[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-96]
STATUS OF ONGOING U.S. EFFORTS
IN IRAQ
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, September 30, 2009, Status of Ongoing U.S. Efforts in
Iraq........................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, September 30, 2009.................................... 45
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
STATUS OF ONGOING U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Odierno, Gen. Ray, USA, Commanding General, Multi-National
Force--Iraq.................................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Odierno, Gen. Ray............................................ 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 65
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Turner................................................... 69
STATUS OF ONGOING U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 30, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
HVC-210, The Capitol, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, today our committee
meets to receive testimony on the status of ongoing U.S.
operations in Iraq. Our witnesses today are General Ray
Odierno, the Commanding General, Multi-National Force--Iraq
(MNF--I); and the Honorable Michael Vickers, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict.
We welcome you, gentlemen.
And, General Odierno, this is the first time I believe that
you have appeared before this committee as such; is that
correct?
General Odierno. It is, Chairman.
The Chairman. We certainly welcome you.
On February 27, 2009, President Obama laid out a path for
bringing to a close America's long war in Iraq that began with
the invasion of March 20, 2003. America's men and women in
uniform have fought heroically to help build a new Iraq, and
over 4,300 Americans have died in that cause. We owe them our
deep, deep gratitude.
Right now the United States has about 120,000 to 130,000
combat forces in Iraq and, under the current plan, will end
this year with 11 combat brigades in Iraq, totally somewhere
around 100,000 personnel. We will maintain that level through
the Iraqi elections and for a period after the elections
through the termination and formation of a new government.
In August 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end, and
our force presence will consist of 6 advise and assist brigades
with about 50,000 U.S. military personnel. These brigades and
personnel will be slowly withdrawn until December 31, 2011, as
required by the U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement (SOFA). No
U.S. military personnel will remain in Iraq.
This readjustment in Iraq will not be an easy one for us
and will not be easy, I suspect, for the Iraqis. Simply moving
so many troops and so much equipment out of the country will be
a significant logistical challenge. We have not conducted such
a large movement over such a distance since Vietnam, and we all
know that did not go well.
As part of the drawdown, U.S. military commands will
consolidate and begin handing over responsibility for a variety
of activities to the Iraqis, the U.S. Embassy or other U.S.
agencies. I hope our witnesses can address how the planning for
this transition is going. For their part the Iraqis will have
to assume full responsibility for internal security, and there
are questions if they will be fully capable in that area by the
time we leave.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has requested authority to
transfer some current U.S. military equipment to the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF), and I hope our witnesses will address
that. Also, if they will take a minute to address potential
future requests for assisting the Iraqis.
The Iraqis will also have to come to an agreement on the
future of the country, and elections in January may be crucial
in helping them define that. They have not yet determined how
the elections will be carried out, and it remains to be seen if
the elections will reinforce sectarian divisions or help create
a truly national government. All of us who watched in horror
the ethnic violence of 2006 and 2007 dearly hope for the
latter.
Finally, the U.S. and Iraq will have to determine our
future relationship. For many of you, January 1, 2012, is a
date when our relations will transform instantly to a normal
bilateral relationship. In some ways it will likely be true,
but in other ways it just may not. Iraq will be incapable of
providing fully for its external defense. Iraq may well
continue to need help developing some aspects of its security
forces. And we will continue to have interest in ensuring a
stable Iraq that doesn't threaten its neighbors or undermine
other regional goals.
I don't expect our witnesses here today to have all the
answers to the questions. The war in Iraq is coming to a close,
but my suspicion is that these transitions will take years to
work through.
This is the first time this general has appeared before the
House Armed Services Committee, but my guess is, General, that
you will be with us many more times in the days ahead.
The Chairman. Now I turn to my good friend, the gentleman
from California, our Ranking Member Buck McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our
witnesses.
It is great to have you here, General Odierno. We really
appreciate you taking the time to be here today. Please pass on
to all the men and women in your command how much we are proud
of their achievements and how much we appreciate their service.
This is a timely hearing. While the focus in Washington is
shifted to Afghanistan, we can't lose sight of the enormous
challenges before us in Iraq. We have made remarkable progress
in Iraq. Violence continues to stay at a level comparable to
2003. The provincial elections earlier in the year were a
success, and the SOFA agreement has held together. Most
recently, in June, the Iraqi Security Forces assumed primary
security responsibility within Iraqi cities, and the U.S.
combat forces departed the last remaining cities.
The issue, therefore, is not whether we have won the war,
but whether we will win the peace in Iraq. With national
elections set for January, a referendum on the SOFA on the
horizon, as well as other significant unresolved political
hurdles like the status of Kirkuk, there are many unknowns that
will determine the prospect of enduring domestic peace in Iraq.
In parallel with Iraq's demanding political calendar, the
President's February 2009 plan calls for a dramatic reduction
to the U.S. footprint in Iraq by August 2010. By next summer
the President plans to decrease our troop strength by 60
percent, in addition to closing bases and moving material out
of the theater.
This leads to some basic questions. First, is it still safe
to assume that the Iraqi Security Forces will be able to assume
security responsibility, and that electoral politics will not
trigger sectarian violence? These are the assumptions
underpinning the President's plan. This plan arguably made
sense in February. Does it still make sense today? Many of us
here have consistently held the position that scheduling troop
withdrawals in Iraq should be based on the conditions on the
ground. General, we would like to hear from you on this
subject. Do we have contingency plans in the event the security
situation demands revisiting the August 2010 timeline? I am
concerned we may be biting off more than we can chew in Iraq.
As we begin executing the President's redeployment plan, we
also need to keep an eye on the future. What do we want the
U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relationship to look like? This leads me
to concerns about the normalization of our relations with Iraq.
After all, we have invested in Iraq, we should be taking steps
to ensure that we pursue a robust security relationship with
Baghdad. Our increase in combat forces was not the only reason
the surge was successful; rather, Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus knew how to leverage our presence to ensure
Iraqi leadership made the right choices. I am concerned that we
may be retreating from this posture too quickly in an effort to
normalize our relationship with Iraq. We must remember this is
an embryonic democracy.
As much as the situation in Iraq has improved, I think it
is fair to say the situation is far from normal. So as long as
we have a force presence in Iraq, our leadership should
continue to improve itself in Iraqi political--involve itself
in Iraqi political affairs to ensure the right decisions are
made. Robust engagement seems to be the key to a redeployment
plan.
Beyond the strategic and political military concerns, there
are a host of issues ranging from operational implementation of
the advisory and assist brigades to the enormous logistical
challenges of moving all of our equipment out of Iraq.
Accomplishing this all in such a narrow window of time is a
Herculean task even if we did not face what you rightly call
drivers of instability.
I hope we can discuss these issues over the course of the
hearing. I look forward to a candid discussion on these
important issues. And again, thank you, General, for being here
this morning.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
I seek unanimous consent that Representative Kilpatrick be
allowed to participate in our committee this morning. The
gentlelady just returned from the Middle East, and we welcome
her. Without objection.
Now, as I understand it, Assistant Secretary Vickers has
not submitted a written testimony and will not be making an
opening statement. Is that correct?
Mr. Vickers. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
So, General Odierno, the floor is yours, and we welcome you
and congratulate you for the excellent work that you are doing.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RAY ODIERNO, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE--IRAQ
General Odierno. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for providing
me the opportunity today to appear before you to provide my
assessment of the current situation, the challenges in Iraq,
and how our strategy is adapting in order to achieve the
President's vision.
First, I just want to tell you what a great honor it is to
command Multi-National Force--Iraq. Having now spent a
significant amount of time in Iraq, I remain encouraged by the
steady and deliberate progress that has been made particularly
over the past 2\1/2\ years. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as
you all know, is now in its sixth consecutive year, and it has
been a complex and challenging mission in a continuously
evolving environment. But the one thing that remains constant
is the demonstrated courage, compassion, and commitment of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and
civilians who continue to selflessly serve. I am humbled by the
opportunity to serve with and privileged to lead these great
Americans. And I also want to recognize the families of our
service members who have sacrificed so much, yet continue to
give their unwavering support in order to allow our service men
and women the ability to focus on the mission at hand.
Although challenges remain in Iraq, with the continued
support of Congress and the American people, I believe we are
now in reach of our goals.
As we all know, Iraq is strategically located in the Middle
East and remains vital to stability in this region. It has
always played a significant role in regional security dynamics,
but too often in the past Iraq has been a source of instability
rather than stability. Today with our help Iraq, is slowly
reestablishing diplomatic, economic, and security relationships
with all its neighbors.
As a developing democracy in the heart of the Middle East,
Iraq has formalized its relationship with the United States.
This past January our country has implemented two historic
bilateral agreements establishing the foundation for a long-
term, comprehensive, strategic partnership. Together the
Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement
demonstrate America's continued commitment to Iraq, its people,
and stability in the region, and they also reflect the maturing
relationship and enhanced cooperation between our two nations.
The Strategic Framework Agreement establishes the
foundation and mechanisms for an enduring relationship between
Iraq and the United States through long-term cooperation in a
variety of areas, including security, technological,
educational, and cultural exchanges, just to name a few. The
Security Agreement focuses on our current military relationship
within the context of Iraqi sovereignty by regulating the
temporary presence and activities of U.S. forces in Iraq and
directing the withdrawal of our forces from Iraq by December
31, 2011.
Since implementing the security agreement this past
January, we have conducted all military operations by, with,
and through the Iraqi Security Forces operating within the
Iraqi rule of law. I am extremely proud of how our leaders and
service members at all levels adapted quickly and quickly
adjusting our mind-set and operations in order to maintain
operational momentum within the framework of the Security
Agreement.
In line with the security agreement on June 30, 2009, the
Iraqi Security Forces assumed primary responsibilities within
the cities, and U.S. combat forces departed the last remaining
cities. June 30th was a major milestone for the Government of
Iraq, its security forces, and the Iraqi people, and a first
step in the Iraqi Security Forces assuming full control of
security in Iraq.
The positive psychological impact has been profound. The
Iraqis wanted to be in charge, they wanted the responsibility,
and they have demonstrated that they are capable. After some
initial coordination issues immediately following 30 June, the
strong partnerships that we have developed over the last
several years in particular have grown even stronger.
Today, nine months after we began implementing the Security
Agreement and three months after U.S. combat forces departed
the cities, we continue to make consistent, deliberate progress
in improving the security environment in Iraq. The combined,
sustained efforts of U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces coupled
with the efforts of our civilian partners have reduced security
incidents and attacks of all types to levels on par with the
summer of 2003.
While statistics do not paint the whole picture, they help
provide some context in understanding the progress made to
date. In the charts before you, we use six-month increments to
specifically highlight the trends in both events and casualties
over time. The security incidents chart displayed here clearly
shows the improving trends across all types of attacks and
incidents. Overall attacks have decreased 85 percent over the
past 2 years, from 4,064 in August of 2007 to 594 in August of
2009, with 565 attacks through 28 September. In that same time
period, U.S. military deaths have decreased by 93 percent,
Iraqi Security Force deaths have decreased by 79 percent, and
ethnosectarian deaths have decreased 88 percent. In fact, there
is another noticeable decrease in ethnosectarian incidents,
specifically during Ramadan, which has always reflected a sharp
increase in insurgent and extremist activity. This year there
are only 19 ethnosectarian incidents compared to 978 in 2006.
Additionally, improvised explosive device explosions have
decreased 74 percent.
But improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain the weapons
of choice of the insurgents and terrorists inside of Iraq. The
second chart shows high-profile explosions that are
specifically intended to have a large impact. You can see the
steady decrease even after the Iraqis assumed responsibility in
the cities. But these high-profile attacks remain a concern,
especially following the two bombings in Baghdad on 19 August,
which targeted the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs.
These were horrific attacks claimed and perpetrated by al Qaeda
in Iraq and aimed specifically against the Government of Iraq's
institutions in order to undermine the public's faith and
confidence in the Government of Iraq.
There was a clear security lapse on 19 August in Baghdad,
but I do not believe it is the result of any systemic problems,
and I remain confident that the Iraqi Security Forces continue
to learn, improve, and adjust. After the 19 August attacks, the
Government of Iraq responded promptly and effectively. They
reassessed security measures, made adjustments, and increased
operations, aggressively enhancing security in the cities, all
enabled by U.S. forces, and they continue to reassess their
security posture.
The Government of Iraq leaders reinforced national unity,
and the people responded. To date the extremist efforts to
destabilize Iraq have failed. The overwhelming majority of the
Iraqi people reject extremism. We have seen no indications of a
return to the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in 2006 and
2007.
Let me now take a little bit of time to discuss the Iraqi
Security Forces. Overall the professionalism and operational
effectiveness of the approximately 663,000-strong Iraqi
Security Forces, including 245,000 soldiers and 407,000 police,
continue to improve, thus both bolstering public confidence and
trust in the Iraqi Security Forces. Supported by U.S. forces,
the Iraqi Security Forces recently provided safe and secure
environments for two mass Shi'a pilgrimages in July and August
in which millions of pilgrims participated and transited
throughout Iraq.
