[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-102]
COUNTERTERRORISM WITHIN THE
AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 22, 2009
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TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
Tim McClees, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, October 22, 2009, Counterterrorism within the
Afghanistan Counterinsurgency.................................. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, October 22, 2009....................................... 27
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2009
COUNTERTERRORISM WITHIN THE AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 2
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 1
WITNESSES
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Resident Scholar, The American
Enterprise Institute........................................... 3
Nelson, Rick ``Ozzie,'' Senior Fellow, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 9
Pape, Dr. Robert A., Professor of Political Science, University
of Chicago..................................................... 7
.................................................................
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W....................................... 34
Miller, Hon. Jeff............................................ 32
Nelson, Rick ``Ozzie''....................................... 47
Pape, Dr. Robert A........................................... 38
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
COUNTERTERRORISM WITHIN THE AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 22, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m., in
room HVC 210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. I call the meeting to order. I apologize for
being late. I was still operating off the assumption that the
meetings were over in the Rayburn room, and it is a much longer
haul getting over here than it is to Rayburn.
But I apologize for that, and I really appreciate our
witnesses joining us this morning, as well as the panel, to
have this conversation. I have read all three of your works on
many subjects. Very, very knowledgeable people on a very
important subject for all of us right now: the path forward in
Afghanistan, and also in Pakistan and that whole region.
This committee has a particular interest in the Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) and its role in counterterrorism.
But, of course, we are also members of the full Armed Services
Committee and interested in the broader picture as well.
Although we certainly look forward to hearing your
testimony on all those subjects, on the best path forward, the
dominant two issues for me are, number one, this is a
critically important part of the region. We have heard some
people talk about Afghanistan and say, well, if our concern is
al Qa'ida, well, they have moved to Pakistan. Or, al Qa'ida is
in 45 or 50 different countries; what makes this one special?
Well, in my view, this one is extraordinarily special. The
relationship between the Taliban and al Qa'ida is unique. This
is the place where al Qa'ida is strongest and most likely to
launch attacks. And it is pretty much the one place on the
globe that we cannot afford to turn a blind eye to, if we are
truly concerned about dealing with al Qa'ida.
I know a number of you have greater knowledge about that
relationship than I. I look forward to hearing about that. But
just to drive home the point that we cannot comfort ourselves
by saying that, well, you know, they are in a lot of different
places, they are more or less in Pakistan, do we really have to
worry about it? In my view, yes, we do. But I look forward to
having that discussion.
The second difficult part about it is having to worry
about, it puts us in a very, very difficult place. And the
central focus of that challenge, I think, is finding a reliable
partner in Afghanistan, finding a government, a tribal
structure, a provincial structure, somebody, some group of
people who we can work with to offer the Afghan people a viable
alternative to the Taliban.
We are in reasonably good shape in that the Afghan people
know the Taliban and they do not like them. However, they like
some form of government; they like some rule of law, some
structure to their society. And if nobody else can offer that,
the Taliban will fill that void.
So we are really struggling right now to find that Afghan
partner. You are all familiar with the problems of corruption
and ineffectiveness within the government; and now we have the
challenge of an illegitimate election. I am very, very pleased
that they made the decision to do the runoff, to at least give
them a chance to have a more legitimate election.
But the challenges there are great in trying to find a
reliable partner, so I look forward to the testimony. I will
briefly introduce the witnesses now before turning it over to
the ranking member on the committee, Mr. Miller, and then
introduce you again when you each speak.
We are joined by Dr. Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at
The American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Robert Pape, Professor
of Political Science at the University of Chicago; and Rick
``Ozzie'' Nelson, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I look
forward to all of your testimony.
I do have a full written statement which, without
objection, I will submit for the record. And with that, we will
turn it over to any comments that Mr. Miller has.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA,
RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not, on
behalf of the subcommittee, say we are glad to have you back
functioning on both lungs today.
Mr. Smith. Right. It is good to have it. Unfortunately,
unlike kidneys, apparently you need both lungs. Just in case
anybody was wondering.
Mr. Miller. Having recently returned from a trip to
Afghanistan over the Columbus Day weekend, I can say that this
hearing does come at a pivotal moment. We know that two months
ago General McChrystal provided the President with his
assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, and as we have all
read in the press, he has deemed the situation serious. While
General McChrystal acknowledges the very difficult task he
faces in bringing security to Afghanistan and its people, he
does not view the situation, however, as a lost cause.
I do have a statement that I want to go ahead and enter
into the record. So I ask unanimous consent to revise and
extend.
Mr. Smith. Without objection. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Smith. With that, I guess we will go left to right, as
I look at it, ironically. And we will start with Dr. Kagan. And
there are statements in our books for the members if they wish
to look through them as we go, as well.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, THE
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Dr. Kagan. Thank you.
And also thanks for introducing me as the left side of this
debate. Since I guess I am vigorously supporting the
President's stated strategy, I suppose I am on the left side of
this particular debate.
Thank you very much for having me in front of this
committee. It is an honor, as always, and I am very grateful
for the attention that you are paying to this very important
topic. I am very pleased that we are having this level of
national debate now, because I do think that whatever we do in
Afghanistan, it is going to be a long process, it is going to
be a difficult process; and it is very important that the
American people understand very, very clearly why we think we
need to do what we are doing, and what we think we are doing,
why we think it is going to work. And I think this entire
discussion and exploration of alternatives helps that.
I am not going to read my--I didn't give you a written
statement. Actually, I gave you a bunch of various things to
look at. I have a 60-some-odd slide show which I am going to
run through--no. Actually, I am just going to make a few
points, and I just look forward to engaging with you in
questions which I think is probably the most useful thing to
do.
Look, when we are talking about counterterrorism in this
part of the world or anywhere, we really have to ask ourselves
the question, What are we trying to do? Are we trying to
prevent attacks against the United States? Is this a defensive
mission, exclusively? And if so, are we prepared to be in a
defensive posture with occasional reactive sorties against
these groups, or are we trying to defeat these groups? If we
are trying to defeat these groups, what does that actually
mean?
We are certainly not going to defeat their ideology in any
short term. And it is an ideology within Islam. It is a
heretical ideology within Islam that has roots in the years
immediately following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. It
goes back a long way. It will always be there in some form to
be used by someone.
And, of course, if you look at the history of the Cold War,
did we defeat the Communist ideology? Well, we tarnished it
very badly by defeating its reification in the world. And that
is something that is important to keep in mind: al Qa'ida has
embodied this particular vision of this heretical ideology, and
its success or failure is tied to a considerable extent to the
value that other extremists are likely to put on this
particular ideology.
And so I think that we do need to understand that there is
a broader issue here than simply preventing this particular
bunch of thugs from attacking us. There is also the question of
trying to make it clear that this ideology is a loser, and it
leads to defeat and it leads to calamity for the people who
pursue it. And it does not lead to success or anything positive
because we want to deter future generations of extremists from
using this particularly noxious ideology to justify what they
are doing.
And in that context, it is very important to understand
that al Qa'ida does not define itself as a terrorist group. Al
Qa'ida defines itself as an insurgent group. It is an
insurgency within the Muslim world. Its objective is to seize
power within the Muslim world and then transform the Muslim
world in accord with its ideology.
And the reason why that is very important to understand is,
first of all, it explains why wherever al Qa'ida goes, wherever
an al Qa'ida franchise goes, it plants a flag, it establishes
the Islamic Emirate of Wherever-the-Heck and it declares itself
the only legitimate sovereign government of the four kilometers
of land that it probably controls.
