[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-111]
AFGHANISTAN: THE RESULTS OF
THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, PART I
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 3, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-006 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, December 3, 2009, Afghanistan: The Results of the
Strategic Review, Part I....................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, December 3, 2009....................................... 47
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2009
AFGHANISTAN: THE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, PART I
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 4
Lew, Hon. Jacob J., Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources, U.S. Department of State............................ 9
Mullen, Adm. Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gates, Hon. Robert M......................................... 51
Lew, Hon. Jacob J............................................ 60
Mullen, Adm. Michael G....................................... 55
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bright................................................... 89
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 77
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 75
Ms. Giffords................................................. 82
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 88
Mr. Jones.................................................... 71
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 78
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................ 73
Mr. Nye...................................................... 86
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 72
Mr. Smith.................................................... 72
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 84
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 75
AFGHANISTAN: THE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, PART I
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, December 3, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in room
210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Our hearing will come to order.
I might state first that we have some votes that may come
up very quickly. I hope we can get them over with and back here
just as soon as possible, and I ask our witnesses to bear with
us. We have no control over those.
I would also urge our members to strictly follow the gavel
on the five-minute rule so as many people can ask questions as
possible.
Today, the House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
testimony on ``Afghanistan: Results of the Strategic Review.''
Our witnesses are the Honorable Robert Gates, Secretary of
Defense; Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Deputy Secretary of State
for Management and Resources.
We welcome each of you, and thank you for being with us
today.
Let me begin by commending the President for his decision
to commit an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to carry out a
strategy for success in Afghanistan. In a lengthy letter and in
private conversations, I urged the President to listen to our
military leaders, and he did. I am pleased that the President
agreed to provide General McChrystal with the time and
resources needed to get Afghanistan right.
Al Qaeda was and continues to present a serious threat to
the United States. Their most egregious attack was September
11th, but it was hardly the only one. While the threat posed by
al Qaeda has been lessened by our actions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, it has hardly dissipated. In the long term, I do not
believe that we can disrupt and defeat al Qaeda if we cannot
deny them the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven.
Unfortunately, shortly after deposing the Taliban regime
and forcing al Qaeda out of Afghanistan in this war we were
forced to wage, the previous administration took our eye off
the ball, choosing to invade Iraq. Due to the preoccupation
with Iraq, the war in Afghanistan was under-resourced, with
essentially no strategy for seven years. Unsurprisingly, the
threat came back.
President Obama's decision to deploy another 30,000 troops
in addition to the troops he ordered to Afghanistan earlier
this year demonstrates that he understands the seriousness of
the threat and the importance of the mission.
In January 2009, there were about 33,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. In about seven months, there will be three times
that. Media reports have focused a lot on these numbers, but
more important than numbers is strategy. As General McChrystal
pointed out, without a change in strategy, all the troops in
the world won't matter.
President Obama conducted a rigorous review of the
situation in Afghanistan, and it resulted in a realistic
strategy designed to seize the initiative from the insurgency,
build the Afghan capacity, and ultimately to allow the Afghan
government and security forces to take the lead in fighting
this war.
The President has appropriately called for additional
troops from our allies. This is not just America's war, and we
must not allow it to become that. Perhaps more importantly, the
President has put the burden of reform squarely on the Afghan
government, laying out clear expectations of performance and
promising support for those ministries and local leaders that
perform.
The President has also rightly acknowledged the importance
of Pakistan. That country remains a challenge, playing a key
and often contradictory role in the region. Pakistan, by
assisting in the pursuit of the al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban
leaders, could help bring the war in Afghanistan to an end.
Conversely, if Pakistan were to return to its old habits of
supporting the Afghan Taliban, the war may be almost impossible
to win. More concerning, the continued ascendency of militant
movements in the region could destabilize Pakistan, a country
with nuclear weapons. This could be a disaster for all of us.
I believe that we have a good strategy, but we must be
mindful that implementing this counterinsurgency strategy will
be extremely complex and far from easy. Just the task of
deploying an additional 30,000 troops will be difficult. Supply
lines to Afghanistan are long and difficult. Bases are austere,
and there is a shortage of every sort of infrastructure. And
the job our troops will have to do once they get there will be
even harder.
Every member of this committee will have questions about
the strategy and how it can be accomplished. For my part, I
have numerous questions: What do we believe must be
accomplished in the next 18 months? How will we move this
substantial number of troops so quickly? How will we mitigate
strains on the force? How will we convince the Pakistanis that
their interests lie with us? How will we measure progress over
time? And how will we help the Afghan people build the sort of
legitimate government that can end the insurgency?
But while I do have questions about implementation, I do
not have any doubt that we must succeed in Afghanistan, that
the President is right to order the deployment of an additional
30,000 troops on top of the troops he has already approved, and
that the new strategy provides a good path for success.
I hope our witnesses today can help us fill in the details
of how the difficult but realistic goals of the strategy can be
accomplished. At the end of the day, I believe we are all
working for the same thing: the safety of the American people
and the end of the threat from al Qaeda.
Now I turn to my good friend, the gentleman from
California, Buck McKeon, the ranking member, for comments he
might care to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, after months of waiting for a decision on
Afghanistan, I am hopeful we have finally turned the corner and
have a strategy in place to succeed in Afghanistan.
On Tuesday night, the President agreed to provide General
McChrystal most of the forces he needs to execute a
counterinsurgency strategy. This is a positive step,
particularly the President's commitment to deploy these forces
as fast as possible. This will assist General McChrystal to
take the fight directly to the Taliban in southern and eastern
Afghanistan, while helping train and mentor the Afghan national
security forces at the same time.
Yet, the President's speech left me unconvinced that his
plan goes far enough to ensure victory. I worry that our
enemies will see the President's announced date for withdrawal
as more of a commitment to leave Afghanistan than a declaration
that al Qaeda will be defeated and the Taliban routed.
Certainly this is what our allies in the region believe.
Today's headline in The New York Times reads, ``Afghans and
Pakistanis Concerned Over U.S. Plan.''
All Americans want to see our troops leave Afghanistan as
soon as possible, but only after successfully completing their
mission. In our view, any redeployment should be based on the
events and conditions on the ground, not the Washington
political clock. Setting a date certain to begin withdrawing
U.S. forces, I believe, risks undermining the very mission the
President endorsed on Tuesday night. This deadline seems to fly
in the face of basic counterinsurgency doctrine. I think
Senator McCain said it best yesterday: ``Success is the real
exit strategy.''
Admiral Mullen, when you testified before the Congress in
September, you said, ``The Afghan people are waiting on the
sidelines for how committed we are.'' I fear that the President
may have deepened the doubts of the Afghan people.
My other concerns reside more in what the President did not
say on Tuesday night, so I would like our witnesses to address
the following questions over the course of this hearing: First,
are 30,000 additional forces enough to win decisively? As
General McChrystal stated in his assessment, resources will not
win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it. Given the
many leaks that General McChrystal requested, at a minimum,
40,000 additional forces, I would like our witnesses to explain
why the President is not under-resourcing his own strategy.
The President should be commended for expediting the
deployment of these forces. Is it our position that it is
better to get 30,000 troops to Afghanistan as soon as possible
than to get 40,000 spread out over the next 15 months? When do
you expect these forces to arrive in theater?
While we have heard top line numbers, we have not heard
discussion of the composition of these forces. How many combat
brigades will deploy? How many will be trainers? Will each
combat brigade receive all its enablers?
As we learned in Iraq, effective counterinsurgency requires
effective host-nation partners. With all the talk of an exit
date, the only credible narrative for redeployment is the
effective buildup of Afghan National Security Forces. According
to General McChrystal, a fundamental pillar for achieving
success is developing a significantly more effective and larger
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), with radically
expanded coalition-force partnering at every echelon.
Both the President's speech and your testimony today do not
address the requisite size of the ANSF. Do you believe we need
to double the size of the Afghan National Security Forces in
order to transition security responsibility to the Afghan
government? General Caldwell and others have the number at
400,000. Do we need to have this force in place before we begin
transitioning?
Finally, I think one of the costs of the three-month
deliberation was the absence of a strong voice promoting our
mission and our strategy. While the executive huddled, public
opinion and support lagged. This needs to be corrected. I hope
the President will travel to communities throughout the United
States to rally the American people and Congress behind his
strategy, much as he has done on health care and other issues.
I thank you for being here today. I know that you have had
a busy last couple of days, and I appreciate your patience and
appreciate your being here. And I look forward to a candid
discussion on these important issues. Thank you again.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Again, I urge everyone to heed the five-minute gavel. We
will, as you know, break for votes and get back just the minute
we can.
As I understand it, our witnesses have a drop-dead time at
4:30, and we will do our very best to abide by your schedule.
With that, we call on Secretary Gates. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting us to testify today.
By now, you are aware of the details of the President's
announcement of our renewed commitment and more focused
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide
an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind his
decisions, in particular the nexus among al Qaeda, the Taliban,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and our objectives and how the
President's strategy aims to accomplish them.
As the President first stated in March and reemphasized
Tuesday night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
extremist allies and prevent its return to both countries. The
international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is
necessary to achieve this overarching goal.
Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are
mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from
one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.
While al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the
Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success
of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda's message to
the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the winning
side of history.
Put simply, the Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic,
each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al
Qaeda leaders, in particular, have stated this explicitly and
repeatedly. The lesson of the Afghan Taliban's revival for al
Qaeda is that time and will are on their side. With a Western
defeat, al Qaeda could regain its strength and achieve a major
strategic victory as long as its senior leadership lives and
can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding.
Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
At the same time, one cannot separate the security
situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a
nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people, now also explicitly
targeted by Islamic extremists. Giving extremists breathing
room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more
coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a
sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan
would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani Government already
under attack from groups operating from the border region.
Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the last year or so,
has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and
stability, carrying out, with al Qaeda's help, escalating
bombing attacks throughout the country. Failure in Afghanistan
would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of the
country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas
could in short order become once again a sanctuary for al
Qaeda, as well as a staging area for resurgent military groups
on the offensive in Pakistan.
Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists, as
was the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts.
It would strengthen the al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed
opportunities for recruitment, fundraising, and more
sophisticated operations.
It is true that al Qaeda and its followers can plot and
execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to
London to Denver. What makes the border area between Pakistan
and Afghanistan uniquely different from any other location,
including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible redoubts, is that
this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist
jihadism, the historic place where native and foreign Muslims
defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse
at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining
superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for
the United States and the world.
Some say this is similar to the domino theory that
underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S.
military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is
that we have very real and very recent history that shows just
what can and will happen in this part of the world when
extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments
complicit with and supportive of their mission. Less than five
years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out
of Afghanistan, in 1993 Islamic militants launched their first
attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford
to make a similar mistake again.
The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the
Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the
time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough
security and governance to stabilize their own country.
The essence of our civil military plan is to clear, hold,
build, and transfer. Beginning to transfer security
responsibility to the Afghans in the summer of 2011 is critical
and, in my view, achievable. July 2011, the time at which the
President said the United States will begin to draw down our
forces, will be the beginning of a process, an inflection
point, if you will, of transition, where Afghan forces assume
greater responsibility for security.
The pace and character of that drawdown, which districts
and provinces are turned over and when, will be determined by
conditions on the ground. It will be a gradual, if inexorable,
process. It will be similar to the gradual but steady
conditions-based drawdown that began to take place in Iraq
about 14 months after the surge there began.
As with so many issues in the national security and defense
arena, the real challenge in Afghanistan is finding the right
balance. The prompt dispatch of some 30,000 U.S. combat troops
on top of the 21,000 already ordered by President Obama earlier
this year sends a sure message of the President's resolve to
both our partners and adversaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
When this buildup is complete, total U.S. force levels in
Afghanistan will have more than doubled under President Obama's
orders, to 100,000 troops. Whether you agree with what we are
doing or not, there should be no doubt at home or abroad about
this President's commitment to the success of this mission.
On the other hand, we need to send an equally strong
message to the Afghan Government that, when all is said and
done, the U.S. military is not going to be there to protect
them forever, that the Afghans must step up to the plate and do
the things necessary that will allow them to take primary
responsibility for defending their own country, and do so with
a sense of purpose and urgency. This is the balance we are
trying to achieve, and I believe the President's plan provides
both the resources and flexibility to do so.
Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan
army and police through an intensive partnering with
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), especially in
combat. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the
Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the U.S. will continue
to support their development as an important partner for the
long haul. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we
abandoned the country, only to see it descend into chaos and
then into Taliban hands.
Let me offer a couple of closing thoughts. The President
believes, as do I, that in the end we cannot defeat al Qaeda
and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the
security situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision
offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum
in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation
in Pakistan and central Asia, all necessary to protect the
United States, our allies, and our vital interests.
As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and
women who have volunteered and re-volunteered to serve their
country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds
and prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally necessary
mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon,
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your
time today.
In September of 2008, I testified here and said in
Afghanistan we are doing what we can. I believe in November of
2009 in Afghanistan we need to do what we must.
I support fully and without hesitation the President's
decision, and I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to
what I believe was a healthy and productive discussion. I have
seen my share of internal debates on national security issues
over the course of these last two years, and I can honestly say
that I do not recall an issue so thoroughly or so thoughtfully
considered as this one. Every military leader in the chain of
command, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice
throughout this process, and every one of us used it.
We now have before us a strategy more appropriately matched
to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and resources
matched more appropriately to that strategy, particularly with
regard to reversing the insurgency's momentum in 2010. And
given the stakes in Afghanistan for our own national security,
as well as that of our partners around the world, I believe the
time we took was well worth it.
Secretary Gates has discussed many of the larger policy
issues in question, and I will not repeat them. But from a
purely military perspective, I believe our new approach does
three critical things.
First, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers
better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ
their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe
haven. They will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who
remain the center of gravity. They will still pursue major
elements of the counterinsurgency desired and designed by
General McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least
some measure of active counterterrorism operations.
But now they will tailor this campaign and those operations
by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on
all of al Qaeda's leadership, by more effectively working to
degrade the Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and
accelerating the growth of competent Afghan National Security
Forces.
At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing
space for the Afghans to secure their own people and to
stabilize their own country. It is about partnering and
mentoring just as much, if not more so, than it is about
fighting. Where once we believed that finishing the job meant
to a large degree doing it ourselves, we now know it cannot
truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the Afghans
themselves. Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theater today
are partnered with Afghan forces, and I expect that number to
rise significantly through 2010.
Secondly, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives
the commanders on the ground the resources and the support they
need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to
accomplish these more limited objectives. I have said it before
and I believe it still today: This region is the epicenter of
global Islamic extremism. It is the place from which we were
attacked on 9/11, and, should we be hit again, it is the place
from which I am convinced the planning, training, funding, and
leadership will emanate.
Al Qaeda may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack,
but the Taliban will be the bricklayers. Though hardly a
uniform body, Taliban groups have grown bolder and more
sophisticated. We saw that just a few months ago in the
Korengal Valley, where Taliban forces attacked coalition
outposts using what I would call almost conventional, small-
unit tactics. Their fighters are better organized and better
equipped than they were just one year ago. And that trend,
which started in 2006, has continued through today.
In fact, coalition forces experienced record-high violence
this past summer, with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent
above 2008 levels. And through brutal intimidation, the Taliban
has established shadow governments across the country, coercing
the reluctant support of many locals and challenging the
authority of elected leaders and state institutions. Indeed, we
believe the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11
of the 34 provinces.
To say there is no serious threat of Afghanistan falling
once again into the Taliban's hands ignores the audacity of
even the insurgency's most public statements. And to argue
that, should they have that power, the Taliban would not at
least tolerate the presence of al Qaeda on Afghan soil is to
ignore both the recent past and the evidence we see every day
of collusion between these factions on both sides of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
The cost of failure is, then, very grave. That is why the
President's decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of
30,000 additional forces is so important. It gets the most U.S.
force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General
McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.
In fact, it is everything he asked for.
It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach,
and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible
chance to set security conditions for the Afghan people to see
our commitment to their future; for the Karzai government to
know our strong desire to see his promised reforms; for the
Afghan Taliban to understand they will not, they cannot take
back Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan who support
the Taliban or would see the return of al Qaeda to realize the
futility of their support.
I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the
21,000 troops the President ordered shortly after taking
office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the
southern Helmand Valley and in the training and partnering with
Afghan security forces.
But, as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no amount of
troops and no amount of time will ever be enough to completely
achieve success in such a fight. They simply must be
accompanied by good governance and healthy public
administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of my
greatest concern. Like everyone else, I look forward to working
with the Karzai government, but we must have the support of the
interagency and international communities as well.
That brings me to my final point. The President's new
strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based
approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in
isolation any more than he views the ties between al Qaeda and
the Taliban as superficial. He has called for stronger and more
productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is
likewise under the threat from radical elements and whose
support remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens.
He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed
emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort,
more contributions by other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) nations, and a realistic plan to transition
responsibilities to the Afghans. His is a more balanced, more
flexible, and more achievable strategy than what we have had in
the past, one based on pragmatism and real possibilities.
Speaking for 2.2 million men and women who must execute it
and who, with their families, have borne the brunt of the
stress and the strain of eight years of constant combat, I
support his decision and appreciate his leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Admiral, we thank you.
I think, Secretary Lew, we can get your testimony in before
we must break. A vote has been called, but I think we are in
pretty good shape to make it.
Secretary Lew, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB J. LEW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Lew. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon,
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify here today.
And I would begin by sharing Secretary Clinton's regrets
that she was not able to be here at this hearing. As I think
you know, she is traveling right now to Brussels to join the
NATO ministerial, which provides an important opportunity to
further consult with some of our closest allies on a number of
important topics, including allied support for the Afghanistan
policy that we are here to discuss today.
Tuesday evening, President Obama presented the
Administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have
further testified on the details and national security
importance of our revised strategy. I will try to limit my
remarks today to providing additional details on the civilian
components of our revised strategy and to augment those
presentations.
As the President made clear, the duration of our military
presence will be limited, but our civilian commitment must
continue even as our troops begin to come home. Accomplishing
our mission and ensuring the safety of the American people will
not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, troops, and
assistance to Afghanistan and significantly expanding our
civilian efforts in Pakistan.
In the past eight months, I have made two visits to the
region, which provided me increased firsthand understanding of
the challenges we face and a deep appreciation for our men and
women who are carrying out our nation's policy. These brave men
and women, civilians as well as military, are making
extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security. I want to
assure the committee that we will do everything we can to make
sure that their efforts make our nation safer.
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but
there is reason to be hopeful. In his inauguration speech last
month, President Karzai pledged to combat corruption, improve
governance, and deliver for the people of his country. In his
words, ``Words now must be meshed with action.'' The Afghan
people, the United States, and the international community will
hold the Afghan government accountable for making good on these
commitments.
The State Department, United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and other civilian agencies
will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen
institutions at every level so they are ready to take
responsibility when our combat troops begin to depart. The
President has outlined a time frame for transition to Afghan
responsibility. As the President said, we will execute the
transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the
ground.
This time frame for transition provides a sense of urgency.
It should be clear to everyone, unlike in the past, the United
States will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the region. Our resolve is reflected in the
substantial commitment of troops and civilian resources that
the President has made since taking office and will continue
long after our combat troops have departed.
Our civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian
experts are helping build capacity in government ministries,
providing development assistance in the field, and working in
scores of other roles. When our Marines went into Nawa this
July, we had civilians on the ground with them the next day.
When I traveled to Helmand in September, I heard firsthand
from local officials and U.S. and allied military personnel how
our civilian-military coordination is growing stronger and
stronger. We are on track to triple the number of civilians in
Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each
civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed
staff to experts with U.S.-funded non-governmental
organizations.
As Secretary Clinton said yesterday, it is a cliche to say
we have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to
be true. When the Secretary was in Kabul a few weeks ago, she
heard from an American colonel that, while he had thousands of
outstanding soldiers under his command, none had 40 years of
agricultural experience or rule-of-law or government expertise
like the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
State Department civilian experts serving alongside his
battalion. He told her that he was happy to supply whatever
support these valuable civilians need, and he said we need more
of them. The President's strategy, with congressional support,
will make that possible.
Not only do we increasingly have the right people to
achieve our objectives, we also have a sound strategy. We are
delivering the high-impact economic assistance and bolstering
Afghanistan's agricultural sector, the traditional core of the
Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce funding that the
Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents
off of the battlefield.
We will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to
Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into
society. We understand that some who fight with the insurgency
do not do so out of conviction but due to coercion or the need
for the money that they are provided. All Afghans should have
the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully,
respect for basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and
renounce al Qaeda.
