[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
A REGIONAL OVERVIEW ON THE MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 28, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, California TED POE, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BARBARA LEE, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota DANA ROHRABACHER, California
RON KLEIN, Florida EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Staff Director
Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
Dalis Adler, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State................. 16
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 3
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 8
The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement............. 19
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 58
Hearing minutes.................................................. 59
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Virginia: Prepared statement................. 60
Written responses from the Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton. 62
A REGIONAL OVERVIEW ON THE MIDDLE EAST
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Ackerman. The subcommittee will come to order.
While this hearing is meant to cover the range of issues
facing the United States and the region stretching from Egypt
to the Persian Gulf, in my opening remarks I would like to
focus on Iran. Like many others, I have been thinking a lot
about Iran, and despite my best efforts, I keep coming back to,
of all things, the second Reagan administration. It was in the
second term that President Reagan and Secretary of State George
Shultz negotiated significant convention and nuclear arms
control agreements and helped thaw out the Cold War with
frequent high-level summits. Throughout this period of
intensive diplomatic engagement, however, President Reagan
never stopped speaking powerfully and frequently about
dissidents, human rights, and freedom.
Obviously, the Soviet challenge then and the Iranian
challenge today are very different. But what really stands out
is the way the Reagan team in the second term sustained a
multifocal, steady and comprehensive of pressure on the
Soviets. The summitry demonstrated that the problem was in
Moscow, not in Washington. The consistent focus on human rights
and freedom reminded domestic, allied and Soviet audiences just
how ugly the Soviet regime really was.
Following some terrible strains in the transatlantic
alliance in the first term, the Reagan administration worked
hard on sustaining our relations in both Europe and East Asia
to ensure that the Soviets had no political escape valve.
Following the initial massive spasm of defense spending in the
first term, the steady deployment of United States and NATO
forces that were technologically passing by the Soviets simply
couldn't be ignored. And, of course, the Intelligence Community
made life in the Kremlin miserable, not only by stealing
secrets, but organizing and supporting opposition to the
Soviets wherever it could take root.
So in thinking about our Iran policy today, what strikes me
is how thin it seems to be. We seem to be depending on just one
or two policy elements, when, in fact, many more are possible.
President Obama's support for direct engagement with Iran, as
with the Reagan-Gorbachev summitry that I have described has
already helped to heal a variety of political woes, but by
itself diplomatic engagement still leaves too much initiative
in Iranian hands.
Likewise, with economic sanctions, if the Iranians remain
calcitrant and sanctions are applied, no matter how crippling--
and I would want them to be absolutely suffocating to the
regime--the initiative is still left to the ayatollahs to
decide when they have had enough. But what seems most puzzling
to me is that the administration appears to have absolutely
nothing at all to say about Iran's Green Movement. Staying out
of the way in June was smart, but the complete silence since
then is, to me, inexplicable.
Support within Iran for the nuclear program runs across the
spectrum, but there is a strong case to be made that the
Iranian regime went to Geneva and has bargained since then,
primarily because of their concern about domestic stability
rather than fears about international sanctions.
I have also heard from many leaders in the Middle East who
complain that the Obama administration doesn't seem to have any
better a plan for increasing the multilateral political and
security coordination in the Persian Gulf than did their
predecessors. And while the administration has increased
American attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at
least in part to win broader Arab support for pressure against
Iran, my question would be, where is the support? The Iranians
are actively stirring up trouble or developing or maintaining
the capacity do so in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the
Palestinian territories, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait and
Morocco. Where is the countervailing United States response?
Where is the Truman-like policy of committing ourselves to
support our allies in their struggle to remain free from
threats and subversion?
I am not suggesting another Cold War or holding up Iran as
the new Soviet Union. My concern is that we are dealing with
the Iranians piecemeal and, thus, giving them too much
opportunity to shape events to their liking. And I am not
calling for linkage, where success in one area depends on one
or more of the others, but I do think that we need a
comprehensive approach.
Like Gorbachev's team, the regime in Tehran is facing an
unprecedented challenge from within. Why is it then we seem
incapable of taking advantage of this fact and bemoaning for
years the insufficiency of our leverage? We don't need to make
threats, and we certainly shouldn't allow ourselves to get
sucked into yet another conflict. But I can't help but wonder,
why can't we squeeze with five fingers instead of just one or
two?
