time-sensitive cargo for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in Haiti.
We supported USPACOM with force rotations and sustainment for
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, transporting more than 2,000
passengers and 2,300 stons and 63,000 square feet of cargo. In support
of the National Science Foundation, Operation Deep Freeze set records--
we airlifted over 6,400 stons of cargo and 5,400 passengers and
sealifted nearly 6 million gallons of fuel and 10,500 stons of cargo
into McMurdo Station, Antarctica.
Working closely with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), we
supported the engagement of an uncontrollable satellite with
operational planning and alert strategic airlift for potential recovery
and consequence management. We are also actively and uniquely involved
with USSTRATCOM in the cyber security challenges that are especially
evident in the strategic partnerships USTRANSCOM has with industry and
the logistics enterprise.
Finally, at home, we aided U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and
government agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
during catastrophic events. During the California wildfires we deployed
command and control, aerial firefighting, and evacuation elements to
reduce loss of life and property. During Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, we
provided defense support to civil authorities in Texas and Louisiana,
including air evacuation of 5,600 civilians and 1,000 patients.
Additionally, we are dedicated to providing deployment support for
USNORTHCOM's Consequence Management Response Force.
Support for the Warfighter
One of our most critical missions is moving injured warfighters
from the battlefield to world-class medical treatment facilities. This
complex, time-sensitive process requires close collaboration with
doctors, military hospitals and our aeromedical evacuation crews to
move injured personnel at exactly the right time to the right place. In
2008, we transported over 7,800 patients from the USCENTCOM AOR and
over 13,000 patients globally. Should a warfighter perish in the
defense of our Nation, we ensure the most dignified transport from the
battlefield to final destination.
Our support to the warfighter also includes improving quality of
life at home. The Defense Personal Property Program improves household
goods shipments by allowing personnel to evaluate transportation
service providers online, obtain counseling via the web and file
personal property claims directly with the provider. With over 329,000
personnel and their families and 1.5 billion pounds of household goods
moving each year, USTRANSCOM has maintained a sharp focus on this
program and its associated IT system, the Defense Personnel Property
System (DPS). DPS successfully came online in November 2008 at 18 DOD
locations, and will be available for all 136 DOD shipping offices
beginning in March 2009.
Improving Global Joint Sourcing Solutions
USTRANSCOM is always searching for ways to improve performance. We
recently established our Fusion Center to integrate planning and
operations, which allows more effective requirements management,
improves distribution pipeline visibility and fosters customer and
partner relationships. Key stakeholders are now able to collaborate on
decisions, resulting in synchronized, cost effective distribution
solutions.
As a result of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
process, USTRANSCOM began construction of our new building designed to
capitalize on efficiencies by colocating USTRANSCOM and component
command experts in close proximity to one another. This design will
enable USTRANSCOM, SDDC and some of the AMC and MSC staffs to work
side-by-side to resolve issues and formulate solutions from an
integrated, intermodal perspective. Additionally, the new facility will
include the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-Transportation (JIOC-
TRANS). By integrating operations and intelligence, we will further
improve mission execution by identifying and assessing threats to our
intermodal operations at seaports, airfields, and connecting surface
networks worldwide.
A further BRAC related effort is the Acquisition Center of
Excellence (ACE) which combines program management, common carrier
acquisitions and contract functions under one authority. The ACE better
positions USTRANSCOM to establish long-term national-level
transportation contracts with decreased overhead costs, build strategic
partnerships with multi-modal transportation and distribution service
providers, and manage command modernization efforts for more efficient
warfighter support.
Finally, USTRANSCOM created the Joint Distribution Process Analysis
Center (JDPAC), an entity which consolidates analysts from USTRANSCOM,
AMC and SDDC. Because of its significant analytical capabilities, we
envision it becoming the DOD's center of excellence for all joint
mobility deployment and distribution studies and analyses. JDPAC's
first major undertakings include oversight of the congressionally-
mandated study of the size and mix of the inter-theater airlift force
(conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses) and the Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which we co-lead
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These studies, expected to
be completed in 2009, will aid decision makers in determining the
mobility requirements necessary to defend the homeland, prevail in the
war on terror, conduct irregular warfare and win conventional campaigns
in the 2016 timeframe.
Maintaining Air Mobility Readiness
While we await the outcome of MCRS-16 to help shape future mobility
requirements, there is no doubt that some of our organic air mobility
force structure requires recapitalization.
My number one recapitalization priority is replacing the fleet of
415 Eisenhower-era KC-135s with a new platform to preserve a unique
asymmetric advantage for our Nation. The KC-X with multipoint refueling
allowing same sortie service to Air Force, Navy, Marine and coalition
aircraft will address the significant risk we are currently carrying in
air capacity and address further capability risks associated with an
airframe that is almost 50 years old--and will be over 80 years old by
the time we recapitalize all of them. The ability to carry cargo and
operate forward with defensive systems will be a game changer when the
aircraft is not needed as a tanker. Further delays in replacing this
aircraft will add significant risk to our ability to rapidly project
combat power to support the Nation and our allies. It is imperative to
expedite a smart, steady reinvestment program.
Our newest tanker, the KC-10, has also served us well since
entering service in 1981. We must continue to modernize the KC-10 fleet
to operate in the global airspace environment and to remain viable past
2040.
Our national defense strategy requires a viable fleet of strategic
airlift aircraft. The C-17 has proven itself a critical asset, offering
the flexibility to fill key tactical requirements in addition to
fulfilling its primary strategic airlift role.
Additionally, the C-5's outsized and oversized cargo capability is
essential to meeting our global mobility requirements. Unfortunately,
low departure reliability and mission capable rates continue to plague
the C-5 fleet. Modernizing all the C-5s with avionics upgrades is
essential to allow access to international airspace and foreign
airfields. New engines and other reliability enhancements for our C-5Bs
and two C-5Cs are necessary to increase aircraft availability, reduce
fuel consumption and significantly improve performance throughout their
projected service life. We will modernize the C-5 fleet while closely
managing the costs.
The C-130 continues to be the workhorse supporting the warfighter
in theater and will remain viable through acquisition of the C-130J and
modernization of legacy C-130s via the center wingbox replacement
program and avionics upgrades. However, the Air Force also needs the
flexibility to retire and replace aircraft at the end of their service
life.
The C-27 (JCA) is an emerging intra-theater asset that will provide
COCOMs and the Services an airlift capability to meet time sensitive/
mission critical movement requirements. DOD will leverage the JCA for
multi-use, alternating between direct support and general support to
maximize utility for the warfighter.
Our mobility aircraft routinely operate in threat areas across the
spectrum of conflict from humanitarian relief to combat resupply. To
operate safely in these environments, AMC continues to equip aircraft
with the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures system and will soon
begin developing other defensive systems to avoid radar-guided threats.
Operational Support Airlift (OSA) and Distinguished Visitor (DV)
transportation are other key components of the global mobility force.
Our senior leaders require time-critical, reliable airlift to carry out
their global missions, and require communications capability equal to
what they enjoy at their homestations. Therefore, in partnership with
the Joint Staff and the Services, we are implementing an airlift
information management system called the Joint Air Logistics
Information System--Next Generation (JALIS-NG). JALIS-NG will improve
visibility of high-priority OSA missions and DV passengers, thereby
more efficiently employing the OSA fleet. Additionally, we are
modernizing the executive aircraft fleet with the Senior Leader
Command, Control, and Communications System--Airborne (SLC3S-A) package
to significantly improve senior leader airborne communications.
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a critical partner in our
ability to rapidly project and sustain forces. We appreciate the
authorities granted in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 allowing the Department to guarantee minimum levels of
business to CRAF carriers. These authorities will help strengthen the
CRAF program as business in the DTS eventually returns to pre-September
11 levels. We will fulfill our congressionally-mandated
responsibilities to improve predictability of DOD charter requirements,
strengthen CRAF participation and entice carriers to use newer, more
fuel efficient aircraft as prerequisites to exercising these
authorities.
Maintaining Sealift Readiness
Like airlift, flexible, cost effective commercial ocean
transportation is vital to our National interests and is a critical
component of the DTS. DOD's ``Commercial First'' policy helps ensure
the U.S.-flagged maritime industry and pool of U.S.-citizen mariners
are available in time of national emergency.
DOD is among the largest single shippers of ocean cargo worldwide,
and in the past year alone spent nearly $1 billion on commercial
transportation. We acquire worldwide intermodal transportation services
in support of DOD and government agency requirements through the
Universal Service Contract (USC). USC leverages commercial service on
established trade routes and capitalizes upon existing commercial
investment in global infrastructure.
USTRANSCOM also partners with the U.S. Commercial Sealift Industry
through programs like the Maritime Security Program (MSP), Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) and Voluntary Tanker Agreement
(VTA) to gain critical access to U.S. commercial capabilities to
support DOD's force projection requirements in times of war or crisis.
We are working closely with the Maritime Administration to help
revitalize the VTA, and we support the Navy's program to replace four
T-5 tankers with two newly built commercial charters in 2010.
MSC and the Maritime Administration are also improving the
efficiency of surge sealift asset management for our organic fleet.
This year we made significant improvements to our strategic sealift
readiness posture by relocating three Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-
off vessels and two Fast Sealift Ships to the West Coast. Our analysis
indicated this move would improve our strategic sealift response
capabilities in the USPACOM AOR, mitigate shortfalls in the Army's
afloat prepositioning program and optimize sealift flexibility. MSC and
the Maritime Administration are also identifying and capturing best
practices for the activation, maintenance and operations of surge
sealift ships to more efficiently manage the fleet and ensure the
readiness of surge assets.
Finally, I urge Congress to continue support for the National
Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) and MSP--both are critical to improving our
sealift capacity for our warfighters. This past year, both the Maritime
Administration and MSC utilized NDSF resources to improve the
capability of roll-on/roll-off vessels in the Ready Reserve Force and
the VISA program. Newly upgraded ramps installed on two of these ships
increase ramp capacity, enabling loading of heavier vehicles and
providing flexibility to load or discharge cargo without regard to pier
configuration.
Maintaining Surface Readiness
Preserving and expanding infrastructure is the cornerstone of our
ability to project national power. USTRANSCOM uses the Global En Route
Infrastructure Steering Committee (GERISC) in combination with regional
steering committees to identify worldwide priority construction
projects. This year the committees recommended taxiway and ramp
improvements in Colombia, a new passenger terminal at Bagram Air Base
in Afghanistan and a fuel facility in Oman to improve global mobility
capacity and throughput as priority infrastructure projects.
The security of our forces and transportation infrastructure is
essential to accomplishing our global mission. Our Critical
Infrastructure Program (CIP) fosters information sharing with the DOD
and with the Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, and the
Transportation Security Administration. The CIP helps identify
worldwide physical and cyber infrastructures critical to USTRANSCOM's
global mobility mission and mitigates inherent vulnerabilities.
In addition to preserving and expanding global access, we continue
to look for ways to optimize our CONUS infrastructure. SDDC recently
completed and is implementing findings from Port Look 2008. This study
recommended retaining all nineteen currently designated strategic
seaports; designating Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the
commercial Port of Charleston as two separate, distinct strategic
seaports; planning for future increased capacity requirements on the
Gulf Coast and in Alaska; and institutionalizing future Port Look
studies on a recurring basis, synchronized with release of the
Quadrennial Defense Review.
Finally, we continue active participation in the capabilities-based
assessment of Sea Based operations for the 2015-2025 timeframe. The
success of Sea Basing depends on advances in at-sea cargo handling,
ship-to-ship cargo transfers with mitigation of motion effects through
sea state four and interface with high-speed connectors. The Joint High
Speed Vessel offers a promising capability to bridge the gap between
high-speed airlift and low-speed sealift, for transport of forces,
equipment and sustainment cargo as part of Sea Based operations.
leading the jdde transformation
Improvements in DOD Supply Chain Management
USTRANSCOM and our JDDE partners are working together to drive
tangible improvements in the DOD supply chain. By improving the
precision, velocity, reliability and visibility of distribution
operations, we gain the ability to synchronize and prioritize the flow
of forces and sustainment to support the warfighter across the full
range of military operations.
The supply chain needs to move people, equipment and supplies to
the right place, at the right time using the most efficient and
effective combination of modes. Our DPO Strategic Opportunities
initiative is designed to improve precision by examining and aligning
key strategic leverage points. Specifically, we are working to strike
the optimum balance between inventory stocks and transportation; align
supply, transportation and distribution processes; and optimize
strategic surface and airlift networks.
For example, given the volatility of fuel and transportation costs,
we are analyzing ways to minimize overall supply chain costs by
positioning high-demand, low-dollar inventories forward to reduce
transportation requirements. We are also examining the impact of
consolidating cargo traditionally carried in 20-foot containers into
40-foot containers to gain efficiencies in surface transportation while
maintaining ``delivery location pure'' pallets and containers where the
demand supports high volume routes. Finally, we are studying ways to
optimize air transportation by increasing pallet utilization, obtaining
``best-value capacity'' for the shipping volume, and achieving maximum
use of organic and commercially contracted airframes. Collectively,
these and other opportunities have the potential to improve
distribution performance by 25 to 45 percent while reducing overall
enterprise-level distribution costs.
USTRANSCOM will focus on velocity to rapidly move America's
military might. We are improving velocity by eliminating bottlenecks
and chokepoints identified across 200 Integrated Distribution Lanes
(IDLs) where we move people and cargo. Each IDL represents a route
along which assets travel and is broken down into supply,
transportation and theater segments. Each segment has associated
performance standards which represent the COCOM's desired expectations.
We improve velocity by optimizing mode and routing selection, and
monitoring performance against the standards for each IDL. As an
example, we have reduced transit times by as much as 35 days for
sustainment cargo shipped from the U.S. to Afghanistan.
USTRANSCOM is also focused on improving reliability--delivering
what is needed, when and where it is needed, the first time and every
time. Perhaps the best example of a system reliability improvement has
been the Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI). Over
the past year, DTCI has changed CONUS freight movement from disparate,
locally-managed processes to a more integrated, enterprise level
program, bringing proven best commercial practices to DOD
transportation. In partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
and the Services, we have contracted with a commercial transportation
services coordinator to manage the movement of eligible DOD CONUS
freight. Under DTCI, DOD shippers specify destination and deadline--the
contractor optimizes the shipments through load consolidation;
maximizes the use of cost effective, intermodal solutions; and
leverages lower commercial market rates. To date, the program's
performance goals for on-time pickup and delivery, minimal damage,
claims processing, small business participation, and cost savings/
avoidance are all on track. Gross cost savings is approaching $10
million (greater than 20 percent savings), and DTCI has increased
visibility of CONUS freight.
Replicating DTCI's visibility successes is particularly important.
USTRANSCOM designated 2008 as its ``Year of Visibility'' to strive for
exquisite visibility--knowing what is in the pipeline, where it is and
how fast it is moving.
A great example of this need occurred in Pakistan. The Pakistan
Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) were plagued by pilferage of
unit movement cargo. In response, we leveraged commercial technologies
to mount cellular and satellite tracking mechanisms on trucks and
inserted lift and intrusion detection sensor technology on containers
transiting the PAKGLOC. The resultant real time knowledge of cargo
location, speed and container breaches enhanced security and
significantly reduced pilferage.
To ensure continued visibility improvements, as DOD's lead
proponent for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and related
Automated Identification Technology (AIT), we have developed an AIT
implementation plan with the Services, DLA and other agencies to fully
incorporate AIT into our business processes. Although active RFID
continues to be the backbone of our efforts, we are also using
satellite technology in austere environments and are continuing to
expand use of emerging passive RFID technologies as a result of lessons
learned in the Alaska RFID Implementation project.
Improved visibility across the DOD supply chain is dependent on
transforming the enterprise information technology portfolio.
Historically, logistics IT systems have been managed and acquired as
Service-specific stand-alone systems. We have begun the process to
replace large, expensive point-to-point monolithic systems and
interfaces with streamlined, web-enabled enterprise level services. Our
goal is to deliver core DPO enterprise services to standardize common
distribution processes and information exchanges while allowing the
Services the flexibility to be unique where they need to be.
One example of this transformation is the Integrated Data
Environment (IDE)/Global Transportation Network (GTN) Convergence
program, an innovative IT program combining DLA's IDE information
broker and USTRANSCOM's Enterprise Data Warehouse capabilities. This
convergence will allow one-stop access to enterprise level supply,
transportation and logistics systems and data, eliminating
redundancies. Although in its infancy, the program will serve as an IT
backbone to provide data visibility and support the needs of the future
force.
One of the most important initiatives over the coming decade is
Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21). AT21 is an effort to
incorporate distribution industry best practices and processes using
commercial-off-the shelf tools and then transition workflow management,
optimization and scheduling solutions. This transition will improve
transportation planning, improve forecast accuracy and increase on-time
delivery of forces and supplies to COCOMs at a lower cost to the
Services. When fully operational, AT21 will provide the warfighter full
distribution pipeline visibility and enable throughput management at
critical ports and waypoints around the world.
Looking Ahead
We are continuously exploring new ways to support the future force.
Through our Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Technology research
and development program, we leverage emerging technologies to fix
distribution and sustainment issues. For example, using the Joint
Precision Airdrop System Mission Planner we have delivered over 3,300
stons of sustainment cargo to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom over the past year, significantly reducing ground recovery
operations and dangerous convoy operations. Additionally, the Node
Management and Deployable Depot (NoMaDD), an Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration, which provided material distribution and
inventory support during Hurricane Ike, processed nearly 4,000 trucks
of meals, water, ice, and plastic sheeting.
Last year, eight USTRANSCOM-funded projects transitioned to DOD
organizations. Building on this success, we will transition an Enroute
Care Module that will enhance patient care from the battlefield to
definitive care; work to improve shipboard handling systems to more
safely move cargo, vehicles and containers in high sea states; pursue
joint integrated solutions for mesh-network, tags and tracking
technologies to ensure end-to-end asset visibility; and develop a
collaborative Single Load Planning Capability. These representative
samples will greatly improve the precision, velocity, reliability, and
visibility of the DOD supply chain.
Fiscal Stewardship
USTRANSCOM is ever mindful of costs and constantly seeking cost
efficiencies. Since 2003, we and our enterprise partners have avoided
over $2 billion in costs through the aforementioned DPO improvements,
forward stocking initiatives, incorporating challenge protocols to
validate high-cost transportation requests and negotiating least-cost
transportation solutions.
Additionally, as the DOD's largest consumer of hydrocarbons, we
continue to pursue alternative fuels. AMC performed operational tests
and demonstrated the potential suitability of synthetic fuel blends in
the C-17, C-5, and KC-135 aircraft--next we will test synthetic fuels
in the C-130. These are early steps in a long term effort to
significantly reduce reliance on petroleum products.
final thoughts
USTRANSCOM is entrusted with an awesome responsibility to support,
mature, and transform the JDDE. We provide what our warfighters and
operators need to execute their mission--when they need it, where they
need it, at the best value for the Nation. From Tblisi, GA, to
Galveston, TX, our end-to-end distribution and logistics capability
allows us to deliver the message of our Nation's strength. Going
forward, USTRANSCOM and its components will continue providing
extraordinary capabilities for projecting national will across a wide
range of military and humanitarian operations. We are strategically
aligned to unify JDDE efforts for delivering value and saving money. I
am extremely proud of this championship team. The men and women of the
USTRANSCOM, together with our enterprise partners, will continue to
enhance logistics capabilities, focus resources, and deliver superior
support to warfighters and our Nation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. All the testimonies will be made
part of the record.
We'll have a first round of 7 minutes. First to you,
Admiral Stavridis. Secretary Gates in his testimony before this
committee in January expressed some real concern about
``Iranian subversive activity,'' in his words. He went on to
say that the Iranians are opening a lot of offices and a lot of
fronts, behind which they interfere in what is going on in some
Latin American countries.
Can you give us your assessment on Iranian intent and
activities? What is the attitude of governments in Latin
America relative to Iranian activities? Also, do you see any
connection between the Iranians and the drug trade?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. First of all, we have seen, as
Secretary Gates said, an increase in a wide level of activity
by the Iranian Government in this region, to include opening
five embassies in the last 5 years, beginning the work in
proselytizing and working with Islamic activities throughout
the region.
