[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-47]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PERSPECTIVE
ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN
MILITARY PARTNERSHIP
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 29, 2009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 29, 2009, Effective Counterinsurgency: The
Administration's Perspective on the Future of the U.S.-Pakistan
Military Partnership........................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 29, 2009........................................ 31
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 2009
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE
FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Boucher, Ambassador Richard A., Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State...... 7
Flournoy, Hon. Michele, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 3
Winnefeld, Vice Adm. James A., Jr., USN, Director of Strategic
Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff........................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Boucher, Ambassador Richard A................................ 42
Flournoy, Hon. Michele, joint with Vice Adm. James A.
Winnefeld.................................................. 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE
FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 29, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good afternoon. Today we have with us the
Honorable Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense; Vice Admiral James Winnefeld,
Junior, Director of the Strategic Plans and Policy for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; Ambassador Richard Boucher, Assistant
Secretary of State for the South and Central Asian Affairs for
the Department of State. We thank you for being with us and
being willing to address the future of American and Pakistan
relationship. We are expecting votes in the very near future.
And I am hopeful we can get most of your testimony in before we
have to leave to vote. And we ask your indulgence while we are
voting. This, however, will be the last series of votes today,
as I understand it.
So maybe we can expedite the hearing when we get back. This
is an extremely important, and, of course, very timely hearing,
and follows last week's hearing before this committee on this
same topic with the outstanding panel of Pakistani experts,
including General David Barno, who testified that Pakistan
presents the U.S. with its greatest global strategic challenge.
It also follows the release of the administration's latest
Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, as well as the administration's
supplemental budget request for a new Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF). Moreover, this
hearing comes at a time when there is legislation pending in
Congress that seeks to both expand U.S. assistance for Pakistan
as well as impose limitations and conditions on U.S. security
assistance to Pakistan. And as we are here today, it appears
security conditions in Pakistan have become even more
worrisome, given the Taliban's recent eastward advance from the
Swat Valley to Buner, only 60 miles or so from Islamabad.
I agree with General Barno, Pakistan may well pose the
greatest strategic challenge facing us today, with serious
implications for U.S. national security in Afghanistan as well
as the entire region. I am pleased that Congress and the region
have both prioritized issues involving Pakistan, and are
committed to strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan partnership. But
these issues are complex. Progress is not likely to come easy.
I believe the administration's recent Afghanistan-Pakistan
strategy is a step in the right direction. However, strategy
alone does not guarantee success. The administration continues
to request significant resources from Congress and the American
people for efforts in Pakistan.
Following 9/11, Pakistan has received almost $12 billion
from our country, including about $6.4 billion in Department of
Defense (DOD) Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursements. I
hope the witnesses will elaborate on the fund, that is the
Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, and tell us what military
objections it will receive and why it should fall under the
authority of the Department of Defense rather than under the
authority of the State Department. With that, I turn to my
friend, the gentleman from New York.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try
do this as quickly as possible. I would ask unanimous consent
my entire statement be entered in the record. Let me very
quickly welcome our very distinguished panelists, particularly
Madam Secretary. This is, I think, your third appearance in the
first 100 days. You must be going for a record. And you are
probably well on your way to setting that. But we thank all of
you for being here to discuss what the chairman rightfully
described as a very important issue. And certainly this hearing
is timely, as the security situation in Pakistan sadly
continues to be at best volatile.
And as you look at, as the chairman mentioned, the movement
of Taliban elements eastward towards Islamabad, some of their
activities on the streets of Lahore, we can all understand why
in her recent testimony, Secretary of State Clinton noted that
the Taliban, in her judgment, and I couldn't agree more, pose
an existential threat to that Nation. In the meantime, here on
Capitol Hill, there has been what I will call a House version
of the so-called Kerry-Lugar legislation that was recently
introduced by the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. I think it is fair to say that unlike its Senate
counterpart, this particular bill calls for what can be fairly
described as heavy limitations and conditions on U.S. security
assistance to Pakistan.
Some have expressed concerns that I share, that this
proposal as currently drafted is disrespectful of Pakistan's
sovereignty, it would unnecessarily constrain the Department of
Defense amidst what is fairly described as an already fluid and
dynamic situation in Pakistan. We are also in the process of
scrubbing the President's fiscal year 2009 wartime emergency
supplemental request, which includes Coalition Support Funds to
reimburse partner nations such as Pakistan for their efforts in
the war on terrorism. This measure also provides a new
authority and funding stream called the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, or PCCF, which is a tool,
very ably designed in my judgment, to improve the capacity and
capabilities of Pakistan's security forces to deny safe haven
and defeat Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other extremist groups within
the Pakistan territory.
Given all these events, as I noted, this committee is
rightly focused on Pakistan and the challenges before us. I
would just refer everyone who has some strange interest in my
comments of the past week, where we outlined my support of the
President's strategic direction for Pakistan, and some of the
questions and challenges that I hope we can explore that lie
ahead. With that, Mr. Chairman, as I said, let's get to the
testimony, and I will again welcome our panelists here today,
and I look forward to their comments and yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. The Honorable Michele
Flournoy, would you please lead off? And again, I know we are
asking a lot of you in your testimony before us, but it is
always so helpful. We welcome you back.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MICHELE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman
McHugh. It is good to be back and see you again. And thank you
for inviting us here today. I am glad to have the chance to
discuss efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military
partnership, which is a vital component of the Administration's
Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Let me start by laying out the
strategic context. In our recent strategy review, we went back
to the most basic question, what are our national interests in
Afghanistan-Pakistan, in that region? We concluded that we have
a vital interest in defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist allies
in the border region. We must deny them safe havens from which
to launch attacks against the United States and our allies. You
all know that the situation in Pakistan is deteriorating.
The insurgency along Pakistan's western border has been
steadily expanding, and militants are increasingly in a
position to threaten the Pakistani heartland. In the Swat
Valley, extremists have already exercised effective control.
And last week militants established bases in Buner, only 60
miles from Islamabad. With instability increasing, many
Pakistani civilians and political leaders fear violent
retaliation if they openly oppose extremist groups. Meanwhile,
opportunities are growing for Al Qaeda and its associates. From
safe havens within Pakistan, they can plan and stage attacks
against our troops in Afghanistan, and potentially against the
United States itself.
Events on the ground are unfolding rapidly. With attacks in
the Pakistani heartland increasing, Pakistan's civilian
government has come under urgent pressure to address this
growing crisis. And they are taking steps to do so, in part by
launching the recent military offensives.
The Chairman. Excuse me, could you get just a little bit
closer to the microphone, please?
Secretary Flournoy. I am sorry. In this context, further
strengthening our partnership with Pakistan, including our
military partnership, is absolutely critical. The Pakistani
Government is undertaking concrete actions to demonstrate their
commitment to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. We must
show our Pakistan partners that if they take decisive action
against extremists, we will give them the support they need. As
you know, Mr. Chairman, forging an effective partnership with
Pakistan's military has not always been straightforward.
Despite our efforts to reduce tension between Pakistan and
India, the Pakistan security forces have historically viewed
India, and not the militants, as Pakistan's most existential
threat. And they have focused their resources accordingly.
There has also been something of a trust deficit in U.S.-
Pakistan relationships.
From Pakistan's perspective, U.S. support has been
inconsistent over the years. We have oscillated between
treating Pakistan as a pariah and as a credible ally. There is
mistrust on our side too. After years of investment in
Pakistan's military, we have seen some progress in countering
violent extremism, but we have also seen many setbacks. Forging
an effective military partnership with Pakistan has also been
hampered by a relative lack of counterinsurgency capabilities
on the Pakistan side. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, we believe
that right now it is more important than ever to strengthen our
military partnership with Pakistan. We share common interests.
If the militants were to cause the Pakistani Government to
falter, this would be as devastating to the Pakistani people
and security forces as it would be for us. It also bears
emphasizing that Pakistan's security forces have made many
sacrifices in their efforts to combat insurgency. Thousands of
military personnel as well as thousands of civilians have lost
their lives. And we have had some notable successes when we
have worked closely with them. For instance, our work with the
Frontier Corps has resulted in improved cross-border
coordination, has increased their effectiveness and operations
in many agencies. But the Pakistan military still has only
limited capacity to conduct effective counterinsurgency
operations. Unless we provide them with better equipment and
training, such operations will continue to lead to short-term
progress, but not necessarily enduring results.