We continue to see signs of normalcy returning to Iraq.
Recently the first international soccer match was held in
Baghdad with over 50,000 people in attendance. And just last
week I witnessed thousands of Iraqis in the parks and streets
across Baghdad celebrating Eid, which is another indicator of
the growing confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces, especially
following the Baghdad bombings just one month prior. You can
honestly feel a difference amongst the people in Baghdad and
around a large majority of Iraq.
The Iraqi Army and Federal Police continue to improve
counterinsurgency implementation, planning, and execution. In
some cases police primacy has been established in the cities,
but this is still a work in progress. The NATO Training
Mission--Iraq continues to focus on institutional training for
the Iraqi Security Forces, enhancing the long-term
professionalism. Although small, improvement continues in
logistics and the sharing and integration of intelligence and
operations. The Regional Operation Centers and Provincial Joint
Coordination Centers continue to improve.
The Iraqi Security Forces are now in the lead across the
entire country with U.S. forces, advising and assisting and
enabling operations in the cities, and providing full-spectrum
partnership outside of the cities. The Iraqi Security Forces
are conducting more and more precision intelligence-driven
operations, most of which are unilateral U.S.-enabled
operations relying on U.S. intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and some aviation and
logistical support. We are seeing improved integration of
Government of Iraq human intelligence and U.S. technical
intelligence. Outside the cities Iraqi Security Forces continue
a combination of independent, U.S.-enabled and U.S.-partnered
full-spectrum operations.
In addition, we continue to see strides in Government of
Iraq counterterrorism operations. In May, we began national
integrated operations with Iraqi Special Operations Forces
facilitated by an Iraqi Operations Coordination Group, a
standing Iraqi interagency organization collocated with U.S.
counterterrorism forces. Every day we conduct jointly planned
and executed counterterrorism operations with increasing
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in results.
I believe that by 2011, the Government of Iraq will have a
national counterterrorism force capable of dealing with a
variety of extremist threats. Just in the last week, we have
jointly arrested 90 high-value individuals, including 52 al
Qaeda in Iraq, 23 Shi'a extremists, and 15 Sunni insurgents and
ex-Baathists. Since 2006, we have systematically decreased the
number of foreign fighters entering Iraq and significantly
reduced al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to a small ideological core that
recruits disenfranchised Iraqis and criminals.
In the north AQI and some remnants of Sunni insurgent
groups continue in their attempt to reestablish a foothold with
the objective of expanding back into Anbar and Baghdad. We are
working with Iraqi Security Forces to establish a defense in
depth across Iraq with Iraqi Security Forces in the cities and
U.S. forces conducting partner full-spectrum operations in the
surrounding belts and along the borders to deny extremists safe
havens and reduce the flow of foreign fighters and lethal aid
into Iraq.
We believe the Iraqi Security Forces will develop the
capacity to conduct internal and basic external defense over
the next 2\1/2\ years as we continue to draw down our forces.
As most of you are aware, the Sons of Iraq program succeeded in
drawing many out of the insurgency, giving them the opportunity
to serve in their communities and earn salaries to support
their families. In April, the Government of Iraq assumed full
responsibility for the Sons of Iraq program. Over 23,000 former
Sons of Iraq have transitioned to the Iraqi Security Forces and
other nonsecurity employment since 2008, including over 5,500
in Baghdad over the last two months. In October, 5,000 more
will transition in Baghdad. Despite budget cuts across the
Government of Iraq, GOI has maintained funding for this
program, understanding its importance not only to security, but
also to building greater trust between the Sunni community and
the government. Sons of Iraq payments through the summer are
complete, and September pay is ongoing by the Government of
Iraq. The Government of Iraq's goal is to integrate all of the
Sons of Iraq into the ministries by the end of this year. I do
not believe they will meet this timeline, but I do believe they
will continue to execute the program in 2010 until it is
complete. We will continue to monitor the progress of this
program very closely.
In January, Iraqi's Independent High Electoral Commission
orchestrated successful provincial elections in which all Iraqi
sects and ethnicities participated and voted out also many of
the incumbents since they failed to deliver tangible results
and rejected those who were overtly supportive by Iran. The
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and
international observers deem these elections credible and
legitimate, and the seating of the provincial government
happened peacefully.
In July, Iraqis experienced another milestone with the
Kurdistan regional government (KRG) elections, with over 78
percent voter turnout of the approximately 2.5 million eligible
voters in the Kurdistan region. Kurds voted in their first
direct and open election for the KRG President. President
Masoud Barzani was elected with 70 percent of the votes. Voters
also signaled a desire for change with the success of the
Change List, which won 21 percent of the KRG Parliament, a
moderate loss to the Kurdistan Alliance. On 20 August, 2009,
the KRG Parliament and President were peacefully seated.
Although security is improving, it is not yet enduring.
There still remain underlying, unresolved sources of potential
conflict. I call these drivers of instability. From the
beginning security in Iraq has been a complex problem that has
required nuanced, evolving approaches, and our strategy has
reflected this. In this environment, we cannot focus on
immediate and traditional security threats alone, especially as
the United States continues to assist Iraq in rebuilding the
foundations of the security, civil, political, and economic
institutions.
We continue to assist the Government of Iraq in addressing
and finding ways to mitigate these root causes of instability.
Current drivers of instability include communal and factional
struggles for power and resources, insufficient Government of
Iraq capacity, violent extremist groups, and interference from
external state and nonstate actors.
Iraq is a nascent democracy emerging from 30 years of
authoritarian rule based on ethnosectarian privilege. Its
future as a stable multiethnic representative state rests upon
its ability to deal with a myriad of these challenges, and some
of these issues will take time to resolve.
The national elections in January of 2010 are critical to
determining the path that Iraq will take into the future. The
rules of the game are being debated in the Council of
Representatives today. Having just returned yesterday from the
Eid holiday, they have a condensed timeline to pass an election
law and many issues to discuss, including Kirkuk, open versus
closed lists, and a single versus multiple district election.
There is a potential to build a competent, capable
representative government, but there is also the potential to
exacerbate societal divisions by appointing people based on
their affiliations rather than their abilities.
Even as the Iraqi political system continues to mature,
there is not yet consensus on the exact nature of Iraq's
representative government, one that is accepted across ethnic,
sectarian, and regional lines. Issues include the role and
power of the central Iraqi Government vis-a-vis the provinces,
the integration and balance of ethnic and sectarian groups
within the government, revenue sharing, and long-standing Arab-
Kurd issues.
Iraqi Government institutions continue to evolve, and their
ability to provide essential services is improving, yet it will
take time to develop the institutional process and bureaucratic
expertise necessary to sustain programs over time. Also,
decades of infrastructural neglect require substantial capital
investment, and a recent decline in the price of oil, the
mainstay of the economy, has resulted in budget shortfalls
negatively impacting the Government of Iraq's ability to fund
its many requirements.
While endemic corruption and mismanagement persist, the
Government of Iraq continues to focus on anticorruption
efforts, and there has been some progress in developing a
culture of accountability for government officials.
Despite their increased capacity and progress in providing
security, the Iraqi Security Forces continue to face
shortcomings and budget constraints due in part to the
declining oil revenues that affect their current and future
operational capacity, including logistical support across the
ministries. We continue to assist and advise the Ministries of
Defense and Interior as they prioritize the minimum essential
capabilities for a foundational defense capability, land, sea,
and air, before the withdrawal of U.S. forces in December of
2011. Critical gaps remain in controlling and protecting Iraqi
ground airspace and territorial waters.
In Iraq, much of the struggles are about power, land, and
resources, which is reflective in the Arab-Kurd and Government
of Iraq-Kurdistan regional government tensions. The key issues
include the pending hydrocarbon law, revenue sharing, and the
disputed internal boundaries, including areas in Ninawa
Province, Diyala Province, and Kirkuk Province. We strongly
support the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq process
promoting political dialogue and resolution of these key
issues.
Violent external groups and external influences take
advantage of seams within Iraq, such as the Arab-Kurd tensions.
Al Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni extremist groups, and Shi'a militant
groups continue to pose threats to stability as they seek to
exploit political fissures, destabilize the Government of Iraq,
and undermine the progress made to date. Interference from
external actors continues to exacerbate the security situation
with Iraq through either tacit or direct support to extremists
and proxy groups. Both enhanced security and diplomatic
measures are required to secure Iraq's borders with Iran and
Syria.
As outlined by the President on 1 September, 2010, 11
months from now our combat mission will end. Our transition
force in Iraq will then focus on training and advising Iraqi
Security Forces; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions
by, with and through the Iraqis; protecting U.S. forces and
others operating around the country, while providing support to
civil capacity-building missions with our interagency partners
as well as the United Nations.
We are reducing our footprint in Iraq by about 60 percent
to an initial strength of 50,000 boots on the ground by 31
August, 2010. Our transition force will consist of three
division headquarters and six advise and assist brigades, which
were specifically tailored to support Iraqi civil development.
We have already begun deliberately drawing down our forces
without sacrificing security. From over 143,500 troops and 14
brigade combat teams on the ground in January, we have
approximately 124,000 troops and 11 brigade combat teams (BCTs)
operating in Iraq today. By the end of October, I believe we
will be down to 120,000 troops in Iraq. As we go forward we
will thin our lines across Iraq in order to reduce the risk and
sustain stability through a deliberate transition of
responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces.
We have already reduced our base footprint by over 200
bases so far and will continue to close bases deliberately and
systematically in Iraq. We have also reduced our contractor
footprint from 149,000 in January to just over 115,000
contractors today, saving over $441 million this year. On 1
January, 2010, we will also combine six headquarters elements
of Multi-National Force--Iraq into a single headquarters called
United States Forces--Iraq. This will reduce our headquarters
force structure by 40 percent, while maintaining the overall
capacity to command and control the force as we transition more
and more responsibility to the Government of Iraq through the
end of mission in 2011.
Over the course of this campaign, nonlethal operations have
been critical to our success. As we change our mission and
continue to draw down, they will become even more vital. I am
referring specifically the Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP) and Information Operations, both of which have
paid huge dividends so far.
This past spring, following the seating of the provincial
governments, Multi-National Force--Iraq in concert with the
State Department-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and
the newly elected Iraqi provincial leaders focused CERP monies
on projects designed to meet the essential needs of the Iraqi
people, sustain security gains, and support provincial
governance development.
CERP remains a critical enabler that we are using
judiciously. In June, we returned $247 million of CERP money,
and at the end of the year we will return another $135 million
of CERP money. As we begin our responsible drawdown of forces
and change of mission in mid- to late-fiscal year 2010 through
fiscal year 2011, we expect our need for CERP to reduce;
however, CERP will remain a critical enabler for stabilization,
and our CERP expenditures in the future will remain within the
20 approved categories that have already been discussed.
Information Operations has also been a vital component of
our overall operations in defeating violent extremist groups
who themselves use emerging media conduits to recruit, solicit
funding, and share their ideology. Our Information Operations
have complemented our lethal operations and helped save lives,
contributed to host nation stability, promoted support for
democratic processes and the rule of law, and reduced the level
of violence, yet we are engaged with adversaries who continue
to exploit the information space to try and reverse our gains.
So I cannot overstate the importance of Information Operations
in achieving our national goals in Iraq.
Over the years, the environment and threat have changed,
and we have continuously adapted our strategy from focusing on
protecting the people in a counterinsurgency fight to
concentrating on developing Iraqi capacity. Today, given the
hard-fought security gains, we are transitioning to stability
operations, and we will continue to responsibly transfer
responsibilities to the Government of Iraq, the Iraqi Security
Forces, and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Though the focus of our forces is shifting from security to
capacity building, our strategic goal remains to foster a long-
term partnership with a sovereign, stable, self-reliant Iraq.
We have a good plan that we are executing, and I am confident
in our way ahead.
Iraq is a state and a society under construction,
struggling to define its identity and its place in the world
after decades of oppression and violence. The way in which we
draw down our forces will impact not only the relationship
between U.S. and Iraq into the future, but also the nature of
the new Iraq. Our presence through 2011 provides psychological
and physical support to the Iraqi people, the Government of
Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. It provides the opportunity
for different groups to build up their constituencies, to
participate in politics, to form alliances, and to reach
consensus. The level and nature of U.S. engagement with the
Iraqis will continue to change as the U.S. military draws down.
Iraq is making steady progress, but has a long way to go.
We must have strategic patience. Through the Strategic
Framework Agreement, the United States has a mechanism for
supporting Iraq to develop its institutional and human
capacity. Success will be defined by our ability to support
Iraq's developing institutional capacity, from governance to
economics, that will sustain Iraq's long-term stability. The
Iraqi Security Forces have made steady progress, and our
efforts over the next 2\1/2\ years will help solidify the
foundation of a professional and competent Iraqi Security
Forces. We must leave Iraq with security forces capable of
defending the Iraqi people and protecting their institutions.
I close as I began, by recognizing the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians currently
serving in Iraq. These great patriots and their families have
made tremendous sacrifices on behalf of our Nation. They have
made a positive difference in the lives of millions of all
Americans--excuse me, they have made positive differences in
the lives of millions, and all Americans should take pride in
their accomplishments.
