[Senate Hearing 111-184]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-184
FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES,
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
of the
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 7, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION,
FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
John Kilvington, Staff Director
Velvet Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Bryan Parker, Staff Director and General Counsel to the Minority
Deirdre G. Armstrong, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Carper............................................... 1
Senator Akaka................................................ 14
Senator Levin................................................ 16
Senator Burris............................................... 19
Prepared statements:
Senator Carper............................................... 47
Senator Burris............................................... 50
WITNESSES
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Hon. Mark Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado....... 4
Paul W. Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and Deputy Assisant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asia, Office of the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State............. 7
Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 25
Nicholas Schmidle, Fellow, New America Foundation................ 27
Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council... 29
Nathaniel Fick, Chief Executive Officer, Center for a New
American Security.............................................. 32
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University............................................. 34
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Curtis, Lisa:
Testimony.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Fick, Nathaniel:
Testimony.................................................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 75
Jones, Paul W.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf:
Testimony.................................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 78
Nawaz, Shuja:
Testimony.................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 71
Schmidle, Nicholas:
Testimony.................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Udall, Hon. Mark:
Testimony.................................................... 4
APPENDIX
Questions and Answers for the Record from:
Mr. Jones.................................................... 81
Ms. Curtis................................................... 92
Mr. Schmidle................................................. 96
Mr. Nawaz.................................................... 98
Mr. Fick..................................................... 102
Mr. Mowatt-Larssen........................................... 104
FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
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TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, Federal Services,
and International Security,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
Carper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Burris.
Also Present: Senator Mark Udall.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. The Subcommittee will come to order. I want
to welcome a very good friend--Senator Udall from Colorado.
Thank you very much for joining us. He and I were part of a
congressional delegation about a month and a half ago that went
to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We learned a lot and came back
with a special interest in the issues we will be discussing
today. So I very much want to welcome you today.
I am going to start off with a statement, and we will be
joined by some others of our colleagues. I would like for
Senator Udall to stay for as long as his schedule permits, and
we welcome him to participate with us as we go through
statements.
Before I begin, I really want to give my thanks to the men
and women serving in the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. We certainly want to give our thanks to the men
and women serving in uniform, particularly in Afghanistan
today. We are grateful for the sacrifice both on the civilian
side and on the military side in that country.
We were in both countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, back
in May. I can say with great confidence that our new Ambassador
there, Karl Eikenberry, and his wife who has joined him there,
and Ambassador Anne Patterson in Pakistan are very impressive
people with a very highly effective staff. We commend them for
their leadership, and all of our personnel that are serving
there capably.
An Islamic insurgency rages, as we know, in western
Pakistan, and senior U.S. officials are concerned about the
declining security situation and new vulnerabilities for
Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal, although I must say I am
pleased, I think we are encouraged, by the way the Pakistan
military has turned on the Taliban with the strong support of
all the political parties of any consequence and the strong
support of the voters and the electorate and the population of
Pakistan.
But the insurgency, particularly in Afghanistan but also in
Pakistan, the political instability in that region, the
devastating humanitarian crisis as a couple million people in
Pakistan have been dislocated from their homes, and an
intensely anti-American population threaten an already fragile
Pakistani Government. These factors present unique challenges
to the United States and the strategy of our President laid out
in late March.
In my view, the Administration has developed a strategy
that addresses the region's concerns while understanding that
the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan are indeed linked.
This hearing will examine implementation of that new strategy.
When we were leaving, Senator Udall and I were doing a
press conference with our colleagues, and I was asked by one of
the reporters, ``What is the exit strategy for the United
States?'' And I said that the exit strategy is our new
strategy, the new strategy outlined by the President in March.
It has military components, training components, and civilian
components, and we need to do all three.
Our focus today will be on the hardest and most critical
problem of the region, and that is Pakistan. Most national
security experts agree that Pakistan is maybe the most
dangerous country in the world today for one primary reason:
Nowhere else in the world is there such a lethal combination of
Islamic extremism, terrorist groups with global reach, nuclear
proliferation, and nuclear weapons.
In late March, President Obama said that Pakistan's lawless
border region has become the most dangerous place in the world
for Americans. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of our Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has called the border region between Pakistan
and Afghanistan ``the site of planning for the next attack'' on
the United States.
General David Petraeus, who oversees the wars in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, said recently that Pakistan has become the
``nerve center'' of al Qaeda's global operations, allowing it
to reestablish its organizational structure, build stronger
ties with offshoots in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and
in parts of Europe.
Pakistani officials acknowledge that their country is
facing perhaps the greatest threat since its creation in 1947:
A growing virulent threat from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
Islamic groups.
In the months since our delegation was in Pakistan, the
Pakistani military, as I mentioned earlier, has launched an
offensive in the North-West Frontier Province, specifically in
the Swat Valley, and in South Waziristan, an agency in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Many experts have been skeptical whether Pakistani
officials understand the existential threat to their own
country. But as I said earlier, an extraordinary thing has
happened in the last month and a half. For the first time
President Zardari, opposition leader Sharif, the Pakistani
military, and more than 80 percent of Pakistanis view the
Taliban and al Qaeda as a critical threat to Pakistan. Those
numbers are almost double what they were about a year ago.
I agree with Secretary Napolitano's recent statement from
Pakistan that the Pakistani Government's crackdown on the
Taliban has improved U.S. security. The Obama Administration
has promised Pakistan $1.5 billion in aid for the next 5 years
in humanitarian and economic assistance; and although the
Senate unanimously passed the Kerry-Lugar bill that I
cosponsored. The bill is now stuck in Congress with a list of
conditions with which many Pakistanis are uncomfortable. This
bill is both vital to the U.S. national security and to
Pakistan's 175 million people, and I urge the conferees to send
the President a bill to sign, and soon.
Finally, it goes without saying that the safety and
security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance
to all of us. As the insurgency spreads in Pakistan, senior
American officials are increasingly concerned about new
vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear weapons, including the
potential for militants to insert sympathizers into
laboratories or fuel production facilities or to seize a weapon
in transport. Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and
technology from falling into the wrong hands should be, must
be, the top priority for both of our countries.
These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. Let me
mention a couple of them.
One, the Obama Administration has recognized that the
United States needs a long-term comprehensive plan to address
the terrorist threats in Pakistan. How is the implementation of
the President's strategy proceeding?
Two, there is a complex network of extremist groups
operating in the lawless regions near the Afghanistan-Pakistan
borders, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban,
al Qaeda, and other affiliated and sectarian groups. How should
policymakers prioritize which of these groups to target? Who is
reconcilable among them?
Three, since September 11, 2001, the United States has
allocated billions of dollars to non-military assistance
programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What should our goal
be for distribution of the Kerry-Lugar assistance? And what
should the delivery mechanisms be?
Four, what can our government do to address the problems
caused by anti-American sentiment in Pakistan? Does the current
humanitarian crisis present the United States with an
opportunity in this regard? What additional actions might
reverse widespread distrust of the United States among
Pakistanis?
Five, in the past the Pakistani Government and army have
undertaken only sporadic militarized efforts punctuated by
lulls when truce deals allowed the militants to regroup and
grow stronger. How should we assess what now appears to be a
fairly robust Pakistani effort to combat extremism inside their
country? Are current military operations a sign of meaningful
change in this pattern? We sure hope so.
And, six, some analysts argue that the Pakistani military
has been slow to reorient itself toward modern
counterinsurgency planning. How does this affect U.S. regional
interests? Has our military assistance to Pakistan sufficiently
bolstered that country's counterterrorism capabilities?
And, finally, what is the probability of al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive
material to create a dirty bomb? What is the possibility of an
insider threat at Pakistani nuclear facilities?
Today, with these questions in mind, I would like for us to
try to do the following: Assess the status of the
implementation of President Obama's new strategy toward
Pakistan; examine the complex set of threats from western
Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan; discuss the most effective
short-and long-term policy options regarding Pakistan; solicit
ideas about how Congress can play a more robust role in the
path forward, specifically in non-military assistance to
Pakistan.
If our national security is linked to the success, the
security, and the stability of a democratic Pakistan, we have
no choice but to engage in a smart, sustained, and long-term
partnership. The United States needs and is finally on the path
to achieving, a Pakistan-based policy as opposed to a leader-
or government-based policy.
Thanks again to our witnesses for taking this opportunity
to talk with us today about the nature of the challenges before
us and how best to address them.
Before I introduce our first witness, I am going to call on
my friend and colleague from Colorado, Senator Mark Udall.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK UDALL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF COLORADO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Carper, and good
afternoon to you, Mr. Jones, and to this very interested and
interesting audience, Mr. Chairman. I note a lot of young
people here interested in policymaking, and clearly they are
going to shoulder some of the challenges in the near and the
far term as we work in very difficult but important settings to
overcome the threat of extremism and violence and chaos.
I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member McCain for
inviting me to address the Subcommittee briefly today. I was
very honored to be a part of Chairman Carper's congressional
delegation trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have
memories and experiences that will stay with me forever.
I did want to share my impressions of the trip with you
here today and with the broader Congress. As the Chairman
mentioned, the purpose of our trip was to get an updated view
of the U.S. military and civilian operations, particularly
focusing on President Obama's new strategy, and we did get an
updated view. I came away believing we have a window of
opportunity to arrest deteriorating security conditions in both
countries and to work with the civilian governments in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve stability and security in
the region, which I really think is our goal.
Let me further add some specific ideas and impressions. I
think I will probably, for the most part, echo the Chairman's
comments, but perhaps I will also augment some of his insights.
In Pakistan, our strategic challenge is different than it
is in Afghanistan. We cannot allow extremists to destabilize
this nuclear armed state that has the world's second largest
Muslim population. By the estimation of many experts, the
possibility that Islamic radicals could destabilize and
undermine the Pakistani state has become, frankly, all too
real. But we do not have troops on the ground in Pakistan, nor
are Americans very popular. Mr. Chairman, a recent poll
indicates that the new Administration is no more popular than
the last, with 90 percent of the Pakistani population agreeing
that the United States is trying to weaken the Muslim world.
One difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan is that our
leverage is much less in Pakistan than it is in Afghanistan,
and, thus, our options are fewer. Yet there are a number of
steps we can and we should take to improve our relationship
with Pakistan, and in so doing, enhance our reputation and our
influence in this critical part of the world.
We can demonstrate an interest in a long-term strategic
partnership with Pakistan, a relationship that goes beyond
fighting a common enemy but assisting as well with police
reform and training and sustainable economic development. There
is no better demonstration of this than the recently passed
Kerry-Lugar bill, which will invest in non-military projects
that will directly benefit the Pakistani people and help
build--and rebuild, frankly--trust and cooperation. We heard
quite a bit about some of these opportunities from the business
community and other leaders in Pakistan.
We can also continue to provide accountable military
assistance--underlining ``accountable''--to ensure that
Pakistan's military and police have the training and the
equipment that they need. And we should encourage India-
Pakistan rapprochement both to demonstrate our commitment to
the region as well as to help the Pakistan people and
government focus on the real and imminent threats.
I was, in that regard, really encouraged to hear during our
visit that the Pakistani people, the government, the business
community, and the journalists we met with are very much
concerned with the growing insurgency on their western border
and less concerned than they have been about their eastern
border with India. There is a much larger recognition that
there is an existential threat posed by extremism to Pakistan
itself, not just to these ungoverned areas on the western edges
of Pakistan, and a sense that the civilian government really
has to reassert itself in this perilous environment. Pakistan's
recent military actions are an indication of this new
commitment.
Having said that, I still have concerns about the way
forward. I am concerned that the Pakistani army lacks the will
to sustain its fight against insurgents within its borders. The
army has driven the enemy out of Swat, but unless it protects
the area, the enemy could return for another day. It is not
enough to clear; the Pakistani army also needs to hold and
build. And I know Senator Carper and I are also very concerned
about the 2.5 million Pakistanis who have been forced to flee
their homes and the areas in which they live because of the
fighting.
Islamist groups are infiltrating the refugee camps, but at
this point, the authorities in Pakistan will not allow American
officials or planes to deliver aid because of anti-American
sentiment and security risks. Pakistani Lieutenant General
Ahmad, who heads up the Pakistani army's disaster management
group, has said that the United States is seen as part of the
problem. But if we cannot help deliver U.S. aid to the
refugees, as we did in the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, this is
a tremendous lost opportunity for us. We are essentially
competing with Islamist groups for the loyalty of these people,
and we are losing, despite contributing more than any other
country to the U.N. effort.
So let me close by saying I believe the President's
combined civil-military strategies are our best hope to turn
the tide in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we should not
overestimate our abilities to rebuild broken states and
transform entire regions of the world. Ensuring our security
here at home and serving our interests abroad means that we
need to be both tough and smart as we engage with our allies
and adversaries.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for letting me have a
chance to share my impressions in this important hearing. I am
scheduled to preside on the Senate floor in about 15 minutes,
but I am going to stay and listen to Mr. Jones before I am
required to leave.
One last comment. I see, again, so many young people here
who obviously are very interested in foreign policy and how to
build a tough and smart international security policy. I just
had a chance to reread a book entitled ``Three Cups of Tea,''
and I would recommend it to all of you here as one of the ways
forward. The author Greg Mortensen would be the first to tell
you that his programs and his successes in northern Pakistan
are not the only strategy that we ought to fund and implement.
But it is a fascinating account of how to build societies in
ways that let those societies then fend for themselves. So I
recommend ``Three Cups of Tea'' to everybody here and, of
course, to my fellow Senators as one of the ways forward.
Thank you again.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much. Thanks again for being
here today and for your comments. I think we are going to have
a partnership on these issues for a long time, and I look
forward to that.
