[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-78]
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PARTS I AND II)
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
AND
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARINGS HELD
JULY 9, AND DECEMBER 10, 2009
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READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROB BISHOP, Utah
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GLENN NYE, Virginia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Megan Putnam, Staff Assistant
------
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
ADAM SMITH, Washington MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JEFF MILLER, Florida
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOE WILSON, South Carolina
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina ROB BISHOP, Utah
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York \1\
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Doug Roach, Professional Staff Member
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
------
----------
\1\ Mr. Owens joined the subcommittee on November 20, 2009.
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearings:
Thursday, July 9, 2009, Army and Marine Corps Reset Requirements
(Part I)....................................................... 1
Thursday, December 10, 2009, Army and Marine Corps Reset
Requirements (Part II)......................................... 55
Appendixes:
Thursday, July 9, 2009........................................... 23
Thursday, December 10, 2009...................................... 83
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2009
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PART I)
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee............................... 3
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Readiness Subcommittee................................. 2
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 1
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 3
WITNESSES
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 5
Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Abercrombie, Hon. Neil....................................... 29
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee..... 35
Amos, Gen. James F........................................... 43
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Ranking Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee........... 34
Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W...................................... 36
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 33
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P........................................ 27
Taylor, Hon. Gene............................................ 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was classified or not available at the time
of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[See Appendix, Part II, December 10, 2009.]
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2009
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PART II)
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 55
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 55
WITNESSES
Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 57
Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.... 56
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
[See Appendix, Part I, July 9, 2009.]
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Taylor................................................... 87
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 91
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PART I)
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Readiness Subcommittee, meeting
jointly with Air and Land Forces Subcommittee
and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 9,
2009.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz
(chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today, the Readiness, Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee meet to receive testimony on
the status of the Army and Marine Corps equipment reset
requirements.
I thank our distinguished witnesses, the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps, for appearing before these subcommittees today to
discuss reset.
Since 2006, the Congress has authorized more than $55
billion for the reset of Army equipment and more than $14
billion for Marine Corps equipment reset. For fiscal year (FY)
2010, the Army has requested another $11 billion, and the
Marine Corps is seeking $2 billion.
What we would like to hear from our witnesses today is,
what has almost $70 billion bought and what differences has it
made to Army and Marine Corps warfighting capability and
overall readiness?
We also need to understand how long the Army and the Marine
Corps estimate that they will need to continue to request reset
funding and at what level. What is the future of reset?
In support of reset, Army and Marine Corps depots are
operating at historically high levels. Since the start of
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has reset
more than 480,000 pieces of equipment. And over the past 3
fiscal years, the Marine Corps has reset more than 60,000
pieces of equipment and plans to reset almost 41,000 pieces in
fiscal year 2010.
As we prepare for Army forces to leave Iraq and as Marine
forces are increasing in Afghanistan, we need to know how the
depots are preparing to handle anticipated changes in reset
workloads.
The redeployment of U.S. forces and the associated
equipment from Iraq will be a monumental undertaking. The Army
alone has more than 31 million items, 100,000 vehicles, 120,000
containers, and tens of thousands of tons of ammunition in
Iraq, and must be moved or otherwise disposed.
The subcommittee needs to understand the role reset will
play in this retrograde of equipment, and how much it is
expected to cost, and what planning is being done to ensure
parts, people and equipment are in place. We need to understand
all these things so that the Congress can ensure a reset
continues in a way that best supports our warfighters.
Drawing down in Iraq at the same time we are building up
forces in Afghanistan presents daunting logistical challenges.
Congress cannot ensure the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
military services have the resources they need to meet those
challenges unless we have a full understanding of the reset
requirements.
Our witnesses today are two distinguished military leaders:
General Peter W. Chiarelli--he is Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army--and General James F. Amos, Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman and my
friend from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks that he would
like to make.
Mr. Forbes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As always, we
appreciate your leadership in holding this hearing. And I will
keep my remarks brief.
I would like to welcome General Chiarelli and General Amos
back to the committee. Gentlemen, we thank you for being here
today. And thank you for all that you have done and continue to
do for our Nation.
This committee has been actively engaged in the issue that
impacts the readiness of our forces in light of the ongoing
combat operations. The Army and Marine Corps reset programs are
a critical part of that.
Although the 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
budget request included $13 billion for Army and Marine Corps
reset efforts, it is very clear that the request was at best a
guess. Despite the agreed-to framework for withdrawal in Iraq,
there is much that is not known, and many critical decisions
have yet to be made.
And we must not forget that the framework for withdrawal is
contingent on conditions on the ground and the capability and
capacity of the Iraqi security forces.
This is an important hearing, and I really appreciate the
chairman asking General Chiarelli and General Amos to join us
today, because I think they can help us better understand the
dynamics of the situation we face.
As General Chiarelli notes in his written testimony, reset
costs for future years will depend on several factors, such as
responsible drawdown requirements, the level of force
commitment, the activity level of those forces, and the amount
of destroyed, damaged or worn equipment.
We face an enormous challenge as we work to rebuild, reset,
modernize, transform, and grow our armed forces while actively
engaged in combat. The redeployment of forces from Iraq and the
increase in forces in Afghanistan greatly increased the
complexity and the resourcing requirements for reset.
I look forward to the discussion today, and I hope it will
provide us with a better understanding of the Army and Marine
Corps efforts to reset the force in light of these challenges.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Ortiz. I will yield to Mr. Taylor for a short
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
very distinguished witnesses. In particular, General Chiarelli,
I want to make note of your efforts to stay in touch with the
Seapower Committee, letting us know the progress with the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP) program. I think you
have gone out of your way to do that. I am very, very grateful
for that.
I have a statement for the record. In the interest of time,
I will submit it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Abercrombie.
STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes, thank you for your observations. I would like
to submit my statement for the record and move to the main
business at hand, Mr. Chairman, with your permission.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abercrombie can be found in
the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Bartlett.
All the statements will be submitted for the record,
hearing no objections.
General Chiarelli, you can proceed with your testimony, and
then you will be followed by General Amos. So proceed whenever
you are ready, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Chiarelli. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Forbes.
Distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today to discuss Army reset in view
of the fiscal year 2010 annual budget and Overseas Contingency
Operations supplemental request. I have submitted a statement
for the record, and I look forward to answering your questions
at the conclusion of my opening remarks.
As you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation's
military. We are at war. We have been at war for the past
seven-plus years, and that has undeniably put a strain on our
people and our equipment. In particular, the increased wear and
tear caused by high usage rates and harsh environments on items
ranging from individual weapons to helicopters to combat and
tactical vehicles has taken a significant toll.
As such, the Army's capability and capacity for reset have
been critically important. Since the beginning of combat
operations, the Army has reset over 470,000 items, including
aircraft, track vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (Humvees or HMMWVs), trucks, trailers, small arms, and
generators.
As you would expect, over the past several years, we have
become increasingly proficient at resetting our equipment. In
particular, we have steadily improved the productivity and
capacity of Army Materiel Command depots to meet our increased
maintenance needs.
Red River Army Depot in Texas, for example, has streamlined
its Humvee process. Now the depot is turning out 32 mission-
ready Humvees per day, compared to the previous rate of 3 per
week.
The commercial pace has also surged to meet the
requirements we have placed on our partners in industry. I am
proud of all that has been accomplished.
However, a tremendous amount of work still remains to be
done. While we are preparing to draw down operations in Iraq,
we are continuing to expand our efforts in Afghanistan. This
will require that at a minimum we maintain the same capability
and capacity for reset.
As the Army has consistently pointed out, due to the
unprecedented stress placed on our equipment as a result of
this war, reset funding will also be required for a period of
two to three years beyond the cessation of operations in
theater.
Our military must always be prepared to respond to
contingency operations around the world, and a critical part of
our reset program will be to rapidly and successfully
reconfigure the Army's prepositioned stocks and to fill unit
shortages, including homeland defense and homeland security
requirements.
Over the past 7-plus years, with the support of Congress,
the United States Army has deployed the best manned, equipped,
trained, and led forces in our 234-year history, and I assure
the members of this committee that we will continue to
coordinate with you and your esteemed colleagues on ways we
might further improve our reset process in the future.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again
for your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment
to the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and
their families. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found
in the Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Thank you, Chairmen and Ranking Members and
distinguished members of this committee, for the opportunity to
report to you today about resetting your Marine Corps.
On behalf of the more than 241,000 active and reserve
Marines and their families, I would like to extend my
appreciation for the sustained support Congress has faithfully
provided its Corps.
As we begin this hearing, I would like to highlight a few
points from my written statement.
As we sit in this hearing room today, there are more than
32,000 Marines deployed across the globe supporting exercises,
security cooperation activities, and overseas contingency
operations. For the first time in over 5 years, we have less
than 15,000 Marines in Iraq, while an additional 10,600 Marines
are establishing a presence in the Helmand province of southern
Afghanistan.
Combined with our forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary
Units, your Corps is fulfilling its role as the Nation's
premier force in readiness. Despite high operational tempo,
your Marines are resilient, motivated, and performing superbly
in missions around the globe.
For the past seven years, they have been fully engaged and
winning in combat operations as part of a generational struggle
against global extremism. This sustained effort and performance
has not come without costs, costs to the institution, to our
equipment, to our strategic programs, and most importantly to
our Marines and their families.
Our forward-deployed units are manned, trained and equipped
to accomplish their assigned missions, and these units are
reporting the very highest levels of readiness for those
missions.
To ensure our deployed and next-to-deploy units have
sufficient personnel, equipment and training, we have taxed our
non-deploying forces and strategic programs as the bill payers.
Although the current security environment has justified the
trade-offs we have made to support the long war, we must
maintain a balanced force capable of responding to crises
across the full range of military operations.
The goals of our reset and modernization programs are to
sustain the current fight by repairing or replacing worn-out
equipment while enhancing our support to the warfighter by
reconstituting our force with new or more capable gear. We
expect to see reset requirements increase as a result of force
reductions in Iraq and a growing presence in Afghanistan.
To prepare for the reset of equipment redeploying from
Iraq, we have created an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) reset
plan. We have completed the first wave or phase of our
retrograde from Iraq with over 36,000 principal end items
having been processed.
Our second wave is underway right now, with equipment
flowing from Iraq to Kuwait and back to the United States for
disposition. We expect a final phase of our retrograde from
Iraq to be complete by about this time next year. Our reset
actions will continue beyond next summer, as they include not
only the retrograde, but also depot and field-level maintenance
of our retrograded equipment, and procurement of replacement
equipment as needed.
The velocity with which we can process and repair our
returning equipment is directly related to the handling
capacity at our main port of entry into the United States,
Blount Island, Florida. This year's unfunded priority list,
totaling $188 million, includes modest requirements at both
Blount Island and our depot in Barstow, California, that will,
if funded, markedly accelerate our equipment processing
abilities.
I have appeared before you several times discussing reset
costs. Thus far, Congress has generously supported our reset
efforts by appropriating over $14 billion to ensure that
Marines have the equipment and maintenance resources that they
need. Continued congressional support of future funding
requests will be necessary to improve equipment readiness
levels across the Corps.
It is hard to predict what the Marine Corps' reset costs
are going to finally be, because it is difficult to estimate
the total cost of reconstitution of our gear returning from
Iraq until that evolution is complete. Complicating reset
estimates is the recent sizable deployment of Marine forces
into Afghanistan.
All of that said, we estimate in the near term that we need
an additional $6 billion in reset funding.
As your Marines continue to serve in combat, they need the
sustained support of the American people and Congress to
maintain their readiness, to reset the force during an extended
war, and to modernize such that we can face the challenges of
the future.
On behalf of your Marines, I extend our appreciation for
your faithful support and thank you in advance for your ongoing
efforts. The Corps understands the value of each dollar
provided by the American taxpayer and will continue to provide
maximum return for every dollar spent.
Today, over 202,000 active and 39,000 reserve Marine forces
remain ready, relevant and capable as the Nation's force on
readiness. And with your help, we will stay that way.
[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. You know, we have to respond
to our taxpayers. And, of course, we have a great committee and
members of other subcommittees and two outstanding chairmen and
ranking members.
But some of the questions that we are asking today--and one
of them is, what has the reset funding done--and I think you
touched on it a little bit--to improve readiness rates across
the board for the Army and Marine Corps. And maybe both of you
could specify a little bit, with the money that we have given
you in the past, how has that helped readiness across the
board, Army and Marines?
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, when I look at reset, it is
sustained readiness. As you know, under the old supplemental
rules and the old OCO rules, we were not only allowed to reset,
but we could recap certain pieces of equipment, meaning that we
could--when we, in fact, brought them back for reset, if we
recapped a piece of equipment, we not only brought it up to 10/
20 standards. We went beyond that, brought it to zero miles,
zero hours, and added any additional upgrades to that piece of
equipment.
Beginning in fiscal year 2010, we will not be able to do
that. We will only reset equipment, equipment brought back from
theater, and it will be brought up to 10/20 standards; 10/20
standards does mean a piece of equipment that is fully mission
capable with maybe only minor deficiencies on that piece of
equipment.
As we get further into the drawdown, much of the theater-
provided equipment will be brought back. And as that is added
to units that are back here in the United States and other
units, that will cause readiness levels to go up.
But we are not expecting that to happen in the next year or
so, and it will be totally dependent upon requirements in
Afghanistan as we draw down in Iraq.
Mr. Ortiz. I think that we can understand your answers
better now that we have got more light.
General Chiarelli. Mr. Chairman.
General Amos. I thought I was having a vision here.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to talk about
this, this issue, because Congress has been very, very generous
thus far. When I appeared before you the last time, Congress
had given the Marine Corps $14 billion. We are now--excuse me,
$12 billion. We are now at $14 billion this year.
We have seen, as I said in my opening statement and my
written one, the levels of all the deployed forces, both the
training readiness and the equipment readiness, is very, very
high. It is exactly what you would want it to be, supporting
our efforts there.
It is the stuff that is back home; it is the equipment back
home. And I don't want to mislead the committee, because the
equipment that is back home, with the exception of that that is
actually working its way through the depots and through the
repair and reconstitution efforts, I mean, that gear is clearly
down.
But the gear that is back at our bases and stations is at a
very high state of readiness. There is just not enough of it,
because we have taken that gear that we would normally have
back in the rear, we have moved it forward to supply the forces
that have been in Iraq and now in Afghanistan.
So the gear that is forward is very healthy. The gear that
is back is healthy. There is just not enough of it.
What we have received, what you have done in helping us
with $14 billion thus far, just to give you a sample for what
we have been able to do, first of all, $1.8 billion of that has
gone to depot-level maintenance over the last 4 to 5 years. In
other words, that is all the gear that has worked its way
through Albany and Barstow, $1.8 billion.
We bought 6,400 Humvees, and now the newest version, which
is the expanded capacity vehicle--that is the up-armored Humvee
that you are seeing out that is being fielded now and in use--
400 mine rollers, 140,000 tactical radio sets. And you might
say, ``Well, why did you need that? Why didn't you have that
before the war started?'' We didn't understand we would be in
the dispersed environment that we are in right now, where we
have platoons up in the mountains of Afghanistan, 80 Marines
and 1 second lieutenant, up there and they need communications
gear, they need satellite communications, they need to be able
to pass digital information.
So over the last several years, the reset has helped us
actually be able to fight the kind of fight that we are in
right now, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. We bought 12 KC-130Js,
6 MV-22s, 4 H-1s that have been the replacement airplanes, and
the list goes on.
So, sir, it is depot-level maintenance, is a big chunk of
it, but it has been to reset airplanes that we have lost,
equipment that we have lost, Humvees that have been blown up,
seven-ton trucks that have been blown up, and that type of
thing.
So we will see our readiness levels back home. Now that we
are coming out of Iraq, you will begin to see those readiness
levels next year begin to creep up. I can't tell you how much
they are going to be, but intuitively it has to, because we
will be down, we will be out of Iraq, the Marines will be, with
the exception of just a few by this time next year. The
equipment will be out of Iraq by this time next year, being
repaired and going to the home stations. You will see the
readiness at home station begin to increase next year.
Mr. Ortiz. You know, the reset of all the equipment back
from theater, I think this is new guidance. Why the change in
fiscal year 2010? Maybe you can enlighten us a little bit on
that.
General Amos. Sir, I want to make sure I understand your
question. Why does it----
Mr. Ortiz. Yes, maybe General Chiarelli can also add to
that. This is new guidance coming out for only equipment coming
from theater, and this is new guidance for 2010. Has the new
policy changed, the new guidance? Are we getting new guidance
now? Or is it the same? Or----
General Amos. The overseas contingency operations rules
have changed. And my understanding, that in fiscal year 2010,
except for very few systems--and nothing is certain in this
business--there are different definitions--but as a general
rule, we will not be able to bring back and recap, and that
means add upgrades to equipment in 2010.
We are still doing it in 2009. And we will continue to do
it throughout this year. But when we start executing the fiscal
year 2010 program, the new OCO rules do not allow the recap of
equipment as a general rule.\1\
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\1\ The information referred to is incorrect. The statement is
renounced and corrected in part two of the hearing held on December 10,
2009.
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Mr. Ortiz. We have a good turnout of Members, and I would
like to give ample time for Members to ask questions.
Now I yield to my good friend, Mr. Forbes, for any
questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, once again, gentlemen, thank you for being here. And,
you know, one of the things we are going to see is this
drawdown of all of our equipment in Iraq. And, General Amos,
you talked about how that was going to help our readiness here.
But there is invariably going to be some disputes between
perhaps U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and some of the services
where that equipment goes, whether it is utilized continually
in theater, perhaps, with some of the Iraqis or whether it is
brought back here for the services.
If there is a dispute there, who arbitrates that, as to the
drawdown of that equipment?
General Amos. Sir, within the Marine Corps, it is done two
places. Number one, the equipment is actually reconciled by our
forward commander on the ground in Iraq right now, General
Tryon. And we have got Marine Forces Central Command, which is
three-star, has his headquarters in Bahrain, as well as his
headquarters in Tampa.
So they actually do the first reconciliation. In other
words, what is on the ground? The gear that is available to
come out, what needs to come out?
Just to give you a sense for the magnitude, we changed
Marine forces and commanders in March of this year. If you took
100 percent of what we call the equipment density list on the
ground in Iraq, we have brought out over 51 percent of that
since March of this year. Just since March, we have moved out
all 51 percent of what we have had on the ground there for the
last 5 to 6 years.