Not long ago Iraq was a society burdened by a seemingly
endless cycle of violence and destruction. Today it is buoyed
by a tremendous sense of hope for a bright and prosperous
future as Iraqis prepare for their national elections,
elections that will determine the future direction of Iraq.
Having demonstrated tremendous resiliency, I believe the Iraqi
people are determined to make Iraq something very different
from what it once was. And we have invested an awful lot in
Iraq, both from a monetary standpoint and from our personal
investment of the many lives of those who have been killed and
injured in Iraq, and I think we have a true opportunity to have
success. So it is important I think that we continue along the
line we are.
So thank you so much for the support that you have given us
in the past and the support that I expect you will continue to
give us as we move forward.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. General, thank you for your very thorough and
positive report to us, and we welcome your presence here today,
and thank you for your great contribution.
[The prepared statement of General Odierno can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. General, in your opinion, how fast can we
responsibly redeploy our troops from that country? And as you
know, our military has been greatly stressed over the past
several years, and we potentially face increased demand for
troops in Afghanistan. So what are the risks in speeding up the
redeployment of troops from Iraq?
General Odierno. Again, as we continue to look at the
competing demands--first, my responsibility, as you stated, Mr.
Chairman, is to present to my chain of command what the risks
are inside of Iraq as we draw down our forces. And as I stated,
the important part is that we do not want to lose the security
progress that has been made. The physical and psychological
presence of U.S. forces help significantly as Iraq continues to
move forward. So what we don't want to do is we don't want to
see what I mention as the drivers of instability cause a
reduction in the confidence of the Iraqi people in moving
forward with developing their nascent democracy. So we have to
ensure that we don't take enough risk where ethnosectarian
violence is able to continue, for example, over Arab-Kurd
tensions, or that we don't allow al Qaeda and some of the
outside external influences by Iran and others to cause
violence inside of Iraq that will cause the Iraqi political
system to fall.
So those are the risks. The plan we have I believe allows
us to withdraw deliberately and maintain what I believe is an
appropriate level of security that the Iraqi Security Forces
ultimately can sustain and continue to improve.
That said, we work very carefully--I work very carefully
with General Petraeus in order to identify any capabilities
that we have and no longer need that can be used in
Afghanistan. We have done that over the last several months,
and we will continue to do that. We will not require--within
our plan I have flexibility to speed up if I think the
situation on the ground allows it or to slow down, and I will
continue to make those judgments as we move forward.
As I announced, we will probably be down to about 120,000
strength by the end of October. That is a bit faster than we
originally planned, and that is based on the improvement that
we have seen out in Anbar Province where we have now replaced
two brigades with one brigade out in Anbar. And so we are able
to make those decisions as we see progress on the ground, and
we will continue to do that. So what I have to do is delicately
do this without losing the gains we have made, while
understanding I cannot have forces there that are not being
used efficiently.
The Chairman. General, the country of Iran has been in the
news a great deal lately. What influence does that country have
on your efforts in Iraq?
General Odierno. Well, obviously, as a neighbor Iran--all
neighboring countries have influences inside of Iraq. What we
want overall obviously is an Iran that wants to have positive
influence inside of Iraq. Unfortunately we still see some
malign intent with Iran as we continue to see training
conducted in Iran of Iranian surrogates that now then come back
into Iraq. We still continue to uncover large caches of
rockets, rails to shoot rockets, and some explosively formed
projectiles that are made in Iran. We continue to see the
potential interference in the political process inside of Iraq.
So those obviously are concerns.
The good part about this is that the Iraqi Security Forces
are uncovering many of these elements in southern Iraq. They
have continued to go after these caches and individuals that
have been trained inside of Iran, so that is a positive aspect.
But it is still very much a concern that they continue to fund
and conduct operations of surrogate elements inside of Iraq.
The Chairman. It appears that the future pole star for
success in Iraq is the upcoming elections. From your vantage
point today, do you see that in a positive light?
General Odierno. I think these elections are extremely
important for the Government of Iraq, and I do believe that
they will occur in a safe manner as I look at it today.
The important part about these elections is that this is
the first election that will be conducted fully by the Iraqis.
They will be conducted by the Iraqi High Electoral Commission.
And this election will be conducted and secured by Iraqis with
our just training and advice and assistance. We will see, I
believe, a turnout among all Iraqi elements, all religious
groups, all people from all areas of Iraq. So I think it will
be critical to the future of Iraq.
We are seeing many coalitions form. The last count, there
were almost 300 political parties that have registered for
these elections. I think that is important to show how much
these elections mean to the Iraqi people and the interest that
has been shown.
And so I believe that these elections will occur. They will
occur on time. Hopefully the Iraqis will pass an election law
here in the next several days. We know they are working very
hard to do that. These elections are important. Those who are
elected will set the stage for Iraq over the next several
years, whether they continue to move towards democratic process
in an open economy or not. And so these will be very important
elections for Iraq and the future of Iraq.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again, General, for your statement. And you know
as well as anyone the sacrifice our country has made in
bringing stability to Iraq.
Either satisfied with success or anxious to focus
elsewhere, many in Washington are pushing to move on from Iraq.
I am worried that that has led some to dismiss the strategic
importance of Iraq. Please state for the American people what
is at stake in Iraq, explain why it is in the national security
interest to keep combat forces there until September 2010, and
why it is necessary to keep a residual force in Iraq until the
end of 2011 and even beyond.
General Odierno. Thank you, Congressman McKeon.
I would just say as you just look at the geographic
location of Iraq, you notice the strategic importance of it. It
is strategically placed within the Middle East. It is centered
in between Iran and--the Persian Shi'a Iran and the Sunni Arab
west and southern partners. And Iraq has always been a country
that represents all of the Middle East with its population.
Iraq is moving towards a nascent democracy and wants to
move towards an open economy, and the ability that it would
have to potentially contribute to stability in the Middle East
in the long term, in my mind, is strategically important to us,
and we can't lose sight of that. We have an opportunity here to
have a long-term strategic partner.
To the Iraqis the Strategic Framework Agreement, which I
discussed in my opening statement, is extremely important to
them because that will help to develop a long-term relationship
with the United States, an economic relationship, a security
relationship, an educational relationship, technological
exchanges. That is important to them as they want to move
forward as a country that is respected, has a democracy, and
can continue to develop its own economy with the vast resources
that it has available to it, but it has yet been able to take
advantage of. And so I think for those factors it is important
for us to stay engaged.
We have spent--as I said earlier, we have spent a lot of
money, and I know you all know that. We have spent a lot of
personal sacrifice inside of Iraq. And security is headed in
the right direction. We don't want to lose that. We want to
give them the time and the space to continue this development.
So by leaving our combat forces in there until September 1,
2010, allows them to go through their elections, allows them to
seat their new government. And then allowing forces to stay
there through 2011 allows them to continue to build their civil
capacity so we can take advantage of the opportunities that we
think Iraq brings to stability in the Middle East.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, General.
Every four years we hold an election to determine our
President. We do that in November. And we understand that the
President is sworn in in January, and it seems to be a very--
for a couple of hundred years we have done that very, very
well. Maybe you could explain the timeline of how their
election works. They have a different system of government. And
the election will be held in January, but it will take a while
to establish a government. Perhaps you could explain that.
General Odierno. Congressman, I will walk through it in
general terms. First, again, by the Constitution, the election
is supposed to occur no later than the 31st of January. Right
now it is scheduled for the 16th of January, again pending the
passing of the election law. Once the election is completed,
they take 45 days to certify the results of the election. And
so what happens is we will have hundreds of international
observers, maybe thousands. There is going to be quite a few
international observers, as well as the Iraqi High Electoral
Commission will certify the results. They will take all
complaints, and then they will deem the elections to be
credible, legitimate or not.
That takes 45 days. Once that happens, you then have 30
days to begin the formation of seating the Council of
Representatives. You then have another 30 days to select the
leadership, the Presidency, and then you have another time
period to select the Prime Minister and then the Speaker. So
within that time period, we expect that it will take from
January to June or so, maybe July, to seat the new government.
In 2005, following the elections, the government--the elections
were in December, and the government was seated in May of 2005.
This is the parliamentary system of government, and it just
takes time for them to do this. So there is timelines on it.
They will follow those timelines strictly, but it will take
time to seat that government.
Mr. McKeon. Based on that timeline, then, you are
comfortable with keeping combat troops in the country until
August, and that will be sufficient, and you are comfortable
with being able to pull them out securely at that time?
General Odierno. I do. I look at the first 60 days or so
following the election as maybe the most critical time if we
think there might be some sort of violence following the
election as the results are certified. Our experiences in the
past have been if within the 60 days, that is when you would
see some level of violence. So that allows us, I think, to make
sure that we believe this will be a peaceful transition of
power, which we expect. But that will allow us to ensure this
peaceful transition of power, and then allow us to draw down as
they seat the government--draw down to a level of 50,000 by the
end of August.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much. We appreciate
your service.
You know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
suggested that there is a breakdown between U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) and the Army Central Command (CENTCOM) on
the movement of equipment out of Iraq. For example, the GAO
stated that a thorough inventory of equipment has not been
completed, nor have any communicated--have they communicated
with each other on how they are going to accelerate the
movement of troops out of Iraq. In your opinion, are you
concerned that this will increase the time required for all
redeployment of forces and ultimately impact unit readiness?
And do our forces in Kuwait have the forces available to
support an accelerated redeployment of our troops out of Iraq?
And what role, if any, will Turkey play in the redeployment of
forces? And maybe you can give us a little----
General Odierno. Thank you, Congressman. I can answer some
of those questions, and I will.
First off, we have been planning for the redeployment of
forces and equipment for some time now. In Iraq I have a cell
that has been established now for about six months that has
representatives from CENTCOM, from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines, that we are coordinating the movement of all equipment
and personnel out of the theater.
We have done a complete inventory of all the equipment that
is in Iraq. We understand what we have in Iraq. And that
immediately within the cell gets transmitted back to the
services and to CENTCOM in order for them to decide how this
equipment will be distributed, whether it comes back to the
United States, whether it goes somewhere else.
So I feel confident that we have a good handle on this. We
have already started moving equipment out that we believe is no
longer needed based on the withdrawal of some of our forces
already, and also on the change in mission that we have. And we
have already sent out over 150,000 pieces of equipment from
Iraq. So we continue to do this on a regular basis.
We plan on in some ways using--we have taken a look at
equipment going through Turkey, as well as Jordan, as well as
Kuwait. And we have actually--we are now actually sending some
equipment through Jordan as well as through Kuwait. We
coordinate very carefully with Army Central Command, who is
responsible for the logistics support inside of Kuwait. They
also are represented in the cell that we have established, and
we know what their capacity is. We have planned this in such a
way where our redeployment fits within the capacity that is
established in Kuwait for both people and equipment.
Mr. Ortiz. And I know that for some years back you were
utilizing a lot of the National Guard equipment and Reserve
equipment because of the damage to some of the regular Army
equipment. You still have a lot of equipment that belongs to
the National Guard and Reserve in Iraq?
General Odierno. Congressman, I can't tell you exactly how
much we have, but over the years, as we have deployed and
redeployed units out of Iraq, we continue to rotate equipment
through Iraq, depending on its usage and its wear, as you
pointed out. So I don't know the exact figure, but I am certain
there is National Guard equipment inside of Iraq.
So what will happen is, again, we have identified all this
equipment that is transmitted back to the services; and most of
it is Army equipment. So most of it back to the Army, through
Army Materiel Command, and they then will provide us
distribution instructions.
And, actually, it goes to our--we will ship the equipment
to Kuwait or Jordan, and then they will ship it back and send
it back to the units of its origin or to some other destination
if they decide that there is another priority.
That decision will be made back here in the Pentagon
between the Joint Staff, Secretary of Defense, and the services
on where exactly the equipment goes.
Mr. Ortiz. My time is now up. Thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Let me point out, in front of each member is the timeline
for each questioner, which is a rather new experience for us
here, but I point that out to the members.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the General for being here.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.
General, I appreciated so much the briefing I received last
month with you in Baghdad. I appreciate your leadership.
In fact, I had two sons serve in Iraq. A reason I felt so
comfortable about their service is persons like you, the
capable American military leadership. It was really reassuring
as a parent.
And I am so grateful for our troops serving currently, for
our veterans. They are making a difference, defeating the
terrorists overseas.
My question, and it is very similar to my good friend
Congressman Solomon Ortiz, is relative to equipment. That is,
as you execute the redeployment of personnel and equipment from
Iraq, to what extent is it reasonable to simply move the
equipment to Afghanistan? In your opinion, are we fully
capitalizing on that opportunity?
General Odierno. Again, we are. I would say again, those
decisions are made by others. But let me give you an example of
what happened, though, recently.
We had 19 sets of route clearance equipment that was
excess, that we once needed that we no longer needed, and we
expedited the movement of that equipment to Afghanistan. So we
identify those key pieces that are no longer needed in Iraq,
they are needed in Afghanistan, and those are moved very
quickly. That is completely coordinated through Central Command
with General Petraeus and his team as we move equipment back
and forth.