That is of concern principally because of the connections
between the Government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of
terrorism, and Hezbollah. We see a great deal of Hezbollah
activity throughout South America. The tri-border area in
Brazil, as in Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, as well as parts
of Brazil and in the Caribbean Basin, is of particular concern.
The known connection between the Government of Iran and
Hezbollah, and the increasing activities of Iran throughout the
region are a matter of concern for us, and I can provide
additional information for the record on that.
Chairman Levin. Any connection with the drug trade that
you've seen?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. We have seen in Colombia a direct
connection between Hezbollah activity and the narcotrafficking
activity. Again, I'd be glad to provide the specifics on that
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. Admiral, give us an up-to-date assessment
of the FARC in Colombia. As our security assistance to Colombia
declines as planned in the coming years, are the Colombians
ready to operate successfully with less U.S. military
assistance and advisers?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, the success of Plan Colombia in the
last 10 years has been notable. I believe it has contributed to
a diminution of the FARC from a high of about 18,000 members to
about 9,000 or less today. It has contributed to the
elimination of three of the key leaders of the FARC over the
last year, and to the rescue of the three U.S. hostages I
alluded to, along with about a dozen other high-value political
hostages who were rescued in that same raid. Since 2002,
kidnappings are down 83 percent, murders are down 60 percent,
and acts of terrorism are down 76 percent.
The Government and the military of Colombia enjoy very high
approval ratings by the people of Colombia. The FARC's approval
rating is somewhere below 2 percent, as opposed to, for
example, the army's approval rating, which is over 70 percent.
So I would say that the assistance of Plan Colombia over
the past 10 years, a bipartisan effort, has been very
successful in helping the Colombian people to achieve the
success that they have achieved on their own. In terms of their
readiness, I believe that they are ready. I am a believer that
we can now begin to move the dial, if you will, from the hard
power side of the equation to the soft power side of the
equation in Colombia because of the capability that's been
achieved by the Colombian armed forces, with some U.S.
assistance over this past period, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Renuart, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation recently wrote ``GMD flight testing to date will not
support a high level of confidence in its limited
capabilities.'' Do you agree that it is important to address
the concerns raised by the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation about the GMD system?
General Renuart. Senator Levin, I absolutely agree that we
have to continue a robust test schedule, and I believe that the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has that kind of schedule on tap.
I've spoken in some detail to the Director of the Operational
Test and Evaluation Organization after his statement and two
things struck me. First, he understands that it is important
for us to continue aggressive testing, and that so far against
the test regimen that has been in place, we have had success.
He would comment that high degree or low degree is a subjective
view.
So I would add maybe a couple comments on my assessment.
Over the last 11 tests, we've had 7 direct hits. While
certainly there were some misses early on, I participated
directly in the last three tests, each of which were
successful. There were some comments in the report that the
last test was supposed to have a decoy as part of that. The
test vehicle did not adequately deploy the decoy, but the
ground-based midcourse interceptor in fact was successful in
finding and having a direct hit on the reentry vehicle.
So I continue to believe that the operational capability is
good. We're working very aggressively with the MDA to continue
this test regimen, to increasingly include all the elements of
the missile defense system, the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) Radar,
the Forward-Based X-Band system, and to continue to make the
test as realistic as possible.
Chairman Levin. General, the last time we met you noted
that we've had periods of constructive dialogue and cooperation
with Russia over many years. Do you believe it makes sense now
to pursue such engagement in cooperation with Russia on
security matters, including notification of Russian bomber
flights, and the possibility of cooperation on missile defense
efforts?
General Renuart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have
had success in the past with military-to-military dialogue with
the Russians. I think that there is a real place for that
dialogue in the future. I think Secretary Gates has continued
to maintain the position that this dialogue is important to our
national security.
With respect to the Russian bombers, the committee members
may know that just prior to the Russian action in Georgia last
summer the Russians in fact filed a flight plan on one of their
long-range training missions that was going to come into the
Alaska region. We welcomed that, had direct communication with
the commander of Russian long-range aviation, creating the
means to do that and continue that in the future.
We hope we will return to that direct dialogue. We've
collaborated on counterterrorism exercises with the Russians.
Sadly, that exercise did not go forward, as a result of the
Russian activity this past summer. But we look forward to the
opportunity to re-open that, and I know both the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense are actively working with
the Russians to reopen that dialogue.
Chairman Levin. The possibility of cooperation on missile
defense?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I think there are some
significant discussions that need to occur and policy decisions
made by the administration. But we think that there certainly
is the opportunity for increased collaboration and confidence-
building in the missile defense area.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McNabb, in my opening statement I mentioned the
increasing difficulties to further our effort in Afghanistan
compounded by at least 17,000 additional troops complicates our
supply efforts. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan we don't have a
convenient neighbor like Kuwait. I think one of the most
underestimated aspects of the conflict in Iraq was the
assistance that the Kuwaiti Government provided us with.
Give us a thumbnail sketch of the challenge and how you
expect for us to meet it?
General McNabb. Yes, Senator McCain. The big part that you
want to do on the supply chain is to make sure you have lots of
options, you have lots of ways to get in there, so you're not
relying on any one of those.
Senator McCain. We just lost one in Kyrgyzstan.
General McNabb. Yes, sir. As you look at that, what you
want to do is to make sure that, as I told General Petraeus, we
will be there; we'll figure out and make sure that you never
have to worry about this.
You're exactly right about Afghanistan; it is landlocked.
We probably couldn't ask for or find a tougher place from a
logistics challenge of getting the stuff in. Obviously, we've
been relying on air and that logistic line coming up from
Karachi from the south, through Pakistan into Afghanistan.
What we're trying to do, in conjunction with the State
Department and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and basically U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and EUCOM,
is to establish in the north with the different nations up
there to say, who's interested in helping us support
Afghanistan, who's interested in peace and stability in that
region? What we found was that a number of countries said, we
would be in favor of that.
We've offered that we would use normal commercial means,
their normal commercial rail and trucks, and we would use our
normal commercial partner companies that would help do that, to
bring the stuff in from the north. We have 738 containers in
the Northern Distribution Network right now and the first 90
have been delivered to Kabul. So we are getting things down
through the north. That again just offers another option.
Senator McCain. What percentage is that of your monthly
supply?
General McNabb. If you look at what we need to do to hold
our own, and you mentioned a 50 percent increase, as we sit
right now, if we average 78 containers a day getting into
Afghanistan, we kind of hold our own. As you say, that will go
up as the 17,000 folks go in.
Right now our weekly average has been holding at about 130
to 140 containers a day getting through there. So we're getting
more in than we need. What we hope is to be able to bring in
about 100 containers from the north a day to supplement the
Pak-Gloc so we have lots of options to get stuff in.
Senator McCain. I'd be very interested in seeing how you're
going to do that, in light of the base closure and the other
increased security threats, particularly using commercial
operations, given what we know is going to be an escalation in
threats to those supply lines.
Admiral, Phoenix, Arizona, was just designated the
kidnapping capital of the United States, and I'm sure you may
have seen that. There's a level of violence on the border that
I've never seen before. Obviously, it spills over into the
United States from time to time; and there's an even greater
threat if that spills over even more.
There have been calls by Governors, including the Governor
of Texas just last week, to send more troops to the border. We
have mounted this massive effort. Yet my information is the
price of an ounce of cocaine on the street in the United States
remains the same.
Maybe you can give us an assessment of the situation, where
you think it's leading, and whether you think we need
additional troops along the United States-Mexican border, and
your assessment of whether the Mexican Government is winning or
losing in this existential struggle with the drug cartels?
Admiral Stavridis. Let me, if I could, sir, also get
General Renuart into this conversation, as Mexico is part of
his AOR.
Senator McCain. We'd be very interested in you too,
General.
Admiral Stavridis. You're absolutely right that it's part
of a connection that flows from the south.
Sir, I'll submit for the record the price of cocaine. I'll
find out exactly what that is. I believe in the United States
the price of cocaine has actually gone up a little bit over the
last year or 2, although there are some indications that may be
because of the movement of cocaine to Europe via Africa, as a
matter of fact. So the point is extremely well taken.
[The information referred to follows:]
As depicted in the chart below, overall the price of cocacine has
increased 104.5 percent from January 2007 through December 2008.
Current price is $199.60 per pure gram of cocaine. Additionally, the
purity level has decreased 34.8 percent.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Admiral Stavridis. As I look at Central America and the
nexus between Central America and Mexico, I feel it is
crucially important that the United States be very involved,
both with our Central American partners and specifically with
our Mexican friends in that zone of violence along the northern
tier, where I think 6,000 people were killed last year just
south of that border and, most shockingly perhaps, about 700
Mexican law enforcement and military personnel were also
killed.
So I'm very hopeful that by military-to-military
cooperation in Central America--we can be helpful as the
security forces of those countries seek to appropriately deal
with the threat that they're dealing with. With that, I'm going
to let Gene comment on the Mexican portion of your question,
sir.
Senator McCain. Also, General, as part of your answer to
the question, if you would include the aspect of the price of
cocaine.
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. We'll add that to the
record in our answer as well. My perception is, with Jim
Stavridis, that the price has marginally increased.
Senator McCain. First of all, is the Mexican Government
winning or losing?
General Renuart. Senator, I would say that the Mexican
Government is taking aggressive action to win. They are
building momentum. I would not say they are losing. Now, that
will sound a little unusual, given the violence we've seen. But
my direct interaction with both the senior leaders of the
Mexican military has left me with the perception that President
Calderon has given very specific guidance to the military to be
much more aggressive in their presence.
Senator McCain. How important has the Merida Initiative
been?
General Renuart. Senator, I can't tell you how important
that is. That is a huge effort. The Mexicans see that as a real
outreach and partnership, and it is making a difference in the
confidence. We are working with the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency to accelerate the deliveries of some of
those capabilities.
Senator McCain. Is the Mexican Government making any
progress in addressing the issue of corruption that goes to the
highest levels?
General Renuart. Senator, I believe they are. I'll give you
an example. In Juarez, where we've seen this violence, the
Mexican Government has put nearly 10,000 military and Federal
police, all who have been vetted, into the region. They've
taken the local police out of their responsibility and
supplemented or replaced them with Federal forces. That is
beginning a return to some sense of normalcy in Juarez. But
they are also going through a long-term process to vet each of
the Federal police and local police leaders. So I think they're
making progress.
Senator McCain. They're effective, the Mexican military?
General Renuart. Senator, they have been very effective
when they've been in place. The challenge for the Mexican
Government is sustainment of that effort because their military
is not that large. We're working with them in a direct
relationship to build more of the capacity to allow them to
sustain that effort in some of these cities.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all of you for your service and leadership to our
country. I want to continue, General, with this line of
questioning. As you've said in your statement, homeland defense
is the preeminent mission of the two commands that you lead.
Let me ask you to indicate to us how much of a threat to our
homeland security you view drug-related violence from Mexico?
General Renuart. Senator, I'll go back to Senator McCain's
comment. Phoenix is a good example of the nexus between the
drug trade and gangs, all of which are in, if you will, a
business to make money with illicit trade. As there is pressure
brought to bear in the efforts between both of our commands to
reduce the flow of drugs, we're seeing a more aggressive
behavior on the part of the cartels and then their related
gangs here north of the border.
So it is a real concern for security in our country. I am
pleased with the interface that we have both with Jim's folks
in the interdiction piece and ours, but also our partnership
with law enforcement to help bolster their efforts along the
border. But it is a real concern.
Senator Lieberman. Can you describe for the committee some
of the things that troops under your command at NORTHCOM are
doing now to deter and prevent drug-related violence from
Mexico?
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. I must say right up
front that it is a partnership between the National Guard and
the NORTHCOM team who work this daily with each other. For
example, we are providing training for some of Mexico's unique
force capabilities that allow them to conduct raids on some of
the cartels.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
General Renuart. Seizing weapons, for example. We are
providing technology to Customs and Border Protection and other
law enforcement agencies to identify tunnels that may have been
dug underneath the border.
Senator Lieberman. Those are technologies that we've
developed in combat situations?
General Renuart. Absolutely, a great transfer from
Afghanistan into our southwest border.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
General Renuart. We man and operate a series of sensors
along the border--cameras, listening posts, et cetera, aerial
vehicles, both manned and unmanned, with night vision
capability--to provide that information to law enforcement
authorities, who then conduct the appropriate operations.
We think we can continue to expand that. We have a planning
team in place today at the Department of Homeland Security
looking at just this kind of additional support, both Guard,
Reserve, and Active components, partnering with the law
enforcement agencies and the States to ensure that the
Governors get the kind of support they feel they need.
Senator Lieberman. That's encouraging, and you anticipated
my next question. I know, because many of us here are on the
Homeland Security Committee as well, that the Department of
Homeland Security is now focused on this threat to our homeland
security from drug-related violence from Mexico and they have
developed plans for reaction to any escalation of the violence.
So I'm glad you're working together with them.
Let me ask a couple of specific questions about that. At
least one of the Governors in the southwest has suggested that
there ought to be National Guard now placed along the border.
What do you think about that?
General Renuart. Senator, I think certainly there may be a
need for additional manpower; whether that is best provided by
National Guard or additional law enforcement agencies. I think
certainly there are capabilities that the National Guard uses,
for example some of their aircraft that have the full motion
video capability, that are helpful to Customs and Border
Protection.
But I think defining the mission for all forces, the team
along the border, is critical. This planning effort this week I
think will give us a good way to answer the questions and
concerns of the Governors.
Senator Lieberman. So it's a little early to answer the
question specifically. You sound a bit skeptical about just
placing Guard on the border, but rather use Guard and Active
resources together with our partners?
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. This is a whole-of-
government problem and I think the best response is an
integrated approach, and we're working toward that
aggressively.
Senator Lieberman. That was actually going to get to my
next question, which is: Is there a trigger in your mind now
for what kind of escalation of violence from drug-related
activities from Mexico would bring NORTHCOM more actively
involved in this battle?
General Renuart. Senator, I think we've had the trigger. To
use the example of the city of Juarez and Chihuahua Province in
Mexico; 1,700 drug-related murders in the last year. That kind
of violence that close to our border I think was the sounding
horn, if you will, on the need for an integrated approach.
We have been working at a constant level over time. I think
the highlight of this kind of violence and the proximity to our
borders elevates the necessity to work aggressively. I think
both Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano understand that
and have given us all mandates to work this problem
aggressively, and I think we'll have good plans come out of
this work this week.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it.
I'm very grateful for the work that has been done at
NORTHCOM to improve our homeland security since September 11.
We usually at these hearings ask only about the current
threats, but I want to just ask you to take a minute to talk
about what under your command we have done since then in terms
of aviation security, that is the security of the American
people from a threat from the air, and also to just say a word
about the consequence response management force that you're
standing up. I bet most people in the country, probably most
Members of Congress, don't know about it, but it's going to be
critically important.
General Renuart. Senator, thank you for that. Two points.
First, on September 11th the air picture that NORAD looked at
to defend our Nation looked outwards, away from our borders.
The air picture the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
looked at every day to control traffic was essentially inward,
although certainly they do have the approaches. But the two
pictures weren't married together. We didn't have an FAA
representative in our operations center on September 11. The
Transportation Security Administration did not exist.
Today we collaboratively, with the FAA, look at every one
of the 7,000-plus aircraft that are airborne at this minute
today around our country.
Senator Lieberman. Is that commercial, military, and most
private?
General Renuart. Yes, sir. If one of them deviates from the
appropriate procedures that are highlighted both to the FAA and
to NORAD immediately and we are able to then use some of those
alert aircraft that we have now around the country, in many
more locations than we've ever had before, to identify this
particular aircraft and determine its intentions, and then take
some action should it be required.
So we've come a long way since September 11 in that regard.
With respect to the consequence management force, I think
September 11 alerted us that we needed to have a capability if
an event like that were taken to a higher level, nuclear,
biological, or chemical. Secretary Gates has been aggressive in
both mandating a mission for me and our commands, but also
funding and allowing us to equip a consequence management
response force that's designed against a catastrophic event
such as a nuclear, biological, or radiological event in our
country.
The first of those forces stood up on October 1st, fully
funded, fully equipped and fully trained and exercised. In
fact, we just completed what's called an emergency deployment
exercise this past week down at Camp Blanding in Florida. It is
a superbly trained force that can allow us to come in and
augment existing nuclear, biological, and chemical
capabilities. The States have a small Civil Support Team (CST).
There are 17 kinds of regional consequence response forces that
are much smaller, only about 200 people.
Senator Lieberman. This force is over 4,000?
General Renuart. It is, Senator. Our force is about 4,600
to 4,800 depending on the units assigned. It's designed to come
in to provide response. It's not a law enforcement force. It is
a response force, to provide medical care, decontamination,
urban search and rescue, and those kinds of capabilities to
sustain over time in one of these events.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very, very much. That should
make all of us feel more secure.
General Renuart. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first of all ask Admiral Stavridis and General Ward
a question. I have talked to you personally about my interest
in the various train and equip programs, 1206, 1207, 1208, the
Commander's Emergency Response Program and the expansion of
that, and the Combatant Commander Initiatives Fund, as to how
they're progressing and how valuable they are to your commands.
Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, very valuable. Anything that builds
partnership capacity is of terrific value in this world to the
south. Just to pick up a thread from Gene Renuart and Senator
Lieberman's conversation a moment ago about what specifically
are we doing about the situation not only in Mexico, but in
Central America, it's good to remember the Merida Initiative
provides funds not just for Mexico, but for Central America,
Haiti, and in the Dominican Republic. So these maritime
approaches can be addressed using the kind of funding that you
just talked about.
We've used some of those to help our partner nations equip
themselves with better radars, intercept boats, a night vision
detection capability, and command and control. So it all fits
together in how we establish a pattern of stopping this flow of
narcotics and allowing our partner nations to know what's in
the water around them. That's one specific example.
Another is the hostage rescue in Colombia, which was
something that could not have been done without that
partnership capacity.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Thank you, Admiral.
General Ward?
General Ward. Senator, I concur. Those programs that deal
with training and equipping our partner nations to better
enable them to conduct counterterror activities, to have better
ability to control their internal borders, are very valuable.
The equipment pieces, including things such as was mentioned by
Admiral Stavridis, information systems, the radar systems, the
equipment pieces that go to their mobility requirements inland,
as well as things that they do in their coastal territorial
waters, have been very instrumental in increasing their
capacity to take care of those challenges.
Senator Inhofe. I notice in your written statement you talk
about the fact that in the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program, of the 52 countries in Africa, you now
feel that there will be 46 of those countries by the end of
this fiscal year that will be participating in that.
General Ward. Yes, sir. We anticipate about 46 African
countries will participate in IMET. The IMET program I think
provides long-term benefits for our national interest as well
as transforming those militaries in positive ways.
Senator Inhofe. You agree with that, I assume, Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. I do. In particular, we like to use
those IMET funds at the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), which is a very valuable
institute for us.
Senator Inhofe. Once there was a time when we thought we
were doing them a favor in this program. But we quickly learned
that once they are tied into us in that kind of relationship,
that remains.
General Ward, there are a lot of problems that people don't
really think about. Everyone's familiar with Sudan. Everyone's
familiar with the pirating off the east coast. But these are
such things as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Right now, in
my opinion we have the three Presidents that are in agreement
with each other and are all trying to work on this Joseph Kony.
Would you want to tell us how that's coming along and how
significant you think that is to do something about that
particular person, Joseph Kony, and his LRA program?
General Ward. Thank you, Senator. That part of the
continent, the heartland, as many Africans describe it, the
eastern Congo, is an area where the internal strife has long
been affecting neighbors. The fact that Uganda, Rwanda, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) came together to look at
a way to deal with the problem of the LRA and Kony and the
effect that they were having on the population was very
substantial.
It has been positive insofar as disrupting the activity of
Kony. It's been positive in addressing some of the training and
recruiting practices that he and his element have performed in
that part of the Congo. The degree of cooperation continues
amongst those three nations and we look for that to continue
and make a positive difference in that part of the continent.
[Additional clarifying information provided for the record
by General Ward:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. I think that is a huge success. You had
President Museveni and Kagame, both having military
backgrounds, there's a little bit of a problem with them
getting along with each other. Now with Kabila, they are
cooperating. I'm glad to hear that progress is being made.