So that was a call by the local commander and by General
Helland. And then once those numbers are put into the system--
in other words, we know what is coming back--and, actually, the
decision as to where it is distributed is not at Headquarters
Marine Corps, but at what we call the Strategic Ground
Equipment Working Group, and it is all done by virtue of the
Commandant's priorities.
So that is handled internally to the Marine Corps. And just
to give you a sense for what I am talking about, we took 27
percent of the gear we had--27 percent of the 44,000 end items
that went into Afghanistan this year to support the operations
that are underway right now, 27 percent of that actually came
from Iraq, and that was gear that was new, gear that had been
refurbished, gear that was kind of sitting up what we call in
stores up against the fence, that it has been preserved. We
ship that gear into Afghanistan.
So that is all done internally to the Marine Corps. Some of
it is done forward-deployed by the commanders, as it should be.
Some of it is done back here at Headquarters Marine Corps.
General Chiarelli. Sir, we recently received a list from
theater that I have not seen, but is currently being evaluated
by the Army staff. And the kind of things we would have to
evaluate is, first, is the equipment excess to our tables of
organizational equipment?
If it is excess and not required, then the decision is much
easier. But when we get to equipment that is part of our table
of organizational equipment, required equipment, and needed to
fill units back here in the United States, it becomes a much
more difficult issue.
And should DOD be given the authorization to direct that we
leave that equipment behind, we will, of course, have to ask
that we be reimbursed for whatever equipment we are told to
leave behind that will affect a readiness level. And if we are
not, it will, by definition, show up in readiness levels. We
will not be as ready in all our units as we were before if we
can't replace that equipment, and we are required to leave it
in theater.
But we will work very, very closely with DOD to ensure that
as much as possible we can avoid those kinds of situations.
Mr. Forbes. Just one last question. It is two parts,
really. But what was the process to develop the budget reset
funding line? And have the current rules for determining the
budget request for reset adequately resourced the Army's reset
requirements?
General Chiarelli. We believe they have. Given the rules
have changed for recap, that portion of the budget that would
normally be used to do that is smaller. But we expect in fiscal
year 2010 to have to reset a total of 27 Brigade Combat Teams.
And we believe, even with the drawdown, that will occur
sometime in fiscal year 2010, we will not see the effects of
that drawdown in Iraq as quickly as the Marine Corps will see
that. We believe we have the necessary money for reset to
handle those brigades coming back in fiscal year 2010.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Chairman Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. General Chiarelli, I know that, by no choice of
the military, particularly the Marine Corps, General Brogan
that handled the program, but in order to field the MRAPs as
quickly as we could, if my memory is, we had five different
chassis, three different engines on those five different
chassis, which, considering the part of the world you are
operating in, had to be a logistical nightmare keeping up with
the parts.
I am curious on the vehicle that we are designing for
Afghanistan, are you going to be able to consolidate your
chassis more? Are you going to be able to consolidate your
engines? Or, because of the industrial base problem, are we
going to have to spread the workload and the engines and
chassis like we did before?
General Chiarelli. There is no doubt, sir, that that
created problems for us. But I have to tell you, hats off go to
the logisticians who have kept the MRAP Operational Readiness
(OR) rates, even with 5 different chassis, at over 90 percent,
both in Iraq and Afghanistan, dipping possibly below 90 percent
for very short periods of time, but they have just done an
amazing job, even with those 5 different chassis.
As you know, the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV), as I
understand it, is sole source. There will be one MRAP ATV. The
good news is, as you know, we don't have the all-terrain
capability in those five different models you talk about, but
both the Army and the Marine Corps are exploring and right now
adding an upgrade to some of those MRAPs, certain models, that
will give them all-terrain capability.
So in my opinion, the decision was the right decision. We
got five different variants down range. If we had gone to a
single variant, we would not have gotten as much protection
down range. We have saved lives, arms and legs with that
decision.
It creates logistics issues, but we are working through
them. And hats off to the logisticians for keeping the OR rates
up so high.
Mr. Taylor. My second question for both of you gentlemen
is, as you do have a monumental task to buy these things, keep
these things running, fixing things, and I realize it is
someone else's job to get them to theater and get them out of
theater, but it wasn't that long ago that the folks from Maersk
made me aware that they have lost about 130 drivers just
transiting Pakistan to get their equipment into Afghanistan.
You know, one of the other contractors I think has lost about
20 drivers.
I am curious to what extent the recent events in Pakistan,
the recent uptick in violence there, has affected your ability
to get equivalent into or out of Afghanistan. And there is a
purpose for all this--it is not to put you on the spot--is, if
we are going to face a situation at some point where we are
going to need an enormous amount of additional airlift because
of the problems on the roads, that is where this question is
leading.
Are you able to get things through Pakistan in volumes
sufficient to do your job?
General Chiarelli. I owe you a rundown of where we are
today as opposed to where we were in January. My understanding
is, things have improved significantly. And we are able to get
equipment in and out of country with far less loss than was
reported at the first of the year.
I know that Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has worked
contingency operations to ensure, should those lost become
untenable, that they can, in fact, continue to supply the force
levels and predicted force levels we are going to have in
Afghanistan. And I have all the confidence that they will be
able to do that.
As for the amount of improvement that we have had in the
last six to seven months, if I could get that to you to show
you exactly how it has improved, but I can state with some
certainty that it has improved. And I feel comfortable and
confident we will be able to supply our forces.
Mr. Taylor. General Amos.
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, it is a little bit easier for
us in the southern part of Afghanistan. The ships come in--we
get our equipment really two ways. They either fly it in, goes
into Kandahar, or now Bastion, now that the airfield at Bastion
is large enough to accommodate the Marines, or we drive it up,
it comes in by ship to Karachi and then takes what we call the
southern route into southern Afghanistan.
I don't have the numbers of interdictions. I will get that
for you. That is easy to get. It is my understanding, having
gone over there recently and talked to the J4, the head
logistics guy for International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), that the southern route is almost--very little
interdiction going on in the southern route. It is just a
cleaner, safer way to go.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
General Amos. So at our point right now, other than just
distance, time to distance and physics, it is just--which takes
time--we are actually, I don't believe, experiencing any
trouble getting the gear into theater.
Mr. Taylor. I thank both of you gentleman for what you do
for our Nation.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Before I yield to my good friend, Mr. Bartlett,
I understand that, at the G-8 summit, there was an agreement
between our President and the Russian president to allow us to
fly over Russia and help us deliver some of the equipment. It
maybe is too early. Are you up to date on that?
General Chiarelli. On my part, Mr. Chairman, only what I
have read in the press and only my understanding that any time
you get multiple ways to enter into a very difficult theater
such as Afghanistan, it cannot be anything but good news that
we have that ability to do that. But all I have read is press
reports.
Mr. Ortiz. General Amos.
General Amos. Sir, I agree. All I know about that is what I
have read in the paper. I have not seen anything specific
within the Department of Defense on it. I did read, though,
which was encouraging, that the agreement was signed to keep
Manas open, and Manas is a port of exit for a whole lot of our
young Marines.
It is interesting how many of those young kids down in the
Helmand province understood the value of Manas, and they wanted
to make sure it stayed open so that they could go home someday.
But that is very encouraging.
Mr. Ortiz. And I hope we can work on that, because it would
be a tremendous asset for us to utilize if this agreement can
be worked out further. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I want to follow up with a question asked by Mr. Forbes.
The Army's 2010 request for reset is about $11 billion, of
which nearly $8 billion, $7.9 billion, is for Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) and $3.1 billion for Procurement.
Now, from 2007 to 2010, the O&M portion has been pretty
constant at about $8 billion, but the Procurement portion has
dropped to less than 50 percent of what it was in 2007. Now, I
know 2007 was a bit higher than it might have been because we
were short in 2006, but at just the time when we need more
money because of all this reset, now we have less money.
And if we are going to justify that on the basis of this
new rule that says that you can't upgrade when you are
repairing the equipment, then I have a problem with that,
because what an opportunity we have when it is in there for
maintenance repair. Why can't we upgrade? That seems to me to
be very shortsighted, and I am wondering why the money wasn't
there.
Did the Army ask for more than $11 billion, $11 billion was
all you could get?
General Chiarelli. My understanding is, no, sir, we did
not. We understood what the new overseas contingency operation
rules were going to be. That amount, that $3 billion-plus, can
only--in Procurement--can only be used for washouts or vehicles
or aircraft that are destroyed.
And for the most part--although, like all these rules, they
change--for the most part, the recap or adding on, upgrades to
equipment is not allowed in fiscal year 2010. And that drove
down the amount of money that we needed for Procurement.
Mr. Bartlett. But, sir, why not? Isn't it our goal to have
a better and better military to support our people? Why
shouldn't we upgrade? And isn't this a very shortsighted
program?
General Chiarelli. Sir, you would have to ask the folks who
wrote the new rules. I think that it makes a lot of sense to
upgrade when we can. It is kind of like paving a road. You
know, it is better to put the sewer system in before you pave
the road. It is not a good idea to, in fact, pave the road and
then decide to dig it up to put the sewer system in.
So when we have equipment in or are able to do that, that
was a plus and allowed us to recap equipment. But the new rules
are that we cannot do that.
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I think Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution says that the Congress makes the rules.
And, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to take a look at that.
Thank you very much. And I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Chairman Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. I want to follow up, General, on what Mr.
Bartlett just was dealing with when he said that the Congress
makes the rules. I am not clear from your answer to Mr.
Bartlett what part of what the Congress wants you to do is
being thwarted by whoever making these rules. Who made this
rule?
General Chiarelli. Sir, my understanding is they come out
of Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Mr. Abercrombie. I am sorry?
General Chiarelli. Sir, my understanding is they come out
of OMB. They write----
Mr. Abercrombie. It is very important to me--you take
orders from OMB and not from the Defense bill?
General Chiarelli. I can only tell you what I know right
now, sir. The rules and--and I don't question who makes rules.
The rules that we----
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, maybe rules is the wrong way. I am
not trying to be argumentative here at all. But this is serious
business because of the questions I have, have to do with
inventory and our capacity to actually do an accurate inventory
so that I can make from--Mr. Bartlett and I, I should say,
because we do this together, make recommendations to the
committee--to our subcommittee members and the committee as a
whole, we try to do this in a way that reflects your needs.
And if you are telling me that--or telling Mr. Bartlett
that someone in the Office of Management and Budget is able to
countermand, I guess, what we are doing, how on Earth are we
supposed to make an accurate assessment, let alone
recommendation, to follow up on requests that you are making
today, let alone what has been made in the past?
I am not quite sure about your answer. Are you saying that
your present course of action, when you make decisions with
regard to the context established by Mr. Bartlett, that you are
not paying any attention to the Defense bill?
General Chiarelli. I am not saying that. I am saying----
Mr. Abercrombie. Then I really need to know what it is that
we are dealing with here.
General Chiarelli. I can only tell you what the people that
I trust to put together our request to Congress have indicated
to us. And in fiscal year 2010, as a general rule, we are not
allowed to recap equipment. And that has dropped down the
amount of money that we requested for Procurement as part of
reset.
Mr. Abercrombie. So you don't need additional funds? Is
that right?
General Chiarelli. I am telling you----
Mr. Abercrombie. Because we could reallocate funds. Believe
me, I have got requests. Mr. Bartlett has requests right now.
If your answer is, is that you don't need this money and that
which was presented to us when--whether I was in the minority
or the majority, because we have been on this subcommittee for
some period of time now--so those estimates from before were
inaccurate?
General Chiarelli. Let me be perfectly clear.
Mr. Abercrombie. I hope so, because, believe me----
General Chiarelli. This----
Mr. Abercrombie. Believe me, I will make some
recommendations for reallocation. Absolutely, I will.
General Chiarelli. We are, in fact, able, with the budget
that we have and what we have requested to you, to do what you
asked me to come here and talk about today, and that is reset
our equipment. That is, bring our equipment up to 10/20
standards, and 10/20 standards meaning that it is fully capable
to do its mission with minor deficiencies, at best.
We do not bring it to a recap situation, but we are able to
reset our equipment exactly as defined with the money that we
have been given by Congress.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. If that is the case, then, what
system is in place, then, whether it is from the OMB or
yourself to accurately assess inventory? The reason that I ask
this question, in following up on Mr. Bartlett's observations
and inquiry, is that, just on shipping containers alone, you
read the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports--on
shipping containers alone, we can't get--our subcommittee staff
is unable to get an accurate answer as to what we need even
from containers for equipment, because we can't get a handle on
your inventory.
What inventory process is in place right now? And do you
have confidence in it?
General Chiarelli. I have confidence in our inventory. And
I have confidence not only that commanders down range, like I
was twice, are maintaining inventory of both their Table of
Organization and Equipment (TO&E) equipment that they bring
over with them, plus the troop-provided equipment.
We have had many looks at our equipment down range to
ensure that accountability standards are high. And they are.
And we feel very, very good that we know what we have got down
range and what we will, in fact, be bringing back and what is
in troop-provided or theater-provided equipment that is issued
to units when they arrive in theater.
Mr. Abercrombie. So the GAO reports on the capacity for you
to accurately assess inventory is incorrect?
General Chiarelli. I believe----
Mr. Abercrombie. I will send it to you.
General Chiarelli. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. And I would appreciate your response. It
is a serious question, because, again, this involves numbers
including billions of dollars. Believe me, we are looking right
now for billions of dollars possibly for reallocation because
of other demands.
So if you don't need this money and you are satisfied that
your inventory assessment is absolutely correct, it seems to me
I am going to have a hell of a lot more flexibility than I
thought I had.
General Chiarelli. We, too, understand the tremendous
fiscal crisis that our country has gone through, the economic
situation. And one of the reasons why there is no question, as
long as we can reset our equipment, we understand that, because
of fiscal requirements, it may be in the best interest of our
country as a whole to cut back on the amount of recap we are
doing. So it did not seem odd to me----
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay, time. Excuse me. In the fiscal
interests, is that the basis--have you had conversations with
these folks at OMB?
General Chiarelli. I have not, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Who would have had these conversations?
General Chiarelli. It would have taken place at the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, OSD.
Mr. Abercrombie. So the Secretary of Defense is saying that
you need, at least from my calculations here, approximately $2
billion less than you said you needed previously with regard to
reset for equipment on the basis of--what was the phrase you
used, fiscal discipline or fiscal necessity?
General Chiarelli. Well, we understand that we all have to
be very, very careful with the dollars that we spend. And
people have made a decision that we will not recap equipment in
fiscal year 2010. And that seems to me to be understandable.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay, it is understandable, yes. Do you
think it is good policy?
General Chiarelli. If I had the ability to recap equipment,
if we had the money to recap equipment, I think it would make
sense to recap equipment.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is not the question I asked. Do you
think you need the money to recap, in your professional
judgment? That is what we are asking for today, not from a
politician appointed in the OMB. I am asking for your
professional judgment today with regard--do you need money to
recap?
General Chiarelli. If I had the ability to recap, I would
recap, for all the reasons I have stated.
Mr. Abercrombie. You think the policy, then, of not being
able to do that, which is reflected in your--in the numbers
that are given to us, is not good policy?
General Chiarelli. I can't say that, and I won't say that.
And I won't say that because I understand that people that make
those rules and make those decisions have to take many other
things into consideration. And that is why I do not----
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes, they have to take into consideration
what we say is in the Defense bill, because we are reflecting--
we are trying to reflect--I am trying to help you here,
because, believe me, if you give me this answer, I want to
know--and, right now, what you are telling me is, is that, in
your professional judgment, the rules or the policy or the
admonitions that you have been given or the direction that you
were operating under reflects your professional judgment as to
what the necessities for the Army are right now?
General Chiarelli. If I had the authority and the ability
to recap, I would. But I----
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Thank you. If this Congress gives
you the authority under the Defense bill, then that would
reflect your professional position that you could use at least
$13 billion per year, rather than $11 billion?
General Chiarelli. I can't give you those numbers. I
cannot----
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, okay. You don't have to--well, those
are the numbers we have been given previously.
General Chiarelli. In previous years.
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes.
General Chiarelli. I would have to go back and ask--we just
don't go and----
Mr. Abercrombie. I won't go further.
Mr. Chairman, this is serious business. We are under the
gun here in the Defense bill to make accurate numbers and put
them forward for everybody to consider.
Now, we have to make a decision whether OMB does this,
because we don't--what the hell, we don't need a committee here
if somebody down in OMB--it is a political appointment. It is
all political appointments. And if we are going to do it on the
basis of what somebody else decides in the Executive is a
budget number as opposed to what our obligation is, which is to
provide for you and the people who serve under you and under
your command, then we have a real dilemma here.
I have a real dilemma, because I can't accurately--or I
cannot in conscience say to Chairman Ortiz or to the other
Members that we are giving a number that adequately responds to
what you believe to be, in your professional judgment, a
necessity. Do you understand my motivation here?
General Chiarelli. I hope you understand mine. I
understand, also, that you have to take many, many things into
consideration when putting together our budget, and that is all
I am saying to you.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
General Chiarelli. We have the money we need to reset the
equipment, and that is what I am here to talk about today.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. And sometimes, you know, we have to--
we are all a team working together. And sometimes we have to
depend on other agencies to help out and to kind of a check-
and-balance system.
But Mr. Abercrombie is right. As long as we can try our
best to get the best information--because our concern, the
bottom line is that we want to be in a position to where we can
help our warriors who are out there. But I am also dependent on
other agencies to help me put this thing together, but I think
that he has a very, very valid question.
And now let me yield to my good friend, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Chiarelli, thank you for being here. I am so
grateful to represent Fort Jackson. I trained there 31 years,
and 3 of my sons have had the privilege and opportunity of
spending a lot of time at Fort Jackson in training, just a
great facility.
And, General Amos, I am so grateful. I also represent
Parris Island, Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort Naval
Hospital, and I know that you have spent significant time in
our community. Next weekend is the Beaufort Water Festival, and
that is a time to celebrate the great affection that people in
the low country have for the Marine Corps. And so, next
weekend, you are invited to come back home.
I wanted to let you know, as we talk about reset, I am
thinking of assembling equipment, retrofitting equipment. To
me, it has been an incredible success story of how the
equipment got there in the first place. And hundreds of
millions of parts and weapons, munitions, vehicles, it is just
an incredible success story to me.