So, absolutely, we identify the critical pieces of
equipment that are needed. We have moved some engineer and
aviation equipment as well from Iraq to Afghanistan as our need
for it has reduced, and we will continue to do this as we move
forward.
Mr. Wilson. And I am particularly interested in unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), so I hope each one that could be moved
would be moved. It just gives such protection to our troops and
allies.
General, I understand that the relationship between the
Multi-National Force--Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces is
actually far more positive than the media portrays. In fact, on
our tour, we were at Tallil, where my son Alan served for a
year, and we visited with your personnel and the Iraqi security
personnel in the same room working together. It was just
startling to me.
Then we had the opportunity to see the new Iraqi Special
Forces, and they have the latest, most modern equipment in the
world.
I also noticed they have M249 crew-served weapons, which
are made by FN Manufacturing of Richland County, South
Carolina, my constituents. They are very proud to make those
for our troops and for our Iraqi allies.
What is your assessment of the relationship and what
measures can be taken to further improve communication and
cooperation?
General Odierno. First, I will say over the last three
years specifically, during and following the surge of forces,
the partnerships that have been developed and the relationships
that have been developed have been extremely strong with the
Iraqi Security Forces, from private up to the Minister of
Defense and Minister of Interior. In every operational command,
in every Joint Provision Coordination Center, which are the
ones that collect all the information, we have joint commands
operating in every one of those.
There are always some anecdotal stories that will tell you
maybe there are not good relationships, but I will tell you
that the strength of the relationships between our leaders and
their leaders continues today as we continue to support them as
they move forward, and the large majority of Iraqi leaders are
appreciative of that support that we continue to give as we
move forward here and as they take more and more responsibility
for security.
Mr. Wilson. Well, it was extraordinary as we were there
that Congressman Patrick Murphy was on the congressional
delegation (CODEL), and he had served in Iraq, and it looked
like he just couldn't wait to join the Iraqi Special Forces.
Mr. Secretary, as our military forces draw down in number
and transition fully to an advise and assist role in Iraq, what
support do you expect from the State Department? In your
opinion, are the Department of Defense and State Department
roles clearly defined?
Mr. Vickers. The National Security Council (NSC) currently
has a process under way to manage the transition of certain
responsibilities from the Department of Defense to the
Department of State. One of these will be assistance to Iraqi
police forces over time, and I believe that process is well
under way.
Mr. Wilson. And a final story, I was with Congressman Henry
Cuellar one time seeing the training of the Iraqi police. He
was right in the middle of them. I thought maybe it was
dangerous. No, they all were practicing English. So it is just
a great experience.
Thank you, and I appreciate your testimony today.
General Odierno. Congressman, if I could just add a little
bit to the last comment. We are in the process of redeveloping
a joint campaign plan between the U.S. Embassy and Multi-
National Force--Iraq which is focused entirely on transitioning
responsibilities to the Embassy as well as the Government of
Iraq as we withdraw our forces in 2010 and '11, and we plan on
publishing this document sometime around the first of the year.
That will identify the deliverables and specifically what we
transition to the U.S. Embassy, who has responsibility for it,
and what transitions to the Government of Iraq. Because this is
really important for the continued success post-2011 as well.
Mr. Wilson. And I am grateful to have a nephew stationed at
the Embassy. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, once again, Mr. Secretary, General, once again, for
being before us, and thank you for the work that you do for our
country. And you are right. Our troops are just doing a great
job. In fact, I get a lot of e-mails and a lot of information
and a lot of calls from them about what is going on on the
ground.
I know, General, you and I usually have a disagreement
about what is really happening out there in Iraq, and I think
usually I am closer to what is really going on than you. But
let me just put for the record that I do believe we are getting
out. We are getting out of Dodge, and we are going to get it
done sooner rather than later, and that means that we really
are looking at our State Department and other departments to
get that other work done as we withdraw our troops.
General and Mr. Secretary, I would like both of you to
answer this question: General, at the end of July, you and
Secretary Gates visited with Kurdish leaders in Irbil; and you
were widely quoted saying that the Arab-Kurd tensions over
disputed internal boundaries and national petroleum policy were
the biggest problem facing Iraq. In fact, you said Arab-Kurd
tensions are the number one driver of insecurity. Yet, this
morning when you began and you talked about the drivers, you
didn't mention this.
So my questions are, do you still believe that the number
one driver is insecurity, or do you still think it is up there?
And what measures have been taken to manage and to reduce the
tensions that are going on?
And, of course, Article 140 of the constitution of Iraq
provides for a phased process of normalization, census, and
referendum to determine the final boundaries of the Kurdish
region within a democratic process. But some have said to me
that they think the U.S. has to be more active in getting this
140 Article issue done, this process done. In fact, when I
asked Secretary Gates in front of this committee, he said that
the U.S. fully supports Article 140.
So my question is, how involved are we in that? What are we
doing to push these sides to get to a resolution under the
constitution? And if in fact we are going to have a responsible
withdrawal, don't you think that getting that Article 140
process done is almost a precondition for us to be able to
remove troops and make sure that these ethnic issues are taken
care of? And why is 140 stalled and what are we doing to move
it in the right direction?
General Odierno. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I still believe that Arab-Kurd tensions is the number one
driver of instability inside of Iraq. I mentioned it. I might
not have said it was number one, but I did mention it. And this
is long-standing problems over land and resources and the
distribution of those in these key areas that have been going
on for hundreds of years inside of Iraq between the Kurds and
the Arab population.
The Article 140 process back in December 2007, actually did
not get finished by December of '07, which was the date in the
Iraqi constitution it was supposed to be finished. And when
that happened, what happened was we formed a United Nations
(U.N.)--the U.N. took over trying to renegotiate and get the
sides together. So we have a U.N. commission now that is
working very hard between the Government of Iraq and the
Kurdistan Regional Government to try to come to some agreement
with these very difficult issues regarding disputed areas in
terms of boundaries as well as a sharing of hydrocarbon and
resources.
So what we are doing is we are fully in support of that
effort. We support the U.N. We engage with both the Government
of Iraq and the KRG on these issues to make sure they continue
to participate in this process, and this process ultimately
will follow hopefully and cause the implementation of the 140,
Article 140, and the resolution of these issues.
In addition, we are attempting to work with the Government
of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to reduce
tensions in the areas. Over the last year or so, on several
cases, it is the U.S. forces who have helped to reduce tensions
between these groups. We now have them in discussion, and they
are trying to come up with some sort of an architecture,
security architecture, that will reduce tensions between the
Arabs and Kurds. So we will be at such a level that everybody
understands that they will solve this problem through the
political processes of the U.N.
This is something that Iraq has to solve. This is an Iraq
problem that the Iraqis have to solve. We have to be engaged at
all levels, and we will continue to be engaged at all levels.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and General
Odierno. Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary.
You know, General, I remember not so long ago flying across
Iraq in pitch darkness in a Blackhawk helicopter just about 150
feet off the ground, and my memory is very clear that I was
much more disconcerted about that than you were.
I just appreciate what a great soldier of freedom you are.
I am convinced when that day comes and we do get out of Dodge,
that those streets of Dodge will be much safer because you
passed that way.
No one knows the future. No one knows what will happen in
Iraq. I suppose there are two people who try to predict the
future, those who don't know and those who don't know they
don't know.
But, that said, I think you have given Iraq a chance to
live in freedom, and you may have brought a beachhead of
freedom to the Middle East that potentially could help the
whole of humanity turn in a better direction. And whatever
happens beyond that, I certainly salute you for your noble and
gallant service.
I suppose my first question is to some degree along
Chairman Skelton's question, but it has to do with power
vacuums. I know it has been said that U.S. presence, if it
disappears, that there will be a power vacuum that could occur.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself has been quoted saying, ``The
political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we
will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, we are
prepared to fill the gap with the help of our neighbors and the
regional friends like Saudi Arabia and with the help of the
Iraqi nation.''
Now, I know that Iran has been implicated very clearly in
making the explosively formed penetrators that are one of the
great dangers to our troops there. So I guess, taking into
account the potential regional influence Iran may have, how
close a relationship do you envision Iraq and Iran to have in
the future, and how great a concern should that be when we are
discussing the amount and type of U.S. forces that should
remain in Iraq for ongoing stability?
General Odierno. First, I think we must always realize that
Iran and Iraq are neighbors and they are going to have a
relationship. The one thing, though, over time that I have
learned spending in Iraq is the Iraqis are nationalists. They
really don't want anyone interfering in their internal
politics. They want Iraq to be for Iraq. And I think it is
important to remember that as we move forward.
Again, I think the important part is about the key term
that the President used in his strategy and the strategy we are
doing is ``responsible drawdown.'' And that is why it is so
important to do it slowly, deliberately, so we are able to draw
down in such a way where the Iraqi Security Forces continue to
grow, all the other civil capacity builders continue to grow,
and that allows Iraq to stand up as a country who can resist
some of these outside forces who might attempt to have undue
influence. That is also why it is so important for us to have a
long-term relationship with Iraq.
So I think those are the keys as we move forward.
Mr. Franks. I suppose, you know, again, it is the obvious
follow-up. You said in the close of your testimony that, ``We
must leave Iraq with the security force capable of defending
the Iraqi people and protecting the Government of Iraq
institutions.''
Obviously, that is the long-term goal that we all want,
very, very cogent remarks. What in the final analysis is your
biggest concern with achieving this goal? What can we do to
make sure that happens? What can the Congress do? I think you
have carried Congress on your back this whole time. So I just
want to make sure you can give us some perspective.
General Odierno. I would just say is that it is about
strategic patience, and even after we leave in 2011, we can't
just say, okay, Iraq is finished. We are going to need some
additional support between now and 2011 to help build some of
the capacities. We will identify what we need to you.
We will also need to continue to support them in some way
beyond 2011, not by having troops in Iraq but by helping them
to continue to develop their institutions, and we can have an
influence on that.
So we have to make sure that we allow them to do that, and
we keep that in mind as we move forward. Ultimately, I believe
that will contribute to our own security and stability in the
region.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, General. My time is gone, but
I thank you again for your commitment to human freedom. My two
little babies I think will live in a brighter place in life
because of people like you, and I appreciate it.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, Mr. Secretary, for being here and for
your outstanding work. I know, General, you certainly are being
credited for helping to turn this situation around, and we
appreciate that.
I wanted to ask you, the Wall Street Journal reported
yesterday that the Iraqis are having difficulty with their
budget crunch and oil prices decreasing and purchasing
equipment that they had already requested from the U.S.
Government, and there are a number of issues combined with
that. How difficult and how high a priority is it for us to get
this straight, and are there policies that we in fact should be
looking at right now that would allow them to purchase more of
those in advance?
General Odierno. I think it is very important. We have been
working this for quite some time.
First, the Iraqi budget, I know because of the price of
oil, their budget has decreased quite significantly. Their
combined Ministry of Defense-Ministry of the Interior (MOD-MOI)
budget is about $10 billion a year. About 85 percent of that is
fixed, non-discretionary, and it has to do mainly with salaries
and other things. So that leaves a very small piece left to
invest in modernization. They have already purchased several
things such as patrol boats and many other Army and some Air
Force equipment that they have to still pay for. So almost all
of their even discretionary income is taken up.
So what I want to be able to do is assist them in some
small ways by using stay-behind equipment, potentially leaving
for them, as well as improving their ability to not have to pay
all costs up front for foreign military sales (FMS), where they
can spread it over a longer time period.
Mrs. Davis. As I understand it, they don't meet a number of
the criteria that we have.
General Odierno. That is exactly right. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) bank has to certify them. And, of course,
they are trying to get through that certification by having
enough reserves so they get certified. So it is a very complex
problem, and we have things competing against each other. So we
are trying to come up with many different ways to help them to
get the equipment we think is necessary for them to have a
foundational capability by 2011.
Part of that might be is we might have to--what we believe
is there is, in fiscal year '10 and '11, we think we have a
requirement of about $3.5 billion that we need to help them in
order to finish getting the foundational capacity that they
need in order to be able to have security by 2011. Then we will
have to continue some sort of a foreign military financing
(FMF) program through the State Department after 2011. If we
are able to do that, that will allow them to slowly build up
and have the security capability necessary to protect
themselves.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that.
One of the things that must be frustrating is that violence
does continue to flare from time to time. I noticed that one of
the high-ranking Iraqi Army generals was recently killed as
well. I guess that was reported yesterday.
What effect does that have in terms of the government, the
army? Or have we gotten so numb to that now in a sense that it
doesn't have the kind of impact?
General Odierno. I think for the Iraqis--first of all, it
was a brigade commander that was killed yesterday up in Mosul.
No, it does have an impact. The Iraqi Security Forces, like our
forces, understand what their duty is and what their mission
is, and they are very dedicated to providing security to their
people. And I have seen many acts of bravery by Iraqi leaders
and their soldiers, and in a lot of ways they are no different
from our soldiers when it comes to that.
