[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-14]
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 3, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Bill Natter, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 3, 2009, U.S. Special Operations Command:
Challenges and Opportunities................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 3, 2009........................................... 25
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TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2009
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Shuster, Hon. Bill, a Representative from Pennsylvania,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 2
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 1
WITNESSES
Carstens, Roger D., Lt. Col. (Ret.) U.S. Army Special Forces,
Non-Resident Fellow, Center for a New American Security........ 6
Martinage, Robert, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments.......................................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Carstens, Roger D............................................ 66
Martinage, Robert............................................ 31
Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking
Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee............................................... 30
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. Welcome. We will go ahead and get started with
our hearing.
We are going to get interrupted, as seems to happen
frequently. But we will get started and at least have the
witnesses give their testimony and take the votes and come
back. It shouldn't be that long. Should be, I think, three
suspension votes, which takes about 20 minutes longer than it
should, but we will take about 45 minutes probably. We will
have that break and come back and try and do that.
And hopefully we will be able to draw up some more members.
I think the weather yesterday disrupted some schedules.
But we appreciate our witnesses being here with us today.
We have Robert Martinage, who is a senior fellow for the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Mr. Roger
Carstens, who is a non-resident fellow at the Center for a New
American Security. And we have asked them here to give us their
perspectives on where the Special Operations Command is at,
where it needs to go, what it does well, what it can do
better--something that is of particular interest to this
subcommittee.
We are very, very focused on what the Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) is doing. They are growing, as we know, as the
demands on their talents have grown. We are trying to grow the
force, so one of our big concerns is how can we do that process
and do it in a way to make sure we maintain the quality.
Because you don't find Special Operations Forces (SOF) people
just walking around the streets. There is a special set of
talents, and we want to make sure we maintain that very, very
high level of quality.
And then, also, they have been the lead organization in the
counterterrorism effort throughout the world. This subcommittee
has had the opportunity to travel to the Philippines, Iraq,
Afghanistan, a whole bunch of different places where SOCOM
forces are taking the lead in combating violent extremism in a
variety of ways, certainly with kinetic action, identifying
high-value targets and disrupting terrorist networks, but also
with nonkinetic actions, indirect action that focuses on
classic counterinsurgency of training local communities to
fight off insurgencies before they can take root and providing
for those local communities in a way that discourages
insurgency.
So, I think there is a lot to learn from what SOCOM is up
to. And we are, you know, just amazed at what they are doing
throughout the world. They are making a difference in being
highly successful in many, many places, some of which are in
the news and some of which aren't. But their talents, I think,
have really been a major, major factor in our successes thus
far against the violent extremist networks, like al Qaeda, that
challenge us.
With that, Mr. Miller has not joined us yet, the ranking
member--he is on his way--but I will yield to Mr. Shuster for
whatever opening comments he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL SHUSTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
PENNSYLVANIA, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Shuster. In light of the fact that they just called a
vote, I am going to be extremely brief so we can get their
statements in, and just echo much of what Mr. Smith said. It is
so important we do this right and we hear from other folks that
are knowledgeable on this subject and learn from them.
Also, I would like to ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Miller, who has a statement for the record, to be submitted in
its entirety.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Shuster. And, with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Smith. Great. Thanks.
And I think we will try to get Mr. Martinage in. If we can
keep it in the 5- to 10-minute realm, we will hear your opening
statement, and then we will break and come back.
You are on.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Martinage. Great. Well, first off, I want to thank you
and the committee for the opportunity to appear here today to
share my thoughts on the challenges and opportunities facing
U.S. Special Operations Forces. I would just like to emphasize
a few points that I have raised in my written statement, which,
I guess, is part of the record, and allow time for follow-on
discussion.
As I think everyone here is aware, SOF have really figured
prominently in U.S. military operations since 2001 and have
become central to the implementation of the U.S. national
defense strategy. Reflecting that reality, the operation tempo
currently being sustained by SOF is the highest in its history.
Looking ahead, the future security environment, we believe,
will likely be characterized by three trends: one, the
continuation and intensification of violent Islamic radicalism;
the potential uprise of China or other authoritarian states as
more aggressive political-military competitors; and the
increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Of course, SOCOM will need to be shaped, sized, and
postured for all three of these challenges. But this afternoon
I really want to focus on the continuation of war against
violent Islamic extremism and irregular warfare more broadly.
If you want to talk about those other two topics, I would be
happy to do so.
So I have organized my thoughts really into three
conceptual bins: first, what are some of the institutional or
policy changes within Special Operations Command, or SOCOM;
second, what are some high-priority investments for SOCOM's
subordinate commands; and, third, what are some steps that the
general purpose forces--the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps--might take to contribute to the irregular warfare
mission or enable SOF.
So, using that to set the stage, I will start from the top.
I would like to suggest two potential institutional changes for
SOCOM. The first is, consideration should be given to the
establishment of a joint irregular warfare command. I mean,
although that is a contentious idea, I think a strong argument
can be made that the indirect warfare part of SOCOM's
portfolio--meaning unconventional warfare, foreign internal
defense, civil affairs, and psychological operations--are
underrepresented bureaucratically. As a reflection of that,
over the past two decades, SOCOM has never been commanded by a
Special Forces officer, and, conversely, every SOCOM commander
has climbed the direct action ladder, and most have held at
least one senior-level command in Joint Special Operations
Command, or JSOC.
So, in addition to centralizing the management of irregular
warfare-related doctrine, organization, training, equipment,
and career path, a joint irregular warfare command would also
be better able to compete for resources and advocate indirect
warfare strategies within SOCOM and the broader Department of
Defense (DOD). This type of organization would also serve as a
needed counterbalance to JSOC within SOCOM, and could also be a
proponent for Special Operations approaches to irregular
warfare within the conventional joint force, which, as you
know, is dominated by general purpose forces. So it would be an
opportunity, really, to give SOF a louder voice in debates
about irregular warfare strategy.
The second SOCOM-wide change that I think merits some
consideration are options for forging a closer, two-way
relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At its
core, the war against Islamic terrorist groups is an
intelligence and Special Operations-intensive war. Making full
use of special authorities to wage this indirect, clandestine,
and covert war is essential.
This should entail not only integrating CIA capabilities
with those of both Black and White SOF, but regularly
leveraging the CIA's Title 50 foreign intelligence authorities
for SOF operations through the flexible and routine detailing
of SOF personnel to the Agency. Ideally, personnel should not
only be able to move back and forth from CIA stations and SOF
ground units, but also to compete for selected mid- and senior-
level leadership positions in either organization.
All right, now I would like to shift quickly to some high-
priority investments for SOCOM subordinate commands. I would
like to quickly make six points.
First, consideration should be given to changing the
regional orientation of the five active Special Forces groups.
The present configuration is really a legacy of the Cold War
and is poorly aligned with current and emerging strategic
challenges. For example, responsibility for Africa, a key
region in the war against violent Islamic radicalism, is
divided among three Special Forces groups. Conversely, the
Fifth Special Forces Group not only has responsibility for the
Middle East and the Persian Gulf, which arguably is a pretty
big area of responsibility currently, but also Central Asia and
the Horn of Africa. So, really, this regional orientation needs
to be relooked at, and I have some thoughts about that.