And with that I will turn to our ranking member, thank you
very much, Representative Burton.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate
you calling this important and timely hearing. There are
countless issues that need to be addressed throughout the
Middle East and South Asia, and it is very difficult to know
where to begin.
First and foremost on my mind is the threat posed by Iran
in its suspected pursuit and development of nuclear weapons and
missiles capable of carrying those weapons. The Iranian regime
has shown no signs that it plans to respond positively to any
diplomatic efforts by the United States or the international
community to halt uranium enrichment. The alleged deal being
negotiated in Geneva, which the Iranian regime has yet to
accept almost 1 week after the deadline, doesn't require Iran
to stop uranium enrichment or even ship its entire current
stockpile of enriched uranium out of the country. In my
opinion, that is not a good deal for the United States--or
Israel, for that matter.
The current Iranian regime has no regard for the United
States, the international community or even the Iranian people.
After the clearly rigged elections, we saw the outrage of the
Iranian people toward a government that is continually
misrepresenting their wishes with an appallingly heavy-handed
response to protests. The time for inaction from the United
States has long passed.
I am pleased that earlier today the full Foreign Affairs
Committee finally marked up Chairman Berman's Iran Refined
Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009. If we truly want to reach an
agreement with Iran, then we must put some muscle behind our
words; and the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, in my
opinion, is the kind of muscle we need.
And I am very concerned that we have got three other
committees that we have got to get this thing through. And we
need to get it done quickly; I mean, it took 6 months to get
this far, and I don't want it to take any longer than that, and
I hope the chairman will push as hard as he can.
While Iran is a net exporter of unrefined petroleum, it is
a net importer of refined petroleum products like gasoline. In
June 2007, when the Iranian Government implemented a gasoline
rationing system, the Iranian public rioted. Giving President
Obama the authority to target Iran's refined petroleum industry
is sure to get the mullahs' attention and strengthen the
President's hand in Geneva.
It is my hope that this bill will move quickly to the floor
for a vote, as it has already garnered the support of 330
cosponsors. However, to do nothing and continue to allow the
Iranians to delay and stall, their capabilities will grow; and
one day we will see on the front page headlines an announcement
that Iran has tested a nuclear bomb, and at that point it will
be far too late for the international community to do anything.
The second major concern on my mind also involves the
Middle East. I am very concerned about the prospects for peace
between Israel and Palestine. I believe that prospects for
peace have taken a giant step backwards in recent weeks, in
large part because of the Goldstone Report, recently issued by
the despot-controlled United Nations Human Rights Council.
This report accused Israel of war crimes, as well as
possible crimes against humanity during Israel's defensive
operations in Gaza last winter. From the beginning, the Council
instructed the Goldstone Commission to focus only on
``aggression against the Palestinian people,'' a presumption of
Israeli guilt before any so-called investigation had even taken
place.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guarantees all
U.N. members the right to defend themselves against terrorism
and other external threats. The Goldstone Report completely
ignores this fundamental right. It also ignores the steps taken
by the Israeli defense forces to minimize civilian casualties,
steps that often put Israeli soldiers at increased risk. And
the Goldstone Report completely ignores Hamas' callous practice
of intertwining its terrorist infrastructure within civilian
population centers, hiding behind hospitals, schools, mosques,
and even U.N. facilities.
The Obama administration should completely reject the
Goldstone Report. The Obama administration should also take
steps to explicitly link future United States contributions to
the U.N. with U.N. action to implement concrete act or root out
the institutionalized fraud and corruption within the U.N.
bureaucracy and then, once and for all, the naked, systematic
anti-United States, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic bias within the
U.N.
I know that is strong, but I mean it.
Third, I would like to express my deep, deep concern over
the administration's inaction on implementing General
McChrystal's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. While I
disagree with the President on many foreign policy questions--
and I don't think that is much of a surprise--I do believe that
President Obama was right a few months ago when he declared,
``The conflict in Afghanistan will not be quick or easy. But we
must never forget: This is not a war of choice; this is a war
of necessity. This is fundamental to the defense of our people
of the United States.''