Last week, Mr. Chairman, you heard testimony from three
experts, all underscoring the urgency of the situation in
Pakistan. We share that sense of urgency. It is vital that we
act now to provide Pakistan with the capabilities they so
critically need. The proposed title 10 Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund is absolutely crucial to
this effort. The PCCF would give General Petraeus, the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) combatant commander, the authority
and funding required to effectively build the Pakistan
military's counterinsurgency capabilities in the kind of time
frame required. Title 10 PCCF will bring responsibilities,
authorities, and funding into alignment. The PCCF is a critical
tool that will allow our military assistance in Pakistan to be
flexible, focused, and fast, providing resources when and where
they are most needed in an urgent and rapidly evolving
situation.
With the PCCF, we can fully fund, plan, train, and equip
efforts involving Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps, its
Special Forces, and expand assistance to the Pakistani Army.
Establishing a dedicated funding stream will also signal our
seriousness and our commitment to Pakistan, which is vital at
this moment when again, Pakistan is demonstrating its
commitment to taking assertive action against insurgents. I
want to make clear that we see PCCF as complementing existing
authorities and funding streams, not replacing them.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) continues to strengthen
U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relations over the longer term, but
beyond the urgent needs the PCCF is designed to meet.
Similarly, Coalition Support Funds remain vital to sustaining
Pakistan's military tempo of operations in the border region.
We must also address the historic imbalance in funding to
Pakistan by increasing nonmilitary forms of assistance. We
fully support the establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones in Pakistan, and we are hopeful that the Kerry-Lugar bill
will help boost rule of law and sustainable economic
development efforts. Nonetheless, the title 10 PCCF is crucial
to our strategy. As General Petraeus, Ambassador Holbrooke, and
Ambassador Patterson have all noted, it is through the PCCF
that we can provide our commanders on the ground the
flexibility they need to assist the Pakistani military.
Given the rapidly changing situation on the ground, Mr.
Chairman, we do oppose rigid conditionality, such as that which
is proposed in H.R. 1886. While we applaud the goal of
increasing accountability, we believe that the bill as
currently drafted is too inflexible, and would reduce our
ability to adapt quickly as circumstances require. We are
committed to continuously evaluating our own performance as
well as that of our Pakistani partners. And to that end, we are
developing measures of effectiveness that will allow us and you
to hold us and our Pakistan partners accountable. Mr. Chairman
and other distinguished members, terrorism and insurgency in
Pakistan are growing, increasing the urgent threat to our
troops in Afghanistan and to Americans here at home. The
proposed PCCF is vital to increasing the effectiveness of our
partnership with Pakistan's security forces at this critical
moment in time. Thank you very much for having me here today.
The Chairman. Thank you again.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and
Admiral Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]
The Chairman. Admiral Winnefeld.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, DIRECTOR
OF STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Winnefeld. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and
Congressman McHugh. I would like to also thank you for the
opportunity to come testify today on ways to improve Pakistan's
counterinsurgency capability. Under Secretary Flournoy has
already covered the goals and the challenges that we face in
Pakistan. From our point of view, this is really boiling down
to a matter of Pakistani will and capability. While we use
diplomacy to build trust and buoy Pakistan's will in this very
important fight and defeating the extremist threats, our
ability and our efforts to build Pakistani counterinsurgency
capability in the middle of an ongoing fight are also a key
element of our new strategy. The Pakistani military knows that
it is a largely conventionally-based force fighting in a very
nonconventional environment.
And we have been down this road, as you very well know,
ourselves. For Pakistan, as it was for us, change has not been
easy in this type of fight or immediate. And it requires
resources. And thus Pakistan needs the equipment and the
training and the changes in doctrine that reflect the difficult
lessons that we have learned over the last eight years. Thanks
to your support, we have made some progress in our efforts to
enable Pakistan's Frontier Corps and their other forces,
including Special Forces and conventional forces, but both the
pace and the scope of our efforts need to be increased.
One way of doing this, as Under Secretary Flournoy
mentioned, is through the PCCF. This is Title 10 authority that
General Petraeus has requested, that Ambassador Patterson has
endorsed, and that the President has submitted as part of his
supplemental as essential to quickly and effectively building
Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities, again, in the middle
of a fight. It is urgently needed in this fight that is going
on right now. We believe that it will be responsive and
immediate, enabling our combatant commander General Petraeus,
who has the authority and the responsibility for this fight on
both sides of the border, to capitalize quickly on
opportunities and to plug emergent capability gaps that we
might discover.
I would say that it will support U.S. troops who are in an
ongoing effort in Afghanistan, because this threat clearly does
not respect borders in this fight. And it will complement the
other authorities that Under Secretary Flournoy mentioned that
are designed to reimburse Pakistan for their operations, that
are designed to build its long term defense capability both in
the counterinsurgency (COIN) and other environments, and to
improves its governance and development. It is very
complementary.
As I mentioned a moment ago, the Pakistanis also have to
have the will, in addition to the capability, to use the COIN
capability we give them. And in this light, I would like to
make two points. First, we believe that with increased
capability should come increased will. Current events, as we
are all watching them unfold in Buner, will be a real test for
Pakistani capability and will. And that only highlights the
need for the kind of flexible authorities that PCCF would give
to General Petraeus. We want to be prepared if there is some
emergent, unanticipated requirement that would pop up that we
need to fulfill, or if a new opportunity arises for us to be
able to work even more closely with the Pakistani security
forces. And PCCF will enable that.
Second, we believe that publicly attaching conditions to
our support will be detrimental to building Pakistani will to
fight. And it will ultimately erode the trust that we are
trying to build between our two nations. Rather, we believe
that private engagement between our senior leadership is really
the key to encouraging our partners, the Pakistanis, to use the
assistance that we give to them wisely.
So we appreciate the committee's willingness to consider
this sort of unusual enactment of authority. We believe we
can't afford to wait until next year to obtain the flexibility
and agility that it provides to General Petraeus. And
accordingly, we ask for your support in accelerating its
implementation, and we will ensure that the accountability
measures are in place so that these funds go exactly where they
are intended to go, and that is into the COIN fight. Again, I
would like to thank you and the members of the committee for
your ongoing support for our troops and their mission, and I
look forward to both your questions and your comments. Thank
you, sir.
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld and
Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]
The Chairman. Ambassador Boucher, why don't we go ahead and
ask you for your testimony, and then we will break for the
votes. I might say that the lack of full attendance here is due
to the fact that there was a caucus for the House regarding the
swine flu challenge that we have. People will be coming in
shortly after we vote. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Ambassador Boucher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
Congressman McHugh----
The Chairman. Get real close.
Ambassador Boucher [continuing]. Distinguished members of
the committee, thank you.
The Chairman. Get real close. Way up there. Way up there.
Come on.
Ambassador Boucher. I am about as close as I can without
tasting it. Thank you. It is a great pleasure to be here today
with you. And thank you for holding this hearing. I have a
slightly longer version of my remarks, but let me make a few
comments at the beginning, because my colleagues, I think, have
already laid out the context and the importance of this
program. In the strategy that the President laid out last month
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the approach that is taken was an
integrated, comprehensive approach that involves stabilizing
Pakistan and building up Afghanistan.
Overall, our success in building institutions,
strengthening governance, and ensuring economic growth is what
will produce that kind of long-term stability. But we also all
recognize that success in those areas hinges on helping
Pakistan secure itself from the dangers of spreading Al Qaeda
and Taliban insurgency. Our role in this effort is to support a
Pakistani effort to defeat Al Qaeda and successfully shut down
the safe havens in Pakistan.
We have an active dialogue with Pakistan's civilian and
military leaders. We hear from them consistently of their
commitment to take on this threat, to take on the terrorist
threat in Pakistan. But it is an ongoing effort, I think, to
see how they can carry that out and to make sure that we are
partners with them in carrying it out. And that is where
programs like this become very important. Cooperation on the
counterinsurgency has to proceed on two tracks, first by
improving the ability of Pakistani security forces to defeat
and dismantle terrorist groups, and second by extending the
reach and the legitimacy of the Pakistani Government to all
parts of their territory.
So to accomplish these goals, we are looking for this new
train and equip program, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capabilities Fund. And as my colleagues have expressed, this is
designed to be a program that can deal with the urgent
problems, that can deal with them quickly and flexibly, and
give the combatant commander the ability to deal directly with
these difficulties on both sides of the border. The State
Department is fully supportive of this fund, fully supportive
of the request for this authority to reside with the Pentagon
and the Department of Defense in the 2009 supplemental.
We think that this new authority will complement Foreign
Military Financing, which remains the foundation of long term
security assistance with Pakistan. We believe the new authority
is necessary because of the unique and extraordinary nature of
the situation we face at this moment in Pakistan. The fund
would be dual key, meaning the Secretary of State would concur
in its use. It would be time limited in order to address
immediate needs. We don't think it sets a longer term precedent
for the issues of authorities from one department to the other,
which we know we are all discussing now.
