[Senate Hearing 111-83]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-83
THE RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED IRAQIS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 31, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Al-Tikriti, Nabil, assistant professor of history, University of
Mary Washington, Fredericksburg, VA............................ 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Aossey, Nancy A., president and CEO, International Medical Corps,
Los Angeles, CA................................................ 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Casey, Hon. Robert P., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Laipson, Ellen, president and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Joint prepared statement of Kenneth H. Bacon, president, and
Kristele Younes, senior advocate, Refugees International,
Washington, DC................................................. 46
(iii)
THE RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED IRAQIS
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TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Casey
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Kaufman, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR
FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. The hearing of the Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian and Central Asian
Affairs will now come to order.
Today, the subcommittee meets to examine the crisis
concerning Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons,
known often, maybe only here in Washington, by the acronym
IDPs, one of the most tragic humanitarian consequences of
America's war in Iraq. The purpose of this hearing is to
determine the efforts being taken by the Iraqi Government, the
United States, and the rest of the international community to
facilitate the resettlement of Iraqis displaced internally, and
the repatriation of Iraqi refugees living in neighboring
countries.
I will, for purposes of moving things along, just summarize
the rest of my testimony. I'll have the entire statement be
made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Casey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Pennsylvania
Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South and Central Asian Affairs meets to examine the crisis
concerning Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), one
of the tragic humanitarian consequences of America's war in Iraq. The
purpose of this hearing is to determine the efforts being taken by the
Iraqi Government, the United States, and the rest of the international
community to facilitate the resettlement of Iraqis displaced
internally, and the repatriation of Iraqi refugees living in
neighboring countries. The presence of such a large population in a
state of displacement not only has humanitarian consequences, but poses
security risks to future Iraqi stability and the interests of
neighboring states and the international community. Accordingly, as the
United States begins to drawdown its military presence in Iraq, we have
a both a moral and a security interest in ensuring the safety and
welfare of Iraqi refugees and IDPs.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates
that 4.7 million Iraqis have been forced to leave their homes.
Approximately 2.7 million are displaced internally, while 2 million
have fled to neighboring states, particularly Syria, Jordan, and
Lebanon. Indeed, these numbers have been called into dispute, and I
invite the views of our witnesses today on whether they are too high or
too low. The Iraqi Government has demonstrated an inability to deal
with a problem of such magnitude. Declining oil revenues and
institutional deficiencies are preventing the government from
effectively addressing this issue. In spite of improved security
conditions, displaced Iraqis who return home are confronted with
deplorable living conditions, or worse, destroyed homes. I am also
concerned that ongoing sectarian divisions could be preventing the
government from mustering the political will necessary to deal with the
refugee crisis. We should assess whether the government's Shiite
majority has an agenda to keep large numbers of Sunni refugees from
returning to Iraq, and we also need to understand what is prompting
thousands of Iraqi Christians to flee to Syria.
The exodus of refugees out of Iraq is overwhelming Iraq's
neighbors, which I witnessed firsthand during my trip to Jordan in
2007. Counties like Jordan and Syria cannot handle the constant flow of
refugees from Iraq, and some have started to impose legal and visa
restrictions on new arrivals. These countries are not signatories to
the 1951 Refugee Convention and have denied Iraqi refugees within their
borders the protections and basic human rights refugees claim in most
countries. As Refugees International reported last month, these Iraqis
cannot find gainful employment in their host countries, and they are
quickly running out of resources to sustain themselves. Unfortunately,
the return of refugees to Iraq, however desirable, continues to be
problematic, due to a difficult security environment and inadequate
living conditions awaiting them at home.
I was pleased to hear that the Obama administration announced FY
2009 contributions of more than $141 million to help displaced Iraqis.
However, the crisis does not appear to be improving. It is my
understanding that the administration is engaged in an ongoing review
of policy toward the refugee challenge. President Obama has announced
that, by August 2010, the majority of U.S. troops will be withdrawn
from Iraq. While I fully support the President's plan to withdraw our
forces from Iraq, I believe we must sustain our commitment to the
refugee and IDP situation affecting nearly 5 million of its citizens,
especially when the problem cannot be effectively controlled by the
Iraqi Government and places undue strain on its neighbors. We cannot
ignore the consequences for regional stability and Iraq's internal
order if a large population of dispossessed and displaced individuals
remains in place. Without any opportunity for reintegration or an
escape from poverty and despair, displaced populations may be
susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups, threatening the
viability of the Iraqi state.
In September 2008, my distinguished colleague, Senator Ben Cardin,
and I filed legislation--titled ``The Support for Vulnerable and
Displaced Iraqis Act of 2008''--to mandate the development of a
comprehensive U.S. strategy to address the mass displacement of Iraqis.
This bill addressed several issues that are still pertinent today. And
as several of my colleagues and I emphasized to then-President-elect
Obama in a letter we wrote in December 2008, these issues should be a
focus of his administration's overall approach to Iraq.
First, a U.S. strategy on Iraqi refugees should address the
responsibility of the Iraqi Government to help meet the urgent needs of
its displaced citizens, including an assessment of how much assistance
is needed to help meet these needs. Second, it should assess what
conditions are necessary for the voluntary, safe, and sustainable
return of displaced Iraqis. Finally, it should outline steps the U.S.
Government will take to engage the international community to implement
the strategy. It is imperative that the United States work in concert
with Iraq's neighbors, donor governments, and other international
actors to address challenges facing Iraqi refugees and IDPs, such as:
The lack of legal status for refugees;
The inability of refugees to work legally;
Limited access to health care and education;
Critical food shortages;
Inadequate shelter, drinking water, sanitation, and
protection.
Moreover, in the context of renewing U.S. engagement with Syria,
the administration could find an important avenue for cooperation by
working with Damascus on the refugee crisis.
The U.S. Government can also bolster its efforts to resettle in the
United States those Iraqi refugees who risked their lives to assist the
U.S. mission. Resettlement is the right thing to do, and it would also
ease the burden on Iraq's neighbors. Only in 2007 did the previous
administration significantly increase the number of Iraq refugees to be
settled in the United States. And even though the United States
exceeded its FY 2008 admissions target of 12,000 Iraqi refugees, the
demand for resettlement outpaces the steps the U.S. Government is
taking. Any comprehensive U.S. strategy on Iraqi refugees should
examine our current resettlement plan, and draw on all relevant
government agencies to support this process.
We are joined here today by an esteemed panel of experts, who will
discuss the myriad challenges involved in the Iraqi refugee crisis. Our
first witness is Ellen Laipson, president and CEO of The Henry L.
Stimson Center since 2002. Ms. Laipson is one of Washington's
preeminent authorities on the Middle East, having written extensively
about the challenges the United States faces in Iraq. Prior to joining
the Stimson Center, Ms. Laipson served nearly 25 years in the United
States Government, many of which were devoted to analysis and
policymaking on Middle Eastern issues. She was the vice chair of the
National Intelligence Council from 1997-2002, and held senior posts at
the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and in the National Security
Council. I look forward to her analysis of the refugee crisis, how it
relates to regional stability, and how the United States should
approach this problem.
Nancy Aossey is president and CEO of the International Medical
Corps. After becoming CEO shortly after IMC's founding in the mid-
1980s, Ms. Aossey helped to transform International Medical Corps into
one of the world's largest humanitarian organizations, providing more
than $120 million in disaster response and recovery programs annually.
Thanks to Ms. Aossey's leadership, International Medical Corps assists
the internally displaced throughout Iraq, providing badly needed
medical care to those in need. She has also served as chairman of the
board of InterAction and now serves on its executive committee.
Our final witness is Dr. Nabil Al-Tikriti of the University of Mary
Washington in Fredericksburg, VA. Dr. Al-Tikriti has written
extensively on the effects of population displacement in Iraq and its
neighbors, and its policy implications for the region. In addition to
his scholarship, Al-Tikriti volunteered with the Catholic Relief
Services humanitarian assistance project in Iraq in 1991-1992, and
later served with Doctors without Borders as a relief worker in
Somalia, Iran, Albania, Turkey, and Jordan.
Before we turn to our witnesses, I would like to enter into the
formal hearing record a statement submitted to the committee by Mr.
Kenneth Bacon, president of Refugees International, and Kristele
Younes, senior advocate for Refugees International.
I encourage all of our witnesses to keep their remarks brief and
succinct so that we can move to questions; accordingly, please limit
your oral statement to no more than 10 minutes. If that requires you to
summarize your statement, the text of your full statement will be
included in the hearing record.
Senator Casey. I know we had some delay here because we
just had three budget votes, and that delayed our start.
But, suffice it to say that this is an issue that has not
received near enough attention here in Washington. It presents,
I believe, to the American people and to the world, both a
moral challenge as well as one that is related to security. I
believe that this isn't just about Iraqi refugees, it's about
how our country's policy will be carried out in Iraq and
whether or not we create a secure environment there.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates
that 4.7 million Iraqis have been forced to leave their homes;
approximately 2.7 are displaced internally, while 2 million
have fled to neighboring states, particularly Syria, Jordan,
and Lebanon. Indeed, these numbers have been called into
dispute, and I'd invite our witnesses, who have labored in this
vineyard, so to speak, a long time, to correct me if I'm wrong
about those numbers, but they're the numbers that we are
working with.
So, with that, I will move forward with our witnesses. I
wanted to briefly introduce them now. We have a distinguished
panel of experts who are testifying today. They'll discuss the
many challenges involved in this issue, really a crisis.
Our first witness is Ellen Laipson, president and CEO of
The Henry L. Stimson Center since 2002. Ms. Laipson is one of
Washington's preeminent authorities on the Middle East, having
written extensively about the challenges the United States
faces in Iraq.
Our second witness is Nancy Aossey, president and CEO of
the International Medical Corps. After becoming CEO, shortly
after IMC's founding in the mid-1980s, Ms. Aossey helped to
transform the International Medical Corps into one of the
world's largest humanitarian organizations.
And finally, we're joined today by Dr. Nabil Al-Tikriti, of
the University of Mary Washington, in Fredericksburg, VA. He
has written extensively on the effects of population
displacement in Iraq and its neighbors, and its policy
implications for the region.
And we know that each of these witnesses brings both a
passion about, but also experience in and scholarship in, the
issues we're going to discuss today.
Our ranking member, Senator Risch, will be joining us
later. When he is here, I'll yield to him for any comments. And
I know that Senator Kaufman is here. If he wanted to make some
opening comments, I'd invite him to do that.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I think we've
waited long enough. But, I want to, again, repeat what you said
about this talented group that have come to testify, and I'm
looking forward to your testimony. Especially recognize Ms.
Laipson, who used to work with me in Senator Biden's office,
and I know how well qualified she is. So, I just would like not
to hold off, and get on with their testimony, which I'm ready
to listen to. I'm going to have to leave to go preside at 4
o'clock, so don't take it personally.
Senator Casey. Why don't we go from my right to left.
And, Ms. Laipson, you may start. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ELLEN LAIPSON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Laipson. Thank you, Senator, for giving me the
opportunity to address your subcommittee on the issue of Iraqi
refugees.
The plight of more than a million Iraqi refugees has
significant consequences for the Middle East region, as well as
for the future stability and identity of the Iraqi state. How
the refugees are treated will also be seen, over time, as a
test of U.S. leadership and a measure of U.S. ability to manage
the consequences of the decision to oust Saddam Hussein.
I approach this issue, not as a refugee expert, per se, or
as someone involved directly in humanitarian programs, but I
look at it from a political perspective as it relates to the
future of Iraq, the stability of the neighboring countries, and
the larger challenge of regional security.
Seen from this broader perspective, the potential
implications of the refugee crisis are profound. At one
extreme, it's worth considering whether the Iraqi refugees will
someday be seen as the new Palestinians, a large population
movement caused by political upheaval and war who have the
potential to change the politics of the region for generations,
reshaping the demographic and political balances in key
countries of the region.
But, even if that scenario does not play out, the drama of
the flow of Iraqis fleeing their homes has huge consequences
for Iraq itself, the tragic loss of cultural diversity, the
tradition of coexistence in urban neighborhoods and rural
villages, the brain drain of well-trained professionals, and
the uncertainties of political loyalties and national
identities that are provoked by this abrupt shift in the
demographic makeup of the country.
Today, I'd like to share some thoughts on how to think
about refugees, in general, some of the definitional problems,
and then briefly look at some of the key countries that have
been receiving countries. How has this affected their politics?
What are the prospects for return or repatriation, as you
mentioned? And the long-term implications for the United
States, and what we should--how we should think about our own
options.
So, let's begin with just a couple of definitional
problems. As you mentioned, we really don't know for certain
how many Iraqis left the country during different phases of the
crisis. It's often cited that as many as 20 percent of the
total Iraqi population has moved since 2003, either within
Iraq's borders or across international borders. A new USIP
study also reminds us that we are still--that Iraq is still
dealing with some of the people who were displaced during the
Saddam Hussein period, so some of the movement back to villages
and towns in Iraq are people that may have been displaced even
prior to 2003.
But, since the American intervention, Iraqis left the
country in two waves; initially in the 2003 to 2005 period, but
a much larger wave left in response to the outbreak of
sectarian fighting that began in February 2006. So, really it's
from 2006 to the present that the largest proportion of the
crisis, as we know it, occurred.
The situation is tapering off now, there are fewer Iraqis
trying to leave now. And so, we can focus on whether this
population currently outside of Iraq may eventually find the
conditions favorable to return.
Refugee experts tell us that there's sometimes not an easy
distinction to be made between who is a refugee and who is an
economic migrant. We know that a lot of the Iraqis left with
their savings, in search of professional opportunities in
neighboring countries, but, over time, their status has
changed; as they've run out of their funding, they now find
themselves needing to register with the U.N. as refugees so
that their children can go to school and that they are entitled
to some of the food programs and other socioeconomic support
systems.
It's also important to note that we tend to look at
refugees as a collective, as a group, with shared requirements,
but we should remember that refugees are individuals and
families, each with deeply personal and unique stories and
perspectives. Resolving the refugee crisis must take into
account that people will respond differently to the trauma of
fleeing their country, and not all will embrace the solutions
that international organizations may offer them. So, we want to
be flexible when we think about refugee programs that are
available to them.
Let me turn now to the prospects for return. It does seem
to me that the refugees themselves are demonstrating to us that
they don't believe that conditions in Iraq today are favorable
for return. So far, we've seen perhaps a few tens of thousands
returning, and many of them are finding that these financial
subsidies that the Iraqi Government offers are not sufficient
to really resume the life that they had known before. Some of
the Iraqis that are trying to return are finding that their
socioeconomic status has been reduced from what they once
enjoyed; but, it still may be better than being unemployed in
Syria or Jordan, so some of them will make that choice.
But, it's important to note that, first and foremost,
perception of security conditions will be the primary factor
that determines whether Iraqis return. Second will be
economics, whether they think they will find employment, and
whether they can resume normal life back in Iraq. And the
services that the Iraqi Government provides are perhaps the
least single important factor in determining the decision to
take the advantage of opportunities to return to Iraq.
Seems to me that the United States has a deep and abiding
interest in both the stability of Iraq and its ability to
resume its place in the region. The presence of Iraqis, with
deteriorating economic conditions in Syria and Jordan in
particular, is a painful reminder of Iraq's weakness and an
increasing burden on those hosts. As Iraq's neighbors adjust to
new realities and we attempt to reintegrate Iraq in the region,
the refugee issue has the potential to be a source of
cooperation and common concern, but also a source of enduring
friction. We should not think that the return of the refugees,
in and of itself, will determine Iraq's relations with its
neighbors, but it will contribute to how Iraq's neighbors
perceive the integrity of the Iraqi Government and how the two
societies relate to each other. Some Iraqis will, of course,
become loyal citizens of other countries, but many will always
yearn to return.
The international community needs to have a range of
programs for the Iraqi displaced--first and foremost, to work
on conditions inside Iraq that will make return a viable and
attractive option; to provide support to the host countries to
manage the infrastructure challenges of absorbing, even
temporarily, large numbers of Iraqis; and to encourage Iraqis
to find long-term solutions, either through integration where
they're currently residing, or resettlement to third countries,
including the United States.
In the end, these are profoundly personal choices. Refugee
policies for the United States that are generous in spirit and
flexible in practice will offer the most solace to a population
that fled the country during war and conflict that can still
return to play an important role in Iraq's future, if they
choose, or to find a new life elsewhere.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Laipson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, The Henry L.
Stimson Center, Washington, DC
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address your
subcommittee on the issue of Iraqi refugees. The plight of the more
than a million Iraqi refugees has significant consequences for the
Middle East region, as well as for the future stability and identity of
the Iraqi state. How the refugees are treated is also seen as a test of
U.S. leadership, and a measure of U.S. ability to manage the
consequences of the decision to oust Saddam Hussein.
I approach this issue not as a refugee expert per se, nor as
someone directly involved in the many laudable humanitarian programs
that support refugee needs. I look at the refugee issue from a broad
political perspective, as it relates to the future of Iraq, the
stability of the neighboring countries that have received large numbers
of Iraqi migrants, and the larger challenge of regional security.
Seen from this broader perspective, the potential implications of
the refugee issue are profound. At one extreme, it is worth pondering
whether the Iraqi refugees will come to be seen as the next
Palestinians: A large population movement caused by political upheaval
and war that has the potential to change the politics of the region for
generations, reshaping the demographic and political balances in some
of the key countries of the region, including Syria and Jordan. Even if
that scenario does not play out, the drama of the spontaneous flow of
Iraqis away from their homes has huge consequences for Iraq itself; the
tragic loss of cultural diversity and coexistence in many urban
neighborhoods and remote villages, the brain drain of well-trained
professionals, and the uncertainties for political loyalties and
national identity that are provoked by this abrupt shift in the
demographic makeup of the country.
My comments today will offer some reflections on how to think about
the Iraqi refugee problem, and about refugees and other forms of
migration. I will then address three key questions:
1. What are the current conditions and policy concerns regarding
Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan, and other Middle Eastern states?
2. What are the prospects for large-scale return of Iraqi refugees?
3. What are the implications of the Iraqi refugee crisis for Iraq,
its reintegration in the region and regional stability?
how to think about the refugee crisis
There are a number of definitional issues that should be
recognized: The unplanned movement of people from crisis zones does not
always mean they can be easily categorized for purposes of the
international community's responses, nor are numbers often reliable or
based on deeply scientific methods. In the case of Iraq, we do not know
for certain how many Iraqis left the country during different phases of
the crisis; it is often cited that as much as 20 percent of Iraq's
population has moved since 2003, half within the country and half
across its international borders. A new U.S. Institute of Peace report
\1\ on Iraq's displaced reminds us that there was mass displacement of
Iraqis during the rule of the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein. Some of
those Iraqis are now moving within Iraq back to their place or origin,
while others have been returning from international places of temporary
residence or asylum. This will add another dimension of complexity with
respect to eligibility for various kinds of support for return,
including housing and employment support once back inside Iraq.
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\1\ U.S. Institute of Peace, Deborah Isser and Peter Van der
Anweraert, ``Land, Property and the Challenge of Return for Iraq's
Displaced,'' USIP Special Report No. 221, April 2009.
