[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-24]
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES
COMMAND
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 18, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Paul Oostburg, General Counsel
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 18, 2009, Security Developments in the Areas of
Responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, Northern Command,
Africa Command, and Joint Forces Command....................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 18, 2009........................................ 43
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2009
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES
COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation for NATO........... 7
Renuart, Gen. Victor Eugene ``Gene,'' Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S.
Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command................................................ 6
Stavridis, Adm. James G., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 4
Ward, Gen. William E. ``Kip,'' USA, Commander, U.S. Africa
Command........................................................ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Mattis, Gen. James N......................................... 112
Renuart, Gen. Victor Eugene ``Gene,'' Jr..................... 79
Stavridis, Adm. James G...................................... 47
Ward, Gen. William E. ``Kip''................................ 135
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Larsen................................................... 172
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 171
Mr. Miller................................................... 167
Mr. Wilson................................................... 170
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES
COMMAND
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Our committee comes to order. And today's
hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with
combatant commanders.
And I am pleased to welcome Admiral Stavridis of the U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Renuart of the U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD), General Mattis of the United States
Joint Forces Command, and General Ward of the United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM).
We are honored to have each of you with us today. We thank
you.
I also want to extend my appreciation to all the servicemen
and women who work with you. They provide an invaluable service
to our country.
Every day, each of you enter intractable challenges that
are not always part of the morning headlines, but are
nevertheless vital to our national security. Let me mention a
few.
Latin America, narco-syndicates have stained the streets of
Juarez, Tijuana, and elsewhere in Mexico with the blood of
criminals and innocents alike, as drug lords struggle to
survive against a Mexican government-led crackdown and inter-
gang warfare.
The impact of this violence on our borders concerns me very
much in both the near term, as well as the long term regarding
the state of Mexico. I would like to hear from General Mattis
and General William Ward about the nature of the threat that we
have been experiencing on our Mexican borders and in Mexico.
Turning to the rest of the region, over much of the last
decade, a growing number of countries seem to have removed
their welcome mats, leaving our country with fewer allies with
whom we can contain and continue to build strong military-to-
military partnerships. The implication of this trend for our
ability to conduct counternarcotics and other operations merit
careful monitoring.
And, Admiral, I welcome your thoughts on this trend.
General Ward, congratulations on your efforts so far. In
short order, you have brought Africa Command from being a
little more than a concept to becoming a fully operational
combatant command, with robust interagency participation. We
thank you for that.
As AFRICOM continues to plan and execute its mission, it
seems to me that improving the Combatant Command (COCOM)
strategic communications is your primary challenge. Your task
is to explain how working with our African partners to promote
stability and security on the continent is consistent with our
core national security interests.
It is tough to draw the linkage from the work you do today
to preventing the coups, the regional wars, and the manmade
disasters that hopefully will never happen in the future, but
that is precisely what you do.
Beyond your strategic communication challenges, the work of
AFRICOM has raised other concerns. A lot of the requirements
inherent in promoting stability and security within the African
continent do not at first glance appear to be military tasks.
Your command must be careful that, by virtue of its size, it
does not squeeze out efforts of our civilian agencies, such as
the State Department and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).
With that, let me turn to my good friend, my colleague,
John McHugh from New York, and, again, thank each of you for
your excellent contributions to our country. We look forward to
your testimony.
Mr. McHugh.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Obviously, all of us welcome you gentlemen. We are in deep
appreciation for the great leadership that you have shown. And
please convey back to those brave men and women in uniform that
you command ours and the nation's most profound respect and
words of thanks.
Mr. Chairman, as always, you have kind of encapsulated this
very important hearing. It is certainly, in my judgment, one of
the more critical ones we hold on annual basis. We are always
very happy that our great leaders can be here in person, join
us to cover the broad range of items, some of which you have
outlined, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask that my entire statement be entered into the
record in its entirety.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And beyond that, let me just underscore a couple of things
that you said. We have very distinct areas of responsibility
here, and each have their own significant challenges.
Like you, one of the most pressing, in my judgment, is the
very disturbing situation on the U.S.-Mexico border. I share
your concern, as I do many others in this nation, Mr. Chairman,
regarding that widening drug war, the possible reach of cartels
into America's border towns.
And it has gotten to the extent where even, just last week,
the President has stated that he is at least considering
deploying National Guard troops along that southern border and,
like you, Mr. Chairman, I am very interested--and I hope we
gather the opportunity today to discuss a bit about that
circumstance and the way forward.
NORTHCOM plays an important role in directing missile
defense operations to protect the homeland. And given the
nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, and particularly in
recent days of Iran and North Korea, we have the opportunity
today to talk about NORTHCOM's capabilities and force structure
to defend the United States from ballistic missile attack.
And, Admiral, as you know and we have had the chance to
discuss, you have some very unique security challenges in your
region. And just to cite one, over the last few years, Colombia
has really risen as a democratic leader with successes against
insurgent and paramilitary groups that is due in no small
measure to the people under your command and the support of
this nation in those efforts.
But for all of that, the drug production and trafficking
are still a very significant challenge for that nation. And I
think it is important for us to hear what we need to do to best
support what I would argue is one of our most stalwart allies
in South America and, in fact, in this hemisphere.
And, General Ward, I think the chairman summed it up very
well. You have done yeoman's work in setting up the command in
one of the most complex and, I would argue, most misunderstood
regions on the face of the Earth. And I think you have done an
outstanding job.
That has not been without challenges that no one knows more
clearly than you, but whether it is questions of interagency
presence and buy-ins, as well as the understandable delays in
establishing certain offices, we need to hear today from you
what kinds of areas still exist where you require the support
of this Congress and this committee particularly.
And, finally, General Mattis, as Joint Forces Command,
amongst the many roles you play, that of providing mission-
ready forces to all geographic commands is key amongst them.
And, obviously, as we draw down troops out of Iraq and begin to
build up into Afghanistan, the demand in increase of support
functions and those kinds of mission personnel is going to be
even more critical.
And the challenge that you face in meeting that, as the
supplier of forces, is so vital, obviously, to those missions,
but to us, as well. And I hope you will be able to give us an
idea of how you are going to meet that growing requirement for
support functions in Afghanistan and still meet the enduring
requirement, as it may exist, in Iraq.
So a lot on our plate here, Mr. Chairman, as you and I both
agree. Certainly we want to get to the testimony and for the
question-and-answer period and a final word of appreciation to
our witnesses, and particularly a word of deep thanks to those
men and women who they have the honor of leading.
I would yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
We will ask our witnesses--before that, I must say that, at
high noon, I have a conflict and someone else will be helping
you finish the hearing. Please understand.
If you wish to condense your statement, without objection,
each of your written statements will be placed into the record.
With that, we will start with Admiral James G. Stavridis.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Stavridis. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank
you very much for holding this hearing and allowing us to
present to you some ideas.
I will make the point that this is a real Goldwater-Nichols
hearing. You have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines seated here.
You could almost call it the Chairman Skelton hearing, in the
sense of all that he contributed to jointness in Armed Forces.
Also, I do want to say, as an admiral, I am always--I feel
a little safer in the company of generals, especially Marine
generals, so I feel pretty safe today, all things considered.
We have had a good and a challenging year down in Southern
Command. I am just going to hit five quick, interesting things
that have happened in the course of the last year that maybe
will enlighten some of our discussions as we go along today.
First, a very good thing. Last week, in my headquarters in
Southern Command, we had the three U.S. hostages who were held
by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
terrorists for five and one half years. Marc, Keith and Tom are
their names, and they came to our headquarters to spend an
afternoon with my command, talk about their experiences, and to
be congratulated by my command for their performance under very
arduous conditions.
So it was a nice moment. And it kind of underscores what
Representative McHugh was talking about, Colombia's
capabilities. I mean, this was a Colombian operation, but it
was mounted after a great deal of partnership-building by the
United States over a ten-year period of bipartisan effort with
Plan Colombia.
So I am glad we have our hostages back, and I think it is
reflective of the good general trend of events in Colombia.
Secondly, last summer, we had a couple of big Navy ships
come down to do a great deal of medical engagement and
training. It was a terrific deployment. We contributed to
medical care for about 200,000 people throughout the region.
And we also had the opportunity as part of that deployment
to have one of our Navy ships go to Haiti and respond to an
enormous disaster there following the hurricane, a good
indication of how our U.S. Navy's Fourth Fleet is able to do
its missions of engagement, training, disaster relief in this
region.
Thirdly, we had a good year of military-to-military
engagement, which is the heart of what we do. We had the
largest exercise in the world, in terms of numbers of countries
participating, 22 of them in and around the Panama Canal, an
exercise called PANAMAX. Also did exercises in special forces,
in disaster relief, in human rights training, in peacekeeping,
a very robust schedule, and I appreciate the committee's
support that makes all of that possible. That military-to-
military human contact trumps everything, in terms of moving
ourselves forward in engagement in the region.
Fourthly, we continue to struggle with the mission of
detection and monitoring of the narcotic flows. And I am sure
we will talk about that today. I continue to be concerned, as I
have talked to this committee over the last couple of years,
about the rise of the use of semi-submersible near submarine-
like platforms by the drug cartels.
We have captured several of these moving as much as seven
tons of cocaine. The numbers we see are rising; it is a
significant challenge for us. We did with international
assistance and with interagency assistance participate in
interdicting 230 tons of cocaine.
There is a lot more flowing, and I believe that a
fundamental part of the solution to this narcotic problem is on
the demand side here in the United States. We can only go so
far with interdiction and work on the supply side. So perhaps
we can touch on those topics today.
I understand the concerns in Mexico. I would make the point
to the committee that it is not just Mexico. It is also Central
America and parts of the Caribbean. There is a supply chain of
narcotics and great difficulties--gangs, poverty--that run
through the region. And we need to address it as a regional
problem and not focus solely on our border.
And General Renuart and I are in frequent discussion about
that, and I think we have a good program to try and work
together across Central America and Mexico in addressing these
kinds of issues.
Lastly, I want to close by thanking the committee very much
for your support to our new headquarters building down in
Miami. We have been in a rented facility for ten years since
the command moved from Panama. Due to the work of this
committee and the support you have provided, there is a new
building going up which will bring together Southern Command
for the first time all in one building in a modern facility
that will allow us to do our mission properly.
It comes on land that was donated from the state of
Florida. It is a great savings to the taxpayer over time. And I
thank the committee for that.
With that, I will close simply by saying thank you for your
support for the men and women of U.S. Southern Command.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found
in the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Admiral.
General Victor Eugene Renuart, Jr. You like that ``Jr.''?
STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR EUGENE ``GENE'' RENUART, JR., USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Renuart. And my mother does, too, as well,
Chairman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Skelton and Congressman McHugh, members of the
committee, good morning. And like Jim Stavridis, I want to echo
the true heartfelt thanks from all the men and women who serve,
for the support from Congress in general, and certainly this
committee in particular.
It is really an honor and privilege to be here today
representing the men and women of North American Aerospace
Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command.
And I want to point out, as I begin, I am pleased to be
accompanied this morning by Command Sergeant Major Dan Wood,
seated here behind me. Dan will be retiring in May after many
years of service to the nation and tours in combat theaters in
the recent years. And so I want to highlight Dan's service to
you to say thank you to him, but also he represents our
children and, in some cases, our grandchildren that are out
there wearing the uniform of our nation every day.
As commander of NORTHCOM, I am assigned really two
particular missions, very specific and important missions, one,
to defend the homeland from attack and, two, to support the
nation with unique Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities in
times of crisis. And so this runs the gamut from capabilities
like ground-based midcourse interceptors for ballistic missile
defense, the execution of the air sovereignty mission within
the borders of the United States, support to law enforcement in
areas like along the border, and to support federal agencies,
both before and after disaster strikes, as was evidenced with
the California wildfires and the hurricanes along the southern
coast this past year.
But it is important to note we are members of a combined
national response. We don't do it alone. DOD does not and
should not have the lead role in many of these events.
We are part of a coordinated effort--international,
federal, state partners, governors, the National Guard, all are
keys to success for the nation, and DOD plays a role, in some
cases, a very important role, in some cases, very much a small
supporting role.
It is also important to note that we have an excellent
relationship with our international partners, Canada, Mexico,
the--or Bermuda, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands. All are part of our area of interest,
and all play a key role, most notably our relationship with
Mexico is as strong as it has ever been military-to-military, I
think, in our history, and we continue to work closely with the
leaders of Mexico, as they face some of the challenges in their
home country.
We train hard to execute our missions. We exercise those
tasks routinely. I am pleased to say we now have a national
exercise program that all the agencies of government
participate in, and we have to ensure that we don't let a sense
of security that we have not had an attack or a major terrorist
event in our country since September 11th let us lower our
guard. We have to be ready to ensure that we never let the
country down.
Those who wish us harm have not gone away. The threats
still exist, and we have to be prepared. They only have to be
lucky once; we have to be on guard 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week to ensure that it never happens. We will keep the momentum
going. We will remain alert. This mission is critically
important to us, because it is to prepare for, to defend
against, and to provide recovery for your families, your
communities, our families and our nation.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to be
here. I look forward to a number of questions this morning.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in
the Appendix on page 79.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
General James N. Mattis, United States Marine Corps.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION FOR
NATO
General Mattis. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify and to update you on Joint Forces Command. I request my
written statement be accepted for the record, and I will speak
for just a couple moments, Mr. Chairman, and leave most of the
time for questions.
As you know, sir, ladies and gentlemen, the command's
primary missions have both joint and coalition, current and
future aspects. We support the current military operations by
providing combat-ready forces to combatant commanders, and you
are seeing now the reduced force levels in Iraq and the
increase in Afghanistan. And that is well underway.
We are also preparing for future conflicts, thinking ahead
so that we are not caught flat-footed in the future. As you
know, we are co-located with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) Allied Command Transformation, which I
also command. And that brings in a central coalition focus to
Joint Forces Command.
We recognize that we can never predict the future
precisely, and we must expect to be surprised in matters of
national security, but we must plan so that surprise is
minimized and it is not lethal. We purposely set out to create
a shock absorber in our force to withstand the shocks that we
know will come.
To this end, we have provided the committee with copies of
the Joint Operating Environment, or what we call the JOE, and
the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, the CCJO.