Our regional diplomacy compliments this political approach
by seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and
working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries from
competition for influence to cooperation and economic
integration.
We also believe that a strong and stable democratic
Pakistan must be a key partner for the United States. People in
Pakistan are increasingly coming to the view that we share a
common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my visits there.
We will significantly expand support to help develop the
potential of Pakistan and its people, to bring our people
closer together. Our assistance will demonstrate our commitment
to addressing problems that affect everyday lives of
Pakistanis, but it will also bolster Pakistan against the
threat of extremism. A village where girls can get an education
will be more resistant to extremism. A young man with a bright
future in a growing economy is unlikely to waste his potential
in a suicide bombing.
We share this responsibility with governments around the
world. Our NATO allies and other international community
partners have already made significant contributions of their
own in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Secretary and Ambassador
Holbrooke are working now in Brussels to secure additional
commitments.
The task we face is as complex as any national security
challenge of our lifetime. We will not succeed if this effort
is viewed as the responsibility of a single party, a single
agency, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and
civilians who face these dangers to come together as Americans,
and together with our allies and partners, to help them
accomplish the mission.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lew can be found in
the Appendix on page 60.]
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
We will break for the votes. There could very well be
another motion to recommit, so it will be a short while. We
will recess.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
I will begin by asking a question or two, and hopefully we
can proceed with everyone staying well within the five-minute
rule.
Afghanistan, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, is
undoubtedly the epicenter for terrorism in the world. So I ask
you, are you fully comfortable with the President's strategy,
including the target date to begin redeploying troops out of
Afghanistan?
I ask each of you.
Secretary Gates. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am very
comfortable with the President's strategy.
I believe that each of these conflicts that we are engaged
in needs to be assessed individually. There are some parallels,
and there are some areas where they are different.
I have been adamantly opposed and continue to be opposed to
deadlines, but I regard the July 2011 date as the beginning of
a process. And it has required balancing between signaling our
commitment, which certainly should be signaled by this
President's approval of some 52,000 more troops this year, and
lighting a fire under the Afghans to give them a sense of
urgency that they have to be prepared and preparing to take
over responsibility for the security of their country.
My hope is that, as that process goes forward and we draw
down our troops, they can sustain the level of security that
then allows us to continue a more purely counterterrorist
mission until al Qaeda is defeated, as the President has said.
So it is a balance, but I think it is a good balance. I
think it is important to see July 2011 as an inflection point,
as the beginning of this process. And, for that reason, I am
comfortable with it.
I would just add one other thing. When people say that it
may embolden the Taliban, it is not clear to me what that
means. It seems to me that the Taliban is pretty bold right
now. They have been very aggressive over the last year or so,
the last two or three years. It is not clear to me they could
be any more aggressive than they are now.
And, frankly, if they want to lie low either in Afghanistan
or Pakistan, I think that would give us a huge opportunity.
Obviously, it would cut down on the number of innocent Afghans
they are killing, and it would give us an opportunity to move
forward with the Afghan security forces' growth and improvement
in capability, as well as development in the country and
governance.
So I think that--I mean, they read our newspapers. They
read our newspapers on Iraq, when the surge started in Iraq,
and they knew the pressures against continuing it for a
protracted period here in Washington. So it seems to me that
signaling a beginning of a process of transitioning, province
by province, district by district, with a firm date, actually
serves our interests.
The Chairman. Before I ask Admiral Mullen, can you honestly
characterize that date as a goal?
Secretary Gates. I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, I think
that date is fixed. I think the President is committed to that
date. In theory, obviously, the commander-in-chief can always
change his mind, but I would tell you he feels very strongly
about it. And I think it is not, in his mind, a goal but, in
fact, a fixed starting date.
The Chairman. Admiral.
Admiral Mullen. First of all, Chairman, I support the
strategy wholeheartedly.
And then, secondly, the only thing I would like to add--I
agree with Secretary Gates on the discussion around July of
2011. I just would like to add one comment about that.
It has been described by some as an arbitrary date. It is
not an arbitrary date. In fact, those of us in the military
believe that that date is a date where we will know certainly
whether we are succeeding or not in Afghanistan with this
strategy.
There is an assessment, a major assessment, which will
occur about a year from now. That will start to look at,
obviously, what has happened over the next 12 months and start
to focus on what the changes or adjustments might be over the
following year, which would certainly encompass July 2011.
But the reason that date was picked is because we added
10,000 Marines this year in Helmand; they immediately had a
positive impact, particularly from the counterinsurgency
standpoint. And so, in the middle of 2011, we will have had
three summers, if you will, 2009, 2010, and 2011, where we have
had those kinds of forces--or the Marines will have been there
three years. And we will be able to assess--for three seasons,
I mean--we will be able to assess how they are doing and where
this is going.
That is, obviously, enhanced with the additional forces
that the President has committed to. And I, too, believe that
his decision to commit the forces is one of very, very strong
resolve to turn this around. And, two, there needs to be a hook
out there that incentivizes the Afghans that they have to take
the lead in lots of areas--in particular, in the area of
security.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
Let me mention to the Members that, in case you don't have
the opportunity to ask a question, questions can be submitted
to the witnesses for the record.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that the start of the
drawdown now has been clarified. It is definite; the President
set the date. No matter what, we are starting to withdraw in
July of 2011. But the pace, the scope, the duration is
uncertain or even conditions-based. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. If yes, who determined the July 2011 start
date? Was it you or anyone in the military chain of command?
And why does that start date make any sense? Or is it just
semantics?
Secretary Gates. Well, we were--both I and Admiral Mullen,
General Petraeus, General McChrystal were all involved in the
discussions and the recommendations to the President that
included this date. And the date was chosen essentially for the
reasons that Admiral Mullen just described. It is two years
after the Marines went into Helmand, three fighting seasons.
And we will have a very good idea by that time whether this
strategy is working and what successes we have been able to
have.
I think something that is important to clarify is that this
is going to be a gradual process of transition. And the
transition to Afghan security responsibility will start,
presumably, in the least contested areas, some of which,
perhaps, could happen now. And it will involve not just the
Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, but local
authorities, local police, tribal groups, and various other
security units.
And it will be our commanders on the ground, in my view,
who make the decision, who make the recommendation, that a
district or a cluster of districts or a province is ready to
transition to Afghan security responsibility, just as they did
in Iraq.
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Secretary, I think all of us say things,
probably, that we would change given different circumstances,
but let me just read a quote that you said on September 27th of
this year.
``I think that the notion of timeliness and exit strategies
and so on, frankly, I think would all be a strategic mistake.
The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback
for the United States. Taliban and al Qaeda, as far as they are
concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to
defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences
in terms of energizing the extremist movement, al Qaeda
recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on.''
Let me ask, based on what we just talked about, that we are
going to have a review about a year from now, Secretary Gates,
in the same exchange with Senator McCain yesterday, you
indicated that in December 2010 the administration will conduct
another review. And here is what you said: ``The President has
indicated that we will have a thorough review of how we are
doing in December of 2010, and I think we will be in a position
then to evaluate whether or not we can begin that transition in
July.''
Am I correct that the administration will conduct another
review only six months or so after all the surge forces arrive
in Afghanistan? In Iraq, the surge forces were on the ground
for 12 to 18 months before we turned the tide. Why is this
enough time in Afghanistan? Why do this review in December of
2010? Will this review also be one that could possibly take
three months and once again put the entire strategy in
question?
Secretary Gates. No. First of all, it won't. It won't do
that.
The surge in Iraq lasted 14 months. The first troops went
in in January of 2007, and I think General Petraeus would tell
you that, by summer, six or seven months later, he had enough
indications of things happening on the ground that he could
tell that this effort was going to work, even though that was
the period when we had the highest casualties that we suffered
over the last two or three years in Iraq.
I am adamantly opposed to deadlines, and I am opposed to a
timeline in terms of completion of a withdrawal of U.S. forces,
other than in general terms, of a period of three years or
something like that. But I do not have a problem with setting a
timeline for the beginning of a process.
Again, we had to balance the question of how do you signal
resolve and, at the same time, signal to the Afghans that we
are not going to be there to protect them forever. I think this
is one of the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan.
Once it was clear the surge was working in Iraq, the Iraqis
wanted us out as quickly as possible. There are some in
Afghanistan, perhaps in the government, perhaps in the elites
or whatever, probably not the general population, who would
probably very much like to have the United States Army and the
United States Marine Corps stay in Afghanistan indefinitely.
They live in a rough neighborhood.
We need to signal that is not going to happen, and they
need to buy into this war. They need to take ownership of this
war in their country against somebody trying to overthrow them.
And trying to incentivize them and get them to be more
aggressive in recruiting and retaining their soldiers and
police and getting them into the fight is very important to the
success of this strategy.
Leaving it open-ended--we have not had any timelines or
guidelines like this in Afghanistan for eight years. So the
question is, how do you get them to take this seriously and
that they are going to have to step up to the plate? I think
this is the proper balance.
Mr. McKeon. Both the President's speech and your testimony
today do not address the requisite size of the Afghan National
Security Forces.
According to General McChrystal, a fundamental pillar for
achieving success is developing a significantly more effective
and larger ANSF, with radically expanded coalition-force
partnering at every echelon. His assessment also stated that
coalition forces must provide a bridge capability to protect
critical segments of the population.
General McChrystal's assessment recommended to grow the
Afghan security forces to 400,000. Admiral Mullen, in your
professional military judgment, do you believe that an ANSF of
400,000 is both necessary and feasible?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, we spent a lot of time on this in the
review, and I think it was time very well-spent. It is very
clear in that examination that the highest-risk area is the
development of the Afghan police. The Afghan army we evaluate
as moderate risk, but key to local security is clearly going to
have that police force.
We know how to do that. We recognize the challenges
associated with that. And while that 400,000 is an aspirational
goal out several years from now, the decision has been made to
look at this literally year-to-year based on how we are doing.
Right now--and General McChrystal has fundamentally shifted
how we do this since he has gotten there, into this
partnership, this radically different partnership. Prior to his
arrival, essentially what we did--and we weren't resourced
well, but what we did was we mentored or we had training teams.
And it was just too small, it couldn't do that, which is why we
are so far behind.
So, each year, we have a goal. And so, for instance, right
now, on the army side, we are 96,000. Not enough of that 96,000
are in the field. We have to improve that from a reduction of
overhead, get them out into the field and partner with them.
And next year, by this time next year, about October first next
year, that 96,000 will go up to 134,000. To achieve that, we
have to reduce the attrition rate, increase the retention rate
and the recruiting. And those are pretty strong goals, with
respect to both the army and the police.
The analytical side of this, from what we have been able to
do, is that aspirational goal looks about right, but it is also
going to depend on how security is going. If we are able to
turn this around from a momentum standpoint, that will provide
the breathing space, the opportunity to recruit more, bring
more in, train more, develop them more quickly. So it is all
very much linked.
And I am confident this approach, as we go year to year,
having that aspirational goal out there a few years from now,
is the right approach. But right now we have to focus on what
we have directly in front of us and make sure we succeed over
the next 12 months.
Mr. McKeon. The authorized force now is 134,000?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, 134,000.
Mr. McKeon. And that is the goal to be at a year from now?
Admiral Mullen. Right. But, again, we will assess it and
move it up each year, but generally on that glide slope out to
400,000. But we have to see where we are.
Mr. McKeon. Could we maybe get from you what that goal
would be, or should we ask General McChrystal that, what the
goal would be a year from now? You say it is 134,000. What
would the goal be by July of 2011?
Admiral Mullen. Can I say, it is the thirtieth of
September, 2011, for the army it is 171,000. I mean, we have
each goal to get out there. But that 2011 goal, I think, will
be tied to the realities of what we experience over the next 12
months.
Mr. McKeon. Is it fair to say, do you have a target date
set for what the date should be by the time we start the
redeployment in July of 2011.
Admiral Mullen. I think that is very much a part of the
assessment. We know approximately what will be--where we will
be based on the assumptions that I have talked about. But,
again, we have got to have an impact on attrition, retention,
recruiting. We have got to incentivize them to come in and to
stay. We have got to raise their pay. And General McChrystal is
doing that because the Taliban are making more money right now
than the Afghan Security Forces.
We have got to get at the corruption side on the police
side. So there is a significant amount of work right up front
that we have got to get right that we just haven't had the
people there for. And it is not just us; it is Coalition forces
to train them and equip them and make sure they are qualified
to assume the mantle of their own security.
Mr. McKeon. What would the number be for the police at the
same time, the goal?
Admiral Mullen. I have got that in here. Roughly 130,000. I
am at 92,000 today. So, in about another year, it is about
97,000. And in 2011, at the end of fiscal year 2011, so
September of 2011, it is about 130,000.
Mr. McKeon. So that, instead of 400, we are looking at 300
now?
Admiral Mullen. That is what we think the goal should be
for each year, and we are going to have to reassess that, and
then to look at the longer-term requirements of what it needs
to be.
Mr. McKeon. I am just still kind of hung up on the number
400----
Admiral Mullen. I understand.
Mr. McKeon. General McChrystal said we needed, and we are
talking about leaving or starting to leave when we are at about
three-fourths of that.
Admiral Mullen. I think you said it very well, starting to
leave. Transition. No decisions yet on the size of that
transition. If security is going really well, it will probably
be bigger. If it is not, it will probably be smaller. From the
challenges that we have in developing the security force
itself, really, I think argue for these very near-term goals to
see how well we can do.
Mr. McKeon. One of the concerns I have is I am afraid that,
in our rush to leave, we might adjust our goals downwards so
that we can claim success and leave.
Admiral Mullen. That is certainly not the intent that I
see.
Mr. McKeon. I appreciate that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
John Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Secretary, you testified yesterday that the
build-up of 30,000 troops would cost an additional $30 billion
to $35 billion, I believe.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. I have a hard time on the back of my envelope
trying to drive that figure. It seems to me to be awfully high
for the 35,000 troops or 30,000 troops we are talking about. We
will need to pay for these deployments, after all only part of
2010. If you assume a deployment of a brigade every two months
beginning in late January until force levels increase to
30,000, the average level of boots on the ground for the year
will be 17,500. Therefore, a cost of $30 billion to $35 billion
would imply that the yearly cost to maintain each troop in
Afghan is $1.7 million to $2 million, which is an awfully high
figure. Could you explain to us what is in the 30 to $35
billion estimate that you gave? Does it include, for example,
maintaining the Afghan army and police force? Are we going to
be picking up a substantial part of the tab for these security
forces, especially as they grow from their present size to
400,000 ultimately?
Secretary Gates. Since we only receive the President's
decision on Monday, our folks with their pencils haven't sat
down to go through the specifics. I would tell you that some of
the upfront costs that we are looking at, for example, that go
beyond the troop costs, is that right now we have the money in
the budget, I believe, for 5,000 or 6,000 Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles. With the additional
forces that are being sent in, we are probably going to
recommend increasing that number to protect those troops to
about 10,000. So that is several billion dollars in and of
itself just for force protection with the MRAPs. But we will
certainly get you the specifics. Now that we know the numbers
and we have a pretty good idea of the timelines of when they
are going in, we can now refine the numbers and get those to
you. The 30 to 35 billion was basically a ballpark figure, and
we now need to get down and get the details.
Mr. Spratt. Does it include a substantial payment, subsidy,
in effect, of the Treasury, our resources, for the Afghan
forces?
Secretary Gates. I don't think so, Mr. Spratt.
I think that there is money to help pay for the training
and equipping of the Afghan National Army and police in the
$130 billion Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) budget
request that you already have, that the Congress has before it.
I don't think there is additional money for that in the money
we are talking about that would be on top of the 130.
Mr. Spratt. Does the latest proposal, 18-month proposal,
the change in time frame imply a change in tactics? Will there
be an increase in ops tempo, an increase in certain
commitments, certain forces as a result of this compressed time
frame?
Admiral Mullen. As far as our overall force levels, our
deployed force levels, there is obviously a big piece tied to
the drawdown in Iraq, which is still very much on plan and on
schedule. We expect to start that in the March timeframe and
come down from roughly 115,000 there to 50,000 or so by the end
of August, and then complete that withdrawal by the end of
2011. So these forces won't--it won't pick up our overall op
tempo period. We will still be able to have on the Marine Corps
side dwell time move out towards two to one fairly
significantly, a little more slowly on the Army side. So it
hasn't increased our op tempo, based on where we are right now,
dramatically. Clearly, adding these forces is going to impact
the op tempo. But as far as where we are right now, overall, it
will actually come down just a little bit for the Army.
Mr. Spratt. Could I quickly ask Jack Lew, does the State
Department have an interest in the $35 billion? Do you expect
to get substantial, a significant sum of additional money for
foreign aid and assistance?
Secretary Lew. Mr. Spratt, there will be additional
requests on the civilian side, both for some additional
civilians that will be deploying because there will be
additional areas that we are going to be partnering for the
civilian-military (civ-mil) plan, and also because there will
be an increased amount of the country where we can be having
our civilian program operate effectively. We are also working
since Monday to put together the precise numbers, but there
will be a civilian component as well.
Mr. Spratt. If you could get us clarification along these
lines, we would very much appreciate it.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
I know that, in the military, theirs is not to reason why;
theirs is just to do and die. But, Mr. Secretary, when I stand
by that coffin with that young widow, I have to ask, why? And I
feel compelled to voice once again the question of an
increasing number of my constituents: Why is our involvement in
Afghanistan not the ultimate exercise in futility? Since, sir,
if we are successful in doing what no one else has ever done,
the British Empire, the Soviet Empire, and we win, what will we
have won? Since the bad guys will simply find refuge in
Pakistan, and then if we invest who knows how many years and
how much blood and treasure in driving them out of Pakistan,
they will go to places like Yemen and Somalia; I am not sure,
sir, that the American people can be convinced that denying
them privileged sanctuary in Afghanistan when they can find
sanctuary in places like Yemen and Somalia is worth the
enormous cost in blood and treasure.
If the reason, sir, that we have to be there is because a
destabilized Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan and nuclear
weapons would come loose, then, sir, we need to make that
argument.
In this connection, let me ask you a specific question. Is
the model of a national Afghan government, a national army,
futile, since it is contrary to Afghan's 300-year history of a
nation of tribes bound by social conventions? Under Karzai's
three-time ratified national government army model, the Taliban
now controls 11 of 34 provinces. The Afghan National Army
controls one, I think. And I believe that the National Security
Forces probably control none of those provinces. And they are
seen as being ineffective, incapable of being effective for a
number of years.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Bartlett, one of the concerns that I
had after the President's decisions in March was that they were
interpreted as the United States supporting a full-scale
nation-building in Afghanistan and also the creation of a
strong centralized government. As you point out, the latter has
not existed in all of Afghan history. And one of the elements
of the dialogue that we have had inside the administration for
the last three months is, how do you narrow that mission and
make it more realistic? How do you communicate that what this
is all about is really our security, and what we are looking at
is enabling the Afghan government and the local authorities to
be able to reassert security control in their own areas?
One of the pieces of this that has not been discussed is
the fact that about 60 percent of Afghanistan is not controlled
by them, by the Taliban, or where they have no significant or
they don't have predominant influence. What we have to do, and
a piece of the President's strategy is, working with the
subnational parts of Afghanistan, working with the tribal
suras, working with the village elders, working with the
district governors and leaders and as well as those in the
provinces, and in fact a good bit of the security that may come
as part of this transition will be local security, local
police, as we have seen develop in parts of Wardak province.
And so it won't be necessarily that we turn over security
responsibility to the Afghan National Army but rather to local
authorities who have established control, reestablished control
of their own areas from the Taliban. So it is a combination of
all of these things that we will work with. And I think that
our view is that what we have to do is try and figure out--
well, not try and figure out. But what we have to do is
strengthen again the local and traditional governance systems
in Afghanistan that in fact can reestablish local control and
deny the Taliban the authority. So I think that--and I also
would say that, as we partner with the Afghans, you get a mixed
picture. But the reality is, for all of the comments about
corruption and everything else, more than 2,000 Afghan police
have died in the line of duty for their country. About 1,000 of
their soldiers have died. And so I think that this picture is
not focused strictly on creating something in Kabul that has
never existed before, but also figuring out at the subnational
level how to re-empower local authorities, because they will be
perhaps our most essential partners in denying the Taliban
control.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you for taking
the time to make this appearance before our committee. Though
it is always a difficult decision to make putting our young men
and women in harm's way, I feel that answering the much needed
request of our commanders on the ground was the best response
to the current situation in Afghanistan. I have a few questions
that I will be asking of you gentlemen today and as we look
forward to the movement of additional troops into Afghanistan.