So they see that as their mission, and they are trying to
root out these last remnants of al Qaeda and other insurgents
in some of these very difficult areas.
The sad part, Congresswoman, is that we continue to see
these attacks against innocent civilians. They absolutely mean
nothing to the outcome, and all it does is kill innocent
people. It is frustrating to us, and it is frustrating to the
Iraqis. That is what we are trying to stop inside of Iraq now,
these mass bombings that occur. Although much less frequently
than before, they still occur and kill many innocent people.
Those are the kinds of incidents we are trying to stop.
Mrs. Davis. Are our civilians able to move freely, go down
and have a cup of tea, to engage in an informal fashion yet at
this point?
General Odierno. They can, in order to meet with Iraqi
officials. I would say you can, but it is still a little bit
difficult to move freely. They are targets, is part of the
problem.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here this morning, and
Secretary Vickers, thank you. I will have a question in a
second.
General, the hash marks on your right sleeve I think
indicate deployments away from family and the comforts of this
country. I can't count them from here. But as a representative
of all the men and women sitting behind you who have earned
those stripes and, more importantly, their families who endured
during those deployments, thank you very much. We sincerely
appreciate your great service to this country. Please pass that
on from us to the folks who you lead. I know you are very proud
to lead them.
Following up a little bit on what Susan just asked, the
Department of Defense has asked for $750 million of legislative
authority to give equipment to the Iraqis. Much of that will be
excess equipment that it might be cheaper to leave it than
bring it home. And this may be a better question for the
Secretary. Much of it is going to be non-excess equipment,
equipment that we may need or do need, judge that we need in
other places. How do we reimburse the services that give that
equipment up? How do they replace it? Is that going to be a
supplemental? Where do we find the money to replace that
equipment that otherwise would be needed for some of the other
forces?
General Odierno. I will let the Secretary answer that.
Mr. Conaway. He has been very quiet all morning.
General Odierno. I will say just one thing. We divide it
into several groups. There is excess equipment that is truly
excess to all of our requirements, so that is not required. But
there is some equipment that might not be completely excess but
what we have determined is it actually costs us more money to
send it back than it would to leave it there. So that is the
decision process we go through on this equipment.
Now, in terms of the authority and reimbursing, I leave
that to the Secretary.
Mr. Vickers. Our J-4, our logistics director to the Joint
Staff, is leading a process right now looking at this issue
with the services about, as General Odierno said, what amount
of the inventory is excess that we could leave in Iraq, what
costs too much to bring back, how we reimburse the services,
but also what we would ship elsewhere, for example, for other
needs, and that process is still under way.
Mr. Conaway. Sure. I understand that. But how do we get the
services reimbursed for that equipment that is considered non-
essential? I have great confidence in your ability to decide
which is which and to figure out it costs more to ship it home.
But how do repay? Is it going to be a supplemental, an
additional budget request? Where are you guys coming up for the
money for the services? Out of hide, or what are you going to
do?
Mr. Vickers. I think that is being worked in the 2011
budget process, sir, is my understanding; and it will be
resolved before then. But I am sorry I don't have a better
answer for you right now.
Mr. Conaway. Okay, if you don't mind getting back with us
on the record on that.
Mr. Vickers. I will, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Conaway. General, as you have lived with the Strategic
Framework and the Status of Forces Agreement for several months
now, are there anything about those agreements that need be to
adjusted or tweaked that you need help with from a legislative
standpoint in terms of filling out the rest of these two or
three years we are involved that would make it easier or
better, from your perspective?
General Odierno. Well, I think I will be honest with you. I
have been pleased. Frankly, it has turned out better than I
probably originally thought it would as we walked into this.
But I think--and it is because, again, I go back to the
relationships. The relationship we will have built with the
Government of Iraq has allowed us to execute this agreement in
a very fair, appropriate manner.
I think we have the authorities we need inside of the
Security Agreement to execute what we need to do. It also,
importantly, puts the Iraqis out front. Although we are still
conducting combat operations, we do everything through the
Iraqis. I think that is where we want to be today, because we
want to slowly give them more and more responsibility. So I
feel comfortable so far with the agreement as it is written.
Mr. Conaway. All right. One last question as it relates to
the risks that the elections won't come off in January. Other
than them not being put into the form of election laws, what
other risk do you see that those elections won't come off
appropriately?
General Odierno. As I look at it today, if we get the
election law passed, I believe unless there is some unforeseen
event that would happen--and I have trouble getting my arms
around what that might be--I really believe the elections will
occur on time, unless there is something that caused a large
amount of sectarian violence to break out between now and the
election. But I just don't see it, because the Iraqi people
don't want to go there. They are tired of that, and they want
to move forward.
Mr. Conaway. Again, General, thank you for your long
service, and please convey to the folks you lead how much we
appreciate it, but especially their families, because I think a
lot of times the families don't get bragged on enough, what
they do to allow you and your team to do what it does.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome, and, Mr. Secretary, welcome to you, too.
Thank you both for your service and, General, particularly your
great leadership of our forces in Iraq. I hope you also pass on
our deep appreciation for all of those that you lead who wear
the Nation's uniform of how grateful we are for their sacrifice
and their service.
General, when you and I had the opportunity to meet when I
was there to visit in Iraq over the Memorial Day recess, it was
just prior to the beginning of the drawdown of troops; and the
particular area that you still had concern about was in Mosul
in particular, the presence there still of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Can you give me an update on the current situation there, the
strength of insurgent forces there, and what you have seen as
we have started to withdraw?
Also, on a broader sense, as we get closer to 2011 and once
we have completed withdrawal of all of our forces, can you give
us an assessment of what the intelligence sources suggest, what
does your personal assessment conclude, is the strength of
those that might be waiting for us to leave and their ability
to carry out attacks to undo everything that we have achieved
to this point?
General Odierno. Thank you, Congressman.
First, with Mosul, Mosul continues to be probably the most
difficult area. Nineveh Province, Mosul is part of Nineveh
Province, is probably still the most difficult area. However,
we are still making progress. Incidents have come down a little
bit.
What we have been able to do is, with the Iraqi Security
Forces taking responsibility inside of the cities, that has
allowed us to move outside in the belts around Mosul and also
move towards the border with Syria, which has made it much more
difficult for foreign fighters and other groups to transit. So
I think, because of that, we are starting to see a reduction in
some of the capacity up there.
But the current concern goes back to their attempt to
exploit some of the political fissures, Arab-Kurd tensions
being one of them, in Nineveh Province, where you have some of
the groups such as al Qaeda trying to ignite some sort of
conflict between Arabs and Kurds and potentially some Shi'a
minority groups and Kurdish minority groups.
Mr. Langevin. Is al Qaeda still the main problem?
General Odierno. It is. Again, its capabilities are
degraded, but they are still a bit resilient, and they are
still able to conduct operations. We have been able to cut into
their finance network a bit, but they are like a Mafia
organization. They extort money from many small businesses in
order to fund their operations. We realize that, and we are
going after that, working with the Iraqis. We believe if we can
really go after their funding it will significantly limit what
they can do.
Mr. Langevin. On the broader question of those who would be
waiting for us to leave and the assessment of their strengths
and ability?
General Odierno. Yes. I think the important part is if we
can get the Iraqi Security Forces, as I stated earlier, to a
level, they are on the right track. If we continue to progress
over the next two-and-a-half years, if we continue to fund some
of the things they need, I believe that they will be ready and
they will be able to handle the groups that are remaining.
The development of the Iraqi special operations forces and
their ability to do counterterrorism operations improves every
day. The improvement of the conventional forces to do
counterinsurgency operations is getting better. Police primacy
is probably the one area that will probably need continued
support following 2011. I think we will have police primacy in
many parts of Iraq but not in all parts.
Mr. Langevin. On the advise and assist brigades that you
developed, can you can give a little more clarity of each of
the troop levels for the advise and assist brigades? I know it
is 35,000 overall, but give us just a breakdown on that.
Again, I understand that the role of those will be to
continue to train and equip and support the Iraqi Security
Forces. What specifically would the advise and assist brigades
accomplish that is not being done already today?
General Odierno. First of all, what we have done is we used
to have--there is about 4,000 people in the advise and assist
brigades. What they do, what they will be able to do they have
not done before is we used to have external advisory teams that
we took from all over, the Army and Marine Corps mainly, and
put them into Iraq and they were independent entities. What we
have now done is we have embedded all of these inside of these
brigades so it gives us unity of command and unity of effort.
These brigades control all of this training and assist. They
will be able to develop at all levels. So it will be much more
organized, controlled, and I believe we will get better results
from it.
In addition, they will be able to continue to provide
security for the provincial reconstruction teams and other
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and U.N. individuals who
want to still work in building Iraqi civil capacity. So that
will be what they do. And also always provide protection for
our force. But that will be what they do.
So what we have done is we have better organized them to do
that mission. We do some of that today, but really we are
organized more for combat operations and not for training and
assistance. So what we have done is we still have the ability
to defend ourselves, but they are better organized to do this
type of mission.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor [presiding]. Mr. Coffman for five minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, I was in Iraq in 2005-2006 with the United
States Marine Corps working with Sunni Arabs in a civil affairs
capacity. And one thing I noticed from the population is that
they repeatedly expressed a concern to me that the army--that
the Iraqi Army at that time working in the area was
predominantly Shi'a, with very few Sunnis in the Iraqi Army,
and they really saw that as an occupation force and not as a
force of their own. Is there better integration in the military
today?
General Odierno. The army and the police force itself is
representative of the population, so I believe there has been
more done to integrate both Sunni and Shi'a. You don't hear
that much anymore.
The Sons of Iraq and integrating some of them in the
security forces, out in Anbar specifically, which we did in
2007 has helped specifically out in Anbar and some of the other
areas. But we have Sunni leaders, we have Shi'a leaders, we
have Kurd leaders. So I think the army for the most part
reflects a good cross-section.
I still think some Iraqis will tell you they are concerned
that leaders have not yet been, by constitution, approved by
the Council of Representatives and are solely selected by the
Prime Minister, so we have to work our way through that. I
think that is one issue that continues to raise its head as we
continue to move forward, and we continue to work that with
them. It is about the Council of Representatives enforcing
their will based on the constitution.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General.
Another question, when we look at the insurgency today--
again, when I was there in 2005-2006, the foreign fighters were
a large part of the insurgency at that time and certainly were
al Qaeda-linked. How would you describe the insurgency inside
of Iraq today?
General Odierno. It is much different than it was.
First, the numbers and size of it is significantly less
than it was. Foreign fighters are coming in at a rate of 90
percent less than what it was back then. There is very few that
come across every month, and once they get into the country,
they have difficulty maneuvering. But there are still some that
are coming in.
We are seeing a smaller and smaller group, and, in some
cases, I would argue it is moving more to criminality than it
is an insurgency. But it is hard sometimes to determine the
difference, whether it is criminal activity or insurgent
activity. But some of those have combined.
Because of the many insurgents either reconciling, coming
back to the Government of Iraq, or over time have been killed
or captured, many criminals are now being used in order to
attempt to try to conduct some of these activities. So it is a
different understanding of those elements.
Overall, I would just continue to emphasize that the
security around most of the country is fairly normal. In only a
few places do we have serious incidents, and in many instances
life has really returned to normal inside of Iraq.
Mr. Coffman. General, how do you see the combat service
support elements of the Iraqi military today? Are they still
largely dependent on the United States, or are they
increasingly independent?
General Odierno. They are better, but they are still not
where they need to be to be completely independent. They still
need our support.
Part of the area that is hurting the Iraqi Security Force
combat service support (CSS) is that they put a freeze on
hiring based on their budget constraints; and in '09, '10, and
'11 is when they are supposed to really build the CSS. And if
they continue to have this freeze they won't have the
individuals to fill the positions. That is part of the problem.
We are working with them now to ensure that happens.
But, overall, we have seen improvement, but it is not yet
where we believe they can be completely independent of
providing their CSS.
Mr. Coffman. General, how much is corruption a factor
today? Obviously, in 2005-2006, it was a significant factor in
the Iraqi Government. How would you evaluate it today?
General Odierno. Corruption is still problematic. It is
still endemic inside of Iraqi society and in the ministries.
However, we are starting to see--I know specifically in the
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, they are taking
specific steps in order to counter corruption. We have seen the
arrest of two ministers involved in corruption. We have seen
the firing of some generals involved in corruption. So they are
starting to understand the importance of government officials
being accountable for their actions and the fact that
corruption will not be accepted.
I still think we will have years in order for them to solve
this problem, but they are beginning to move on the right path.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Courtney for five minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
General and Secretary for being with us today.
I was with Mr. Lynch in July, as you may recall, visiting.
You had pretty much just passed at least the 40-month mark, at
least, when we were visiting you. I think when they write the
history books of this whole conflict your service is going to
just stand out in terms of your dogged persistence. And I
think, again, the fact that there are so many empty seats in
this room is the ultimate statement on how successful you have
been. Two years ago, this topic, you couldn't move in a
committee hearing room, and, again, I think that by itself says
a lot.