Withdrawal from Afghanistan is not an option. What I have
heard over and over from witnesses before this committee is
that if the Taliban is allowed to regain control of the
country, the security of the world will be at much higher risk
and the reputation of the United States and NATO will take
years to recover.
Victory is possible. Our counterinsurgency forces are more
experienced and more knowledgeable than they have ever been,
and our enemy is despised by the great majority of the Afghan
people. The President's hand-picked commander, General
McChrystal, has presented the President with a strategy to win
the conflict, and it is inexcusable to delay.
The President needs to act now before the situation in the
region deteriorates even further, and General McChrystal must
come and testify before Congress so that Republicans and
Democrats can ask him questions the American people want us to
ask. How do you propose to win the war and get our troops home
safely?
It has already been said 100 times before, but it bears
repeating: Success in Afghanistan is crucial for success in
Pakistan where there is a real threat of nuclear weapons
falling into the hands of terrorists.
Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al-Qaeda
is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from
its safe haven in Pakistan. If either the Afghan of Pakistani
Government falls to the Taliban or allows al-Qaeda to go
unchallenged, that region of the world would once again be a
base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as
they possibly can. It gets no clearer than that.
The very people who attacked us on 9/11 are plotting future
attacks on us in Afghanistan and the border region in Pakistan.
We must disrupt and neutralize these groups before they strike
again. This is a war of necessity and, as such, we must commit
the necessary effort in order to be victorious.
And, finally, I would like to briefly touch upon the broad
issue of religious freedom. Religious freedom is a foundational
value of the United States and the right to religious freedom
is firmly enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 18. A nation's adherence to this principle is
now, along with others, an indication and standard bearer for
good governance that protects the rights of minorities and
safeguards social peace. The promotion of freedom of religion
and belief has been a consistent part of the U.S. foreign
policy for decades.
I recently introduced House Resolution 840 that condemns
violations of religious freedom in the Middle East, calls on
President Obama to renew the United States' commitment to
promoting religious freedom as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign
policy, and urges all Middle Eastern governments to respect and
defend the rights of religious minorities within their borders.
I hope all of my colleagues will join me in cosponsoring this
important bill.
And, once again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for calling this
important hearing. I know I talked a long time, but I was
trying to cover a lot of stuff. So I appreciate your
understanding. Thank you very much.
And I want to tell you I look forward to hearing our
distinguished witness.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much.
The Ambassador has been waiting for over an hour for us
because of votes, but I am going to see if we can ask each
member that wants to make an opening statement if they could do
it in 1 minute or so.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just very quickly I want to associate myself with the
remarks of the chairman and the ranking member regarding Iran.
Mr. Burton rightfully brings up the Goldstone Report. I think
it is important to note that, in fact, the administration has
opposed in many different avenues and in many different venues
the Goldstone Report, the conclusions that it reached. And, in
fact, the strongest response that the administration could
provide is happening as we speak.
In Israel today there is the largest American-Israeli
missile defense joint exercise in the history of our two
nations--on the ground in Israel, 1,300 American troops.
Likewise, when our NATO ally just recently disinvited the
Israelis from a military exercise, a joint exercise with the
United States and other nations, we unequivocally responded by
saying we would not show up as well.
The level of cooperation between the United States and
Israel on intelligence and military matters has never been
greater, all for the purpose of security and peace, but also to
maintain Israel's qualitative military edge. So I think our
response from the administration on down to these disturbing
events has been quite resolute.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Ms. Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. I am anxious to hear our witness' statement,
so I think I will defer my questions until later or at least my
statement until later.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. I, too, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time,
will submit my statement to the record and just associate
myself with the remarks that have been brought forth so far--
especially yours, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. I, too, will pass and take this up during
questioning. So we can get started with the witness.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take all 5
minutes--no.
I do appreciate the comments that the chairman and the
ranking member made, and I, too, am concerned with the
challenges we are facing in the Middle East today. And I look
forward to the testimony of Ambassador Feltman, and let us
begin there.
Mr. Ackerman. To have five Members of Congress pass because
they are anxious to hear you is the greatest sign of respect I
have seen around here in a long time.
Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman has appeared before this
subcommittee on several occasions, but this will be his first
appearance since being sworn in as assistant secretary of state
for Near Eastern Affairs on August 18 of this year.
Congratulations, Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Feltman ascended to his current position having
been acting assistant secretary of state since February, and
since December 2008 principal deputy assistant secretary.