First, I would like to see about, will forces be rotated
directly from Iraq to Afghanistan? And, if so, how will the
Department of Defense (DOD) ensure that they receive the
training that they need, because, as we all well know, the
environment is totally different?
And, second, what analysis has DOD done on its ability to
provide the key enablers, such as support forces in
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and which
are already in high demand, to currently support the drawdown
in Iraq and troop increases in Afghanistan? We are drawing down
here and increasing there.
And, lastly, given the many logistical challenges in
Afghanistan, how is DOD able to synchronize the arrival of the
troops with their equipment? And the reason I ask is because we
just made a little tour of some of our military and some of our
young men and women who are deploying, and as I mentioned to
you earlier, Mr. Secretary, you will probably be getting a
letter from us about some of the equipment that they feel is
inferior to what they need.
So maybe if you can answer those three questions, because I
am concerned of putting somebody in harm's way if they don't
have the--there are a lot of things that worry me. When we
increase the troop levels from maybe, you were saying from
300,000 to 400,000 if we have to, are we going to have enough
non-commissioned officers (NCOs)? Do we have enough captains?
Are we producing enough of them to carry out these duties? I
yield to both of you.
Admiral Mullen. Sir, let me actually try to answer that
last question first.
I see monthly from General Casey a lengthy report on the
overall assessment of various measures of how the Army is doing
in terms of things like that. And right now we are. So the
retention of our captains, the retention of our majors, meeting
the needs that we have, and, in fact, have seen over the last
year the overall recruiting and retention numbers for all our
services, but particularly for the Army, go up. A great
statistic as far as I am concerned is that a year, year and a
half ago, the overall percentage of high school graduates that
were entering the Army was about 80 percent, 81 percent, which
is low. We like it in the nineties. Over this last year, it has
been 95 or 96 percent.
There is nobody that has been more dedicated to making sure
that our men and women in harm's way have the right equipment
than Secretary Gates. And I can and I personally attest to
that. I watch him do that all the time. And I know you have
spent a great deal of time on this as well, and I really
appreciate that.
With respect to your questions, largely, forces will not be
moving from Iraq to Afghanistan. There are some enabling
forces, critical enablers that we have moved in very small
numbers literally on a deployment, but it is a very small
number. There are forces that were headed for Iraq that are now
being re-missioned to go to Afghanistan, first of all.
Secondly, we have recognized for some time that Afghanistan
was coming, and so our training has been very focused on that
in ways that we hadn't before. And, in particular, we are
focusing on culture and language, things we learned in Iraq we
had to get right. They are the same issues, but it obviously
takes a different skill set, if you will, in Afghanistan. So we
are very focused on that as we transition. But we have been in
transition now for the better part of the last year, year and a
half, the Marine Corps specifically, as the first ones that
really put significant additional forces there.
We are very focused on the enabling pieces. This gets to
your second question. We are short in some of those. In fact, I
worry more about their op tempo, their dwell time staying at
one-to-one than I do some of our bigger units. And we are very
focused on both buying that, distributing it, and focusing on
the fight. And General Odierno has been very supportive of this
overall effort to give up some enablers that he had in order to
support Afghanistan.
And then just lastly, logistically, focused on this for
months. The unsung heroes, and many of them are in logistics
and transportation, and they are performing magnificently. We
know the challenge, and we think we are going to be able to
support getting them there as fast as possible.
Mr. Ortiz. I want to thank both of you for your service.
Thank you so much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, the press reports today indicate that you
initially resisted a timetable; that it was the White House
that came up with the idea of setting a date, but that you were
persuaded once you got some additional flexibility to adjust it
according to the situation on the ground. Is that true?
Secretary Gates. Well, not entirely. I think that all of us
learned as part of this dialogue, it was also reported that--
and accurately--that I am opposed to troop increase because I
was worried about the footprint on the ground. I was, over this
process, persuaded by General McChrystal that it is less the
size of the footprint than what the soldiers are doing in terms
of how the Afghans react to them.
As I said earlier, I have in the past been adamantly
opposed to deadlines. And I think that, and where I was
persuaded in this case, was the importance of incentivizing the
Afghans and finding the right balance, and my concerns were
mitigated by, frankly, our military's view of when they were
convinced they would be able to say with some confidence
whether the strategy was working. So I would say that most--I
would say virtually everybody involved in this dialogue in
front of the President learned something, changed their
positions, adjusted their positions, and at the end of the day
all came out unanimously supporting the recommendations that
went to the President and that he decided on.
Mr. Thornberry. Have you heard any evidence, or is there
something that you think is particularly persuasive that says
setting this date will be effective in getting the Afghans to
do something that they would not do otherwise?
Secretary Gates. Well, again, I go back to what I said a
little earlier. We had eight years without any timelines,
without any pressure on the Afghans to perform. And it seemed
to me that, you know, as we go into this and with this size of
American commitment, and don't forget, we are talking about
really a two-year period starting last July when we began to
put additional resources into Afghanistan beyond what had been
approved in the last administration. And I was persuaded by--I
have been persuaded by General McChrystal and by General
Petraeus and others that this beginning of a period of
transition on a date certain will in fact incentivize the
Afghans. And this is one of the things that we will be
watching.
Mr. Thornberry. A few weeks ago we had General Keane here
testifying. He testified that it is critical that tribal
insurgent leaders sense our commitment to see this through to
the end. War is always about breaking the will of your
opponent.
That seems to resonate with me, I guess. You talk about
this balance between sending a message to the Afghans and
sending a message to adversaries and friends about our
commitment there. I guess my thought is, the more important
conveyance is to make sure that tribal sheik in Afghanistan and
that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer in Pakistan has
no doubt that we are going to stick with this through thick and
thin; otherwise we won't get the information, we won't get the
loyalty and so forth, that we need to be successful. Are you
concerned about today's reaction in Afghanistan and Pakistan
that seems to question, I guess, somewhat this date where the
troops are going to be there for such a short time before the
withdrawal is required?
Secretary Gates. First of all, it is up to us to sit down
with them, as we have in the course of our discussions over the
last several months, and explain what we are talking about.
Again, I think the important aspect of this is that July 2011
is the beginning of a process, and the pacing of that process
and where it will happen will be conditions based on the
ground, as the President said.
But the reality is, look, another audience here is the
American people. And we have been at war for eight years. This
is the longest war in our history. And the American people, I
think--and you all are the elected representatives. But it
seems to me the American people, American people want to know
that this isn't going to be just another 10 years of commitment
at $100 billion a year and with our troops committed to the
degree that they are now. I think there is plenty of
flexibility in this process in terms of the pacing of the
drawdown and the conditions based that it certainly has left
our military commanders feeling comfortable about it.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Gates and Admiral Mullen.
Let me start by saying our Nation is very, very lucky to
have both of you where you are. If I ask you tough questions,
it is because I think it is my job.
In Colombia, we have spent billions of dollars and over the
course of the past decade sent thousands of advisers to help
the Colombians keep their nation from turning into a narco
state. It is common knowledge that Karzai's brother is one of
the biggest narcotics dealers in Afghanistan. It is common
knowledge that a lot of the warlords on our side are in the
narcotics business. The testimony before this committee said
that if we went after the narcotics trade, those warlords would
turn against us.
And I realize that you have been dealt a tough hand, and I
am not trying to make it any harder, but I think this is a fair
question. Why do we spend billions in Colombia and risk the
lives of thousands of Americans trying to keep that from
becoming a narco state when we are apparently willing to accept
the fact that the Karzai government is a narco state, and in
Iraq, at some point, the oil revenues paid the sheiks to get
people to quit shooting at us. And I am glad that happened.
That started about last April.
But all I can see in Afghanistan is a future where the
major source of revenue is narcotics. And do we really want to
establish a government with American dollars and, more
importantly, American blood that is just nothing more than a
narco state because they are not the Taliban?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think Secretary Lew probably has
some things to say on this, but I would make a couple of
points. First of all, ISAF changed its strategy with respect to
the narcotics trafficking about a year ago and aggressively
began to go after labs, drug lords, and the traffickers. The
eradication----
Mr. Taylor. Does that include the president's brother? I
want to make it clear, President Karzai's brother.
Secretary Gates. I understand. Let me just say that, as
Secretary Clinton testified in the last day and a half, we
understand the importance of this corruption and how corrosive
it is. And the truth of the matter is there is a heck of a lot
more money going into corrupt pockets that is coming from us
and the international community than is coming from the narco
traffickers. We are putting tens of billions of dollars into
Afghanistan, and too much of it is ending up with sticky
fingers along the way. And so we are putting in place some
procedures in terms of certifying ministries, certifying
ministers, governors, and others that we have confidence are
not corrupt. And we won't do business with the ones that are
corrupt at the same time that we are going after the narcotics
guys.
So we do understand the nature of this problem. We do
believe it is a serious problem. Narcotics, we think,
represents about a quarter of the $12 billion gross domestic
product (GDP) of Afghanistan at this point.
And the good news is one of the big pieces of this program
is, frankly, our agriculture program to give these guys an
alternative. I mean, for the farmer, the poppy is not a
particularly great crop. He has got one customer who doesn't
negotiate on the price, and you can't feed your livestock these
things or your family. So we have some pretty expansive
programs as part of the strategy going forward to try and deal
with this and give them an alternative. And the truth of the
matter is there was a significant reduction in narcotics
production this year in part because the price of wheat became
competitive.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, what about President Karzai's
brother?
Secretary Gates. I am just not going to talk about that in
an open session. We are dealing with a sovereign government.
Mr. Taylor. Someone from our State Department before this
committee admitted that it was true.
Secretary Gates. Well, we have problems with him. There is
no question about that.
Mr. Taylor. But, again, don't you think it ought to start
with the president's brother abiding by the rule of law? Is
that not one of the things----
Secretary Gates. We understand the problem.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, again, we as a nation are lucky
to have you where you are. You have got a tough job.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here and the leadership
to our country that you provide. The day that the President
made his announcement, in the Jacksonville paper, which is the
home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base, the heading of the local
article, ``Obama Expected to Send 30,000 More Troops to
Combat.'' In the introductory of the article, I will just read
this part: Local military are reacting to the news with
skepticism and concern. The article interviews three Marines
and one Navy corpsman.
Mr. Secretary, you have tried for many years, and I applaud
you for this effort, to get North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to understand that this war in Afghanistan is their
responsibility as much as it is ours. My question to you would
be, if NATO is counted on to provide, I was thinking the number
of 7,000 troops, more troops, would these troops be trigger
pullers? Would they be involved in combat with the Taliban and
al Qaeda?
Secretary Gates. Our hope and expectation is--what we would
like to do is have our ISAF partners, other than those who are
partnered with us in the Regional Command South, basically take
total responsibility for the north and the western parts of the
country so that we could concentrate our forces in the south,
in the southern and eastern parts of the country. So our
expectation is that the additional forces, as with many of the
forces they have there now, would in fact be prepared to engage
in combat as necessary.
Obviously, the security situation in the north and the west
is not as difficult as it is in the south and the east, and we
think that they should be able to take responsibility for that.
And we have some commitments that give us confidence that we
are in fact going to get another 5,000 to 7,000 troops. And I
would point out that, as we have increased our numbers, so have
our ISAF partners. When I took this job, there were 17,000
Europeans and other ISAF partners in Afghanistan. If we get
this additional 5,000 to 7,000, there will be about 50,000. So
they have tripled the number of troops that they have. And I
would say, also, they have removed a lot of the caveats that
used to limit what their troops could do.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, I have this
second question.
Again, I like many on this committee, maybe all on this
committee, worry about the stress on the force and how many
times we can continue to ask these brave men and women to keep
going back and back.
And I do want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral
Mullen, for taking the time you did to try to figure out what
is the right policy for Afghanistan.
The question is, of the 30,000 that will be going to
Afghanistan, how many of the 30,000 can you give us, if not
today, maybe to the committee, the number of deployments that
each one of the 30,000 have been on? Do you know now how many
deployments the 30,000 have been on? Has it been half the
30,000 have not been to Afghanistan or Iraq and the other half
a number of times? Can you answer that, or would you like to
submit that to the committee?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Jones, let me take a shot at it. I
can't give you a complete answer, but I think it is an
important question. On the Marine Corps side, I think nobody
knows this better than you, we have rotated basically every
seven months with respect to deployments. And the expectation
is, for the major units, that will continue in the Marine Corps
even as we shift from--as we have shifted from Iraq to
Afghanistan. What I can't tell you is, for these units--there
are sort of two measures--for these units, how many deployments
this unit, a unit, has been on. And then, in that, how many
deployments on average have the individuals in that unit seen?
And that is what I would need to get back to you for.
Although the Marine Corps has managed this in a way--and
the growth of the force to 202,000 has been incredibly
important here, so that actually General Conway, even with
these deployments, is going to get over the next year to twice
as long at home as deployed. And, as you may remember, it
wasn't that long ago we were at one-to-one.
The Army is more challenging. And the major units, the
brigade combat teams for the Army, typically a unit is on its
third or fourth deployment. There is plenty of change-out in
the units between deployments, and the Army is going to get to
its two-to-one goal in a couple of years as opposed to the
Marine Corps.
I just want to tell you that it is something the Secretary
and myself, the service chiefs, General Casey and General
Conway spend an awful lot of time on, recognizing the stress
that they have been under. But that is where we are right now.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, gentlemen.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I know it has been a
tough several days. I just want to go on record as supporting
the President and his decision, and particularly the thoughtful
process that he used to come to that decision. And I know he
stated the other night that we are not alone in this effort in
Afghanistan. I believe he said 43 other nations are involved.
My question--and I will ask it to Secretary Lew. My
question is, I know we have ongoing efforts to try to elicit
additional cooperation from other nations besides the 43. If
you can give us a status report on that, how successful are we?
And the other question I have for any or maybe all of you
is the following: How are we working to ensure that
developmental funds will reach the intended recipients? Because
one of the--I think one of the critical issues here is
reassuring the nations we are trying to recruit to help in
addition to the 43 to support in an effort that is going to be
successful. So how are we doing that? How well are we doing?
And what is your anticipated success?
Secretary Lew. Mr. Reyes, the partners are participating in
different ways. Some are providing troops; some are providing
development assistance. Part of the President's plan called for
allies to provide troops. The responses have been very
positive. Secretary Clinton is in Brussels, and we are
confident that we are going to get commitments that will be
very much in line with what was expected.
On the development side, our partners are doing the same
kind of work we are doing. They are doing the kind of
development work in agriculture and rule of law, and we are
working very cooperatively both to provide programs in the
areas that we control, to share best practices, and to work
with the Afghan ministries to build capacity.
The very important question you ask on how to make sure the
money gets to where it is intended, that is a challenge, and we
have made it clear that it is not something that has just one
answer. We are going to work with Afghan national ministries
that have the capacity to get the money where it goes. Some of
them have done very well.
In the agriculture area, which is central to the issue that
Mr. Taylor was asking about, we have a lot of confidence that
the agriculture minister has a plan, that the money is getting
to the areas, to the farmers to give them seeds to plant legal
crops. And for most Afghan farmers, if they can plant and sell
legal crops, they don't want to grow poppies. So it is part of
the counternarcotics policy as well as the general development
policy.
We have to work at the subnational level. We need to work
with provincial governors. We need to help build governance in
areas where it hasn't been. When I was in Helmand right after
our military moved in to make that area a place where we could
do development work, it was almost overnight that we had
development workers helping build an air strip so that farmers
could get their crops out of Helmand, giving them seeds so they
can plant legal crops, and working in communities to try to get
local leaders to meet with their people sometimes for the first
time. I know the governor of Helmand has said that it was
incredibly important that the civilians were there with the
military from day one.
Secretary Gates. Part of what I think is important in this
is that we not take the Soviet approach and focus too much on
big signature projects that take years to complete. What we
need are, I think, principally small-scale efforts that reach
individual Afghans pretty quickly and where they see their
lives change for the better almost immediately after U.S.
forces and our partners and the Afghans clear an area. And I
think you can find ways through using these provincial
reconstruction teams and the other civilians that are with our
troops to do that. And I think that a one-room school, an all-
weather road, a small bridge, a well, these are the things that
matter to the individuals and that will make them want to be
our partners in this.
And I think that, frankly, one of the things that Secretary
Clinton and I talked about in the House Foreign Affairs
Committee yesterday is that the State Department and AID and
our civilians out there need the same kind of flexibility in
terms of the way they are able to commit funds for these kinds
of things that our commanders have with the Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds so that they can be
there the next day and commit and provide some dollars for
people to do that work.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And as Congressman Taylor said, I am going to ask some
tough questions, but I do appreciate you being here.
There was a time in our country when words mattered, when
laws and statutes mattered.
Mr. Secretary, Title X, Section 231 of the U.S. Code
required that you submit to us, to this committee, a
shipbuilding plan when you sent your budget over so that we
would know where the money was going to be spent on our ships,
and that you certified that the budget you sent over complied
with that shipbuilding plan. You just refused to do it this
year.
Title X, Section 231(a) required that we have an aviation
plan sent over to us and that you certify or have an assessment
that the budget comply with it, and you just refused to do it.
House Resolution 477 was unanimously approved by this
committee on both sides of the aisle requiring that you would
submit to us that shipbuilding plan that the law required by
September 15. You just refused to do it.
H. Res. 478 required an aviation resolution, and that
assessment that you would just comply with the law and submit
it to us by September 15. You just refused to do it.
Title 50, Chapter 15, Subchapter one, Paragraph 404(a)
required that we have a national security strategy submitted to
us by the President within 150 days after he took office. We
didn't get it.
The Guantanamo Executive Order issued on January 22, 2009,
said that Guantanamo Bay would be shut down no later than one
year from the date of this order, which would have been January
22, 2010. We know that is not going to happen. I disagreed with
that order, but that is what it said.
So my question, Mr. Secretary, to you today is this: If we
are not going to comply with Title X, Section 231; Title X,
Section 231(a); H. Res. 477; H. Res. 478; Title 50, Chapter 15,
Subchapter one, Paragraph 404(a); Guantanamo Executive Order,
what confidence do our allies and our troops and our citizens
have that the words we are hearing now are words that have
meaning and are not just semantics?
And as you think about that question, Admiral, I would ask
you this question. You testified earlier today that General
McChrystal got all he wanted, everything he wanted when he
asked for 30,000 troops. And the question I would ask you--I
have never known a general to get all he wanted. I have known
them to get all they formally requested but not all they
wanted. And I would just ask you, are you saying to this
committee that all General McChrystal ever wanted was 30,000
troops to wage the war that he is having to wage now?
Mr. Secretary, I give you that time, and then Admiral
Mullen.
Secretary Gates. First of all, with respect to the 30-year
aviation plan and shipbuilding plan, it was important for us to
be able to get a five-year defense plan from the administration
so that we had some predictability, and we are in the process
of doing that. The five-year defense plan has been put forward.
It was not for fiscal year (FY) 2010.
I can provide you that kind of--I can provide you a list.
It will be meaningless, because we don't know. We don't know
what the resources will be until we get the five-year plan.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, and again, I don't mean to
interrupt you, but that is not what the law says. And the law
says that you submit whatever plan you are working on. If we
have no plan, we need to know it when we are voting on budgets,
that we have don't have a plan. We are waiting for it.
But the reason that the law requires it is because it is
important that we know that, one, we have a plan, and what this
budget is trying to reach in that plan. So, with all due
respect, I would have appreciated and I think this committee
would have appreciated at least some response back as to why we
weren't complying with the law on doing that.
And I yield back.
Admiral Mullen. What I thought I said earlier about General
McChrystal, what I meant to say, was that the strategy that the
President has executed and made the decision on with respect to
the 30,000 troops is, General McChrystal is going to get what
he asked for in 2010. He is going to get those troops in some
cases more quickly than he had originally asked for them. And,
to me, that is significant, because that will give him the
thrust to turn the momentum around, turn this insurgency
around, which is his number one concern. And outside that,
longer term, there----
Mr. Forbes. And I appreciate that. I only have got eight
seconds. And I will just say this. It is a difference to us
when we say he got all he wanted than all he officially
requested.
Admiral Mullen. I would agree there are very few, if any,
commanders that have ever gotten everything that they wanted,
myself included.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, as we anticipate this influx of troops into
Afghanistan, the normal flow and plan that goes on with moving
large numbers of troops around, there are some pretty good
restrictions set in law by Congress on the role that women can
play. I am not asking for an administrative position. But would
it be helpful if those restrictions, those legal restrictions,
were removed so that you were free to move troops around
better, given the nature of counterinsurgency in both Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I think Admiral Mullen is probably more
familiar with these restrictions than I am. But certainly, on
the logistics side of it, I am not aware of any restrictions
with respect to moving the troops to Afghanistan and out of
Iraq and so on.
