[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-91]
THE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
WITH RUSSIA AND ITS IMPACT ON
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 30, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, July 30, 2009, The U.S. Security Relationship with
Russia and Its Impact on Transatlantic Security................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, July 30, 2009.......................................... 41
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2009
THE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND ITS IMPACT ON
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Gordon, Hon. Philip H., Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State........ 9
Vershbow, Hon. Alexander, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense..... 4
Winnefeld, Vice Adm. James A., Jr., USN, Director for Strategic
Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff........................ 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gordon, Hon. Philip H........................................ 63
Vershbow, Hon. Alexander..................................... 45
Winnefeld, Vice Adm. James A., Jr............................ 56
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 75
THE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND ITS IMPACT ON
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 30, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room
HVC-210, Capitol Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. This is the first hearing we
are having in these temporary quarters. And when our quarters
back in the Rayburn Building get completed, they are going to
look very much like this. And I hope you enjoy the trappings
that we have.
We welcome you to this hearing on ``The U.S. Security
Relationship with Russia and Its Impact on Transatlantic
Security.''
Appearing before us today, the Honorable Alexander
Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security, U.S. Department of Defense; our friend, Admiral James
Winnefeld, United States Navy, Director of Strategic Plans and
Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--good to see you again,
sir; the Honorable Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State.
Even though we are learning the scope of today's hearing on
Russia to security issues, it still presents us with a range of
topics as broad as that country is wide. Once the heart of a
superpower, and today a power still to be reckoned with, Russia
plays a major role in multiple, overlapping issues that have
impact throughout the globe.
Still, as big as it is, physically and metaphorically, it
has been a while since Russia has dominated our thinking in
regard to security issues. We have had an ongoing dialogue over
matters of nonproliferation with them, of course. And I am
pleased that President Obama has undertaken the ambitious
effort to strengthen and expand our nonproliferation
cooperation with Russia. It is clear that progress is already
being made in that arena.
In many matters, our two sets of national interests are
intertwined. Both nations are concerned about extremist
terrorism. Both nations are concerned about the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Both nations are concerned
about energy security.
There are many such areas that are ripe for our
cooperation. The U.S.-Russia relationship remains important,
and I am glad that President Obama has reinvigorated it.
In the last few years, Iraq and Afghanistan have been
center stage, and we have grown accustomed to thinking of our
security challenge--as well as our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies--through that lens. But we need to
look no further than the Georgia crisis of last summer to
remind us that Russia also represents a significant challenge
in our security landscape.
It is clear that Russia would like to define a sphere of
influence in what it calls its ``near abroad.'' And it is
equally clear that it has made some of our NATO allies and
other European friends quite nervous.
So, while NATO is performing an independent role in
Afghanistan, we must not forget that it is first and foremost a
regional security arrangement, and many of our allies count on
it--and, therefore, us--as the guarantor of European stability.
In regards to arms control and nuclear security, President
Obama has established an ambitious agenda that he has described
eloquently in his April speech in the Czech Republic. I am glad
to see the Administration is working hard with its Russian
counterparts to complete a modest follow-on to the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that expires in December.
Even if a new treaty cannot be ratified by the December
deadline, START should not be allowed to expire, because the
data exchanges and other verification provisions in that treaty
contribute significantly to strategic stability and is in our
national interest.
Yet these initiatives in other areas of mutual cooperation
could be stunted by disagreements over issues such as non-
strategic nuclear weapons, and especially missile defenses. The
Administration's ongoing review of missile defense requirements
and how that fits in the larger framework of U.S. national
security interests and striking that appropriate balance in
U.S.-Russia and U.S.-NATO relations is a necessary though
difficult task.
And with luck, the Administration can find ways to work
with Russia on some of these and more difficult topics. But in
the end, the United States must balance its desire to reset the
relationship with Russia with a clear calculation of our own
national interests and the risks and threats that we and our
allies do face.
We must be careful to define these interests in the context
of our overall national security strategy. At the end of
today's hearing, it will be clear that Russia remains a
critical influence on that strategy.
Now, let us turn to my friend, my colleague from
California, the ranking member, Mr. McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for agreeing to hold a hearing on this
subject regarding the relationship with Russia and its relation
on impact--its impact on transatlantic security.
Your testimony this morning gives our members an
opportunity to understand the Administration's Russia reset
policy and better appreciate the ongoing and evolving security
challenges in Europe and Eurasia.
This committee last met in March to discuss Russia and NATO
when we received testimony from General John Craddock, who was,
until recently, Commander of European Command and Supreme
Allied Commander. His testimony was insightful and came with
much appreciated candor. General Craddock said that, after the
end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
there were no borders under threat of invasion in Europe and
Eurasia.
General Craddock continued, stating he thought that
assumption has been proven false. General Craddock assessed
that Russia's intent may be to weaken European solidarity and
systemically reduce U.S. influence.
As a result, since the Georgia conflict in August of 2008,
European Command (EUCOM) has called for a re-evaluation of the
strategic environment, which includes EUCOM's deliberative
planning, a strategy for Russia and an evaluation of U.S. force
presence in Europe.
That was the view of our top military commander back in
March. Since that time, the Administration's Russia reset
policy has taken shape.
While I want to make clear that I support engagement with
Russia, I am concerned that a grand bargain with Russia may
risk the viability of the security architecture that has kept
the European continent peaceful for nearly 60 years. Russian
misdeeds and provocations in the recent past, as well as their
planned European security treaty, suggest that the Kremlin
seeks to weaken NATO, marginalize U.S. influence in Europe and
gain a veto over European security affairs.
This is why I support a NATO-first policy, which would make
clear to our NATO allies that U.S. bilateral engagement with
Russia will not foster collective insecurity among our allies.
I commend the Chairman for including in the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) many of the provisions from
the bipartisan NATO First bill sponsored by Mr. Turner and Mr.
Marshall, which takes legislative steps to strengthen
transatlantic security. These provisions, to name a few, cover
the START Treaty, long-range missile defense in Europe, and
U.S. force presence in Europe.
Vice President Biden's visit to Ukraine and Georgia last
week was a step in the right direction. And his assessment that
Russia used a pretext to invade Georgia demonstrated that the
reset policy should not sugar-coat Russian behavior. Yet
striking the balance of renewed engagement with Russia and
supporting Central and Eastern European allies and partners is
proving to be a challenge.
In a July 15th open letter to President Obama, written by
22 prominent Central and Eastern European figures, expressed
deep concern among America's Central and Eastern European
allies over the implications of improved relations between
Russia and the U.S. on their security and the transatlantic
relationship.
Following Vice President Biden's visit, Russia's envoy to
NATO said that Russia considered the question of rearming
Georgia more serious than whether Georgia enters NATO.
Secretary Clinton quickly affirmed that the Obama
Administration considered Russia a great power, and remains
committed to reset bilateral relations.
It is precisely this balancing act that played out in the
headlines this week that I would like our witnesses to discuss
today. How do we ensure that our bilateral agreements with
Russia do not compromise our commitment to transatlantic
security?
This leads me to a number of specific concerns. What kind
of military-to-military relationship do we expect to have with
Georgia and Ukraine? And will EUCOM continue its deliberative
planning?
With respect to European missile defense, I would like to
understand how the reset policy has affected NATO's support of
European missile defense, in particular, the impact that it has
had on Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the
Administration's missile defense review.
With respect to the START Treaty that many of us in the
House have concerns about: how START may impact the nuclear
triad, considering the announced reductions in strategic
delivery vehicles to between 500 and 1,100; the
Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which frames the
military's nuclear requirements; advanced conventional
capabilities and space capabilities; enhancing the reliability,
safety and security of our strategic nuclear forces and the
needed modernization of our aging nuclear weapons complex; and
finally, the large number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons
deployed near Europe.
In addition to hearing your views on these specific
concerns, I am interested in the Administration's views on the
provisions in the House-passed NDAA that address these issues.
Finally, I hope your testimony today will cover the
recommendations of the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States. In particular, I am
interested whether the Administration will adopt two of the
commission's unanimous findings and recommendations: number
one, that the United States must retain nuclear weapons until
such time as the international environment may permit their
elimination globally; and two, the United States must also
continue to concern itself with issues of deterrence, assurance
and stability in the nuclear relationship with Russia.
As you can see, there is a lot to cover today, and I look
forward to your testimony and hope that the discussion we have
today will give this Congress and the American people a better
understanding of the U.S.-Russia security relationship.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
We will begin with Mr. Alexander Vershbow.
The Honorable Vershbow, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Vershbow. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Ranking
Member McKeon, and other members of the committee.
I very much welcome this opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the U.S. relationship with Russia and its
implications for transatlantic and U.S. security.
Russia has been a lifelong interest for me since I began
studying the Russian language in high school in the 1960s. As a
Foreign Service officer at what was then the Soviet desk in the
1980s, as U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2001 to 2005, and now
as assistant secretary of defense for international security
affairs, I have learned that getting U.S.-Russian relations
right is one of our highest priorities and one of our biggest
challenges.
So, it is especially meaningful to report that recent
developments in U.S.-Russian relations--and, most importantly,
the Moscow summit that took place earlier this month--have
created new opportunities for cooperation with Russia to
enhance U.S. and European security.
We are now trying to build on this positive momentum to
collaborate with Moscow in areas where our national interests
coincide such as nonproliferation, arms control and bringing
security and stability to Afghanistan.
Although we have pressed the reset button, this does not
mean we will shy away from dealing with Russia on areas where
we disagree such as Georgia or NATO enlargement. And we will in
no way, reduce or compromise our commitment to the security of
our NATO allies and also our allies in Asia and other parts of
the world.
The challenge is to find a way not only to work
cooperatively with Russia in areas where our interests coincide
but also to continue to engage in the other more contentious
areas without artificial linkages. It is on this basis that we
seek to establish a more solid basis for a sustained engagement
with Russia.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few comments on major
areas of common interest where we did make some progress at the
summit and where we believe Russia can work with us as a
contributor to our mutual security. I will also touch on a
couple of issues where we still have important differences.
I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for
the record. So I will keep my opening remarks brief.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Secretary Vershbow. Thank you, sir.
The summit in Moscow was far more productive than we had
expected. The mood was positive and the discussions were highly
substantive, opening the way to some concrete agreements and
understandings on a range of subjects.
Topping the list was Afghanistan, President Obama's highest
priority. The Russians I think recognize that they, too, have a
stake in defeating the Taliban and establishing a stable,
democratic Afghanistan.
The most important deliverable was the signature of an
agreement permitting the transit of troops and lethal material
through Russian air space, up to 4,500 military flights and
unlimited commercial flights each year which will diversify
supply routes and significantly reduce transit times and fuel
costs. We also are encouraged by Russian interest in expanding
their involvement in other areas such as training the Afghan
police.
Arms control was another area of progress. One of President
Obama's primary goals was to reach a framework agreement for a
new START Follow-on Treaty and under the joint understanding
signed in Moscow, strategic delivery vehicles will be reduced
to a range of 500 to 1,100 and their associated warheads to
between 1,500 and 1,675. My colleagues, I think will say more
about START.
Another major summit goal was to strengthen our cooperation
with Russia on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
And in this regard, Presidents Obama and Medvedev had lengthy
discussions on how to deal with the immediate challenges posed
by Iran and North Korea. They spent a lot of time on Iran in
particular. And they agreed as well to broaden our bilateral
cooperation to increase security of nuclear materials and
facilities worldwide.
I think, taken together, the initiatives of the summit--on
nuclear issues, the START follow-on and understandings on
nuclear security--were an important step toward President
Obama's goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and will
strengthen U.S. and Russian leadership as we prepare for next
year's review conference for the nonproliferation treaty.