And I know, as a parent who had two sons serve in Iraq, I
always felt like I knew they could get the equipment because of
what I had seen, and that is that, in visiting Kuwait, I
visited the Theater Distribution Center. And I saw firsthand--
and I wish the American people know about this--and that is
that the--down to the smallest part, using a bar code that the
parts, the different vehicles, the, again, munitions, the
weapons, that they are monitored using the United Parcel
Service (UPS)-Federal Express (FedEx) models of delivery.
They are stored in areas, square miles, with bermed spaces
so that they can be secure, but yet they can be easily
recovered and sent straight to the warfighter so that they can
be protected.
And so, as we look now at returning the equipment, I am
counting on the same level of professionalism, and the
logisticians, I just truly wish the American people knew how
extraordinary it was of what they did.
But as we look to the future, I am particularly interested
in any preference given to the National Guard, given to the
Reserves. Can the Adjutant Generals and Army and Marine Reserve
generals and the logisticians develop a list of equipment for
their missions in training? Is that being done?
General Amos. Sir, I will take the first stab at that. We
have, within the Marine Forces Reserve, we look at equipment
holistically across the Marine Corps. They have what we call a
training allowance in every Reserve unit across America, which
is a small slice of what they would need.
If they had the full thing, if you were an infantry
battalion, first of all, they are not all co-located, so they
are spread out across in some cases many, many states. So they
have a slice of equipment that they can train with and they can
adequately maintain.
But we holistically as a Marine Corps, when we start taking
a look at deploying Reserve forces, and we have got a Reserve
battalion right now that is in Iraq, and we are cranking
another one up to go to Afghanistan, they will come together at
Twentynine Palms, and they will fall in on gear that we have
there. And then we will ensure that they have the right
equipment overseas.
So we look at it holistically. It is not a ``this is
Reserve equipment and this is that.'' So I don't know whether
that answers your question, but they are part of the greater
requirement and reset and kind of rearming and refitting effort
that the Marine Corps has. I don't know whether that answered
your question.
General Chiarelli. Sir, I would add that we are all proud
of what has happened. And I just need to give this one comment.
I think it is absolutely amazing, after 7\1/2\ years of war, we
have operational readiness rates down range that in excess of
90 percent.
And it is in no small part due to what you have done for
us, in allowing us to reset that equipment throughout this 7\1/
2\ years of war. We bring that equipment back; we put it into
reset for 180 days; and we issue it out to our soldiers.
Now, when it comes to Reserve components, Reserve
components have the same priority as Active components. Whoever
has the highest priority, be it for a homeland defense mission
or for a mission overseas, regardless of whether it is an
Active component unit or a Reserve component unit, gets the
equipment.
Currently, we are at 83 percent fill for National Guard
units for critical dual-use equipment that is not only needed
here for homeland defense-type issues, but down range.
Some of that dual-use equipment is deployed with some
Reserve units, which brings down that percentage of fill when
you look across the entire force. However, most states have
compacts with other states where they can get at that
equipment, should it be needed here at home.
But we have made great progress in filling up Reserve
component equipment needs across the force, particularly in a
critical dual-use equipment category, that which is used both
down range in theater and back home for homeland defense-type
missions.
Mr. Wilson. And what you are into, to me, is a challenge
and an opportunity, particularly for the most modern equipment,
for Guard and Reserve forces to be able to train, but also, as
you indicated, dual use, as we have the hurricane season
approaching the southeastern part of the United States, and we
want the best equipment for evacuation, recovery and relief.
A final question is that, General Chiarelli, there has been
a reset pilot program that has been implemented. Have there
been any lessons learned?
General Chiarelli. We have had four different periods where
we have taken lessons learned from reset pilots to continue to
improve the system. As you know, based on the Army's Army Force
Generation Model, as we bring units back, we reset their
equipment, both their ground tactical vehicles and aviation
equipment, in that first 180 days.
The goal here was to give our soldiers and families the
predictability that, in that 180 days, we would bring all that
equipment back, reset it, and have it available for those
soldiers, as they move in, out of reset, that 180-day period
immediately after they return back home, and into their train
and ready phase, where they train up for their next deployment.
We have learned a lot from the reset pilot program and have
instituted that into the force. And, in fact, we just recently
conducted a very, very successful reset Rehearsal of Concept
(ROC) drill under the auspices of the United States Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) commander, General Campbell. Over 250 general
officers got together to look at the entire reset process and
how we could make it more efficient and provide equipment back
to the force as quickly as we possibly can.
Mr. Wilson. I want to commend and thank both of you for
your professionalism. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortiz. Before I yield to Chairman Reyes, I understand
that we are going to have around 15 votes in the next--which
means that we might be on the House floor for the next 2 hours.
And I know that both of you have very important jobs and very
important responsibilities, so we don't want to keep you here.
I would suggest to the members of these three subcommittees
that maybe we can reconvene so that we can continue with this
hearing later on, because, to keep you waiting for two or three
hours would be a long time.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief.
My question is for General Chiarelli, and it relates to the
fact that you were still in the planning stages for drawdown of
U.S. forces from Iraq when the fiscal year 2010 and OCO budget
requests were submitted.
My question is, did these requests include adequate funding
for both the withdrawal and the reset of the forces and the
equipment that goes along with that? That is number one.
And number two is, if, in fact, it wasn't, do you foresee
requesting additional funding for the drawdown in fiscal year
2010?
General Chiarelli. Sir, as you know, we will not see a
drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq as quickly as the Marines see
it. And we believe that we have enough money in the fiscal year
2010 reset request to do the necessary reset we will have to
do, with an understanding that the elections will take place
sometime in the January time period, if everything goes, that
it may be 30 to 90 days after that before we start to see a
large amount of additional units coming out of Iraq, Army units
coming out of Iraq.
And given the time it takes to get to the depots, we feel
we will be in good shape to continue the necessary reset work,
even with those forces coming back, and make the adjustments in
2011.
As you know, the key to reset is timely funding, because
timely funding gives us the capability at our depots. It takes
us about 90 days to bring on additional workers. But it can
take us as long as 12 to 14 months for some critical long lead
parts. So the key for us is the timely receipt of funding and
the availability to go ahead and forecast and look forward and
get those critical long lead parts.
We think we are going to be in good shape in 2010 with the
money that you have so generously--we hope you will so
generously give us to complete that reset work.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield
back.
Mr. Ortiz. Yes, I will yield to Mr. Akin for a motion to
submit something for the record.
Mr. Akin. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wish I could submit my opening statement for the
record, if I could.
Mr. Ortiz. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Ortiz. And we will going to continue with questions
until we have about 5 minutes, because--and what we are going
to do once we reconvene the hearing, because of the votes that
we are having--we have 10 minutes left right now, right, 10
minutes left--I would like for Members to know that, when we
close this hearing today and postpone it, we will start again
from where we left and the Members will follow on the order
that we have now.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Yes.
Mr. Abercrombie. So we will reconvene another day?
Mr. Ortiz. That is right, in another day. And you will be
notified by the staff.
Okay, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, very much. You know, there is
never a way to express to you the gratitude that all of us feel
for the lifetime commitment that you have shown for the cause
of human freedom. I don't think I can repeat that often enough.
General Chiarelli and General Amos, how many years do you
expect to have to fund reset costs as a result of the Iraq war?
And has this been discussed with the current Administration's
officials, in terms of long-term funding?
I mean, the point is, I am concerned that we may have to
continue this process for a significant length of time, and
perhaps we are not thinking far enough ahead.
I will direct it to you, General Chiarelli, first.
General Chiarelli. I will be quick. We have been consistent
in stating that reset will go on for two to three years after
the cessation of hostilities. And that has been a consistent
Army position throughout the 7\1/2\ years of this war.
General Amos. Sir, it will take between two to three years
just to--if everything came to all stop, and you brought,
started moving all the equipment to ports of debarkation, and
then got it back to America, it will take two to three years to
get the stuff through the depots.
That doesn't include procurement with replacement equipment
that may be in competition in an assembly line somewhere and
where we fall in behind somebody else's priorities. So those
things could take three or four years on a procurement
timeline, but two to three years to get the equipment fixed at
the depots, and then whatever else time piles on top of that as
a result of procurement.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, a part of the reason for
the question is just to remind the committee that, you know,
this drawdown in Iraq should not be considered a bill-payer for
everything else, because we do have some ongoing
responsibilities there, especially in terms of the reset in the
future.
Let me just quickly ask one other question, because I want
to give someone else a chance here, so I am not going to go
through the others. Both of you have discussed disposal and
replacement of equipment that is beyond repair as part of your
reset strategy, and I guess this percentage could be fairly
high.
Can you discuss for a moment how you plan to dispose of
unserviceable equipment? I mean, for example, will it be
disposed of in the area of operations, or will it be shipped
somewhere else and disposed of? Tell us what the process is
there and the policy.
General Chiarelli. I will have to get back to you. My
understanding is the majority of it would--if it is a washout,
would be brought back home. It would not be left in theater,
possibly taken to Kuwait.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Franks. Not going to fall into the bad guys' hands?
General Chiarelli. Absolutely not. Absolutely not.
General Amos. Sir, unless it is just a pile of scrap metal,
we are going to bring it home. That is the plan. It may not
have a cap on it. It may not have a motor in it. But we are
going to bring it home. And our plan is to get it to Kuwait,
get it on ships, bring it back to Blount Island, and then
process it through the depots.
We have a figure of roughly 65 percent of the value of the
vehicle. If it costs more than that, then we will discard it
back here in America. And you go to our depots and they are
taking pieces off of different vehicles that have been
discarded to build one. So they are pretty good stewards of the
money.
Mr. Franks. Well, again, gentlemen, thank you for your
gallant service.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I hope to give someone
else another shot at it here.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much, both of you, for your
testimony. And I think that we have a lot to learn and a lot to
do. And the committee staff will let you know when we are going
to reconvene this meeting with these three subcommittees.
And at this point, the subcommittees stand recessed.
[Whereupon, at 10:37 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 9, 2009
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 9, 2009
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PART II)
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Readiness Subcommittee, meeting
jointly with Air and Land Forces Subcommittee
and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Thursday,
December 10, 2009.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
(chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. The subcommittee will come to order. We are
limited as to the amount of time that we are going to have
here. It will be about less than two hours. I know, and I want
to say that we are sorry that we did not finish this hearing
when it was supposed to be finished. We were interrupted by
votes. But thank you so much for joining us today.
Today the Readiness, Air and Land Forces and Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee meet to continue our hearing
on the status of the Army and Marine Corps equipment reset
requirements. I thank our distinguished witnesses, the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps, for returning today to discuss reset.
You will recall that our July hearing was cut short by a
prolonged series of votes, so today our primary purpose is to
give those Members who did not get a chance to ask questions in
July, to give them an opportunity to do so today. But before we
move to the Members' questions, I would like to ask if any of
the other chairmen or ranking members would like to make an
opening statement.
And we have our subcommittee chairman Mr. Taylor, if you
would like to make any statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
understand the need for brevity.
Gentlemen, it has come to my attention that on some of the
items we are trying to bring home from Iraq, that the Iraqi
Government, in what appears to be--and I will use the words--
which strikes me as a scam, is demanding importation documents
on the things we brought to that country before they will issue
exportation documents. And as I have recently written their
ambassador and reminded him that there are no importation
documents in a war zone, and that this whole thing really does
strike me as a shakedown.
So I know you were not prepared for this question today,
but I would ask you at your convenience, hopefully within the
next couple of weeks, to get back to me as to whether or not
you have seen any evidence on this on those things that you are
trying to either redeploy over to Afghanistan or bring back to
the States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Before we move to Members' questions, I would like to say
that we are very fortunate to have two outstanding military men
with us today, and we are happy that you are here with us
today. As in July we did not finish our hearing, but today we
are going to hopefully finish because we should be out of here
before 12:00.
We have with us today General Peter W. Chiarelli and
General James Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
When the subcommittee met in July, the President had not yet
announced his strategy for Afghanistan, but much has changed in
the past five months. To get us started today, could each of
you please give us a brief summary of what has changed
regarding the reset requirements for the Army and Marine Corps
equipment since July when this was the last time you testified
before our committee.
Following General Chiarelli's and General Amos' statements,
we will go directly to Members' questions, and we will name
those Members who did not have a chance to ask a question last
time.
General Chiarelli, whenever you are ready to start your
testimony, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Chiarelli. Well, Mr. Chairman, in answer to your
question, I will tell you that the big thing that has changed
is 22,000 soldiers additionally being sent to Iraq--to
Afghanistan, and a requirement for quite a bit of the equipment
from Iraq coming out of Iraq and out of Army Prepositioned
Stocks (APS) to be used to support those soldiers as they
deploy to Afghanistan in the next months ahead. That will mean,
as we begin the Iraq drawdown in earnest, that there will be
less equipment coming back to the States for reset.
But one thing I want to make sure that I clear up is that
when I initially appeared before the committee, I pledged to
always provide you with an honest and forthright assessment and
my best military advice as requested. In keeping with this
promise, I would like to take this opportunity to correct some
inaccurate information I provided at the last hearing in
response to a series of questions posed by Congressman Bartlett
and Congressman Abercrombie. During my latter exchange, I
stated my belief that at the time that in fiscal year 2010 as a
general rule we would not be allowed to recap equipment with
funds requested in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
budget. It was my sincere belief that this policy represented a
change to OCO ground rules as signed out by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) in March of 2009.
Overall, the lesser requests for fiscal year 2010 as
compared to fiscal year 2009 was based primarily on the limited
amount of equipment expected to be redeployed from theater
during this period. This was due in part to the realignment of
equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan, and the retention of
equipment in Iraq until the planned drawdown of forces is
underway in that second half of fiscal year 2010 and fiscal
year 2011.
I apologize for any confusion, and I will confirm for the
record, as members of this committee have accurately stated,
that current rules do allow the Army to use OCO funding to
recap or upgrade equipment returning from theater if the
upgrades are war related and there is a production line
available.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Amos. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to come
back. I want to tell you what has changed in the landscape
since we met in the early part of July.
Before I begin, Chairman Taylor, I had not heard about the
importation guidance, so we will get back to you on that thing.
That is breaking news for us, and we will dig through that
between Pete and I and sort out what is going on on the ground.
I had not heard that.
When we spoke the last time in July, I think it was July
the 9th, the Marine Corps had 15,000 Marines on the ground in
Iraq, and we were just getting started with--just getting
started with putting some Marines on the deck in Afghanistan.
We actually had about 2,500, 2,600 Marines on the deck at that
point.
But we had 15,000 Marines on the ground in Iraq, and since
then, since July of this year, we have redeployed 10,000 of
those Marines, roughly, 10,000 back home, and we have
redeployed or taken out of Iraq 97 percent of what we call the
equipment density list, and that is--that would be a combat
table of equipment, to put it in kind of common terms. So all
that equipment that has been building up for 6 or 7 years since
we went back in February of 2005, we have redeployed 97 percent
of that equipment out of Iraq.
We are down to just about 5,000 Marines, and by the time we
hit January/February of this coming year, we will be down below
2,000 Marines. And really their job--their job in Iraq is to--
is to facilitate to get that equipment out. So the plan that we
devised about a year ago is to try to get the equipment out,
get it back down to Kuwait, get it triaged and then get it on
ships and back to our depots. And Congress has been very
generous with OCO funds to help us fund our depot.
So we had this grand plan until recently. And I want you to
know that a big chunk of that equipment now that found its way
to Kuwait and was being triaged and was waiting to go to--get
on ships when we first started hearing inklings of a plus-up of
forces in Afghanistan, we took the equipment that we knew was
serviceable and in good condition and set that off on a lot off
to the side in Kuwait in anticipation of the President's
direction. And, in fact, it has happened.
You might be interested to know that within 24 hours of the
President's speech that night, the lead elements of 1st
Battalion, 6th Marines from Camp Lejeune were airborne on
Marine C-130s, closing in on Afghanistan. That battalion, that
first surge battalion, will be closed into Afghanistan, people-
wise, by the 20th of December. We will have taken--our
contribution, our part of the plus-up of the forces in
Afghanistan is roughly 9,000 Marines and our sailors. We will
have that force commanded by a two-star general, a Marine
Expeditionary Force forward, all on the deck and ready to go by
the end of April.
So much has changed. As we take a look at our depot-level
maintenance, we have actually had to release some contractor
support. We have had to release some temporary employees, and
we have had to release some folks that were not permanent
personnel both at Barstow and at Albany simply because the work
is not going to be there. It will someday, but right now our
greatest priority is to get the equipment into Afghanistan and
get it there for the forces that are on the ground.
My final thing I would like to say is that I want this
committee to understand that the Commandant's number one
priority are those forces that are in Afghanistan. We will have
100 percent of every piece of equipment that they need and all
the capabilities. We are closing adequate now, and we are going
across the Marine Corps now to source that equipment to get it
either in Kuwait or to get it at home stations, and get that
stuff on ships, and get it up--get it in Afghanistan. But I
want everybody to know that we will--that those units that are
going in will be well trained, highly focused on Afghanistan
operations, and they will be 100 percent equipped. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
We are going to yield to those Members who were here at the
last hearing, but did not have a chance to ask questions. And I
would like now to yield to Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Generals, for being here today and for your
service.
My question is about procurement dollars and reset. And I
certainly understand and support it, but the priority is to
make sure that those troops and units that are going to
Afghanistan need to be ready to go 100 percent. My concern,
though, is on these procurement dollars, especially High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees or HMMWVs), we
are down $2 billion from last year's budget, and it has been $5
billion down over the last 3 years. And it would seem to me
that--you said, General Amos, someday the money will be there.
My concern is that someday may be sooner than we want it to be.
So my question is what part of the workload is going
unfunded? I go back to the President's budget. I don't think we
put enough money into the budget, and it is--I think it is a 1
percent or 1\1/2\ percent increase, which I think needs to be
greater because with inflation, and you are going to see a
flatline or decrease in spending. But what portion of the
workload is going unfunded as a result of these reductions; and
specifically the HMMWVs, what percentage of them are not going
to be reset or are just going to--I know the operation
maintenance accounts are flatlined. Are we just going to be
patching them up and hopefully not having to use them?
General Amos. Sir, I will take a stab at it first, and then
Pete can pile on.