At any given moment there were probably five different
capitals of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq--some of them tiny
little villages out in the middle of nowhere, but it was, by
God, the capital of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq.
And they set up--they tend to set up rather elaborate
government structures even if they are, in some cases,
fictitious. So in Iraq I was delighted to discover that al
Qa'ida and Iraq had an Emir of Administration. I think if only
we could get them to do their planning on PowerPoint, we would
be a long way towards success in this effort.
But that kind of bureaucratization is not the sort of thing
that you saw from terrorist groups that really see themselves
as terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
fighting the British, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
fighting the Spanish. They define themselves politically sort
of as insurgencies, but they don't have the same elaborated
political superstructure that they intend to impose.
And the reason why that matters is because terrain actually
matters to these guys. Where they plant the flag, they intend
to stay. And if you take it away from them, it is a blow to
them. And all of their rhetoric during and after the Iraq surge
demonstrated that they saw that as a defeat. They did not just
see it as, Oh, well, that didn't work out; we will go somewhere
else. They saw that as a defeat.
They saw what the Lebanese military did to a burgeoning al
Qa'ida cell within Palestinian camps in Lebanon as a defeat.
They saw the fact that the Saudi Government drove al Qa'ida in
the Arabian Peninsula largely out of Saudi Arabia into Yemen as
a defeat.
So this is not a group that will, with any joy, pick up and
leave from this particular area, which makes this particular
area important. And it is one of the reasons why recapturing
Afghanistan is an important objective for these guys.
Now, Mr. Chairman, you raised the excellent question of how
are these groups intertwined; and I think that has also been
blurred in the discussion somewhat. There is no meaningful
difference in the ideology that the Taliban, the Afghan Taliban
pursues, the ideology that the Pakistani Taliban pursues and
the ideology that al Qa'ida pursues. They all agree that
temporal secular states are evidence of apostasy and, in fact,
of polytheism.
They all agree on the basics of how the Muslim community
should be ruled. The Afghan Taliban, the Quetta Shura Taliban
sees itself as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It is the
franchise that will control that part of territory. The Tehrik-
e Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) sees itself as the franchise that
will control Pakistan. But all of that is under the umbrella of
an al Qa'ida effort to reestablish the caliphate for the entire
Islamic world.
So there is a differentiation in the sense of the Taliban
group saying, This is our front, that is your front and this is
somebody else's front. But there is not a differentiation in
terms of the objective. And I think it is very important to
understand that, as well, because if you ask the question, is
the Afghan Taliban now plotting to attack the United States
here, the answer is ``no.'' If you ask the question, is there
any basis to believe that over the long term if you allowed the
Taliban to persist in Afghanistan, it would not develop in the
direction of pursuing global jihadism, the answer is ``no.''
There is no reason particularly to think that, except that it
hasn't had the opportunity to do that yet. But it would be
fully consonant with its ideology to pursue that objective.
The Tehrik-e Taliban in Pakistan has already indicated that
it had the objective of attacking the United States. Baitullah
Mehsud said he would attack the White House. Now, there is not
a lot of teeth behind that, but you do have the stated
intention.
So when you are talking about defeating al Qa'ida, I don't
believe that you can separate that from the problem of
defeating its allies and its local proxies. And that is how we
get to counterinsurgency. And that is why I think that a
counterterrorism strategy has to be embedded within a
counterinsurgency strategy, or at least has to be married to a
counterinsurgency--it doesn't necessarily have to be
subordinate to it--because I don't think that we can succeed
with a counterterrorism strategy that actually aims at what I
think we need to aim at, which is defeating these organizations
without defeating the insurgent groups.
And I would like to just make a couple of quick points and
then I will stop. First of all, there is a straw-man argument
that is sometimes put out that some of us have been religiously
converted to the ideology of counterinsurgency, and wherever
there is a conflict, we see an insurgency and we want to use a
counterinsurgency approach. I certainly don't feel that way. I
know that General McChrystal doesn't feel that way.
It is weird to make that comment about General McChrystal.
This subcommittee probably knows General McChrystal better than
any collection of Congressmen that there are. This guy knows
all about counterterrorism. If he is coming to tell you that
you need to do counterinsurgency, it is not because he has
drunk that particular Kool-Aid.
I just look at this and say, Look, you have this alliance
of groups with similar objectives. We have to defeat them all.
Though on our side of the border, the ones we are facing are
primarily insurgents. The way that you fight insurgents is with
counterinsurgency doctrine. If they weren't insurgent groups, I
wouldn't be advocating that. And I think that is an important
straw man.
And lastly, I will tee this up so that my colleagues can
defend their propositions. I will show my cards in advance
instead of ambushing them. I want, first of all, to correct
what I am sure was an unintentional misstatement in Bob Pape's
recent op-ed. General McChrystal's own report says--he explains
that American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
forces are a major cause of the deteriorating situation because
they have been viewed as foreign occupiers.
The assessment does not say that. I don't believe that
General McChrystal anywhere says that he believes that American
forces are seen as occupiers. And, in fact, the assessment has
prominently a quotation from the Afghan defense minister who
says, Afghans have never seen you as occupiers, even though
this has been the major focus of the enemy's propaganda
campaign.
And I think it is an important point because I don't agree
with the assertion that we are generating this problem by our
presence in Afghanistan, and I don't believe--I think that
there is also a problem with the statistical correlation of
rise in violence as resulting from increased troop presence.
In fact, the increased troop presence has lagged behind the
rise of violence generally. For example, in fiscal year 2005,
there were about 19,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. In fiscal
year 2007, there were about 23,700 U.S. soldiers in
Afghanistan. Pretty constant. By the way, a tiny footprint. If
that is an occupation, then one soldier is an occupation.
With 19,000 American troops in a country of 30-some million
people, one-and-a-half times the size of Iraq, virtually no
Afghan ever sees an American soldier. So what you are talking
about is enemy propaganda. And I would submit to you that the
minimum required number of American troops in order to be
occupiers is one.
But in that period, the number of suicide attacks, as Bob
points out, went from 9 to 142. Was that a response to the
increase by 4,500 American soldiers? I don't think so. That is
not what that was about.
What was going on was that in the period between 2002 and
2005, the insurgent--the Taliban, which had been eliminated
from power in 2001 in Afghanistan was reconstituting. It was
redeveloping its capability. It was reestablishing its networks
within Afghanistan; it was reestablishing its leadership
structure and preparing for an insurgency.
It began to launch that insurgency in 2005, which is why
violence began to rise. We very slowly and cautiously--too
slowly and cautiously in my view--started to increase our
forces in response to that. Naturally, that created more
military targets for the Taliban to go after, which is one of
the reasons Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) went up.
In other words, I dispute the causal relationship between
the presence of U.S. forces and the increase in violence here.
This was an insurgency that had as its objective retaking
Afghanistan not because we were there, but because they had
been the government. That is what they were trying to do. And
they would have done that whether we were there or not.
The question we have to decide is, do we think it is okay
if they do? Or do we think it is okay--do we think that we can
have a counterterrorism strategy with the civil war that will
ensue if we abandon the effort to establish counterinsurgency?
Now, civil war may ensue anyway. We can fail. This is war.