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Since 2003, Iraqis left the country in two waves: One in the early
period of chaos and uncertainty, and a much larger wave provoked by the
outbreak of sectarian fighting in February 2006. The flow of Iraqis
across the borders to neighboring Syria and Jordan in particular was
largest in 2006 and began to taper off in 2007, when conditions began
to improve gradually inside Iraq, and receiving countries developed
more formal policies for those seeking to come for safety and work. The
number of Iraqis who have left since 2003 is not known; officially the
commonly used arithmetic is 1.2 million Iraqis in Syria, 500,000 in
Jordan, 200,000 in the gulf countries, and some tens of thousands in
Egypt and Lebanon. But NGOs and experts on the ground considered those
figures to be swollen by as much as 30-40 percent.
Migration experts, such as those at the American University of
Cairo's Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, point out that there
is sometimes not a clear distinction between an economic migrant and a
refugee. A person or family can choose to leave their home when
conflict or chronic instability makes it hard to earn a living. They
leave in search of a more normal life, both in terms of livelihood and
safety. The receiving country may consider the person an economic
migrant; the decision to self-declare as a refugee is also not a simple
proposition for a middle-class person who hopes to quickly acquire a
home and a job, not to live as a ward of local charities or the
international community.
One's status can also change over time. In the case of the Iraqis
in Syria, for example, many came as ``guests'' of the Syrians, and were
able to finance their temporary residence in Syria's cities. But over
time, absent promising conditions in Iraq to lure them back, these same
families deplete their savings, find no employment in the local
economy, and reluctantly find themselves applying for services and
subsidies that oblige them to register as refugees. The U.N. High
Commissioner on Refugees is now encouraging Iraqis to register, in
order to facilitate access to basic human needs programs, including
financial support for food, housing, health, and education.
It is also important to note that to address the needs of a refugee
population, it is often necessary to treat them as a collective, as a
group with shared requirements. But refugees are individuals and
families, each with deeply personal and unique stories and
perspectives. Resolving the refugee crisis must take into account that
people will respond differently to the traumatic experience of fleeing
their country, and will not all embrace the services provided by relief
organizations or the incentives offered by Iraq or receiving countries
for those migrants to return. The long-term solution, therefore, will
require a range of options for the refugees, not a policy based on an
assumption that they are a cohesive or like-minded cohort.\2\
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\2\ For a useful discussion of different and simultaneous options
for Iraqi refugees, see The International Rescue Committee, ``Five
Years Later, A Hidden Crisis,'' Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi
Refugees, March 2008.
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current conditions and concerns
The environment in which Iraqi refugees find themselves in early
2009 in the neighboring Arab states is affected by a range of factors:
The global economic downturn and its local impact, the history and
legacy of Iraq's relations with each host country, and the host
government's views of the changing situation in Iraq and prospects for
return. It is also affected by the behavior of the Iraqis themselves.
It is important to note that no major Arab country has created
``refugee camps'' for the Iraqis. Some Arab cities, however, now have
neighborhoods where Iraqis cluster, with restaurants and customs that
have an Iraqi character, In other cases, Iraqis choose to move together
to small rural enclaves and avoid the cities where they may be subject
to discrimination or run afoul of security authorities.
Some of the early concerns about Iraqis bringing sectarian politics
or violence with them appear to have abated. Local security services
have attempted to screen out Iraqis with a clear political agenda, and
for the most part, there are few instances of Iraqi refugees, migrants,
and guests causing conflict or law and order problems in their
countries of temporary residence. Local populations, however; perceive
the Iraqis in a somewhat hostile way, considering them responsible for
inflation, for high real estate prices, and even for water scarcity.
This suggests that conflict or competition over resources will remain a
concern for host countries.
A quick snapshot of the situation in key Arab states may be useful
\3\:
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\3\ I am grateful for a draft paper by Sara Sadek, ``Iraq
`Temporary Guests' in Neighboring Countries: Challenges and Prospects
of Integration,'' Center for Migration and Refugee Studies; American
University in Cairo. Discussion paper prepared for a Stimson Center-
AUC-AUB workshop on migration held in Beirut, March 16-17, 2009.
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Syria
Overall, Syria is viewed by the aid community and political
analysts to have been the most generous and accommodating of the
regional states toward Iraqi refugees. The government in Damascus
considers the Iraqis to be ``guests'' and does not formally take a
position on repatriation. Syria received a larger share of Christian
refugees than other neighbors, and it is widely assumed that the
Christians, many from small villages in northern Iraq, are not likely
to return, even if security conditions improve in Iraq. The Christian
Iraqis receive support and services from various local and
international Christian nongovernmental organizations, and are somewhat
integrated at the social level.
Economic conditions for Iraqis in Syria, however, are dire. Many
have depleted their savings or proceeds from selling homes and
businesses in Iraq, and are not able to seek formal employment in the
Syrian labor market, where unemployment is already high. The strain on
resources is considerable, and the international NGO community finds
itself serving both the Iraqi refugee population and Syrians who are
also in need of food, education, and housing support.
The Syrian Government remains relatively confident that the refugee
problem is manageable. Syrian officials would like more financial
support from Iraq, which Damascus complains has not lived up to its
promises to help finance the basic needs of Iraqis in Syria, and from
the international community, but they seem to take a long-term view.
The leadership realizes, nonetheless, that unemployed and undereducated
refugees in Syrian cities could, over time, become a virtual ``bomb''
for Syria, and for Iraq, should they return.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See U.S. Institute of Peace-Stimson Center joint report ``Iraq,
Its Neighbors and the Obama Administration: Syrian and Saudi
Perspectives,'' a working paper on a study mission in January 2009, p.
8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan
Jordan has been more nervous about the presence of Iraqi refugees,
has more stringent policies for screening who is eligible to enter, and
has felt a more direct impact of the influx on its relatively smaller
population and infrastructure.
Jordan provides Iraqis with asylum-seeking status, rather than
refugee status granted by the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees
(UNHCR) as it provided in most other countries, once the refugees
register. They are given a 6-month visa with no authorization to work,
although affluent Iraqis who can deposit $150,000 in Jordanian banks
have been given longer residence permits.
Jordan is also worried about the long-term impact of sectarian
consciousness of a Shia refugee population in a Sunni majority country.
Jordan sees the refugee crisis from the perspective of its own history,
hosting Palestinians who now form about half of the Jordanian
population, and its once-close relationship with Baghdad.
Egypt \5\
The relatively small cohort of Iraqis in Egypt does not generate
much attention or concern from the Egyptian Government, which also
houses large refugee populations from Sudan, Somalia, and other African
conflict zones. Many Iraqis in Egypt have legal residence, either
through their economic investments or through registering with UNHCR to
allow their children into the public school system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, for example, their study ``Iraqis in Egypt: A Statistical
Survey in 2008,'' at http://www.aucegypt.edu/ResearchatAUC/rc/cmrs/
Documents/Iraqis%20in%20Egypt%20Provisional%20 Copy.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast to the large African populations in Cairo, Iraqis are
perceived as wealthy migrants, based in part on the collective memory
of Egyptian laborers who worked in Iraq in the 1980s. There are some
social frictions over property, and Iraqis complain that they have been
blocked from forming their own civil associations, reportedly on
security grounds.
Lebanon
Iraqis in Lebanon face considerable obstacles to normalizing their
status. They are granted refugee status by UNHCR, but this has not
protected them from detention by Lebanese authorities. Many do not have
residence permits and are required to pay fees to acquire them. They
also have no access to public health and education services, or to the
labor market.
Unlike the situation in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, Iraqis in Lebanon
have formed community networks to survive, and Lebanon has permitted
them to establish these services. Given the profound and seemingly
permanent impact that Palestinian refugees have had on Lebanon, it
appears unlikely that the government in Beirut will permit the Iraqis
to fully integrate, and they may remain in rural enclaves, or migrate
to other locales as circumstances permit.
prospects for return
Repatriation of Iraqis who have not already integrated elsewhere or
who may achieve resettlement status outside the Middle East is an
important and compelling solution. It requires a number of conditions:
Iraq has to be perceived as a relatively stable and secure environment,
and refugees need some assurances about their prospects for returning
to their homes and for finding employment. Much of the burden for
meeting these conditions resides with the Iraqi Government and society,
but the international community can also contribute to making this a
viable option for many refugees.
The perception of security conditions inside Iraq is likely to be
the most important driver of a refugee's decision to return: All the
services and subsidies will not suffice if the fundamental reason for
flight has not been addressed. Iraqis in refugee status maintain
contact with relatives and neighbors inside, as well as media accounts
of conditions inside. They are interested in security at the national
level, but also at the neighborhood level and at the family level. In
2006, families fled because of direct threats from neighbors of a
different sectarian identity. They will gauge for themselves whether
those conditions have changed and how much risk they are willing to
take. Do they have the option of living in a more homogeneous area
where sectarian dangers are reduced? Refugee experts suggest that the
refugees themselves will be good indicators of when the right
conditions for return prevail: Iraqis have informal networks of
information and even travel back into Iraq, to appraise the situation.
Economics is also a powerful driver of the decision to return.
Iraqi refugees were not able to calculate the duration of their refuge,
and many would return at a lower socioeconomic status than they enjoyed
before their departure. The readjustment to life in Iraq may be hard,
but at some point, it may be better than remaining unemployed in a
neighboring country. Resuming their earlier professional lives may not
be feasible immediately, but can be an aspiration that motivates them
to return.
The Iraqi Government offers transportation and modest financial
assistance to returnees. The estimate of returnees in early 2008 was
less than 100,000, a very small reaction of those displaced since 2003.
In general, these services and the sustained commitment to providing
them are not robust enough to have generated large numbers to date, nor
are the other conditions cited above strong enough.
long-term prognosis
The United States has a deep and abiding interest in the stability
of Iraq and its ability to resume its place as a key state in the
region. The enduring presence of Iraqis with deteriorating economic
conditions in neighboring states will be a painful reminder of Iraq's
weakness and its internal strife, and an increasing burden on their
hosts. As Iraq's neighbors adjust to new realities, and Iraq is
integrated back into the region, the refugee issue has the potential to
be a source of cooperation and common concern, but also an enduring
source of friction. Disaffected Iraqis with few prospects of
integration in host countries could be drawn to extremism or
lawlessness, which will hurt Iraq and the host societies and impede
prospects for regional security.
The international community needs to have a range of programs and
policies for the Iraqi displaced: First and foremost, to work on
conditions inside Iraq that will make return a viable and attractive
option; to provide support to host countries to manage the
infrastructure challenges of absorbing, even temporarily, large numbers
of Iraqis; and to encourage policies that permit Iraqis to find long-
term solutions, through integration when possible and resettlement to
third countries, including the United States. In the end, these are
profoundly personal choices. The United States needs to work
strategically for stability in Iraq, recognizing that some of these
societal traumas will take a very long time to heal. Refugee policies
that are generous of spirit and flexible in practice will offer the
most solace to a population that needs support now, and attention over
time so that Iraqis who fled war and conflict in recent years can
return to play a role in Iraq's future if they choose, or find a new
life elsewhere.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Ms. Aossey.
STATEMENT OF NANCY AOSSEY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS, LOS ANGELES, CA
Ms. Aossey. I'd like to thank you, Chairman Casey, for
calling this very important hearing today, and Senator Kaufman,
for being here today, as well.
I head the International Medical Corps. We're headquartered
in Los Angeles, CA, and were founded in 1984. We are currently
operating programs throughout the world in more than 25
countries.
We have been working in Iraq continuously, in almost all of
Iraq, since 2003, promoting self-reliance and long-term
development programs. Our 500 staff in Iraq work mostly outside
the Green Zone, among the Iraqi people. We have 22 expatriate
staff and about 40 technical experts. We also have about 200
staff members and 13 expatriates in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.
Our local staff are hired from the communities where we work.
And, in fact, it is because of this that we have longevity in
Iraq. It is the result of our staying true to the principle of
acceptance of our presence by the people in the communities
that we serve.
International Medical Corps builds close ties to these
communities where we work, and we work in consultation with
local leaders and institutions to build this local support. The
currency of our relationships, and the foundation of all of
them, is trust.
I'd like to focus on the conditions in which Iraq's
displaced live, as well as the challenges ahead for this
population. I will then present four recommendations for U.S.
policy in Iraq that we think will help mitigate the current
displacement crisis and assist in finding durable and long-
lasting solutions. Of course, I've submitted my written
testimony, which is quite a bit longer.
Until now, the plight of displaced Iraqis has really
received mostly sporadic attention. If left alone, the
displacement has the potential to undermine the nation's
fragile and hard-won gains. How the displacement crisis is
handled by all of us will have far-reaching consequences.
Decisions regarding return, repatriation, and resettlement
should not be made in haste.
The plight of Iraq's internally displaced people is largely
invisible. There are no sprawling tent camps or dramatic
airdrops to capture international attention. Instead, the
majority of them have found shelter quietly among the poorest
of neighborhoods or sometimes amid strangers in overcrowded
cities. Most are forced to rely on external support, with no
means to make a living.
The estimated 2 million Iraqis who fled to the neighboring
countries do not fit the stereotype of refugees; they live in
urban settings among the local population. They often cannot
work. An ongoing assessment by International Medical Corps in
all three countries finds that the majority of Iraqis refugees
chronically lack access to health care and education, and that
women and children, especially, experience declining health and
social isolation. The reality is, in all three countries,
Iraqis have fled insecurity, only to face severe poverty and
deprivation.
As a real, yet fragile, degree of security continues to
settle over Iraq, some of the displaced families have begun to
return home. Their numbers are small, just under 300,000, less
than 6 percent of the total displaced population. And 9 of 10
returnees are internally displaced persons. This means that the
tremendous pressures on neighboring countries that host these
refugees remains essentially unchanged.
The international community really does owe a debt of
gratitude to those nations of the Middle East that have taken
in large numbers of these refugees and accept the economic,
social, and political burdens that come with them. While the
evidence of returns is encouraging, it's very important not to
rush this process, because to push for accelerated returns
before the proper conditions are in place could cause the
exchange of existing problems for new, equally complex, and
possibly much more dangerous set of challenges. We must also
assure, of course, that other options are available to those
who are not able to settle back into Iraq.
But, return--and I repeat--return can only occur when Iraqi
families feel it is safe to do so. And they rely on their
information, in large part, not from government entities, but
by talking to relatives and friends, in the communities from
which they come, to get a sense of how safe their friends and
relatives feel in those communities. That's where they're
getting a lot of their information.
Certain conditions must be put in place for these displaced
populations to feel that they can return. They need access to
accurate information, they need an acceptable level of
security, they need a package of support that's offered by the
international community.
The evidence is clear that the Government of Iraq needs our
help in this task, and this is, in large part, due to the fact
that ministries, such as the Ministry of Displacement and
Migration, with whom we work, have demonstrated the commitment
and the willingness to assume their roles, but truly don't have
the capacity to do so.
I'd like to focus on some recommendations. There are
certainly many compelling reasons why the United States should
remain engaged and support the Iraqi Government in helping to
establish conditions for long-term solutions for displaced
Iraqis. Certainly, Iraq is vital to the stability of the Middle
East. Considering the conditions I've described, the United
States policy toward Iraq should develop and implement a
strategy to address the crisis of IDPs and refugees in
neighboring countries that figures prominently in the
administration's plan for political and economic stability in
Iraq.
There should be increased support for humanitarian efforts
aimed at fostering the conditions necessary for safe and
sustainable return. Additional resources should be provided to
USAID, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the
Department of State to help them achieve the humanitarian and
development objectives necessary to address this crisis in a
comprehensive manner, and we should urge--and, very
importantly, support--the Iraqi Government in the development
of a unified legal and administrative framework designed to
ensure safe and sustainable returns. Finally, we should
accelerate technical and capacity-building measures within the
Iraqi Government ministries to help them comprehensively
address the country's displacement crisis. Managing this crisis
must be an Iraqi-led process, it cannot be carried out solely
by the rest of us, and it requires close collaboration with the
Iraqi Government.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Aossey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy A. Aossey, President and Chief Executive
Officer, International Medical Corps, Los Angeles, CA
Chairman Casey, Senator Risch, members of the subcommittee, I am
Nancy Aossey, President and CEO of International Medical Corps, a
private, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization headquartered in Los
Angeles, California, that has been working continuously in Iraq since
the spring of 2003 and is currently assisting Iraqi refugees in Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon.
Thank you for the invitation to testify and the opportunity to
appear before you. We applaud your decision to conduct this hearing on
the plight of the millions of Iraqis forced from their homes over the
past 6 years.
I have led International Medical Corps for the past 23 years since
shortly after its founding in 1984. I would like to share with you
today our unique perspective as a humanitarian assistance organization
that has worked for nearly 6 years with displaced Iraqis and their
families both on the ground in Iraq and in the neighboring countries.
International Medical Corps' work in the region seeks to promote self-
reliance and advance long-term development by targeting four key
sectors: Health, humanitarian assistance, capacity-building, and
democracy and governance.
International Medical Corps was founded by volunteer doctors and
nurses to train mid-level health care workers in Afghanistan. We are
now a global humanitarian organization dedicated to saving lives and
relieving suffering of those affected by war, natural disaster and
disease and to delivering vital health care services that incorporate
capacity-building of our counterparts. International Medical Corps
helps people return to self-reliance by enabling the development of
essential skills for health, livelihoods, rehabilitation and service
delivery. We implement major emergency relief and longer term
transitional and development programs that provide comprehensive health
and nutrition services, rehabilitate infrastructure, train local
personnel and enhance community participation and development in more
than 20 countries worldwide. Those countries today include Iraq,
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, where the overwhelming majority of the
displaced Iraqis currently reside.
At your request, I will focus my testimony today on the present day
realities in the region for the displaced Iraqi population, how I
believe the process of return and resettlement will proceed and how the
United States can best play a constructive role in coordination with
the Iraqi Government and the international community. I will conclude
with recommendations to the administration for addressing the current
crisis.
My comments are based on International Medical Corps' considerable
experience in dealing with the current crisis--our experience is
certainly among the broadest and deepest of the nongovernmental,
humanitarian relief organizations operating in the Middle East region.
Although exact numbers are difficult to obtain, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates the current total
displacement in the region at 4.7 million people. Of that number,
approximately 2.7 million have been displaced inside Iraq, and up to 2
million refugees are estimated to have fled to neighboring countries.
International Medical Corps has been in Iraq without interruption
since the spring of 2003, and has operated extensively in all of the
country's 18 governorates. We have worked in the region, providing
assistance to a target population of 3 million inside Iraq and are
currently serving a beneficiary population of nearly 200,000 Iraqi
refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. We have implemented programs in
these areas totaling over $150 million as of December 2008.
We currently have more than 500 staff members inside Iraq,
including 22 expatriates and over 40 visiting technical experts. In
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, we have more than 200 staff, including 13
expatriates. The vast majority of local staff we hire comes from the
communities where we work. We have worked in coordination with a
variety of U.S. agencies and departments, including the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad, the U.S. Agency for International. Development (USAID), the
U.S. Department of State, as well as with United Nations agencies,
international and Iraqi nongovernmental organizations and local
religious and tribal leaders.