As it relates to HMMWVs and basically ground tactical
mobility, the Marine Corps right now is--we have been doing
this for about two or three years--really trying to just zero
in on the bull's-eye on just what that balance of ground
mobility equipment should look like. Two years ago, when I was
the head of requirements, it was a different picture than it is
right now. There is no question that HMMWVs, what we call the
expanded capacity vehicle, the up-armored HMMWV with all of the
extra equipment on it and safety features, is going to be a
staple item for the forces. I cannot tell you how many we are
buying to replace. I don't have that information. I can get you
that.
But if I just kind of back out of that just a little bit
and tell you that within the Marine Corps--and we will take--
the guy who took my job's requirement is he is supposed to sit
down with us in the January/February time frame and try to give
us the entire landscape of what the ground tactical vehicle
strategy will look like in the Marine Corps. As you know, we
would like to get away from flat-bottom vehicles. The vision
always was to go to this Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
The Army and the Marine Corps have partnered on that effort. It
is not here yet. There are some issues with it. But with that
vehicle you get a V-shaped hull, and you get--I am going to use
this loosely--Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)-like
protection. That is, I think, where we would all like to go to
protect our Marines and soldiers and sailors and airmen. But
that is out there.
So we have a dilemma within the Marine Corps, and it is
near term, about what are we going to do. Are we just going to
continue to recapitalize and reset with more HMMWVs, or are we
going to try to find an interim vehicle that has a V-shaped
hull, that might not be a JLTV yet because it is not developed,
but we hope to get there someday? That is what we are
struggling with right now, and we are working through that.
But on a broader scale, if you take a look at reset dollars
and reset--the definition of ``reset'' and things that we can
spend supplemental money on or OCO money on, the things that
have been destroyed, worn out, have gone beyond their service
life, they have been blown up, those kinds of things, and when
I testified the last time, I said Congress had been gracious
enough to give us I think it was $14 billion at that point to
help the Marine Corps reset as a result of combat. And I said I
needed about $20 billion all total within the Marine Corps. So
I needed about another $6 billion to reset the Marine Corps.
That wasn't to modernize it or recapitalize it, that was just
to replace the stuff that is worn out and blown up.
Well, since I testified in July, that the longer we stay in
combat, and now we have redeployed to a harsher environment by
a factor of probably 3 or 4, with mountains and deserts, spread
out, that figure has jumped for the Marine Corps $10 billion
for reset and another $5 billion to buy the equipment that we
had not had to accommodate the lessons learned from this war.
So it is about a $15 billion bill, sir. And that is a long
answer, but I think I had to kind of paint the landscape.
Mr. Shuster. I appreciate that.
That goes back to one of the points I made. What you are
saying is you are confirming to me we are not investing enough
in the procurement, in the reset for the Marine Corps and our
military in general.
General Amos. I would say that the 2010 OCO has not been
approved yet, so I cannot tell you what that is going to look
like. It is up on the Hill. But prior to this, the former
supplemental, now OCO money, has for the most part helped us
recapitalize with regards to reset. That has actually worked. I
cannot tell you how this is going to work this year in the 2010
budget.
Mr. Shuster. I see my time has expired. And, again, I want
to make the point that I believe in it. Again, it sounds to me
what you have laid out is that the budget does not provide
adequately for procurement, and that is something that we in
Congress need to fight to make sure the funding is there and
fight the Administration if they are not willing to invest more
in what we need, as the last thing I want to have is the
Secretary of Defense having to say to the American people, we
fight a war with what we have. And I am concerned we are not
going to have the HMMWVs, and we are not going to have the
tactical ground forces that we need in the future, God forbid,
if something else flares up in the world. So thank you very
much for your answer.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder if both of you could answer--and thank you for
your service as well to our country. I wonder if both of you
could answer a question related to the MRAPs and the status of
depot-level facilities in the continental United States
(CONUS), and what is being done to deal with this. When do you
anticipate having a national repair capability and strategy for
MRAP sustainment?
General Chiarelli. Well, sir--Congressman Taylor, if I
could quickly answer as best I can your question. I am riding
with General Amos. Neither one of us--I have not heard of that
either. But we do do an Equipment Review Board every two weeks,
and I am really surprised it didn't come up at that Equipment
Review Board. So I will ask that question downrange the next
time we meet, which should be in about a week.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, General.
I am going to supply to Colonel Glaze a copy of the letter
we sent to the ambassador, and we will have it in his hands
today. Thank you.
General Chiarelli. Thank you, sir.
Sir, I will tell you the Army is looking at establishing
Red River Army Depot as our national facility for the rebuild
of the MRAPs. We have initiated a reset pilot program there in
fiscal year 2010. That pilot program--we have vehicles en route
to begin that pilot program for reset. They are going to get 5
MAX Pros and 31 Kamans to begin with to establish that
capability. And we look at that being full up in fiscal year
2011.
We have put money in our budget for the required Operation
and Maintenance, Army (OMA), almost $58 million for the MRAPs,
although the MRAP is not a program of record as of yet. It
meets all the requirements, and we are moving, having
integrated 3,700 of those into our formations and into our
tables of organization and equipment. And a lot of the
sustainment for the MRAP still flows out of the Joint Program
Office (JPO), which has about $1.7 billion. So I think we are
embracing the MRAP and doing everything we can to ensure that
when those vehicles start flowing back out of theater, we are
ready to accept them and reset them.
Mr. Coffman. General Amos.
General Amos. Sir, I know that when I was--the last time,
probably three months ago, when we were looking at how we were
going to bring all of this equipment back from Kuwait that I
talked to in my opening remarks, and MRAP was part of that. It
has only been within the last six to seven months that the
Marine Corps has determined that MRAP is actually going to be
part of the total ground tactical vehicle strategy that I
referred to just a second ago. There was a period of time where
we thought it was too big, it was too heavy for us, and it just
didn't fit our expeditionary kind of flavor. And we have kind
of come full circle right now. So our anticipation is we were
going to have 2,346 of these rascals that are going to become
part of our regular inventory.
It is not a program of record per se in the Marine Corps
either. We have been living graciously off contractor logistics
support that have come from, in our case, Force Protection,
Incorporated, which is the organization in Charleston that
builds most of our MRAPs. But we are at a point now where we
are going to have to get serious within the Marine Corps, and I
suspect it will find its way to Albany, but I cannot give you a
firm answer on that right now.
But we haven't sorted out yet where we are going to do
that. All of our vehicles that are back in the continental
United States, and there is a pretty good slice of them for
training, their bases and stations and training areas like
Twentynine Palms, they are a long ways away from needing depot-
level repair yet. It is just the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan
and Kuwait and Bahrain, and we have not brought any of those
back yet. When we do, we will have a plan for that. We just
don't have it yet, Congressman.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
General Amos, a couple of things that you said talking
about the lightweight vehicles, that is kind of something we
want, but just kind of keeps hangs out there, what is the
problem, and what is the delay? And if we are looking at
spending lots of money to reset, and this is what we want, and
we are having to make decisions about what we might have to
use, what is the delay?
General Amos. Sir, good question. When former Vice Chief of
the Army and former Assistant Commandant pulled industry
together about two years ago, they called this thing a
Manhattan Project, and they had really the kind of heads of
industry there, and they said, we want you to push technology.
We want this vehicle to be light enough--in our case something
around a 13,000-pound vehicle--so we can pick it up with a
heavy-lift helicopter and it is part of our expeditionary way
we employ our forces. But we wanted to have that MRAP-like
protection, and we were hoping that ceramic armor, we were
hoping that a whole host of things were going to develop and
give us this little capsule kind of vehicle that had high
mobility and high protection.
It is not there yet. We have variants of it out there.
Different companies have their version of what they hope to
become the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, but it doesn't meet
all the needs yet. It doesn't provide the explosive safety. It
doesn't necessarily provide, in our case, the weight. You are
talking vehicles that are
23-, 24,000 pounds. That is not what the Marine Corps is
interested in. We can't put that on ships. We just don't--we
can't do that. That is why we are struggling with this Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle.
There is a slug of money in the budget for this thing, and
there are folks working it pretty hard, but it has not
manifested itself yet. So we find ourselves now with this
little bit of a gap. What do we do in the meantime? Do we
continue to buy flat-bottom HMMWVs, or is there an alternative
out there that can be a gap filler? And we are looking at an
alternative right now that actually fits on top of a HMMWV
frame manufactured by an outfit down in North Carolina, and it
is a capsule, V-shaped hull kind of a thing. So that is kind of
where we are with it, sir.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, I am not sure there is any additional role
the committee could play, but it would seem like that would be,
if there is. And if we could expedite that, it would certainly
be worth our while.
General Amos, you also said something to--and I think you
said maybe $5 billion of lessons learned.
General Amos. Right.
Mr. Kissell. Can you expand upon what you meant there?
General Amos. Sure, I sure can. And let me tell you, I am
going to get you some--this is actually a good news story. When
we crossed the border in March of 2003, we were just like
Pete's soldiers; we were a major land force moving forward to
engage the enemy in standard kind of place, set kind of
tactics. As things evolved, we found ourselves settling into
Iraq and now in Afghanistan--we found ourselves in what
Secretary Gates calls this hybrid warfare. We found ourselves
dispersed. We had one infantry battalion in Afghanistan that
had over 10,000 square miles. So you had basically 1,000
Marines with 10,000 square miles.
So what we found now in the kind of environments--this
hybrid nasty kind of warfare that we think we are going to be
into for the next couple of decades, it takes a different kind
of table of equipment, and I will give you an example. We used
to have 80 of these little handheld radios, personal radios,
for a 900-Marine infantry battalion. We now have 800 of them.
We used to have satellite communication (SATCOM) that would
only go down to the regimental level and maybe down to the
battalion level. Now we have got platoons, you know, 80 Marines
up in the mountains in places like Golestan, that have to have
their SATCOM so that they can communicate, they can receive
their digital information, their maps and overlays.
We have increased the amount of crew-served weapons almost
300 percent, because we are putting--these are .50-caliber
machine guns and these kinds of things on the tops of HMMWVs.
When you see the convoys going out, every one of those vehicles
has got a young soldier or Marine with his head sticking out
the top with a .50-cal or a 240 Gulf or something like this.
So these are the lessons learned. So the old table of
equipment that we started across the border with in March of
2003 was good then, but now that table of equipment has--and we
have spent almost a year going through lessons learned, how
much of this stuff do we need, not gold-plating it. We didn't
buy enough for all 27 infantry battalions and for the entire
world, but we did say each infantry battalion is going to need
to have--instead of 56 vehicle HMMWVs, it will have to have 86
vehicles that are HMMWVs. And that is what I mean by that. And
that comes with a cost. We haven't--we haven't--I have talked
about it in my statements this year and earlier this year, but
we haven't presented that bill yet, but we have just totaled it
within the last month, and it is about $5 billion.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for your service and for appearing
before our committee today, again, on what really is a pretty
critical issue. I think everyone here on this committee knows
that since I have been in Congress, I have expressed real
concerns about the availability of equipment, especially for
our National Guard, for both training purposes and for their
State and homeland security responsibilities, and I don't mean
just in Iowa, but across America.
Just this week the Iowa National Guard responded to the
heavy snowstorms, the heavy snowstorm that hit Iowa, and, of
course, last summer we had the great flood of 2008, and they
partnered with the Iowa Department of Transportation just
recently in assisting stranded motorists. This service to our
State is particularly poignant and, I think, important, given
the recent announcement that upwards of 3,500 Iowa soldiers
will be deploying to Afghanistan by the fall of 2010. This will
mark the largest deployment of Iowa National Guard since World
War II, and I firmly believe that it is critical that they and
all members of the Reserve components--and again, not just in
Iowa, but across the country--have sufficient equipment to
train on for their overseas mission as well as to respond to
emergencies at home.
And I just visited a newly opened readiness center in Iowa
City on Saturday night, and we are going to have another one in
Cedar Rapids soon and some other places in my district. Those
buildings are wonderful, but we have to make sure we have the
equipment, obviously, and not just for their deployment when
they deploy overseas, but also for their--as I said, their
homeland security missions.
So, General Chiarelli, given the demands being placed on
Army equipment by the President's strategy in Afghanistan,
given the amount of the equipment that the National Guard and
Reserve units left in Iraq at the end of their deployments, the
question is how will you ensure that Reserve components are
sufficiently equipped both for training and for their homeland
responsibilities?
General Chiarelli. Well, Congressman, the Army has made
significant progress in equipping the Army National Guard to
enhance its role both in the homeland defense area and when
deployed.
The numbers I show is that we are anticipated to average
$3.9 billion a year from fiscal year 2002 to 2013, and that is
a 290 percent increase in equipping the Guard. As you well
know, most of our formations that are going over to Afghanistan
today are following in on theater-provided equipment. And for
the Army, the employment of the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV),
a new vehicle that currently we are buying 6,000 of them, the
Joint Program Office is, and we expect that number to go up
with the increase in Afghanistan, will allow most of the Guard
HMMWVs and some of their medium trucks to remain back when your
soldiers deploy. These forces that we have coming out of Iraq
with responsible drawdown will be able to redeploy with their
equipment and certain items of theater-provided equipment that
has been used in Iraq as long as that theater-provided
equipment is not needed in Afghanistan.
So we feel we are going to continue to be able to make
progress in equipping our National Guard formations, of course,
when they are deployed, but most importantly on that critical
dual-use equipment that they need at home to do their homeland
requirements.
Mr. Loebsack. So you are coordinating with the National
Guard Bureau on these matters as well.
Mr. Chiarelli. I just talked to Ray Carpenter yesterday
about our status moving ahead for medium trucks.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chair, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thanks for what you do. And this is kind of
a burdensome, really detail-oriented job when it comes to this.
So thank you for everything.
The question is this: When we talk about--actually let us
start with an explanation. What is cross-leveling? Could you
explain what cross-leveling is to me?
General Chiarelli. Cross-leveling is a requirement that we
do either in equipment or personnel to fill out formations that
are not fully filled out with Military Occupational
Specialities (MOS) or numbers when it comes to personnel or
with equipment for units that may, in fact, be short equipment.
Mr. Hunter. So you cross-level units that are going to
deploy in the near future, and you start doing that at what
point prior to their deployments?
General Chiarelli. For National Guard units----
Mr. Hunter. For Active units.
General Chiarelli. We are not in a position where we are
having to cross-level for Active units. We are, in fact--as you
well know, the Army has adopted a fourth-generation model which
has us going from reset to train-ready to deploy.
Mr. Hunter. I actually don't. Could you explain that one?
General Chiarelli. Yes, I can, sir.
The Army's Force Generation Model provides for a unit
returning from deployment to have six months in what we call a
reset phase. During that time equipment and personnel are, in
fact, reset. They enter out of that six-month period with
certain goals for personnel fill and equipment fill to begin
their train-ready phase that goes on for a minimum of the next
six months, possibly longer. If they are going to get more than
12 months ``boots on the ground'' (BOG), it can go 7, 8, 9, 10
months before they deploy again. Over that time we have minimum
equipment goals. We attempt to get units to coming out of reset
for train-ready phase. But I will tell you, given the tempo we
are on, we continue to fill units as they move toward their
latest arrival date.
Mr. Hunter. So can you stick with that plan with this
surge? I mean, how is the surge affecting that when you have
units that are not going to have as much dwell time, and you
are having to reset them sooner; you might not have that 12
months of dwell time back at home or 18 months? The question is
basically how does that affect it, and are you going to have to
cross-level Active units with this surge?
General Chiarelli. We are not. We are not. Quite frankly,
with the drawdown in Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan, we
see about a month, a month and a half where we will have about
2,000 more soldiers deployed than we have right now. Now, some
of that is just dependent on the election and when General
Odierno begins major troop movements out of Iraq. And we expect
that to occur sometime after the elections in order to meet the
President's goal of having us down to 50,000 soldiers by
September of 2010. But because of that drawdown, we only see
about a month to two month period where we will have more
soldiers deployed than we have deployed today.
Mr. Hunter. So it almost evens out?
General Chiarelli. It almost evens out. And it will go down
the more soldiers we get out of Iraq.
Mr. Hunter. So you are fine with the surge when it comes to
reset--well, you have already said that what you needed has not
changed much.
General Chiarelli. Right. And we feel that we have got the
right amount of money in our reset OCO. We feel we are in
pretty good shape. We will, in fact, coordinate with Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) if we see additional
requirements. But we feel that we are in pretty good shape when
it comes to reset and the movement of equipment into
Afghanistan. But the big issue----
Mr. Hunter. But folks here training, they are going to be
fine, too, just like normal?
General Chiarelli. They will be.
Now, at the same time, the Army is coming off a stop-loss,
And there are some requirements of coming off a stop-loss that
are unpredictable. But our very first unit off of stop-loss,
the 110th Infantry, is looking at about 48 percent of the
soldiers who would be on stop-loss who have signed up for the
additional bonus and to complete the rotation for their unit.
That will add about 200 folks to the rear detachment. But we
believe with the 21,000 temporary end strength increase that we
received, that we will be able to fill our formations to 90 to
95 percent before deployment.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, General.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chiarelli, I am curious to know what sort of legs
the work being done by Rhonda Cornum, General Cornum, on post-
traumatic growth as opposed to post-traumatic stress and
thoughts concerning how we reset personnel-wise, how we train,
how we deal with our soldiers, and the sort of studies that she
and others are engaged in to try to address the problem of
mental strain and breakdown--what kind of legs is all that
getting in the Army?
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, the program you speak of is
Comprehensive Soldiers Fitness, and it is a relatively new
program to increase the resiliency of soldiers from the day
they enter the Army until the day they leave the Army. We are
currently in a training phase where we are sending what we call
master resiliency trainers to the University of Pennsylvania
where they attend a course and go back to their units.
There is no doubt in my mind--and I had my first outbrief
from the National Institute of Mental Health yesterday on the
$50 million study that they have begun to look at behavioral
health and suicide in the United States Army. There is no doubt
in my mind that over time, as comprehensive soldier fitness
gets set into the force, it will have a huge impact on the
behavior health, the mental health, and will assist us in
lowering our suicide rate. There is no doubt in my mind.
Some of the interesting things--but that is going to take
time. It is going to take time, given a program that we are
going to implement for 1.1 million soldiers and their families.
We will have a module available on line for families after the
first of the year. It is going to take time for that to get
totally in place and for us to see resiliency continue to grow
or start to grow at appreciable rates in our service. I believe
that----
Mr. Marshall. Is your view--it sounds like you are pretty
enthusiastic about the possibility here. Is that widely shared
at senior levels?