Our first witness, panel one in its entirety, Paul Jones.
Mr. Jones serves as both Deputy Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asia at the U.S. Department of
State. That is quite a title. He is a career member of the
State Department's Senior Foreign Service, formerly served as
Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Manila,
Philippines; as a U.S. Representative to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Vienna, Austria; and as
Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Macedonia. While
working for the State Department, Mr. Jones was Director of the
Office of Central Europe, responsible for the U.S. policy in
the Balkans. There is a lot more I could add to that, but I am
going to stop right there so we will have an opportunity to
hear from you and our other witnesses today. We are honored and
thankful for your service and very much pleased that you could
be here today.
Thanks so much. Welcome. Please begin.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL W. JONES,\1\ DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you so much, and,
Senator Udall, a great honor to appear before both of you and
your Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the
opportunity.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jones appears in the Appendix on
page 51.
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I want to bring greetings from Ambassador Holbrooke who is
currently winding his way back from consultations in Egypt to
further our outreach to key countries for our strategy in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it is a great opportunity for us
to explain a little bit of the strategy and get into a
conversation, because we would really welcome your views. So I
will be quite brief in my opening statement, and I look forward
to your questions and your comments.
Secretary Clinton and Special Representative Holbrooke are
very much committed to working closely with Congress as we
implement the President's new strategy in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. We acknowledge and very much appreciate the deep
interest and firsthand experience among Members of your
Subcommittee.
Since January 20, Special Representative Holbrooke has
assembled a very diverse interagency team to implement this new
strategy, leveraging the expertise of representatives from nine
U.S. Government agencies as well as leading academics. Our
early efforts have supported Pakistani efforts to enhance
political and economic stability as well as Pakistani efforts
to roll back the Taliban threat and respond to the need of the
growing numbers of displaced persons.
More specifically, the United States has, over the past
couple of months, established regular cabinet- and summit-level
trilateral consultations to build trust and cooperation between
Afghan and Pakistani leaders. We have deepened relations with
leading Pakistani politicians across the political spectrum. We
have worked with Japan and Pakistan to organize a Pakistan
Donors Conference in Tokyo in April of this year, resulting in
$5.8 billion in pledges to assist Pakistan as it addresses
significant macroeconomic challenges.
We have helped rejuvenate Pakistan-Afghanistan transit
trade negotiations, which have the potential to enhance
economic opportunity in both countries. We have encouraged the
first direct contacts in the context of these trilateral
discussions between ministers of agriculture, interior, and
finance of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And we have provided
military assistance to support renewed Pakistani efforts to
defeat insurgents, and we have led the international effort to
mobilize relief for Pakistan's internally displaced persons.
At the same time, Pakistan itself has taken a number of
very important steps. Pakistan has resolved a political crisis
in mid-March, resulting in the reinstatement of the Pakistani
supreme court justice. Pakistan political leaders held an All-
Party Conference on May 19, which resulted in a declaration
supporting military action against insurgents and extremists.
Pakistan has conducted a sustained counterinsurgency operation
with wide public support, and it has assisted about 2 million
displaced persons under the civilian-military leadership of the
same Pakistani officer who directed Pakistan's effective
earthquake relief effort in 2005.
In the coming months, we plan to enhance our support for
Pakistani efforts to address significant economic and
governance challenges. We deeply applaud the Senate's unanimous
passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which
authorizes $1.5 billion per year in non-military assistance for
5 years. Final passage of this legislation will be a powerful
demonstration of our long-term commitment to helping the
Pakistani people and reinforce our desire for a long-term
partnership based on common interests.
It is vital that we help address the economic and social
conditions that extremists exploit in western Pakistan with
more and more consistent economic aid. Our assistance will
support Pakistani efforts to hold and build in western Pakistan
as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not
return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended.
But more than helping rebuild homes and businesses, we must
also enhance bilateral and regional trade potential by
encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors such as energy
and by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones to provide
incentives for investment in critical regions by offering duty-
free imports to certain products made in the border regions.
Legislation before the Senate today would establish
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in areas directly affected by
the fighting and would boost confidence in economic
opportunity, including for displaced persons who will be
returning. The President called for passage of this ROZ
legislation when he announced his new strategy on March 27, and
again during the trilateral summit meetings with Presidents
Zardari and Karzai on May 7. It is a critical aspect of our
strategy to bring economic opportunity to what would otherwise
be the heart of al Qaeda's safe haven, and it is vital for
protecting our national interests.
The challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are, of course,
very complex, and we cannot expect results overnight. Signaling
and demonstrating our long-term commitment to a true
partnership is essential for our success. The Administration is
committed to working closely with Members of this Subcommittee
and Congress generally on every aspect of implementing the
President's strategy.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity,
and I welcome your questions and your comments.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much for that statement and
for the responses that we are about to receive.
If you could just summarize for us briefly the
Administration's changes in strategy for Pakistan. Just go back
several months, rewind and pick it up right there.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are several
aspects that I would highlight. One is the level of political
engagement. We are presented with an opportunity of a new
civilian democratically elected government in Pakistan, and as
the Administration came in, very quickly we moved to engage the
entire spectrum of civilian political leadership in addition to
our ongoing conversations with the security sector and other
sectors of society at both the summit and the cabinet level,
and we have had a tremendous response from the Cabinet of the
U.S. Government who are directly engaged with their
counterparts in Pakistan and Afghanistan to raise the level of
our dialogue.
We have also put forward a plan and we are detailing it now
in a series of assessments for how we would increase quite
significantly our economic assistance to Pakistan, focusing
more on people-to-people exchanges and efforts that have a real
impact immediately for people on the ground.
In particular, some things have changed since the strategy.
Obviously, the development of the insurgency and the quite
dramatic change, as you have highlighted, Mr. Chairman, in
public opinion led to other challenges and opportunities that
we have responded very quickly to in terms of assisting with
displaced persons. But I would generally say that we are
looking at increasing our engagement both in terms of
assistance and in political activities, and also, as I had
mentioned when speaking about Ambassador Holbrooke's travel, we
are engaging at very serious and high levels with all of the
many countries who have relationships and interests in Pakistan
and Afghanistan in order to get us all sort of on the same page
politically speaking; and complementing that, we are engaging
in a new effort to try to raise the level of our donor
coordination for these countries so that we can make better use
of all international donor assistance.
Senator Carper. When we were in Pakistan, I was struck--
even now--at the enduring distrust and concern that the
Pakistani political leaders and military leaders still view
India with. They have had a change of leadership in India as
you know, maybe the strongest central government they have had
there in a long time, and it seems to me and to those of us who
were on our delegation trip that this was maybe a unique
opportunity--hopefully not the only opportunity--for some kind
of rapprochement between Pakistan and India, a chance to begin
to ratchet down levels of distrust, to be able to refocus
Pakistani military preparedness not on their eastern borders,
but where the real problems lie with respect to the insurgency
groups that are in the western part of the country.
I was struck by the apparent reluctance of the Pakistani
Government and military leaders to accept our help, direct or
indirect, even with respect to helicopters and the need for
mobility to go after the bad guys in the northwestern parts of
the country. They have in Pakistan only a handful of
helicopters that apparently are operable. I do not know if they
are willing to accept more helicopters from us. I do not know
if they are even willing to accept our support for parts and
for training their maintainers to be able to extend more
effectively their counterinsurgency operations.
But we have been presented--and I think the Pakistani
people have been presented--with a great opportunity here given
the fact that the Taliban overplayed their hand in Pakistan,
there has been a sort of uprising, popular uprising that has
led to the military taking a very strong role and I think a
very successful role thus far.
But when you look at what we are trying to do to further
bolster the Pakistani military hand in going after the bad
guys, a real help here could be to go after once and for all
this distrust--more than distrust between Pakistan and India,
but this long-time focus almost to the exclusion of everything
else on India. How do we move into this situation? If we cannot
convince them to take our helicopters or our aid in making sure
that the half-dozen or dozen helicopters they have will work,
what can we do on the positive side with respect to ratcheting
down the tension between Pakistan and India? Just lay that out
for us if you would. Because to the extent that they spend less
money and less time thinking about India and having to worry
about that flank, that gives them more time and more resources
to go after the people they really need to be going after.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I need to
state clearly for the record that Ambassador Holbrooke's
mandate is for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we treat India,
which has been very interested in--obviously, as a major
neighbor, has invited Ambassador Holbrooke to visit on each
occasion that he has been in the region and continues to be
very interested in the implementation of our strategy. But he
does not have a specific mandate for the relationship between
Pakistan and India. That is handled in other parts of our State
Department.
I think, as you suggest, there clearly is some recognition
in the governments that they would like to open up more
dialogue. There was a meeting recently between President
Zardari and Prime Minister Singh.
Senator Carper. Where did that occur? And I think there may
be another opportunity down the road.
Mr. Jones. Yes, that was in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on the
margins of dual meetings. There was a summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and what is called the BRIC--Brazil,
Russia, India, China. There was a summit meeting there that
presented an opportunity.
I would like to comment about the other elements of your
question. Clearly, Pakistan has laid out some very clear red
lines in terms of the assistance that it would like to accept,
and I think this goes to the heart of what you were discussing
in terms of the distrust that has a lot of historical baggage
in our relationship. But Pakistan actually has been welcoming
helicopters and other hardware to support the counterinsurgency
operations--we have made a huge priority in this Administration
to support that request. We have delivered four MI-17
helicopters to Pakistan just in the last few weeks. We have two
more coming, I believe later this month, and a couple more
behind that. It is not a helicopter that we use or stock, so it
is not so easy to go around and try to identify and find the
helicopters to assist Pakistan with. We have also gone out to
countries around the world to see who else could help with
helicopters that are in their inventory, and there are other
ongoing efforts in that regard.
But I think what we will see is, as we are able to
demonstrate both in terms of our response to the humanitarian
crisis and the assistance that Pakistan is open to receiving
our consistency and commitment to supporting their efforts, I
think we will see gradually greater openness, and that is, I
think, how we overcome the distrust. But that will not be a
short-term process, but it is an important one that we are
embarked on. And I think really a key to this is the
legislation that we have discussed, the commitment of not just
$1.5 billion per year, but over a 5-year period of assistance,
that I think will allay a lot of the concerns in the political
class in Pakistan that we are there for short-term benefits
rather than a long-term partnership.
Senator Carper. Well, I do not mean to be critical of the
priorities that the Pakistanis are setting for their own
military. Just look at our own. We are going to be debating in
the next week or two on the Senate floor the defense
authorization bill, and we are going to be trying to determine
whether or not if we are going to continue to buy weapons
systems, build weapons systems, very expensive weapons systems,
to fight last decade's wars instead of spending monies to fight
this decade's and next decade's more likely
counterinsurgencies.
The F-22 is a perfectly good aircraft. We have been
building them for years, flying them for years. I do not
believe we have ever used one in combat. Now we are faced with
a question of continuing to build more of them. We will see
where that ends. But I am encouraged to hear that there is
willingness to accept some helicopters, and maybe the
willingness of some other countries to provide that kind of
mobility.
We are putting, as you know, 17,000 additional Marines and
Army troops into Afghanistan. They will be aided by 150
helicopters to go after the bad guys, especially in the
southern part of that country. I think there are four new
helicopters. That is good. Two more after that. Well, that is
good as well. A hundred and fifty in Afghanistan just to help
the 17,000 men and women that we are putting into that country.
One last thing before I move off of this. We met at a
wonderful lunch, and I think it was hosted by the governor of
Lahore, and I recall sitting at a table with the former Foreign
Minister from Pakistan, and he talked to us about back-channel
negotiations with the Indians over a decade ago which he
thought led very closely to some kind of rapprochement between
Pakistan and India. We have learned of a similar kind of
initiative maybe 2 or 3 years ago in that country--the same,
again, trying to find some meeting of the minds between
Pakistan and India. I would just urge us to use whatever
influence that we have, direct or indirect, to move that along.
I think it was in April 2008, GAO reported that the United
States lacked the comprehensive plan encompassing all elements
of national power. What progress has been made in developing
such a plan for addressing the situation in Pakistan? How well
are the various agencies coordinating their efforts in
developing a comprehensive plan? And what interagency
agreements, if any, have been reached?
Mr. Jones. Thank you. I think to start with one element,
Ambassador Holbrooke's team is, as I said, located in the State
Department, but consists of representatives of nine U.S.
Government agencies detailed out, selected by the member of
Cabinet--the head of agency to represent in Ambassador
Holbrooke's office. So we are not conducting this operation by
an interagency committee but actually have a whole-of-
government approach nested under Ambassador Holbrooke to whom
President Obama entrusted the implementation of the civilian
aspect of the plan.
In addition to that quite remarkable--in my experience, the
first in my 23 years with the government--experience of such an
interagency operation, we have a tremendous level of
interagency coordination and cooperation. We have instituted a
weekly meeting that we just had last night--it goes on for
about an hour and a half--where Ambassador Holbrooke and
General Lute from the National Security Council (NSC) chair--
and I co-chair in Ambassador Holbrooke's absence--of very
senior members from a remarkable number of agencies, much more
than the nine represented on our team, with a very open and
quite remarkably free-flowing conversation.
We discuss, for example, as just referenced, the visit of
Secretary Napolitano, and the points that she was planning to
make, we were talking about them in terms of how do we add into
her points, how do we reinforce the message there, how do we
make it part of our broader context. So there is that going on,
which I think is really quite a remarkable effort, in my
experience.
Then, finally, I would note the civ-mil coordination.