Despite an extremely difficult environment, International Medical
Corps has worked continuously inside Iraq since 2003. In Baghdad, our
staff live and work in the so-called ``red zone''--the majority of the
city that is outside the tightly guarded, high security ``green zone''
that is home to the U.S. Embassy, the Iraq Parliament and the
residences and offices of many of the international organizations
working in Iraq.
We have been able to work outside the green zone without a heavy
security presence. Our ability to do this lies in our disciplined
adherence to a few basic ``musts.'' First, we operate on the principle
of acceptance of our presence and our work by the local population.
Second, we depend on building close ties to the communities where we
work. In addition to hiring staff locally, we consult and collaborate
with Iraqi institutions, local leaders and groups and government
officials at all levels in order to build the necessary support for our
relief, development, and training efforts. Third, the currency of these
relationships is a common understanding and trust. In a very real
sense, our word has been our bond.
For example, today in Iraq, International Medical Corps projects
build the capacity of the government while concurrently providing
direct services to Iraqis. In the health sector, we implement
continuing medical education and professional development programs for
health workers, recently, training more than 200 health professionals
in anaesthesia, ophthalmology, emergency medicine, psychiatry, and
obstetrics/gynecology. International Medical Corps also responds to
emergency situations, including specific incidents that have resulted
in displacement. For example, when violence erupted in Mosul, in early
October 2008, militants forced more than 11,000 of the city's
Christians to flee. With financial support from USAID's Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within 24 hours we procured and
delivered emergency food rations, hygiene kits, and household items to
displaced families. Also with funding from OFDA, we are assisting the
Ministry of Displacement and Migration in operating Returnee Assistance
Centers to provide immediate and longer term assistance to internally
displaced people and refugee returnees, including registration,
protection, legal assistance and ministerial capacity-building.
International Medical Corps has used our unique position to conduct
original research on the flow of internally displaced Iraqis--
especially in and out of Baghdad and also within Baghdad itself. Our
January 2007 report on displacement in Baghdad was among the very first
to document the gravity and scope of the violence-driven shifts of
populations underway in Iraq. Our role as an American nongovernmental,
international relief agency working in both Iraq and three neighboring
countries hosting some of the largest concentrations of displaced
Iraqis gives us a special perspective on the impact of the crisis
across the Middle East region.
Despite the size of the problem, the plight of Iraq's displaced
people is largely invisible. There are no sprawling tent camps or
dramatic airdrops to capture international attention. Instead, the
majority of Iraq's displaced population has found shelter quietly,
often in the poorest neighborhoods of unfamiliar communities, sometimes
with friends and relatives inside Iraq, sometimes amid strangers in an
overcrowded foreign city. Most are forced to live on their savings
because there is little or no work available. In many cases the
communities hosting the 2.7 million internally displaced Iraqis are as
destitute as those they are helping. For the majority of the estimated
2 million other displaced Iraqis who have sought safety in neighboring
countries, work is illegal and livelihood opportunities are extremely
limited to nonexistent. Because they have fled their country of origin,
they are officially known as refugees.
I believe the international community owes a debt of gratitude to
those nations of the Middle East that have taken in large numbers of
these refugees and accepted the economic, social, and political burdens
that have come with them--all with limited support from the world at
large and from the Government of Iraq. That said the work of important
donor agencies, including USAID, the State Department's Bureau of
Populations, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and U.N. agencies such as the
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UNHCR have played important roles in
helping ease the suffering.
If there is good news about the crisis of displaced Iraqis in the
spring of 2009, it is that the number of those on the move has slowed
substantially. According to a February 2009 report by the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), the numbers of newly displaced
families has dropped from an average of 16,000 per month during most of
2006 and early 2007 to only a few hundred families per month in the
final months of 2008. Many of these new displacements stem from
specific events, such as militia attacks against Christians in the
northern city of Mosul last fall.
The bad news, however, is that all too many of the millions of
displaced Iraqis are suffering the predictable ills of substandard
life. They are experiencing deteriorating health, plummeting income
levels, reduced education, poor, overcrowded living conditions and the
psychological weight of living a life on hold, uncertain when it might
end.
At a political level, the internal displacement of nearly 10
percent of its population has a serious impact on Iraq's economic
development prospects and saddled the government with daunting social
and political problems. Outside Iraq itself, the presence of such a
large and economically unproductive refugee population has added an
additional burden on host nations already struggling to provide for
their own. The pressures of the global economic downturn merely
exacerbate the situation, building upon social tensions in countries
where citizens suddenly find themselves competing with refugees for
such fundamentals as adequate health care. In short, the conditions in
which the majority of displaced Iraqis currently live is unsustainable
over the long term.
As a real, yet fragile, degree of security has settled over Iraq
over the past several months, some of the displaced families have begun
to return home. The numbers remain small--just under 300,000
individuals so far, according to the most recent IOM figures. That
figure is less than 6 percent of the total displaced population. Nine
of every ten returnees are internally displaced, that is they are
returning to their locations of origin from other parts of Iraq. That
means the burdens on neighboring countries hosting refugees remains
essentially unchanged despite the improved security situation.
Our own internal research tells us the majority of those heading
home have cited improved security conditions as their reason for moving
back. We also know from historical experience that the majority of
people forced to leave their homes prefer to return once conditions on
the ground are in place that provide a safe and secure environment. We
know too that for some, returning may not be an option, and other
durable solutions, including resettlement in another country, must be
made available.
While evidence of returns is heartening, I believe we need to be
careful not to move too quickly on this front. To push for accelerated
returns before the proper conditions are achieved could effectively
cause us to exchange existing problems for new, equally complex, and
possibly more dangerous, concerns.
the process of return
The process of return poses major challenges to the Government of
Iraq. To succeed, it will need the help of the United States and other
members of the international community. While the Iraqis have
instituted a few support measures to help those returning home, they
have been insufficient and only marginally effective. The unfortunate
reality is that the Government of Iraq has yet to develop a
comprehensive strategy to deal with this issue.
Most importantly, necessary conditions must be met that enable both
refugees in neighboring countries and those displaced internally to
return home voluntarily, in safety and with dignity. Some of these
conditions are already in place. For example, with a popularly elected
Government, a Constitution, and an active Parliament, Iraq today is
increasingly a nation that functions under the rule of law. Other
important conditions are also necessary. I will name just a few:
Access to accurate information is a key concern for
displaced Iraqis as they consider returning to their place of
origin. We know that displaced populations tend to return in
large numbers when they believe they have reliable, accurate,
and objective information on their locations of origin or
habitual residence. It is also clear that refugees most often
rely on sources of information they most trust--that is the
local community, family, friends, and relatives still living in
the location of origin.
We believe that improving the flow of credible and independent
information is a critical component in helping refugees and internally
displaced Iraqis in the decisionmaking process of when--or if--they
should return home. This reality merely underscores the need for a
community-based approach to providing information. A forthcoming survey
on Iraqi internal displacement, conducted by International Medical
Corps in conjunction with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and
Migration and the United Nations, found that displaced Iraqi
individuals and families overwhelmingly turned to the local community
for information and even tried to visit themselves where possible. Few,
however, turned to local or national authorities or other government
channels. We at International Medical Corps have worked to open these
channels in order to facilitate the flow of information by setting up a
web portal at a returnee acceptance center in Baghdad. The web portal
was established in cooperation with local community councils and
leaders to provide information on specific Baghdad neighborhoods and
share experiences with members of displaced families who have already
returned. It also serves as an information source for displaced people
to learn about the registration process and learn what they can expect
to receive in terms of financial and social benefits upon return.
There must also be an acceptable level of security. Security
has improved dramatically in Iraq over the past year, but
remains fragile and uncertain. According to a Government
Accounting Office (GAO) report on Iraq released earlier this
month, the number of insurgent-initiated attacks fell from
nearly 180 per day in June 2007 to 27 per day in January 2009.
The challenge here is to make the security gains sustainable so
that security becomes stability--an essential ingredient to
ending the displacement crisis successfully. To achieve this
requires the continued commitment of the Iraqi Government. As
the number of U.S. troops decreases, it is of course important
to further the ability of the national government to provide
security for its citizens. Support for other efforts that
promote national reconciliation are also critical in helping to
establish a stable and secure environment--for example, efforts
that promote interreligious and intersectarian dialogue and
understanding.
The Iraqi Government must develop a strategic framework to
deal with the returns in a systematic, coordinated manner and
be in a position to provide a package of support specifically
tailored to the needs of those returning, such as a functioning
mechanism for resolving disputes over property abandoned in
haste. The, government must also be able to provide the basic
public services to the community at large, including health
services and education, and assure the availability of both
affordable housing and employment opportunities. The job will
not be easy. Both Iraqi refugees and those displaced internally
remain in desperate need of immediate humanitarian assistance
ranging from health care, water and food to housing, education
and economic opportunities. They will also require longer term
assistance to help them rebuild their lives and fully integrate
into society.
The Government of Iraq has struggled--and often failed--to meet the
needs of the relatively small number of displaced Iraqis who have
returned so far. In general, the displaced remain in a precarious
situation across Iraq and little attention or effort has been devoted
to helping them reintegrate into their original communities. Property
issues have been, and will continue to be, an important challenge for
those responsible for managing the returns process. Over half of the
families who return to their original location report that their homes
are seriously damaged or occupied by another family, according to data
from the IOM. To succeed in the larger task ahead, the Government of
Iraq will need the support of the international community--including
the United States, the United Nations, and nongovernment organizations
with experience of such crises such as International Medical Corps.
To prepare for a greater flow of returns, the Iraqi Government's
Ministry of Displacement and Migration has taken some steps. It has
opened Returnee Assistance Centers in Baghdad, and others are planned
for areas outside the capital. The Iraqi Government also provides one-
time grants of 1 million dinars per family--an amount equivalent to
about $850--to help ease the financial costs of returning home.
Officially, the decision to return rests with the individual displaced
families. However, concern has been expressed by a number of
international groups supporting displaced Iraqis that the present poor
conditions in which the displaced currently live could lead to returns
that are not truly voluntary. Mounting political pressure for return
from some of the governments involved in the crisis may also result in
the displaced returning at a time conditions on the ground may not yet
be suitable, safe, or sustainable.
Returning to one's place of origin is the preferred durable
solution for any displaced population, while recognizing that there
need to be options in place for those who feel that they cannot return.
But return can only--I repeat--only occur when Iraqi families feel it
is safe and secure to do so. Returns must take place in an environment
of confidence, dignity, safety, and mutual respect. Conditions for
return must also be sustainable. In such an atmosphere, I can assure
this committee that International Medical Corps and other
nongovernmental organizations inside the country will be well-
positioned to assist returnees as they meet the many challenges
involved in the transition back home to a productive, peaceful life.
While the evidence of returns is heartening, I believe we need to
be careful not to move forward too quickly. To push for accelerated
returns before the proper conditions are achieved could effectively
cause us to exchange existing problems for a new, equally complex--and
possibly more dangerous--set of challenges. We must also ensure that
other options, such as resettlement in a third country, and integration
into current communities; are available to those for whom return is not
appropriate.
In the struggle to stabilize Iraq, every year has been heralded as
``critical.'' Yet, coming after the surge, with provincial and national
elections looming, U.S. forces due to withdraw from cities and towns,
and a new U.S. administration to take the helm during a time of
unprecedented domestic and international economic upheaval--2009 truly
promises to be a watershed in the Iraq conflict. The staying power of
Iraqi civil and security institutions, and therefore U.S. investment in
building their capacities, will be sorely tested.
the role of the united states
After 6 years of sacrifice and tens of billions of dollars of
investment to rebuild Iraq, International Medical Corps believes the
United States would be ill-advised, at this important juncture, to
reduce U.S. support of Iraq's development process. Technical assistance
from the United States, the United Nations and other international
agencies and organizations is a must in order to assure robust and
fully supported programs that create jobs, stabilize local economies,
and raise the prospect of a better future for all Iraqis.
There are also compelling reasons why the United States must remain
fully engaged in Iraq at this crucial time.
--Because a stable Iraq is vital to the stability of the broader Middle
East, the United States must reinforce its efforts to strengthen
the Iraqi Government's capacity at all levels to respond to the
needs of its people, regain their trust and rebuild the kind of
strong, prosperous communities that lie at the heart of a stable
nation.
--Such efforts are the most effective weapon against a resurgence of
extremism. And at a time large numbers of displaced Iraqis weigh
the possibility of returning home, effective measures are needed to
improve the chances of the successful reintegration of these
returnees. If this process of return fails, the result will be
heightened social tensions and a very real danger of a new descent
into violence.
--It is also important that the United States set an example of moral
leadership in helping the Iraqis help the most vulnerable elements
of their population--the more than 4.7 million displaced by
violence.
I can assure members of this subcommittee there is compelling
evidence that the Government of Iraq needs help in this task. I am
encouraged that those in key Iraqi Government ministries understand
this fact and want our help. They have demonstrated a commitment and a
willingness to reform. International Medical Corps has experienced this
firsthand as it has worked to strengthen the capacity of important
ministries, including the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, a key
ministry in the process of return.
Currently, however, the majority of Iraqi ministries are crippled
by problems of political patronage, unskilled staff, bureaucratic
inertia and decisionmaking processes that are unnecessarily convoluted
and highly centralized. The price of such practices is high. I cite
just one example: The recently released GAO report on Iraq noted that
central goyernment ministries responsible for providing essential
services to the Iraqi people managed to spend only 11 percent of their
2007 budgets. We do not believe such problems should be addressed by
sending in battalions of outside advisers, many of whom may not even
possess the needed expertise. Our experience tells us that carefully
calibrated, targeted assistance deployed to work on well-defined issues
is an efficient, cost-effective way to generate meaningful results.
Since 2006, International Medical Corps has been at the forefront
of efforts to improve the capacities of these ministries. We have
assisted numerous Iraqi ministries in improving their technical,
managerial, and administrative capacities with the aim of promoting
good governance, transparency, and improvement in the delivery of
essential services to Iraq's citizens. Central to our approach to
building the capacity of the Iraqi Government to serve its people is
the belief that ``professional development'' is not a one-off event,
but rather a continuous process of improvement and growth through the
accumulation of skills and ideas.
Most recently, International Medical Corps has been working in
partnership with the ministries of Migration and Displacement, Health,
and Labor and Social Affairs to design and deliver programs tailored to
address each ministry's existing gaps in capacity and improve the skill
sets of senior and middle management. The success of our programs in
this area has led to an increase in requests from Iraqi ministries for
the establishment of direct partnerships. Such partnerships would
strengthen staff capacity and ensure that public sector employees
possess the skill sets necessary to provide high quality services to
the population. To fail to respond to such requests would, in my
opinion, be simply irresponsible.
the regional picture: hidden suffering, unseen pressures
The estimated 2 million Iraqis who fled to neighboring countries
and now wait to come home do not fit the refugee stereotype. They don't
live in camps and only a minority has registered with UNHCR. None of
the three host countries where International Medical Corps works--
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon--has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, the
cornerstone document in international law that defines both the rights
of a refugee and the obligations of a hosting country. The result of
all this means that Iraqis who have fled to these countries live amid
considerable uncertainty.
An International Medical Corps assessment in all three countries
conducted in early 2007 found that the majority are living with limited
access to health care and education. Having left their homes and jobs
behind, many Iraqis have lost a stable income and live in squalid
conditions, depending on loans and gifts. Working legally is extremely
difficult. Our research found that most Iraqis in exile are extremely
vulnerable. Women and children especially show signs of declining
health and social isolation. In all three countries, Iraqis have fled
insecurity only to face severe poverty and deprivation.
In these countries, International Medical Corps has operated a
series of services for refugees, ranging from continuing medical
education and continuing professional development programs that target
the skills of Iraqi refugee professionals to the distribution of
nonfood items, such as mattresses, blankets, children's clothing and
diapers, to improve living conditions.
To all but the discerning eye, the Iraqi refugees are unseen, many
of them swallowed up in the poorer neighborhoods of Damascus and Amman
and the southern suburbs of Beirut. The price of relative safety in a
foreign land has been steep for an Iraqi refugee population, much of
which once considered itself part of a well-educated middle class. In
Syria, for example, nearly one-third of the refugees have a college
degree, according to UNHCR. One-third expects their financial resources
will last for 3 months or less. The refugees scattered across the
region come from different areas of Iraq, but a majority share a common
dream. They want to go home.
Syria
International Medical Corps began working in Syria in 2007 and
continues to be the only American medical nongovernment organization
authorized or officially registered to operate there. Over half of all
Iraqi refugees in the current crisis have fled to Syria, a country that
suddenly finds itself host to the world's largest concentration of
Iraqis outside of Iraq. Worried about being overwhelmed by the wave of
refugees that followed the February 2006 bombing of a holy Shiite
shrine in Samara, Syrian authorities ended unrestricted entry for
Iraqis in the fall of 2007 and implemented visa requirements that allow
entry to certain categories, such as academics and their families,
students, and a limited number of other categories.
Under programs funded by PRM and in collaboration with the Syrian
Arab Red Crescent, International Medical Corps operates clinics in four
different Syrian communities, focusing on providing comprehensive
primary and preventative health care needs for some of the most
vulnerable refugees. Over a 6-month period, International Medical
Corps-supported clinics provided nearly 50,000 consultations, an effort
that helped ease pressures on Syria's existing health infrastructure--
one already hard-pressed to meet the demands of its own citizens.
In the past 18 months, conditions for some refugees have eased
following the arrival of several international assistance groups,
including U.N. organizations such as UNHCR, the World Health
Organization, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF.
I would like to cite an example of the impact assistance from the
United States has made at a very personal level. It is the story of a
young Iraqi girl named Zainab, whom we saw at an International Medical
Corps clinic in Syria. She had acute lymphoblastic leukemia, but had to
stop her treatment short because it was so expensive. We approached our
U.S. Government donor about the possibility of including care for
chronic and complicated health issues in its already successful Syria-
Iraqi Refugee Assistance Program. Shortly after, a program was launched
that brought specialized treatment to people suffering, chronic
conditions, including Zainab. Although Zainab died of leukemia last
December, the program she inspired is saving lives. Three Iraqi women
in the program would not otherwise have received care for their high-
risk pregnancies and were scheduled for Cesarean-section births to
bring their babies into the world safely, thanks to American assistance
and the inspiration of a remarkable child.
Jordan
Conditions for Iraqi refugees in Jordan are also difficult. Iraqis
in Jordan equal about 8 percent of the country's own population. Visa
requirements have limited the entry of many Iraqis trying to enter the
country, while Western human rights groups have reported a
disproportionate number of young men being turned back at the border.
Once in Jordan, life is tenuous for Iraqi refugees. Their legal status
is unclear and opportunities for work are severely restricted. Only one
in five low-income Iraqis reported having a valid residence permit,
according the UNHCR. As in Syria, some Iraqis live off their savings,
while others are supported by relatives from outside the country.
According to UNHCR statistics, one in five families is headed by a
female--an additional burden in the Arab world--and are often found
living among more impoverished elements of society. Despite this, the
overwhelming majority of Iraqis recently surveyed in Jordan by UNHCR--
95 percent--said they wanted to return to Iraq only when security
conditions had improved.