General Chiarelli. I just left our four-star conference
this morning. It was one of the chief very first comments to
the four-stars, and there is great anticipation and support for
the program because we all realize it is going to have a huge
impact.
Mr. Marshall. Why weren't we doing something like this
previously?
General Chiarelli. I don't think we had looked at it hard
enough. I see other areas that we have got to look at harder.
In the briefing I received yesterday, I found out that soldiers
who are suffering from post-traumatic stress are six times more
likely--and that is the general population--to commit suicide
than those that are not. I know for a fact that the greatest
single debilitating injury of soldiers returning from Iraq and
Afghanistan that have in one injury, disqualifying injury, 30
percent or greater, is post-traumatic stress. And both General
Amos and I have been working very, very hard to get at both
post-traumatic stress (PTS) problems within our services and
traumatic brain injury, which is also--that is my second
leading problem I have got.
Mr. Marshall. I guess that is a good segue to General Amos.
I don't know whether you are familiar with the work that is
being done by General Cornum, but I have spent a little bit of
time with her, and I am pretty impressed by what she has to say
about possibilities here. I am just curious to know whether or
not the Marine Corps is a tag-along or could be a tag-along or
is independently pursuing something similar.
I am very attracted to the idea that in some instances,
what could turn into post-traumatic stress could, in fact, be
post-traumatic growth; a person becomes stronger as a result of
the experiences, the bad experiences, that they have had in
combat rather than weaker mentally. Any comment from the Marine
Corps' perspective?
General Amos. Sir, first of all, I want to assure you that
unlike probably five years ago, the whole post-traumatic stress
disorder is taken very, very seriously within the Marine Corps,
as it is in the Army. We are past the point of manhood on that,
and I will tell you that at one point I think it was--it was a
manhood issue. We are long past that because this is a serious,
serious issue.
We are not joined with the Army on this effort. I have
heard pieces of it over the last three or four months, and it
is something that Pete and I are very close on a whole host of
other things that we are doing on Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) protocols and
the Defense Centers of Excellence (DCOE) effort trying to
sort--you know, trying to actually get some capability out
there to heal these kids that have got it. But what we are
trying to do, I think what Pete is trying to do, is get out
ahead of it.
So we are not doing what they are doing, and I will--I will
tell you what, just sitting there listening to it, it is
interesting, and I will stick my nose into it.
Mr. Marshall. I would encourage you, General, just to get
General Cornum to come in and give you a brief. I was pretty
impressed the two sessions I had with her at the possibilities
here. I don't know whether it will work out.
To the extent that we--it is interesting. You know, it is
not manly to acknowledge these kinds of problems. To the extent
that we invite folks to talk about these things, you worry
there may be some who will be encouraged to talk about them and
sort of head in that direction. Well, none of us have the kind
of expertise we need to have to really make that kind of
judgment, so the kind of studies that the Army is going through
and with General Cornum's leadership, I think you all should be
interested in it.
General Amos. We will do that. And I tell you, there is no
corner on the market on this PTSD psychological health thing.
There is no panacea on this thing. We have been looking for
one. So I take your advice on it, sir, and I will do that.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the indulgence.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to get parochial and talk about the Anniston Depot,
which is in my district. I would like to know if you could tell
me a little bit about when, how and what maintenance standards
you plan to reset the combat vehicles coming back from Iraq?
General Chiarelli. Sir, we plan on resetting every single
combat vehicle that comes back to Iraq. Much equipment will be
reset, and some will be recapped depending on the model. This
year or next year a majority of our HMMWVs coming back will, in
fact, be recapped. We have very few other lines that will
require a recap, but they will receive a full reset, and we
believe that we have what we need to do that.
Mr. Rogers. Over what timeline do you see most of those
combat vehicles coming back.
General Chiarelli. That is difficult for me to tell you.
Given the requirement, the additional requirement, in
Afghanistan, the flow will, in fact, come out of Iran as
planned. I honestly believe that. But some of the equipment
that we expected to come back into the United States for full
reset will be refurbished and redirected to Afghanistan to meet
the requirements in Afghanistan.
Mr. Rogers. But all of the combat vehicles eventually you
plan to bring back either--take out of Iraq and either take
them to Afghanistan or bring them back for reset or recap?
General Chiarelli. We plan to reset every vehicle that
comes out of Iraq or Afghanistan and comes back to the United
States. And as we have stated, and I think it has been true,
everyone who has sat in front of this committee and every other
committee, the Army believes that will be at a minimum a two-
year period after hostilities end before we get complete with
that reset.
Mr. Rogers. One of the reasons I asked that last question
is that, as you know, earlier this week there was an article in
the Washington Post about leaving a lot of equipment in Iraq,
and was curious if you could talk a little bit about the
thought process as to what you do leave and don't leave. I
understand that the commander is allowed to leave up to $30
million worth of equipment from each facility, and that is up
from what had been a $2 million threshold. What kind of
equipment are you going to leave over there and why?
General Chiarelli. Most of the equipment you speak of, sir,
is, in fact, not standard equipment. And all of the equipment
you speak of, unless it is, in fact, excess to the United
States Army, is equipment that is non-economically viable to
bring back.
I noticed in that same article a comment about temporary
buildings. We just can't get temporary buildings out of Iraq,
down to Kuwait and into Afghanistan in any shape where they
would serve any interest for anyone in Afghanistan.
But I can tell you even with the limited drawdown that has
come out of Iraq, the last number that I saw is that 27,000
pieces of equipment have moved from Iraq to Afghanistan to meet
requirements in Afghanistan. And I chair, along with the Army
Materiel Command (AMC) Commander, who has sent her three-star
downrange to work with General Webster, our 3rd Army Commander,
to work through these issues--we chair every two weeks, General
Dunwoody and myself, a video teleconference with all of the
players. It talks about every single Foreign Military Sale
(FMS) case; where equipment is going that is coming out of
Iraq, and we are ahead of schedule right now with the drawdown
of that equipment; and what pieces need to go to Afghanistan;
and what are the requirements of the Iraqis in order to get
their military to a minimal, acceptable level so we can turn
everything over to them.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your great service to our
country.
General Amos, I wanted to ask on your comments about
aircraft in page six of your testimony, you say that we are
nearly tripling the utilization rates of our workhorses, and
then you go through the FA-18C and D, the KC-130 aerial refuel
platform, the EA-6B electronic warfare craft, and then you say
even the new MV-22 Osprey. I know the Osprey now has been put
into active service and utilized more widely.
Can you update us on exactly how the Osprey is performing,
given the concerns historically with the performance of that
aircraft, now that is being more fully deployed? Can you tell
us how that is helping you? Because later in that same
paragraph you mentioned that you are short 248 aircraft across
all type model series. Is the Osprey helping bolster that, or
are you still short of the Osprey you need?
General Amos. Sir, we have about half the Ospreys we need.
We have just finished fleshing out the squadrons on the East
Coast down at the Marine Corps Station New River in just this
past year, and we are just now in the process of transitioning
out to the West Coast a Marine Air Corps Station Miramar with
the stand-up of the 1st Osprey Squadron. The airplanes are not
out there yet, but the squadron has--this transition between
the old CH-46 helicopter, which has been our workhorse and we
have had in service for well over 40 years, we stand those
squadrons down, roll the flag up, take 60 percent of the people
in that squadron, add another 40 percent of new guys and gals,
and we send them through 6 months of Osprey training, and then
one day we unfurl that flag, and we have a stand-up ceremony,
and that is kind of where we are out on the West Coast right
now.
So we are about--we are actually not even halfway through
the transition of the CH-46s to the Ospreys. The Osprey has
made three combat deployments now. It has had three deployments
to Iraq. It just came off the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU). Just within the last--in fact, that Marine Expeditionary
Unit just pulled into the East Coast this past week. We took
those 10 airplanes off of that--off of that Marine
Expeditionary, the MEU. We took those 10 Ospreys off and flew
them into Camp Leatherneck there in Afghanistan. We took the
whole--we took a squadron that had already been to combat in
Iraq, took that squadron and flew them into Afghanistan, and
they fell in on top of those 10 airplanes.
So today we have an Osprey squadron, 10 airplanes. We are
about to put two more in there once we figure out how we are
going to get them over there. But we have got an Osprey
squadron that has been flying in Afghanistan now for just a
little over a month. By all accounts--and I watch this very
closely, having been at the birth of this program--it is
performing all of its missions really, really well.
We are struggling right now with availability of the
airplane. For instance, in Iraq, those 18 months of deployment,
those 3 combat deployments, 62.8 percent mission capable was
the percentage for those airplanes. On the Marine Expeditionary
Unit, the one that just gave up those 10 airplanes and they
flew into Afghanistan, they were 65.9 percent for the mission
capable for their deployment. And that sounds--I mean, that is
certainly unacceptable to us, but I think it is important to
know, because the program had been drug out for so long. We
really have--just in the last 2 years, we have got over 50
percent of the total Osprey flight time that has ever been
logged on that airplane from the time it was conceived and came
off many years ago off the assembly line, just in the last 2
years. The bulk of that has been forward deployed in combat.
So we are learning, we are basically learning the lessons
of maintenance, we are learning there are suppliers, we are
learning the lessons on equipment reliability and
maintainability that probably should have been learned 5 or 6
or 10 years ago. They weren't. So we are working very closely
right now with industry. We have got a plan. We know where we
are right now. We have got a plan to rectify this to get our
availability back up in the 70s and 80 percent.
But the airplane itself hasn't failed to make a single
mission either in the 18 months in Iraq or on the Marine
Expeditionary Unit, and I anticipate it is going to be the same
thing in Afghanistan. It is really performing well. And it does
the kind of things, when you have a casualty evacuation out of
on the Iranian border with a Special Operations Unit or
whatever, you can now get that soldiers or Marines or SEALs--
you can get them to a hospital pretty quickly in that airplane.
So it is going to be a game changer in Afghanistan. It just got
there.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. That was very good to hear.
I went to the Osprey simulator training when that was put
in at New River Air Station. My district goes up to the edge of
Camp Lejeune, and, of course, Congressman Jones and I share a
lot of common issues and concerns in that area. And that is a
great report to hear. Thank you for your commitment and work on
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the
two of you for being here, for your service, and for being
willing to come and testify before us today. I think you have
sort of addressed this, and I just want to make sure I
understand what you were saying a little bit ago, and sort of
set to rest some of the issues that we have seen in the media
regarding equipment in theater. So the intent, as I understand
it, is when we are talking about things like wheeled vehicles
that are in Iraq today, that those will be moved out of
theater. And can you address sort of the path process there?
They get refurbished and then those that are needed in
Afghanistan will be transferred there. Is that an accurate
articulation of what you have represented here today?
General Amos. Sir, it is close. There is a significant
amount of equipment that is finding its way from, in our case
down from Iraq into Kuwait, staged, ready to go, as I talked
about earlier. A significant amount of that equipment is
finding its way into Afghanistan to sustain the fight and to
augment the new 9,000 plus-up of Marines. Just to give you a
sense for what I am talking about, just a level of effort, when
we put the Marines on the ground, the 10,600 Marines there,
about 8 months ago, we put in 44,174 what we call principal end
items. That can be vehicles. It can be a seven-ton truck. It
can be an operations tent module. It can be a generator. It can
be a water purification unit. But we put about 44,000 of those
major end items in; 22 percent of that number came from stuff
that was already in Iraq, and we sent that right over there.
As we transition to this latest plus-up of the 9,000
Marines, that is about 27,362 principal end items more. Even
though the force is about the same size that is going in, part
of what was there before provided the basic structure and some
of the sustainment kind of things that you need to build a camp
and that kind of thing. So a little over 27,000 new pieces of
equipment are going in. Almost 30 percent of that is coming
from within theater, coming from Kuwait, or it is coming from
Bahrain, or it is coming from Qatar.
So all the rest of this stuff will find its way back on
ships, and just like the Army is going to do, we will refurbish
every single vehicle that is worthwhile. If it has got a 50
percent of its life left, then we are going to refurbish that
thing. But we are sending a big chunk of that into theater. I
don't know whether that answers--
Mr. Heinrich. It does. And I just wanted to make sure I
understood that correctly. And most of the things that are
being left behind, then, are things that are specific to, and
would not be, as you mentioned, you know, temporary buildings
and other things that just don't make sense to move out of
theater.
But to shift gears a little bit, General Amos, you spoke
quite a bit about what you have learned in Iraq over the years
and how that has changed, the utilization of equipment and how
things are organized. I have heard a little bit about how the
physical environment in Afghanistan is even more challenging on
equipment. But how much of that is analogous in terms of what
we have learned about making some of those changes as we
transition to Afghanistan? Is it a very analogous situation, or
are there a whole new set of things that we need to learn about
how we equip?
General Amos. I don't think it is a blank sheet. We are not
starting from scratch. If I had to give a percentage, and this
is just my personal opinion with no analysis behind it, I would
say probably 80, 80 to 85 percent of what we learned in Iraq
over the last 5 years--not to begin with, but this distributed,
kind of irregular, nasty warfare we have been in, in a
counterinsurgency environment, can be applied into Afghanistan.
The other 20 percent or so is different. It is a different
government. It is a different language. It is a different
culture. The tribes don't have the same amount of clout. You
know, you remember, it was the tribal sheiks that started the
Awakening and began to make the difference in Iraq. That is
hard to do in this country. This country is about another 40
percent bigger; population is bigger. So you are spread out in
this thing. But the climates are harsher. What we would call a
road in Iraq truly is almost a little bit bigger than a goat
trail in Afghanistan. So that is why these MRAP all-terrain
vehicles, why the Marine Corps has put a new independent
suspension upon the old MRAPs and stuff, trying to make use of
them to get them off road.
But there is a piece of this that doesn't apply. And it is
the lessons learned: We know how to operate in a
counterinsurgency environment. We know how to live among the
people, we know how to protect them. We know how to try to
segregate the enemy. And that is exactly what we are all trying
to do.
But as it relates to equipment and the harshness on the
equipment, that piece of it is a different animal.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you both.
And I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Chairman Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much for your testimony. I find
it a little difficult to understand all the components here
because I think there is some clarification of nomenclature
that might help. As I understand it, reset means the
overarching rubric; that is it comprehends a number of
different things. First of all, it comprehends repair and
maintenance. That would include routine repair and maintenance
that is scheduled and expected. It would also include ad hoc
maintenance for equipment that was not performing. Then we have
replacement, and then refurbishment, and then routine field
maintenance, as opposed to depot maintenance. Pretty soon, all
of these items begin to wash into each other.
And my interest in it from a budgetary standpoint is how do
we get our hands around it so we can expect what the
requirement is going to be here? For the last several years,
reset has been pretty much of a wild card that shows up in the
supplemental appropriations. To what extent are you now trying
to define a number for the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)
that will be the operative number for three to four years to
come, as opposed to leaving it determined year by year based
upon the supplemental for that year.
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, we are very specific in what
we ask for. I think you know we asked for fewer procurement
dollars in this year's OCO.
Mr. Spratt. That tends to be year by year, though. Is there
any sort of projection of what the cost is likely to be over a
five-year budgetary period of time?
General Chiarelli. I don't have that figure in front of me
right now. I can try to get you that figure.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Spratt. My main interest is, do you actually do that?
Do you develop a number that reflects the fact that you are
probably going to have more repair, more refurbishment, more
reset than previously because of the harsh environmental
conditions you encounter in both theaters?
General Chiarelli. Yes, sir. But I will tell you that on
reset, the only equipment that we are resetting is equipment
that we are bringing back into the United States. What is
difficult for us to do right now in telling you, in getting you
that number is understanding what the requirement is going to
be in the outyears. Just the addition of the 22,000 additional
soldiers to Afghanistan has changed the amount of equipment
that, as we draw down in Iraq, that we are going to be able to
bring back to the United States for full reset. And we will
reset every single piece of equipment we bring back to the
States, except for that that are washouts, that are non-
economically feasible to reset. But that is reset to us, and
that is bringing that equipment back to its original condition.
Mr. Spratt. Towards the end of your testimony, your
prepared testimony, you indicated that the request for the 2010
supplemental was about $11 billion, of which about 30 percent
is procurement and 70 percent is maintenance.
General Chiarelli. I am sorry if I misspoke, sir, it is not
that high in procurement. Yeah, I think it is a little less
than that in procurement. And that procurement will go for
vehicles that have to be replaced because of combat losses and
any kind of recap, which is reset plus bringing that vehicle up
to the higher standard. Because that vehicle was built at a
time when we had not added certain things that make it more
modern, more survivable, more able to fight in the environments
that we are in.
Mr. Spratt. If you would both present or prepare for the
record what the five-year FYDP levels are of operation and
maintenance (O&M) as well as procurement that comes under the
rubric that comes under the rubric of reset. If we could have
those numbers on a five-year basis on the current FYDP basis,
it would be useful for the record, please, sir.
General Amos. Sir, I can tell you what the Marine Corps is
right now. I stated in my statement that the total reset is
estimated to be $10 billion. That will actually extend beyond
the FYDP. But it is $8.2 billion for the Marine Corps is the
prognosis today. For what reset will cost us in the FYDP is
$8.2 billion. It will take another----
Mr. Spratt. $8.2 billion all together?
General Amos. $8.2 billion reset for the Marine Corps.
The definitions that we live by, Chairman, is reset and
reconstitution. Refurbishment is part of reset. The purchasing
new stuff, in some cases, is part of reset. Because when you
take a look at what reset is allowed, what is allowed in reset,
it is equipment replacements for items not already included in
the FYDP; combat losses; replacement of equipment that is given
to coalition partners; replacement or repair of equipment due
to original--get it to its original capability because it has
been worn out. Those are the two things we deal with.
Reset is combat losses, stuff that is worn out, and will
get you back to where you were when you started. Reconstitution
of a unit--and by the way, most of that reset is done in OCO
dollars. It is supplemental. And the longer we stay in this
fight, the more that that supplemental, that reset dollars are
going to slide to the right. So it is not something that you
can nail down today and say, that is all it is going to be, and
that is all the requirement. It will continue to change the
longer we are engaged.
Reconstitution for the most part is in our baseline
budgets. And that is procurement of some equipment. That is the
training. That is the buying of people. That is the buying of
the people's equipment and that kind--that is a reconstitution.
Those are the two terms that we deal with in Department of
Defense (DOD).