Second, serious consideration should be given to expanding
Special Operations rotary-wing aviation capability, Special
Operations helicopters. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) did a lot of important, very good things in terms of
preparing SOF for the future, including, most notably, a one-
third expansion of SOF ground forces. The problem, however, was
there was no proportional increase in the fixed- and rotary-
wing aviation required to support those ground forces. And this
shortfall really is something that needs to be addressed as
soon as possible. In Iraq and Afghanistan, conventional Army
aviation units are relied upon to provide lift support for
about two-thirds of SOF grounds units. In Afghanistan, nearly
50 percent of the lift request to support Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, or JSOTF-A, are routinely
unmet.
So, simply put, more SOCOM-controlled helicopters are
needed to move and support a busy and expanding SOF ground
force. I suggest in the paper that creation of at least two
additional Special Operations helicopter battalions, hopefully
over the next five years. Given the altitude challenges in
Afghanistan, the need to operate at high altitude with
relatively heavy payloads, the top priority should be standing
up a new MH-47 Chinook battalion to support White SOF.
To accomplish this in a timely manner, it is going to be
necessary to redouble ongoing efforts to recruit, assess, and
train helicopter crews. That really is the pacing factor in
terms of this. And, more specifically, additional funding will
be needed to increase the number of instructors and expand the
limited training infrastructure currently available to the
Special Operations Aviation Training Company in Fort Campbell,
Kentucky. Options should also be explored for having the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps contribute to the Special Operations
aviation lift requirement.
The third point is, for the same reasons I discussed a
minute ago, it is also necessary to recapitalize and expand the
fixed-wing aviation fleet under Air Force Special Operations
Command (AFSOC). This should entail both additional C-130
variants, as well as smaller aircraft like the C-27J Spartan
and single- or dual-engine aircraft in some numbers similar to
the U-28s.
Fourth, given the importance of winning over the hearts and
minds of local populations in a future security environment
that is likely to be characterized by persistent irregular
warfare, serious consideration should be given to further
expanding active-duty civil affairs and psychological
operations (PSYOPS) force structure.
Fifth, Air Force Special Operations Command clearly needs
additional unmanned combat air systems, or UCAS, capacity to
provide persistent airborne reconnaissance and strike coverage
globally. While SOCOM is in the process of expanding AFSOC's
fleet so that it can provide 10 combat air patrols with a mix
of Predator and Reaper systems, it still falls far short of the
30 orbits that is the stated requirement just for the Central
Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR).
Now, of course, the conventional Air Force should also
provide some of that capacity for persistent surveillance and
strike coverage. The question is, what is the appropriate
balance? But I think, clearly, additional organic capacity
within Air Force Special Operations Command is needed.
Sixth, and finally, Air Force Special Operations Command's
combat aviation advisor, or Aviation FID, Foreign Internal
Defense, capacity needs to be further expanded. At the
direction of the 2006 QDR, the Sixth Special Operations
Squadron, where this capability resides in SOCOM, is doubling
its capacity from 110 to 230 authorized advisors. That
expansion is still insufficient. And to close that gap between
available capacity and demand, SOCOM should consider creating
an irregular warfare wing that would have two core missions:
providing specialized air power necessary to support U.S.-led
irregular warfare operations globally, and training and
enabling partner nations to develop, sustain, and employ air
power in combating internal threats.
Now I would just like to briefly wrap up with a few
comments about how the general purpose forces might better
support the irregular warfare mission and enable SOF.
Basically, the Army and the Marine Corps must develop the
capabilities and capacities needed to train and advise foreign
security forces in multiple, widely dispersed countries
simultaneously. What does this mean? For the Army, it means a
significant shift away from heavy or future combat system
brigade combat teams (BCTs) toward infantry or security
cooperation BCTs and, preferably, a much smaller security force
assistance or other specialized irregular warfare units. A
similar shift needs to occur in the Marine Corps.
It would also be helpful if Army took steps to better
support SOF ground forces, especially with respect to rotary-
wing aviation and logistics support. Currently, the structure
of the brigade combat team and supporting brigades, like the
combat aviation brigades, significantly constrains their
ability to support or enable SOF.
The Navy really needs to take on the steady-state maritime
foreign internal defense and security force assistance mission.
I can share some details with you later on, if you are
interested in what that might entail, and the Air Force----
Mr. Smith. I will think we will probably have to wrap up on
your Air Force point, because we are getting close to time and
the members need to run over and vote.
Mr. Martinage. Okay. The Air Force really--just like the
Sixth Special Operations Squadron (SOS) needs additional
capacity, the regular Air Force should stand up dedicated
irregular warfare and aviation advisor squadrons. And that
would have a number of implications for the Air Force. But it
would be good to have that capacity both in the regular Air
Force and AFSOC.
And, with that, I will wrap up.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinage can be found in
the Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Smith. You raised a lot of issues, most of which I
think we all want to talk about further. So we will sprint over
and vote, hopefully quickly. Best estimation, based on previous
experience, is that we will be back at 4:30. So we will try to
get back sooner than then, but, for planning purposes, that is
the most likely outcome. We will be back.
[Recess.]
Mr. Smith. I think we will go ahead and dive back in. The
goal is still to be done no later than 5:30. So we will hear
from Mr. Carstens, then open it up for questions.
STATEMENT OF ROGER D. CARSTENS, LT. COL. (RET.) U.S. ARMY
SPECIAL FORCES, NON-RESIDENT FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY
Mr. Carstens. Chairman Smith and distinguished members of
the committee, I am honored to appear before you today, and I
thank you for your invitation to discuss the challenges and
opportunities that will face U.S. Special Operations Forces.
As a 20-year veteran of Ranger battalions and Special
Forces units, I was given the opportunity to conduct a year-
long study to catalog how SOF has changed since 9/11 and where
SOF should go in the future. My study took me to Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa, as well as 13 military
locations, ranging from the National Training Center in
California to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. My findings and
recommendations emanate from those visits, and I look forward
to sharing them with you today.
With the chairman's approval, I would like to submit for
the record a more comprehensive review of my findings and
summarize verbally.
Mr. Smith. Without objection.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee
files and can be viewed upon request.]
Mr. Carstens. Special Operations Forces have spearheaded
the war on terror from the very first days of the campaign in
Afghanistan to the current battlefields of Iraq. Some of their
missions and successes are well-known; others, such as the
quiet battle being waged against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines,
less so. But one thing seems certain: The demand for SOF in the
near and long term is likely to increase. As conventional
forces depart Iraq, SOF is projected to stay. As United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM) grows, so will SOF participation in
Africa. And, as pressure on the defense budget grows,
policymakers will increasingly look to SOF as an efficient and
effective return on investment.
To that end, senior leaders must be aware of the issues
that face SOF and of the choices that they will have to make to
best position this capable force for the future. This study has
identified some of those key issues and has derived a set of
findings as a result. And I will go through them quickly.
Number one, SOF must ``right-size'' growth to support QDR
2006 increases. The 2006 QDR dictated substantial growth in
personnel and equipment for SOCOM. These increases, however,
have not been right-sized to meet the current and future
demands of SOF. As a result, the 2010 QDR needs to focus
heavily on right-sizing growth to support 2006 gains, as well
as growing SOF across the spectrum to meet emerging missions.