But, Admiral.
Admiral Mullen. I guess, Mr. Snyder, where I would go with
that is I am not aware of any major restrictions which are
really hurting us in terms of constraining our ability to do
that.
But I do think it may be worthwhile, on a little larger
level, to look at what we have learned over the last seven or
eight years of war and assessing that. In fact, I have talked
specifically with General Casey about maybe it is time for us
to review that to see if there are some changes that we should
make that may not be applicable directly to what we are doing
right now or that could be in the next couple of years but
would be applicable based on what we have learned in the long
term.
Dr. Snyder. Secretary Gates, over the last few years, you
have had some pretty strong statements about some of the
difficulties we have had on the civilian side of government, of
having the civilians following the surge into Iraq. Are you
confident that we will be able--that the civilian side of
government will be able to do what Admiral Mullen needs it to
do to accomplish the missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq?
Secretary Gates. This is clearly not a problem that can be
solved in the short term. I think that--I have confidence that
every effort possible is being made to get more civilians into
Afghanistan. And there have been a lot of changes in policies
and practices at the State Department. Secretary Lew can talk
to that.
But the problem overall is that the State Department--and
this is my old song. The State Department, AID, other civilian
agencies involved in national security have been starved of
resources for decades. You can't turn that around overnight.
When I left the government in 1993, there were 16,000 people
working in AID. They were deployable. They were expeditionary.
They had the languages. They were prepared to live in
rudimentary conditions and even dangerous conditions. AID, when
I came back to government, had 3,000 people, and they were
mainly contracting people.
So building that cadre of people, building a larger cadre
of Foreign Service officers, getting the kind of agricultural
experts that we need for this task is something that where the
groundwork laid today may not pay dividends for five years or
more, but it is important to start.
But as I say, just to repeat, I think everything that can
be done right now to get people into the field as quickly as
possible, civilians, is being done. And, frankly, it is a whole
of government effort, as Jack would tell you. They have got
people from the Department of Agriculture and the Justice
Department and various other departments of government
participating in this.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Chairman, I have about a minute and a half
left.
Mr. Owens of New York, if you would like to ask one
question, I would be glad to yield the remainder of my time to
you.
Mr. Owens. Thank you very much.
I do have a question. Early in the testimony there was a
reference to the fact that if we pulled out now, we would
likely see a civil war occur in Afghanistan. What do you
believe will cause that not to occur as we begin the pullout in
2011 given the history in that region?
Secretary Gates. The key is reestablishing traditional
forms of governance at the local level in the districts and the
provinces. It is having a credible government where we have at
least been able to strengthen the capacity of key ministries,
such as defense and interior, where we have high-quality people
in charge of them.
The thing to remember is that a very high percentage of the
Afghan people, based on all the polling and all the information
available to us, like 80 to 90 percent of the Afghan people do
not want to see a return of the Taliban. But the Taliban
intimidate. They murder. And until we can provide a security
environment where people know that they will not be subject to
that kind of retribution, we will have the danger that the
Taliban will be able to continue the kind of momentum that they
have had for the last year or two.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Before I call Mr. Miller, let me ask you a quick question.
Has it been made known as to what troop increase, if any, the
NATO countries are willing to proffer?
Secretary Gates. A number of countries are talking about
making commitments. We have received some firm commitments in
two telephone calls. Day before yesterday, I received firm
commitments of upwards of 2,000 troops. But these countries
haven't announced their willingness to do this to their own
people, so we can't preempt them. I also think that a number of
countries will wait until after the London conference in
January that Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Brown have
called on Afghanistan, and I think that some countries will
wait until then.
But the efforts that Secretary General of NATO Rasmussen
and the rest of us have made, Admiral Mullen, the Secretary of
State, National Security Adviser, and so on, I think give us
pretty high confidence that we will meet the numbers that we
have set forth.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, one of you in your testimony just a few minutes
ago--and I don't recall which one it was, but both of you can
respond, if you would. I think the comment was that there has
been no pressure for the Afghans to perform over the last eight
years. Is that a true statement?
Secretary Gates. I think that there has been--there has
been verbal pressure, but I think there has not been a serious
exercise of leverage.
Mr. Miller. You were Secretary of Defense. I mean, you
didn't pressure the Afghan people to perform?
Secretary Gates. Every meeting that I had with the minister
of defense, every meeting that I had with President Karzai, the
subject of recruitment, retention, strengthening their military
capabilities came up.
But the leverage is more in the kinds of assistance that we
have been offering, not military assistance but civilian
assistance, subsidies and so on. And I think there is some real
opportunities for that leverage.
Mr. Miller. Well, and is part of that leverage bypassing
the Karzai administration with the funds and going to some of
the local provinces and areas instead of giving them the money?
Secretary Gates. Well, I will defer to Secretary Lew.
But I think that--as I said earlier, I think that we are in
the process of developing some procedures in terms of trying to
tackle this corruption problem where we will not deal with
ministers and ministries that we believe are corrupt. We will
not deal with agencies or organizations that we believe are
corrupt. And, as I said just a few minutes ago, I think that
the more we can get the money directly to villages and local
authorities, the more successful we are likely to be.
Mr. Miller. And to Mr. Taylor's point earlier, I hope that
also means that we will not deal with governors or mayors that
are corrupt, either, even if they are the brother of the
president of the country.
Secretary Gates. I think that we have to make very--there
are certain provinces and certain ministries that are critical
to our success, and I think we have to be willing to use
whatever leverage is at our disposal to ensure that the people
who lead those ministries and who are the governors of those
provinces are competent, honest people we can work with.
Mr. Miller. Yesterday you had an exchange with Senator
McCain where you explained how the U.S. forces would begin
withdrawing in July of 2011, and this was your response: I
think it is the judgment of all of us in the Department of
Defense involved in this process that we will be in a position
in particularly uncontested areas where we will begin to
transition by 2011.
Is that a correct statement?
Secretary Gates. That sounds right.
Mr. Miller. So if this is correct, the drawdown occurs only
when the areas are uncontested. So, in other words, we redeploy
when we have accomplished clear holds and build. Correct?
Secretary Gates. Correct.
Mr. Miller. Can you name one province in Afghanistan where
we have U.S. forces or intend to send U.S. forces that is
currently uncontested?
Secretary Gates. I would have to look at the intelligence
reports and get that back to you.
Mr. Miller. Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. General McChrystal's plan overall is to
send the bulk of U.S. forces to the east and to the south,
which are very contested. We have got forces out in the west
where there well could be--where there is not that significant
of an insurgency, for instance, some forces out there and
coalition forces as well.
Mr. Miller. I think it is safe to say that we have very few
troops, if any, in places where they currently are uncontested.
And so I guess what I am driving at is that 2011, it is going
to be very, very difficult to find an area where our troops are
going to be that is uncontested, thereby beginning the
withdrawal process.
Admiral Mullen. I mean, we see in Helmand right now in some
of the districts or provinces, you know, it is pretty Helmand
quiet in a place called Nawa where it was really tough before
the Marines showed up. Now, we have got to build and transfer
after the clear and hold, which is where we are right now. And
by quiet, I mean the bazaar is open and there is a significant
amount of economic activity there in a place that a few months
ago there was virtually none. So what we have got to do is
connect that with the rest of Helmand. For example, that is
going to take additional troops.
So would you say that is contested or uncontested? I mean,
right now we have got--right now, it isn't. But we have got to
be able to assure that we can build and transfer it so that
that can be sustained, and that is where the Afghan Security
Forces come in.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
I have got five seconds left. Can either of you tell me why
the President did not use the word ``victory'' in his speech
the other night?
Admiral Mullen. He writes his own speech.
The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, again for being before us today.
Let me just paraphrase something that the last time I was
in Afghanistan, which was less than a year ago or sometime
earlier this year or late last year, that one of our people on
the ground said to me. They said, we give dollars to the
Afghanis to do something, to build a school, make a community
center, et cetera, and then we check in with them, and nothing
is done. And we say to them, you know, what happened to the
school you were supposed to build, or what is going on? And
they say to us, yeah, we need a school. You build it.
Meanwhile, all the money is gone. And what this gentleman was
saying to me was basically, if we want something done, we are
building it for them. And, secondly, we are paying for it
twice. This was the comment he made to our group.
So my question for you is that, despite eight years of
combat and billions in foreign aid and investment, the
situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated to a point where
President Obama has already ordered troop increases that have
almost doubled the size of the U.S. force there in the first 10
months of his presidency, a 100 percent increase in force
levels.
And yet, Admiral, you just testified that the Taliban has
dramatically increased in size and tactical proficiency in the
past 12 months. And apparently nothing we have done so far has
prevented the Taliban from growing back in strength and
effectiveness.
So I have no doubt that we will have a new campaign plan
for the military operations and that additional troops will
actually increase our tactical effectiveness against the
growing Taliban threat. But, Admiral, you also testified that
increasing the size of our force is an exercise in futility
unless corruption is eradicated in the Karzai government. You
stated that no number of troops will ever win this war unless
the Afghani people have better government and less corruption.
And, for example, it was said that the American forces in
Vietnam won every tactical battle, and yet we lost in part
because the South Vietnam had plagued and weak and corrupt
governments. So there are a lot of parallels to Vietnam; some
substantiated, some not. But one lesson that I think we learned
is corruption and bad government is bad government.
So I believe that we will lose this war and that the
deployment of these additional troops will be in vain unless
and until we have a strong and respective government in Kabul.
So, why should any of us believe that Karzai will fight
corruption or significantly improve the effectiveness of his
government? Karzai has been in power for five years. He just
got another five years. I want to know from you what changes he
has actually implemented this year that would persuade you that
he has the will and the capability to eliminate corruption and
improve governance there. And I am not asking what he has
promised to do. I am not asking what we intend to do. I want to
know what he has done, and I want specific examples, concrete
evidence. Corruption prosecutions, increased transparency,
high-level firings, putting his brother in jail.
What good governance has happened in the last 18 months?
What makes you think that he is going to change his stripes and
that things will turn around?
I would like the evidence because, as you know, hope is not
a strategy.
Secretary Lew. Ms. Sanchez, I think if you look, there is
clearly a lot of work to be done.
Everyone in the administration from the President on down
has recognized that we need to keep the pressure on the
government of Afghanistan to deal with the problem of
corruption.
But there has been progress. You look at the ministries in
the government. They are not all great. I am not going to sit
here and say that they are all where they should be, but there
are quite a number of them which have tackled corruption in
terms of firing people, in terms of trying to instill a
different kind of culture in their ministries. We work closely
with those ministries, ministries like the ministry of finance,
the ministry of agriculture. We have to recognize that that is
significant progress.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, I would like a report on the specifics
of what has happened, actually, because I haven't seen much
change.
Secretary Lew. And we are happy to provide additional
information.
And at the inaugural, I think it is important to note that
the idea of tackling corruption, naming a major crimes task
force, is an action. We have to keeping pressure on to make
sure that that is followed by further actions. But it was a
different message than had been the message before.
Ms. Sanchez. Talk is cheap, as they say in this town.
Secretary Lew. The major crimes task force is not just
talk. It is putting in place a mechanism to do something. A lot
of work to be done.
Ms. Sanchez. I will just remind you, we have had task force
after task force about changing Social Security in this city,
and nothing has been done. So a task force sounds good, but I
want concrete examples.
So if you will please send that to me in writing, I would
appreciate it.
The Chairman. We thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all three of you for being here this afternoon.
Admiral Mullen, in order to win in Afghanistan, I believe
withdrawal of troops must be based on conditions, not an
arbitrary date. What conditions do you hope to achieve by July
of 2011, and what will be the course of action if we do not
meet those victory milestones? Which is most crucial,
conditions or an arbitrary date?
Admiral Mullen. This is not an arbitrary date. It is a date
actually that those of us in the military looked at what we
need to do over the next couple of years, from summer 2009 to
summer 2011. General McChrystal specifically has said that we
have to turn this thing around in the next two years or we very
possibly can't win under any circumstances. We will have had,
as I said before, the Marines there for three summers at that
point in time. We think it is the right strategy. We think the
force levels are about right, and we think we can succeed with
respect to that.
So it is a date at which we will start to transition. There
is no size associated with that. There is no deadline. There is
no withdrawal date associated with that. And it is important--
and I believe this. It is important that the Afghan Security
Forces recognize they have got to grab this as well, so that
they are both motivated to train and equip as rapidly as they
possibly can. And that decision, the decisions that surround
that, where, how much, will be done, one, responsibly, and,
two, based on conditions.
Mr. Wilson. And I want to thank you. I think that is
reassuring to our troops, to military families, and also our
Afghan allies and other coalition forces. So thank you for your
response. I think that was very clear.
And, General, Secretary Gates, it is hard to imagine, but
you are getting to the point of your second anniversary of
being in service. December 18 will be----
Secretary Gates. Third.
Mr. Wilson. Oh, my God. Well, anyway, this is good.
Secretary Gates. That is exactly what I would say.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you. I believe you are placing
troops where they should be.
Under your watch, there has been over a 90 percent
reduction in the number of attacks in Afghanistan. There were
1,400 when you came in to office; now, there are
significantly--almost to a 100. Sadly, in Afghanistan, you are
placing more troops because there has been an increase to
nearly 200 attacks a week. But I believe that you are placing
the troops where they are needed.
In terms of training, I know what can be been done with the
Afghan forces. My former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade
of South Carolina led by General Bob Livingston, worked with
the Afghan police and army units. They developed a close
relationship with their Afghan brothers, and they saw the
capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces.
With that in mind, I understand that the training program
for the Afghan National Police is being transferred from the
State Department to the Department of Defense, which will
involve a transition on the ground. How confident are you that
the training program will not be disrupted? Does this transfer
put the mission of the Afghan Security Forces at risk?
Secretary Gates. No, I don't think it does. And I think
that, as Admiral Mullen has testified and I would invite him to
comment, we have put new people in, in all of these training
programs.
But the reality is, both with the police and the army, that
working together and partnering is the key to their
effectiveness. They can go through basic training, but what we
found in Iraq and what General McChrystal is intending to do in
Afghanistan is, once those people get out of basic training,
once those units show up, that they will live together, work
together, plan together.
That hasn't happened before, and that is how you build
trust between these people. But it also is the way you give
them competence and confidence. And we saw it in Iraq, and that
is certainly General McChrystal's approach on all the security
services on the Afghan side.
Mr. Wilson. And actually, I have seen it myself in visiting
in Kabul--I have been there nine times. Visiting with the 218th
Brigade, it was always extraordinarily encouraging to me that
they were not just at Camp Phoenix; they were spread throughout
the country in a mentoring program. And it is and can and shall
be successful. And I want to thank you for your service. All of
you. And I just appreciate your efforts to protect American
families by defeating the terrorists overseas.
And I yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for being here. We certainly
appreciate, I certainly appreciate the deliberate process that
you have used. And I know that it has been difficult. It is
difficult for us, too. I feel quite conflicted around this.
Could you help us understand how you won over some of your
own skepticism and others in looking at a few issues? And I
guess I have a--Pakistan, for example. We have made the
assumption that adding 30,000 troops in Afghanistan and
partnering with a new, hopefully more, Afghanis in the services
and in the law enforcement will make and help stabilize
Pakistan. And yet, we read in the press and we know that in
many ways there will be a flow of Taliban likely into Pakistan.
How does that help to stabilize Pakistan?
I think the other assumption that is being made is that we
will be able to recruit the number of Afghanis that are
required through their tribal leaders. And I am wondering,
where do we see that happening in such numbers that you have
the confidence to believe that that is the case? I haven't seen
that indication.
And then I think, finally, the whole issue in terms of the
civilian, quote, surge that we have talked about, and yet I
think, Secretary Gates, particularly you said that, I mean,
that is going to be years before we really have the kind of a
force that is required to do that. And I am wondering, are
there plans already to have the civilians partnering and
training with our military that are going over there together?
And then, finally, are we focusing largely on our reserves
and our National Guard as well as our active duty troops that
will be deployed to Afghanistan?
Secretary Lew. If I could start with the civilian question
that you asked. Secretary Gates' comments about the long-term
need to rebuild USAID and State, we all believe that.
But notwithstanding that, there is a very large effort
under way to get civilians to Afghanistan. We are tripling the
number of civilians in place. By early next year, we will have
almost 1,000 people on the ground. They are leveraged ten to
one because local nationals are hired either directly or
through contract or non-governmental organization (NGO)
arrangements. So that is a fairly substantial number of people.
You are talking about 10,000 civilians. Civilians don't come in
battalions; they come in ones and twos. You have a half a dozen
civilians in a district, and they are able to--U.S. civilians--
and they can organize an awful lot of activities. They can
handle the disbursement of monies. They are on the ground, and
they can deal with some of these corruption issues because they
are there to supervise the way the monies are being given out
in terms of the projects being funded.
This is very hard work. I wouldn't sit here today and say
that it is going to be easy to get enough civilians in to do
all the work that we have to do in Afghanistan. But we are
getting the numbers there with the specialization that we need,
with agriculture specialization, with rule of law
specialization, for each of the functions that are identified
by military and civilian planners working together.
Mrs. Davis. And just, do they have the staying power? How
long are they required to stay? And when will you know that
perhaps you are not going to have those?
Secretary Lew. When we started at the beginning of the
year, there were just over 300 people, most of whom had
commitments that were less than a year, three months, six
months. We are bringing a thousand people in, the vast majority
of who are making the commitment of a year or more. That is a
very big difference and a very important difference and one of
the major changes that we have had made.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. Let me first quickly piggyback on Secretary
Lew. He would never say this, but I have watched him work this
problem over the last many months, and he personally and his
people have had a huge impact on getting the right skilled
people there; not just a body, which is a problem we had in
Iraq, but the right skilled people into the right job.
And the multiplier is just huge. Because I was with the
Marines right after they went into Helmand, and the one
civilian that rolled in with them literally the next day had a
huge immediate impact. And so the leverage that he talks about
just, you can't say enough about that. And I really appreciate
that effort.
With respect to Pakistan, an awful lot of work going on
with Kayani and the Pakistani Military (PAKMIL). Kayani--and I
give General Dave McKiernan credit for this. He started, we
started this tripartite, Afghan, Pakistan, as well as ISAF U.S.
meet, that continues, and General McChrystal has met with
General Kayani several times. We are working to synchronize the
campaign, if you will, so that we don't have the kind of
impact. We sent the Marines into Helmand. Not that many
insurgents went back across the border.
And then, lastly, just very quickly, we recognize the
recruiting, retaining and retention problems that we have on
the ANSF. And not unlike we have to incentivize that, we also
have to create a security environment in which they can be
recruited, trained, and sustain that environment over time.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlewoman.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciate all of you for being here
today. I think one of the things you can tell is that members
of this committee are struggling, and they are struggling
because they are hearing a lot of things that are contrary to
policies that we have heard before. You, yourself, had said
that in the past you were adamantly opposed to deadlines, and
yet today we are dealing with a July 2011 deadline that,
Admiral, you said: By then, we will know whether or not we are
succeeding or not by that date. We will know whether or not we
are succeeding by that date.
But there is no trigger with respect to the date. It
doesn't matter when you get to that date how you are doing.
There has been a date set for drawdown. This is not a date for
assessment. This is not a date to determine whether or not this
strategy that you are currently implementing is something that
needs to be changed. This is the beginning of a drawdown.
Now, Secretary Gates, you tell us, well, but it is how the
drawdown is done that will be the evaluation. But nonetheless,
it is a date where we are saying, July 2011, whether or not we
are succeeding, as you have said, Admiral, that we are going to
begin to draw down.
And I am really troubled, Mr. Secretary, by your statement
of, for over the past eight years, we haven't exerted enough
leverage. And you acknowledge that three of those eight are
your own. And I am not comfortable with your conclusion that
setting that date, which is an arbitrary date of July 2011, is
going to provide you with that leverage.
And you turn to us and you said, well, you know, I think
that the American people want to know that there is going to be
an end, having eight years of this. Mr. Secretary, I think what
the people want to know is, are we going to be safe? I mean,
the reason why we are in Afghanistan is because we were
attacked on 9/11, and we lost the World Trade Center from
perpetrators that originated from Afghanistan. This isn't an
issue of whether or not we want an end. It is how we want an
end.