We want to do the other things that are necessary to make
this program succeed in the counterinsurgency effort. We are
proposing also to step up our assistance to strengthen police
and governing institutions in the most vulnerable areas around
Pakistan so that Pakistanis can also work on the hold part of a
clear, hold, and build strategy. So security assistance, this
kind of security assistance is only one component of a much
larger strategy. And those efforts are designed towards
creating the kind of modern, vibrant, and democratic state that
Pakistanis desire and that the U.S. looks forward to working
with as a partner in advancing stability in a key region of the
world. So I will conclude with that and be glad to take
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Boucher can be found
in the Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. Rather
than begin questions now, I think it is best that we proceed to
the floor to vote, and then we will return forthwith and carry
on. So we will be in recess.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will resume and questions will
begin. Let me ask a couple of opening questions.
Madam Secretary, there is a growing sense, at least here in
the House of Representatives, that the Coalition Support Fund
construct is not serving the interests of either our country or
Pakistan very well and the time is right to begin moving away
from that mechanism as it is. Can you recommend any alternative
constructs that can achieve the same goals and objectives and
be equally or more effective?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, the Coalition Support Funds have
been absolutely critical to providing reimbursement that
enables the Pakistan military to maintain its operations tempo
along the border with Afghanistan. Those operations are
critical to helping secure the lines of communication going
into Afghanistan, supplies supporting our troops, et cetera.
They are also critical in other ways.
So I think it is a very important mechanism. We have been
sending teams over to work closely with the Pakistanis to make
the process go better in terms of how the reimbursement gets
made, while maintaining all of the necessary accountability
measures to make sure that we in the executive branch and you
here in Congress know how the money is being spent.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Boucher, excuse me, Ambassador Boucher, what do
you want to be called?
Ambassador Boucher. You can call me anything you want to,
sir.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that
the State Department is supportive of the PCCF fund being used
through Title 10 in the Department of Defense. Am I clear?
Ambassador Boucher. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. There is some debate here in Congress about
whether this authority should be granted to the Department of
Defense or the Department of State. Could you elaborate a bit
on what is important by way of this authority to ensure that it
can be used to make a difference on the ground in Pakistan
quickly?
Ambassador Boucher. The issue of which authority to use and
for which stream of funds is, of course, something that is
being discussed on the Hill and in the administration as well.
The new administration said they want to sort out some of these
authorities and funding streams. But when we looked at this
immediate program, the decision was made to go for the route
that we felt most suited the program in the present
circumstance and most suited the need to get urgent approval
for a flexible funding mechanism that would accomplish what
this program could accomplish, meaning just get it up and
running quickly, and so this was the preferred route was to do
it under Defense Department authority. We thought that was the
best way to go about it.
The Chairman. In other words, the administration is in
favor of it, and the State Department is in favor of this fund
being used through Title 10 in the Department of Defense; is
that correct?
Ambassador Boucher. That is the way we made the request.
The Chairman. Not the Department of State; is that correct?
Ambassador Boucher. That is the way we made the request and
we support that, sir.
The Chairman. You are not for it to be in the Department of
State, right?
Ambassador Boucher. We are for it the way we asked for it,
I guess.
The Chairman. That is right. Defense Department, right?
Ambassador Boucher. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Good. Thank you. Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Given the importance of the issue I am tempted
to get a clarification of the Ambassador's statement, but I
think it was pretty well established. I am going to make a
comment about it, however. It may seem we are very closely
focused on--this is a critical issue. And I appreciated the
admiral's comments about the fact of the matter is--and I spoke
to General Petraeus yesterday--our commanders, starting with
General Petraeus, view the control and flexibilities embodied
both in the Coalition Support Funds and the PCCF as absolutely
essential and absolutely essential they be controlled through
the Department of Defense, without State Department or any
other department's filters.
And I think the fact that President Obama, as has again
been clarified--not clarified, but reaffirmed here today by our
witnesses--has to his credit listened to the commanders on the
ground and, along with the endorsement and support of
Ambassador Patterson, has asked for these funds in this fashion
is a message that cannot be overemphasized. I am deeply
concerned about rumblings coming from the Appropriations
Committee that regardless of what Congressman Berman, Chairman
Berman's bill may or may not do, there are very significant
voices on that committee working, as we speak, to put those
kinds of State Department filtering conditions on our
commanders.
So just to kind of put the cherry on the sundae, if you
will, I assume beyond Chairman Berman's bill, Madam Ambassador,
you would also oppose any similar constraints imposed to the
appropriations process? Simply put.
Secretary Flournoy. I am sorry sir, you said Madam
Ambassador, so I am not sure if it should be for me or him.
Ambassador Boucher. I think we can answer in unison.
Secretary Flournoy. We agree with the perspective.
Mr. McHugh. You are an ambassador of goodwill, Madam
Secretary, I apologize.
Secretary Flournoy. We would--I would agree with your
perspective sir.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you. Let me ask another question. There
has been discussion, media reports, Secretary Lindsey Graham--
oh, boy--Senator Lindsey Graham and I--I am just kicking people
from one department to another here today. Senator Lindsey
Graham and I have been trading phone calls. There has been
discussion about advancing some significant moneys to the
Pakistanis prior to the development and passage of the
supplemental.
Obviously both President Karzai and Zardari are going to be
in town in the very near future, and this was looked at both as
a confidence-building measure, but also something to free up
funds more quickly to get supporting dollars into Pakistan and
begin the work that I think the administration has done a
pretty good job in detailing in their proposal. Does the
administration have any position on that initiative at this
time?
Secretary Flournoy. I think this has been discussed, and I
think there is a desire for getting this funding as quickly as
possible. I think within the administration, I think the
preference is probably to accelerate the entire supplemental,
to have an earlier decision on that, and to keep these moneys
as a coherent sort of package. But I think there is definitely
a desire to have this as soon as possible. And I think it is
open for discussion.
I don't know if there is a different view on the State
Department side.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, the view is essentially the same
from the State Department. Our hope is the whole package can
move expeditiously in the supplemental. The supplemental
contained a number of elements on Pakistan economic assistance,
security assistance and some operational things that we need to
get on with right away. And I think our view is it is best if
the whole package can move quickly.
Mr. McHugh. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I will yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share the concerns
of Governor McHugh--excuse me--of Representative McHugh. I
think his term was ``unwelcome signals'' that we could send if
we include language in the legislation that is not as helpful
to the work that you all are trying to do.
I wanted to ask, it seems like, Madam Secretary,
Ambassador, that we also need to have some positive signals
that we send to the Pakistani people. As I look ahead, I don't
know how far off, 15 years, 20 years, 8 years, I can foresee a
time when we will look at our relationship with Pakistan as
being one of the really strong economic cultural relationships.
I mean it has that kind of potential. I am always reassured
when I pull out those pictures of those lawyers in coats and
ties demonstrating for the rule of law in the streets of
Pakistan. It seems to me that we have a lot of common shared
values.
And my question is, what other things can we be doing to
send positive signals that this is more than just our desire to
have a military ally at a time that we need military help?
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, that is a very important point. I
think part of it is the strategy that is the administration
presented and that you see in the Kerry-Lugar bill and the
House bill as well, that we know that we need to beef up, do
more on the economic and institutional side so that we can help
Pakistan modernize its institutions of government, modernize
its education system, modernize its economy so that people see
the benefits of this.
There is a group I talked to not too long ago. One of the
Pakistani colonels in the group said, you need to offer people
something more than war. And we need to offer them peace. We
need to offer them prosperity. And indeed if you look at the
whole region strategically, the opportunities that a stable
Pakistan that is free from terrorism opens up economically, in
terms of relations with India, in terms of access rights to
Central Asia, in terms of stability between the Middle East and
the Far East, are enormous. And I think we do have that long-
term interest in Pakistan and in the people of Pakistan. We
just need to make that part of our rhetoric, but also part of
our programs.
Dr. Snyder. As you look back in the relationship in the
last few years, I had occasion to talk with some Pakistani
friends a few weeks ago, and they were going back far enough, I
didn't know what the details were, but it was like in the last
year, two or three, and they expressed concerns that they felt
like we had not followed through on some things that we had
told them we would do as far as military equipment or those--
something like that.
Do they have some merit to the fact that we didn't follow
through like perhaps we had led them to think we would?
Ambassador Boucher. I guess I would say we probably did
follow through, but we didn't necessarily follow through as
fast as they wanted. I look at the challenges that they face,
and especially that the new democratic government has faced
since last March when they came into place. They are dealing
with an economic crisis, a political crisis of stabilizing
democracy, and a huge security crisis all at the same time.
Every single one of these needs is urgent.