Previously, the Ambassador served as Ambassador to Lebanon, as
a senior official in the Coalition Provisional Authority in
Iraq for 14 months, as acting principal officer at the U.S.
Consul General in Jerusalem.
A career member of the U.S. Foreign Service since January
1986, Ambassador Feltman brings a wealth of hard-won experience
to his current position. We are fortunate to have him in the
service of our country. We are delighted to welcome him back to
our subcommittee today.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Feltman. Chairman Ackerman, Ranking Member Burton,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting me to appear before you today. My colleagues in the
State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and I very
much appreciate the committee's abiding interest in and
attention to our Nation's priorities in the Middle East.
I prepared a full statement for the record, so I will make
a brief oral statement now and then look forward to any
questions.
Mr. Ackerman. Without objection, your full statement will
be in the record.
Mr. Feltman. As the committee is well aware, as the opening
statements certainly indicated, the issues, the opportunities,
the challenges that we face in the Middle East are among the
most consequential for our Nation's security and national
interests. They are among the most difficult; international
peace and stability, nuclear proliferation, energy security,
economic growth, and protection of human rights are all
affected greatly by developments in this region we are
discussing today.
This administration is vigorously pursuing a comprehensive
peace in the region, which we believe is not only in the
interest of the parties of the conflict, but in America's and
in the world's interests.
The administration recognized from Day One that working to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict is key to fostering
stability, to addressing the security needs of our allies and
to promoting United States interests in the Middle East, South
Asia, and the broader Muslim world from Morocco all the way to
Indonesia.
Achieving a comprehensive peace will be challenging. The
U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, Senator George
Mitchell, knows all too well that committed, persevering and
patient diplomacy will be required. Progress is quietly, but
steadily being made, and we very much appreciate the support
and assistance of this committee and Congress more generally
for the work that we are doing.
Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains
unshakable. We believe that our pursuit of comprehensive peace
in the region will make Israel more secure, the region more
secure and stable, and in doing so, will also help promote
American security and interests.
Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of course, will
not automatically resolve the other challenges that we face in
the region, such as those outlined by the opening statements,
posed by Iran, just as resolving concerns about Iran will not
automatically produce an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But
efforts on these fronts and on others are mutually reinforcing.
Like all of you, we are all watching developments with Iran
very closely. The administration is implementing a strategy of
principled engagement with Iran, where we deal with the
Government of Iran directly and work to resolve diplomatically
the international concerns about its nuclear program.
The October 1st P5+1 meeting in Geneva with the Iranians,
in which we participated actively, was a constructive first
step, but it must be followed by constructive actions, by
tangible steps. We look to Iran to respond quickly and
positively to efforts by the P5+1 and the IAEA to make progress
on the commitments on October 1st and to build confidence in
negotiations. But the P5+1 countries have made clear that our
approach runs on two tracks, and we are prepared to pursue
increased pressure if negotiations stall or prove fruitless.
The opportunity for engagement is genuine, but it will not
be open-ended if Iran continues to refuse to fulfill its
obligations. We are not going to talk simply for talking's
sake.
We are also concerned--as your opening statements indicated
you are as well, Mr. Chairman--about Iran's other policies,
including Iran's abysmal human rights record: The disturbing
aftermath of Iranian elections, which saw hundreds arrested and
scores killed, as well as Iran's support for terrorist groups
across the broader region.
One American citizen, Kian Tajbakhsh, was among those
convicted and tried in the summer's show trial. He was recently
sentenced to 15 years for baseless charges. Other Americans,
including the three American hikers, remain imprisoned in Iran
with no charges and not even any contact with their families;
and we have made clear to Iran that they should all immediately
be allowed to rejoin their families in the United States. We
continue to call on Iran to resolve the 2-year-plus case of
missing American citizen Robert Levinson.
Turning our attention to Iraq, the United States stands by
all Iraqis at this crucial time leading up to national
elections, and we pledge to join them in working together to
combat all forms of violence and attempts at intimidation. The
devastating bombings against government targets on October 25
and those on August 19 were truly horrific, but they do nothing
to shake the determination of the Iraqi Government to build a
peaceful and prosperous country or America's determination to
help the Iraqis do just that.