One of the other things that, two years ago, when General
Petraeus testified, he was joined by Ambassador Crocker to sort
of report in from Iraq, and, obviously, some things have
changed. The Green Zone has now been disbursed in terms of the
new U.S. Embassy, and you are in a new physical location. As
Congresswoman Sanchez indicated, the political challenges
facing Iraq are still as much a part of the end game here as it
was two years ago. How is the relationship between your office
and the ambassador? How often do you interact, and what efforts
are still being made by us to keep moving forward on the
political end?
General Odierno. Thank you so much for the question.
First of all, we interact every single day. We probably
meet personally three or four times a week. I have an office in
the Embassy that I man. But I also have about 300 people within
MNF--I that are actually in the Embassy that are in support of
economic, police, training, and other agencies, planning, that
are there every single day working with the Embassy. So we are
completely integrated at every level. We continue to be
completely integrated.
We are updating this joint campaign plan, which is a joint
plan between Ambassador Hill and myself. We are working this
very hard, very closely together. It is very important, because
it really is going to set what the deliverables are as we
transition to civilian capacity building once the military
completes civilian capacity building.
The way I put it to all of my people is, in 2003, we had a
chance to do this. We didn't do it quite right. We have a
chance now. We have got to make sure we have the planning and
the deliverables necessary to make sure this works as we reduce
our presence. We are hand in hand doing a joint process with
the Embassy, and I feel very comfortable with this.
So I believe we have a real good system in place. Every
meeting that I hold, we have a member of the Embassy at the
meeting. So our relationship is good. Ambassador Hill and I
work very closely together on a daily basis. As I tell him, the
only thing Ambassador Hill and I disagree with every day is
that he is a Red Sox fan and I am a Yankees fan. So, besides
that, we do pretty well.
Mr. Courtney. Well, I have to side with the State
Department on that issue.
Just to follow up on Congressman Conaway's question about
SOFA, there was a lot of time spent in terms of trying to
balance the jurisdictional issues in terms of if there was
disputes and how to resolve disputes. And I think, again, you
were talking in July when we were over there about the fact
that it was still kind of new to people, but we were trying to
get it done at the street level rather than have it go up
above. Do you find that you have to kind of referee or at least
the systems requires refereeing?
General Odierno. I think we are all honest brokers, is how
I put it, in some of these issues. Sometimes we become the
honest broker. They know we will work for both sides trying to
come up with the right solution. Those times are coming less
and less, but we still are, on many issues, the honest broker.
So what we try to do is play a role that allows the Iraqis to
solve it, with us facilitating the process for them to solve
these problems.
That is a change in mindset that we have to have. It is not
that we have less leverage. It is that our leverage is
different today than what it was, and it needs to be different
because of the security agreement, because we recognize their
sovereignty. We want them to build the capacity to solve these
problems themselves. So it is our responsibility to make sure
we help them to solve those problems themselves in any way we
can.
Mr. Courtney. And, real quick, you mentioned that the CERP
money, a substantial amount of money was returned. I mean, why
is that happening? It is just the need isn't there? Were we
overbudgeted?
General Odierno. A couple of things. First, some of the
money was actually used to pay the Sons of Iraq, and that was
the first $240 million we returned. The Iraqis took over the
payments of the Sons of Iraq. Since that is why we said we
needed this, we turned it over.
The other thing is we also had $270 million of Iraqi CERP
money that they gave us. So we used their money before using
our money. So both of those combinations allowed us to turn
back some money.
The other thing is, obviously, now we are very careful that
we will not do projects that we know we cannot track and make
sure they are successfully completed. So sometimes we don't
have the capacity to ensure that these projects are done and
done properly and they are finished properly. So I think that
all of those contributed to us turning the money back in.
But I do want to emphasize it is still a very important
program. We still need some CERP money in the next few years to
do this. But it will be a request that is, obviously, less than
it was in the past.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Shuster for five minutes.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, thank you for being here today. I appreciate
your service. I just want to echo what my colleague from
Connecticut said. When they write the story about Iraq, your
name will be prominent in that story. Because in my several
trips over there, I can't remember a time when I haven't met
with you in Iraq. This is the first time I think I have seen
you out of Iraq in the last several years. So, again, I
appreciate that service.
Secretary Vickers, I am glad that you are still over at the
Defense Department, especially with what is going on in
Afghanistan. We know you are an old hand at Afghanistan. So
thanks for being here today.
General, you said to us in my last trip there in June that
November, December, January and February will be the key
months--two months before the election, two months after the
election--as to whether we will be able to continue the
drawdown.
I think you mentioned here today that you don't foresee
that happening, but violence will be--that will be one of those
things that we look at. Is that the only thing, a spike in
violence, that could possibly cause you to say to the
President, let's slow down or stop the drawdown, a spike in
violence?
General Odierno. Again, I think unless we had some sort of
not only violence but if we saw a collapse for some reason in
the government itself, which I don't foresee. But it is what we
look at, is what are those potential points of instability that
could cause us to have concern about the seating of the
government and the successful seating of this government and
will they be able to continue peacefully as they move forward.
Mr. Shuster. The last election, as I recall, it took months
before they were every able to form a coalition. Would that be
something, if they haven't formed a government in February?
General Odierno. I think what we would have to decide is if
we think it will not happen peacefully, and I think I will know
that by the first 60 days following the elections. So even if
they are having trouble forming coalitions, as long as they are
doing it peacefully, I think we can continue. We will still
have 50,000 people. That is still quite a bit of individuals,
that we can still have some impact if we need to.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
The next question, we talked about the loss of oil revenue.
How diversified is the Iraqi economy and what have we been
doing or what have they been doing to diversify it?
General Odierno. It is not diversified. About 90 percent of
their revenue comes out of the oil industry right now.
One of the things they are doing, in October, there will be
an investment conference held here--I think it is the 20th and
21st--where we will have many of the Iraqi leadership coming
over to meet with U.S. businessmen. They have done the same
thing in London already. These are the kinds of things we have
to do to attempt to diversify the economy.
They still have some work to do in investment laws that
they have to pass. They are working those now, and I am hopeful
that maybe before the October meeting they will have passed one
of these investment laws. There is some indication they might
be able to do that, but we will have to wait and see.
So it is important that they start to develop an atmosphere
where businesses--there is lots of opportunity in Iraq for
investment, but it is about does it have the environment for
investors to go in. That is what we have to continue to help
them to focus on.
I think I also believe getting a new government in will
help. I think you will see the Iraqi Government continue to
mature. I think the next government will be more mature than
the last government. They will understand the process more,
they will understand their roles, and I think that will help
them to also work some of these key issues that have to be
worked in order to diversify the economy.
Mr. Shuster. When you are in the economy diversifying it,
education has got to play a key role, as well as building a
representative democracy. What has been happening as far the
education? Have you been building that up?
General Odierno. First of all, a week ago, they reported
that 6.6 million children will go to school in Iraq. Their
school year will start here at the end of September, the
beginning of October. That is the highest number that they have
had in a very, very long time, in fact, maybe the highest
number on record. I know the highest number since 2003, and I
think it is actually the highest number even before that. So
that is a positive sign, that they will have 6.6 million
children that will go to school.
Their universities are now developing relationships with
U.S. universities. We know that some of the land grant
universities around the U.S. have visited and are conducting
regular engagements with them and exchanges.
The Government of Iraq also approved $4.5 million in grants
for Iraqi students, Fulbright scholarships for Iraqi students
to study around the world, mostly in the United States and
Western Europe. So I think these are all positive steps that
are starting to be taken that will allow them to continue to
educate their population.
The Iraqis have always been a fairly educated population,
but there has been some problem with that based on what has
happened here in the aftermath of 2003. But we see that
starting to regenerate itself, and we are encouraged, but there
is still quite a bit of work to do.
In the Strategic Framework Agreement, this is one of the
strong parts of this agreement, is the education piece.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
The Chairman [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.
General, I just have two questions. One is just a tactical
issue.
You have mentioned that we have withdrawn 150,000 pieces of
equipment already from Iraq. GAO says there is 31 million
pieces of equipment in Iraq. Do you really believe that we can
be totally out of there by the end of 2011, in view of that
number and all the other numbers attendant to that? And do you
plan per the Army requirements to close up the bases even with
the environmental requirements?
As you know, in Korea, they have been closing them up, but
they put a stop to them because they haven't followed the
correct procedures, nor have we funded for it.
Are you planning to help expedite this to turn over more of
those pieces of equipment? Because is a large difference
between 150,000 and 31 million.
General Odierno. First, Congressman, if I could, I believe
it is 3.1 million is the number we have, 3.1 million pieces of
equipment. Still, 150,000 is a small piece of 3.1 million as
well.
First off, I do believe we can get that equipment out by
then. When we say 3.1 million, of course, that goes from the
smallest piece of equipment up to a tank. So there are several
different kinds.
As we close our bases, we have a very sophisticated process
that we go through that includes environmental assessment based
on a security arrangement which we signed with the Government
of Iraq which addresses this issue; and they have to go through
very specific points in order to determine this. So I feel
confident we are following what we agreed to in the security
agreement with the Government of Iraq on how we turn over these
bases.
In some cases, it takes nine to ten months to do this. So
the important part is we are able to identify this ahead of
time in order to have the time to do the things necessary.
In addition, many of these bases will actually be turned
over--they won't be closed. They will be turned over to the
Government of Iraq, especially the big bases.
Mr. Sestak. You do this in a non-permissive environment?
That is the plan?
General Odierno. We have closed 200 bases so far. So we
have already done it, in some cases, in a non-permissive
environment.
Mr. Sestak. My second question is, Iran consistently comes
through this committee and almost any security briefing in the
general area of southwest Asia or the Middle East, whether it
is Afghanistan or tomorrow's hearing on ballistic missile
defense (BMD). And you spoke a lot of Iran, but over the last
couple of years, I was struck by several comments that had been
made.
One was by the intelligence agency when they sat before the
committee and said, if we are not there bleeding, Iran will
work for stability in Iraq.
The second one was made by General Eikenberry as he
departed Afghanistan as a General. And when asked if Iran works
towards our same objectives in Afghanistan, as we do, he
replied, yes, they do. They want stability there, and they
don't like al Qaeda because they are Sunni.
The third one was the national intelligence estimate (NIE)
that came out about 2007, and in testimony here the
intelligence community again testified that, with regard to
foreign policy and security decisions, Iran takes a cost-
benefit approach, rather than a headlong rush to a decision
irregardless of cost or benefits to its diplomatic, political,
and other goals.
You have worked--and you can't miss it, particularly in
this job--and you have brought up Iran a number of times. What
perspective can you provide us?
Because Iran will continue to be brought up in almost any
security briefing, and you can provide us, rather than ``they
cause mischief.'' Got it. North Vietnam caused mischief. But
what can you take away to give us of how to deal with this
nation, in view of those three statements that say, you know,
maybe this nation overall, much like other nations we have had
to deal with, has similar goals but comes about it from a
different way?
General Odierno. I would just say, first, if we weren't
there to bleed that they wouldn't conduct attacks, it is hard
to say. What I would tell you is I know right now that on a
daily basis they conduct attacks against Iraqi Security Forces
with no U.S. forces around. So I am not sure that quite tracks
with that statement.
But what I would say is, again, I think Iran needs to have
a relationship with Iraq, but it has to be the right kind of
relationship, defining what is best for Iraq, what is best for
Iran. I think they should have free trade. I think they should
have a relationship that helps with religious activities, et
cetera.
But, again, I think they have objectives that aren't clear
to us. Iraq is important to them because of the potential
Sunni-Shi'a issues that are in the Middle East, and Iraq falls
in the middle of that. So I think there are other reasons why
they want to be in Iraq besides just having normal
relationships.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Sestak. So could the Secretary just answer, if you
don't mind? The Secretary is just going to make a comment, sir.
Mr. Vickers. Just one comment on Afghanistan. Their
meddling there is somewhat less than they have done in Iraq,
but they do support Sunni groups. Strange alliances, but they
do, in fact.
The Chairman. I didn't catch that, so thank you very much.
Mr. Hunter, please?
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Vickers, I know you through reputation. Just
thanks for your work as the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(ASD) when it comes to counterterrorism (CT) and
counterinsurgency (COIN) and the doctrine that is being
reinvented right now for Afghanistan.
And, General, you have been praised eloquently here. I will
just back that up by saying thanks for letting us walk up to
the men and women who have served in Iraq and say thanks for
winning this. I think that is important.
The first question is, if you could both put your heads
together and say--I think we have been through two-and-a-half,
maybe three generals--McKiernan, McNeil, and now McChrystal in
Afghanistan--during the time that you have been in charge of
Iraq, what lessons learned would you like to see brought over
to Afghanistan from Iraq that you haven't seen?
General Odierno. Well, I would just say, first, I have
been--as you said, I have spent a large majority of the last
several years in Iraq, so I don't pretend to understand the
environment in Afghanistan in order to understand what could be
applicable inside of Afghanistan versus Iraq.