There are no guarantees. But I am as confident as I can be that
if we adopt a remote approach to counterterrorism here, not
only will we have a failed--totally, completely failed--state
in Afghanistan with a lot of regional consequences that are
very troubling, but I also believe we will have failed on the
counterterrorism mission.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Smith. Dr. Pape.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT A. PAPE, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Dr. Pape. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
honored to be here today and pleased to discuss General Stanley
McChrystal's proposal to commit an additional 40,000 troops to
Afghanistan.
General McChrystal's recommendation reflects a growing
consensus that our current force levels cannot win the war
against the Taliban; and his proposal has been called an
``ambitious new course.'' In truth, however, it is not new and
not ambitious enough.
America will best serve its interest in Afghanistan and the
region by shifting to a new strategy, offshore balancing, which
relies on air and naval power from a distance while also
working with local security forces on the ground. The reason
becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks
in Afghanistan in recent years.
General McChrystal's own report explains that American and
NATO military forces themselves are a major cause of the
deteriorating situation for two reasons. First, Western forces
have become increasingly viewed as foreign occupiers. You see
the quote on the screen from the report itself.
Second, Western forces are viewed as supporting an
illegitimate central government--again, directly from the
report itself. Unfortunately, these political facts dovetail
strongly with military developments in the last few years.
In 2001, the United States toppled the Taliban and kicked
al Qa'ida out of Afghanistan with just a few thousand American
troops and mainly with a combination of American air power and
local ground forces from the Northern Alliance. Then, for the
next several years, the United States and NATO modestly
increased their footprint to about 20,000, mainly limiting the
mission to guarding Kabul. Up until this point, 2004, there was
little terrorism in Afghanistan and little sense that things
were deteriorating.
Then the United States and NATO began to systematically
extend their military presence across Afghanistan. This is
NATO's own map of their plan to extend that presence. The goals
were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time
and to eradicate poppy crops. Western military forces were
deployed in all major regions of Afghanistan, including the
Pashtun areas in the south and the east in 2006.
Over these years, Western troop levels escalated
incrementally from 20,000 in 2004 to 50,000 in 2007 to nearly
90,000 today. General McChrystal's request for another 40,000
is simply the next step in this escalation.
As Western occupation grew, the use of the two worst forms
of terrorism in Afghanistan, suicide attacks and IEDs,
escalated in parallel. Let me focus on suicide terrorism, the
biggest killer and greatest threat to Americans and the focus
of my personal research efforts funded by Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Carnegie Corporation in New
York.
There were no--as you can see from the slide, no recorded
suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001 and only a small
number in the immediate aftermath of America's conquest of the
Taliban. But in 2006, suicide attacks rose ten times and have
continued at that high level ever since. These attacks have
been concentrated against security targets, that is, American
and Western ground forces, not Afghan civilians, and nearly all
the suicide attackers have been Afghans.
The picture is clear. The more Western troops have gone to
Afghanistan, the more local residents have viewed themselves
under foreign occupation and are using suicide and other
terrorism to resist it.
I will be glad, by the way, in Q&A, sir, to respond to Dr.
Kagan's specific challenges to this. If you would let me just
continue with my prepared statement at the moment now, we will
have plenty of time for that.
Our central purpose in Afghanistan is to prevent future 9/
11s. And this, first and foremost, requires stopping the rise
of a new generation of anti-American terrorists, particularly
suicide terrorists, the super-predators who can kill large
numbers of people.
What motivates suicide terrorists is not the existence of a
terrorist sanctuary, but the presence of foreign forces on land
they prize. So it is little surprise that American troops on
Pashtun homelands are producing anti-American Pashtun
attackers.
Second, it would be helpful to prevent a safe haven for
terrorists, for them to use either as training or as safe areas
for their leaders. This is not as important as our main goal,
since the main training for the 9/11 hijackers occurred in
American flight schools, but this goal would help disrupt
terrorist ability to organize and inspire any new recruits with
impunity.
Alas, adding 40,000 new troops is unlikely to achieve
either of our goals. It would probably add to the sense of
occupation, while not preventing Taliban areas from spreading.
The reason is clear when you compare General McChrystal's
request to the requirements for counterinsurgency (COIN) in
General Petraeus' COIN manual.
The Petraeus counterinsurgency manual has two requirements,
and McChrystal's recommendation falls short on both. The first
is the need for a legitimate central government around which to
rally local support from the population. In fact, I am quoting
you directly from General Petraeus' manual that this is
actually the most important of our objectives.
And, of course, the widespread fraud by Karzai in the
August election raises a serious issue about whether our
military forces are now engaged in supporting an illegitimate
government that does not have the consent of the people.
The second requirement is a 1-to-50 ratio of troops to
population. For Afghanistans, over 13 million Pashtuns in the
south and the east, this comes to 265,000 troops or 175,000
troops beyond our current level, or 135,000 beyond General
McChrystal's request. Hence, adding 40,000 troops for COIN
would be a half-measure that does not guarantee success by its
own doctrine while increasing the sense of occupation that
motivates suicide terrorists.
I think we need to consider other alternatives. Overall, I
believe our best strategy is offshore balancing, relying on
air, naval and rapidly deployable ground forces, combined with
training and equipping local groups to oppose the Taliban. This
strategy is what toppled the Taliban when it controlled 90
percent of the country in 2001, and it is our best way to
prevent the Taliban from seizing Kabul, establishing
significant terrorist camps in Afghanistan and controlling
large areas as safe havens for Taliban and al Qa'ida leaders.
It is also a strategy that will prevent the rise of a new
generation of anti-American suicide terrorists, and so achieve
our core interests in Afghanistan.
We should transition to this strategy over the next two or
three years, say, by the end of President Obama's first term.
And given the ethnic divisions in the country, the first
step is to use political and economic means to empower local
Pashtuns to achieve greater autonomy from all outsiders,
creating a third option between the Taliban and Western
domination. A similar strategy of empowering Sunni groups in
Anbar reduced anti-American terrorism in Iraq and is our best
way forward in Afghanistan.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer you to my written
testimony which includes background slides for a strategy of
local empowerment in Pashtun areas.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pape can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Smith. Mr. Nelson.
STATEMENT OF RICK ``OZZIE'' NELSON, SENIOR FELLOW,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Nelson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Miller,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss this important topic.
I come to you today as a recently retired Navy officer who
has spent most of his last decade focused on the challenges of
combating global terrorism, including assignments at the
National Counterterrorism Center and the National Security
Council. In April, I returned from a tour of duty in
Afghanistan where I was director of a joint task force in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom. During the next few
minutes, I plan to discuss the threats posed by al Qa'ida and
other terror groups and how they should figure into debates
over U.S.-NATO strategy in South Asia.
It can be difficult to assess the current state of al
Qa'ida and other globally focused terrorist organizations. We
are told that Afghanistan has fewer than 100 al Qa'ida
operatives, but that the failure of the Afghan Government will
lead to the group's inevitable return to the State.
The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
reports that al Qa'ida's haven in the federally administered
tribal areas, the FATA, is shrinking. You have militants there,
including al Qa'ida, that have launched a spate of attacks in
Pakistan over the last weeks. And descriptions of al Qa'ida's
crisis of leadership are tempered by revelations of a suspected
jihadist cell in New York.
Here is what we do know: Al Qa'ida remains intent on
attacking the United States and our friends and allies across
the globe. The organization maintains transnational reach, but
is rooted in Pakistan's semi-governed tribal areas. As Admiral
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted
recently, any al Qa'ida attack on the U.S. is likely to emerge
from the FATA.