Number two, SOF must strike a balance between the indirect
and the direct approaches. Conventional wisdom holds that the
Special Operations community has not struck an effective or an
appropriate balance between the direct and the indirect
approaches. While the case for imbalance may be overstated, the
need to address this issue is not.
Number three, SOF and general purpose forces, GPF, must
seek a division of labor. As SOF responsibilities grow,
policymakers and military leaders will need to determine where
GPF can take on SOF roles and where SOF has a comparative
advantage. SOCOM and GPF must find the right balance.
Number four, SOCOM must evaluate roles and missions to
address duplication and better balance resources. Seven years
into the global war on terror, SOCOM tactical units are heavily
engaged in direct and indirect actions around the world.
However, there is still some confusion as to who should be
doing what.
Number five, SOF must conduct acquisition at the speed of
war. SOF has traditionally been the lead in rapidly taking
equipment and putting it into the hands of its operators. A
lack of acquisition executives at SOCOM with Special Operations
experience, combined with the risk-averse approach to bringing
in new soldier systems, have dramatically slowed the
procurement process. SOCOM needs to reverse this trend and
bring back the days of soft primacy in the arena of combat
development and acquisition.
Six, DOD must ensure enabler and logistical support to SOF
remaining in Iraq as the conventional force withdraws. It is
clear that the conventional military forces that are now in
Iraq will draw down in the near future. It is likely that SOF
will not be drawing down. SOF, however, does not have the
logistics architecture to support such prolonged deployments.
Basing, messing, fuel, motor pools, medical facilities,
ammunition resupply, and base security, to name a few areas of
concern, reside within the conventional force. Civilian and
military leaders alike will have to make value judgments as to
what the conventional military leaves behind.
Number seven, SOCOM must receive more authority to manage
and recruit personnel. The 2006 QDR was generous to SOCOM,
adding over 13,000 people to its rolls. The services, however,
retain a strong voice in the management of these Special
Operators. SOCOM should have more of a say in how they are
managed, and that may require revising Title 10.
Recommendations that follow from these findings, there are
five:
Number one, encourage SOCOM to re-evaluate component roles
and missions. In a time of decreasing budgets, the demise of
the wartime supplemental, and the confusion in the field as to
who should be doing what, it is necessary for SOCOM to re-
evaluate the mission it expects its components to execute.
Two, increase interagency participation in Special
Operations. In the early days of the fight in Afghanistan, Army
Special Forces and CIA officers used their unique talents and
congressional authorities to great effect. Such efforts in
bringing these two elements together, as well as other members
of the interagency, will allow for the meldings of Titles 10,
22, and 50 during the conduct of operations.
Three, dramatically increase SOF to meet future demands.
SOCOM must match the missions that they expect SOF to conduct
with the forces and enablers that are required. SOF will have
an increased role in a future that will likely include a
persistent presence, persistent engagement, and shaping
operations. Such steps as dramatically increasing the size of
the Special Operations Aviation Regiment, formalizing the
creation of a Special Operations aviation training battalion,
adding another Ranger battalion, increasing more Special
Operations Command (SOC) personnel authorization, bolstering
civil affairs, and growing more in-house enablers, like
unmanned aerial systems and intelligence analysts, are prudent
choices for the Defense Department to make in this environment.
Number four, establish a permanent position on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for a Special Operations flag officer. All the
services currently have elements organized under SOCOM. While
SOCOM sits as a combatant command, it is not adequately
represented at the JCS level in the Pentagon, where uniformed
services conduct strategy, planning, and resourcing decisions.
There have been discussions in the past of creating a
completely separate service of SOF to address this shortfall in
representation. While this has some appeal to address the
current and future military challenges, it is not appealing in
an environment of constrained resources. The services have
significant organization, support, and logistics scales, which
SOF would have to recreate at significant cost in terms of both
resources and time. A more timely effect could be achieved by
having a SOF representative sit on the JCS as an equal partner.
Lastly, restructure the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity and Interdependent
Capabilities to report directly to the Secretary of Defense.
The ASD SO/LIC & IC is currently organized under the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. At a time when ASD
SO/LIC & IC is functioning as the Secretary of Defense's
primary advisor on SOF and countering extremists, this is
ineffective. This advice and oversight extends across all the
services and agencies of the Department. As such, ASD SO/LIC &
IC should be elevated to a level where oversight and
coordination can more effectively include all aspects of the
Department.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will conclude by
thanking you for giving me the opportunity to come and share my
thoughts with you. I hope that you found this testimony useful.
I will be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carstens can be found in the
Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
We will get to questions, and we will stick to the five-
minute rule. Typically, on the subcommittee level, we have time
to get around to a second round, but I find it moves
efficiently if we stick to the five-minute rule for everybody,
including me.
The first question I have, really for both of you: There
are a lot of items here, and I very much agree with where you
are going on this, particularly the idea of elevating SOCOM in
a variety of different places. They have such a vastly more
important role now than they did seven, eight years ago. Giving
them greater status on the Joint Chiefs, increasing their
acquisition ability, increasing cooperation, I think all of
that is very good. And as you also list through the areas where
they could use more resources, I can't disagree with any of
them.
I am also mindful of the fact that there is simply no way--
particularly in going through Mr. Martinage's list, they are
not going to get all of that. I guess the question I would
have: What is the most important? What are the one or two
things in that list?
You mentioned more fixed-wing, more helicopters, more
personnel in general, more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)--a
bunch of different issues. I am not sure if you had a chance to
talk about that in your actual remarks, but in your statement
you talk about on the Navy side more Sea Air Land (SEAL)
delivery systems, more for the boat teams. There is a lot of
``more'' in here.
So I have already asked the question. If you said, here are
the two things that, if you gave this to SOCOM, this is what
would really give them the greater operational capacity to the
maximum extent, most bang for the buck, if you will.
Mr. Martinage. Number one for me would be the rotary-wing
aviation piece. I think increasing the capacity of the 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) is probably job
one.
Beyond that, I am really torn. I have five that I was going
to suggest. But I think probably number two----
Mr. Smith. That is the thing about being in a think tank.
You guys figure it out. I understand.
Mr. Martinage. I will tell you what the second one is. I
think I would go with probably the combat aviation advisors,
the Sixth Special Operations Squadron, just because I see a big
demand for that down the road. That is really running very
close with the PSYOPS and civil affairs capacity. So I snuck
three in on you.
Mr. Smith. Okay. And the same question, Mr. Carstens,
actually, from your perspective.
Mr. Carstens. Sir, I have to agree with Bob. I think we
need to get dedicated SOF Air. That can be done in numerous
ways, but one would be to increase the size of the Special
Operations Aviation Regiment and formalize the creation of a
Special Operations aviation training battalion to better
prepare their crews and their aviators, because right now they
are taking everything out of hide.
The second thing would not really cost much. It would have
hidden costs. But I really think we need to take a look at
Title 10 again and take a look at trying to give the SOCOM
commander more control over personnel. We can go into great
depth on that, but I will throw out one example.
