[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 2 AND 10, 2009
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Serial No. 111-78
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
FloridaUntil 1/4/ EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
10 deg. RON PAUL, Texas
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts MIKE PENCE, Indiana
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CONNIE MACK, Florida
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
Jasmeet Ahuja, Professional Staff Member
Genell Brown, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
December 2
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 5
The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 14
Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.. 20
December 10
The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan,
U.S. Department of State....................................... 67
Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander,
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander,
U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), U.S. Department of Defense.. 86
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARINGS
December 2
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: Prepared statement......... 8
The Honorable Robert M. Gates: Prepared statement................ 16
Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN: Prepared statement............... 23
December 10
The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry: Prepared statement............. 70
Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal: Prepared statement..... 90
APPENDIX
December 2
Hearing notice................................................... 132
Hearing minutes.................................................. 133
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 135
The Honorable John Boozman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arkansas: Prepared statement.......................... 136
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement......... 137
The Honorable Gus Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida: Prepared statement....................... 139
The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 140
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Virginia: Prepared statement................. 141
The Honorable John S. Tanner, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Tennessee: Prepared statement..................... 143
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement............................. 145
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas: Prepared statement.................... 146
The Honorable Ron Klein, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida: Prepared statement........................... 149
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee,
a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
responses from:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton........................... 151
The Honorable Robert M. Gates and Admiral Michael G. Mullen,
USN.......................................................... 155
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Gus Bilirakis
and responses from:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton........................... 167
The Honorable Robert M. Gates and Admiral Michael G. Mullen,
USN.......................................................... 170
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Sheila
Jackson Lee and responses from:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton........................... 177
The Honorable Robert M. Gates.................................. 180
Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN................................. 184
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Jim Costa, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
responses from:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton........................... 189
December 10
Hearing notice................................................... 191
Hearing minutes.................................................. 192
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: Prepared statement............... 194
The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement............................. 196
The Honorable Diane E. Watson.................................... 198
The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina: Prepared statement.................... 199
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee: Prepared statement............. 200
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Michael E.
McMahon, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
York, and responses from:
The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry............................... 206
Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal....................... 207
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida, and responses from:
The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry............................... 209
Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal....................... 212
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher
H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
Jersey, and responses from:
The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry............................... 214
Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal....................... 220
U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN, PART I
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order.
Before beginning my opening statement, I would like to make
several brief announcements. As most of you know, our
colleague, Robert Wexler, will resign from Congress at the end
of this year to become president of the Center for Middle East
Peace and Economic Cooperation. Effective today he is resigning
as chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, and he will be
succeeded in that position by Bill Delahunt. Looking at Bill
Delahunt you would think he is going to be focused on old
Europe, but he is going to be focused on old and new Europe.
Russ Carnahan will serve as the new chairman of the
International Organizations, Human Rights, deg. and
Oversight Subcommittee, following in the footsteps, believe it
or not, of his grandfather, who chaired the same subcommittee
in the 85th Congress, a contemporary of Bill's.
We thank Bob for his service in the Congress on this
committee, a very good friend to many of us, and wish all three
of our colleagues the best of luck in their new positions.
Second, I want to welcome the Prime Minister of Hungary
Gordon Bajnai, who is here with us today. Hungary is one of our
staunchest allies, and I want to thank the Prime Minister for
his country's leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team
in Baghlan Province in Afghanistan and for the brave men and
women of Hungary who are serving there.
Welcome, Mr. Prime Minister.
Finally, given the time constraints on the witnesses, they
must leave at 4:15 wherever we are, and to ensure that as many
members as possible have a chance to ask questions, we will
limit opening statements to myself and the ranking member. And
I will not be taking all of my time. And without objection, all
other members may submit written statements for the record.
And now I will recognize myself for an opening statement.
Last night President Obama spoke eloquently to the Nation
about his plan of action in Afghanistan. Today we are pleased
to welcome three senior officials to testify on the President's
proposed strategy: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. We greatly appreciate
your participation.
As the President stated, it is clear that the United States
has a deg.vital national security interests at stake
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Determining the best policy to
serve those interests is the most difficult foreign policy
challenge before this President, before this Congress, and
before the American people. It is a situation with no easy
answers and no predictable outcomes.
Our goal in the region, as defined by the President, is to
``disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and
our allies in the future.'' Many news reports suggest that
there was a healthy debate in the administration about whether
this critical objective could be met by pursuing a targeted
counterterrorism strategy as opposed to a more extensive and
robust counterinsurgency strategy.
Could the United States succeed in Afghanistan by employing
relatively small numbers of Special Operations Forces and high-
tech weapons systems to disrupt and defeat al-Qaeda and reverse
the Taliban's momentum while also accelerating the training of
Afghan security forces? Or does the deteriorating security
situation in Afghanistan call for a more ambitious strategy--
one that includes military, political, and economic
dimensions--to protect the people of Afghanistan and instill
confidence in that country's fragile national government? If we
pursue the latter approach, then, as the President indicated,
success will hinge on a substantial deployment of civilian
resources.
The President also noted that success in Afghanistan is
dependent on what he referred to as ``an effective partnership
with Pakistan.'' What more will we expect Pakistan to do that
they are not already doing? What more will the U.S. have to do
to nurture that important relationship?
And finally, is the full cost of our efforts in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in terms of military and civilian
resources, something we can afford and are willing to pay?
The President took the time to consult carefully with his
generals, his diplomats, his national security team, and
numerous others to form a complete picture of the situation in
Afghanistan.
Now begins the deliberative period for Congress and the
people we represent. Now is the time for us to evaluate the
strategy, to test its coherence, and to raise the questions
that will examine the assumptions on which it is based. We
cannot shirk our responsibility to ask the tough question; the
stakes are simply too high.
I now turn to the ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for any
opening remarks she would like to make. And following that we
will proceed immediately to the testimony of our distinguished
witnesses.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And before I begin my opening remarks, I wanted to state
for the record and inform our distinguished witnesses today
that our colleague Mr. Manzullo is unable to be at the hearing
today because he is at a briefing that Senator Durbin is
hosting on bringing Gitmo detainees to Thomson in Illinois. Mr.
Manzullo will make every effort to join today's hearing
following the conclusion of the briefing on Gitmo detainee
transfers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our security and vital interests are at stake in
Afghanistan. As the President said in his speech last night,
``This is no idle danger, no hypothetical threat. This danger
will only grow if the region slides backwards and al-Qaeda can
operate with impunity.''
Our brave men and women in uniform understand this reality
and stand ready for duty. They embrace the opportunity to
defend our Nation and protect our homeland by defeating the
enemy in a convincing manner so that they cannot ever again
rise against us. It is our obligation to provide them and all
of our personnel on the ground with the support and the
resources necessary to win the war in Afghanistan and prevail
against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other militants.
I am, however, concerned that before the strategy has been
implemented, the President has placed a deadline on our
commitment and a timeline for the withdrawal of our troops.
What message does this telegraph to the enemy? How does it
impact the morale of our troops and the mind-set of our Afghan
counterparts and our other allies in this effort?
This is a fight that we cannot afford to lose. General
McChrystal wrote on August 30th that the next 12 months are
critical, yet one-quarter of that time is already gone. As
President John F. Kennedy said, and I quote, ``There are risks
and costs to action, but they are far less than the long-range
risk of comfortable inaction.'' Now that the President has
articulated the administration's approach toward Afghanistan,
we must fully commit to doing everything possible to succeed
there.
I ask that our distinguished witnesses address the
following: What are the key differences between the strategy
that the President articulated yesterday and those that he
articulated last March? What action is the administration
taking to ensure that those who have pledged to provide
multilateral and bilateral assistance to Afghanistan actually
fulfill their commitments?
And, Secretary Clinton, what is our anticorruption strategy
in Afghanistan? What is our strategy for promoting a more
capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan
that truly serves the Afghan people?
Secretary Gates, what is our strategy for expanding the
numbers and building the capacity of the Afghan National
Security Forces? What is our strategy for supporting
Afghanistan in disrupting and dismantling narcotraffickers and
breaking the narcotics/insurgency nexus?
I would like to refer to an editorial appearing on Monday
in the Wall Street Journal Europe section where the author
refers to a discussion he had with the chief prosecutor for the
International Criminal Court. The ICC's chief prosecutor said
that he already has jurisdiction in Afghanistan because the
Afghan Government ratified the Rome statute in 2003, and that
he is already conducting a preliminary examination into whether
NATO troops, including our American soldiers fighting the
Taliban, may have to be prosecuted by the International
Criminal Court.
Secretary Clinton, this past August you expressed ``great
regret that we are not a signatory'' to the International
Criminal Court. Then just a few weeks ago, the U.S. sent an
observer mission to the ICC Assembly of States. What is the
administration's current position concerning the ICC, and what
protections are being provided to our personnel in Afghanistan
to ensure that they are not subject to ICC prosecution?
And in closing, Mr. Chairman, because the administration is
concerned about cost and wants to put a price on the defense
and the security of our Nation, I would suggest that we
withhold U.S. contributions to the U.N. until reforms,
accountability and transparency measures are actually put in
place. I am confident that the American people would prefer
that their limited taxpayer funds would be provided to our
personnel in Afghanistan so that they have the tools needed to
win rather than have it squandered away by a U.N. system
hijacked by enemies of freedom and democracy. Just yesterday
the U.N. General Assembly passed multiple anti-Israel
resolutions in their International Day of Solidarity with the
Palestinian People, and the U.N. vote just continues to astound
us every day.
The challenges in Afghanistan are great, Mr. Chairman, but
they are not insurmountable. I look forward to the immediate
implementation of a strategy that provides us the highest
chances for success with the lowest risk to the safety and
well-being of our brave patriots serving and about to serve us
in Afghanistan.
Thank you very much for the time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Thank you. The time of the gentlelady has
expired.
And I would like to introduce the witnesses, as if they
need an introduction. I will not go through your colleges and
first four or five jobs. But Secretary Hillary Clinton is the
67th Secretary of State of the United States. Previously
Secretary Clinton served as the junior Senator from New York
for two terms, where she was known for working across party
lines. As First Lady she was a tireless advocate of health care
reform and worked on many issues relating to children and
families.
Secretary Robert Gates is the 22nd Secretary of Defense of
the United States. Dr. Gates is the only Secretary of Defense
in U.S. history to be asked to remain in that office by a newly
elected President. President Obama is the eighth President
under which Dr. Gates has served. Previously, just before
becoming Secretary of Defense, Dr. Gates was the president of
Texas A&M University. Secretary Gates joined the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1996--1966 and spent nearly 27 years as
an intelligence professional.
Admiral Michael Mullen is the 17th Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He serves as the principal military advisor to
the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security
Council and the Homeland Security Council. Prior to becoming
Chairman, Admiral Mullen served as the 28th Chief of Naval
Operations. His last operational assignment was as Commander,
NATO Joint Force Command, Naples Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe, and he did graduate Notre Dame High School in Sherman
Oaks, California.
Secretary Clinton.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member, members of the committee. I am grateful for
this opportunity to testify today. And I also want to
acknowledge the leader of one of our very strong allies, the
Prime Minister of Hungary, who the chairman has recognized and
to whom we show our appreciation.
Yesterday President Obama presented the administration's
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today we will be
answering your questions and providing additional details. But
let me speak briefly at a more personal level about why we are
making this commitment.
Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, we believe
this is the best way to protect our Nation now and in the
future. The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and
Pakistan have attacked us and our allies before. If we allow
them access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001,
they will have a greater capacity to regroup and attack again.
They could drag an entire region into chaos. Our civilian and
military leaders in Afghanistan have reported that the
situation is serious and worsening, and we agree.
In the aftermath of September 11th, I grieved with sons,
daughters, husbands and wives, those whose loved ones were
murdered. It was an attack on our country; it was at the time
an attack on my constituents. And I witnessed the tragic
consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families,
the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So I
feel a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from
such violence.
The case for action against al-Qaeda and its allies has
always been clear, but the United States' course of action over
the last 8 years has not. The fog of another war obscured our
focus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere, the
Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan, and the extremist
threat grew in Pakistan, a country with 175 million people, a
nuclear arsenal and more than its share of challenges.
It was against this backdrop that the President called for
a careful thorough review of our strategy. I was very proud to
be a part of that process, and our objectives are clear. We
will work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to
eliminate safe havens for those plotting attacks against us,
our allies, our interests. We will help to stabilize a region
that is fundamental to our national security, and we will
develop long-term, sustainable relationships with both
Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes
of the past. The duration of our military presence may be
limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our
troops will begin to come home.
Now, accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of
the American people will not be easy. It will mean sending more
civilians, more troops and more assistance to Afghanistan, and
significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan. And
the men and women carrying out this mission, both civilian and
military alike, are not just statistics on a PowerPoint slide,
they are our friends and neighbors, our sons and daughters, our
brothers and sisters, and we will be asking them and the
American people who support them to make extraordinary
sacrifices once again. I want to assure this committee we will
do everything we can to make sure their sacrifices make our
Nation safer.
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but
it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in
public. The beginning of President Karzai's second term has
opened a new window of opportunity. We do have real concerns
about the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan
Government, and we will continue to pursue them. But in his
inauguration speech last month, which I attended, I witnessed
President Karzai call for a new compact, a new compact with his
country and a new compact with the international community. He
pledged to continue to work with us, and he pledged to combat
corruption, improve governance and deliver for the people of
his country. His words were long in coming, but they were
welcome. They now must be matched with action, and we intend to
hold the Afghan Government accountable. We will work with our
Afghan partners to strengthen institutions at every level of
society.
The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to
Afghan responsibility. As he said in his speech last evening,
the additional American and international troops will allow us
to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and
allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan
in July 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute
this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on
the ground.
A timeframe for transition will provide a sense of urgency
in working with the Afghan Government, but it should be clear
to everyone that the United States, our allies and our partners
will have an enduring commitment, a civilian commitment, to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our resolve in this fight is
reflected in the substantial new increase in troops, but also
in the significant civilian surge that will also accompany it.
The civilian effort is bearing fruit. The civilian experts
and advisors are helping to craft policy inside government
ministries, providing development assistance in the field. And
when our marines went into Nawa Province this last July, we had
civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the
very next day. As our operations progress, our civ-mil
coordination will grow even stronger.
We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions
to 974 by early in January. On average, each of these civilians
leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to
experts with U.S.-funded NGOs. It is a cliche to say that we
have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to be
true. When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an
American colonel who told me that while he had thousands of
outstanding soldiers under his command, none of them had the 40
years of the agricultural experience of the USDA civilians
serving alongside his battalion, or the rule of law and
governance expertise of the civilian experts from the State
Department. The colonel said to me, I am happy to supply
whatever support these valuable civilians need, and we need
more of them.
That is part of our strategy, our combined civilian-
military strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic
assistance and bolstering the agricultural sector; we will be
helping to support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to
those Taliban who renounce al-Qaeda, abandon violence and want
to reintegrate into society. We know that regional diplomacy is
essential, and it will complement our approach.
I will be going to Brussels tomorrow to work with our
allies to obtain additional commitments of troops and civilian
aid. We also know that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan is
a necessity as a key partner in this effort. People in Pakistan
are increasingly coming to the view that we do share a common
enemy. I heard that repeatedly during my recent visit there. So
we will significantly expand support to help develop the
potential of the people of Pakistan, and we will do more to
demonstrate to the Pakistani people that they must continue
their efforts to weed out and defeat the Pakistani Taliban.
As we are moving forward with our international efforts, we
have a great deal of commitment to troops, trainers and
resources that will be reported in the days and weeks ahead.
Ambassador Holbrooke, our Special Representative, is already
there consulting with our allies. And we are especially
reaching out to Muslims everywhere to make clear that those who
pervert a great religion do not represent it, and everyone has
a stake in ensuring that they do not dominate the message and
the narrative of what Islam stands for.
So let me conclude where I began. We face a range of
difficult choices, but the President's plan represents the best
way we know to protect our Nation today and tomorrow. The task
is as complex as any national security challenge in our
lifetime. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the
responsibility of a single party or a single agency within our
Government or a single country. We owe it to the troops and
civilians who will face these dangers to come together as
Americans along with our allies and international partners to
accomplish this mission. I look forward to working with you to
ensure that we do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton
follows:]Hilary Clinton deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of
the committee, thank you for inviting us to testify today. I
would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and
context behind the President's decisions, in particular the
nexus among al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan,
and our objectives on how the President's strategy aims to
accomplish them.
As the President first stated last March and reemphasized
last night, the goal of the United States and Afghanistan and
Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its
extremist allies, and to prevent its return to both countries.
International military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is
necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating al-Qaeda
and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing
missions. They cannot be untethered from one another as much as
we might wish that to be the case.
While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on
the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the
success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al-Qaeda's
message to the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the
winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al-Qaeda
have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and the
mythology of the other. Al-Qaeda leaders have stated this
explicitly and repeatedly.
The lesson of the Afghan Taliban's revival for al-Qaeda is
that time and will are on their side; that, with a Western
defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a major
strategic victory as long as their senior leadership lives and
can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding.
Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda.
At the same time one cannot separate the security situation
in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed
nation of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by
Islamic extremists. Giving extremists breathing room in
Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more
coordinated and sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing
a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan
would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani Government already
under attack from groups operating in the border region.
Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban in just the last year or so has
become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and
stability, carrying out, with al-Qaeda's help, escalating
bombing attacks throughout the country.
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of
much, if not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil
war. A Taliban-ruled area could in short order become once
again a sanctuary for al-Qaeda as well as a staging area for
resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan.
Success in south and central Asia by Islamic extremists, as
was the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts.
It would strengthen the al-Qaeda narrative, providing renewed
opportunities for recruitment, fundraising and more
sophisticated operations.
It is true that al-Qaeda and its followers can plot and
execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to
London to Denver. What makes the border area between
Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other
location, including Somalia, Yemen and other possible redoubts,
is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of
extremist jihadism, the historic place where native and foreign
Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its
collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole
remaining superpower in the same place would have severe
consequences for the United States and for the world.
Some may say this is similar to the domino theory that
underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S.
military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is
that we have very real and very recent history that shows just
what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have
breathing space, safe havens and governments complicit with and
supportive of their mission. Less than 5 years after the last
Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan,
Islamic militants launched their first attack in 1993 on the
World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a
similar mistake again.
The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the
Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the
time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough
security and governance capacity to stabilize their own
country.
The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold,
build and transfer. Beginning to transfer security
responsibility to the Afghans in the summer of 2011 is critical
and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district
by district, province by province, depending on conditions on
the ground. The process will be similar to what we did in Iraq,
where international security forces provided overwatch first at
the tactical level and then at the strategic level.
Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan
Army and police through extensive partnering with ISAF forces
especially in combat. Even after we transfer security
responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces,
the United States must continue to support their development as
an important partner for the long haul. We must not repeat the
mistakes of 1989 when we abandoned the country only to see it
descend into civil war and then into Taliban hands.
Let me offer closing thoughts. The President believes as do
I that in the end we cannot defeat al-Qaeda and its toxic
ideology without improving and stabilizing the security
situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision offers the
best possibility to decisively change the momentum in
Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in
Pakistan and Central Asia, all necessary to protect the United
States, our allies and our vital interests. And so I ask for
your full support of this decision to provide both Ambassador
Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources they need to be
successful.
As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and
women who have volunteered and often revolunteered to serve
their country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our
minds and prayers as we take on this arduous, but vitally
necessary mission.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates
follows:]Robert Gates deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your
time today.
Let me say right up front that I support fully and without
hesitation the President's decision, and I appreciate the
opportunity to contribute to what I believe was a healthy and
productive discussion. I have seen my share of internal debates
about various national security issues, especially over the
course of the last 2 years, and I can honestly say that I do
not recall an issue so thoroughly or so thoughtfully considered
as this one. Every military leader in the chain of command, as
well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice throughout
this process, and every one of us used it. We now have before
us a strategy more appropriately matched to the situation on
the ground in Afghanistan and resources matched more
appropriately to that strategy, particularly with regard to
reversing the insurgency's momentum in 2010. And given the
stakes in Afghanistan for our own national security as well as
that of our partners around the world, I believe the time we
took was well worth it.
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates have already walked
you through the larger policy issues in question. I will not
repeat them. From a purely military perspective I believe our
new approach does three critical things. First, by providing
more discrete objectives, it offers better guidance to
commanders on the ground about how to employ their forces. They
will still work to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and
prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven; they will still
strive to protect the Afghan people, who remain the center of
gravity; they will still pursue major elements of the
counterinsurgency campaign desired and designed by General
McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least some
measure of active counterterrorism operations. But now they
will tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing on
key population areas, by increasing pressure on al-Qaeda's
leadership, by more effectively working to degrade the
Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and accelerating the
growth of competent Afghan National Security Forces.
At its core our strategy is about providing breathing space
for the Afghans to secure their own people and to stabilize
their own country. It is about partnering and mentoring just as
much, if not more, than it is about fighting. Where once we
believed that finishing the job meant to a large degree doing
it ourselves, we now know it cannot truly or permanently be
done by anyone other than the Afghans themselves. Fully a third
of the U.S. troops in theater are partnered with Afghan forces,
and I expect that number to rise significantly over the course
of the next year.
Secondly, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives
commanders on the ground the resources and the support they
need to reverse the momentum of a Taliban insurgency and to
accomplish these more limited objectives. I have said it
before, and I believe it still today, this region is the
epicenter of global Islamic extremism. It is the place from
which we were attacked on 9/11, and should we be hit again, it
is the place from which I am convinced the planning, training
and funding will emanate. Al-Qaeda may, in fact, be the
architect of such an attack, but the Taliban will be the
bricklayers.
Though hardly a uniform body, Taliban groups have grown
bolder and more sophisticated. We saw that just a few months
ago in the Khorangow Valley, where Taliban forces attacked
coalition outposts using what I would call almost conventional
small-unit tactics. Their fighters are better organized and
better equipped than they were just 1 year ago.
In fact, coalition forces experienced record high violence
this past summer with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent
above 2008 levels. And through brutal intimidation the Taliban
has established shadow governments across the country, coercing
the reluctant support of many locals and challenging the
authority of elected leaders and state institutions. Indeed we
believe the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11
of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
To say there is no serious threat of Afghanistan falling
once again into Taliban hands ignores the audacity of even the
insurgency's most public statements. And to argue that should
they have that power, the Taliban would not at least tolerate
the presence of al-Qaeda again on Afghan soil is to ignore both
the recent past and the evidence we see every day of collusion
between these factions on both sides of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border.
The cost of failure is then grave. That is why the
President's decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of
30,000 additional forces is so important. It gets the most U.S.
force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General
McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.
It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach, and
it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible chance to
set the security conditions for the Afghan people to see our
commitment to their future; for the Karzai government to know
our strong desire to see his promised reforms; for the Afghan
Taliban to understand they will not, they cannot take back
Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan who support the
Taliban or would see the return of al-Qaeda to realize the
futility of their pursuit.
I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the
21,000 troops the President ordered shortly after taking
office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the
southern Helmand Valley.
But as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no amount of
troops and no amount of time will ever be enough to completely
achieve success in such a fight. They simply must be
accompanied by good governance and healthy public
administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of my
greatest concern. Like everyone else, I look forward to working
with the Karzai government, but we must have the support of the
interagency and international communities as well.
And that brings me to my final point. The President's new
strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based
approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in
isolation any more than he views the ties between al-Qaeda and
the Taliban as superficial. He has called for stronger and more
productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is
likewise under threat from radical elements, and whose support
remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens. He has
pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed emphasis on
securing more civilian expertise to the effort, more
contributions by other NATO nations and a realistic plan to
transition responsibilities to the Afghans.
His is a more balanced, more flexible and more achievable
strategy than we have had in the past, one based on pragmatism
and real possibilities. And speaking for the 2.2 million men
and women who must execute it and who, with their families,
have borne the brunt of the stress and the strain of 8 years of
constant combat, I support his decision, and I appreciate his
leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen
follows:]Michael Mullen deg.
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Chairman Berman. Well, I thank you and thank all of you.
We have 2 hours to go at our distinguished witnesses. As is
the custom, the gavel will go down after 5 minutes. Members can
make comments; we can ask questions. As a matter of common
courtesy, if we expect an answer to the question, we might give
the witnesses something more than 7\1/2\ seconds of that 5
minutes to answer.
I yield myself 5 minutes. I would like to ask a couple of
short questions and then a little more time on the Afghanistan-
Pakistan relationship.
First, and you sort of made it evident by your testimony,
but, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do you believe a
civilian surge is an essential part of the President's
strategy?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Admiral Mullen. Absolutely.
Chairman Berman. Secretary Clinton, are you in a position
at this time to know the resources you will need to accomplish
this?
Secretary Clinton. Mr. Chairman, we do not know
specifically, but we will be submitting budget requests in
order to achieve the numbers that are going to be needed.
Chairman Berman. Thank you.
Turning now to Afghanistan and Pakistan--that connection--
the administration has described the current situation in
Afghanistan as detrimental to the stability of Pakistan. It is
publicly reported that elements of Pakistan's intelligence
service continue to have ties with a number of the insurgent
groups that seek to destabilize Afghanistan. Don't many in
Pakistan see these groups as a means to maintain influence in
Afghanistan? What incentive does Pakistan have to cut these
ties and join us in going after these groups?
We do know that the Pakistan military is conducting
unprecedented operations in Waziristan, but the way it looks,
these operations are focused on the Pakistani Taliban and not
against those extremists and Taliban that are using Pakistan as
a sanctuary to launch operations in Afghanistan and against our
troops. Do you see evidence that Pakistan will act against
these groups? And for whoever and how many of you care to
respond to that.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I would say that, first of
all, there is--one of the significant political developments in
Pakistan over the last 7 or 8 months has been a strong shift in
public opinion in support of the actions that the Pakistani
Army is taking in--first in Swat and now in South Waziristan.