And that is really what I was looking for today, was some
answers as to how we are going to get that end, not an
arbitrary deadline. And what concerns me, again, with arbitrary
deadlines, I mean, you look to Guantanamo. This is an
administration that said, we are closing Guantanamo in 12
months, which is something I opposed. But now we are going to
be drawing down from Afghanistan in 18? We couldn't accomplish
closing Guantanamo, where there are a handful of terrorists and
we have complete control, but in Afghanistan, where there
certainly is an innumerable amount, and we are going to begin a
drawdown in 18 months.
Now, Admiral, you said that--I believe I got this right--
that the Taliban are making more than the Afghan army. Several
members have asked you questions about the drug trade, and I
have a chart I want to hold up, Mr. Secretary.
This is looking at the drug trade from 1995 to 2009. I
think this is important for us to look at, because every time
we take up the issue of, what are we going to do, how is the
Taliban being funded, how is al Qaeda being funded, and we talk
about the drug trade, it should not be an issue of this
esoteric concept of drug trade. It is actually the increase
from the drug trade.
Now, this chart goes from 1995 to 2009. I am going to fold
it back so that we look at the highest numbers going away since
1995. And what do we find? We find the last four years being an
astronomical amount that is off the charts with respect to what
has occurred in Afghanistan before. Three of those four, Mr.
Secretary, as you just said, are the time periods where you
have served as Secretary of Defense.
Now, we all know that the Afghan National Army is competing
against the Taliban, from which this funding is coming from.
Now, I, like other members of this committee, I am a member of
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). And in their last
meeting, they had a resolution that was brought up with respect
to addressing the drug trade, and actually, the Russians came
forward with a resolution calling on NATO and the NATO PA as a
policy perspective to address the issue of the drug-related
illegal activities. There were members of parliament from NATO
who said that it wasn't NATO's responsibility to address the
drug trade.
Now, again, we know that there has been in the last four
years an astronomical increase, and we know that it is funding
what we are fighting. I would hope that your strategy includes
addressing this issue. And perhaps you could give us some
information today that would give us confidence that this,
which is funding what we are fighting, might be something that
you can address.
Secretary Gates. You are correct about the reluctance of
other ISAF nations to tackle this problem. I would tell you
that NATO's policy on this, the ISAF policy, to which the
governments have acceded--I wouldn't say they supported
enthusiastically. But the ISAF rules of engagement in terms of
going after drug traffickers, drug lords, and the drug labs was
changed about a year ago. And so ISAF, the commander of ISAF
now can deploy forces and engage forces in trying to deal with
these groups.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen in his testimony says that South Asia is the
epicenter of global Islamic terrorism. And I think this
decision will have tremors well beyond that epicenter. My
friend from Ohio just mentioned Guantanamo. I would want to ask
Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates if they would still stand by
their earlier statements, which I believe are correct, that
closing Guantanamo removes a symbol that is a valuable
recruitment device for the jihadists whom we are fighting;
would you still agree with that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I do.
Admiral Mullen. I said that in 2005, and I believe it
today.
Mr. Andrews. And so the relationship of the Guantanamo
question to this one is it makes it more difficult for those
whom we are fighting in Afghanistan otherwise to recruit those
to fight against us.
I wanted to ask you about Pakistan and the tremors that it
involves in relationship to this. If we are successful in this
military mission in substantially degrading al Qaeda and the
Taliban in and near the Afghan-Pakistani border, what impact do
either of you think or any of you think that that would have on
the stability of the Pakistani government?
Admiral Mullen. I think it would have a significant impact.
I think the Pakistani government and the Pakistani people pay
an awful lot of attention to their neighbors, and their
strategy is designed around what kind of governments and what
kinds of threats they have next door. So I think a stable,
supportive Afghanistan would have a significant impact on how
Pakistan would look at its future. And I think the opposite is
true as well.
Mr. Andrews. To what extent is the rising tide of terrorist
violence against civilians in Pakistan attributable to the
resurgent Taliban?
Secretary Gates. I would say that it is a result of the
growth in the last year to 18 months of the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan, the TTP, the Taliban in Pakistan, or the Pakistani
Taliban, I should say. We have evidence that al Qaeda is
helping them pick targets, do operational planning, helping
them in their effort to try to destabilize the Pakistani
government.
The other piece of this that does not include the Taliban
or that is apart from the Taliban is we also know that al Qaeda
is helping the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group that
carried out the bombings in Mumbai. Al Qaeda sees using the
Taliban in Pakistan and groups like LET as ways to destabilize
Pakistan and even try to provoke a conflict between India and
Pakistan that would inevitably destabilize Pakistan. So this is
all tied together.
Mr. Andrews. I think Admiral Mullen implicitly answered
this question. But if the opposite were true, if we were either
to fail in this offensive mission against the Taliban and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan or not embark upon it, what would the
impact then be on the stability of the Pakistani government, in
your opinion?
Secretary Gates. Well, let me comment and then just ask
Admiral Mullen. First of all, we have seen what happens. When
the Pakistanis made deals with the tribes and various groups on
its northwestern frontier, it created a sanctuary and safe
haven in which Taliban, which had been knocked back on its
heels and nearly destroyed in 2001-2002, had the space in which
it could reconstitute itself to the point where it could become
a major problem for the United States and a number of our
allies.
If, given the same kind of space in eastern Afghanistan and
southern Afghanistan, the TTP in Pakistan could use it to
strengthen itself and expand its ranks and be even more
effective in its efforts to destabilize the government.
Admiral Mullen. I have spent a lot of time in Pakistan, and
each time I go, I learn how much I still have to learn. And one
of the messages that comes from there is a message of lack of
trust. And that is based on not just what happened in 1989 but
in fact what happened as early as the 1960s. They recall we
have betrayed them three times. The question is, are we going
to do that again?
Mr. Andrews. I certainly hope not.
Admiral Mullen. And I think the worst case is that that
government does get destabilized; they are nuclear capable.
Mr. Andrews. If we may, we certainly I think have a
consensus that we don't want a nuclear weapon Iran. If, God
forbid, we had one, what is the greater threat to the United
States, a nuclear weapon Iran or a nuclear weapon Pakistan
under a jihadist government?
Admiral Mullen. I think they are both pretty, I mean,
dramatic threats to us and to other nations in the world.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.
Admiral Mullen, in response to a couple of questions, you
have affirmed that the 30,000 troops is what General McChrystal
wanted for 2010. I guess we don't know what he wanted in total,
and perhaps when we see him next week, we can see what that
total number is, unless you can tell us what his total request
was. But, in the meantime, we have 30,000 that we are looking
at.
Can you help us understand what the makeup of that 30,000
is? How many combat brigades? How many people will be trainers?
What kind of enablers are going with it? And particularly,
because you have already talked about the stress on enablers
and the difficulty of moving some from Iraq to Afghanistan and
their quick turnaround, can you give us some idea of the makeup
of that 30,000? Is the strategy complete enough for that?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, with the decision as recent as it
is, the details out through the 30,000, the further you get to
the right in the timetable, we have got some more precise work
to do. But up front, it is clearly a regimental combat team
from the Marine Corps specifically that would be at the front
end of this. There is also a package in there similar to the
Fourth, B-82nd that is a training brigade. So focused
exclusively on training, although in a combat environment, and
this goes to the partnership piece, we have got one we sent in;
we are going to send another.
With respect to the enablers, we are looking at other
brigade combat teams. And, actually, one of the things that the
President gave General McChrystal was the flexibility to put
together the forces as he best sees fit. And so we are working
with him now to really look at the details of that, and we just
don't have that at this particular point in time. I would
expect certainly at least one more brigade combat team, if not
a second one. Everybody has got a training mission and a
partnering mission as they go in.
And then we are very concerned about the enablers, the
kinds of things the Secretary talked about earlier, those that
protect our people. It's medical. It's ISR. It is helicopters,
engineers, improvised explosive device (IED) related. And we
are focused--we have been focused on that for many, many months
now to do two things: One, make sure we can get as many of them
there as possible, and they are a significant part of the
30,000. And it is not just having them in the 30,000; it is,
where do we get them, to your point, Mr. Kline, because they
have been turning pretty quickly. And we are very aware of that
as we look at their turnaround ratios.
But all of it--I believe all of it is doable in terms of
what he needs, what he has asked for, what he needs and our
ability to get them there, particularly over the next six,
eight, six to eight months.
Mr. Kline. Admiral, I am a little bit concerned that we
don't have more clarity into what the makeup of this would be,
because we have set on 30,000, but I don't know how we got the
30,000 if we don't know how many of those are going to be
combat teams and how many of those are going to be enablers. It
seems to me that that 30,000--I hate to use the word arbitrary
again, but I don't understand how we know what that number is
if we don't know what the makeup is going to be.
Admiral Mullen. It is not arbitrary. And I would only
repeat, since that word keeps coming up, that July 2011 is not
an arbitrary date, either. I mean, we certainly have a broad
view of what this should be. The closer that they will deploy,
the more specific it is. General McChrystal has some
flexibility that is tied to that, and we are working the
details of how those packages get put together.
Broadly, they are brigade combat teams. They are enablers.
They are trainers. They are the kinds of things that we know we
will typically need. It becomes a question of identifying them,
making sure they are available, and then literally putting
ourselves in a position to be able to deploy them in a timely
way.
Mr. Kline. All right. Admiral, we will be looking forward,
I am sure, in this committee to those details, and of course,
we are anxiously awaiting General McChrystal's arrival to
testify here. I am very concerned about those enablers. I am
very interested to see what kind of medical support we are
going to have for this, how much increase there is going to be.
Are we going to build a hospital? There are a number of issues
in terms of the force makeup that I am really looking forward
to getting details on, and I know that other members of the
committee are.
Just one other point. I think my colleague from Florida
asked why the President didn't use the word ``victory.'' And,
as you said, you didn't write the speech. Are we looking for
victory in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. And I, certainly in our discussions--and we
believe that this strategy is a strategy that will allow us to
succeed.
Mr. Kline. Is that victory?
Admiral Mullen. And that is to allow us to succeed. To get
us to a level where we can turn this over to the Afghans.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Before I call on Mr. Langevin, let me make an observation.
In both Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, we have Navy and Air
Force personnel doing virtually Army type of work, is that not
correct?
Secretary Gates. Correct. Some of these enablers, very
important enablers, are from the Navy and the Air Force.
The Chairman. Well, is that part of the 30,000?
Secretary Gates. I don't know the answer to that.
Admiral Mullen. Well, I mean, I don't know specifics, but,
certainly, I think it would be. They have been a significant
part of what we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan and will
continue to be.
Secretary Gates. And, particularly, I would say the Air
Force, in terms of the intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, I want to thank you for being here, for your
testimony. I know you have had a busy week, but we are
certainly appreciative to have you here today to clarify some
of the issues surrounding the President's decision to increase
troop levels in Afghanistan.
We all recognize, obviously, that there are serious
security challenges ahead, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
And I am certainly glad that the President's new strategy was
really developed after thorough deliberation and careful
assessment of the conditions on the ground.
And, while the President has answered many of the questions
on Tuesday night, there obviously are many that remain, some of
which are going to require time and patience and others that
are going to require deeper investigation and continued
oversight by Congress as the war moves on.
I am struggling with a few things. As the President
discussed in his speech, with the domestic challenges that we
face at home, we simply can't commit our armed forces to a
prolonged and costly attempt at nation-building. And, in terms
of where we are right now and the way forward, I am struggling
with a couple of things. One centers around the footprint; the
other is the counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism
strategy.
You know, clearly, the Taliban--and, Secretary, I probably
am now where you were, and I haven't heard a whole lot to
really convince me or move me yet. But, clearly, the Taliban
are not over-
whelming us with their numbers or their firepower, but yet they
have been able to increase their influence significantly in
Afghanistan.
And I need to drill down more on that. Because what I see
is that, as our troop levels have increased, we have been seen
more by the Afghan people, perhaps, as occupiers. And that is
the real nexus which has allowed the Taliban to increase their
influence. So I need to have you drill down more on that and
explain that a little more, in terms of how you got to where
you are.
And on the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategy,
after having reviewed the available options, I would like to
hear a little more about what the President felt could be
gained strategically from a counterinsurgency approach that
couldn't be obtained by following a more counterterrorism-
focused effort.
Secretary Gates. First of all, in terms of the footprint,
the first point that General McChrystal made to me when I
raised this concern is that it is not so much the number as
what those troops do. And I think this also ties in with issues
relating to civilian casualties. It ties in to the heretofore
largely absent partnering with the Afghans, so that when we
would go into a village, the person knocking on the door, or
knocking the door down, was an Afghan and not an American.
These are all things that General McChrystal has changed,
in terms of how he is going to use the forces he has been
given, the ones that are already there and the ones that are
coming in. And if the Afghans are truly partnered with us, as
is his intention, the civilian casualties are dramatically
reduced since he issued new orders on this, and that is having
a difference.
The reality is, in part, the reason that the Taliban have
been successful is that they are so ruthless and they
intimidate a lot of people. As we have said several times, this
has long been an under-resourced effort on our part, and we
haven't had the troops or the partnership with the Afghans to
give Afghans in villages and rural areas, where most of the
people live, the confidence that when they get a night letter
saying, if you cooperate with ISAF or the Afghan Government,
you will be killed and your entire family will be killed.
So the key to getting the Afghans who are hedging because
they are not sure who is going to win is to give them the
confidence that what we are trying to do is the winning side.
But our behavior, the behavior of our troops, the way we use
those troops, and the way we partner with the Afghans, I think,
have a huge amount to do with this reducing-the-footprint
issue.
The other side of it is, I think this is an area where
people misuse history. The Soviets did get defeated in
Afghanistan, but it is important to remember that they were
trying to impose an alien culture and political system on the
country. They murdered about one million Afghans. They made
five million more into refugees. And they were virtually
isolated internationally in that effort. None of those
conditions apply to what we are trying to do in Afghanistan and
where we are.
And with respect, very quickly, to counterinsurgency (COIN)
and counterintelligence (CI), the reality is you cannot do--
counterterrorism, rather--you cannot do effective
counterterrorism unless you have a presence on the ground and
are able to collect intelligence that informs your targeting.
And the only way you can do that is to provide some minimum
level of security for the population so that you can operate
there.
So this is not a fully resourced COIN in the original
sense. We have tried to narrow and refine the mission so there
are major aspects of COIN associated with this but also major
aspects of counterterrorism and, I would say, having forces
also outside the protected areas, where we are protecting the
population that are, in fact, out and about, disrupting the
Taliban and making them feel very uncomfortable.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
We have time for one question from Mr. Rogers, and then the
witnesses will turn to pumpkins.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question deals with metrics. Mr. Secretary, you talked
about transferring authority over, starting the process in July
of 2011. And, in August of this year, you talked about
beginning the process of building these metrics by which we are
going to measure success over there.
Can you tell me where that process is now?
Secretary Gates. Well, we have a very detailed set of
metrics that I think have been shared with the Congress that
came out of the March endeavor. We have tried to narrow those
and make them more precise in terms of our expectations of the
Afghans, our expectations of the Pakistanis and of ourselves
and our allies. And those have been worked in the interagency,
and I will go back and see if we cannot provide those to the
Congress.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a question, but if
I could just reread back something, I think the most important
point made by the Secretary, if I could just reread it again?
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Secretary, you said here today--I think
this is the most important point today in the whole process.
And you said, ``This part of the world represents the epicenter
of extremist jihadism, the historic place where native and
foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view,
caused collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole
remaining superpower in the same place would have severe
consequences for the United States and the world.''
I think that is the point we all need to remember as we go
forward here, and I appreciate your saying that.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me first compliment and thank the members of the
committee for staying within the time limits for questions.
And a special thanks to the witnesses for being with us. It
has been very, very helpful. We wish you success in this most
difficult endeavor. We couldn't have a better team, couldn't
have a better team. And we know that, and you have our
confidence.
Without objection, Members have five legislative days to
submit their statements into the record.
And, with that, gentlemen, thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
December 3, 2009
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 3, 2009
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 3, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, I have this second
question. Again, I like many on this committee, maybe all on this
committee, worry about the stress on the force and how many times we
can continue to ask these brave men and women to keep going back and
back. And I do want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Mullen,
for taking the time you did to try to figure out what is the right
policy for Afghanistan. The question is, of the 30,000 that will be
going to Afghanistan, how many of the 30,000 can you give us, if not
today, maybe to the committee, the number of deployments that each one
of the 30,000 have been on? Do you know now how many deployments the
30,000 have been on? Has it been half the 30,000 have not been to
Afghanistan or Iraq and the other half a number of times? Can you
answer that, or would you like to submit that to the committee?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Jones, let me take a shot at it. I can't give
you a complete answer, but I think it is an important question. On the
Marine Corps side, I think nobody knows this better than you, we have
rotated basically every 7 months with respect to deployments. And the
expectation is, for the major units, that will continue in the Marine
Corps even as we shift from--as we have shifted from Iraq to
Afghanistan. What I can't tell you is, for these units--there are sort
of two measures--for these units, how many deployments this unit, a
unit, has been on. And then, in that, how many deployments on average
have the individuals in that unit seen? And that is what I would need
to get back to you for.
Total Service--The Military Services have not yet identified all of
the 30,000 Service Members as support for the plus-up. The remaining
Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines will continue to be sourced as
requirements are finalized and the full sourcing process is completed.
As of 27 Jan 10, 26,470 of the 30,000 have been identified.
Of the people we have identified and can track their deployments
(Army, Air Force, Marine Corps), 14% have deployed 3 or more times to
Afghanistan or Iraq. 40% have not deployed to Afghanistan/Iraq; this
would be their first deployment to one of these locations.
Army--The Army has identified 16,186 Soldiers as support for the
plus-up.
Of that number, 10,627 have participated in one or more
deployments:
Army
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 or more
Afghanistan/Iraq 0 Deployments 1 Deployment 2 Deployments Deployments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5,559 6,010 3,150 1,467
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force--The Air Force has identified 393 Airmen as support for
the plus-up.
Of the 393 Airmen 144 participated in one or more deployments:
Air Force
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 or more
Afghanistan/Iraq 0 Deployments 1 Deployment 2 Deployments Deployments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
249 100 32 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy--The Navy has identified 1,391 Sailors as support for the
plus-up.
Navy is unable to provide requested data on individual OIF/OEF
deployment history. The Navy does not have a corporate-level system in
place to effectively track and report repeat deployments to a specific
named operation.
Marine Corps--The Marine Corps has identified 8,500 Marines as
support for the plus-up.
Of that number, 3,995 Marines have participated in one or more
deployments:
Marines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 or more
Afghanistan/Iraq 0 Deployments 1 Deployment 2 Deployments Deployments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4,505 2,635 1,020 340
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Jones. In your prepared testimony you stated: ``General
McChrystal intends to use these additional U.S. troops to conduct more
focused counterinsurgency operations that enhance population security
against the Taliban in south and east Afghanistan. As in Iraq, our
troops will live among the population. Thus--and as General McChrystal
has successfully emphasized since his arrival as COMISAF last June--we
will continue to make every effort to eliminate civilian casualties,
not just because this is the right thing to do, but because these
casualties work against our goal of Afghan population security.
Although we must expect higher Alliance casualties in coming months as
we dedicate more U.S. forces to protect the population and mentor the
ANSF, our extended security presence must--and will--improve security
for the Afghan people and limit both future civilian and military
casualties.'' How do you envision limiting civilian and military
casualties? Can this be accomplished solely by a change in tactics? Or
can technology assist us in achieving this?
Admiral Mullen. With regards to limiting civilian casualties, the
Tactical Directive issued in July 2009 states:
`` . . . I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the
use of force like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds
and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance
with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against
the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission
success more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.
. . . The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires
against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and
prescribed conditions.''
The above quotes deal directly with ROE and troops using CAS in
self-defense. The Tactical Directive does not prevent troops from
protecting themselves as a matter of self-defense but makes them
determine whether CAS is the only option available to them.
Limiting civilian casualties cannot be limited by changes in
tactics or technology as separate entities. The changes in tactics are
addressed in the Tactical Directive. Technology enhances the ability of
the troops to determine appropriate levels of force and identification
of hostile forces before engaging, thereby limiting the possibility of
inadvertent civilian casualties.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. I have concerns that the Administration approached the
Afghanistan situation without putting the most robust effort forward.