Mr. Spratt. Thank you both very much.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The world of how these numbers are put together and graphs
and all this is also a little new to me. But what I am seeing
here, for instance, in the Army reset-over-time graph that has
been provided for me, one of the things I am noticing, first of
all, is that in 2007, you had $16.4 billion; 2008, $16.1
billion; and then 2009 is $13 billion; and coming down to $11
billion in 2010. And yet I am not so sure that the rate that we
are going through equipment has changed all that much. I guess
my concern is, if this is all supplemental-type of dollars,
what happens if the supplemental bill doesn't go through this
year and we end up with another continuing resolution? And to
what degree are we just postponing this reset over time?
General Chiarelli. Well, we are in fact providing you with
the numbers that we need to reset the United States Army
equipment that comes back to the States. And that number has
gone down, as indicated. And one of the reasons is we have less
procurement money in there as we have recapped fewer and fewer
vehicles. We have not had a requirement to do that. And we have
seen that number go down. But we feel----
Mr. Akin. Excuse me, can I interrupt? Because you are using
terms that I am not sure I understand. Are you saying that what
you actually feel that you need is less than what you had
before; therefore, the numbers go down because you don't have
as much equipment as you had previously? Is that what you are
saying?
General Chiarelli. We have not brought as much equipment
back that required reset.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So, in other words, we have less equipment
in States than we had before, and therefore, the reset has gone
down.
General Chiarelli. You have an increase in Afghanistan as
well as a relatively small decrease in Iraq. And in addition to
that, there has been a requirement to replenish our Army
preposition stocks.
Mr. Akin. So, in other words, it is not that we have like
less pieces of mobile equipment in the Army. It is just that we
have less of that back in country.
General Chiarelli. Less of it has come back for reset.
Mr. Akin. For reset.
General Chiarelli. For reset. And we would expect, and even
if the Iraq drawdown goes as promised, our 2010 number is a
little bit lower, because by the time we get it back over the
ocean and to the depots, we will be into the next fiscal year.
And I would expect to see that number increase if those larger
numbers of pieces of equipment come back home.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So this number is not the overall measure
then of how we are doing in keeping up or keeping our equipment
base where it should be. This is more numbers as to how that
base is only with equipment in the United States.
General Chiarelli. And it keeps--that number is used in the
Army sense to refurbish equipment, equipment that comes out of
Iraq that has to go into Afghanistan. When we bring it down to
Kuwait, we make sure we look over that equipment so we are not
sending a whole bunch of problems to the folks in Afghanistan.
So they get a piece of equipment within the capability of our
workers in Kuwait to return that equipment as best as they can
so that Afghanistan gets a good piece of equipment that they
can use. That number is also included in there. But that is not
the same as reset. It is not the same level of a maintenance
you are going to get if you fully reset a piece of equipment,
which we do in our depots.
Mr. Akin. Right. And the depots are more in this country,
then, when you do that total rebuild kind of thing.
General Chiarelli. They are.
Mr. Akin. Now, when you do that, there are two categories
within that, I gather. One is to reset it to what the equipment
was like when it left. Another is to add, if there have been
some modifications or changes to the design, you bring it up to
the higher level. And you make a distinction between those two.
But they are still all coming out of supplemental money in the
past.
General Chiarelli. A majority of that is. A majority of
that is; that recap is coming out. We have a certain amount of
procurement money in there. Now, there are some that it may not
be in the supplemental, but we will look to our base to get to
if we feel it needs to be done.
Mr. Akin. So, just last, if we do not get the supplemental
through, we do a continuing resolution, will we then have to go
back to the drawing board as to how we are going to fund this?
General Chiarelli. We are at this time--we will continue to
do the work that we need to do, but if we were never to get
that----
Mr. Akin. It would be a problem?
General Chiarelli [continuing]. That would be a huge
problem.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, aloha to both of you. Thank you for your
attendance here today. I need to make a little bit of a
preamble, and then I have less of a question than I have a
comment. And if you can comment in turn, that would be fine.
But I leave it to your discretion on that.
General Chiarelli, on page six of your testimony, you have
referred about resetting and multiyear requirements. Due to
unprecedented stress placed on our equipment as a result of the
war, reset funding is required, underlined, in your testimony
for a period of two to three years beyond the cessation of the
current conflict, which may be quite extensive. Any reset
requirements that go unfunded in one year will roll over and
increase the following year's requirement.
And then, General Amos, in your testimony, on page eight, I
think is the one I want to refer to. As our focus shifts to
greater support for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), costs
will continue to rise over time. Continued congressional
support of future funding requests will be necessary to improve
equipment readiness levels across the Corps. Then you go on to
talk about the future of reset.
Based on what we now know, we estimate the near term we
have the $6 billion. You referred to that. And then you revised
that in your commentary to 10 plus 5, and the plus 5 really
referring to the table of equipment numbers and also in the
context of prepositioning equipment. All of this takes place in
the context, which you mention on page one, of Secretary Gates
in a commentary in Foreign Affairs, whether it was a speech or
an article I don't remember, but it was, I believe the subtitle
of it was ``Balanced Strategy for a New Age.''
So I bring all of that up in saying with all of this
forward looking, and then your final statement from you,
General Amos; we are mindful the Corps cannot rely on
supplemental appropriations for baseline operations. Now, we
have talked on the committee, and the Secretary has talked, and
you folks have talked now about not wanting to rely on
supplemental budgets. On the other hand, supplemental budgets
are not going to disappear because we have contingencies that
we can't anticipate, and that is what a supplemental is all
about.
But given the fact that both of you stated you know pretty
clearly what your requirements are going to be in terms of
resetting with all of the definitions that you just outlined
with Mr. Spratt, what I recommend here for your consideration
is you are going to have to take something up in terms of
capital budgeting. You have got to separate operational
requirements from capital asset acquisition. And reset here
seems to me an ideal way to get to the question of capital
budgeting, of looking ahead, of getting a budget proposal on
the table that is multiyear, that you know has to be done
multiyear.
You know that you are going to have to make these
purchases. And to simply come in every year with each Defense
bill and each Defense appropriations bill hoping you are going
to be able to get the money for reset in competition with all
of the other capital asset acquisitions you do year by year
puts us in the position we are in right now. Every single
service is now having to scramble internally to have one kind
of equipment, one kind of a capital asset, a carrier, a Joint
Strike Fighter, a combat--a new combat vehicle, and they are in
competition with all the rest of it. We don't want reset in
this category.
I am just saying to you, by way of conclusion to my
remarks, that this is something I put forward for your
consideration and Secretary Gates' consideration, that a
capital budget or its equivalent be established where reset is
concerned so that you don't become dependent on a supplemental
budget which may or may not come in an appropriate time frame
to meet your needs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it took some time to do
that, and I don't know if they can comment or not at this
point.
Mr. Ortiz. Go ahead, if you have a comment, either one of
you. Just go ahead.
General Amos. Sir, your point is well taken. We are kind of
stuck because--and you know that----
Mr. Abercrombie. That is why I brought it up. I believe you
are stuck. I believe you are now having to set a competition
between the reset necessities and other capital acquisitions.
And I will stop with that.
General Amos. Exactly, sir. And in both our services, and
really in all four services, the focus is on succeeding in the
fight that they are in. You know, we have been sent to do this;
our Nation expects us to succeed, so we are going to do
whatever is required. And when you do that, there are the
trade-offs. There are the decisions you are making back home in
what we don't call it a capital budget, we certainly call it
our baseline budget. And so now we are robbing Peter to pay
Paul, and all of a sudden, it just continues to snowball.
I think if we were at war for three years, you could
probably hold your breath on the back side and say, okay, we
are going to figure it out. We actually can do this inside of
FYDP. But we can't. We have been at this now since we crossed
the border in March of 2003.
So your point is well taken, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
General Chiarelli. I would just say your point is well
taken, and we will look very, very hard at attempting to do
that.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
We are going to have a series of votes in about six
minutes, so we have two more members who will have a question.
Mr. Reyes and then Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Generals, thank you for being here this morning.
I think most of my questions have been asked already, but I
think it might be useful if we have for the record an
understanding percentage-wise of how it impacts our training
capability, because obviously our number one priority is making
sure that our troops in combat have the best equipment out
there. But I am curious, as we rotate through what soon will
be, we hope, only the Afghanistan theater, how are we affected
percentage-wise in our capability to train? Are we at 50
percent capability in training? Because for the doctrine of we
train how we fight, I am a little bit concerned of everything I
have heard here this morning. I think it is having an impact on
that ability to do that.
General Amos. Sir, I will tell you that I can't give you a
percentage-wise, but this equipment that is now flowing into
Afghanistan, and we talked about what came from Kuwait, but
just to give you kind of an order of magnitude on what has come
from the United States, which is the training piece that you
are talking about and you are referring to, when we put the
10,600 Marines in there about 8 months ago, we took 15 percent
of that 44,000 came from the United States, bases and stations.
When we took this 27,000-plus, 33 percent of that has come from
the bases and stations. So it is cumulative.
And so what we are finding is that we are having less of
those kind of principal types of pieces of equipment that we
need to be able to train on back here in the continental United
States, so that we do what we said to begin with when we came
in here; have no fear, we are going to have those units fully
equipped that are forward deployed. We have been able to do
that in the past and kind of robbing Peter to pay Paul, moving
things around back home to ensure that those battalions we
start--Congressman Hunter asked and talked about kind of the
stand up of the training cycle and cross-leveling.
Our model is 180 days out we stabilize the unit. And then
we stabilize it with manpower. And about 120 days out, we try
to stabilize it with its equipment, so that, as it gets inside
of 120 days, it is in the final preparatory training phase
prior to going to Iraq before and now Afghanistan. So it has
100 percent of what it needs, training opportunity and training
equipment and people-wise.
But what has happened, and we have been able to kind of
hold our breath on all those forces that have just returned and
those forces that are kind of not in the training cycle yet,
they haven't entered their 180-day mark. But I will tell you
what is going to happen now as a result of this latest move is
there is going to be fewer of that kind of equipment that is
going to be back in home station. And we are going to find
ourselves still really trying to juggle that very carefully to
make sure that those units that get inside that 180-day pre-
deployment training cycle have exactly what they need. And we
will do that.
But everybody else, there are going to be hungry children
back there. And they have to train as well. Their training is
not nearly as important as those units that are inside the 180-
day window, because they are going to go, but they will
eventually themselves move inside that 180-day window. But when
they are on the outside, they are going to be hungry children.
But I don't have a percentage for you.
General Chiarelli. Thirty-two percent of the vehicle
requirements in Afghanistan will come from theater in the
United States Army. Those are the numbers that I asked for the
other day; 25 percent of the overall equipment will come from
theater. So you have a higher percentage of vehicles that will
come from theater than you do overall equipment, which is at
about 25 percent. And I asked for that exact figure and how it
was going to affect the training base back home, and I am told
it will be anywhere from 5 to 10 percent less vehicles and
equipment will be available during the training phase back here
for about 24 to 36 months, is what we are looking at, sir. But
we believe we can train our soldiers up given the equipment
sets that we will have back home.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank both of you gentlemen for being here, and
General Chiarelli, in particular, for the work you are doing on
MRAPs to get them to the stateside stations for training.
I wish I had more time to brag on what you are doing right,
but I really want to spend the time I have asking you some
questions, hopefully preventing some problems that may occur as
we leave Iraq. I was just curious, you know, when a nation is
$12 trillion in debt, it can't afford to waste anything. And I
know that, as warfighters, both of you gentlemen's first
priority is get the best stuff in the hands of the warfighters.
But I was wondering, to what extent, as we are leaving these
things behind in Iraq, are you trying to get maybe some folks
from the National Guard or the State emergency management
agencies to let them have a look at what we are leaving behind
to see if they have any use for this?
And obviously, a guy who is a small town alderman is going
to look at something differently than you, the warfighter. And
things that you may think are not worth bringing home, they may
look at as gold. And again, it is just the difference in
philosophy. And I very much respect the philosophy you two
gentlemen have because you are warfighters, and our Nation
needs you, and I respect you for that. But I do think a guy who
may be a National Guard major who just came from being an
alderman back home, from being a highway patrolman back home, a
hospital administrator back home, he is going to look at some
of these things differently. And I am just questioning, how are
you getting different sets of eyes on the same pieces of
equipment so some of the mistakes that we know we made in
Panama, in the Philippines, when we left things behind aren't
being made again in Iraq?
General Chiarelli. Well, one is the tremendous focus you
and everybody else has.
Mr. Taylor. I am several thousands miles away, General.
General Chiarelli. We instituted this Equipment Review
Board here two months ago to look at exactly that. And what I
am told right now is, we will leave behind no piece of
equipment that in fact is economically--it makes sense to bring
back economically.
But you bring up an excellent point about asking some of
our National Guard formations and the soldiers that are inside
those National Guard formations to look at some of the things
we may be leaving behind to get their take on whether they
would be of value to them. And I will use the Expanded Defense
Resources Board (EDRB) video teleconference that I have next
week to tee that up for theater to get another look to ensure
we are doing exactly what you ask of us, Congressman Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. I very much appreciate that. And again, I
supplied that letter to Colonel Glaze. We have been informed by
some of the State emergency managers that this is something
that is occurring, and that the Iraqis--and again, from several
thousand miles away, it sure strikes me as a scam that they are
asking for what documents did we import these goods with, and
obviously, we are not issuing importation documents in 2003
during an invasion or any time since then, since, early on,
there was no government of Iraq to be dealing with. And so,
again, whatever you can do on your end to help resolve that I
would greatly appreciate.
General Chiarelli. I will immediately tee that up, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. I have a question, General Chiarelli.
If 30 percent of your equipment is not returning to the
United States for reset, how is the Army or how are you going
to be able to accomplish your training requirements back home?
Because you know, at the beginning of the war, this is one of
the huge problems that we were having, that some of the
recruits were not getting proper training because they didn't
have the equipment. Is this going to present a huge problem to
you?
General Chiarelli. We believe we can work around it. It is
32 percent of the vehicle requirements with the increase in
Afghanistan are being met by vehicles that are currently in
theater. That is what that says. And they have been in theater.
We expect it only to be 5 to 10 percent. But we believe, given
the fact that our units come back and go into the six months of
reset, that we will be able to immediately move that equipment
around to ensure that they are properly trained up on post
camps and stations.
And one of the great improvements we have made, I believe,
is getting MRAPs out to the individual post camps and stations
so we can train our soldiers on driving MRAPs. We don't have
nearly enough to outfit a combat formation, but we can at least
give them drivers training. And we have done that with the MRAP
ATV, too. We asked early on to take some of those early
vehicles, do the licensing requirement for units deploying over
here so when units arrived in Afghanistan they could more
quickly be issued that equipment with less training time
required in theater.
In addition to that, we have an unbelievable common trainer
that we are using that has done just wonderful things for MRAP
training. So I think, in many ways, we might be in a little bit
better situation today than we were in before. But there is
going to be about a 5 to 10 percent decrease in the amount of
equipment we have got back home for about a 24- to 36-month
period. That period is as long as it is because when the
equipment comes back, before we can reissue it to units, it
will have to go through a reset program.
Mr. Ortiz. See because another area that concerns me is the
equipment that we need for the pre-stocking stocks throughout,
you know, reset. Are we going to be able to provide the
training equipment and then be able to give the pre-stocking
areas to be filled up for them to have the right equipment?
This is the thing that worries me.
General Chiarelli. And, sir, I will tell you, some of that
32 percent is coming out of Army prepositioned equipment. So we
are going into the APS stocks, which in reality are theater
stocks, but that is part of that 32 percent. That is why it is
a 5 to 10 percent decrease back in the United States. But we
really believe we will be able to work this through smart
management of our assets.
Mr. Ortiz. Yes, sir. And I just have one last question.
When did replacement of equipment given to coalition partners
and foreign military sales become part of the definition of
reset?
General Chiarelli. I didn't mean to infer that it did, sir.
I just meant to infer that, in order to get the Iraqi army up
to the level that we need to, when we have a FMS case that
comes out of Iraq, because that system can be very, very slow,
and we know that the Iraqi army must be equipped in order for
us to leave, we are following every single one of those. We are
not in fact providing the Iraqis any equipment that would in
fact impact Army readiness. The only equipment would be excess
equipment. And then we have certain requirements to come to
Congress in those cases to make sure that we report to you
before any of those transfers are made.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you.
General Amos, would you like to make a further statement
before we shut down this hearing?
General Amos. Sir, I want to thank you for your continued
support. You really do, we have had a good discussion on
supplementals and OCO, and I think the thing I would like to
leave with to this committee, Mr. Chairman, would be, again,
the war in Afghanistan will be fought well by young men and
women fully equipped and fully trained. I want you to know that
and have confidence in that.
But there is this continuing drain of equipment back home
to do this. So there are two things that come to mind that are
troublesome. One, eventually it will begin to impact home
station training. It has not yet. And my prognosis is, because
of the way we train in the Marine Corps, it probably won't,
even in the future over the next year. We will probably be able
to manage it. The micromanaging of that will be very, very,
very time-consuming, and it is going to be an all Marine force
effort.
The second piece is our ability to be able to go someplace
else in the world and do the Nation's bidding. I think that
would be something that--and I get asked the question what
would you do? We would cobble it together just like we did when
we put the Fifth Marine Regiment together just out of just a
skeleton and went to Inchon, but it was very, very painful. So
that is kind of the danger part of the home station piece just
being eaten at. And that is why supplementals, we have had the
discussion on, should you, or shouldn't you? And I will be
honest with you, without it, without being able to replace
those vehicles that are being combat lost and worn out, we
would find ourselves further in the hole and less capable than
we are today.
Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. We appreciate your service.
Another thing that worries me is that our National Guard,
our Reserves, I have visited some of them, and some of the
equipment has been left behind for the active Army. You know,
but I know you are doing your best, and we are going to have to
do with what we got. And we want to be sure that this committee
provides you what you need. There has been some good questions
asked by the members, and there have been some good responses.
And now I would like to allow, for those members who
couldn't be here with us today, for them to be able to submit,
you know, questions for the record.
We do not have any other questions?
Thank you so much for joining us today. And this hearing
now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
December 10, 2009
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
December 10, 2009
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
General Amos. No. As we have been retrograding our equipment over
the past year, we have not seen any evidence of this documentation
requirement in Iraq. [See page 56.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 10, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Mr. Ortiz. Who will make the decision about what equipment in Iraq
will be reset into the Army (or Marine Corps) and what will be provided
to the Iraqis? What factors figure into that decision?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What has been done to increase depot capacities in
preparation for the potentially huge influx of equipment from Iraq or
the need to surge reset equipment into Afghanistan?