Much as in Syria, the addition of a large and vulnerable population
of Iraqi refugees has strained Jordan's public services, including its
health care system. Iraqis have access to the same medical services as
Jordanians, but the overall health infrastructure lacks the capacity to
provide comprehensive primary health care services to the enlarged
population. As the Iraqi refugee population grew, Jordan also opened
its schools to Iraqi children.
International Medical Corps' programs in Jordan have serviced the
Iraqi refugee population since 2007, while at the same time also
providing critical services to vulnerable Jordanians. Working from
clinics and mobile units, International Medical Corps provides
community level primary and mental health services and is working to
boost the ability of Jordan's primary health care providers to deal
with mental illness through theoretical and on-the-job training.
International Medical Corps also offers pediatric health screenings and
facilitates mother-to-mother support groups that deal with health care
and other child-rearing issues. Because the women are under stress, we
have found these sessions are often emotional. In one such meeting, a
woman named Hadaf introduces herself with one sentence. ``I am an Iraqi
woman; I have no other aim than going home one day.'' Her comment came
in what is called the ``ice breaker,'' when women tell the other women
in the group about themselves in a few sentences. Within minutes all of
them are crying, for themselves and the other Iraqi mothers in the room
whom they never met before but who share their hardship, their
homesickness, and their lost sense of belonging in exile.
The workshops, run by social workers from International Medical
Corps and the Jordan River Foundation, address how these women can
build positive relationships with their children and discover how to
change negative practices. The project is a small but important
component of a far larger effort to improve the quality of life for
Iraqi refugees. It is funded by UNHCR, UNICEF, and PRM. In total, 600
mothers have participated and 10 of them eventually will become ``peer
mothers'' and train others in improving the well-being of their
children.
Lebanon
For the estimated 50,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon, where
International Medical Corps has worked since 2006, conditions appear to
have improved over the past year, although they remain arduous. Due to
Lebanon's delicate religious and sectarian balance, integrating or
legalizing Iraqi refugees is not a political option. The majority of
Iraqis in Lebanon are young, single men, not permitted to work legally.
A quarter of them are Christian. Prior to February 2008, human rights
groups, such as Amnesty International, reported that Lebanese
authorities arrested and detained hundreds of Iraqis, who were then
held indefinitely on charges of being in the country illegally. The
tactic was viewed by many as an apparent attempt to coerce the refugees
to return to Iraq. Early last year, the Lebanese Government changed
course, introducing a program to legalize foreign nationals and offer
them year-long residence and work permits; however the costs and
necessary bureaucratic steps made the offer difficult to fulfill.
Still, according to a June 2008 Amnesty International report, the
number of refugees in detention had dropped from about 600 in early
2008 to less than 150 five months later.
Iraqi refugees have settled in various parts of Lebanon, but the
majority now lives in Beirut's southern suburbs, an area where the
government's law enforcement has been historically weak. A second
concentration, mainly comprising Iraqi Christians from Mosul and
Baghdad, has come together in the poor Christian neighborhoods of
northeast Beirut. Many of the estimated 11,000 Christians fleeing
intimidation and violence carried out by militia groups in Mosul ended
up in Beirut because of the relative freedom of Christians to follow
their faith there. The story of one such family that received support
from International Medical Corps helps illustrate the fate of Iraq's
Christian minority in Lebanon. The family of five, including two
infants, headed by a man named Nawar, managed to escape Mosul with
little more than the clothes on their back. They came to Beirut
because, like other Christians, they felt it was a safe place to
practice their faith. The entire family lives in a one-bedroom
apartment with no heating and sporadic electricity. Both Nawar and his
mother have health problems, and because Nawar cannot work, they don't
have the money to buy the nutrient-rich food his infant sons require.
An International Medical Corps mobile medical unit provides free food
supplements, clothing, hygiene kits and even complete physical exams to
Nawar's family and other refugee families with young children.
iraq: encouraging security, elusive stabilty
International Medical Corps assessment teams first crossed into
Iraq from Kuwait in March 2003, amid concerns that heavy fighting would
generate a large population of refugees or internally displaced persons
(IDPs). As we now know, those population movements only came later--
beginning in 2004 and escalating with the rise in sectarian violence,
the beginning of al-Qaeda operations in western Iraq and a dramatic
deterioration of security in many areas of the country.
Changing security landscape and the rise in returns
It is evident that overall living conditions in Iraq have improved.
Physical and human security has especially improved in ways we could
only hope for just 18 months ago. These dramatic changes in Iraq's
internal dynamics have also had a strong effect on the issue of
displacement within the country and across its borders. By late 2007,
it was clear that displaced Iraqis were beginning to feel confident and
safe enough to begin weighing a return to their homes and locations of
habitual residence.
Since then the number of returns has increased steadily, with the
most notable rise taking place in Baghdad, where it is estimated that
upward of 31,521 families (or 189,126 individuals) have returned to the
governorate, according to the February 2009 IOM Emergency Needs
Assessment Report. That constitutes nearly two-thirds of all returnees.
According to the same report, returns have also picked up in areas of
the country that were once subject to some of the worst of the
country's sectarian-based violence. In Diyala, for example, 8,818
families (or 52,908 individuals) have returned, while 4,542 families
(or 27,525 individuals) have returned to Anbar.
As noted earlier, issues surrounding property rights represent just
one problem displaced Iraqis face as they return home, attempt to
reclaim their lives and begin anew. Among the others:
Security--real but fragile
Security continues to be a priority concern for displaced Iraqis as
they weigh the possibility of return--whether they be refugees residing
outside the country or those who have been displaced inside Iraq. And
although there have been major improvements in the last several months,
the tangible gains are considered fragile and the perception of
displaced population is that it is generally not yet stable enough for
them to return to their place of origin. There are also several factors
that will test the strength of the existing calm in the months ahead.
For example, the Iraqi Government's inability to spend money already
budgeted coupled with the unexpectedly sharp decline in the price of
oil have raised the prospect of cuts in the Iraqi military, which is
now the single most important player in maintaining law and order in
the country. Another vital component in Iraq's security fabric is the
U.S. military presence, which is also expected to decline steadily in
numbers. At the same time, tensions are rising between the government
and the mainly Sunni militias that have helped keep the peace in Sunni-
dominated western Iraq.
The early stages of the return process constitute an especially
delicate time, both socially and politically, in a society such as
Iraq, so deeply divided along both sectarian and ethnic lines.
Significant population movements can easily reignite violence and
therefore need to be handled very cautiously. However, the inability to
spend money already appropriated for essential services plus worries
about shrinking oil revenues could also limit the kind of Iraqi
Government support needed to ease social tensions, such as new jobs and
public services.
Kirkuk--exception to a larger calm
Unlike most of Iraq, security in the key northern city of Kirkuk
has not improved and in some areas has actually worsened. It still
presents a difficult security challenge for the Government of Iraq. The
city has sizable populations of nearly all Iraq's ethnic, religious,
and linguistic groups, in addition to one-third of Iraq's proven oil
deposits. It is also an anomaly in that both its displaced and returnee
populations, unlike the rest of Iraq, continue to be highly mixed in
their ethnicity, religion, and language. Because of its oil, Kirkuk has
long been the object of a power struggle between Kurds and Arabs, and
the enormity of the economic stakes, coupled with the social tensions,
make the issue as delicate as it is complicated.
The call for a more comprehensive approach to the needs of the
displaced
Increasing humanitarian aid to those still displaced is needed to
avoid so-called push factors--factors driving the displaced from their
current location and effectively forcing them to return home. If
displaced Iraqis return home because they cannot access basic services
in their location of displacement (as is currently the case in many
areas), it does not qualify as a voluntary, safe, and dignified return.
Meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of displaced Iraqis must be
kept a priority and cannot be sidelined even in the face of increasing
returns.
For those who do choose to return home, assistance must move beyond
the current level provided to them--primarily a one-time monetary
grant. Returns should be sustainable, and conditions must be in place
to make that happen. Basic services, including employment generation
activities and such services as psychosocial assistance, vocational and
skills training and child development activities, should be extended to
populations that host displaced people, as well as vulnerable
communities and populations where returns are taking place.
Speaking for an organization with vast experience in the health
sector, I can attest that Iraq's health care system has been hit hard
by the flight of skilled medical professionals, and important gaps now
exist in access to medicine and equipment, while medical facilities
have been damaged or neglected. While affecting all Iraqis, this
situation disproportionately impacts the internally displaced and other
vulnerable populations, where a lack of quality health care increases
the spread of disease and worsens the impact of chronic health
conditions.
The option of staying put
Because of these and other difficulties, there is evidence to
suggest that many of those displaced inside Iraq appear to be
considering the option of remaining where they are. A large number of
families participating in the national survey on internal displacement
said they preferred to integrate locally into their current community
rather than return home. Depending on the area of the country, the
percentage of families expressing this desire ranged from roughly half
to almost 80 percent, according to preliminary data gathered by
International Medical Corps and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and
Migration.
However, there are also problems for IDPs in trying to settle
permanently where they are. For example, there are serious disparities
in the level and quality of services offered in different parts of the
country. The data gathered through the national survey on internally
displaced Iraqis suggest this disparity falls mainly along sectarian
lines, with IDPs in predominantly Sunni areas having more difficulty in
accessing government benefits and services. Between 70 percent and 85
percent of the IDPs questioned during the survey reported they were
dependent on some form of assistance as their main source of income.
The fate of minorities
As a country whose land encompasses both the cradle of civilization
and some of the region's most well-traveled ancient trade routes, Iraq
is home to a generous sprinkling of ethnic, religious, and national
minorities, including Jews, Christians, Turkmen, Kurds, Yazidis,
Palestinians, and Mandaeans. With the exception of the Kurds, who
govern three northern governorates of Iraq where they constitute a
majority of the population, most of Iraq's minorities have suffered
disproportionately during the past years of unrestrained violence. As a
result, their numbers have declined sharply. Iraq's Ministry of
Displacement and Migration estimates nearly half the country's non-
Kurdish minority population is no longer in the country. According to a
recently released Brookings Institution report on Iraqi minorities, all
but a handful of Iraq's few hundred remaining Jews have fled the
country, the Turkomen population has dropped by about 75 percent, the
Palestinians by over half and a sizable Christian minority of as many
as 1.4 million is now believed to be between 600,000 and 800,000,
according to Ministry figures.
Many Christians have taken refuge in Lebanon, while others have
sought resettlement to third countries, including the United States,
Canada, Australia, and Europe.
recommendations: an agenda for fostering stability and sustainability
While recognizing that humanitarian crises require political
solutions, it should also be recognized that addressing Iraq's
displacement crisis is a key element in achieving sustainable peace and
security in Iraq and the region. The United States must also
demonstrate moral leadership in helping to resolve the crisis of Iraqi
refugees and internally displaced persons.
How the displacement crisis is handled--by this administration, the
Iraqi Government, countries hosting the refugees and the broader
international community--will have far reaching consequences. Decisions
regarding return, repatriation, and resettlement should not be made in
haste and must ensure that the best interest of displaced Iraqis, not
political pressure, is the guiding factor in determining the
appropriate solutions.
An effective strategy will mean ensuring that immediate needs of
IDPs, refugees, and returnees are met, in addition to longer term
planning to develop effective policies that address the underlying
social, political, economic and cultural dimensions of the crisis.
Considering the conditions that I have just described, I recommend
the following elements be included in U.S. policy toward Iraq:
1. Implement a strategy to address the crisis of Iraqi displacement
that figures prominently in the administration's plan for political and
economic stability in Iraq as it decreases its military presence over
the coming months.
It should be acknowledged that addressing Iraq's displacement
crisis is a key element to ensuring a sustainable peace in Iraq and the
region. Focused, high-level U.S. Government engagement and coordinated,
strategic planning among U.S. agencies is critical in both addressing
the needs surrounding displacement and in helping to facilitate steps
toward durable solutions.
Working together with the Iraqi Government, U.N. agencies and other
international actors, the U.S. Government can develop its strategy that
will support Iraqi communities. With the change of administration, such
a focused approach would signal to Iraq, the region, and the
international stage that the U.S. Government is serious about facing
the challenges surrounding Iraqi displacement.
2. Increase support for humanitarian efforts aimed at fostering the
conditions necessary for safe, voluntary and sustainable return.
Despite the fact that new displacements have virtually ceased,
those who have been driven from their homes, whether as IDPs or
refugees, continue to live in dire conditions where access to health
care, water and sanitation, employment, electricity, education and
other services is extremely limited. To avoid involuntary returns,
humanitarian assistance that addresses the current needs of those
displaced must be increased.
Similarly, the conditions needed for durable solutions can only
come when people are well-informed and confident they are returning to
an environment that can meet their basic needs. Effectively addressing
this challenge will require the understanding that Iraq's displacement
crisis is more than a humanitarian emergency, that it is inextricably
linked to the country's security, stability, and prosperity. Any large-
scale return of displaced Iraqis before adequate support and basic
services are in place to serve their needs could lead to renewed social
tensions, conflict, and instability.
It would be irresponsible and dangerous to assume that the
challenge is over once IDPs and refugees start returning in large
numbers. Efforts must focus on building the capacities of the
Government of Iraq and local communities to deliver more than
transitional assistance to those returning. Displacement will only
truly end when people have regular access to services, sustainable
employment, and adequate housing.
Additional resources should be provided to USAID and the Department
of State to achieve the humanitarian and development objectives
necessary to effectively address the crisis in a comprehensive manner.
This assistance should be allocated to approaches that are community-
based and through established, accountable agencies and organizations
that possess the necessary technical expertise and capacity to do the
job efficiently and well.
3. Urge and support the Iraqi Government in the development of a
unified legal and administrative framework designed to ensure safe and
sustainable returns.
Beyond working to create conditions that will be conducive to
returns, the U.S. Government should urge and support the Iraqi
Government ministries dealing with the crisis--especially the Ministry
of Displacement and Migration--to develop and implement a comprehensive
framework and package of measures that ensures sustainable returns and
durable solutions.
At the moment, returnees receive some assistance from the Iraqi
Government, although mainly in the form of financial compensation.
Followup support, however, is either entirely absent or extremely
limited and ad hoc in nature. More troubling is the fact that no
overarching strategy or plan exists at the national, provincial, or
local level to coordinate the response of government entities
responsible for managing returns. In order to effectively deal with
returns, it is imperative that a national legal framework be put in
place to guide the government's response.
Supporting and assisting in the development of such a framework
should be a key priority for the United States Government. By helping
the Iraqi Government establish a legal and administrative framework for
returns, the United States will ensure that the Government of Iraq and
its ministries are up to this crucial task, that ministries and systems
are synchronized to confront the range of challenging issues arising
from return, such as property restitution and providing access to basic
services, documentation, and government benefits.
4. Accelerate technical and capacity-building measures with Iraqi
Government ministries to help them comprehensively address the
country's displacement crisis.
Managing the displacement crisis must be an Iraqi-led process. It
must not, indeed cannot, be carried out solely by the United States
Government, international. nongovernmental organizations, the United
Nations or any other international agency. A sustainable approach to
returns, however, will necessitate that Iraq's Government ministries
are responsive, capable, and functional. Unfortunately, at present most
Iraqi ministries, including the Ministry of Displacement and Migration
as the lead ministry on displacement issues, lack the skills, capacity,
management and general expertise needed to meet these challenges. This
fact is painfully obvious to the millions of Iraqis living in
displacement.
There is, however, reason to be hopeful. There have been successes
in building Iraqi Government capacity, and we know, firsthand, it can
be done. U.S. Government-funded projects have allowed International
Medical Corps and other nongovernmental agencies to carry out capacity-
building programs with a variety of Iraqi ministries. International
Medical Corps has worked with the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs and, most recently, with the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration. As a result of International Medical Corps'
work with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the ministry was
able to open on time a much-needed second Returnee Assistance Center in
west Baghdad. The center has been open since November 2008, and its
capacity to register returnees is triple that of the original center.
These successes underscore the need to accelerate technical
assistance and capacity-building support to Iraq's ministries,
especially those tasked with handling the displacement crisis.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you again for inviting me to
testify before the subcommittee on the critical issue of Iraqi refugees
and internally displaced persons that is so central to the future
stability of Iraq.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF NABIL AL-TIKRITI, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF MARY WASHINGTON, FREDERICKSBURG, VA
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Senator Casey, I wish to thank the
committee for this opportunity to testify, for the record, on
the issue of Iraqi sectarianism and forced migration, and its
effects on Iraq, the Middle East, and the United States.
Commentators frequently affirm that sectarian violence in
Iraq springs from age-old ethnic tensions; however, while the
relevant sectarian identities do date back several centuries,
sectarian violence has not persisted as a social constant
throughout the millennia of regional history. In fact, Reidar
Visser only sees three instances in the last five centuries.
Rather, outbreaks of sectarian violence have erupted in highly
specific occasions, most of which can be explained through
careful analysis of the particular social stresses at the time.
As in other societies, when long-term shifts, such as
dwindling natural resources, mass migration, housing shortages,
or changes in social identity are inflamed by deliberate and
short-term policy choices, violence can break out.
In accordance with this presumption and projection of age-
old ethnic tensions, it's the perception of Iraqi society as
little more than unnatural British creation of the early 20th
century, held together solely by brute force. Those who see
Iraq this way also envision Iraq as three distinct
ethnosectarian regions: A Shia Arab southern Iraq, Sunni Arab
central Iraq, and Sunni Kurdish northern Iraq. While this
simplified portrayal does bear some general resemblance to
ethnosectarian reality, it provides insufficient contextual
information to competently engage with Iraqi society, one of
those situations where knowing a little bit is more dangerous
than knowing nothing.
If one must classify Iraq according to ethnosectarian
identity, then there are far more than the three major
ethnosectarian groupings frequently mentioned. Sizable
additional groups include the Chaldo-Assyrian Christians,
Turkoman, Jewish Iraqis, Yazidis, Sabaean-Mandaeans, Shabak,
Armenians, and several smaller groups. In addition to these
indigenous categories, several third-country national groups,
including Palestinians, Mujahidin-i Khalq Iranians, Iranian
Kurds, and guest workers have settled in Iraq over the past
several decades, and have found their situations deteriorating
following the 2003 collapse of the Iraqi state.
Not only are there several minority groups in Iraq, but the
three largest ethnosectarian groups, historically, have rarely
acted in internally coherent fashions. As a result, before
2003, one might more usefully have categorized Iraqi society as
being divided between Baghdad and the rest of the country,
Baath Party members and the rest of society, Kurdish
nationalists and their opponents, communitarian activists and
secularists, exiles and residents, tribal confederations,
various class actors, such as merchants, bureaucrats, peasants,
and landowners, and several other categories, which no longer
carry the same relevance today. However, rather than
recognizing the relevance of such classifications, Americans
have tended to force Iraq into an artificial tripartite box
allowing for only Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish categories.