One of the lessons I learned is you have got to understand
the environment, and you have to understand what are the
social, economic, political, military issues that underpin the
reason why violence is occurring.
So, the one thing--and from what I have seen, General
McChrystal is doing exactly this. He is outlining what are the
underlying factors that are causing the instability inside of
Afghanistan, and you have to take a whole government approach
to solve those problems.
So I can't tell you specific because I don't understand the
environment enough in Afghanistan. But I can tell you that,
from everything I have read, that he understands that
completely and understands the fact that it is a complete
approach that has to be taken to solve the problem there, just
like we needed to do that in order to solve the problem in Iraq
and will continue to need to do that until we leave at the end
of 2011.
Mr. Hunter. Let me ask a quick follow-up before Mr. Vickers
answers that.
Do you think you would have seen the success in Iraq that
you have seen now if you did not have the surge?
General Odierno. Well, again, I would say, obviously, the
surge of forces in Iraq helped us to create the security
environment that we have now, along with many others things.
The one thing I tell everyone with the surge in Iraq, it
was just not about the surge of forces. It was about the change
in our tactics, procedures, the techniques, and procedures. It
was about a surge of the State Department people as well in
order to create embedded provincial reconstruction teams with
the brigades. It was about an outreach program to the Sunni
insurgents that allowed them to begin to reconcile and form the
Sons of Iraq. It was about understanding what was causing the
underlying impacts and that we tried to go after these using a
combination of CERP, military capacity, and others. So that is
what I learned in terms of the surge.
Mr. Hunter. So a lot of things happened, but you wouldn't
have been able to do it without that increased security to
allow all of those things to take place.
General Odierno. Well, again, the surge of forces clearly
had an impact on our ability to improve the security inside of
Iraq.
Mr. Hunter. Got you. Thank you.
Mr. Vickers, first question: Lessons learned, without being
critical of anything that is going on, possibly lessons
learned. I know tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are
different in Iraq and Afghanistan, different people, different
kind of violence, different area. The actual terrain is
different. But if you could take something from Iraq and put it
in Afghanistan, maybe systems of lessons learned, the ways that
we did things there that we are not doing in Afghanistan, what
would that be?
Mr. Vickers. Well, first, the difference is the insurgency
is more rural-based. It is less based on ethno-sectarian
conflict in Afghanistan. It is more a Pashtun-based insurgency
in the south and the east. And then there is the critical
importance of the sanctuary that Afghan insurgent groups enjoy
in Pakistan. They also receive more funding from external
sources than I believe Iraqi insurgents did, getting more
internally.
That said, there are common principles in good
counterinsurgency that can be transported; and I think General
McChrystal is doing some of that now. The focus on protecting
the population is a core mission for forces, and the
integration of all elements of power, the whole of government
approach, as General Odierno talked about. But also things like
counterterrorism and counternarcotics to make sure they support
our overall COIN effort, as was done very, very well in Iraq.
Mr. Vickers. As you know, we have a major review going on
right now at the White House of our Afghanistan-Pakistan
strategy, and so that is probably about as much as I would like
to say now.
Mr. Hunter. I am out of time. Thank you both for your
service. And thanks for winning once again, General.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
We have Dr. Snyder, Mr. Taylor and Ms. Giffords in that
order. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I was unable to be here earlier, General Odierno, and you
may have answered some of these questions, but in your written
statement on page seven, you talk about nonlethal operations, a
force multiplier, and in specific you talk about CERP and the
Information Operations. There is very little mention of the
provincial reconstruction teams. Have they not been as much a
force multiplier as you have desired, or do you not consider
them in that category? Is there a reason why you did not
discuss them more?
General Odierno. No. I did because it is the House Armed
Services Committee, but they are absolutely critical to what we
do. The provincial reconstruction teams, as I just stated
earlier, were a key piece in the surge of allowing us to get
out and reach and build civil capacity, and it continues to be
very important.
Dr. Snyder. How is that working as you have transitioned?
You mentioned the number of bases that you have closed, and
PRTs can only operate in a secure environment. Have they had to
pull back, or are they using Iraqi forces to provide security?
General Odierno. Well, the plan we have, we have 27
locations. Some are satellite locations now. We provide the
security for them in all those areas. When we plan our
drawdown, one of the considerations we take into place is the
breach of the provincial reconstruction teams, and we have
coordinated with the State Department how we will do this. So
they will be able to maintain a fairly significant number, 16
is the number we are looking at, throughout the country and
will be able to continue. One of the main missions of the
advisory and assistance will be to provide security for the
provincial reconstruction teams to make sure that they have the
access necessary.
Dr. Snyder. You don't foresee that that will be--at some
point the PRTs will have Iraqi troop security--only Iraqi
troops for security?
General Odierno. I think we will slowly turn that over to
them so when we get to post-2011, that they would be able to do
that. That will be part of the process.
Dr. Snyder. As you had mentioned earlier in discussion, I
think, from Mr. Shuster about economic investment coming from
abroad, what is the current status, if you know, in terms of
the Iraqi, I would use the word ``diaspora,'' Iraqis who left
the country to Jordan and other countries? Are they returning,
are they not returning?
General Odierno. They are returning, but in very small
numbers.
Dr. Snyder. Do the ones that are outside the borders, do
they participate in the elections?
General Odierno. In 2005, they participated in the
election. As part of the election law, it will be--they will
develop what countries they will provide the opportunity for
those not in Iraq to vote, and that will be part of the
election law as they approve it.
Dr. Snyder. We focus a lot here in the Congress, and the
American people do, too, on troop strengths, I think probably
sometimes to our detriment; that we should focus on an
Afghanistan discussion, for example, and a whole lot of other
things. But I wanted to ask, are there any limits or
considerations with regard to U.S. Government civilian numbers?
I assume those numbers are relatively small. I don't see them--
you mentioned civilian contractors have come down
substantially, but I think we have a whole lot smaller numbers
of U.S. civilian personnel there. Is that a number that you are
following, and, if so, which way is that going?
General Odierno. Obviously I work--the Ambassador is
obviously the one who tracks the civilians that work in the
State Department side. As part of our contracts, we have some
American citizens who work as part of the contractors, and I do
track that.
But in terms of the State Department side, we do watch
that. They are--what they are trying to determine is part of
our joint campaign plan. They are to determine the number that
is needed as we transition, and I think that number will not go
down. I think it will stay about what it is now, and, in fact,
some cases have to come up. For example, if they take over the
police training, they will need more civilians than they do
now.
Dr. Snyder. And it is not just State Department, it could
be Justice Department, Ag.
General Odierno. Exactly. Justice Department, Agriculture
Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), et cetera.
Dr. Snyder. Are you satisfied with the morale of our
troops?
General Odierno. As I go around, I am very satisfied. And
one of the things we always check--I talk to them all the time.
Reenlistments are over 100 percent in Iraq. In fact, in June we
finished reenlistment, and they have met all of the goals. So,
I mean, I think that is also a sign of morale. They are proud
of what they have accomplished in Iraq and are starting to see
some of the progress that has been part of their sacrifice.
Dr. Snyder. As you have closed bases and pulled back U.S.
troops, are you satisfied with the ability to do medical
evacuations of wounded troops?
General Odierno. About once every two weeks, I get updated
on our ability to conduct medical evacuation. I am absolutely
confident that we can provide medical evacuation for all of our
soldiers, sailors, and marines that are currently stationed
there.
Dr. Snyder. Does Iraq have any helicopters and helicopter
pilots that they do their own medical evacuations?
General Odierno. They do have the capacity to do that, but
it is small.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General. Thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from Arkansas.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. General, like everyone else in this room, on
behalf of the people in south Mississippi, we are very grateful
for what you have done and continue to do over there in the
many years of your life that you have devoted to this effort in
Iraq.
I have always been impressed by the brilliance of whoever
discovered the Sons of Iraq policy, and literally found out
that for a fairly small amount of money, we can take people who
were shooting at us to become our defenders. Since that has
been such a successful program, you did touch on it for about a
paragraph in your testimony, what steps are being taken to see
to it that those people who are now on our side remain on the
side of the Government of Iraq? Do they recognize the
significance of what has happened? What steps are they taking
to work those people, to either keep them on the payroll in
their present capacity or find some other job within the Iraqi
Government for them?
General Odierno. Thank you, Congressman. The Government of
Iraq does understand the importance they play. It is very
interesting. They have a plan in place to move all of them--
they actually showed us a list of all the names of the Sons of
Iraq. And they showed us the list, that some will go to this
ministry, some will go to this ministry, some will go to the
local governmental ministry. And they laid it all out and said,
we are going to begin to execute this, and they started to
execute that in August. So that is a positive sign.
But what is interesting is after the bombings on 19 August
in Baghdad, the Commander of the Baghdad Operational Command
came back and said, I want to slow down the movement of the
Sons of Iraq into the other nonsecurity ministries, I want to
keep them on longer because of what they do for us in order to
help us in the security. So they made a decision to keep them
on a bit longer. I think that shows first the recognition of
the senior commanders of how important the Sons of Iraq are to
the security, and, secondly, that they, I believe, will
transition them and take care of them. In 2009, when they had
all the budget cuts, the only line that was not cut was the
Sons of Iraq, and they continue to have that fully funded. So I
think those are all positive signs.
What I have to make sure happens is since they will not get
them all transitioned to the ministries by the end of 2009, we
have to make sure that that will be taken care of in 2010. And
we will work very hard with the Reconciliation Committee of the
Government of Iraq in order to do that.
Mr. Taylor. I didn't see it in your prepared remarks, but
obviously one sign of things getting back to normal would be
electricity to the average Iraqi. And I know--have we gotten to
the point where we have reached or they have reached prewar
levels of electricity to the average citizen?
General Odierno. Actually they are above the prewar levels.
They are producing I think it is an average of 155,000
megawatts. What that means basically is about a 20 percent
increase from last year. And even more importantly is they have
less units now going off line. So what they are able to do is
maintain a more stable grid.
That said, although they are producing more electricity,
they still have some problems with distribution. And so they
have some problems in some areas of distributing electricity to
all the people. So my guess is you would run into some Iraqis
who have yet to see an increase.
The other problem, of course, is demand has increased
fivefold since 2003, which is a sign of freedom and other
things, but also obviously puts more pressure on the Government
of Iraq to provide more and more electricity.
Mr. Taylor. I guess lastly I am going to ask you to look
out into the future. It is my impression from several thousand
miles away that we have replaced a strong, brutal thug with
more of a distribution of the powers amongst the sheikhs. And
if you had to say, it would look more like the Magna Carta than
the Declaration of Independence or the United States
Constitution. I was just curious, in your opinion, do you think
it remains for the foreseeable future some sort of a power-
sharing agreement amongst the sheikhs, or is power being
consolidated in Baghdad? How do you see their political system
going forward?
General Odierno. I think it is still to be determined. But
what I would say is what we are seeing is following the
provincial elections of this year; people want to see more of a
nationalistic government. And I think as we see the new
alliances form for this election, you are seeing that they are
reaching it. They are just not a Shi'a alliance. There will be
a Shi'a plus some Sunnis and some others. Maliki's--Prime
Minister Maliki's alliance will be a nationalistic alliance
that has many different groups in it. So I see that as
extremely positive that they have recognized the fact that to
be successful you have to be able to have more than one
representative or one area of the people inside of Iraq.
Mr. Taylor. Thanks again for your service.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Giffords.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, it is good to see you again. Thank you for
your time to come here and for your service to our Nation.
Unfortunately because of a conflict I wasn't here for most of
the hearing, but I did have a chance to read your testimony.
And, of course, it impresses me that within your second
paragraph you talk about military families, and you talk about
their unwavering service and their sacrifice.
I know a lot of strategic questions have been asked
already, but I would like to talk about the families. As a
military spouse myself, and as someone with Fort Huachuca and
Davis-Monthan, I have a lot of military interest in southern
Arizona. I have a chance to meet with military families and
really learn about the unspoken heroes, the real stories of
hardship that have happened behind the scenes. And I still
remember quite succinctly the first time we met in Iraq and you
talked about your wife, and you talked about if we lose the
families, we will lose the soldiers, the sailors, the airmen
and the marines. So could you talk about our efforts to draw
down the changing stresses on the service members and their
families as well?
General Odierno. I think what we are trying to do obviously
is reduce the time between deployment--I mean, increase the
time between deployments, because we all know--and all of us
and all the people sitting behind me in uniform, they have all
been on several deployments. And although we tend to play off
what that really means, we know that there is an impact on
every single person who deploys, and you need a time to recover
from that deployment. And if you are not given enough time, it
can have an impact not only on the soldier, but the family.
So number one is we got to try to increase the amount of
time between deployments, where they can enjoy their families,
get settled again, understand and build those relationships,
and then allow time for them to recoup and recover with their
families. And we also have to realize the impact that these
deployments have on a single parent because you become a single
parent for a very long time, and I think sometimes that is the
part we miss is we think about the soldiers and the help they
need, and we forget about the impact of our wives or husbands
who become single parents for very long periods of time,
sometimes during very difficult times for their children as
they are growing up.