To what extent have the Army and Marine Corps developed strategies
for workloading their depots over the next 5 to 10 years to satisfy
reset requirements?
Based on these workloading plans, what confidence do the Army and
Marine Corps have that they will be able to obligate the reset funds
they have requested in fiscal year 2010 and beyond?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What plans are there for the replenishment of Army and
Marine Corps pre-positioned stocks through reset?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. We understand that at present there are no depot-level
facilities for MRAPs in the United States. What is being done to deal
with this? When do you anticipate having a national repair capability
and strategy for MRAP sustainment?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. At what point will DOD move all funding for equipment
into the base budget, given that contingency operations have been going
on for several years and it is becoming increasingly difficult to
distinguish between equipment requirements related to base and
contingency operations' needs? What are the risks of continuing to fund
reset, and in the Army's case, the majority of the depot maintenance
account, through contingency operations funding?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. Operations overseas in harsh conditions affect
equipment's long-term condition and expected useful lifetime. For
purposes of projecting the equipment that the Army has on hand and will
have for the next several years, the Army assumes that equipment now
being used overseas will be returned to the United States and fully
rehabilitated as part of its reset program.
a. Has the Army assessed the percentage of equipment that is now in
Iraq and Afghanistan that may not be able to be rehabilitated (wash-out
rate) and the effect that this rate may have on its longer-term plans
for equipment availability?
b. Has the Army performed a cost/benefit analysis on the relative
advantages of returning used equipment to the United States for repair
and rehabilitation as opposed to purchasing new equipment that may have
a longer service life?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. The Army is implementing a rotational force readiness
model, called the Army Force Generation Model or ARFORGEN. The cycle is
intended to increase unit readiness over time from when a unit returns
from deployment for rest and resetting through training phases until it
is available to deploy. The Army recognizes that implementation of this
model will affect the way it equips the force to increase their
readiness over time to reach deployment readiness. Currently, the
Army's requirements processes still reflect the Army's acquisition goal
of providing all units all the equipment they need for their missions
at all times, and this assumption drives the Army's Acquisition
Objective (AAO). However, officials acknowledge that units in a
rotational force generation cycle may need less than 100 percent of
some equipment requirements in the early phases of their training cycle
but may need more than 100 percent of some items to account for
situations such as having some equipment unavailable because of
maintenance, for example.
What plans does the Army have to adapt its current equipment
strategy as it resets the force and implements the ARFORGEN readiness
model?
For what types of equipment does the Army anticipate needing
greater than 100 percent of current requirements and why?
For what types of equipment does the Army anticipate needing less
than 100 percent of requirements?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. How does the theater communicate and coordinate
equipment retrograde and reset requirements to the Army and Marine
Corps? How much equipment do the Army and Marine Corps plan to reset in
fiscal year 2010?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What determinations went into your Overseas Contingency
Operations reset budget request for fiscal year 2010? How will the
fiscal year 2010 budget be executed?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. How long will reset continue and what do you expect the
annual recurring cost to be? How long do you anticipate funding for
reset will be paid for by supplemental or Overseas Contingency
Operations funding only? How will the Army and Marine Corps prioritize
resources between your many initiatives and programs, including reset
and future modernization investments?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. How do non-deployed systems figure into the Army's and
Marine Corps' reset programs?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What is the Army's and Marine Corps' approach to reset
management and planning? How do the Army and Marine Corps determine
which equipment will be repaired, recapitalized, or replaced? What
percentage of equipment being reset in fiscal year 2010 will be
repaired? What percentage will be recapitalized? What percentage will
be replaced?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What life-cycle extensions and additional capabilities
will result from recapitalization? By how much does recapitalization
extend the life of equipment?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. How do you respond to the GAO's criticism that the Army
and Marine Corps are sacrificing short-term equipment needs are for
long-term modernization?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. Can the industrial base meet the demand the Army and
Marine Corps have for maintenance, recapitalization, and new
production, particularly in light of the reduction of forces in Iraq
and the increased forces in Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. Does reset need to be accelerated? If so, what could the
Army and Marine Corps do to accelerate resetting the force? Is
additional depot capacity needed?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What is the impact of service support contracts on Army
and Marine Corps equipment reset?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. What is the relationship between the drawdown of
military forces and contractor personnel in Iraq to the Army's and
Marine Corps' ability to execute equipment retrograde and reset? That
is, how reliant are you on specific levels of military or contractor
personnel in theater to support your requirements for equipment
retrograde or reset?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. Please explain the goals of the Army's reset pilot
program. What lessons were learned and how have they been applied to
redeploying units? What has been the practical impact of the pilot
program on how units reset themselves at home station?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. How does the Army balance operational equipment needs
versus Title 32 responsibilities assigned to the reserve components in
terms of reset prioritization?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. The Army has spent more than $70 billion over the past
four years on equipment reset. Why, then, are some Army units reporting
C-4 readiness because of equipment shortages or training shortfalls due
to lack of equipment?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. Where will the Army find enough mission-capable
equipment to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? Where will it
come from? Will the Reserve Component be a source?
General Chiarelli. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Ortiz. Who will make the decision about what equipment in Iraq
will be reset into the Army (or Marine Corps) and what will be provided
to the Iraqis? What factors figure into that decision?
General Amos. The decision about what equipment in Iraq will be
returned from theater to reset into the Marine Corps will be made by
MARCENT with Headquarters Marine Corps based on operational
requirements for OEF. OEF operational requirements will also factor
into the final decision on what equipment is available to source to the
Government of Iraq.
The Joint Staff directed, under an operational planning team
construct, the Services review their capability to transfer defense
articles to the Government of Iraq in an effort to facilitate a
responsible drawdown of U.S. forces. All Services were in attendance in
the 8 month-long planning process, to include the Army National Guard.
On 6 Oct 09, the FY10 NDAA, Section 1234 was passed. This will
allow the Services the ability to direct up to $750 M worth of
equipment to the GOI in FY10 and FY11. SECDEF will not execute the
authority provided in FY10 NDAA Section 1234 until 30 days after the
``Report on the Transfer of Defense Articles and the Provision of
Defense Services to the Militaries and Security Forces of Iraq and
Afghanistan'' has been submitted to Congress. The report is currently
in staffing. At this time, no Marine Corps equipment has been
transferred to coalition forces under the Section 1234 legislation.
If directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Marine Corps would
only transfer equipment that does not pose a risk to the Marine Corps
or would impact the Marine Corps Reserve.
Mr. Ortiz. What has been done to increase depot capacities in
preparation for the potentially huge influx of equipment from Iraq or
the need to surge reset equipment into Afghanistan?
To what extent have the Army and Marine Corps developed strategies
for workloading their depots over the next 5 to 10 years to satisfy
reset requirements?
Based on these workloading plans, what confidence do the Army and
Marine Corps have that they will be able to obligate the reset funds
they have requested in fiscal year 2010 and beyond?
General Amos. Marine Corps Logistics Command, Maintenance Centers
in Albany Georgia, and Barstow California increased production in 2008
and executed 4.4 million direct labor hours. In 2009, we estimated 5.45
million direct labor hours in preparation for a potentially huge influx
of equipment. We hired additional personnel for these years in
consonance with section 2472 of Title 10, U.S.C., with the expectation
that the workload, and therefore the workforce, would remain throughout
reset. However, CY09 workload did not materialize due to equipment
sourcing requirements to support the Afghanistan troop levels. As a
result, Maintenance Centers Albany and Barstow were forced to decrease
the work force in order to meet this lessened workload requirement. Now
that the decision has been made on the deployment and timeline of
additional USMC forces to Afghanistan, we can now expect that depot
maintenance will be performed on approximately 6,100 retrograded items
and field maintenance on approximately 10,000 items during FY-10. Only
items that have a continued requirement within the Marine Corps will be
reset. The Marine Corps is confident that it will fully obligate depot
maintenance reset funds in FY-10 and beyond.
Mr. Ortiz. What plans are there for the replenishment of Army and
Marine Corps pre-positioned stocks through reset?
General Amos. As equipment is retrograded from Iraq and reset
through either maintenance or procurement actions, it will be issued to
Marine Corps activities (e.g. Home Station Units, Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF), Marine Corps Prepositioning Progam-Norway
(MCPP-N) Supporting Establishment Units) according to their
prioritization as established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Therefore, prepositioning stocks will be replenished through reset
based on the availability of reset equipment and relative priority of
distribution as determined by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Mr. Ortiz. We understand that at present there are no depot-level
facilities for MRAPs in the United States. What is being done to deal
with this? When do you anticipate having a national repair capability
and strategy for MRAP sustainment?
General Amos. The Marine Corps has been assigned as the Primary
Inventory Control Activity (PICA) for the Cat I and Cat II Cougar MRAP.
As such, we solicited and received a Depot Source of Repair (DSOR)
designation through the Joint Depot Maintenance Activity Group (JDMAG)
for the Marine Corps Depot facilities at Albany and Barstow. We also
solicited and received DSOR assignment for the Buffalo Cat IIIs fielded
to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is currently conducting a proof-
of-principle (POP) on the Buffalo Cat III to develop the National
Maintenance Work Requirement (NMWR). Additionally, Marine Corps
Maintenance Centers Albany and Barstow both plan to start maintenance
production on CAT I, II and III MRAPs by 1st Qtr FY11.
Mr. Ortiz. At what point will DOD move all funding for equipment
into the base budget, given that contingency operations have been going
on for several years and it is becoming increasingly difficult to
distinguish between equipment requirements related to base and
contingency operations' needs? What are the risks of continuing to fund
reset, and in the Army's case, the majority of the depot maintenance
account, through contingency operations funding?
General Amos. Equipment needs resulting from Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) have not been in the baseline because both Congress
and OSD have generally agreed that war related costs should be part of
the Service's OCO submissions. No determination has been made to move
away from this funding strategy as long as we are engaged in OCO
activities. There is more risk associated with moving Reset
requirements in the baseline than continuing to fund in the OCO
requests because our ability to recover from this current conflict
would come at the expense of the modernization necessary to meet future
threats.
Mr. Ortiz. How have Marine Corps reset requirements changed as a
result of additional personnel and equipment purchases?
General Amos. As personnel have been added to the Marine Corps as
part of the 202K initiative, associated equipment to outfit those
additional Marines is also identified as an element of increasing our
end strength. Such additional equipment is distinct and separate from
reset requirements of existing forces. Equipment purchases to support
Overseas Contingency Operations are used to fill deficiencies in two
areas: replacement of equipment due to combat loss/increased usage due
to high operational tempos, and equipment purchases above established
table of equipment allowances to enable units to perform missions
different from what they were originally intended to perform. Reset
requirements are constantly changing to meet the constantly changing
needs of equipment replacement due to combat loss/wear and tear from
increased usage due to high operational tempos. Additionally, reset
requirements are impacted when home station equipment is sent overseas
to fulfill immediate emerging equipment needs due to mission analysis
of our forces going into combat. As our forces continue to adapt to
meet the enemy, equipment needs also continue to change
Mr. Ortiz. At what capacity are Marine Corps depots operating? If
not full capacity, should they be?
General Amos. USMC depot capacity is elastic. The Marine Corps
depots have the ability to expand and contract as necessary to meet
workload requirements. There are multiple options to adjust depot
capacity including overtime shifts, multiple shifts, hiring of contract
and/or temporary labor, hiring full time additional labor or
contracting with commercial vendors. We can also utilize capacity at
other Service depots. Currently, we have the ability to expand if
necessary.
Mr. Ortiz. What lessons has the Marine Corps learned from Iraq and
Afghanistan regarding its unit table of equipment requirements that
apply to reset? How have those lessons been applied and what is the
impact?
General Amos. Lessons learned from 8 years of major combat have led
the Marine Corps to change the baseline it uses for the ground
equipment requirement. This change--as well as critical funding to
reset and reconstitute the force--will posture the Corps for tomorrow's
challenges and ensure the Corps' standing as the nation's expeditionary
force in readiness.
The old metric for the ground equipment requirement, which worked
well in peacetime, did not work well in war when equipment requirements
changed rapidly and new units were created.
The benefits of using a new baseline are as follows:
Provides more accurate measure of the ground equipment
requirement
Supply readiness is now calculated against the unit's
stable, actual requirement vice a floating metric.
It enables commanders to conduct a more accurate and
useful assessment of their ability to accomplish the mission.
Demonstrates stronger linkages between force structure,
materiel readiness, operational readiness, and funding.
Better linkage between equipment fielding and
improved unit readiness.
Easier to articulate our equipment requirement
shortfalls to Congress.
Facilitates better acquisition decisions and cross-
leveling of equipment based on requirements.
The impact of applying the lessons learned on Marine Corps
readiness:
Deployed forces still have the equipment required to do
their mission.
There has been a drop in equipment readiness levels for
non-deployed forces.
Mr. Ortiz. What new equipment needs have emerged for Afghanistan
and how will these new needs affect Marine Corps reset? How has the
Marine Corps dealt with the evolution of personal protective equipment
through the reset process?
General Amos. With regard to the first part of this question,
``What new equipment needs have emerged for Afghanistan and how will
these needs effect Marine Corps reset?'' we continually work with our
deployed units via the Urgent UNS process, lessons learned reviews, and
our deliberate combat development process. Meeting the immediate needs
of units deployed to Afghanistan will certainly have an effect on our
reset, although the full effect is difficult to determine since the
length and level of our commitment there is not fully known. We
continue to take risk in the readiness of our home station units by
drawing their equipment, and by redirecting equipment that was
scheduled for reset from Iraq to Afghanistan. As far as response to
urgent needs goes, since February 2008 we have received known cost
estimates totaling $490.2M from units deployed to Afghanistan. We also
have received known-cost estimates totaling $58.1M from units inbound
to the theater. Most of these in-bound U-UNS address shortfalls
generated by growth of the OEF MAGTF to a MEF(Forward).
Examples of equipment needs identified in OEF U-UNS include:
Persistent Surveillance. Family of systems to enhance surveillance
capabilities at Forward Operating Bases and other areas where there are
no co-located coalition forces. Twice requested for quantity increases
by OEF forces and is now MARCENT's number one priority to field.
Recently approved U-UNS of 121 additional systems at cost of $147M;
delivery pending.
Mobile Armored Trauma Bay. Newly developed armored, mobile facility
that provides the ability to conduct forward resuscitative care as
close to the point of injury as possible. First 6 units were delivered
to theater. Cost for 8 units is $8.2M.
Scalable Plate Carriers. Provides commanders with a scalable body
armor option to maximize individual ballistic protection balanced with
mobility as dictated by mission requirements. This capability has been
increased twice by U-UNS request to outfit to forces deploying to OIF
and OEF. The most recent request delivers 17,636 units to OEF at a cost
of $20.7M.
Robots. Source of multiple U-UNS requests for counter IED
capability fielded to EOD, engineer and infantry forces. Five different
OEF centric U-UNS requests have been approved since July 2009 providing
an increase of 71 units across two variants for surveillance and IED
interrogation at a USMC cost of $9.2M. 51 additional units were
obtained as Theater Provided.
Mr. Ortiz. What additional capability and capacity, if any, is
needed at Blount Island to accommodate Marine Corps reset?
General Amos. Blount Island Command is already operating as an
integral part of the MCLC Field Level (Intermediate Maintenance) Reset
Plan. Blount Island Command supports the Marine Corps' strategic
prepositioning programs. Their seasoned contractor workforce possesses
the skill sets to perform less than depot-level repairs on nearly the
full range of USMC equipment retrograded from the CENTCOM AOR. The
limiting factor at Blount Island continues to be the lack of suitable
facilities to improve the infrastructure capacity for the reset effort.
In 2006, the Marine Corps identified the need to accelerate 10 planned
MILCON projects to address this concern.
Mr. Ortiz. What guidelines are Marine Corps operational commanders
given for assessing equipment and who makes the decisions on what to
repair and what to dispose?
General Amos. The Marine Corps' overall reset strategy was
developed with the technical advice of the equipment Total Life Cycle
Managers based on current and future requirements for Marine Corps
equipment. This was the initial guide used for determining what
equipment will be reset. If a requirement exists, then maintenance
experts from the Marine Corps operating forces and the Marine Corps
Depots conduct a thorough technical serviceability inspection of each
individual item of equipment to determine if it is repairable or if the
costs to repair exceed the benefit and the item must be disposed.
Mr. Ortiz. How does the theater communicate and coordinate
equipment retrograde and reset requirements to the Army and Marine
Corps? How much equipment do the Army and Marine Corps plan to reset in
fiscal year 2010?
General Amos. Retrograde requirements are identified back to the
Marine Corps in CONUS via Marine Corps Logistics Command Forward in the
MARCENT AOR. All major items of Marine Corps equipment are transferred
to Marine Corps Logistics Command Forward, which then coordinates the
physical movement of equipment either back to CONUS for reset or to
Afghanistan to meet operational requirements. Retrograded equipment is
assessed and placed into one of five reset categories: depot
maintenance candidate, field maintenance candidate, no reset action
required, i.e. immediately available for re-issue, or disposal
candidate. Equipment disposed of will be for one of two reasons: the
item is beyond economical repair, or the item is obsolete and no longer
a part of the Marine Corps inventory. Items disposed of due to
obsolescence will be reset through new procurement of replacement
equipment.
Prior to the decision to deploy additional forces to OEF, the
Marine Corps planned on performing Depot maintenance on up to 12,241
retrograded items and field maintenance on 24,137 items in FY-2010. Due
to the diversion of equipment to support expanded operations in
Afghanistan, we now expect that depot maintenance will be performed on
approximately 6,100 retrograded items, and field maintenance on
approximately 10,000 items in FY-2010. Only items that have a continued
requirement within the Marine Corps will be reset. Items that are now
obsolete due to procurement of upgraded/improved equipment will not be
reset.
Mr. Ortiz. What determinations went into your Overseas Contingency
Operations reset budget request for fiscal year 2010? How will the
fiscal year 2010 budget be executed?