I notice you didn't spend a lot of time in your written
statement on Zimbabwe and didn't mention Mugabe. They're
apparently trying to work out a program where he and the
opposition--very similar to Burundi--work together. Do you
think that might work? Do you think Mugabe might work in that
program and start getting cooperation?
General Ward. I hesitate to say. I don't know. I think
clearly the initiative that's under way with that potential
being there is a positive development, and I would certainly
look forward to something positive coming from this arrangement
that Mugabe and Tsvangirai have put in place.
Senator Inhofe. Let me ask a question of you, General
Renuart. You might be the best one, I'm not sure. Maybe some of
the rest of you have some ideas. It's been 5 years now since we
lost the battle of Vieques. At that time, I can remember when
General Laseo was actually testifying before this committee,
where he threatened the lives of some people you're looking at
right now.
We had made the statement that they closed down that
particular facility that offered a type of training that in my
opinion--I think most of you would agree with this--couldn't be
replaced anywhere else. Now, as we anticipated, since it is
closed, they are coming back. The very people who wanted it
closed in the first place are saying, is there any way in the
world we can get this thing opened back up and use this
facility?
I know it's not a question anyone would anticipate, but
have you got any thoughts on that? Can it be resurrected?
General Renuart. Senator, I'm probably not the right person
to speak specifically on the capacity to resurrect that
training. I will say that we have recently moved the islands of
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands into the NORTHCOM AOR. On my
first visits down there, it was clear to me that one of the
challenges we have is to continue to extend the visibility of
our homeland further to the southeast in areas of detection of
illicit trade and trafficking, a significant human trafficking
area there, certainly also in the area of air sovereignty and
air defense, as we saw the participation Senator McCain
mentioned of Russian bombers in the region.
So I think there is an opportunity for us on a small basis
to put some capacity into that area that maybe hasn't been
there in quite a while and that could be integrated into our
national homeland defense system. So we are looking to work
with both the Navy and the National Guard to see how we might
take advantage of some of the systems and equipment that is
still in place in the Vieques area.
I might defer to Jim Stavridis for a Navy view on this.
Admiral Stavridis. I think you have it exactly right, and I
wouldn't speak for the Navy. I'm a joint officer, like
everybody else up here.
But, sir, I'll be glad to take that one back to my good
friend Admiral Roughead. I think he'll be interested in looking
at that. Vieques was the crown jewel of maritime training at
one time.
Senator Inhofe. Well, if you would do that I would
appreciate it.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. We'll collaborate and get you a common
answer to that, Senator.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The former U.S. Navy range on Vieques Island has been turned over
to the Department of the Interior. In addition, the former Naval
Station Roosevelt Roads is being disposed of by the Base Realignment
and Closure Commission Program Management Office with future parcel
ownership by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and other private/public
entities. U.S. Northern Command is engaging with the U.S. Navy staff
and the new Roosevelt Roads' property owners to better understand the
disposal plan and discuss possible use in a Defense Support of Civil
Authorities scenario.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McNabb, roughly what percentage of contract airlift
do you depend upon and how cost effective and efficient do you
think it is? Does it depend on the area of operations changing
from one theater to another?
General McNabb. Senator Reed, we have a Civil Reserve Air
Fleet, and we depend on that when it's fully up to be about 40
percent to almost 90 percent of the movement of passengers,
about 30 percent of the cargo, which is the bulk cargo.
Today I would say during normal operations we do about $500
million worth of business. Today we do about $2.5 billion worth
of business with them. They have been very instrumental in our
ability to both resupply Iraq and Afghanistan. We do have cargo
missions that go directly into Afghanistan, which has really
helped free up things like Manas.
The one issue with the civil reserve airfleet is the fact
that you have to really look hard at the threat to see if you
can operate it forward. If you can't take it in there, you have
to stop at an intermediate base and then transload to a C-17,
C-5, or C-130, and that's the portion that obviously we look
at.
As we think about Manas, I say that it's useful but not
essential, because we just need to make sure that we have bases
that are in there close. CENTCOM's looking very closely at
other places where we could bed down airplanes. Obviously if we
could keep Manas that would be great. If not, we do have other
options.
I would say that we depend a great deal on the civil
reserve airfleet. It is the cheapest possible way to move
palletized cargo.
Senator Reed. General Ward, your command, does it rely
extensively on contract airlift or are you directly supported
by military aircraft?
General Ward. We are directly supported by military
aircraft, Senator. We do have some contract aircraft, but we
are directly supported by military aircraft.
Senator Reed. Are you concerned that there are some
operations that might be tactical in nature that this contract
aircraft wouldn't be suitable for? Is that a concern that you
have?
General Ward. Not at this time.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis, you mentioned the tri-border area. Can
you generally describe the level of human intelligence (HUMINT)
that you have there? Do you have good insights into what is
going on there, or is that an issue of concern?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we have good coordination with the
three national partners who are in that region, Brazil,
Argentina, and Paraguay. Via their capability, we then receive
a reasonable level of HUMINT in that area. But I don't feel the
need for it as long as we work well with our partners in that
region.
Senator Reed. General Renuart, have you received comments
or complaints from the Government of Mexico that some of these
bands are being supplied with weapons from the United States?
General Renuart. Yes, Senator. In fact, from the very first
meeting I had with both General Galvan and Admiral Saynez, the
leaders of their military, they mentioned the very large
percentage of weapons that are captured in that area seem to
come from the United States. That message has been continuous
and loud. I think it was brought up to the President when he
and President Calderon visited. Certainly it was brought up to
Admiral Mullen when he visited with General Galvan just a week
or so ago.
It is a principal concern. Not all of these weapons
directly come from the United States, but in many cases are
brokered by illicit weapons dealers that do reside here. I know
that our law enforcement partners have had some success and are
continuing to work that aggressively.
Admiral Stavridis. Can I add to that?
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stavridis. I get the same thing in Guatemala, in
Honduras, in El Salvador, and in Nicaragua. The same weapons
are flowing from the United States through Mexico and down to
Central America. So I too receive that comment and I associate
myself with Gene's remarks.
Senator Reed. Do you gentlemen think it's troubling that
countries that we see as in some cases teetering on the edge of
stability point to the fact that one of the greatest threats to
them is coming from weapons that are flowing, it seems with
great numbers, into these countries from the United States?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I do, and I know there are
diplomats like Ambassador Tom Shannon over at the State
Department who are working hard on this. I think it's something
we should try and address.
General Renuart. Senator, just if I could add a point.
There are and continue to be more successes in this regard. For
a period of time, it was difficult to get what I'll call the
forensics of these weapons captures back from the Mexicans.
After some active intervention with their leadership, we are
now getting much more of that information. That is allowing us,
the interagency, to begin to take some legal action here in the
U.S., with some success.
So we're building confidence now with our partners, at
least in Mexico, and I think in the other countries as well,
that we'll actually do something about it if they continue to
share information.
Senator Reed. Our allies in this effort cite the situation
of easy access to firearms in the United States as a major
threat to their stability and consequently as a major national
security threat to the United States.
General Renuart. I think that view is held by our friends
in Mexico and in Central America. It is concerning that that's
a threat to them, and certainly the violence that is brought
from this cross-border flow of money and guns generally south,
narcotics generally north, is finding its way into this kind of
gang violence and other things we see in places like Phoenix.
Senator Reed. Just a final point. Do you think the
perception that this problem exists in any way inhibits the
ability or the willingness of these governments to cooperate
with the United States?
General Renuart. No, sir. I find it to be one of the ways
they would like to cooperate more.
Senator Reed. They would like us to do more?
General Renuart. Yes.
General Renuart. I agree with that.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Renuart, I want to ask you about a study by the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserve that you and I
have discussed before. It was released last year, and it
asserted that there is ``an appalling gap in our Nation's
ability to respond to the use of a weapon of mass destruction
on our soil.''
You've talked this morning, in response to questions from
Senator Lieberman, about the standing up of a 4,000-member
consequence management response team and that is certainly
great progress. But as I recall the report, it was very
critical of how these teams were going to be put together and
whether one team would be sufficient. I believe that the report
actually called for three such teams.
We're now a year later. What is your assessment of our
ability to respond to the use of a weapon of mass destruction?
Let me ask more specifically. What is your assessment now, in
responding to the commission saying that there is this
appalling gap?
General Renuart. I think I can very confidently say that
the situation cited by that commission doesn't exist today.
First, in terms of the ability to plan and integrate together,
the National Guard Bureau and NORTHCOM are integrated in a way
as never before in history. We collaborate on every planning
effort. I mentioned to Senator Lieberman that we are at the
Department of Homeland Security today working on Mexico border
security planning, and we are there in partnership with the
National Guard Bureau.
Each State has a small CST that allows them to assess a
nuclear, biological, and chemical event, but with not a lot of
muscle to do much about that.
Senator Collins. Those are very small.
General Renuart. They are small, about 22 people.
In addition, there are 17 so-called Chemical, Biological,
Radiological/Nuclear (CBRN) and Explosive Enhanced Response
Force Packages (CERFPs). They are another response team built
within the National Guard. They're spread around the country. I
monitor the readiness of each of those. But they are also
relatively small, about 200 or so people. They do have an
ability to do consequence management, but on a smaller scale.
As you mentioned, we have the first of three planned
consequence management response forces now fully trained and
equipped. We are building the second one as we speak. It will
be operational on the 1st of October of this year. As you
mentioned from the report, we have a tasking from the Secretary
of Defense to build three of these teams total. So we'll build
the third in the next year.
That will allow us something on the order of about 16,000
trained and equipped individuals, teams, and organizations
capable of responding to a large-scale event. All of this is an
integrated approach, so that it's not replacing something the
State has. It's augmenting it and supplementing it.
We are now building the collaborative planning process to
be able to go from very small to very large with the
appropriate size force to provide assistance to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and to the Governors and the
States. So I'm very pleased with the progress, and I think that
if that report were written today it wouldn't even mention
that.
Senator Collins. That's great news. Nevertheless, General
Blum, who's now your deputy, I believe, and was the head of the
National Guard Bureau, testified in the past that 88 percent of
the Army National Guard was very poorly equipped. In a hearing
before our Homeland Security Committee in July 2007 I asked
General Blum whether that lack of resources was adequate to
respond to a catastrophic event, and he testified that in a no-
notice event, which obviously is what a terrorist attack would
be, we are at significant risk.
It's now about a year and a half later since he gave that
very sobering assessment. Is the National Guard now
sufficiently equipped so that we're no longer at significant
risk in your view?
General Renuart. Well, my good friend Craig McKinley, now
the new four-star chief of the National Guard Bureau, I'm
pleased to say, I think would echo my comments. But my
assessment is, for the areas of homeland security that you've
described, that the National Guard is equipped at better rates
than they've ever seen in their past. It varies with each
State, so I won't give you a specific percentage. I can get
that and add that to the record if you'd like.
[The information referred to follows:]
For the Army National Guard, dual-use equipment (items identified
as critical to domestic missions) is currently at 81 percent and
projected to be at 86 percent by June 2010. Approximately 16 percent of
dual-use equipment is currently deployed, making 65 percent available
to Governors.
General Renuart. But we also sponsor a Reserve Component
Advocacy Working Group at our headquarters, that gets just to
this issue: How do we ensure that we put into the budget
adequate resourcing so that the National Guard can conduct its
homeland missions? I'm very comfortable with the progress we've
made. There is a commitment on the part of Secretary Gates to
continue that progress. So I think if General Blum were here
today he would not give you that same, very sobering assessment
and he'd be much more positive in his comments.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General McNabb, in 2001 at my request the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) studied the security of munitions,
weapons, and ammunition being moved within the United States by
surface transportation under the supervision of TRANSCOM. Are
you familiar with that GAO report?
General McNabb. Ma'am, I am not.
Senator Collins. The report was classified because its
findings were so alarming in terms of the security of the
weapons as they were being moved from point to point within
this country. I would inform you that originally there was no
intention of classifying the report, but the findings were so
serious that GAO and DOD decided that it should be classified.
A major issue, without getting into the classified details, was
the availability of depots throughout the United States to
receive weapons shipments 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
To your knowledge, are those depots now open and available
to receive shipments 24 hours a day?
General McNabb. Ma'am, I will take that for the record. But
in general, when you think about what General Renuart just
talked about with NORTHCOM, there is a lot more of what we are
talking about in conjunction with NORTHCOM getting their arms
around all of this, working with the Services, because
obviously the Services have a big play in that. But I would say
that we work together to bring the whole-of-government approach
to these kinds of issues, because you are talking significant
dollars. Depots are run by the Services. I will take that for
the record, take a look at it, and we'll come back with a
combined answer that includes OSD, NORTHCOM, and us.
[The information referred to follows:]
All of the Department of Defense (DOD) installations in the United
States which serve as final destinations for Arms, Ammunition, and
Explosives (AA&E) shipments are available to receive shipments 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week (24/7). Furthermore, weapons carriers have access
to additional DOD installations and other secure holding locations
short of the final destination which can be used 24/7 to get the
shipment off the road and secured. Additionally, we have set up an
Interagency Working Group to exchange information and collaborate on
AA&E and other hazardous material distribution, security management,
and surveillance issues.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Renuart. Senator, just a quick add-on. We were
given a responsibility for more of that security. I can tell
you that I monitor the movements each day. In a classified
environment I could tell you how many are moving today and
where. We monitor that and flight-follow those movements.
In terms of the hours of the depots, I think we're going to
need to come back to you with specifics. But I can also tell
you that we have, if you will, way points that these shippers
can use if for some reason a depot is not accessible. There are
DOD installations that provide them a temporary haven during
their movement.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to compliment General Ward and
Admiral Stavridis as you are adapting to this new policy where
you're not only a warrior, you're also a diplomat. Secretary
Gates actually commented on this policy. He says: ``Broadly
speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest
of the world, it's important that the military is and clearly
seen to be in a supporting role to civilian agencies.''
You've been doing that, Admiral Stavridis and General Ward,
as you're setting up AFRICOM. You're doing that.
Admiral Stavridis, what would you say to General Ward on
your experience in prioritizing the coordination with those
civilian agencies?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, you'll be glad to know that
General Ward and I just brought our staffs together for 2\1/2\
days of very specific conversation on this, to include a great
deal of our personal time and all of our senior leadership. We
learned a lot from each other, and I'm learning things from the
way Kip Ward is doing business and hopefully we were helpful to
him.
I would say that fundamentally both General Ward and I
understand, based on these conversations, that SOUTHCOM and
AFRICOM do defense and that State Department does diplomacy and
USAID does development. But as you said, what we try to do is
be in a supporting role wherever we can. At SOUTHCOM, to give
you one specific example, we are taking all of our theater
security cooperation plans about our military-to-military
activities and we're actually going and sitting with our
partners at State and USAID and looking at how our training
activities, our human rights seminars, and our disaster relief
work can be supportive of what USAID does as they do
development and what State does as they do diplomacy.
So we very much see ourselves as taking a supporting
background role. We do not want to militarize our foreign
policy in any way. We want a civilian face on these activities
and civilian leadership, but we want to seek to be helpful in
supporting them where we can. That's been our approach.
Kip?
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm going to short-circuit this if I
may, General Ward, because I have some other questions that I
need to get into. Just suffice it to say, congratulations on
what you're doing.
Admiral, are you satisfied with the Fourth Fleet that's
standing up? Does it give you the projection?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, the Fourth Fleet has been very
positive for SOUTHCOM and our efforts. The ability of that
planning staff in Mayport, FL, to reach back to the Navy and
obtain the assets has been a singular success. I talked earlier
about our ability to bring Navy ships like the Boxer and the
Kearsarge into the region to do medical activities. That's an
example of it. Our disaster relief off of Haiti, that's an
example of it. Our counternarcotics interdiction of last summer
and this past fall, that's an example of it.
So we're very satisfied with the Navy's decision to stand
up the Fourth Fleet.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Renuart, NORTHCOM is
responsible for missile defense operations to protect the
homeland.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. We're developing a national missile
defense system. Do you think that the system needs to be
operationally effective, suitable, survival, and cost-
effective?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think that we need to take the
steps needed to make sure that the system is all of those
things?
General Renuart. Senator, I absolutely do, to include the
robust testing that should be carried out.
Senator Bill Nelson. In that GMD testing program, should it
include operational testing?
General Renuart. Senator, it should absolutely. In fact, I
will tell you the last two tests had operational crews actually
conducting that missile launch.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are you doing in coordination
with the MDA and Strategic Command to realistically test the
GMD?
General Renuart. Senator, we have become a member of the
Missile Defense Executive Board, which up until about a year
ago we did not participate in. That allows us to drive an
operational requirement into the test and development and
budgeting process. We work directly with now-General O'Reilly,
the Commander, to ensure that at each test we add a more
operational feature to it. He has been very supportive of that,
and we continue to work aggressively to get more and more of an
operational flavor into the test program with each subsequent
mission.
Senator Bill Nelson. In doing that, are you going to be
able to reconcile the test and evaluation responsibilities with
your mission to defend the homeland?
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. In fact, as we
prepare for the next test series that will occur, we have added
at our request some complications in the communications network
we use for command and control, just to test those kinds of
possible system failures that may occur.
Senator Bill Nelson. The bottom line question is: Is it
operationally effective so that in fact if we had the threat it
could do the job?
General Renuart. Senator, I think we're right now in a mode
of very limited threat. Essentially, North Korea is the system
that we are focused on. Senator, I'll tell you, if we felt the
North Koreans were going to shoot a ballistic missile at us
today, I am comfortable that we would have an effective system
able to meet that need.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's particularly true because of
the layers, such as the Aegis system and so forth.
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. The chairman has given me the
responsibility on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee to be able
to answer the underlying question, is the national missile
defense system operational today? Now, if you're talking about
the layer, such as Aegis, the answer to that is yes.
But if you're talking about the one shot from Vandenberg or
from Alaska, today the answer is no.
As you suggest, when that threat may materialize, maybe it
will be. But we have to have absolutely clear eyes with regard
to the capability of this system.
By the way, Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the new
three-star who is the head of Ballistic Missile Defense. He is
approaching this straightforward and transparently. He answers
your questions. He's absolutely committed to operational
testing. I think it's a new day there and I want to compliment
the General.
Chairman Levin. I would join Senator Nelson, by the way, in
that reaction to the commander there.
General Renuart. Sir, I would also echo that. He has been
very focused on bringing the operational user into this
process. So I think we're on the right track.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome all and thank you very much for your service and
your testimony today.
Admiral, I want to start with you, obviously, from the many
areas of interest that we share. But as we look at the
Venezuelan situation, the declining price of oil, do you
perceive any change in the ability of Venezuela to project
itself in the region, given the diminution of their financial
status?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I do. As always, whenever I discuss
Venezuela, I'd like to begin by pointing out the United States
has enjoyed a long, positive relationship with Venezuela
stretching back 150 years. Clearly we have some political
differences right now. We do have correct professional
military-to-military relations with the Venezuelan military.
My assessment is, like any other nation that sees a
reduction in its revenues, there will be effects on the ability
of the Venezuelan military to not only continue the high level
of arms purchases, $5 billion over the last 4 years, more than
$20 billion in contracts, and all of it with Russia, I think
the ability to consummate all of that and then to maintain and
train and equip these very expensive systems would be
diminished significantly with the loss in oil revenues, yes,
sir.
Senator Martinez. By the way, speaking of that level of
purchases, those are very disproportionate to the region and to
what any other country may be doing in the region, correct?
Admiral Stavridis. That's correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. Do you have any clue from all of that
type of data, as well as the recent naval exercises with
Russia, as to what are the intentions of Venezuela as it
relates to military projection in the region?
Admiral Stavridis. I do not, sir.
Senator Martinez. I wanted to ask a combined question of
General Renuart and yourself, Admiral. It really has to do with
the regional perception of our country. Sunday we saw where a
new government was elected in El Salvador. While it might be
perceived to be not particularly friendly to our country, I do
like the statements that the new president has made so far. But
whether it is that, the trend in other neighboring countries--
Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, or the situation which continues
in Cuba, what do you perceive that we as a country should be
doing in the region? Obviously, I'm now asking you in your
merged role as diplomat as well as military.