Unfortunately for Iraq, in the wake of the 2003 invasion,
occupation authorities insisted--or, rather, instituted
policies which, in their effect, although not usually in their
intent, encouraged an increased sectarianism, which eventually
culminated in the violent geographic consolidation of Iraq's
ethnosectarian mapping after 2006. Predictably, policymakers at
the time blamed age-old ethnic conflicts when sectarian
violence exploded throughout the country after the February
2006 Samarra Shrine bombing. Several prominent commentators
even argued for various forms of tripartite state partition as
a solution for this violence. While a notable shift in United
States policy in 2007 eventually contributed a calming of the
violence, the remapping of Iraq's ethnosectarian geography has
not yet been, and may never be, completely reversed.
Ironically, this remapping has all but created the
tripartite Iraq that American policymakers imagined already
existed in 2003. In effect, Iraq's new imagined community was
imagined right here in Washington, DC, and continues to be so
imagined.
Now, I'm going to skip a bit that's in the permanent
testimony, and skip to recommendations.
So, where do we go from here? Here are some recommendations
for addressing, ameliorating, and partially reversing the
troubling legacies of Iraqi-forced migration of recent years,
starting with IDPs.
Property adjudication and returnee assistance. For further
detail, interested parties should examine the outstanding
special report being issued, just this week, by the U.S.
Institute of Peace on this issue. According to that report,
several initiatives might alleviate the problem of property
adjudication, without which no longer term solution is
possible. In line with these, I would emphasize the following.
The Iraqi Government should adjudicate post-2003 property
disputes with the same bureaucratic zeal and legal priority as
pre-2003 property disputes. Without such adjudication, return
cannot be envisioned for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.
International actors should provide capacity-building
assistance to Iraqi Government agents charged with adjudicating
property disputes originating both before and after 2003. The
Iraqi Government currently provides return assistance only to
those displaced between 2006 and 2008. This limitation clearly
disadvantages those displaced between 2003 and 2006.
All right, housing, next category. There needs to be a
radical increase in housing throughout the country to make up
for over 30 years of postponed construction. A recently
announced $160 million initiative in four southern provinces is
a step in the right direction, but there needs to be far more,
and it should be coordinated with the Ministry of Displacement
and Migration.
Elections. The Iraqi Government should ensure that Iraqi
citizens, wherever they are physically located, have equal
access to the polls in the elections scheduled later this year.
If they do not, then the elections will be seen to be as
tainted, and the future Iraqi Government will lose a great deal
of legitimacy as a result, which will have knock-on effects on
stability.
PDS transferability. The public distribution system cards
are not currently easily transferrable from government to
government, which is increasing the burden on those displaced
internally in Iraq. They should be more freely transferrable.
There need to be special protections for the
microminorities that I mentioned earlier. One idea that's been
floated is a minority security council.
And then, finally--two final points--for regional forced
migrants, there needs to be the possibility of look-and-see
returns, where they can go back to Iraq, see if their situation
has improved, and go back to the country where they're
currently resident. That is not currently possible, because of
the restrictions on crossing borders.
Finally, there needs to be more emphasis and ability to
process Iraqis who need third-country resettlement, especially
in the United States. And once they get here, the support
programs need to be increased radically, as they were with the
1970s Southeast Asian refugee assistance programs.
I'll close my points there. Thank you very much for your
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Al-Tikriti follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nabil Al-Tikriti, Ph.D, Assistant Professor of
History, University of Mary Washington, Fredericksburg, VA
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the committee for this opportunity to
testify for the record on the issue of Iraqi sectarianism and forced
migration, and its effects on Iraq, the Middle East, and the United
States.
Commentators frequently affirm that sectarian violence in Iraq
springs from ``age-old ethnic tensions.'' However, while the relevant
sectarian identities do date back several centuries, sectarian violence
has not persisted as a social constant throughout the millenia of
regional history. Rather, outbreaks of sectarian violence have erupted
in highly specific occasions, most of which can be explained through
careful analysis of the particular social stresses at the time. As in
other societies, when long-term shifts such as dwindling natural
resources, mass migration, or changes in social identity are inflamed
by deliberate and short-term policy choices, violence can break out.
In accordance with this presumption and projection of ``age-old
ethnic tensions'' is the perception of Iraqi society as little more
than an unnatural British creation of the early 20th century, held
together solely by brute force. Those who see Iraq this way also
envision Iraq as three distinct ethnosectarian regions: a Shi'i Arab
Southern Iraq, Sunni Arab Central Iraq, and Sunni Kurdish Northern
Iraq. While this simplified portrayal does bear some general
resemblance to ethnosectarian reality, it provides insufficient
contextual information to competently engage with Iraqi society.
If one must classify Iraq according to ethnosectarian identity,
then there are far more than the three major ethnosectarian groupings
frequently mentioned. Sizeable additional groups include the Chaldo-
Assyrian, Turcoman, Jewish, Yazidi, Sabaean-Mandaean, Shabak, Armenian,
and several smaller groups. In addition to these indigenous categories,
several Third Country National (TCN) groups, including Palestinians,
Mujahidin-i Khalq (MEK) Iranians, Iranian Kurds, and guest workers,
have settled in Iraq over the past several decades, and have found
their situations deteriorating following the 2003 collapse of the Iraqi
state.
Not only are there several minority groups in Iraq, but the three
largest ethnosectarian groups historically have rarely acted in
internally coherent fashions. As a result, before 2003, one might more
usefully have categorized Iraqi society as being divided between:
--Baghdad and the rest of the country;
--Baath Party members and the rest of society;
--Kurdish nationalists and their opponents;
--Communitarian activists and secularists;
--Exiles and residents;
--Tribal confederations;
--Various class actors such as merchants, bureaucrats, peasants, and
landowners; and
--Several other categories which no longer carry the same relevance
today.
Rather than recognizing the relevance of such classifications,
Americans have tended to force Iraq into an artifical tripartite box
allowing for only Shi'i, Sunni, and Kurdish categories.
Unfortunately for Iraq, in the wake of the 2003 invasion,
occupation authorities instituted policies which in their effect--
although usually not in their intent--encouraged an increased
sectarianism which eventually culminated in the violent geographic
consolidation of Iraq's ethnosectarian mapping after 2006. Predictably,
policymakers blamed ``age-old ethnic conflicts'' when sectarian
violence exploded throughout the country after the February 2006
Samarra Shrine bombing. Several prominent commentators even argued for
various forms of tripartite state partition as a solution for this
violence. While a noticeable shift in U.S. policy in 2007 eventually
contributed to a calming of the violence, the remapping of Iraq's
ethnosectarian geography has not yet been--and may never be--reversed.
Ironically, this remapping has all but created the tripartite Iraq that
American policymakers imagined already existed in 2003. In effect,
Iraq's new ``imagined community'' was imagined in Washington, DC--and
continues to be so imagined.
The effects of the ethno-sectarian remapping described here are
widespread, potentially permanent, and highly problematic for the
cohesion of Iraq's future state and society. Communal consolidation has
progressed to such an extent that Iraq has already evolved somewhat
from a mosaic patchwork of geographically mixed sectarian clusters into
the rough outline of three large regions coinciding with the
majoritarian ethnosectarian identities of Shi'i Arab, Sunni Arab, and
Kurdish. Those who either refuse to or are not allowed to fit within
these majoritarian identities have mostly been forced out, causing:
--The nearly complete erasure of certain microminority communities such
as the Sabaean-Mandaeans and Shabak;
--The external migration of roughly half of Iraq's Chaldo-Assyrian
Christian populations;
--The entrapment and/or external migration of prominent third country
nationals such as the Palestinians, certain Iranian Kurds, and the
Mujahidin-i Khalq Iranians;
--The expulsion of minority clusters of majoritarian ethnosectarian
groups caught outside of their region of dominance.
The Government of Iraq announced a major initiative in July 2008 to
help reverse the ethnosectarian remapping described here. This
initiative promised incentive packages to return to place of origin, an
increased emphasis on property rights and protection of returnees, and
other elements that might promote the reversal of post-2003 forced
migration. Unfortunately, implementation has remained uneven since this
initiative's initial announcement. Through today the return of Iraqi
populations to their pre-2003 place of origin has remained minimal.
Does this mean we should push for immediate return? Paradoxically, no.
Displaced Iraqis have quite well-founded fears of return at the moment
and their returns should not be encouraged before adequate legal
frameworks to deal with property disputes are in place. The rushing of
such returns could destabilize Iraq and endanger recent security gains
if overall political progress has not first been sufficiently achieved.
current recommendations
So, where do we go from here? Here are some recommendations for
addressing, ameliorating, and partially reversing the most troubling
legacies of Iraqi forced migration of recent years:
IDPs
--Property Adjudication & Returnee Assistance: For further detail,
interested parties should examine the outstanding special report
being issued by the U.S. Institute of Peace's Deborah Isser and
Peter Van der Auweraert on this issue this week. According to that
report, several initiatives might alleviate the problem of property
adjudication, without which no longer term solution is possible. In
line with these, I would emphasize the following:
The Iraqi Government should adjudicate post-2003 property
disputes with the same bureaucratic zeal and legal priority as
pre-2003 property disputes. Without such adjudication, return
cannot be envisioned for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.
International actors should provide capacity-building
assistance to Iraqi Government agencies charged with
adjudicating property disputes originating both before and
after 2003.
The Iraqi Government currently provides return assistance
only to those displaced between January 1, 2006, and January 1,
2008. This limitation clearly disadvantages those displaced
between 2003 and 2006.
Property adjudication and returnee assistance initiatives
should be implemented within a broader framework of national
reconciliation and transitional justice.
--Housing: One of the underlying factors contributing to forced
migration in Iraq is a previously unrecognized and acute housing
shortage throughout the country. The Government of Iraq--and its
supporters--must strive to construct housing throughout the
country, in order to catch up with nearly 30 years of postponed
construction and ameliorate property pressures which have
contributed to sectarian violence in recent years. A newly
announced $160 million initiative to construct 5,000 housing units
throughout four southern provinces is a step in the right
direction. Coordinating such housing initiatives with the Ministry
of Displacement and Migration might help alleviate the plight of
displaced populations, both in Baghdad and throughout the
governorates.
--Elections: Iraqi Government authorities and international support
agencies must ensure that all Iraqi citizens are able to vote,
regardless of their physical location at the time of the elections
scheduled for later this year. If election administration is
perceived as rigged against displaced populations (domestic and
international), the results are not likely to be perceived as
legitimate, which will undermine the future stability and
legitimacy of any elected government.
--PDS Transferability: One of the factors causing hardship among
displaced Iraqis is the nontransferability of Public Distribution
System (PDS) cards between governorates. Such cards should be made
freely transferrable between governorates in order to reduce the
hardship of vulnerable populations, and contribute to the
stabilization of displaced populations.
--Microminority Protections: The ``microminorities'' of Iraq serve as a
figural ``canary in the coal mine'' vis-a-vis the maintenance of
social stability, individual freedoms, and cultural diversity. If
such populations--the Sabaean-Mandaean, Shabak, Chaldo-Assyrian
Christian, Yazidi, Turcoman, and others--are secure, then the
chances for a stable, diverse, and secure Iraq are greatly
increased. In order to bring about such a situation, several
recommendations come to mind:
Minority Security Council--such a body should be created and
tied directly to the Prime Minister's office. It would provide
a voice for minorities close to the center of governance
without creating any extraterritorial or sectarianizing
expectations on behalf of the body politic.
Concentrate third country resettlement of Sabaean-Mandaeans,
so that the cultural continuity of this very small community
might be preserved. At this point, the spreading of this
community throughout the world threatens their very survival as
a communal identity.
Autonomous Zones--such initiatives should not be encouraged,
as they encourage the further factionalization of Iraqi
politics and would encourage a dangerous backlash from the
respective regional majority populations.
Regional Forced Migrants
--Cross-Border Mobility: In order to encourage those who have left Iraq
to consider return, the United States should help Jordan and Syria
think creatively about a special and temporary status that would
allow those Iraqis in those two countries mobility across the
border. Such an initiative would allow Iraqis to carry out ``look
and see'' visits to their places of origin. At this point, hundreds
of thousands of Iraqis in neighboring countries face a ``one way
ticket'' back to Iraq--if they can afford to leave at all due to
penalties assessed on those who overstay their visas. If such
Iraqis return and then discover that their situation is unsafe,
they would be effectively trapped as they cannot return to the
countries they are currently residing in due to their ad hoc and
semilegal status as ``guests.'' In order to ameliorate this
situation, neighboring countries--particularly Jordan and Syria--
must be encouraged to waive visa overstay penalties and allow
Iraqis to enter again should they find their return untenable
following such a brief visit. If this policy change is not
implemented, migrant Iraqis are unlikely to risk return at all,
unless they're absolutely sure that the situation in Iraq is better
than in their current location--which will not be the case any time
soon.
Third Country Resettlement Forced Migration
--Increase in-country processing of asylum seekers in Iraq, Jordan, and
Syria. This has been stated several times in recent years, but
remains a key need.
--Increase federal support for domestic assistance for asylum seekers,
modeled on the 1970s Southeast Asian refugee assistance programs.
The United States is directly responsible for the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of vulnerable Iraqis--the least we can do as
a society is to ease the transition for those fortunate enough to
survive the horrendous violence of the past 6 years.
The forced migration of Iraqis comprises at one and the same time a
series of individual and communal tragedies, a humanitarian challenge
in the near term, and a potential security challenge for the future.
While there is no single ``silver bullet'' which can solve this highly
complex and contentious set of issues, I hope these strategies might
serve to address the most troubling aspects of the problem.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
I wanted to start with a question on the numbers, the
numbers we've been using, and I want to make sure the record
reflects any corrections or amendments. We've been using 2.7
plus 2, so a total of 4.7 million. I'd ask each of our
witnesses, to the extent they wanted to comment on this,
whether or not you think those numbers are correct, incorrect,
in the ballpark. What's your sense of that? It's just one
metric, but it's important, I think.
Ms. Laipson. I think, in general, there is a concern that
these numbers that are the 2-plus-million category of Iraqis
outside of the borders are probably inflated. I've heard an
inflation factor of as high as 30 to 40 percent.
Senator Casey. So, you mean that the 2.7----
Ms. Laipson. That that number is too high, yes.
Senator Casey [continuing]. Or the 2 million outside of
Iraq, that number is inflated or too large.
Ms. Laipson. Correct, so that--I've heard----
Senator Casey. How about--I'm sorry.
Ms. Laipson. So, for example, in Syria we use a figure of
1.2 million. The UNHCR interacts with a small fraction of that
population. Some of the people consider--the Syrians consider
them the guests, the Iraqis may consider themselves to be just
temporarily resident in Syria and they don't register as
refugees, so there's no methodology for counting all of them.
So, let's assume that the number is smaller than over 2 million
outside of Iraq's borders. But, even if that were true, we are
still talking about hundreds of thousands of people.
If we look at UNHCR today, they say about 300,000 Iraqis
are registered with them, meaning have actually filled out the
forms to be entitled to certain programs, but UNHCR would not
assume that that's the total number; that's a portion of the
total.
Senator Casey. So, according to what you're saying, the
number outside of Iraq is too high, possibly--the 2 million.
What about the 2.7 internally displaced number?
Ms. Laipson. Others may know more about that. I believe
that is also--you know it's a very fluid situation, where
people move temporarily, they move back after, you know, the
tensions abate a bit. And so, my guess is, that's also on the
high side, but others may have a more specific view on
internal.
Senator Casey. OK.
Ms. Aossey.
Ms. Aossey. Yes. It is really extremely difficult to know.
There are estimates that you can extrapolate from the numbers
that UNHCR is quoting are consistent with estimates that
they've made around the world when they have just as little
information, so if they are inaccurate, they're, relatively
speaking, probably inaccurate according to other refugee
situations, as well.
This one is difficult, especially, as Ellen mentioned, the
IDPs because there's so much fluid movement. It's really
difficult to track in real time where people are--they're
moving back and forth so much.
Whether or not 4.7 which everyone is using, is the exact
number--is really difficult to know. It's possibly high.
Especially because, when you look at the refugees, many of them
are afraid of being repatriated back into their countries,
therefore, they're literally in hiding. So, it's difficult to
tie down. We're using it because we rely pretty much on the
UNHCR method of estimating these numbers, knowing that they
might be off.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. First, a simple answer. The range that I
have seen in the literature for--globally, that is, within Iraq
and in the region, as a whole--the low number seems to be 3.8
million as a total, and the high number sometimes goes up to
5.2 or 5.5. Ergo, the 4.7 is kind of a golden mean. That's the
simple answer.
Explanations as to why this is happening. First of all,
when you get into the--outside of Iraq--Jordan and Syria see
this as a sensitive point of their own state security, so they
are highly resistant to any kind of surveys being done. Now,
there was one very notable survey done in Jordan, and that
survey itself was quite a hot potato within Jordanian internal
politics, and, as a result, they actually had to negotiate what
the final number was.
That said, roughly 300,000 refugees have been registered at
UNHCR in the two countries that are primarily involved here,
Jordan and Syria, and the estimates for Jordan and Syria are
750,000 and 2 million.
Finally, on the IDPs, there seems to be primarily two
sources, that I'm aware of, that keep getting cited: The
Ministry of Displacement and Migration, their own sources, and
IOM, the International Organization for Migration. IOM is cited
more, and IOM is very confident of its own numbers. And in an
interview that I had with them in the field, they said that
they were based on surveys of something like 80 percent of the
whole population. They're highly confident of their numbers.
That said, it is a very fluid situation, and categorization
is a problem, because you don't know whether you're counting an
IDP from 1987, in the Anfal campaign, whether you're counting
someone from 1990s, during the sanctions era, you're counting
someone, 2003 to 2006, 2006 to 2008. And each of these
categories has highly contentious political and sensitive and
sectarian overtones.
Senator Casey. Well, thank you. We'll never know the exact
number, but at least we're in agreement that there is a
consensus, at least about a range. I think that's a safe thing
to say for the record.
Ms. Aossey, I wanted to make sure that--and I want to make
sure I'm pronouncing your last name correctly.
Ms. Aossey. It's ``Aussie,'' like Australia. You are.
Senator Casey. Like ``Aussie.''
Ms. Aossey. ``Aussie,'' that's right.
Senator Casey. ``Aussie,'' not ``Owsie.'' OK, ``Aussie.''
Ms. Aossey. Yes, sir.
Senator Casey. Sorry about that.
Ms. Aossey. No, it's not----
Senator Casey. I was close.
Ms. Aossey. Very close, closer than most people get.
Senator Casey. You had mentioned, in your testimony, the
Ministry of Displacement and Migration within the Iraqi
Government. And you said--but I'm not reading from your
testimony, I'm reading from my notes--that the Ministry doesn't
have the capacity to deal with that. It's a quick summary of
what you said. Tell me more about that. What's your sense of
that? When you say ``doesn't have the capacity,'' does that
mean--because I think there's some debate about whether it's
capacity or will, or whether it's capacity or some other
impediment. What's your sense of that? And define what you mean
by ``capacity.''
Ms. Aossey. Our experience with this ministry is that they
do have the will. We've worked very closely with them, and we
do believe, through the people that we've worked with in--
within this ministry, that they are very interested in doing
the right thing by their people.