General Petraeus, entrusted with implementing the military
aspects of the President's strategy, is in constant touch with
our team, with Ambassador Holbrooke, and members of his team
are in touch with ours. And our embassies, our missions in both
countries are developing civ-mil implementation plans for the
strategy that are quite detailed and expensive and bring in at
the post level in our missions out there all the agencies
required.
So I submit that it is quite a remarkably successful
interagency effort going on now, and I think we are drawing
on--to cite one example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is
putting forth a remarkable increase in the number of people out
in Afghanistan and looking at a strategy for Pakistan because
these are two countries that depend hugely on agriculture. So
we are bringing in agencies that were not so directly involved
before and marrying them up with the agencies that we are----
Senator Carper. Good. One last question, and then I am
going to recognize Senator Akaka and then Senator Levin, and
welcome to you both, gentlemen. Thank you both for joining us.
I think it was Einstein who said in adversity lies
opportunity. We have got the Pakistani military going after
Taliban and other extremist militant outfits in the western
part of the country. That is the good news. The bad news is we
have seen a couple million people displaced from their homes. I
am impressed by how many of those displaced people are
literally taken into people's homes, as opposed to shuttling
them off into refugee camps.
But there is a great opportunity for us to help relocate
from the Swat Valley and other places where people have been
displaced, helping people get back to their homes, rebuild
their homes, their communities, and get their lives back to
something close to normal.
I understand that there is a reluctance for the Pakistani
Government to even accept U.S. aid that is clearly identified
as from the United States; perhaps we need to work maybe
through nongovernmental entities, NGOs, to provide that
assistance.
But having said that, to the extent that the Pakistani
military has driven out the bad guys and gotten them on the
run--we have a lot of people displaced--to the extent that we
can go in and be seen, directly or indirectly, as helping to
improve that situation, it is a great plus for us and obviously
a great plus for the Pakistani people.
Your thoughts, please? How is it going? What are we doing?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Senator Carper. How successful are we being?
Mr. Jones. Normally, in such humanitarian situations, most
of our aid does go through the United Nations and
nongovernmental organizations, and in this case it is no
different. So we have pledged a total of $381 million,
disbursed currently a little over $160 million, to assist the
displaced people, some 2 million people.
I think it is quite well known and recognized in Pakistan
that we are the leader in that effort. You are quite right,
some of these areas, in contrast to the earthquake situation,
are still not secure. It is not a very safe situation for us to
send out American personnel much beyond Peshawar. In fact,
there are quite a number of threats right now. So we are
somewhat limited by other factors as well.
The Pakistani Government has said that they want to pay for
the side that is their responsibility and, in fact, have
disbursed an equivalent of about $380 per family to the
displaced people so that they would have the opportunity on
their own to live outside of their homes.
As you mentioned, some 80-, 90-plus percent are living in
people's homes, so it is not always the easiest place to access
people. It is much better in homes, but there are fewer central
points to provide assistance. But we believe the U.N. and NGOs
have really spread out their assistance in a way that is
helpful.
I would say that, as you suggest, we do want the people of
Pakistan to know that America is assisting. We also want the
people of Pakistan to know that their own government is
assisting. And I think that is coming across quite clearly and
is a very important effort to counter the attempts by
extremists to influence displaced persons. It is very important
for the displaced persons to see that their own government is
actually providing assistance. And I think that is in one
respect why Pakistan is possessive about that effort, and they
are doing, by all accounts, quite well at it.
I was just speaking to a member of our team who recently
came back from Pakistan who said, in contrast--because this
gentleman served in Pakistan a couple of years ago. He said you
just flip through the channels on TV or you hear of what people
are talking about on the radio and we see it in the print
media, and you see both public service ads and editorials that
very much praise the role of the Pakistani military and the
Pakistani Government in responding to this situation, the
military in terms of the offensive against the insurgents and
the government in terms of the assistance to people. And that I
would say is also very important because that is what is going
to keep people from being influenced by extremists who are
seeking to take advantage of vulnerable people who are
displaced. So we are very pleased with that.
You are right. It is also important for people to see the
American Government as playing its appropriate role in
assisting, and I think that is coming along. But I think it is
also important, as I say, that the Pakistani Government is
rightly seen as being helpful to the citizens.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Senator Akaka, welcome. If you would like
to make an opening statement, feel free. Senator Akaka, thank
you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for holding this hearing. The implementation of an
effective policy toward Pakistan is a very significant and
important national security priority.
I just want to mention that there are two issues in
particular that I want to highlight.
First, if we pursue an engagement strategy with Pakistan to
reduce the threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, we
must be prepared for a long-term commitment. I am pleased that
President Obama supports efforts to strengthen Pakistan's civil
institutions and security. These efforts will help address the
short-term and the long-term challenges facing Pakistan.
Second, the United States should forge lasting,
international partnerships to bring security and prosperity to
both Pakistan and Afghanistan. We must listen to the needs of
our partners as we define and refine the implementation of our
strategies. History has shown us that nations working toward
the same goals in a well-coordinated manner bring a greater
likelihood of success.
I am keenly interested in Pakistan. For me, it goes back to
the year 2000 when I visited Pakistan, and at that time
President Musharraf was in charge there. It started for me a
good relationship with Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, this is my opening statement.
Senator Carper. Fair enough. Would you like to go ahead and
ask some questions?
Senator Akaka. Yes. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jones, Mr. Fick's written testimony--he is the CEO from
the Center for a New American Security--states that the costs
of the unmanned aerial vehicle air strikes inside Pakistan
outweigh the benefits and these air strikes are, on balance,
harmful to the U.S. and allied interests.
What is your view on this issue? And, what steps should the
United States take to reduce the potential loss of good will in
Pakistan and Afghanistan if these air strikes continue?
Mr. Jones. Senator, thank you so much. Thank you for the
question. I would have to say on that particular subject I
would need to defer speaking about that in any specific sense
for a closed session, if you would understand that. I would say
that a very important part of our strategy is to, with
strategic communications, influence information as it is termed
in various aspects.
I think that in that area overall we are making some
progress. We have plans to increase quite significantly our
assistance to Pakistan in terms of helping it get its own
information and its own information out in the tribal areas and
among displaced persons, and we are working closely with
international organizations and with the Government of Pakistan
to try to help do that through various means of assistance in
procuring local radios and helping with Pakistan public service
announcements, things that will help people understand what
actually are the goals of the Pakistani Government and the
international community and how they are helping the country of
Pakistan.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Jones, in the President's strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, he stated that the United States will
set clear metrics to measure progress and be accountable. I
agree that metrics are important and that we need to focus on
measuring effectiveness and not just effort. How are these
metrics being designed and implemented?
Mr. Jones. Yes, thank you for that. We have been working
hard on metrics so I appreciate the question, Senator.
There are a couple of different levels of metrics,
obviously. One, as I was mentioning just a little bit earlier,
both in Pakistan and Afghanistan our embassy and our military
counterparts are developing implementation plans at the field
level, and embedded in those plans will be specific metrics
that we will be able to assess how we are doing in implementing
our plans.
Then at the higher level, at the strategic level here in
Washington, the National Security Council is taking the lead in
pulling together the higher-order metrics that we will measure
against on a regular basis and report both to the Executive
Branch and to Congress on how we are doing against those
metrics. Our effort is to try to focus on metrics that there
are metrics that measure inputs, metrics that measure outputs,
and metrics that measure actual effects on the ground. We want
to focus on the latter, recognizing that we need a certain mix
of those three metrics because the effects on the ground are
usually somewhat delayed from the inputs, and so you want to
see that the activities that we have pledged to undertake are
actually happening, that there is some output from it, and then
there is effect on the ground.
So we are heavily engaged in that process, and I think
pretty shortly we will be able to come to Congress and explain
the metrics that we have devised. We welcome input, and I think
there has been quite a number of consultations at the staff
level on what sort of metrics would be most useful. And we have
also received that feedback in terms of appropriations
legislation.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Jones, in the President's strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, he articulated his goal: To disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and
to prevent their return to either country in the future. A
primary focus on al Qaeda, of course, makes sense. Are there
any other significant organizations that may negatively impact
regional or international security that must also be
considered?
Mr. Jones. Yes, Senator, there certainly are, and the
organizations that have in the past and currently aid and abet
al Qaeda, such as the Taliban, are of great concern to us,
organizations such as LeT and others that have been engaged in
terrorist operations that are on sanctions lists. There is a
variety of opinion about to what extent some of these
organizations coordinate and cooperate, but I think it is safe
to say that there is the--as long as you have organizations
that are inclined toward extremism and terrorist acts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, that increases the vulnerability to
cooperation with al Qaeda and organizations that actually have
the ability to and the intent to inflict harm on the United
States, on our allies and our interests.
And that is clearly what we see currently as the threat in
this region, and so we take a broader view than just al Qaeda,
as you mentioned, Senator.
Senator Akaka. The President's strategy states that the
United States must pursue constructive diplomacy with both
India and Pakistan. This is an important issue considering the
historic tensions between these two countries.
What is the strategy for pursuing constructive diplomacy
between these two countries? What steps already have been made?
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Senator. We are very encouraged to
see some of the steps that have been taking place on their own
between India and Pakistan. There has been the recent meetings
we were discussing just a short while ago between the leaders
of those two countries in Russia on the margins of a summit,
and the possibility of future such meetings appears, according
to their statements and according to their stated interests, in
improving their relationship.
Under Special Representative Holbrooke's office, our
primary responsibility is implementing the President's strategy
in Afghanistan and Pakistan and working with all the countries
and neighbors that have an impact on that. Obviously, India is
a very important neighbor, and the Indians have specifically
requested Ambassador Holbrooke to stay in very close contact
and to visit New Delhi whenever he can on his trips out to the
region. So we are in very close contact. The Indians are
obviously also a significant donor in Afghanistan, major
players in the region.
I think what is most encouraging is seeing the interest on
both these countries, India and Pakistan, to improve their
relationship.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Senator Carper. Senator Akaka, thank you very much again
for joining us, for your statement, for your questions, and
your interest in this issue.
I am delighted that the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee is here. Senator Levin, please proceed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
holding this hearing. It is a very important subject, and it
needs a great deal of attention.
It has been my concern for a long time that unless
Pakistan's leaders, both civilian and military, commit in deeds
and words to eliminating the threat from militant extremists
and make clear that they are doing so for the sake of their
country's own security interests and not for the sake of the
United States, then no amount of assistance will be effective.
I raised this point directly with Pakistan President Zardari
when he was in Washington in May. If Pakistan makes the fight
against extremists their own fight, then we ought to be willing
to help Pakistan achieve a more stable and secure future. But
we cannot buy their support for our cause, or appear to do so,
since that would only play into the hands of their and our
enemy.
Now, in the last few weeks, Pakistan's military operations
in the North-West Frontier Province and more recently in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), suggests that the
Pakistan Government may now recognize that the terrorist threat
posed by extremist groups in the western border region is an
existential threat and must be confronted.
Yesterday, it was reported that President Zardari said he
wants to create a ``Pakistan where militancy is defeated,'' and
Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Kayani was quoted as
saying that ``the immediate internal threat'' of Taliban
extremism was greater than any external threat, which was
understood to be a reference to India.
Where do they make these statements? The interview
yesterday, with the the President of Pakistan, was in the
London Daily Telegraph. Is he making the same statements to the
Pakistan public? Do you know, Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. Senator, thank you. I do not know specifically
if he is saying those words. I would note that there has been,
as I am sure you have noted, quite a change in the whole
political dialogue in Pakistan among the leaders and among the
media that have changed quite considerably to recognize the
Taliban as an enormous threat.
Senator Levin. Is that well known to the Pakistani public
that their government considers the Taliban the major threat to
their existence?
Mr. Jones. According to the polling that I have seen--and I
have not seen anything very authoritative--there has been a
remarkable shift in public perception of the Taliban as being a
threat to their government and society, to the order of 30
percent to 80 percent. I have had, as I am sure you have, the
experience of meeting with quite a number of Pakistanis out in
Islamabad who are really quite scared for the future of their
country. And as I understand it, that certainly would not have
been the case a year or more ago.
So I think there has been quite a dramatic turnaround. It
is an iterative process. I do not think we can say that has
turned the corner, but it is something that I think we have a
great interest in encouraging what we would say is the correct
analysis of their national security interests.
Senator Levin. Would you agree that unless they make it
clear that is their view, not something that we are imposing or
buying from them, that it is not going to be effective?
Mr. Jones. I completely agree, yes.
Senator Levin. Does the Government of Pakistan have any
intention of confronting the Afghan Taliban in Baluchistan to
deny them safe haven and prevent cross-border attacks against
U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan?
Mr. Jones. Senator, the history and relationships along the
border area are remarkably complex with a lot of historical
baggage, and I think what we have seen is the government and
the army of Pakistan taking some significant steps against the
Pakistani Taliban. I think it is in our interest to encourage
those steps and look toward widening the aperture so that the
activities go much broader to all the various extremist groups
that threaten Pakistan in the region.
So I think we are headed in the right direction. It is
going to take some time to overcome some of the history and
relationships that have developed since the time of the Soviet
invasion.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether the Government of
Pakistan has sought to prevent the Afghan Taliban leadership or
the Shura from meeting openly in Quetta, Pakistan?
Mr. Jones. I think in order to fully address your question,
we would have to--I would want to go into a closed session to
talk about what we know and on what basis. But as I say, I
think the important statement to make in this setting is that
we think that there are opportunities here that are being
recognized in Pakistan. As you say, the most important part is
what is being recognized there, but that we can encourage.