Now, on missile defense, although it remains a very
contentious issue, we were able to reach agreement on a joint
statement, which includes a joint ballistic missile threat
assessment, that will be focused primarily on Iran and North
Korea. We have had a U.S. team in Moscow this week to begin the
process. We also pledged to redouble efforts to open the long-
planned Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow.
We hope these modest steps will serve as the basis for more
substantial cooperation, both bilaterally and in the NATO-
Russia Framework, aimed at defending our nations against
ballistic missile threats.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is, as you know,
conducting--is taking a comprehensive look at plans for
European missile defense as part of the wider ballistic missile
defense review. The outcome on European missile defense will be
determined by the threat from Iran, by the technical
feasibility of different missile defense options and the cost.
This is not a bargaining chip in our dealings with Moscow on
Iran, or START, or on any other issue.
There are a lot of other subjects where I think we made
some progress in resetting relations, including NATO-Russia
cooperation, military-to-military contacts and European
security architecture. My colleagues will say more about those.
They are covered in my prepared statement.
As I mentioned at the outset, there are some important
issues where we continue to disagree, and where the U.S. is not
going to compromise its principles. These include NATO's open
door policy, upholding the sovereignty of countries in the
post-Soviet space, Russia's suspension of its compliance with
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and its
backsliding on democracy and human rights issues.
As we move forward, we and the Russians will need to
discuss these issues in an honest but respectful way, and keep
them from damaging cooperation in other areas as much as
possible.
I think that of all these areas, relations with Russia's
neighbors may be the most difficult to manage. As the President
said in Moscow, the United States rejects anachronistic, 19th
century notions of spheres of influence or spheres of
privileged interest.
That is why Vice President Biden, during his visits to
Georgia and Ukraine last week, reaffirmed U.S. support for both
countries' sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
In our view, good U.S. relations with Russia and cooperation
with Russia's neighbors--including in the defense and security
field--should not be seen as mutually exclusive.
Russia, on the other hand, continues to take a zero-sum
approach, so we are going to have to continue to address these
differences in a bilateral dialogue, in discussions in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on
strengthening European security architecture. And we will, of
course, continue to give highest priority to NATO, which is
still the bedrock of transatlantic security. And as we begin to
review NATO's new strategic concept, ensuring that there is no
doubt about the firmness of Article 5 will be one of our
highest priorities.
So, Mr. Chairman and members, the signals from Moscow since
the summit have thus far been largely positive. We hope that
with a more formal institutional framework for the relationship
in the form of the bilateral presidential commission, we will
be able to move toward a more stable and substantive
partnership.
I will just conclude by saying that, if we can maintain the
momentum, historians may view the Moscow summit as a turning
point in U.S.-Russia relations. But there is a lot of work to
be done before we can say that. We are under no illusion that
the reset will be easy. Nor do we believe that a strategic
partnership will simply develop overnight, since our interests
do not coincide in a lot of areas.
But we do believe that improved relations between the U.S.
and Russia, which had started on a downward trend long before
the August 2008 events in Georgia, can help us meet many of the
challenges that we face today.
So, we are cautiously optimistic, as we diplomats say, that
the agreements that arose from the summit will assist our
efforts broadly, from reducing strategic weapons stockpiles to
bringing peace to Afghanistan.
So, thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Vershbow can be found
in the Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Winnefeld.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, DIRECTOR
FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Winnefeld. Chairman Skelton, Mr. McKeon and members
of the committee, it is good to be back. Thank you for inviting
me to address the committee today. In support of my colleagues,
I will focus my comments on the military aspects of our
relationship with Russia.
It goes without saying that the nature of our relationship
with Russia--on the military side and elsewhere--has changed
dramatically over the course of the last year, with the
invasion of Georgia clearly representing a setback. And at that
point, as you are aware, we suspended all military-to-military
activity with the Russians.
And I would point out that that seminal event actually
underscores the importance of having a strong military-to-
military relationship with Russia, as with other nations in the
world. Indeed, at several pivotal points during that particular
conflict, the only constructive contact between our governments
was the military-to-military channel.
And when I accompanied Admiral Mullen to Helsinki in
October of last year to meet with his General Staff
counterpart, I observed firsthand how maintaining a strong
military-to-military relationship can reduce tension and
mitigate misunderstanding during a crisis.
Moreover, it represented a small but important step in
reinforcing our working relationship as a foundation for future
progress. And we are making progress in resetting this vital
relationship.
We recognize that the path towards greater partnership and
in cooperation will not always be smooth. However, by not
allowing our relationship to fracture when our interests
diverge, we will enable the benefits of cooperating where our
strategic interests actually coincide.
Positive relationships between our militaries are a
foundation for good relationships between our governments and
our countries. And we are working with the Russian Ministry of
Defense and the General Staff to rebuild, and to try to
improve, on the military-to-military programs we had before
they were suspended.
And, in fact, even since the beginning of this year, we
have allowed the Harvard generals program to occur in February,
after a difficult decision. We conducted two port visits to
Vladivostok--one in June for Russia's National Day, and one in
July in support of our own Independence Day.
We have seen limited but good cooperation on countering
piracy off of Somalia, with limited Russian presence in that
part of the world. And we reached, as you are well aware, an
agreement on transit through Russia of non-lethal supplies
bound for our troops in Afghanistan, even before the summit
occurred.
And as you are certainly aware, Admiral Mullen recently
visited Moscow twice, once in late June for discussions with
counterpart, Chief of the General Staff Makarov, and again in
July in support of the presidential summit, where, in addition
to various other agreements that were inked, they signed a new
framework on military-to-military cooperation.
This framework is our combined vision for changing the
nature of our relationship, based on the principles of
pragmatism, parity, reciprocity, balance and synchronization
with NATO. It will set conditions that raise cooperation to a
new level between our respective armed forces, although I would
echo Ambassador Vershbow in saying that this will not happen
overnight.
Our interactions with Russian military officers will
importantly improve their understanding of our society and lay
the foundation for future relationships such as that enjoyed by
Admiral Mullen and General Makarov.
These two men are also committed to leading the military-
to-military working group of the Presidential Bilateral
Commission to ensure that cooperative endeavors in the military
realm remain on track and continue in the strategic direction
that the President has mandated.
We are currently in the midst of preparing a robust and
meaningful proposal for how the military-to-military commission
will function, how it will be constructed and what it will
accomplish.
Meanwhile, the 2009--and remember, we only have 6 months
left--the work plan approved by Admiral Mullen and General
Makarov encompasses nearly 20 meaningful and mutually
beneficial exchanges and operational events. It is not as much
as we would like for it to be in the future, but it is a good
start for the remainder of this year.
They include, among other interactions that I will be happy
to list for you if you would like, joint staff talks which I
will co-chair with my counterpart in Moscow, we hope in
October. In addition, the U.S. European Command and the Russian
Ministry of Defense are postured to create an even more
ambitious work plan for the coming year.
I would like to make an important caveat, though. Our
improved military relations with Russia will not come at the
expense of our already positive and cooperative military
relations with our NATO partners and our other important
partners.
We do not believe it beneficial to engage in zero-sum
gamesmanship in Eurasia or anywhere else, and we hope to convey
that sentiment to our Russian colleagues to cooperative
progress in areas of common strategic interest. We intend to
continue our work with all parties to cultivate stability and
enhance transparency throughout the region and indeed across
the globe.
In conclusion, we nearly always regret severing our
military relationships with another country, as we did with
Pakistan in the 1980s. As such, we are getting back on a
constructive footing with the Russian military without
compromising our principles.
As I rediscovered in January of last year while visiting
the Baltic Fleet deputy commander aboard his flagship, Moskva,
in Lisbon, relationships at the tactical level are almost
always warm and productive. It is our mandate to ensure that
the warmth and cooperation that we enjoy at the tactical level
percolates up to the strategic level, and we have every
intention of succeeding.
Thank you again, sir, for the opportunity to be with the
committee today. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld can be found
in the Appendix on page 56.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much.
Mr. Gordon. Secretary Gordon, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Secretary Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
McKeon and all the members of the committee. I would also like
to thank you for holding the hearing and giving us the
opportunity to speak with you today about the Administration's
accomplishments at the Moscow summit and about our Russia
policy more generally.
I have also submitted my full testimony for the record, and
here, if you will permit, would like to just make a few brief
opening remarks.
The Chairman. Any prepared remarks by the witnesses will be
entered, without objection.
Secretary Gordon. Thank you very much.
My colleagues have already talked about a number of the
military and security issues. So I would like to begin by
putting the results of the summit in a somewhat wider context.
The Obama Administration entered office seeking to put an
end to a period of difficult and deteriorating relations with
Russia. Last December, then-President-elect Obama talked about
a reset in our relations with Russia.
What he argued was that the United States and Russia have
common interests in a number of areas. These include nuclear
nonproliferation, Afghanistan, terrorism and many others. And
he argued that it should be possible to cooperate practically
in these areas, even as we disagreed on other issues.
And I think it is fair to say that the results of the
Moscow summit demonstrate that the President's instincts on
this were correct. Just six months since the President took
office, and just three months since he and President Medvedev
met in London and agreed to hold the summit in Moscow, the
United States and Russia have gone far towards achieving a
fresh start and reaching concrete accomplishments.
At the summit, our leaders made progress in improving the
tone of our relations and helping to build good will between
our two countries. But perhaps even more importantly at the
summit, we were able to translate this rhetoric about potential
cooperation into concrete actions that are fundamental to the
security and prosperity of both of our countries.
This significant progress in our relations with Russia, let
me stress, did not in any way come at the expense of our
principles or our partnerships with good friends and allies.
There are still many areas where the United States and Russia
disagree. My colleagues have already mentioned Georgia and NATO
enlargement among them. And we will continue to disagree about
these and, no doubt, other issues.
The President made this clear in Moscow. And he also did
not shy away from raising--both privately and publicly--issues
such as democracy, human rights and press freedoms. At the same
time, in Moscow, we also demonstrated in real terms our shared
desire to build a relationship based on common interests and
mutual respect.
As my colleagues have pointed out already, the United
States and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear
security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning
with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. The two
Presidents signed a joint understanding for a follow-on
agreement to START that commits both parties to a legally
binding treaty that will reduce our nuclear warheads and
delivery systems by at least one-third over current treaty
limitations.
President Obama and his Russian counterparts spoke at great
length on Iran. And the President underscored the importance we
place on international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. President Obama also emphasized the importance
of Russia's role in pressing Iran to comply with its
nonproliferation obligations.
In addition, the Presidents agreed to participate in a
joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of
the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North
Korea. An interagency team of experts is already heading out to
Moscow this week to begin discussions of this joint threat
assessment.
In another related area, we made concrete commitments to
deepen security cooperation, including by working together to
defeat the violent extremists and to counter transnational
threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking.
As my colleagues have pointed out, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Mullen and his Russian counterpart have agreed
on a work plan of resuming military-to-military contacts that
were cut off after the war in Georgia.
I think another very tangible result of the summit was
Russia's agreement to allow the United States to transport
military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of
the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force and
our other coalition forces in Afghanistan. This agreement will
add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply
routes, resulting in potential savings of up to $133 million in
fuel, maintenance and transportation costs.
The significance of this contribution to our efforts to
bring peace and stability in Afghanistan--which is also of
strategic benefit to Russia--should not be understated. It is
indeed an excellent example of how the two countries can
cooperate in pursuit of common interests without any quid pro
quos.
We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in nonstrategic
areas, including public health, and by restoring the work of
the Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.
Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized
the need for a more structured foundation for advancing
cooperation in key areas across our respective interagencies.
The Bilateral Presidential Commission, to be chaired by the two
Presidents and coordinated by Secretary Clinton and Foreign
Minister Lavrov, will provide a mechanism for sustaining and
expanding on the progress achieved in Moscow while also
providing a forum in which we can work together to effectively
narrow our differences.
Notwithstanding all these positive developments, I want to
stress we have no illusions that our reset of relations will be
easy, or that we will not have continuing differences with
Russia. We are, however, confident that the United States and
Russia can still work together where our interests coincide,
while at the same time seeking to narrow those differences in a
mutually respectful way.
In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his
message that the reset in our bilateral relationship will not
come at the expense of our friends and our allies. More than in
words but in actions, we have demonstrated our commitment to
the territorial integrity and independence of Russia's
neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia. President Obama made
very clear in Moscow that we will continue to support their
sovereignty and their right to choose their own security
alliances, a message that was reinforced last week by the Vice
President in his trip to both of those countries.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, at the Moscow summit the United
States and Russia took significant steps forward in translating
the reset in our relations into concrete achievements that
benefit both our nations and our global partners. Without
abandoning our principles or our friends, we demonstrated that
the United States and Russia can work effectively together on a
broad range of issues where our interests coincide.
Thank you again for giving us the opportunity to address
these issues, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gordon can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
The Chairman. I think, Secretary Gordon, my questions
should be addressed to you.
Can you give a quick summary of the relationship between
Russia and Iran? And I have follow-up questions on them.
Please?
Secretary Gordon. I think, in terms of the way we look at
the need for cooperation with Russia and Iran, there are some
positive elements and some less positive elements.
I believe that Russia shares our interest in preventing
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. And they have taken some
constructive steps along with us to achieve that goal. They
have agreed to several U.N. Security Council resolutions making
it illegal for Iran to enrich uranium, and imposing sanctions
on Iran for doing so.
And they have joined us in the so-called P5-plus-1 or E3-
plus-3 process, which is our main diplomatic mechanism for
showing Iran a path to cooperation with the international
community, if it agrees to provide reassurance it is not
producing nuclear weapons, but also making clear to Iran that
there would be consequences if it fails to do so. And I believe
that Russia has constructively worked with us within that
context.
At the same time, let me be honest. We do not see Iran
exactly the same way. And as I noted, the President raised this
very clearly with his counterparts--and they probably discussed
this more than any other issue in Moscow--because we believe
that Russia has an important role to play. If Iran fails to
respond to the offer that is currently on the table, we believe
that pressure needs to be enhanced on Iran, and that requires
Russian cooperation.
Russians have been less convinced than we are that such
pressure will need to be applied. And therefore, we continue to
work with the Russians and make it very clear to them that we
hope and expect them to work with us on the way forward, if
Iran fails to respond.
The Chairman. That leads me to the question: Will Russia
support us should events come to pass in the United Nations
Security Council to have strong economic sanctions against
Iran, if further evidence emerges that Iran is developing
nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gordon. Well, we will certainly seek such
cooperation.
For a number of years, a number of countries including----
The Chairman. That is not answering my question.
Secretary Gordon. Well, I will get to that.
What I was going to say is, we have been working for a
number of years--for a number of years, countries including
Russia have been asking us to be prepared to engage with Iran
and make sure that Iran has an alternative to pressure and
sanctions, to make sure that Iran has an alternative path if
they do cooperate with the international community.
We have now done that. The President has made clear we are
prepared to support a civil nuclear energy program for Iran.
And we are prepared to talk directly with Iran. And we are
prepared to support the other members of the Security Council
in offering Iran such a path forward.
That is on the table. And we have responded to the requests
by our allies in Europe and in Russia to offer Iran that
opportunity.
And we have said, and the President has made clear, that if
Iran does not respond soon--certainly by the end of the year--
we will then come back to our partners on the Security Council
and say we have offered that path, and now it is time to
increase the pressure.
So, there is only one way to find out. We will take it back
to the Security Council and seek Russian cooperation.
Can I guarantee that they will give a positive answer? No.
But that is what we are working to achieve.
The Chairman. What arms transfer and what nuclear
cooperation has passed from Russia to Iran in recent months and
years?
Secretary Gordon. In terms of nuclear cooperation, Russia
has for years provided assistance to Iran in finishing the
construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, which is not
necessarily a contribution to their nuclear weapons program.
And so long as the fuel cycle is controlled by Russia, that can
be contained without undue proliferation concerns.
Beyond that, I do not think that Russia is in any way
involved in contributing to nuclear cooperation in ways that
would lead to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The great concern in Iran, indeed, is its own autonomous
capabilities. Our great concern in Iran is that it develops
itself the technology to master the full fuel cycle, which
would give it the opportunity to so-called break out of its
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and produce its own
nuclear weapons.
So, it is not so much a matter of Russia's cooperation with
Iran in the nuclear area; it is Iran's development of
autonomous technology that would give it a fuel cycle and a
breakout capacity. And that is what we are working with Russia
and others to try to prevent.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony and for your service.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, in March General
Craddock assessed that Russia's intent may be to weaken
European solidarity and systematically reduce the U.S.
influence.
I would like to ask each of you if you share General
Craddock's assessment.
And then, does the Administration have any concerns
regarding President Medvedev's proposed European security
treaty? And does the Administration support EUCOM's efforts to
conduct deliberative planning?
Secretary Gordon. I am happy to start. I am sure my
colleagues will want to weigh in.
The short answer to the first question is, yes, there have
certainly been signs that Russia has an interest, or pursues an
interest, in dividing the Western alliance. I think we always
have to be careful in talking about Russia in deciding which
Russians we are talking about. I think I would not want to
issue such a blanket statement that all Russians pursue this. I
think there are others who do not.
But, yes, for sure there have been signs of Russian efforts
to divide the West and to prevent what they would see as undue
American influence and hegemony. I think that is accurate.
On the President Medvedev idea of a European security
treaty, we have said that we are always open to discussions of
European security and happy to have a dialogue with Russia and
our other partners about how it can be strengthened.
But we have also said that we believe there are already
some pretty sound European security organizations, including,
first and foremost, NATO, also including the OSCE. And those
are the channels in which this discussion should take place.
The NATO-Russia Council is an opportunity for us to speak
with the Russians about European security. And the OSCE is a
chance for all 56 of its participating states to have exactly
the sort of discussion that the Russians have proposed. So, we
have insisted that that discussion take place at the OSCE, as
it did at the recent ministerial.
And frankly, there was not a lot of support for a Russian
idea of some sort of new treaty, because, as I say, not only do
we think we already have some pretty good institutions, we
already have some pretty good principles for European security
including a non-use of force and respect for territorial
integrity, and the principle that countries can join the
alliances of their choosing.
So, we are open to dialogue, we are happy to hear Russian
ideas, and we are happy to talk to them. But we think it should
remain in established channels based on the principles that we
have already agreed on.
Mr. McKeon. And finally, do you support EUCOM's efforts to
conduct deliberative planning?
Secretary Gordon. Yes, that is a very important
manifestation of our commitment to NATO's Article 5. I am sure
my colleagues will want to elaborate on this. But the short
answer is, ``yes.''
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
Secretary Vershbow. Mr. McKeon, I certainly share my
colleague's assessment that the Russians continue to practice
the kind of policies that General Craddock described in terms
of seeking to create divisions between the U.S. and its allies,
and to create anxieties on the parts of our allies,
particularly the new members of NATO in Central Europe,
regarding their security.
But I think the Russians at the same time are also
realistic. And if we are doing our jobs in terms of ensuring
that our security guarantees through NATO remain effective, and
that we make clear that key initiatives such as missile defense
are not going to be bargaining chips, I think that we can
manage this and steer the Russians towards a more cooperative
agenda. It is not going to be an easy challenge, but that is
certainly our goal.
I cannot add much to Phil Gordon's comments on the Medvedev
proposals. I think that we certainly see room for improving
some of the mechanism's effectiveness in preventing conflicts.
What happened a year ago in Georgia, clearly, is something
that we do not want to see repeated. And to the extent that we
can improve the effectiveness of mechanisms like the NATO-
Russia Council, the OSCE, in diffusing these kinds of
situations before they escalate, I think everybody's security
would be enhanced.
But we do not think that we need to scrap the institutions
we have. And I think the Russians, after initial signals that
their agenda was to eliminate NATO or to downgrade NATO's role,
have taken a more realistic approach, and have said as much,
including in the Moscow summit, when they insisted that they
were not trying to abolish NATO.
We do definitely believe that not only EUCOM but NATO as a
whole should be doing the prudent planning for the defense of
all of its members. And I think this is something that
President Obama attaches great significance to, as does
Secretary Gates. And it will be something that we will be
pursuing as we engage with our allies in the formulation of
NATO's new strategic concept, which we are hoping to complete
by the end of next year when NATO has another summit in Lisbon.
Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, for the first two questions, I
think my other colleagues are better positioned to answer those
than I am. But I would tend to concur that the Russian behavior
over the long term has been transactional, balance of power,
and that they will take whatever they can get.
I think the important thing is that, we have seen from our
allies and our friends in Europe that they have exercised
considerable resolve, and they understand the nature of a
Russian proposal to do what they have suggested. And I think
that Russia has recognized the resolve that these nations have
shown.
And, in fact, I think there was a recent comment from one
of them--one of the Russians--that, ``Well, we don't really
want to change the hardware; we just want to change the
software,'' you know, sort of backing down off of that proposal
just a little bit.
So, I think I am not concerned about the commitment of our
friends in Europe to maintaining the health of the current
mechanisms that are there, while they are interested in
listening to what the Russians have to say, as they should.
On the last point, it goes without saying that any
discussion of actual military planning is a sensitive topic
that I would be cautious in an open hearing in discussing.
But I would also add that we tend to be very supportive of
our combatant commanders when they come in and suggest that
they need to do some planning, and that Admiral Stavridis has
only been in the seat, as it were, for several weeks. And we
know that he is building his thought process and his opinions
on what he would like to do there. And we will listen very
closely when he comes in with a formal proposal, should he have
one.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, we have a lot of members, so I will do these
other questions later or in writing. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McKeon.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to Mr.
Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Well, thank you, Mr. Taylor. I really
appreciate the opportunity to speak to our witnesses.
And thanks to all of you for your service. In particular, I
guess I----
The Chairman. Will the gentleman suspend just for a moment?
The clock showed two lights for a vote. That is a Senate
vote and not a House vote. The House is not wired for this room
evidently, so we can ignore that.
Mr. Loebsack, you can proceed.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Chairman, can we ignore the Senate as well?
The Chairman. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Loebsack. Suddenly, we are all members of the Senate.
The Chairman. Who said that?
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen, we will take that under
consideration.
Mr. Loebsack. We might get bipartisan support for that
proposal.
If we could just spend a little time on Afghanistan,
perhaps broaden it out to Pakistan as well, to the region.
I think it was you, Mr. Gordon, who mentioned supply
routes. Can you elaborate on that a little bit to begin with?
Secretary Gordon. Sure. And as I noted, that was what I
think is a very good example of the type of cooperation we can
pursue in areas where we have common interests, even while we
strongly disagree in other areas.
Mr. Loebsack. First, can you tell us what those common
interests are? How do our interests coincide in this?
Secretary Gordon. I think both the United States and Russia
have a very strong interest in a stable and peaceful
Afghanistan. We have both, of course, fought wars and made
sacrifices and lost lives and spent a lot of money in
Afghanistan when it was unstable.