On a more immediate level, al Qa'ida operatives in
northwest Pakistan are believed to have teamed with other
militant groups, including the TTP and recent attacks in
Pakistan and India.
Al Qa'ida offshoots remain active beyond South Asia. Al
Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) gained notoriety for its brutality during
the early stages of the Iraq war. While its influence has
subsided since the Sunni awakenings, AQI, still threatens
regional stability in the Middle East.
I have increasing concern there are several al Qa'ida
associated groups in North Africa, Southeast Asia, Yemen and
Somalia. The case of Somalia, like Pakistan, highlights the
dangers posed by collaboration among different extremist
groups. In recent testimony before the Senate Homeland Security
Committee, FBI Director Robert Mueller suggested that the
Somalian insurgent group al-Shabaab has grown close to al
Qa'ida. This development has helped propel al-Shabaab,
originally a Somali-focused insurgency, into a terrorist
organization with global reach, including contacts in the
United States. This trend is illustrated by a recently
uncovered plot to recruit Minnesota-based Somali immigrants to
fight with al-Shabaab.
Along these same lines, officials in September arrested
three Afghan citizens and U.S. legal residents on charges of
lying in a matter involving terrorism. The key figure in these
arrests, Najibullah Zazi is believed to have been planning
explosive attacks in New York after receiving training at an al
Qa'ida camp in Pakistan in 2008.
While these developments represent an expansion and a
flattening of al Qa'ida's global scope, they should not be
taken to minimize the continued importance of the group's
senior leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri. On a functional level, these men remain active, most
likely in Pakistan's semi-governed tribal areas. On a larger,
more symbolic level, they drive al Qa'ida's agenda by inspiring
future jihadists and by reminding everyone, including U.S.
officials, of their organization's resilience.
Successfully combating al Qa'ida ultimately will require
puncturing the group's cult of personality by capturing and
killing senior leaders, including bin Laden and Zawahiri.
What I have tried to do in this brief overview is to show
that al Qa'ida, despite certain setbacks, remains global in
scale and determined to attack the United States. The epicenter
of its power lies in Pakistan's semi-governed tribal areas.
It is important to appreciate how this fact relates to
Afghanistan. We should recall that the U.S. invaded Afghanistan
to defeat al Qa'ida, but ask foreign policy analysts why U.S.
and NATO forces remain in Afghanistan today and you are likely
to see a flurry of different responses. Defeating the Taliban,
stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan and maintaining American
credibility are just a few of several reasons given in addition
to counterterrorism for our continued presence in the country.
These are all laudable goals, but the White House must
ensure that combating global terrorism generally and al Qa'ida
specifically remains a strategic anchor in Afghanistan. Framing
American interests in this fashion will lead us to ask
important questions of the various strategies now being
debated.
I will conclude by posing just one question: What effect
would additional troops in Afghanistan have on the stability of
Pakistan? After September 11th, American troops and our allies
essentially pushed extremists out of Afghanistan and into
Pakistan, which heightened terrorist activity in northwestern
Pakistan. Over the last year in particular, we have seen a mix
of al Qa'ida, TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militants strike
large Pakistani cities and military facilities with increasing
frequency. Meanwhile, the FATA haven serves as a primary base
for al Qa'ida's global terrorist agenda. These developments are
troubling not just because they endanger a nuclear armed
regime, but because the U.S. is largely powerless to combat the
threat without Pakistani support.
Fortunately, Pakistan's military has just become a 30,000-
troop assault on al Qa'ida- and Taliban-controlled territories
in South Waziristan, the type of campaign that U.S.
policymakers have long sought. As Pakistan confronts extremists
in its northwest, we must be careful to ensure that any U.S.
troop increases do not push insurgents in Afghanistan across
the border. This would effectively heighten extremist activity
in the FATA and make Islamabad's mission even more difficult.
Indeed, in meeting with General Petraeus and Senator Kerry
earlier this week, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani asked
the U.S. and NATO forces to restrict militant infiltration from
Afghanistan into Pakistan.
In the end, any regional strategy which shores up
Afghanistan while destabilizing Pakistan will detract from our
goals of combating terrorism.
I would be happy to elaborate on this and any other issues
during our questions. Thank you again for inviting me to speak
today. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you all.
I will start with--we will put everybody on the five-minute
clock. I will try to get two questions in. I will just start
with one basic one for Dr. Pape.
I think you have hit upon one of the great challenges of
what any counterterrorism or counterinsurgency effort is. You
have to defeat the terrorists without alienating the
population. In some places, that is easier than others. In the
Philippines we have had some success, I think in that area
because it was not as violent and as out of control. And we had
a local partner that we could work with.
But the one question I have off the top about your strategy
of a sort of standoff approach, I mean, we are going to be
creating just as many terrorists, if not more, if we are
bombing them from afar than if we happen to be in their village
trying to fight them that way. In fact, that is one of the
things that General McChrystal has really focused on, this
standoff aerial campaign approach has vastly more civilian
casualties and alienates the population even to a greater
extent. So what are we truly accomplishing if we say we are
going to cut in half the number of troops and just launch
missiles at you?
Dr. Pape. Sir, I think your question is excellent. And I am
not calling for sort of increasing numbers of drone attacks. I
am not calling for let's just kind of replace ground troops
with still more application of air power. In fact, I think that
probably what we need to look at is actually even a reduction
in our drone attacks.
Let me explain this by showing you the kind of base that
bin Laden had in Afghanistan in 2001 before 9/11. I think it
would be very helpful. I am not sure, you may have seen this
base before, sir; but this is what we call a ``terrorist
camp.'' Notice how--this is a base, sir; this is like Maxwell
Air Force base where I taught for three years.
So when we talk about a terrorist training facility before
9/11 that al Qa'ida had in Afghanistan, we don't mean three
buildings. We don't mean one safe house for some suicide
terrorists somewhere in----
Mr. Smith. Got that. I am a little short in time here. How
are we working back to the question?
Dr. Pape. The question is, sir, that I believe what we need
to do is focus on preventing camps, large camps, not every safe
house.
And so, sir, I think that if we are going to attack safe
houses, then we need to be much more judicious in attacking
safe houses. And specifically, sir, we need to ask the
following risk/reward question.
At the moment, the way risk/reward works when we go after
safe houses, as you probably know, is we run it through Judge
Advocate General (JAG) and what we do is we say, is the benefit
of getting this terrorist worth the loss of X number of Afghan
civilians on the side?
The real risk/reward ratio, sir, is different. Every time
we go after a safe house, what that is going to do is probably
produce collateral damage which will produce suicide terrorists
who will want to kill Americans.
Mr. Smith. General McChrystal quotes that all the time. I
will come back to that. I have another question.
But the trap is, either we are fighting them or we are not,
to a certain extent. If the strategy is, we are going to pull
back and stop fighting them, I think that the benefit that you
identify is there, but the detriment is there as well. There is
this--there is no way no matter how you do it, to sort of half-
fight them and fight them in a way that doesn't create some
animosity.
So whether you are doing it standoff, whether you are being
careful about what you are bombing, wherever you are at, if you
are accepting as part of the strategy that there are bad guys
there that we need to try to take out in some way, we are still
kind of in that tension that you have.
But I want to ask Dr. Kagan. I mean, the big question
here--and this is the challenge. We don't have a local partner.