Senator Levin. Are you familiar with a group that is, I
think, called the ``Nazir Group in South Waziristan?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Senator Levin. Is it true that the Pakistan military
considers them as a good group of Taliban? And do we? They have
a goal of attacking us in Afghanistan, us and NATO. I am just
wondering whether or not--what our attitude is towards that
group, and what is the Pakistan Government's attitude towards
the Nazir Group?
Mr. Jones. Yes. Obviously, Senator, we place an extremely
high priority on working with Pakistan against groups that pose
a direct threat to our troops, and there are quite a number of
individual clans, groups, offshoots, in that region who do pose
such a threat.
The complexity of the relationships and the historical
approach that Pakistan has taken to this region lead to
shifting alliances, shifting attitudes. So if the Pakistan
Government is going after, for example, in one moment Baitullah
Mehsud, one individual organization that is credited with the
assassination of Prime Minister Bhutto, at that moment they may
cooperate with other groups that would also be encouraged to go
after that particular organization, while at other moments they
may shift to another approach.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether or not--and I will
conclude; my time is up. But just on the same subject, do you
know whether the Pakistan military, both at this moment but
also in the recent past, considers that group, the Nazir Group
in South Waziristan, as a friendly, good group of Taliban?
Mr. Jones. I do not know that.
Senator Levin. OK. Fair enough. Thank you.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Senator Levin, thank you very much for
being here and for all those questions.
Senator Burris has joined us from the State of Illinois. It
is great to see you, and thank you so much for being a part of
this hearing. Senator Burris, you are recognized. If you would
like to make a brief opening statement, feel free, and then you
will have time for a number of questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
interested in the situation and came more to listen to the
testimony than to raise what I think would be some difficult
questions. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Thanks so much for being a part of this.
Let me come back to you with a couple more questions, Mr.
Jones, and if any of my other colleagues have them, fine, and
after that you are done. But thanks for your presence here.
I remember, I think it was December 2007, being in Iowa. I
was there during the run-up to the Iowa caucuses. I was there
with the senior Senator from Delaware, who was running for
President at the time. And I was with him the morning when
former Prime Minister Bhutto was assassinated. I remember being
with him at a press conference, a hastily called press
conference, I believe in Des Moines. And I remember the words
that he said that day. Among other things he said that what we
need in Pakistan is not a Musharraf policy, we need a Pakistan
policy.
And what I think I heard you describing earlier today when
you talked about the interagency cooperation on our side, I
thought you mentioned that you co-chair this working group, and
one of the other co-chairs you mentioned is a military leader,
and certainly when Ambassador Holbrooke is not there, I think
you fill in for him.
That sounds to me a lot more like a Pakistan policy than a
Musharraf policy.
Mr. Jones. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more, and
as mentioned earlier, I think Congress plays an incredibly
important role in that in the legislation and the attention
that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives have
paid to broadening our engagement. And I think now when we
visit Pakistan, we are engaging with the entire political
spectrum, and also looking, as I referred to earlier, to deepen
our engagement with the Pakistani people.
We had in a recent congressional delegation--the mayor of
Karachi came up.
Senator Carper. It was ours.
Mr. Jones. Yes, it was yours--came up from Karachi, the
head of the MQM party. Another great opportunity to engage
across the political spectrum with leaders of Pakistan, which
makes a more firm basis of a policy. And I think when you look
at the different levels of support within Pakistan for their
different leaders, obviously, as in ours, it is dynamic, it
shifts, and it is to our benefit to really make our engagement
as broad as possible.
Senator Carper. The last issue I want to discuss is, if you
will, the safeguarding of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is a
matter on which they certainly have a lot of interest, a lot at
stake, and as it turns out, so does the rest of the world.
Where does the United States rank the issue of the security of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal given the numerous priorities that
we have in Pakistan? And what is the probability of militants
inserting sympathizers into Pakistan's laboratories or fuel
production facilities?
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say just in a
very general sense that, obviously, that is among our very top
priorities, and we have within the U.S. Government and within
the State Department people dedicated who are following that
problem and working on it, following that issue very closely.
We obviously pay attention to that on Ambassador Holbrooke's
team and work closely with other personnel in the State
Department and other agencies following that.
I think overall I can say that we have confidence that the
nuclear weapons of Pakistan are being safeguarded by the
Pakistani authorities. To go into more detail, I think we would
want to bring the people who are particular experts on that
into a closed session, but I completely agree with the level of
interest and appreciate the question.
Senator Carper. What has been the level of cooperation
between U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani
Government to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S.
funds?
Mr. Jones. The relationship between the Pakistani
Government?
Senator Carper. Not with respect to nuclear weapons.
Mr. Jones. Right.
Senator Carper. Just talk to us about the level of
cooperation between our U.S. agencies and their counterparts in
the Pakistani Government to ensure oversight and accountability
over U.S. funds.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Senator Carper. We want to know how our funds are being
spent.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Senator Carper. And I am not sure that other countries to
whom we provide aid or assistance are all that interested in
allowing us, through transparency, to actually know how the
money is being spent.
Mr. Jones. Yes. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Chairman,
in addition to the historical inconsistency in our levels of
assistance, we have also shifted back and forth with the way we
have delivered assistance in Pakistan. We had previously
offered quite a great deal of budget support. We went through a
period not too long ago of actually breaking that down into
projects, projectizing the budget support, which allowed us to
have greater oversight and a greater window of visibility into
exactly how funds are being spent.
What we are doing now is we are going to quite
significantly increase the number of USAID direct hire
personnel in Pakistan, consonant with the planned increases in
economic assistance. But that, we believe, will give us a
greater level of oversight into the assistance that we provide.
We have some issues that are--we feel we have good
cooperation from the government, but in any situation where one
is providing assistance, we have to have internal controls. And
we have a great deal of interest from the Inspector General of
USAID and the State Department and DOD in following exactly
that question.
We also have some restrictions in terms of our ability to
physically get out in some insecure areas where we particularly
want to target our assistance. But we have tried to overcome
that by sort of a tiered approach of having local nationals who
work for us, having a number of different windows into how the
money is being spent, and getting photographic and other
evidence that the projects that we have supported are actually
coming to fruition. So it is a complex environment, but it is
one that we follow very closely.
I would simply add that another element of the
Administration's strategy is to try to reduce the large
contracts, break them down into smaller units that can be
monitored more effectively on a short-term basis and have more
direct effect, whether it is implemented through government
agencies or civil society and NGOs.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I know you have indicated that the question
of drone attacks, UAV attacks--much of which can only be dealt
with in a classified setting. But something which has been in a
very unclassified setting has been the attacks on us for those
attacks that the Pakistani leaders have engaged in. And I do
not doubt for one minute that they are aware of the fact that
we are going to be using these attacks against targets. And yet
when they attack us publicly for doing what I believe is
obvious, they are very well aware of and support, what it does
is make our situation a lot worse in Pakistan in terms of the
Pakistani public view of the United States. And we can have all
the humanitarian assistance in the world, hope that the
Pakistani people understand the source of it, and that is fine,
providing we are effective in that effort. But it just wipes
out a lot of the value of that if the Pakistani leaders are
publicly attacking us.
I am just wondering whether or not we have raised this
issue with the Pakistani leaders. They do not want us to use
UAVs, tell us privately we are not going to be using UAVs in
Pakistan if they oppose it. But for them to look the other way
or to give us the green light privately and then to attack us
publicly leaves us, it seems to me, at a very severe
disadvantage and loss with the Pakistani people.
I am wondering what your thoughts are on that.
Mr. Jones. Thank you. I appreciate the comment, Senator. We
have those discussions with the leadership in Pakistan because
the Pakistani leadership raises those issues directly with us.
And I think it strengthens our hand to be able to refer to the
comments that you just made and have made on other occasions,
Members of Congress have made on other occasions to have those
conversations in ways that will benefit both our countries. So
I will take that comment, if I could, sir, and relay it to
Ambassador Holbrooke, and we will factor that----
Senator Levin. I have already relayed it to Ambassador
Holbrooke. My question is whether he has relayed it to them.
Mr. Jones. Well, as I say, during the meetings that I have
been in in Pakistan, the subject certainly comes up, and there
is quite a wide-ranging discussion on it.
Senator Levin. Well, I have got to tell you, if they do not
want us to do this, they should flat out tell us privately. Do
not look the other way and then attack us publicly. It is
wrong. It is not just wrong morally. Put aside that. It is
wrong in terms of American security for us to be attacked by
Pakistani leaders for doing something which they quite
obviously know we are going to do and support, either
implicitly or privately, explicitly. That affects my view, I
have got to tell you, on the kind of support that we ought to
provide to Pakistan because one of the reasons for that support
is that hopefully the view of the Pakistani people of our
motive will be improved if they see we care about their
economic situation. But that is just wiped out if their leaders
are blaming us for the loss of civilian life inside Pakistan.
These are very difficult issues. I know they are. And they
ought to be limited, if not eliminated, these UAV attacks. They
surely should be limited and handled with incredible care, if
they are going to be used at all. But it is unacceptable to me
to be pilloried by the Pakistani leaders, criticized in their
public for carrying out these attacks. And I just want to let
you know, and you can let them know, if you want. That approach
of theirs affects the view of this Senator in terms of the kind
of support which I am willing to vote for.
Mr. Jones. We certainly will let them know that. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Thanks.
Senator Carper. Just a quick comment. We had rather
extensive discussions 4 or 5 or 6 weeks ago when we were there
on this subject and highly classified briefings as well. One
thing I think we can all agree on is that to the extent that
there are drones or pilotless aircraft used in these attacks,
it is imperative that we minimize as greatly as we can any
civilian casualties.
A second thing, it appears to me that if we had better
intelligence--and as you know, we try to use electronic
intelligence, we try to use human intelligence to be able to
verify where the most highly dangerous of insurgents are
located, where they are operating, where they might be
gathered. To the extent that we can be provided more accurate
information and more timely information through the Pakistani
intelligence services themselves, we can, I think,
significantly reduce the potential that people, civilians, are
going to be harmed in those attacks.
Senator Levin. I agree.
Senator Carper. Senator Burris, any closing comments here
before we excuse our witness?
Senator Burris. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Just one thought.
Senator Carper. Please.
Senator Burris. It is not a question. It is just a concern
in terms of what the Taliban are doing: That is, surrounding
themselves with civilians, and that makes our task even more
difficult when the evidence shows, Mr. Jones, that this does
take place, where Taliban forces will be in homes or villages
and launch their activities from those sources where there are
civilians. And it makes our job that much harder, and then we
end up launching a drone or a missile, and 18 or 19 civilians
are killed, and then we are the bad guys. So in some way, we
have to try to solve that situation.
Senator Carper. I could not agree more.
Mr. Jones, I was meeting with some folks in Delaware the
other day, and as we were ending our meeting, this fellow said
to me, well, I would not be doing my job if I did not give you
my final order--not a direct but an actual request for what we
might do in the Congress to address the concerns that were
raised at our visit.
I am going to give you an opportunity to close it out here
from your panel. What do you need from us? Not just this
Subcommittee or not just this Committee, but what do you need
from the Congress particularly with respect to Pakistan? We
will not get into Afghanistan. What do you need from us?
Mr. Jones. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just
say before commenting on that, I am really heartened and
encouraged that I think we are in complete agreement between
the Executive and Legislative Branches, as discussed in this
hearing, with the goals of our policy, and we are really
committed to working together with you to achieve them.
The support has been tremendous. I think enactment of what
is known as the Kerry-Lugar legislation in the Senate and the
Berman bill on the House side would be very important. I think
that is critically important to conveying the kind of strategy
that you enunciated.
Obviously, passing the President's request for the 2010
budget--it contains significant assistance that we need to
incorporate into our strategy.
And then, finally, as I mentioned, the Reconstruction
Opportunity Zone legislation, which is attached to the House
version, to the Berman legislation. Obviously, there are other
vehicles, but we think that is something that really carries a
lot of resonance in Pakistan, and it is particularly targeted
at the border areas and would encourage confidence, would
encourage some economic activity that we think would show
people that it is not only about assistance but it is about
opening up what for us is a very small opportunity of duty-free
trade for the Pakistanis, a very big symbol, and we think it
would help our mutual efforts.
So I really appreciate this opportunity and look forward to
being in close contact with you, Mr. Chairman, and your
Subcommittee.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you so much. Thank you for
joining us and for your efforts. And you are excused.
We would like to invite the second panel to join us at this
time, please. Thank you.
Mr. Jones. Thank you again.
Senator Carper. As our second panel is joining us at the
table, I am going to go ahead and begin some introductions of
our panelists.
I will start off with Lisa Curtis. Lisa Curtis is a Senior
Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation where she focuses
primarily on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It is a great
portfolio for this panel. From 2001 to 2003, she served as a
Senior Adviser in the State Department's South Asia Bureau,
where she advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistan
relations. In the late 1990s, Ms. Curtis served in the CIA as a
political analyst on South Asia. She also served as a political
officer to U.S. embassies in Islamabad and in New Delhi from
1994 to 1998, and during her tour in Islamabad, she earned a
Meritorious Honor Award from the State Department for
contributions to a year-long four-nation endeavor to free
hostages held by militants in Kashmir.
Next, welcome to Nicholas Schmidle. Mr. Schmidle is a
Fellow at the New America Foundation. He is the author of ``To
Live or To Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years Inside of
Pakistan,'' which just came out, I am told, in May, about 2
months ago. My staff has read it and highly recommends it to
me. I understand that you regularly contribute to the New York
Times Magazine, to Slate, to the New Republic, the Washington
Post, the Virginia Quarterly, and many other publications. In
2008, I am told Mr. Schmidle received the Kurt Schork Award for
freelance journalism based on his reporting in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, where he lived throughout 2006 and 2007 as a Fellow
of the Institute of Current World Affairs.