And we have tried to come through for them in a lot of
ways, but some of these things take time to fund and procure
and deliver. And so I think they are right in saying, hey, we
need it now. And that is one reason why we are coming to you
with this program because this is a way to get now to the
people who are out there fighting the insurgency. Pakistan's
military just this week is pushing back against these
encroachments.
Dr. Snyder. I would encourage them if they think that we
have made some promises--like our constituents, let us know if
they think there is a problem.
The last question is, it seems like if I were a Pakistani
military leader, it would be very difficult for me to figure
out how to be as involved as perhaps we would like to be in the
area along the Afghanistan border, given their great concern
with the potential tension with India. Is there a way that the
Pakistani-Indian relationships can improve, apart from what is
going on in this war against terrorism, or do they go hand in
hand? I address that to you, either one of you.
Ambassador Boucher. I think there are a lot of ways that
the Pakistani-India relationship can improve. And, one, we have
seen a lot of progress over the last few years, Pakistanis and
Indians both pushing forward new ideas in trying to solve some
of the issues. The issue of terrorism, though, is central to
this.
The Mumbai bombings carried out by a group that was based
in Pakistan really disrupted the progress that was going on.
And one of the best ways to improve Pakistan's relations with
India is to see Pakistan carry through on what they have
started, and that is to prosecute and disband, eliminate the
group that was responsible for the Mumbai bombings.
India is going through an election right now. But I hope
that when the new government comes in, that they will see the
progress on terrorism and they will be able to work with
Pakistan to try and reestablish some of that broader progress.
Reduction of tensions, improvement of economic ties, people-to-
people ties, all that I think would benefit not only stability
in the region but also the fight against terrorism in the
region.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before I ask Mr. Coffman, let me ask the fact that Taliban
forces have seized an area. I think some 60 miles from
Islamabad, is that of great concern to you, Madam Secretary?
Secretary Flournoy. It is of concern and it is an example
of some of these militant groups moving out of the northwest
territories and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
and into what I refer to as the Pakistani heartland. I think
the attacks against the cricketers, the attacks on Lahore, we
have seen a number of these examples, are part of what is
contributing to a shift in the level of concern and the
determination to do something about this on the part of both
Pakistan's leaders and ordinary Pakistani citizens.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is,
I have seen analyses that show that 80 percent of the Pakistani
military is focused on its border with India, in the Kashmir
area, that that is their orientation.
One question is, has that changed? And the second is, what
initiatives does the United States have to defuse the situation
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir so that we can get them
to focus in on the Taliban?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, if you don't mind, I will defer
the military lay-down question to my colleague and just note
that I think on the India-Pakistan question, I think part of
the strategy that we laid out is very much of an intensive
diplomatic engagement not only with Afghanistan-Pakistan, but
also all the countries in the region, to try to reduce tensions
where they exist, to enable some shifts in resources to deal
with this problem of extremism on the border. But I will let my
colleagues comment on the details.
Admiral Winnefeld. First, to comment on the exact number of
troops and whether they are shifting or not inside Pakistan, in
this unclassified forum, would probably be unwise. But I will
say that the Pakistanis do have around 100,000 troops in the
western area. And it is my sense from talking with my boss, who
does an awful lot of military diplomacy with his counterparts
in the region, that there is a desire on the part of Pakistan
to move to the west. And it is just about building trust, which
is clearly a public diplomacy and a military diplomacy task
that we are taking on and we have been taking on, and we
believe we are gradually building that trust.
It is sort of two steps forward, one step back sometimes.
And there are setbacks when things like Mumbai occur, which
sort of tend to make people fix in place or even add troops and
other pieces of military equipment in the areas we would rather
not see them.
But our sense is the Pakistani military ``gets it,'' that
they understand where the real threat to their nation's
stability exists, but they continue to be worried about their
perennial concern, which is India. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. We have had testimony before this committee
that seems to suggest that funding institutions, such as the
police and the Frontier Corps, are more effective than funding
the regular Army in counterinsurgency. And in this funding, do
we have the ability to be specific as to what entities we fund,
or are we simply giving it to the Pakistani Government?
Admiral Winnefeld. That is one of the great things about
this authority, is that it really leaves the determination in
our hands and General Petraeus' hands, with Ambassador
Patterson clearly having a very, very important input, along
with the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan
(ODRP) commander, Admiral LeFever, as to us funneling this
money specifically towards counterinsurgency capability, with
specific equipment, that we determine what will be purchased
for the Pakistanis and also the training side as well. Yes,
sir.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could just add, PCCF as a Title 10
authority, is available to support the Frontier Corps, the
special operations forces, and we would propose also expanding
to the army forces that are in that border region. But critical
to a broader counterinsurgency strategy is also building police
capacity, but that would be done under separate authorities and
funding streams that are in the State Department's purview
through their International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
program.
Ambassador Boucher. In the supplemental request that we
have presented, there is another $65 million for the police and
Frontier Corps, about $40 million specifically for the police.
And that would be added to some other programs that we have
this year, and we hope next year, to really focus on building a
stronger police capability in that area because what we are--
part of the counterinsurgency is to allow the government to
maintain control in areas that the military has been able to
clear out, and that is a very important priority for us and, I
have to say, for the Pakistanis as well.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith, please.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up a little
bit on the counterinsurgency piece and our strategy there,
first of all, tell us a little bit about how we get the
Pakistani military and police to the point where we feel
confident in their ability to engage in counterinsurgency. How
far off are we? What do you see as the main challenges there?
Because it certainly seems critical. It is the cornerstone of
counterinsurgency, by, through, and with the local population
and the local law enforcement, as opposed to our hand. And that
is particularly true in Pakistan, given how the Pakistani
people feel about us.
What is the path forward in terms of getting them to the
level of capability they need to be effective everywhere,
including the FATA, throughout the whole region?
Secretary Flournoy. Let me start and the admiral may want
to add. I think there are many dimensions to this. The first is
equipment. They have focused most of their equipment
acquisitions on their deterrent capacity vis-a-vis other
neighbors, particularly India. They have not focused their
equipping efforts on counterinsurgency. And there are some
different kinds of capabilities that they need there.
But, as important, is training and you know as we have
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, these operations require
different mind-sets, certainly different doctrine, different
skill sets sometimes, different kinds of leadership ability. So
I think the training and education piece is just as important
as the equipment piece, and giving them the ability to do
population-focused military operations where securing the
population is really at the heart of what they do.
Mr. Smith. On that point, sorry to interrupt, but how
confident are we in our intelligence or in Pakistani
intelligence on getting to know those critical populations, to
know who the community leaders are, who the tribal leaders are,
who we can work with? Because certainly that was the key in
Iraq, was finding members of the local population who were
willing to turn on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
I am not as confident that we have that same level of
knowledge, or even necessarily that we are working towards that
level of knowledge in the critical areas in the lawless regions
of Pakistan. What is our plan for dealing with that?
Secretary Flournoy. I think historically--I don't think
that there has been a deep understanding of the sort of
cultural demographics, if you will, of that area. I think that
certainly as with the Frontier Corps there with Pakistan, the
government moving more, starting to focus more on that region,
move people and resources into that region, that is starting to
improve. They are gaining knowledge as they go and so forth.
But I think that is an area where improvement could be made.
Mr. Smith. And is that an area where within DOD or within
our Intel Community we are planning to ramp up our efforts to
gather information on our side, either supply----
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, sir, I can't really comment on the
Intel side of it because it is sort of out of my purview.
Mr. Smith. We had testimony last week on this subject with
some outside experts, including Mr. Kilcullen who is very much
an expert on these issues. And he basically, he made the
statement that the Predator strikes were counterproductive;
that basically you are going for counterinsurgency, building
support with the population.
I don't think I agree with that, but certainly there is a
point at which if we are doing counterinsurgency correctly, if
we are building sufficient support within the local population
to confront the problem that way, they do become
counterproductive.
Is that something that you have contemplated in terms of
our strategy there, our unilateral actions, and ramping that
down to build up population support and to build up the
Frontier Corps's strength in that area?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I don't mean to be unresponsive,
but I don't feel--I don't think it is a good thing for me to
comment on in an open session. But we would be happy to talk to
you in a closed session on that.
Mr. Smith. Fair enough. Last question has to do something
with what Mr. Snyder was raising, and that is sort of the trust
gap between Pakistan and the United States. And I guess this
would be for the Ambassador.
What are the most important things we can do to try to
build up the Pakistani trust? There has been excessive focus on
our side, with our lack of trust in them, which of course only
exacerbates the other problem. But in terms of exchanges, in
terms of different things our government could do to try and
build and strengthen our relationship with Pakistan, are there
suggestions that you would have for us?