If a Navy intel analyst swings by a SEAL unit, goes to
Iraq, gets numerous combat deployments under his belt, becomes
an expert after two or three years of manhunting and dealing
with special operations, what he might find is that in his next
assignment he is going out to sea to serve a shipborne duty and
he may never rotate back to the Special Operations community.
We need to somehow fix that in either closing the loop or
giving them a skill identifier, which gives the Navy a chance
and also the Army and the Air Force and Marines Special
Operations a chance to get some of these people back.
That is one example; there are many. But we need to get
more personnel control back to Admiral Olson.
Mr. Martinage. Can I throw in one more thing? Two of the
other areas that I would have suggested are the fixed-wing
aviation and then the UCAS, or unmanned combat air systems.
But, really, the question is, what is the appropriate
balance between SOCOM and, in this case, AFSOC and the big Air
Force? So if the Air Force steps up to provide more of that
capacity, it is a less urgent demand for AFSOC. If they don't,
that increases the priority of those things.
Mr. Smith. That is a major concern of the committee, is on
the air wing side, because the Air Force has so many demands on
them right now, so many programs that are a little bit behind
in terms of the acquisition need, certainly with airlift, with
the C-17--and those folks from the Northwest are familiar with
the tanker issue--that we fear that, because of the dependency
that SOCOM and AFSOC, in particular, has on the big Air Force,
the Air Force doing all this stuff, what is left over? Not
enough. And I think that is a big problem.
I have a couple other question areas, but I will suspend
those until later and yield back the balance of my time and
call on Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. You are starting to sound like an
appropriator: ``Just one more thing, one more thing.''
My question is concerning the personnel. I think a lot of
people on the committee have expressed concern that, as we
start to increase the force number, that we don't degrade the
quality. I spent time at Coronado last year, and General Kernan
was getting, he told us, a lot of pressure from his bosses in
the Navy to make sure the washout rate was reduced. And he was
very concerned about that, as well as folks in the Army I have
talked to. They are concerned about decreasing their criteria
and letting people through that aren't combat-ready. I have
read some information that schools seem to be turning out
people on shorter timelines.
And I just wondered what your thoughts were on that picture
of more people and making sure the quality is there.
Mr. Martinage. Certainly, that is a clear priority. That is
what makes SOF special, is the training of the personnel.
As you know, the goal right now is to send up five new
Special Forces (SF) battalions by the 2013. Two have been
created, leaving three to go. And the big challenges right now,
as you suggested, were the limited size of the recruiting pool;
the high proportion of washouts, as you mentioned; and, sort
of, retention, competition from the private sector, as well as
family pressures.
I think SOCOM has taken pretty good steps to try to address
the challenge of increasing capacity without reducing quality
through the 18X, or 18 X-Ray Program. That has worked out
pretty well. We can argue about the training pipeline and
whether the expansion of that from, like, 400 to 700 has
actually had an effect on quality. People have vastly varying
views on that. And retention bonuses for senior operators have
also been important.
I think, going ahead, the question is, if this is really
important--and I think it is--to achieve the SF battalion
growth that has been directed, what else might be done? And I
think one thing is retention incentives for mid-career
personnel, extending some operator benefits like education
reimbursement to their families.
For you, this is kind of getting in the weeds, but section
517 of the U.S. Code Title 10 restricts the number of E-8s and
E-9s in each service. That has already been waived for JSOC.
That same thing could be waived for SOF across the board, which
would prevent some very seasoned operators from being pushed
out the door because of that.
And then lastly, if possible, to open up the Qualification
Course (Q-Course) to other folks by making it easier for
Marines, Navy, or Air Force guys to transfer into the Army to
go into the Q-Course.
But it is a challenge. I think it is important to get the
growth, but, as you suggest, it is important to keep the
quality up. I think those types of steps would be helpful.
Mr. Shuster. Colonel.
Mr. Carstens. Sir, what is painful is you all are searching
for the same guy. You all want that intelligent athlete that is
comfortable in the chaotic and ambiguous environment. So
whether it is Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) or the
SEALs or Green Berets, you are all looking for that same guy.
Right now, they are too experienced. The Army Special
Forces School is actually doing quite well. I talked to a
pretty mean, grizzled SF battalion commander, and I said,
``Tell me about the 18 X-Ray Program.'' I used to run the Q-
Course. I expected him to tell me it was an abysmal failure.
Instead, he looked me right in the eye and said, ``They are the
best soldiers I have ever had. They are 10 times better than
you and I were in our youth.'' And he gave me a few vignettes
to show me how good these young kids are. So I think the SF
course is doing quite well.
The SEAL course is a little more challenging. No matter
what they do, it seems they still get the same failure rate. It
is a very tough course, very demanding. Even if they get more
people going into the course, they are still getting the same
numbers coming out. The Navy is working hard. I had a chance to
visit Coronado. They are trying to get more guys through the
pipeline.
Mr. Smith. I think it is the whole water thing. That adds a
layer to it. It just isn't there. I talk to people about it and
they say that is what makes it very difficult, because all
these skills are hard to find, and you throw into it, ``Oh, by
the way, you have to hang out in freezing cold water for a few
hours several times a day.'' How you get around that, I don't
know. But you are right--go ahead.
Mr. Carstens. That had an effect on me. I thought it would
be much easier to be a Green Beret than a SEAL.
I am sure Dave Silverman is around. He is a tough little
guy.
There are a few things that we need to take a look at, and
one is recruiting from different backgrounds. I know SOCOM
right now is trying to look at perhaps recruiting from legal
aliens. And that has a benefit for a few different reasons. It
increases our pool. And wouldn't you want to have a guy who is
a legal alien in the United States who came from the Sudan, who
speaks local dialects, who can get through our program,
culturally aware, and can go and do the missions and become a
full-fledged member of the Special Operations community? There
is a thought.
Another thought is making sure we target the right high
school and collegiate areas. For some reason, some of our
recruiting programs are not quite hitting that college athlete
who is bored of going to college or that high school wrestler
who wants another challenge and doesn't necessarily want to go
on to higher education. We have to do a little better job of
targeted recruiting and maybe open up the aperture of who we
are recruiting from.
Lastly, you get the pipeline problems of just increasing
the capacity of the schools. I know with the Q-Course, we
didn't want to have non-Green Berets in the course because you
want to have Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority
over your students. Maybe it is time to go into the contracting
world and give up that UCMJ authority just to make sure we have
the right number of instructors to keep the pipeline
functioning properly.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Are we going to have another round?
Mr. Smith. Yes, certainly.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this today.
Two quick questions, Lieutenant Colonel Carstens: With Fort
Bragg and Lejeune being on either end of my district, I read
with great admiration for the work you have done and wanted to
ask you, you mentioned on page three of your testimony that DOD
must ensure enabler and logistic support for SOF remaining in
Iraq as well as conventional forces withdrawal, yet you did not
list it as one of your top two priorities.
I am concerned, since we know the President was at Camp
Lejeune when we were there with him just this past Friday, that
day is coming now. We do have a certain date after all the
debate and discussions. And so, how critical is it for us to
get them logistic support? Because this is on the horizon now.
I want to know if you think, well, they can make it a
couple of years; or they can only make it six months; or they
can make it four or five years. How urgent do you think this
is, on the logistics support question?