Next is Shuja Nawaz. Mr. Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, was
named the first Director of the South Asia Center at the
Atlantic Council in Washington this past January. Mr. Nawaz has
contributed his experience to RAND, the United States Institute
of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
the Atlantic Council, and other leading think tanks. While
attending Gordon College, he was named the Cabot Fellow and won
the Henry Taylor International Correspondent Award. His latest
two books are ``Crossed Swords: Pakistan and Its Army, and the
Wars Within'' and ``FATA--A Most Dangerous Place.''
Next, Nathaniel ``Nate'' Fick. Mr. Fick was named Chief
Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security
about a week ago. Congratulations. Before joining the Center
for a New American Security, Mr. Fick served as a Marine Corps
infantry officer--Semper Fi--leading a reconnaissance unit
during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I understand you are the
author of the 2005 New York Times best-seller entitled ``One
Bullet Away.'' The Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Central Command has made your book required reading for
officers deploying to Afghanistan and to Iraq. Mr. Fick,
previously an on-air national security consultant to CBS News,
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the
International Institute for Strategic Studies. I understand you
serve on the boards of the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation,
whose mission is to provide opportunities for children of
marines killed in action. Good for you. Thanks for doing that.
And, finally, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen.
Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served over 3 years as Director of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of
Energy. You served, I am told, for 23 years as a CIA
intelligence officer in various roles, including Chief of the
European Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, and Deputy Associate
Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. Mr.
Mowatt-Larssen's overseas assignments include Stockholm,
Moscow, Athens, Yerevan, Zurich, and Oslo. Before his career
with the CIA, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the
U.S. Army. He has been awarded the CIA Director's Award,
Secretary of Energy's Exceptional Service Medal, the
Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, among others.
That is quite a line-up, and we are honored to have each of
you before us this afternoon to continue this conversation.
I am going to ask you to please stick to your 5 minutes,
and if you go much beyond that, I will have to rein you in. But
I will ask you to stick to that so we will be sure to be able
to ask you some good questions later on.
Ms. Curtis, I understand you are just back from the region,
having participated in a Transatlantic Opinion Leaders tour of
Afghanistan, and we want to invite you to begin your testimony.
Welcome and thank you.
TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,\1\ SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Ms. Curtis. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Levin, and
Senator Burris. It is an honor to be here today. My remarks
will focus on developments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan
where, as you mentioned, I recently returned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on
page 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Containing the global terrorist threat in South Asia
requires the United States to forge a trusting and cooperative
partnership with Pakistan. The future direction of the region,
including the outcome of the war in Afghanistan, pivots on
Pakistan's ability to overcome multiple socioeconomic
challenges as well as its willingness to fight terrorism in all
its forms within its own borders.
There has been a welcome change in the Pakistan military's
attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the
northwest part of the country in just the last 10 weeks. In
late April, under both Pakistani public and U.S. pressure, and
following Taliban advances into new districts close to
Islamabad, the Pakistan army began an offensive that has since
ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley. A combination of
events, including the Taliban declaring democracy in Pakistan
as ``infidel,'' has begun to change the Pakistani public's
attitude toward the Taliban, thus prompting the army to take
them on militarily.
The fighting, however, has led to a severe humanitarian
crisis with nearly 3 million people fleeing their homes. The
United States has provided substantial aid to help relieve the
crisis, $380 million, as we heard previously, but the United
Nations is still far short of the funds it needs to address the
crisis. There are reports that banned extremist organizations
have access to refugee camps and will use the plight of the
displaced people as a recruiting tool. The United States must
insist Pakistan restrict extremist groups' access to these
camps.
The Pakistan army also is preparing for an additional
offensive in the tribal areas in South Waziristan. This is
where insurgent forces of Pakistani leader Baituallah Mehsud
reside. Baituallah Mehsud is an ally of both al Qaeda and the
Afghan Taliban, but has focused his attention more recently on
targeting the Pakistani state through a spate of suicide
bombings. The United States must encourage Pakistan to
implement hold and build strategies in the tribal areas
following any military operations. The United States also
should discourage the Pakistan military from striking
additional peace deals, pointing out that past deals have only
undermined Pakistan's position strategically.
During my recent visit to Afghanistan, several NATO
commanders expressed the view that Pakistan military operations
in the tribal areas are helping reduce the flow of militants
and insurgents into eastern Afghanistan. Still, NATO commanders
acknowledge that the command and control of the Afghan Taliban
resides in and around Quetta, Baluchistan, and provides
leadership and critical access to money flows for insurgent
operations in Afghanistan. They said that if the Taliban
leadership in Quetta was neutralized, it would deal a
significant blow to the insurgency in southern Afghanistan,
depriving it of guidance, focus, and legitimacy.
Therefore, the United States must convince Pakistan to
crack down on Afghan Taliban leadership and should determine
the level and type of further U.S. military aid to Pakistan
based on Islamabad's efforts in this regard.
One of the major problems in garnering full Pakistani
cooperation against the Afghan Taliban is continued paranoia
among security officials about India's role in Afghanistan. The
United States views Indian development activities, like road
and dam construction, and humanitarian assistance as helpful
while Pakistan security officials view it as an attempt to
encircle Pakistan.
Let me just say a few words on Afghanistan, if I may, based
on my observations from my trip.
I think there has been improvement in the coordination of
the international effort that I could perceive, and I think
there is support among the NATO partners for the evolving U.S.
strategy, namely, the focus on a population-centric approach.
Allies such as the U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Poland are providing invaluable contributions to the fighting.
The new push by U.S. forces into Helmand Province is part
of a broader effort to regain the initiative from the Taliban
in the south. The NATO commanders I met with in Regional
Command South were enthusiastic about the arrival of the
additional U.S. troops to southern Afghanistan. They noted that
up until now they had lacked sufficient resources to implement
an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The commanders we met
with believe the U.S. troop influx will help shift the momentum
against the Taliban, perhaps as early as late summer or early
fall.
It is important that the August 20 elections in Afghanistan
are carried out in a credible manner and that the Afghan people
believe the democratic process can bring change to their
everyday lives. It would be devastating if, just as the
international community is getting its act together and
implementing a winning strategy, the Afghan people lose faith
in the democratic process because of a flawed election.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, containing the
global terrorist threat requires us to partner closely with
Pakistan. In this regard, Congress should move quickly to
reconcile the two separate pieces of Pakistan legislation that
have recently passed the House and the Senate to demonstrate
the U.S. commitment to a long-term partnership. The Afghanistan
and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act that would
provide U.S. duty-free access to items produced in zones in the
border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan also is an integral
part of changing security perceptions in the region and should
be a priority for this Congress.
Thank you.
Senator Carper. Ms. Curtis, thank you. Mr. Schmidle,
welcome.
TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS SCHMIDLE,\1\ FELLOW, NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION
Mr. Schmidle. First, I would like to thank you, Chairman
Carper, Senator Levin, and Senator Burris. I am honored for the
opportunity to share some thoughts on the subject of
strengthening U.S.-Pakistan relations today with a specific
focus on explaining the character and dynamics of jihadist
militancy in Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Schmidle appears in the Appendix
on page 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States is dependent on Pakistan for
accomplishing its objectives in Afghanistan. Many of the
insurgents fighting against American soldiers in Afghanistan
are either based in Pakistan or being commanded from Pakistan.
Top Afghan Taliban leaders use Quetta, the capital of
Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, as their headquarters from
where they direct operations in southern Afghanistan. And
insurgents in eastern Afghanistan are being supported and led
by networks in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
and, to a lesser extent, the North-West Frontier Province.
I am going to focus my testimony today on those insurgent
and jihadists fighting against the Pakistani Government,
however. I often hear U.S. military officials describe their
adversaries along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in general
terms such as ``the enemy,'' while in the same sentence
proposing to isolate specific ``irreconcilable'' militants from
specific ``reconcilable'' ones. But what is the character of
the jihadist threat in Pakistan? I want to take a few minutes
to answer this question in two parts. The first part is who
constitutes the enemy in Pakistan, and the second part is how
does the Pakistani military conceptualize the enemy.
So who are the jihadists and insurgents fighting against
the Pakistani Government? The Pakistani militants are not a
monolithic, disciplined entity. They are probably best
understood as belonging to one of three categories, each with
different safe havens, objectives, and vulnerabilities. Those
three groups are: First, foreign al Qaeda elements; second,
Kashmiri and sectarian militants; and, third, Tehreek-e Taliban
Pakistan, or the Pakistani Taliban Movement.
The foreign militants--which are predominantly Arabs and
Uzbeks, with a smaller number of Turks, Chechens, Africans, and
some Europeans--can be classified as al Qaeda and are estimated
to account for several hundred fighters. They are suspected of
being based in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mohmand
Agency, Bajour, and in Swat. Owing to their internationalist
backgrounds, most of them have international aims, whether it
is committing terrorism abroad; committing terrorism against
international targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan; or in order
to consolidate their own control over these areas, committing
violence against the traditional tribal authorities. Of the
three categories of militants in Pakistan, these are by far the
least interested in reconciliation.
The Kashmir and sectarian groups have long enjoyed a
symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani State. In the mid-
1980s, the main anti-Shia outfit, Sipah-e-Sahaba, was formed
with military support with the goal of transforming Pakistan
from being a Muslim state into being an explicitly Sunni Muslim
State. However, Sipah-e-Sahaba members spent a considerable
amount of time in Afghanistan during the Taliban era,
participating in pogroms against Afghanistan's Shia Hazara
minorities. In the early 1990s, a Sipah-e-Sahaba splinter
group, known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, was created with an even
more ambitious and murderous agenda and has been accused in the
abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl and the bombing of a
church in Islamabad in 2002 and, to some extent, the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi are the homegrown Pakistani equivalent of the sectarian
death squads that have terrorized Iraq for years.
Within the second category are also the Kashmiri militant
groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, and
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Most of these groups, Kashmiri and sectarian
ones alike, are based in southern Punjab, in and around Multan,
Bahawalpur, and Jhang. The Kashmiri groups receive substantial
support from the Pakistani intelligence agencies to carry out
attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir, and this support and
training makes them now particularly dangerous. So unlike many
of the Pashtuns who call themselves Taliban and are fighting
against the State, these fighters are simply more than just
disgruntled men with guns.
The uprising at the Red Mosque in July 2007 was critical
for this reason, for not only did it bring together sectarian
and Kashmiri militants from southern Punjab, but it also
brought together Pashtuns from the border and Arab jihadist
ideologues. But, second, and most importantly, it exposed the
limitations of the Pakistani intelligence agencies, for while
senior leaders of the state-supported jihadist groups went to
the mosque to plead with the brothers who were in charge to
halt their activities, the foot soldiers from these state-
supported jihadist groups had already switched sides. In other
words, the state may have succeeded in its bid to reconcile the
leaders of some groups, but what good is a leader with no one
to lead? Those who survived the final raid on the mosque
ultimately fled to the tribal areas, where they have taken up
refuge with the Taliban.
This brings us now to the Pakistani Taliban, which have
evolved into the lethal force they have become primarily
because they represent a fusion of al Qaeda, Kashmiri and
sectarian jihadist groups, and Pashtun discontent. Consider the
case of Baituallah Mehsud and his organization based in the
Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. Mehsud's deputy, Qari
Hussein, belongs to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the anti-Shia sectarian
group. When his men kidnapped almost 200 Pakistani soldiers in
August 2007, they looked through the soldiers' gear, found at
least one of them who was carrying Shia literature, and
proceeded to have his head cut off--by a teenage boy with a
knife. This sectarian facet is critical to understand because
now we see most of the fighting in the Kurram Agency of the
tribal areas occurring between Sunni Talibs and local Shia
fighters.
So who is reconcilable? There are two groups of combatants
who fall into this category: Those Pashtuns currently fighting
alongside the Taliban who joined the Taliban out of a sense of
ethnic identity and Pashtun nationalism, and those bandits and
criminals who realized that donning a turban and beard provided
some legitimacy to actions otherwise considered ``banditry.''
But the most important group that the Pakistani Government
should be targeting with aid and security are those Pashtun-
populated areas in the North-West Frontier Province and
Baluchistan where the Taliban are not a significant presence
yet. The more that Islamabad can portray the insurgency as
being led by foreign religious extremists and not by local
Pashtuns, the better chance it has of success.
Could I have two paragraphs to talk about the Nazir Group
here in the end?
Senator Carper. If they are short.
Mr. Schmidle. OK. Publicly, the Pakistani military and
intelligence establishment has maintained a certain amount of
confidence that it can pit various groups against one another.
But as we were mentioning, as Senator Levin was mentioning
earlier, in the Pakistani threat perception there are ``good''
and ``bad'' Taliban, and this case certainly applies in South
Waziristan, where right now the military is talking about an
offensive there, and we see Baituallah Mehsud and his fighters
coming under attack, and yet Maulvi Nazir being seemingly
unfazed.
Now, this relationship between Maulvi Nazir and the
Pakistani military really dates back to the spring, April 2007,
when Maulvi Nazir drove the Uzbek foreign al Qaeda elements out
of his territory with support from the Pakistani army. The
general who was in charge of this territory later confided to
me that he had commanded his soldiers to take off their
uniforms, to take AK-47s, to look like locals, and to fight
``as Taliban'' with the Taliban against these foreign fighters.
So this story should show that the new-found vigor on display
by the Pakistani army only pertains to some militant factions.
I will end on that.
Senator Carper. Thanks very much. Mr. Nawaz.