Ambassador Boucher. I guess I would say that the most
important thing is to come through on a broad program that
actually does improve education and help them economically and
help them meet their energy needs and help them build
institutions of government that they need and help the police
provide security for people. If we can help the Pakistani
Government deliver what its people want, then I think that
builds the level of public as well as governmental trust
between the two countries. And so that is one of the thrusts of
the program.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of
you. I know that it is always difficult to speak to kind of
theoretical questions. But related to any possibility that
there being a breakdown in Pakistan's military hierarchy,
whether it is Taliban or whoever it might be, that could either
gain through a loyalty breach or through a force of arms,
control of some or all of Pakistan's military weapons,
especially their nuclear weapons. And I am not sure what you
can say in this venue.
But, Admiral, what do you think should be our greatest
concern there, our greatest focus?
Admiral Winnefeld. First of all, I would tell you that we
believe that the Pakistani military is a very stable
organization that is well led. General Kiyani has a very good
relationship with Admiral Mullen, and vice versa, and you know
that he has been over there many times over the last year. I
have lost count; I think it is up to nine. And he has gotten,
he has built a very deep sense for this organization and an
affinity for it as well.
And I think he would be the first to say that he is not
concerned about the Pakistani military breaking down per se in
the face of a Taliban influx or an assault upon the military
organization itself.
So I think that the thing we need to make sure that we
continue to do is to build the trust that we do with the
Pakistani military. And we do that in many ways: through the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program,
which is absolutely critical--as you know, we had a 12-year gap
there and we are trying to recover from that--by coming through
on what we agreed to deliver to them, by also holding them
accountable in private, by continuing our training programs
that we do for them. And it is really across a broad spectrum
of building trust and buttressing their military to (a) be a
good strong COIN force and (b), be a very responsible actor
inside Pakistan. Those are the things we need to concentrate
the most, I think.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir. And thank you for your service
to this country, to say the least.
Ms. Flournoy, I guess I will put the question to you in a
little different way, because obviously you have even the same
goal that the admiral does, but just a different mechanism.
Secretary Clinton stated this week, and I am quoting, she
said, one of our concerns which we have raised with the
Pakistani Government and military is that if the worst, the
unthinkable were to happen and this advancing Taliban
encouraged and supported by Al Qaeda and other extremists were
to essentially topple the government for failure to beat them
back, then we would have to--they would have the keys to the
nuclear arsenal of Pakistan, unquote.
And then she goes on to say, we can't even contemplate
that, we cannot let this go on any further, which is why we are
pushing so hard for the Pakistanis to come together around the
strategy to take their country back. And unquote here again.
What is the Department, from your perspective, doing about
the, quote, unthinkable, and specifically understanding and
controlling Pakistan's nuclear stockpile? And what are we doing
to contemplate and come up with a strategy to ensure nuclear
weapons don't fall into the hands of Al Qaeda?
It is a little twist on the question I asked the admiral
but, of course, some of the diplomatic approaches are obviously
different from the military. What are we doing there to really
make sure that we are protecting this country, and essentially
the world, from those weapons falling into the hands of the bad
guys?
Secretary Flournoy. First of all, I would say I think we
have to be concerned anywhere where there is a potential for
instability in a nuclear armed state, be it Pakistan or
anywhere else. I think the first thing we are doing is, as
Admiral Winnefeld described, is we are raising the issue, we
are talking about it, we are emphasizing the importance of
Pakistan's responsibility for the security of its weapons. And
as the admiral said, I think they are focused on this and they
take it very seriously and they have actually invested a
substantial amount of resources and time and effort in recent
years to improve the security of their arsenal.
So I think that it is something that we focus attention on,
on our side, in our thinking about contingencies and such. But
it is also something that we consistently raise in dialogue
with them, and we try to ensure that we are there to work with
them to make sure that that focus remains. But I think that it
is definitely in everybody's mind and there is no lack of
attention being paid to it.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For some time now,
we have been underfunding State's activities generally,
worldwide, that are important to us as far as maintaining
relationships, developing intelligent sources, et cetera, is
concerned.
Frankly, funding to the State Department is an easy target
politically. It is easy to cut that stuff and say that we need
to be spending money here at home as opposed to abroad for any
number of different reasons.
I have suggested for some time that perhaps we think about
funneling money through DOD to State Department-type activities
as perhaps a mechanism to have a sustained, politically
sustainable over the long haul way of addressing long-term
security needs that can only be met by developing the right
kind of partnerships, the right kind of relationships
worldwide.
We can't do this ourselves. We have got to have our
partners like the Pakistanis furthering our strategic interests
and securing nukes basically in this instance and pursuing Al
Qaeda generally. And I kind of see it heading in that direction
and, in that sense, positive.
I am a little worried, though, that you seem to be pretty
adamantly opposed to H.R. 1886 because of rigid conditionality,
I think is the term that one of you used in testimony. What are
the conditions in H.R. 1886 that have been proposed that would
somehow constrain your ability to act in a way that you find
unacceptable?
Obviously, everybody would like to just have a free hand,
you know. Congress, give us the money, we will do the right
thing with that money, trust us. Congress has the obligation,
though, to make sure that money is to be spent appropriately,
so some conditions were apparently proposed that you all don't
find acceptable. And I am curious to know what those conditions
would be.
Secretary Flournoy. I think that our concern was that the
wording of some of the Presidential certification requirements
was--to our reading, it seemed very absolute and inflexible. So
that if we are making progress but we weren't at the end state
yet, we are still not at the end state, so no assistance. We
are worried about the way things were worded.
Mr. Marshall. If I could interrupt. Have you already, in
writing, let the bill's authors know what your concerns are?
Does the committee to which it has been assigned know what your
concerns are?
Secretary Flournoy. Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen
have written a joint letter, actually, to Chairman Skelton and
to Mr. McHugh, expressing our concerns about the bill;
applauding the bill for its desired increased assistance to
Pakistan, and to do so in a comprehensive and integrated way,
but voicing concern about some of the specifically inflexible
language on conditionality and so forth. So we are supportive
of the spirit but have concerns about how it is actually
operationalized in the bill.
Mr. Marshall. I see it is in writing, so I don't need to
further pursue that line of questioning. I will just read what
you have written. I appreciate that.
We are going about this business, once again, taking the
lead. And it may be that we are the sole actor that is doing
this, and as a consequence it will be American tax dollars and
American personnel executing this.
Who are we teaming up with? Obviously, Pakistan's stability
is of interest to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the entire world, really. And Nunn-Lugar proposes 1.5 billion
of additional dollars for the next 5 years. It just seems to me
we ought to have a lot of international partners working with
us.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, we do. And you may want to
elaborate on this, Ambassador. But at our urging, our allies,
the Japanese actually just hosted a donors conference for
Pakistan in Tokyo that raised--I think it was $5.6 billion in
international pledges. So we are not alone in this.
Coming out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review, we
really sought to rally others around our desire to strengthen
the Pakistani Government and to offer various assistance
efforts. I don't know if you want to elaborate on that.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, I think there is a lot of
international concern about Pakistan. And the conference in
Tokyo did overpledge the amount that was required. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified a shortfall of
about $4 billion that was going to be needed for balance of
payments, budgetary and program support for Pakistan, to get
them through the economic crisis. And in Tokyo we came in for
$1 billion, the Japanese came in for $1 billion; the Saudis
were in for $700 million; the rest of the Gulf Emirates was
300-plus. So $1 billion from the Gulf. Europeans were
substantial.
Some of the other countries that didn't pledge anything
new, like China, are already fairly substantial supporters to
the Pakistanis. So I think there was very broad international
support, final number. I think the way the IMF counted it was
$5\1/4\ billion against an original target of $4 billion. So I
think there is substantial support as well as international
concern, and the two go together.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of
the panel, for joining us today. I wanted to follow up a little
bit on the letter that was sent to Admiral Mullen and Secretary
Gates concerning the whole Pakistani issue. But I want to focus
in on the international military education and training aspect
of that. And I also want to include in that a conversation I
recently had with General Zinni, who was former CENTCOM
commander, and looking at the utility of that particular
program. And it was pointed out by both the Secretary and
Admiral Mullen that has been critical in the past and they see
it as being important into the future.
I wanted to get your viewpoints about will these programs
be increased? Will they be enhanced? How will we apply these to
try to make sure that we have that sort of training,
integration of thought process with U.S. forces and Pakistani
forces? And what we are seeing today are officers at the junior
grade that haven't been through those training programs. And we
are seeing now a difference between the senior officer corps
and the junior officer corps. And I am wondering what your
thoughts are on where this is going. Where do we look to
enhance that, and what utility will that have on our success
there in Pakistan?
Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir. Without using up too much of
your time with specifics, I will tell you that Admiral Mullen
is an extremely strong supporter of the IMF program. He came
back from one of his trips one time, really energizing the
staff to pour more attention and time into buffing that program
up essentially so that it would accomplish more of the things
that you are describing.
I think we have 37, if I am not mistaken, Pakistani IMET
students in the United States right now. That is sort of a
long-term program in the sense they come over for an extended
period of time. And in order to get more leverage and more
exposure to the exact group of Pakistani officers you are
speaking about, we would like to get some of them and some of
their noncommissioned officers over for shorter periods to
expose them. And we believe we are going to start seeing some
success in doing that. And there are other programs that we are
trying to ramp up in order to get that done.
So I think the short answer is we understand this. We
really want to get at that--particularly that tranche of
officers that did not have the exposure. And it is a very
important program for us.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could just clarify, the PCCF
authority proposal does not at all affect IMET. In fact, we are
increasing our request for IMET. PCCF will allow more
operational types of training but it is a complementary effort,
not a replacement to IMET.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Secretary Flournoy, a question
about the integration of different efforts there in Pakistan.
We know there has been a lot of talk, and we had a panel that
testified before us last week suggesting that there has been
maybe an overreliance on the military strength through the U.S.
intervention there in the region, and that maybe we ought to
look at some additional efforts along the development side or
the implementation of what they call soft power.
I just wanted to get your thoughts about how do you
integrate both of those efforts to be successful in those
regions, to make sure that we not only provide security but we
look at security in sustainable ways as it relates to the other
aspects of Pakistan and its economy?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, when we came up with a budget
proposal that is in the 2009 supplemental, and then also what
is in 2010, we very much came at it from a holistic
perspective. And so you see the bulk of the assistance on the
civilian side to do things like rule of law assistance,
economic development assistance, police, et cetera. The
military piece is a portion of that. And it comes in several
flavors.
But I think we do have a holistic perspective. We in
Washington have worked the interagency process very hard to get
coherence. And then in the person of--combination of Ambassador
Holbrooke, who will be looking at a regional perspective, and
Ambassador Patterson and our folks on the ground, they will be
very much looking to ensure those things work together.
Secretary Flournoy. I can tell you that the military piece
is very much designed to help create the security environment
in which the governance and development assistance can be more
effective.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield the
balance of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor, please.
Mr. Taylor. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for being
with us, Admiral, Ambassador. I am just curious, I do come from
a part of the world where $400 million is still a lot of money.
What is it you think we accomplish with that 400 million? What
is your level of confidence at the end of the day it has made a
difference, that anything has changed favorably our way? Or is
this just a very small down payment on something we are going
to be asked to provide a heck of a lot of money for in the very
near future?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I think that as the Pakistan
leadership, both civilian and military, become more focused on
this threat and more willing to deal with it, I think our
ability to help them develop the capabilities to be effective
is going to be that much more crucial. And so what we are
talking about is, in the PCCF, is moneys that can help train
and equip the Frontier Corps, the Special Operations forces,
but now expand also to the Army forces in the area. And that
can give them very specific capabilities, equipment and
training that they lack that are essential to effective
counterinsurgency.
So I think this is something that we have been working
piecemeal by putting together a patchwork of authorities and
trying to take little bites out of the apple. What the PCCF
will allow us to do is take much more concerted and coherent
approach to getting further down this road much faster.
Ambassador Boucher. Sir, if I could just add to that,
because I have gone out to the border areas a number of times,
and I remember a trip I was down south in the area across from
Helmand, where the U.S. forces are going in, working with some
people from the Frontier Corps, going out to visit forts that
we had actually built along various infiltration routes. And
talking to the commander of one of these forts, I said do you
have night vision goggles? Do you have body armor for your
troops? And he said we have a very small amount, and we switch
it between different places, different forts on different
nights depending upon where we think the smugglers or the
infiltration might occur. And I think what this program is
designed to do is to sort of make sure they can all have their
body armor, that they can all get out there and do what has to
be done in a more coherent and concerted way. So it is really
trying to do this in a systematic way, and not just as the
Under Secretary said, sort of the hodgepodge that we have done
before.
Mr. Taylor. And again, I will presume you have spent years
in that area and I haven't stepped foot in Pakistan. But from
everything I read, it seems to me that Pakistani Government
considers India their primary threat, Taliban not to be a
threat. So that runs counterproductive to what you just said.
Night vision goggles to protect themselves from what, the
people they don't consider a threat?
Ambassador Boucher. These are people that are on the
infiltration routes in and out of Afghanistan.
Mr. Taylor. Right, but they don't consider that
infiltration route to be a problem.
Ambassador Boucher. No, they do. It is just they are not
equipped to deal with the problem. And I think what this
program tries to do is equip them to deal with it.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I think what you describe is
historically accurate. I think there really is a shift taking
place as these attacks come into the heartland of Pakistan, and
as, you know, they threaten the Punjabi territory and so forth.
I think it is also very important to see this in the context of
the fact that, you know, this is an integrated theater, this
border region. And we have tens of thousands of troops on the
Afghan side. Part of preventing attacks coming from Pakistan
across that border is helping the Pakistanis to be more
effective in securing the border, denying that area as a safe
haven, establishing security for the population in those areas,
and securing the lines of communication. That has a direct
impact on our forces in Afghanistan. And now that there is
greater willingness on the Pakistani side to address this, I
think we have to support them in being more effective because
it will affect us in very concrete ways.
Mr. Taylor. In the short time I have remaining, has anyone
in the Pakistani Government actually asked for this money, and
if so, whom?
Admiral Winnefeld. To our knowledge, they are not asking
for the money, they are asking for us to help them with their
capability.
Mr. Taylor. Who? What is the name, what is the title?
Admiral Winnefeld. General Petraeus is asking for----
Mr. Taylor. No, no, in the Pakistani Government, who in the
Pakistani Government, the name and the title, is asking for
this?
Admiral Winnefeld. General Kiyani. General Kiyani, sir, is
asking for us to dramatically enhance his Armed Forces, the
Frontier Corps, the Special Forces that he has, and in fact,
the Eleventh Corps, their ability to do counterinsurgency. He
has lost 1,400 killed in action along the border region. He has
lost a lot more people out west than he has against India, and
he knows it. He realizes, and the entire government is
beginning to realize more and more that this is the real
immediate threat. At the same time, they are still worried
about India. And we would love for them to worry less about
India and more about the west, but they are definitely raising
their awareness of and their concern about what is happening in
the west.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here today. I agree with Dr. Snyder. I am hopeful for
Pakistan. I visited the country a number of times. And the
people I have met there are very dynamic. There are 30 million,
possibly 40 million middle class people, significant high level
of education. I have had the opportunity to meet with
parliamentarians on my visits there. And also we have a number
of members of the parliament from Islamabad come and visit
here. Every time I am really impressed at the dedication of the
people that I have had the opportunity to meet. I have also had
the opportunity, with the earthquake relief in 2005, to visit
with U.S. Marines who were working with the Pakistani military.
And the military impressed me as very professional, very well
organized.
And so I am just again hopeful, but I have also seen
tragedy. I had the opportunity, sadly, to have breakfast at the
home with Benazir Bhutto a month and a day prior to her murder.
And so I want the best for that country. And Admiral Winnefeld,
last week when we had a hearing, there was concern expressed
that Pakistan is actually on a trajectory toward becoming a
failed state. In general, we have been discussing this the
whole time, but what specifically can we do to develop a
strategic partnership with that country to succeed? Actually,
any of you if you would like to.
Secretary Flournoy. I think those words are very important,
strategic partnership. I think one of the things we have got to
do is move out of a very transactional relationship to
investment in a strategic partner and a long-term program to
invest in strengthening Pakistan's political and social
institutions, strengthening their military, and their ability
to provide security within their own borders, strengthening
their economy and so forth. The stability of that country is so
important to our interests and to the region. I think that we
have to engage as a priority at all levels, using all
instruments, from diplomacy to assistance to military
engagement and so forth. And I think, again, this is one of the
primary insights that has come out of the strategy. And I think
we are trying to move out in that direction. But we do need
help. We do need the tools to be effective in doing that.
Mr. Wilson. And I have served twice as the co-chair of the
India caucus. And I have made the points to our friends of
India and our ally of India that the country that would benefit
most from a stable Pakistan is India. And Secretary Boucher,
you have indicated that there have been steps towards a better
relationship between the two countries. What can we do to
promote an improvement in relations between two countries that
it would be in their mutual interest that each be successful?
Ambassador Boucher. I think U.S. encouragement helps them
achieve the kind of progress that they have made in the past.
There are more concrete things that we do. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) has been involved in the follow-up to
the Mumbai bombings on both the Indian side and the Pakistani
side to try to get the facts out, try to get the prosecutions
under way, try to help them deal with this problem, eliminate
the further threat of terrorists from these people and move on.