The JOE, the Joint Operating Environment, is our analysis,
and it identifies the problem as best we can discern it about
the future, a future of persistent conflict, of hybrid enemy
threats, global instability, increasing access to weapons of
mass destruction, the rise of regional state and non-state
actors, and the unpredictability of security threats.
The Capstone Concept is Admiral Mullen's vision for how the
joint force will operate in the future. That is our proposed
solution to the problem statement presented in the JOE, and it
guides our force experimentation and, of course, guides our
force development.
One thing is clear: We must make irregular warfare a core
competency, and this is Joint Forces Command's top priority
right now. By using the lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan,
the second Lebanon war, and applying them to our efforts, we
are going to do this.
At the same time, we must have balance, as Secretary Gates
has clearly articulated. And as we institutionalize irregular
warfare capability, we must maintain our nuclear and
conventional superiority, which brings great benefit to the
international community.
And we also have to bring together this whole-of-government
approach that we have gotten great support from this committee
and other committees on, because it is going to be vital to
maintaining the nation's security in the future when military
means alone are not sufficient.
I would like to stop at this point, Mr. Chairman, and leave
the rest of the time for questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in
the Appendix on page 112.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General William E. Ward, known as Kip Ward. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. ``KIP'' WARD, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND
General Ward. Thank you, Chairman Skelton.
Mr. McHugh, distinguished members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to provide this overview.
With me today are Ms. Nory Fleffner from Department of
Commerce and Mr. Jerry Lanier from the Department of State. And
I am also honored to appear alongside my distinguished
colleagues here.
Last year, we discussed the plan to establish a
headquarters. Today, United States Africa Command is executing
our mission of conducting sustained security engagement through
military-to-military programs and military-sponsored activities
to promote a stable and secure African environment.
We work in concert with other U.S. government agencies and
international partners to ensure that our activities are
harmonized. Our strategy is based on military-to-military
efforts to enhance the security capability of our African
partners.
In many engagements with African leaders during my time as
commander of United States Africa Command and previously as
deputy commander, U.S. European Command, the consistent message
they gave me is that, for their intent, for America--for
African nations to provide for their own security. Most welcome
our assistance in reaching their goals for security forces that
are legitimate and professional, have the will and means to
dissuade, deter and defeat transnational threats, perform with
integrity, and increasingly able to support international peace
efforts.
We work as a part of the overall United States government
effort. We work closely with the Department of State, the
chiefs of mission and country teams, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Departments of Treasury,
Commerce, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and others doing work
on the continent. And like Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen,
I fully support enhancements to the capabilities of our
interagency partners.
Similarly, we reach out to international partners,
including Europeans, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, private enterprise, and
academia. Their perspectives on the situation in Africa are
very valuable.
U.S. Africa Command is involved in military training,
education, sustainment, and logistics support, amongst other
activities, throughout our area of responsibility. The Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti,
conducts training, education, and civil military assistance
that helps prevent conflict and promote regional cooperation
among nations of Eastern Africa.
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is a military
component of the Department of State's counterterrorism
partnership with North and West African nations. Africa
Endeavor is an annual communications interoperability exercise
that this year will include 23 African nations.
We support the State Department's Africa Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance Program that roughly trains
20 battalions of peacekeepers per year. The peacekeepers have
been deployed on United Nations and African Union missions
across the continent. Recently, we helped the Rwandans deploy
some of their heavy equipment to the United Nations (U.N.)
mission in Darfur.
Continuing deployments of the Africa Partnership Station
provide training to the navies and coast guards of maritime
nations in the Gulf of Guinea and in Eastern Africa, helping
them better secure their own territorial waters.
Given the lack of infrastructure within Africa and the
island nations, our sustainment infrastructure, forward
operating sites, and en route infrastructure are vital. I
endorse upgrade projects supporting these key infrastructure
nodes.
The enduring presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti makes
possible our engagement in East Africa and other parts of the
continent and supports our U.S. strategic goals in that area of
the world.
It is, indeed, my honor to serve with the uniformed and
civilian men and women of the Department of Defense, as well as
our interagency teammates, who are making a difference on the
continent every day. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to
the spirit and determination of the American people and our
commitment to contributing to the well-being and security of
our nation and the people of Africa.
Again, thank you for this opportunity. Thank you for your
support. And I stand ready to participate in the hearing.
[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the
Appendix on page 135.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General Ward.
General Mattis, you said that irregular warfare should
become a core competency for our military. History tells us
that a country in particular, our country, prepares for the
last war. How assured are you that irregular warfare will be
with us in future conflicts?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, I am absolutely certain that
irregular warfare will be with us in future conflicts. We need
to only look back to last summer's Russian incursion into
Georgia, where we saw many irregular aspects in that war. Their
combat units even had irregular forces in front of them as they
went into the breakaway republics.
I think, too, that our study of the second Lebanon war
shows how this hybrid threat in--it is being watched all around
the world. And they recognize they cannot take us on at 15,000
feet right now; they cannot take us on, on the high seas; they
don't want to take on the U.S. Army in open desert, mechanized
warfare.
But there is an area where we are not superior. And we have
seen the enemy play to those positions.
I think that the paradox of war is that America at this
point in history cannot abrogate any aspect of the conflict
spectrum. By that, I mean the enemy will gravitate to the area
that they perceive to be our weakness, so we cannot give up
conventional capability. We cannot give up nuclear superiority.
But we must develop irregular, if we want to checkmate the
enemy.
It is a balanced approach, as I think Secretary Gates has
articulated very well, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me ask both Admiral Stavridis and General Renuart about
Mexico. There is a great deal of concern in and out of the news
media about that country and the drug-related violence that is
there. Number one, describe how serious it is through each of
your eyes. And, number two, what can America do to help?
General Renuart. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the media has
given us many examples of how difficult that challenge is for
the government of Mexico. President Calderon is courageously
leading an effort. He has asked his military to play a
principal role in that. And they are doing so.
And I would use as an example the presence of thousands of
military into Juarez, the city that we have seen so many of the
murders recorded over the last year and certainly in these last
couple months. That presence has made a difference. We began to
see the violence settle, and I think that is an indicator of
the seriousness that President Calderon takes with respect to
action here.
In terms of the drug challenges, Admiral Stavridis
mentioned in his opening comments the challenge of the supply
side. He leads--or hosts in his headquarters Joint Interagency
Task Force (JIATF) South. I say in his headquarters, in his
organization. They are located in Key West. That is an
interagency process to get at the supply side.
We participate directly with his staff. The Mexican
government also participates directly with his staff.
So I think the opportunity for us to share common operating
pictures, share intelligence, share information not only
between our headquarters, but with our Mexican friends is
improving every day.
Finally, I would say that there certainly is the potential,
as we have seen in many reports, for some of that violence to
spill over. There is a relationship between organized gangs in
the United States and the drug cartels in Mexico.
Our role in DOD is a small one, but it is to support law
enforcement as they might need that along the border. I think
the problem is real. Mexico is engaged. The United States is
actively trying to support and assist Mexico in any way that
might be helpful. And we have a very good relationship with the
Mexican military in that regard.
Jim.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I would echo what General Renuart
said. I would add, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I
think there is a demand side component to this. If we ask what
we can do to help Mexico, we could work on anything that
reduces demand here in the United States, not really our lane
in the Department of Defense, but I think we are mentioning the
context.
Secondly, sir, I would enlarge Gene's comments to include
Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The Merida
Initiative, which I support--I know Gene supports, as well--
looks at all of those regions as a whole.
In the end, this is a supply chain. We have to understand
it, we have to reverse-engineer it, and we have to help kill
it. Doing so will require international partners, as well as
our interagency work together.
Thank you.
The Chairman. General Ward, in your opinion, would you
describe for us America's national security interests in what
you do in the Africa Command on the African continent, please?
General Ward. Thank you, Chairman.
The continent of Africa is an immense geographical domain,
as well as huge water space along its borders and its
territorial waters. Resources, population, globalization,
stability all very firmly point to that part of the world being
integrally linked to the security, as well as the continued
development of our country.
A stable continent of Africa with a population approaching
9 million, growing at a rate of 2.4 percent a year, expected to
double by 2050, if left unchecked with the issues of illegal
immigration, trafficking of various commodities, from weapons
to drugs to people, undeveloped so that immigration becomes
issues for not just the nations of Africa, but Europe, as well
as America, having today programs in effect that assist those
nations to provide for their own security that will, in fact,
enable development, enable the growth of effective institutions
of government, clearly in our national interest in today's
globalized society.
Nothing goes on in a part of the world, clearly the size,
importance of Africa, that would not have an ultimate effect on
us, our security, and our well-being.
The Chairman. Does the activity of the United Nations help
in regard to this? Or is it a paper tiger?
General Ward. Sir, I think the United Nations and the role
it plays in coalescing nations and reaching the sort of
consensus that is important to move forward with these
sovereign nations is an instrumental activity.
I think we should look to ways to buttress those
activities, because I think, in the end, it is that consensus,
it is that degree of support that is, in fact, garnered by the
world community that can be applied, that is what we need.
And so I would say that the United Nations has a role, as
do the continental organizations there in Africa. The African
Union, as it attempts to get its feet under itself, moving
ahead in the areas of stability, as well as development,
translates also to the regional communities there on the
continent of Africa that are now five in number, as they also
attempt to move ahead.
Those activities that would coalesce, build, combine
activity sets to address common shared problems I think can
contribute to addressing those challenges.
Admiral Stavridis. Mr. Chairman, can I just add, from a
SOUTHCOM perspective, on the United Nations question? The U.N.
is doing a very good job in Haiti. The peacekeeping force there
is 7,000 U.N. peacekeepers, 2,000 U.N. police, very, very small
U.S. presence. They have done a very good job over the last
three years in a security proposition there.
Sixty percent of those peacekeepers come from other nations
in the Americas. So it is an example of what General Ward's
talking about, that there is goodness in the United Nations'
efforts.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, General Ward.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Renuart, I want to go back to you for a moment. As
you heard in my opening comments, I greatly share the deep
concerns that the chairman and many others have with respect to
the drug situation in Mexico. Reports I have seen, more than
6,000 killed in those cartel wars. That is a pretty stunning
figure in one year, when you consider the loss of those brave
American lives in the now going on six years in Iraq, for
example.
But nevertheless, I think we have to keep reality in
context. I have seen reports in recent days by organizations
who claim they track these kinds of things who have listed
Mexico as a potential failed state, along with Pakistan and
such.
How close might Mexico be or not be to being a failed
state? How deep a concern do you have in that regard?
General Renuart. Congressman, I certainly am not the expert
at defining a failed state. I think there are certain
characteristics, however, that, I guess I would say, Mexico
does not exhibit.
For example, they continue to have a democratically elected
government, and they are actively taking on this problem so
that the core of government does not seem to be jeopardized, if
you will.
Certainly, they have a strong trading relationship with the
United States. They are our third-largest trading partner. That
relationship continues, and it is important to both nations.
The Mexican natural resources are significant. Certainly,
their oil industry continues to help keep the government moving
strongly.
The economic decline that many of our nations have all
suffered is not as significant at this point in Mexico. So many
of the indicators of a very vibrant and active state continue.
I think it is certainly a challenge for the law enforcement
aspect of the government. The drug cartels are certainly
involved in a great deal of violence. Much of the violent
deaths that you have talked about have been cartel-on-cartel
violence. And while it should not replace or eliminate our
concern, it is an indicator that the cartels are fighting each
other for turf and for, if you will, market share.
So I think President Calderon understands that clearly. He
has engaged aggressively. He is in the process of re-vetting
his police forces. We have seen successes in places like
Juarez, where he has put federal troops on the ground.
And I think, in our small role, we support the State
Department and their efforts with the government. Certainly,
the Merida Initiative is a huge, huge demonstration of American
willingness to work with our Mexican friends to allow them to
be successful in this effort. We need to continue that kind of
support.
Our role is a direct military-to-military relationship with
the Mexican army and air force and navy, and we do that on a
routine basis. So I am comfortable that this country is really
working hard to deal with the challenge.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.
Admiral, you mentioned the variety of challenges in your
area of responsibility (AOR). And clearly the drug component of
that is not insignificant. But I want to talk a bit about
Venezuela.
I and many others have been deeply concerned about the
reported arm purchases that Hugo Chavez has entered into,
particularly with the Russians, reportedly 100,000 of the
latest-generation AK-47, Russian fighter jets, et cetera, et
cetera.
And when you couple those with recent reports of both
Venezuela and apparently Cuba offering to bed down Russian
long-range strategic bombers and talks of Hezbollah fundraising
in Caracas and elsewhere, we wonder what to make of this very
murky soup.
I wonder if you could just put your own perspective on the
national security threats that Hugo Chavez's arms purchases,
coupled with his seeming friendship in places like Iran and the
support of Hezbollah, or certainly the blind eye towards
Hezbollah, might mean for this committee and for your AOR?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, thank you.
Whenever I speak of Venezuela, I like to begin by pointing
out that the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed an
extremely good relationship for about 150 years. Over the
recent past, there has been some political disagreement between
the two countries, and to some degree that is the nature of
democracy and in all the democracies in the Americas today,
there is only one dictatorship, and that is in Cuba.
So every other country is a democracy. And democracies have
a tendency to disagree with each other about political
direction, in many cases.
In terms of a national security threat, I do not believe
Venezuela poses a national security threat to the United
States. You are absolutely correct: They have bought about $5
billion in weapons from the Russians over the last four years.
They have contracts for at least $20 billion more high-
performance jets, attack helicopters, AK-103s, the new
generation of the AK-47, and so forth.
I don't believe that they, however, even with all of that
armament, pose a significant threat, because I don't see the
commensurate investment in training, in people, in building
capability to really employ those weapons in a way that would
be a threat to the United States of America.
Mr. McHugh. How about the--if not the active support,
certainly the forbearance of fundraising for terrorists, listed
act organizations like Hezbollah. Is that at a high level or--
--
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I am concerned throughout the
region of the activities of Hezbollah. And that really runs
from the Southern Cone of South America to the Andean ridge to
the Caribbean coast. We see Hezbollah acting throughout the
region in proselytizing, fundraising, involved in the drug
trade.
There is a fair amount to be concerned about with
Hezbollah. And I would like to provide that for the record and
give you some specifics.
Mr. McHugh. Yes. I would appreciate that.
And, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back, but I would
say, for the record, this is an area that I know leaders, as we
have here today, are focused on and concerned about, but I
think it would behoove all of us on this committee if we had
the opportunity to delve into that a bit more deeply, perhaps
in closed session.
But it is an important development that needs our urgent
attention. And with that, I would yield back and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank all these gentlemen for being here.
Very quickly, General Mattis, your quote was something to
the point of, ``The enemy will gravitate to our weaknesses.''
Would you say it is a fair assessment that the enemy gravitated
to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and underbody explosions
to flat-bottom Humvees in Iraq, as one example of that?
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. And, therefore, again, using the media, using
computers, told the whole world that we have a vulnerability to
attack from underneath, from flat-bottom vehicles?
General Mattis. Sir, the attacks make even our heaviest
tanks vulnerable. I would not confine it to the flat-bottoms.
That is one aspect of it, but, in fact, war is a constant game
of give-and-take. You know this, sir. I think as we adapt to
the flat-bottom attack, they will adapt, and it is just the
normal heave-and-ho of war.
Mr. Taylor. Again, using your quote, using our experience
in Iraq, I would certainly hope that you would weigh in, as we
are making the decision on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle,
that we, before we build it, make it resistant to mines, and
not after the fact. And that is a very real debate going on
right now, and I would hope, using your quote, that, you know,
we could use that to our advantage.
General Renuart, I happen to live in coastal Mississippi.
NORTHCOM was nowhere to be found after Katrina. That is water
under the bridge.
But let's take a similar circumstance. And, God forbid, I
don't want anything to happen to Pennsylvania, but I am only
using them as an example, because a large percentage of their
Guard is in Iraq right now.
Two simultaneously horrible events happen in Pennsylvania,
one in Pittsburgh, one in Philadelphia. They don't have
hospitals; they don't have electricity; they don't have food
distribution. What are the resources at your disposal now that
we have learned the hard way--let's start with Philadelphia.
Could--are you in a position to contact the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and say, ``I want an amphibious assault ship
and that floating hospital as close to Philadelphia as you can
get right now''?
General Renuart. Congressman, I will tell you a short
answer: Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Taylor. You have--okay, so you are the guy?
General Renuart. I am the guy. And, in fact, today, I have
an amphibious ready group that is available to me. It is--we
keep one on the East Coast, one on the West. They are doing
other training missions, but they are identified for homeland
security and homeland defense response, should that be
required. And I have the authority from the secretary to ask
and move those.
Similarly, the hospital ship--although she will be headed
to Jim's world here in the south to do some great humanitarian
work, but if she is available, absolutely. But I will also tell
you----
Mr. Taylor. If I may, sir----
General Renuart. Yes.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. One of the Seabee battalions is home. We
won't say which one. You are in a position to say, ``I need you
to go to Pittsburgh and start building places for people to
berth in''?
General Renuart. Again, Congressman, absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. And, General, the reason I am saying this is, I
think yours is the most--we have the least understanding of
your command. And I want to give you this opportunity to clear
that up because, you know, again, I have sat in this room for a
long time. I am convinced something bad is going to happen on
American soil. As good a job as you do, somebody is going to
get through.
And I think the point that we need--the Americans need to
know is that you are the guy who is going to respond.
General Renuart. Congressman, I appreciate that. And I,
too, share your view that we have to be prepared, because
something untoward will happen, whether it is manmade or
natural disaster. And we are the DOD command. We partner, as
you know, with the National Guard. We are----
Mr. Taylor. Let's get a clarification. What is your
authority with the Guard?
General Renuart. Congressman, the first authority with the
Guard, as you know, is with--the governor will order those
forces it needs into place. We have twice a day joint ops and
planning meetings with the National Guard Bureau so that we
integrate responses so that we don't duplicate and we
complement each other in each event.
But certainly, in this case, the governor of Pennsylvania
will want to have and should have access to those national
guardsmen. As you said, many are deployed. Under the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, additional guardsmen can come
from other states.
We will also be in a position to support. And we do that in
conjunction with our friends in Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). And as you mentioned, an event occurs in one of
those large cities that may be nuclear or biological or
chemical, we have a--today a fully equipped, fully trained,
4,000-plus-person consequence management and response force. It
sits on a very short response notice.
I have coordinated with Transportation Command for the lift
it takes to move that. And if an event occurs in Philadelphia
or in Pittsburgh, and that capability is needed for the
particular unique nature of the circumstance, I can move them
and the Secretary of Defense is fully supportive of moving
them, at the direction of the President, in there and would be
in within 48 hours.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
General Renuart. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Bartlett, please.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, I would like to join Chairman Taylor in his
appeal to you that you take a look at the Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle. There are options that would provide
enormously more protection for our troops there, and I would be
happy to join you and Chairman Taylor in a discussion of this
problem and these options.
Admiral, I was impressed that twice you mentioned the need
for reduction of demand on drugs. You mentioned it in your oral
testimony, and you mentioned it in the answer to one of the
questions.
What we are doing relative to drugs kind of fits Albert
Einstein's definition of insanity, doing the same thing over
and over again and hoping for a different result. We are really
quite good at eradicating drugs and interdicting them, but it
has had no effect on the availability of these drugs in our
cities.
As a matter of fact, in Philadelphia--I am sorry, in
Baltimore, in my state, in Philadelphia, too, the quantity and
quality of drugs was such that we have people dying from
overdosing because the drugs no longer had to be cut for street
sale.
So, obviously, the roughly $3 billion that we spend a year
in Colombia in eradication and interdiction has no effect on
the availability of drugs in our country, and that is, of
course, the reason we do that, to reduce drug use in our
country.
Now, I applaud, sir, your concern that we need to spend
more effort on education, on reducing demand. If nobody bought
drugs, nobody would be selling drugs, would they? And I think
we need to have enormously more attention on reducing the
demand for drugs, because obviously we are not going to reduce
the availability of drugs. We have tried that over and over
again, and it is not working. We just have to own up to that.
General Mattis, you mentioned that the enemy gravitates to
our weakness, and Chairman Taylor mentioned the potential
weakness of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. There is
another weakness that really concerns me, and it is a growing
weakness.
We continue to field weapons systems that have little or no
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection. And every one of our
potential enemies in their open literature and in their war
games mention the use of EMP as an early event in any conflict
with us.
The EMP Commission interviewed Russian generals who told us
that the Soviets had developed--and they obviously have--EMP
weapons, enhanced weapons, that would produce 200 kilovolts per
meter at the center. That is 100 kilovolts per meter at the
margins. If that is true, sir, we never have built or tested
anything to that level of EMP protection.
Why do we keep fielding these weapons systems that will not
be available to us when we really need them? We don't need them
for wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. We will really need them
against a peer, and they won't be useful to us because the
first thing he will do is an EMP laydown.
Why do we keep investing billions of dollars in these
systems that have little or no EMP protection, therefore,
little or no utility in a war with one of our peers? Why do we
keep doing this?
General Mattis. I cannot give you a good answer, sir. I can
speculate. I think, for some period of time, there was a hope
that this nuclear issue was going to go away. I think we saw
some turning away from keeping focused on it. I will add that
any concern about that in the recent past has been taken care
of by the U.S. forces, but not when it comes to the
acquisition.
I don't have a good answer for you other than to say that I
believe that now thinking the unthinkable is no longer off-
limits. And we will work it. I don't have a specifically
satisfactory answer for you, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Several years ago, I called my friend, Tom
Clancy, who has done several events for me. He had an EMP
scenario in one of his books, and I knew he did very good
research, and I asked him about EMP. He said, ``If you read my
book, you know all I know.''
Let me refer you to--in his words, to the smartest man
hired by the U.S. government, and that was a Dr. Lowell Wood in
Lawrence Livermore in California. In those days, we didn't have
cell phones, so I paged him. And I thought he was in
California. An hour later, he was sitting at my desk in my
office because he was here in Washington.
Lowell says that the reason that we don't address this is
because it is just too hard. We don't want to face it, and so
we ignore it. Do you think that is true?
General Mattis. Sir, I will tell you, the physics of the
problem probably make going to the moon look easy, so I think
he has probably a good point. And when you talk about hard, you
are talking about enormous cost. And in some cases--in, I
think, most cases, we have not even done the Research &
Development (R&D) that allows us to look at acquiring systems
that have the capability--in other words, we still have to
figure out how to do it.
But we are going to have to get on with it, sir. Again, I
will not defend where we are at right now. I cannot.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And now we call on Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
General Ward, I am going to address my time with you. And,
first, I want to just make a comment. I had to step out while
you did your oral statement, but in your written statement, you
referred to--have a brief discussion about the over-fishing off
the coast of Africa.
And, you know, I applaud you for including that in a
national security discussion about what is going on, because
poverty and hunger and lack of economic vitality are huge
national security threats. And I think probably most of us
don't realize what the potential degradation of the fish off
the coast of Africa means for a lot of nations and a lot of
people and for stability in Africa.
On page four of your written statement, you say the
following: ``The greatest security threats facing Africa
include enduring conflicts, illicit trafficking, territorial
disputes, rebel insurgencies, violent extremists, piracy, and
illegal immigration.''
The first one on that list was enduring conflicts. And
would you describe for me, please, what you see the role of
AFRICOM is in these enduring conflicts?
And I want to mention two specifically as examples. We have
this ongoing dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia on that
border, that--while there has not been active military
engagement for some time now of any major amount, none of us
would be surprised if it were to flare up again at some point.
It is an unresolved border and an unresolved war.
The second one is the several--well, a couple decades long
now dispute between the Polisario that are based on the
Moroccan-Algerian border and the kingdom of Morocco.
When you look at those two threats, what you have referred
to as enduring conflicts, what do you see as the role of
AFRICOM in disputes like those?
General Ward. Thank you, sir.
First, the acknowledgement of the threats to the
environment, I appreciate your noting that. To be sure, these
threats to those resources that could be made available to a
people of a nation to increase their lot, to increase their
well-being, critical, very, very important. And when it doesn't
occur where they are, then they will seek it elsewhere.
With respect to the enduring conflicts, they range, as you
have noted--they are the borders of Eritrea, Djibouti, the
borders in North Africa, with respect to the Western Sahara,
also the central part of the continent, there in the Congo.
As it comes to the role that we play, the command, the
military role, you know, where there are political agreement
that talk to, one, creating stability, that talk to, two, the
need to create a force, a security force that would, in fact,
help the legitimate government of a nation provide that control
or that stability, where there is a lack of training, a lack of
equipment, a lack of interoperability, a lack of working
effectively to some degree with its neighbors, where, again,
there is the political will to do so, and a determination is
made that we, in fact, can play a role in increasing the
capacity to address those deficiencies, that is where we as a
command, a military command come in to take a role to increase
the capacity of those nations to do such.
For example, as the situation in the Congo was occurring
and interoperability deficiencies were noted, our ability to
work with those nations--Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic to a degree--to
help information-sharing, to help with equipment
interoperability, providing sometimes needed logistics support
and enhancement, to cause those governments to be able to have
a better sense of what goes on inside their borders against
insurgencies or the rebel factions, and then be able to work in
some degree of commonality to address them.
But, again, those actions that we take, sir, come on the
heels of a policy decision having been taken by the nations
themselves, obviously, our national policy direction that
supports the activities that we would, in fact, do to help in
those instances.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, as someone who argued for the creation of
Joint Forces Command 10, 12 years ago, I have become concerned
over time that the command--that the focus on the future, which
was part of the reason to create that command, has faded over
time, and I recently read in a book by Dr. Andrew Krepinevich,
where he said that, unfortunately, Joint Forces, established to
identify emerging threats and support for the military's
transformation to address them, has progressively moved away
from that mission since Millennium Challenge 2002.
And, as you know, Millennium Challenge 2002 was a war game
that was stopped in the middle because the good guys were
losing. And they had to rearrange the deck in order to prevent
an embarrassment.
Dr. Krepinevich makes three suggestions to help refocus
Joint Forces Command on the future. And I would like to get
your reaction to them.
One is, he thinks your--the tenure for your position needs
to be lengthened, because nobody can occupy that job in the
normal rotation and make the real difference with that
futuristic orientation that you really need, because sometimes
that goes countercultural to the services.
Secondly, he says Joint Forces ought to have a seat on a
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). And, thirdly, he
says Joint Forces ought to have a seat on the defense
acquisition board so that you are there with a voice when
acquisition decisions are made.
What is your reaction to those three suggestions?
General Mattis. Thank you, sir.
In terms of our future focus, it is a balancing act. I will
be the first to admit it. However, I will tell you that the
joint training that goes on right now is critical to making the
Goldwater-Nichols--the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols into
reality.
The providing of forces--of prepared joint forces going out
is so smooth that I spend very little of my time on it. There
is a small section of the command that, when the Secretary of
Defense approves our request for forces from one of the
geographic commanders, it goes very quickly.
Not a lot of distraction there, is my point. Most of our
effort, most of my effort with Joint Forces Command goes into
the future.
In regards to lengthening the commander's tour, I think
that there is a--if I remember right--around 50 percent of the
total command, 27 percent of the command has got government
contract or contractors, civilian contractors. They provide
continuity. There is also a fair amount of continuity from
government civilians.
So although the commander's tenure is one consideration--
and I wouldn't necessarily refute or come up with an argument
against it--I don't think it is as bad as thinking that
everything stops when a commander comes and goes. Some of us
may think the world begins and ends with us, but I think the
reality is, the command functions quite well.
We do have to get some institutionalization of this focus
on the future that perhaps disappeared under the urgency of the
active operations overseas. I think we have that back, and we
are going in the right direction, and we are open to any kind
of assessment that wants to come down and look at us on that.
On the JROC seat, I will tell you right now, sir, I can
walk into the JROC any time, any combatant commander can, and I
exercise that when necessary, but I do not feel inhibited.
Plus, I can always do an end run on them, to put it bluntly,
and walk into the Deputy Secretary of Defense's office, where I
have a very close working relationship.
So I am not inhibited by not having a formal seat there. I
can be in any meeting, and I can work with the deputy secretary
and the vice chairman, if there is something I think is going
off the rail.
As far as the defense acquisition board, there is an awful
lot of folks who get involved in acquisition today, almost to
the point that we have paralyzed the process. If I can bring
something--bring an advantage to it, I am more than willing to
do so.