TESTIMONY OF SHUJA NAWAZ,\1\ DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA CENTER, THE
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Nawaz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Levin and
Burris. I am honored to appear before you today to share my
thoughts with you on what works and what could work in
Pakistan, and how we can make the United States a better
partner in building Pakistan safer and stronger. I speak as a
Pakistani but also as someone who has lived and worked in the
United States since 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz appears in the Appendix on
page 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the situation in Pakistan may appear bleak, I do not
think it is hopeless. Pakistan is a complex country, struggling
nearly 62 years since independence to define its nationhood.
Repeated military and autocratic rule, both civil and military,
has left its key institutions stunted. The limitations of its
military rulers have been matched by the short-sightedness of
its civil leadership. Most political parties are run as
personal fiefdoms and family businesses or on feudal patterns.
Rarely do they allow internal democratic systems to emerged.
Ironically, only the major religious party, the Jamaat-i-
Islami, actually holds elections at various levels and
routinely elects new leaders from the rank-and-file.
I welcome President Obama's and the U.S. Congress' moves to
change the relationship with Pakistan to focus on a longer-term
commitment to the people of Pakistan and not on an alliance
with any single person, party, or institution. In this season
of bipartisan support for help to rebuild Pakistan and reshape
U.S. policy, I offer some information and suggestions.
First, we must recognize the emerging demographic shape of
Pakistan: Over 60 percent of its population is below 30 years.
Most of its youth are disenfranchised, disconnected with the
economy and polity, and unemployed. They are disaffected and
vulnerable to the blandishments of their radical co-
religionists, who have used a convoluted interpretation of
Islam to attract Pakistani youth to their side.
Yet Pakistani society has strong sinews. When given the
chance, its people work hard and do well. They helped build
Britain's textile factories and help run the economies of the
Gulf States and the Arabian Peninsula. They remit about $6
billion a year to their homeland. A recent World Bank study
showed that from 1980 to 2007, Pakistan ranked second only to
China's 9.9 percent average GDP growth rate with a growth rate
of 5.8 percent. All this in spite of government. Today Pakistan
has a middle class of some 30 million with an average per
capita income of $410,000 a year on a purchasing power parity
basis.
So how do we engage this complex Pakistan so we can
leverage its strengths and build a long-lasting relationship?
Certainly not by threats or coercion, for Pakistanis are a
proud people and do not respond well to the carrots-and-sticks
approach. In any case, such an approach is not employed by most
of us in our personal friendships. Why would we use it with
another country? Rather, we need to build trust on the basis of
understanding.
Pakistan's military now appears to have recognized that the
internal threats are more immediate than the looming presence
of a powerful India to the east. But it does not have the full
training nor the equipment to fight an insurgency. When the
United States talks of counterinsurgency training, it sounds to
the Pakistanis that they must abandon conventional defense. We
must clarify that this is not the case.
Until Pakistan's threat perceptions change, we must be
prepared to support its military in creating a hybrid force,
ranging across the spectrum of capabilities. This will allow
them to shift from the Committee on Information Needs (COIN) to
conventional, as needed.
Now, how can the United States become more effective? USAID
is broken badly by years of neglect. It must be rebuilt,
empowered, and given the staff to strategize and manage its
projects, develop relationships inside Pakistan, and
effectively deliver aid where it is needed. USAID is aptly
named in my view. Most of its aid money stays in the United
States. This must stop. USAID needs to stop being a contract
management agency and become again a powerful partner of U.S.
diplomacy, working with local counterparts.
We must also better coordinate assistance, so DOD, State,
Treasury, Commerce, USTR, DOE, and other agencies work together
rather than autonomously or at cross purposes. So Congress
needs to support the Special Representative's work in this
regard.
Trade can be a huge supplement to aid. Politically
difficult moves such as the Free Trade Agreement and removal of
quotas on textile imports would allow Pakistan to help itself.
A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics
supports this idea. But we must encourage Pakistan to move up
the value-added chain towards manufacturers if it is to stay
ahead of the population growth curve.
The ROZs fall in the same category. It is a very expensive
solution, but it is not a permanent solution to the problem. So
we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added ladder
towards manufacturers, as I said, and to have these ROZs
located near population hubs and communications.
There is a better way of creating jobs in FATA, and we have
a calculation that if you create 300,000 jobs in FATA, you have
basically eliminated the entire pool of unemployed youth in the
area which are being recruited by the Taliban.
On retraining the military, we must recognize that the
Pakistan army also needs help in keeping up its conventional
force even while we build up its mobility and ability to fight
militants. Mr. Chairman, four helicopters will not do the
trick. The United States can and should divert larger numbers
of helicopters and COIN-oriented equipment to Pakistan as it
replaces the fleets of European Allies, for example.
We must also replace the coalition support funds with
regular foreign military funding with milestones and benchmarks
proposed by Pakistan's military and agreed to by the United
States. This will help transform the current patronage
relationship from an army for hire to an army that is fighting
Pakistan's own war.
How do we attract the aid monies and make their use
transparent? I believe in accountability, Mr. Chairman, and
responsible use of domestic and foreign funds. Pakistan does
not have the ability to track its civil or military
expenditures effectively; we must help Pakistan to create these
systems. A comprehensive financial tracking system in the
Ministry of Finance and in the Ministry of Defense will help
strengthen civilian control and supremacy inside Pakistan.
Chairman Carper. Mr. Nawaz, I am going to ask you to wrap
up your testimony please.
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir.
The Pakistani Diaspora can provide the backbone for such
efforts. On its part, the U.S. Government needs to make its aid
transparent. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I return to the complexity
of Pakistan, its strategic choices and external and domestic
challenges. The United States must work behind the scenes to
understand Pakistan's security concerns and to alleviate them,
and India is a key player in this region. The United States
must use its influence with India so that it shows, in the
words of my friend Peter Jones at the University of Ottawa,
``strategic altruism.'' Both India and Pakistan must leapfrog
the hurdles of historical distrust and conflicts to fight the
common enemies of poverty, terror, and religious extremism.
There is no alternative.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much. Mr. Fick, welcome.
TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL FICK,\1\ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER
FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Mr. Fick. Thank you, Chairman Carper, distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fick appears in the Appendix on
page 75.
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My comments this afternoon are based largely on a research
project I have just completed with my colleagues David
Kilcullen and Andrew Exum. I know you are familiar with Dr.
Kilcullen's work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Mr. Exum is
currently serving on General McChrystal's assessment team in
Kabul. I have submitted our entire formal report as written
testimony.
Avoiding the worst outcomes in Pakistan over the coming
year demands that we focus on securing areas that are still
under government control, build up the police and civil
authority, and measure progress against realistic benchmarks so
that we know what is working and what must be changed.
The near-term challenge for the United States and its
allies is to stop the extremist advance, both geographically
and psychologically. If the militant advance is not at least
halted in the coming year in the Pakistani State, including the
supply routes supporting the coalition in Afghanistan and
Islamabad's nuclear arsenal could face an existential threat.
The first priority is to change two policies that have
proven especially destabilizing: Drone strikes against targets
beyond al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and
the North-West Frontier, and unconditionally aiding the
Pakistani military at the expense of other security forces.
Remote attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles are currently
the U.S.'s primary method of combating violent extremism in
northwest Pakistan. The appeal of drone attacks for
policymakers is clear, their positive effects are measurable,
and they avoid coalition casualties. They create a sense of
insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions
with each other.
Despite these advantages, the costs of drone attacks as
they are currently being conducted inside Pakistan outweigh the
benefits, and they are in the current context harmful to U.S.
and allied interests. U.S. officials vehemently dispute,
rightly, the civilian casualty figures used by the Pakistani
press, and it seems certain that far more militants and far
fewer civilians have been killed than is reported there.
What matters as much as the real numbers, however, is the
perception of these operations among the people in the FATA and
the northwest frontier, as well as among the people of
Pakistan's other provinces. Even beyond the Pashtun belt, drone
strikes against Taliban targets as opposed to al Qaeda excite
visceral opposition across a broad spectrum of Pakistani
opinion. The U.S. reliance on drones also displays every
characteristic of a tactic or, more accurately, a piece of
technology substituting for a strategy.
Currently strikes from unmanned aircraft are being carried
out in a virtual vacuum without a concerted information
operations campaign or an equally robust strategy to engage the
Pakistani people more holistically. Killing terrorists is
necessary. Expanding the target list beyond al Qaeda, as
happened in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's assassination,
empowers the very people the coalition seeks to undermine.
With militant attacks spreading east of the Indus River and
threatening the urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, where much
of the Pakistani middle class lives, the United States and its
Pakistani allies should build on their strengths by drawing a
notional line at the Indus River to defend those people already
under the control of the central government. One element in
this strategy should be the reallocation of funds from the
Pakistani military and intelligence services--which continue to
view India as Pakistan's most pressing threat--and toward the
police.
The Kerry-Lugar Act is a welcome step in the right
direction. It decouples military from non-military aid, triples
that non-military aid to $1.5 billion a year, and includes
increased allocations for the police, independent judiciary,
and anticorruption efforts. It also--and I will cover this in
more detail shortly--requires benchmarks and criteria for
measuring the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.
To be sure, short-term aid to the police forces is not a
long-term fix for Pakistan. In the coming year, however, the
neglected Pakistani police forces must be bolstered so that
they can credibly secure the populations of Punjab and Sindh
from militant attacks.
All strategies require constant assessment, and President
Obama's plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is no exception. In
the speech unveiling his new approach, the President promised
to set clear metrics and consistently assess the impact of U.S.
policies.
Effective benchmarks, as Mr. Jones correctly stated
earlier, should measure outcomes for the population rather than
inputs by governments. Too often, the international community
has measured progress by tracking money raised, money spent, or
troops deployed. These are inputs, not outcomes, and they
measure effort not effectiveness.
Better benchmarks track trends in the proportion to the
population that feels safe, can access essential services,
enjoys social justice and the rule of law, engages in political
activity, and earns a living without fear of insurgents, drug
traffickers, or corrupt officials.
Because perception matters in politics and the coalition's
goals are political--to marginalize the extremists, bolster the
government, and wean the population away from armed struggle--
perceived outcomes matter the most. It is not enough to make
people objectively safer and better off. Before they are
willing to put down their weapons and support the government,
the population must feel safer and must perceive the government
as the winning side.
Key metrics to watch in Pakistan include the rate at which
Taliban chapters continue to open in the Punjab and whether the
balance of 2009 sees more attacks in the urban centers of
Karachi and Lahore. These developments would indicate that
instability is increasing in the Punjab and Sindh heartlands
and would suggest that the situation on the ground is
worsening.
The assassination rate of maliks is another indicator. The
Taliban have killed hundreds of maliks since 2004, a sign of
intimidation and illustrating the erosion of civil society and
the collapse of law and order. A drop in killings might simply
indicate that most maliks have been killed or driven away from
their districts, but continued high assassination rates would
indicate ongoing insecurity.
In closing, I would like to make an overarching suggestion.
During the campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan, one
slogan unified all efforts of the U.S. Government: ``Get the
Russians out.'' For this campaign we should consider using
``Build local capacity,'' which, while maybe not as catchy, has
the virtue of being clear and one word shorter.
Thank you for the privilege of testifying before you today.
Senator Carper. Thanks very much. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.
TESTIMONY OF ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. Thank you. Good afternoon, gentlemen.
The Subcommittee asked me to address three issues: First, to
assess the security challenge to Pakistani nuclear weapons;
second, address the nuclear terrorism threat, in other words,
the terrorist nuclear intent and capability; and, third, to
make some recommendations on what might guide stronger
cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen appears in the
Appendix on page 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To that end, I wrote a paper with my Harvard colleague and
nuclear security expert, Matthew Bunn. I provided that paper as
a restricted document to the Subcommittee so we could go in
full into this topic, particularly the cooperation, without
hyping or otherwise exacerbating any sensitivities,
particularly when cooperation entails issues that affect
national sovereignty as well as specific nuclear sensitivities
that obviously, whether we are talking about Pakistan, the
United States, or any other country, are very relevant.
It is also, I think, for context, important to bear in mind
that it is very dangerous to hype the issue of losing control
of Pakistani nuclear weapons. I think any statement I have made
certainly has stressed that the Pakistan military that protects
the nuclear arsenal is a very professional organization. It
takes its duties extremely serious, and I do not think anything
I would say would question the degree of effort that they have
put into this or their intent.
I think the bigger question here is the problem we face
itself has a zero tolerance standard, which applies
particularly when we are looking at Pakistan but also globally.
It is a standard that President Obama laid out very clearly in
Prague, and I think changed the entire nuclear landscape. He
described it as ``a single bomb threshold,'' where a bomb going
off, a terrorist bomb, in any city of the world changes life
for everybody. That is the standard that we are worried about
when we think about upgrading security in any country in the
world and the nature of the cooperation. I think that demands
to cooperate are enhanced.
The essential challenge we face is that terrorists only
have to be successful one time, we have to be successful every
time. And there is no such thing as perfect security or perfect
anything if my 36 years in the government are of any relevance.
I would like to summarize just a few of the highlights of
things I think would be germane to say publicly. First, there
are three trends that Pakistanis face that in particular affect
them. They are not unique to Pakistan, but they are trends that
are particularly worrisome. First is the increasing levels of
extremism in the country that exacerbate the threats for
insiders working with outsiders, the insiders in the nuclear
establishment working with outsiders to either take out
material or facilitate people's access inside.
Second, their program, unlike many programs in the world,
is an expanding program, a rapidly expanding program. More
weapons in more places means more potential for things to go
wrong.