As I indicated earlier, there has developed over the last
year a nexus between al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the
Tariki Taliban in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and
they are mutually reinforcing both in their narrative and in
their operations. What we have seen is the Pakistani Army going
after the Taliban and other extremists in western Pakistan.
There is no question but what it has put pressure on some of
the insurgent groups that are acting against the United States.
A number of these people have fled from South Waziristan into
North Waziristan, some may be going into Afghanistan. So there
clearly is a value to what the Pakistanis are doing.
The Pakistanis' relationship with these groups dates back,
frankly, to when I was dealing with them more than 20 years ago
when we were taking on the Soviet Union in Pakistan. These
relationships between the Pakistanis and these groups were
established then as a vehicle for taking on the Soviets. They
have maintained some of those contacts and those relationships,
frankly, as a hedge because of their uncertainty whether the
United States would be a reliable partner and ally for them
going forward, and whether we would remain in Afghanistan until
we were assured of success in taking care of the extremists.
I think as we make progress and as they make progress,
their incentive to change this approach to opt strategically to
partner with the United States becomes significantly more
powerful.
Admiral Mullen. I would only add that as I watch Pakistan,
Mr. Chairman, that they have made great progress and great
changes certainly compared to 12 months ago, and that from my
perspective it is their view--how they will proceed will be
based on in many ways how Afghanistan turns out. That is why
stabilizing Afghanistan, having an Afghanistan that isn't a
threat to them, stability in the region, I think that offers
great opportunity for them to continue to change and break some
of these relationships or change some of these relationships
over time.
And I just remain extremely concerned about the
collaboration--the collaborative aspect of what has happened
with all these separate terrorist groups over the last couple
of years who have joined hands in ways that we just haven't
seen before.
Chairman Berman. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
The ranking member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to our distinguished panelists today.
In his speech the President stated, ``We will pursue a
military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and
increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.'' How
would we measure Taliban's capabilities, and what are the
specific indicators that we are monitoring to assess the
Taliban momentum? And if the Taliban momentum is not broken
within 18 months, what are our contingency plans?
If you could care to comment on reports that U.S.
assistance has made its way into Taliban coffers, what
oversight mechanisms do we have in place to prevent funds from
being diverted to pay for Taliban protection rackets, for
example?
Lastly on Iran, would you agree that Iran plays a
destabilizing role related to the security and stability of
Afghanistan? Would you agree that we have seen an increase in
the level of support that Iran has provided to the Taliban and
insurgent groups, including lethal aid? What is our strategy in
Afghanistan as it relates to the threat posed by Iran?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates. Let me take on the second and third parts
of your question and ask Admiral Mullen to take on the first
part.
First of all, there is no question with respect to your
second question. One of the concerns that I have, we talk about
the narcotics trade being the source of a great deal of income
for the Taliban and, frankly, also for corruption in
Afghanistan. And one of my concerns is that another source of
corruption and support for the Taliban, I fear, is the enormous
amount of international money coming into Afghanistan through
our own efforts and those of our partners in Afghanistan, the
42 other nations that are contributing troops, the hundreds of
NGOs and international organizations and so on.
There is a huge amount of money flowing into Afghanistan at
this point, and one of the things that we have to think about
is the way in which we approach our contracting, and the way we
deal with the Afghan Government, and the way we use the funds
that are available to us to reduce their contribution both to
corruption and potentially some part of it flowing to the
Taliban themselves. The place we can start is the place where
we have control, and that is where we write the checks, so that
is the place to start now.
It has been a long day, so remind me of your third
question.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is about the influence of Iran. We had
talked about the Pakistan----
Secretary Gates. That is good enough. I would tell you that
we do have evidence of Iranian involvement, particularly in the
western part of Afghanistan. But I think based on the
intelligence and the information available to us from our
commanders, it is still a relatively small and not
significant--making a relatively small and not significant
contribution to the Taliban effort.
I think that the Iranians are trying to straddle a very
narrow divide. They want to support the Afghan Government, they
want to have a friendly relationship with the Afghan
Government, but there is no question they would like to inflict
pain on us. And so I think trying to target their efforts in
ways that are aimed at ISAF and not at the Afghan Government is
what they are trying to do, but it is still at a very modest
level.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And, Admiral Mullen, just how we can calibrate success?
Admiral Mullen. Ma'am, it happens through security, there
is no question about that. And that is why flowing these forces
as rapidly as we can, literally starting in a couple of weeks,
but over the course of the next 6 or 7 months, is so critical.
And in General McChrystal's routine travel around the
country, the elders tell him, the leaders tell him security is
first. And through that comes training and equipping the Afghan
security forces. And we will have very strong indicators over
the next 12 to 18 to 24 months where we stand with respect to
that.
And I really think it is a momentum piece. And we had an
operation; there is a reconciliation, a reintegration piece of
this as well, and we will know how well that is working.
We had a situation a couple of weeks ago where upwards--you
know, there were tens of Taliban who said, I am done. And there
are a lot of people out there that are tired of fighting. And I
am not basing it all on that. The point is that will be a piece
of this as well.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee,
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am really struggling with this one. It seems a bunch of
years ago I participated in a clunkers for cash program. My
President sold me a clunker, and I paid for it with my
children's and my constituents' children and grandchildren's
cash. We are still paying for that one. And I just want to make
sure the best that I can that we are not buying another
clunker.
I am trying to think this thing through. I think the best I
come up with is that we have a shack that is on fire, but it is
located next to the dynamite factory. And the question that I
think I know the answer to, but my constituents keep asking, is
it worth risking the lives of those who respond to the fire in
a place that may or may not hold a lot of value in and of
itself, and what is going to be the result, and what would
happen if we don't respond to that?
I guess the question I would ask is this: As of 8 o'clock
last night, do we have a new war, or do we have an old war
under new ownership, or is it the same war with a new
management strategy to muscle up and have a more elegant exit
plan? Maybe we could start with that.
Secretary Gates. I think we have inherited the same war,
but it is a dynamic war, and frankly the situation is getting
worse. The fire is getting hotter. The situation in Pakistan,
as we have seen in the last year or so, a number of terrorist
bombings, a clear intent on the part of al-Qaeda to work with
the Taliban in Pakistan to destabilize the Government of
Pakistan with nuclear weapons and a much larger population. We
have seen the Taliban, as Admiral Mullen said earlier, becoming
more bold and more aggressive. And it is clear, I think, to the
President and to the rest of us that we need to do something to
change the dynamic, to change the momentum. And what I think
the President has done is narrowed the mission.
One of the concerns we had coming out of March, one of the
concerns that I had, was that those decisions were interpreted
by many as saying, well, we are going into full-scale nation
building, and we are going to try and reestablish or establish
a strong central government in Kabul.
I think what we have done in this process, and one of the
things that has taken us some time, is figuring out how to
narrow the mission so that it is focused on the threat to the
United States. How do we keep al-Qaeda and that terrorist nexus
on that border from becoming an even greater danger to the
United States? How do we disrupt them? How do we dismantle
them? How do we defeat them? And the conclusion is we must
stabilize the security situation in Afghanistan.
Of course, we don't need to build a 21st century country in
Afghanistan to accomplish that objective. And so the purpose I
think of what the President has announced is to narrow our
mission, focus it on our security and as well the future of
both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Secretary Clinton. I think, Congressman, the process that
we have gone through has been aimed at testing every
assumption, asking all the hard questions. I think it is fair
to say that if the President could have concluded that this was
an old war that could be wound down and walked away from, that
would certainly have been an easier choice.
He is, as we all are, well aware of the political and the
economic and the loss of young men and women that this decision
presages. But the dynamite factory is there, and,
unfortunately, it has been stocked with even more dynamite in
the last couple of years, and therefore we think we have to
address it.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The ranking member of the subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that commitment is extremely important, and the
civilian commitment the Secretary of State talked about is
important, but they have to be covered by the military. And
today, at 12:59 p.m., Admiral Mullen said, in part, that by
roughly the July time frame we will have 20 to 25,000 troops in
theater, and there will be 5,000 troops, Marines that will be
over there very shortly.
Now, if the time frame is correct in my mind, the President
has indicated he wants to start removing troops in July 2011,
and you are telling us that they are not going to be there
until July 2010. That gives 1 year before they start removing
the troops.
Now, I understand that this can be adjusted, and the
witnesses have indicated that this can be adjusted if the need
arises, but what kind of a signal does it send to the Taliban
and al-Qaeda when you know that the troops aren't going to be
there until July and you are going to start moving them out 1
year from then?
Even if you reassess, you have given them a time frame
within which to work. And I just think that is a terrible
mistake.
And, you know, there is another issue that I want to raise.
Last night, I was watching my good friend, Representative Poe,
on the floor; and he raised an issue that has not been talked
about in the media very much. You know, back in World War II,
if the Japanese had killed and mutilated four Americans, hung
them from a bridge, and then we captured one of the people that
did that, one of the ringleaders and they got a split lip and a
smack in the stomach, I don't think they would have been court-
martialed. I think if the Germans in World War II had killed
and mutilated American troops and hung them from a bridge and
somebody busted them in the mouth when they captured them, they
wouldn't have been court-martialed.
And yet, right now, one of the ringleaders of al-Qaeda,
Ahmed Hashim Abed, was captured in Operation Amber. He was
wanted for the murder of four U.S. contractors in Fallujah that
were mutilated and hung, dragged through the streets and hung
from the bridge there, and those Navy Seals that captured him
in Operation Amber on December the 7th, the day we were
attacked at Pearl Harbor, are going to be court-martialed.
I think that is insane. What kind of a message are we
sending to our troops in the field when they do their duty,
risk their lives, capture a terrorist that is wanted, one of
the top 10 terrorists, and we are going to court-martial them?
I don't care if they broke the guy's nose or broke both his
arms and his legs. This is insane. The troops need to know
there is total commitment by the people of this country and the
military leaders. And for us to start court-martialing people
who capture a leader in al-Qaeda who mutilated Americans and
hung them from a bridge and we are going to court-martial them
for capturing this guy and punching him in the stomach and
giving him a broken lip? This is crazy.
We need to send a signal we are going to do whatever is
necessary to protect our troops and protect the people of this
country in this war against terror. And I hope that you will be
able to give me a satisfactory answer, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as to why these gentlemen are being court-
martialed.
Admiral Mullen. Sir, I have great faith in our judicial
system.
Mr. Burton. But why are they being court-martialed in the
first place?
Admiral Mullen. I have got great combat leaders out there,
great leaders in the SEAL community specifically that I have
tremendous faith in; and I await the results of whatever that
leadership recommends and the procedures that would follow. And
I wouldn't be involved in any more, in any way, shape, or form,
in those proceedings. It would be improper for me to get
involved in any way, shape, or form at this point.
Mr. Burton. Let me just follow up by saying, sir, I think
it is improper that these men are being court-martialed after
capturing this guy in Operation Amber and him having a split
lip and getting--and was hit in the stomach. Because that is
what we were told happened. And if security is job one, then I
think an artificial timeline in Afghanistan is improper as
well. It sends the wrong signal, in my opinion, to the Taliban
and al-Qaeda.
Respond if you like. You have 23 seconds to respond, if you
like.
Admiral Mullen. The timeline is one that gets--the decision
is one that gets forces there very, very rapidly. The decision,
the timeline in July is set to transition, transfer security
responsibility, start to do that, and transition. And it will
be a responsible transition, and it will be based on conditions
on the ground.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The representative from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I would like to personally express the
deepest gratitude and appreciation to you and your office for
the splendid assistance that was given after the recent crisis
in the earthquake and the tsunami in the Samoan Islands. I
deeply appreciate that.
There was an article last month in the Washington Post
which expressed some concerns that Ambassador Eikenberry had
given, to the fact that his feeling was that if we increase our
force structure in Afghanistan it will mean that the government
will be more dependent on our support and our assistance. And I
guess out of frustration President Karzai was noted in the same
article in the Washington Post, and I quote: ``U.S. Officials
were particularly irritated by an interview this week in which
a defiant Karzai said that the West has little interest in
Afghanistan and that its troops are there only for self-serving
reasons.''
And the quote from President Karzai was, ``The West is not
here primarily for the sake of Afghanistan. It is here to fight
terrorism. The United States and its allies came to Afghanistan
after September 11th. Afghanistan was troubled like hell before
that, too. Nobody bothered about us.''
And I guess there is a sense of negligence that we had
given because we were focused on Iraq and the problems that we
have encountered there in that terrible conflict. What is your
sense on this, Secretary Gates? Is there some truth in
President Karzai's sense of frustration that after 6 or 7
years' absence all of a sudden we refocused, now suggesting
Afghanistan is a very important issue for us to consider as far
as our national security is concerned?
Secretary Gates. I think the frustration on the part not
just of the Afghans but also on the part of the Pakistanis does
not refer just to the last few years but rather goes back to
1989, where one of the major proponents in this House of
providing support to the mujahedin to take on the Soviet Union
similarly took on the cause of trying to provide additional
U.S. help and support after the Soviets left. And of course I
am talking about Charlie Wilson. And there is no question in my
mind, and I have said before publicly that I was in the
administration, I was the deputy of national security at the
time, had the----
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, I didn't mean
to interrupt, but my time is so limited. Would you basically
agree----
Secretary Gates. My point is their frustration dates from
1989, not from 2003.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And the frustration is well taken. I
mean, there is some truth in what----
Secretary Gates. Absolutely. And that is why the emphasis
in the President's policy on a long-term relationship with both
of these countries.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Okay. General Petraeus appeared before a
joint committee hearing that we had a couple years ago, and I
expressed some real serious concern about the strained--
severely strained military force structure that we currently
have. Nobody wants to talk about the draft. We are going to be
putting in an additional $30 billion for these 30,000 soldiers
and about 100,000 soldiers that we are going to be sending to
Afghanistan. Are we still working on the cheap as far as
sending this number of soldiers? Some have estimated it is
going to take a lot more than 100,000 soldiers from the U.S.
Secretary Gates. Let me make two quick comments and then
turn it to Admiral Mullen.
First, the previous administration and this administration
have significantly increased the size of the Army and the
Marine Corps, 65,000 for the Army, 27,000 for the Marine Corps,
another 22,000 for the Army just a few months ago. So we have
tried to put in place some measures that will relieve the
strain.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And on the voluntary force structure, if
I might add also, we have had to use about 30 percent of our
National Guard and Ready Reserves to assist in fighting the war
in Iraq. And is this really the intended purpose of our
reserves, to fight a war? Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, from what I have seen, I mean, the
National Guard and Reserves have contributed at such high
levels we would not be where we are. They actually are
enthusiastic about this.
We have to achieve a balance. We can't deploy them in some
cases as frequently as we have, although I don't think we are
that far off. And I do think there is no question that the
additional force structure that has been added over the last
couple of years has made a huge difference, and I think it is
about right.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to identify myself with the
remarks of Mr. Burton concerning court-martial of our military
personnel who were involved in the capturing of terrorists.
What we need to say very clearly, either we support our troops
or we don't send them in. And, quite frankly, we shouldn't send
them into a no-win situation. And I believe what I have heard
today and heard from the President last night is not a strategy
that will bring any type of victory to our efforts there in
Afghanistan.
Let's note that there was a quick defeat of the Taliban
after 9/11, and that was a tremendous, low-cost victory, and it
was not accomplished by U.S. troops. It was accomplished with
only 200 U.S. troops on the ground when Kabul was liberated
from the Taliban. The rest of the fighting was done and almost
all of the fighting was done by the Northern Alliance, which
was basically mobilized village militias.
In the aftermath of that great victory, and contrary to
their traditions and their culture, we, the United States
Government, forced a centralized Kabul-based government
structure on the Afghans, and then our military took over the
fighting. It was a strategy that has not worked. And what we
hear today, Madam Secretary, with all due respect, it just
seems to me that we have got the same policy that has not
worked with perhaps a few more troops, perhaps some more money,
but basically the same strategy that has not worked. But yet we
are going to send 30,000 more of our boys and women into
Afghanistan to do the fighting that should be done and could be
done by the Afghan villagers themselves.
I wonder if any of you have read--and I submit this, Mr.
Chairman, for the record--a report by Major Jim Gant. Have any
of you read this report? It is a report--he was embedded in the
villages in Afghanistan. He comes up with a strategy that will
work. And what will not work is simply having more U.S. combat
troops doing the fighting or building, which we heard here
today, this centralized Afghan military that is based in Kabul,
the Karzai military establishment. We are going to bolster that
and we are going to expect that that is going to bring the
villagers and the tribal people over to our side? That is going
to drive them into the arms of the Taliban, just like if we
just sent in more U.S. troops to do the fighting.
[Note: The report referred to, ``A Strategy for Success in
Afghanistan, One Tribe at a Time,'' by Major Jim Gant, United
States Army Special Forces, is not reprinted here but is
available in committee records.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. Again, why is it--what is different about
what the President has said? Even today I don't hear anything
different. But maybe a different facade, but it is the same old
policy. U.S. troops do the fighting.
Americans are war weary of doing the fighting for other
people. We would not have succeeded originally in Afghanistan
had we sent in all of these major military combat units and
done the fighting against the Taliban originally. So if it
wouldn't work then, how come it is going to work now?
Secretary Gates. Two quick points.
First, there is recognition in the President's decisions of
the importance of working with the locals. And I personally
think that a big part of our progress going forward,
particularly in terms of being able to transition
responsibility for security to the Afghans, is not necessarily
the Afghan National Army or even the police but local law
enforcement, local police, local security people who are
working with the government. They may not be in a chain of
command, if you will, but clearly a major part of the
President's strategy is more attention to the subnational
government, to working with the tribes, working with the
villagers.
And the second point----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Those are words. Those are words. But we
haven't changed the structure a bit.
The provincial leaders are basically appointed by Kabul.
Our State Department insisted on a centralized structure that
is totally contrary to Afghan tradition. Then we expect that
the Afghan people are just going to swallow it, especially when
their government is so corrupt they can't even have an honest
election? How can we expect our men and women to go over there
and put their lives on the line when we haven't been willing to
actually be tough with Karzai and force the restructuring of
that system so it is more consistent with what the Afghan
culture is all about?
Secretary Gates. We have to build consonant with the Afghan
culture. And I think one of the things we have talked about is
focusing our efforts in dealing with the existing tribal and
other--and local structures, and trying to strengthen them
rather than build something new.
Second, a big part of the President's strategy is, frankly,
training up the Afghan Army as quickly as possible so that they
can take over responsibility for the security from our troops.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
I certainly would like to say that, you know, if we had
done the right thing before we had gone into Afghanistan and
Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden was and al-Qaeda, we would not
be in the situation we are in today. We have the shock and awe,
we go into Iraq, it had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, and now we
find ourselves stuck in Afghanistan.
They criticized President Obama for taking a long time to
come up with this plan and then secondly criticized him for
having a date to come out. President Bush said that the mission
was accomplished after 3 months, and we are still in Iraq. At
least President Obama knows when he has a plan, and it wasn't 3
months after we go into Iraq that we get on an aircraft carrier
saying the mission is accomplished and we are still there. So I
don't think there is any comparison.
Secondly, we talk about the cost. We had a President that
reduced taxes at a time we are increasing the war, and now we
wonder why we are in this dilemma and all this criticism. I
don't like the increase in troops. I don't think we can win a
war in Afghanistan. I think that we have to hopefully
transition the Afghans to be able to be trained, as it has been
indicated, and fight for themselves.
We have three choices: One, stay the course and go nowhere.
Two, withdraw and be criticized. Three, to increase troops. I
mean, he had to pick one of the three, and so we made this one.
But we have to quickly transition into having the Afghans take
care of themselves, and I hope that that will happen.
I wonder, finally, if in your opinion do you believe that
this time up until June 2011 is enough time?
And, secondly, I would like to mention that I would hope
that we would also focus on other areas where al-Qaeda is
coming in, like in Somalia. If we stay there and do not put in
the assets, we are going to have the same problem with Kenya
and Eritrea and Ethiopia there. If we stand up Sheik Sharif's
militia now, we can prevent the al-Shabab and Hezbollah from
taking over Somalia. We can prevent a lot of money being spent
and destabilizing all of East Africa. So I would hope we would
giving give that some consideration.
What about the fact do we have enough time and manpower to
train the Afghans to prevent our troops from being in harm's
way and have them take over? Because, like I said, I just feel
very troubled that more American troops are going to be sent
into Afghanistan.
Admiral Mullen. Sir, I share your concern about other
places where al-Qaeda is growing. Somalia and Yemen are two in
particular, although their core leadership and their heart
really beats in that border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
That is why it is so critical.
With respect to enough time, the entire military chain of
command believes, including the Joint Chiefs, that we will know
where we are by summer of 2011 whether we can succeed here or
not. And that we know we have got to get these forces in. We
have to secure--turn the security situation around. It is
really under that umbrella that we will be able to develop the
Afghan security forces, the Army, and the police.
We have got goals set to do that. There are some challenges
associated with that. There is some significant risks
associated with that. But we really think this is the right
answer and that in fact is the way that we turn their own
country over to themselves. Actually, in many ways not unlike
Iraq.
We don't underestimate the challenge. But that really is
the path, and we think there is enough time between now and
then to really step out in that direction and know whether we
are going to make it or not.
Mr. Payne. Just a last question, is there any way we can
impress Pakistan that India is not their biggest enemy about
Kashmir and have Pakistan concentrate more on Pakistan and stop
worrying about India and some India and Pakistan conflict?
Admiral Mullen. President Obama in March, his strategy then
focused--and I was a big supporter of this--on the region and
greatly focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it really is
the region. And India is a big player in that region as well.
And I think all of us international players, particularly the
regional players, have to take steps to stabilize. And the
relationship between Pakistan and India is critical and
leadership there must I think step forward to stabilize that
border more than anything else. And I think that would be a
great step forward in stabilizing the region.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I would ask the witnesses this. General McChrystal notes in
his assessment that the Afghan insurgency is clearly supported
from Pakistan and that insurgent groups are reportedly aided by
some elements of Pakistan's ISI. Now, for the longest time, as
I can remember, we have had a dysfunctional relationship with
Pakistan in which many of the presumptions that the Pakistani
ISI or intelligence service have made have not actually been in
the interests of Pakistan, such as originally training and
recruiting the Taliban.
Now we face a situation where the Taliban not only is a
threat to Afghanistan but is also a threat to Pakistan. And
since Pakistan has 100 nuclear weapons, that becomes quite
problematic since al-Qaeda wants to get its hands on these
nuclear weapons.
I guess at the end of the day the question is, what are we
prepared to do to bring pressure to bear on that government in
Pakistan to assure that they do not continue this practice of
allowing the Taliban that kind of sanctuary, or at least
support for certain elements of the Taliban inside Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, that is obviously a
critical question. Here is how we see it.
We think that in the last year the Pakistanis have really
stepped up. Their military action against the Pakistan Taliban
in both Swat and South Waziristan is an abrupt about face from
their prior policies. And it has been a unifying policy,
supported by the people of Pakistan. So they have taken an
important first step, but they need to take more steps in their
own best interests. And that is the case we have been making to
them, that there has to be a recognition of the connection
between those elements of the Taliban who have attacked their
military headquarters, their intelligence headquarters,
indiscriminately killed and maimed so many hundreds of
Pakistanis and all the other elements of this syndicate of
terrorism. Obviously, we think al-Qaeda is not only the
inspiration but the funder, the equipper, the trainer, the
planner. And so our task, which Admiral Mullen has been
particularly and deeply involved in, is to make that case.
And so, if I could, let me turn to Admiral Mullen.
Mr. Royce. Well, I am just going to ask another question
and make the point that I don't think to date we have been very
effective in bringing the type of pressure to bear on Pakistan,
and I would suggest that all of us think anew about a strategy
that might work.
Now let me bring up the other point which was touched on
earlier. But that is the report that Navy SEALs secretly
captured one of the most-wanted terrorists in Iraq. The
consequences of that, when they captured him, they are now
facing charges because reportedly he told--the terrorist told
the investigators he was punched by his captors and he had a
bloody lip to prove it. So the three SEALs, Navy elite commando
unit members, they have refused nonjudicial punishment. They
called a captain's mast. They requested a trial by court-
martial, is basically what has happened. And their attorney is
saying, ``I don't know how they are going to bring this
detainee to the United States and give us our constitutional
right to confrontation in the courtroom.''
But, again, we have terrorists getting their constitutional
rights in New York City, but I suspect that they are going to
deny these SEALs their right to confrontation in a military
courtroom in Virginia, which is what the SEALs are requesting.
The question I would put to Admiral Mullen, and certainly
to Secretary Gates, goes to the issue of rules of engagement.
When we are at war with terrorists abroad and you have the
types of rules of engagement being dictated to our troops and
you have this kind of action against our Navy SEALs at a time
when we are talking about trying to stop the insurgency in
Afghanistan, I do not think it is helpful. And I would like to
hear any commentary on your part about what could be done on
the issue of bringing terrorists to trial in New York City
while the constitutional rights of our own American servicemen,
in my view, are being violated.
Chairman Berman. Unfortunately, the time has expired.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. It hangs out there.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much.
And, first, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your very
kind words earlier in the hearing; and I very much want to
acknowledge what I think is an extraordinary privilege for all
of us, to serve on this committee, particularly with your
leadership and the leadership of Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen.
Both of you exhibit the kind of character that I think the
American people justly deserve.
I also very quickly would just simply say that I have
cherished the opportunity to develop wonderful friendships not
only with my fellow Democrats but with so many Republicans as
well who I deeply respect, and I think the American people
should understand the degree of respect and camaraderie that
exists on this committee and that they are well served by it.