In fact, violence in Iraq remains at levels significantly
lower than that of 2006 and 2007, and we will continue to
transition from a U.S. military- to a U.S. civilian-led mission
in Iraq. We also remain committed to meeting the withdrawal
time line set forth in the security agreement that we concluded
at the end of last year.
The United States commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty and
independence remains firm and will not be compromised by our
engagement with any other party in the region. Mindful of
Lebanon's delicate internal situation, we also recognize that
there can be no lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict
reached at Lebanon's expense. We continue to support the
efforts of Prime Minister-Designate Hariri to form a government
on the basis of Lebanon's legitimate elections held last June.
The administration has initiated a strategy of principled
engagement with Syria, and I and others have made several trips
to Damascus this year, opening lines of communication. But the
Syrians must realize that our ability to expand our engagement
with them depends on the level of cooperation they show in
areas of concern to the United States, including respect for
Lebanon's sovereignty and control of foreign fighters seeking
to enter Iraq.
We continue to develop our strategic relationships with
other partners in the Gulf, North Africa and throughout the
region. Our friends in the region remain critical to our energy
and our defense interests, and we consult with them frequently
on an array of issues of mutual concern.
The challenges of the region are difficult ones: Persistent
conflict and insecurity, an acute and impending increase in the
youth demographic, and democratic institutions of governance
that are often absent or weak. President Obama and Secretary
Clinton have put us on the path of forging a new beginning for
United States relations with Muslim communities in the Middle
East and around the world. With our friends and allies, we are
reinvigorating more comprehensive partnerships, reaching beyond
governments to touch the lives of individuals through economic,
educational and scientific cooperation. Together, we can forge
solutions to shared problems and seize the opportunities for
progress that exist in the region.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your past and your
ongoing support of the efforts of our brave diplomats and our
troops across the Middle East, often serving in the most
difficult and challenging circumstances.
And now, I look forward to taking your questions.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feltman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ackerman. In your statement you said, with regard to
Iran, that we are pursuing a two-track approach. Why not a
comprehensive approach? Why not all of the things that I
mentioned? Why is multiple choice not ``all of the above,''
just ``A and B''?
Mr. Feltman. The dual-track approach I mentioned is one
that we are pursuing with the P5+1 partners. And it is focused
primarily on the nuclear file that causes so much concern in
the region and globally.
But let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we have a pretty
comprehensive understanding of the problems that Iran's
behavior poses, and we are addressing these in different ways.
I will just mention four problems.
One is Iran's nuclear ambition. Big problem.
A second is Iran's repression of its own people, its
violation of its own people's human rights.
Mr. Ackerman. We will stipulate that you have made those
points and that they are clear. I am talking about the approach
to those problems.
Why not have a policy that we are not only helping, but
utilizing the fact that they have this Green Movement going on
over there?
Why not utilize the fact that they have all these other
countries that are living in fear and trepidation of them every
single day, and work to line them up?
Why not give an assurance, Truman-like, to as many
countries as we can there that we are their protector and will
protect them against any threat by Iran under the following
terms and conditions? And put in maybe a word about
participating in sanctions or anything else that might fit in
that?
Why not all of these things at once?
Mr. Feltman. Mr. Chairman, I believe we are addressing
these issues that you have mentioned.
For example, there is much greater international emphasis
now.
Mr. Ackerman. With all due respect, I have not heard an
utterance about the Green Movement there, so I don't know how
you are pursuing it unless--are we sending secret messages to
the Green Movement or something?
Mr. Feltman. On the Green Movement, per se, of course this
was an indigenous Iranian movement of the Iranian people very
heroically going out on the street. It was not anything
orchestrated by the international community.
Mr. Ackerman. Have we said that?
Mr. Feltman. Yes.
Mr. Ackerman. To?
Mr. Feltman. I think that we have been clear.
Mr. Ackerman. We have been saying it to each other.
Mr. Feltman. I think we all recognize that the Iranians
very courageously have taken to the street after elections, are
looking to see confirmation of some kind of legitimacy of their
governing institutions.
We now have the opportunity, and we have used it, to speak
to the Iranians directly about our concerns of what we saw
afterwards. That was one of the messages that was delivered to
the Iranians directly on October 1.