We certainly can't put enough troops in there to do a
counterinsurgency for the full population, the 30 million
population. These are both true. I mean, part of the strategy
that is talked about now is going to try to secure pieces of
the population within classic counterinsurgency doctrine.
We also have a major problem in terms of unity of effort.
We have so many people involved there, not just militarily, but
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), various development
groups. I mean, they are all sort of going past each other and
wasting money in an incredibly inefficient way.
With those three great challenges, how do we go forward and
implement even a more limited, more strategic counterinsurgency
strategy?
Dr. Kagan. If this were easy, you probably wouldn't be
holding hearings about it, and we wouldn't be having this
discussion. It is hard.
I want to make note of the fact that what--the quote from
FM3-24 actually is that the primary objective of
counterinsurgency is to foster the development of an effective
and legitimate government. That is an output; it is not an
input. You don't--it is not the case that you can't do
counterinsurgency if the government is not legitimate. If the
government----
Mr. Smith. Don't get me wrong. Just for the record, I want
to be clear that I don't buy into this notion that unless you
can, like, build Minneapolis in Afghanistan, somehow you don't
have an effective counterinsurgency strategy, that unless you
can have an overwhelming force, you can't possibly succeed. I
mean, we saw that wasn't true in Iraq.
I think you can have a more limited, realistic goal and
still have an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
So this idea that counterinsurgency is some big, grand--
presto, instantaneously build the most modern, sophisticated
civilization ever is ridiculous. So I am with you on that.
But from that, there is a good deal of distance between
that and where we are at in Afghanistan, and I am trying to
carve out what that realistic strategy is.
Dr. Kagan. And you have put your finger on one of the most
glaring lacunae in the administration's approach to this
problem. General McChrystal has put together--in my biased
opinion, since I have participated in it--a very good
assessment of the situation and a very good recommendation for
a military plan that also goes pretty far toward recommending
some of the key political changes that need to be made.
Mr. Smith. It says a heck of a lot more than 40,000 more
troops. Everyone is fixed on the 40,000 more troops. It is a
60-some-odd page report that gets into a lot of important
detail.
Dr. Kagan. The question is, where is the political
strategy? Where is Ambassador Holbrooke's assessment and
recommendation? Where is Ambassador Eikenberry's assessment and
recommendation? Where is Secretary Clinton on this?
This is, I hope--as the Obama administration goes through
this review, I believe--if you come to a second round of
questions and want to spend more time on this, I can lay out
what I think something like that would look like.
Mr. Smith. I think we will do that.
I don't want to set a bad precedent here, so we will go to
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
And, Dr. Kagan, I agree. I think there is a weak link, and
that weak link may very well be with State Department in
regards to what their activities are going to be.
But I would assume that all three of you read or are aware
of Max Boot's article yesterday in the New York Times. Could
you comment a little bit on the statement that he made that
said, basically, only by sending more personnel, military and
civilian, can President Obama improve the Afghan Government's
performance, reverse the Taliban's gains and prevent al
Qa'ida's allies from regaining the ground they lost after 9/11?
Could you?
Dr. Pape. Yes, sir. I am glad to.
I think--I respect Max. I think that he is right that where
our troops are at the moment--that is, if you take our military
forces and put them down in a certain area, a neighborhood--
they are able to pacify that area. I have great respect for our
troops.
The problem that we have is that the COIN doctrine would
require 265,000 American forces for this purpose, and we just
simply don't have the troops to do that. And that is only for
the south and the east, and that would be if we abandoned all
of the rest of Afghanistan.
So the problem we have, sir, is, if we are going to sort of
go big, then we have to be still more ambitious because this
idea of the gradual drip by drip by drip that we have been
going through for the last few years, I am afraid is actually
producing more suicide terrorists than it is killing.
Dr. Kagan. If I can comment, first of all, I have to take
exception with the COIN math that is being laid out here. It is
not a requirement of one American soldier for every 50 of the
population. It is a requirement for one counterinsurgent for
every 50 of the population. And in counterinsurgents we include
American soldiers, we include the NATO forces that are
operating, which are a significant number of troops, and we
also include any effective, indigenous forces that are
operating. And in this case, there are about 100,000 troops in
the Afghan National Army, and they are pretty darned effective.
The Afghan National Police I am willing not to count
because they are very corrupt and inefficient and so forth,
although elements of them operate.
That gets you up to about 200,000 right now. If you add
40,000 American troops, it gets you up to 240,000. We are
planning to bring Afghan National Army, just army, up to
134,000 by next year. That covers the gap. So the notion that
this is not doable from the standpoint of the COIN math, I
respectfully disagree with that.
But the key point in your question, which I really think
needs to be emphasized, is that American troops and NATO troops
affect governance at the local level and they can affect
governance at the national level, too. And we saw this very
clearly in Iraq.
American forces engaged in counterinsurgency do not simply
spend their time kicking down doors and pulling bad people out
and shooting people. They also spend their time being eyes and
ears on the ground, developing tremendous assets, especially
for local intelligence, and in turn feeding that up the chain
of command. And in Iraq, the model that I would give you for
the role that the military can play in developing governance is
how we curbed sectarian death squad activity, supported by
senior leaders within the Iraqi Government, relying on
intelligence that was developed by our soldiers on the ground;
and relying on those soldiers, those officers on the ground--
brigade commanders, battalion commanders, sometimes company
commanders--to address malign actors within their areas and
then coordinate with senior leadership to address at the
highest level.
I believe that that approach can be modified to address the
fact that it is not sectarian death squads in Afghanistan, it
is abuse of power and corruption and so forth to identify and
put pressure on key malign actors to facilitate a governance
program. But the military is an essential component of that
because without the military forces you don't have the access
to the population that you need to understand what is going on
and affect it.
Mr. Miller. Dr. Pape, could you respond to the math?
Dr. Pape. Yes, sir. I think the best way is to actually do
it in Iraq and Anbar, because we had a similar situation. You
remember in Iraq, we had this huge problem, this insurgent out-
of-control problem, especially in Anbar. We also had this whole
debate were we building an Iraqi Army and so forth and was it
going to work and all that kind of stuff.
But let's look right at Anbar, sir. If you look at the
chart about what actually changed in Anbar, between September
2006 and September 2008--I am sure you have seen charts that
the attacks went down against Americans. That definitely
happened; Anbar definitely quieted down. The question is why.
First, American troops and the coalition did not actually
increase their aggregate number of troops. We did put more
troops in Iraq, but as others were leaving. So we essentially,
in the aggregate, came down.
Second, if you look at the number of troops specifically in
Anbar, they only go up a teeny, tiny amount. The real change--
and we would have needed 100,000 by COIN doctrine. The real
change occurred in the Sons of Iraq; that is, they went from
5,000 in September 2006 to 100,000 in September 2008.
So, sir, yes, the COIN math probably does work and, yes,
locals can backfill. But we actually have to have real locals
from the local area doing the heavy lifting. That is what we
did in Anbar, and that actually worked quite successfully. And
what my local empowerment strategy is calling for is to try to
do the same thing to a large degree in the Pashtun areas of
east and southern Afghanistan.
And let me also just add, sir, I was not against the idea
of sending 20,000 troops to Baghdad in December 2006. I
supported the idea here of what became called The Surge in
Baghdad because there you had Sunnis killing Shi'a, Shi'a
killing Sunnis.
That is not what we have here in Afghanistan. We do not
have Tajiks killing Pashtuns. We do not have Pashtuns killing--
we don't have this big rivalry that way.