Some would suggest that the fence on the border is a very
bad signal. Others would talk about different issues. What is
your assessment?
Admiral Stavridis. Let me address El Salvador first. State
Department has come out and congratulated President-elect
Mauricio Funes on his election. By all standards, it is a very
legitimate process that unfolded, with high voter turnout.
President Funes has indicated a real willingness to continue to
work strongly with the United States.
We count El Salvador on a military-to-military basis as
among our very strong partners in the region and we're looking
forward to continuing that very strong relationship and, based
on what I've heard, that's what I expect will happen.
Looking at the region very broadly, I think it's the nature
of something good, actually. In all of the Americas today,
every country is a democracy, with one exception, and that of
course is Cuba. Senator, you know democracies don't always
agree. There are going to be political disagreements. From my
lane doing defense and looking at military-to-military, I would
believe that our military-to-military engagement across the
spectrum of political actors in the region is a very positive
aspect of what we need to continue. So we work very hard to
have positive military-to-military relations with Ecuador, with
Bolivia, with Nicaragua, with Brazil, with Argentina, with
Colombia, with Mexico, et cetera, et cetera.
So I would say that from a defense lane, strong military-
to-military activity is a very positive force as we work
through these occasional disagreements amongst friendly
democracies.
General Renuart. Senator, I might just add a couple points,
if I may. First, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM have created a
transparent relationship across the border of our combatant
command lines that I think is very positive. We share prisoners
routinely with our staffs back and forth. We two have had
staff-to-staff talks. We put liaisons, for example, in the
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South down in Key West.
They put liaisons in our Joint Task Force (JTF) North along the
Mexican border.
Mexico, I think, could be put into many of the same
categories that Jim mentioned. They are eager to reach out to
us in a military-to-military way. They see that relationship as
very positive. I think we need to continue with that. In
Mexico, the national military is one of the most highly
respected organizations in the country.
Mexico also sees a role for itself looking south. It is a
considerable economic power in that area and it is increasing
its trade to the south, and I think that's a positive element.
It also allows Mexico to begin to collaborate with the nations
to its south on the illicit traffic issue as well.
So I think from the U.S. perspective, we have to continue
that certainly positive engagement. The soft power we bring is
very important. One thing we've found with the Mexicans in
particular is that our experiences of interagency cooperation
are a very positive element for Mexico, and they are trying
very aggressively to learn how to do that better, and that will
help them in the counternarcotics fight.
Senator Martinez. Thank you very much.
Admiral, do you have any insights into the recent purge in
Cuba?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, I do not, other than I think it
shows that Raul Castro has completely consolidated power in
that country.
Senator Martinez. There's an interesting article in this
week's Newsweek by former Foreign Minister Castaneda.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I saw it. Thank you.
Senator Martinez. If you get a crystal ball available to
you at any point, let me know.
General Ward, I wanted to ask you about the piracy issue
near Somalia in the past year, where you know we've had a
considerable amount of disruption to commercial shipping. Any
insights into that issue and what can we do to continue to try
to stave off those problems?
General Ward. Senator, the counterpiracy effort is led on
the water by CENTCOM, the Combined Task Force 151. There has
been considerable progress made as the coalition of nations
supporting counterpiracy has increased. That is an
international coalition of nations. We support that through our
activities ashore as well as through our limited facilities in
Djibouti as those nations participate in the counterpiracy
activity.
But I would offer, as I think most of us know, that the
root of the piracy issue in the Gulf of Aden there and the
Indian Ocean is the result of the lack of an effective
government in Somalia. So our efforts to support the
establishment of effective institutions of government in
Somalia would be the long-term fix to the piracy that goes on
there. It also exists on the west coast of Africa, certainly
not to the degree. But in that regard, our efforts to work with
those nations to increase their capacity to provide for their
own maritime safety and security have gone a long way to
helping address the threat of piracy.
We look to increase those efforts along the East Coast of
Africa, again adding to the capacity and capability of those
nations to coordinate, to share information, to have visibility
over their territorial waters, and to be able to do something
about it once something is detected. So those efforts continue,
the large increase in naval presence afloat with that
coalition, as well as tactics being taken by commercial
shippers to address the issue, because there are measures that
they have been taking to help address piracy issues as well.
So it's been a combination of those things that have led to
what has been received or seen as a reduction in the level of
pirating that goes on in the Gulf of Aden and there in the
Indian Ocean.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
General McNabb. Senator Martinez, if I could just add to
what General Ward mentioned, in working with CENTCOM and with
AFRICOM, but it is with our commercial partners, working with
the Maritime Administration (MARAD), as we have Military
Sealift Common (MSC) ships, but also we have a lot of
commercial U.S. flag vessels that are taking our cargo across
that area. We are working very closely on those techniques
about how you get through, when should you convoy, how do you
make sure you have visibility, and when you are the type of
ship that may be a little bit at risk then you'll be escorted.
It's all of those kinds of things. MSC also, working with
MARAD, has asked our commercial partners that if they need, we
have anti-piracy assessment teams that will join them and say,
here's some techniques that you can use. Again, everybody is
working together with the idea that obviously you have the
military who are watching this, but also there are a lot of
things that our commercial folks can do to make sure that they
help themselves. All of that is going on.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, General. I'm sorry we didn't
have time to talk about KC-135, but maybe in the second round.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The piracy issue, if my history recollection is right, is
reminiscent of what President Thomas Jefferson had to deal with
with the Barbary pirates. Who would have thought in 200 years
we'd be dealing with something like that again?
General Renuart, you spoke earlier about the consequence
management force that became fully funded, equipped, and
trained on October 2008. Can you speak to how this force will
work with the National Guard CSTs? The funding for the CSTs has
been cut for the last 3 years. So will we be able to have a
full partnership there with adequate resources to be able to
fund it?
General Renuart. Senator Nelson, thank you for that
question. I think it's important that we continue to push for
adequate funding for each element of these forces. As I
mentioned earlier, no one of them can stand alone and do this
job. As I mentioned to Senator Collins, the integration and
partnership with the National Guard is at a level really never
before seen in terms of its collaboration, coordination, and
communication.
But what we've tried to do is to tier our approach so that
the first responders will always be the State and local
responders. The CST is integral to that. We have 55 of those
teams funded. My sense is that the upcoming budgets allow them
to sustain that effort. They don't necessarily allow them to
grow. We are working on some training opportunities that will
expand their training under the NORTHCOM flag in exercise
funding.
The second layer in terms of size and capacity is the
CERFP, and it is a force of about 200 guardsmen as well. There
are 17 of them around the country. On any given day, about five
or six of them are what I'll call green across the board, all
the people, all the equipment, and all the training. They are
on a tiered set of alerts so that they could respond in due
course if an event occurs.
We are advocating for some additional funding, especially
in the area of pharmaceutical supplies for some of those teams,
to grow them a bit. DOD seems supportive of that, so I don't
think that's in jeopardy.
The consequence management response force that is under my
command is a much larger force, designed to come in on top of
both the existing civilian and military forces to provide long-
term sustainment of a large-scale effort. Right now we have
about $130 million in our budget for the next few years to grow
and build those forces. That's for National Guard. The active
duty comes out of its existing operations and management (O&M)
budget. That's not at risk at this point.
So I'm not uncomfortable. It's something we just watch and
pay attention to. But I think we have the capacity to grow each
of those appropriately over the coming years.
Senator Ben Nelson. As a former Governor, I hope that we'll
be in a position to make sure that the CSTs are able to respond
appropriately. Not that long ago, I realized by first-hand
inspection that resetting the equipment needs was way behind
the curve. We put some more money in for that, but I'm not sure
that we've achieved the level of reset that we had hoped to. So
I hope that we'll keep pushing for that, because without the
equipment the capabilities are going to be diminished, there's
no question about it.
General Renuart. Senator, just one quick point to finish on
that. I look at the readiness numbers of each of those on a
weekly basis, as does General McKinley. We collaborate on
advocacy within the budget on those issues, and we continue to
keep them very much at the central part of our focus. So we too
are concerned that we not let that capability deteriorate on
the vine, and we'll work that hard.
Senator Ben Nelson. I'll see General McKinley, I think,
next week and I'll go over this with him as well.
I am encouraged by the efforts to make commands seamless by
avoiding overlap or underlap by working together. As combatant
commanders, I would hope that perhaps this seamless approach
would apply to determining what kind of equipment you need,
because that has been part of the reason for complaints about
cost overruns and the challenges we've had with waste and
questions about the costs of equipment. By working together
perhaps we can avoid some of that which Secretary Gates has
mentioned and we're all concerned about, given the fact that we
want to get the biggest bang for the military buck that we can,
particularly as it comes to equipment.
Would you agree that your working together can help us
overcome some of that? Admiral?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, very much so. As we mentioned,
in our staff talks with NORTHCOM and our staff talks with
General Ward at AFRICOM, and we have staff talks scheduled for
the Pacific Command later this year, we're trying very hard to
do precisely that, to synthesize all of our requirements and
our approaches. I think there's great, no pun intended, money
to be made there.
General Renuart. Senator, I'd absolutely agree. In fact, I
know my great contributing partner, Duncan McNabb, who owns the
lift of all of the world, gets a lot of questions about tankers
and airlift. But I will tell you that in our air sovereignty
mission tankers are equally critical to us. So we try to
collaborate on each of these issues, so that DOD gets a true
sense of the requirement.
General Ward. Senator, I would even carry it beyond just
equipment. To the degree that we collaborate, the entire
resources available to our Nation are better used. So we take
that very seriously, not just with our combatant command
partners, but also our interagency partners, working as closely
as we can to assure ourselves that those resources are in fact
used wisely and appropriately and are in fact not duplicated or
in an overlapping of posture.
General McNabb. Senator, from our standpoint as TRANSCOM,
we're always going to be the supporting command of one of these
folks or one of the other theater commanders. Whenever they
say, this is what we need, we have to be there, but we
obviously have to have already exercised that and made sure
that we are there, that we have the systems and processes all
set. I talked about General Renuart. When you look at NORTHCOM
and TRANSCOM as they work through consequence management; how
fast can you react to a disaster relief effort for a hurricane
or a CBRN event. Our ability to have already worked that out
and already have that all set, so that our staffs and our
command centers already know exactly how this will go down,
with General Renuart saying, here's what I need, and then we
flow the forces to him, all that works well.
I would say the same thing with Admiral Stavridis, General
Ward, General Petraeus, Admiral Keating, and General Craddock.
In every case, they know that when they say, here's what we
have, we can have a dialogue back and forth and say, if we can
do it this way, you just tell us when you need it; we'll figure
out the best way. It might be multi-modal, it may be Guard and
Reserve, or it may be commercial. There's lots of different
ways of doing it, and we're always looking at satisfying the
warfighter first, but making sure that we're doing it with an
eye towards the taxpayer as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate it.
My time has expired. Just one, hopefully for the record. If
you could provide more information about the arms that are
being supplied to Mexico. Are they manufactured in the United
States or are they just brokered through a broker in the United
States? Do they flow through the United States? Are they
illegal or legal weapons in any event under U.S. law? I'd like
some more information on that. It would be very helpful.
General Renuart. Senator, we'll collaborate and get an
answer for you for the record with some more detail on that,
absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF) exercises jurisdiction, enforces Federal criminal
laws, and regulates the firearms and explosives industries. As such,
ATF is the appropriate organization to answer your questions.
Senator Ben Nelson. That would be very helpful.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and
thank you for your leadership.
General Renuart, we are certainly pleased with where you
have landed with this last assignment. We still miss your
leadership at Moody.
General Renuart. Sir, I miss it as well.
Senator Chambliss. You discuss in your statement the issue
of aircraft capitalization and air sovereignty. I want to quote
what you said there. You said: ``Our ability to maintain air
sovereignty in the future is at risk. Legacy fighters are aging
and will be stressed to maintain reliability and capability as
we move into the 2013-2025 time frame. The tradeoff between
modernization of airframes and transformation to fifth
generation aircraft could limit efforts to keep pace with
emerging technologies.''
I agree with that statement. I think it's very fair and
accurate. You go on to talk about the role of the F-22 as well
as the F-35 in air sovereignty and in homeland defense
generally.
Looking out over the next 10 to 15 years, General, how
concerned are you about the ability of legacy non-stealth
aircraft to play that role with respect to domination of the
airways as well as general homeland defense? Where does the F-
22 and the F-35 play into this in your mind?
General Renuart. Senator, thanks, and I really honestly
really do miss Valdosta, Georgia.
I think first, as the combatant commander responsible for
the defense of the homeland and the sovereignty of our air
space, it is important to me to ensure that over the long term
we continue to recapitalize those resources, as I mentioned in
my statement. I think that there are really two tiers that we
need to pay attention to. First is, is there a peer competitor
nation who would threaten us? That certainly would require the
best capability the Nation has.
I think there is a second tier. That is, can I go find that
aircraft that's not complying with FAA regulations somewhere in
our United States? That may not require the same, very high end
capability, but certainly capability nonetheless to find and
fix that target, very high or low altitude, large radar cross-
section or small radar cross-section.
I think both of those requirements talk to advanced
aircraft capabilities. The F-16 will begin to go out of service
here shortly. Much of my air sovereignty force resides in the
National Guard, many of whom are flying some of the older
versions of the F-16. So as I see that end of service
approaching, I still have the requirement to maintain the
sovereignty of our air space. I've worked very closely with the
chiefs of the services, not just the Air Force but the Navy and
the Marine Corps as well because they certainly can contribute
to this mission. I've worked closely with Duncan McNabb on air
refueling tankers to ensure that we have a robust, sustainable
capability.
The F-22 certainly is a marvelous aircraft. It gives a
variety of capabilities. I think we have already used it in our
air sovereignty missions, primarily in Alaska, but occasionally
here in the lower 48. The F-35 offers again an all-aspect
capability that will be helpful, not just to see aircraft, but
to see ships on the surface of the ocean, small radar cross-
section, cruise missile, that kind of threat.
So both of those fit very well into the capabilities that I
think we'll need in the next 10 to 15 to 20 years. I maintain
the requirement for a certain level of capacity and rely on the
Services to provide that. So I try not to get into specific
numbers of airplanes with the Services or with the committee,
but rather maintaining a level of capacity for the country.
Certainly those aircraft will both fit into that for the
future.
Senator Chambliss. Are you comfortable with where you see
us headed over the next 10 to 15 years about having that
capacity?
General Renuart. Senator, I'm very comfortable in the 10-
to 15-year point. I'm a little more careful on the 5- to 10-
year just because there is a production build and we want to
make sure we can sustain the existing force. The Air Force is
working very aggressively to look at bridge capacities in
there. So far I'm comfortable with their approach. They haven't
determined the final answer yet.
Senator Chambliss. Admiral, your security cooperation
arrangements throughout SOUTHCOM and the Southern Hemisphere in
large part allows you to be successful in your mission. Almost
everything you do at SOUTHCOM is in partnership with other
countries in that region. One of the best ways we have to build
and sustain those partnerships is through WHINSEC. Both
Chairman Levin and I serve on that board at WHINSEC and we have
seen first-hand the value of the training WHINSEC conducts and
the partnerships with our southern allies and what it does to
create that good feeling between our respective countries.
I was pleased to see you mention WHINSEC in your written
statement. If you would amplify as to what your thoughts are on
WHINSEC, and in particular regarding how it helps you carry out
your mission.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I serve on the board of
visitors of WHINSEC along with you and the chairman. Every year
we have about 1,500 students from 23 different countries. It's
a tremendously positive personal contact event for all of them
to come. They come with their families. They spend a year in
Georgia. It's a terrific positive event that will cause them to
be bound with the United States in many ways forever.
So it's an irreplaceable aspect of our security cooperation
down south. There's an extremely high component of human rights
training that goes on in every one of those courses. Between 10
and 35 percent of the time in every course taught there has to
do with human rights, which is a very important part of how we
can share lessons across all of these militaries throughout the
region.
So I'm a very firm believer in it. I'm a satisfied
customer. The U.S. Army runs it, but I'm proud to be on the
board of visitors and I'm proud of the work that goes on down
there. It is fully transparent. I would invite anyone who wants
to, to come and visit at any time, and I'd be glad personally
to facilitate that with the U.S. Army. We don't do it as a dog
and pony show. We'll bring you in there to see a class, to walk
through the classrooms, to walk through the teachers, lessons,
and books. It's a transparent facility that is doing very, very
good work in the region in my opinion.
Senator Chambliss. General McNabb, we have this ongoing
conversation relative to the C-5 and the C-17. I view those
airframes as not being in competition with each other, but as
making a significant complement one to the other. But with
respect to the C-5, all those airframes are old. We keep the
modernization program constantly on the books. The C-17, we're
flying it at 150 percent of the anticipated rate that we
thought we'd be flying it in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now we're
looking at whether or not we're going to continue that line of
C-17s.
What's your thought about where we are from a current
capacity rate with respect to those aircraft and where do we
need to go in the future?
General McNabb. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. Where I sit
is the program of record that has 205 C-17s, re-engining the C-
5Bs and two C-5Cs, and then doing the avionics modernization
program on the C-As, that mix of airplanes satisfies the
requirements that I have, the 33.95 for outsized, oversized
cargo. Then obviously I have the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to
carry the bulk cargo as well.
That came out of the Nunn-McCurdy. They looked at a lot of
options, including additional C-17s or re-engining all the C-
5s, and they came up with this mix. I was part of that as the
vice chief, but also as the AMC commander, so I'm comfortable
that that meets those needs.
We have MCRS-2016 that is in the works right now, about to
be taken to OSD in May. It is looking at the additional things
that have happened since the mobility capability study, the
increase of the ground forces, changed the way we use the
airplanes; as you mentioned the higher usage of the C-17. It's
also looking at the tanker capability and the sealift as well.
So that's the latest study. We'll take a look at that. As
the different studies have gone on, Senator McCaskill tasked
the size and mix of the airlift force and it confirmed the
same, so this mix about works.
The good news on the C-5 re-engine program is the first
three have been delivered to Dover. They're going to go out in
the system and we'll test it out. When I talked to Lockheed, I
said I'd like to have the reliability like we have on the C-17
so that we can get it out and trust that it'll go back and
forth with high reliability. They promised 75 percent as a
minimum. It looks like 81 percent is what the test is showing.
So we'll go out there and wring it out, and I'm really
excited about that complementary capability of those C-5Bs and
C-5Cs that become re-engined will be huge. The C-5As, we'll put
the avionics modernization program and that'll allow it to fly
in the airspace all over the world.
So I think the overall mix we have is about right, unless
something changes. I will say from my standpoint, that more
modern airplanes is better because, if you can trust it, if it
has more reliability, you don't have to put backup airplanes
out there and so forth. Multi-modal also plays well.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. First of all, I want to congratulate Admiral
Stavridis on the rescue of Keith Stansell, Thomas Howes, and
Mark Gonsalves, as well as the 12 other hostages, last July
from the FARC. I can remember watching that shaky video and
just thinking how professional and how remarkable the operation
was, and I can assure you the pride that you felt in watching
that rescue was shared by millions of Americans. It was
certainly a great moment for SOUTHCOM and for our country and
for all of our partners in that mission. I'm just sure it must
have been an extremely gratifying and emotional event for you.
Admiral Stavridis. It was. The Colombian military, which
undertook that operation, is to be highly congratulated in
every sense.
Senator Hagan. Very good.
General Ward, in my hometown in Greensboro, NC, I have a
large number of refugees from the DRC. They talk to me
frequently about their situation and their home and their fears
for their safety, for their family members and associates
there. There is also a situation where if there is a violation
of an immigration status that there's fear that people who are
deported back to the Congo will be murdered when they arrive.
I wondered if you could update us on the security situation
there. Then in addition, I read quite frequently about the use
of rape as a weapon against young women and children and old
women in the Congo. There was a recent article that Bob Herbert
wrote in the New York Times talking about that it's really
hundreds of thousands of victims, and the fact that should they
live the humiliation of themselves and their family members is
widespread.
General Ward. Senator, to be sure the violence that can be
perpetrated against civilian populations in the DRC and other
parts of the continent is absolutely deplorable. We through
various mechanisms are doing our part in providing increased
capacities for these nations to, firstly, deal with these rebel
and renegade groups that operate inside their territories.