And Russia, like the United States, has an interest in
stemming Islamic extremism which, of course, emanated from
Afghanistan and struck this country so tragically.
So I do not think we have different interests in
Afghanistan. Broadly at least, we both have interests in
stabilizing that country.
And that is precisely what we said to the Russians. ``We
may disagree in other areas, but we are working very hard with
the rest of the international community to try to stabilize
Afghanistan. You have an interest in that as well. It would
help us if you allowed us to transit your country and diversify
our supply routes.''
And the agreement that we reached allows the United States
to undertake up to 4,500 flights, including military flights,
across Afghanistan to get what we need to our troops there.
And, as you know, that is such a difficult challenge, given
Afghanistan's location.
And we were able to do that. The estimates are that doing
so, depending on how many flights we end up flying, could save
this country $133 million a year by having the shorter routes
to fly. And that will directly and concretely benefit us.
And as I said in my opening statement, there was not a quid
pro quo. And that is just the sort of positive working together
that we are seeking to achieve--not, they will allow us to fly
across their territory, Afghanistan, if we do X or Y on Georgia
or in NATO. No. We have a common interest and let us do it.
So, it is a concrete agreement, and I think it directly
benefits the United States.
Mr. Loebsack. What about other countries in the region,
Central Asian states, for example? What is Russia's
relationship with them and their allowing us over-flight rights
as well?
Secretary Gordon. There has been some sort of competition
in terms of influence in those countries, at least through
Russian eyes. They have been cautious about any American
presence or involvement in what they see as their near abroad.
And that has been a problem, because, again, we keep trying to
stress that we should not see our relationship with Russia in
zero-sum terms.
Just to take a concrete example, if the United States is
able to fly supply missions to Afghanistan from Kyrgyzstan, we
would argue that Russia should have an interest in that. It
helps our common goal of stabilizing Afghanistan.
Russia has seen it somewhat differently, and is worried
about any American presence in what they consider to be their
backyard.
But we are now to the point where the United States does
have an agreement to use Kyrgyzstan territory to help supply in
Afghanistan. We think that should not threaten Russia. And I
think maybe the Russians have come around to that view.
And that, again, is the example of the sort of thing we
should be able to do without the other country seeing it in any
way as a geopolitical threat. That is precisely the sort of
thinking we are trying to get beyond, the notion that a gain
for the United States is a setback for Russia, or vice versa.
Being able to operate out of Kyrgyzstan is a gain for the
United States. It should not be seen as a threat to Russia.
Mr. Loebsack. And what about counterterrorism efforts,
cooperation with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
Russian counterterrorism efforts and ours?
Secretary Gordon. They are nowhere near playing the sort of
role that we are and some of our NATO allies. But at the same
time, they are not interfering in the role that we are trying
to play.
Mr. Loebsack. Okay.
Any others want to make any comments on that?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would simply add that we have a common
interest with Russia in the drug piece coming out of
Afghanistan. Both Iran, candidly, and Russia have tremendous
markets for those drugs, and they flow freely across their
borders. And it worries Russia tremendously. And they would
like--the cooperation there is good.
Secretary Vershbow. I would just add, coming back to the
supply routes issue, as you know, Congressman, there have been
problems with some of the routes through Pakistan in recent
months. So our goal has been to establish a network of multiple
routes through Central Asia, through the Caucasus, through
airfields in the Persian Gulf region, where we have close
friends who provided us access, so that we are not dependent on
any one route.
So, the Russians have expressed understanding and said that
transit is something that they can support.
But as Mr. Gordon said, they are very touchy about the
presence of U.S. forces on the territory of former Soviet
republics. They keep saying that permanent bases are
unacceptable, and we keep assuring them that we do not have any
long-term designs to have permanent bases in the region.
The Afghan campaign has gone on longer, perhaps, than we
anticipated. But our aim is to support the war effort only as
long as that is necessary.
Mr. Loebsack. Thanks to all of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Taylor.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Mr. Gordon, you indicated that you were excited to come and
speak to us about some of the achievements that occurred in
Moscow. And I am certain that you know that many have also some
concerns about what is coming out of the discussions in Moscow,
and I am looking forward to getting some of your additional
thoughts.
When we take a look at the Joint Understanding on a
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that was signed, it included a
provision that each nation would reduce their strategic
delivery vehicles to a range of 500 to 1,100, from 1,600 in the
1991 START 1 Treaty, and the associated warheads to 1,500, to
1,675 from 1,700, to 2,220 in the 2002 Moscow treaty.
Obviously, the concern arises on what would be a drastic
reduction in the level of delivery vehicles, if we were to go
to a level of 500. The bipartisan Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States, led by Drs. Perry
and Schlesinger, believe that the triad of strategic nuclear
delivery systems should be maintained, with our number
somewhere around currently 1,200 of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and
bombers. And reducing it to a level of 500 would certainly be a
very drastic reduction.
Secondly, the joint understanding also included a statement
saying that a provision on the inter-relationship of strategic
offensive and strategic defensive arms. Russian President
Medvedev had suggested that progress on START could hinge on
the U.S. giving up its European missile defense plans. It would
appear that the Administration is considering such a concession
by addressing defense arms in START.
And then thirdly, the issue of--according to March 2009
data from the National Nuclear Security Administration, Russia
is estimated to possess 3,800 operational tactical nuclear
weapons, while the U.S. possesses less than 500. The START
joint understanding does not address Russia's tactical nuclear
weapons.
So, the questions that follow arise out of the concerns of,
you know, with such a drastic reduction that could be signaled
in the joint understanding on delivery vehicles, what is the
effect on our nuclear triad? And is that then at risk?
And secondly, on the issue of our defensive arms, is the
Administration including missile defense in the START
negotiations?
And then thirdly, since the joint understanding does not
include Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, does the
Administration plan to address Russia's overwhelming number of
tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gordon. Thank you for raising all those important
issues. Let me make a couple of comments, including, in
particular, on the offense-defense and missile defense issue.
And I hope my colleagues in the Pentagon will elaborate further
on the warheads issues.
Just broadly what I would say on the tactical nuclear
weapons, no, the START follow-on agreement is the follow-on
agreement to a treaty reducing offensive weapons. And that is
what it is focused on, because we believe that both countries
have an interest in reducing the numbers of their offensive
nuclear weapons. So, it does not focus on tactical weapons.
Again, I would say broadly, while deferring to my
colleagues on some of the specifics of the triads or the
numbers, but that the basic belief is that we can certainly
maintain our deterrent adequately, even at the lower numbers in
these ranges of 500 delivery vehicles and 1,500 warheads.
On the issue of missile defense relationship to START, I
want to be very clear. There is not a relationship between our
thinking about missile defense in Europe and the START Treaty.
There was not at the summit, and there will not be
subsequently.
On missile defense in Europe, the President has been quite
clear all along that he believes there is a growing threat from
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, particularly from Iran,
and that if we can deploy missile defenses in Europe or
elsewhere that will protect us and our allies from that threat,
we should do so.
When he came into office, he asked for a review of plans to
do that, to make sure that we were going about it in the best
way possible. And that review is currently under way. And what
I want to stress is that that review is being driven by our
perception of the threat, particularly from Iran, and by our
assessment of the technology that would be used in achieving
this goal.
And the goal, again, is how do we best protect Americans
and our European allies from the growing threat from ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons. It is not what do other countries
think, including Russia, or what is the impact of this on
START.
And I also want to point out, because I think it is quite
relevant, as you noted, sir, the Russians insisted all along
that the price for these agreements in Moscow would be us
abandoning the so-called ``third site'' in Europe. And in
particular, they did not want to have even a statement about
missile defense, unless we agreed beforehand to do that.
We did not do so. We refused to do so. And it was not until
the morning of the summit that they understood that we were
serious about that, and went ahead with the joint statement on
missile defense and the agreement to a joint threat assessment
from Iran. And as I say, our people are already heading over
there now, to try to share with them our analysis of the Iran
situation and convince them of its seriousness.
So, no, there is not a link between missile defense and
START, or anything else. Missile defense decisions would be
driven by what the threat is and how we think we can best
protect Americans and Europeans.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a few quick questions, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Vershbow.
Who is in charge in Russia? And what is the relationship
between the President and the Prime Minister?
Secretary Gordon. If I could defer to our former ambassador
to Moscow. I will make a comment, and then I am sure our former
ambassador in Moscow will have a view.
What I will not do is speculate on who is up and who is
down. Russia has a president, President Medvedev. That is our
President's counterpart, and that is who he mainly met with at
the summit.
He spent more than four hours with President Medvedev and
talked about the full range of issues. And he signed the
agreements that he signed with President Medvedev.
He also met with Prime Minister Putin, because Prime
Minister Putin is the prime minister and a significant figure
in Russia, and has significant influence.
And we will not get engaged in really trying to figure out
who does what. They have a constitution. They have a system. We
deal with the President. We also acknowledge the importance of
the Prime Minister. And we have reached agreements with Russia,
and those are the ones that we intend to continue to pursue.
Are there differences in emphasis? Yes, I think it is
accurate to say that there are. Read their public statements,
and I think you see some differences.
But we can only deal with the government that is on the
other side, and that is what we do.
Secretary Vershbow. Well, Congressman, I cannot add much to
that. It is clear that we are dealing with what the Russians
themselves are calling a ``tin democracy.'' And I think
President Medvedev has been a close ally of now-Prime Minister
Putin for many years. And I think that they do represent a
team.
And as Mr. Gordon said, under the constitution, President
Medvedev is the head of state and has overall responsibility
for foreign policy. And therefore, he is President Obama's
principal counterpart. But President Putin clearly wields
considerable influence in that system, as prime minister has
responsibility for the economy. And so I think that, as Mr.
Gordon said, we deal with the government structure as it is.
And I think that the conversations in Moscow that our
President had with both of them suggested that there is not
huge daylight between them. And I think that the progress that
we made, we must assume reflects a consensus between the two
leaders, even if, as Mr. Gordon said, they do have different
accents in talking about certain issues, reflecting their
different backgrounds.
Mr. Kissell. Why do you think you made more progress in the
recent talks? Why do you think the Russians were more ready to
concede, cooperate, whatever, than we had expected?
Secretary Gordon. One can only speculate. We cannot know
why Russians do what they do. It does seem, however, that the
first six months of the Administration were a testing period.
They wanted to see if maybe it was the case that we would be
prepared to make all sorts of concessions in the name of a
reset, in the name of a successful summit, in the name of
getting over the deteriorating relations that I talked about.
That would not be a surprising policy for Russia to pursue
and test us, insist that we give up missile defense in order to
reach agreements, insist that we make concessions on START,
because we might want a successful summit.
And I think, to be very frank, we showed them that that was
not going to be the case. We were quite clear all along. We do
want some agreements. We do want a better relationship. We do
not think this is a zero-sum game in which we always have
different interests. But we are not going to trade off
important principles or allies in order to have a successful
summit.
Just for example, the issue of the U.N. follow-on mission
in Georgia came up within two weeks of the summit. And I think
some were wondering, if we were so keen on having a good
relationship with Russia or a successful summit, that we would
agree to whatever at the U.N. on Georgia in order to have a
successful summit. But we did not, because we had red lines. We
had certain principles that we were not going to walk away from
where Georgia was concerned.
We stuck to our guns, and the Russians ended up vetoing the
U.N. follow-on mission in Georgia. And we were prepared to do
that, because there are certain things we are just not willing
to concede on.
And I think that, to really answer your question, once they
realized that was the case, then they went ahead and reached
more agreements than, frankly, I at least would have predicted
even a week before the summit.
Mr. Kissell. One real quick question as my time--has just
gone.