So I still think there is some work we have to do along
those lines. I know the Army and the Marine Corps and the Air
Force and Navy are looking at this, and they constantly look at
it. But, you know, the strength of our families, you can only
rely on that so much without giving them the assistance
necessary. And so I think it is something that we absolutely
have to keep our eye on as we continue to move forward with
supposedly increased requirements now in Afghanistan.
Ms. Giffords. General, obviously we would look forward to
any of your suggestions. We were able to implement through the
Wounded Warriors Assistance Act a couple of years ago some help
for soldiers that were getting out of the military. But I think
when I last saw you, there was a--I don't want to say epidemic,
but a real strong spike in the number of suicides, particularly
in the Army. And I know that you talked about implementing some
programs there in Iraq, but can you talk about whether or not
those were successful, and have we seen the numbers decrease?
General Odierno. We have actually--although we hadn't had a
suicide in about 60 days, which is the longest period we have
gone, but I think we may have had one last night, so
unfortunately that might have ended. But I think we have
started to see some of these programs take hold, the fact that
we have more counselors, the fact that we continue to have more
awareness. It is really about leadership awareness and
leadership down the chain of command to recognize when an
individual has problems.
So I am seeing some progress, at least in Iraq itself. I
can't speak for the Army as a whole, but I can speak for in
Iraq itself. But we still have too many, so we still have more
to do. And again, what is always disappointing to me is it is
not because people don't care, but when you break down a
suicide, you always find that there are three or four places if
somebody had intervened, we could have stopped the act from
happening. And so what we got to do is understand where those
intervention points are and then do it so we save a life. And
that is what we have to continue to work on.
Ms. Giffords. General, Mr. Chairman, there is incredibly
strong bipartisan support for our service members and the
families, but oftentimes we look to you, those commanding
generals and officers in the field, to let us know what is
working and what is not working. So having that feedback is
very important.
And just in closing I just have to thank you for your
willingness to reach out to The Colbert Show. This is a
population that wouldn't necessarily be paying attention to
day-to-day operations in Iraq, but you are able to put, I mean,
a real face on how hard it is and what the service members go
through. I mean, of course it was a comedy, but it was very
well done. I just thank you for your willingness to reach out
and engage on that level.
General Odierno. Thank you. And I think he is due for
another haircut.
Ms. Giffords. I think so, too.
The Chairman. We will make judicial notice of the fact.
I have Ms. Shea-Porter, and Mr. Coffman wishes a second
round. So Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. And as a former military
spouse, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of
Congresswoman Giffords, and thank you for the attention you are
giving to these military men and women, who, as you know, have
carried the burden for so long for the rest of us. So thank
you.
I wanted to talk to you about a conversation I had with
General Petraeus earlier this year when I was talking about the
electrocution deaths of some of our soldiers. And I was told
there was Operation Task Force Safe Actions for Fire and
Electricity (SAFE), and that they were going to be doing the
investigation. And I believe that the investigation was
supposed to end right about now, but again comes some horrible
news about a former military man who came as a contractor to
Iraq, Mr. Hermanson, and he was recently electrocuted. And so I
had a couple of questions for you, General.
First of all, was his facility inspected, or were you only
inspecting the facilities that soldiers occupied?
General Odierno. It was not inspected. What happens is as a
contractor it is the responsibility of the contractor to ensure
they have adequate facilities, so we were not inspecting those
facilities. However, since that incident we have sent Task
Force SAFE over to first outline to all the contractors what is
expected of them in terms of proper safety requirements. And we
have also offered them any assistance that they might need with
Task Force SAFE to go look at all of their facilities to ensure
they are in line with what we believe to be safe structures.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Since we knew that we were having trouble
with the contractors who were supposed to be doing the safe
wiring, why was the decision made not to inspect the
contractors' facilities?
General Odierno. I am not sure we made a conscious decision
not to inspect them. I think what we focused on was the
Department of Defense personnel. And I think as we continue to
expand this, we will look. But there are some contractual
issues that we have to work through. So we asked the lawyers to
take a look at this to see what we can and can't do because of
the fact they are contractors, so we are working our way
through this now.
This obviously highlighted a problem that we all didn't
understand at the time, and so we continue to work it. And what
I am telling you is we are working this problem now, but we
have to go through some legal reviews and other things. We have
offered some initial assistance just to make sure we don't have
any repeated offenses in that specific contractor. But there
are many other contractors that have facilities that in some
cases aren't even under the Department of Defense. And I don't
remember, but I think this one wasn't even under the Department
of Defense either. I think it was under a Department of State
contract as well. So that throws in a whole other issue of how
we do this.
So we are working through this because we want to get rid
of the bureaucracy so we save the lives of the people who are
going there to work, and that is important to us.
Ms. Shea-Porter. These men and women serve this country as
well, and I really don't understand it because I know that many
of them had access to the medical care that the military was
providing, and so clearly there was some crossing over there
that they felt comfortable not even reimbursing, as you recall,
I am sure. So I just can't understand what happened there.
Were there any other services provided for the people in
those buildings?
General Odierno. I will have to get back with you on that.
Ms. Shea-Porter. If you could do that, I would appreciate
that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
Ms. Shea-Porter. I have one last question. Can you comment
on whether the Department of Defense has declined to
investigate the apparent electrocution of the American
Department of Defense contractor?
General Odierno. Again, I have to go ahead and take a look
at that and see exactly what happened, okay? I will get you an
answer back on that.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I would appreciate that General, because I
feel very certain that when that family sent their loved one
over to serve this country, they expected that we would do what
we could to protect all of them, whether they were in uniform
or whether they were serving as civilians.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Coffman, second round.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Secretary, could you discuss Kurdish
aspirations, because I think that there certainly was some
concern when some of the Kurdish provinces were engaging in
their own negotiations in terms of oil exploration and
development. Given the fact that the central government relies
on those oil revenues, what are Kurdish aspirations, and how
does the oil issue enter the equation?
General Odierno. I can't speak for Kurdish aspirations, but
what I can speak to is the two oil fields that are producing
oil inside of Kurdistan are actually oils fed to the central
government, and they are getting all of the revenue from those
oil fields.
Mr. Coffman. There have been reports that some new--not the
existing oil fields, but there are some new exploration.
General Odierno. Yeah. The issue has to do, Congressman,
with there is some new exploration that has been done since
2003. Those are pumping oil, those are going to the central
government. There are also--there might be some additional
exploration going on. That is the issue. Who pays for the
exploration? The central government could be doing it. Does the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have the authority to issue
these contracts? And that is what is yet to be resolved and has
to be resolved through the hydrocarbon legislation.
Mr. Coffman. De-Baathification clearly went too far in the
aftermath of the invasion, post-invasion of Iraq. Where is that
now, because it certainly led to a lot of resentment among
Sunni Arabs?
General Odierno. They have what they call the
accountability and justice law, which was passed a couple of
years ago, which also has had some significant problems in
implementation. So what it is going to require, I believe, is
for them to go back and pass some more legislation that will
adequately address this issue, and that is something that I
think they have to do internally.
But the accountability and justice law has been something
that has been very difficult to implement because it in some
cases had not appeared to make sense based on some of the
individuals that would no longer be allowed to work who had
been serving honorably for several years already within the
system. So the Government of Iraq knows that they have to
readdress this problem, but it is still one that has to be
addressed.
Mr. Coffman. The problems with the Shi'a militias, how
would you evaluate the Shi'a militias of today. And to what
extent are they aligned with Iran?
General Odierno. The number of Shi'a militias has declined
significantly, and the number of Shi'a militias in Iraq have
declined significantly since the March-April 2008 operation
done by the Government of Iraq in both Basra and Iraq. I think
there are--what you don't see any more is large movement of
Shi'a militias who control areas, but what you have now is some
militant groups that don't control areas, but conduct attacks
for several different reasons. And I think we have seen the
militia element move in their ability--in what they do and
their abilities. So although they continue to be a threat
because they do conduct attacks against both U.S. forces and
Iraqi Security Forces and others, their influence has been
significantly reduced to what it was in 2007 and the beginning
of 2008.
Mr. Coffman. To what extent is Iran--I think you mentioned
briefly Iran providing them training. To what extent is--and I
think you also mentioned Iran providing them munitions and
weapons.
General Odierno. Yeah.
Mr. Coffman. What is the trend line on that now?
General Odierno. I think it is less than what it was, but
what they have done is they appear to target it a little more
to certain organizations, small organizations that continue to
train inside of Iraq--train inside of Iran, and who come across
with increased capabilities to conduct operations and attacks
inside of Iraq. And they are still provided munitions such as
rockets and explosive-form projectiles.
Mr. Coffman. Many of the Sunnis in Iraq, at least when I
was there, would speak of the Shi'a and say the question is at
the end of the day are they Arabs first, or are they Shi'a
first? And they would speak of this in reference to the
influence of Iran over a Shi'a-dominated Iraqi Government. How
do you see that at this time?
General Odierno. You know, the people I deal with--again, I
don't--what I would say is the people I deal with, I believe,
are Iraqis first, I will put it that way. And I think that Iraq
is first and foremost in their mind. There are, of course, many
who are trying to influence. I think Iran is trying to
influence some. I think there is others, Syria and others,
trying to influence as well. That is what makes Iraq so
important, I think, in the long run.
The Chairman. I certainly thank the gentleman.
General Odierno, we thank you for your appearance, for your
excellent testimony. We thank you for the service that you are
rendering. You are making history in your leadership in Iraq
for our country, and we thank you for that.
I may also mention that all of us in this committee feel
that the young men and young women in your command are making
history as well. And when the final chapter of Iraq is written
in our efforts there, I know full well that your name will be
very, very prominent as well as all those young men and young
women who have worked so hard and so professionally, and the
families that we support, and we just can't thank them enough.
So, General, thank you very much.
Mr. Vickers, thank you for being with us.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 30, 2009
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=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 30, 2009
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
General Odierno. Throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations
contractor camps exist where provision of life support for employees is
the responsibility of the contractor. However, every contract has
differing provisions and levels of Government support for their
personnel. All of our contracts require that every contractor will
uphold both U.S. and local laws and require that the contractor
complies with the CENTCOM and MNF--I regulations and living standards
(as applicable).
With regards to the contractor and specific contract in question,
the U.S. Government provided: office space, dining facilities and
water, medical care (contractor personnel shall be authorized medical
care in emergencies to prevent loss of life, limb, or eyesight of any
personnel/employee), MWR/PX/Fitness Center, electrical power, badges,
ammunition storage, fuel (the Government will provide fuel access to
all contract vehicles/generators that are used in direct support of the
contract). [See page 41.]
General Odierno. At the direction of the Multi-National Force--Iraq
Commander and in coordination with the DOS, Task Force SAFE conducted
an on-site investigation of Camp Olympia from September 3-7, 2009. The
investigation found that improper bonding and grounding of electrical
systems in Mr. Hermanson's billet combined with a faulty water heater
element caused the metal pipes in the shower to be energized. Task
Force SAFE found many of Camp Olympia's electrical facilities to be
improperly bonded or ungrounded, and identified 1,031 immediate Life,
Health, and Safety defects which were reported to Triple Canopy, and
the Department of State Regional Security Office for immediate
correction. Triple Canopy was issued a Cure Notice on September 4,
2009, from Joint Contracting Command Iraq-Afghanistan directing them to
take actions to repair the shortcomings identified by Task Force SAFE
within 10 days. In response, Triple Canopy hired an electrical team
comprised of local national and U.S. electricians led by a U.S. Master
Electrician to make the necessary repairs. [See page 41.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 30, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. On January 10, 2007, President Bush ordered a ``surge''
of 20,000 additional soldiers, increasing the number to nearly 160,000
U.S. forces in Iraq. During this time the Democrat leadership brought
many resolutions and bills to the floor disapproving of the President's
decision to increase the number of troops and demanding an immediate
withdrawal from Iraq. On February 16, 2007, the House passed H.Con.Res.
63 opposing this mission and on March 23, 2007, the House voted on H.R.
1591 to remove all U.S. forces in Iraq by August 2008. According to the
``Security Incidents'' chart provided in your written testimony, the
number of potential and executed attacks decreased from approximately
40,000 to approximately 25,000 during the end of 2006 through the end
of 2007 coinciding with the ``surge'' of American troops. General
Odierno, was the ``surge'' successful in combating the insurgents and
decreasing the security threats in the region?
General Odierno. Yes. The ``surge'' of forces in Iraq helped us to
create the security environment that we have now, along with many other
things. The ``surge'' was more than a surge of U.S. forces; it was a
surge of ideas and represented a change in our tactics, techniques and
procedures. It also consisted of integrating support led by the State
Department which included embedded provincial reconstruction teams with
our brigades. It was about an outreach program to the Sunni insurgents
that allowed them to begin to reconcile and form the Sons of Iraq.
It was about understanding what was causing the underlying impacts
and using a combination of increase in troops, partnership with the
State Department and engagement with former insurgents to enable
security so the people and government of Iraq could build their
capacities and develop a stable, democratic government.
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