The capacity, the best way for me to describe that is
historically, the Government of Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was
very, very centralized. And as a result of that, we haven't
seen, within Iraq, throughout the country, an ability for
people within the ministries, to really administer what they're
faced with. They just literally don't have any historical
experience with setting up systems, with decisionmaking, with
delegating, with the kinds of things that one needs in place in
order to, not only make decisions, but to implement them, to
make sure services get to where people need them. They just
don't know how to do it. To some extent, there's some inertia
too--probably because people are afraid of making mistakes, and
because they're not accustomed to making decisions, all the way
down the chain. We have just seen that they don't have the
mechanisms in place.
If you look at the GAO report, which cited that only 11
percent of the Government of Iraq's budget was spent getting
services to the people--in large part, they don't have the way
to administer those funds, because they just don't know how to
do it, whether it be management expertise, as I mentioned
earlier, or systems.
We haven't seen where it's a lack of will, we've just seen
that they don't necessarily have many of the skills that they
need, and that is where we think they need a lot of support.
When you think about what it takes to put money out or put
programs out, or figure out ways to reach people and do the
right things, there's a whole list of mechanisms that have to
be set up, and they're not necessarily there. Often people
don't know how to get that money out the door in the form of
services where they are needed.
Senator Casey. So, experience in operating a function of
government, in essence.
Ms. Aossey. That's exactly it. It's difficult, obviously,
for us to imagine that, but the history there is that people
were not necessarily empowered to do these things. Obviously
there were a few people at the top who were, but the people
themselves don't have a history of being empowered to do some
of the things that we have learned over the years, just because
we've had the opportunity to do them. Part of that is a
function of time, but part of that is a function of needing
support when it comes to setting up those systems. Giving them
the confidence that they can disburse money, that there can be
checks and balances, and that the funds and the services will
get to people, where they need to, without being afraid of
making decisions, or the wrong decisions. They've never been in
these situations before, where they had that kind of
decisionmaking authority.
Senator Casey. How about other agencies that can work
together with the Iraqi Government to mitigate the effects of
the crisis? Any sense of how you think that's going, right now?
Ms. Aossey. I feel that there are a number of things that
can be done to ``bolster'' efforts in the future. I mentioned
earlier the efforts of the United States Agency for
International Development and the State Department, of U.S.
OFDA, to bolster civilian capacity. This is very, very
important, and they do that, working in partnership with groups
like International Medical Corps, other NGOs, and the U.N.,
helping people through a civilian mechanism, building trust
within populations and bringing in core technical expertise to
work side by side with Iraqis, and do the kind of training that
is needed. A lot of this is management training and
administrative expertise, and a number of these organizations
and these funders are accustomed to doing this kind of work
and, I believe, would be most well-equipped to do it.
Senator Casey. Doctor, you had----
Mr. Al-Tikriti. I should just point out that the Ministry
of Displacement and Migration is a post-2003 creation, in and
of itself. It was basically written into existence by
Ambassador Bremer during the CPA era. And as recently as 2007,
it had a very small budget and very small staff, something in
the magnitude of a few million dollars and a couple of hundred
staff members. I think it's been operationalized quite a bit
since 2007, but that's fairly recent to have been
operationalized.
In the old days, their functions would have been shared out
between the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Red Crescent
Society, both of which still exist and might be able to provide
some sort of services, but I go beyond what I know, right
there.
Senator Casey. I guess the volume, too, is a problem, huh?
I mean, even if the operational impediments or lack of
experience weren't an issue, which they are in this instance, I
guess just the sheer volume, alone, makes it pretty difficult.
Ms. Laipson.
Ms. Laipson. I just wanted to add one additional thought,
which was, as the United States presence gets reconfigured in
Iraq with the drawdown of United States troops, there is this
new institution that we've created, called these Provincial
Reconstruction Teams.
Senator Casey. Right.
Ms. Laipson. And for the refugees and the IDPs that return
to some of the provinces of Iraq, the PRTs themselves could
become useful supporting-cast players in helping, at the
provincial level, determine the housing needs of returnees,
some of the employment opportunities, so that the function of
the PRTs committed to reconstruction activities, could be very
relevant and useful, should an important wave of returnees
occur. That isn't yet happening, so we have not yet seen
significant numbers of the refugees choosing to return. But
there is, as we said before, sort of a movement of internally
displaced that are trying to resume, in some cases, to parts of
the country where either the housing stock has been degraded,
destroyed by conflict, or whether other people are living in
their homes, so that, in terms of housing needs and in other
infrastructure needs, the PRTs may be able to be important
players in that.
Senator Casey. One question that I have had, and others
have had, is what's happening at the senior levels of the
government. One of the challenges that we face is determining
whether, in fact, the Shia--the central government, which has
Shiites in charge, whether that government's discriminating
against the displaced Sunni population. I'll go from right to
left. If you have an opinion on that, what's your sense of
that?
Ms. Laipson. Well, it's clear that the politics of Iraq are
still in some state of agitation and that there's not complete
mutual trust. I think some of the stories of discrimination
could be because people are not fully testing the system yet,
they don't really know whether they should believe that there
is rule of law, they're not, perhaps, taking advantage of all
of the legal recourse they have, if they perceive that
something was--that they were treated unfairly. And I do think
it's correct to suggest that different parts of Iraqi
leadership probably have different attitudes about population
movement issues. I do think that President Talibani, of course,
who is the Kurd, sees--is very attentive to Iraq's image,
internationally. He sees, I think, the return of some Iraqi
refugees as part of Iraq's credibility, as part of Iraq's
positive image, and as part of the reintegration goal; whereas,
other political actors, possibly including the Prime Minister
or some of the ministries, are still enjoying being the ones on
top, after many years when they were not, and they may be, you
know, not always signaling as positive an attitude as, perhaps,
they need to. I don't think the government, in general, has
made repatriation a high priority. But, I think they look at it
through different political lenses, and some of the people who
don't yet trust the new Iraqi Government are not also testing
the system to find out whether they'll be treated fairly or
not.
Senator Casey. Ms. Aossey, you said before, you don't think
there's a lack of will.
Ms. Aossey. Absolutely. And I just want to add to something
that Ellen said. People have networks--their families, their
friends--living in their communities. They're communicating
with them back home all the time. We have found, regardless of
what the government says, they don't feel safe to return home.
They don't feel that they will have many of the basic things
they need. But, it first starts with the feeling that safety
must be something that's durable and not fleeting, even though
things have stabilized.
As far as our experience, International Medical Corps has,
as I mentioned earlier, been working throughout Iraq, and over
time, has served a population of up to 3 million people, some
of them displaced inside Iraq and some of them not displaced.
Generally speaking, it appears to us that people who are Sunni
have a more difficult time accessing services. That's been our
general impression. It's hard to explain all the reasons why.
But our experience is that they do have a more difficult time
accessing many of the services that they need.
Senator Casey. That who does?
Ms. Aossey. Those who are Sunni, versus Shiite. These
populations seem to struggle more in accessing services that
they need, but we don't know exactly why that is; we can't
pinpoint it. It's something that we have noticed. There tends
to be some trends in that regard. That's a very general
statement, but it is something that we have noticed.
Senator Casey. Doctor.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Regarding the behavior of the central
government, I think the record is mixed, but far better than
their predecessors, under Ibrahim al-Jaafari. And I also think
that it behaves more like a classic Iraqi central government
than a simply sectarian government, so they have a lot of
parallels with any Iraqi central government through the ages.
That said, here are some examples where they either have or
have not acted in a sectarian fashion. There are several.
They acted against rival Shiite factions in Basra a year
ago, which was seen as a positive nonsectarian action. On the
other hand, just this past weekend, they acted against Sons of
Iraq militia factions in Fadhil neighborhood, and may have set
off the beginnings of a civil uprising in Baghdad. That's a
negative.
They have not extended assistance to those displaced during
2003 to 2006. They've accepted them, from the categories of
those getting assistance, according to the USIP report, right
here. And most of those are--can be seen as Sunnis, minorities,
and professionals. So, there is a sectarian element to that,
potentially.
Their housing initiative, that I mentioned in my testimony,
started in the south. Najaf is attracting a lot more resources
than other parts of the country, like a brand new airport, for
example. That's tied to the pilgrimage traffic.
There's anecdotal evidence, or not even evidence--rumor, I
would characterize it--that the east Baghdad field offices of
the Ministry of Displacement and Migration are functioning
better than the west Baghdad. Again, that's a rumor, but if
it's accurate, that could have a sectarian bent to it.
And finally, the Kurds are quite worried about developments
in the disputed territories; namely, Kirkuk, Diyala, and
Ninawa. So, there's a rising Kurdish-Arab tension happening
right now, as well.
So, those are--it's mixed. It's a mixed--it's a mixed
record, and I think, again, they act more like a central
government than they do a sectarian government, most of the
time.
Senator Casey. Doctor, I want to ask you a more blunt
question, I guess. Is it your sense, or do you have any reason
to believe, that Prime Minister al-Maliki is actively
inhibiting the return of refugees who happen to be Sunni?
Mr. Al-Tikriti. No. I do not believe that. I do believe,
however--and I think there's a lot of evidence to back this
up--that those who are displaced do not trust al-Maliki. Now,
where blame lies in that, I cannot venture to guess. But, for
example, in October 2008 in Syria----
Senator Casey. So, you mean it could be on their end of
the--the refugee--you're saying that the refugees may be----
Mr. Al-Tikriti. There's a lot of bad blood----
Senator Casey [continuing]. Reluctant to----
Mr. Al-Tikriti. There's a lot of bad blood--sorry----
Senator Casey. Yes.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. There's a lot of bad blood, because of the
developments, particularly of 2006 to 2008--or, rather, 2006-
2007, as well as what went on back in the1980s and 1990s. So, I
mean, there's the flip side of it, as well. I don't know that
any particular group's hands are clean, and I don't know who is
being more distrustful, but there's definitely a logjam afoot
right now.
Senator Casey. I think it's--look, and I think this is an
important point and sometimes at hearings we don't have the
record very clear. I'm not trying to start a fight, here, but I
think it's important for--as best we can, for witnesses to be
able to state clearly how they perceive the situation, and I
appreciate your candor on that.
I wanted to move to another area of questioning more having
to do with resources and what's happening on the ground.
Our Government, as you know, is providing substantial help,
here. The Obama administration has committed about $150 million
to assist displaced Iraqis in this current fiscal year, 2009.
Our Government is committing almost $100 million to UNHCR, and
several million to both the World Food Programme and the World
Health Organization. It seems as though the administration is
attempting to tackle several important issues simultaneously.
And I guess, Ms. Aossey, I wanted to ask you from the
perspective of an organization that benefits from USAID
funding, do you believe the United States is providing adequate
resources to NGOs and international organizations with a
presence in Iraq?
Ms. Aossey. I think additional resources are needed, less
for infrastructure, which has been, historically, the case, and
more to do the things that USAID and the State Department have
known all along were important, and that is to build the
capacity of the people. A lot of the focus in the past--and,
understandably, when you look at the funds that have flowed to
Iraq--has been on the infrastructure. I really believe that
they are correct in wanting to focus on building, within the
ministries, the people, the skills. As important as
infrastructure is, there's only so much that can be done.
People in key ministries basically are not really familiar with
how to administer a budget, when you look at this kind of
central authority. It's more this than it is intent or
discrimination or bad will toward anybody. It's the lack of
their ability to administer what is required. I think that
resources to help USAID and the Department of State do that,
working with partners like my organization and others, is an
important step forward.
Senator Casey. I'm not sure I understand the difference.
Explain to me what you mean by ``infrastructure'' versus
spending in other areas.
Ms. Aossey. Hardscape kinds of projects, things that are
important--buildings, et cetera.
Senator Casey. Right.
Ms. Aossey. They're important, but, at the end of the day,
the people who have to then turn around and administer services
or, negotiate property rights or set up judicial systems so
that many of these property disputes can be resolved, figure
out how to get health services and education back into the
population--the skill set doesn't seem to be there.
Senator Casey. So, training becomes a priority of----
Ms. Aossey. Training becomes the priority. If you look at
many of the refugees, safety is No. 1. But, as bad as things
are where they may be, if they don't think that they can come
back and have a place to live, because their house has been
taken over by someone else and they have no way to get that
house back, or to get health care, or to send their children to
school--as bad as it may be, they at least may feel it's not as
bad as going back. Right now the Iraqi Government makes
payments to people when they come back. They're able to make
one-time payments, and there are incentives to have people, in
homes, leave homes that do not belong to them. So, there has
been some of this.
But, it's difficult for them to do anything beyond these
one-time payments. It's very much payment-driven, and, beyond
the disbursement of payments when people repatriate back, they
just don't seem to have the skill set that is needed to set up
things that go way beyond that.
There's a host of things that we've talked about; basic
services, property rights--that we've already discussed, where
people think they have something that they can return to--
because it's very difficult, when they're hearing, from people
within their communities, there are no jobs. That's a key
piece. If there's no jobs--even if it is safe to return, or
they perceive it as safe to return--if they can't get a job,
don't have a place to live, let alone health and education,
they don't feel a large incentive to come back. And I think
that's one of the main reasons we haven't seen people coming
back.
Certainly, stability is better, and hopefully, over time
it's sustainable. There's no question about that, that it's
much safer today. But, all these other things also have to be
in place for people to feel that they can improve their
situation, beyond where they already are.
Senator Casey. I want to give our two other witnesses a
chance, if you have anything to add on that question, about
resources or how the dollars are spent. Either of you?
Ms. Laipson. Well, we might want to make a distinction
between activities inside Iraq--and Iraq, after all, is
potentially a very wealthy country, a country that should be
able to finance, over time, most, if not all, of its
reconstruction, versus, kind of, temporary services that are
needed to the Iraqis outside of the country. So, I think the
United States contributions to some of the U.N. agencies that
are really serving this population outside of Iraq is where the
most immediate need probably is. And there, I think the U.N.
agencies would say they could always use more. But, the United
States is not the only donor; we are the largest donor, but
we're not the--part of the goal here is to make sure that other
countries also make contributions.
Senator Casey. Unless you had something, Doctor----
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Well, just that the amount that has been
pledged, $160 million recently, is not so greatly different
than what it was in the last couple of fiscal years. And I've
heard two very different critiques of this.
One is that, on this grand scale of things, $160 million is
really a small amount of money, especially compared to the
figures that are being thrown around for other issues in
governance these days. That's one critique.
Another is that much of the international community feels
that this is primarily a U.S. crisis, and the United States
should be primarily involved in dealing with it. And the U.S.
response to date has been, as I understand it, to pretty much
stick with the global formulas for international donations; in
other words, something like one-quarter of U.N. funding. And
the other part of the critique says, no, the United States,
this time, should pay more.
Countering that is the one critique that I've heard from an
NGO professional in the field, saying that they were a little
bit skeptical that if more money, just more money were thrown
out there, that they would really be able to use it all that
well. That was just one NGO professional who stated that, not
all the others. And that was a little bit of a, you could
almost say, heretical viewpoint within the NGO community, but I
did hear at least one say that.
Senator Casey. Yes.
Ms. Aossey. May I just add--I think that a lot of that
comes back to the capacity of the Government of Iraq to
administer. And if there was, say, a master plan that the
Government of Iraq had to deal with all these things, where
other donors outside the United States, as well, had confidence
that there was some kind of a plan to actually tackle a whole
host of these issues, then I think people would want to
participate and they would want to support the ministries in
doing what needs to be done.
The Government of Iraq has resources, too. And, as the GAO
report pointed out, a lot of those resources could certainly be
brought to bear. I think that, in many ways, they're not using
all their own resources, just for the reasons we talked about
before. I don't think that they really know how to administer
many of the things that are needed. Others would step in and
help them, if there was some kind of a plan or package of
support where others could plug into.
Senator Casey. I wanted to move to the security issue,
which each of you have mentioned more than once, I think. But,
before I get to that, I wanted to ask you about children.
If we look at this problem just through the eyes of a child
or from the vantage point of what happens to a child in this
process, not just whether or not they're provided with the
services and the opportunity that they should be provided with,
but whether or not those opportunities and services and help
are being provided to such an extent that it will dissuade or
create a disincentive for a child or someone coming of age to
be attracted to an ideology which is harmful, what's your sense
of how children are faring in this process, both from a
mechanical point of view, in terms of what services they're
getting, but also from a more--I'm not sure how best to express
it, but from a broader view, in terms of whether or not we're
doing enough to dissuade them from being attracted to some
extremist ideology because of the lack of services?
Ms. Laipson. I visited some Iraqi refugees in Syria, and I
know that there is a deep concern, not so much very young
children, but teenagers that are idle all the time, and whether
there are opportunities for them to have outside activities
that are healthy ones, whether it's sports or educational
opportunities, after-school--some of them don't go to school at
all. And----
Senator Casey. You mean, Iraqi teenagers in Syria.
Ms. Laipson. In Syria----
Senator Casey. OK.
Ms. Laipson [continuing]. With nothing to do. And--now, in
Syria it's a somewhat controlled environment. There are not
many opportunities to join a jihadi club or something that
would be promoting an ideology that could be dangerous. But,
there is always the concern that this long period of isolation,
the family has experienced a great drop in its socioeconomic
status, et cetera. Now--so, the question is--opportunity. I
think that, in a way, the environment is something one should
be concerned about.
That's not something that the United States can necessarily
direct by itself. In the case of Syria, the Syrian state also
worries about not allowing its own citizens to be exposed to
either religiously motivated or ideologically motivated
activities. It's quite adamant about secularism. But, I think,
in some of the other countries, that would be a concern.
In Lebanon, for example, the Iraqi refugees have somewhat
left--been left to their own devices and have been allowed to
create community associations so they can try to inculcate
Iraqi identity, Iraqi songs, activities, et cetera, that at
least hold on to some Iraqi culture. But, they are also in an
environment where there's a great diversity of political views,
in Lebanon, so they could be exposed.
In Egypt, they could also be exposed, I think, to a wide
range of political activities.
Ms. Aossey. Certainly, in both refugee populations and IDP
populations, children suffer disproportionally. And if I could
add, women and children. One of the troubling things that we
see is that a number of families are struggling because they
are now female-headed households. Women, as a result of that,
face greater isolation than the family would otherwise.
Children living in poverty, for a whole host of reasons, is
always a bad situation. And certainly, they are more
vulnerable, more fragile.
There's a number of psychosocial interventions that are
happening both within the refugee populations and within the
IDP populations. I cannot overemphasize enough how important
these programs are, because in addition to the fact that
children lack access to basic health care and education and the
kinds of things that a child needs to develop and thrive and be
healthy, they also don't always have an outlet to express many
of the things that they've seen, their fears, and the kinds of
things that they have to come to terms with, just as children.
It's often too much for an adult to cope with these kinds of
things, let alone a child.
Many times we have found that, by working with the mothers
and the women in these families, we're able to improve the lot
for the children, by working with the mothers, because as we
know, children, in large part, react to how their parents are
doing. Regardless of what's happening in their world, what they
form a lot of their opinions and draw a lot of their securities
or insecurities from is based on their parents. Often by trying
to take care of the family, by trying to take care of the
father and the mother, you can then often best take care of the
child.