Yes, thank you.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Sorry.
Mr. Coffman, please.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you so much for your service to our country.
Can you give me an estimate of the current governance of
Russia? It seems that either they have legitimate concerns in
terms of their security, or it is a state which--a nation-
state--which is devolving more into an autocracy, to where they
are trying to establish their legitimacy by focusing or, if not
creating, threats, to establish legitimacy to the Russian
people.
But, I mean, their view of NATO, the expansion of NATO,
their view of U.S. influence in satellite states that were
former Soviet republics, as was mentioned earlier, missile
defense, political and military interventions in Georgia and
Ukraine--you know, are these based on legitimate historic fears
of the Russian people? Or is this an autocratic government
trying to flex its power and gain legitimacy that way?
Secretary Gordon. Legitimate or not, I would certainly say
these Russian fears exist and are unfounded. I believe it is
accurate to say that Russia has historical concerns and
insecurities that have led it to conclude that its most
promising path for its own security is to dominate its
neighbors.
That is a historical Russian perception, and it continues
to exist today to, what I would say, is an unfortunate degree,
because I do not think it is accurate.
I genuinely believe that Russia would have an interest in
stable, prosperous democracies on its borders, even if they
should be members of NATO, and that this perception that Russia
has that somehow European security should be seen in zero-sum
terms. And if its neighbors like Ukraine want to be friendly to
the United States, or want to join the European Union or NATO,
that is a threat to Russia. I believe that that is inaccurate.
But really, to get at your question, the Russian view, at
least for many Russians--again, I want to be careful about
over-generalizing, because I think different Russians have
different views. And hopefully, with time, the next generation
will have a different view, and may come to the view that
stable democracies in Russia's neighbors is in Russia's
interest.
But right now, yes. The predominant view in Russia is that
they are better off dominating their neighbors, even if that
means instability, than accepting the choices of those
neighbors--unfortunately.
Secretary Vershbow. If I could add, I agree with all of
what my colleague said.
I think you have both phenomena at work when you talk about
what is driving Russia, what is the governance in Russia when
it comes to their national security policy. And they clearly do
have some legitimate security concerns which overlap with ours,
whether it is violent extremism, which has affected them in
Chechnya, and even in Moscow with terrorist bombings a few
years ago.
I think they do share an interest in controlling the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and working with
us to try to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions.
But it is when you get closer to their borders when the
more negative impulses, I think, tend to dominate. And that is
why those are going to be the toughest issues for us to manage
as we go forward.
But I think that, objectively speaking, as Mr. Gordon said,
Russia is not threatened by NATO or by new countries, new
democracies coming into NATO. The real security threats facing
Russia are largely to their south.
And that is where I think we are going to try to expand our
cooperation while continuing the dialogue, trying to convince
them that NATO, whose mission now is largely to deal with
distant security challenges like Afghanistan, bringing durable
stability to the Balkans, is actually contributing to Russia's
security rather than posing a threat. But that is going to be a
long debate.
I think there is a tendency on the part of some Russian
leaders to overdramatize external threats as a tool of
maintaining political control and discipline at home. And the
system is not one which has all the checks and balances and
instruments of accountability that we would like. So, a kind of
xenophobic mentality has entered into the Russian
consciousness--not just on the part of the leaders, but on the
part of the people.
So, this is going to be a continuing problem for us going
forward.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I do not want you to feel left out, so I had a few
things for you.
Actually, in your testimony you discuss some of the U.S.
naval activity in the Black Sea region and the unforeseen
increase in military activity in the region having to do with
our humanitarian visits to Georgia, as opposed to anything
else. Also, you discuss Russian military exercises in the
region.
Just on the idea of exercises with this reset taking place,
and some questions about whether--you know, we do not see
things as a zero-sum game; perhaps the Russians do.
What objectives or goals would we hope to seek through some
of these military exercises with the Russians in that context
of how we are perceiving each other?
Admiral Winnefeld. So, I believe you are asking about the
military exercises with the Russians, not with Black Sea
partners.
Mr. Larsen. That is correct, yes. Sorry.
Admiral Winnefeld. We believe that, whenever we are able to
exercise with the Russians or another partner, that we gain
common understanding, that we are able to better understand
each other's operating principles and techniques, tactics and
procedures, so that when we do have a common objective--for
example, in piracy off of Somalia--that we can work more
effectively together.
And we are seeing the drawbacks of not exercising with
them, frankly, on the naval side as much as we would like to in
those piracy operations off of Somalia.
The Russians have had a near-continuous presence of a
destroyer crew--you know, a small ship out there--along with
their logistics support ships. We have had collegial and
friendly interactions with them. They have appeared at the
shared awareness and deconfliction events, and, in fact, are
great supporters of those events.
But we still find that we do not have the kinds of
connectivity and signaling techniques, and the like, that we
would like to enjoy with them in order to make that counter-
piracy operation effective.
One way of doing that is to exercise together. Another way
of doing that is just to operate habitually together.
And before the Georgia crisis, we did have intermittent
operations in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean,
which is a counterterrorist, counter-proliferation type of
operation, in which a Russian ship would show up perhaps once a
year, and we would enjoy some contact like that. And I think
that sort of stretches across the board in land, air and sea
domains in which it is healthy for us to exercise together.
As I mentioned earlier, you have the opportunity to build
personal relationships with individual Russian leaders, who may
grow up someday to be important Russian leaders. And I think
that is a very important interaction for us to have, because,
as I mentioned, the sort of warm feelings and understanding you
are able to achieve at that tactical exercise level are
something we would like to percolate up into the higher levels
where there tends to be a little bit more bureaucracy in
scheduling meetings and that sort of thing than we would like
to see from the Russia side.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Will you speak a little bit, then, to the
idea that the Russians and the Chinese also have done separate
military exercises recently?
And I know some of us have pressed the previous
Administration, and I imagine we will press this
Administration, and make a request that we be observers at
those exercises as well. And, of course, we have been turned
down, I think, in the past for that.
Can you talk a little bit about the relationship between,
say, Russian military exercises with other countries, and that
we are not participating in that we would like to participate
in? Can we use these relationships to press that case?
Admiral Winnefeld. I think that you make a good point. We
are always seeking transparency in our relationship with
whoever it is--Russia, China, and the like. And we have talked
about inviting Chinese observers to certain exercises that we
conduct. And we would love to be able to participate as
observers in exercises that might be under the aegis of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or other events that Russia
does with other people--other nations that it considers its
partners.
Transparency is good. It builds confidence on both sides
that you understand the purpose of the exercise and the actual
tactics, techniques and procedures that were used in the
exercise to make sure that nothing is amiss. And we invite them
to observe our exercises all the time. And they do not always
appear. But the invitation is out there.
So I think the fundamental principle is that transparency
is good. We seek more of it. And I think we are meeting them
more than halfway, and in the hopes that they will understand
that it is in their interest to do the same.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. That was quick.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here today. And I apologize if
you have had this question asked before.
I just was concerned about the Russians issuing a decree on
opposing sanctions against manufacturers who sell arms to
Georgia. I wondered if this will cause U.S. policy to change in
supporting the Georgian military.
Secretary Vershbow. I think this Russian announcement is
unfortunate, but it will certainly not alter our policy. We
think that Georgia, as a sovereign state, has not only a
legitimate right to choose its security alliances, but also a
legitimate right to have a military capacity to defend its own
borders, and also to participate in multinational operations.
So, we have developed a strategy of providing security
assistance to Georgia, which will focus in the short term on
helping raise the professional standards, helping them
institute more high-quality defense personnel management
systems, improving their training.
But over time, we are prepared to consider the provision of
defensive weapons to Georgia, as well. And we are also
supporting their NATO aspirations and are helping them do the
very arduous process of submitting their annual national
program to NATO as they pursue their candidacy there.
So, as I said, the Russian announcement is unfortunate, but
it is not going to alter our policy.
Mr. Shuster. That is good to hear.
Also, is there any consideration--is the Administration
considering to participate in the European Union monitoring
mission that is going on in Georgia?
Secretary Gordon. About that I would say that we think that
is a critical mission. As you know, we lost the presence of the
OSCE monitors in South Ossetia, because the Russians did not
agree to a proposal that almost everyone else in the OSCE did.
And we lost the U.N. presence in Abkhazia, because the Russians
vetoed the follow-on agreement.
And in the absence of those two missions, the European
Union stepped up with more than 250 monitors. And we support
that mission, because we think it is critically important that
there be independent, objective monitors on the ground.
The E.U. last week agreed to extend that mission for
another year, and we are very pleased about that. No one has
invited us to participate. We want to be supportive in whatever
way we can.
Mr. Shuster. Would that be something that we would
consider, if somebody invited us to participate?
Secretary Gordon. We will consider any way to strengthen
efforts to make sure that there are appropriate, independent,
international monitors on the ground in Georgia, yes.
Mr. Shuster. And just in general, what is your assessment
of the situation? I have spoken to some Georgians. They do not
think it has gotten any better, and in some cases worse. Just
your general observations on that situation in Georgia.
Secretary Gordon. Well, the situation in Georgia is a
troubling one. Russian forces remain in both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty is
being violated.
As the Vice President made clear in Georgia, we do not
believe that there is a short-term or a military solution to
this issue. But we will also not turn away from it. I think
there, the Russians may hope that, in the absence of the U.N.
and OSCE missions we would just say, okay, you know, too bad.
We will walk away.
On the contrary, we have brought it up at every occasion,
including the President in Moscow, including the ongoing Geneva
talks, and including through the support of the E.U. monitoring
mission. We do not consider the situation resolved. We think
Russia should implement the cease-fire agreements of August and
September 2008, in support of Georgian territorial integrity.
Mr. Shuster. Well, I am pleased to hear you say that.
Ambassador, were you going to add to that?
Secretary Vershbow. Nothing really much to add.
We have not been asked yet, as far as the E.U. amendment is
concerned. But I think we are considering the possibility, if
we are asked.
Mr. Shuster. Right. Well, I am pleased to hear that,
because in dealing with the countries in that region, and the
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, they are all very, very concerned about
what America is going to do in regard to Georgia and Russia.
And so, I think it is important that we stay strong with the
Georgians.
Secretary Gordon. If I might just permit myself to add in
the context of staying strong with the Georgians, I have talked
about how the President emphasized these important points, and
the Vice President did when he was there last week.
We have also, thanks to Congress' support, completed the $1
billion assistance package to Georgia to help the country
rebuild from the war. And that is already paying dividends in
the Georgian economy and helping resettle refugees who were
expelled.
We have launched a commission following up on the U.S.-
Georgia strategic cooperation arrangement from last year, which
met recently in Washington. As I noted, the Vice President has
recently been to Georgia. The Deputy Secretary and I have been
there twice.
We are actively demonstrating our support for Georgia, even
while reminding the Georgians that they need to make more
progress in their own democracy, and that they need to avoid
any provocative actions. I think our relationship with Georgia
is very strong.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Spratt, please.
Mr. Spratt. Thanks very much for your testimony. I have
been in and out, and may have missed this question. It may have
been asked before.
Basically, what is the status of our deployment of missile
defenses in the Czech Republic and in Poland? And is there any
discussion, or was there any discussion with the Russians of
alternative locations or alternative means of accomplishing the
same objective, but with different locations?
Secretary Gordon. We did comment on this briefly earlier.
And what was said was that we are reviewing our approach to
missile defense in Europe.
The President believes that we should do what is necessary
to protect ourselves and our European allies from a growing
threat of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. He has
ordered a review of plans to deploy an X-band radar in the
Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland.