Mr. Carstens. Sir, I think it is incredibly important. I
don't think they can make it a few days. When the conventional
military leaves, when the unit takes off, it is going to take
with it a lot of the enablers and a lot of the support that
would have afforded Special Forces an operating base.
So if you go to either Iraq or Afghanistan, Djibouti,
Bagram, if there are Green Berets and SEALs sitting in the
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs), if the
conventional force leaves, they suddenly take with them their
aviation support, their basing support, the people who run the
dining facility, the contractors. And it is going to be much
harder. Something as simple as putting fuel in vehicles, be
they rotary-wing or be they Humvees and Ground Mobility
Vehicles (GMVs), they are going to have a critical problem.
The one thing I can say is, no matter where I went, if I
went anywhere in the United States, or if I went to Coronado to
talk to the SEALs, or Lejeune to talk to the Marines, I would
ask that question that we all love to ask: What keeps you awake
at night? And every single officer and Non-Commissioned Officer
(NCO) I talked to said, ``We are stressed out that, if we fold
up in Iraq, we are not going to have logistics support to keep
operations up and going.'' So while it did not make my list of
the top two, I know that it would probably make the top one of
everyone in the Special Operations community right now.
Mr. McIntyre. That is the urgency that I wanted to hear in
terms of what we need to focus on.
Mr. Smith. I wanted to follow up on that. Is the 30,000 to
50,000 that the President talked about, is that the right
number? Does that calm some of those concerns? Or is there
still a concern that there is going to be too much pulled out?
Mr. Carstens. Sir, that is a great question. Some of the
guys I talked to in the Fort Bragg area--and I didn't pulse the
Navy SEAL community on this, sadly--but they feel the number
seems a little more right. And yet the question is, again, what
is left behind?
Bob and I had a chance to go to SOCOM just this past week,
and what they are worried about, even with big numbers being
thrown about, with troops staying in Iraq, are you going to be
able to break down the conventional military unit to leave
behind what SOF needs?
A good example, rotary-wing aviation assets. When an
infantry BCT rotates back to the United States, it pretty much
has to take everything with it, because if it doesn't, it
becomes combat-ineffective. And on the report manning
requirements that filter up through the highest levels of the
Pentagon, that is not a good thing. So, trying to convince a
BCT to leave behind an enabler is going to be hard to do.
What SOCOM would like to do, in working with the GPF, it
gets into the regular warfare directive. What can you do to
help us? Can you disaggregate the BCT and just leave us
something? Can you disaggregate a corps and leave the aviation
to the mess hall facilities?
If the GPF can work with SOCOM under the rubric of
irregular warfare and break down the BCT to extend and
disaggregate its capabilities, we will have a fighting chance
to answer that question in the affirmative, that it be done.
Mr. McIntyre. That is a perfect follow-up, my point
exactly. Is there a particular ratio generally where you can
say, like, for every special operator is it 1:1 or 1:1.5, 1:2,
in terms of logistic support, typically?
Mr. Carstens. My answer would be that I am not sure. I wish
I could say I was a little smarter on that. I am probably not
the brightest lightbulb in this room, sadly.
I think it comes down to more like packages. Whether the
ratio might not be right, but SOFs want to make sure, when
someone leaves, they have X number of intel analysts, X number
of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) people to make radio
communication right, and X number of dedicated rotary-wing air,
and probably another list. So it might not be the ratio; it
might be whatever package they show up with.
Mr. McIntyre. Right. That is logical.
And one last quick question in the few seconds I have left.
Where do you see the strongest resistance to elevating SOF to a
Joint Chiefs of Staff level? Is it certain personalities, or is
it a certain branch of the services, or is it just the
tradition that that has not occurred? Can you identify where
you think the resistance to that idea would come from?
Mr. Carstens. Sir, it hasn't been floated around much, and
I believe the actual chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and
the service representatives would probably have some heartburn
with that. But I guess my thought is, why shouldn't United
States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) be there, why
shouldn't U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) be there, why
shouldn't SOCOM?
Right now, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
service representatives that basically argue for what they
want. As the Army four-star, I am really not worried about the
joint force, I am worried about the U.S. Army. We need to break
that down and take these cross-pollenating entities like SOCOM,
STRATCOM, and TRANSCOM and give them a voice on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, because right now they have none.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. That is an excellent idea.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have kind of a comment first, and then a question, just
because I missed part of the presentation I am interested in
hearing. You talk about the UCMJ, and you talked about Special
Operation Forces sort of having their own flag as part of the
Joint Chiefs possibly someday.
One of the concerns that sort of just popped in my head
when you said that--and then you brought up the idea of
independent contractors, like Blackwater or whatever, over
there. And I don't know what the logistics of this--but it is
just something that concerns me, as a former judge advocate in
the Army, is that the line between an independent Special
Operations Forces with its own member of the Joint Chiefs, not
subject to the Army or Navy or whatever, and how they are sort
of perceived by this sort of changing international community
with regard to--bottom line, if one of our guys gets in
trouble, we have to make sure that they are subject to UCMJ and
not some other jurisdiction that we can't control because they
are sort of out there on their own. As of now, you know, if the
guy is a Green Beret, he's part of the Army, obviously.
So there is not a question there, but that is just
something that popped into my head when you were discussing
that. I just want to make sure that we are very careful, if
that actually comes to fruition, that there is a clear
distinction between those guys and guys that are independent
contractors.
But my question is with regard to something that I didn't
get to hear you talk about, and that was the resurrection
potentially of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and how
that could actually play out in this day and age.
Mr. Martinage. You know, the OSS had a lot composed within
it: research and analysis, which now has really been the
Intelligence Community writ large, of which there is a number
of different entities; secret intelligence and activities,
which is now absorbed mostly by SOF and JSOC in particular, and
divided with the CIA and their special activities division; and
the counterespionage role that OSS had is now sort of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
So what does that mean? I think what that means is to
create a new OSS would really require essentially blowing up
the entire national security bureaucracy and starting over, to
some degree.
Mr. Smith. So you are thinking that might be a little
difficult.
Mr. Martinage. I am thinking that it might be a little
difficult, and I am not sure if the disruption would really be
worth it, especially because individual elements like CIA's
Special Activities Division and Special Operations Group and
Black SOF are very effective. Now, that is not to say that
there isn't room for improvement. And that is why I would
stress, I think, three things, but sort of a middle course
between keeping everything the same and blowing everything up:
One, I would say increased institutionalized cooperation
between the CIA and SOCOM, including hybrid career paths so
people can go back and forth between the two.
Two, regional interagency task forces that bring together
the CIA, SOCOM, DOD, and other relevant agencies to solve a
common problem. We have done that already in some areas of the
world, and they have been terrifically effective.
Third, expanded SOCOM authorities, perhaps closer to Title
50. That gets into very contentious ground, but if we can't
make some of those other things work, that might be the
direction where things need to go.
That would be my response to that.
Mr. Carstens. Sir, quickly, that would be a dream of mine.
I would love to serve in that unit. And if I could go back in a
time machine and be in the OSS and do feats of daring and--
well, you know what I am saying. But I don't think, in this era
of constrained resources, that that may be possible. I think
that will be just a bridge too far. So I would recommend a few
things.
Number one, JSOC has actually done a pretty good job of
taking the interagency and bringing it into the military realm.