We continue to provide support to civil society in Iran and
across the region to create space for civil society voices to
be heard, to be protected. We continue to look for other
international fora in which we can highlight the abysmal
practices that Iran----
Mr. Ackerman. I want to move on in this, but I will just
make the point one more time.
It would have been very helpful, I think--certainly not
while it was occurring, because it would have made the regime's
point that the thing is U.S.- or Western-inspired. But
afterwards, which includes today and tomorrow, it might not be
a bad idea to let people know verbally--out loud, for all the
world to see, including them, the kind of support, at least
talk--that we appreciate what they are doing and that we are
inspired by their courage.
You know, some statement. It doesn't have to be what I
said, but something would certainly be helpful to let them know
they are not alone. Because, you know, I think everybody
understands that that is probably in the interest of moving the
ball forward except we are not going to move the ball forward
unless there is somebody there that appreciates its being moved
forward and these people get some kind of encouragement.
Let me ask you a question about Lebanon, and then we will
move on.
In two areas where you are looking to improve our relations
with Syria--our relations, as well as the Israeli-Syrian peace
agreement dialogue or whatever--are we going to be willing to
pay for that in Lebanese coin?
Mr. Feltman. The answer is unequivocal. No.
Our discussions with the Syrians, our dialogue with the
Syrians is not going to come at the expense of Lebanon's
sovereignty. We are not trading away Lebanese sovereignty in
order to gain something with Syria. Absolutely not.
Mr. Ackerman. Great. I wanted to hear that on the record.
Is the administration still committed to the full
implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701?
Mr. Feltman. 1701 is actually the basis, the foundation
stone, of our policy with Lebanon. And we saw another violation
of 1701 yesterday that just heightens our concern and the need
to see that resolution fully implemented.
The rocket was fired from Lebanon into Israel last night.
The Israelis responded. It is a reminder that we need to
reinvigorate this resolution, we need to see this fully
implemented by all parties.
Mr. Ackerman. Lastly, is the administration going to
support the Special Tribunal for Lebanon until it finishes its
work and make no deals with any party that would jeopardize the
Tribunal's future?
Mr. Feltman. We are fully committed to supporting the
Tribunal until it finishes its work.
We are not involved in the Tribunal, which is as it should
be. This is not a political tribunal. This is to bring justice
to an unsolved assassination case and, hopefully, to bring the
end of the era of impunity, and we will be fully supportive of
that tribunal.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess, first of all, these comments I am going to make
are not directed at you, Ambassador. You have got a tough job
and I appreciate that.
But the frustration level among a lot of us--and it goes
across party lines, I think, although people on the other side
may not be as willing to make some of the statements that I
will.
The Obama administration, to me, really hasn't taken a
strong position on Iran. Iran is the one that has got its
finger into so many pies over in the Middle East it isn't
funny. And while we are talking about some kind of a
negotiation process, they continue down that path, I believe,
toward a nuclear weapons program.
And what really bothers me is that we have said, you know,
we are going to continue to try to find a path to peace. And it
reminds me--as I said earlier today in our other hearing about
Lord Chamberlain, Munich, Clinton talking to the North Koreans
trying to work things out--these people who are despots, who
have a goal in mind in Iran, is to destroy Israel, as well as
possibly the United States and they are supporting terrorist
organizations, Hezbollah, Hamas and God only knows who else.
We ought to be stating in a very, very strong way that
while we are willing to negotiate with them, there is a limit
to our patience, and that we are going to move and we are going
to support Israel in moving to make sure they don't develop
this nuclear weapons program.
What they have said in Geneva and elsewhere, they ring
hollow to me and they still are kind of backing and vacillating
around that. They need to know very clearly where the United
States and our allies stand, and they are not getting the
message.
I mean, you know, I remember back in Lebanon, or in Libya,
when Muammar Qadhafi was rattling his sabers and everything and
Reagan kept warning them that this was not right, that we
weren't going to allow this to happen. And then we moved, and
we bombed him, and you didn't hear any more from Muammar
Qadhafi until just recently because he knew the United States
was resolute of purpose.
And that is what we need to do now with Iran. We need to
let them know that if they continue down this path toward a
nuclear development program that will endanger our ally,
Israel, will destabilize Iraq, the whole Middle East, then they
have to know that we are willing to support Benjamin Netanyahu
in Israel and we are going to do whatever has to be done to
stop them.