Generally speaking, I would bring one more voice that is
saying something that is already being considered, but if I
think it is not being considered, I can always insert myself
there.
I am not, as some of you know, I am not shy about inserting
myself where I think I need to be, although there are some
points that have been made by Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Taylor that
I recognize, too, that in the normal scheme of things--and this
is what you are talking about--in the normal scheme of things,
I may not be in the room.
But if it comes down to command and control, I am in the
room. That is my job. And on the other things, I somewhat defer
to those who have the title 10 responsibilities, because I
eventually--I hope that addresses your question, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. It is helpful. And I am very grateful you
are where you are, because I think you have a real chance to
focus the command more where it needs to be focused. And I
would hope to visit with you more about that.
Just briefly, Admiral Stavridis, you talk about your mantra
being joint, international, interagency, public, private. One
of the suggestions is, as we grapple with this interagency
issue, is that we ought to use the structure of the combatant
commands to be the structure for the U.S. government in
bringing all of these different agencies and instruments of
power together.
What--just briefly, what lessons have you learned in your
command that might be useful as all of us try to figure out how
to get all of the tools in the toolbox available for us in all
parts of the world?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, first and foremost, I think it is
important that we don't militarize our foreign policy. That
would be a tremendous mistake.
State Department must do diplomacy. Agency for
International Development (AID) must do development. Defense
must do defense. But the trick is, how do we do all of that in
a way that we are mutually supportive?
And in general, in my region, I find that it is very much
State in the lead on defense, AID in the lead on development,
and where we can try and be helpful from defense, we try to be.
I believe that it is vitally important that everything we
do ought to go through a filter that says: Have we approached
this in an international way? Have we avoided unilateralism?
Have we taken the transnational approach?
Because so many of the challenges we face in this region,
in the Americas, in this home we share together are, in fact,
transnational.
Secondly, the interagency has to work together. I think we
have come a fair way at doing that over the last five years,
but I think we have a distance to go.
I think there is a role for the private sector in all of
this, and we are exploring how linkages can be established
between government, private sector, in the defense arena, for
example.
The other part of the whole equation that is so important
is strategic communications. It is communicating these ideas in
ways--particularly in South America and the Caribbean, Central
America, in ways that show respect for sovereignty, take an
approach of equality with the other nations in the region, and
don't in any sense come at the problem with a sense that we
have all the answers, because we don't.
So however we structure our organizations for national
security in the future, those would be the points I would
submit are the valuable ones that we have learned at Southern
Command. I will leave it to others to decide what the best
structure is.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for being here and certainly
for your extraordinary service to our country.
This really follows up on the question that you just
answered, Admiral, and perhaps the rest of you would like to
expand. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is holding a
hearing today, as you may know, which is exploring the
Department of Defense's role in foreign assistance.
And there are concerns, of course, that the military's role
has contributed in some way to the weakening of the State
Department, its more traditional leadership role in managing
U.S. foreign policy.
And, you know, a lot of what you just responded to, sir,
and I appreciate that, I wonder if there are--there is really
more to say in this area, because to a certain extent, you
know, it is not clear that military activities are always
vetted through the country team or understood.
And how are we really on the ground getting it done? I
understand the goals, but what more should we be doing? How
should we focus on this in a different way?
Admiral Stavridis. If I could quickly just add to what I
said before, in a practical sense, we take all of the military-
to-military engagement that we do--any activity that is done in
Southern Command is always vetted through the country team.
And then we take our larger, what we call theater security
cooperation plan, and we bring that here to State, to AID. We
show it to them. We have complete transparency. We take all of
their changes.
You are absolutely right: What happens on the ground in a
country has to be the responsibility of the ambassador in that
country. And I am very confident we are taking that approach
fully at SOUTHCOM, and we will continue to do so.
General Renuart. Ma'am, if I could, I would like to add,
first, echo Jim. Our numbers of countries that we deal with are
much smaller, but certainly Canada and Mexico are partners that
we work with very actively.
And, again, those--you have to have diplomacy in the lead
when you talk about the relations with foreign nations that we
deal with each day.
It is critical to have a partnership there because so
much--and I will speak from my experience with Mexico--so much
of what is done within the country is done by the military.
That is the nature of their structure. So there is a natural
relationship mil-to-mil that complements the ambassador's
program in the country. And I think that is critical.
I would like to add one twist here in the homeland, because
we have a unique interagency process in our headquarters that
is a little different, in that we deal with the 49 nations, 3
territories, and the district. And so that requires a bit of a
different private-sector and interagency approach.
We have 45 federal agencies that have assigned senior
individuals to our headquarters. We incorporate them into our
ops and our plans and our intelligence and that sort of thing.
It allows a level of partnership and in an interagency way that
I am very pleased and proud of. It allows us to be a
contributing partner to each of those agencies.
So the interagency approach, the whole-of-government
approach has got to be the best way--is the best way, has got
to be the way of the future for us. And I think there are some
models that can be helpful in other places.
Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. When you were working with our country teams,
what role does the military necessarily play? How would you
assess the public opinion towards the United States in your
areas? And how do you merge some of that understanding? And
what effect does it have on your operations?
General Ward. I think, Mrs. Davis, two things. First, I
certainly echo all that has been said by Admiral Stavridis and
General Renuart. We work very closely with the country teams,
but not just in implementing the plans, also in developing the
plans.
From the outset, the country teams are involved to include
the public diplomacy aspect of those, because we rely on the
public diplomacy section--what is inside the embassies--to help
us assure that the effect that we want to create are understood
by the populations with whom we are trying to serve.
And so that relationship is absolutely critical. It is
cradle to grave, from the beginning of a plan to its execution,
fully including and, in fact, taking the lead from the
embassies' action plans, insofar as how what we do supports
that overall process there within the country.
Mrs. Davis. If I could shift really quickly just to Mexico
for a second, because there is a great deal of concern that
some of the weapons being smuggled into Mexico are coming from
the U.S. To what extent is that true and a problem? And should
there be greater restrictions so that we can get a better
handle on that?
General Renuart. Well, ma'am, it is for Congress to decide
on restrictions, but I would say that, certainly, the quantity
of weapons that have been captured or uncovered in Mexico that
have been used by the cartels are predominantly either U.S.-
made or trafficked through the United States dealers, not
necessarily flowing through our borders, but there have been
illicit dealers that have been working that.
The experts in our law enforcement agencies really are
working this very hard, not truly a military role to be
involved in that, although, interestingly, we have worked with
the military in Mexico to help share that information with our
law enforcement folks. It is a real problem, and we have to pay
attention to it.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.
I want to continue with the discussion about Mexico,
General Renuart, if I could for a minute.
In the news, the President has announced that he is sending
federal agents to the border for reinforcement. And as you have
heard here--and I know you know very well--there is fear that
the violence is spilling over from Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo
Laredo and others into the United States, in both those cases
into Texas.
Periodically in this body, we debate and sometimes vote on
whether or not we should be using U.S. military forces, to put
the U.S. Army on the border. I wonder if you would address that
very briefly to the wisdom of such a thing and--or the
practicality of such a thing?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. I think,
first, militarizing our border should not be our approach at
this point. We have a number of agencies who have that role and
responsibility. There certainly is some modest assistance that
DOD might be able to provide, and I think we ought to be in a
position to provide that, should it be requested.
I do believe that there is a challenge with the--or the
potential that violence south of the border could spill over.
You have seen, I am sure, media reports of additional
kidnappings or increased kidnappings in Arizona, for example.
But the military really has the role to provide assistance
to law enforcement. Certainly, the National Guard has some
legal authority to assist law enforcement in their role. But as
the President has mentioned, Secretary Napolitano has
mentioned, Secretary Gates has mentioned, we ought not to
immediately move towards militarization of the border, but we
ought to look at a collaborative effort.
And I think the planning efforts are ongoing now to come up
with that kind of a solution.
Mr. Kline. Thank you. And I agree wholeheartedly. We should
not be moving to militarize the border. There are other ways
that we ought to address that.
And, clearly, the military can and has provided assistance.
But the notion of putting armed infantry on the border is
probably not a good one. And I just wanted to get that from
you, and I am delighted to see that you concur.
General Ward, I want to pick up on two things, if the time
allows. One, you talk about the value of United Nations forces
and African Union forces. And I know you can reflect back to a
number of years ago when we were much younger in--and, in fact,
in Africa and looking at U.N. forces hunkered down in
Mogadishu, for example, and not venturing off the airport.
And so I trust that either in African Union or United
Nations forces--and I know that you are involved in the
training of forces--I gather from your earlier answer, you are
saying that that is not the case now or at least that those
forces are more useful and more effective than in those long
years past. Is that correct?
General Ward. Thank you for that, sir. Two things. First,
it is a function of how well-trained and equipped they are and
that they are clearly--even today, there are variances in that
training and that equipment. And then, thirdly--correction,
secondly--what authorities they then have to do a mission or
not.
So I think it is a combination of those two factors, their
training and equipping, and then what authorities that they
have. When those align, then their use, their role can, in
fact, make a difference, and there are instances where that, in
fact, is the case.
It is not absolute, and so therefore, I think, to the
degree that we can be of an assist in helping to provide
trained and equipped forces from whatever contributing nation
that would provide forces to those formations, either United
Nations-sponsored formations or African Union-sponsored
formations, then we have a role, I think, in helping those
forces be better trained and equipped--clearly authorities
commensurate with whatever mission they are assigned as they
are employed.
Mr. Kline. All right. Thank you.
I see my time is about to expire. I will yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Taylor [presiding]. The chair thanks the gentleman.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
A couple questions real quickly. Admiral, you talked about
we had this large joint force, 22 countries participated.
Without naming them all, four or five of the major countries
that we would look at as being stronger allies with us and that
participated there?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I will provide the entire list for
the record, of course, but Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile,
Panama. I could go on and on. It is literally every country
that has a significant-sized military force in the Americas,
with the exception of Venezuela and Cuba, obviously.
Mr. Kissell. Okay. And I was looking for, was it the larger
countries or was it, you know, some of the smaller nations?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, it is both. It is both. And I will
just make the point, last summer, we had a Brazilian admiral
taking command of forces on one side of the Panama Canal and a
Chilean admiral taking command of forces on the other side of
the canal. It was extremely gratifying to see the nations
working together.
Mr. Kissell. And, General Ward, along the same lines in
Africa, the military-to-military contact we have, what are some
of the nations of Africa that seem to be the strongest in
working and willing to work with us?
General Ward. Sir, I think, if we look at those nations
that contribute forces to the peacekeeping missions, from
Uganda to Rwanda, South Africa, Nigeria, there are several
that, in fact, have a capability.
They need assistance logistically predominantly to either
deploy to one of these far-off places, to sustain themselves in
one of those far-off places, but there is an increasing will
that I see among many of the African nations to, in fact, do
what many of them say they want to do, that is, provide for
their own security.
And so the level of nations--Burundi is another example.
Small, out just from a very severe internal conflict, but
realizing that it can play a role in the future and attempting
to do so.
So the range is quite broad, as Admiral Stavridis
mentioned, but, again, most--many lack capacity, typically in
logistics areas--manpower typically is not an issue. We work
with them to help increase health situation within those
nations, as an example, our program for HIV-AIDS to complement
the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) through
our defense HIV-AIDS prevention program, to help them get
enough people that can, in fact, then be trained and then to
deploy into a peacekeeping set, though those nations are, in
fact, numbers are there.
Mr. Kissell. What would you say in terms of our outreach to
the countries of Africa? What portion of Africa? Are we
reaching half, three-quarters? How far out does that outreach
go?
General Ward. I think if I were to--and I will get a more
precise number to you--but we are reaching nations throughout
the continent, north, east, south, west, and central Africa.
We have probably 35 nations--and I would just hazard that
guess--of the 53 on the continent that we have active programs
with to some degree, as we--as we work with them and the
various either counterterror programs, programs developed in
their transportation of their militaries, and also in just
basic logistic support, as they participate in U.N.- or African
Union (A.U.)-sponsored peacekeeping operations.
Mr. Kissell. And, General Renuart, I know I haven't got
much time left, and one of the first--I think it was the first
hearing and being a new congressman I came to was former
Senator Gramm gave a report on weapons of mass destruction,
proliferation, said we weren't winning that fight, gave
recommendations, had some predictions about what could happen
within the borders of the United States in the next few years.
Do you all have in any involvement in trying to implement
the recommendations that commission made?
General Renuart. Sir, I think--I will have to say I am not
as familiar with the specific recommendations. However, I will
tell you that we have taken a number of actions specifically
regarding this challenge in the last three or four years to
include growing and building and equipping a consequence
management response force that can allow us to respond to a
weapon of mass destruction.
We have also increased our capability to help prevent loss
of, for example, a nuclear weapon or a nuclear device. So I
believe we are moving down the road in that direction. But if
you have a specific area, I would be happy to mention that.
Mr. Kissell. Well, I would say, you know, the commission
had some specific suggestions how we could, you know, avoid
this happening and also towards the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. And I would simply that, you know, it would
probably be good for everybody that has, you know, some time in
this to really look at that commission's report.
Thank you, sir.
General Renuart. And, Mr. Kissell, I will get the report
and provide you an answer for the record.
Mr. Kissell. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Wittman, please.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today and thank
you so much for your service to our nation.
Admiral, in January of 2009, the Navy announced its
decision to homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport
Naval Station in Florida. And Mayport's never homeported a
nuclear-powered carrier and, based on previous Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) decisions, no longer has the nearby air wing
at Cecil Field to support carrier operations.
And, Admiral, as the COCOM for this region, I wanted to
know, were you consulted in this decision? And if so, when were
you consulted? And what was your position? And if you are not,
are you aware of anyone within Southern Command that was
consulted to provide strategic input into this decision?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, as you know, it is a decision made
by--well, a recommendation made by the Chief of Naval
Operations, Gary Roughead, to the Secretary of the Navy. It
goes to the Secretary of Defense. So I don't in any way
participate in those conversations in any formal sense, no.
Mr. Wittman. Well, as a follow up, in April 2008, the CNO
announced the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet in Mayport.
And the commander of the Fourth Fleet, as you know, also serves
as the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, the
Navy's component command of SOUTHCOM.