And then I think, frankly, the more we do to help Pakistan deal
with the terrorist problem, the more we open up opportunities
for India and Pakistan to cooperate.
Mr. Wilson. What is the status of trade relationship
between the two countries?
Ambassador Boucher. It is open for a slightly increasing
list of goods. There is a lot of potential there should we say.
There is probably a lot of trade that goes in and out of the
gulf. But there is, I think, very identifiable trade
opportunities that both would like to take advantage of.
Mr. Wilson. And what is the status of assisting in any way
education? Are we helping in any way the educational--the
schools in Pakistan?
Ambassador Boucher. We are. It has been a priority for
previous programs. We have done a lot of it for many years
through budget support. Last year we moved this into specific
projects that we were funding. But I think in terms of the new
budgets, the new amounts that are being requested, that would
be a very high priority.
Mr. Wilson. And in the past, that has been a real problem
of the lack of education and extremists taking over the system.
So thank you all for your service.
Ambassador Boucher. Exactly. If I could just say the goal
is to create a good public education sister testimony so it
draws kids out of madrassas and into the modern sector of life
and society and the economy.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Before I call on Mr. Kissell, let me ask is
it not true that the key to success in Afghanistan is full
cooperation with Pakistan? Or I should say by Pakistan?
Secretary Flournoy. I do think that cooperation with
Pakistan is critical to our success in Afghanistan. And I think
that enabling them to help apply pressure on their side of the
border in dealing with this extremist threat is absolutely
crucial to success over the long haul.
The Chairman. We don't want to even speak of Pakistan
becoming a failed state, but what if they become as fully
ineffective in helping us with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and
the criminal element? What about our conflict in Afghanistan
under those circumstances?
Secretary Flournoy. I think the more that either side of
the border becomes a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other
extremists, the more difficult it is for us--the more difficult
it will be for us to achieve stability and security in our
objectives on either side of the border.
The Chairman. At what point do we say since you are not
helping us as much as you can, we will not allow a safe haven
to exist?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I don't know how to answer that
question. I think it is----
The Chairman. But it is a real question.
Secretary Flournoy. It is a real question. And I think our
job is to try to avoid getting to that point. We have
opportunities I think to make that a more remote possibility by
investing in the capacity and capability of Pakistan to avoid
the kind of outcome that you are describing. And I think that
is the primary course of action that we should be taking.
The Chairman. Bottom line, doesn't it amount to the will of
the Pakistani Government to get their house in order?
Secretary Flournoy. I think there is a will component and a
capability component. And I think the more effective we help
them to be in addressing the insurgency when they choose to
address it, which they are doing right now, the more that will
build political will to keep on down that path.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here today. Madam Secretary and Mr. Ambassador, recently
in Afghanistan, I had a chance to visit. And numbers given to
us for polling numbers independent of the government or
military, this came from evidently media, listed support for
the Taliban in Afghanistan being below 10 percent, single digit
numbers. How strong is the support for the Taliban not in
Pakistan in general, but in the region where they have recently
been so active? How strong is the local support for these
people? And also I saw a news account this weekend that
indicated that parts of the Pakistan Government said here, you
can have this, just leave us alone over here. How true was that
and how--what does that mean to us?
Ambassador Boucher. I think probably support for Taliban
groups in this area, in the border areas of Pakistan is
probably higher than it might be in Afghanistan. They are
rooted in tribes, culture, and history, in traditional
opposition to governing authority. At the same time, when you
talk to people up there, you hear they want schools for their
kids, they want hospitals, they want roads, they want job
opportunities. And I think if the government can deliver those,
people want to side with the government.
Now, it has been dangerous to do that. There have been
hundreds of tribal leaders who have stood up over the last year
or two in various meetings and supported the government, trying
to get rid of the Taliban, and they have been killed. The
Taliban have killed at least 200, I think last year, tribal
leaders. So it is very dangerous to stand up and side with the
government. But there are substantial portions of the
population that want to do that. The idea that maybe, well, you
know, if we just left them alone, they could stay up there and
not cause us any trouble, that kind of goes back on and off to
British days. And it has never worked.
It didn't work for the British, hasn't worked for this
government. And particularly right now when you see these
groups trying to push into other areas and take over other
parts of the country, the government I think is feeling that
they really do have to assert governmental authority. And that
is what this is all about in many ways.
Mr. Kissell. Admiral, we had a group last week and I asked
this question to them, as we are successful in Afghanistan does
that help or hurt Pakistan in terms of its ability to fight the
Taliban? Would it mean that the Taliban would concentrate more
there? Just what would it mean?
Admiral Winnefeld. That is a very difficult--we are looking
through a glass darkly when we are trying to foresee the answer
to that. But I think we can safely say that as we are
successful in Afghanistan, it is possible that some of the
Taliban will be driven back over the border, which the
Pakistanis are very concerned about.
I would add, as a side note, that having authority like
PCCF to enable us in an agile way, enable General Petraeus to
help enable the Frontier Corps, for example, and we are going
to move that effort into the south eventually where we are
going to try to strengthen the capability of the Frontier Corps
in the south, and the Ambassador alluded earlier to how really
poor they are in just the basic needs, just being able to move
from point A to point B somehow other than being on foot down
there is very difficult for them.
So strengthening them down there will help Pakistan, and it
will help sort of sandwich the Taliban who might be tempted to
leave Afghanistan if they are losing in the south, as we are
confident that they will be this summer and this fall once we
get additional forces in place. On the other hand, anywhere we
can beat the Taliban we are going to beat them. And we believe
that we wouldn't want to let up at all in southern Afghanistan
in order to prevent, you know, them from going back across the
border. That is why we want to work closely with Pakistan, we
want to use authorities like PCCF to strengthen them and get
this job done.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
panel. The first question kind of ties into what Chairman
Skelton said in the very beginning. He just mentioned that the
Taliban are 60 miles outside of the Pakistani capital. And I
have heard the words trust, diplomacy, good will, strategic
partnership, but I haven't heard much, maybe the Admiral can
answer this, about closing with and destroying the enemy
through firing and close combat as the Marines do, which is
what they need right now. The $400 million isn't going to do
anything for that, nothing, about what is going on now. So what
is going on now? What are we doing right now to help them? If
you can talk about it in this venue.
Admiral Winnefeld. Yeah, I think in the most unclassified
manner of speaking, the Pakistanis, as you can read in the
press, are moving into that area in an attempt to eliminate the
Taliban presence, the extremist presence in Buner. That is
going to be a difficult job for them, partly because we believe
that it is possible the insurgents are trying to entrench
themselves in that area and they are going to be hard to root
out like insurgents are anywhere, as you well know. And what we
are doing is listening to the Pakistanis. If they are going to
ask for a request for support we are going to listen very
carefully. And again, having authority like PCCF would help us
respond to requests like that very quickly. If they were to
request--if there were an unanticipated need that were to
emerge, whether it be training----
Mr. Hunter. Are you saying you can't do that now, you can't
fulfill those needs without the PCCF right now?
Admiral Winnefeld. We are less able do it now than we can
if we have the PCCF, that is correct.
Mr. Hunter. Not to belabor the PCCF, but we are talking
about that a lot, General Petraeus said that the PCCF, in a
letter that I have here, is integral to the success of Enduring
Freedom because it enables the commanders on the ground to do
what they need to do when they need to do it. And this is for
all of you. Do you think that if the State Department had
control of this that it would be inserting the State Department
into the military chain of command, which is so integral to
have quick, efficient operations on the ground?
Admiral Winnefeld. I wouldn't want to paint it in that
negative of a light. I think it is appropriate that for an
ongoing combat operation, where General Petraeus is
responsible, has the authority and responsibility on both sides
of that border, for whatever we can do to make that fight go
the way it needs to go. A real no kidding, ongoing fight, that
it is appropriate for the military from ODRP to General
Petraeus up through the chain to have the responsibility, and
therefore the resources in order to do that. I would add that
Ambassador Patterson is a very important piece of this, and
that she is the chief of mission, she understands what is going
on on the ground, and she will have a direct influence on how a
PCCF would be employed. But we believe that General Petraeus
should have the authority to use these funds.
Mr. Hunter. Unilaterally, through his chain of command.
Admiral Winnefeld. I think ``unilaterally'' is the wrong
word.
Mr. Hunter. The Department of Defense down from the
President, with that military chain of command.