We have heard in the media report of low-, medium-, and high-risk
recommendations. 1) Did General McChrystal request 30k? 2) Who provided
that number to the President? 3) Based on all the options that were
presented to the President, was that his lowest risk/highest chance of
success option? 4) Are 30,000 forces enough to win decisively? Please
describe those risks that this President is willing to take by going
with a force package of 30k.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The initial resource request
remains a classified document, so we are unable to go into complete
detail. However, we can cover the process undertaken by General
McChrystal.
Once his initial assessment was complete, he developed a classified
resource analysis. In that analysis, he identified different force
packages with associated risks based upon his assessment. Following
this process, a direct recommendation was submitted through the chain
of command to the President.
The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along with
additional coalition forces and growing Afghan national security force
numbers, is a significant step toward expanding security in critical
areas and in demonstrating resolve. The President's force package
provides U.S. forces as quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal
the combat power he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative. In addition,
our Allies and partners have committed to more than 7,000 additional
forces through the NATO/ISAF Force Generation Process.
The President's decision rapidly resources our strategy,
recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive and
ultimately enable success. Rolling back the Taliban is a prerequisite
to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda. The mission is not only important;
it is also achievable. We can and will accomplish this mission.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. It should be in our country's best strategic
interest to protect Pakistan from al Qaeda. Reports indicate that these
terrorists might be receiving money from members of the Pakistani
Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Our country and the
world cannot afford to have Pakistan taken over by terrorists due to
its nuclear capabilities. What are we doing to protect the strategic
interest in Pakistan? Will Pakistan fall if Afghanistan falls?
Secretary Gates. The core goal of the President's strategy is to
disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan and to prevent their return to both countries. This
strategy also recognizes that the security situation in Pakistan is
inextricably linked to that of Afghanistan. Pakistan's security,
especially along its Western border, cannot be separated from
developments in Afghanistan.
Taliban sanctuaries in the south and east of the country would be
profoundly disruptive to Pakistan, especially if the Taliban-ruled
areas become a staging area for resurgent military groups to attack
Pakistan. By deploying an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan,
the President's strategy aims to deny such sanctuaries by degrading the
Taliban's momentum and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the
Afghan government.
Another key part of the current strategy is reinforcing Pakistan's
understanding that active opposition to extremist groups within its own
borders is essential to its strategic interests. Recent military
operations in South Waziristan, Swat, and other areas of Pakistan
reflect Pakistan's increasing recognition of the extremist threat. We
work closely with Pakistan on a range of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency efforts, with a focus on strengthening its
capabilities as it seeks to root out extremists in border areas and
interdict terrorist attacks in settled areas. We also provide
substantial resources--$1.5 billion annually for the next five years
through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-
Lugar legislation) for example--to enhance Pakistan's democratic
institutions and encourage prosperity among the broader populace.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. The stability and security of Pakistan
depends on the success in Afghanistan. Moreover, with the tensions high
in India, the region is ripe for chaos. How does the President's
strategy affect our relationship with Pakistan and India? Will this
enhance stability?
Secretary Gates. As you note, the outcome of our efforts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan have serious implications for the entire
region. The President's strategy aims to address the challenges we face
on both sides of the border, because we cannot allow violent extremists
to gain access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001. Al
Qaeda continues to use extremist groups as a way to destabilize
Pakistan and attempt to provoke a conflict between Pakistan and India
that would inevitably destabilize the entire region. This is why the
President is committed to long-term strategic partnerships with both
Pakistan and India that benefit both parties. We recognize that long-
term regional stability will be unattainable without a solution that
involves both nations.
The President's new strategy recognizes the importance of a
comprehensive approach to regional problems. This approach seeks to
mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and works to encourage
neighboring countries to shift their efforts from competition for
influence to cooperation and economic integration. We have an array of
programs that aim to achieve these goals through building and
strengthening our relationships with regional actors. Ultimately, we
will work diligently to encourage stability in the region, because
doing so is fundamental to our national security.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. There are terrorists harboring in the
northwest part of Pakistan. These Al Qaida members are slowly taking
over this area. What are we doing to not have these terrorists take
over the entire country?
Secretary Gates. As President Obama stated repeatedly, our goal is
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. In recent months, the
Pakistani military has made significant efforts to address the
extremist threat within its borders. We must encourage and aid
Pakistan's fight against the extremists in South Waziristan and Swat,
and across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Additionally, we must help Pakistan begin to expand its objectives to
include seeking out and eliminating all forms of violent extremism and
terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
the wider South Asia region, and the world.
The U.S. withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by
a severing of military-to-military relations as a result of Pakistan's
test of a nuclear weapon, contributes to Pakistan's skepticism that the
United States is not a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We are
deepening ties with the people of Pakistan, as well as with their
security forces, in order to overcome this ``trust deficit.'' Our
security assistance programs, such as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Fund and the symbolically and tactically important F-16 program, are
vitally important to this effort. We also provide substantial
resources--$1.5 billion annually for the next five years through the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-Lugar
legislation) for example--to enhance Pakistan's democratic institutions
and encourage prosperity among the broader populace. We must continue
to make efforts to show that we view our long-term relationship with
Pakistan as vital to our national security interests and to ensure
Pakistan has the capability to defeat terrorists and insurgents.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. What role will the NATO forces play in this
surge? What are you doing to get commitments from our NATO allies? What
commitments have you already received? What limitations do you see NATO
coming up with (where they will fight and how)?
Secretary Gates. NATO will play the same role that U.S. forces will
play--to secure the country and train the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) in preparation for the eventual assumption of
responsibility by the Afghans themselves. We are working with NATO
Brussels to reach out actively to all Allies and partners to seek to
meet all requirements, and we are hopeful that contributing nations
will announce their commitments at the upcoming International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Generation Conference on December 7,
2009, the London Conference on January 28, 2010, and the NATO Defense
Ministers meeting in Istanbul on February 4, 2010. Since we just
recently announced our Afghan strategy, we are working within NATO
channels to secure commitments. Although some NATO nations do place
limitations on national contributions, many do not. We are working with
our Allies and other troop-contributing nations to seek the greatest
flexibility possible in ISAF forces for General McChrystal's
(COMISAF's) command and control.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Are we thinking of a plan to send more
American troops if other countries do not live up to the President's
request?
Secretary Gates. The President authorized 30,000 additional forces,
in addition to granting me a modest amount of flexibility for an
additional 10 percent. We will continue to assess conditions as we move
forward.
The President has already welcomed the announcements of U.S. Allies
and partners to increase substantially troop and training contributions
to Afghanistan in 2010; approximately 7,000 additional forces through
the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Force
Generation Process, with more likely to come in tandem with the London
Conference on January 28. These new commitments demonstrate strong
support for the President's decision on Afghanistan and Pakistan and
the firm resolve of NATO Allies and ISAF partners to succeed in our
shared mission.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. After President Obama announced the
deployment of 30,000 additional troops, the surge of forces bring the
total American commitment to nearly 100,000. I understand most of these
troops will come from the Army and Marines. Will the Navy and Air Force
play a role in augmenting these taskings? How many brigades, trainers,
and support troops do we expect to deploy during this surge? What
impact will this be on the Guard and Reserves?
Admiral Mullen. The composition of the entire 30K is still being
determined by COMISAF. As of the 14 Jan 2010, 27,442 U.S. Service
Members have been ordered against the President's additional
authorization of 30K. Of these, the Navy and the Air Force are making
contributions to the increased augmentation of Afghanistan
Headquarters. The Navy is filling 129 positions and the Air Force is
filling 240 positions.
The composition of the entire 30K is still being determined by
COMISAF. As of the 14 Jan, 27,442 U.S. Service Members have been
ordered against the President's additional authorization of 30K.
Specific capabilities ordered include:
One Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (Full Spectrum
COIN)
Two Army Brigade Combat Teams (Full Spectrum COIN)
One Army Brigade Combat Team
One Combat Aviation Brigade
One Division Headquarter
1,250 Joint Individual Augmentation Plus-up
Of the 27,442 ordered as of 14 Jan 2010, the National Guard is
filling 3,489 positions and the Reserves are filling 1,390 positions.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. It has been reported that the minimum number of troops
General McChrystal had requested was 40,000. General McChrystal has
said he will focus on the population centers. Can you tell us the
population centers that will be left unprotected as a result of the
reduced number of 30,000? And in addition, can you tell us the
cumulative number of people (Afghan) that will be impacted by sending
30,000 instead of 40,000?
Admiral Mullen. The President's decision deploys the combat
brigades needed to achieve population security in all of General
McChrystal's priority centers. The President's decision appropriately
strikes balance between too many and too few forces, and provides what
General McChrystal needs to achieve success. It provides the balance
needed to avoid being perceived as occupiers. It also provides the
trainers needed to support the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
growth plan and partnering. Importantly, it sets the conditions that
will enable us to transition Afghanistan responsibly into the hands of
an Afghan government capable of providing long-term security.
The force levels considered during the strategic review represented
a range of options with associated levels of risk. The force
commitments announced by the President, augmented by the expected
contributions from NATO allies, fall squarely within the range of
capability and risk that General McChrystal recommended. The additional
30,000 U.S. troops combined with the expected additional NATO
commitments gives General McChrystal everything he needs to reverse the
Taliban's momentum, and accelerate the growth and development of the
ANSF.
General McChrystal has been given the flexibility to employ forces
in the specific locations and sequence as he sees fit to best achieve
his operational and tactical objectives. We are confident that the
resources the President has committed to Afghanistan will enable the
commander to achieve the campaign's objectives. General McChrystal's
plan will protect all the key population centers necessary to reverse
the insurgency's momentum and enable the ANSF to provide the long-term
stability to prevent the return of al Qaeda.
Mr. Conaway. The Afghan government cannot or does not currently pay
for the ANSF. With the increase in ANSF that is part and parcel to the
President's Plan, can you tell us who will fund these forces for the
near term and as well as the long term?
Secretary Gates. Currently the U.S. Government funds most of the
expenses associated with the development of the Afghan National
Security Force (ANSF). In accordance with the London Compact, the
Afghans apply 34% of their GDP to security force development. In FY09,
they contributed approximately $350 million. The United States
continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA) to increase its ability to generate revenue.
Additionally, we are pressing international Allies and partners to
contribute to the development of the ANSF and its long-term
sustainment. Allies and partners have pledged approximately $300
million to the NATO Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. Regarding
the police, the international community provided just over $600 million
to the Law and Order Trust Fund since 2002. The international community
also donated equipment to the ANSF.
Over time, we will continue to press the international community to
fund more of the ANSF and to assist the GIRoA in increasing its ability
to generate its own revenue. Still, the United States is likely to be
the major funder of the ANSF for the foreseeable future.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you for the
investment of your time on the second day of testimony on Capitol Hill.
I'm pleased that the President has come to a decision on the future
strategy of our forces in Afghanistan and I fully support the
deployment of additional troops and resources to aid in the fight
against extremists that continue to threaten our country and way of
life. I do however remain concerned with the mention of any sort of
hard and fast timetable. I hope that the tension generated by the
articulation of a timetable generates the intended results. Secretary
Gates, I understand that you're not necessarily in favor of the
timeline and I can appreciate that. Admiral Mullen, I have full trust
and confidence in our military leadership and our troops. I know that
you will successfully complete this mission and I hope that my
colleagues here and in the administration will continue to fully
resource your efforts. Admiral Mullen, I'd like your help on a somewhat
separate issue. I'd like to get a clear understanding for what our
Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) are asking for in terms of ships--
aircraft carriers and amphibious ships specifically. Without discussing
the assumption of risk, will you provide my staff with the raw COCOM
numbers requested for aircraft carriers and amphibious ships over the
last few years?
Admiral Mullen. As of 21 Jan 10 the following requests for Navy
Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships have been registered in the last
three years (FY 09, 10, 11)
1. USAFRICOM:
Three Amphibious Ships (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
1.92 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) (0-FY09, 92-FY10, 1-
FY11).
2. USCENTCOM:
Three Amphibious Ships (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
Three ARGs (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
3.55 Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) (1.2 -FY09, 1.2 FY10,
1.15-FY11).
3. USEUCOM:
2.08 Amphibious Ships (.08-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
Three ARGs (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
Two CSGs (.5-FY09, .5-FY10, 1 FY11).
4. USJFCOM (Global Response Force (GRF), all contingency sourced
upon SecDef order).
Two ARGs in FY11.
Twelve CSGs (4-FY09, 4-FY10, 4-FY11).
5. USNORTHCOM:
Four Amphibious Ships in FY10, all contingency sourced
if required.
6. USPACOM:
4.2 ARGs (1.4-FY09, 1.4-FY10, 1.4-FY11).
4.5 CSGs (1.5-FY09, 1.5-FY10, 1.5-FY11).
7. USSOUTHCOM:
2.13 Amphibious Ships (.5-FY09, .83-FY10, .83-FY11).
Includes 2 ARGs supporting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.
.22 CSG in FY10.
Includes 1 CVN supporting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.
Mr. Wittman. I'm not sure what type of force package fits squarely
beneath the 30,000 number. Can you help me understand what we may see
in terms of Brigades, Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), and the required
enablers?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The composition of the entire
30K is still being determined by General McChrystal, Commander,
International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF). As of 14 January
2010, 27,442 U.S. Service Members have been ordered against the
President's additional authorization of 30K. Specific capabilities
ordered include:
One Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (Full Spectrum
COIN)
Two Army Brigade Combat Teams (Full Spectrum COIN)
One Army Brigade Combat Team
One Combat Aviation Brigade
One Division Headquarter
1,250 Joint Individual Augmentation Plus-up
Mr. Wittman. I'm concerned that in an effort to maximize combat
troops we may overly complicate the command and control, and supported/
supporting unit relationships to where we actually reduce a unit's
effectiveness. As we know, Marines fight as a Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) and come as a task organized warfighting package
including sustainment capability. Should the Marines in Regional
Command South (RC-South) expect to have to rely on perhaps an army
sustainment brigade even though they fight most effectively as a MAGTF?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. General McChrystal and
Lieutenant General Rodriguez are currently looking at the structure and
command relationships throughout Afghanistan. The aim is to ensure
unity of effort and unity of command that best support the combat
forces on the ground. With the addition of 30,000 U.S. troops, it is
crucial that these forces are employed to maximize their effectiveness.
Specifically on RC-South, I am confident that General McChrystal and
Lieutenant General Rodriguez will take a comprehensive look at the best
way to employ forces in that area and ensure that each element in their
inherent structure and maximizes each unit's effectiveness.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. I have read General McChrystal's Initial Assessment of
August 30, 2009, both the redacted and the un-redacted versions. In
neither version does he make a specific troop request. Open source
documents (i.e. published newspaper stories) have stated that the
request is 40,000. However, I have since learned that the 40,000 number
was a midrange option and that there was also a low- and high-range
option with commensurate probabilities of success associated with them.
General McChrystal acknowledged to me that the three options exist but
would not relay to me what the upper range was for obvious political
reasons. The President has now selected a number that appears to be
beneath the midrange option. How does that translate in terms of
probability of success?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The initial resource request
remains a classified document, so we are unable to go into complete
detail. However, we can tell you that the President's decision to
deploy an additional 30,000 forces provides the most U.S. forces as
quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal the combat power he
needs in 2010 to gain the initiative and succeed according to our
Afghanistan strategy as outlined on 1 December 2009. In addition, our
Allies and partners have committed to more than 7,000 additional forces
through the NATO/International Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Generation
Process.
Mr. Coffman. According to open source media reports, U.S. and
Afghan officials have begun helping several anti-Taliban militias that
have independently taken up arms against insurgents in several parts of
Afghanistan, prompting hopes of a larger scale tribal rebellion against
the Taliban. When I was in Afghanistan last week I asked General
McChrystal's staff about expanding this aid beyond supplies and
training and utilizing these tribal militias as we had done in Iraq.
The response was that the Karzai government was not in favor of the
U.S. arming tribal militias. (The Maliki government in Iraq was equally
opposed when the U.S. began arming former Sunni Arab insurgents through
the Sunni Awakening program.) I believe Afghanistan has a warrior
culture and many of the tribes have been fighting for the last 2,500
years. In 2001, the Northern Alliance defeated the Taliban on the
ground with tribal militias and without the assistance of U.S. ground
troops--only air, advisory, and logistical support. Shouldn't we be
more focused on supporting Afghanistan militias in the manner that they
are familiar with versus a conventional military organization that is
alien to them?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. It is important to note that
the United States is not backing tribal militias. There currently are
several initiatives to promote community security and development. The
major program is the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), which is
currently a pilot program in Wardak province. The program works with
the village shura (i.e., meeting) to nominate personnel to provide
security for the community. These personnel are representative of all
ethnic groups and tribes in the community, and they receive three weeks
of training as well as equipment. They are formally part of the
Ministry of Interior Forces. Currently the pilot program has produced
over 500 members of the Afghan Public Protection Force, and we have
heard largely positive comments about their ability to improve security
in the communities that they work in.
Additionally, the United States is working with the Government of
Afghanistan on several Local Defense Initiatives. Through these
programs, the United States is providing some development support and
training to communities that have been willing to step up and provide
additional community security, similar to a community watch program.
The United States' focus in terms of securing the population of
Afghanistan is on developing the Afghanistan National Security Forces
and growing them so that they can eventually take over the security of
Afghanistan.
Our counterinsurgency strategy provides our forces in Afghanistan
the best possible approach and resources to set the security
conditions: for the Afghan people, to see our commitment to their
future; for the Karzai government, to be supported as it seeks to
implement promised reforms; for the Afghan Taliban, to understand they
will not and cannot take back Afghanistan; and finally, for those
beyond Afghanistan who support the Taliban or would like to see the
return of al Qaeda, to realize the futility of their pursuit.
Mr. Coffman. A fixed schedule to begin the withdrawal of our forces
from Afghanistan seems ridiculous. There should be a flexible time
schedule based on the conditions on the ground. Was there such fixed
withdrawal schedule given prior to the surge in 2007 in Iraq? Or wasn't
it only after the surge in Iraq was successful that a schedule for a
drawdown of our forces was negotiated between Coalition Forces and the
Iraqi government?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The circumstances in Iraq and
Afghanistan are different. While the addition of more than 20,000 U.S.
troops to Iraq announced in January 2007 did not include a withdrawal
schedule, President Bush said, ``America's commitment is not open-
ended.'' The security situation produced by the surge's success enabled
the U.S. and Iraq to jointly sign the U.S. Security Agreement, which
required that all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq no later than December
31, 2011.
For Afghanistan, the President has made it clear that July 2011 is
when we will begin to transition to an Afghan lead. This date was not
chosen arbitrarily, but is based on careful analysis of when we will be
able to responsibly begin transitioning. However, it is imperative to
understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process. It is not when
we rush for the exits; rather, the pace and character of that drawdown
will be determined by conditions on the ground. There is no
determination of how long this will take and there is no withdrawal
date set for after July 2011. It is important to balance signaling
resolve in the fight against al Qaeda and showing our enduring
commitment to stability in the region with ensuring the Afghans take
primary responsibility for defending their own country with a sense of
purpose and urgency.
Mr. Coffman. Was the strategy of consolidating our forces around
the population centers and the central river valley in Helmand Province
envisioned before or after the development of General McChrystal's
Initial Assessment of August 30, 2009? Does this strategy require fewer
troops than he thought in that Assessment?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As the Taliban resurgence
gained momentum since 2003, most notably in the south, it became
increasingly clear that the Coalition's efforts must be focused on
addressing the insurgency where it lives and grows. Although the
Taliban has been expanding its influence throughout the country,
Kandahar is the Taliban's birthplace and Helmand Province lies at the
intersection of the insurgency and the thriving narcotics trade.
Therefore, the insurgency's roots are most deeply planted in the south.
General McChrystal's initial assessment during his first months of
command allowed him to closely examine the environment. His assessment
confirmed that a population-centric approach that protects the key
population centers and reverses the insurgency's momentum where the
insurgency is most threatening would provide our best chance of
success.
The force levels considered during the strategic review represented
a range of options with associated levels of risk. Importantly, the
internal deliberations considered many other aspects of the strategy,
which involve much more than the application of additional resources.
The President's decision appropriately strikes balance between too
many and too few forces and provides what General McChrystal needs to
achieve success. It provides the balance needed to avoid being
perceived as occupiers, and it deploys the combat brigades needed to
achieve population security in all of General McChrystal's priority
centers. It also provides the trainers needed to support the Afghan
National Security Force growth plan and partnering. Importantly, it
sets the conditions that will enable us to transition Afghanistan
responsibly into the hands of an Afghan government capable of providing
long-term security.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. What I believe our Service Members, military
families, Iowans, and all Americans need to hear is a clear-cut
description of the civil-military strategy that will be implemented to
achieve that goal. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, can you please
provide me, in 50 words or less, a concise description of that
strategy? As clearly and concisely as possible, how you will accurately
measure the success of this strategy?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The overarching goal of the
President's strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten
America and our allies in the future. This will be achieved by a civil-
military effort to reverse the Taliban's momentum and increase the
capacity of Afghanistan's government and security forces; a civilian
surge that will work with the Afghan government to help consolidate
security gains through governance and development; and a long-term,
strategic partnership with Pakistan.