If you don't help the mother and the father, if they are
unemployed, if they are deprived, if they are isolated, if they
are afraid, then, chances are, so are the children. That's been
our experience, over and over again, not just here, but
throughout the world. That concern is a major concern, and it's
something that we are seeing on all sides of the borders.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Although it's a legitimate concern of the
U.S. Government, I'm personally uncomfortable with the paradigm
of youth as a security threat, if, for no other reason, than
you can create a surreal negative incentive, whereby you'll
have children say, ``Educate me or I'll blow up a hotel.''
That said, rather, we should see these individuals, both as
individuals deserving the full menu of life's opportunities,
but second, as factors in the region's future positive economic
and social development. So, as such, I think Jordan and Syria,
in particular, should be given cart blanche, in terms of
support, for educating Iraqis amongst their population. There
will be leakages. They will use this money to educate Syrians
and Jordanians, but there are many who say that's not
necessarily a bad thing. In fact, that's not a bad thing at
all.
Senator Casey. Before turning to my colleague, I have just
a real quick question on the number. If we're operating from
that 4.7 million number, do you have any sense, or is there any
estimate, as to the number of children that comprise that? What
percent of the 4.7 million are children? Does anyone have a
rough estimate on that?
Mr. Al-Tikriti. I don't have a rough estimate, although
someone here might, but just that it's higher than it normally
would be, because these are survivors of a war zone.
Ms. Aossey. We know that women and children account for 75
percent, give or take.
Senator Casey. Seventy-five.
Ms. Aossey. Yes; 75 percent. And it's possible that, of the
overall numbers, children account for possibly more than half
of that number, give or take.
Senator Casey. That's a big number.
I wanted to turn to my distinguished colleague, the ranking
member, Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, I'll pass, Mr. Chairman. Let's
continue on with the list.
Senator Casey. I've been----
[Laughter.]
Senator Casey [continuing]. Given unlimited time, here.
There's probably some people who want me to turn it over to
you. [Laughter.]
If you wanted to match my time, you get about half an hour.
[Laughter.]
Let me just ask one or two more.
One real concern that people have here, as well as in other
parts of the world, is just the stability and security,
generally, but, in particular, how this crisis--and there's no
better way to describe it than that word--how it affects, among
other challenges, the Middle East itself, and the potential
destabilizing effect that the crisis has on the Middle East. I
mean, we know some of the larger numbers in Syria and Jordan. I
was in Jordan, in August 2007, and we heard an awful lot, at
that time, about the challenge of dealing with this inflow. One
official extrapolating--and I think, appropriately so--
extrapolating from--the inflow of Iraqi refugees into Jordan
would be the equivalent of us having hundreds of thousands--I
think it was more than 500,000 refugees coming to the United
States----
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Try 10 million.
Senator Casey [continuing]. Which--well, depending on how
you count it--but, this was--this was extraordinary. So, do you
have any sense of that, in terms of the impact it can have on
the region, in terms of stability? Anyone have an opinion on
that?
Ms. Laipson. I think if we look at the smaller regional
states, Jordan and Lebanon, for example, would be one scenario,
and I think Syria and Egypt would be a different one. Both
Jordan and Lebanon, I think, are deeply, deeply nervous about
any transfer of, sort of, some of Iraq's political problems to
their own societies, so they worry about rising sectarian
consciousness, they worry about some of these Iraqis being
``bad guys.'' And certainly, within refugee populations, you
have your normal spectrum of human behavior, and you're going
to get some who don't respect the law, bring in some political
views that may not be congenial to the host governments, et
cetera.
For the most part, those anxieties were most acute, I
think, in 2006 and 2007. And, in a strange way, the countries
in the region have more or--I feel that the temperature is down
a little bit, in terms of how anxious they are that these
Iraqis are going to really disrupt life, as they know it, in
their home country. They are a little bit more focused on their
economic requirements than on the security question, per se; in
part, because the Iraqis are somewhat docile, and they're
nervous, and they are--the Iraqis are preoccupied with just
day-to-day survival and really have not become very politically
active. But, again, I think it's important that both Jordan and
Lebanon have--feel deeply scarred by the experience of
absorbing, or failing to absorb, such large cohorts of
Palestinians, and they really don't want to see it happen to
them again.
Syria has taken a somewhat more relaxed view, for reasons
that are not completely clear. Syria has always had a testy
relationship with Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and yet, it
considers Iraq a brother country and has been quite generous,
at the social level, in allowing the Iraqis to kind of settle
where they want, to find homes, et cetera.
In Egypt, the numbers are much, much smaller, and the
Iraqis really don't stand out as such a significant refugee
cohort, when you compare them to the Sudanese or other refugee
groups that are currently resident in Egypt.
So, I think that there was an initial worry that some of
Iraq's, sort of, social strife and deep divisions would somehow
be transferred to these neighboring countries, and that they
would also almost be infected, if you will, by sectarianism.
And it seems that the worst fears have not played out and that
there has been some tolerance. Now, that tolerance may be based
on an assumption that, when conditions improve, the Iraqis will
go home. The long-term absorption of these Iraqis is really
something that I don't think Syria and Jordan have completely
come to terms with.
Senator Casey. How about with regard to what our
Government's doing, vis-a-vis Syria? Is there more that we
should be doing, in terms of any kind of new strategy or new
initiative with regard to Syria? I mean, they've got very high
numbers, and--I don't know if you have a sense of that.
Ms. Laipson. Well, the Syrians certainly want to manage how
international NGOs are playing, vis-a-vis the Iraqis, but it's
possible that there is--that they would be receptive to greater
support for those activities.
What I found interesting was that the Syrians were a little
bit frustrated that they have not been able to do business with
Iraq. They believe that the long period of American disapproval
of Syria has inhibited them from being kind of a more natural
economic partner of Iraq. So, joint ventures, business
opportunities, Syrian investment in Iraq, et cetera, which
could help Iraqi reconstruction and could, in theory, on the
margins at least, improve the chances for Iraqis to go home,
have not been exploited, have not been developed. So, the
Syrians would argue that if the United States were to create a
more conducive environment, you could get more natural economic
interaction between Syria and Iraq that would help the Iraqi
displaced people, as well.
So, one intervention, perhaps in the context of an overall
improvement in United States-Syrian relations, would be
something that would clarify the status of Syrian businessmen,
Syrian investors, in the Iraqi economy.
The Iraqi business partners suggest that they don't want to
do business with Syrians, because they think Syrians are
somehow disapproved by Washington, so it's not worth--if they
were to bump into sanctions, for example. Now, the reason for
those sanctions are--is a different set of issues, and it's
possible that those sanctions cannot be lifted very, very
quickly, but that's something that at least the Syrians believe
would improve their ability to help Iraq.
Senator Casey. Ms. Aossey.
Ms. Aossey. If you look at Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon,
generally speaking, I think they've done, overall, a pretty
good job of accepting large numbers into their populations when
their populations are already in need of many of the kinds of
services that these refugees also need. Although, of course,
rights have been limited, and certainly the right to work is
limited, many of these refugees have had access to what is
already a very, very strained system within these countries.
I can't think of many countries that want a refugee
population in their country permanently. And, as mentioned
before, many of them are still struggling with the issue of the
Palestinian refugees within their own communities since 1948.
Also, there is a general concern even though the tension is
significantly decreased, as Ellen mentioned, there is a general
concern about how the influx of these refugees affect the
religious balance within their countries, and what that may
mean within each particular country. So, there has been concern
about that, although it seems to be less.
I think, in large part, one of the ways that there has been
less tension among these host communities, between the refugee
population and the population of these countries, is that,
because the refugees are not allowed to work, they can't take
jobs that would go to someone who lives in that country. It's
difficult for the refugees, of course, but to some extent,
there is a little less tension because they're not taking local
jobs away from the economy.
Just a comment on Syria. It's been our experience, in
working, in the last couple of years, with the Syrian Arab Red
Crescent and a number of other such institutions, that there
seems to be an opening up of the regime, and we should try and
embrace that openness. Perhaps this issue of refugees in their
country is a way to have a dialogue about that.
Refugees within Syria have had access to a lot of basic
services. Certainly we never want to create reasons for people
to go back home, except for reasons that are, of course, very
positive. If people had a good reason to go home, we think many
of them would. It's not because life is easy in Syria, but that
they do have access to basic services, so if they do go home,
it would be voluntary in nature.
Senator Casey. Well, I know--moving to a different topic,
because I know we have to wrap up soon, but--even as we point
to what the Iraqi Government's doing or not doing well, or
other governments, we have to look inward, as well. What is our
Government doing? And we spoke a little bit about the dollar
amounts, but the concern that I have--and a lot of people have
this concern--and Senator Cardin--Senator Ben Cardin, from
Maryland, and I expressed this to the President, when he was
President-elect, in a letter about the need for someone in the
White House to be able to coordinate, in terms of the
interagency interaction. That's my sense of it, and I'd be
curious to see what our witnesses think, whether or not the
administration--our administration here--should appoint a
special coordinator for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced
persons. Do you have any opinion on that? If you disagree,
you're not going to offend me. This is an open forum.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. I look positively toward that idea. Up
until now, as I understand it, there's been--the lead,
internationally, has been BPRM, over in the State Department,
but they have been unable to speed the process, in Homeland
Security, for getting third-country resettlement asylum-seekers
into the United States, and they've had no traction whatsoever,
in terms of what happens to those asylum-seekers once they get
to the United States. So, you've effectively got three
different sets of bureaucracies, and they're not coordinating
very well at all, from what I've read and come to understand.
So, if someone were somehow coordinating those three
different sets of bureaucracies, it would be a great advance
over what it has been, up until now.
And the other thing I want to emphasize is, again, what I
mentioned earlier in the testimony, namely that there should be
a great deal--a great increase in resources allotted for those
who do manage to get to the United States, because these--the
benefits--``benefits'' is, maybe, a dicey word to use there--
but, the support, the assistance that they've been getting once
they reach the United States has been allowed to wither ever
since the 1990s, and, as a result, they really are only getting
something like a few weeks' support and then they're on their
own. And, as anyone can testify in the United States, without
health insurance and a steady job, life can be very difficult.
And if you don't know all that solid a grasp of English, then
it's even more difficult.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask--Ms. Laipson, your long
experience in government; you know more than just the theory of
it, the practice of how it actually works. What's your sense of
this question, as to whether or not to have a special
coordinator in the White House?
Ms. Laipson. Well, I find myself a little bit conflicted.
I'm not sure that special coordinators and creating, kind of,
more processes that these dense bureaucracies, you know,
already resist a bit, is necessarily the solution. But, I liked
very much Nabil's description, that--my understanding is that
the Iraqis--to get an Iraqi process to come into the United
States is mindbogglingly complex, that they--there's almost a
Catch 22, when they're outside the United States, of how they
qualify; once they qualify, they have to start all over again
with a different process, et cetera.
I'm not sure that a czar in the White House can break
through all of that, and I don't know whether there's a
legislative remedy to trying to streamline the process, not
just for Iraqis, but for any other asylum-seekers and refugees.
I do think this is a moment where our post-9/11 system gets in
the way of some of our other foreign policy goals, and I don't
know whether there's an opportunity here--again, not just for
the Iraqis, but for others, as well--to clean up a system that
may be unnecessarily slow and complex.
So, I'd put it in a--in kind of a larger question. I
personally would rather see, you know, the Department of
Homeland Security need to demonstrate a willingness to come up
with more efficient processes. Someone sitting in the White
House, maybe would add value, but not necessarily.
Ms. Aossey. I think it would show the extraordinary
importance of this. Whether or not it would get muddled in the
bureaucratic process is difficult to know, but I think that the
issues are so important, so large and so looming that I think
it would be a good idea, in large part, because it would be
someone's only job. Probably the best way to look at it is,
they have a lens into what all the different issues are, across
the board, they would, from that perspective, be able to solve
some of the issues. They're not solved necessarily, because no
one single person is doing this across all agencies.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. May I have a follow-on, on that?
Senator Casey. Sure.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. This is a personal anecdote, as a New
Orleans native. Growing up in New Orleans in the 1970s, there
was a very large Vietnamese community that were overwhelmingly
refugees from the Southeast Asia conflict of the 1960s and
1970s. When they came to the United States, they had the kind
of support that allowed them to work at the local supermarket,
and half of their salaries, as I understand it, were paid for
by the Federal Government. The supermarket cut its payroll in
half, they got minimum-wage jobs; these jobs went on for years.
And their children are doing quite well, as I understand it,
including the most recent Republican Representative from
District 2 in New Orleans. And that is a anecdote, that is an
example, of what can happen, a generation after these asylum-
seekers are accepted into the American immigrant mix.
Senator Casey. Well, thank you. And I wanted to--I know we
have to conclude, but--wanted to get your sense of how we're
doing with regard to resettlement of Iraqi refugees, in
general, but, in particular, whether or not we're doing enough
to resettle Iraqis who supported the United States mission
since the war began, as well as oppressed minorities, like
Iraqi Christians, here in the United States.
Ms. Laipson. I think we're doing poorly, across the board.
I think the numbers aren't big enough, and, I think, once they
get here, the programs aren't generous enough, as Nabil
explained.
I take the notion that we should be particularly sensitive
to the most vulnerable populations. I hope that that definition
of ``vulnerable'' is inclusive enough so that it's a mix of
vulnerabilities, not just focused on what they call the
``American-affiliated Iraqis''--the translators, et cetera. I
hope that it would be more than one definition of ``vulnerable
population.'' But, the numbers are just, I think, exceedingly
small, given the scale of the people that could qualify to be
``vulnerable.''
Mr. Al-Tikriti. And I would agree with that. I think that
any sectarian definition of those who get preference--in other
words, saving Iraqi Christians because they're Iraqi
Christians--would be a very big mistake, if only for Iraqi
sectarian politics back there, as well as in the Middle East,
as a whole.
On the other hand, I can see an argument for supporting
those who--as a special category--who helped the American
venture in the last 6 years, because they did put their life on
the lines for this adventure, whatever you think of it.
Ms. Aossey. If I could make one more comment about this
coordinating mechanism, I've had an opportunity to think a
little bit more about it. And certainly resettlement issues
would be a part of that. But, if you look at the past, the lead
for the refugees has been PRM at the State Department. And the
lead for the internally displaced has been USAID's OFDA. And
these two organizations, we are a partner of them and we know
them well, have really done an extraordinary job under very
difficult and challenging--very, very difficult situations.
But, there needs to be, in addition to that, overall
leadership at the highest level that looks at all these issues
together, including the resettlement issue, which is, of
course, politically charged in so many ways. This challenge is
a big one, and has tremendous implications, both in the
neighboring countries and our own country and within Iraq. And
if there's someone at the senior level who is able to work with
people who have been focused on it over the years, look at it
at a broader level, I think these issues, including the
resettlement issues, that we're obviously struggling with,
would be best looked at. It's not because I think the solutions
are easy, it's because someone at a very high level would be
looking at them all the time and across the board. And
certainly, that includes the resettlement, as well.
Senator Casey. I forgot to ask one question I was thinking
of earlier. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams--as our troop
presence is diminished and as we drawdown, I'd ask you whether
or not you think the PRT's role has to be augmented because of
that. Is there a general consensus on that, or not?
Anyone. This is----
Ms. Laipson. Yes; I personally think the PRTs will continue
to have a very important role, and perhaps even an enhanced
role, in this period of transition. Eventually, though, if we
imagine, kind of, at the 5-year mark or beyond, a more normal
relationship with Iraq, I don't know what--whether Iraq will,
you know, either want, or we will give priority to, having such
a robust presence at the provincial level.
We have this enormous Embassy in Baghdad that is perhaps
too big for where the relationship will be, 3 years from now, 5
years from now. The PRTs are a very--you know, are an
interesting experiment, and it's really to--in my mind, a
transitional concept.
Eventually, when Iraq is stable, we would have normal
consulates. But, when we think about the role of diplomats in
the 21st century, we know that there will be a kind of
different skill mix, and, in a way, PRTs are a pioneering
effort to see what, kind of, different professions and
different, kind of, functional backgrounds are needed in our
civilian corps when we deploy, internationally. So, we want
water engineers and we want legal experts and we want people of
very different professional training.
And so, in a way, the PRTs are a very important experiment
that perhaps will become institutionalized and become a
permanent way we do business overseas. But, overall, I think
that we should think of it, still, as a transition for Iraq,
and eventually our diplomatic posture in Iraq may look
different.
Senator Casey. Anyone else, before we wrap up?
Ms. Aossey. I think----
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Go ahead.
Ms. Aossey. The feelings toward the PRTs among the
communities in Iraq vary from place to place, depending on what
their relationship with them is. I'm a strong proponent of more
being done at the civilian level--because civilian
organizations, international organizations, NGOs, the U.N.--are
used to working at the grassroots level with communities, and
winning their trust. I think that's going to be very important
in Iraq as we go forward. I think that much more needs to be
done through civilian organizations. In that regard, it is a
transition, and things have changed. There is much more of a
role for civilians, whether it be organizations or the U.S.
Government or the international community in general, because
they are used to working within communities. They've been doing
this for years and years, around the world. And they've done it
very effectively, and in so many other places. I believe much
more of that can be done in Iraq than has been done in the
past.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. I would agree with everything that's been
said. I just have one caveat. And I--that is, that I would hope
that the PRTs' presence throughout the country, throughout the
provincial capitals, would not later be used as a reason to
maintain a security presence, a military presence, in order to
protect the PRTs. In other words, sort of a reverse tail-
wagging-the-dog kind of scenario. So, while I agree that their
role probably should, and could be, and will be, enhanced, I
don't think that should be a reason to keep a military presence
there to protect them.
Senator Casey. Before we leave, I wanted to give each of
you--you have written testimony, you've given oral testimony,
but just give you, maybe, 30 seconds each to do a kind of an
exclamation point. What's your most important message you want
to leave with us, so the record is crystal clear why you showed
up here? [Laughter.]
Ms. Laipson. Well, I think the refugee story is a very
important test of American leadership and how we bring this
extraordinary period of our--of Iraq policy to some kind of
closure. So, I would like the United States to pay more
attention to the refugees.
Having said that, I want to think about the refugee problem
in a very holistic way, and that really the solution to the
refugee problem is organically linked to achieving some of the
basics in Iraq, so that when Iraq is more stable, people will
choose to return. So, I don't want to kind of put the refugee
question under a microscope and say that that should be issue
No. 1; I want to see it in the context of the United States
remaining engaged in Iraq, at least for some period, until Iraq
achieves stability. And then, I think there will be some
natural resolution to at least part of the refugee problem.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Ms. Aossey. I think it's important that we take the hard-
won gains and the progress that's been made over the last years
and keep things progressing, that we don't actually backtrack.
That is, we cannot rush the return of the refugees, or rush the
return of the IDPs, beyond a point where they're not
comfortable. It needs to be voluntary. People need to be safe,
and they need to feel that they want to be back in their
societies for there to be long-term and durable hope in Iraq.
I believe that this should be civilian-led. I think that
working with the communities at the civilian level will have
the most impact over the long run in Iraq in building those
relationships. And that we, both the U.S. Government and the
international community, should help the Government of Iraq to
carry this out; that they need help with the master plan; that
they do have the will to do it, but they don't have the
capacity. A civilian-led effort to help them do that will be
the most effective and, over the long run, will help with our
relationships within communities throughout the country.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Mr. Al-Tikriti. Thank you for this opportunity.