If I may, to Secretary Clinton and Secretary----
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? I ask that the
gentleman's full time be restored.
Chairman Berman. Yes, he is entitled to respond to the
criticisms of him that were made earlier.
Mr. Wexler. Once you say you are leaving, people are much
nicer to you here.
If I may, to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, this
morning when you appeared before the Senate and Senator McCain,
in his usual eloquent and sincere fashion, questioned you, he
seemed to be making the point that the President's creation of
a timetable for transition and the consideration of conditions
on the ground are mutually exclusive points of reference; and
it would seem to me in the manner in which the President has
constructed his plan that in fact that is not, respectfully to
Senator McCain, the case and that the way the plan is
constructed that both the creation of a timetable for
transition and the consideration of conditions on the ground in
fact will happen together. And I was wondering if you could
explain that so that there will not be any confusion in that
regard.
Secretary Gates. The President was very clear last night
that his decision is that we should begin the transition to
Afghan security control in July 2011. The key word here is
``begin.'' This will be a process. And it will look a lot like
Iraq, where some districts and provinces will be able to be
turned over fairly quickly, with us in a tactical and then
strategic overwatch, sort of the cavalry over the hill, if you
will, for a time, and that that will spread in the country.
And so you will have situations where security control has
been--responsibility has been taken over by the Afghans in one
set of districts or one province, while there is still heavy
combat going on in other provinces that are more contested with
the Taliban.
The key here is, and one of the things that was central to
our deliberations, how do you demonstrate resolve and at the
same time convey a sense of urgency to the Afghans that they
must step up to the plate and begin to take responsibility for
their own security and to protect their own country against
these extremists?
And I think that, you know, the interesting thing for me,
appearing before the Congress now on my second surge, is that
the Bush administration accepted firm deadlines for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq. The President is suggesting
and is proposing a timeline for the beginning of a transition
of responsibility for security in Afghanistan. We will review
this formally in December 2010 and decide then whether our
strategy is working and whether we think we are in a position
whether we need to make adjustments. But the President's clear
intent and his decision is that we will begin that process.
But the key is to realize that--I guess another point I
would make is that, in Iraq, as soon as the surge was clearly
going to be successful, the Iraqis wanted us out as quickly as
possible. That is not entirely clear in Afghanistan. The
Afghans live in a very tough neighborhood. They have been at
war for 30 years. It would be understandable if they would
enjoy having the United States Army and Marine Corps there for
an extended period of time to provide protection.
We are not prepared to do that, and so what the President
has tried do is set in place something that demonstrates
resolve on the one hand but on the other puts the Afghans on
notice that they need to step up the recruitment of their
soldiers and their police. They need to get them trained, they
need to get them experienced in combat, partnering with us, and
then they need to begin to take responsibility. And we will do
this in a gradual and conditions-based way.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
And if you could share with us the administration's
expectation as to the participation of our NATO allies, given
the President's speech last night.
Secretary Clinton. Yes. We are encouraged by the response
of a lot of our NATO-ISAF allies. We have 43 countries that are
troop-contributing countries. Working with the Secretary
General of NATO, I will be going to NATO tomorrow to be there
on Friday in Brussels. We anticipate a significant commitment
of additional forces by our NATO-ISAF partners, as well as
additional money. Because, of course, we want to establish a
robust trust fund for both the Afghan National Army and the
police so that the funding needs can be not only carried out in
the next couple of years but be maintained after that.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.
Mr. Paul. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome the panel today. I wish I could promise you an
eloquent statement where I could convert all of you to a
noninterventionist foreign policy and a policy where we are not
nation building, but I don't think I can promise you that.
I wish I could come up with some profound questions for the
panel so that I could point out the inconsistencies not of the
current foreign policy but the foreign policy that has been
going on for quite a few decades.
But all I can think about are some terms that come to mind
that I have learned all the way back in the 1960s when I was
serving as a military officer, an Air Force officer for 5
years; and I come up with thoughts: Quagmire, perpetual war for
perpetual peace, war is the health of the state, war is a
racket, truth is the first casualty of war. And I think there
is some profoundness to that, and I had to plagiarize them.
Those are not my thoughts.
But today we are in a mess, and we are trying to figure out
how to do it. We had a war going on for 8 years, and I think it
has a lot to do with the way we get into the wars, and then we
try to justify why we are there later on.
One thing that almost all debates are prefaced by is don't
come off as an extremist. Can we have a military victory? Have
500,000 troops go in there and win like we used to? No, that is
off base. But do you want to just come home? No, that is not
allowed. We have to have this balancing act, which guarantees
the politicizing of the war.
This is why we end up with courts-martial and arguments
that are justified. We end up with military tribunals and
secret prisons, because we are not precise of what our goals
are and why we are involved, and I think that is the biggest
problem that we have. And what we need to do I think is try to
be more precise about why we are going to war.
Now, the question I have for the panel, and I hope each and
every one of you can answer this question, is I would like to
know whether or not you endorse the Bush doctrine. Ironically,
last night the speech was given, which truly was eloquent, but
it was given in the same place that the former President gave a
speech in 2002 and emphasized a profound, dramatic change in
our attitude toward the world. And it is recognized now as the
Bush Doctrine. I think it is something, maybe one of the most
important events in our history when it comes down to foreign
policy.
So each and every one of you, do you endorse the Bush
Doctrine of preventive war or do you reject it?
Secretary Gates. I think that the term ``preventive war''
is a very important one, because it differentiates from
preemptive war. A preemptive war in my view is one where you
know you are about to be attacked and you strike first. My
personal view is that the standard for intelligence and for
confidence for preventive war is an extraordinarily high one;
and there are very, very few instances where I think it is
justified. If the experience of the last 8 years has taught us
anything, it is to reaffirm the historic lesson that war is
inherently unpredictable.
Mr. Paul. Okay.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I think that
Secretary Gates draws an important distinction. There are times
when it is appropriate for a country to protect itself from
what it knows would be a devastating attack. But that standard
should be so high, and obviously we didn't see that standard
met in the last 8 years. But let me just add that is not the
situation in Afghanistan. We were attacked from Afghanistan. So
even if the doctrine is or is not an appropriate one, it is not
applicable to the situation before us.
Mr. Paul. But we were never attacked by an Afghani.
Secretary Clinton. That is not true. Al-Qaeda was embedded
in Afghan society. It was given safe haven by Mullah Omar and
the Taliban leadership. They were given a chance to turn over
al-Qaeda and bin Laden before we attacked them, and they
refused.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our minimum objective in Afghanistan is so uninspiring that
no one will embrace it or acknowledge that we have actually
achieved it. That minimum objective is to make sure that Afghan
territory is not used for a successful major attack against the
United States and to achieve that objective 1 day at a time.
It may also be our minimum objective to make sure Afghan
territory is not used successfully to destabilize Pakistan; and
we have achieved that 1 day at a time for many years with a
much, much smaller force than we have at the present time, let
alone planned.
There is a bolder objective, and that is that we achieve
our minimum objective without having to have troops there, that
we have a functioning Afghan Army achieving that goal or those
two goals for us. And then there is the maximum objective of a
functioning, perhaps even democratic Afghan state.
We have rejected the idea of a smaller number of troops for
a longer number of days because it clashes not so much with our
strategic objectives but with our national culture. Playing
defense and having to do it for as long as you have something
to defend may be the Roman way; it is not the American way.
I have got a number of questions, and I will ask for
responses for the record if time doesn't permit. But I will
start with the Admiral.
This plan is based on roughly 5,000 additional allied
troops, which may or may not materialize. If we don't get but a
small percentage of those 5,000 troops, do we need to abandon
this plan? Do we need to put in more American troops? Or are
those 5,000 really not essential?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, every indication I have--and this
isn't hope, this has been through an awful lot of work--that we
are going to achieve some level of increased support from NATO
sort of at the minimum levels of 5,000, and it could be more
than that. And that has been worked by myself, Secretary
Clinton, Secretary Gates, Admiral Stavridis, Secretary General
Rasmussen. And so I am confident that we will see some level--
at least some level around that number.
Mr. Sherman. Are you relying on any French troops as part
of that total?
Admiral Mullen. I wouldn't speak to any specific country
right now. They have to speak for themselves.
Mr. Sherman. The risk of the strategy that is being
announced is that we are telling the American people there will
come a day when we don't need to have any troops in
Afghanistan. Now, if the strategy works, we are going to have a
functioning government in Afghanistan sometime after the middle
of 2011, and that will prevent the Taliban's return. But the
achievement of that strategy is outside the control of the
United States. It relies in large part on the Afghan people and
the Karzai government, which may be as bad as detractors
indicate.
Secretary Clinton, are we prepared to go to the American
people and say we tried counterinsurgency, it didn't work, not
a fault of the U.S. military, and that we are returning to
counterterrorism? Or are we promising the American people that
by 2012, 2013 we will be out of Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I think it is
important to draw the contrast between combat troops and
between support troops, the kind that would be continuing to
train, provide logistics, perhaps intelligence, airlift, the
support that the Afghans might need going forward.
We have certainly determined that we have to stand up the
Afghan security forces as quickly and effectively as possible
so that the combat mission can transition. That is exactly what
we are attempting to do. But there may well be in the----
Mr. Sherman. Madam Secretary, if I may interrupt and
rephrase my question. Let's not talk then about whether we
still have troops on the ground but whether we are still
sustaining casualties every day or every week. What if in 2013,
2014 the Afghan Government isn't doing what we want and the
only way to have counterterrorism is to incur casualties?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I am not going to
speculate about what is going to happen in 2013 or 2014. I
happen to believe that as we implement the strategy that the
President outlined last night we will change the reality on the
ground. We will improve the chances of success in this mission.
Mr. Sherman. I can only wish you well.
I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. I thank the chair. I thank the witnesses.
First, I want to compliment the administration for taking
the time to study this. I know there has been some criticism
about the length of time that it took. That has not come from
me. I think we would do well to study and deliberate more
around here.
Having said that, when you look at the policy that was
enunciated last night, there is an old adage that a camel is a
horse designed by committee. And in many ways I think this
looks to be a policy designed by committee, a little something
for everybody. For those who want to get out, there is the
timetable. For those who want to get in, we have the surge. But
it may not work very well.
How would you respond, Secretary Clinton, to that assertion
that this smacks of the problems of policy designed by
committee?
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, camels are very sturdy
animals. They are patient and may be plodding, but they
eventually get to where you hope they will arrive. I think that
this policy is the result of a very intense discussion that
questioned every assumption, that put everything on the table,
that invited the most vigorous debate.
I think, as Admiral Mullen said, for those of us who
participated in I think it was ten meetings with the President
and probably three times that many among ourselves, it was an
exhausting and thorough process that led us to the decision
that the President announced last night.
I don't think any of us believed that there were any easy
or simple or quick options that we thought responsibly could be
adopted. This is the best result of all of our efforts. And I
am sure that there are many who can, you know, pick at it, but
I think that it reflects an extraordinarily honest assessment.
And I think the time frame, which is often at the core of
the concerns people reflect, is intended to do two things,
because there are so many audiences for this policy. It is
intended to send a message of both resolve and urgency. The
resolve that we are committed, we are going to put additional
troops in, our young men and women. We want a long-term
civilian commitment. But that there is an urgency to this, that
we cannot just have the Americans and our 42 other nation
contributors bear this burden, that the Afghans, both
governmentally and among the people, have to step up. And that
is what we are attempting to deliver here, and we will be
assessing it very closely for the months ahead.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
In terms of that assessment, General Jones said just less
than 2 months ago in answer to a question on CNN, well, I think
this is one of the central issues that, you know, obviously the
good news is that Americans should feel good about is that in
Afghanistan that the al-Qaeda presence is very diminished. The
maximum estimate is less than a hundred operating in the
country. No bases, no ability to launch attacks on either us or
our allies. He says the problem is with sanctuaries across the
border. He said, ``But I don't-- deg.I don't foresee
the return of the Taliban; and I want to be clear that
Afghanistan is no longer in danger, imminent danger of
falling.''
Now, if you have a statement like that, it might suggest
caution in inserting 30,000 more troops. And then 1 year from
now, or 18 months from now, in July 2011, what constitutes
success? Is it 50, a maximum of 50 al-Qaeda operating in
Afghanistan? And if we already acknowledge that Afghanistan is
not in danger, imminent danger of falling, what constitutes
success in July when we are going to decide whether we should
pull troops out or not? Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. I think no one thinks the government in
Kabul is in imminent risk of being overthrown. But it was
certainly the conclusion of General McChrystal's assessment
that the situation was serious and deteriorating. And we have
seen the Taliban get more aggressive and more bold with each
passing week.
What we want to do is, in helping the Afghans, make sure
that that government doesn't fall and that we are able to
sustain a friendly government in Kabul that will help us deny
al-Qaeda a safe haven.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank all
our distinguished witnesses for testifying.
I listened very carefully to the President's speech last
night, and I am willing to give the President the benefit of
the doubt. But my fear, as is the fear of so many others, is
that we could easily get bogged down in an endless war.
What happens if this doesn't work? Do we leave in 3 years,
as the President is stating, or do we stay longer? What happens
if General McChrystal makes another public speech saying that
he needs 10,000 more troops in attempting to back the President
into a corner? What do we do then?
We talk about Afghanistan and Pakistan. I noted that just
last week their representatives abstained in the recent
resolution, the IAEA resolution critical of Iran's nuclear
program. If these are our allies, I hate to see what our
enemies think. So there are all these questions.
And, finally--and I would like anyone to comment on
anything I have said--where is Osama bin Laden and why can't we
seem to get him? If we are relying on our intelligence to tell
us that this is what we should be doing next in Afghanistan and
our intelligence can't even tell us where he is--there was a
recent Senate report that says shortly after the war in
Afghanistan began we had Osama bin Laden and we let him slip
through our fingers--how much can we count on our intelligence
now when we can't even capture one guy in 8 years?
Admiral Mullen. Let me start with the last one first.
Actually, there has been a considerable diminishment of al-
Qaeda over the last couple of years in terms of their
leadership, obviously not bin Laden or Zawahiri specifically.
And what I have learned over the years, and particularly in the
last several years, is individuals like him--and it is not
unique, quite frankly, to him in this area--that their job one
for them is survival, and they do it really well. And so it is
not--and we have good intelligence and good agencies, and it
has improved a great deal, and I rely on them tremendously.
That said, it is still a big problem. And it doesn't mean we
are not trying to find him and the rest of the leadership.
With respect to--I am sorry--the first part of your
question?
Mr. Engel. Getting bogged down in an endless war.
Admiral Mullen. No, sir. It is just not going to happen. It
is very clear--this President has said it, the military
leadership understands it--that this is not open-ended, and we
are not going to escalate. We believe that these troops, this
strategy, the civilian surge that goes with it, the opportunity
we have because Pakistan is making progress, we have got a new
President in Afghanistan, we have got the right leadership on
the ground, we have got the right leadership in the embassy,
that now is the time and we can actually turn this thing
around. And so I don't have an expectation that we are going to
get bogged down there or that there will be requests for any
additional troops.
Mr. Engel. Secretary Clinton?
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, I think that your focus on
bin Laden is absolutely appropriate. I share your frustration
that 8 years from the attack that devastated New York has not
led to the killing or capturing of bin Laden and his principal
lieutenants.
As Admiral Mullen said, we have degraded their leadership,
we have been successful in going after a number of the
mainstays of his organization, but we haven't gotten him, and
we haven't gotten Zawahiri, and we haven't gotten Mullah Omar.
And I think that that has to be a primary goal of what it is we
are doing. And it certainly is for me, and I think it is for
the President, and part of the strategy that we are unfolding
we think will assist us.
And I would just add that, you know, this strategy has been
largely on the military side influenced by General Petraeus and
General McChrystal, one of whom is our foremost expert on
counterinsurgency, the other on counterterrorism; and I think
that there is reason to put a lot of stock in their opinion.
Secretary Gates. I would just add one thing. The President
gives the orders, but every man and woman that is deployed
overseas is deployed over my signature. And if I came to
conclude that we were bogged down and stalemated and we were
sending young men and women into a maw with no purpose and no
hope of success, I wouldn't sign any more of those orders.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this distinguished panel. I thank you all for
your service to the United States, and I greet you with
respect.
Specifically, I have a question I want to direct first to
Secretary Gates and then to Admiral Mullen having to do with
some military aspects and issues arising out of the President's
address last night.
First, let me say I, like many have said before, I welcome
the President's call for reinforcements; I appreciate the
President's embrace of this same surge strategy that worked in
Iraq. Despite the fact that, as a candidate, the President
opposed it, and I think every Democrat on this committee
opposed it, the surge worked.
And as a point of clarification to Secretary Gates, you
said this is your ``second surge,'' I think that is an
affirmation of that assertion that I made.
But I want to specifically talk about this issue of
timetables for withdrawal and get your reaction. You made
mention earlier that the Bush administration did embrace a
timetable for withdrawal. Of course, that was after the surge
worked. When President Bush announced the surge in Iraq, he did
not announce a timetable for withdrawal. The timetable was
negotiated in the status of forces agreement following what was
universally accepted to be the success of the surge.
And so my question is really about this business of
timetables. Because my Democratic colleagues I think made more
than a dozen efforts in 2007 and 2008 to impose specific
timetables for withdrawal on our efforts in Iraq, fortunately
unsuccessfully on the floor. And the President made reference
to July, 2011.
Secretary Gates, you said in April 2007 with regard to
Iraq, ``I have been pretty clear that I think the enactment of
specific deadlines would be a bad mistake.''
In September of this year, you told CNN, ``I think the
notion of timelines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I
think would be a strategic mistake.''
I am someone who believes it never makes sense to tell the
enemy when you are going to quit fighting in a war. Mr.
Secretary, I wondered if you might elaborate on that--and then
I have a quick question for the Admiral--on what has changed in
your view here? What am I missing that distinguishes your
opposition to timelines in Iraq, your opposition to a timeline
you expressed here in September with regard to Afghanistan to
the President's enunciation of July, 2011?
Secretary Gates. First of all, there may not have been a
specific timeline associated with the announcement of the surge
in Iraq, but it was quite clear that domestically it could not
be sustained indefinitely. And the reality is the surge in Iraq
lasted 14 months. The President is talking about at least 18-24
months with this surge.
I would say that--well, first of all, I have adamantly
opposed deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I opposed
deadlines in Afghanistan. But what the President has announced
is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. And it
is clear that this will be a gradual process and, as he said
last night, based on conditions on the ground. So there is no
deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan.
Mr. Pence. Reclaiming my time--Secretary Gates, forgive me
for the constraints of our time here--your line to CNN was you
opposed ``timelines and exit strategies,'' but I will leave
that there, and I will accept your response.
Admiral Mullen, last night the President said in his
speech, ``Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for
support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these
reinforcements did not arrive.'' The Secretary's predecessor,
Donald Rumsfeld, this afternoon called that a ``bald
misstatement''; and former Secretary Rumsfeld said he was ``not
aware of a single request.''
I wonder, Admiral, are you aware of a request for
reinforcements from 2001 to 2006 or 2008 that was not heeded?
Can you tell the committee who made those requests? Can you
tell the committee who in the chain of command denied those
requests? Because I find the President's assertion, having been
a part of a very strong bipartisanship support for Afghanistan,
really astonishing.
Chairman Berman. Unfortunately, another issue left hanging.
The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Pence. I would ask unanimous consent to permit the
Admiral to answer the question.
Chairman Berman. Any objection?
Admiral Mullen. Just in my tenure here, sir, that General
McKiernan specifically had a fairly substantial request for
upwards of 20,000 forces, which we couldn't meet because they
just weren't there. They were in Iraq.
I spoke out very early that Afghanistan had been under
resourced and that, from where I lived, the heart of that was
under resourced with military forces. We didn't have them
because they were pushed to Iraq, and we couldn't--we really
didn't have the flexibility to move them. That was the priority
of a previous President. We do what the President says. And
that is what we did.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I thank the chairman.
And I would note, in response to the answer by Admiral
Mullen, that I would submit that we are here today because over
the course of the past 8 years we have been distracted from
focusing on Afghanistan, and that is why we find ourselves in
this terrible situation that we are discussing here today.
I think it was you, Admiral Mullen, that talked about
turning it around. We have been there 8 years now, and we are
still talking about turning it around. Is 18 months going to be
sufficient? We have been talking about training the Afghan
Army, the Afghan police. The rates of desertion have been
particularly disturbing during the entire 8 years, and here we
are in 2009 going into 2010 talking about training and building
an Army. What has happened over the course of 8 years?
Admiral Mullen. In my view, when you under resource an
effort for an extended period of time, when you in many ways
starve an effort, the impact--and I don't just mean with forces
because we have done it with training, we have done it
intellectually, we have done it diplomatically, politically,
you name it. We were focused on the other war, and that was a
priority. And the impact of that, I think, is evident in where
we are right now.
So I understand better than anybody that this is our 9th
year of war and we are losing people, and every single one is a
tragedy, and I understand that. But in many ways this strategy
is a new strategy, and it is as if we were starting over. And I
know we are not. But what I said earlier with what Pakistan has
done, moved, we have got a new government--or, I am sorry, new
leadership, a freshly elected leadership in Afghanistan, we
have got new leaders on the ground and all those things.
Mr. Delahunt. Admiral Mullen, let me interrupt you. That is
a very difficult tale to tell to the American people that have
been there going on 9 years, and here we are still talking
about turning it around. I respect what you have said, I concur
with what you said. And let me indicate all three of you have
served your country very well. But we are here to make a policy
decision at some point in time in terms of what our position is
going to be.
The President talked about consultation in conversations
with world leaders, with our allies in NATO. Maybe, Secretary
Gates, you can respond. Have we got hard commitments from our
allies in terms of dollars, in terms of the civilian side? Do
we have hard commitments in terms of incremental numbers of
military personnel being assigned to this new surge, if you
will?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, we do, and we anticipate getting
more during the meeting that Secretary Clinton is going to
tomorrow and at the London conference in January.
I would point out that the Japanese have committed $5
billion for Afghanistan. We have some firm troop commitments.
Those countries have not announced them to their own public, so
we are not in a position to announce them for them.
Mr. Delahunt. The President has also used the figure of $30
billion last night in his remarks to the American people. I was
unclear as to is that additional monies that the American
taxpayer will have to put on the table? And what period of time
does that cover? And if we are talking about an 18-month surge,
can you give us an estimate of the additional monies that it is
going to cost the American people?
Secretary Gates. The additional cost for Fiscal Year 2010
is between $30 billion and $35 billion, and it is additive to
the overseas contingency proposal that the appropriations
committees have in front of them of $130 billion. I would point
out as a result principally of our drawdown in Iraq the
supplemental in Fiscal Year 2008 for Afghanistan and Iraq was
$185 billion. This OCO for 2010 will be about $165 billion.
Mr. Delahunt. Let me conclude by just commenting on an
observation by Mr. Payne of New Jersey regarding India.
Secretary Clinton, if you have time, have we consulted with the
Indians in terms of their relationship with Pakistan in
reducing the concern that the Pakistanis have relative to
India?
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Yes, no questions are very good for the last 7 seconds.
The gentleman from Florida Mr. Mack is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our
witnesses for being here today and for your service to our
country.
I agree with many of the President's points in his speech.
I, too, believe that with every fiber of my being that we as
Americans can still come together behind a common purpose.
Nonetheless I disagree with the President's decision to
personally relay to our enemies when they can regroup and when
they can retake Afghan territory. I simply cannot understand
and cannot agree with this approach. For President Obama to
indicate that he has already made a decision that will take
effect in 18 months irrespective of what the situation is on
the ground not only emboldens our enemies, but allows them to
prepare and plan. Imagine if the Taliban leadership telegraphed
to the world that on a certain day they would reinforce a
certain region, and on another day they would withdraw their
forces. That doesn't make sense, and neither does President
Obama's decision to tell our enemies what our plans are.
And, in fact, when the President says that we will begin to
withdraw troops in July 2011, doesn't that, in fact, say to all
of you to begin your plans to withdraw troops, which in effect
takes our eye off the ball? Shouldn't our purpose, shouldn't it
be what we are looking for is to win the war? I will ask each
one of you to answer.
Secretary Gates. Well, first, I think it is. We wouldn't be
in this if we didn't think we could be successful and if
success was not--and victory in terms of achieving our
objectives was not possible.
Again, I would say that, you know, are the Taliban going to
be more emboldened than they already are because of this
announcement? I don't think so. They are moving as aggressively
now as we have ever seen them. And what are they going to do?
Are they going to lie low for 18 months? That would be terrific
news because that would give us open-field running. Are they
going to go back to Pakistan and wait for 18 months? Terrific.
It gives us the opportunity without opposition to help the
Afghans build. Are they going to lie low in Afghanistan?
If they are not attacking Afghans, if they are not blowing
things up, if they are not attacking our coalition troops,
then, again, that gives us a huge opportunity. On the other
hand, if they are going to engage, if they are going to be as
bold and as aggressive as they have been over the past year,
then they will encounter 150,000 foreign troops and a couple
hundred thousand Afghan troops who will root them out, and we
will reintegrate those that are willing to come over to the
government side, and we will take care of the rest. But the
point is they are going to confront a very aggressive and very
capable military force not just for the next 18 months.
Again, July 2011 is not a cliff, it is the beginning of a
gradual process of turning over responsibility for security to
the Afghans over a period of time as conditions on the ground
permit.
Mr. Mack. Mr. Secretary, and Madam, that is probably a
sentiment shared by all of you. So if I may, then, what is not
terrific and what is not great is if at the end of 18 months we
begin to withdraw and these terrorist groups then begin to
retake Afghanistan. That is not something that I think the
American people want or the administration wants.