And that review is being driven by our perception of the
threat from Iran and the technology. And we hope that that
review will be done by the end of the year, so that we can move
forward in the way that best would defend us and our allies.
In terms of the Russians, what their discussion of it--what
there has been discussion with Russia of--is ways in which
Russia and the United States could cooperate on the issue of
missile defense. Because as we have made quite clear, any
missile defenses we deploy in Europe will not be directed at
Russia. They are designed to deal with a different threat. And
the size of deployments considered could not in any way
threaten the Russian arsenal anyway.
So, we have been open with the Russians, as the previous
Administration was, in terms of exploring the possibility of
cooperation that could help protect both of our countries. We
have sent a delegation to Moscow several times.
It is true the Russians continue to say that they do not
want to talk about cooperation unless and until we give up or
change our current plans. And we continue to make clear that
that criterion is not acceptable to us.
But we do think that we have a common interest in
protecting ourselves from missile defenses. And if the Russians
want to work with us on that, then we would be open to that.
Secretary Vershbow. If I could just emphasize, we are
looking at the question of European missile defense as part of
the broader missile defense review. And the site in Poland and
the radar in Czech Republic are among the options that are
being considered, together with other options that might be
able to perform the mission, as well.
Mr. Spratt. Does your review include alternative locations
and alternative defenses?
Secretary Vershbow. We are looking at a range of options.
It is really not appropriate to get into what those options
are, but we are reviewing these internally. We are not engaged
in any discussion with the Russians about alternative options
at this point, until the review is completed.
And as we have stressed, our conclusions will be based
exclusively on the threat from Iran, the effectiveness of the
systems and the cost. We want to see what is the best way to
meet the real and growing threat from Iran to ourselves and to
our allies.
But we do, as Mr. Gordon said, believe that this is
something that the Russians should see a common interest in.
They, too, could be threatened by long-range ballistic missiles
from Iran, and that there may be ways to connect with the
Russians, once we have made our own conclusions, in terms of
cooperation, whether it is shared early warning or joint
testing initiatives, which have been pursued in the NATO-Russia
framework in the past.
Mr. Spratt. With respect to strategic arms limitation
talks, would defensive systems be part of that?
And, in addition, what are our objectives going into these
talks? What are the broad objectives that we are seeking in
terms of warhead levels and the mix of our weapons within our
nuclear arsenal?
Secretary Vershbow. As we stressed, defensive systems are
not covered by--are not going to be covered by--the START
follow-on agreement. It will deal strictly with limitations on
strategic offensive arms, strategic nuclear arms.
We and previous Administrations have recognized that there
is a conceptual relationship between offense and defense, and
there may be some reaffirmation of that principle. But that
does not translate into any limitations on our ballistic
missile defense systems.
To the extent that the Russians are prepared to engage in
possible cooperation on missile defense, I think we would
pursue that in a separate forum which has yet to be
established.
But there is no linkage between limits on offensive systems
and limits on defensive systems. But the limits that you have
seen in the joint understanding for the START follow-on
agreement reflect a range of possibilities. The specific levels
still have to be negotiated.
But before we made any proposals in this negotiation, we
analyzed our strategic force requirements as part of the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is still ongoing. As one of
the initial thrusts of the NPR, we look for a strategic
approach that could ensure stability at lower numbers, so that
we could proceed with the START follow-on negotiations, given
that the existing START Treaty expires in December.
But the proposals that we put on the table were based on
the NPR analysis. It was not the other way around. And the
proposals maintain our policy and strategy objectives in terms
of assuring our allies, dissuading competitors, deterring
potential adversaries, and defeating adversaries if deterrence
fails.
So, the final result will have to be consistent with those
principles as well. We are not necessarily willing to accept
any number within the ranges that are in the joint
understanding.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses and your bearing with us on
the questions.
I have got a couple of quick ones, yes or nos, and then I
have a couple of longer ones. And, of course, we are all on the
clock, so if you can help me with fairly short answers, I would
appreciate it.
First, are we going to continue to train and equip the
Georgian military?
Secretary Vershbow. Yes, we are. And in the short term, the
Georgians have made an offer to send a battalion to Afghanistan
starting next spring. And so, later this year, we will be
engaged in helping to train that unit for----
Mr. Akin. In that context, then. Okay. Thank you.
And then, will the U.S. support NATO membership for Ukraine
and Georgia?
Secretary Gordon. We continue to support their NATO
aspirations, and are working with them on becoming stronger
candidates.
As you know, last year NATO agreed to have commissions with
both countries. And in the context of those commissions, we are
working with them to strengthen their candidacies for NATO
membership.
But of course, they will only join NATO when there is a
consensus in NATO that they will join.
Mr. Akin. Got that. Good. Thank you.
These are a little bit longer questions.
You made a comment in terms of missile defense, that it is
going to be based on the threat of Iran or North Korea? In that
regard, are we limiting missile defense, that it is only going
to be relative to two nations? Because I think my sense is that
missile defense is good any time somebody lobs an ICBM at us.
So, are we, in a way, trading off some of our missile
defense when you say that it is specifically connected to North
Korea and Iran?
Secretary Vershbow. Well, I think the focus, in terms of
what are the most immediate threats we see looming, are the
missile programs of North Korea and Iran. And certainly, the
focus in terms of European missile defense is Iran, which has
tested a 2,000-kilometer, medium-range ballistic----
Mr. Akin. We all understand that. My question is, though,
we build missile defense--at least in my opinion, I vote to
fund it. And I do that, because not only North Korea and Iran,
but somebody else that makes some over-sized skyrocket with a
nuclear weapon on it, we like to shoot it down from that
country, too.
Secretary Vershbow. I think we are obviously trying to be
prepared for any threat, anticipated or not. And of course, an
accidental launch via a single missile from a country that is
not a rogue state is something that we should be prepared for,
as well.
Mr. Akin. So, we are not in any way negotiating away our
use of missile defense for any kind of missile that is shot at
us then?
Secretary Vershbow. No. There is no negotiation going on
that would give away our missile defense option.
Mr. Akin. Okay. The second thing is on the limits on
nuclear warheads. Almost every treaty that I know of that we
ever got with the Russians, they always cheated on all of them.
Do we have verification that that is not going to happen here?
Secretary Vershbow. That is going to be one of the many
challenges in completing this treaty, and we have a very short
time period to do so.
But we are going to probably use many of the verification
provisions from the soon-to-be-expired START Treaty. But we may
need to be more ambitious under this agreement, particularly
given, you know, the margin of tolerance may be lower as you go
to lower levels under these kinds of agreements.
Mr. Akin. Because it does seem like it is a pretty hard
thing to verify, whether they have got some arsenal of them
now, and we do not know how many they had before, so then it
makes it hard.
I guess the last thing--I have only got about a minute-and-
a-half, and I was trying to be a good steward of time.
If you could, one thing that you did not include in your
testimonies that is of interest, and it would probably be of
interest to other members of the committee. And that would be,
if you could just describe sort of in broad brush, what is the
nature of the way Putin and Russia has--you know, was 8 years
ago with us--that relation degenerated to some degree.
With a new President, hopefully, we are getting kind of
back on a talking--I am a big fan of the inter-military kind of
things.
Could you just give us a broad brush as to where you think
we are in relation with them? And that is the last of my
questions. Thank you.
Secretary Gordon. Thank you.
I think I said in my opening comments that we saw the
relationship that we inherited as one that was deteriorating,
which, frankly, is accurate. And when the Cold War ended and
the first few years after that, I think we had hopes that by
now the relationship with Russia would be much different from
what it is. We had hopes that by now, NATO might have--sorry,
Russia--might have gotten over its aversion to NATO enlargement
and been more willing to work with the West.
I think one thing that has happened, to be very brief about
it----
Mr. Akin. Was that their biggest--NATO enlargement--was
that the biggest thing that rubbed them the wrong way?
Secretary Gordon. I think it stands in for a greater point,
which is simply America's role in the world.
I think when the Cold War ended, the Russians believed and
hoped that both sides would stand down, and we would be no
greater a power than they were, and our equality would be
maintained. But that, of course, was not realistic, and the
United States played an important role in the world. And it
frankly became the sole superpower, rather than having two
superpowers.
And it has been very difficult for Russia to get used to
that world. And again, I think for many Russians, it is
something that they have resented. And therefore, in particular
in the past few years, as high oil prices have fueled a
resurgent, or had fueled a resurgence of the Russian economy,
some Russians wanted to take advantage of that and do more to
try to stand up to the United States.
I would add, unfortunately, the period when Russians
perceived Russia to be down coincided with the period when
Russian democracy was being established. And the period in
which many Russians perceived Russia to be rising coincided
with, in some ways, a backing off of democracy. And that,
unfortunately, has led a number of Russians to equate the two,
which we do not think is the case.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for being here.
Secretary Gordon, I would just add one comment. I think,
during the period in which Russia was down in the early days of
the post-Cold War period, I think it is fair to say that,
retrospectively, the United States clearly could have done more
to help what many people perceived to be as a floundering
Russian economy.
I mean, having personally been there, and I saw people out
and standing on the side of the road, middle-aged women with
brand new green hose. That was their pay from the factory. If
they could sell it on the road, that was their payment. I mean
there were really some things that we could have stepped
forward on to assist them, and did not.
I wanted to ask one missile defense question.
Maybe I will direct this to you, Mr. Vershbow.
I was talking with one of my Russian friends recently, who
made the point that I think most people agree with. It is that
Russia has nothing to fear from any missile defense system we
put in, and they know it. They know that they have nuclear
missiles in places that we do not know where they are at, and
that this kind of a system really is not aimed at Russia. And
they know that, if we ever thought it was, it just would not be
the facts of the situation.
But this man made the point, he said, ``What makes us
apprehensive is that there will be people in your power
structure that will believe it can do more than it is capable
of doing.''
And we have had--you know, from their perspective, they
have not agreed with all of the foreign policy decisions made
in the last decade-and-a-half, and would hate to see some of
these foreign policy decisions of the future based on some
misbelief that some of this limited system could somehow allow
for some American action that we might not take otherwise, if--
anyway, I probably made the point.
How do you respond to that kind of--that perspective?
Secretary Vershbow. That is a very good question,
Congressman.
And I think you are correct that, objectively speaking,
most Russians--particularly their experts who really know the
capabilities of our system--recognize that it is not a threat
to the Russian strategic deterrent, as they claim. In fact, it
is not solely because they have mobile systems and submarine
launched systems that could be survivable.
But actually, if you look at the geography of our systems,
if we go forward with the site in Poland, are not physically
capable of intercepting the vast majority of Russian strategic
missiles heading toward the United States, because those go
over the North Pole. And our missiles would be a day late and a
dollar short.
So, they are, clearly, optimized to deal with threats such
as those from Iran, from the south. And hopefully, through this
joint threat assessment, we can begin to chip away at some of
the Russian misperceptions.
But sometimes we hear that, well, there are only 10
missiles today, but tomorrow we could wake and there will be
1,000. But still, there are defensive systems in a position
that, even if there were more than 10----
Dr. Snyder. Well, I am running out of time, and I have a
second question.
But I mean, they do not believe that, no matter how many
missiles we put in that area, that it would be a threat to
their ability to overwhelm us. But it still deals with the
issue, their apprehension, that there may be people that
replace Admiral Winnefeld, that will actually think it can do
more than it is capable of.
And maybe I will just leave it as a point to be made. It is
a more difficult kind of reassurance to give.
Secretary Vershbow. I would certainly agree with you that
those kinds of views exist within the Russian elite. There is a
tremendous amount of paranoia and worst-case assessments.