General Amos. The Marine Corps uses a Reset Cost Model to evaluate
OIF/OEF equipment status and requirements and to identify cost factors
and strategies by assessing historical operational tempo, equipment
demand, combat losses, and degradation to equipment on a two year
basis. Current year requirements are then developed and scrubbed for
executability prior to inclusion in the OCO request. The Fiscal Year
2010 budget is expected to be fully executed.
Mr. Ortiz. How long will reset continue and what do you expect the
annual recurring cost to be? How long do you anticipate funding for
reset will be paid for by supplemental or Overseas Contingency
Operations funding only? How will the Army and Marine Corps prioritize
resources between your many initiatives and programs, including reset
and future modernization investments?
General Amos. Reset efforts will continue as long as the Marine
Corps is fighting in Overseas Contingency Operations and an annual
recurring cost is not easily captured (nor accurate) as our
requirements have continued to, and will continue to, change as long as
we are engaged in contingency operations. Reset requirements will
continue to be requested via OCO submissions until the current conflict
is concluded or a change in policy is implemented. The Marine Corps
prioritizes Reset and future modernization requirements the same way as
any baseline budget--we build and submit a fiscally balanced,
defendable, and executable budget based on the warfighting and
readiness priorities as directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Even in a fiscally constrained environment, Marines will always be
equipped with the best equipment that the Marine Corps can provide.
Mr. Ortiz. How do non-deployed systems figure into the Army's and
Marine Corps' reset programs?
General Amos. Marine Corps forward deployed forces have the
resources and equipment needed to train for and conduct operations but
it has come at the expense of home stations. Equipment from OIF that
was scheduled to go through a depot overhaul has now been redirected to
support OEF efforts, thus accelerating the stress on equipment and
having to globally source an expanded Equipment Density List has
created additional equipment shortfalls and lowered home station
readiness. Reconstitution efforts are being supported in our baseline
requests as they do not fall under the current definition of Reset.
Mr. Ortiz. What is the Army's and Marine Corps' approach to reset
management and planning? How do the Army and Marine Corps determine
which equipment will be repaired, recapitalized, or replaced? What
percentage of equipment being reset in fiscal year 2010 will be
repaired? What percentage will be recapitalized? What percentage will
be replaced?
General Amos. The Marine Corps manages its reset liability and
plans reset actions via individual ``reset strategies'' specifically
designed for each type of equipment item in theater. Each strategy is
developed by the equipment item's life cycle manager in coordination
with the Marine Corps' requirements determination branch. Equipment
strategies are designed around five possible categories: procure new;
depot-level maintenance/modernization; field-level maintenance; no
reset required; and obsolete/disposal. Each strategy is designed based
on an item's age, estimated life-span, estimation of its usage in
theater, and finally the Marine Corps long-term requirements for that
item. In general, equipment whose repair cost exceeds 65% of the new
procurement cost is replaced. For equipment repair costs that fall
between 20% and 65% of the new procurement cost, the equipment is sent
for depot-level maintenance for repair. For equipment that does not
exceed 20%, maintenance is performed at the field level where capable.
Many items being retrograded will have a ``no reset'' strategy because
they are obsolete and no longer a part of the Marine Corps inventory.
Items disposed of due to obsolescence will be reset through new
procurement of replacement equipment or modernization. Current
estimates project that approximately 47% of the equipment repaired in
2010 will be repaired either at a depot or field level maintenance
facility, and 36% of the returning equipment will have to be replaced.
The remaining 18% includes items for which no reset action is
necessary. This includes theater-specific items which have no intended
usage beyond OIF, or items that can be put directly back into the
Marine Corps inventory with no maintenance actions.
Mr. Ortiz. What life-cycle extensions and additional capabilities
will result from recapitalization? By how much does recapitalization
extend the life of equipment?
General Amos. The Marine Corps does not use the term
recapitalization as it relates to returning equipment to zero hours,
zero miles condition. For the response to this question the definition
of recapitalization is the process to procure a new system, or
enhancing a system as part of rebuilding the system or modernization.
The Marine Corps uses the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and
the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to the
Standard (RAM R/S) to ensure the Marine Corps attains the full program
life of the equipment and implements upgrades to equipment
capabilities.
The current operational tempo creates challenges in maintaining
optimal readiness levels on legacy systems resulting in additional
resource requirements. In order to mitigate this challenge, the Marine
Corps seeks to expedite Initial Operation Capability (IOC) of
replacement items, conduct continuous product improvement through
modernization, and continue the SLEP to extend the life of aging ground
equipment assets in the inventory.
By how much does recapitalization extend the life of equipment?
The following are prime examples of systems used in OIF and the
results to extend the life of equipment.
The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) SLEP and RAM R/S were designed
to extend service life and improve combat readiness and effectiveness
of the legacy fleet until fielding of a replacement vehicle. The
Program Service Life is until the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
is fully fielded in 2025 which equates to 42 years. The average age of
the AAV is 35 years. While the EFV is being developed to replace AAVs
and remains the Commandant's top ground combat priority, the projected
pace of EFV fielding will result in significant quantities of AAVs
remaining in service until at least 2025.
The LAV fleet was fielded in the first half of the 1980s with an
expected end-of-service date of 2008. The LAV SLEP upgrade was designed
to extend the service life of the legacy fleet to 2015 by replacing
obsolete or soon to be obsolete components in the legacy vehicle. As a
result of the initiation of OIF, a second upgrade was made to
incorporate additional survivability into the platform in response to
the new threats. With the release of this new configuration, the LAV
A2, the end-of-service date was extended to 2025. The LAV A2 upgrade
was accomplished to add more capability to the platform at the same
time as the platform was undergoing a complete refurbishment (via the
Specified Overhaul and Repair statement of work) at the Marine Corps
depots. This approach justified the end-of-life extension to 2025. With
the replacement of combat losses as well as the new platforms procured
as the result of a force restructure increases, leaves the average age
of the a LAV at 23 years. The Program Service Life is now 42 years.
Mr. Ortiz. How do you respond to the GAO's criticism that the Army
and Marine Corps are sacrificing short-term equipment needs are for
long-term modernization?
General Amos. The Marine Corps employs a documented, standardized,
and flexible reset strategy designed to meet both current operational
requirements and long-term reconstitution strategies. First, regarding
the formulation of budget requirements, Programs and Resources (P&R)
develops requirements for both short-term and operational needs and
longer term reset needs without prejudice or constraint beyond that
levied by OSD and Navy guidance.
Second, tactical level execution of reset, most notably equipment
distribution, is also a comprehensive process involving the evaluation
of short term deployment needs and long term modernization efforts. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps prioritizes equipment and manning
priorities in a joint message to all Marine Corps commands. This
document serves as the basis for equipment distribution prioritization
conducted by the Marine Corps's Strategic Ground Equipment Working
Group (SCEWG). This group is entrusted specifically with the priority
distribution of equipment across Marine Corps units and initiatives.
The SGEWG works diligently to ensure that equipment availability for
all units and over the long term to meet our modernization goals.
Predeployment training (Mojave Viper, Desert Talon, and Mountain
Warrior exercises) is afforded the #1 equipping priority. Likewise, in
generalized equipping, operational requirements (OIF, OEF) are given
higher priority than longer-term reset initiatives (such as
prepositioning reconstitution or filling supporting establishment
shortfalls). Furthermore, units preparing to deploy are afforded higher
priority than non-deploying units per the Commandant's message. Most
importantly, all Marine Corps units are 100% equipped upon arrival in
theater.
The Marine Corps understands that every unit experiences change as
it participates in the unit life cycle process, i.e., return from
deployment (rest/refit/reset) predeployment training (individual and
collective combat skills/mission essential tasks/core competencies)--
deployment. The Marine Corps recognizes the inherent differences in an
individual unit's maturity and readiness as a reflection of where it is
in this deployment preparation cycle. The SGEWG is the Marine Corps'
way of meeting each unit's equipment needs based on where it is in the
deployment/predeployment life cycle process. Regarding the operations
of the SGEWG, in the general priorities, the Marine Corps does not
identify individual units, but treats every unit in accordance with its
individual needs and challenges commensurate with its continual
development as a cohesive, combat-ready unit as it prepares for
deployment. In the event there is a priority conflict between a
specified or general priority, the requirement is returned to Plans,
Policies, and Operations Division (PP&O) and a decision is made on
where we can best accept risk. Discussions on risk are coordinated
between all affected commanders before a decision is made. The SGEWG is
the venue for working those matters of prioritization and distribution.
The SGEWG and prioritization list is an inherently flexible tool for
assessing distribution and recommending where to accept and how to
mitigate risk to the force as a whole.
Consequently, the Marine Corps has a concrete and comprehensive
plan of equipment distribution explicitly targeting short-term
operational requirements over longer-term reset initiatives, making the
overarching theme of the report factually inaccurate.
Mr. Ortiz. Can the industrial base meet the demand the Army and
Marine Corps have for maintenance, recapitalization, and new
production, particularly in light of the reduction of forces in Iraq
and the increased forces in Afghanistan?
General Amos. The Marine Corps expected to receive a large amount
of equipment from Iraq to be repaired and reset but as operational
commitments have grown overseas, much of the expected equipment has not
materialized, and is being retained to support other operations. This
means that the Reset workload is not as large as expected. The size of
the industrial workforce constantly flexes to meet workload needs and
to best utilize taxpayer dollars, the workload requirement is
continually assessed and adjusted as appropriate, to include workforce
cuts when requirements have decreased. Should there be an increase in
the workload; expedited hiring processes are in place to rapidly expand
the workforce as required.
Mr. Ortiz. Does reset need to be accelerated? If so, what could the
Army and Marine Corps do to accelerate resetting the force? Is
additional depot capacity needed?
General Amos. The Marine Corps reset does need to be accelerated,
however due to a combination of circumstances, this will not be
achieved through the maintenance of equipment returning from Iraq. The
Marine Corps was poised to accelerate reset at our maintenance centers,
however, because of the requirement to rapidly build up forces in
Afghanistan in the midst of retrograding forces and equipment from
Iraq, the Marine Corps transferred significant amounts of equipment
directly from Iraq to Afghanistan without a full reset action. For that
reason, capacity at our depots does not need to be increased further.
Without an adequate Depot Maintenance Float Allowance (DMFA), we can't
conduct robust PEI rotation. Therefore, the maintenance reset action
will be delayed until MARCENT releases equipment from OEF into the
depot system. Increasing procurement resources and procuring new
equipment however, is an effective way to accelerate reset of home
station forces.
Mr. Ortiz. What is the impact of service support contracts on Army
and Marine Corps equipment reset?
General Amos. Service support contracts in the MARCENT AOR are used
to repair equipment en route to or in Afghanistan. This will diminish
reset workload in CONUS but gets the required equipment to the war
fighter faster.
Service support contracts in CONUS, are used to support equipment
reset. This compliments our depot or organizational unit organic
maintenance capabilities.
Mr. Ortiz. What is the relationship between the drawdown of
military forces and contractor personnel in Iraq to the Army's and
Marine Corps' ability to execute equipment retrograde and reset? That
is, how reliant are you on specific levels of military or contractor
personnel in theater to support your requirements for equipment
retrograde or reset?
General Amos. The majority of USMC equipment in OIF has been turned
in for retrograde and is either in CONUS or located in specific
retrograde pipeline nodes. MARCENT and LogCom have worked as a team
during this time to evaluate and implement the proper mix of military
and contractor personnel to perform care and storage, and to expedite
equipment movement. As long as USMC equipment remains in Iraq, there
will be a requirement for this mix of military/contractor personnel,
corresponding to the type and amount of equipment. This is determined
by COMUSMARCENT aided by the planning and support of MARCORLOGCOM.
Specific contractor personnel, such as MRAP, communications, AT/FP
(GBOSS), etc. are rare in their expertise and crucial to the smooth
extraction and retrograde of forces and equipment. Thus far, they have
been a critical cog as II MEF FWD executes a near flawless retrograde
of equipment from Iraq. These critical contractors have also been
instrumental in the smooth reception, staging, washdown, and
manifesting of equipment for shipment to CONUS as well as supporting
the receipt and support of equipment redirected to OEF
Mr. Ortiz. Please provide background on the logistics teams that
have been sent into theater to assess Marine Corps equipment reset
needs in light of potential increased equipment requirements in
Afghanistan.
General Amos. The Marine Corps has tasked forward deployed
operational commanders with assessing the condition of equipment being
retrograded in order to determine what equipment could be categorized
as fully mission capable and redeployed into Afghanistan for combat
operations. Additionally, the Marine Corps exercised a standing MOA
with the Army Material command Forward (AMC) Forward to have less than
depot repairs made on select tactical wheeled vehicles to support the
increased Afghanistan requirement. Finally, the Marine Corps assigned
additional maintenance personnel to Marine Corps Logistics Command
(Forward) to make minor repairs on equipment in theater in order to
satisfy increased Afghanistan equipment requirements.
Mr. Ortiz. How, if at all, is the Marine Corps' readiness affected
by the continued delay in the construction of new vessels for the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)? Specifically, what impact will
the delay in construction of the MPF(F) amphibious assault ship, the
LHA(R), and the Mobile Landing Platform have on the service life of the
existing MPF ships or the risk associated with the Marine Corps'
ability to generate Marine Expeditionary Brigades capable of conducting
major combat operations?
General Amos.
USMC Power Projection Doctrine
While the basic building blocks of combat power are frequently
expressed as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), it is the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) around which the USMC's combat planning
revolves. The MEF provides the full complement of ground and aviation
warfighting capability, together with the logistics support, to sustain
the force. Doctrinally, and as stipulated in Combatant Commander war
plans, the Marine Corps is tasked to fight in major combat operations--
which require a 3.0 MEB force. While the first two of these MEBs are
delivered by Assault Echelon shipping, the third MEB, the reinforcing
and supporting element, is provided by the afloat prepositioning force
in what is envisioned to be the MPF(F) with all of its vertical and
surface maneuver and sustainment capabilities.
Assault Echelon Lift Requirements and Current Capabilities
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) have determined that the requirement for shipping to
support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift is 38 total
amphibious assault ships as stated in a 7 January 2009 letter to HASC,
SASC, HAC-D, and SAC-D committee chairmen. Assuming that the current
operational availability for these ships is maintained over the long
term, a 38 ship inventory will ensure there are at least 34 ships
available at any time. This 34 ship inventory best fits the load
requirements in terms of vehicle square, cargo cube, aviation deck
spots and personnel necessary to support the timely offload and
sustainment of a 2.0 MEB force should it be called upon to conduct
amphibious operations. Understanding this requirement, and in light of
the fiscal constraints with which the Navy is faced, the SecNav, CNO
and CMC stated in the same 7 January 2009 letter to HASC, SASC, HAC-D,
and SAC-D committee chairmen that the Department of the Navy would
sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon.
This 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat support and
combat service support elements of the MEB but has been adjudged to be
adequate in meeting the needs of all parties within today's fiscal
limitations.
With this basis in mind, the Navy currently has a total of 31
Assault Echelon ships in commission, which does not meet the standard
for providing 2.0 MEBs of amphibious lift.
As directed by the FY 2009 NDAA, the Navy moved funding for the two
MPF(F) LHA(R)s in the FY09 President's Budget from the MPF(F) budget
line to the Assault Echelon budget line to mitigate risk, increase
operational flexibility, and provide a more robust aviation capability
within this force thus enabling the 2.0 MEBs to be sourced from both
the East and West coasts. This move was reflected in the Navy's FY10
program submittal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Though
integral to reinforcing and supporting the USMC's 2.0 MEB Assault
Echelon force, MPF(F) MEB is not considered a part of the Assault
Echelon since it does not have a capability to conduct forcible entry.
Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron Capabilities and
Enhancements
The Marine Corps estimate is that the loss of the MPF(F) LHA(R),
MLP, and the Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships does not
have a direct impact on the service lives of existing MPF ships.
However, it is expected that a full recapitalization of legacy MPS
squadrons must occur in the 2020s. By that time, existing MPF AMSEA and
WATERMAN ships will have reached the end of their expected service
lives. In anticipation of that eventuality, the Marine Corps, as part
of a wider Department of the Navy effort, is seeking key enhancements
to our current MPS program to give legacy Maritime Prepositioning Ship
squadrons additional at-sea vehicle and equipment transfer and
selective offload capabilities in the near term, and to emphasize
capabilities that will guide development of MPF (Future) squadrons and
seabasing capabilities over the long term.
We are pursuing specific enhancements that provide for increased
battle force engagement, irregular warfare, and security force
assistance capabilities, as well as improved selective offload and in-
stream offloading options in austere locations.
(1) Incorporating MPF(F)-designated T-AKE's 12-14, previously
funded in FYs 09 and 10, into our current MPS squadrons, thereby
enabling pallet-level stowage of approximately 25 percent of MPS
sustainment stocks for at-sea selective offload to support exercises,
experimentation/demonstrations, and contingency operations.
(2) Development and operational testing of a revised Mobile Landing
Platform MLP to enable at-sea transfer of vehicles, personnel, and
supplies from MPS LMSRs to Landing Craft Air-Cushioned (LCAC) for
delivery ashore.
(3) Technology insertion and integration of sea state-3 capable
ramps, pendulation controls system cranes, and LCAC interface features
within Joint High-Speed Vessels, MPS LMSRs, and Roll-On/Roll-Off
Discharge Facility(s) (RRDF), respectively.
These enhancements will increase the Department of the Navy's
ability to engage, respond, and project power across the range of
military operations.
Conclusion
The loss of MPF(F) LHA(R), MLP, and LMSR lift capacity
significantly jeopardizes the established Marine Corps 3 MEB, MEF-level
doctrine for sustained major combat operations forcible entry
requirements and does not enable maneuver and sustainment operations
from the seabase as conceptually envisioned. Effective MEF-level
vertical and surface maneuver capabilities are necessary to provide the
full complement of warfighting capabilities and longer-term sustainment
capacity.
The loss of the MPF(F) MEB's MEF-level reinforcing and supporting
capabilities will require continued reliance on today's Maritime
Prepositioning Ships program which possesses less overall operational
speed and employment flexibility, when compared to MPF(F), and poses
greater operational risk.
While potential enhancements to today's MPS squadrons would provide
vastly improved capabilities for in-stream offloading and delivery of
personnel, supplies, and equipment ashore, such enhancements would not
fully enable legacy MPS squadrons to provide the full range and depth
of vertical and surface maneuver capabilities necessary to reinforce
and support 2.0 MEB assault echelon forces during MEF-level forcible
entry operations from the seabase.
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