But let me just say this then. It is well known that the
President took his time, and I am not faulting taking time, to
come to this decision. And I hope this means that you can
answer some of these questions. When will the training begin,
how many trainees does it take, how many trainees are
available, what are the benchmarks, how long does it take to
train the trainees, and do we have a schedule of how this
training is going to take place?
Admiral Mullen. The training has begun. And probably the
most significant shift that General McChrystal put in place is
to partner with the Afghan forces, the Army and police. We are
at about 95,000 for both the police and the Afghan Army right
now to get to increased goals of about 134,000 for the Army by
the end of 2010. We have got specific goals; we assess it
annually. We are very focused on what it is going to take to
retain them--train them, retain them, recruit them and retrain
them. We know those are concerns as well. We have got strong
leadership in place to get at this, new leadership to get at
this. So this is really for General McChrystal, after security,
his top effort.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
It is clear we will not finish giving all members an
opportunity to ask questions. The panel has another 35 minutes.
Next week we will be having a hearing with top--we hope to be
having a hearing, it is not all tied down yet--with leaders in
the field both on the military and civilian side. It will be
the intention of the chair to start the questioning at that
hearing where we leave off today. And I am going to ask Vice
Chairman Ackerman to preside while I leave and be right back.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect on behalf
of myself and the rest of the senior members----
Chairman Berman. I am worried.
Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. Who chair subcommittees, we will
defer down the line to Mr. Wexler to chair the rest of the
hearing on this his last day as chairman.
Chairman Berman. And while he is walking over here, the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, is recognized.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, first please give my heartfelt
congratulations to the youngest Clinton on her decision to make
a monumental move in her life.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you. It was a very long,
thoughtful process.
Mr. Meeks. I also want to thank the President of the United
States for, as he ended his speech last night, talking about
the American people coming together and being unified. I think
that we have forgotten that right after 9/11 the American
people and, in fact, this Congress almost unanimously wanted to
go into Afghanistan to make sure that we start doing the work
that is being done now. The only time that when we became
divided as a Nation is when this President decided that
Afghanistan was not to be our focus, that Iraq should be.
And so I want to--and I think that part of what the
President is trying to do is to bring this country back
together so that we can refocus on where we was in the
beginning when this horrific act took place that killed so many
American people, American citizens. And I think that is the
direction that we need to be going, moving back into in uniting
as a country. Democrats and Americans were together at that
particular time, and we should be together again as we move
forward to do what we have to do, and not, as Secretary Gates
says, just abandoning Afghanistan for several reasons. So I
want to compliment the President on that.
With that being said, I also know that Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen have indicated that we need to show the American
people a shift in momentum within 12-18 months to ensure public
support. And my question is what do you think will demonstrate
such a shift in momentum so that we can make sure that we have
the confidence of the American people?
Admiral Mullen. I think it starts, sir, with security, and
the first individual who will be able to tell us that is
General McChrystal. It is what they seek, it is what the
Afghans seek more than anything else as he travels through
Afghanistan, because it is going in the wrong direction from
security that gives us an opportunity to train and transfer
security responsibility to the Afghan Security Forces.
But I also think it is very clear we need to see progress
on the part of the Karzai government. This gets to the
ministers, the provincial governors, things like
reconciliation, reintegration, local governance, how that is
going as well.
We need to look at--and I am optimistic--look at continuing
contributions on the part of our international partners as a
measure. And this is 43 countries. We are not in this alone at
all; 43 countries are here.
So those are some of the areas that we would look at for
progress over the next 18 months.
Mr. Meeks. Well, let me ask. Our current policy that the
President espoused, do you describe that as removing
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism?
Admiral Mullen. It is principally counterinsurgency. It is
very focused. It is focused on key population centers, key
production centers, key lines of communications. It is not
focused throughout the country. And, in fact, we are going to
ask our coalition partners to focus in the north and west,
because the worst part of the insurgency is in the south and
the east, in the Pashtun Belt, and that is where we have sent
the Marines in the south, and we will put forces in there to
turn the tide there.
But there is a counterterrorism piece of this as well that
is resident not just in the east and the south, but will be
part of operations throughout the country.
Mr. Meeks. The prior strategy, I don't know whether it is
the same, I guess General McChrystal had indicated that we
would need about 400,000 Afghan security forces. Is that figure
still what we are shooting for, aiming for?
Admiral Mullen. Well, there is an aspirational goal out
there that is somewhere in that number, but where we really are
in this strategy is to look at it year to year. We know what we
need, we know what we have, we know the things we have to fix
with Afghan security forces right now, and we know where we
want to be 1 year from now, 2 years from now, and we are going
to assess that. And that is a high-risk area for us. So rather
than put something out there that we couldn't achieve, we are
going to look at it constantly, but literally year to year, and
focus on achieving our annual goals.
Mr. Meeks. And lastly, real quickly about the payment of
that, but I heard some of that. I know that it worked with
reference to the surge in Iraq. It was because the Sunnis
turned against al-Qaeda, and that was the Awakening. And I was
wondering if there is any such momentum that can be felt on the
ground now in Afghanistan to show that that kind of shift is
about to take place?
Admiral Mullen. There is some of that. I would not say it
is at the level of the Sons of Iraq at this point.
Mr. Wexler [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you
for appearing today.
Afghanistan is not America's challenge alone, it is the
world's problem. And right now our ratio of U.S. troops to NATO
troops is 2 to 1. After this surge it will be 3 to 1, assuming
no other NATO input.
The President last night was not exactly clear in the
nature of the commitments that are going to be forthcoming.
Many of the world's powers are content to sit while America
sacrifices on their behalf. You have touched on this today, but
I think the question deserves further unpacking. I believe you,
Mr. Secretary, mentioned Japan is going to contribute $5
billion. There is a move toward meeting with other NATO allies
to harden those commitments. But we are leading with our chin
right now, and the American people need to know this is not a
disproportionate burden that we are undertaking. Can you
comment on that? And I will pivot to some other questions.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I think it is
important to recognize that until relatively recently, the
ratio between American and non-American NATO ISAF troops was
very close, because, as Admiral Mullen was saying in response
to, I think, Congressman Pence's question, we were at a level
of 30,000 for a very long time. And the NATO troops, Bob, I
think were about that or a little bit more all together. And so
now before this latest decision by the President, we were at
68-, they were about at 42-, something like that. So it has
been certainly a comparable commitment given the relative size
of our respective force levels.
And I think if, as Admiral Mullen said, we get the kind of
response we have reason to believe we will, yes, we will have
additional support from our NATO ISAF allies, we will still be,
at the end of our troop commitments, about 2 to 1, but there
will also be a collective presence that is very significant
since it was the United States that was attacked, and all these
other countries under Article 5 of NATO, others like Australia
coming in, have really seen this fight which was picked with us
as their fight as well.
Secretary Gates. Congressman, I would just like to make one
other point. Since 1941, the United States has borne a
disproportionate responsibility for peace and security around
the world. This is not a new development. And it has gone with
our assumption of world responsibility along with our world
power.
Mr. Fortenberry. Let me thank you. Let me pivot to another
question.
What is the definition of success, and, given his current
plan, what is the probability of success?
Secretary Gates. I believe that success in Afghanistan
looks a lot like--from a security standpoint looks a lot like
success in Iraq, and that is the gradual transfer of
responsibility for security to the indigenous forces and the
local government, and with the United States being able to pull
back into first a tactical and then strategic overwatch and
then withdraw our troops to the point where we have a minimal
presence.
I think we ought to think about, if the Afghans want us, a
prolonged partnership well into the future of training and
equipping. But fundamentally it is the transfer of this
responsibility to an Afghan security force that is able to
sustain that security and protect their own borders.
Mr. Fortenberry. And the probability of that outcome?
Secretary Gates. I think if we did not believe that this
outcome had a strong probability, we would not have supported
it.
Mr. Fortenberry. Let us go back to the earlier point about
international commitments. Now, you mentioned a London
conference. You mentioned that you are clearly trying to be
nimble enough to allow other countries to manage their own
internal political dynamics as they make these commitments. But
how hard and real is the momentum toward burden sharing with
us?
Secretary Clinton. I think it is very real. Before coming
into the hearing, I spoke with Secretary General Rasmussen, the
Secretary General of NATO. He has been working very hard to
help shape the commitments that NATO members will be making. I
know everyone at this table----
Mr. Fortenberry. And other world powers as well.
Secretary Clinton. And other world powers as well. And it
is not only the commitment of troops, which are very important,
but also the commitment of resources. And there will be a
number of announcements over the next days and weeks that we
will be sure that this committee has notice of.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
here today.
Secretary Clinton, you said this was one of the most
complex foreign policy challenges you have ever seen. And,
Admiral Mullen, you said you have never seen an issue so
thoughtfully and thoroughly reviewed. Well, I want to thank the
President, all of you, the entire team of the administration,
for giving this issue the time and really the thoroughness that
our troops, our values and certainly our security deserves.
Secretary Clinton, this past month you were in Afghanistan.
You delivered a sharp message to President Karzai about needing
to clean up the corruption to really address the needs of the
Afghan people. What is it going to look like? What kind of
benchmark should we be looking for in the weeks and months
ahead to see if we are making progress on that front?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman Carnahan, there are
some areas where we can actually measure the progress. For
example, in education there has been significant progress. The
United States has been quite involved in moving from a school
population of a little less than 1 million, nearly all of whom
are boys, to a population of 7 million, 40 percent of whom are
girls, and there is about 5-6 million more. So we are going to
be able to measure that.
In terms of agriculture, which we think is a key strategic
imperative because it is the best way to raise incomes to wean
people from poppies, the United States and other allies have
been contributing to better seeds, better fertilizer, working
with a really quite competent and effective minister of
agriculture.
The minister of finance has begun to move against a lot of
the petty corruption. There are 1 million cars in Afghanistan.
It took a month and a half to get a car registered, and you had
to go through a lot of different hands to get there. The
process has been streamlined. It has been not only cleaned up,
but it is now benefiting the Treasury of the country to the
tune of about $50 million a year.
So there are specific areas where we can see with a
transparent, accountable partnership the progress being made.
We are now certifying agencies. We are not going to put a penny
of American assistance into any agency that is not certified.
So I think that as we go through this, we will be submitting
reports to this committee and other relevant committees
demonstrating how our civilian assistance program, support for
governance, the anticorruption efforts we are undertaking are
working and what kind of expectations we have for them.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you.
And we also heard the President talk about these new
resources that can allow us to make a final push that is
necessary to train the Afghans so that we can transfer
responsibility. I have big concerns about the training. We have
heard some of the same discussion in Iraq. I visited there in
2005. We saw big claims about how quickly we were going to be
able to train up the Iraqi troops and police. We were way off
on those estimates in terms of quality, quantity, in terms of
the time to train.
What lessons have we learned from that, and what kind of
measure should we be looking for to be sure we are getting the
Afghan Army and police trained in the numbers that we need? For
Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates.
Admiral Mullen. I think that we have learned those lessons.
We see similarities in the sense that police are not coming
nearly as quickly as the Army, for instance. That was the case
in Iraq. We have really taken those lessons and used them to
focus on what we need in Afghanistan. But it is a big
challenge. And I indicated earlier that is a high-risk part of
the strategy is training and equipping the Afghan security
forces.
That said, it is a good fighting force. We have had a
considerable amount of progress on the Army. We are way behind
on the police side. There are several programs in place to get
at this, and I don't mean just brand new. And then the
fundamental shift, as I said earlier, about partnering with
them in the field, getting them off the bases so they are in
the fight in the villages. Together with our coalition forces
we think that will accelerate the ability to transfer that
responsibility.
Mr. Carnahan. And Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. I think exactly what Admiral Mullen said.
I think, as he mentioned, we have changed the personnel, the
leadership of the training program. The key about the training
that is important is the best part of the training is not the
basic training where they learn how to march and learn how to
shoot, it is when they partner with us in combat. And it not
only teaches them the skills, what we saw in Iraq is that it
gives them confidence. And the more confidence they have, the
more ability they have to operate on their own.
Mr. Wexler. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say to Secretary Gates, Texas A&M misses you,
but we need you exactly where you are today. And thank you for
the great job and your service to our country.
To Secretary Clinton, Admiral Mullen, I was over in
Pakistan, Afghanistan last 4th of July when the conditions were
starting to deteriorate, and I remember coming back and
visiting with President Bush about this and making the
recommendation that we need more resources. I know in the
transition team this is one of the recommendations that was
made, was to do exactly what you are getting ready to do, and
that is a surge in forces. In my view, we either get all in to
win, or we get out, and I think that is how most Americans feel
about this issue.
To Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the way you turn the
Iraq war around and many others, I think there are many lessons
to be learned by that. The counterinsurgency mission, the
surge, the Sunni Awakening, many of these actually turned it
around so that we can say that we have won that war.
The one thing that we fought very hard in Congress was the
idea of timelines. The President has announced an 18-month
timeline before withdrawal. I sensed a bit of inconsistency in
the message last night between withdrawing based upon
conditions on the ground and a withdrawal based on an 18-month
timeline. My concern is the Afghan people and the tribal
leaders are trying to weigh who their alliance, allegiance is
going to be with, and if they don't see a long-term commitment
or a sustainable commitment on our part, and if they feel that
we are going to abandon the mission at any given point, that
they are going to side with the Taliban, because if we leave,
they are dead. And that is a simple message.
And I want to pose that first question, if you can explain
to me the inconsistency between withdrawing based upon
conditions on the ground versus a withdrawal based upon an 18-
month timeline.
Admiral Mullen. I think the absoluteness of it is not
intended at all. And I think withdrawal exit strategy, we are
done, good-bye, that is just not going to happen. It is a
transfer and transition strategy. And the decision is show
strong resolve. This is a huge commitment. It is the right
commitment. It gives us the forces to turn this thing around,
we know we can do that, and at the same time it creates an
expectation we are not going to be there forever.
And to the discussion about telling the enemy what we are
doing, I mean, this insurgency has gotten worse every year
since 2006. It is not going to significantly get better or
worse based on July 2011, at least that is my view. So it is a
signal that we are in, we can win this thing, and at the same
time, Afghanistan, you have to pick up on this. And we cannot
win this if the Afghan Government and the Afghan people don't
reach out and share this. Another 30,000 troops on top of this
wouldn't make any difference. That is the message. And that has
got to happen over the next couple of years. And General
McChrystal, I am sure, and he will tell you this personally
when he is here, feels this way as well. We have got to turn
this thing in the next 18-24 months.
Mr. McCaul. With respect to what we did in Iraq with the
Sunni Awakening, can you tell me what this plan proposes?
Because in my view, winning the hearts and minds as we did with
the tribal leaders in Iraq is critically essential in
Afghanistan.
Admiral Mullen. Great focus there. We have seen some of
that. I think it is way too early to say that it is going to
happen per se, but part of this strategy is the reintegration
and reconciliation aspect of it at senior levels right down
into the villages. And so we expect that will be a part of this
as well, but it is not going to happen until we start turning
security around.
Mr. McCaul. With the last minute I have, there have been
reports that--and I believe we win this with good
intelligence--there have been reports that terrorists are
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan and are taken to the
detention facilities and then read their Miranda rights. The
first line is, you have the right to remain silent; the second,
you have the right to an attorney.
I don't know whether, in fact, that is happening. If it is,
in my view, that cuts off the intelligence flow because we
can't get inside the terrorist's head like we did with Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed. Will the panel comment on that?
Secretary Gates. I don't think that is true.
Mr. McCaul. And it would be good to verify whether there is
a lot of perhaps it is misinformation out there that this is
occurring.
Secretary Clinton. Well, we will try to find out for you,
but I don't have any reason to believe that.
Admiral Mullen. Nor do I.
Mr. McCaul. That is good to have that answer. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the
panel for being here and the Secretary for all of your
dedication to this country over the years. Admiral Mullen and
certainly Secretary Gates, you could have been watching Texas
play Texas A&M, and it would have been a lot easier.
Secretary Gates. That is the most painful thing to say in
this entire hearing.
Mr. Sires. I was watching a report the other day, and you
see all these reports on television, and it goes to the
question that my colleague asked before. It is regarding our
U.S. soldiers, whether they have a difficult time building
trust and confidence with the Afghan forces that they are
supposed to train. If there is a lack of trust as an issue of
our soldiers working with the Afghanis, isn't that going to
imperil our efforts for the next 18 months?
Secretary Gates. Let me answer and then ask Admiral Mullen.
I think that one of General McChrystal's central--one of the
central themes of his new strategy is a genuine true partnering
of ISAF and Afghan forces where they are working together,
living together, operating together. Too often in the past, the
Afghans were set over here, and we did the fighting or we did
whatever was going on, and we didn't give them very much
intelligence, they were starved for equipment, but mainly they
were kept apart by some of our forces and by some of the other
ISAF partner forces.
General McChrystal is determined to bring them together,
and it is in that relationship that the trust builds. And that
is exactly what we saw happen in Iraq.
Admiral Mullen. And the stories that I hear based on this
shift, which is focusing on partnership, are very positive, but
it is very early. I mean, a significant--over about 80 percent
of the Afghan units right now, we are partnered with them, and
there were none in June. So that shift is really significant,
and that will build a trust. And it is basically living with
each other, planning, fighting, all the things that the
Secretary mentioned.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
And I know the President mentioned the other day that we
must, and I quote, ``invest in our homeland security and
improve and better coordinate our intelligence.'' I certainly
believe in this. What are we going to do differently now that
we haven't been doing for 8 years in terms of gathering
intelligence?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I think it is continuing to improve.
We have learned a lot since 2001 with respect to all that. And
I think in particular our intelligence has gotten better and
better, and I think we just need to keep that up. And I would--
I think our agencies, I think there are 17 intelligence
agencies, and they are much more integrated, and they share
much better than they have in the past, and we need to continue
to do that. And this is an intelligence-driven--the
counterinsurgency efforts is an intelligence-driven operation,
and our ability to gather intelligence, teach the Afghans how
to do this, and turn it around so with that fresh intelligence
we can continue to succeed in terms of countering the Taliban
is core to our ability to reverse this momentum.
Secretary Gates. I would also say that over the last 15-16
months, I have made it a high priority to send more
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets into
Afghanistan. So Predators, Reapers, Warriors, all the different
kinds of collectors and capabilities that we have were flowing
in now, Liberty airplanes that are being put together in Texas
to provide full-motion video. So there has been a huge influx
of ISR assets to help our commanders in the field.
Mr. Sires. And I assume we are doing the same thing with
Pakistan in terms of the intelligence improvement.
Admiral Mullen. Well, I mean, we are in support of them in
many ways in terms of training. We actually have had a
relationship with their intelligence service. And I recognize
that there are views of that, but we have actually--there is a
very positive side of that historically and recently as well.
And these same kinds of things the Secretary is talking about,
to work to try to share with them on our mutual objectives, is
a big part of where we are and where we need to continue to go.
Mr. Sires. Thank you. Thank you for your service to our
country.
Chairman Berman [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has
expired. We will have, I think, time for two more questions if
that works, two more questioners.
Mr. Bilirakis, the gentleman from Florida, is recognized.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I
thank the panel staying, and I really appreciate your service
to our country.
I would like to address this question to all the witnesses.
I know we have touched upon it, but maybe a little more detail.
A 34-page document signed by General McChrystal and Ambassador
Eikenberry outlines an integrated civilian-military plan which
contains 11 counterinsurgency transformative effects. Does the
plan President Obama articulated last night execute these
worthy goals, such as improving population security and
reducing insurgent capability while advancing governments?
Secretary Gates. Yes, it does. And the difference is that
it is focused--our strategy has focused very heavily,
particularly from the United States standpoint, on the southern
and eastern parts of Afghanistan.
Secretary Clinton. Yes. And we have taken significant steps
to actually accomplish the integrated civilian-military
approach that both General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry
have proposed. For example, we have beefed up the embassy in
Kabul. We have assigned different responsibilities so that, for
example, there is one ambassador there working with Ambassador
Eikenberry who is responsible for coordinating aid.
There is a lot of work that brings together our military
and civilian personnel. I met with a group of the teams that
were out in the field when I was there for the inauguration and
heard about how well they are coordinating and the fact that we
are embedding civilians with our military units. So we are on
the way to trying to implement exactly that kind of integrated
strategy.
Admiral Mullen. If I can just say briefly, I was in Helmand
with the Marines right after their operation in July. And
Secretary Clinton has said this, and she has seen this. I
watched our civilians from the State Department literally go in
right behind the fight, first of all.
Secondly, I have seen it in Iraq, I see it in Afghanistan,
the multiplier that those civilians are. I am not sure what the
right number is, but one civilian who can make a difference is
just hugely impactful in terms of the overall strategy. I don't
know if it is a company of marines or a battalion, but, I mean,
in an area of expertise, that makes a difference, agriculture,
et cetera.
So I just can't say enough about the shift and the focus
and the difference that it is making in this strategy, and it
needs to continue to do so.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
One last question. Is President Obama's specific--is this a
specific plan, counterinsurgency plan, outlined by General
McChrystal in August?
Secretary Gates. I think it is fair to say that the
assessment that General McChrystal submitted in August was the
basis of the entire dialogue that we have had for the last 3\1/
2\ months. And what we have been working on is how do we--the
assessment was based on his view of what he was being asked to
do by the President's decisions in March.
What troubled me fairly early on was that those decisions
were being interpreted fairly broadly as full-scale nation
building and creating a strong central government in
Afghanistan, neither of which was our intent, nor was it our
ability to do in any reasonable timeframe and at any reasonable
cost.
And so a good part of the debate and the discussion we have
had is how do we focus that, how do we narrow the mission so
that we are focused on selective capacity building in the
government, capacity building that is essential to our success
and the transition of security responsibility and ultimately
the defeat of al-Qaeda? How do we protect the population? What
populations do we need to protect? How much of the country do
we need to do that in, and so on? And so that was a good part
of the discussion, but I would say that the starting point was
his assessment.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia Mr. Connolly. I am sorry, no.
Mr. Connolly. I am sorry, you said.
Chairman Berman. No. I withdraw it.
Mr. McMahon of New York.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is not the
first time the good gentleman from Virginia has tried to do
that to me.
Chairman Berman. That you know of.
Mr. McMahon. Hello, Madam Secretary. It is great to see you
again. And, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I am Mike
McMahon. I am a new Member of Congress from Staten Island and
Brooklyn, New York.
We all remember September 11th with clear, vivid and sad
memories, but for us in Staten Island and Brooklyn, the tragedy
really hit home. A third of the firefighters who were killed
that day came from my district, over 10 percent of the
individuals. I will never forget the day because it was my
first election. It was primary day in New York, and we were out
campaigning. We heard the news of the first jet, then got down
to the harbor, got on the ferry and watched the second jet come
in, and then watched the buildings fall. And we kind of felt
like that is what it would like to be in World War II.
As civilians we rallied, and we set up triage centers, and
we set up blood banks and waited for the injured to come.
Staten Island is the logical place to bring them, and a lot of
people came that were not injured. We waited and waited, and no
survivors ever came. And that was the most eerie feeling I
think that any of us ever felt.
I say that because I think we all realize on that day or
the next day or the next day, as a Nation, that we had a sacred
trust, a mission that we had to complete. And it was simply, as
you said here today, Admiral, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its
capacity and the Taliban's to threaten America and our allies
from either country in the future.
Unfortunately, 8 years later we are still sitting here
talking about this because we as a Nation were distracted. We
were led down a pernicious primrose path by the prior
administration, God knows why. So many lives were lost, so much
treasure, as people say, were lost, our standing in the world.
And here we are back again completing this mission that it is
indeed our sacred trust to do. I want to thank you on behalf of
the people that I represent for your resolve and the
President's resolve to do this.
And, Madam Secretary, obviously from your testimony, from
your statement, and for the way you have answered the
questions, you have not forgotten what we have lost that day.
It was a tragedy. And if we were here in November 2001, we
would not be having the distracting questions you are hearing
today, like questions about individual cases of military
justice. They are certainly important, but this should not
distract us again, and issues of the timeline and whether that
should distract us again. We must be resolved. And I am so
proud of you that you have that resolve.
I do want to the deg.ask a question just from
sort of a geopolitical point of view. If you look at the map of
Afghanistan, if you look around and you see the countries that
surround it, many are Muslim, including Turkey. And clearly the
Turks in particular, because they are Muslims as well, have had
great success in Afghanistan in dealing with the people there
in gaining their trust.
What are we doing to encourage more help from Turkey, and
help from Turkmenistan, and help from Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan, and from China, and from India, and obviously
Pakistan, all these countries that border Afghanistan? It would
seem to me that their responsibilities should be raised, and
their involvement should be raised. Could you just tell us is
there hope there that a regional solution can be here as well
as a global?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, thank you for what
you said and for your leadership. And we are certainly working
to add to the list of countries who are working on behalf of
this mission. Turkey has been a great ally, and they have been
with us from the very beginning. They are a NATO ally, and they
are a true contributing country in Afghanistan. United Arab
Emirates has also contributed troops and money. We expect that
other countries will be as well, and we will be announcing some
of those.
I think that the regional picture is a little more
challenging, but we have gotten a lot of good help from the
Central Asian countries in assisting us with the transit of
material, with the use of military bases.
The Admiral just reminded me Jordan has also been working
with us.
So we think that our renewed effort, the President's
resolve, is actually going to bring more countries into this
fight.