As was mentioned recently, the collaboration that exists
between three governments--the Governments of Uganda, the DRC,
and Rwanda--to address the LRA in the eastern Congo was I think
at this point in time something that we should all look at in a
very optimistic way as signaling a degree of cooperation
amongst those regional neighbors to address a common problem
that has done the sorts of things you described as it
terrorizes the populations of those areas.
The use of violence, rape, murders, and other atrocities
that these groups commit against citizens in these areas is
something that we all look at in a very negative way, and to
the degree that we can continue to support efforts to address
that I clearly say we ought to take every opportunity we can to
do so. We do that in conjunction with the Department of State,
with USAID, as they work their activities to help increase the
effectiveness of the institutions of government in those
region. Obviously, our role there as we work with these nations
is increasing their capacity from a security point of view to
deal with that threat that exists.
Programs such as the Defense Institute of International
Legal Studies, where we provide some support to these
institutions and these governments, where in fact they catch
and apprehend folks who have done these crimes and can
prosecute and punish them accordingly, we also support. To be
sure, those are deplorable situations that we pay attention to
and do our best to do something about.
Senator Hagan. It's certainly a horrible thing to read
about and to think that that's happening on a daily basis. It's
most concerning.
I have another question I wanted to ask you, about oil
theft. You discussed the serious problem of oil theft in the
Niger Delta. In your written testimony you stated that in
Nigeria oil exports have been reduced by up to 20 percent due
to banditry, and in a country in which 95 percent of the
foreign exchange earnings come from the oil industry certainly
a 20 percent reduction in exports is a serious blow to that
country's economy.
Can you expand on this problem and what is being done to
address it?
General Ward. The country of Nigeria, Senator, a sovereign
nation, has its own requirement to provide for the security
within its borders. We, through various programs, work with the
Nigerian Government to increase their capacity to in fact deal
with these problems of illegal oil bunkering as well as other
threats against the oil infrastructure there in the Niger
Delta.
We do not get actively involved in activities, but we in
fact are involved in our training work. There is the Africa
Partnership Station, which is a training program where we work
with the nations in the region, the Gulf of Guinea, to increase
their capacity to do several things: first, to detect what goes
on inside their territorial waters; second, to address it in
some common way; and third, to do it in a way that helps to
increase and promote security, such that the work being done by
those in the military and other security forces is in fact work
that contributes to additional security, as opposed to
alienating populations, alienating the local community, et
cetera.
Our programs for increasing their military capabilities
include training, equipment, and common operational procedures
that lead to better interoperability among these nations as
well. That is an ongoing project that we have, working with the
Nigerian Government, but also other governments there in the
Gulf of Guinea to address that problem of illegal bunkering.
I would also add that when effective training for illegal
bunkering happens, it also transfers over into other areas like
illegal fishing, which also robs those nations of a very, very
valuable resource that can be used to support their population.
It also gets to the point that we talked about with SOUTHCOM;
the flow of illegal drugs, trafficking in people. They're all
tied. Our ability to correct those issues is enhanced through
our military-to-military cooperation and military-to-military
support, and training and assistance programs that address
these common threats that exist in the region.
Senator Hagan. If there is such a stealing of the oil,
though, there has to be a distribution network set up to deal
with it. I was just wondering, from a security measure and an
oversight standpoint, do you see this distribution system also?
General Ward. We don't see it in great fashion. I will take
that and get a better answer back to you. But what we do know
is when it does occur it is done through black market channels,
that bunkering that exists. The local population, because of
the wealth distribution, will use that to augment their own
resources that they can bring to account. But it is there. We
don't know the extent to which it goes on in sight of the
government, but unfortunately, it also wastes a lot of the
resource. So in many respects it all goes back and it
contributes to pollution and other negative effects there on
the environment as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
The theft and distribution of Nigerian oil is best characterized as
a combination of black market and legitimate commerce (or ``gray
market''). The stolen (``bunkered'') oil goes into the international
trade along with legitimately-loaded oil. Many of the tankers leaving
the Gulf of Guinea carry a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate oil,
since much of the 100,000+ barrels of oil a day of ``bunkered'' oil is
``paper'' theft, due to deliberate misrepresentation of the amount
actually pumped, loaded, and/or transported. For the portion of stolen
oil that is physically taken from existing pipelines via illegal ``hot
taps'' and subsequently ferried offshore in barges for further
transportation, it is often either mixed with legitimate cargo or put
in separate false/hidden tanks. Since stolen oil and legitimate oil
come from the same wellheads, the stolen oil is very hard to chemically
trace. Regardless of the method used to steal the oil (paper theft or
physical theft), once transported to and off-loaded at foreign
refineries, it vanishes into the worldwide market as refined products,
and some is even re-imported into Nigeria, since Nigeria has little
indigenous refining capability.
The rate of oil theft in Nigeria is at least 100,000 barrels of oil
per day and likely higher. A small portion of the stolen oil is sold
directly on the open market in Nigeria since the sweet, light crude
from the Niger Delta can be burned directly in diesel or gas engines
with minimal refinement. Tracking stolen oil and the proceeds from its
trade is extremely difficult. Endemic corruption at multiple levels of
government and within the oil industry facilitates the trade and
frustrates tracking and prosecution.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all very much for your service to our
country.
General Renuart, I wanted to come back to the issue of air
sovereignty for just a moment. In your prepared testimony you
discuss the impact that retiring legacy fighters will have on
air sovereignty operations and highlight the importance of
continuing planned recapitalization programs. According to a
GAO report released in January, even under F-22 and F-35
fielding schedules an air sovereignty alert fighter gap will
exist by 2015. Added to this, the GAO report states that the
Air Force has requested the Secretary of Defense's approval
to accelerate the retirement of over 300 F-15s and F-16s
in the fiscal year 2010 budget, many of which are performing
alert duties.
If approved, retiring these aircraft earlier than is
currently planned will likely begin affecting air sovereignty
alert operations in the near term. I guess my question is, do
you agree with the GAO's findings that by 2015 some of the
units that are currently performing air sovereignty alert
operations will no longer have aircraft with which to perform
that mission?
General Renuart. The GAO report took a good hard look at
the air sovereignty mission, both from the operator standpoint,
our perspective, and the service provider's perspective. I
think that their point is well taken, that if we don't make
some clear decisions now that we will see a gap out there in
the future, given the current sustained role of air sovereignty
missions.
I've made the strong case that that level should continue
for the foreseeable future and I think have support from DOD to
continue that mission. Given that, then we have to build some
bridge strategies that will allow us to ensure that the basic
requirements for this mission are met. But as a joint service
activity, I can pull that from a variety of different possible
service providers. Certainly the Navy has the capability, as do
the Marines, as well as the Air Force.
The Air Force is working very aggressively to build that
strategy. We are being very supportive of them in terms of the
key requirements for air sovereignty to continue in the future.
I think we still have a little work to do in terms of having a
firm plan to sustain this over time.
I mentioned earlier to Senator Chambliss I think there's a
bridge capacity that needs to be created, and General Schwartz
and his team are working on that now. Until I see the results
of that, I'd be careful to be too definitive in an assessment
at this point, Senator.
Senator Thune. Do you foresee units that currently don't
have a full-time alert mission, say for example the South
Dakota Air National Guard, picking up a full-time alert mission
in order to mitigate that fighter gap? Is going to some of the
Guard units a possibility?
General Renuart. Yes, Senator, I think absolutely. As we
get a better sense of what that recapitalization line will look
like, whether it is refreshing existing aircraft or upgrading
radars and the like on existing aircraft, there will also be a
discussion, I think, on moving this mission around to a variety
of units. Certainly we have done that. As Ellington Field Joint
Reserve Base drew down its F-16 missions, we relied on Tulsa
and other units to come in and fill that gap. So certainly we
will continue to meet the requirement, and that's the bottom
line for us.
We're comfortable with any of our Guard units. It requires
some training, but we can do that and have them pick up the
mission as it may be required.
Senator Thune. As I'm sure you know, we would love to
continue to have a discussion with you about that where South
Dakota's concerned.
Admiral, a question for you regarding the January 22, 2009,
executive order to close the detention facilities at Guantanamo
Bay within 1 year, in which the President also ordered an
immediate review of all of those detention facilities. The
review I think mandated certain participants be included, one
of which was the Attorney General, who's responsible for
coordinating the review, as well as the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others.
Additional review participants can be designated by the
Attorney General. As the regional combatant commander
responsible for the military's JTF in Guantanamo, you have
valuable first-hand expertise on how dangerous some of these
detainees are and the requirements for their proper
disposition. I guess my question is: Has the Attorney General
requested you or any of your subordinates to take part in the
administration's review of all Guantanamo detentions?
Admiral Stavridis. He has not asked me personally. Attorney
General Holder came down almost immediately upon taking office
and spent a great deal of time on the ground in Guantanamo Bay.
He had very detailed discussions with the two-star admiral
who's down there. I think he has a full-sight picture. We stand
ready to answer any questions that are posed by the Secretary.
Senator Thune. Could you in your knowledge of those
discussions that were held provide any details about perhaps
dealing with the proposal that might transfer Guantanamo Bay
detainees into facilities in the United States? Are you
familiar with the discussions?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir. Those are not really in my
purview. My job is to provide humane, transparent, and legal
care to the detainees, and we do that every day in accordance
with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and the Detainee
Treatment Act, which is U.S. law, and we'll continue to do
that. But disposition is outside of my purview.
Senator Thune. I compliment you on the treatment that you
do provide. I think everything I understand is very good in
terms of all the things the detainees are permitted to do, the
way that they're cared for, the opportunities they have to
worship, and everything else. I think the issue is that over
the course of this next year as this study is completed, that
will concern many Members of Congress is, if in fact they are
not housed or stationed at Guantanamo, what will be the
alternative, and would that entail putting them somewhere here
in the United States?
There are a couple of bases in particular that have been
mentioned, both of which I think the delegations from those
States would find objectionable. But as you perhaps know, there
was a vote in the Senate last year, a 94 to 3 vote, that that
not be a solution.
So as this process plays out, to the degree that you are
apprised of what's happening and could share any details about
that with this committee, there will be a very high level of
interest, I can assure you, in Congress about that.
So thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to commend our distinguished panel for all the
work that you do on behalf of the people of this great country
and the people of the world. So congratulations, gentlemen.
I'm going to really focus, in the interest of time, on two
of the commands. I noted that the three geographic commands all
addressed interagency cooperation in the statements and
specifically a new interagency organizational model at SOUTHCOM
and AFRICOM. I'm interested in how success with interagency
organizations' inclusion can be used in other commands. I'm
also very interested in the future of AFRICOM, and in
TRANSCOM's response to increased fuel prices and any piracy
concerns related to our transportation assets.
Let me begin with my question to SOUTHCOM. I understand
that the USNS Comfort, a Navy hospital ship, has its home port
in Baltimore. It's preparing to deploy next week for a 4-month
humanitarian assistance mission through Latin America and the
Caribbean. The hulking hospital ship, three football fields
long and one wide, which must be a monster, will deliver
medical, dental, veterinarian, and engineering assistance in
support of the mission Continuing Promise. This mission is
SOUTHCOM's fourth in as many years, and the public diplomacy
value of a visit by the Comfort is immeasurable, according to
DOD and State Department officials.
So Admiral, have the nations receiving assistance from the
Comfort expressed any concern, about the visit of the Comfort?
What is their reaction to that service coming to them?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, it's been overwhelmingly positive.
Comfort made a voyage 2 summers ago and did 400,000 patient
treatments through 12 different countries. The public response
to that was extremely positive in each of the nations, and we
have very detailed information about that and I'd be glad to
share that with you as a matter of record. In fact, I'd like
to.
This summer's voyage of the Comfort for that reason is
called Continuing Promise. The first one was The Promise
because it was the first time we were lucky enough to have a
hospital ship, and this year's voyage is to show that we want
to continue those good effects.
It's important to note that this is a ship that's full of
nongovernmental volunteer organizations, such as Operation
Hope, for example, one of our partners. It has full interagency
cooperation. It's very tied into and supportive of the
individual country teams. It functions under the direction of
the ambassador when it gets into the individual port. It has
been received with open arms in every port visit it's gone to
in the past, and we anticipate the same this summer, sir.
Senator Burris. Thank you.
Let me go to AFRICOM. I noted that you've addressed the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) treatment program in Africa,
but no other broad-spectrum military treatment. General Ward,
what consideration has your command given to securing a visit
from the hospital ship? Is that ship going to head for any
African ports?
General Ward. Senator, clearly, given the success that the
hospital ship program has had in other geographic commands, we
too are looking at it as an augmentation to our security
cooperation and the benefits that we can provide to the
continent of Africa. Of the nations in Africa, there are
currently five that have the capacity to bring that large
vessel into port. Most of them are on the Mediterranean, and so
therefore what we have done in the meantime, as we continue to
pursue the benefits of the hospital ship, is to incorporate
those like capabilities aboard our Africa Partnership Station,
bringing medical, dental, and veterinary treatment, as well as
providing a platform for training the regional medical
personnel to embark upon those platforms when they are in their
geographical areas along the coastline, receive training, treat
local residents, and then continue on.
We do see this as a viable option and as we conduct our
security cooperation planning efforts in the future we see the
hospital ship program as one that we too would like to take
advantage of as we continue to provide this type of support to
our African friends.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, if I could just add to concur
completely with General Ward. This was a subject of discussion
between AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM at the staff talks that I
mentioned earlier. We learned a lot from how General Ward's
folks are doing what he calls Africa Partnership Stations,
which is a terrific program. We want to try some of those
things. Hopefully he had a chance to look at the hospital ship
program. It's a good example of how we're trying to cooperate
amongst ourselves here to be efficient.
Senator Burris. Regarding AFRICOM's headquarters location,
upon the command's establishment there was speculation that
AFRICOM might be permanently located in Europe or in the United
States. Some have argued that AFRICOM's headquarters should be
located in Africa. I understand it's in Stuttgart, Germany. Is
that any hindrance to the service that you can give the
continent of Africa, General Ward?
General Ward. Senator, at this time it is not a hindrance.
As we stood the command up--and this occurred about a year
ago--the location that we had there in Stuttgart, Germany,
provided the facilities, the geographic locational relationship
that we need as we work with our European partners, as well as
working with the nations of Africa.
The continent is obviously so large, wherever the
headquarters is, quite candidly, sir, we would be going
someplace else, as reflected in the tremendous travel that I do
on a weekly basis throughout the continent of Africa.
Right now, where we are works for the command. Our focus,
our priority, is to show our African friends, show our
international as well as interagency partners, that the
creation of the command is enhancing the delivery of security
assistance programs on the continent. The headquarters location
at the current time is not a factor in our ability to do that
in an increasingly effective way.
As time goes on, I'm sure that this decision might be
revisited. But at the current time it does not at all impede
the ability that we want to have and the results we want to
have, and that is increasing the capacity of these African
nations through our robust military-to-military programs, as
well as our other military support activities.
Senator Burris. My time has expired, but just one quick
question for General McNabb. Is there any problem with piracy
in the transportation of our assets?
General McNabb. Yes, Senator. We are doing a couple things.
On our MSC ships and ships that they charter, we have security
teams that are aboard them. For our other commercial liners, we
work with MARAD to make sure that they know the latest
techniques and how to link in with Combined Task Force-151,
make sure that they are working very well, especially ships
that are more at risk, ones that are slower and have a lower
freeboard. We've also offered to those companies anti-piracy
assessment teams that could help them and say: Hey, if you
encounter this, here are some things that you can do in terms
of tactics, techniques, and procedures.
So it is one that I'm concerned with. I really like how the
interagency has worked together on and with MARAD and the Navy
in particular, and then with both CENTCOM and AFRICOM. All of
that has played out very well.
Senator Burris. Mr. Chairman, I have some more questions,
but I'll just submit them. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Burris.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I'm sorry I had to leave during the hearing. I
had a meeting in my office, but I did follow a good bit of the
hearing when I wasn't here on the television screen in my
office.
First of all, I'd like to say I appreciate all of your
willingness to come by and talk to us personally and our staff.
It's been very valuable to explore some issues that we're not
going to be able to go into in a whole lot of depth today. But
I do want to follow up on a number of those.
I watched the exchange between Senator Reed and the Admiral
and General Renuart on the shipment of guns. I'd just like to
raise a cautionary voice here, that we really need to be
careful that we're not understating the problem that we are
facing along our border and in the country, or causing people
to view it in an improper context, that this is simply gun show
loophole, guns going down there, and basically, we're arming
the threat that we face.
It's much, much more sophisticated than that. We're
talking, just with the Mexican drug cartel, a business that
runs about a $25 billion profit, from what I've seen. They're
highly trained. A lot of these individuals are former Mexican
army soldiers, some of whom were trained by our own special
forces. Their tactics are very sophisticated. You don't get a
rocket-propelled grenade, an automatic weapon, or a hand
grenade at a gun show. So we need to make sure that people
understand that as we're discussing, what we're going to do
about it.
There have also been some exchanges here talking mainly
about the situation on the border, and I think it's important
for people to understand that this is not simply a Mexican
problem and it's not simply a border problem. What we have seen
along the border has illuminated the problem for a lot of
people in this country, but it's a national security problem.
The Mexican cartels by the evidence that I have seen are
operating in 230 American cities right now. There were reports
that the outdoor marijuana plantations in California--by the
way, marijuana is now the number one cash crop in California;
it just outstripped wine about a year and a half ago--are run
principally by the Mexican drug cartels.
So we have a situation and it's transnational, which,
Admiral, you used in your testimony a couple of different
places. I've been trying to get that word in the lexicon as
well. But it's also transcommand here, because so much of it
initiates in your command, but so much of the response is going
to have to come out of your command, General.
So my question really is, at what point does a
transnational organized criminal threat become an insurgency or
something tantamount to an insurgency? If so, what do we do
about it?
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely we should make no
mistake, this is a transnational, very complex, well-
integrated, apparatus. It flows from the sources, some of which
are in South America, certainly to the distributors, many of
which are here in our country.
You are correct in saying that there is a presence in our
Nation in hundreds of our cities. In fact, just a week and a
half ago, the Drug Enforcement Agency announced some fairly
significant efforts that they had concluded, yielding the
arrest of some 700 distributors, and these were distributors in
our country, not the cartel members in Mexico.
So this is a problem that we have to deal with. You are
absolutely correct to say that the Mexican drug cartels are
much like an insurgent organization. They are well-trained,
they're well-equipped. Their tactics are good. Those in the
Gulf cartel area are some of the most sophisticated around.
Having said that, we need to ensure that we have created an
interagency capacity that can start at the source and continue
all the way through the retailer, if you will. Our role is to
ensure that Jim's folks and ours are integrated each day. We do
that through his JIATF-South and my JTF-North. We both partner
with the full interagency effort and we are as supportive as we
can be.
I think that, as we come further to the border, our role is
to then help the Mexican military, who is the principal element
of the law enforcement effort. The lack of corruption in the
Mexican military is noteworthy. They are carrying this role for
their government.
As we move to the border, we partner with our law
enforcement to help identify and stem the flow as much as we're
able. Then of course, the law enforcement has the retail
element there.
So I think this is an effort that will require even closer,
more aggressive work, but it is one that is significant.
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with Gene's remarks. Senator, I
agree with your comments. I believe that, as I mentioned
earlier, sir, this is really about finding a supply chain,
understanding it, reverse engineering it, and killing it.
That's the process we need to undertake. To do that, we need
international and interagency cooperation.
Sir, I'd love to get you down, or any member of the
committee, to JIATF-South, JTF-North, and we'll show you how
these seams fit together. It's been something we've been
working very hard.
Senator Webb. For our purposes, I think we may be looking
at the necessity of a more robust Federal response. I think
we're going to have to have that debate up here.
General McNabb, when you and I visited in my office, we
were talking about the alternative supply routes into
Afghanistan. You addressed a good bit of that today. I have two
thoughts for you. One is, and this is for the record, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to see a comparison of the cost and the
time and the load capability of the different approaches that
we are now taking.