What we basically have is an ideological battle occurring
among the Pashtun south; and for that, it is very similar to
Anbar. Anbar is our best analogy, not Baghdad. And this is what
happened and what calmed down Anbar.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
panel for your very thoughtful testimony here today. And it is
obviously very helpful as we are all struggling in trying to
get our arms around the way forward in Afghanistan.
I guess at this point my question would be, assuming that
we, instead of going with the counterinsurgency strategy, we
focus more on the counterterrorism strategy, as Mr. Pape has
suggested, what is the best- and worst-case scenario of that
strategy?
I would like to hear from Mr. Pape and then, if I could,
Mr. Kagan.
Dr. Pape. Thank you, sir. I think that is an excellent
question.
I think that the worst-case scenario is essentially a
freeze of today's status quo. I think that it is the case today
that, as best I can tell, the Taliban control--and what I mean,
by ``control'' is, they are in village areas 24/7, with sharia
courts, something like 10 percent of Afghanistan and about 20
percent of the southern areas in the south and in the east.
I think that my strategy is effectively calling for the
containment of those areas and then the gradual shrinking of
those areas over time through this local empowerment strategy.
But it may not work. I think that this--the worst case, though,
is that it stays the same.
And what I think is the best case is that as we shift to
the offshore balancing strategy over the next two or three
years, you will see the radical reduction in suicide attacks,
anti-American suicide attacks, that we are now seeing in Iraq
as we are building up the local militias in Anbar Province.
What that has done is, it is allowing us to actually withdraw
forces.
And we are not just withdrawing forces from the country.
Notice how we pulled them back from cities. Over the last year
and a half, we have had a radical difference in the military
occupation of Iraq and that has actually caused suicide attacks
in Iraq to go down almost 85 percent.
Mr. Smith. I am sorry. I just have to interrupt.
Obviously, the best way to prevent suicide attacks against
U.S. troops is to pull the troops out. There isn't any argument
with that because then they are not there to be attacked.
The argument and the issue is, what does that do to the
Taliban's ability to control greater amounts of territory and
not, in essence, be stopped? That is the tension.
Dr. Pape. Sir, I would add one other point which is that
our presence there is not only threatening--it is not just
suicide attacks against our troops. We just arrested an Afghan
national from Colorado with links to this area, clearly
motivated by--or possibly, allegedly motivated anyway by our
presence there--who was doing reconnaissance for attacks in the
New York subway system.
So, sir, I would not think that what is happening is that
the threat to Americans of suicide--anti-American suicide
terrorism is limited to what is happening in Afghanistan. I am
afraid that what we have seen time and again--in Madrid, what
we have seen in the London bombings--what we have seen is that
this motivates suicide terrorists to attack us here, or our
allies.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Kagan, best-case and worst-case scenario if we go with
counterterrorism versus counterinsurgency.
Dr. Kagan. Osama bin Laden's given reason for attacking the
United States was because of the presence of American forces in
Saudi Arabia at the invitation of the Saudi Government which he
defined as an occupation. If you are going to call for making
decisions based on the enemy's propaganda line, then I think
you are going to have a very difficult time coming up with any
rational strategy.
I completely disagree with Dr. Pape's analysis of what the
worst-case scenario is. The Taliban is very strong now in the
south, and it has been gaining strength. This is General
McChrystal's assessment, and it is the assessment of almost
anyone who has looked at the situation over there.
Were we to reduce our footprint significantly and move to a
counterterrorism approach, Kandahar City would fall rapidly
into Taliban control. They now control and effectively govern
almost all of the areas around Kandahar City. Helmand River
valley would also fall back under complete Taliban control
where now we are contesting areas within it. The surrounding
provinces of Oruzgan, Zabol, Ghazni into Farah, Nimruz would
also fall under complete Taliban control. The Government of
Afghanistan does not have the military capability to prevent
this from happening.
We are still--we have already begun to see the mobilization
of the Tajiks and Uzbeks in response to the perception that the
United States might be pulling out and abandoning them to this
conflict, and I believe that there is a very high probability
that you would see a full-scale civil war reemerge as either
those groups launched preemptive attacks to prevent a Taliban
takeover of the sort that occurred in the mid-1990s or that the
Taliban launch such a takeover attempt, which is clearly its
intent.
I don't see any force in Afghanistan right now that would
be capable of resisting the Taliban's pressure or deterring the
reemergence of the Northern Alliance and the redevelopment of a
civil war.
In that scenario, it is impossible for me to imagine that
the United States will be maintaining footprints within
Afghanistan from which to be conducting counterterrorism
operations. I think that is a preposterous notion from a
logistical standpoint, from an image standpoint, and I think it
is militarily infeasible. So that is the worst case. I also
think that it is the most likely case.
We can describe a best case, I suppose, in which the
Northern Alliance, perhaps with our assistance, crushes the
Taliban, crushes the south and then we somehow manage to
support them over the years in maintaining dictatorial rule
over the Pashtuns which will inflame Pashtun nationalism
throughout the region. But I can hardly call that a good
scenario. I do not believe there is any good scenario that can
emerge from the adoption of such a strategy.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Dr. Pape, back to your math again on the 50-to-1 ratio. In
the COIN strategy it is a 50-to-1 strategy, but you make the
argument when you talk about Anbar, it doesn't say, that I am
aware of, that it is 50-to-1 U.S. or International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) troops that make up that ratio. It
talks about police, military, U.S. troops, ISAF troops.
And you make the case in Anbar province that it was the
Sunni awakening, that is what raised the ratio up and that is
the success. And I think that is the same thing that General
McChrystal is trying to accomplish in Afghanistan.
But you keep coming back to it, that it is faulty. I don't
understand what your math is. And when you put the numbers
together, you can achieve that if we have the right people
there to train up the Afghan army and the Afghan police.
Dr. Pape. Yes, sir. I don't think the real issue here is
actually discrepancy over math per se. I think that everybody
recognizes that we need local allies to help us in Afghanistan.
That is what you are really hearing. So we should just go focus
right on that issue.
This issue of trying to kind of hold things together--you
know, bit by bit by bit with another half-measure, another
half-deployment of American forces--is actually pushing off the
day when we will be able to truly engage the local population;
and that is really our dilemma.
And the reason we are not able to engage the local
population today is not that we haven't tried. We have sort of
offered money and we have offered bribes, but we have done it
in a way where we are expecting the local population, the
Pashtuns, to basically become employees of the central
government; that is, to fall under the broad rubric of the
central government, sir.
That is not what we did in Anbar. The Anbar awakening is
not being run by the Shi'a. In fact, if you remember, sir, in
Iraq, the Shi'a government was opposing this precisely because
they were partners, not employees.
So our real----
Mr. Smith. Sorry to do this again.
How does that get--and I am with you totally about the
mistakes. And McChrystal talks a lot about those mistakes as
well and how you need to change that. But how does that get
easier to flip those people if we start pulling out en masse?
How do--I mean, you are looking to flip a local Taliban
person. He is, like, okay, the Taliban is here and they are
headed out. It just doesn't make any sense.
Dr. Pape. Yes, sir. What is strengthening the Taliban today
is not their numbers. Because, as you know probably better than
I do, the assessments by the experts are that there is
somewhere between 10,000 and 40,000 Taliban fighters in the
country; and, of those, the experts are kind of agreeing that
10,000 are the hard core. Well, that is the number. So the
Taliban clearly are not winning by numbers of hard-core
fighters. What they are winning by is support from the local
population, which they are getting from three sources:
Number one, opposition to America's military presence and
our forces just simply being there and then also carrying out
operations that lead to collateral damage which has not just
happened for a year, but it has been going on nearly eight
years, sir. Second is money. Third is arms, in some cases.