I happen to agree, unfortunately, with the thrust of your
comments that, you know, we just took our eye off the most
important ball. And there is no doubt in my mind that had we
stayed with it, had we, you know, paid more attention to our
commanders on the ground in Afghanistan, because it is a longer
history--I know some of the people who did have command
responsibility in Afghanistan, and there were very frequent
requests up the chain of command for additional resources, but
we are where we are right now. And just because it has been a
frustrating and challenging 8 years, and it is unfortunate that
this President has to face up to the hard decisions that we as
a country have to make, doesn't mean we shouldn't be doing what
we are doing, and that is why we are here today.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Our three witnesses, you wouldn't know it by listening to
them, but they had to do this for 2\1/2\ or 3 hours earlier
today. You were superb advocates on behalf of the
administration's position. We thank you very much for being
here. We will start our second hearing on this subject with
field leaders from where we left off in terms of questioning.
Thank you all very much for being with us today.
[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]Appendix at the end of Part II,
53829.001 deg.Transcript rec'd; completed and
proofread; hold for Part IEdits from: Boozman, Green, Ros-
Lehtinen, Berman deg.
U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN, PART II
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. Before
beginning my opening statement, I would like to make two brief
announcements on procedure. First, given the time constraints
on the witnesses and to maximize the time members have for
questioning, only the ranking member and I will make opening
statements; after that we will turn to the witnesses for their
testimony. Without objection all other members may place
written statements in the record, and, as I mentioned at the
end of last week's hearing, I will recognize members for
questioning at the point where we left off last week. So those
who did not have an opportunity to question our witnesses last
week will get the first chance to ask questions today. The
staff has sent out specific information about the order in
which members will be recognized. And now we will go to the
hearing.
Last week the committee heard from Secretary Clinton,
Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen, three of the President's
top national security advisors. They did an excellent job in
making the administration's case for the new strategy in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Today we welcome the top American officials on the ground
in Afghanistan: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, the chief of
mission at our Embassy in Kabul, and General Stanley A.
McChrystal, the commander of all United States and
international forces in Afghanistan.
The President and his team have made it very clear that our
efforts to degrade the Taliban and defeat al-Qaeda cannot stop
at the Durand Line. Indeed, nearly all of the jihadi groups
operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan--al-Qaeda, the Pakistani
Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, LET, and
others--have joined together in an extended terrorist network
that shares the same goals, including destabilizing Afghanistan
and destroying the Pakistani state.
Fortunately, there appears to be a growing recognition in
Pakistan that it is impossible to differentiate between
different terrorist groups, and that the same people killing
American, international and Afghan troops are now arming
suicide bombers in the streets and markets of Pakistan and
killing Pakistani civilians.
We sympathize with the plight of the Pakistani people who
have suffered great losses from the growing number of terrorist
attacks in that country. As reflected in the legislation
recently passed by Congress, we are committed to doing what we
can to improve their economic and physical security.
As all of our witnesses emphasized in last week's hearing,
the President's military strategy in Afghanistan can only
succeed if it is accompanied by a robust ``civilian surge''
designed to improve governance, strengthen the rule of law, and
promote economic development in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This fact often gets lost in the debate about troop levels and
the time frame for withdrawal, and we must make sure that these
critical civilian programs aren't shortchanged.
To that end, Ambassador Eikenberry, will you have enough
capable civilians on the ground to help strengthen governance,
build rule of law, and promote economic enterprise? Will these
civilians have sufficient knowledge in these areas to be
effective? Will they have sufficient experience operating in
dangerous environments like Afghanistan? And are 974 civilians,
as the administration has proposed having on the ground by next
year, all we need? If not, when will you be able to tell us
exactly how many are required? What will your new civil-
military campaign plan include that the August plan did not?
With regard to the military strategy, I am curious: One of
the keys to our success in Iraq was the ``Sunni Awakening,'' in
which thousands of Sunni tribesmen, many of whom had
participated in or aided the insurgency, essentially switched
to our side. Is there any prospect of a similar shift in
Afghanistan? Can we succeed in Afghanistan without such an
``awakening''?
Finally, General McChrystal, will 30,000 troops--even with
an additional 7,000 apparently pledged by other nations--be
sufficient to break the Taliban's momentum? Can we meet the
President's objective of degrading the Taliban by focusing
primarily on the south when the Taliban is already operating in
the north? What types of soldiers--trainers, civil affairs,
infantry--will comprise this 30,000 increase?
Now I am pleased to return to the ranking member, Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen, for any remarks she would like to make. And following
that, we will proceed immediately to the testimony of our
distinguished witnesses.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, General
McChrystal, and Ambassador Eikenberry. For months we have been
requesting your presence before the committee to discuss the
Afghanistan strategy, so we are extremely pleased that the
administration has now authorized you to provide testimony.
Welcome, sirs. Last week we received a broad presentation. When
the chairman asked Secretary Clinton if she knew the resources
that will be needed for the civilian surge she was unable to
provide specifics, adding that the administration, and I quote,
``will be submitting budget requests in order to achieve the
numbers that are going to be needed.''` deg.
So we anxiously await a more detailed assessment on what
you need to prevail against our enemies. Before we look
forward, we must present an accurate portrayal of the last 8
years in Afghanistan, the progress that has been achieved, and
the challenges that lay ahead. Claims of failure from some are
an affront to our brave men and women, such as my daughter-in-
law Lindsay who served as a Marine officer in Afghanistan in
2007, it minimizes their accomplishments.
And let me briefly contrast Afghanistan in 2001 to
Afghanistan now. The Taliban is not in power, does not control
Afghanistan. While our enemies are rebuilding, Afghanistan has
not been used to launch attacks against the United States
homeland. There are serious problems with corruption, but there
is a duly elected government in power, one that is an ally of
the United States. And Afghan women and girls have
unprecedented access to the health and education services and
are integrated into Afghan society.
As Ambassador Eikenberry noted this week, Afghanistan has
come a long way since the dark days of the Taliban, and I have
witnessed this progress during my travels there. Turning to the
strategy announced by the President, I have five main issues
for our distinguished panel. First, I am concerned about the
delays in the decision making, the impact on our ability to
succeed in disrupting, defeating, dismantling al-Qaeda and the
Taliban.
General McChrystal, you wrote on August 30th that the next
12 months from that date were critical, yet one quarter of that
time has already gone, and by the time the surge is expected to
reach its full capacity three quarters of that time would have
elapsed. Operations such as the Marine offensive Operation
Cobra's Anger are being undertaken. Is this illustrative of the
counterinsurgency strategy that will be carried out as part of
the surge? And how does this compare to the counterterrorism
strategy?
Secondly, General McChrystal, has the President provided
you enough troops and other resources to successfully complete
our mission? There have been reports that the mission's goals
have changed from your original proposal focusing on the
elimination of the Taliban to instead ensuring that insurgents
could no longer threaten the Afghan Government's survival.
Also, are our rules of engagement robust enough to repel and
permanently eliminate the Taliban as a threat? And as the
chairman asked, Ambassador Eikenberry, do you have the
necessary tools to carry out the civilian component of this
strategy?
Thirdly, I have concerns about the July 2011 trigger for
withdrawal that has been highlighted in the President's speech.
Talk of transition and exit ramps with an 18-month target to
begin withdrawing telegraphs to our enemies that all they need
to do is persevere and through a few difficult fighting seasons
because the U.S. will retreat. Some also argue that withdrawal
time lines make our troops wonder about the determination of
Washington to succeed and could undermine our efforts to secure
greater cooperation from our allies.
The New York Times recently reported that the President's
time table for withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan
rattled nerves in that country and in Pakistan as well,
prompting diplomats to scramble to reassure the two countries
that we would not in fact cut and run. A fourth concern
involves the problems of command and control, coordination with
our allies, and burden sharing. Our allies are being asked to
provide more troops to help push the Taliban out of center and
north.
Some such as the Dutch, Canadians, British, and French
shoulder a greater burden. Do you foresee difficulties in
securing a greater commitment from our allies to contribute to
the war effort? Do the forces that the NATO Security General
identified have the combat capabilities that you require? And
what actions has the administration taken to convince countries
to give you more flexibility in placing troops where they are
most needed rather than leaving them in safe zones?
And fifth and finally, our Afghanistan strategy does not
exist in a vacuum. At last week's hearing I referred to
statements by the chief prosecutor for the international
criminal court that he already has jurisdiction in Afghanistan,
that he is already conducting a preliminary examination into
whether NATO troops, including our American soldiers, may have
to be prosecuted by the ICC. Also, as you know, three Navy
SEALs, part of a team that captured the ringleader of those
responsible for the 2007 brutal murder of four of our American
contractors in Fallujah, are facing court-martial after the
killer initially complained that he suffered a bloody lip while
in U.S. custody.
So combined with the reinvestigation of our U.S.
intelligence activities, the prosecution of CIA operatives, the
transfer of Gitmo detainees for trials in the United States,
the negative impact of our activities in Afghanistan could be
dramatic and could undermine critical intelligence gathering
that could save, save the lives of Americans serving there.
Despite these concerns, our nation's safety is at stake, and we
must ensure that the brave Americans serving in Afghanistan as
well as our critical allies are provided the support that they
need to win this war decisively. I thank you both gentlemen for
appearing before us. Thank you so much for the time, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Thank you very much. And now to introduce
our witnesses. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry retired from the
United States Army with the rank of Lieutenant General on April
28th, 2009, and shortly thereafter was sworn in as the U.S.
Ambassador to Afghanistan. Prior to this assignment, General
Eikenberry served as the deputy chairman of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium. He
has served twice before in Afghanistan, first as U.S. Security
Coordinator and Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in
Kabul, and then as Commander of the Combined Forces Command
Afghanistan.
General Stanley McChrystal is the current commander,
International Security Assistance Force and commander, U.S.
Forces Afghanistan. Previously, he served as director of the
joint staff from April 2008 to June 2009, and as commander,
Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008, where he
led the operation that resulted in the death of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Ambassador, General,
we are honored to have you here. Ambassador, why don't you
begin?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KARL W. EIKENBERRY, U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thank you, Chairman Berman, Ranking
Member Ros-Lehtinen, and distinguished members of this
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on
Afghanistan today. I would ask that my full statement be
submitted for the record.
Last week, in a speech at the United States Military
Academy at West Point, President Obama presented the
administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His
decision came after an intensive, deliberative, and a far
reaching review, and I am honored to have been part of that
process. I believe the course that the President outlined
offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and ensure that
al-Qaeda cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks against
us. I can say without equivocation that I fully support this
approach.
I consider myself privileged to serve as the United States
Ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats,
development specialists, and civilian experts who form the most
capable and dedicated United States Embassy anywhere in the
world today. I am extraordinarily proud of them. I am also
honored to testify alongside General Stan McChrystal, my
professional colleague and friend of many years. I want to say
from the outset that General McChrystal and myself are united
in a joint effort where civilian and military personnel work
together everyday, side by side with our Afghan partners and
with our allies, and we could not accomplish our objectives
without this kind of cooperation.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the United States is at a
critical juncture in our involvement in Afghanistan. On
December the 1st, the President ordered 30,000 additional
troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an accelerated time table
with the goal of breaking the insurgency's momentum, hastening
and improving the training of Afghan national security forces
and establishing security in key parts of the country.
On the civilian side we aim to increase employment and
provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity, and
to improve critical ministries and the economy at the national
level. These steps taken together I believe will help to remove
insurgents from the battlefield and to build support for the
Afghan Government. As the President said, we will be clear
about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.
After a difficult election the Afghan Government does show
signs of recognizing the need to deliver better governance and
security. We await urgent, concrete steps in a number of areas.
I would like to briefly discuss the three main pillars of
our efforts in Afghanistan, which are security, governance, and
development. General McChrystal will address our plans to
improving security and building the Afghan national security
forces. Since assuming my post, I have made a special point of
getting outside of Kabul to see conditions first hand, and I
fully concur with General McChrystal's assessment that the
security situation in Afghanistan remains serious.
Sending additional United States and other NATO ISAF forces
to Afghanistan is critical to regaining the initiative, and I
am confident that if these troops arrive the situation will
stabilize and turn in our favor. Additional troops will also
permit us to expand our work with the Afghan army and the
Afghan police so that they can take a larger role in providing
for security for their own people. As President Obama said, the
transition to Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of
2011 when we expect Afghan security forces to begin assuming
lead responsibility for defending their country.
Moving on from security, the second pillar of our
comprehensive strategy focuses on governance. At the national
and subnational levels, our overarching goal is to encourage,
improve governance so that Afghans can see the benefit of
supporting a legitimate government, and the insurgency loses
support. As General McChrystal points out, one of the major
impediments our strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack
of credibility with its own people. To strengthen this
legitimacy, our approach at the national level is to improving
key ministries by increasing the number of civilian technical
advisors and providing more developmental assistance directly
through these ministries' budgets.
By focusing on ministries that deliver essential services
and security, we can accelerate the building of an Afghan
Government that is sufficiently visible, effective, and
accountable. At the provincial and the district levels, we are
working jointly with our military teams, through our provincial
reconstruction teams, our district development working groups,
and district support teams which help build Afghan capacity,
particularly in the areas of greatest insecurity in southern
Afghanistan and eastern Afghanistan.
Underpinning all of these efforts is the need to combat
corruption and to promote the rule of law. With our assistance,
the Afghan Government is steadily building law enforcement
institutions to fight corruption, organized crime, and drug
trafficking. In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated
his intention to make merit based appointments in his new
cabinet and to implement an anticorruption strategy, and we are
encouraged by his statements.
The cultivation of poppy and trafficking in opium also
continue to have a debilitating effect on Afghan society. Our
strategy is multipronged, it involves demand reduction, efforts
by law enforcement agencies and the military to detain
traffickers and interdict drug shipments, and support for licit
agricultural development. The narcotics problem of course will
never have a solution though without economic development, and
this leads to the third pillar of our effort, which is
development.
In recent months we have adjusted our approach to focusing
on building key elements of the Afghan private sector economy,
increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government
revenue collection, and improving the coordination assistance
within the United States Government and the international
community. These steps were taken to produce improvements in
the lives of ordinary Afghans and to contribute directly to
more effective government and lessen support for the
insurgency.
Rebuilding the farm sector in particular is essential for
the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who
form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that
some 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income
either directly or indirectly from agriculture. Mr. Chairman, I
want to emphasize that we are concentrating on what is
essential and what is attainable. The President's strategy is
based on a pragmatic assessment of the security interest of the
United States and our belief that a sustainable representative
government and a sustainable economy are essential to success.
We need a viable Afghan Government so our forces can draw
down and the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars can be
reduced. In closing, I need to mention two important risks that
we do face in carrying out this strategy. The first is that in
spite of everything that we do, Afghanistan may struggle to
take over the essential task of governance and security on a
timely basis. The second is our partnership with Pakistan. The
efforts we are undertaking in Afghanistan are likely to fall
short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress at
eliminating the sanctuaries used by the Afghan Taliban and
their associates in Pakistan.
If the main elements of the President's plan are executed,
and if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I am
confident that we can achieve our strategic objectives. I say
this with conviction because for the first time in my three
tours in Afghanistan all of the elements of our national power
are being employed with the full support of the President and
increasingly of our allies. Achieving our goals for Afghanistan
will not be easy, but I am optimistic that we can succeed with
the support of the United States Congress.
Our mission has been under resourced for years, but it is
now one of our Government's highest priorities with substantial
development funds and hundreds more civilian personnel. We will
soon have increased our civilian presence in Kabul threefold
and in the field six fold just over this past year. And we will
of course though need more. U.S. foreign assistance is also a
comparatively small but essential fraction of the total amount
that is being spent in Afghanistan and has been spent over the
last 8 years.
Additional resources will be necessary, and we look forward
to sharing more details on our anticipated needs with Congress
in the coming days and weeks. Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a
daunting challenge. Success is not guaranteed, but it is
possible. With the additional troops and other resources
provided by the President and with the help of Congress, we
will work tirelessly to ensure that al-Qaeda never again gains
refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country. And thank you,
sir, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eikenberry
follows:]Karl Eikenberry deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you very much.
General McChrystal?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL,
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) AND
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN (USFOR-A), U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
General McChrystal. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-
Lehtinen, distinguished members of this committee, thank you
for the chance to appear before you today. I welcome this
opportunity to testify on our way ahead in Afghanistan, and I
am pleased to do so with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, an old
friend. Let me begin by saluting the bravery of the men and
women of the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan. They are anchored by over 68,000 courageous
Americans, our close partners in the NATO alliance, and a 43-
nation coalition. We honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the
veterans, and their families.
We also recognize the toll paid every day by our
counterparts in the Afghan security forces and by Afghan
civilians, who ultimately suffer the most from this insurgency.
It is for them and for all of us that we seek a stable
Afghanistan, a defunct al-Qaeda, and a secure future in that
vital region of the world. I first deployed to Afghanistan in
2002 and have commanded forces there every year since. Despite
that experience, there is much in Afghanistan that I have yet
to fully understand. For all of us Afghanistan is a challenge
that is best approached with a balance of determination and
humility.
While U.S. forces have been at war in Afghanistan for 8
years, the Afghans have been at it for more than 30. They are
frustrated with international efforts that have failed to meet
their expectations, confronting us with a crisis of confidence
among Afghans who view the international effort as insufficient
and their government as corrupt or at the very least
inconsequential. We also face a complex and resilient
insurgency.
The Quetta Shura Taliban, or Afghan Taliban, is a prominent
threat to the Government of Afghanistan, and they aspire to
once again become the Government of Afghanistan. The Haqqani
and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups have more limited
geographical reach and objectives, but they are no less lethal.
All three groups are supported to some degree by external
elements in Iran and Pakistan, have ties with al-Qaeda, and
coexist within narcotics and criminal networks, both fueling
and feeding off instability and insecurity in the region.
The mission in Afghanistan is undeniably difficult, and
success will require steadfast commitment and incur significant
costs. I participated fully in the President's assessment and
decision making process and was afforded multiple opportunities
to provide my recommendations and best military advice, which I
did. Combined with insights and policy considerations from
across our Government, I believe the decisions that came from
that process reflect a realistic and effective approach.
To pursue our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda and
preventing their return to Afghanistan, we must disrupt and
degrade the Taliban's capacity, deny their access to the Afghan
population, and strengthen the Afghan security forces. This
means we must reverse the Taliban's current momentum and create
the time and space to develop Afghan security and governance
capacity. The President's decision rapidly resources our
strategy, recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be
decisive and ultimately enable success. I fully support the
President's decision.
The President has also reiterated how this decision
supports our national interests. Rolling back the Taliban is a
prerequisite to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda. The mission is
not only important, it is also achievable. We can and will
accomplish this mission. Let me briefly explain why I believe
so. My confidence derives first from the Afghans' resolve,
since it is their actions that will ultimately matter most in
ending this conflict with their interests and by extension our
own secured.
Second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. The
Taliban have no widespread constituency, have a history of
failure in power, and lack an appealing vision. Third, where
our strategy is applied, we have begun to show that we can help
the Afghans establish more effective security and more credible
governance. Finally, Afghans do not regard us as occupiers.
They do not wish for us to remain forever yet they see our
support as a necessary bridge to future security and stability.
I have been back in Afghanistan for 6 months now. I believe
that with the President's decision and ongoing reforms I
outlined in our initial assessment, our efforts are now
empowered with a greater sense of clarity, capability,
commitment, and confidence. Let me start with clarity. The
President's recently completed review of our strategy to
include its deep and pointed questioning of all assumptions and
recommendations has produced greater clarity of our mission in
objectives.
We also have greater clarity on the way forward. Additional
forces will begin to deploy shortly, and by this time next year
new security gains will be illuminated by specific indicators,
and it will be clear to us that the insurgency has lost the
momentum. And by the summer of 2011 it will be clear to the
Afghan people that the insurgency will not win, giving them the
chance to side with their government. From that point forward,
while we begin to reduce U.S. combat force levels, we will
remain partnered with the Afghan security forces in a
supporting role to consolidate and solidify their gains.
Results may come more quickly, and we must demonstrate
progress toward measurable objectives, but the sober fact is
that there are no silver bullets. Ultimate success will be the
cumulative effect of sustained pressure across multiple lines
of operation. Increasing our capability has been about much
more than just troop increases. For the past 6 months we have
been implementing organizational and operational changes that
are already reflecting improvements in our effectiveness.
But the additional forces announced by President Obama are
significant. Forces to increase our capacity to train the
Afghan national security forces and forces to partner with
Afghan army and police in expanding security zones in key areas
will provide us the ability to reverse insurgent momentum and
deny the Taliban the access to the population they require to
survive. Our commitment is watched intently and constantly
judged by our allies and by our enemies. The commitment of
30,000 additional U.S. forces along with additional coalition
forces and growing Afghan national security force numbers will
be a significant step toward expanding security in critical
areas and in demonstrating resolve.
The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed
by a clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I will
briefly mention three. The first is the Afghan Government's
credibility deficit, which must be recognized by all to include
Afghan officials as a critical area of focus and change.
Equally important is our ability to accelerate development of
the Afghan security forces. Measures such as increased pay and
incentives, literacy training, leader development, and expanded
partnering are necessary to position the Afghan national
security force to assume responsibility for long term security.
Third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both
sides of the border with Pakistan with freedom of movement
across that border must be mitigated by enhanced cross border
coordination and enhanced Pakistani engagement. Looking ahead,
I am confident we have both the right strategy and the right
resources. Every trip around Afghanistan reinforces my
confidence in the coalition and Afghan forces we stand
alongside in this effort. But I also find confidence in those
we are trying to help. That confidence is found where an Afghan
farmer chooses to harvest wheat rather than poppy or where a
young adult casts his or her vote or joins the police or a
group of villagers resolves to reject the local insurgency.
We face many challenges in Afghanistan, but our efforts are
sustained by one unassailable reality: Neither the Afghan
people nor the international community want Afghanistan to
remain a sanctuary for terror and violence. And if we are to be
confident of our mission and our prospects, we must also be
accurate in our assessment of progress. We owe ourselves, our
leaders, and the American people transparency and candor
because the price to be paid is high and the stakes are even
higher.
In closing, my team and I would like to thank you and your
colleagues for your support to the American men and women
currently serving in Afghanistan and to tell you a bit about
them. We risk letting numbers like 30K roll off our tongues
without remembering that those are fathers, mothers, sons, and
daughters serving far from home, selfless in their sacrifices
for each of us. The other day I asked a young but combat
experienced sergeant where he was on 9/11, and his answer,
getting my braces removed, reminded me it has been more than 8
years since 9/11, and many of our service members and families
have experienced and sacrificed much.
But as I see them in action at remote bases, on patrol,
partnering with Afghan forces, recovering in combat hospitals,
they don't talk about all they have given up, they talk about
all they are accomplishing and their determination in this
endeavor. This is not a force of rookies or dilettantes. The
brigade commander in coast is completing his fourth combat tour
in Afghanistan, and his experience and expertise is reflective
of the force that represents you.
All have felt fear and loneliness, most have lost comrades,
none have lost heart. In their eyes I see maturity beyond their
years, in their actions I see a commitment to succeed and a
commitment to each other. I am confident that I share your
pride in what these great Americans are doing for our country
in Afghanistan, and it will be my privilege to accept your
questions on their behalf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General McChrystal
follows:]Stanley McChrystal deg.
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Chairman Berman. Thank you both. And, General McChrystal,
you are commander of the International Security Assistance
Force as well as U.S. Forces, would you be willing to introduce
a few of our NATO representatives who are here with us today?
General McChrystal. Yes, sir. This is part of my personal
staff, of course I have got Colonel Charlie Flynn who is a U.S.
Army officer. Kristoff is my German aide, I have two aides, one
American and one German. Bill Rafferty is one of our planners,
a British officer. Another allied officer from the U.S. Navy,
Greg Smith, runs our communications. Jake McFarren is our
political advisor in the headquarters. KC Welch is my other
aide, my American aide, had 27 months in Iraq before he came to
Afghanistan with only 5 months off between those two
deployments. And then Dave Silverman works in my personal staff
as well, obviously another naval officer.
Chairman Berman. Great, thank you very much. We will begin
the questioning now, and I am first going to recognize the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
continuing the hearing. And I want to thank both Ambassador
Eikenberry and General McChrystal for what you do and your
leadership for our young men and women, not only serving in the
military but obviously on the civilian side. Having been to the
Embassy in Afghanistan a couple of times and having been hosted
there, it is not the plush area anyone ever thinks. But I
appreciate what you all do and I know Members of Congress do.
General McChrystal, there are currently 94,000 Afghan
soldiers on the ground, and current plans call for increasing
that number to 134 by October of next year. There are currently
about 91,000 Afghan police officers on the ground and there are
current calls for boosting that to 96,800 by next October. This
would make a total Afghan security force of around 230,000
police and military. During the strategic review you advocated
for boosting the number of Afghan security forces to 400,000.
Security forces in Iraq, with a much easier terrain, now total
about 600,000. Do you think 400,000 with tougher terrain in
Afghanistan is realistic? It is a lot more than 230--the
estimate--but is it still within range of what we really need
for the Afghans?
General McChrystal. Congressman, as everyone knows
Afghanistan must ultimately be secured by Afghans, that is what
they want and that is the right answer. We did a detailed
analysis of what it would take using basic COIN doctrine to
secure Afghanistan, and the number reaches up near 600,000
total Afghan security forces of all kinds, police and army. But
the insurgency is not in the entire country, not all the
country is threatened.
So as we refined our focus, in fact we were able to reach
what we believe is a better longer term instate. We came up
with about 400,000 combinations of army and police as being the
right number for Afghanistan to have as coalition forces drop
down to a fairly small number of advisors or for the long term.
That would of course be adjusted or could be adjusted based
upon whether there is an insurgency at that point and the size
of that insurgency. A number of 400,000 divided between the
army and the police of 240,000 ultimately in the army and
160,000 in the police would not be really out of range for that
part of the world for standing armies and police.
But I think we need to view that not as a hard number at
this point but as a goal we work toward and adjust constantly.