[The information referred to follows:]
We believe we can deliver 100 containers per day into Afghanistan
using the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) whereas approximately 150
containers per day can be delivered via the Pakistan Ground Lines of
Communication (PAK GLOC). The cost and timing estimates are based on
approximately 190 containers being delivered via the NDN to date and
over 13,000 containers delivered via the PAK GLOC in the past 6 months.
For containers originating in Continental United States, the NDN
Russian route costs $17,600 per container and currently performing at
59 days from booking to date of delivery. The PAK GLOC costs $5,900 per
container and is currently performing at 95 days.
For containers originating in Germany, the NDN Russian route costs
$16,200 per container and currently performing at 45 days from booking
to date of delivery. The PAK GLOC costs $5,100 per container and is
currently performing at 88 days.
Initial NDN costs are based on 120-day quotes from our commercial
partners. Competition and volume should contribute to lower rates over
time. The biggest reason for the cost differential is longer ocean
transit for the Pakistan route as compared to the NDN routes. This
factor drives the difference in overall cost because ocean transport
costs less than surface segments. The additional cost provides for
better velocity as NDN's transit time will be half of PAK GLOCs.
Senator Webb. In other words, what we are moving through
Pakistan right now. Per container, what's the cost of moving it
that way, what's the time, what's the volume that we are able
to move over a period of time, say a quarter, 3 months,
whatever it is, from the different approaches that we're
taking? If you could give that to us, I would appreciate being
able to look at it.
General McNabb. Senator, if I can give you a rough order of
magnitude cost. We do it by container for the land.
Senator Webb. You don't have to say container, but what I'm
trying to do is to get something that's measurable, where we
can look in a logical way at what these changes are going to do
to the resupply pattern in there.
The second question I would have is, there's been a lot of
discussion and a lot of verbiage on the Internet about some
NATO countries moving supplies through Iran, making a deal
there. Do you know what stage that approach has reached?
General McNabb. Senator, I do not, and we are not in any
way contemplating using Iran.
Senator Webb. I understand the United States is not, but
it's been widely reported that other NATO countries are.
General McNabb. I saw that General Craddock, in his role in
NATO, is saying that if individual countries want to negotiate
that. That's what I saw as well. I would just tell you that
we're not in any way thinking about Iran, for all the reasons
that you and I talked in your office.
Senator Webb. Right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Webb, I was late because I was at a Judiciary
Committee hearing on the Mexico matter. We've had Customs and
the attorney general from Arizona and others. I concluded
fundamentally the best thing we can do to help Mexico is to dry
up these organizations, as Admiral Stavridis indicated. They
are flowing money back in huge amounts, so it gives them the
power. If we target those we would help Mexico a lot.
They're doing a lot better. I believe a lot of the violence
is because Calderon is standing up to these guys and taking
them on. If he'll stay at it, I believe they'll be as
successful as President Uribe in Colombia. But it's life and
death. They'll kill you, and it's a dangerous bunch. He has to
break that group because it threatens the good and decent
people of Mexico and their ability to have a good government.
General McNabb, on the tanker, this is such an important
issue. It remains the Air Force's number one acquisition
priority, is that correct? You have to be responsible for all
of that in TRANSCOM. Aren't a lot of these aircraft 50 years
old or more in age?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. The KC-135s are Eisenhower-era
tankers. By the time they start being replaced, it'd be 50
years.
Senator Sessions. So it's been a priority for how many
years now?
General McNabb. Senator Sessions, starting in 1999 when I
was the Air Force programmer we were working hard on the
replacement to the KC-135.
Senator Sessions. So we're about 10 years off and we still
haven't gotten there. I hope that we can get there. I believe
it's possible.
I will just add for my colleagues' sake that it was
reported that the Northrop Grumman-EADS aircraft that was going
to be built in my home State of Alabama by American citizens
was 25 percent less expensive than the competing aircraft, 17
years later, newer in design, and had larger capacity and
capability, which is why I assume the Air Force chose it in the
competitive process.
So where we go and how we get there I don't know, but it
would be folly and damaging to the integrity of our entire
acquisition process if somehow politics caused us to do
something that's not right. We ordered that thing bid. It ought
to go to the best bidder. If we have to we can analyze a dual
situation perhaps and see how that comes out, but in the long
run we need to get the best aircraft for the best people, and I
think you correctly decided that.
General Renuart, you remain committed, do you not, and the
military does, to the completion of the deployment of the 44
missiles in Alaska and a few in California that would complete
the anti-missile system, that would provide protection against
a limited missile attack?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, we do. That 44 production rate
is the number we remain committed to.
Senator Sessions. We have what, 26 now already in the
ground?
General Renuart. We have 26 operational silos, Senator.
We've moved some in and out to do maintenance and that sort of
thing, but yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. All I would just say is, yes, this has
been 20, 30 years of research and development. These systems do
work. I'm absolutely convinced that if a missile were launched
from North Korea, as they're talking about launching, and it
came all the way to the United States, that this system would
effectively knock it out of the air.
General Renuart. Senator, I am confident that with the
capabilities that are designed into the system, the various
radars and sensors, it would give us good enough information
against that single target to be successful.
Senator Sessions. I think so, too. There are costs, are
there not, if you were to substantially reduce the assembly
line production of those missiles? Wouldn't we probably have
contract penalties to pay and wouldn't it end up costing more
per launch vehicle than we would if we went on and completed
it?
General Renuart. Senator, I think General O'Reilly, the
Director of MDA who owns that process, is better suited to give
you specifics. But my sense would be that any time you stop a
contract there are costs to that. So my sense would be in this
case that there would be some costs.
Senator Sessions. We're more than halfway there and I think
we need to just go on and complete that.
Now, with regard to the proposed site in Europe, this is a
matter I think of real importance. This is not a small thing.
We've asked our friends in Poland and in the Czech Republic to
participate in a system that would defend virtually all of
Europe and the United States from attacks from Iran, and
they've gone along with us on that. I am, I have to say,
disturbed, troubled, worried that some of the politicians are
now talking about making a deal with the Russians and maybe
they'll promise us something and we won't go forward with this
site, maybe.
Is that your pay grade?
General Renuart. Senator, you've just jumped it up about
three above me.
Senator Sessions. At any rate, we spent all these years
doing the system. Now, with regard to a system that would be
deployed in Europe, isn't the key thing in all of these systems
the guidance system that's on the nose of the rocket? Isn't
that the most complicated and critical component? We have a lot
of missiles, but the question is whether we can guide it to the
collision point; isn't that right?
General Renuart. Yes, sir. I'm not an expert on the
technical means, but I would tell you that the success of this
capability is based in the system of systems. It is the radar
sensors. It certainly is the guidance system on the missile. It
is the ability to update that in transit. It's the
collaboration of the many space and land-based, I call them
radars, although some are different kinds of capabilities. All
of those together give you the precision that allows you to
strike a target in space in that regard.
So it is, as we've mentioned with Senator Levin, the
combination of all of these that can give us success.
Senator Sessions. We've proven, I think, in the Pacific
that we have the radar systems that all come together so
fantastically, and the guidance system to make that thing work.
I guess all I'm saying is that, with regard to the European
site, we're talking about a two-stage rocket instead of a
three-stage rocket that we have in Alaska and California. In
many ways, isn't that really a simpler launch system?
I know we have to test it, but it's not a quantum leap
forward. If you have the guidance system, in theory at least it
should be simpler to have a two-stage system than a three.
General Renuart. Senator, I'd like to defer that to Pat
O'Reilly.
Senator Sessions. You just need to agree with me that it's
logical. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. You're doing really well, General. Stick to
your guns. [Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. That's the logical thing. We may have to
test it and prove it, but a two-stage system is certainly not
something we can't perfect. We've perfected a three-stage which
is more complex.
I would say this for the record. I believe that independent
sovereign nations that were once part of the Soviet empire are
independent sovereign nations. They have a right to decide who
they sign treaties with. They have a right to decide what kind
of defense systems they'll deploy in their nations. I think we
ought to be prepared to defend that and not be taking any
action that might be interpreted as an affirmation of Russia
that they have the right to tell these countries how to conduct
their defense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last, not a bad place to be, although a lot of material I
wanted to talk about has been covered by other Senators, and I
will not go back over it. I know that the study that we asked
for on the C-17 and the C-5 is pending and we're anxious to get
the information from that as soon as it's available. We have
not yet seen any information from that.
There are some bad habits we have in Congress, and that is
a tendency to be very parochial when it comes to you buying
things. I have to confess my parochial interest, obviously, in
the C-17. It's pretty obvious, I represent Missouri. Boeing is
an important employer in my State.
What is confusing to me is when it seems like you may not
be asking for things because you know that there's enough
political will to give it to you anyway as an add-on. I guess
my question is, if we're utilizing the C-17 at 159 percent--I
mean, we're just flying the wings off of those things--why are
you not asking for more? Could it be that you're encouraging
our bad habits in terms of being parochial by knowing that if
you don't ask for it we're all going to pile in and put it in
the budget anyway?
General McNabb. Senator, I hope we are not. I will only say
that from the standpoint of any of these, you start with the
requirement. You will look at a number of different options,
and it really is competition that will come up with the best
mix. My responsibility as TRANSCOM Commander is to take a look
at everything that goes in and say, okay, does this meet what I
need to do for the combatant commanders that I support? As long
as it does, what we'll try to do is make sure that you get the
most cost-effective mix that actually meets those needs.
It really does depend on that competition, on the cost, for
instance the re-engining of the C-5 vice how much does a new C-
17 cost. That's what they did in the Nunn-McCurdy. They brought
that all together and said, hey, there's lots of different ways
of doing this, and they brought everybody together and came up
with, okay, here's the fleet mix that we think makes the most
sense both for the warfighter and the taxpayer.
I was part of that. I would say that it was very open. They
went through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which is
all the Vice Chiefs of the Services, reconfirmed the
requirements, made sure that we have that right, and then
turned that over to, in this case, John Young, who is
overseeing that, and said: ``Okay, here's all the parts of the
puzzle; let's come up with the best mix overall.''
I think that, hopefully, we are the honest brokers to come
back and say: ``Hey, this is the best overall way to do this,
and of course that's what you see in the program of record.''
Senator McCaskill. I'll be anxious to see the results of
the study. I want us all to break these bad habits and I want
to make sure that you're not enabling us by maybe not being as
forthcoming with what the real needs are and by the way you put
this thing together. There's a lot of habits we have that are
really hard to break and we don't need enablers. So help us
with that.
I particularly am interested that the plan to do the
Avionics Modernization Program on the C-5 ended up being
obviously way more expensive. It's another one of those
textbook cases of incredible cost overruns. I don't want to be
a Monday morning quarterback here. I don't think that's fair.
But looking back, I'm not sure that modernization program was,
frankly, the best bang for the buck since it's turned out to be
way too many bucks.
Let me talk a little bit about the Iraq drawdown as it
relates to equipment. What kind of plan is in place in terms of
what's coming back? What about the rolling stock versus the
white property? What I'm really concerned about in terms of the
contracting is, how much is walking away with our contractors,
and what's on top of that? Who's paying attention to our
inventory?
We've had problems with our inventory over there, whether
it's guns or other things. Obviously, that's been a big issue
for us, and I'm concerned. Who's in charge of getting our stuff
back and making sure contractors don't call it their own when
it's not theirs?
General McNabb. Obviously, CENTCOM is putting together
their plan on how they will bring that back, and they are
sorting out now what they are going to bring back, what they
are going to leave behind maybe for the Iraqis, or what they
are going to move to Afghanistan. So they're going through all
of that.
I will say, the oversight of the contracting, making sure
that's all done, is under CENTCOM's purview. I would say that
what they do with us is they say, okay, here's how much we
think we're going to bring out. I make sure that on the supply
chain side, not only the transportation but also the
distribution network, that I have plenty of lift to be able to
do that.
Senator McCaskill. You've not gotten any heads-up yet about
what kind of lift you need to start to begin to expect over the
next 18 months to 2 years?
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am, they have. I want to make sure
that we were not a long pole in the tent and we are not. We
have plenty of lift, especially because of our commercial
partners. As long as we give notice of what's available, our
U.S. flag industry, both air and sea, is actually tremendous if
you can give them advance requirements, and obviously we can
use that. It's one of the great advantages we have, and that's
cheaper than using military-unique type vessels.
So I think that right now I know that we are not the long
pole in the tent. The big part there is just to say, hey, as
soon as you have it really definitized let us get that out to
the market and then we can get it even cheaper on the market as
well.
Senator McCaskill. The cost-benefit as to whether we leave
it or bring it back is being done by CENTCOM?
General McNabb. The Services. So for instance, if it's on
the equipment it'll be CENTCOM as the combatant commander
working with their Service components, to say, okay, how do you
want to do that. What might we also do in prepositioning and
leave it in theater for that, all of that's being worked out.
Senator McCaskill. I just want to know whose shoulder I
need to look over, because I'd like to pay attention to that. I
think we've learned some lessons. I just want to make sure
we've learned them.
General McNabb. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. General Renuart, as we talk about the
National Guard and equipment, it seems to me that there is this
rub between civilian needs of equipment and military needs. I
think probably it varies with each Guard how much they're drawn
to almost a seduction of getting all the military equipment as
it relates to that side of their responsibility, which is huge
now since they've become more operational as opposed to
strategic.
On the other hand, I know what a Humvee costs and I know
what a pickup truck costs or a passenger van, and I know in our
State, in terms of their domestic mission in terms of ice
storms and flooding that it is not major flooding where you
need a vehicle that goes through water, you need to transport
people. I'm worried that we're spending big, big, big money on
Humvees when a real good sport utility vehicle for a fraction
of the cost is what we should be buying.
Would you comment on that?
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. The Guard has their
principal deployment mission, and it is a significant one. So
we need to ensure that they are adequately and properly
equipped and trained for that mission. In my role overseeing
what I'll call the support to civil authorities and homeland
security mission, we look at the capabilities that each of our
partners in the National Guard have and look at what might be
used out of that operational pool, because you don't have to
buy anything else and you don't overuse the equipment to a
degree. We also look at maybe some unique capabilities that
really only apply to that mission.
You're absolutely right, in your State certainly tornadoes
and floods and ice storms, but also planning for a large
earthquake, the New Madrid Fault is a huge issue along all of
the border States of the Mississippi and Missouri Valley.
So we try to advocate for those unique pieces of equipment,
things like portable cell phone towers, interoperable
communications devices that allow law enforcement and Active
Duty and Guard military to talk to each other. We try to make
sure those are included in the funding lines either of the
State or of the DOD budget to provide to those States.
So we are sensitive to your concerns. We try not to buy
Cadillacs when a Jeep will do.
Senator McCaskill. It's like Apache versus Chinook. We have
Apache helicopters in our Guard and I'm like, do we need those
in Missouri? We need to take people in them.
General Renuart. Yes, ma'am. So as we continue this road
map with the National Guard, it is a partnership. Craig
McKinley and I talk about this on a routine basis. He works
with the Services for those operational force requirements. He
and I work together with the Services on those homeland
security kinds of things. We try to be good stewards of that.
But we do try to take advantage of the equipment that they
already have so that we don't procure new equipment just for
the unique mission that they might have in the homeland.
Senator McCaskill. I would just encourage you to muscle up
on your side.
General Renuart. We will do that, yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. I think if you muscle up on your side
it's going to in the long run give our folks the equipment they
need day-to-day in terms of what they're doing. Not that they
don't need some of the other, but I just think that if the
pendulum is going to naturally swing away from the dual use
equipment, I hope you keep advocating, because it's obviously
much less expensive and desperately needed.
General Renuart. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely, we will.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We're not going to be able to have a second round, but the
record will be open for questions. If Senator McCaskill has no
other questions, there's no one else here to ask; I will bang
the gavel. Thank you very much for your testimony. It was very,
very helpful.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
drug-related violence in mexico
1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Stavridis, according to a press release,
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) disrupted the flow of more than 200 metric
tons of cocaine in 2008. You have made great strides in the SOUTHCOM
area of responsibility (AOR). From your experience in SOUTHCOM, how can
the Department of Defense (DOD) best utilize its diplomatic, military,
and economic power to minimize U.S. impact from the drug-related
violence in Mexico?
Admiral Stavridis. No single action will eliminate the flow of
illegal drugs into our cities or illegal drug use in our Nation.
Countering this threat requires coordinated U.S. and international
effort against all aspects of the illicit narcotics industry--
education, treatment, cultivation, production, transportation, and
consumption--to fully attack this complex problem.
SOUTHCOM works closely with Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to
counterillicit trafficking and its effects in Mexico. Central America,
as a transit-zone for narcotics trafficking on its way to Mexico, is
also facing similar challenges. We appreciate Congress' continued
support of the Merida Initiative, which includes funds for both Mexico
and Central America.
Mexico's military is currently the most effective element combating
the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating within their
borders, and while the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements
of a whole-of-government approach are essential to success, NORTHCOM's
most significant contribution is in strengthening the operational
capacity of the Mexican Army and Naval forces. This goes beyond
providing the hardware and associated training that puts its military
on an equal tactical footing with the DTOs. Our engagement should also
focus on developing the ability to analyze and share the intelligence
that allows the Mexican military to rapidly and effectively interdict
critical capabilities within the DTOs' apparatus in order to
systematically dismantle the organizations perpetrating the violence.
Leveraging the renewed sense of gravity of this situation, we continue
to assure Mexico that we are committed to a long-term security
partnership that benefits both nations. The most significant
consideration in determining military ways and means is to work with
our Mexican and U.S. Government partners to provide support to their
efforts.
africa command efforts
2. Senator Akaka. General Ward, I recognize the increasing
strategic significance of Africa and believe that Africa will pose one
of the greatest potential challenges to global security. At this point,
how do the people of Africa and other foreign countries in the region
perceive Africa Command (AFRICOM) efforts in the region?
General Ward. Most African nations welcome AFRICOM's assistance in
reaching their goals for security forces that are legitimate and
professional.
We try to have our best understanding of our partners--their
culture, environment, history, traditions, et cetera. Those things help
build our relationships, and increase Africans' trust and confidence in
our command.
Africans see us as partners and allies. The focus of AFRICOM is on
our programs.
The good will generated by the election of U.S. President Barack
Obama has created a more positive and receptive environment for
AFRICOM. AFRICOM has reached French, Lusophone, and English-speaking
audiences through media venues including BBC, Al Jazeera, Africarama
Magazine, VOA, and local media.
Over the past 2 years, media coverage of AFRICOM has become
somewhat less critical. Media analysts attribute this trend to
AFRICOM's efforts to communicate the command's mission, goals, and
objectives to our African partners.
Overall, media analysis over the past year has suggested that
Africans are more receptive to AFRICOM than they were in 2007 when the
command was first announced.
evacuation standards in afghanistan
3. Senator Akaka. General McNabb, according to previous testimony
from Secretary Gates, the goal in Iraq is to have a wounded soldier in
a hospital within 1 hour. However, in Afghanistan, that time is closer
to 2 hours. As we continue to send additional troops to Afghanistan, we
need to make sure the necessary medical support is available in
theater. In your opinion, what is the greatest challenge to improving
evacuation standards in Afghanistan?
General McNabb. Senator, in my opinion, the challenge in
Afghanistan is one of distance, terrain, and altitude, along with the
dispersion of medical support, aviation resources, and combat forces.
Although the evacuation of wounded from the battlefield is a Service
responsibility, Central Command (CENTCOM), in concert with the Services
is increasing forces and aviation assets in theater to support the
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) mission in Afghanistan. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) is currently engaged in transporting these
additional helicopter units and forces to theater, and will continue to
support CENTCOM and the Services as they provide a more robust MEDEVAC
capability to meet the needs of the warfighter.
operation deep freeze
4. Senator Akaka. General McNabb, in your prepared statement, you
mentioned TRANSCOM's support of Operation Deep Freeze. As you know and
experienced in Operation Deep Freeze, Hawaii and the rest of the
Pacific theater are unique because we have to deal with the tyranny of
distance. How would you assess TRANSCOM's current ability to support
the humanitarian assistance and operational missions in the Pacific
theater as it relates to your current forward basing strategy of air,
land, and sea mobility assets?