And let me read you a recent statement from former
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Winter at the Current Strategy
Forum in June of 2008. And he said, ``The Fourth Fleet
demonstrates the Navy's commitment to the region by creating
presence in support of combined training operations,
humanitarian operations, and disaster response, and this can be
done without using a carrier battle group.
``We should also remember that it is sometimes more
effective to have a smaller combatant that can access many of
the littoral areas where we need to go. Smaller platforms are
also more suitable for training, as they are more compatible
with the navies with which we will be operating. We must
balance our present requirements with the missions and threats
we are likely to face in the given region.''
And my question is this: Given the fact that we know many
of the existing facilities at Mayport--excuse me, existing
frigates at Mayport will be retired soon and given the unique
types of missions we encounter in the Fourth Fleet's operating
areas, such as counterdrug operations, theater support
cooperation, military-to-military exercises and training, do
you agree with Secretary Winter's assessment that the Fourth
Fleet can accomplish its objectives without a carrier battle
group? Or do you believe that homeporting a nuclear carrier at
Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix of assets to
support the U.S. Fourth Fleet?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I am not going to address whether
or not the Fourth Fleet--anything about homeporting, because I
really don't have anything to do with homeporting.
And the way it works for a COCOM, sir, is, we just go to
the Joint Staff and we tell them what kind of ships we need.
And where they come from is really not my concern. They could
come from Mayport. They can come from Norfolk. They could come
from San Diego. A lot of the ships that work for me come from
San Diego. So, in terms of where ships are homeported, that is
really just not in my purview.
In terms of, what kinds of ships do we use in Southern
Command? We are far more likely to use frigates, large-deck
amphibs, hospital ships, innovative high-speed ships. Those are
what we are more likely to use, but I can't rule out ever using
any particular kind of ship. But I agree with Secretary Winter:
It is more likely that we have used the type of ships he
describes and I just mentioned.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good.
And, finally, the Navy identified strategic dispersal
considerations, consistencies with the Navy's fleet response
plan and operational readiness as the justification for its
decision to homeport a carrier at Mayport. In the Navy's
decision document, the record of the decision, however, failed
to provide any real detail on why strategic dispersal
considerations and consistency with the Navy's fleet response
plan and operational readiness support moving a carrier.
Can you comment on whether moving a carrier is necessary to
accomplish these objectives and the Navy's fleet response plan?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I really can't. It is really not in
my purview. I am a joint official. I could as equally be any
one of these colored uniforms. I am not in the Navy chain of
command at the moment, so I would really refer that question to
Admiral Roughead. I will take it to Admiral Roughead, and I
will ask him to get back to you with an answer to that
question.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Gentlemen, I joined the Army in 1993 and never had the
opportunity to meet a four-star general, so to have four of you
here at the same time is pretty awesome. And to spend the last
hour-and-a-half with you has been educational.
I want to thank you for your service to our nation. We
really do appreciate it.
I wanted to kind of focus my remarks on AFRICOM. So to
General Ward, my brother is a major in the Air Force. He just
came back from a deployment to Djibouti. And, you know,
appreciate what you are doing in the early stages of what is
going on with AFRICOM and the balance on your mission between,
obviously, short-term counterterrorism operations and then
long-term political and economic development.
I wanted to focus and get my arms around the fact that,
when you look at Africa as a continent and your mission, you
know, the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and India
combined geographically is smaller than your mission in Africa.
And you look at the fiscal year 2008 budget for your
operation, $350 million, which is approximately what we spend
in Iraq per day, is there one function, you know, when you say,
given your balance and the multiple demands on your command, is
there one function within your budget that you need more help,
that you need more funding, and that you think that we should
be focusing on as a Congress and as an Armed Services
Committee?
General Ward. Well, Mr. Murphy. I thank you very much. And
thank you, too, for your service.
I wish I had an opportunity to have met you during those
early times in the 1990s there. So I appreciate what you have
done and appreciate where you are now, as well, sir.
I think, you know, my command, except for the work that we
do--and we do accomplish counterterror work, to be sure--we do
that as a part of a global counterterror effort--my command's
predominant role is in doing our activities to help our partner
nations increase their capacity.
It doesn't take a lot to do that. What it takes is
something we call persistent and sustained engagement from the
standpoint of our training. Our best method of doing that is
when our nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can
pair up with these nations who are attempting to transform and
do things differently.
Given the commitment of those resources in places like
Afghanistan, Iraq, very difficult. What we do now is work very,
very closely with other potential sources of that type of
support, our National Guard, as well as, as was pointed out,
submitting requirements through the Joint Staff for forces that
may be in some period of outside of dwell, but not actively
employed in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, to cause that
relationship to go on.
Huge continent, so getting things around is a big
requirement that we have. So our mobility requirements are
clearly there as another requirement that we have.
Resources to assist these nations and increasing their
littoral--their maritime safety and security, so to the degree
that we can--the sorts of vessels we have talked about here
and, again, the range is a range that is quite wide, from
frigates to large deck amphibian, we--the aircraft carrier--we
just had an aircraft carrier visit South Africa, first time
since apartheid, this past fall.
So we take all of these as we can to help, one, build
relationships, two, provide some sustained-level security
engagement, that, three, leads to a capacity increase in our
partner nations that is reflective of integrity, that is
reflective of legitimacy, that is reflective of military
performing as we would like them to perform, as they wish to
perform, and societies where they respect their people, are
protectors of their people, and are--contribute themselves or
act----
Mr. Murphy. Sure.
General Ward [continuing]. As responsible members of that
society.
Mr. Murphy. Sir, how was the population of South Africa--
how were they toward the aircraft carrier being there? Were
they--I mean, I think back when the USS John Kennedy was in
Ireland. And, obviously, they loved it when our--that ship was
there. But how about as far as, what was the local populace in
South Africa?
General Ward. The reaction was very positive.
Mr. Murphy. Perfect. Let me focus real quick, sir, on--you
know, I also serve on the Intelligence Committee. You look at
the real concern with Africa, with terrorist organizations,
especially in Somalia, the Sudan, and I am trying to get a
strong stranglehold. What about a potential widespread outbreak
of a disease, really a continent-wide outbreak? And, obviously,
that would--what would that do to the--you know, the spilling
over to government and everything else?
Is there a focus, is there a preparation that you need that
we need to assist there to counter that possibility?
General Ward. There are, sir. We pay attention to that. The
threat of a pandemic disease is very real, and we do pay
attention to it. And devoting resources to that is, I think, a
very wise investment.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, sir.
My time is done. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I certainly thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, generals, admiral.
General Mattis, it is especially good to see you here. I am
just very proud of you, sir, and what you have done. You are
truly a warrior-leader. It was great serving under you in Iraq.
Admiral, my first question is for you. Could you talk a
little bit about China and Russia's involvement in how the--
maybe the Russian tentacles are back out there again where they
were receded for quite a while and how China is there now, too,
please?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. In--thank you for your service,
and thanks to all the veterans. I know there are a lot of
veterans of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard, and others who
serve on this committee. And we are proud of that part of the
relationship, as well.
Congressman Hunter, as to China, I am not overly concerned
about Chinese activities in the Americas. I believe they are
here for economic reasons to find markets for their products,
to obtain raw materials. I think it is part of the general
pattern of global trade that is going on.
I do not perceive geopolitical or geostrategic interest.
And I don't see a great deal of military-to-military activity
between militaries of this region and the Chinese military. We
watch it closely, but thus far I am comfortable with the
Chinese engagement in the region.
In terms of Russia, much has been made of this recently, I
believe stemming from four Russian ships that operated in the
Caribbean this past summer. They operated with the Venezuelan
navy. They made some port visits in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and
in Cuba, as well as some flights of Russian strategic bombers
that came down.
My friend, General Renuart, tracked them very assiduously.
In all cases, as the Russian military forces were operating in
this region, we kept track of them. That is our job.
But I don't perceive a military threat from Russia in this
region. Nor do I become overly exercised by their deployments
in the region, at least at this stage. They don't pose, in my
view, a military threat to the United States.
And Secretary Gates said at his hearing when he was asked
the question, ``Hey, maybe next time, if they send ships, they
will do a port visit in Miami.''
I think there is an approach here which ought to be one of
recognizing that the Russians have a global navy; it is going
to operate around the globe. They have a global air force; it
is going to operate around the globe. And in terms of Latin
America and the Caribbean, I don't see a military threat from
them.
Mr. Hunter. That is good to hear. Thank you.
In the interests of time, let me move on here. Do you see--
for General Renuart, do you see them taking advantage--anybody
taking advantage of the chaos in Mexico right now? Because the
enemy does gravitate to our weakness, and right now Mexico is a
weakness, whether or not it is a threat.
But do you see other countries operating through Mexico in
order to destabilize us?
General Renuart. Mr. Hunter, I--again, I share Admiral
Stavridis' view that neither China nor Russia--and in my
assessment, there is not another country that is actively
working in Mexico to destabilize us. I think certainly there
are----
Mr. Hunter. Iranian influence in Mexico? You don't see
that?
General Renuart. There is an Iranian presence in Mexico,
for sure. The government of Mexico is working that themselves.
We monitor it, but it is a relatively small presence.
Mr. Hunter. Do they have a stabilizing factor?
General Renuart. I don't see that at this point, no.
Mr. Hunter. So they have a destabilizing----
General Renuart. I am sorry. I misunderstood what you said.
Mr. Hunter. Oh, I am sorry.
General Renuart. They do not have a destabilizing effect
that I have seen, at least at this point.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, one last question for you, sir. Do you know
that there is no golden hour in Afghanistan right now with the
forces that you deploy to Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Say again, the question, sir?
Mr. Hunter. That there is no golden hour. That is the one
hour that you have to get people up if they get hit back to a
facility to get treated.
General Mattis. Sir, we are working the deployment of the
sufficient helicopter assets to make certain we get it down a
golden hour. There are--you know the size of the country. You
have served there. It is a challenge. But that is our goal. And
the Secretary of Defense, I believe, has approved the request
for forces that will get us there.
Mr. Hunter. Will the--you realize that there aren't any
Ospreys in Afghanistan. Is that true, there is no Osprey
squadron?
General Mattis. That is correct right now.
Mr. Hunter. Did you know that they just deployed an Osprey
with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I am aware of that. And that----
Mr. Hunter. Would the Ospreys have made it so that there is
a golden hour if they were deployed to Afghanistan--the MEU?
General Mattis. I would have to do the time-distance factor
to give you a truly accurate statement.
Mr. Hunter. But let me say, I have done it for you. And
they would have. And I was wondering if you had any say
whatsoever in having the--do we not trust the Osprey? Do they
not want it in combat? Or are we doing it purely to put it with
the U.S. Navy?
I understand that they might be going over there in the
future, but they aren't there now. And I was wondering if you
had any say in that when it came to the deployment of the
Osprey?
General Mattis. Sir, the commitment of the specific
helicopter assets going into country will be part of the Marine
contingent that the secretary has approved. I don't know what
percent of that is Osprey and what is CH-53, that sort of--I
can get that answer for you, though.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals, Admiral.
The Chairman. The members will notice that the public
affairs--public relations--whatever you call it, the P.A.
system is working much, much better. Complaining does help. You
don't have to ask the witnesses nor the members to repeat their
questions or their answers.
The gentlelady from New Hampshire, there are two votes
pending. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, will
assume the chair upon the return, and the hearing will
continue.
And, gentlemen, we appreciate your patience.
But in the meantime, we will call Ms. Shea-Porter to finish
up before the vote.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you so much for being here and your service to
the country.
General Ward, I wanted to ask you about the humanitarian
assistance programs on the continent of Africa. I wanted to
know specifically how we are doing in comparison to other
countries such as China. Are they more visible? Do we have a
greater visibility? Is it enough? And what are your plans to
make sure that the continent of Africa understands what our
goals are there and our concerns for them?
General Ward. Thank you, Madam Shea-Porter.
Two things. First, the work that we do is work that
complements the greater effort being done by our U.S. Agency
for International Development, insofar as our humanitarian
assistance effort is concerned.
We, working in concert with the chiefs of mission, the
ambassadors, determine those areas that, one, are not being met
by any other aspect of our government and then, two, support
the military capacity of our servicemen and women who have
skill sets in those areas, as well.
I think, from the standpoint of what others are doing--
i.e., nations, China, India, and others--clearly, they are
expending a great amount of resources in various humanitarian
projects, programs, infrastructure construction, things that we
are not matching, things that we are not doing.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Does that concern you?
General Ward. It concerns me from the standpoint of what
the effect of what is being done by others has in the
environment and the influence that they have based on that and
how that is influencing how those nations who receive that
support react and respond to it.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Well, thank you, General. I am going to
interrupt because of the time, but I think that is exactly the
problem that we have so often, that we come late to the game.
And so, if I am hearing you correctly, you are concerned, as I
think most of us would be, that we might be losing a little bit
of the edge that we could have right now if we were more active
and the Africans understood that we were a generous, good
people concerned about their welfare.
So which country, can I ask you, concerns you in Africa?
What other foreign countries do you feel is making greater
gains than we are, in terms of winning hearts and minds?
General Ward. I would have to take a close look at that and
get back to you. I think in a general sense, the reaction
occurs throughout the continent of Africa. In today's economic
situation, it is even exacerbated a bit because of the reaction
or the reflection that what might have been already provided
may be reduced--may not be as prevalent.
And so I think that is a concern that is there. I think
African nations are meeting in Europe in a prelude to the G-20,
expressing the same thought of concern about their continued
development based on the economic situation.
But I am not sure I could name a single particular country
that would concern me more than any other at this point in
time.
Ms. Shea-Porter. So looking at the economic instability and
the long history of problems that they are enduring, this might
be an opportune time for us to raise our visibility through
these kinds of efforts?
General Ward. I think anything that we do makes a
difference. And I think it should be not episodic. If we can
make it consistent, that is even better, ma'am.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Okay. And one last question, thank you.
Operation Objective Voice, getting our message, our
ideology across, our goals for democracy, how strong a message
are we delivering there right now? Is it--are you able to
actually have an impact? Or is it still a challenge to
communicate like that?
General Ward. I think the assessment that we get and how we
see those pieces of information that are transmitted through
Operation Objective Voice, when those things appear in other
media on the continent, it lets us know that people are paying
attention, the Africans are paying attention.