The President's decision is to grow those forces like we are
growing the army to 134,000 by next fall, and we will clearly
continue to grow the police, but to relook that every year will
allow us to reflect what the state of the insurgency is and
then of course what their ability to grow is, can they make
those numbers. We are getting some very heartening feedback
here recently, there have been pay raises for both the army and
the police implemented by the Government of Afghanistan with
the international community's help, and we are seeing a
significant improvement. But we have got to see whether that is
sustainable long term.
Mr. Green. And you recognize that our goal is to make the
Afghans protect their own neighborhood, and you share that and
the President I know shares it and I know Congress does.
General McChrystal, in your testimony you write ``additional
forces will begin to deploy shortly, and by this time next year
new security gains will be illuminated by specific indicators.
It will be clear to us that the insurgency has lost momentum.''
Other than generally saying conditions on the ground and
knowing that the security situation will never be perfect, what
specific criteria can the American people look to that we are
basing that decision on sometime next year?
General McChrystal. Sir, we collect a tremendous number of
metrics, but we try to pull those together in a number that is
understandable both to us and then communicable. The first and
biggest will be the security situation by district across the
country within the 34 provinces, whether the district is in
fact under solid government control, whether it might be
contested or whether it might be under insurgent control. So we
do a map that is fed by a tremendous amount of data that allows
us to look at those districts. If we are seeing progress in
those, that will be one of the major indicators.
I believe the other major indicator will be the growth and
development of the Afghan national security forces or
increasing capacity of Afghanistan to secure itself. In
addition to those two major indicators that I believe will be
most illustrative, we feed that with a tremendous amount of
information from polling data of what the Afghan people think,
which is key because ultimately this war will be won in the
minds of the Afghan people, and indicators of their ability to
go about their lives, whether they can drive through secure
areas to market, the cost of goods, and things like that.
Mr. Green. And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman. And the 5 minutes
allotted includes questions and answers.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you
being here, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal. We do
appreciate the service to your country, and then also your
families, and I think that was so illustrated by your staffer
when you mentioned that he was in Iraq and now in Afghanistan
and the time away from home.
General McChrystal, following the President's March speech
to Congress, the President developed a series of metrics to
judge progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Are those metrics
still useful? Did they have any influence on the strategy and
assessment that you did in August? Are these metrics still
useful based on this President's new strategy? Do the metrics
have any influence on the July 2011 withdrawal? And do the
metrics need to be revised as a result of the new planning?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I believe the metrics,
they are still in place, they are useful. I do believe they
will evolve over time because of the conditions on the ground
evolve and we collect even more data and look at it I think it
is important we keep being willing to evolve those to
understand it. So I expect those to be baseline metrics, but I
expect to inform that with many others as well, sir.
Mr. Boozman. I know that you all are very metric driven. We
have had many come and testify before Congress that President
Karzai is going to be held accountable. Do the metrics that you
have developed, do they specifically include assessment for
President Karzai?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congressman, our assessments, yes
they include the effectiveness of the Government of Afghanistan
at the national level and, as General McChrystal said,
assessments that are at the subnational level as well, that we
have a robust plan of assessments at all levels.
Mr. Boozman. I know that Prime Minister Brown has
reportedly given President Karzai a list of milestones and
metrics that he will judge him by. Have you seen the list? Are
we trying to replicate and work with them in that regard?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I have not seen the
specific list, but I am roughly familiar with the intent of it.
Mr. Boozman. Good. Lastly, the other guys who were here and
testified, Secretary Gates and also Admiral Mullen, and I think
that, I know in my district, I think throughout the country,
there really is a great concern of the four guys that are under
indictment or whatever you call that in the military, and I
think the concern is that somehow we are being caught up in
political correctness. I wanted to tell Secretary Gates, I
didn't get a chance to ask a question of him, but Arkansas
played Texas A&M earlier in the year and beat them in Texas
stadium.
But you know, in the heat of that battle, if somebody hit
somebody in the mouth they would be suspended for a game. And I
know it is different, the situation, but it is not that
different. And I guess what I would like from you is just your
reassurance, I know through the years people have stood up for
me, your reassurance that you are looking into that, you know,
and shepherding that process.
I know you can't get involved directly at the point it is
now. Admiral Mullen indicated that he had confidence with the
people that were taking care of it, and again my comeback to
that is that I know that he had confidence in the people at
Fort Hood and yet a third grader could have told that there was
something going on there that was not right. And I think again
the American people are concerned that that is due to political
correctness.
General McChrystal. Congressman, I am not familiar because
the incident that happened in Iraq, with the current one that
you mentioned, with the specifics of that case, but I will tell
you we stress to all of our people the importance of how they
act, but there is also an absolute loyalty to people as well.
So I think the balance is about right. I feel very good
particularly, we have learned a lot over these years as we go
through this.
Mr. Boozman. I know that is an Iraqi situation, but it does
make a difference in the sense your guys now, when they are
deciding whether or not to do an action or this or that, the
easiest thing to do is to not do, okay? It does make a
difference as far as decision making and things, and so I would
hope that you would work with your cohorts, and I know that you
have got tremendous influence in various areas but that really
is an important thing, it is an important thing with the
American people and their support of the military. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, General
and Ambassador. Let me start off with the mission as it was
articulated by General Gates and Secretary Clinton last week
was this, that our mission is to go in, destroy, dismantle,
defeat al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and see to it
that they do not return. That being the case, what about
Pakistan? Pakistan is where the crux of the problem is, but yet
it is the least emphasis where we have seen our strategy. That
is where al-Qaeda is, that is where the real apex of the
situation is. Will our troops be able to go into Pakistan and
do exactly what the mission says, destroy, dismantle, and see
that it doesn't return to Pakistan?
General McChrystal. Sir, the importance of the mission
against al-Qaeda is about clear. As commander of ISAF my
responsibility or my authorities stop at the border of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. We do however work very hard, and I
personally spend a lot of time with General Kiyani, developing
a strategic partnership to enable them to meet their strategic
objectives.
Mr. Scott. Well let me just ask you because I only just
have a few minutes here and I have a number of questions. To
your knowledge, of your involvement with the joint strategy
with Pakistan, to your knowledge will our troops be able to go
into Pakistan?
General McChrystal. Sir, I am really out of my lane to
discuss that.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Let me ask you about NATO and our troops.
NATO has said they are sending around 7,000, 6,000 7,000
troops. Those troops come with caveats. Can you comment very
briefly on what that presents to you, where a nation may send
soldiers but they tell them, you can go, you can see, but you
can't conquer, you can't get into battle, you must sit on the
bench. What does that do to our strategy?
General McChrystal. Sir, many of the 43 nations' forces
come with no caveats and they operate just like ours.
Mr. Scott. What percentage of that?
General McChrystal. I am sorry?
Mr. Scott. You said 40 percent?
General McChrystal. No, sir, many of them. I don't know the
percentage; I would like to get that back to you for the
record. The caveats are something that I work with all our NATO
partners and ask them to reduce to increase our flexibility,
and I think it is important that we continue to reduce those so
that they can prosecute operations, particularly
counterinsurgency, effectively.
Mr. Scott. Going back for a moment to you, Ambassador, you
mentioned some things, there has been a hesitancy to stay away
from the word nation building. But as I listened to you as you
talked about setting up the Afghan Government, as you talked
about your three corners which were security, which was
governance, which was building up the economy, if that isn't
nation building I don't know what is. Is not that nation
building? Can we not be successful unless we do that?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congressman, I think our goals are
clear, they are narrowed. What we are seeking to achieve in
partnership with our Afghan allies is a government that has the
capability of providing for the security of its own people.
Mr. Scott. Let me just ask you though because I only have a
little bit of time, are we in nation building in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I think that what we have
established are clear goals that are narrow that have to do
with establishing sufficient security.
Mr. Scott. But I am asking you, yes or no, are we in nation
building in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No, I would not characterize what we
are doing, we are providing assistance to the state of
Afghanistan, no I would not characterize it as open ended
nation building, clearly not.
Mr. Scott. Well, all right. Let me go back to you, General
McChrystal. You mentioned, and you spoke eloquently and I agree
with you, of the sacrifice and the great job that our soldiers
are doing, but here is what concerns me. There is a terrible
strain on our military. Many of our young men and women are
going on their third and fourth tours of duty. There has been
an ugly side to this. Every time I have gone over there--for
four times I have been to Afghanistan--I go back to Lonstall
Air Base; I care about our military. The situation in Fort Hood
was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of excessive stress,
the mental strain, the suicide, the divorce rates. Tell me how
deep is the strain on our military and what are we doing about
it?
General McChrystal. Congressman, the strain is significant,
but the force is holding up extraordinarily well. I think the
things we are doing to take care of families back in the
states, the things we are doing to look after service members
while they are there, to get leave, all those things to take
care of wounded warriors, to me all of those come together to
give the force much more resiliency than it would otherwise
have and historically would have.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Scott. Thank you both.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. General, Ambassador, thank you very much for
being here today. I have a special appreciation of your
commitment. As a Member of Congress I am grateful to be the co-
chair of the Afghan caucus. I appreciate your hospitality at
the briefings that I have had with both of you, I just have
great faith in your service. Also I am very happy that we share
that our army careers began together in the 1970s, and so I
appreciate as a veteran your service, more particularly as a
parent I have got four sons serving in the military of the
United States today, I am very grateful for their service and
military service means a lot to our family.
And that is why I want military families to know that I
have faith in your integrity, I have faith in your ability, you
truly are looking out for the troops, I believe you are going
to be victorious in this second surge where we will be
defeating the terrorists to protect American families at home.
On Tuesday I was honored to be at the Armed Services Committee
meeting, Ambassador, and was pleasantly surprised when you said
that there has been progress in Afghanistan.
And sometimes I have to read about progress in unusual
places like Rotary Magazine, and they were giving indications
of rotary projects around the world, and one that they are
backing up are schools, the number of schools have increased
from 650 to 9,500. Can you tell us what you see as progress,
and then what is the role of a provincial reconstruction team?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thanks, Congressman. There has been
remarkable progress since the very dark days of Taliban of
2001, you mentioned one, education. In 2001 there were 1
million children going to school; they were almost all boys;
they were receiving a certain persuasion of education. Today
there are 6.5 million Afghan children who are going to school;
about 35 percent of those are girls. In 2001 very little of the
Afghan population had access to any healthcare, now 80 percent
of the population has access to primary, albeit rudimentary,
but access to primary healthcare.
I could go on with the development of roads, I could go on
with now 10 million Afghans have cell phones. And there have
been profound changes. Against that, we know where the
challenges are. General McChrystal and I both share our views
of where those challenges are, but there is room to have great
hope as we move forward, there is much to build upon. The
provincial reconstruction teams; the provincial reconstruction
teams have a very important role both as civilian-military
combined effort in many of the provinces of Afghanistan under
NATO ISAF command, and their roles are to assist the local
government in strengthening their government to help them
develop capacity in order to improve their distribution of
basic services to the people in the area.
Mr. Wilson. And something that would be very helpful, I
served with Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee in the Afghan
caucus, if you could provide to us say a bullet type of
presentation that we could distribute to our colleagues on
items of progress that you see, that would be very helpful.
And, General McChrystal, I have had the opportunity to visit
the police training academy in Jalalabad, my former National
Guard unit, the 218th, helped train the police units across the
country, and I saw really dedicated persons but I am very
concerned about their pay, the pay is so low that it certainly
would call into question loyalty and then lead to some level of
bribery. What is the status of pay, training; who is paying?
General McChrystal. Congressman, well timed. The Government
of Afghanistan just increased the pay of Afghan national army
and police, didn't quite double it but brought it almost to
twice. It is still, the design is to get to a living reasonable
wage so that we don't have people who are forced to resort to
corruption or family support to go forward. And it is foreign
money that helps. The Afghan Government is required to pay 34
percent of their budget according to the London Compact 1996
toward their Afghan security forces, but that clearly does not
cover the major part of the cost.
Mr. Wilson. And the cost largely covered, you say, by
foreign contributions, it is my understanding that Japan has
been a major contributor and should be given credit. Again
people do not know the extraordinary efforts and support from
around the world as unlikely as Japan supporting the police of
Afghanistan. Thank you again for your service.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Ross, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McChrystal, the
Arkansas National Guard, like those in other states, plays an
important role in responding to natural disasters and other
domestic emergencies in Arkansas. It is not uncommon for them
to respond in other states as well, such as Louisiana after
Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these domestic roles, the
Arkansas National Guard's 39th infantry brigade combat team has
twice been deployed to Iraq, and while this team has to date
not served in Afghanistan there is a significant National Guard
presence in Afghanistan.
In fact the 39th has been to Iraq not once but twice and I
think most of them have a pretty good idea of what may be in
their future. I am grateful for the service the men and women
of the National Guard provide our country. Their continued
deployment leaves the National Guard fewer troops and equipment
needed to respond to domestic issues. How many of the 30,000
additional troops do you envision coming from the National
Guard? And how soon will National Guardsmen and Guardswomen
return home after the planned draw down begins in 2011?
General McChrystal. Sir, I will have to take for record the
number of the 30,000 and get back to you that look like
National Guards. The Services will determine that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal
to Question Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Mike Ross
Force Packages 1, 2, and 3 presently include the following National
Guard Forces: Combat Service Support Battalion (78), Engineering
Company (Route Clearance) (122), Military Police Law and Order
Detachment (45), Maintenance Company (173), and Communications
Detachment (77). It is important to note that the sourcing process
continues, and additional capabilities from both the Active and Reserve
Force, in support of all three Force Packages are still being
identified and sourced. We are continuing to work with USCENTCOM,
USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Services to ensure the
timely deployment of these troops. The pace and intensity of the
transition that commences in 2011 is to be determined, as stated by the
President, by conditions on the ground.
General McChrystal. I would like to take a second though to
talk about National Guardsmen in service, because they were
extraordinary across all of the different disciplines,
engineers, infantry, trainers, a significant number of people
training the Afghan national security forces are National
Guardsmen. And then the agricultural development teams that are
there as well from many states, they provide a linkage to
practical agriculture expertise that we can provide, and they
also develop a sense of partnership with the Afghan people that
is a combat multiplier, not just developmental assistance, it
actually helps security as well. So I can't say enough about
what National Guardsmen do or the sacrifices they have made.
Mr. Ross. In my time remaining, approximately three
quarters of the food, fuel, and other provisions that supply
NATO forces passes through Pakistan. In the face of increased
Taliban attacks on the supply routes the Pakistani Government
has been unable to increase security. Since September 2008 the
attacks have forced several temporary closures of NATO supply
routes through the Khyber Pass. As a result of these attacks
and the decreased security in Pakistan, NATO was forced to seek
alternative supply routes into Afghanistan.
The continuing attacks raise concern for the deployment of
additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan which will require a
significant increase in supplies. While some of the additional
supplies will be transported via other ways, such as the
northern distribution network, much of the additional supplies
will have to pass obviously through Pakistan. What will be done
to ensure American and NATO forces receive the supplies
necessary during their deployment in light of this?
General McChrystal. Congressman, that is an important
point. We look at very hard what we call the ground lines of
communication that go through Pakistan are essential to our
effectiveness there. And so what we work with is our strategic
partnership with the Government of Pakistan to continue to
secure those. We actually have a very good track record of
amount of equipment that makes it through without any issues,
it is a very, very high percentage, it has been a very strong,
predictable flow. That said, we always understand that
instability could threaten that, and that is why the northern
distribution network was developed, not because we absolutely
had to have it but we wanted to have alternate means so that if
one means was threatened or one line of communication was
threatened we would have the additional.
Mr. Ross. And, Mr. Chairman, my goal in life remains
keeping you happy, and with that I will yield back my remaining
40 seconds.
Chairman Berman. Well, I hope it is contagious.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, you lead
an awesome group of folks and we thank you for your service and
for their service. You mentioned that our commitment as a
nation is being watched intently, and you called it a
significant step to commit 30,000 troops, is it sufficient?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I am confident that it is.
Mr. Inglis. And with the commitment being watched intently,
what do we signal by a time line for transfer, does that
undermine the signal of commitment or does it, what is the
impact of talking about a date certain for transfer?
General McChrystal. There are several points I would like
to make on that. There is first a vulnerability in any date
that is set, the enemy can take that date and use it for
propaganda purposes, but I believe we can combat that. But
there are a number of positives in where we are right now, and
I would like to stress those. The first is that the date does
serve as somewhat of a forcing function for the Government of
Afghanistan and the Afghan people to understand that their
responsibility for security is absolute and we need to move
toward that, and I think we have already begun to see some of
the effect on that, so that is positive.
But I would also step back and talk about the more
important part to me at the security standpoint, the President
has outlined his commitment to a strategic partnership over
time, long term, which provides assurance to the people of
Afghanistan and the government that we are partnering with
them. Were I an insurgent and I saw that solid assurance from
the United States, then I would understand that a date doesn't
change anything.
In the near term, the 30,000 additional American forces
combined with coalition forces is going to allow my force to
turn this momentum and very seriously push back on the
insurgency, and I think very effectively, and I think that will
be clear to everyone. At the same time the growth of Afghan
national security forces will be rising during that period so
that any point whatever pace the President decides to draw down
our combat forces, I think that is met with growing Afghan
national security force and government capacity. So I really
think we don't leave much of a window of opportunity for the
insurgency, particularly when they see the long term
commitment.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you. And, Ambassador, you also lead an
impressive group of folks and we thank you for their service
and your service. And the General mentioned that the wonderful
decision by a farmer to decide to harvest wheat rather than
poppy, do you have any idea what the per acre profit margin is
comparing those two crops? I mean what can a farmer make on
wheat as opposed to poppies?
Ambassador Eikenberry. It changes from year to year, it
changes from region to region. I will submit for the record,
Congressman, the most current data. The fluctuation of the
price of wheat, one of the main staple crops of Afghanistan,
has an extraordinary amount to do with decisions by farmers.
But I would also emphasize there is a direct correlation, a
known direct correlation between areas of insecurity in
Afghanistan where there is no legitimate Government of
Afghanistan presence and high poppy yields.
We see that very clearly in southern Afghanistan. In one
province of southern Afghanistan, Helmand, over 50 percent of
poppy production for the entire country occurs there, and it is
exactly the area where General McChrystal's forces right now
and the Afghan national security forces have part of their main
effort. Part of that success that we will have there will have
to do with pushing the Taliban back and securing the Afghan
population, part of the success will also yield reductions in
poppy production and narcotrafficking, and there is a clear
nexus between the two.
Mr. Inglis. Yes, it seems to be a clear nexus between the
security, the imposition, our ability to project forth so that
we stop that poppy production. Because otherwise the unpopular,
as a general statement, unpopular Taliban becomes more popular
by comparison if you can feed your family selling an illegal
crop as opposed to slaving away on a low profit margin crop
that maybe isn't going to feed your family. So it is crucial I
suppose to have these things to together, that we have to push
to say that, well you can't grow this anymore, but also provide
some hope that other crops will work and you can make a living.
Ambassador Eikenberry. One of the key first principles of
our developmental strategy is in the area of agriculture, and I
think, Congressman, it gets exactly to what you are talking
about.
Mr. Inglis. Okay.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Crowley. I thank the chairman, I thank both of you
gentlemen for being here before us today. Like many of my
colleagues I have some very serious reservations about
additional troop buildup in Afghanistan, especially in the
midst of a tough economic cycle that we are under right now
here, our first and foremost responsibility I believe is to the
American people. In addition to the cost, the geopolitical
realities of the Afghanistan and Pakistan and the greater
region all raise questions about U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
I am also concerned about the well being certainly of our
troops. I had the opportunity to travel to both Afghanistan and
to Iraq last year. Probably the sharpest distinction that I
could draw after coming back was that the different assets that
appear upon landing in Afghanistan. And I want to thank, I
don't know if it has been done already, I noticed behind you,
General, there are representation of the coalition of forces
that are engaged in Afghanistan, I want to thank them for their
participation, for the sacrifices that they have made as well,
I know this is not just an American cause.
But having said that, we will be sending many, many more
American troops than coalition forces from abroad. With that in
mind, I just want to ask and just to follow up on the last
questions that were brought up to both General McChrystal and
to you, Ambassador, in terms of your initial report to
Secretary Gates you said that the narco profits were a major
earner for the insurgency. If we were to displace that as a
profit mode for the rebels and for al-Qaeda, do you believe
there are other alternative resources that they would be able
to use to supplant that? And would they be enough to carry out
the work they are doing right now?
General McChrystal. Congressman, we calculate that the
Taliban get about a third of their funding from the
narcotrafficking, but that they could operate without it. They
essentially tax the narco trade, they could tax licit crops as
well.
Mr. Crowley. Right.
General McChrystal. So we don't think that that would
cripple them. The greatest threat from the narco trade is the
corrosive corruption that it brings into governance. So what we
need to do first is get security and bring all of those down
together.
Mr. Crowley. I just thought it was important to make that
point, and I appreciate you doing that, that that in and of
itself will not end the problems we have. Yes, Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Just briefly, Congressman, another
source of revenue of course for the Taliban comes from outside
of Afghanistan, funds that come from the Gulf, funds that come
from different elements in Pakistan, and there is a full out
combined intelligence, military, and law enforcement effort to
try to choke that off.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you. I have limited time so I just want
to get to another point. Testimonies by numerous government
witnesses have pointed out that the United States is going to
increase the number of trainers working to expand the Afghan
army. Over time, if the plan works, the size of the Afghan army
will grow substantially. Going forward, how will the Afghan
army sustain itself financially? And does your plan include a
measure of self sustainability so that American taxpayers are
not footing the entire bill for decades to come?
General McChrystal. Sir, in the near term it is clear that
Afghanistan will not have the funds to pay for security forces
of the size that they need. As their economy grows, that would
be the hope, but in the foreseeable future, that does not
appear possible.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Also, Congressman, important to note
that when we talk about the Afghan national security forces,
the army and the police, I don't think we could tell you
precisely what is the ratio of cost of having a U.S. Army
soldier or Marine deployed to Afghanistan versus the cost of
sustaining an Afghan national army soldier or policeman, but it
is probably on the order of 30 or 40 to 1. So obviously the way
forward of developing an Afghan national army and police that
can provide for the security of their own people, it makes good
sense for a lot of reasons.
Mr. Crowley. I appreciate it. Looking at my clock, I have
less than 1 minute, so, Mr. Chairman, your work has been
incredibly important in terms of the level of witnesses we have
had before this committee, and I too want to stay in your good
graces, and I will yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Berman. Well that is nice, thank you. The time of
the gentleman has been relinquished to the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Poe, recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you both for being
here. I am from southeast Texas, I represent a guy by the name
of Charlie Wilson's old district, and so I have a few
questions. I just got back from Afghanistan on Tuesday, I met
with our generals, German, Canadian, and British NATO allies
and our troops down on the Pakistan Afghanistan border. I was
pleasantly really surprised to learn that the Afghan people
appear to me to be very supportive of our presence in
Afghanistan, that they fear the Taliban, they fear the
reprisals that they have lived under the Taliban, and they
supply us a lot of information about the Taliban, good
intelligence.
The question, several questions. We have heard about the
President's position on more troops, I call it the surge and
retreat policy, but now that has been hedged a little bit, in
the summer of 2011. General McChrystal, what is our policy now?
Is it to reevaluate our troops, our position, in 2011, the
summer of 2011, is that what it is as you understand it?
General McChrystal. Congressman, my understanding is in
July 2011 we will begin the reduction of U.S. forces. The pace
of that and the scope of that will be based on conditions on
the ground at that time.
Mr. Poe. So we will start bringing troops home but we won't
necessarily bring them all home then, is that what you
understand?
General McChrystal. Exactly, Congressman, there will be
some slope, some pace that is determined by conditions.
Mr. Poe. And if the conditions are worse, what happens
then?
General McChrystal. Sir, the President can always make
decisions based upon conditions on the ground, but it is my
expectation that beginning on July 2011 we will start a
reduction.
Mr. Poe. You believe that you can accomplish the mission
you have when you receive the troops, which is in several weeks
or even months, maybe just a year time that you have to do
that?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I do. I think that with
the forces we have, the additional forces and that time, I am
comfortable that we will be able to do that.
Mr. Poe. Well I think it is obvious to anybody that goes to
Afghanistan and Iraq too that our troops are just the best,
there is no comparison to the quality of our troops. How many
members of the Taliban are there? We would like to know how
many of the enemy we are trying to defeat. How many of them are
there, General?
General McChrystal. Congressman, it varies based upon their
popularity. We assess between 24 and 27,000 members of the
Taliban, but I believe as momentum is turned that affects their
ability to retain their force. So I think it is not people with
long term enlistments, I think it is more flexible than that.
Mr. Poe. Having been on the Pakistan Afghanistan border and
talking to just regular troops, just my opinion is that the
Pakistan Government isn't doing enough to ratchet up protecting
their side of the border, that the Taliban come over in to
Afghanistan and woe be to them if they do because the military
is going to find them, but they run back over to Pakistan and
have sanctuary, and it appears to me we know where they are,
Pakistan gives lip service to doing something about it. I met
with their people and I am not convinced that Pakistan is
engaged in helping defeat the Taliban. Can you give me some
insight on that?
General McChrystal. Sir, I believe our long term way ahead
is with a strategic partnership with Pakistan. They are
absolutely focused against the TTP, or Pakistani Taliban
internal to Pakistan. They have not focused on the Afghan
Taliban that use sanctuaries. Interestingly, and I have a very
close relationship with the Pakistani military and building
this relationship
Mr. Poe. Excuse me, General, for interrupting, I just have
30 seconds.
General McChrystal. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. So they take care of business with the Taliban
that is the homegrown folks that just stick around in Pakistan
to do mischief, but people running back and forth across the
border into Afghanistan, they don't consider that their
problem?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I think that may
oversimplify it, I think they do but I wish they would do more
against the Afghan Taliban.