And third is the potential threat to a change in government
and the challenges that might pose that have not been fully
considered. The challenge to the national command authorities
who control the nuclear command and control is not trivial at
all. Now again, I am sure that the Pakistani establishment is
taking it extremely serious and working through all the
scenarios they think could occur.
Second area of broad interest, what can terrorists do? Can
terrorists, in fact, detonate a nuclear weapon? It is very hard
for a terrorist group to do this. No one is saying it is easy.
Is it more than 1 percent? If it is, it is an existential
problem, and that is what we face.
Terrorists have three pathways to do this. They can steal a
bomb, they can attack a facility, or they can steal enough
material to construct a bomb. We know since Aum Shinrikyo in
the early 1990s and al Qaeda as early as 1993 that the intent
is clear, terrorist groups want to do this. The only thing we
think that they have not been able to do, which is significant,
is overcome the barriers in terms of having the capability. And
that is what we are trying to stop by ensuring security of all
nuclear facilities globally, but particularly in unstable
areas.
Finally, in looking at cooperation, just to discuss in a
more general sense, I think one thing in particular I would
stress is the insider threat. We have seen in the United
States, itself, that we have had arrests in my time in the
Department of Energy, for example, of employees that had
issues. So, therefore, again, we think we have something to
share. We think all countries should share more about nuclear
security-related upgrading. The Pakistan-U.S. effort in this
regard, from my standpoint, is a model for how countries need
to think. And I think the International Atomic Energy Agency
should play a bigger role.
Second, how do they strengthen protection against
outsiders, particularly outsiders who will attack a facility?
Third, talking about winning the battle of hearts and
minds--and I have heard some of that here today. And most
notably with hearts and minds is making the point that Islam as
a great religion in no way would condone the slaughtering of
innocents that is part and parcel of a nuclear terrorist
attack. Groups like al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or others
cannot get a free ride expressing the intent as a legitimate
expression under Islam, and it is important that clerics and
groups worldwide, particularly nongovernmental groups, work
against that trend.
Fourth, increasing threat awareness, the fact that nuclear
terrorism is not still regarded as a real threat in many parts
of the world, as I alluded to earlier.
And, finally, the improvement of joint communications and
reducing misunderstandings. If the United States and Pakistan
do nothing else than have a robust trust and communication that
is created through these exchanges, by my standard, again, of
the most important things we need to do, that would be at the
top of the list. We can resort to those mechanisms,
particularly in a crisis where there is a suggestion--whether
it has happened or not--that there may be a lost nuke or an
attack on a facility, and we are dealing with reports that have
to be confirmed and the only way we are going to really be able
to do that is through trusted channels between Pakistan and the
United States.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Yes, thank you for excellent testimony from
all of you. And Senator Levin, who has been here in the U.S.
Senate for a long time, heard a lot of witnesses, a lot of
panels of witnesses, said to me just before he slipped out
during Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's testimony, he said, ``These are
damn good witnesses.''
And I have sat next to him in a bunch of hearings over
time, and I do not think I have heard him ever say that. I am
sure he has thought it. But this is really exceptionally a good
panel, and thank you all for sharing your thoughts with us.
I am going to yield to Senator Burris if he has any final
questions or comments. I have a number of questions I want to
ask before we conclude. I think we are going to vote at 4:45,
about 20 minutes from now. But I would like for us to get in
more questions. Senator Burris, any comments or questions you
would like to ask, feel free.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am listening to
this excellent testimony and thought I knew a lot until now.
Mr. Schmidle, maybe you can help me out here. I am trying now
to distinguish between whether or not the Pakistanis or al
Qaeda or the Afghans or the Talibans or each of these groups,
are these Pakistanis that are what we would call militants and
they are joining the anti-force within their own government
that are now fighting for or against our troops that would
cross over the border and go back into Afghanistan? Could you
clear this up for me since now I have listened to such
excellent testimony and am trying to sort it out?
Mr. Schmidle. Senator Burris, thank you. I am not sure that
I can totally clarify it. I think that it is incredibly murky,
as you suggested.
Those who are fighting in Pakistan, there are very few
Afghans who are crossing the border to fight with the Taliban
against the Pakistani Government. There are, however, many
Pakistanis who up until the time--really we have to look at
this July 2007 government raid of the mosque in Islamabad as a
turning point when the insurgency against the government became
popular for a while amongst the various militant groups, who up
until that point, even though they thought that President
Musharraf was doing the work of the Americans and there was
still some opposition to him, still primarily focused their
attention on fighting American and NATO forces across the
border in Afghanistan.
So since that event, though, it did attract a great amount
of attention from the various militant groups. Those Pashtuns,
however, who are fighting in the North West Frontier Province
are not necessarily militants. I mean, some of them are simply
tribesmen who, over the course of the past several years, have
in an accidental bombing raid by the Pakistanis had their house
destroyed and have then said, OK, well, I have now sworn the
rest of my life to avenging my wife's death, or whatever.
It is multi-layered as to who the actual belligerents are
in this struggle. I do not know if that clarifies things at
all.
Senator Burris. It does not. Can anyone help me out here?
Ms. Curtis. If I might?
Senator Burris. Sure, please, Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. I think you have hit on a major crux of the
problem, sir, and this has been that we have seen from the
Pakistan Government, the military in particular, a dual policy
of fighting some terrorists and supporting others. And it has
not worked, sir. It is threatening to our interests in the
region, threatening to their own interests in the region. And I
think that is why we see such a confused situation----
Senator Burris. Is the Taliban--they are al Qaeda?
Ms. Curtis. What I am saying, sir, is that Pakistan has
supported and elements of the security services probably are
supporting parts of the Afghani Taliban to protect their own
interests vis-a-vis India. They do not want India to have a
foothold in Afghanistan, so this is part of the problem that we
do have different objectives, and I think what we need to see
from Pakistan is a more holistic approach to militancy and a
willingness to confront the militancy and confront all militant
groups on the same level rather than, as we heard from one of
the other witnesses, shifting alliances, supporting some groups
on one day, other groups on another day.
It seems this policy has failed. It has failed to provide
security in this region, and it is threatening to global
national security interests.
Senator Burris. Mr. Nawaz, can you help me out a little
bit?
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, Senator, if I can just simplify it, the
Afghan Taliban comprised the so-called Quetta Shura and then
the Haqqani group, which is in North Waziristan and the group
belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that operates in the northern
regions of FATA from Nuristan and Kunar Valley.
The Afghan Taliban have not gotten into any battles with
the Pakistan army. They have avoided it, and the Pakistan army
has returned the favor. They have not made it difficult for
them to seek sanctuary in Pakistan. The local Taliban, the ones
that Mr. Schmidle was referring to----
Senator Burris. When you say ``local,'' you mean the Afghan
Taliban?
Mr. Nawaz. The Pakistani Taliban.
Senator Burris. Oh, the Pakistan Taliban.
Mr. Nawaz. They are known, in fact, as the Tehreek-e
Taliban of Pakistan or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. They
emerged only in the last couple of years. They have aligned
themselves as franchisees of al Qaeda at times as well as
aligned themselves with the Punjabi militant groups, the Sunni
groups that were previously supported by the Pakistan
intelligence services in Kashmir against India. So new
alliances have been formed that are now operating inside
Pakistan against the Pakistani State.
But just to be clear, the Afghan Taliban have not taken up
arms generally against the Pakistan army, and the army has not,
therefore, chosen to attack them. This is a sort of
oversimplified view. There are areas where there are some
crossovers, but this is probably the best that one can do in--
--
Senator Burris. So this is what our combatants over there
are trying to deal with it?
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fick. Senator Burris, could I add one comment----
Senator Burris. Please, Mr. Fick.
Mr. Fick [continuing]. From the perspective of a former
combatant. I would suggest that one easy way to think about it
is almost like the concentric rings of a target. And if at the
center of the target you have the groups with ambitions beyond
the theater, Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically al Qaeda,
an organization with global ambition, the next concentric ring
going out would be organizations with ambitions perhaps
throughout Pakistan, and then wider still are groups with more
local and limited ambitions.
And as you get closer to the heart of that bull's eye, the
heart of that target, the greater is the threat to the United
States and the more latitude we should have to deal with it
militarily. As you get closer out to the edges there, to the
groups that have more local and limited ambition, we have to be
much more careful militarily for risk of turning the people
against us.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Carper. You bet. Thank you. Thank you so much for
joining us today, Senator Burris.
I was just saying to Wendy Anderson, our senior staff
person on these issues, it seems to me--and I have sort of
moved toward this thought as I listened to the first panel and
now our second panel--the importance of reducing tensions
between Pakistan and India and sometimes I think in terms of a
two-fer, or I think we may have a three-fer here in this case:
One, to the extent that those tensions are significantly
reduced; first, reduce the likelihood of a war between those
two countries and potential for nuclear exchange.
Second, it allows the Pakistan military to focus on
counterinsurgency rather than fighting a war with the country
of India. One of you talked about helicopters and we need more
than just four helicopters. The Pakistanis need more than four
or six, for that matter. But then it would be, folks, the kind
of military equipment and capabilities that frankly have not
much at all to do with India.
The third is that one of you spoke about how the Pakistanis
provide almost a safe harbor for--I think it was through the
Afghan Taliban so that the Afghan Taliban can go back and forth
and really destabilize the Government of Afghanistan, keep them
occupied in an effort to reduce the presence or the successful
involvement of India in Afghanistan. If I were the Pakistanis,
I would not want to be surrounded on one side by a hostile
India and on the other side, on my other flank, by an
Afghanistan that is allied with India.
I think that those are potentially at least three good
things that flow from reducing tensions. My hope going forward
is that the efforts that have been started before in the 1990s
and even in this decade that they will not just begin anew, but
will begin with our strongest support and encouragement.
Anybody have a thought on what I just said? You do not have
to, but if you do I welcome it. Yes, Ms. Curtis?
Ms. Curtis. Yes, I think the India-Pakistan rivalry, deep-
seated, historical, three wars, military crisis, so I think to
try to say that, ``Well, if we could just get Pakistan to not
have to worry about its border with India, then it could focus
on militants,'' is just too simplistic. We have to look at what
led to the derailing of the dialogue. We had a very productive
Indo-Pakistani dialogue from 2004 to 2007. The Mumbai attacks,
a Pakistan-based group conducting a rampage, killing 160 people
in India in November 2008.
Senator Carper. Excuse me for interrupting, but do you
think that attack had anything to do with trying to undermine
the discussions that were going on?
Ms. Curtis. I think it probably did. I think it probably
was aimed at causing conflict between the two countries and
probably was aimed at taking Pakistani forces away from
fighting the militants in the tribal areas to having to focus
on the India border. But India also has to think about its
security, and if it is being attacked and the elements are
coming from Pakistan, then it has to prepare itself as well. So
we have to keep this in mind.
I think the role that the United States can play is to
quietly encourage them to get back to talks, but talks that
will really allow them to view the region differently, focus on
non-state actors that destabilize both countries. Rather than
trying for the United States to insert itself into the very
sensitive Kashmir issue.
Senator Carper. Notice I have not mentioned Kashmir at all.
Ms. Curtis. Yes. I think this issue has been dealt with in
the past through the back-channel negotiations that were
mentioned before; there has been movement. So encouraging the
two sides to get back to those talks bilaterally I think should
be the focus of the United States.
Senator Carper. Another comment? Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, Senator. I am often referred to as an
optimist. But then a friend----
Senator Carper. So am I.
Mr. Nawaz. A friend reminds me that a pessimist is an
optimist with experience.
Senator Carper. Yes, I think you noted that in your
comments. I wrote that down. I hope you do not mind if I use
it.
Mr. Nawaz. Not at all. Senator, I think the key is not
simply in making this a linear equation between opening up the
dialogue between India and Pakistan and getting Pakistan to
focus on militancy.
The longer-term goal really must be to strengthen both
Pakistan and India so that they can achieve their economic
potential. India has 300 million people living at absolute
poverty; Pakistan has also huge gaps between the rich and the
poor, and the opportunity cost of their defense expenditures is
extremely high. So whatever can be done by the United States
and other friends of both countries in opening up a dialogue
between the two countries, opening up trade, for instance,
which would create vested interest groups on both sides, which
would make war impossible, should be encouraged.
Economics 101 dictates that neighbors should be major
trading partners. Neither India nor Pakistan is each other's
major trading partners. India's major trading partner is the
United States or China, depending on how one counts the
figures. Pakistan's major trading partner is the United States.
And neither are neighbors of the United States.
So it is very critical to try and reopen the dialogue that
had begun, that was near fruition, at least on three of the
four key areas where there was conflict, with Kashmir having
been decided as an issue that was best left to settle by itself
and to grow organically so that the line of control would
become irrelevant. I think that is the approach that needs to
be encouraged. And that will allow Pakistan to become
economically and politically stronger and, therefore, be able
to deal with the militancy at home.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Let me return to the issue
of security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and particularly
with the points I think raised by Mr. Mowatt-Larssen with
respect to insider threats at nuclear facilities.
I am going to ask you to try and be brief; we are going to
start voting in about 5 minutes. So please be brief in
responding. But as I think, as you rightly point out in your
testimony, the Pakistani military intelligence and nuclear
establishment are not immune to rising levels of extremism in
Pakistan.
Do you believe that increasing levels of extremism create
or exacerbate the insider threat at nuclear facilities? We will
just start with you, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.
Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. Yes, I would Mr. Chairman. In fact, I
would describe the insider threat from the standpoint of my
background in intelligence and security and counterintelligence
as their No. 1 threat. It is a far more likely possibility
than, say, the more hyped problems of losing control of a nuke
or a convoy being ambushed. Those things are things that have
to, of course, be eliminated from possibility, but the
possibility of the insider who is able to gain access to a
facility and, say, over time bring out material or technology,
we have already seen in Pakistan. And I know it does not help
to raise this all the time, but the A.Q. Khan network where, of
course, the father of the Pakistan program was working outside
the control of the Pakistan establishment, that is, of course,
something that is always going to be there, as well as the
group that worked with al Qaeda and bin Laden specifically
after September 11, 2001, that was trying to do the same thing.
So we have already seen very scary examples of the insider
threat.
What exacerbates it even more--and I will close with this
thought--is the fact that we know that nuclear materials have
been out there, accessible for terrorists to buy on the black
market. There have been 19 incidents of weapons-usable material
that have been seized on the black markets in the last 15
years. So we know that there is a problem, and in all 19 of
those cases, to the best of my knowledge, they were not
reported as missing from the facilities that they started at.
So we do have a problem, and it is very important for the
Pakistanis to simply exclude the possibility that insiders
could take material out so terrorists can construct a nuclear
bomb.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Mr. Schmidle, and then
Ms. Curtis.
Mr. Schmidle. I just want to comment on whether the
scientists, the army, the intelligence agencies are more or
less prone to extremism than anyone else in society. I do not
think that is the case. I think when you look at who is
composed of the scientists, who is composed of the army, and
even in the case of the ISI--which is often labeled as being
excessively Islamist. The ISI is picked from the army; the army
is picked from the population. The population, up until very
recently, was sympathetic to the idea of the Taliban, was
sympathetic to the idea of them as righteous Muslims, slightly
misguided, but at least doing what they thought was in the
right way.
I think that the game has changed in the past couple of
months with the idea of the Taliban and the reality of the
Taliban have collapsed. I also do not know to what extent there
was ever really sympathy. I never heard common sympathy from
common people for al Qaeda. Maybe for al Qaeda leaders as
symbols, but not for al Qaeda tactics.
Senator Carper. Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. Yes, I agree with Mr. Mowatt-Larssen that the
biggest threat is the insider threat rather than the idea that
somehow the government or the military is overthrown by
extremists.
But that said, I think it is important for the military
leadership to be clear on how much of a danger extremists are
posing to the country. And this gets back to the point--Senator
Burris is not here--but the fact is in the past the Taliban has
been seen as a strategic asset for Pakistan, and so it is
incumbent on the military leadership to explain to the public
that ``no, these are threats to the country.''
And we are beginning to see that General Kayani did state
last Friday, in his speech to Staff College, to upcoming
military officers, that while there still were external
threats, the most immediate threat to Pakistan right now was
internal.
So I think these kinds of statements are extremely
important because they do in a sense form the thinking within
the military, which is very important.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
A question for Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Maybe two
questions. First of all, how resilient or dedicated are the
people of Pakistan to continue supporting the nation's campaign
in South Waziristan?
Mr. Schmidle. I think that the test case is ultimately the
plight of the refugees. I think that the plight of the refugees
is more important right now than any military operation and the
government can do because the Pashtuns on either side of the
border right now in Afghanistan and Pakistan are watching to
see whether the Pakistani army is, (A) serious about actually
catching the heads of the Swat-based Taliban, Maulana Fazlullah
and his associates, and, (B) serious about bringing the people
back to their homes, convincing them the Pakistani army may
have messed up once, but it will not mess up again, that it is
now there for their security.
I think this is the most critical thing. I think that if
the army takes its eye off the ball and now goes into South
Waziristan, leaves these 2.5 million refugees in Swat, creates
another couple of hundred thousand refugees in South
Waziristan, I think the public support will begin dissipating
very quickly.
Senator Carper. Mr. Fick, any thoughts on that?
Mr. Fick. I agree.
Senator Carper. Short answer, isn't it? Right to the point.
That is good. No, you can stop right there. I have more
questions, so thank you.
Again back to Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Could you just
elaborate for us, if you will, on your recommendation that
Pakistan refrain from launching a campaign in South Waziristan?
You talked about this in what you just said, but help me again.
You may have said this, but again, what alternatives would you
offer to that?
Mr. Schmidle. The alternatives I think are--I feel like the
problem is overextension more than anything else. I feel like
you fail to consolidate what has been a military success, to a
certain degree, in Swat.
Senator Carper. It reminds me just a little bit of our
involvement in Afghanistan----
Mr. Schmidle. I would agree wholeheartedly, that taking the
eye off the ball into Iraq----
Senator Carper [continuing]. In 2001.
Mr. Schmidle. Definitely. But I think that it then
complicates--I think that it also exposes the inherent
incompatibilities of U.S. and Pakistan priorities and perhaps
creates more short-term problems for collaboration, and right
now there is some level of momentum, there is some level of
support. I think that when the United States sees that the
Pakistani army is only going after some of these Taliban
leaders and leaving others to cross the border at ease, it then
resuscitates some of these bilateral problems between the two
countries.
Senator Carper. Please, Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. I would disagree somewhat, sir. I think that
what you risk is if you are squeezing the Swat Valley, taking
operations there, a lot of these people are going to be able to
still find safe haven in South Waziristan--or North Waziristan
for that matter.
So I think it is important while the Pakistani public is
supporting the military in these operations that they do carry
the fight to South Waziristan as well. I understand the plight
of the refugees. That has to be dealt with, but that is mainly
an issue for the civilian government to be dealing with.
So I have to say I see it a bit differently, and I do not
compare it to the situation with the United States and Iraq and
Afghanistan because I think that you would have synergy in
terms of if the Pakistanis are squeezing the militants in South
Waziristan, you have the coalition forces on the other side in
Afghanistan, and then we can finally have this hammer and anvil
strategy that we have been working toward for so long. And you
do have the Pakistani public behind these operations in Swat
Valley, so I would just have to disagree, and I think we should
be encouraging them to also start squeezing the militant safe
haven in the tribal areas as well.
Senator Carper. Just very briefly, go ahead.
Mr. Schmidle. I think we should not mistake what is a
change in will on the part of the Pakistani army with what is
not a change in capacity. The Pakistani army does not have the
ability to take on the entire tribal belt if it is inflamed
with Taliban insurgency, which it would be if they went into
South Waziristan.
Senator Carper. OK, thanks. Let me just follow up on that
with a question of Mr. Nawaz and probably Ms. Curtis, and that
is, your assessment, please, of the ability of Pakistan to
adopt and integrate counterinsurgency doctrine.
Mr. Nawaz. Senator, I think there has been some attempt,
but it is going to take a long time. The army is still very
much conventional and its stance is conventional, and it is
still looking at most of these actions as low-intensity
conflict and not as counterinsurgency. They do not have the
equipment nor the training. And, therefore, I do not think that
they are quite ready.
If you look at Swat, it was really conventional use of the
military and it is not counterinsurgency. In my own
conversation with senior military leaders, they tell me that
they do not have the capacity to hold Swat or Bajour or other
parts of FATA, that they need to have civilian counterparts and
the police force that will be there--which is why the new move
to induct ex-servicemen into the police force is probably a
good idea.
Senator Carper. Good. Ms. Curtis and then maybe a former
marine would share a thought on this. Ms. Curtis, please.
Ms. Curtis. Well, obviously----
Senator Carper. I do not know if you are ever a former
marine. At least I do not think so.
Mr. Fick. Just never an ex-Marine.
Senator Carper. There you go.
Ms. Curtis. Well, obviously the capability issue is an
enormous one, and I think the United States is going to have to
play a very large role in assisting the Pakistanis with
counterinsurgency training, with equipment, more helicopters,
as you specified, and then also encouraging the military to
work with the civilian leadership to develop a comprehensive
approach to be able to hold and build areas. And this is
definitely going to be an uphill battle, but I think it is
something that has to be done. We cannot really hesitate in
following through on this.
But it is my understanding that there has been some measure
of resistance within the Pakistan military to receive this kind
of training. This may be starting to change, but I think it is
something we need to keep working toward because it will be
absolutely critical because now that they have gone in,
militarily, particularly the Swat Valley, they will have to
work on a hold and build strategy. They cannot allow the
Taliban to come back in. This would be, I think, sort of
devastating for security in the country and the future
stability of the rest of the country.
Senator Carper. Mr. Fick, please.
Mr. Fick. I would suggest that the use of heavy artillery
is inversely correlated with effective counterinsurgency, and
the Pakistani army right now is using a lot of heavy artillery
in the west, which is why I am suggesting that we look at the
police. And we should not get too wrapped up over the question
of whether the Pakistani army can effectively conduct a
counterinsurgency campaign. We should look at whether the
Pakistani Government can do it. And that requires using
different tools.
For most people, especially in rural areas, contact with
the police is the only contact or the most frequent contact
they have with their government, and this is the first line of
contact and defense for the Pakistani Government. In terms of
training the police, we should not look to our military. Posse
Comitatus works. Our military is not good at training police,
so we need to find other ways to do it.
Senator Carper. Well, we have some experience in training
police in Iraq.
Mr. Fick. And Afghanistan.
Senator Carper. And now in Afghanistan.
Mr. Fick. And we are much better at training militaries
than we are at training police.
If I could get back to your earlier question with regard to
South Waziristan and suggest that you look at the work that
then-Colonel Mick Nicholson, now Brigadier General in RC
South----
Senator Carper. We know him.
Mr. Fick. The work he did in RC East when he was a brigade
commander, effectively influencing tribes across the border in
Waziristan, is another model. He had great success.
Senator Carper. That is a good point. Thank you. As we come
to the end here, we have a vote underway, and so we are going
to excuse you very shortly.
One of the things I like to do when we have a panel this
diverse, and frankly this well regarded and thoughtful, one of
the things I like to do is to ask you to say--just run down the
list really quick, Ms. Curtis, as you listened to your other
four colleagues here on the panel, I am sure they said some
things you agree with, some things that you do not agree with.
Just think back to maybe one of the points or two that you most
agree with, that the other panelists, your colleagues, have
suggested. Anything come to mind? There has to be one or two.
Ms. Curtis. Well, I think that Mr. Schmidle did an
excellent job of explaining the different Pakistani militant
groups and clarifying a lot of those issues. So I think I agree
with everything he said in his oral remarks. And I think he
spelled out clearly how complex this situation is and
demonstrated from the Pakistani viewpoint what exactly they are
dealing with.
And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, I think I agree with how he
characterized the threat of the safety and security of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the dangers of hyping that threat.
I think too often we focus on that. What I say is it is a low-
probability but high-risk scenario. I think the Pakistan
military takes the safety and security of its nuclear weapons
very seriously, and there is no reason to panic, but at the
same time, obviously, it is an issue that we have to stay
attuned to.
Senator Carper. Great, thanks. Mr. Schmidle, among the
comments of your colleagues, what really stands out in your
mind that you want to reinforce with us?
Mr. Schmidle. Mr. Fick's point about the police and about
thinking of the Indus River as a conceptual line. I think it is
a lot less threatening for the Pakistani Government and for the
Pakistani military and intelligence establishment to accept
American police trainers in the Punjab, which is a much less
politically sensitive area to be working with police there,
training, building up capacity in areas that have not been hit
by the Taliban yet, but could be the next line. And I think
that is a very good point and something that should be taken
into consideration.
Senator Carper. OK, thanks. Mr. Nawaz, same question,
please.
Mr. Nawaz. I agree with Mr. Fick's point that
counterinsurgencies are won by police and not by the military,
and also that the nuclear threat will always be there because
there is no perfect security. But there are enough very serious
minded people in the military and in the Government of Pakistan
that are devoted to ensuring that the Nuclear Command Authority
and the Strategic Plans Division remains active and totally
involved.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Fick.
Mr. Fick. I like to look at things in terms of the most
likely course of action and the most dangerous course of
action. And Mr. Schmidle addresses the most likely course of
action, one of the Pakistani army and government supporting
some groups while fighting others; that is something I am going
to take away.
The most dangerous course of action here, the existential
threat, if there is one, is nuclear. And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's
point about the insider threat is something that I am going to
look more into.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.
Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it has been
fascinating for me just what my colleagues have discussed that
directly pertains to the ultimate effectiveness of nuclear
security, and that is my biggest takeaway. As that battle goes,
particularly the battle for the control of the country and the
hearts and minds and the antipathies towards the United States,
lowering those reduces that insider threat.
I also agree, actually, with the comment by Mr. Schmidle
that there is no greater propensity for the use of nuclear
weapons to be extremist than any other segment of society. I do
not even know what the statistics are, but it is that the
consequences are that much higher in that actuarial calculation
if one or two are.
Finally, I would have to pile on to the police equation
from the stand point of something we have talked about as well
on the nuclear security side? It is good to get out of
sometimes the mentality of nuclear security as the nuclear
security people look at that, whether that is in the
intelligence services or in the military, and the police do
have a role and can play a bigger role in nuclear security as
well in Pakistan.
Thank you.
Senator Carper. All right. In closing, we have about 5
minutes left to vote. I just want to say to each of you, thank
you for the work you have done with your lives to date. Thank
you for sharing some of what you have learned with us here this
afternoon. I appreciate very much where you have agreed because
it is helpful to us to reinforce the messages that you all
reinforced here, especially in the last several minutes. My
colleagues and I are grateful for your work, and I want to say
to our first witness from the Administration, we very much
appreciate that input.
In the next couple of weeks, we are going to have the
hearing record open for 2 weeks--for the submission of
additional statements and questions from my colleagues. If you
get any of those questions, I would just ask for your
cooperation in providing prompt responses to those questions
that might be submitted for the record.
Again, our thanks to each of you. This has just been
illuminating, certainly interesting, and I think very
important. Thanks so much.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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