And then, as we get reactions from our embassies, because
we do that in very close coordination with the embassies and
the country teams, their public diplomacy sections, that we get
the assessment that it is making a difference, they are
listening, and it does cause them to see what goes on from a
perspective that reflects that that we would intend our force
to be.
So I think it is making a difference. And our partners, the
ambassadors, the country teams, as well as the nations, think
is a very good program that we are involved in.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will go vote. We have two votes, and Mrs. Davis will
assume the chair. And as I read the list, Mr. Larsen will be
the first batter up.
And, again, thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance.
[Recess.]
Mrs. Davis [presiding]. All right, everybody. Thank you so
much for waiting. We appreciate your patience.
I am going to turn to Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. And it looks like I am the only one
left. Unless someone else shows up, I will just take about 30
minutes, if you don't mind, Madam Chair. I will be very--try to
be brief here.
General Renuart, I want to chat with you about the other
border, the U.S.-Canadian border, obviously, and specifically
with regards to the 2010 Winter Olympics, which will be held in
Vancouver, British Columbia, obviously in another country, but
only about 10 miles north of the U.S.-Canadian border and right
across from what is my district.
And I know U.S. NORTHCOM and DOD has had a supporting role
in some of the preparation for security for the Olympics. And I
just wanted to ask you what you see the role and function of
U.S. NORTHCOM with regards to the Olympics and what role you
have played and missions you have played?
General Renuart. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that
question.
Actually, there are--I have roles in two hats. In my NORAD
hat, as you know, we provide for air security and sovereignty
for both the U.S. and Canada, and we have had a very close
relationship with the security, the integrated security unit
formed by the governor of Canada--government of Canada, to
ensure that we have the pieces in place to provide for a safe,
secure monitoring of the airspace in and around not just
Vancouver, but, as you know, Seattle and the traffic and
transit across the border back and forth each day, not just
with the Olympics, is substantial.
And so we have been involved very actively through our
Canadian air defense sector and my Canadian NORAD region to
understand the challenges that the Canadian government feels it
has with respect to a secure airspace.
We are partnering with Transport Canada, with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), with our NORAD regions both in
the U.S. and in Canada to ensure that we have created
procedures that will allow for safe transit flow of aircraft in
and out of the area, and to monitor the area--the airspace
around that area, low altitude to high, for any potential
threat.
In my NORTHCOM hat, as you may know, we have a civil
assistance plan that we have agreed to between my counterpart
in Canada, Canada Command, and Northern Command, to allow us to
have a framework that could provide military support, should it
be requested by either of the governments.
And I would use a great example, Hurricane Gustav, where
really the last evacuees we took out of New Orleans were on a
Canadian C-17. So we have exercised that process already.
With respect to NORTHCOM support, really, we sit in a
situation where the Canadians clearly need to lead and manage
and are managing their support to the Olympics. There may be
some unique capabilities that don't reside within the Canadian
military.
The Canadian government is considering those potential
needs and will provide that through a diplomatic note from the
ambassador to the U.S. government. And then we are in a
position and be prepared to provide whatever support may be
required.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks.
General Mattis, good to see you again, sir. And hopefully
the Zags will do a good job tomorrow night. We are all cheering
for them and the Huskies.
Can I ask you some questions about NATO, your role with
NATO transformation, if that is all right.
Last week, we had a hearing about the economic crisis and
its impact on national security. One of the themes was that the
economic recession globally would have an impact on our allies'
ability to meet their own defense budget needs.
And are you running into a problem as your--with your NATO
hat on, with our allies and their investment into their
transformational capabilities?
General Mattis. Sir, I am, but it is not a late-breaking
thing that I can attribute directly to the economic turndown.
This was a big enough concern for me when I arrived there at
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Allied Command Transformation a
little over a year ago, that we started the multiple futures
project, in an attempt to try to harvest from the best think-
tanks in Europe and North America what are the threats to the
populations and come to some agreement on what is the threat to
Europe.
Because if we don't come to an agreement on that, then to
try and get them to perhaps carry a more equitable share of the
load, I think, was going nowhere. And we continued to see
declining defense budgets.
So I think there is a larger issue at stake, frankly. And
it is something that we are going to have to engage upon
through the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense--already
going on, by the way--but we need to get the military
appreciation of the situation sufficient that the political
leadership know what we think is the threat.
And I should report that out to my boss in Brussels, the
Secretary General, within the next 30 days, right after the
summit.
Mr. Larsen. Madam Chairman, just two questions for the
record, and I will submit these for the record, one for General
Mattis about perhaps a change in who is going to be sitting in
as supreme allied commander transformation, the possibility--it
is possible it might be the French, in their new role in NATO.
And, second, I will have questions for the record for
Generals Ward and Stavridis on 1206 and 1207. And we will give
those to you all relatively soon.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Renuart, could you please provide an update on the
security upgrades being made to building two at Peterson Air
Force Base?
General Renuart. Certainly, Mr. Lamborn. It is good to see
you.
And, Mr. Coffman, also, good to see the Colorado
delegations almost the last two standing, so well done.
With respect to--and, Congressman Lamborn, you know we have
been involved in a number of improvements in to expand the
security protection, if you will, of our operations in so-
called building two, our NORAD-NORTHCOM command center.
We have completed now about $4.5 million to $5 million
worth of projects since we had the chance to chat last. They
include improvements to the entry access procedures. We have
created a dedicated Department of Defense security guard force
now that is trained and equipped.
We have added additional fencing, access control, vehicle
control, vehicle inspections to our security procedures so that
we would reduce the potential for someone with a threatening
intent to gain access to the building.
We have a couple projects that are just still underway,
continuing to work. One involves the electrical access in the
building. One involves the provision of electromagnetic
hardening. I am sorry Mr. Bartlett's not here, but we are
improving that electromagnetic hardening in the building.
And we continue to work with the wing to find additional
security measures that the host wing can take to ensure that we
don't have that kind of access to the building that might cause
us a threat.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Now, what role do you envision for Cheyenne Mountain Air
Force Base in the future?
General Renuart. Well, Congressman, as you know, we
continue to use Cheyenne Mountain as our alternate command
center. It has played an active role. As a matter of fact,
while we were doing some minor construction in the primary
command center, we moved our operation to the mountain and have
conducted full-up operations out of the mountain, although, as
you know, it is at a slightly smaller footprint.
We continue to have a rotating presence of assessors and
command-and-control capability in the mountain. And we will
continue to do that for the foreseeable future.
So I think Cheyenne Mountain will continue to have a
principal role in our overall command structure, albeit
principally as the alternate command site.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you for those answers. And I do
look forward to continuing a dialogue with you on these
important issues.
General Renuart. Absolutely.
Mr. Lamborn. And thank you for the work that you do.
General Renuart. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Mattis, it is--we obviously use a pretty large,
conventional footprint when it comes to regime change and then
nation-building and used the counterinsurgency strategy. But we
also have insurgency capability in special operations and our
ability to go in and align ourselves with an indigenous peoples
that share our strategic view in terms of regime change or
trying to influence a political situation in a given region.
Could you for us speak to an assessment of our
capabilities, in terms of insurgents, on that side of
insurgency?
General Mattis. Mr. Coffman, it would be best if Admiral
Olson, my shipmate at special forces, Special Operations
Command, gave it. However, I can perhaps address at least some
of the edges of this.
We have never had a more integrated special forces, general
purpose forces effort in our history. They are so embedded now
in each other, they have, in many cases, the same capabilities
and, where they are not the same, the unique capabilities are
used back and forth appropriately by the combatant commanders.
The special forces are heavily used right now. And the
result is, we have to come up with a better allocation of
resources, of enablers, for example, from the general purpose
forces that enable the special forces to operate.
At the same time, we have a very well-defined division of
labor, having sat down with Admiral Olson of Special Operations
Command, chief of staff of the Army, commandant of the Marine
Corps, myself, and we look at when we are going to try to do
these things before we have to send in large footprints of
general purpose forces, who should do it?
And let me tell you what the breakout is, in general terms.
If we are going to set long-term relationships with indigenous
forces, with other nations, that is going to be special forces.
It will remain there. The Army A-teams, the kind of people who
are trained to do this.
Where it is going to be teaching skill sets--marching,
marksmanship, first aid, basic infantry tactics--the general
purpose forces will pick those up so that we free the special
forces to do what they only alone can do best, if that gives
you somewhat of an answer, I hope.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Mattis.
General Ward, in AFRICOM, what is your role or the role of
AFRICOM--is there a role in Darfur, indirect or direct,
potentially direct, obviously, no direct role right now, but
maybe you could speak to that?
General Ward. Well, thank you, sir.
Clearly, our role in Darfur today is that--of an indirect
nature, as we support those African Union and United Nations
forces that are there, that have been designated to go there,
enabling them, training, equipping to a degree, as well as
providing logistic support.
I mentioned, you know, in January, February timeframe, we
provided lift assistance to the government of Rwanda to move
outsized cargo--essentially, trucks--that they would use in the
mission they are in, in Darfur.
And so we are involved with those nations. We are involved
with the African Union, as they endeavor to put their plans in
place for addressing the situation in Darfur.
Clearly, you know, whatever we would do would be a result
of a policy decision having been taken with respect to the role
that we play. And, as you pointed out, to this point, that is
purely a role from the military point of view of providing
assistance to those peacekeeping forces that have been
earmarked for peacekeeping activities in Darfur.
Mr. Coffman. Would a correct assessment be that things have
deteriorated recently in Darfur?
General Ward. I think, from the standpoint of the
indictment and the reduction in the nongovernmental
organizations that are allowed to operate in Darfur, it would
certainly indicate a degradation of what goes on there.
Not been there, obviously, so I can't speak to it directly,
but clearly the indications are that is the case.
I think, at this point in time, you know, the pipeline
distribution issues are there, with respect to supplies,
foodstuffs, water, et cetera. So I think it would be fair to
say that there has been a degradation of the humanitarian
relief efforts there in Darfur.
Mr. Coffman. Admiral, I think it was expressed during the
discussion about a Hezbollah presence in your battle space.
Could you speak to that and assess the threat level?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I will afford myself, if it is
appropriate, the opportunity to provide for the record
classified portions of this.
But as a general proposition, I am concerned about the
presence of Hezbollah throughout the Americas, in the Southern
Cone of South America, in the Andean ridge, and in the
Caribbean. Their primary activities are proselytizing,
recruiting, money laundering, drug selling, and using the
profits from that to conduct a variety of the other activities
that I mentioned.
It is of concern. I do not see operational terror cells in
the region, but I do see that kind of support mechanism. It is
of concern. And I will, again, provide some more detail to the
committee on that.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Admiral.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Renuart, I have been hearing lately that you have
been quoted--I think very accurately--as saying that our
missile defense capability, as it is now, our present
capability, is--that you have confidence that it is an
effective defense against the present threat from North Korea.
And it is a perspective that I share.
One of the concerns that some of us have is that--I think,
what, we have 26 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) now in the
inventory, and there is a question related to the 18 remaining
that we are hoping to put in inventory soon. And because I am--
like a lot of other people--concerned about the need to have as
many GBIs in inventory as possible related to potentially, you
know, a growing North Korean threat and even, at some point--I
know it would be more for the East Coast for the time being,
but if the Iranian missile threat continues to grow.
And so just from a strategic perspective, what do you think
the strategic implications are of not fulfilling the inventory
or filling the inventory to a total, I believe, that would be
of 44? What do you think are strategic implications of either
delaying that or failing to follow through with those 18
additional GBIs?
General Renuart. Well, thanks. I think it is--as you say, I
have expressed confidence in the capabilities that we have
today against the threat that we see.
Mr. Franks. Right.
General Renuart. I think it is important for us to continue
the robust testing regimen that General O'Reilly has laid out.
That will allow us to grow the level of confidence we have
against a variety of capabilities that might develop in the
future.
I have been supportive of that--as you mentioned, the
planned buy of 44 interceptors. I think that makes very good
sense to allow us to not only maintain a capability against
growing threats, but also to refresh missiles as they may need
to be upgraded, in terms of software and the like.
So I continue to be supportive of that initial plan. I
think there is still quite a bit of discussion ongoing now with
respect to European basing sites that I am really not in a
position to have an expert opinion on.
And so I would--my advocacy, if you will, is to keep the
current testing program, the regimen on track, to continue to
make it a complicated, sort of all-aspect testing program so
that we continue to be comfortable that, as threats may
develop, as other nations, rogue nations might expand their
capability, we have an ability to answer to that.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, sir. I guess, you know, I had
the privilege of being present last night at the Missile
Defense Agency when one of these tests was conducted, when we
had--down in the Pacific, they shot a missile about 200-plus
kilometers into the air, and they sent from our Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system two interceptors. The
second one was not necessary.
And I just thought it was a great moment for America, as so
many of these things are, and yet a lot of times the Armed
Forces don't get the credit that they deserve, so--you know, so
nobly deserve in these situations.
Even when there is not a war going on, you guys are always
out trying to make us stronger and more capable of defending
this country. And I honor you for that with all of my heart.
And I--again, you don't get the credit. I think that should
be all over the news today, that, you know, we no longer hit,
as General Obering says, a bullet with a bullet. We hit a spot
on the side of a bullet with a bullet on a consistent basis.
And that is an accomplishment, and I think that that means that
my two little babies are going to be safer. And I appreciate
you for protecting them.
So I got about one last shot at you here.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Franks. Given the fact that we have--essentially, our
firing doctrine is three on one, related to the Korean threat,
or at least we want to be prepared for that, that would give
us, really, right now, a chance to only effectively engage
eight missiles. And, again, that is, I know, a rough analyses.
But is there anything else that you would say related to
the strategic necessity of having additional interceptors? Do
you think that that is important? What emphasis would you put
on that?
General Renuart. Well, Congressman, I am glad that you,
first, had a chance to see that THAAD test. It really was a
great success. And I think what that does is it also underlines
the fact that missile defense is not just about the ground-
based midcourse interceptors. It is a comprehensive approach,
from the warning sensors that we must use, air-, sea-, space-
based sensors, radars, if you like, in simple terms, to both a
long-range and a theater capability to defend.
And, certainly, the Navy's SM-3 aboard our Aegis cruisers,
the THAAD system that you saw tested so successfully, as well
as the ground-based midcourse interceptors provide us a
comprehensive capability.