We need to take that capability that we have learned from in
the last seven years and migrate that down to the CJSOTFs level
for white-side Special Forces and SEALs. There is no reason it
shouldn't have people from the State Department, Department of
the Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency all working
together in, say, Bagram or Balad.
Secondly, migrate Special Forces over to the CIA. And I am
not just talking about onesies and twosies. Why not take a
Special Forces company, just plop them down in Virginia and
say, when you go to that company you are spending a three-year-
long tour working for the Agency? And what that would do is
give ground branch a resident capability in foreign internal
defense, which is not a bad thing.
Thirdly, joint interagency Operational Detachment Alphas
(ODAs). Let's have it go the other direction. Let's take people
from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
Treasury, Department of State and, if they meet the right
criteria, let them serve on a 12-man ODA. Maybe it becomes a
14-man ODA. But how wonderful would that be to be in a foreign
country and have all the authorities right there. You want
Title 50? Well, you have John right over there. You want Title
22? You have Al right over here. But bring the interagency down
to the 12-man ODA, bring it to the Central Intelligence Agency
and, by all means, put it in the CJSOTFs.
Lastly, if we can't win by creating an OSS, that also
argues for taking that four-star officer and putting him on the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and making ASD SO/LIC a
direct report to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Because,
really, the overarching issue is making sure that SOF has a
bigger voice and making sure that the interagency is brought
into the fold.
So we can do it all sorts of levels, from the 12-man ODA
and a line of continuity that goes right up to the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
Mr. Carstens, in your testimony today, you mentioned that--
and this may be have been covered, I came in late, so if it was
covered, you can let me know. But, for my own edification, I
would like to know. In your testimony you said, ``It is likely
that, with the withdrawal of conventional forces in Iraq, the
Special Operations Forces will see even greater demand.'' And
what do you believe their primary mission should be, training
and support or combat operations?
The second part of it is you noted that, in the early days
in Afghanistan, they were a model for interagency cooperation
among the SOF community and the Intelligence Community. And I
was wondering if you could expand on this and offer your
assessment as to what other interagency missions Special
Operations Forces could be involved with, especially your
comments you just made to the prior question.
But are there any lessons to be learned from this success
that could be applied to other interagency missions? It is kind
of a follow-on to the previous discussion.
Mr. Carstens. Yes, sir.
Sir, to answer your first question, do they train or do
they go on combat? And the great answer is: Both. The thing
that people do right now is called combat FID, and that is
foreign internal defense. But you work with your host nation
element, you train them, you take them through tactics,
techniques, and procedures, and then you actually get on the
helicopter and go out and fight with them.
Now, we don't do that everywhere. We don't do that in the
Philippines, and we don't do that in Colombia. That is more
like direct FID. You train the members of the Filipino army or
the special ops, and then you stay in the base camp and they
actually leave to conduct the combat operation.
But in Iraq I think it would be appropriate to keep
conducting combat-level FID. Right there you get into the great
question of, what does the GPF do and what does SOF do? It
would probably be preferable than, when it comes to basic rifle
marksmanship and basic soldiering, that maybe general purpose
forces conduct that level of training for Iraqi forces, be they
police, military or such. But when it gets into the creation of
high-end finishing forces, I think SOF has a role in conducting
that.
By the way, I hope I answered that question, sir?
Mr. Langevin. That is fine.
Mr. Carstens. Okay. And they could be very busy doing that,
by the way. I had a chance to serve with the Iraqi National
Counter-Terror Force when I was in Iraq, and I think that is a
model for how you can take a unit and just keep elevating it
and elevating it to make it a high-end finishing force.
Secondly, on the interagency side, if Special Forces were
to work with the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that
would give them a better training capability in conducting
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare at either
the classified level, to where, if the CIA has a mission in
country X, if it brings along an ODA, a resident capability in
foreign internal defense, they might actually have a more
powerful entity downrange trying to complete that mission.
In working with the State Department, there are places in
Africa where it is hard for a military unit to go to a village
and build a well, to build positive relationships with a
village, because we don't have the proper authorities. And you
have probably been here for all the battles between 1208
funding, 1207 funding, and 1206 funding. If you are working
with the State Department, you suddenly have a positive melding
of authorities. That well does get dug because you are working
with people with Title 22 authorities and Title 22 money.
And I hope I answered that question, too, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Yes. And can either of you expand on the
issue of, perhaps do we need clearer ties between Special
Operations Forces and our intelligence communities? Maybe we
can look at that. Is there sufficient coordination now? Can
that be a greater force multiplier?
Mr. Carstens. I think we have made great strides. In fact,
there is someone in the audience who actually did that in
Afghanistan. He was there during the early days. And I will
have a chance to introduce him to you afterwards.
But the point being, I think we have made incredible
strides in taking the Special Operations community and melding
it together with the intelligence agencies. There is more work
to be done. And I would say, based on the people I have talked
to, that people are seeking that closer cooperation. So I think
we are trending in the right direction. We still have a ways to
go.
Mr. Langevin. What about--probably in the not-too-distant
future, I am hoping even before 2011 when there is more of a
drawdown of U.S. forces, we are still going to have to have, I
am sure, a presence in the area to make sure that we don't have
to go back there in five years. And I expect that Special
Operations Forces will be playing a very effective role, being
stationed outside of Iraq and going in and out when necessary
to back up Iraqi security forces.
Can you maybe expand on that vision? And how will they be
limited, and how will they function the same way if they are
not per se in-country?
Mr. Carstens. I brought that up when I was in Iraq. And
every time I brought that up to a Special Forces officer, they
would kind of push that to the side, because, to them, it just
didn't make sense. Their argument was, why would I want to be
outside the country when I can be inside the country, eating
the same food with my Iraqi counterparts, training with them,
living with them, spending my time with them, building positive
relations, training them, and then fighting together in combat
FID?
Right now, all Special Forces units that are conducting
missions in Iraq or Afghanistan are partnered with a like unit,
an Iraqi or an Afghan unit. And I think that is kind of where
everyone wants to keep that. When you talk to folks, they don't
necessarily want to be outside the theater of operations,
flying in unilaterally to conduct a mission. They would rather
make sure that they are with their partners and that they are
fighting that way.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I have a couple more questions, but I know Mr. Shuster had
some as well. So I will yield to Mr. Shuster for five minutes.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
Mine are back to the personnel situation. We started
talking about a little bit on the recruitment piece of it. I
know that when we were in Coronado, the admiral brought in a
college coach, I don't remember what college, a football coach.
He had a whole group of people trying to figure out how to
better to recruit SEALs.
How has that worked? Is that something you have looked at?
And what is going on on the Army side? You mentioned a little
bit of that recruitment. Are they looking at different ways?
Mr. Carstens. When I was in Coronado--and it was, gosh,
probably about eight or nine months ago--they were still
struggling through that. They had done a few interesting
things, I thought. They were trying to target these audiences,
as you just mentioned. And I think they had also hired a
contracting firm to conduct some pre-Basic Underwater
Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training to make sure that when a
prospective candidate went into that environment, they had more
of a fighting chance to succeed. And what was confounding them
is they still had the same failure rate. They are increasing
the numbers, they are recruiting, they believe, the right guy,
they are providing them with some training that would make them
physically and mentally harder before they go into the training
environment, and yet the failure rate is the same.