So what I am calling for, sir, is to reverse-engineer those
three reasons for that local support.
Mr. Shuster. What you left out was the fear factor. We were
there once, and we left them, and the Taliban came back in and
started to kill people. That is another reason why they are not
trusting us to be there, and now I think that is what General
McChrystal is reversing.
And following what the chairman has said, how do you get
them to trust us when you pull in and you pull out and you let
the bad guys in?
I am pretty clear on your position. I don't agree with it.
But I would like to ask--I read a recent article in
Strategic Forum that talked about the most significant problem
in Iraq; and turning to Mr. Nelson first, if I could, the unity
of effort on our part. We have dozens of international
organizations, other countries in there. How do we pull that
together and make that unity of effort not only with the dozens
of countries but with our own military units over there? And
where do you see that improving? Or how does it improve? Mr.
Nelson.
Mr. Nelson. That is a terrific question. I think that is
one of the reasons why the civilian component of our policy
over there is so important.
General McChrystal's strategy is the military strategy. We
talk about the military surge, but we need a civilian surge as
well. Those are the individuals who will help bring these
different entities together.
Information-sharing among the NATO partners remains a
serious issue. Obviously, we have information-sharing caveats
with some of our closest allies and partners. But some of the
folks that we rely on the ground every single day, we don't
share those same caveats.
The good news is General McChrystal has taken that on and
has said, I want to take the risk of sharing information
because I think the benefits outweigh those actual risks. That
is something that I think, from a Washington, D.C.,
perspective, that we can continue to do, is push the folks back
here to curtail some of those information-sharing restrictions.
Mr. Shuster. I think one of the important things that I
have seen him do is he appointed General Miller to take on 500
or 400 officers who are going to be committed to a three-year
period. And I have asked the State Department on a number of
occasions are they doing the same kind of effort, and they
continue to say ``yes,'' but I see no evidence of that.
Somebody here mentioned that General McChrystal's
assessment didn't include Ambassador Eikenberry or Ambassador
Holbrooke. So it seems to me like there is still a huge problem
between State and DOD coming together, having a model. Petraeus
and Crocker, they worked together seamlessly. So what are your
thoughts on the State Department and what they are doing or not
doing, Dr. Kagan?
Dr. Kagan. Well, as I said, I think we are yet to see the
development of a coherent political strategy, and I think that
is a major failing on the State side.
I think we have seen a mad scramble to try to recover from
a crisis that we got ourselves into through nonfeasance while
it was clear we were headed toward a fraudulent election. I
think what we have gotten to now is a position where we have
expended a tremendous amount of political capital that has not
achieved our political objectives.
So this is not an issue of interagency process or unity of
effort. This is an issue of priority within the State
Department and the way that it is structured and the way that
its individuals are functioning, simply failing to come up with
what should be their purview.
If I could beg your indulgence briefly to comment on
something that has been driving me crazy in this discussion,
which is the characterization of the Sons of Iraq and Anbar,
which I think is being completely mischaracterized, frankly.
First of all, there were not five million people in Anbar.
So the requirement for COIN is not 100,000.
Second of all there, there were either 10,000 or 20,000
Iraqi troops and police that were also in Anbar that were
operating, which is one of the reasons why we got up to the
COIN math at work.
Third of all, one of the key parts of the agreement that we
made all of the initial Sons of Iraq sign was an agreement to
recognize the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and serve it;
and we always had the stated intention, which has now been
realized, of having the Iraqi government pay for the Sons of
Iraq. So it is indeed the Shia who are now in control of that
organization, and they have continued to pay it, and it has
continued to work.
So it is not the case that this movement erupted
spontaneously without us getting to any kind of proper COIN
ratio. Nor is it the case that this was just our agreement with
them and had nothing to do with the Iraqi government.
Mr. Smith. We have votes coming up. I will give Mr. Bright
the last set of questions. This is supposed to take, once we
leave, about a half hour. Hopefully, we could be back by 12:15,
12:20 or so. Do the witnesses have another 25 minutes to take
questions?
Dr. Kagan. Sir, I have an interview at 1:30.
Mr. Smith. Okay, we will try to wrap up fairly quickly
after we return.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I was told that they were going
to hold votes for 30 minutes. The GOP has a briefing going on
right now on Afghanistan, so they are going to hold the board.
So we may have a little more time.
Mr. Smith. We will go to Mr. Bright.
Mr. Bright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very
valuable hearing. It is very obvious from the testimony today
that there is not a clear-cut plan or strategy for our efforts
in Afghanistan. I will be very brief.
My question will go directly to Mr. Nelson. Mr. Nelson, can
you tell me and elaborate somewhat as far as your opinion is
concerned on what is the interconnection between the
Afghanistan and the Pakistan Taliban? What is their
relationship? How interrelated are they? How entwined are they?
Do they share personnel? Do they share funds? If you would, I
find your answer to that very interesting.
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, sir. It is a great question.
Personally, I think it is hard to tell at this juncture. We
are not just dealing with the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan
Taliban. We have divisions in the Afghan Taliban. The Quetta
shura. We have the Haqqani network and Hekmatyar as well; and,
of course, on the Pakistan side, you have the TTP.
Obviously, it is possible that they are sharing funds and
are sharing resources; and some have argued, like Peter Bergen
and Tony Cordesman, that they are intimately connected. But
there are some very important differences, and the other
speakers have highlighted this.
The Taliban's goal in Afghanistan is to be in Afghanistan.
It is not a global agenda. The al Qa'ida's agenda and its
relationship to the Afghanistan Taliban is much more of a
global agenda. That is the major difference there.
So defeating the Afghan Taliban is important for
Afghanistan, but it is not important strategically in the
United States in preventing attacks against the United States,
ultimately.
Mr. Bright. Dr. Pape, let me commend you. I am aware of
your tenure at Maxwell since I am from that area and was mayor
of Montgomery for awhile. Thank you for your service down
there. It is great to see you back up here.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend each person for their
testimony. It has been very educational and very enlightening
for me as a new member. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. I thank the panel for your excellent testimony.
I know we have to run out of here shortly, so I will try to be
brief.
I am still kind of stumped on this issue of occupation, Dr.
Pape, that you spoke of.
Having read the McChrystal report--and I tried to
understand what the General was asking the Commander in Chief--
one thing that sort of stuck out to me right from the get-go
was that the situation is deteriorating. So the request
initially for a troop increase would be followed by sort of
this winning hearts and minds type philosophy of integrating
with the Afghani population so that the intimidation and the
threats to the local populations could be minimized.
I know you didn't get into your specific plan because of
time, and I tried to just skim through it very briefly, but I
am kind of at a loss as to how you would go about integrating
into the Afghani population.
Aside from just money or paying them, how do you give them
the sense that I am going to keep the Taliban and their threats
at bay, and I am going to trust the Americans and the coalition
forces to provide the kind of intelligence or help to the
Americans in what we are trying to accomplish there, without
having the sense that there is security in my village. I feel
emboldened that I don't have to worry about these threats from
the Taliban. How do you do that without having those guys on
the ground in those villages?