And I think it is important for us to continue that
integrated approach. How that translates to numbers of
missiles, I think we don't know yet, because as the
capabilities of each system mature, you may see trade space
amongst each of those systems to allow you to have the most
efficient capability to defend the nation.
I think, as you said, the capability against the limited
threat we see today, we are in good shape. I would not tie to a
particular shot doctrine, because, as the system matures, the
system will actually do some analysis to determine how best to
intercept one of these incoming missiles.
So I think, again, we have a good commitment to this
production rate. My sense is the department is supportive of
that, so I don't--I am not worried about that at this point.
But I think we need to let this testing regimen complete itself
before we tie ourselves to some number that may not actually be
needed or maybe there is more. Hard to say.
Mr. Franks. Well, Madam Chair, thank you.
I know that they don't put four stars on the shoulders of
these individuals casually. So I thank all of you for your--
really, committing your whole life to the cause of human
freedom. And I wish we could really see more of what you do
sometimes. I think it would mean a lot to the country.
Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
And, as we wind up, and I want to thank you very much, as
well.
Can I just go back to a second--to comments earlier about
irregular warfare? And I am wondering if you have any message
to the Personnel Committee in what we should be focusing on, in
terms of the recruiting, retention, and training of our
military that will continue to support the goal of having a
superiority in irregular warfare, as well as superiority in
conventional and nuclear technology?
Can you respond quickly? Anything----
General Mattis. Yes, ma'am, just very quickly, none of us
can predict the future, and we all have certain modest
expectations about whether or not we will really know where the
next threat comes from, but we know this.
If we keep a very high-quality force, officer and enlisted,
if we keep recruiting the kind of folks who can think on their
feet, the kind of folks who can integrate high technology, but
not lose sight of the fact that human factors in war remain the
dominant reason for success or failure, then we will make the
adaptations, for example, in language, training, cultural
training, and these sorts of things.
But it really comes down to one fundamental premise, and
that is that we get the best and the brightest for their jobs.
We are decentralizing decisionmaking. And as we look at the
cyber threats, and the EMP note that was made earlier, we are
going to have to continue to decentralize decisionmaking.
That means we need, at the very youngest ages, young folks
who can use initiative and exercise good judgment, both
tactically and ethically, because of the nature of these
fights. It is all about quality, ma'am.
General Renuart. Ma'am, if I could add a point----
Mrs. Davis. Go ahead.
General Renuart [continuing]. One of the keys to, if you
will, preventing irregular war is the ability to build
partnership capacity among our friends around the world. And
while certainly Jim is right that today's young men and women
are eager to serve and they understand the technical nature of
the business, I think it is important for us to continue that
capability to build partnership capacity among our friends so
that countries can manage those irregular threats that may
develop without it requiring a large U.S. presence.
Admiral Stavridis. And--oh, I am sorry, Kip, go ahead.
General Ward. And just not to let that one--not go without
another strike. In that whole regard of building the capacity
of our partners, clearly our cultural understanding is
critically important. The language programs within my command,
my director of intelligence and knowledge development, whereby
we try to have our best understanding of our partners, their
culture, environment, history, traditions, et cetera, et
cetera, those things help with those relationships, helps with
the partnerships that we build, increases the trust and
confidence between us, and therefore helping--to get to the
point that was made--create the type of environment that would,
in fact, prevent the irregular requirements from even existing.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Stavridis. I will just close, if I could, by
underlining language and culture very specifically. And I
believe there are enormous second-order effects having 2
million people in the Department of Defense studying and
learning language and culture. It is a ripple effect, both in
the world and in our own country.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
We will look forward to working with you, as we all face
those difficult decisions and choices. And we hope to put more
of our resources in that direction.
Thank you very much for being here. Again, we applaud your
service. And thank you for your time and attention today. Thank
you.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 18, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 18, 2009
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 18, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. Do you support the Navy's reasoning, as identified
below, for re-establishing the 4th Fleet in Florida? ``This is a
significant change and presents us the opportunity to garner the right
resources for the missions we run for Southern Command,'' said Rear
Adm. James W. Stevenson Jr., Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern
Command (NAVSO). ``As a numbered fleet, we will be in a better position
to ensure the Combatant Commander has the right assets available when
needed.'' http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=36606
Admiral Stavridis. The 4th Fleet has been very positive for
USSOUTHCOM in our efforts. The ability of the planning staff in
Mayport, Florida to reach back to the Navy and obtain assets has been a
singular success. Our ability to bring Navy ships like the Boxer and
the Kearsarge into the region to do medical activities, our disaster
relief off of Haiti, our counter-narcotics interdictions of last summer
and this past fall are just a few examples of the positive effect of
the 4th Fleet. We're very satisfied with the Navy's decision to stand
up the 4th Fleet.
Mr. Miller. As a Senate-confirmed 4 star flag officer, you have
testified many times that when asked to provide your personal opinion
to the Congress, you would do so. With that in mind, do you agree with
the following statements made by the Navy to Senator Webb and his
staff: ``The decision to create the capacity to homeport a CVN at Naval
Station Mayport represents the best military judgment of the Navy's
leadership regarding strategic considerations. The need to develop a
hedge against the potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event
was ultimately the determining factor in the decision to homeport a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport. The consolidation of CVN
capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the East Coast presents a
unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are spread among
three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three
locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available
to Pacific Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic event occurs. By contrast,
Naval Station Norfolk is homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to
the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast
location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is
the only location in the U.S. capable of CVN construction and
refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet
trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. A second
CVN homeport on the East Coast will provide additional CVN maintenance
infrastructure and provide strategic options in case of a catastrophic
event in the Hampton Roads area. It will also enhance distribution of
CVN assets, thereby reducing the risks to CVNs and associated
maintenance and repair infrastructure supporting those crucial
assets.''
Admiral Stavridis. The Navy's objectives for homeporting a CVN in
Mayport are independent of 4th Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM Area of
Focus. Homeporting decisions and policies are made by the Navy and they
consider many factors. I have no reason to doubt the Navy's reasons for
this move.
Mr. Miller. ADM Stavridis: I'd like to ask you about President
Obama's Executive Order to close the detention facility at GITMO since
it is in your Area of Responsibility (AOR). To what extent were you
consulted by the Administration to get your military expertise on
whether or not to close GITMO, the risks of closing GITMO and the
practicality of closing GITMO?
Admiral Stavridis. Providing oversight of Joint Task Force
Guantanamo, and the mission of safe and humane, transparent, legal care
and custody of detainees in our charge, remains our focus. The
Secretary of Defense has appointed a Detainee Task Force (DTF), co-
chaired by Mr. Joseph Benkert (Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Security Affairs) and Major General Irving Halter (Vice Director
for Operations, Joint Staff), to coordinate the Department of Defense
decision-making and actions necessary to implement the 22 Jan 09
Executive Orders affecting detainees and detainee operations. This
includes expediting the Department-wide responses to the President's
orders to review and determine the disposition of individuals detained
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This Command provides input to the DTF through
a U.S. Southern Command representative, who participates in all
planning efforts. I receive routine updates on the DTF progress and
have opportunity to pro-
vide input. USSOUTHCOM also provided membership to the Admiral Walsh
Compliance Team that visited Joint Task Force Guantanamo in February
and reported back to the Secretary.
Mr. Miller. ADM Stavridis: In your testimony, you discuss the
growing Islamic extremist threat in South and Central America. Please
elaborate on this, particularly increased support for Hizbollah in
Venezuela. To what extent is Islamic extremism's reach in SOUTHCOM and
what steps can we take to better combat this?
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Miller. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ``soft
power.'' I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our
themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is
your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What
are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?
Admiral Stavridis. At Southern Command, Strategic Communication is
our main battery. Within our Area of Focus, there is no conventional
country on country conflict, nor will there likely be in the
foreseeable future. Instead, we face a market place of ideas. Strategic
Communication at Southern Command enables our leaders to synchronize
words, images and actions to reduce and ultimately eliminate what we
call `the say-do gap.' By ensuring our words, images and actions are in
alignment, we build credibility with both our friends and adversaries.
This creates the conditions necessary for our ideas to resonate most
effectively in the market place. This approach can only improve with
greater interagency integration.
Mr. Miller. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ``soft
power.'' I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our
themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is
your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What
are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?
General Renuart. Mr. Miller, we agree that a better whole-of-
government approach to unifying our words and deeds would be beneficial
to the nation. I am confident that the President's designation of the
Department of State as the lead for the U.S. Government's strategic
communication efforts will ensure the needed unity of effort. As part
of the Department of Defense, NORAD and USNORTHCOM represent the
military elements of the U.S. Government's strategic communication
efforts in the United States, Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. It is
my responsibility to ensure our actions are consistent with the intent
of the Secretary of Defense's and Secretary of State's larger vision.
At NORAD and USNORTHCOM, our strategic communication efforts are
centered on developing, executing, and assessing communication
strategies that have been integrated across the Commands, as well as
synchronized with interagency partners. These strategies are designed
to support the strategic objectives of our military plans. In general,
these objectives include dissuading and deterring external threats,
providing timely and effective civil support, and enhancing unity of
effort with our interagency, intergovernmental and international
partners.
To date, we have been remarkably successful in our strategic
communication efforts for a very limited set of outcomes. However, more
work needs to be done to appropriately scale this effort to address the
whole of the Commands' objectives. We are committed to resourcing this
effort to ensure its success.
Mr. Miller. What is NORTHCOM's readiness if and when there is a
coordinated cyber attack on the United States?
General Renuart. USNORTHCOM's readiness in a coordinated cyber
attack on the U.S. is at a moderate to high level for computer networks
within DOD, and at a low to moderate level for support of civil
authorities with respect to the cyber domain. On a day-to-day basis,
USNORTHCOM's focus is on cyber defense of those computer systems,
networks, and related infrastructure required to execute our assigned
missions. Defensive measures by DOD and non-DOD mission partners help
to mitigate the adverse impact of cyber events on our mission
performance. We believe that our cyber defensive posture will allow
USNORTHCOM to operate effectively during major cyber incidents in order
to ensure continuity of operations, but we recognize that more needs to
be done.
To improve the command's readiness, USNORTHCOM is an active
participant in National and DOD-level cyber exercises. We have
participated in such exercises as Cyber Storm (Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)-sponsored), Bulwark Defender (DOD-sponsored), and have
integrated more cyber play into our Command's exercise events.
One of USNORTHCOM's missions is civil support, to include Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), at U.S. Federal, tribal, State,
and local levels, as directed.
The recent addition of cyber to USNORTHCOM's role in DSCA has expanded
our responsibilities and will require the Command to plan for and
provide augmentation of DOD capability to DHS in an effort to mitigate
cyber threats to the homeland. In February 2009, USNORTHCOM staff, with
support from Department of Homeland Security, initiated a DSCA cyber
mission analysis which helped define the cyber capabilities DHS might
need from DOD. Operational planning that includes identifying/
provisioning DOD force structure to address the DSCA cyber requirement
is a task that will be completed during calendar year 2009. This
includes planning for second and third order effects that may occur as
a result of a coordinated cyber attack on the United States.
Mr. Miller. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ``soft
power.'' I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our
themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is
your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What
are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?
General Mattis. USJFCOM's strategic communication effort focuses
across a ``functional AOR,'' providing joint forces that are well-
trained in the subtleties of operating in complex public information
environments. Defense and service schools, and Joint Professional
Military Education venues provide basic knowledge on strategic
communication, but USJFCOM is tasked with providing applied training
for joint force commanders and staffs through participation in major
exercises, seminars, and planning events. USJFCOM closes this cycle by
encouraging dedicated improvement of joint capabilities across
doctrine, training, education, and technologies through collaboration,
concept development and experimentation.
USJFCOM's strategic communication training and capabilities
development efforts continue to grow. The following items reflect some
of the demands placed on USJFCOM strategic communication requirements
during the past two years, and manifest as a summary of shortfalls.
- Development of media analysis tools/capabilities to support the
joint force
- Development and integration of strategic communication
education, language, cultural awareness in existing training mechanisms
- Delivery of strategic communication training across COCOMs and
applying it to exercise support requirements
- Design and conduct of a study to determine what force structure
is needed to properly conduct strategic communication processes across
DoD at the joint force level
- Study and design processes to integrate viable SC planning and
execution across DoD and with other agencies
- Developing access, understanding, and processes and procedures
for dealing with social/emerging media
- Resource (Man and equip) and operate the Joint Public Support
Element (JPASE) to ensure quality connectivity at all classification
levels
- Completion of fourteen 2006 QDR SC Roadmap tasks
So the needs focus on a lack of sufficient manpower and resources
for adequate coverage of training requirements, and a lack of
sufficient funding to address capabilities and requirements for joint
strategic communication in the future. This is commensurate with the
importance of USJFCOM's strategic communication task at hand:
developing innovative capabilities that enable contributing joint
functions to perform strategic communication as well as they perform
coordinated, joint kinetic operations.
Mr. Miller. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ``soft
power.'' I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our
themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is
your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What
are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?
General Ward. Strategic Communication is a priority at U.S. Africa
Command, and we have made it a consideration in all our programs,
operations, and activities. The Command has developed Strategic
Communication guidance that includes all appropriate audiences,
encourages two-way communication, and ensures a consistent message in
our area of responsibility. We have collaborated closely with the
interagency community and CENTCOM on a Strategic Communication plan to
support anti-piracy efforts. We still have work to do, of course, in
improving interagency coordination and becoming more proactive than
reactive in our Strategic Commu-
nication efforts. In order to be more effective, we currently are
identifying the training and manpower resources that our component
commands need to plan and execute Strategic Communication in support of
our missions.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. What is your response to the GAO report that
eradication efforts have been offset by increased efficiencies of the
cultivators of coca? Do you believe that it is time for new counter-
narcotics strategy in the Hemisphere?
Admiral Stavridis. I am not significantly surprised to see new
efficiencies in coca cultivation partially offsetting our collective
efforts to reduce supply. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are
well financed, adaptable and utilize the latest technology. The fact
that DTOs must pursue new techniques indicates that we are having an
impact, forcing them to adapt. This is also borne out by recent DEA
statistics that show an approximately 104 percent increase in price and
approximately 35 percent decrease in purity in U.S. markets.