Mr. Poe. The only other thing I want to mention, and I am
sorry we can't go into it, I too am concerned about the rules
of engagement, the Navy SEALs capturing one of the worst guys
in history, and it seems they ought to be getting medals rather
than being court-martialed, but we don't have any time to talk
about that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ellison. Let me welcome you and say good morning to
both you, Ambassador and General, it is good to see you again.
We were with you only a few weeks ago. We have talked a lot
about 30,000 extra, but what about the civilian surge side of
this, could you elaborate on that, Ambassador Eikenberry, what
is our projected number, what are we hoping to arrive at, and
how is that process going along?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thanks, Congressman, good to see you
again.
Mr. Ellison. Absolutely.
Ambassador Eikenberry. We have made very significant
progress over the last 12 months in increasing our civilian
numbers and our civilian capabilities in Afghanistan. By
January of next year here in about a 7-week time frame, if you
look back over the last month we will have had a threefold
increase in our civilian increase in Afghanistan, very
importantly in support of General McChrystal's efforts, a six-
fold increase in the field. Numbers roughly then that we are
talking about early next year, January February time frame, we
will be looking at about 1,000 civilians overall in
Afghanistan, about 400 of those we project to be out in the
field.
It is a very diverse group of civilians. These are
civilians not only from the Department of State as you know,
but USAID development specialists, Department of Agriculture
specialists around the country, members of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation mentoring and helping establish an Afghan FBI.
We have brave members of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
members of the Federal Aviation Administration, a really
impressive array.
We have had innovations over the course of the past 6
months in which the way that we organize our civilian efforts
and multiply the effects of wherever they are through hiring
Afghans and then through those Afghan organizations amplifying
the effects, we have very close collaboration with General
McChrystal in the integration of these efforts. Projecting
ahead, Congressman, we are set to build to 1,000. Right now we
are in discussions with the Department about what additional
capabilities and numbers will we need on the ground, that is
also in collaboration with General McChrystal understanding his
campaign so we can support that. I don't have an exact number
for what we will grow to, but it might be on the order of
needing several hundred more over the course of the next 6-9
months beyond what we have projected currently.
Mr. Ellison. Well I guess my question is, I mean that is
very impressive and I thank you for that, and the movement in
education, girls' education, there are a lot of good stories to
tell and I thank both of you for that. But as I look at what we
are trying to arrive at at a civilian number and what we are
trying to arrive at at a military number, it is like 100 to 1,
is that the right ratio? I mean shouldn't we have a greater, I
mean if we are trying to help stabilize the country, harden the
country so that it is more impervious to, you know, these
forces that would overthrow the government and hurt the county,
shouldn't the proportion be a lot greater when it comes to
civilian representation?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Representative, numbers are
important at one level, but you have to look at the effects
that they are going to be achieving. When we talk about the
military we talk about mobilizing platoons, companies,
battalions of 600 to deploy to Afghanistan to achieve effects.
Remember when we are talking about civilians we are talking
about individuals, three good Department of Agriculture
specialists working in the Ministry of Agriculture of
Afghanistan can help transform that entire ministry and its
delivery of services, of agricultural services, throughout the
country. And so, yes numbers matter, but at the end of the day
it is how do you organize them and what effects are you trying
to achieve? And if you wish, for the record I can give many
more examples of that, Congressman.
Mr. Ellison. Yes, and I would like that, but not now
because I have got one more question for you. You know, when I
was in Afghanistan only a few weeks ago, our mission as part of
the House Democratic Partnership Commission, was to interact
with our counterparts, other legislators there, and I was
really impressed with many people I met including several women
legislators. One of them was from Helmand province, she told
us, this is what she said. She reported that without the
intervention of the U.S. Marines she probably couldn't even be
a member of the Parliament, and I guess my question to you is,
you know, how is security related to women's rights in
Afghanistan, in your view?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Security is a very critical
dimension of the advancement of women's rights in Afghanistan
certainly. There are many other factors, but security is
fundamental.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the last 3
months the current prosecutor for the International Criminal
Court has been making public statements that he has
jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity in Afghanistan and is performing a ``preliminary
investigation into operations by U.S. and other NATO forces.''
This could lead to ICC prosecution of American soldiers even
though the United States has never ratified their own statute.
Among other things he has declined to rule out ICC
prosecutions based upon unmanned drone strikes against leaders
there in Afghanistan. However, this administration has been
moving the United States closer to International Criminal
Court, the Secretary of State has expressed great regret we are
not a signatory to the Rome statute, and last month for the
first time since their own statute entered into force the
administration sent a delegation to participate in a meeting of
the ICC assembly of parties. It is my understanding that the
U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes, Ambassador Rapp, was
at the meeting, said nothing to protest or dispute the ICC's
prosecutorial jurisdictional claims.
We understand that there is an Article 98 agreement with
Afghanistan that exempts Afghanistan as signatory to the Rome
agreement from turning our troops over to the International
Criminal Court, however the soldiers there in member states
such as Japan, Germany, and even the U.K. may be subject to
jurisdiction. I would like to hear your opinions on whether you
agree or disagree with the ICC's prosecutorial claim of
potential jurisdiction to prosecute U.S. and NATO troops over
actions taken in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congressman, let me just speak from
a United States perspective. We do have a bilateral agreement
with Afghanistan, Article 98, as we do with certain other
states that are parties to the ICC, and this precludes the
Afghan Government from surrendering U.S. troops to the ICC. The
bottom line is here, and the important bottom line is, our
troops are protected from being turned over to the ICC, a
commitment of this administration.
Mr. Manzullo. While they are in Afghanistan. What if they
are in other countries that are not signatories to an Article
98 agreement but the countries themselves are signatories to
the Rome agreement?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Let me get back for the record on
that important question, Congressman, I know it is a
complicated legal issue.
Mr. Manzullo. General McChrystal, do you have an opinion on
that? I mean I think we need a definitive answer because young
men and women are being asked to go overseas to Afghanistan to
engage in combat, they need to know whether or not they can be
arrested in countries that are signatories to the Rome
agreement.
General McChrystal. Congressman, I absolutely agree we need
clarity. I would like to along with Ambassador Eikenberry take
this for the record to ensure we get you an accurate answer.
Mr. Manzullo. Well I had hoped that we would have it today.
I mean we are concerned about the prosecution of the Navy
SEALs. A lot of people contacted us, they don't think the
military is standing behind the young men and women in uniform,
they don't think that because some terrorist got punched out
that they should be subjected to a court-martial that is taking
place in this country. I would like the assurance of both of
you that if there is no clarity on this that we will have
clarity, especially in light of the fact that the Secretary of
State is expressing regret that we are not a party to the Rome
agreement. Ambassador, both of you, are you on record as saying
that you are absolutely opposed under any circumstances to men
and women in uniform being arrested anywhere in the world and
tried before the ICC court as a result of their actions in
either Iraq or Afghanistan?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congressman, yes. And we will get
back with you for the record on the very specifics of what you
are talking about.
Mr. Manzullo. And, General, your answer would be yes also?
General McChrystal. Same position, Congressman.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Klein. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you for
being with us today and thank you for your service to our
country, difficult challenges and we appreciate you taking
these challenges on. General McChrystal, this week when you
testified before the Armed Services Committee, you explained
that the Taliban may react to the arrival of reinforcements
with a shift of asymmetrical tactics, suicide bombers,
increased use of improvised explosive devices, strategies other
than traditional large scale operations. Can you share with us
what are we doing to prepare our troops who are already there
to confront these types of asymmetrical threats and what are we
doing to get the Afghan military to prevent these as well?
General McChrystal. Congressman, on the direct tactical end
we are doing extensive training on combating improvised
explosive devices. We are using a number of technical means
from engineer equipment to intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance, drones and what not looking, we are using human
intelligence as well. So we are doing the tactical things to
try to combat the problem as it already arises. I think more
widely the real way to get rid of things like IEDs is to secure
an area.
When you secure an area it is like reducing crime in a
neighborhood, rather than trying to stop each crime you can
increase overall security, and so what that does is the
population becomes intolerant of IEDs because they suffer the
most casualties from IEDs, civilians do. So we are working in
that way to improve. Our partnership with the Afghans is the
same; we are trying to provide them equipment and training as
well so they have the same expertise. Again, suicide bombers,
it is mostly intelligence, sir.
Mr. Klein. Okay, and as a follow up, I think that one of
the discussion points that many people are raising about the
whole effort and the tactic and strategy is whether there is a
different way to do this, which would be to continue with
success to train the Afghan military, we know the police
continues to be more complicated and a lot more effort, but
continue to build the quantities of players there, and then use
our military in a tactical way, special force tactical way to
go after al-Qaeda where they are in those areas.
And of course this lends itself to the question of these
organizations do not respect national boundaries, we understand
that and the discussion has been Pakistan Afghanistan, but also
they can also be more nimble and they can pick up from one area
and go to another area, Yemen, Somalia, other weak states if
you will. What is to stop them and what are we doing tactically
within the territory that we are talking about here to prevent
them from going to other areas and how do you assess those
threats of those other areas as being hospitable if we have
success in eliminating them from Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. Congressman, terrorists and insurgents
do best in under governed or ungoverned areas. They thrive on
that and they don't survive in areas that have effective rule
of law and governance. So what we are trying to do inside
Afghanistan is create first areas of security into which we can
fill that vacuum with effective governance development hope for
the Afghan people so that it becomes more durable. When you
talk about outside Afghanistan, the same thing applies.
We see terrorists moving to places like Somalia, Yemen,
where there is less effective governance. I think our best way
forward is to partner with those nations to try to increase
governance. We still need to complement that as we do in
Afghanistan with precision strikes. So you can't allow leaders
or sanctuaries to emerge, so you have got to keep them under
pressure as you do these other things. So the thing about
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism, because there are a lot
of similarities, is there is no single answer. It is security,
governance, development, precision strike force.
Mr. Klein. And I agree with that. I think that those people
who are questioning in our communities back home about the
effectiveness of the strategy in Afghanistan, also recognizing
the threat of the Taliban's influence and the nuclear issue
which is extremely important and is obviously part of the whole
strategy here, is this question about, you don't necessarily
need a whole nation state for al-Qaeda to operate in. I mean
this notion of, it is all about Afghanistan or all about Iraq,
you know, they need territory but it doesn't have to be large,
it could be square miles, to train and to do some of the
things, and they can very easily move to another place even if
we were 100 percent successful in Afghanistan. So how do we
respond to that notion, other than the nuclear issue, which is
important, how do we respond to that notion of them picking up
and going to other places and stopping them from doing that?
General McChrystal. Sir, the best way is very extensive
intelligence sharing with all our partners and then staying
after them. It is like following a criminal gang around.
Mr. Klein. Ambassador, do you have any other thought on
that?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No, I share General McChrystal's
assessment on that. It is a comprehensive diplomatic
intelligence and military approach that is needed to defeat
this network.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for your extraordinary leadership and for your
extraordinary service. Let me just ask a few questions. Number
one, the Iraq surge of 2007 deployed, as we know, 20,000 combat
troops, extended the tour of 4,000 Marines already in Iraq, and
constituted intervention to help the Iraqis clear and secure
neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and
to help ensure that Iraqi forces left behind were capable of
providing security.
Notwithstanding Senator Reid's infamous statement that the
war is lost and that the surge is not accomplishing anything,
stated back in April of '07, the surge did create space for a
political solution and reconciliation. My question would be,
did the success of the Iraqi surge inspire the Afghan surge?
What lessons learned from that surge, pro and con, were
incorporated into the new beefed up troop deployment?
Secondly, I agree that we need an exit strategy, but
shouldn't it have been kept secret? Why announce it to the
Taliban so they can craft and employ strategies, especially
after redeployment begins some 18 months from now? And did
either of you recommend that it be kept secret or go public?
Third, what is Iran's role in Afghanistan today, including
EFPs? Is it increasing, diminishing, or staying the same, and
what are we doing about it? And fourth, is it true that the
primary source of funding for the Taliban is no longer the
opium trade but foreign donations from the Persian Gulf
countries and others? What is our counter-threat finance
strategy for Afghanistan?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I will start on those,
starting with the last first. We think that the funding for the
Taliban is probably about evenly split between external
donations, narco related raising, and then money that they can
raise from kidnapping and other things inside both Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Neither the loss of one of those three would stop
them from operating, they don't cost a lot and we think they
could make out. But we do have an extensive counter-finance
task force that focuses on this and tries to reduce that. So I
think we are focused pretty hard on it.
Sir, back to the first one on the surge, Iraq is very
different from Afghanistan, but it is clear that we were
informed by the experience in Iraq, and I was having spent so
much time there, into the situation in Afghanistan. What I
learned in Iraq that I think is applicable is that you must
have an approach that is both counterinsurgency and includes
counterterrorist capacity in it, and then of course the
counterinsurgency has to be holistic. The governance and
development parts, Ambassador Eikenberry's team has got to be
shoulder to shoulder with us as we go forward, and I think we
are pulling all of that together here. We were late doing it in
Iraq, I think that we are doing that now here, and I think it
postures us well.
And just last point, on the time line on July 2011, the key
point for me is the President and the Secretary's very public
pronouncement of long term strategic partnership for
Afghanistan. I think that changes everything, I think that
gives the Afghans and the insurgents, the Afghans hope and the
insurgents a lack of hope because there is not going to be
daylight in the long term. And I would turn it over to Karl.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Two quick points, thanks,
Congressman. First of all on the threat financing, we have a
very integrated, robust effort both within Afghanistan and
outside of Afghanistan to look at the challenge of Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and beyond, which is an integrated effort, which
includes our intelligence agencies, Department of Treasury, our
military diplomatic efforts. I also want to highlight that
within Afghanistan itself our Department of Treasury agents on
the ground are actually building within the Afghan Ministry of
Finance and within their central bank their own independent
threat finance capability, we are mentoring with them and they
are starting to get some impressive results.
Secondly, with regard to the emphasis that you placed on
the date, the July 2011, the transition date, I am absolutely
aligned with General McChrystal in how we look at this.
Afghanistan, they have a lot of insecurity based upon their
history, their people are insecure people based upon their
history, based upon other nations withdrawing their support
from them over time, they live in a very uncertain
neighborhood. So they have an ambivalence about the long term
presence of the United States, they want us here in Afghanistan
because of that insecurity, but increasingly they want to stand
up and take charge of their own security.
That was reflected in President Karzai's inauguration
speech where his own aspirations over the next 5 years for
Afghanistan to stand up and be in charge of its own security
with their army and police. So that 2011, I agree with General
McChrystal, it is a very good forcing function kind of date to
get the Afghans moving forward, and President Karzai has shown
his support for that date publicly.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have now set
ambitious goals for training and equipping Afghan army and
police forces, but the Karzai government by anyone's estimation
remains a very weak government. You said earlier much of
Afghanistan is ungoverned still. Having a weak government and a
strong military frequently leads to unhappy results in many
parts of the world. We have also had at best mixed success in
trying to build a military as a unifying national institution
in nations that don't have a strong national identity.
We tried to do that in Iraq, and it appeared that we
effectively armed and equipped every side in the sectarian
civil war. The cell phone video of the execution of Sadam
Hussein and the taunting by the Shi'a military but obviously
also members of the Shi'a militia that was more loyal to
Muqtada al-Sadr, did us great damage. It created the impression
that that was a sectarian revenge killing, not the execution of
justice in a society with a legitimate rule of law. What is the
desertion rate now, where are those folks going, how are we
going to make sure that the military we build is not going to
dominate the government, and how are we making sure that we are
not training and equipping the forces that will be fighting for
warlords in a short time?
General McChrystal. I think that it is important that I
start with the fact that one of the things Afghans fear most is
militias and warlords. There will be security forces that form
in Afghanistan whether we form them or not. They will form in
their own defense, and I think that it is important we form a
national army and national police capacity, a recognized
legitimate defense security apparatus, or the vacuum will be
filled by exactly what the Afghans fear, which is a return to
strong militias that in many cases are ethnically based and
rose with the departure of the Soviets.
I think that there is an absolute national identity in
Afghanistan. They don't expect the same things from their
central government that many Western nations do, they expect
less. But they do have an absolute sense of being Afghans
before they are any other ethnic or local identity. They take
huge pride in the Afghan national army even though it is still
a developing entity, they would like to be secured.
And when I talk to Afghan elders, they thank us for being
there and then they always say, we would like to be secured by
the Afghan national army, we are proud of them, but we will
welcome you just until they are strong enough to do it. So I
think that rather than being a threat to the Government of
Afghanistan, I think it is a major source of credibility as
they go forward. Now clearly it has to stay under civilian
control, and I have seen no indications that that is not likely
to be the situation. I would ask Ambassador Eikenberry to jump
in.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thanks, Congressman. My views are
the same as General McChrystal on this. The Afghan national
army was established on first principles of being all ethnic
and all national, and indeed it is. It is a symbol of pride for
the Afghan people, it is a sign of hope that this country after
30 years of warfare and fighting can come together, the Afghan
national army is a manifestation of that. Secondly, the
principles upon which the Afghan national army were established
were good principles inspired by us, and that was that this
military would be under civilian control, it would respect the
rule of law, respect the people. I believe very much that those
principles are still in place.
Mr. Miller. What is the desertion rate? I have heard it is
25 percent. What is the desertion rate?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I will get you that for
the record, it is not that high. One of the things about
desertion is, many of the young Afghans who enlist in the army
go home because there is not yet a good leave policy
established. There is also we are still working through issues
of how they are paid, electronic pay is clearly the wave of the
future, but in many cases they go home to take pay or to see
family, great sense of family there. So it is something, and a
significant percentage come back. So it is a significant
problem, I don't want you to believe that it is not, but it is
something that is less clear than it might be in another army.
Mr. Miller. I will take the cue from my colleagues and
yield back to curry favor with the chairman.
Chairman Berman. I thank the gentleman. We have had a
little misunderstanding. My intention always was that every
member gets to ask questions alternating between Democrat and
Republican. We are now at the point, treating these two
hearings as one, where every member of the Republican
Conference on the committee who is here has had a chance to ask
a question, a number of Democrats have not yet had to. It was
my intention to proceed so that everyone gets to have time
before we go back to alternating, but we did not make that
clear with the minority.
So the compromise I would propose is we alternate but those
who have asked a question get 1 minute for a statement and then
we go back to the others. In the future it would be the intent
that these rights are individual more than group and that every
member should get a chance to question before we go back to the
alternating. And at this point I will recognize the ranking
member for 1 minute.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to yield my minute, and he can add his own minute, to Mr.
Burton of Indiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was a question
asked a while ago about the international court, and both of
the witnesses said that they would get back to us on that.
There is a story I want to talk about that they wrote a book
about. Have you heard of Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell, have
you heard of him? He was on a mission, and they were supposed
to kill an al-Qaeda leader, and they went up there and they ran
into two people and a boy. And they couldn't decide whether
they should kill them or not because they were afraid they
would alert the Taliban to their mission and that they would
all be killed.
Well they decided after an argument, Luttrell said, ``Okay,
we will let them go because we trust them, they won't say
anything.'' Fifteen minutes later 200 of the Taliban came
across, and al-Qaeda I guess, came across, killed him, killed
his partners, and left him for dead. Sixteen Navy SEALs, other
Navy SEALs, came in a helicopter; they shot them down when they
came to rescue them, and killed all 16.
Now we have got these three Navy SEALs that are on trial
right now. How do you say to these troops who were sent on a
mission out there to kill an al-Qaeda leader what they should
do? Should they have killed those three people? Should they
have shot them right on the spot so they wouldn't alert the
enemy that they were coming over the hill? And if they had,
would they have gone to the international court? Would they
have been court-martialed by the United States?
And here we are court-martialing three guys who in
Operation Amber attacked one of the leaders and arrested him,
turned him over to the Iraqi military, they turned him back
over, they said he smacked him in the mouth and they hit him in
the stomach and you are court-martialing, it makes no sense.
And you are the General in charge and you are the Ambassador
over there, and I talked to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
the other day, I just do not understand why somebody doesn't
say, this is bologna.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Watson. I want to thank our two witnesses for the
service to our country and the image that you serve to fill
abroad. I want to thank you for your experience and wish you
well. Now my question goes to the Afghans. In the 8 years that
we have been involved and more, what is it that is lacking in
their government and their experience and their commitment to
their own where they could not train their people to stand up
and defend their own country? Let me start with the Ambassador
first.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Well, Congressman, first there has
been as we said extraordinary progress that has been made.
Ms. Watson. Hold. How many years has it been and how many
years will it take to train them? You see, I am looking ahead
too, that is why I ask this question, and I am looking at our
financial commitment to be there at a time of growing deficit,
you know, how long do we have to commit for them to bring their
defense force up where they can protect their own country?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Well, Congressman, let me turn to
General McChrystal for the specifics, but the President's
strategy is very clear in that regard.
Ms. Watson. No, I want you to tell me from your experience
what is it with the Afghans where they don't seem to be able to
succeed on their own.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congresswoman, they are succeeding,
they have had great success.
Ms. Watson. Then why do we have to have additional forces?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Well the context over the last 8
years, Congresswoman, is this mission over the last 8 years
until recently has never received the adequate resources that
have been needed.
Ms. Watson. I am not talking about our resources, I am
talking about their own.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congresswoman, starting where they
were in 2001 and 2002, we are talking about a country that had
been at war for 30 years, two generations of Afghans without
education, we are talking about----
Ms. Watson. Okay, let me stop you there because I am
watching my time. General McChrystal, you have asked for
additional forces to go in. We are giving a great deal, the
life of our military, our finances, to a country that operates
based on war, and they can't seem to bring their people to a
point where they can defend their own nation. We are shedding
blood, limbs, and building a tremendous deficit that will
probably never be closed in my lifetime. What is the element
that is missing among their own people?
General McChrystal. Congressman, I agree with Ambassador
Eikenberry, this was a society literally torn apart for 30
years, the tribal parts of society, the governance. And they
die at a higher rate than coalition forces now.
Ms. Watson. I would hope. You know, why do we have to be
the international police? And that is what I don't get. With
Iraq, and now with Afghanistan, maybe Pakistan, maybe Iran. But
there is something in their psyche, and what I think is
happening is that we are fighting an ideology rather than at
the end of a gun kind of thing. And I don't know, if we knock
out every Taliban village and kill them all, if that ideology
doesn't continue among the Taliban and spread in the area. I
don't know how we identify them as they go over their boundary
lines into other areas. Are we having to maintain a force there
in perpetuity, General?
General McChrystal. I don't believe we will. I do think we
need to have a strategic partnership to reassure the Afghan
people, but they want to defend themselves. What they want is
time and space and opportunity to build their nation.
Ms. Watson. Well, and I am going to give you back my time,
Mr. Chairman, I don't see any end to it. If we are going to put
our people on the front line and put the resources behind, why
would they put up, you know? I just think there is a lack
somewhere in their ideology that, you know, we need you to help
us defend ourselves. And so I would rather invest the money
elsewhere than there. I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, let me just
note for the record that I am very disturbed with a policy that
has ended up with giving me 1 minute to express my opinions and
to ask questions at this very important hearing considering my
background on Afghanistan. So I am sorry, I apologize to the
two witnesses, I am going to say some things and I just have to
say it quickly. Number one, 30,000 troops, more troops in
Afghanistan means $30 billion more a year.
My experience in Afghanistan tells me for a small portion
of that we could buy the allegiance, we could earn the good
will through payments to tribal leaders and village leaders
throughout that country without putting anybody at risk. Number
one, I would like your reaction to that. Number two, General,
your statements about Afghans fearing their militias is
disturbing to me, dramatically disturbing. Militias there are
nothing more than all the male children in their villages.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chairman, and want to welcome
both the Ambassador and the General to this committee, and
indicate that at least speaking for this Democrat, I am
generally supportive of the policy that is emerging from the
White House. And after your deliberations, having been to
Afghanistan, I believe that there are large swaths of the
country that are not sufficiently secure and that the
introduction of additional troops actually could make a
dispositive difference. I don't believe this is like Vietnam,
and I think our new President deserves the benefit of the doubt
at least at this time in history.
Having said that, the policy deliberations were a little
unusual. General McChrystal, a paper you wrote got leaked in
advance of the President convening formal review and
deliberations. And, Ambassador Eikenberry, your memo, or in the
old days we would have called it telegram, also got leaked. And
they represented seemingly very different points of view. And I
just wonder if each of you might comment on what you think
about, you know, developing foreign policy by, you know,
leaking and counter-leaking, and what you think, you know, we
should learn from that experience.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Thanks, Congressman, I will go
first. The review that the President led was an extraordinary
review. It was a very open, it was a deliberative process,
everyone that participated was encouraged freely to provide
their analysis and their best advice. We did that in a variety
of ways, through video teleconferences, face to face meetings,
and in writing. The leaks that occurred are absolutely
regrettable.
Now, against that, my own views, during this process I want
to emphasize, Congressman, at no time did I ever oppose
additional troops being sent to Afghanistan, indeed I fully
shared and share General McChrystal's security assessment. As
he had written and is his analysis, security in parts of the
country were deteriorating, security situation is serious today
in many parts of the country. Against that, the only way then
to move forward with regard to troops is additional troops are
needed to deal with those security issues.
Mr. Connolly. Ambassador, I am going to come back to you on
part two here about governance, I take your point. General
McChrystal, did you want to respond?
General McChrystal. I would, I agree with Ambassador
Eikenberry. The leaks made our job harder. The difference
between our views is really not very large at all, but selected
leaks made it look like they were. We were shoulder to shoulder
on this thing throughout, and I absolutely regret the leaks.