And so, we have to continue to chip away at this through
our dialogue, and by trying to bring the Russians into the
architecture to some degree and make this a cooperative
venture.
Dr. Snyder. It may be helpful for people like you to remind
all of us that, in fact, that system does not have the ability
to do to anything to Russian systems.
My final question--I am running out of time, Professor
Vershbow, so I will direct it to you--where do you think we are
right now with regard to our Russian language speaking skills
within the Foreign Service?
And Secretary Gordon, if you have any thoughts, too, as far
as Foreign Service officers with Russian language skills. What
is our current need, gap, and where we are with getting the
number of Foreign Service officers with Russian language
skills?
Secretary Vershbow. Well, my impression is that we are
doing pretty well. And the State Department has a very good
Russian language program, which, through an intensive course of
10 months, does prepare people to operate professionally in
Russian--in Moscow and in some other posts in the former Soviet
Union where Russian is still used.
But we are seeing fewer and fewer people coming out of the
universities having studied Russian. It is not as popular as it
used to be.
But in terms of the overall deficits in language skills, I
think we are still more worried about Chinese and Arabic
speakers, Farsi speakers, than we are about Russian speakers.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Admiral Winnefeld, I want to thank you for your
service, supporting our ground troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I also want to point out, as we are discussing Russia, that
20 years ago this summer, no one projected that in about three
months that the Berlin Wall would collapse. There were no
projections, truly, of the extraordinary and wonderful
reunification of Germany. The projections of Ronald Reagan,
that the Soviet Union would end up in the ash heap of history,
did come to fruition.
I am an optimist. And I am really hopeful and I believe,
that through mutual contacts, freedom, democracy, free markets
will prevail. And I have visited Russia a number of times. Each
time I am impressed by the friendship that the Russian people
have for the American people.
And I have worked very closely promoting the new Rotary
Clubs across the country giving opportunity for Russians to
interact with people around the world, chambers of commerce.
And then I am particularly interested in military-to-military
contacts, so that there are not misunderstandings. This is
mutually beneficial to Russia, to America.
And so, Admiral, you have mentioned this. Could you go a
little bit further on specific contacts that we have?
Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I would be happy to.
One of the key points that you raise is the importance of
people meeting people. And that is why earlier this year, when
the tensions really had not subsided as much as they have to
the point they are today, we made the difficult decision to
allow the Russians to come over and participate in what we call
the Harvard generals program, where a number of them come over
and are able to visit the United States.
They attend Harvard for a couple of weeks, and it is really
just an exchange. And in fact, it is really just Russian
generals going to Harvard for two weeks, giving them a great
opportunity to see America, what we are like and to perhaps put
some of their predispositions behind them.
And we carry that through in our military-to-military
relationship any way that we can. And I can list some of these
events for you.
Obviously, the joint staff talks that I mentioned in my
opening statement will occur this October, we are hopeful. And
that would lay the groundwork for a lot of the planning that we
would do to really get the detail into the relationship that we
are talking about.
We are hopeful that their chief of defense or some
representative will show up at the Pacific Commanders
Conference that he is holding for all Asian area chiefs of
defense, and that would be a great thing for them to be a part
of. They participate in the share awareness and understanding
and deconfliction piracy pieces.
So, they are out there operating with us, and they see U.S.
officers working with other countries' officers in a very
cooperative, collegial way. And they want to be a part of that.
They want to act like that when they see it.
We will have a counter-hijacking exercise with them, Navy
staff talks. The International Sea Power Symposium up in
Newport, they will attend. And Naval War College and Russian
Naval Academy exchanges, where for a couple of weeks they will
have young people coming over.
And these people are going to grow up to be leaders
someday, particularly if they have the credibility that comes
with perhaps having visited the United States for a while.
Our port visits are very important to us. We have had two
to Vladivostok in just the last couple of months. The Russian
Military Academy is going to have an exchange with Fort
Leavenworth. The air staff talks are going to occur.
We are going to try to set up a number of conferences at
the Marshall Center in Europe. West Point and Russian Ground
Forces Academy cadet exchange, which is not a full-year
program. Again, it is one of these 2-week things.
The Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, so they can get
a sense for how we view deterrence, and perhaps the missile
defense may be not part of that as much as they may think. And
then the EUCOM Colonels Working Group, where they roll up their
sleeves and get down to what the program would be for next
year.
And we are hopeful that all of this will happen in this
calendar year. So, that is a pretty ambitious program. And we
are hoping to expand that cooperation into the next year.
And our challenge is always with the Russian military in
doing these sorts of things, they have, believe it or not, a
more cumbersome bureaucracy than we do. Just to get decisions
made on who can show up for a conference is a challenge.
And that is why I speak of percolating this trust up
through their ranks, so that it is a little easier for them to
make these kinds of decisions, a little more natural, a little
less suspicion and distrust, so we can expand this kind of
cooperative activity.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I really appreciate it. You have taken
virtually all of my time, but that is good, because this is
good, people-to-people contact.
And I just want to commend Secretary Vershbow for your
service as ambassador to Moscow. You know the beautiful culture
and how we should be working together. We have a great shared
culture.
But thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to be with
you today. Thank you for your service.
The Chairman. Ms. Shea-Porter, please.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Mr. Gordon, you said that the U.S. and Russia affirmed
their commitment to increase assistance provided to the
government of Afghanistan developing the capabilities of the
Afghan National Army and police.
Now, I was there in May, and I know that Afghanistan has a
lot of problems--corruption, lack of trained personnel, et
cetera.
But what do you perceive the role of Russia to be there? To
do exactly what?
Secretary Gordon. We would be happy for Russian assistance
in developing the sort of stable Afghanistan that we are trying
to seek.
The statement that you are alluding to there was actually a
Russian initiative. They came to us and said, ``We have a
common interest in Afghanistan. We would like to help your
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. And we would like to show
that we have this common interest.''
So, they proposed a joint statement on Afghanistan along
the lines that you cited from. And we were more than happy to
agree with that, because Russia--as I believe one of my
colleagues alluded to earlier--has the same interests that we
do in stopping extremism and drug-running out of Afghanistan.
And if they can help us deal with that, sharing intelligence
and dealing with those responsible, then we welcome it.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Well, they had many years there, as you
know. And I am not sure that the Afghans would welcome this.
Are you talking about a physical presence there? Or are you
just talking about providing monetary help, personnel? Could
you tell me what you see their role as?
Secretary Gordon. Well, we will have to look at what role
could be constructive. A physical presence is probably unlikely
for the reasons that you say.
But there are all sorts of porous and dangerous borders,
and people coming back and forth. And the Russians do have some
intelligence on Islamic extremists who go back and forth to
Afghanistan. So, that is the type of help that I am referring
to.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Do you see them as training the Afghan
police or the Afghan military?
Secretary Vershbow. Congresswoman, I think you are right
that a military presence by the Russians is probably not
something that the majority of the people in Afghanistan would
be welcoming.
But they have participated in some counternarcotics
programs, including setting up an office of their federal
narcotics service in Moscow to help coordinate assistance. And
they are doing some training of Afghan police at a center in
Moscow, at Domodedovo, which has been going on in the NATO-
Russia framework.
So, their contributions may be small and narrowly focused,
but they are meaningful, and we think more should be
encouraged. But I think they have done some infrastructure
projects, as well, and repairing some Soviet era bridges and
tunnels that are improving access for commercial goods in and
out of Afghanistan.
So, again, military presence is not something we are
talking about, but more on the civilian side.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Now, as they train the Afghan National
Army and police, we have different philosophies very often.
So, what kind of control would we have? How would we know
for sure that what the Afghan military was learning was
something that we thought was appropriate in terms of, say,
democracy or the way that you treat the civilians, et cetera?
I just want to know what our thinking is on that and how
hands-on they will actually be.
Secretary Vershbow. I do not know enough about the details
of these programs. We will have to get back to you on that.
But I know that the terms of reference were drawn up pretty
carefully by NATO and Russia within the NATO-Russia Council.
So, I think we have--I am sure we have--a good idea of exactly
how the Russian trainers are operating and what kind of skills
they are focusing on.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I would appreciate it.
Secretary Vershbow. In fact, during the summit, some of our
delegation had a chance to visit this training center. So,
there is good transparency.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And I would appreciate it, if there is
further information, that you could share it with me.
Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For Mr. Gordon, I understand the department's Nuclear
Posture Review is not expected to be complete until the end of
the year. According to an online DOD terms of reference
factsheet dated June 2nd of this year, the 2009 Nuclear Posture
Review, quote, will establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy,
strategy and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years, and will
provide a basis for the negotiation of a follow-on agreement to
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
Now, with that in mind, how can the Administration or the
department commit to specific nuclear force reductions prior to
the conclusion of the NPR? Isn't that putting the cart before
the horse?
Secretary Vershbow. Congressman, as the Pentagon
representative, let me respond.
We are certainly putting the NPR first, and the START
negotiations second. And within the NPR, we are looking at a
whole range of alternative strategic approaches.
But in view of the fact that the existing START Treaty
expires in December, we made it an initial priority within the
NPR coming up with a strategic approach that could ensure
stability at somewhat lower numbers, so that we could engage in
the START follow-on negotiations and try to complete it by
December.
But the alternative approach, which is the basis for the
proposals that we have put on the table, has been judged within
the NPR to maintain our policy and strategy objectives of
assuring our allies, dissuading all competitors, deterring
potential adversaries, and defeating those adversaries if
deterrence fails.
So the NPR goes on, and its conclusions will be released
later in the year. And continuing analysis is going on in terms
of longer term scenarios, in which we might, in a follow-on to
the follow-on treaty, consider even deeper cuts.
But we did not put the cart before the horse. We have done
the analysis within the NPR process before putting any
proposals regarding the warheads levels or the delivery
vehicles----
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. If I hear you correctly, you have said
that you have agreed to lower numbers. You used that term,
lower numbers. And yet, the NPR is not done yet.
Secretary Vershbow. Again, lower numbers than in the START
or the Moscow treaty, but numbers which we believe can fulfill
our deterrence objectives during the term that this new treaty
will be in effect, a 10-year period.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I guess I see a contradiction there. But
let me ask a follow-on question.
I am deeply concerned that in considering deep reductions--
possibly deep reductions--in our strategic delivery vehicles
from 1,200 down to a level as low as 500. And my concern is
because the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States, led by Drs. Perry and
Schlesinger, believe that, quote, the triad of strategic
nuclear delivery systems should be maintained. And my concern
is that levels as low as 500 could threaten the triad.
Isn't there a contradiction between maintaining our nuclear
triad and reducing delivery systems to the 500 level?
For anyone of you.
Admiral Winnefeld. I would tell you that the NPR is
considering all of that in great rigor and detail, and that, as
Secretary Vershbow mentioned, we advanced the analysis on that
to inform the START negotiation process. And it would be, of
course, inappropriate to get into the details of the START
negotiation process or the details of the NPR at that point.
But I can assure you, the analysis is rigorous.
And I would also suggest that, whenever you see a band
presented in a document, it is generally because one side is
sort of on one end of that band, and the other side is on the
other end.
So, we are really looking at this responsibly. We are
looking very closely. The triad has been a strength of our
nuclear deterrent for many, many years, and it would be
unlikely that we would consider, you know, threatening the
fundamental nature of what our triad is and how it is a force
deterrence.
But again, all this and the analysis has advanced. It is
rigorous. I would tell you the NPR is the most advanced of all
the studies we are doing right now, because we knew we needed
to get it done. And there was already a lot of pre-existing
analytical detail that we leveraged, that has been done over
the years and very recently.
So, as worm's eye view of the apple here, I am very
confident that it is a healthy process.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I appreciate those answers.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here
today, and thank you for your service to our country.