Success will be measured by progress towards a stable security
situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan--one that is sustainable over the
long term by their governments. We will present a report to Congress in
March outlining our metrics.
Mr. Loebsack. I have long been concerned about the impact that
multiple combat deployments are having on our military readiness, our
Service Members, and on our military families. Will the deployment
ordered by the President--and the pace of that deployment--affect our
readiness to respond to emergencies at home and other contingencies
abroad? Will it affect dwell time ratios and the overall health of the
force? What will be the long-term impact of this deployment on our
military and our military readiness?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As we have reported in our
quarterly readiness reports to Congress, our deploying forces'
readiness for ongoing counterinsurgency mission is high; however, we
lack the dwell time required to train ground forces for the complete
range of military operations we may be asked to respond to. But as the
recent deployments to Haiti have shown, we can still respond rapidly
and professionally when our nation calls. The additional deployments
ordered by the President, when viewed in light of force adjustments
made in other ongoing contingencies, are not expected to significantly
alter our readiness posture or health of the force. We must continue to
balance the force for an uncertain future while remaining focused not
only on dwell time but on restoring and repairing equipment to levels
that support training and response capability for a full range of
missions. We partially mitigate our ground forces' risk through
investments in capacity and capability, as well as by the significant
capability inherent to our air and maritime forces. Nonetheless, our
limited ability to generate additional ground forces constitutes a
concern that we continue to focus attention and resources on.
Mr. Loebsack. How does U.S. Central Command plan to meet the
tremendous logistical, supply, and infrastructure requirements
necessary to deploy 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan at such a
rapid pace? How will the Afghanistan ramp-up be balanced with the
complexity of simultaneously drawing down our troops, equipment, and
infrastructure in Iraq?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We have a large number of
professionals who are balancing the demands of both operations. Their
greatest challenge is overcoming the differences that exist between
Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq's infrastructure is more accommodating and
CENTCOM is leveraging the infrastructure and the drawdown from Iraq to
help equip forces in Afghanistan. Additionally, CENTCOM is moving as
much cargo as possible via surface modes and recently conducted an
assessment of Afghan airfields in order to maximize throughput. I
remain confident that our professionals will continue to adapt and
execute the mission we have assigned them.
Mr. Loebsack. What are the civilian goals of this strategy? Does
the President's plan include an increase in the number of civilian
experts on the ground in Afghanistan beyond the number that was
committed this past spring? How will the civilian goals be integrated
and coordinated with the military goals?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President's strategy is an
integrated civil-military strategy. Both military and civilian efforts
will support the President's core goal to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its
capacity to threaten the United States and our allies in the future. As
Secretary Clinton described during her testimony, civilian efforts will
include building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and
diminish the threat posed by extremism, and delivering high-impact
economic assistance--especially in the agricultural sector--to create
jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy
cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield. As Secretary
Clinton also mentioned, the Department of State will be seeking
additional resources, including additional civilian personnel in
Afghanistan, in order to implement the President's strategy. The State
Department, in coordination with our military commanders, is currently
examining the requirements for additional personnel to complement our
military force increase. I believe that an increase in civilian
expertise is an essential element of this strategy's success.
In order to coordinate these civilian activities with our military
efforts, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal published an
``Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to
Afghanistan'' in August 2009 that provides guidance from the U.S. Chief
of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S.
personnel in Afghanistan.
U.S. Government senior civilians have been established and
integrated at each level of the military chain of command to serve as
counterparts to military commanders and coordinate civilian efforts.
This newly established U.S. Government integrated civil-military
decision-making chain in-theater allows for planning and coordination
of activities at all levels from the district/company level to the
national/embassy level. Although new, this structure has already
exhibited vast improvements in the coordination of civilian and
military activities.
Mr. Loebsack. How does the President's strategy assure that
military actions in Afghanistan will not further inflame or entrench al
Qaeda and other extremist groups in Pakistan? The President's speech
indicated that part of his strategy includes further engagement with
Pakistan. Has a new assistance package or strategic plan been discussed
with the Pakistan Government?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President's strategy aims
to address challenges we face on both sides of the border. Afghanistan
and Pakistan, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border
of more than 1,500 miles. The presence of extremist sanctuaries in
Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Permitting a sanctuary for
extremists in Afghanistan would put even more pressure on Pakistan's
government, which is already under attack from groups operating in its
border region.
The President believes that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan
must be a key partner with the United States and an ally in the fight
against violent extremism. People in Pakistan are increasingly coming
to view that they share a common enemy with the United States. Our
relationship is anchored in our common goals of civilian rule; robust
economic development; and the defeat of those who threaten Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and the peace of the world. We will significantly expand
support intended to help develop the potential of Pakistan and its
people. Last year, the United States committed $7.8 billion to support
economic and social development, and our defense relationship has never
been stronger. Our assistance will demonstrate the U.S. commitment to
addressing problems that affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis and
will bolster Pakistan against the threat of extremism.
Mr. Loebsack. Do the additional NATO troop commitments that have
been reported in the press since the President's speech come in
addition to already scheduled NATO troop increases? In other words, are
these truly new additions from our NATO allies?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Of the approximately 7,000
forces pledged by Allies and partners at the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Generation Conference on 7 December 2009,
35 percent of the offered forces were already in Afghanistan in a
temporary capacity for election security. These forces were extended by
the troop-contributing nations so they do in fact represent a new
enduring commitment of forces, and thus all 7,000 forces should be
considered new commitments. We are also hopeful that certain Allies and
partners will use the London Conference on Afghanistan on 28 January
2010, and the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Instanbul on 4
February to announce increases in both financial support and additional
forces.
Mr. Loebsack. What are the civilian goals of this strategy? Does
the President's plan include an increase in the number of civilian
experts on the ground in Afghanistan beyond the number that was
committed this past spring? How will the civilian goals be integrated
and coordinated with the military goals?
Secretary Lew. The civilian goals of our strategy are intended to
advance the larger strategic goals of disrupting, dismantling, and
defeating al-Qaeda by helping the Afghans develop effective governance
and promoting sustainable economic development. Our goals are:
Promoting good governance and connecting the Afghan
people with their government by helping make Afghan government
institutions more visible, effective, responsive and accountable at the
local level. This includes capacity building programs at the national,
provincial and district levels in the health and education sectors, and
supporting programs that give Afghans a greater stake in their own
government. A key emphasis will be assisting Afghan efforts to reduce
corruption;
Promoting the rule of law and justice delivery,
consistent with the Afghan constitution, by strengthening the formal
justice system across Afghanistan, and creating space for traditional
dispute resolutions mechanisms;
Assisting with reconstruction and development aimed at
job creation, creating links to cross-border trade, and enhancing the
Afghan Government's ability to secure its borders and increase customs
revenue;
Sapping the insurgency of foot soldiers and income from
the narcotics trade by implementing a new civilian-military
agricultural redevelopment strategy;
Supporting Afghan government efforts to reintegrate
Taliban and other insurgents who renounce al-Qaeda, cease violence and
accept the constitutional system;
Redoubling international efforts to target illicit
financial flows to the Taliban;
Countering al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, while also
empowering Afghans to challenge the insurgents' narrative by improving
access to mobile phones, radio and television;
Improving the coordination of international assistance
through regular consultations with Allies and partners to strengthen
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and to enhance
civilian coordination among ISAF partners;
Regional diplomacy aimed at shifting the calculus of
Afghanistan's neighbors from competition in Afghanistan to cooperation
and economic integration; and
Advancing the rights of Afghan women and girls across all
lines of effort, with particular focus on expanding economic
opportunities, improving access to justice, improving basic service
delivery in education and health, and increasing women's participation
in the political process.
Accompanying an increase in civilian assistance will be a
significant increase in civilian subject matter experts--beyond the
tripling of deployed U.S. civilians that occurred over the past year,
from 320 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan in January 2009, to
nearly 1,000 on the ground today. We plan to increase that staff of
1,000 by another 20 to 30 percent by the end of 2010. These civilians
will partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of government
institutions and help rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors.
The integration and coordination of civilian and military goals
occurs at all levels in Afghanistan. At the Provincial and District
level, we have civilian employees who work for USAID, USDA and the
State Department on their agencies' respective governance and
development projects. Based in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
and District Stabilization Teams (DSTs), each team has a `lead
civilian' representative, who serves as the commander's civilian
counterpart. The lead civilians coordinate closely with the military
commanders of the PRTs and DSTs to ensure that civilian and military
projects reinforce one another.
The net effect of this is that we have developed synchronized
civilian-military chains of command, to ensure coordination at each
level: district, provincial, regional, and national. At the national-
level we have also created a dozen civ-mil working groups to improve
coordination on key issues and to support work in the field. So far,
our experience has been that this has promoted coordination on
development and other issues. But as our military and civilian demands
keep increasing over the coming months, we will need to further adapt
our mechanisms to ensure our work is linked together across civ-mil and
U.S.-Afghan lines, both at the Afghan national and sub-national levels.
Mr. Loebsack. How does the President's strategy assure that
military actions in Afghanistan will not further inflame or entrench
al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in Pakistan? The President's speech
indicated that part of his strategy includes further engagement with
Pakistan. Has a new assistance package or strategic plan been discussed
with the Pakistan Government?
Secretary Lew. Our efforts in Afghanistan are inextricably linked
to the situation in Pakistan. We remain committed to working with both
the Afghans and Pakistanis to defeat violent extremism. As we disrupt
and dismantle al Qaeda, we believe it will make other extremist groups
less likely to carry out attacks within Pakistan. We have a robust
security assistance program that promotes our strategic interests in
Pakistan, fosters stability in civil-military relations, enhances U.S.-
Pakistani military interoperability, and improves capacity in areas
critical to COIN and counter-terrorism operations.
Ambassador Robin Raphel, the Coordinator of Economic Assistance at
Embassy Islamabad, has held discussions regarding our civilian
assistance strategy with the Government of Pakistan at the national,
provincial and district level. At all levels, the Government of
Pakistan has expressed support for the strategy, which aims to:
Improve the capacity of the Government of Pakistan to
address the country's most critical infrastructure needs, with an
initial focus on energy and agriculture, to help Pakistan recover from
its energy and water crises.
Help the Government of Pakistan address basic needs and
provide improved economic opportunities in areas most vulnerable to
extremism.
Strengthen Pakistan's capacity to pursue economic and
political reforms that reinforce stability.
As is consistent with best practices in international development,
U.S. assistance will be directed increasingly through a broad range of
Government of Pakistan institutions, as well as local non-governmental
organizations (including the private sector) with the capacity to
implement programs effectively and accountably. This approach will help
increase host country ownership, and U.S. commitment to building a
long-term partnership with the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistani
people.
Mr. Loebsack. Do the additional NATO troop commitments that have
been reported in the press since the President's speech come in
addition to already scheduled NATO troop increases? In other words, are
these truly new additions from our NATO allies?
Secretary Lew. While some of the approximately 7,000 additional
forces pledged by Allies and partners at the ISAF Force Generation
Conference on 7 December include the long term extension of troops that
were already in Afghanistan in a temporary capacity, more than 65
percent of the offers were new additions. We are also hopeful that
announcements of additional troop contributions will follow the 28
January London Conference on Afghanistan and the 4 February NATO
informal Defense Ministerial.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
Ms. Giffords. Thank you all for your time and your service and for
your deliberate attention to this process. We have a tremendous
responsibility anytime we commit the young men and women of our country
to war, to ensure they are properly equipped during the fight and taken
care of when they return home, and those are the two areas I want to
address today. As the only Democrat that serves on both the Foreign
Affairs Committee and Armed Services Committee, I approach this new
strategy from a unique perspective. First I want to talk a little bit
about resourcing these new requirements and then about how we are
planning to care for the Service Members and civilian support staff
once they return home. Every day in my District in Arizona, I see the
physical and mental stresses we put on our forces and their gear,
specifically the low density-high demand specialties unique to this
type of conflict. As we require more of these assets in-theater, what
is the plan to fully resource them from both a manpower and equipment
perspective? Specifically I am talking about ground intelligence, ISR
(Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Combat Search and
Rescue, UAVs and Electronic Warfare assets that are all stretched
extremely thin across Afghanistan and at training locations here at
home.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Taking care of our people is of
the utmost importance to us. As you stated, we have placed our force
under tremendous pressure in order to assure success. I assure you that
the health of the force figures prominently in our calculus to develop
a successful strategy in Afghanistan. You accurately touched on several
essential warfighting areas and systems that are indeed in high demand
and short supply. The Fiscal Year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations
Supplemental Appropriations request we are developing will fully
resource the President's Afghan Strategy to include these low density-
high demand assets. Secretary Gates and I look forward to presenting
this request to the Congress in the very near future.
Ms. Giffords. How do we plan to fund the specific equipment needs
we will have in these low density-high demand specialties?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Maintaining military equipment
in good working order, whether it is for low density-high demand
condition, or for other requirement, requires the Department to
delicately balance a range of needs within the context of available
resources. Depending on anticipated mission demand and tempo, specific
equipment requirements are adjusted annually to compensate for
operational changes which contributed to washouts, stress, or
operational losses. These factors influence what particular items are
to be procured in any given fiscal year. To do this, Military
Departments maintain lists of equipment, along with inventory
objectives, designed to fulfill the National military strategy. Those
objectives are then reviewed in the context of whether the optimal
solution would be to procure new equipment or refurbish what we already
have. It is recognized that it is a delicate calculation to decide
which critical item is put in the budget. I can assure you that when
calculating our procurement funding requests, the Department takes into
account, demand requirements, and how equipment inventories impact the
total force.
Ms. Giffords. What incentives will be sought to ensure we can
retain the skilled troops in these areas where retention has been
problematic in the last few years due to recurring deployments?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The low density/high demand
skills that are constantly needed for operations are monitored at the
Department through a formal balanced scorecard forum chaired by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
Through this process, the Department monitors critical skills
personnel and recommends incentives to improve recruiting and
retention. Some of these critical skills include explosive ordnance
disposal, linguists, intelligence and counterintelligence analysts,
para-rescue operators and contracting specialists.
The Department finds that the statutory authorities to encourage
highly skilled and technical officers and enlisted personnel to remain
in the Service are crucial to maintaining capabilities in these skills.
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and the Critical Skills
Retention Bonus (CSRB) authorized by 37 U.S.C. 308 and 37 U.S.C. 355
respectively, are among the most effective incentive tools to attract
and retain qualified personnel in critical military specialties. The
Department uses these authorities with appropriate oversight and rigor.
Despite the overall strength of enlisted retention over the last
few years, there remain critical shortages in these skills and other
``hard-to-retain'' skills that justify the continuation and application
of the statutory bonus authorities. Current bonus authorities, along
with the special and incentive pay consolidation authority granted in
the FY 2008 NDAA to be phased in over the next few years, give the
Department ample monetary incentive flexibility and agility to retain
skilled Service Members in critical areas.
Ms. Giffords. On my second line of questioning, I am extremely
concerned with our ability to care for our Service Members and civilian
staff when they return home. How is the Department of Defense budgeting
for the future care needs of returning Service Members?
Secretary Gates. Beginning with the development of our Fiscal Year
(FY) 2010 budget request, I placed great emphasis on identifying and
providing for future care needs of our returning Service Members. The
Department has a well-established Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior
Oversight Committee, which is engaged with all emerging requirements.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, along with
each of the Services, identified requirements in support of the future
care needs of returning Service Members and we fully funded those
requirements. The details of the FY 2011 Defense Budget will be
submitted to Congress by the President.
Ms. Giffords. On my second line of questioning, I am extremely
concerned with our ability to care for our Service Members and civilian
staff when they return home. How have efforts between the Department of
Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) progressed from
the perspective of digital records transfer and continuity of care?
Secretary Gates. DOD and VA share a significant amount of health
information and continue to spearhead interagency data sharing
activities that deliver information technology solutions to
significantly improve the secure sharing of appropriate electronic
health information. These initiatives enhance healthcare delivery to
beneficiaries and improve the continuity of care for those who have
served our country. Today, VA has access to DOD electronic health
information on more than 5 million individuals. Exchange of outpatient
pharmacy data, laboratory results and radiology reports began in 2001,
with more health data increasingly made electronically available to VA.
VA and DOD are working collaboratively to upgrade and enhance the
technical framework that supports data sharing, and improve that
framework's capability to handle increasing amounts of shared data.
Since 2001, DOD has provided VA with one-way historic
information through the Federal Health Information Exchange (FHIE) for
separated Service Members. On a monthly basis DOD sends laboratory
results; radiology reports; outpatient pharmacy data; allergy data;
discharge summaries; consult reports; admission, discharge, transfer
information; standard ambulatory data records; demographic data; pre-
and post-deployment health assessments (PPDHAs); and post-deployment
health reassessments (PDHRAs).
- As of November 2009, DOD transmitted health data on more
than 5 million retired or discharged Service Members.
Approximately 1.8 million of these patients have presented to
VA for care, treatment, or claims determination. The number of
individuals with data available to VA grows monthly as health
information on recently separated Service Members is extracted
and transferred to VA.
- DOD also transmits data for VA patients being treated in DOD
facilities under local sharing agreements. As of November 2009
more than 4.4 million health data messages have been
transmitted to VA for patients treated in DOD facilities.
For shared patients being treated by both DOD and VA, the
Departments maintain the jointly developed Bidirectional Health
Information Exchange (BHIE) communications system for transferring data
for use in another's application. Implemented in 2004, BHIE allows DOD
and VA clinicians to access each other's health data in real-time.
Available information includes: allergy; outpatient pharmacy; inpatient
and outpatient laboratory and radiology reports; demographic data;
diagnoses; vital signs; family history, social history, other history;
problem lists; questionnaires; and Theater clinical data, including
inpatient notes, outpatient encounters, and ancillary clinical data
such as pharmacy data, allergies, laboratory results and radiology
reports.
- As of November 2009, there are more than 3.5 million shared
patients (including and more than 150,000 Theater patients)
available through BHIE.
- To increase the availability of clinical information on a
shared patient population, VA and DOD have further leveraged
BHIE functionality, allowing bidirectional access to inpatient
discharge summaries from DOD's inpatient documentation system.
Access to DOD discharge summaries is operational at some of
DOD's largest inpatient facilities, representing approximately
61 percent of total DOD inpatient beds.
Since 2006, VA and DOD have been sharing computable
outpatient pharmacy and allergy data through the interface between
DOD's Clinical Data Repository (CDR), and VA's Health Data Repository
(HDR). Exchanging standardized pharmacy and allergy data on patients
enhances patient care and safety through the ability to conduct
automated drug-drug and drug-allergy interaction checks using data from
both repositories. As of November 2009, computable outpatient pharmacy
and medication allergy data on over 47,900 patients receiving
healthcare from both DOD and VA has been exchanged.
To support our most severely wounded and injured Service
Members transferring to VA Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers for care,
DOD sends radiology images and scanned paper medical records
electronically to the VA Polytrauma Centers.
Initiatives underway to further support and enhance the
Departments' ability to share electronic health records include the
Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) and the DOD/VA Multiple
Network Gateways.
VLER: Sharing of electronic health information with DOD
and VA private sector partners is the primary focus of the VLER and the
Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) initiatives. DOD, VA, and
Kaiser Permanente (KP) began a proof-of-concept for the three-way
exchange between the electronic health records systems of DOD, VA, and
KP in the San Diego area in January 2010. The collaboration marks the
first time a computerized patient-records system operated by a federal
agency will be linked to one operated by a private organization.
Network Gateways: In 2008, a DOD/VA team defined
functional, infrastructure and policy interoperability requirements
that yielded a DOD/VA Multiple Network Gateway concept of operation.
The Departments developed and implemented an enterprise architecture
infrastructure solution and established a series of strategically
planned network gateways for secure, redundant connectivity between
facilities and to facilitate seamless transfer of health data. DOD and
VA have established four gateways to receive migrated network traffic
for data exchange. The target for migrating all data existing is FY
2010.
Ms. Giffords. On my second line of questioning, I am extremely
concerned with our ability to care for our Service Members and civilian
staff when they return home. When we talk about the costs associated
with surging additional troops forward, are you also including within
that figure the anticipated costs of future care?