Our overall hemispheric strategy includes efforts in the source,
transit and arrival zones. As you know, DoD's primary role is in supply
reduction. Whereas DoD focuses on Detection and Monitoring and supports
Law Enforcement in interdiction and apprehension, Department of State
(DoS) is lead for eradication. Both missions are mutually supportive
and overlap. We constantly strive to refine our strategy in order to
counter a highly adaptive adversary. Again, changes in DTO practices
across the drug spectrum; cultivation, production, transportation to
markets, and distribution indicate that we are having an impact on
DTO's. We will continue to review our strategy to ensure it is the most
effective possible and anticipates future shifts in DTO methodology.
Mr. Wilson. Can you describe the current mix of U.S. military
forces in SOUTHCOM's AOR? What is the optimal mix of active and reserve
forces to execute your mission? Do you have the right mix of force
skills and capabilities?
Admiral Stavridis. I believe that there is a proper mix of reserve
and active duty forces throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR. At any one time,
there are approximately 7,000 personnel assigned to 30 countries and
the Services have determined the best fill for our requirements,
whether from reserve or active duty forces. I recognize that there are
some skill sets that exist primarily in the reserve component and we
welcome their deployment to the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
USSOUTHCOM utilizes forces from both the reserve and active
component to accomplish Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events,
Counter Drug/Counter Narcoterrorism (CD/CNT) operations, detainee
operations at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), Special
Operations Forces (SOF) missions, exercises, and humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief operations as required. Capabilities
required to successfully accomplish the missions outlined above reside
in both the active and reserve components of the force providers. For
example, JTF-GTMO utilizes reservist lawyers and doctors to provide
safe and humane treatment of detainees. Our theater special operations
command's missions are augmented by the 20th Special Forces Group,
which is regionally aligned for South and Central America, as well as
Navy reserve Special Warfare operators that carry out missions
throughout the region. The National Guard also provides security forces
at Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras in the form of a 35 person
security detachment.
Exercises are another form of reserve support to the command and
the Services provide reserve units to exercises as a means to
accomplish key and critical training objectives to ensure unit
readiness throughout the year. Additionally, reservists provide
significant support for headquarters USSOUTHCOM and the military groups
around the region. Virtually every office at headquarters USSOUTHCOM
receives some reserve support and without their service, there would be
an additional workload on the civilians and active duty forces assigned
to the headquarters.
Active duty forces provide a preponderance of the force at JTF-
GTMO, for CD/CNT operations, and disaster relief operations. There are
currently more than 2,000 personnel assigned to JTFGTMO and except for
the lawyers and doctors mentioned above, most are active duty. CD/CNT
operations are carried out by forces from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force, Army, and Coast Guard. The Navy sources approximately four
guided missile frigates at any one time, the Marine Corps provides
training teams that deploy to the region and teach small unit tactics
for host nation counter drug forces, the Air Force provides base
operating forces at Curacao in addition to flying AWACS sorties in
support of the ongoing CD/CNT efforts, and the Army provides SOF assets
to increase the capability of host nation SOF forces in an effort to
reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and increase the capability of
host nation forces.
Mr. Wilson. With the closing of SOUTHCOM's access to the Manta Air
Base this year, how will the counter-narcotic missions that were being
staged out of Ecuador be executed?
Admiral Stavridis. USSOUTHCOM is grateful for Ecuador's assistance
and support over the last ten years, and appreciates and commends the
Ecuadorian Air Force for its hospitality and cooperation. Ecuador has
fulfilled its commitment to the U.S., and we look forward to continued
cooperation with Ecuador on counterdrug efforts.
Some operations currently conducted from Manta can be conducted
from other locations where we have access to facilities. For example,
the Air Bridge Denial program can be conducted from Curacao, but at
higher operational cost due to increased transit times to the
operational area in Colombia.
Additionally, JIATF-S is able to operate law enforcement aircraft
in support of USSOUTHCOM's Detection and Monitoring (D&M) mission from
commercial locations in partner nations that are reluctant to allow
U.S. military air operations. Military aircraft conducting D&M missions
will continue to operate from existing facilities in El Salvador, and
other locations where we currently have access.
However, it is important to identify alternate locations in order
to maintain the operational reach needed to monitor trafficking
corridors that extend deep into the Pacific. We are in discussions with
other governments to allow the U.S. to utilize their airfields and
support facilities. These airfields must have runways of adequate
length, sufficient fuel available and appropriate force protection.
Additionally, they must be close enough to the threat vector to give
aircraft as much on station time as possible.
As we continue to analyze the available options to offset the loss
of Manta, we will make the Committee aware of any additional resources
that may be required in the National Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. Wilson. What is your assessment of Venezuela's relationship
with Iran? How does this correspond with indications of increased
support for Hizbollah in Venezuela?
Admiral Stavridis. Iran views Venezuela as a gateway to increased
involvement in Latin American affairs, leveraging Venezuelan ties in
Latin America to diminish the effectiveness of UN sanctions and U.S.
influence. Venezuela benefits by increasing its international profile
while continuing to push an anti-U.S. Agenda. Increased support for
Hizbollah would add to this anti-U.S. agenda.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. What do you see as the future of the Air Sovereignty
Alert (ASA) mission in the future, both near term (one to five years)
and long term (five years plus)?
General Renuart. As long as we have population and infrastructure
that our government deems necessary to protect, the requirement for the
ASA mission will not diminish over both the near and long term. What
will change are two things: (1) the asymmetric air threat, which likely
will become increasingly sophisticated and (2) the ASA force structure,
which will continue to evolve with modernized technologies and
capabilities. Just as the September 11th attacks demonstrated a level
of terrorist sophistication never before seen, we must be ready for the
next level of asymmetric aerial attack. ASA aircraft will remain
essential in getting eyes on unusual aerial activity, determining
intent and ultimately defeating the aerial activity, if required. Our
ASA force structure must remain technologically viable to counter
future threat sophistication and of sufficient numbers to be postured
to defend assets specified by our government.
So, assuming the asymmetric threat will remain a reality, I believe
the future of the ASA mission is a continued evolution to counter a
more sophisticated air threat with the goal of protecting what we value
most--our homeland and way of life.
Mr. LoBiondo. Beginning in 2015, 80% of the Air National Guard ASA
units begin losing aircraft due the planes running out of flying hours.
How will this affect the ASA mission? Does the USAF and/or NORTHCOM
have any plan to address this so-called Fighter Gap? And its effects on
the ASA mission? What steps can this committee and Congress take to
assist you in addressing the Fighter Gap issue?
General Renuart. I have a requirement for a certain level of
capacity to maintain the sovereignty of our nation's airspace. As such,
I work closely with the Chiefs of the Services, not just the Air Force
but the Navy and Marine Corps, to ensure we have a robust, sustainable
capacity to fulfill this requirement in the next 10-20 years. The DoD
is working very aggressively to look at bridge capabilities and I'm
comfortable with their approach. Congress can assist in addressing the
``Fighter Gap'' by fully funding the President's current and future
requests for fighter aircraft.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. I understand that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have used
funding from the 1206 and 1207 (train and equip) programs to provide
training and equipment to partner militaries in both South America and
Africa. Could you briefly give a couple of examples of how this money
has been used in your areas of responsibility?
Admiral Stavridis. USSOUTHCOM used Section 1206 funds, with DoS
concurrence, to support two major partner nation capacity building
programs addressing Counter Terrorism (CT) requirements: Enduring
Friendship Maritime Security Program and the Operation Enduring
Freedom-Caribbean/Central America (OEF-CCA) CT Units.
Enduring Friendship, USSOUTHCOM's key maritime security initiative,
utilized 1206 funds to achieve Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) crew
training, command-control-communication (C3), and interceptor boats for
Jamaica, Bahamas, Nicaragua, Belize, and Honduras. Special Operations
Command South (SOCSOUTH) also utilized the funds to support Operation
Enduring Freedom-Caribbean Central America (OEF-CCA) in an effort to
equip elite partner nation Counter-Terrorism units in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom--Caribbean Central America (OEF-CCA).
Countries were: Belize, Colombia, Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay, and
Suriname.
USSOUTHCOM used 1207 funds in Colombia for the U.S. Embassy's
support to the Colombian government's `Colombian Coordination Centers
for Integrated Action' (CCIA). The CCIA is a program designed to
reestablish governance in previously ungoverned spaces of Colombia. It
synchronizes the Colombian military's operations with the operations of
other Colombian ministries.
In Haiti, 1207 funds were used to support the Haiti Stabilization
Initiative (HSI) run by DoS/SCRS (State Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization). This project was built around small projects that
develop local leadership, train and equip local police, including
``community oriented police programs'', and provide justice system
access to the residents of marginalized slums.
Mr. Larsen. What steps do you take to ensure that 1206 and 1207
money is being used to promote broader regional interests? To what
extent is the State Department involved in formulating and approving
funding plans? Has the State Department ever vetoed a DOD-formulated
plan, or vice versa?
Admiral Stavridis. The initiatives purchased under both 1206 and
1207 were part of two major regional strategic and interagency
programs: Enduring Friendship, USSOUTHCOM's key maritime security
initiative; and Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean/Central America
(OEF-CCA), the theater supporting plan to combat violent extremism.
These activities under Enduring Friendship and OEF-CCA were
synchronized with SOCOM programs. The Department of State/PM has
ultimate authority to approve or deny both programs.
Section 1207 initiatives in Colombia and Haiti were integrated and
synchronized with the U.S. Embassy Country Team effort to support each
partner nation's government plan to establish government presence and
services in areas of the country taken over by armed illegal
transnational groups. These programs are also synchronized with FMF to
support sustainment in the out years for 1206 programs.
Department of State has vetoed further funding of OEF-CCA
initiatives due to the lack of compelling and credible evidence of an
active Counter Terrorist threat presence in the Caribbean/Central
America region.
Mr. Larsen. I understand that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have used
funding from the 1206 and 1207 (train and equip) programs to provide
training and equipment to partner militaries in both South America and
Africa. Could you briefly give a couple of examples of how this money
has been used in your areas of responsibility?
General Ward. One example of 1206 funding is the Regional Maritime
Awareness Capability (RMAC) Project. This capability gives the Coast
Guard of Sao Tome and Principe the ability to observe maritime traffic
and potential threats in its territorial waters. This 1206 project
served as the catalyst for other assistance projects including U.S.
Navy Seabee construction of a pier next to the RMAC facility, mapping
of the port, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies'
assistance in developing maritime laws.
1207 projects are in various stages of implementation and are
proving to be successful. The Somalia Reconciliation and Stabilization
program has made progress in
addressing tensions along the Somalia and Kenya border. For example,
after a violent conflict between two clans, 1207 resources were used to
establish dialogue among security personnel, high ranking government
officials, and clan leaders.
These accomplishments came about through interagency coordination
and support, and through the use of critical 1206/1207 funding and
flexible funding authorities.
Mr. Larsen. What steps do you take to ensure that 1206 and 1207
money is being used to promote broader regional interests? To what
extent is the State Department involved in formulating and approving
funding plans? Has the State Department ever vetoed a DOD-formulated
plan, or vice versa?
General Ward. The Department of Defense has a process in place for
developing and prioritizing 1206 and 1207 requests. At the Africa
Command level prior to submission to DoD, a board of Interagency
experts consisting of representatives from USAID, Treasury Department,
and U.S. Africa Command's Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate,
Legal Counsel, and the Foreign Policy Advisor meet to detemiine the
most effective use of 1206 and 1207 funding. This board uses criteria
that are linked to U.S. Africa Command's theater strategy, long-term
sustainability, how the project complements other programs already in
place, and the current threat level within the area.
The State Department is involved at the ground level in developing
the 1206 and 1207 projects. The Offices of Security Cooperation and
Defense Attache Offices work with their respective Country Teams to
develop proposals supported by the Ambassador. U.S. Africa Command
requires an Ambassador's cable approving the proposal before it is
forwarded to the Joint Staff for consideration.
U.S. Africa Command works closely with the Department of State
Africa Bureau through the entire process to ensure the State Department
is involved in formulating and approving the programs.
Mr. Larsen. Given that the Commander of JFCOM has traditionally
been ``dual-hatted'' in his role as combatant commander and commander
of the Allied Command Transformation, how would you view this recent
development of splitting up the position?
General Mattis. If the political decision is made at NATO
Headquarters to have a separate commander for Supreme Allied Command
Transformation (SACT) I view this change as a positive development.
Guiding the transformation and modernization of the twenty-eight NATO
Nations and twenty-four Partner Nations is a full time job. It requires
continuous interaction with NATO Headquarters leadership and National
representatives. Likewise, interacting with Contact, Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries
as well as various International and Regional Organizations such as
United Nations and European Union requires a considerable investment of
time. Nurturing the special relationship NATO has with Russia, Ukraine,
and Georgia also places demands on SACT's time. By delinking the
command of USJFCOM from ACT it will allow the Commander of U.S. Joint
Forces Command to focus his attention on transforming and modernizing
the U.S. Joint Force. Similarly, it will allow Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation to devote the time and energy necessary for transforming
NATO's military capabilities to meet the emerging challenges of the
21st Century. Since the two commands are co-located in Norfolk I
foresee no degradation in the working relationship between USJFCOM and
ACT. The existing procedures and command relationships that have been
institutionalized over the years between the two commands will continue
to produce world-class collaboration, coordination, and information
sharing results as if they were led by a single commander.
Mr. Larsen. Recent reports state that a French officer may assume
the position of Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation. How might this
transform the relationship between NATO and U.S. forces?
General Mattis. If the decision is made to assign a French Officer
to command Allied Command Transformation I see this as strengthening
the Trans-Atlantic link. The French bring a great deal of experience
and expertise to the table. They have a modern military force, vibrant
and innovative industry, a mature lessons learned process, excellent
working relationships with a variety of international agencies and Non
Governmental Organizations, strong democratic institutions, competitive
economy, and a great deal of military experience around the world.
These are all characteristics and qualities that will enable the French
to effectively lead and guide NATO's military transformation. The
French also have a solid understanding of whole of government approach
to operations. They understand that to be effective at countering a
wide variety of threats in the 21st Century a ``Comprehensive
Approach'' to operations is necessary. This clear understanding of the
future security environment will help NATO and the U.S. to better
leverage best practices and
share lessons learned. Finally, the United States and France have a
strong tradition of teamwork dating back to the Revolutionary War and
extending through World War II. I see this same spirit of cooperation
continuing if the French are assigned command of ACT.
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