I was in an Intelligence Committee meeting at the start of
this, so I apologize if my question has already been addressed.
But for Secretary Vershbow, the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration and DOD's Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program have generally enjoyed cooperation,
access and cost-sharing issues with regard to nonproliferation
efforts in Russia.
Could you elaborate on the successes and the challenges of
these cooperative efforts, and kind of give us an update on
where we are and, say, what is still left undone?
Secretary Vershbow. Okay. Well, I will give you the general
answer, Congressman.
I am not in the office that is responsible for those
programs, but I think we have made enormous progress since
those programs were initiated in the immediate years following
the end of the Cold War. And I visited many of the sites when I
was ambassador, in terms of creating better security at the
Russian nuclear facilities, helping now begin the destruction
of the Russian chemical weapon stocks at the Shchuchye
facility, which I think began operating this year.
We have basically completed most of the major
infrastructure projects in terms of storage security upgrades
that were envisaged by the program. And we are now beginning to
broaden the focus of the CTR program to address problems in
some other countries. And in this regard, the Russians are now
becoming a partner and contributing even some of their own
resources to these programs.
So, that is, I think, the best I can give you today,
Congressman. I do not have all the chapter and verse on the
state of play on some of these programs.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
For Secretary Gordon and Admiral Winnefeld, with Iran's
recent satellite launch and ongoing development of its nuclear
program, the threat to regional stability obviously continues
to grow. This threat obviously affects not only the Middle
East, but Europe and Asia, as well. Russian arms transfers and
nuclear cooperation with Iran are also considered destabilizing
by many countries in the Middle East and elsewhere in the
international community.
How does Russia's relationship with Iran affect its ties
with such regional powers as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iraq? And
are there more areas for cooperation with the Russians that we
have not yet explored?
Secretary Gordon. First I would simply say we share your
concern about the potential proliferation threat from Iran. And
as I noted earlier, there was probably no subject that
President Obama raised and discussed more intensively in Moscow
than this one.
You ask how it affects, if I understood correctly, Russia's
relations with other powers in the region. And I think it is
accurate to say that we are not the only country in the world
concerned about Russian cooperation with Iran, whether it be
arms sales or nuclear cooperation.
The countries you mentioned, all of those--Iraq, Saudi
Arabia and Israel, and others in the Gulf and elsewhere--are
very concerned about a potential Iranian nuclear weapon and
concerned about any country, including Russia, helping them.
So, I do think that Russians know and should know that there
are consequences to any relationship with Iran that it might
have.
As I said earlier, I think we have seen signs of
cooperation with Russia on this issue, and then other areas
where they have been less helpful. And we are obviously doing
all we can to move them back towards the former category.
I am sorry. There was a last element of your question that
I----
Mr. Langevin. Well, can you elaborate on the first part,
though? I want to know, have we seen any tangible fallout from
Russia's continued cooperation with Iran with respect to how
they interact with other nations in the Middle East?
Secretary Gordon. Well, not dramatically, because other
nations, like we, are watching very carefully what Russia does.
And no doubt, certain Russian actions would provoke a real
problem in their relationship with those countries or with us.
But I think Russia has refrained from moving forward with
what would be really considered more destabilizing arms
transfers to Iran, or steps in the nuclear area that would be
provocative to us and others.
Mr. Langevin. Before my time runs out, the second half of
my question. Are there areas of cooperation with the Russians
that have not been explored?
Secretary Gordon. We are constantly asking ourselves how to
best work with the Russians.
Are there any that have not been explored? Not that we are
aware of. But obviously, we have not had total success on this
issue, so we need to keep doing whatever we can to try to get
the Russians where we are.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. McKeon and, I believe, Mr. Shuster have additional
questions.
Mr. McKeon, the floor is yours.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mine is just a short
follow-up.
If the Administration does not intend to--and this came up
in earlier questions--to link missile defense with START, then
why include a provision in the joint understanding to address,
and I quote, the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms?
Secretary Gordon. The President addressed this issue quite
clearly in Moscow.
The provision, the reference that you allude to, is
actually a standard reference in previous arms control
agreements as well. It is in the START agreement. It is in the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreement.
And it acknowledges, as Assistant Secretary Vershbow
suggested earlier, that we do accept that there is some
theoretical, conceptual relationship at some level between
offensive weapons and defensive weapons.
What the President made quite clear in Moscow, however, is
that, A, the START follow-on agreement is only about offensive
weapons; and, B, the type of defenses we are talking about in
Europe are just not relevant to the types of numbers we are
looking at in an arms control agreement with Russia.
We are talking in terms of European missile defense about
sites, as discussed earlier, that could deal with a handful of
missiles coming from a country like Iran. That in no way
threatens the numbers that, even at the lower end of the
spectrum, that we are talking about from Russia.
So, again, the President was quite clear with the Russians
on this, that even if this follow-on agreement should include a
provision talking about this potential conceptual relationship,
as previous strategic arms limitations agreements have done, it
is not relevant to our discussion about European missile
defense. And we are quite clear about that. And it will not
change between now and when the treaty is negotiated.
Mr. McKeon. And you are confident that, even though we put
it in there, we understand that it is not going to be part of
it, that the Russians have the same understanding?
Secretary Gordon. I can only speak for our side, and can
reassert that the President made that quite clear.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Shuster, wrap it up.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just back to Georgia for one final question to the admiral.
I wondered if you might talk a little bit about the
training and equipping of the Georgian forces. Many are
concerned that we are not doing enough, and that they believe
that Russia is not done in Georgia, and they are going to wait
for another opportunity.
So, can we do more to train and equip them to deter the
Russians from making another incursion deeper into Georgia?
Admiral Winnefeld. I would like to give you a summary of
what we are doing.
We have recently concluded a couple of exercises with them.
One is--and you may well be aware of these, but I will mention
them anyway--Cooperative Longbow and Cooperative Lancer. And
Cooperative Longbow was an exercise--multinational brigade land
staff, sort of a staff ex, if you will, a command post
exercise. And it also involved air integration training with
the Georgians, which is something that they definitely needed.
A lot of participants--NATO countries and several other
partner countries, including Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia--and I won't list
them all. But it was a good, successful exercise.
And then, that was followed by Cooperative Lancer, which
was a live-fire exercise with many of the same players to
promote interoperability with Partnership for Peace countries,
and the like.
And it goes without saying that whenever we do an exercise
like this--and this was sort of a crisis response exercise--
that it is going to improve the Georgian military. And our
principal focus right now is on organization and training of
that military. EUCOM has done an assessment, has looked at
where their shortfalls are in that area, and we are trying to
address them.
At the same time, as Ambassador Vershbow mentioned, I
believe, they are going to deploy a battalion to Afghanistan.
And we are going to help them train for that deployment.
Now, this is a counterinsurgency operation. But again, it
goes without saying, that any exposure they have to our
tactics, techniques and procedures, writ large, is going to
help their military become more proficient. And this is
probably a two-year deployment that they are going to take in
six-month chunks, so that a lot of Georgians will be exposed to
how we operate on the ground.
So, I think, in general, they are getting a lot of exposure
to us, and it is going to raise them up as that progresses.
Mr. Shuster. What about the equipment? Is there anything we
can----
Admiral Winnefeld. The equipment--I do not believe that we
are--we did return their equipment from Iraq, as they
requested. And I believe we are still exploring what the nature
of our equipment support to the Georgians would be.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. If there are no further questions, let me
thank you gentlemen for this very excellent hearing. It has
been very enlightening, and we appreciate it. We look forward
to seeing you again.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 30, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Speaking at the Ukraine House exposition center on
July 22, 2009, VP Biden countered Russian claims made following their
War with Georgia by stating, ``We recognize no sphere of influence, or
no ability of any other nation to veto the choices an independent
nation makes as to with whom and under what conditions they will
associate.'' Does this statement apply to all Former Soviet States and
Russia's neighbors and what actions is the Obama Administration willing
to take to uphold this position?
Secretary Gordon. Both the President and Vice-President have made
clear that the United States rejects any notion of a country having a
``sphere of influence'' or declaring they have ``privileged relations''
with other nations. We continue to support the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence of Russia's neighbors, as well as their
sovereign right to make their own choices about their defense and
alliance relationships. The President has addressed this issue very
directly and clearly in his discussion with his Russian counterpart,
and noted that we will not paper over our differences on these issues
even as we seek to cooperate in areas where it is in both countries'
interests. The United States continues to support NATO enlargement and
the aspirant countries working to meet NATO's performance-based
standards for membership. We reject zero-sum thinking regarding Russia
and its neighbors, and believe that our good relations with Russia and
with its neighboring countries are not mutually exclusive.
Mr. Shuster. How does the Obama Administration plan to encourage
Russia to comply with its obligations under the Six Point Peace Plan
with Georgia and prevent loose interpretations of the agreement that
violate the intent of the agreement?
Secretary Gordon. The United States calls on all states to uphold
their commitments under numerous UN Security Council resolutions to
support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. We continue to
press the Russian Government to fulfill its August 12 Ceasefire
Commitments to allow humanitarian access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
to pull back their troops to positions held prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, and to continue its engagement in the ongoing Geneva
talks. The United States is actively working with the UN, OSCE and EU
to restore an adequate monitoring presence in the conflict zones and
maximize the participation of the international community in promoting
human rights and the unhindered provision of humanitarian aid in all of
Georgia. We are also working to convince the Russians to revisit their
decision to block the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and the OSCE
Conflict Prevention Center. We support the efforts of the EU Monitoring
Mission, welcome the Incident Response Prevention Mechanism talks which
have aided in lowering tensions in the region, and encourage Russia to
weigh on South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities to cooperate fully in
those talks.
Mr. Shuster. Since Russian military doctrine identifies NATO's
eastward enlargement as a threat to its National Security because
Former Soviet States have joined or are seeking NATO membership, how
will this affect Russian/NATO relations?
Secretary Gordon. The United States and our NATO Allies are
committed to upholding Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which
states that ``The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty
and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede
to this Treaty.'' As the President has made clear, we also stand by the
principle that all states have a right to choose their own Alliances,
and no country should have a ``sphere of privileged interests.'' At the
same time, we seek areas for practical cooperation with Russia in the
NATO-Russia Council on such issues as counter-narcotics,
counterterrorism, and Afghanistan, to name only a few. It also means
engaging with Russia in a broader security dialogue in which we seek to
reject zero-sum thinking about security in Europe and Eurasia. We
believe NATO Allies and Russia both have an interest in cooperation,
and we will continue to pursue practical cooperation and engage with
Russia in a broader dialogue about European security while maintaining
NATO's principle of an open door.
Mr. Shuster. The transit agreement made with Russia on July 6th
allows the U.S. to move troops and critical equipment to resupply
international forces in Afghanistan and to bring needed supplies to the
government and people of Afghanistan, potentially saving $133 million
annually, but at what cost is this agreement made to the strategic
flexibility of United States response to any Russian actions or
aggression during a crisis without having ``troops or critical
equipment or supplies'' delayed, halted, or detained in transit to
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gordon. The transit agreement provides the United States
with an additional avenue in the Northern Distribution Network for the
supply of the international mission in Afghanistan. If we were to lose
access to this avenue, we would continue to utilize the non-Russian
routes we have heretofore been using to move supplies to Afghanistan.
Beyond the material benefit to our resupply efforts, this agreement
also serves as an example of the potential for cooperation with Russia
and underscores the strategic importance of success in Afghanistan to
both our countries. We look forward to working with Russia bilaterally
and in multilateral fora towards a stable, prosperous Afghanistan.
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