Secretary Gates. Beginning with the development of our FY 2010
budget request, I placed great emphasis on identifying and providing
for future care needs of our returning Service Members. We have a well-
established Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior Oversight Committee, which
is well engaged with all emerging requirements. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, along with each of the Services,
identified requirements in support of the future care needs of
returning Service Members and we fully funded those requirements in our
baseline budget request. During the FY 2011 Program Review process, we
will continually assess our progress and resource implications.
Within our Overseas Contingency Operations request, we have
included funding for the health care requirements associated with the
increased forces, both Active and Reserve, for planned operations. The
baseline budget includes funding for anticipated costs of future care
for all returning Service Members.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. It seems to me that we can do everything right in
Afghanistan but the success of our efforts greatly depends on the
commitment from Pakistan. How does the current Pakistani offensive in
Waziristan fit into our strategic plan? What is the desired end state
of this offensive for both Pakistan and the U.S.? How are we able to
verify Pakistani claims of success? Finally, as we approach July 2011,
how will you take into account Pakistan's progress and how will this
progress influence the 2011 assessment?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Our success in Afghanistan is
inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We share a common
enemy and a common goal: disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al
Qaeda and its extremist allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To
accomplish this goal, we are working to strengthen Pakistan's capacity
to target extremist groups that threaten other countries and have made
it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose
location is known and whose intentions are clear. The Pakistan military
has been involved in sustained, committed, deliberate military
operations against extremists in South Waziristan and Swat, and across
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for the last several
months--its largest successive offensives in years. The goals of these
operations are to eliminate insurgent-controlled safe havens, restore
the writ of the State, and provide security to the Pakistani populace.
Since 2001, Pakistan has lost thousands of its soldiers and civilians
in this fight. We continue to interact constantly with the Pakistani
military leadership to determine the efficacy of their efforts, and we
agree that, although much remains to be done, their efforts in 2009
have reduced safe havens and degraded militant capacity.
Progress in both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be measured and
assessed by the U.S. Government on a regular basis using a mix of
quantitative and qualitative measures, intended to capture objective
and subjective assessments. This assessment will look at past progress
and start to focus on changes or adjustments that might be made over
the following year. A description and assessment of U.S. Government
efforts, including those of the Department of Defense, the Department
of State, the USAID, and the Department of Justice, in achieving the
objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan is due to Congress in March
2010.
Ms. Tsongas. If we do not see the desired results by July 2011, or
even by December 2010, is there a scenario in which you would ask for
more troops beyond the 30,000? Do you have an existing plan for a troop
increase above 30,000 and what events on the ground would trigger this
request?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President has authorized
30,000 additional forces, in addition to granting us a modest amount of
flexibility for an additional 10 percent. We will assess conditions as
we move forward. Based on those assessments, the President will
determine the scope and pace of a gradual and responsible drawdown of
U.S. combat forces.
Ms. Tsongas. What does the commitment of an additional 30,000 U.S.
troops do to the support structure that is currently in place in
Afghanistan? How many contractors will we need to send to Afghanistan
to support the increase of 30,000 troops and the civilian surge? I
believe that we will need more contractors and support personnel to
provide life support for our troops. If this is true, is the
President's estimated cost of 30 billion dollars to support this surge
accurate?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Contractors are a critical
enabler in Afghanistan and will continue to provide a wide range of
tasks essential for operations including logistics, maintenance,
construction, transportation, security and base life support. There are
currently 104,000 contractor employees supporting our forces in
Afghanistan. Based on current troop-to-contractor ratios, we anticipate
an additional 50,000 contractor employees will be required to support
the troop increase. The President's estimated cost included the
associated increase in contractor support, to include compensation,
deployment and sustainment. More than 75 percent of the additional
contractor employees will be Afghan citizens. Employing Afghan citizens
in support of the surge provides a boost to the local economy, reduces
labor costs, and will contribute to a stable, sovereign Afghanistan
supporting the theater commander's counterinsurgency strategy. Hiring
local individuals further mitigates the cost of increasing the number
of contractors. As local hires, Afghani contractor employees do not
incur the life support and sustainment costs of U.S. or third-country
nationals. Lastly, contractors are a subset of the operational and
maintenance costs necessary to support the force, which are included in
the President's estimate.
Ms. Tsongas. The $30 billion does not include costs of replenishing
equipment and addressing long-term health and mental health care costs.
Do you have or are you in the process of developing the long-term
personnel and readiness costs of sending an additional 30,000 troops to
Afghanistan? If so, please provide them to the Committee.
Secretary Gates. Beginning with the Fiscal Year 2010 budget
request, we included funding for all requirements identified
Department-wide to provide for long-term health and mental health care
costs. We continue to refine requirements and are working to improve
all health care processes related to long-term health and mental health
care needs of our Service Members. This is one of my top priorities,
and the Department will continue to include the necessary resources to
provide the best possible health care for all of our Service Members,
who deserve nothing less.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE
Mr. Nye. America's key goal of disrupting and defeating al Qaeda in
South Asia is largely dependent on the action of the Pakistani forces.
What plans do you have to incentivize the Pakistani government to
continue its counter-insurgent operations in the areas bordering
Afghanistan and to expand their operations to excise al Qaeda forces
from Pakistan? What are failback options if the initial plan does not
succeed?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As the President stated in his
address on 1 December 2009, our core goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and
eventually defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent
their return to both countries. In recent months, the Pakistani
military has made significant efforts to address the extremist threat
within its borders against extremists in South Waziristan and Swat, and
across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)--its largest
successive offensives in years. The goals of these operations are to
eliminate insurgent-controlled safe havens, restore the writ of the
State, and provide security to the Pakistani populace. Since 2001,
Pakistan has lost thousands of its soldiers and civilians in this
fight.
We must continue to encourage and aid Pakistan's fight against the
extremists; we must also continue to make efforts to show that we view
our long-term relationship with Pakistan as vital to our national
security. To accomplish our objectives, we are strengthening Pakistan's
capacity to target extremist groups, and have made it clear that we
cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and
whose intentions are clear. We must also help Pakistan widen its
aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
the wider South Asia region, and the world. Pakistan's greatest
incentive to accomplish this goal is its own security interests. We are
deepening ties with the people of Pakistan as well as with their
security forces. We see progress with our Pakistani partners as
paramount to the way ahead. The United States is also providing
substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development
to demonstrate that we are a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We
believe, based on the significant incremental progress we have seen in
2009 with our Pakistani counterparts, that the President's revised
strategy will succeed.
Mr. Nye. On the White House's website, in regards to the
President's new plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan, it states: ``The
United States will focus on working with Pakistani democratic
institutions. We have reaffirmed this commitment by providing $1.5
billion per year for five years to support Pakistan. This assistance
addresses: Helping Pakistan address immediate water, energy, and
economic crises; Supporting broader economic reforms; Helping Pakistan
eliminate extremist sanctuaries.'' As you mentioned in your testimony,
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people. A stable
Pakistan is critical in its own right and for success in Afghanistan.
However, there have been many examples of clear corruption and misuse
of support funds in the Pakistani government. What mechanisms are in
place to properly oversee the military funds Pakistan will receive as
we escalate our support to the country?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We are committed to a long-term
strategic partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of
mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. For FY 2009 and FY
2010, DOD will execute the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF),
appropriated to the Department of State and transferred for execution
to DOD. This funding provides assistance to Pakistan's security forces
to support train and equip programs and other enablers that enhance
Pakistan's ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations that
complement the U.S. Government's efforts in Afghanistan. Given the
priorities of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, the United States will
ensure the delivery and integration of warfighting capabilities rapidly
and efficiently, with appropriate attention and adherence to
accountability and end-use monitoring (EUM) requirements. Proper
financial management, fiscal controls, and accountability in accordance
with statute and DOD policies, including the DOD Financial Management
Regulation (FMR) and any additional guidance that the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) may provide, are being followed. Additionally,
quarterly execution reports will be submitted to the appropriate
Congressional Committees.
Mr. Nye. Pakistan all too often allocates vital defense resources
on protection from India, instead of focusing on the Pakistani Taliban
and al Qaeda terrorists operating in their country. How will you ensure
U.S. dollars are not used to resource any kind of military defense
operations against India but instead are utilized to fight Pakistani
Taliban and al Qaeda factions? Do you intend to have U.S. military or
civilian personnel on the ground in Pakistan to provide oversight?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Although the Department of
State is the lead agency for overall security assistance, the Office of
the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODR-P) in Islamabad oversees
and monitors all military assistance provided to the Pakistani armed
forces. The purpose of direct DOD assistance programs is to build
Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities and to provide Pakistan with
equipment that enables operations along its western border. ODR-P's
security assistance team provides the oversight to ensure that DOD
funding is used for the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism purposes
intended.
Furthermore, we believe that Pakistan's ongoing operations on its
western border and recent shifts in Pakistani public opinion show the
degree to which the Pakistani people, their government, and the
military take the extremist threat seriously. I believe that supporting
the Pakistanis in their struggle against the extremist threat within
their borders is in the long-term best interests of the United States.
We will continue our oversight toward that end.
Mr. Nye. With the increase in troop deployments, our military
personnel and their families will face an added strain. What steps is
the Department of Defense (DOD) taking to prepare to meet the medical
care, mental health, and transition needs of the additional personnel
who will be deployed?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. A broad range of programs are
in place to sustain the health and well-being of Active and Reserve
Component Service Members and their families before, during, and after
deployment.
The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military
Community and Family Policy offers several state-of-the-art programs
for Service Members and their families. The Military and Family Life
Consultant (MFLC) and Military OneSource (MOS) programs offer
confidential, non-medical, short-term counseling support to members of
the Active and Reserve Components and their families to prevent the
development or exacerbation of conditions that may detract from
military and family readiness. These services are available throughout
the deployment cycle.
MFLC services are flexible to meet emerging needs. MFLCs deploy to
installations for up to 90 days to provide non-medical counseling
support. In many locations installation MFLCs are embedded with units
to offer counseling support specific to that unit. Large groups of
MFLCs may also be mobilized and deployed to provide ``surge''
counseling support to Brigades returning from combat. Child and Youth
Behavioral (CYB) MFLCs are assigned to child development centers, youth
centers, DOD Education Activity, and military connected schools to
support staff, teachers, parents, and youth confronting deployment-
related issues and transitions. CYB-MFLCs also deploy to numerous
summer program activities to support youth who have a parent deployed.
Finally, the Joint Family Support Assistance Program (JFSAP) augments
existing family programs to provide a continuum of support and services
based on Service Member and family strengths and needs and available
resources. The primary focus of support is families who are
geographically dispersed from a military installation. JFSAP
specifically supports National Guard and Reserve members and their
families. Services are delivered in local communities through
collaborative partnerships with Federal, State, and local resources.
Once deployed, Combat and Operational Stress (COSC) teams support
Service Members and commanders in theater. These teams are available
24/7 while Service Members are deployed. COSC promotes Service Member
and unit readiness by enhancing adaptive stress reactions, preventing
maladaptive stress reactions, assisting Service Members with
controlling COSRs, and assisting Soldiers with behavioral disorders.
Additionally, the Services have each developed garrison and
training programs to mitigate the effects of combat-related stress. The
Army recently launched the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the
Air Force uses the Landing Gear Program, the Navy has an Operational
Stress Control program, and the Marine Corps uses a program called
Operational Stress Control and Readiness. Each of these programs seeks
to prepare Service Members to cope better with combat and deployment
stress.
To enhance access to mental health care, the Department has
actively recruited new, qualified mental health providers, both to
military treatment facilities and the TRICARE network. The Public
Health Service is also providing mental health providers to work with
the Department.
Each Service also has a comprehensive program to address the
reintegration needs of the wounded, ill, and injured, including the
Army Wounded Warrior Program, the Marine Wounded Warrior Regiment,
Navy's Safe Harbor Program, and the Air Force Wounded Warrior Program.
The DOD Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program was established to address
the needs of the Reserve Component members and their families, and
facilitates access to support and reintegration services throughout the
deployment cycle.
Mr. Nye. Much debate has been given to the number of, and timeline
for, military personnel who will be sent to Afghanistan. What role will
civilian agencies play and will they too be ``surged''? Civilian-
military coordination is crucial to the fight in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. How will the President's surge affect this relationship? Will
there be enough civilian personnel to support our warfighters on the
ground?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department of Defense
strongly supports civilian increases in Afghanistan as a critical
element of our strategy and as an essential element to improve civil-
military integration. In 2009, we saw significant improvements,
including a substantial increase in civilian experts in-country (nearly
triple from the previous year), and the establishment of a U.S.
Government senior civilian structure, whereby a U.S. Government
civilian counterpart is established at each level of the military chain
of command to coordinate civilian efforts. We are aware that military
force increases will likely require the deployment of additional
civilian experts. Secretary Clinton and Deputy Secretary Lew testified
that they expect additional civilian increases of 20 to 30 percent in
2010-2011. The Department of State and Embassy Kabul are working with
our military commanders to identify additional civilian requirements.
We refer you to the Department of State for further details.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you and the Administration's full national
security team for conducting a serious and comprehensive review of the
War in Afghanistan. In order to allow our troops to come home, I
believe we need to aggressively pursue the training of effective Afghan
Security Forces so that we can ultimately transfer this important
responsibility; an immediate, increased U.S. and allied presence can
make this possible. I am concerned, however, about a number of elements
that complicate this strategy. Please expand on the following: The
Afghan government has not been a reliable partner and I believe
correcting this will be critical to our success. Please expand on what
specifically we will be doing to combat corruption and ensure greater
accountability from the Afghan government? How will we enforce such an
approach? British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently said the Afghan
government ``will be expected to implement . . . far-reaching reforms
to ensure that, from now on, all 400 provinces and districts have a
governor appointed on merit, free from corruption, with clearly defined
roles, skills, and resources.''
Admiral Mullen. The United States has been working closely with the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) on the issue
of corruption, and we are encouraged by recent steps taken by President
Karzai to ensure greater accountability. At the January 28 London
Conference on Afghanistan, President Karzai announced to the
international community that fighting corruption will be the key focus
of his second term in office and that he will strengthen the High
Office of Anti-Corruption through additional resources and new powers.
I fully support these efforts to combat corruption and end a culture of
impunity.
The U.S. is also taking steps to fight corruption. Currently, the
State Department is working on a process to certify Afghan ministries
to receive direct funding from the U.S. Government based on their
financial and human resources management capabilities and transparency.
The Departments of Defense and State are also reviewing our contracting
processes to find ways to improve the responsiveness of our resources
directly to the needs of the Afghan people, reducing avenues for
potential corruption. This includes smaller contracts, more local
procurement, and more contracting officers in the field to oversee
contracts and partner with Afghans.
Mr. Heinrich. Please expand on the following: Can you please
elaborate on the enhanced ``strategic partnership'' with Pakistan--what
does this mean specifically, and what will the United States be
committing to ensure we have a critical ally to help eliminate
terrorist cells inside Pakistan as well as within the mountainous
Afghan-Pakistan border area?
Admiral Mullen. The President's strategy recognizes that the
security situation in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to stability
in Pakistan. Action on both sides of the country's shared border is
necessary to ultimately disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its
extremist allies and prevent its return to both countries. As such, the
President's commitment to a long-term, strategic partnership with
Pakistan is a critical component to his overall strategy. As General
McChrystal stated in his recent testimony before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, ``Our strategic partnership with Pakistan and the
Government of Pakistan, I believe, is the critical long-term way to
help reduce al-Qaeda.''
By demonstrating our commitment to the region, recognizing our
shared enemy, and providing significant resources for democracy and
development, as well as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the
President's strategy enhances our ability to work with the Government
of Pakistan and build Pakistani capacity to address the insurgent
threat within its borders. The Government of Pakistan has already taken
promising steps in this regard with the military operations that it has
conducted over the past year against insurgent forces in South
Waziristan, Swat, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We must
encourage and aid Pakistan's fight against extremists in these areas.
Additionally, we must also help Pakistan begin to expand its objectives
to include seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
the wider South Asia region, and the globe.
However, this partnership with Pakistan will go well beyond
military cooperation. It will be a whole-of-government approach
focusing on the long-term security and prosperity of the country. For
additional information on these efforts, I suggest that you contact our
counterparts at the Department of State.
Mr. Heinrich. Please expand on the following: In terms of
developmental and civilian assistance, what has changed from the
President's strategy announced in March 2009, and how will we encourage
alternative agricultural products other than opium poppy?
Secretary Gates. This question is best addressed by the Department
of State, which has responsibility and authority for coordinating our
civilian efforts in Afghanistan. Since March 2009, the President has
further underscored the need to focus civilian assistance on those
ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and
deliver assistance to the Afghan people. The Department of State will
certify ministries for assistance and align our assistance more closely
with priorities outlined by the Afghan government. In addition, U.S.
Government civilian assistance will be implemented through small and
more flexible contracts, supported by more civilian expertise in the
field to supervise and advise on our efforts. As for development
priorities, immediate impact on the lives of the Afghan people is the
critical consideration. Therefore, our top reconstruction priority is
implementing a civilian-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to
restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture sector. This effort will
also target key Afghan populations for assistance with alternatives to
growing poppy, as opposed to a previous focus on eradication efforts.
Although many of these changes were launched in March 2009, they have
been further focused and refined following the President's decision in
December 2009.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIGHT
Mr. Bright. Providing the lift capabilities our soldiers require is
of the utmost importance to me and I look forward to working closely
with both of you on that issue moving forward. However, I'm also
concerned about existing programs that have been used to procure
Russian-made Mi-17 airframes for the Iraqi and Afghan militaries. Let
me be clear: I personally believe that any American taxpayer dollars
used to procure equipment for these militaries should be spent on
American-made equipment. You may disagree with that point. But, at the
very least, we should ensure that there is a full, open, and
competitive process for procuring airframes in Afghanistan. Can you
tell me if we are still purchasing Russian Mi-17s on a sole-source
basis and whether you have plans to let American companies compete for
these contracts?
Secretary Gates. The Department of Defense supports building
partner-nation capacity in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq to meet
strategic goals including host country participation in coalition
stability operations and improvement of regional security.
There are no known plans for Iraq to procure additional Mi-17s. As
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their sustaining institutions have
grown more comfortable with U.S. equipment and the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program, the Government of Iraq has expressed increasing
interest in U.S. helicopters and, in fact, has already purchased 24
Bell helicopters.
The Commander of U.S. Central Command decided to continue to
support the Mi-17 for the Afghan National Army Air Corps due to the
Afghans' experience with the platform dating back to the 1980s, the
operational suitability and reasonable cost, and the ease of
maintenance. The Department is assessing the potential need to expand
the fleet in Afghanistan in the short term, with an eye toward
identifying alternative platforms in the longer term.
Subsequent to the date of this hearing, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designated the non-
standard rotary wing aircraft as a special-interest acquisition and
designated the Army to set up a dedicated project management office.
The Department is committed to ensuring effective program management
and oversight.
In this effort, an Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint
Staff-led study team has been formed to assess the Department's
enduring requirements for rotary wing aircraft such as the Mi-17, as
well as to develop a strategy for building partner-nation capacity that
is less reliant on foreign sources of supply.
Mr. Bright. Finally, I mentioned my concern about a sole-source
procurement for helicopters in Afghanistan but I think we may end up
considering a far more costly sole-source procurement here at home. The
draft RFP for the KC-X tanker, as it is currently written, demonstrates
a clear preference for a smaller, less capable tanker than the one the
Department requested in previous rounds. We all know that this will
ultimately favor one bidder over the other. We also learned on Tuesday
that one of the bidders may decide that unless changes are made to the
RFP, this company may not be able to make an offer.
Secretary Gates--This is a serious development and something many
of us would like to discuss with you further. By forcing one bidder out
of the competition, we risk jeopardizing a process that's supposed to
ensure best value for our military and the taxpayer. No matter which
tanker a Member favors, I can assure you that Congress has no appetite
for a sole-source bid to the tune of $35 billion dollars. Secretary,
what steps are you taking to ensure that we get a fair and impartial
final RFP?
Secretary Gates. The Request for Proposal (RFP) requirements will
clearly state the Warfighter's needs for a tanker that is ready to go
to war on day one and will be a more capable tanker than our current
tanker fleet. We believe the source selection strategy is crafted to
favor no one except the Warfighter and taxpayer. The Department is
committed to ensuring the competition is fair, open and transparent. We
believe that both of the principal competitors are highly qualified,
and we would like to see competition continue in this process. However,
we cannot compel industry to participate.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