Secretary Flournoy. The way I would say it is that the best
way to align the authorities, responsibilities, and funding is
to make PCCF a title 10 authority. And I don't think there is
any disagreement between the Department of Defense and
Department of State on that at this time, particularly in the
urgent period of the 2009 supplemental. And I think everybody
recognizes that alignment is what is needed to be operationally
responsive on the ground, particularly in a battle zone. The
closest analogy is the kind of authorities we have provided to
build and support the Afghan National Security Forces and the
Iraqi Security Forces. We need something comparable here on
both sides of the Afghan border to be effective.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Boucher. I think I would agree with the way
Under Secretary Flournoy put it. The reason we approached this
in this manner was to provide a more direct route to have an
urgent, because of an urgent need. I do have to say that all
these programs are carried out with a lot of consultation, a
lot of effort between the departments, and it comes together in
the country team that Ambassador Patterson runs in Pakistan. So
I don't think we----
Mr. Hunter. Not when it comes to buying things like Naval
Beach Groups (NBGs) or getting them Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR). There is no State Department involved
with buying magazines for AK-47s for them.
Ambassador Boucher. No.
Mr. Hunter. No, there isn't. And should there be?
Ambassador Boucher. No, I don't think so. There is one
place to buy those, and that is the people who make them.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
Ambassador Boucher. Our job, I think, is just to say, look,
as we approach counterinsurgency, here is how we need to work
it with the government, and we all work it together.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the three
of you for being here today. I appreciate your service, and
certainly what you are trying to do with respect to Pakistan. I
have a very simple question at the outset. Can you lay out, and
I guess Madam Secretary, that might be your job to do this, can
you lay out not what our goal is in Pakistan, or what our goals
are, but what is our strategy as it stands today?
Secretary Flournoy. I think our strategy is to invest in
strengthening the civilian government of Pakistan and the
institutions of Pakistan so that they can meet the basic needs
of their people and render Pakistan a secure, stable country
that is inhospitable to insurgency and terrorism. It is about
building the Pakistanis' capacity to address their own
challenges. They cannot do it alone. They need our help. And
they need our help urgently. And when they start to take--when
they take steps in the right direction, we should be there
supporting them to the fullest extent possible.
Mr. Loebsack. And to what extent does the strategy then
include components that are beyond Pakistan's borders,
Pakistan's relationship to India and to other countries around
Pakistan? How does that play into the strategy, if you will?
Secretary Flournoy. It is very much a regional approach.
We, as the Ambassador suggested, we have an important role to
play in trying to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and its
neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan. We are about to hold
another trilateral session in Washington with the President
coming soon, Pakistan with India. Hosting things like the
donors conference. Getting regional stakeholders to realize
that they have a stake in a stable and prosperous Pakistan.
Mr. Loebsack. There is mention in your testimony, and I was
not here for your oral remarks, I apologize, you may have
mentioned it, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. Can you
elaborate on what that is? Is this something similar to the
PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan? And I should mention, too, that
Congressman Marshall and I agree that in Afghanistan they
shouldn't probably be called reconstruction zones, because they
start from scratch more often than not. Is this what we are
talking about PRTs, but in the case of Pakistan something
different, a little bit different?
Ambassador Boucher. No, this is a different, it is a
regional trade benefits program for border areas of Pakistan
and all of Afghanistan so that products that they make in those
areas would be able to enter the United States duty free. It is
to create an opportunity for businesses to set up there,
manufacturing to set up there, and basically to get kids not to
pick up a gun and pick up a job or a wrench instead.
Legislation has been introduced in both the House and the
Senate, the bill on the House side sponsored by Congressman Van
Hollen and I think several others. I am sorry, I don't know the
whole list. But we are hoping that the Congress will pass this
legislation. The Pakistanis have been looking forward to this.
And feasibility studies say there are actually real
manufacturing opportunities in these border areas,
opportunities to get kids jobs, and get them out of the
fighting business.
Mr. Loebsack. So you are talking about the FATA, you are
talking about the border areas with Afghanistan?
Ambassador Boucher. Exactly.
Mr. Loebsack. Okay. And one last question on interagency
coordination, that dreaded phrase that no one likes. What is
happening with respect to--because we have had a number of
questions already. That is one advantage I have of being among
the last to ask the questions, I get to hear a lot of my
colleagues' questions and your responses. But it seems as
though that has not been resolved yet perhaps, the whole idea
of interagency coordination. Is there any one particular
individual, or how is that working with respect to Pakistan and
our strategy?
Secretary Flournoy. Well, as someone who is in the middle
of it, I will actually say it is working quite well. At the
Washington level, you know, the deputies committee, the NSC
process is putting a lot of time and attention. I mean, I am
very pleased to say that when we finished the strategy review
we didn't just put it on a shelf. We immediately turned to,
okay, how are we going to get this implemented? And that is why
we are here today. This is part of getting the strategy
implemented.
Mr. Loebsack. So it is in the NSC principals?
Secretary Flournoy. At the policy, sort of grand policy
oversight level, yes. But then if you go down a level,
Ambassador Holbrooke has developed a very close relationship
with the ambassadors in the region, with General Petraeus as
the regional combatant command (COCOM). He is working this
interagency coordination piece at the regional level. And then
when you go down on the ground and you look at the embassies,
in Afghanistan there is a direct coordination between the
ambassador and the military commander on the ground. In
Pakistan you have an interagency country team that is working
these issues. So it is happening at multiple levels. And for
the most part, I have been actually quite impressed with how
well it is working so far.
Mr. Loebsack. Okay. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin will be the last questioner
unless there is someone that has additional questions on a
second round. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary
Flournoy and Admiral Winnefeld and Ambassador Boucher for your
testimony here today. There have been many news reports about
the troubling level of support that the Pakistani intelligence
services, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has given to
Taliban forces. If part of our strategy is to end violence in
the region is to help train the Pakistani Army on how to
develop and fight counterinsurgency-style warfare, how does the
ISI's close relationship to Taliban forces affect the trust and
ability of our forces to train and support their Pakistani
partners? And furthermore, what steps is the U.S. taking to
reduce the ISI's support of Taliban forces? And what challenges
does the U.S. face with ending their relationship?
Admiral Winnefeld. The ISI is an organization like any
organization, and it has a hard time changing. I can speak from
personal experience in my own Department that we have gone
through many changes over the years that have been difficult
and painful. And they are going through a difficult and painful
change right now. And I believe that they are going to succeed.
I think we are seeing them succeed. General Kiyani brought in a
new ISI chief, General Pasha, who has quickly replaced all
except two of his two star subordinates inside the ISI
headquarters. And we are starting to see the changes filter
down throughout that organization. Now, does that mean they
have completely changed? No. We do not necessarily believe
that. It is going to take time for change to penetrate all of
the different corners of that organization. But our sense from
them is that they understand the need to change, the need to
make a strategic shift away from some of their past policies.
And we are confident that they are going to move in the right
direction. Never as fast as anybody would ever want them to,
but we believe that through the personal diplomacy that we have
experienced between Admiral Mullen and General Kiyani and other
interchanges between the U.S. Government and the Pakistani
Government that they are going to get moving in the right
direction.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Now, there are reports today,
someone discussed this already, that Pakistan is planning major
troop movements from its borders with India to help fight the
militants near the border with Pakistan. And while this of
course is welcome, the Pakistani Army still remains really
unprepared to fight counterinsurgency-style war. And throwing
people at the problem isn't necessarily going to make it go
away. So the question I have is does this move reflect a
broader shift in the Pakistani military organization towards a
more counterinsurgency-focused mission? And also what are we
planning on doing beyond training to help Pakistan bring a
whole government approach to its security efforts?
Secretary Flournoy. I think this is exactly the kind of
moment that makes the argument for the PCCF authority, in that
it is a specific situation where we are getting specific
requests for assistance, and we would like to be able to
respond urgently, quickly, to say, yes, here is the equipment,
training, whatever you need to be more effective. Part of the
PCCF authority is specifically designed to help train the
Pakistanis in the civil and military aspects of
counterinsurgency, not just the clear piece, but the hold and
build. What do you actually need to do with and for the
population to actually consolidate security gains once you have
cleared an area to protect the population, to get them on your
side so that the insurgents don't return to that area. That is
very much part of what this program would enable us to do. So I
think the particular situation now is very much an argument for
trying to get this kind of program in place.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. That is all the questions I had. I
am hopeful that we can provide the right support to make these
things reach fruition as we intended. I think ironically, the
Taliban moving into Buner was a real wake-up call to the
Pakistani Government, and also the population as a whole. And
we may have seen, hopefully, the shift that will allow some of
our efforts, in coordination with the Pakistani Government, to
be successful in turning this thing around in undermining the
Taliban. So thank you very much for your testimony. With that,
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Is there any further
questions? If not, for the panel we thank you for being with
us, for your excellent testimony. We look forward to seeing you
again.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 29, 2009
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April 29, 2009
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