They may have made some different gains in the last eight
to nine months, but when I was there, they were still
struggling through that, and it was frustrating to them. They
want more numbers, and that gets into a whole other
conversation. More numbers are going to allow them to fill the
requirements they have at the higher levels of, say, 2003,
2004, and 2005. The trick is getting people into the pipeline
and then out.
On the Army side, they have had great success with the 18
X-Ray Program. And the Army is also doing a training
environment to allow a prospective candidate to show up at the
start of the Special Forces Qualification Course having already
received some land navigation, some military physical training
and such.
So we are trying to give everyone a chance to just show up
and be as best as they possibly can. Because, at the end of the
day, it is not about how physically fit you are. We are working
on someone's ability to thrive in an ambiguous environment. It
is more mental than physical. But the physical portion many
times is what we use to test the mental.
Mr. Shuster. What about diversity? Are we trying to go into
different people with different backgrounds? I know they talked
about that. I don't know what kind of success rate they are
having with people from culturally different backgrounds.
And that goes into the next question of talking about
foreign nationals. What are the thoughts of recruiting foreign
nationals to come into our Special Forces and being able to
operate in those parts of the world that we will never be able
to, as Americans, be able to fully understand and appreciate?
Mr. Carstens. I appreciate that question. I can tell you
from the Q-Course side and the BUD/S side, I don't know the
answer to that.
I can tell you that SOCOM writ large and SOCOM in Tampa has
put a major effort into trying to work through that with the
Pentagon. They have been talking to OSD Personnel and
Readiness, they have been talking to the Department of the Navy
and the Army and the Air Force and such. They have kind of
spread out a broad attack to find out what they need to do that
would legally allow them to recruit legal aliens. They have
even wrestled with the idea of perhaps coming to you at one
point and asking for another Lodge Act.
Mr. Smith. The regular forces--there are legal aliens in
the regular forces, are there not? Or am I wrong about that?
Mr. Carstens. Sir, you can join the Army. But what SOCOM
wants to do is fast-track people. You know, if they want to
recruit into that population, as opposed to having someone just
join the Army, they want to focus that spotlight on them.
Mr. Smith. I see. Focus on their recruitment, not just take
them if they come.
Mr. Carstens. I can tell you they are pushing the edges.
Right now, they are talking about legal aliens. They have
considered maybe, as I said, another Lodge Act.
SOCOM is actively trying to seek to really answer your
question, how do we get into a diversified recruitment? How do
we find that guy from Botswana? How do we find that guy who
just left Syria? How do we bring them into our culture and
train them and have them become full-fledged SEALs and Green
Berets and MARSOC employees?
Mr. Martinage. One of the constraints has been the ability
or inability of those people to get a security clearance; and
the Secretary of Defense, I think, recently made some changes
to make it possible for some of those naturalized citizens to
get the expedited security clearance for this exact reason.
The only thing I throw into the mix on this topic is that,
well, increasing recruitment and expanding the training
pipeline are essential. If that just continues without any
improvement on the back end, the maturity of your force is
going to go down. It is going to be diluted over time as more
and more of these young folks come into the teams. So that is
why retention is really, really important. Because you need to
keep the retention to balance the overall experience level and
maturity of these units. So you can't focus just on the
recruitment end.
Mr. Shuster. I know that we have talked to some SEALs and
E-8s and E-9s, and there aren't enough spots. And it comes down
to, I think, the question we asked after we talked to the folks
who wanted to stay in, who wanted to serve longer? Is it is a
matter of money? We only funded so many slots, but it seems to
me that it is not wise from our side to not keep these guys in
that want to continue to be active and serve.
Mr. Martinage. I agree, sir.
Mr. Smith. And we continue to work on that issue with the
Personnel Committee. That is something we should definitely,
definitely take a look at.
Just a couple more questions. One quick follow-up on that
in terms of whether the SEALs are out with their numbers. How
big is the problem in terms of them meeting whatever the
expanded requirements are for them in the next five, six years?
I am trying to get an idea of how short the current process is
going to leave them in terms of being able to meet the numbers
they want.
Mr. Carstens. Sir, I wish I could give you a good
percentage. I can't.
I can say that I think they are going to have to--they are
challenged. They are challenged in trying to get, again, people
to graduate in the right amount. They are getting about 130 to
150 graduates every year. They would love to elevate that, but
they just can't seem to break into the 200, 250 realm no matter
what they are doing.
I know they are working on it. They are smart guys. I am
sure they will figure it out here any day now.
But another problem I will just throw out there, though, is
even if they increased the capacity of the school, and let us
say that they suddenly started generating 200 to 250 people,
where they are currently, they are going to have problems
putting people in slots. There are only so many SEAL platoons.
And if you suddenly push 250 through, you are going to be
almost double-slotting people in basic SEAL platoons; and yet
you have to do your time in a SEAL platoon before you can rise.
So it is almost--you want them to create more SEALs, and it is
almost like you have to create more force structure to create
more SEAL platoons to get to the right force structure you want
as you progress through the rank structure through time.
Mr. Smith. I wanted to follow up on the irregular warfare
piece of this. You had suggested setting up an irregular
warfare command, and I think that speaks to the larger issue of
how we sort of get the SOF to cooperate and work more closely
with the broader force on the demands that are so
disproportionately placed on SOCOM. Because a lot of the type
of stuff we are talking about, counterinsurgency, certainly the
indirect action piece but also the direct action piece that
SOCOM has done so much of, is really sort of the future face of
the war we are going to be fighting and where we are going to
be fighting it.
One of the ways to sort of get past some of our number
problems would be to leverage the larger military into that.
And certainly having an irregular warfare command having focus
on that, having a cooperation--I have heard some other people
suggest, just as you had suggested on the ODAs, bringing in CIA
and Treasury to sort of get that cooperation, that you do the
same thing with the regular military, that you start slotting
some of those people out into the force with an ODA or with a
SEAL team or with the CJSOTF in different places. I just wanted
you to play out for us a little bit how you envision that
happening.
And, also, specifically, I know the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) has looked at how to expand and place more
importance on irregular warfare (IW). We put some language in
our bill last year to try to push them in that direction. How
is that effort going and where does it need to go to get the
level of focus on IW force-wide that you think we need?
Mr. Martinage. Well, when I was talking about the Joint
Irregular Warfare Commander, that I envisioned would be under
SOCOM. It was really intended to be sort of the indirect
approach counterpart to JSOC to direct action; and the reason
for that, sir, is really a combination of things. One is to
centralize the--sort of the material development, the
organization, the training, the caring and feeding career paths
of folks who are in that sort of career specialty. Because
there is some concerns certainly within the Special Forces
community that they--the indirect warfare approach folks don't
get the same opportunity, the same training opportunities as
the direct action (DA) folks do.
The second reason to consider doing it is to create a more
powerful advocate for the special operations approach to
irregular warfare within the broader joint force. So, you know,
you are out there either within SOCOM or within DOD trying to
push the case for the Special Operations answer to this
irregular warfare challenge. It would be nice to have some more
senior folks in that position.