Rather than restate some of what I've said before, I want
to close on a slightly different point, and that is, I think
the focus should be on the most vulnerable populations; and it
hasn't always been, up until now. And I want to mention three
particular populations, that haven't necessarily been mentioned
yet today, quickly.
One, the Palestinian refugees in Iraq are effectively
trapped; 2,500 of them on camps on the border. They need to go
somewhere, and they're stuck, for the last 6 years,
effectively. That's one group.
Another group are the Sabaean-Mandaeans, who have
effectively ceased to exist as a community in Iraq. There's
less than 10,000 of them now. They've been dispersed all over
the world, and they are of such numbers, as a community, that
their communal identity is in danger of fading as they spread
to Australia, Europe, and the United States.
And the third one are the Mujahidin-i Khalq Iranians in
Camp Asraf, who have a long and difficult history in Iraq,
obviously. They are not immediately vulnerable, but if things,
politically, go a certain way and the United States withdraws,
they could find themselves suddenly extremely, extremely
vulnerable. So, it's not a case of vulnerability right now,
it's a case of potential vulnerability in the future.
Once again, thank you for allowing me to testify.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much. And this is very
helpful, and we'll make sure that all of your testimony is a
part of the record.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Joint Prepared Statement of Kenneth H. Bacon, President, and Kristele
Younes, Senior Advocate, Refugees International, Washington, DC
Thank you, Senator Casey, for holding this hearing today. As
President Obama noted in his February 27 speech on responsibly ending
the war in Iraq, ``millions of displaced Iraqis . . . are a living
consequence of this war and a challenge to stability in the region, and
they must become part of Iraq's reconciliation and recovery.'' This
hearing and legislation such as the Casey-Cardin ``Support for
Vulnerable Iraqis Act'' will play an important role in addressing the
security and stability challenges presented by Iraqi displacement.
Refugees International has been working on the plight of displaced
Iraqis for 3 years. In 2006 and 2007, we called the Iraqi displacement
crisis ``the fastest growing'' in the world. Although the rates of
displacement have since slowed, about 20 percent of the Iraqi
population remains displaced. The Governments of Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, and other host countries say that they are sheltering almost 2
million Iraqi refugees, while the International Organization for
Migration notes that another 2.6 million are internally displaced in
Iraq. The latter are known as IDPs.
Throughout the past 3 years, Refugees International has advocated
increased assistance to displaced Iraqis, as well as increased
resettlement of Iraqi refugees in the U.S. and other countries. Our
efforts have led the United Nations to significantly increase their
presence and work in the region and the U.S. Government to step up
efforts to respond to the crisis. In 2008, the U.S. Government provided
$400 million in assistance to displaced Iraqis. To date, in 2009, the
U.S. has contributed $150 million and expects to contribute more. As
for resettlement, the U.S. welcomed more than 13,000 Iraqis in 2008 and
plans to resettle at least 17,000 in the current fiscal year. More
needs to be done, but these improvements in the humanitarian response
are encouraging and demonstrate the willingness of the U.S. Government
to address some of the humanitarian consequences of the war in Iraq.
Assistance by the international community and the resettlement of
vulnerable Iraqis to the U.S. and elsewhere remain critical components
of a comprehensive response to the Iraqi displacement crisis. However,
with such a large segment of the population displaced, the solution for
most displaced Iraqis will be to return home.
As security in Iraq seems to be improving, it is essential that the
Government of Iraq, the U.S. and the United Nations (U.N.) work
together to create conditions suitable for returns.
Earlier this month, we conducted a mission to Iraq to survey work
in the main areas of displacement and return in the center of the
country. We visited several areas of Baghdad, as well as Eskanderia, in
the former ``Sunni triangle of death,'' Fallujah in the Anbar
governorate, Karbala and Hilla in the Babel governorate.
I very much appreciate your invitation to brief you on our
findings. Unfortunately, a medical emergency has forced us to present
our testimony in writing. I hope you will make this entire statement
part of the hearing record and that you will not hesitate to submit
questions in writing.
Here are our major findings:
As security in Iraq improves, refugees and internally
displaced Iraqis are starting to return home, but the returns
are slow and tentative.
While security remains the major factor in a family's
decision to return home, other factors play a role--
infrastructure, particularly water and electricity, employment
opportunities and health care. The Government of Iraq (GOI),
the U.S. and the United Nations have to do a better job of
working together provide the services necessary to support
returning Iraqis.
The capacity of the GOI to provide protection and services
to returning Iraqis is weak. A vibrant civil society sector,
including increasingly competent local nongovernment
organizations, is beginning to develop in Iraq, but the
government often sees the civil society movement as a threat
rather than a potential partner. The U.S. and the U.N. should
concentrate on helping to develop a better partnership between
the GOI and civil society organizations.
Returns tend to ratify the ethnic cleansing that took place
during the worst years of sectarian violence, when many mixed
neighborhoods became all Shia or all Sunni. The GOI needs to do
a better job of convincing Iraqis that rule of law applies
equally to all Iraqis and that the government is nonsectarian.
the state of returns
Since November 2007, the Government of Iraq has been trying to
encourage the return of displaced Iraqis. In Syria, Jordan, and Egypt
the GOI has made buses and planes available to help refugees return to
their country and has provided them with a small sum upon their return
home. As for the internally displaced, they too can receive assistance
to vacate the homes they sometimes occupy illegally and to return to
their homes. Iraq went as far as violating international refugee law by
asking Syria to close its borders to refugees at the end of 2007, when
the number of people fleeing was still significant, because of fears
that the large number of refugees gave a bad image of the security
situation inside the country.
In its strategy to encourage returns, the Government of Iraq has
failed to take political, social, and economic reality into
consideration and examine the country's capacity to absorb large
numbers of returns. Instead, it has made the return of displaced Iraqis
a component, as opposed to a consequence, of its security strategy.
Large returns, the Government reasoned in 2007, would create the
impression that security in Iraq was better and would win popular and
international support for the Government's military and political
actions.
Pressure on the displaced to return to their homes continues today.
Refugees International met with Government officials who all expressed
the desire to see the ``IDP file'' closed in 2009, as there are ``no
longer reasons to be displaced'' in Iraq. As a result, IDPs are no
longer being registered, as the government hurries to make the
displacement problem disappear. Moreover, Prime Minister al-Maliki's
Shia Government has little sympathy for the largely Sunni refugees in
neighboring countries. Syria and Jordan state that almost 2 million
such refugees are still in their countries, but the Government of Iraq
states that there are no more than 400,000, and fewer have registered
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. According to a U.N.
diplomat in Baghdad, the Prime Minister sees all refugees as
``traitors'' or ``Baathists'' who prefer ``getting money without
working'' rather than helping rebuilding their country.
Displacement from Iraq has slowed but hasn't stopped yet; the U.N.
continues to register new arrivals in Syria and Jordan for instance. A
small percentage of the internally displaced are returning, in part
because of the cease-fires imposed by Sunni and Shiite militias and the
security those militias have established in their fiefdoms for members
of the same sect. Also, many formerly mixed communities are no longer
mixed and there is essentially no one left to force out. In addition,
the conditions for displaced families both within Iraq and in
neighboring countries are extremely difficult and continue to
deteriorate. Thus, some Iraqis are returning to ``safe'' neighborhoods
in Baghdad.
Returns remain a trickle, however, rather than the solution of
choice for most displaced. According to the IOM, around 50,000 families
(250,000 persons) have returned, mostly to Baghdad, and mostly from
within the country. Only 8 percent of these returnees were refugees
from neighboring countries. As for the rest of the IDPs, a survey by
IOM shows that 61 percent of those still displaced would eventually
like to return, but don't feel ready to do it now. The remaining 39
percent would either like to integrate in their current communities, or
resettle somewhere else. Obviously, if the post-2006 population
movements aren't reversed, there will be serious consequences for the
political future of Iraq, as entire neighborhoods and cities will
remain homogenous.
Returns are the most effective way to gauge lasting improvements in
Iraq, as refugees and IDPs are often the best informed about the
conditions in their places of origin. The low numbers demonstrate that
major obstacles and challenges need to be addressed before mass returns
can take place. According to UNHCR and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,
many who have returned to Iraq from neighboring countries have now
become internally displaced, unable to go back to their homes. They
seek shelter in neighborhoods reflecting their religious sect, not
neighborhoods where they are the minority and might feel threatened. As
for IDPs, many fear returning because returnees have been killed. Local
security officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) confirmed
that there have been incidents of intimidation or murder in many areas,
and these stories spread quickly throughout the population. Refugees
International visited the Sunni area of Amriya, where a Shia family was
killed when it tried to return. We heard of similar incidents happening
to Sunni families in Shia neighborhoods.
Besides the fragility of the security situation, there are many
other obstacles to return. According to assessments conducted by
international and national aid agencies, refugees and IDPs who have
returned need shelter, electricity, water, employment, and nonfood
items. Health care is also a major issue: There are 18,000 health care
workers in Iraq today, versus 36,000 in 2000. Humanitarian
organizations have designed programs to target some of these needs. For
instance, IOM designed a returnee food and nonfood basket, and seeks to
assist returning families by including them in its community
assistance, water/sanitation, health and education programs. Similarly,
UNHCR included assistance to returnees in its 2008 and 2009 programs,
while both international and local NGOs stand ready to assist in many
areas of Iraq. As for the GOI, it announced assistance to returnees--
around $800 per family--that is neither sufficient nor efficiently
distributed.
Despite these initiatives in assisting returnees, the systems are
currently not in place to handle a large number of returnees as it is
the overall infrastructure of the country that needs to be revived.
Moreover, there is no unified process to deal with returning internally
displaced persons or refugees. As in the post-conflict Balkans,
property disputes are a key issue in Iraq, as many returnees are unable
to go home since their houses are occupied by others. Property disputes
will linger for many years to come and are likely to spark renewed
violence. For now, they are being handled by the Iraqi Army on orders
from the Prime Minister's Cabinet dealing with the eviction of
``squatters,'' many of them IDPs themselves.
creating conditions for returns: the role of the government of iraq
Despite improvements in security, many Iraqis believe large-scale
violence might resume, as internal struggles for power emerge and are
no longer limited to the Sunni-Shia divide. In particular, many fear
the consequences of the U.S.-planned withdrawal, and the effect it will
have on the different factions. The fear is compounded by the current
lack of capacity of the Iraqi Government, which is reflected by its
inability to deal effectively with displacement.
Inside the Government, sectarian bias remains strong. According to
senior U.S. officials in Baghdad, ``there isn't one Government in
Iraq,'' but a regroupment of factions, each pursuing their own agenda.
Sunni still largely feel disenfranchised and underrepresented, and
mistrust toward the Shia-dominated Government is largely present at all
levels of society. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) is
run by Shia Kurds, whose first priority has been the resettlement of
refugees coming back from Iran. Most advisers to the Prime Minister are
Shia. IDPs feel it is much easier for displaced Shias than for
displaced Sunnis to gain assistance. Similarly, many Iraqi NGOs working
in Sunni areas report having trouble registering with the Government of
Iraq. One NGO representative told us that when she went to the
government NGO office to register her organization, she was asked ``why
she works in these areas,'' meaning Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad.
Sectarianism is not the only problem with the Government of Iraq.
Corruption is rampant, and makes it extremely difficult for the
Government to effectively deliver assistance and for international and
national NGOs to operate. The World Food Programme (WFP), which
delivers food assistance to hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis,
had its cargo seized by Iraqi police who alleged that the food was
rotten. Refugees International met with many local and international
groups operating in the city of Hilla, in Babel, who complained that
the local head of MODM was an incompetent 26-year-old, who was
appointed because of his links to the Governor and who constantly tried
to intimidate agencies into distributing assistance to his friends and
family.
The improvements in security have not translated into improvements
in the provision of services. This situation is unlikely to improve in
the near future, given the financial difficulties that the Government
of Iraq is currently experiencing. The fall in oil prices has had a
severe impact on the Iraqi national budget, which went from a planned
$82 billion to less than $60 billion for 2009, with further cuts
planned. Moreover, the government has also made cuts in the public
distribution system of food (PDS) which cost $5.9 billion last year.
The Government has nevertheless tried to take a few steps to
address displacement. The creation of returnee assistance centers in
Baghdad provides legal and financial assistance to returnees.
Unfortunately, the government interrupted the payment of $800 to
returnee families in October, and it is unclear when assistance will
resume. To address property disputes, the Prime Minister's office
issued two orders for the Iraqi Army (through the Baghdad Operations
Center, or BOC) to evict squatters when returnees can show documents
establishing their property rights. Those evicted are entitled to some
assistance. This system is, however, flawed, as many squatters are IDPs
themselves who cannot return home. As for homeowners, getting their
property back does not mean they can return, since they often fear for
their safety.
Assistance to returnees, property restitution, and the provision of
basic services are essential for Iraqis to return home. But many will
still not return until they feel the root causes of the conflict have
been addressed. They need to feel accepted by the community and
provided with security guarantees. Baghdad, and indeed the rest of
Iraq, resembles a large military base today--with each neighborhood
sealed off by walls, and populations unable to move freely when they
choose. Areas are currently protected by the army or by ``awakening
groups,'' Sunni militias created by the U.S. Army, who were eventually
supposed to be integrated into the Iraqi Armed Forces and police. Save
a few exceptions, it hasn't really happened yet, making the situation
unsustainable. Refugees International and others worry that absent a
real political reconciliation process and an efficient disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program, these groups will remain as
armed militias with the same political agenda and strong grievances.
The possibility for resumed violence is also present along the disputed
boundaries between the Kurds and the central Iraqi Government. A
political solution is vital to ensure there won't be large-scale
confrontations.
The U.S., the international community, and the U.N. need to provide
financial and technical assistance to the Government of Iraq to address
the needs of the displaced, the returnees and the root causes of
displacement. In addition, political pressure on the Government of Iraq
to address its own sectarianism and rampant corruption must be
maintained. A comprehensive, interministerial system is needed to
establish the rule of law, which is essential for Iraqis to feel safe
and return to their homes. Finally, the international community must
work with the Government of Iraq to create jobs. With 30 percent
unemployment rate, Iraq's economic future is compromised. So is its
security, as most of the unemployed are young men who are vulnerable to
recruitment by militias and other armed groups.
the way forward
Humanitarian needs remain a priority in Iraq. The U.N. assistance
mission to Iraq is currently trying to build the Government of Iraq's
capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies and should be supported
in this work. Many populations in Iraq live in vulnerable conditions,
unknown to the aid community which, because of security restrictions,
has been unable to get a comprehensive picture of conditions in the
country. Refugees International visited groups of displaced Iraqis in
Baghdad and elsewhere who lived in unsanitary conditions, were not
registered with the MODM, and had never received any assistance from
any U.N. agency or NGO. Aid organizations must work together and
establish better coordination and reporting mechanisms to ensure that
vulnerable Iraqis stop falling through the cracks.
NGOs and U.N. agencies have started addressing these problems by
designing several types of programs: Some targeting basic needs and
others looking at longer term development, such as job training for
widows. UNHCR is working with local NGOs to provide protection and
assistance to the most vulnerable, while UNICEF is launching its IMPACT
program, addressing the needs of some of the poorest communities in
Iraq. These organizations and others who are working in Iraq need
financial and political support. At the end of 2008, the U.N. launched
an appeal for $547 million to meet the needs of Iraqis both in and
outside of Iraq. Contributions to this appeal have been insufficient to
date. Refugees International urges the U.S. to lead by example and fund
50 percent of the overall appeal. The U.S. plays a special role in the
region, and this needs to be translated into the prioritizations of
humanitarian assistance as well.
Civil society plays an essential role in Iraq. Both international
and national NGOs have been at the forefront of providing assistance
since the beginning of the war, often at great risks for their staff.
Yet there seems to be great mistrust by the Government of Iraq toward
NGOs, especially Iraqi ones. The Government is currently discussing a
law that if passed, would enable the State to exert a disproportionate
level of control on NGOs, on their finances, and even on their
lifespan. It is true that the Iraqi civil society is young, and that
many NGOs exist only by name, or as a tool for political parties. Many
others however, are legitimate and could become important actors if
they were given the resources and the capacity-building they need.
Refugees International met with impressive local groups, who provide
assistance to thousands of vulnerable Iraqis, without any support from
the Iraqi Government or the international community. The U.S. and other
donors must also work with the government to achieve a compromise that
would ensure government oversight without impeding NGOs independence.
Iraq today is struggling to replace sectarian violence with political
discourse and reconciliation. It has a long way to go, but more active
civil society organizations would provide a good mediation channel.
Even if fully funded though, the U.N. and NGOs will not be able to
address major problems, such as the establishment of basic services
throughout the country. This task has been taken up by the government,
and also by the U.S. provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) which have
a much larger budget that any U.N. agency. For example, UNICEF had $30
million budget in 2008, the PRTs had $862 million at their disposal to
undertake projects such as the repair of power grids, the rebuilding of
schools and bridges, or the construction of hospitals. Unfortunately
the PRTs projects are often implemented without much coordination with
the central authorities, the U.N., or USAID. There needs to be much
increased coordination with communities and all actors involved in the
reconstruction of Iraq to ensure ownership and sustainability.
Furthermore, as the U.S. troops drawdown, thought has to be given to
the handing over of PRT projects to the Government of Iraq or the U.N.
The U.S. has a responsibility to ensure that these projects don't fall
through, and that whomever they are handed to has the capacity and the
resources to maintain and complete them.
As efforts continue to stabilize and rebuild Iraq, special
attention needs to be given to the most vulnerable, and durable
solutions need to be found. The stateless Palestinians of Iraq remain
one of the most vulnerable groups, the subjects of discrimination and
attacks by many factions. The hundreds who sought shelter in the camps
of Al-Tanf and Al-Waleed at the Syrian border with Iraq must be
resettled immediately and the criteria applied should be the same as
for Iraqis. According to the U.N., there are 10-12,000 left in Iraq.
For this population, resettlement to a third country is likely to be
the only durable solution.
The U.S. and the international community must also turn their
attention to Iraqis who will not be able to return home, whether they
are refugees or internally displaced. They may be too vulnerable to
return, or have reasons to fear for their safety. Either way, there are
currently no plans to address their needs and plan for their future.
The U.S. must engage Syria, Jordan, and other host countries on finding
durable solutions for these particularly vulnerable groups. As for the
39 percent of internally displaced Iraqis who don't plan to return
home, they will need assistance to either integrate in their new
communities or resettle elsewhere. The political implications for the
future of Iraq must be carefully considered, while respecting the will
of the displaced.
We can avoid repeating past mistakes. The U.S. must consider the
humanitarian implications of its engagement in Iraq, and ensure that
measures are taken to mitigate the effects the conflict continues to
have on civilians. Working with the Government of Iraq and the U.N.,
the U.S. must stand ready to assist vulnerable Iraqis, including the
displaced and the returnees. This is not only a humanitarian
imperative, but a security one as well.
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