General McNabb. TRANSCOM has the ability to meet all humanitarian
assistance and operational missions in the Pacific theater in
relationship to the current forward basing strategy of air, land, and
sea mobility assets. For example, in February 2008, Hawaii- and Alaska-
based C-17s delivered 225,000 pounds of food, medicine, and cold-
weather supplies to Shanghai, China, to provide relief for Chinese
citizens across 19 provinces during their most severe winter in 50
years. Within 18 hours of the Secretary of Defense's mission approval,
18 cargo pallets were delivered to mainland China. In May and June
2008, Yokota Air Base C-130s delivered 1.3 million pounds of relief
supplies to Burma in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis that caused
tremendous devastation and tragic loss of life.
Global Reach allows TRANSCOM to bridge the distances in the Pacific
to deliver effects in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. Basing Air
Force C-17 airlift assets in Alaska and Hawaii shows the increased
emphasis TRANSCOM puts on improving our ability to respond more rapidly
in this region. Bases in Alaska and Hawaii serve as critical components
for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or combat operations. In
addition, C-17s in Hawaii and Alaska have brought unprecedented levels
of organic, flexible airlift to the warfighter. Hawaii- and Alaska-
based C-17s are strategically co-located with Army units, allowing
PACOM to respond immediately with a joint force to any type of
contingency worldwide. Likewise, KC-135 tankers permanently based in
Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan, as well as rotational tankers on Guam, make
up the air bridge required to move fighters, bombers, and other assets
throughout the theater. In short, they allow us to dissuade, deter,
and, if necessary, defeat any potential adversaries. Forward based
aerial port squadrons and detachments throughout the theater from
Alaska to Diego Garcia and Perth, Australia ensure ready support for
strategic airlift movements in support of national interests.
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command's forward basing in
Hawaii, Alaska, Japan, and Korea ensure quick execution of surface
movements originating both within and outside of the theater. This
capability ensures timely movement of heavy forces for both contingency
and humanitarian support. Their strength comes with strong commercial
partnership with strategic sealift liner services provided by U.S. flag
carriers and ground transportation provided by U.S. military units and
contracted services.
Rounding out TRANSCOM's forward posture, the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) provides in-theater, Pacific Rim, command and control of
sealift ready to meet any challenge offered. MSC's presence in
Singapore, Korea, Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and other strategic locations
ensures hands-on availability. They have strong ties to our commercial
partners to contract sealift capabilities on short notice when
required. MSC is also positioned to respond with government controlled
vessels to include large medium speed roll-on/roll-off vessels
strategically stationed in 3 locations on the west coast of the United
States and to activate over 14 Ready Reserve Force vessels including
roll-on/roll-off and crane ship capabilities. Whether it's contracting
ferry support from a foreign nation in a time of crisis for non-
combatant evacuation operations or working with indigenous maritime
resources to execute short notice cargo charters, the MSC is ready to
carry out any mission in the Pacific theater.
TRANSCOM continually reviews readiness of our forces to include
posturing of capabilities to meet any need while keeping our resources
balanced across the globe. Based on our assessments and reviews, we are
confident the forward posture of our forces best fits the need in the
Pacific theater as it is today. As part of our planning and readiness
review process, TRANSCOM will continue to analyze our forces and
posture as the environment changes.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
relocation of cheyenne mountain operations center
5. Senator Udall. General Renuart, I've had concerns about the
relocation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) from
Cheyenne Mountain to the new NORTHCOM/NORAD Command Center at Peterson
Air Force Base (AFB). In particular, many members in the House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) were not happy with the decision to relocate
operations without fully analyzing the full range of threats--nor was
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which was made clear by a
GAO report last year highlighting the lack of a comprehensive threat
analysis. Last year, because of our ongoing concerns about the
vulnerability of the new command center, HASC Chairman Skelton and I
urged Secretary Gates to retain redundant operations at Cheyenne
Mountain. When you and I spoke last, you assured me that redundant
capabilities would be maintained in Cheyenne Mountain for the
foreseeable future. You also told me that you would inform me should
that ever change. I'd ask you to please repeat that commitment for the
record, and give me a brief summary of some of the security measures
you are putting in place to protect the command center in its new
location.
General Renuart. For the foreseeable future, the NORAD and NORTHCOM
Alternate Command Center will remain in Cheyenne Mountain. We will
inform Congress of any decision regarding the location of our Alternate
Command Center.
In order to further protect our ability to accomplish the NORAD and
NORTHCOM missions, we have a comprehensive security enhancement
program. This includes consulting with security and mission assurance
experts from Sandia National Laboratories, Air Force Space Command, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Joint Staff Integrated
Vulnerability Assessment Team, who have identified vulnerabilities and
assisted in designing the best security system for our facility. We
established a new security directorate to implement these
recommendations and improve the overall security posture of the
commands.
Our physical security systems supporting the NORAD and NORTHCOM
Command Center have been upgraded to include additional vehicle
barriers, new perimeter fencing, and a vehicle searching station. We
have converted our contract access controllers for the facility to Air
Force security guards. We also have 24-7, dedicated 21st Space Wing
Security Forces in our facility to provide the External and Internal
Response Teams, and control access to the restricted areas. We have
also instituted a security education and training program,
comprehensive external security agency coordination, improved access
control and screening, and Peterson AFB installed the Defense Biometric
Identification System at their gates.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
acquisition policy
6. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavirids, General Renuart, General
Ward, and General McNabb, in a report titled, ``Defense Acquisitions:
Perspectives on Potential Changes to DOD Acquisition Management
Framework'' (GAO-09-295), GAO found that reform of the requirements
process is necessary to create a truly joint military and lay the
foundation for an acquisitions process that is responsive to
operational needs. Based on its work and other major acquisition reform
studies, GAO believes that enduring requirements reform will occur when
the combatant commands (COCOMs) have more influence over the
requirements process to meet their priorities. To your knowledge, has
the Joint Staff been engaging the COCOMs in the requirements process
through participation in meetings of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC)?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. The Joint Staff welcomes and encourages
SOUTHCOM participation in the requirements process through Functional
Capabilities Board (FCB) participation as advisory members. I have an
open invitation to attend any JROC meeting. The Joint Staff solicits my
review of and comments on draft JROC memoranda and requirements
documents.
General Renuart. Yes, NORAD and NORTHCOM actively participate in
the JROC process and engage its supporting construct, which includes
the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) and FCBs as advisory members, but
not voting members.
In order to assure maximum support for NORAD and NORTHCOM equities
within requirement and capability forums and processes, members of our
Programs, Resources, and Analysis Directorate represent the commands in
each FCB and coordinate JCB and JROC participation when required. These
resourcing professionals provide my focal point for the commands'
requirement and capability activities, and coordinate the participation
of other command subject matter experts to provide core knowledge when
interfacing with these forums. They maintain routine engagement with
Joint Staff offices to assure our active participation and awareness in
the DOD requirements processes, and advise me of JROC and JCB
requirement and capability topics that may require NORAD and NORTHCOM
senior leader participation.
Our active engagement with Joint Staff and senior OSD leadership
also includes the annual JROC and JCB site visits, which put particular
focus on the combatant commanders' capability gaps and issues, and
address the latest JROC initiatives and OSD policy and programming
issues.
General Ward. Yes, the Joint Staff has been engaging the combatant
commanders in the requirements process through the JROC. Also,
subordinate to the JROC, the Joint Staff actively and adequately
engages the COCOM through participation in: Joint Staff requirements
forums such as the JCB and the nine DOD Joint Capability Area based
Functional Capability Boards (FCB); the Capability Portfolio Management
(CPM) process; the Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF) process; the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) product
development process; and most directly through the COCOM Integrated
Priority List (IPL) process.
General McNabb. Yes, the combatant commanders are engaged in the
requirements process through active participation in the JROC.
Additionally, our involvement continues to increase through the direct
review of all capability documents (via the JCIDS), voting membership
on FCBs, COCOM co-leadership of Capability Portfolio areas, increased
importance of COCOM IPLs, the emerging Science and Technology IPL and
increased use of SWARF.
7. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavirids, General Renuart, General
Ward, and General McNabb, do you think that combatant commanders need
to have more formal influence than they do now over the requirements
process to meet their priorities?
Admiral Stavridis. No. Multiple forums to address SOUTHCOM current
and future requirements are available and the Joint Staff actively
encourages our participation in each venue.
General Renuart. No, various venues are already currently available
to me to formally influence the requirements process to deliver
capabilities for near-term (less than 2 years), mid-term (2 to 7 years)
and long-term (beyond 7 years) resourcing and capability development
needs in response to the commands' requirements. We actively
participate with appropriate acquisition authorities to influence the
requirements process.
For instance, while we do not often initiate or develop Joint Staff
JCIDS documents, we are routinely tasked by the Joint Staff to
coordinate and comment on formal JCIDS documents initiated outside the
commands. In many cases these documents have great potential to
contribute to capabilities required by NORAD and NORTHCOM.
In addition to the JCIDS process, the SWARF provides an effective
means for 3-star level COCOM leaders to engage their counterparts to
identify issues and capabilities associated with a particular mission
or function, develop agreement on common gaps within current
capabilities, and develop new, coordinated approaches for addressing
emergent opportunities. The results provide a consensus view from
senior warfighters to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for identifying joint warfighting capabilities, associated gaps, and
opportunities within those required capabilities.
As an example, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) mandates
that combatant commanders interface with and provide feedback to
acquisition authorities on the suitability and timeline regarding
proposed solutions to JRAC-certified Immediate Warfighter Needs. In
compliance with JCIDS processes, an acquisition authority may request
NORAD and NORTHCOM to develop and provide requisite architecture
products to develop solutions analysis and influence follow-on
acquisition documents.
General Ward. Combatant commanders' inputs should be incorporated
at all levels of analysis in DOD. This will ensure that as risk/benefit
trade-offs are debated throughout the decision process, COCOM inputs
are part of the final DOD position. We must ensure COCOM IPLs remain
within their original context as these validated operational
requirements proceed through the FCB, JCB, and JROC.
General McNabb. No. Current involvement via the IPL, review of
capability documents via the Joint Capabilities Integrated Development
System, FCB voting membership, COCOM-led Senior Warfighter Forums,
Capability Portfolio Management roles, and direct engagement with the
JCB/JROC provide combatant commanders sufficient venues to influence/
shape the DOD's requirements process.
8. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavirids, General Renuart, General
Ward, and General McNabb, what, if anything, do you think can be done
to provide more authority to combatant commanders to ensure that their
long-term needs are met or do you believe that the current IPL process
embodied in the JCIDS is sufficient?
Admiral Stavridis. Though the IPL serves as an important document
to communicate critical capability shortfalls, the IPL process remains
an inadequate way to ensure long-term COCOM needs are addressed. IPLs
do inform the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build process and lend
credence to COCOM issue nominations to the OSD Program Budget Review
(PBR) process. Unfortunately, the Services are not required to formally
accept and integrate COCOM IPL issues into their POM submissions.
Instead, the Services are directed to modify their POM submissions
after a COCOM successfully argues a position within the OSD PBR
process. If the Services were directed to formally discuss how their
POM submissions addressed COCOM IPL items during a JROC meeting, it
would help the Services' senior leadership focus on COCOM long-term
requirements earlier in the process.
General Renuart. The NORAD and NORTHCOM IPL is one of the most
important documents for communicating my most critical capability
shortfalls or gaps to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staffs, and Military Services to influence the DOD Planning,
Programming, Budget, and Execution process.
The IPL focuses on 2 to 6 years out. Because of this, it is
insufficient as a single-source document for acquiring long-term needs.
The IPL addresses my highest priority requirements, prioritized across
Service and functional lines, which affect the forces' ability to
accomplish our commands' assigned missions. The current IPL process,
vetted through a Service and Functional COCOM JROC-centric construct,
is only one capability-based format embodied in the JCIDS. The JCIDS is
an important tool to influence solution development of our commands'
long-term needs across the entire Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities spectrum
within, and external to, the JCIDS process.
Other requirement documentation sources available to the combatant
commander--and which I use--include overseas contingency operations,
Lessons Learned, Joint Combat Capability Assessments, Comprehensive
Joint Assessment, and Joint Urgent Operational Needs.
I do not believe that more authorities are necessary; the IPL does
the job of conveying our critical capability gaps. However, the
existing processes that the IPL feeds, the proliferation of inputs to
those processes, and the various methods of analysis to support
decisions have become more and more difficult for the participants to
navigate.
Joint Staff and OSD receive inputs from an ever-growing number of
sources--FCBs, Capability Portfolio Managers, Command and Control
Capabilities Integration Board, and Senior Warfighter Forums to name
some of the more prominent ones. In most cases, these entities have
different charters, leadership, and membership. We should continue to
critique our processes to allow us to better focus our limited
resources to effect change and acquire needed capabilities.
General Ward. The establishment of AFRICOM is recognition that the
Department must take a longer-term view of activities, programs,
investments, and desired effects in our dealings with partner nations.
A review of existing authorities with a view to help the Nation meet
the threats of this century would be consistent with that approach. A
longer-term focus (beyond the usual budget cycle) would help provide
sustained, predictable, and reliable engagement, resulting in measured,
consistent improvements in partner capacities over several years.
AFRICOM's core mission is Sustained Security Engagement to reflect a
new and evolving focus on building partner capacity at the country and
regional levels. Current 1206 and 1207 authorities along with the wise
use, and continued support, of FMF and IMET funding are key to our
ability to assist our partner nations. Any additional authorities must
support a robust, multi-year, sustainable ability to provide Security
Sector Reform assistance programs to build partner capabilities.
General McNabb. The JROC is experimenting with shifting a portion
of its authorities to functional combatant commanders commensurate with
their Unified Command Plan mission which is expected to provide a
greater COCOM voice in addressing long-term needs. This combined with
existing participation in SWARFs, FCBs/JROCs, Capability Portfolio
Management roles, Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs), various studies/
assessments, and an increased voice in science and technology, is
sufficient to address long-term requirements.
9. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, General Renuart, General
Ward, and General McNabb, what additional resources, if any, do you
believe that combatant commanders need to establish robust analytical
capabilities to identify and assess their long-term requirements?
Admiral Stavridis. Additional financial and human resources to
enhance SOUTHCOM's in-house analytical capability to identify and
assess our long-term requirements would be very beneficial. However, as
an economy of force command, SOUTHCOM is very sensitive to concerns
that additional analytical personnel at a geographic COCOM might
duplicate robust analytical capability in the functional COCOMs,
defense agencies, and Services.
General Renuart. Increased in-house analytical capacity to conduct
unbiased identification of required capabilities over time and to
perform strategic-level assessments of our commands' long-term
capabilities to execute multiple missions and to achieve desired
effects could be beneficial. However, we must be cautious not to drive
a negative resourcing impact to current DOD manpower allocations or
create a duplication of robust defense service and agency analytical
capabilities. The commands currently leverage these capabilities within
the supporting defense agencies and Services.
Using our commands' modest analytical capacity for capabilities and
requirements determination, NORAD and NORTHCOM have developed and
implemented a Capability Review and Resource Assessment analytical
process that links national strategies, departmental guidance, internal
direction, and formal plans to strategic investment decisions intended
to deliver required capabilities. We leverage existing Defense
Department, Service, and Agency analytical capabilities. Our process
employs a capabilities-based risk and resource management methodology
providing traceability from national-level strategy to programs of
record. This linkage provides the foundation for engagements with OSD,
Joint Staff, defense agencies, and the Services to influence
investments in training, capability development, acquisition, and
sustainment. It establishes a top-down view from the combatant
commander's perspective to assure that developmental programs, driven
by strategic guidance and assigned missions, will meet the warfighters'
needs (i.e., ``requirements''). This process provides the ``guidance-
mission-objective-effect-capability-program'' correlation that is
essential to establishing the connection between guidance and required
capabilities. Likewise, the linkage provides the Services and agencies
with a bottom-up perspective to assure that their programs provide the
COCOM's priority capability requirements.
NORAD and NORTHCOM use a Linking Plans to Resources process that
serves to define the missions and desired effects, validate the
capabilities required, identify the capability gaps, assess the risk to
each gap, prioritize the gaps, identify and assess potential Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel
and Facilities solutions, and provide recommendations on where to
accept risk and how to address mitigation strategies within near-term
(less than 2 years), mid-term (2 to 7 years) and long-term (beyond 7
years) resourcing and capability development opportunities in response
to the commands' requirements.
General Ward. Combatant commanders require robust analytical and
assessment capabilities to support our execution of national defense
policy and guidance (e.g. Guidance for the Employment of the Force,
QDR). Our vision and strategy, campaign and subordinate plans
(Comprehensive Joint Assessment, Annual Command Assessment); all
require assessment capability to ensure that near- and long-term
operational requirements are synchronized with assigned missions and
Theater Campaign Plans. At each level of analysis and assessment, a
robust capability is needed to inform and guide future plans and
execution of the strategy.
General McNabb. The robust analytic capability provided by
TRANSCOM's Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) is a key
enabler and is increasingly in demand by other COCOMs. We continuously
balance our analytical resources between operational and programmatic
support, but may require additional analysts and funding if the demand
continues to grow.
10. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, General Renuart, General
Ward, and General McNabb, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report
(BGN Phase II Report) recommends that DOD could utilize functional
commands, such as Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), to provide robust
analytical support to the geographical COCOMs to identify and assess
each command's long-term requirements. That recommendation appears to
be reflected, at least in part, in a recent JROC memorandum, dated June
20, 2008, titled ``Assignment of Joint Potential Designators and
Coordination by COCOMs on Capabilities Documents.'' Do you believe that
the BGN Phase II Report's recommendation has merit?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, the recommendation has merit as it is
certainly beneficial to have independent experts, such as the JFCOM,
assist in assessing geographical COCOM long-term requirements.
Functional COCOMs have much to offer geographical COCOMs; their advice,
support, and expertise should be sought to ensure that the latter
collaborate, combine efforts where possible, and create efficiencies.
Furthermore, SOUTHCOM would certainly appreciate additional analytical
support. Nevertheless, two ideas expressed in the BGN Phase II Report
should govern any proposed changes: ``those charged with executing
missions should set the requirements for the capabilities they need''
and ``the process for identifying and advocating joint capability
requirements be restructured around the COCOMs.''
General Renuart. Yes, the BGN Phase II Report's proposals have
merit, paraticularly the ideas that ``those charged with executing
missions should set the requirements for the capabilities they need,''
and ``the process for identifying and advocating joint capability
requirements be restructured around the COCOMs, with Services competing
to supply the capabilities that the COCOMs determine are necessary.''
It's important to highlight that significant changes have occurred
within the JCIDS process since the publishing of the July 2005 BGN
Phase II Report. Recent changes to the March 2009 revised JCIDS
instruction include reducing in the number of Joint Staff acquisition
focused documents going to the JROC, streamlining capabilities-based
assessment requirements, and determining analytical depth that produces
``relevant but imperfect'' analysis over robust ``perfect but
irrelevant'' analysis.
COCOM empowerment highlights another key change as evident by JROCM
130-08, which provides functional combatant commanders with enhanced
COCOM authority and responsibility within the JCIDS process to
influence capability-based, acquisition documents in four of nine
portfolio areas (Battlespace Awareness [STRATCOM], Command and Control
[JFCOM], Logistics [TRANSCOM], and Net-Centric [STRATCOM]).
However, of note is that these improvements in the JCIDS process
help with the lack of mission-focused geographical combatant commanders
authority and responsibility. As a geographical combatant commander, I
must champion my prioritized requirements against other geographical
combatant commanders within the functional combatant commanders' and
Services' oversight.
It is important to understand and appreciate the robust analytical
requirements demanded on Services as well as all COCOMs. Services are
responsible for sustaining current force capabilities as well as
developing future capabilities that are organized, trained, and
equipped to meet the geographical and functional combatant commanders'
requirements. Geographical combatant commanders are responsible for
employing those existing and emergent capabilities to achieve our
geographically-focused missions within current and near-team strategic
and operational environments.
General Ward. The BGN Phase II Report provides a number of
informative and constructive recommendations for improving the advocacy
of joint capability requirements and in providing the combatant
commander a greater resource allocation role.