Dr. Pape. First, I think it is helpful to be clear when I
said transition over two or three years I don't mean that we
cut and run and pull all our forces out in year one. What I
mean is year one we do a serious local empowerment strategy.
That is why I offered those slides.
Mr. Rooney. How do you do that?
Dr. Pape. Glad to cover that, sir.
Just so you follow the logic of what I am trying to do,
this slide shows you what is happening right now is the more we
occupied, we have to go through the villagers to try to get to
the Taliban. The problem is that the villagers are loyal to the
tribe. They are never going to be loyal to our western values,
at least not in short term, and they are also not loyal to
Islamic fundamentalism.
What we are doing is, by trying to get to the Taliban by
going through the villagers, we are pushing them together. What
my local empowerment strategy is trying to do is pull back from
the occupation and then grow the size of the villager bubble so
that they can contain the Taliban, not without our help at all.
And the way to do that, I have actually gone through and what
the slides do is they offer you a real strategy for doing that.
The key to the strategy is recognizing that, first of all,
the problem we have today is part of our own creation with the
constitution. We wrote or certainly helped construct the
constitution which created for the first time in Afghanistan's
history, sir, a top-down central government with very tight
power of control in the presidency. It is President Karzai who
picks the provincial governors. It would be like President
Obama picking the governor of Illinois.
Mr. Smith. Bad example.
Dr. Pape. Well, I am trying to help you see that this is
not even democracy by our own light, sir. And in this country,
for hundreds of years, governance has gone bottom up from the
tribal level. What we need to understand, the Taliban, we are
giving them opportunities, sir. What we are doing is making it
easy for them to exploit the local grievances against our
occupation because of this top-down political flow, and so we
need to reverse the arrow.
We have had existing programs. I am glad to go through them
in great detail, or some detail, and talk about why they are a
problem. But, as I already hinted at, we are trying to make
Pashtuns employees, not partners. And what I would do
specifically is empower local Pashtun areas but differentially,
not just across the board, but by trying to empower the groups
who are really our potential partners, not those we can't work
with.
What I am doing on this slide is showing you there are
large areas of the south and the east where the authority rests
with tribal leaders and councils, many of which are now
cooperating with the Taliban, but they are not doing it out of
religious affiliation. There are areas controlled by the
Taliban where there are not tribal leaders, or at least not
independently. That is about 20 percent of the south and the
east. And then there are drug lords, about 10 percent. They are
not motivated by either tribe or religion; they are motivated
by money.
What my strategy would do is empower, one; marginalize,
two; and reconcile, three. The remaining slides, we would go
through each policy in detail for those three.
Mr. Smith. If I can follow up--and hopefully we can wrap
this up before the votes--everything you say--well, not
everything but most of what you say makes a great deal of
sense: what we have done wrong, the centralized government,
basically treating the Afghans like employees. All of that is
absolutely true. General McChrystal talks at great length about
all of this in his report, about how we have made the mistake--
by, through and with. Classic counterinsurgency strategy has
been totally ignored here. We have been dictating and
directing, not doing by, through, and with.
But the part that doesn't make any sense is how we can make
this transition that you are describing, to do it differently
with fewer people, for two reasons. Number one--forget the
security issue. That is my second one. I will get to it in a
minute. Just the basics of supporting them in setting up the
rule of law and construction and schools and wells and
everything, less is not more in that situation. They need more
help, not less. So you keep saying we are going to change the
strategy and do it with less people.
Second, the other basic level here is you have got to have
security. What the Taliban are doing village to village is a
classic protection racket. You know, we are the only ones who
can protect you. If you don't trust us to protect you, we will
show you.
If you cannot provide security, they have got no place to
go. I will grant you we need to provide it better. I guess the
way to sort of formulate that question is what Dr. Kagan
described, if we don't increase troops and if we reduce troops,
how the Taliban will continue to spread.
As frustrated as I am by the situation in Afghanistan and
what we have done wrong and what the Afghan government has done
wrong, the lack of a reliable partner, I don't see how, if we
don't increase troops, we begin to pull back in six months,
whatever your timeline is, how the Taliban don't build on their
successes and just take on more and more villages.
You seem to be saying, we are going to change the strategy
and empower them. With what? With whom? How are the Taliban, if
they are doing as well as they are doing right now, how are
they suddenly, magically not going to be doing too well when
there is less resistance to what they are doing?
Dr. Pape. Sir, I am not saying that we should pull out any
troops in the first year, number one.
Mr. Smith. I thought you said the worst-case scenario would
be to keep things as they are.
Dr. Pape. No, no, no, sir. I said the worst-case scenario
would be that things would stay as they are.
Mr. Smith. I don't know how that is different than what I
said.
Dr. Pape. I think his question was after two or three
years. If you implement the whole strategy, after two or three
years, what is the worst-case scenario? What I am trying to
explain--and maybe I was unclear, and I apologize to the
committee if I am unclear on this point, but I am trying to
make it clear, which is that I am not calling for withdrawing
troops in the first year or on some deployment schedule. What I
am saying is what we should do in the next 12 months is not
increase troops. We should dedicate ourselves--which will help
protect the cities, the major areas. There will still be
problems in the rural areas. I am not calling for the
abandonment of major cities.
Mr. Smith. One quick question of Dr. Kagan. What is wrong
with that strategy? That is one of the things that is kind of
emerging, not the pullout strategy, not even sort of a standoff
strategy, just--look, we don't know exactly what we are doing
there right now. So to commit more forces in that situation,
the stress on our troops and the stress on our force, to ask
them to go and fight in a situation that is as muddled as I
think we have all kind of agreed, it is irresponsible.
We simply have to do a containment strategy, hold the line,
give McChrystal a chance, and hopefully get Eikenberry and
Holbrooke more involved, figuring things out and moving us in a
more positive direction, contain the Taliban from spreading
further instead of throwing more troops into a confusing
situation.
Dr. Kagan. What is wrong with that is we can't do that with
the forces we now have, and that is General McChrystal's
assessment, and it is the assessment of his staff. I think it
is very easily supportable by facts on the ground. So we will
continue to lose ground with the current numbers because they
are not adequate even with all of the in-theater readjustment
that General McChrystal is undertaking to do this.
And I think it is very important to note here that we
really shouldn't be pulling troop numbers out of our fourth
point of contact. This is not something where we just say,
well, maybe we will only send 10,000 or whatever.
Troop numbers have to come based on a very specific and
careful full-up staff, troop-to-task analysis by our
professional military about what is required to achieve a
particular set of objectives in a particular set of
circumstances. General McChrystal has done that. We don't have
to necessarily accept it, but we can't beat it simply by
saying, ``Well, I don't like 40. How about 20?''
Somebody else would have to go through a very detailed,
troop-to-task analysis for a different set of objectives within
an agreed-upon framework of what the circumstances are and tell
you what the number would be for a different set of objectives.
But if you try to do this as a rheostat with I don't like 40, I
want 20, now tell me what I can do with that, you put our
troops in a very high probability of being given a mission that
can't succeed.
Mr. Smith. I think that is an excellent point to end on. I
appreciate your coming and testifying. It is very, very helpful
for me and the members of the committee. We will keep this
dialogue up as the decision is going forward.
I will close with, re-emphasizing what Dr. Kagan said,
whatever we do, it has to be a clear strategy and a clear plan
so that the troops and the people that we ask to go and
implement it know what they are doing. And that is the minimum
that we can expect, no matter what we decide.
Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 22, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 22, 2009
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