Mr. Connolly. Okay, thank you. Let me go back then to I
think where you were headed, Mr. Ambassador and General
McChrystal, you also talked about, you know, the desire of
Afghans is essentially to have some kind of government that
functions in a particular way that protects the security. Mr.
Ambassador, you expressed some skepticism about the current
circumstances being able to meet even that kind of threshold. I
want to give you both an opportunity to talk about, because
some of the skepticism up here is, we are backing a government
that is seen as frankly organized thuggery, it is corrupt, it
doesn't deliver services efficiently, and frankly the Taliban
unfortunately is an effective alternative. I would like your
comments.
Ambassador Eikenberry. We both share the importance of the
need for a legitimate government respected by its people,
credible. We have two challenges on the civilian side, the
Afghans have two challenges. One is at the national level, the
establishment of national level governance. There, Congressman,
we do really have a lot to build upon, there are good
functioning ministries, they need more capacity. We think our
programs that we have moving forward are well focused.
Our greater challenge, though, is at the local level, the
areas where General McChrystal's forces and the Afghan national
army right now are dealing with these areas of insecurity out
in some of the provinces, especially in the east and the south.
We are working closely with the Afghan Government and our
military to try to develop the right kind of combinations of
service delivery and governance that as security is brought to
a provincial area or to a district, that shortly behind that
government can start to take hold, service delivery can take
hold, and you start to have credible governance. I don't want
to underestimate though the challenge that we are facing in
this second category. Last point, Congressman, President
Karzai's inauguration address that he gave several weeks ago,
it does show some promise. Of we are waiting for action now.
Mr. Connolly. General, you get 12 seconds.
General McChrystal. I agree with Ambassador Eikenberry,
sir.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, has been
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, General. I want to second my
colleague's concern about the treatment of the three Navy SEALs
now facing the court-martial for actions taken while
apprehending a terrorist who cost the lives of four American
security guards. Court-martial is very serious business, I
don't think it had to be this way, and I would like to ask what
alternative actions might still be taken in place of a court-
martial, informal councils, formal councils, non-punitive
letter of reprimand.
Now the point I want to make is that there is ways of
dealing with this issue, assuming there is an issue here at
all, far short of a court-martial. And second, if acquitted,
General, will these SEALs be given the opportunity to be
restored to full fitness and duty, will their careers be spared
a black mark which has a very harmful effect on morale?
General McChrystal. Congressman, that incident happened in
Iraq, so appropriately I don't have the details of the
incident, nor do I have any responsibility and it would be
inappropriate for me to talk about that case. I do believe,
however, that the chain of command in the process has been
extraordinarily good across the Services in providing fair
hearings for people.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Terrorists and
terrorism thrives in poor economies, in futures where the
citizens consider their future hopeless, where there is lack of
infrastructure, education, healthcare, roads and sewer systems.
And terrorism thrives in areas where the citizens believe that
they are being occupied by outside forces. I am concerned about
the lack of focus on the civilian surge in this regard, because
I think that is the balance to what being an occupier requires.
In his speech at West Point, the President dedicated most
of his time to military might, and he just only once mentioned
the civilian side of the equation. And so, you know, you both
have said and other leaders in the military and throughout the
diplomatic corps really agree, that one major way to secure
stability is through the use of smart security where we win the
hearts and the minds of the civilians, and we are talking about
Afghanistan right now of course.
So I ask you, what resources are currently being dedicated,
you said a little bit about that, to smart security? And in the
years to come, here is the main question, what additional
resources do you need? How will the administration promote this
smart approach over a military solution? And will a smart
approach ever be able to win over military? Start with you, Mr.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congresswoman, the President's
strategy has been clear that the military effort is a necessary
effort, it is not a sufficient effort. Ultimately, the need for
good governance to be established in Afghanistan, for economy
that allows Afghanistan to have a sustainable country all
important. I do believe that the President's strategy and this
way we are going about now, the implementation, does address
the essential government services that are needed, the
essential pieces of the economy. Again, I will just quickly
mention agriculture. We see the absolute need for agriculture
to help improve security, to help improve the economy, that is
where our emphasis is.
Ms. Woolsey. Okay, let me just interrupt a minute, because
you did say this and I really respected it, but tell us where
our civilian surge will come. Of course we want the Afghani
civilians to do all this and we need to help them. How will our
civilians help and how many?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congresswoman, the civilian surge
has been ongoing, we are soon to triple our presence over the
ground in the past year. So the surge is not something that we
are ready to launch. We are going to add to our capabilities on
the ground. Our areas of emphasis are in the areas focused on
what is necessary in the economy, in the areas of agriculture,
we are focused in the key areas of government and helping the
Afghans develop further rule of law, law enforcement, we are
focused in the financial sector helping the Afghans to develop
the capability for more revenue collection, critical if it is
going to be a sustaining economy, sustaining government.
Ms. Woolsey. Well let me interrupt 1 more minute because we
only get a little bit of time. We know we are sending 30,000
troops. Are we talking about a tripling of the surge from one
to three people or from 100 to 300, 1,000 to 3,000? I mean give
us some idea of what we are talking about.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congresswoman, at the start of this
year, before the President announced his strategy in March,
reflecting the under-resourcing of Afghanistan, we had a little
over 300 civilians in Afghanistan. At the end of January of
next year we will have 1,000 and we are continuing to grow
beyond that. It is an impressive gains deg. that we
are making, and it is an all-government effort. Department of
Treasury is on the ground, the Department of Agriculture, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Aviation
Administration, the Department of State, USAID, this is truly
an impressive effort.
Ms. Woolsey. General?
General McChrystal. The one point I would make, because I
agree with Ambassador Eikenberry, when you talk about military
it may not look like what you traditionally think. We have got
military partnered with his who are out doing agricultural
development, helping with governance, enabling the civilian
expertise. And so I think it is key that we understand we are
really trying to do this with every part of our capacity that
we have.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you very much.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized
for 1 minute.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for appearing today. Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate
your emphasis on agricultural development, the Nebraska
National Guard has helped lead some of this and I think that is
noteworthy. Before my question, I want you all to succeed, the
gravity of the downside to not succeeding is very apparent.
With that said, Mr. Ambassador, and this was touched upon a
moment ago, your cable to President Obama a month ago was
decidedly pessimistic about Afghanistan's governance capacity
as well as the potential for success of our military efforts.
What changed?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I wouldn't characterize my views
ever as decidedly pessimistic concerns express. With the
President's decision, we have a refined mission, we have
clarity at this point now with what means we are going to use
to move forward, resources appropriately matched against that,
and you have got with a proper combination of ends, ways, and
means, I am confident now as we move forward, Congressman.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening this hearing and the way that you have done it, you
have been true to your word and I appreciate your leadership.
Let me thank both of these distinguished public servants. I had
the chance to greet them and I want to thank them again for
their service, and it was good to see both of you in uniform
today, Amabassador, you are not. It was good to see you,
General, in Iraq, and of course you know that I have visited
Afghanistan. Today the President received the Nobel Peace
Prize, and I salute him and believe in him that he is a man of
peace.
He defined for those esteemed audience members a question
of a just war. But let me quickly say to you that I believe
that we have a major dilemma, and I would call for as I speak,
right now, an immediate beginning of negotiations to end this
conflict, and that would be the only way that I could concede
the possibility of any troops being added to Afghanistan, and I
will tell you why. I would like to submit into the record very
quickly, Mr. Chairman, an article by Jonathan Godomi, ``Lessons
from the Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan to the United States
and NATO,'' I ask unanimous consent.
[The information referred to is not reprinted here but is
available in committee records.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me indicate what was that came out of
that article which is so true, the Afghan Government urgently
needed to establish legitimacy, ethnic tensions were
underestimated, Afghans were highly intolerant of foreign troop
occupation, and a military solution was proven not sufficient.
The Vietnam War in 1966 saw 200,000 troops committed to
Vietnam, and at the peak of the war, 543,000 with 53,000 of our
treasure lost. General, the CIA has indicated that Afghanistan
is 4,000 feet up in the air, versus Iraq that is flat. You
asked for 40,000 troops, you got 30,000. What is your
commitment to protect troops as they travel up into those
mountains and to save lives?
General McChrystal. My commitment is absolute. Our rules of
engagement provide them every responsibility and right to
defend themselves, we believe that the equipment we are
providing them is as good as we can, and we will continue to do
that better, and I will push for every asset we need to protect
their well being.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you for that. I think the terrain
is so difficult it brings to mind the Pat Tillman story that
opportunities for friendly fire and loss of life are
heightened. There is a theory of clear, hold, build, and
transfer. President Karzai today said this week with Secretary
Gates that it will be 15 years before he can maintain a
military with his own resources.
Ambassador, why are we engaged with a country, of which I
have great appreciation and want to see helped with political
help and social help and economic help and constitutional help
and helping to make sure that they treat their women right and
keep their schools open, how are we going to in essence fight
against this concept that Afghans do not want foreigners on
their soil and have a government that says it will take 15-20
years before they can maintain their own military? That is 15-
20 years that the United States will have to be there guarding
them. Why can't we go the political and social and economic
route, Ambassador?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congresswoman, the Afghans first and
foremost, they do want to take control of their own
sovereignty. We have to appreciate the baseline that they begin
at and have already articulated that the Afghans though they
need security right now to help them get the time and space so
that they can fully take charge, I think we are on a good path
forward as we see our articulation of this July 2011 time line
where the Afghans will start to move and take responsibility
for security, President Karzai clear in his inauguration speech
about his own goals. But we have to be clear, the Afghans
beyond that period of time, they are going to need our
assistance.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me have a quick intervention please,
if you don't mind. This article says that by the time the
Soviets realized that only a political solution could end the
conflict, they had lost the ability to negotiate. Ambassador,
what is the strategy for going in now and getting the parties
to sit down and be engaged with Karzai, warlords, Taliban,
governors, and this very weak government and the United States
and NATO? Where are we now sitting down and beginning the
negotiation to hand over the responsibility to the Afghan
Government? Are we doing that as we speak?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Well, Congresswoman, we have a very
clear way ahead right now with the eventual transfer as Afghans
develop national security force capability, yes we do have a
clear plan. Politically, President Karzai has made clear again
in his inauguration speech, he would like to move forward with
reconciliation and reintegration with Taliban leaders, with
Taliban fighters, and we are working in support right now of
the Government of Afghanistan to help achieve those goals.
Ms. Jackson Lee. He needs to do that now. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Pakistan has always
been in my view the epicenter of this war on terror, it is
where al-Qaeda has sought safe haven, Ramzi Yousef, the World
Trade Center bomber, his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The
history with the Pakistani ISI has not been a good one. They
tend to side with the extremists, at the same time help us with
high valued targets. Has this improved, and what do you plan to
do to work better with the Pakistan intelligence service?
General McChrystal. Congressman, my official responsibility
ends at the borders of Afghanistan. We do, however, have a
close relationship with the Pakistani military so that we build
up a partnership against the problems on both sides of the
border. It still has a long way to go. I am absolutely
committed, like our intelligence agencies are, to improve in
that so that our shared strategic goals are met.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, and what is the influence of Iran in
Afghanistan right now?
General McChrystal. It is both positive and negative. There
are a number of positive things they do economically and
culturally. There is always the threat that they may bring
illicit or inappropriate influence in, and we watch for that.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, General.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, again, good
hearing, it is timely. I thank both of you for your service to
our country. Mr. Ambassador, a lot has been discussed this
morning about metrics and milestones, and on the leger of our
milestones and the Afghan, the Karzai government's milestones
as we try to achieve these metrics, one of the early I think
determinations as to whether or not they are achieving them is
in the naming of his cabinet.
Defense Minister Wardak I guess is leaving and another
minister is leaving as well I have heard, and whether or not
President Karzai is able to turn the page, it seems to me, is
going to be evident in these early appointments. When will they
be completed and what is your sense of that process? I mean
will we be able to determine for example by the end of January
when he finishes that process how that milestone has been
achieved?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Congressman, President Karzai in his
inauguration speech that was attended by Secretary Clinton, he
made a commitment in that inauguration speech to the
appointment of qualified, responsible individuals in his second
administration.
Mr. Costa. Right, and proof is in the pudding.
Ambassador Eikenberry. It is. It is interesting, though,
Congressman, when he said that he got a spontaneous round of
applause from the Afghans in attendance, so it is the Afghans
who have high expectations. Well to answer your specific
question, we expect his cabinet announcements to be made
relatively soon within the next several days before the
Parliament goes on its recess, because these nominees would
have to be approved by the Parliament.
Mr. Costa. But we should get a good judgment here very soon
as it relates to the cabinet selection.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Yes, and it will be very important.
Mr. Costa. And then how does that relate then, follow
through to the governors, some that have been closely
associated we believe with this narco trade?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We believe, Congressman, that after
the initial announcements of cabinet ministers that
subsequently there will be changes in the governors.
Congressman, if I could though, I would like to emphasize that
the cabinet of Afghanistan, President Karzai's cabinet, it has
got a lot of very well qualified people in it, the Minister of
Defense, Interior, Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Education,
Health, these are world class ministers. They are challenged
because they don't have the human capital right now given the
30 years war at they have underneath, but we are making
progress.
Mr. Costa. Because of my time I want to shift over here.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. General McChrystal, we talk about
the army and the police force and the training that is taking
place there, and I don't want to get into a discussion of
semantics, but I think that part of this whole effort is akin
to nation building because you are not going to be able to have
a solid military or a police force unless you have got the
credibility and you are relatively corrupt free. Since we are
now taking over the training especially in the police force,
and I have been there several times and I have heard all sorts
of anecdotal stories I won't go into those talks about the
dismay of our ability to do so, we are taking over the complete
training of the police force now, is that correct?
General McChrystal. Well NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
is part of that, so it is the whole coalition is doing that,
sir.
Mr. Costa. Okay, but are these people with police
backgrounds training the police or is this the military
training the police, and are we going to end up with a
paramilitary police force?
General McChrystal. It is a combination, there are
policemen that have been hired to do it, there is Jan Cambareet
from European partners, and then there is some military as
well.
Mr. Costa. Ambassador, back to you, on the smart power
issue, and I have been a big proponent of that and I have
talked to the Secretary of State about this, we saw about the
investments of the housing that got involved in corruption and
$8 million, other anecdotal stories where money has been
wasted, the housing hasn't been occupied, it has been
substandard. What efforts are we pursuing to correct those
kinds of investments and infrastructure, learning from Iraq?
Ambassador Eikenberry. We have many, let me highlight two.
First of all, in terms of how we are contracting, we think that
we are designing contracts in a much better way that improve
performance and transparency. Secondly, in terms of audit and
oversight, we have many means for that. I want to emphasize
that we think the most important is exactly with the United
States Congress, as you know, you have the special investigator
for Afghanistan reconstruction which provides oversight for DOD
and State and USAID efforts. We think that it is a very
important oversight area.
Mr. Costa. Quickly, Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with
the Abstar Hospital in Kabul?
Ambassador Eikenberry. Sir, I am not.
Mr. Costa. Okay, I want to make you aware of that, it is a
success story that really we have not participated in but the
Americans have made it happen.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, is recognized
for 1 minute.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your extraordinary service to our nation.
General McChrystal, in response to Senator McCain's question
the other day about the inability to defeat al-Qaeda unless bin
Laden is captured, did you mean that there would be U.S.
presence in the theater until bin Laden is captured, and can
your plan ever fully succeed if bin Laden is not captured?
General McChrystal. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity
to expand on that because that was a very short question in a
long hearing. I believe that al-Qaeda can be defeated overall,
but I believe it is an ideology and he is an iconic leader. So
I think to complete the destruction of that organization it
does mean he needs to be brought to justice, it will be another
of the steps. However, I don't believe that simply getting him
ends that organization either, I think it is one step in it.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
hearing also. Let me just say I do very clearly remember your
saying at the last hearing that those who didn't have the
opportunity to speak would be in that order of priority today,
so thank you again very much. I want to welcome and thank our
witnesses and just say to you that, I have to say as the
daughter of a military veteran, 25 years, served in World War
II and Korea, I strongly support our troops, I want to thank
all of you who are with us today for your sacrifices and your
service, and my belief that the sacrifices made by our men and
women in uniform should always be acknowledged and honored.
Let me just say from the get-go, I think many of you may
know that I opposed the war in Afghanistan from day one for
many reasons. But now moving ahead, many of our military
national security experts agree that the presence of our troop
continues to fuel the insurgency in Afghanistan and give
residence to al-Qaeda recruiters around the globe. I also
happen to believe that, and disagree, respectfully disagree,
with this overall prior 8-year strategy and the strategy today.
I was glad to hear you respond, because I was going to ask
you about Osama bin Laden and if in fact his capture is part of
the strategy and a benchmark in terms of the success or failure
of this effort. But let me ask you, how does an increasingly
expanded and costly role for United States troops in
Afghanistan serve United States national security interests in
combating al-Qaeda if it feels anti-American sentiment among
populations sympathetic to extremist insurgents in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere in the world?
Also let me just say that many have said, and you probably
disagree but I would like to hear your response to this, to
complete this mission will require about 400 to 500,000 troops,
possibly 8-10 years, possibly $1 trillion, do you believe that
to be the case or not, or why do we hear that so often now? And
finally let me just say I am extremely concerned about the
strain on our military members and their families in the face
of this expanded indefinite commitment in Afghanistan.
The physical, psychological, and logistical strain in the
U.S. Armed Forces under the stress of two wars to me seems to
be untenable. And so just know that we are going to do
everything here to support our troops and to help them
transition back, hopefully soon, to life with their families,
but I am very concerned about the stress and strain it has
taken. Thank you.
General McChrystal. Congresswoman, thanks for the support
for the troops and know how much it is appreciated,
particularly this time of year. I think to step back, I think
in terms of our national interest the eventual destruction of
al-Qaeda is critical, and not just for the U.S. but for the
world and that region as well. I think the role of Afghanistan
first is denial of location for al-Qaeda to return to, which I
believe they would. But I also believe that the Taliban have an
absolute linkage to al-Qaeda, and for them to resume power even
over significant areas of Afghanistan would create instability
in the region, opportunities for al-Qaeda but also wider
instability that would cause significant problems for the
world, it would not be localized at that point.
I believe that it is important that Afghans secure
Afghanistan. Your point about the concern about foreigners,
there is an almost antibody-like response in many cultures to
foreign forces there, and that is understandable. Xenophobia is
a natural part of any society, even greater in that area. I
think it is therefore important that we work as hard as we can
to enable the Afghans to secure themselves, they want to secure
themselves, they don't want the Taliban there, and they want us
there only long enough and only in large enough numbers to
enable them to get there. I wouldn't ask for a single force
more than we had to have simply to give time and space to get
the Afghan national security forces.
Ms. Lee. Sure, but the anti-American sentiment that is
spurred by this in Pakistan and Yemen and Somalia and other
parts of the world, I mean you try to nip it in the bud here,
it pops up somewhere else.
General McChrystal. It is a danger. I would offer that one
of the greatest resentments in Afghanistan and Pakistan now is
their perception that we deserted them in 1989. When the
Russians pulled out we ended our involvement with them, and
they believe that we walked away from them. So I think it is a
balance, I think we need to give as much help as they need to
get on their feet, and then I think we need to help them stand
by themselves.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from California has graciously agreed to 1
minute.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Elton is on for 5 minutes.
Chairman Berman. He is entitled to 5 minutes----
Mr. Gallegly. I have 1 minute, I have like 52 seconds left.
I would just like to say, General and Ambassador, thank you for
your service, I know you face challenges that are in some
people's views very difficult if not more so from Alexander the
Great to the Soviet Union, but I appreciate the job you are
doing and we want to try to give you all the support that we
can here. As a member of the Intelligence Committee I have a
little insight about some of the challenges that you have that
maybe others don't know. But I would like to take my remaining
time and yield to the gentleman from California, Dana
Rohrabacher.
Chairman Berman. 10 seconds.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that
those who did not get a chance to ask questions would have 5
minutes; Mr. Elton Gallegly did not have that chance to ask
questions.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Point of parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Berman. State your point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is that point that I just made not
correct?
Chairman Berman. Mr. Gallegly was entitled to 5 minutes;
just listen for a second. I was told he sought 1 minute. I am
now recognizing the only person left in this committee room
who, unlike you, has not had a chance to speak yet, the
gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Points of parliamentary inquiry, Mr.
Chairman, as you know, have precedent over other decisions.
Point of parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Berman. Yes, sir?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you think this has turned out fair?
Chairman Berman. I think because of you it hasn't. The
gentleman of Tennessee, 5 minutes.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General
Eikenberry, it is awfully good to see you again, and I remember
many of our visits to Brussels with the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly. And, General McChrystal, I appreciate your
conversation with me on the phone at the last NATO PA meeting.
I see and am very encouraged by the reaction of the NATO
parliamentarian members at the last meeting 3 weeks ago in
Edinburgh, there is a new spirit and a new cooperation I think
for the first time in several years.
It is my impression, to use a football analogy, that they
realize and have no problem with the United States being the
quarterback of NATO, they would just like to be in the huddle
when the play is called. And you and I think the administration
have done a good job of including them in the huddle and it
makes a tremendous amount of difference, let me say, in the
attitude and the atmosphere where all of these parliamentarians
from member nations gather. And as a president of that
organization for the next year, I want to thank you both for
doing that. I would encourage you every way you can to always
speak of this as a coalition led by, and not us going it alone.
I was on active duty during the Vietnam days, and I saw
that critical mass of public support that is necessary for a
prolonged overseas deployment sort of just fritter away, and I
have been worried that that would be the case in Europe. And we
have of course some people here with our situation in terms of
our own economics, but it is important in my judgment to
maintain this critical mass of public support for the
coalition. And so anything you all could do, including
reiterate from time to time that we are not there to westernize
anybody, we got off the beam in Iraq. Talking about we are
going to create this western style democracy won't work.
We are not there to westernize Afghanistan in my view, and
I think that appeals to the European allies and NATO. We are
there to enable the Afghani people and their institutions to
say no to Taliban and al-Qaeda. And that is why we are there
and if they can do that and we can limit the sphere of
influence that this poisonous philosophy has and hopefully
limit it to an area where we can monitor and contain it,
hopefully it will wither and die like a plant without water.
Two questions real quick. On the civilian surge, talking with
some of my colleagues and people who have been there, there
seems to be a bottleneck on the civilian side with respect to
getting projects actually on the ground.
You get people there but they can't get through the maze of
okays or whatever, I know we were stolen blind in Iraq
sometimes because we didn't have some protections. But if you
could really take a close look, both of you, at the
coordination of the commanders, the SERP money and how that can
be streamlined with the civilian money and coordinated, I would
really encourage you to do that because I think that is, both
of you have said, is a critical part of our success. The other
thing I would like to talk about is the reintegration, I think
General Petraeus talked about it yesterday, and I knew him when
he was at Fort Campbell in our district.
I think that is down the line maybe a part of it, and I
would be encouraged to have your insight into what you think
the chances there are. The state of play in Pakistan of course
is a large, large part of this particularly if we are going to
try to contain on the border in some physical manner these bad
guys so that we can monitor and contain their sphere of
influence if that is possible. And then finally, is there any
thinking about what will happen if we pull back into the more
populated areas in terms of our concentration of troops, how do
we maintain in the rural areas the security that necessarily
brings up? I know I have talked about a lot, and it is really
great seeing you, General Eikenberry.
Chairman Berman. I think the important questions to be
unfortunately answered at some other point because our time is
expired, and we have zero time remaining on the clock on the
floor.
The gentleman from Arizona for 1 minute.
Mr. Flake. I thank the chairman, and I am sorry, this is
ground that has been ploughed. General Jones less than 2 months
ago, less than 2 months ago, gave a pretty rosy assessment of
the situation there, stating that there were fewer than 100 al-
Qaeda members in Afghanistan at present, that there was a
diminished capability of the Taliban to destabilize the
government. The question I have is, 18 months from now, will we
be in a better position than that? Or maybe you disagree with
the assessment in the first place, but General McChrystal, do
you have a comment there?
General McChrystal. I outlined in my initial assessment my
view of the situation, and I think that it has improved
slightly since that was published. I think we will be in a much
better place 18 months from now, Congressman.
Mr. Flake. All right. Ambassador Eikenberry, any comment
from you?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I share General McChrystal's
assessment there, Congressman.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. Our
prayers are with you for your success. Ambassador, yes?
Ambassador Eikenberry. I wonder, Congressman, if you would
give me 1 minute here, just not in response just one point I
wanted to make for the record with your permission?
Chairman Berman. I think we owe it to you, sure,
absolutely. This is not an effort to keep us from voting on the
floor though is it?
Ambassador Eikenberry. No it is not.
Chairman Berman. No, okay.
Ambassador Eikenberry. Chairman, a lot has been said over
the course of the morning about the great sacrifice of our men
and women in uniform and our allies. I also wanted to say for
the record just emphasize the great sacrifice that our great
civilian team is making on the ground. On the 13th of October
we had two civilians, one from USAID, Travis Gardner, 38 years
old from Nebraska, and Jim Green from the Department of
Agriculture, 55 years old from Oklahoma, they were in a convoy
with the United States military in a striker, a unit, their
convoy was hit by IEDs down in Spin Boldak.
I always make a point when I learn of that kind of trauma
that our civilians are facing, giving them a call. I gave them
a call both that night and asked how they were doing. They said
they are doing great, and they said that very humbly and with
great sincerity, we are just doing what we were sent over here
to be doing. And we couldn't be more proud of our civilian
force on the ground too.
Chairman Berman. Yes, our ranking member.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, gentlemen, and, Mr. Chairman,
thank you so much, and some of our members would like to submit
some questions to our great panelists.
Chairman Berman. We thank you both very much. Our prayers
really are with you for the success of these efforts. And with
that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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