I am not sure if Roger wants to talk about the idea of
trying to integrate conventional forces into that. That, to me,
gets into some really sticky areas between SOCOM and the other
commands.
Mr. Smith. Just quickly, how open do you think OSD is to
the idea you just described?
Mr. Martinage. I am not sure. OSD I think might be
reasonably open to the idea. I think the question more is
SOCOM. I think SOCOM and the Center for Special Operations in
particular would be very opposed to this idea. So there we are.
But, as I said earlier, it is not a coincidence that there
has really never been a Special Forces officer commanding SOCOM
and that all the SOCOM commanders have come from the direct
action community. And the question, as you said, if the world
we are looking at over time is really more of this persistent
irregular warfare where the indirect and clandestine approach
is really central, should we do something to build up those
guys?
Mr. Smith. I want to drill down this--I am over time, but I
am in charge, so I am going to cheat. I will get to Mr.
Langevin in just a second.
First of all, I don't know that you can draw such a neat
line and say that there has never been an indirect action
person in charge of SOCOM. Certainly they have all had that
experience.
That aside, a lot of these folks have done a lot of
different things. So I would be leery of drawing such a bright-
line distinction.
I doubt outside of certainly the Rangers, you know, most
people who served, certainly in the last four or five years, in
SOCOM have had occasion to do both in one place or another. So
I think it blends over a little bit.
And, also, in talking with Admiral Olson and in talking
with General Brown before him and a lot of different folks, I
mean, there seems to be a lot more emphasis on indirect action
right now within SOCOM, you know, for the importance of this
piece. Just in traveling around and talking with people about
it, that is my perception. My perception could be wrong. Don't
you see SOCOM sort of moving at least a little bit in that
direction on their own now?
Mr. Martinage. Sure. And just going back to your previous
point, I wouldn't make the distinction between direct and
indirect so much as between Special Forces and nonspecial
forces or some other career path to be the direct action
community. Anyway, that is sort of a minor issue.
But I think--yes, I think SOCOM recognizes and I think they
are putting more resources into that area. But I still think
you have this perennial institutional tension between sort of
the two sides. And, as mentioned earlier, you know, okay, what
explains, for instance, the fact that White SOF in Afghanistan
don't get the lift they require 50 percent of the time and the
special mission units get whatever they want? That to me
suggests that there is----
Mr. Smith. I don't question the validity of your overall
point.
Mr. Martinage. I think they are moving in the direction. I
just think there is probably more that could be done to balance
it.
Mr. Smith. Certainly.
Jim, do you have any more?
Bill, this is unfair at the moment, but do you have
anything else.
Mr. Shuster. No.
Mr. Smith. One other issue area. As far as the theater
Special Operations commanders are concerned, how do you see
their role in all of these issues we have raised in terms of
interagency, in terms of working with the intelligence side, in
terms of working with the broader military? Do you think that
that is effective right now? And how would you--what makes
sense in terms of enhancing it and making those things work
better, focusing on the Theater Special Operations Commands
(TSOCs)?
Mr. Martinage. That is a great question. I have a couple of
quick comments.
One is, I think there is a question about what is the
TSOCs' role. Is it really supporting the global combatant
commander or is it being the instrument through which SOCOM
coordinates and synchronizes global operations?
Mr. Smith. It is kind of both.
Mr. Martinage. In theory. I think right now it is more
about supporting the global combatant commander. And the sense
I certainly got when we were at SOCOM is SOCOM is much more
interested in how can we help you Geographic Combatant Commands
(GCCs), and the TSOCs are a part of that. And someone suggested
that, you know, SOCOM should use the TSOCs as a more powerful
instrument for coordinating and synchronizing global activities
and for getting the Special Operations approach attention
within the regional combatant commands. And as part of that,
you know, certainly the TSOCs could serve in an interagency
task force at the regional level within each of the global
combatant commands.
But I think the question is again coming back to would it
be appropriate to give the TSOCs a louder voice in the global
combatant commands. Because, you know, we face this irregular
warfare dominant world where Special Operations are really
central and they are intensive. So in making the points with
the very much GPF-dominated staffs, would it be helpful to,
say, to increase the rank structure or the staffs of the TSOCs?
So, for instance, in a place like U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which is clearly a major area for this irregular
warfare indirect and clandestine fight against terrorist
groups, should that TSOC commander be a three-star, just to
give again a stronger voice to the Special Operations
community?
Mr. Carstens. My sense is that the TSOC has a lot of unused
potential. If you were to go down to Djibouti and ask the
CJSOTF there or SOC, however you want to refer to it, it is a
rather small element, if you were to ask them about the role
that TSOC right there, Special Operations Command-Forward (SOC-
F), they would say they would like them to step up a little
more. Right now, they feel like that are part of CJTF, the
conventional military's special staff with regards to Special
Operations. They don't feel that TSOC is taking an
appropriately aggressive role in providing them support and
giving them a voice.
So in Djibouti they would say, we would like the TSOC to
step up to the plate a little more. I think in Afghanistan they
felt the same way. They felt that there is such a convoluted
approval process for fires and for increasing troops--and I
will especially go to fires. They would like the TSOC to have a
stronger, more aggressive role in providing them top cover and
for giving them a voice.
Iraq, I really didn't probably delve into that as much as I
needed to. I will at least say from two of the three places I
visited overseas, they would like the TSOC to step up to the
plate and give them more of a voice.
Mr. Smith. Well, thank you.
That is all the questions I have. I really--I think the
issues you have raised here have been very important, and one
of our main focuses on this committee is to try to expand the
number of people who are paying attention to this and to try to
get certainly Congress but also OSD to really focus on this.
There are a lot of issues clearly surrounding our military
right now. But as you go forward, as you look at the most
important battles that we are going to fight, they are against
insurgencies, insurgencies attached primarily to the violent
extremist ideology that al Qaeda and others are promulgating.
And it is Africa, it is Southeast Asia, it is Iraq,
Afghanistan, and a bunch of other places.
The lead on this, in my view, in the decades ahead is going
to be much more an irregular warfare piece, which is what SOCOM
is uniquely qualified to do and has been doing an outstanding
job. But how is not just the military but how is our entire
government apparatus, including the intelligence pieces and the
State Department piece, how is it structured to fight that
counterinsurgency fight?
Right now, I think too much is focused on more Cold-War-era
issues. And I understand if that is sort of where you came of
age and where the skill sets are or where the weapon systems
are that there is this natural tendency to try to say, no, but
this is perfect for the new fight, too. Just flop it around
here and make it fit.
But really, if we are going to effectively fight this, we
need to make some shifts. I think you guys have some great
suggestions here; and it is the intention of this committee to
push the envelope on that in our authorizing bill, to push for
some of these changes that you have talked about, which ones we
think we are most likely to be successful on with the full
committee and the full House. But we definitely want to see
some of these changes.
I just think you have given us some outstanding ideas, and
we want to keep up the dialogue and continue to work with you
as we go about trying to push and implement some of these ideas
into the administration and into OSD. So thank you for your
excellent work, and we look forward to working with you.
We will also probably submit some questions for the record
that we will then get written responses from you as more ideas
occur to us after this.
So thank you very much for your work and your testimony,
and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 3, 2009
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 3, 2009
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