Even so, there are several recommendations within the BGN Phase II
report that require additional scrutiny. It may be possible that a
functional command could identify and provide input to a geographical
COCOM's long-term requirements, but we should examine the functional
application of this concept to ensure it does not detract from a
combatant commander's ability to synchronize activities and reinforce
success. I would support a review of BGN recommendations that allows
each COCOM its own team of analytical subject matter experts that
understands its command's core missions while leveraging the synergy of
a common functional approach.
We should use caution that the use of an isolated and
geographically separated functional entity such as JFCOM would not
create additional seams within the geographic COCOM at the operational
and planning levels, thus hindering our ability to synchronize near-
and long-term operational requirements.
General McNabb. I believe the report has merit. The TRANSCOM is
already providing support to the geographic COCOMs in this capacity
through its analytical contingent, the Joint Distribution Process
Analysis Center (JDPAC). The JDPAC is a collaborative organization
comprised of analysts from our transportation component commands and
networked with the Services and other DOD analytical agencies.
TRANSCOM's JDPAC is quickly becoming a center of mobility analytical
excellence.
relocation of cheyenne mountain operations center
11. Senator McCain. General Renuart, in July 2006, the former
Commander of NORTHCOM announced plans to move certain functions from
Cheyenne Mountain, CO, to an integrated command center at nearby
Peterson AFB. Cheyenne Mountain was built in the early 1960s to
withstand a multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and to provide protection
against chemical and biological warfare. In justifying the decision to
scale down Cheyenne Mountain, DOD officials have stated that the threat
of an intercontinental ballistic missile strike on facilities in
Colorado in today's environment is low. As the current Commander of
NORTHCOM and NORAD, do you still share this assessment of the
relatively low threat against your operations center?
General Renuart. Yes. We assess the threat to the NORAD and
NORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson AFB from an ICBM or chemical and
biological weapons as low. An ICBM or chemical and biological weapon
strike against Peterson AFB would only occur as a result of a major
nuclear confrontation, which is highly unlikely given the current geo-
political environment. Further, due to the increased size and accuracy
of today's nuclear warheads, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station's
ability to withstand a nuclear strike is less certain, as it was built
to withstand the threat of the day, some 40+ years ago. We are
currently in the process of designing a chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear collective protection system for our Command
Center, and have upgraded our physical security system to provide
additional protection against a high-yield explosive threat.
12. Senator McCain. General Renuart, how is your current command
center at Peterson AFB protected from likely threat scenarios and what
plans do you have in place to improve that protection?
General Renuart. NORAD and NORTHCOM have a comprehensive security
system protecting our Command Center. Our physical security system at
the facility has been upgraded to include additional vehicle barriers,
new perimeter fencing, and a vehicle searching station. We have
converted our contract access controllers for the facility to
Department of the Air Force Security Guards. We also have 24-7,
dedicated 21st Space Wing Security Forces in our facility to provide
the External and Internal Response Teams, and control access to the
restricted areas, and Peterson AFB installed the Defense Biometric
Identification System at their gates. We maintain integrated,
redundant, and distributed command and control functions, hosted in a
resilient network of facilities that enhance flexibility and
survivability.
Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station continues to host, protect, and
operate key assets securely remoted to the NORAD and NORTHCOM Command
Center in Building 2 on Peterson AFB, CO. It further serves as our
NORAD and NORTHCOM Alternate Command Center and a daily training
location. We routinely train and exercise the operational relocation of
critical mission essential functions from Building 2 back into Cheyenne
Mountain and to other redundant mission sites. We also have plans to
improve High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse and Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear protection, electronic monitoring, and access
control to our Command Center.
13. Senator McCain. General Renuart, should Cheyenne Mountain be
restored as your primary command center? If not, why not?
General Renuart. [Deleted.]
establishment of refugee camps at naval station guantanamo bay, cuba
14. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, the Secretary of the Army
notified this committee in November 2008 of the intent to use emergency
construction authority on your behalf to spend $18 million to install
utility infrastructure to support a 35,000-person contingency mass
migration complex at the Leeward North Naval Station Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. This notification was subsequently rescinded in January 2009 due
to concerns raised by congressional defense committees about the
requirement, but may be readdressed in the upcoming President's budget
for fiscal year 2010. In light of all other issues facing you, is the
construction of the mass migration complex still a high priority for
you? If so, why?
Admiral Stavridis. I appreciate the feedback from Congress on the
authority originally selected to advance this important project and
assure you it remains a priority.
Under Executive Order 13276, SOUTHCOM serves as a supporting
command to the Department of Homeland Security and operates migrant
camps at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba in order to
provide for the safety, care, custody, and transportation of migrants
interdicted outside of the United States. Currently able to accommodate
around 10,000 if needed, GTMO regularly houses a small number of
migrants, a number which has increased since the beginning of the year.
The risk of high mass migration numbers continues as a result of
natural disasters and political or economic turmoil plague the region.
This past year, Haiti and Cuba were devastated with the cumulative
effects of tropical storm Fay and hurricanes Gustav, Hanna, and Ike. In
Haiti, the heavy rains caused mass flooding, eroded roads, and wiped
out bridges throughout the region. The destruction of cropland severely
retarded food production and further compromised the ability of the
poor to cope. Over 700 persons were killed and 114,000 were displaced.
Currently 78 percent of Haitians live on less than $2 a day. In Cuba,
hurricanes wiped out approximately 63,400 homes and damaged
approximately 446,500. Agriculture, poultry, and tobacco industries
were negatively affected; one-third of crops destroyed causing food
shortages. Cuba's damage is estimated at over $10 billion U.S. dollars.
It has been assessed that the governments of Cuba and Haiti will
require 2-3 years to fully recover from the hurricane season of 2008.
Another strong hurricane season coupled with the current economic
crisis could severely affect stability in Haiti, Dominican Republic,
and Cuba, greatly increasing the chances of a mass migration.
Past experience shows that GTMO is under-resourced to adequately
handle such a mass migration scenario which could easily exceed the
requirements of the one experienced during Operation Sea Signal in
1994, where GTMO housed some 46,000 migrants.
The modest Leeward North request would provide waste and fresh
water utility infrastructure to support an additional 35,000-person
contingency mass migration. In my view this cost is prudent compared to
the nearly $1 million per day that would be required to purchase,
transport, and store fresh water and to rent portable facilities to
handle human waste of this magnitude.
As a result of discoveries during the ongoing unexploded ordnance
clearance at GTMO, the project has to be relocated; it will remain on
hold until a more suitable site is determined.
15. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, understanding the fact that
we have a history of supporting refugee operations at GTMO with
existing facilities, why is this requirement urgent?
Admiral Stavridis. Currently able to accommodate around 10,000 if
needed, GTMO regularly houses a small number of migrants, a number
which has increased since the beginning of the year.
The risk of high mass migration numbers continues as a result of
natural disasters and political or economic turmoil plague the region.
This past year, Haiti and Cuba were devastated with the cumulative
effects of tropical storm Fay and hurricanes Gustav, Hanna, and Ike. In
Haiti, the heavy rains caused mass flooding, eroded roads, and wiped
out bridges throughout the region. The destruction of cropland severely
retarded food production and further compromised the ability of the
poor to cope. Over 700 persons were killed and 114,000 were displaced.
Currently 78 percent of Haitians live on less than $2 a day. In Cuba,
hurricanes wiped out approximately 63,400 homes and damaged
approximately 446,500. Agriculture, poultry, and tobacco industries
were negatively affected; one-third of crops destroyed causing food
shortages. Cuba's damage is estimated at over $10 billion U.S. dollars.
It has been assessed that the governments of Cuba and Haiti will
require 2-3 years to fully recover from the hurricane season of 2008.
Another strong hurricane season coupled with the current economic
crisis could severely affect stability in Haiti, Dominican Republic,
and Cuba, greatly increasing the chances of a mass migration. We need
to act prudently but rapidly to posture ourselves to humanely provide
for the care, custody, and safety of migrant populations at GTMO.
The modest Leeward North request would provide waste and fresh
water utility infrastructure to support an additional 35,000-person
contingency mass migration. In my view this cost is prudent compared to
the nearly $1 million per day that would be required to purchase,
transport, and store fresh water and to rent portable facilities to
handle human waste of this magnitude.
closure of manta air base, ecuador
16. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, in 1999, the U.S. Government
signed a 10-year lease with the Government of Ecuador to allow us to
operate counter-drug missions from Manta Air Base. The Ecuadorian
government announced in early 2008 that it did not intend to renew the
lease, even though the U.S. Government invested over $70 million to
improve the airfield and pumps an estimated $6 million annually into
the local economy. How does the loss of Manta Air Base affect U.S.
counter-drug operations in South and Central America?
Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM is grateful for Ecuador's assistance
and support over the last 10 years, and appreciates and commends the
Ecuadorian Air Force for its hospitality and cooperation. Ecuador has
fulfilled its commitment to the United States, and we look forward to
continued cooperation with Ecuador on counterdrug efforts.
Manta Air Base has proven to be a highly valuable asset in
countering narcosignificant geographic advantage in accessing narcotics
trafficking routes both south and west of the Galapagos Islands
frequented by smuggling vessels. Without Manta we will lose the ability
to target these specific routes. Loss of access to Manta will also
degrade support to the Air Bridge Denial program in Colombian airspace.
17. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, what is being done to find
other locations to compensate for the loss of Manta?
Admiral Stavridis. Some operations currently conducted from Manta
can be conducted from other locations where we have access to
facilities. For example, the Air Bridge Denial program can be conducted
from Curacao, but at higher operational cost due to increased transit
times to the operational area in Colombia.
Additionally, JIATF-S is able to operate law enforcement aircraft
in support of SOUTHCOM's Detection and Monitoring (D&M) mission from
commercial locations in partner nations that are reluctant to allow
U.S. military air operations. Military aircraft conducting D&M missions
will continue to operate from existing facilities in El Salvador, and
other locations where we currently have access.
However, it is important to identify alternate locations in order
to maintain the operational reach needed to monitor trafficking
corridors that extend deep into the Pacific. We are in discussions with
other governments to allow the United States to utilize their airfields
and support facilities. These airfields must have runways of adequate
length, sufficient fuel available, and appropriate force protection.
Additionally, they must be close enough to the threat vector to give
aircraft as much on station time as possible.
18. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, will you require any
resources or authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 to assist you in overcoming this loss?
Admiral Stavridis. Our immediate efforts to address the loss of
Manta will focus on increasing our intelligence capabilities and
coordinating additional basing options for the DOD, interagency, and
partner nation aircraft that fly in support of SOUTHCOM's D&M missions.
As we continue to analyze the available options to offset the loss of
Manta, we will make the committee aware of any additional resources
that may be required in the NDAA.
Title 10, U.S.C., section 124, provides the necessary authority to
conduct D&M operations. No additional authorities are required to
accomplish this DOD directed mission.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
maintaining or retiring assets
19. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb, you discuss the value of the
C-130 in your written statement, and it certainly is, as you say, ``the
workhorse supporting the warfighter in theater.'' You also mention the
need to continue acquiring the C-130J and modernize legacy C-130s, but
you point out the need for the Air Force to have flexibility in
retiring and replacing aircraft that are at the end of their service
life.
I am all for modernizing and maintaining aircraft, and other
equipment for that matter, that have useful service life left and that
it makes sense to modernize. But as anyone who owns a 15-year-old car
knows, they are more expensive to maintain, never get any cheaper, and
are also less safe. The Services, including the Air Force, have a
careful, analytical method for determining which platforms should be
modernized and which should be retired. For the past several years, the
best judgment of you and the Air Force leadership aside, Congress has
forced you to keep C-130s that you've wanted to retire and added funds
to the budget for maintaining them.
I would appreciate it if you could outline what you do with those
aircraft that you are forced to keep in your inventory, the effect it
has on your ability to accomplish your mission, and to what extent you
believe keeping them in the inventory and adding unrequested funds for
this purpose is a wise use of taxpayers' dollars.
General McNabb. Under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, Congress did
not place restrictions on C-130E retirements. However, the Air Force is
still required to maintain 24 C-130Es (retired under the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2008) in a ``condition that would allow recall of that
aircraft to future service.'' This is classified as Type 1000, or
``inviolate,'' storage. These aircraft will require reopening,
inspection, and new preservation actions every 4 years, at an
approximate cost of $37,000 per aircraft, or almost $900,000 for all 24
aircraft. Of these 24 C-130Es, 16 had flight restrictions and 2 were
grounded due to center wing box cracks and fatigue, while the remaining
6 aircraft were either temporarily repaired or near center wing box
related flight restriction. The cost associated with regenerating these
aircraft for future service is projected to be $10 million per aircraft
for basic airworthiness repairs alone. Therefore, they do not appear to
be good candidates for return to service. Additionally, the Type 1000
restrictions mean the Air Force is unable to pull parts from these
assets, nor are they available for foreign military sales.
20. Senator Chambliss. General McNabb, do you have any thoughts in
general about how the Services should go about making decisions whether
to maintain or retire assets and do you think Congress should have
confidence in the Services' recommendations in this area?
General McNabb. The Services conduct rigorous analysis with regards
to life cycle management of military assets, to include compliance with
Federal acquisition regulations. As long as the Services continue to
present solid, empirical analysis as the basis for asset management, I
see every reason for Congress to have full confidence in their
recommendations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
mexico
21. Senator Wicker. General Renuart, earlier this year JFCOM
published ``Joint Operating Environment 2008.'' It referenced the
possibility of Mexico becoming a failed state. Violence in Mexico is on
the rise and is spilling over our border. Recent trends show that the
cartels even acquired military grade weapons on the black market. The
Governor of Texas has requested additional National Guard troops for
security along the border. Furthermore, instability within Mexico
creates the potential for a refugee crisis.
On page 21 of your prepared testimony you discuss the situation in
Mexico. In it you comment on how our relationship with Mexico is
improving and you thank Congress for its support of the Merida
Initiative. At the beginning of your testimony you state ``Homeland
defense is the preeminent mission of NORTHCOM.'' What contingency/
operational plans does NORTHCOM have to respond to the possibility of
Mexico as a failed state?
General Renuart. While the collateral violence that has escalated
between the competing drug trafficking organizations and the associated
effects upon our border states is serious, we do not see any strategic
indicators that the government, infrastructure, or social fabric of
Mexico are at risk of collapse. In fact, the violence represents the
result of the Mexican Government's laudable efforts to attack this
ongoing source of crime and corruption. As such, NORTHCOM is not
developing any plans for a failed state scenario; however, we have
developed plans and operational concepts that allow us to support the
appropriate U.S. lead agency north of the border, or support Mexican
efforts south of the border, including, but not limited to:
humanitarian relief, mass migration, or support to law enforcement. We
are also currently engaged with the Department of Homeland Security as
they address a range of potential concerns; and we continue to partner
with the Mexican armed forces, in line with the traditional geographic
COCOM security cooperation process, to support Mexican efforts to
diminish violence within their borders.
22. Senator Wicker. General Renuart, at the unclassified level,
what resources are needed to help stabilize Mexico?
General Renuart. Mexico is in the midst of a deliberate campaign to
root out powerful drug cartels that have been tolerated to some extent
in the past. Under the U.S.-Mexico understanding of a mutually shared
responsibility for this drug war, Mexico needs our assistance to get
this effort down to a more manageable level where they can finish off
the job themselves. So, I believe it's incorrect to couch Mexico's
security posture as one of ``stability'' or ``instability.''
The drug cartels are nimble and highly adaptive in exacting their
violence. Because of the cartels' use of increased firepower and lethal
tactics, Mexican President Calderon has tasked his military to bear the
brunt of the mission to defeat them. Accordingly, we have given a hard
look at what immediate capabilities their military needs now. Working
with our counterparts in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and the
Department of State, we have identified the most urgently needed non-
lethal support that the Mexican military needs to turn the corner on
its national campaign to defeat violent transnational drug trafficking
networks. In the arena of short-term capabilities, this includes
information and intelligence sharing, air platforms (fixed wing and
rotary wing) with which to conduct surveillance, resupply,
interdiction, and eradication operations. We have also identified a
need for extensive upgrades, repairs, and modernization to Mexico's
existing fleet of surveillance aircraft. It also includes a host of
specialized tools such as night vision devices, ion scanners, tactical
communications, non-intrusive inspection equipment, personal support
equipment, and digital media forensics training and equipment. These
items meet an urgent, short-term need to get a firm grip on the current
situation.
23. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, what impact would Mexico as
a failed state have on the SOUTHCOM AOR? What contingency/operational
plans does SOUTHCOM have to respond to the possibility of Mexico as a
failed state?
Admiral Stavridis. Though the situation in Mexico is critical,
Mexico has fully functioning executive, legislative, and judicial
branches and President Calderon has demonstrated he has the political
courage to confront the cartels that threaten the region's security.
SOUTHCOM has neither contingency nor operational plans to respond to
Mexico as a failed state, as they are part of the NORTHCOM region.
broad-area surveillance
24. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, as you are no doubt aware,
the March 2008 edition of Seapower Magazine has a piece regarding the
number one capability gap that exists in the SOUTHCOM region. The title
of the piece indicates that ``Broad-area Surveillance is SOUTHCOM's
Greatest Need.'' Clearly the SOUTHCOM region is vast with large areas
of open ocean and lots of coastline where narco-terrorists are
presently operating. Can you tell me the level of resources and what
kinds of surveillance systems you have been able to apply to this
problem over the past few years?
Admiral Stavridis. The scope of this problem is large; SOUTHCOM's
area of focus is nearly one-sixth of the Earth's surface. Not only are
there large areas to cover, but the vast open ocean and extensive
coastlines require a mix of sensors to provide the necessary coverage.
No one sensor system can address this target adequately. SOUTHCOM has
put considerable resources toward this issue using DOD and Interagency
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Although the
Seapower article identifies ``Broad-area Surveillance'' as our greatest
need, SOUTHCOM's top two IPL priorities are Signals Intelligence and
Foliage Penetration collection. These are critical capabilities that
support broad-area surveillance.
Other specific surveillance systems applied to this problem include
the USN Global Hawk demonstration, the USN Rampant Lion technology
demonstration, contract B200 maritime patrol missions, available
National Technical Means, and JIATF-S assigned air, surface, and
subsurface assets.
25. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, broad-area surveillance
systems such as satellites and high flying unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) such as Global Hawk are also in short supply and their operating
costs are relatively expensive. Are there other kinds of systems or
other UAV systems that can give you greater, more persistent
surveillance capability and availability at a lower cost?
Admiral Stavridis. We are constantly pursuing potential solutions
which promise greater persistence and capability at lower cost. Some of
these initiatives may not live up to their potential in terms of cost
savings and capability, but the demonstrations themselves allow us to
test out the systems while applying additional capabilities to the
current problem. We are currently exploring very promising systems that
include UAVs, radar systems, and sensor systems.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
missile defense
26. Senator Vitter. General Renuart, I'm very glad you confirmed
that our missile defense system is ``an effective system'' able to
defend against a North Korea missile threat, and I strongly agree with
you. Would you assert that any cuts to our missile defense program or
halting or retraction of our missile defense developments send a
message that we don't have confidence in our missile defense system
despite your stated confidence in its ability to defend us?
General Renuart. Our missile defense program is oriented toward
countering the threat defined by our U.S. leadership. That threat is
dynamic, meaning that both the defensive systems we have in place today
and those we have planned for tomorrow will necessarily evolve as we
adapt to maximize our defense against new threat capabilities.
27. Senator Vitter. General Renuart, if we do cut our investment in
missile defense, would that empower hostile nations like North Korea
and encourage military aggression?
General Renuart. [Deleted.]
______
Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
commerce guard
28. Senator Collins. General McNabb, in September 2008, TRANSCOM
deployed a new container security system, called Commerce Guard, that
helps protect military container shipments moving from Afghanistan to
Pakistan by providing an alert if a container's doors are opened. Has
this system proven effective enough to deploy more broadly and further
address any security vulnerabilities in the supply chain?
General McNabb. Yes, the system has proven effective in reducing
pilferage and enhancing security of containers in transit. Although
Commerce Guard is no longer available due to General Electric's
business decision to discontinue the product line, we continue to
evaluate this and similar technologies for further applications in the
supply chain. We used this technology only for unit move cargo into
Operation Enduring Freedom, but we plan to mature the capability in
other applications such as Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives cargo
shipments and Joint Staff sponsored exercises.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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