They are a terrorist state, and what bothers me is that
there has not been any definitive statement made by this
administration. And, quite frankly, we didn't do as much in the
last administration as we should have. We should have been
very, very straightforward and let them know exactly what the
price was going to be if they kept--if they were going to keep
heading down the path they were on.
So I am not going to ask any questions, except to say that
I hope that you as the ambassador and a person who has great
expertise in that area will carry back the message to the
administration that--let's send them a direct message: Look, we
want to work with you. We want to stop this nuclear development
program. But if you don't move, even though we are talking
about sanctions and all that sort of thing right now, which may
or may not happen, if you continue down that path and our
intelligence-gathering capability indicates you are going on
with this development program, you are going to pay a heck of a
price.
And we are not talking about damaging individual citizens
over there, or killing people who are good friends of the
United States who live in Iran, people who really like the
United States; but those people who are in charge, those sites
that are developing nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons,
they are going to be our targets and we are going to go after
them.
Once they know we mean business, like Muammar Qadhafi did,
I think you will see a change. But until that time, just this
hyperbole and these words ain't going to cut it.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding me
this time.
You can respond if you like, but what I would like to hear
is that you are going to send them this clear message.
Mr. Feltman. Ranking Member Burton, I will certainly take
the message back to the administration, as you request, and
take your views back.
You know, we do want a diplomatic solution to this. But let
me make a couple of comments.
Diplomatic solution doesn't mean soft. Diplomatic solution
doesn't mean that we roll over and play dead. Diplomatic
solution means we work multilaterally, we work bilaterally, we
line up alternatives. So we do want a diplomatic solution.
But we also agree with you 100 percent: This cannot be an
open-ended process of talking for talking's sake.
Mr. Burton. Let me just say this and I will be quiet.
As long as they think that we are not going to act, they
will just keep playing us like a deck of cards. They have to
know there is a fist there and that fist will be utilized if
they don't stop this nonsense.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't view my station in life as being that where I
always have to respond to Mr. Burton, as much as I respect him,
but yesterday the National Security Advisor of the United
States of America, I think a gentleman we would all agree is a
fairly serious man, General Jones, stood in front of a group of
people and said with respect to Iran, outlining the policy of
engagement, at the end said, but understand all options are on
the table.
I think adults understand what General Jones means when he
says all options are on the table.
Mr. Ambassador, if I could, in the context of what I hope
is an understanding that I support 110 percent the efforts that
the administration has undergone with respect to the Israelis
and the Palestinians, I would like to ask you with respect to
our position with respect to settlements, I don't understand
the rationale of presenting settlements as the central core
issue of the Israeli Palestinian dispute when in fact there are
issues that equal or are greater in terms of what is going to
be required to resolve this historic conflict.
But to the extent that we do address settlements--and I
believe that they should be addressed, absolutely--why is it
that we are not focused mostly on those settlements that in
fact pose a significant obstacle to the ultimate creation of a
contiguous Palestinian state which is prosperous, as opposed to
those settlements that I believe, at least in private, all
responsible parties understand ultimately do not pose that kind
of an obstacle to the ultimate creation of a Palestinian state?
I understand the legalities. I understand that, in effect,
under our law all settlements at this point are treated the
same. But the truth is, in terms of moving forward at a very
difficult process and permitting the Israeli Government an
opportunity to, in fact, take significant risks for peace, if
we focused on those settlements that, in fact, do pose an
obstacle to a contiguous Palestinian state, isn't this a
formula that might possibly allow us to get at the heart of the
issue as to why the question of settlements needs to be
addressed as soon as possible?
Mr. Feltman. Congressman Wexler, thanks for the question.
I need to state from the outset, because everything will be
conditional on this, that President Obama stated our policy on
settlements clearly in several different fora, including the
U.N. General Assembly when he said that the United States does
not accept the legitimacy of ongoing settlement activities.
That is the policy.
What have we been trying to do lately? We have been trying
to get the parties back to direct negotiations where they deal
with the big issues and they deal with the permanent status
issues. The discussions on settlements that we have been having
with the Israelis are not some condition that we want to see
met before we get to negotiations. We want to get to
negotiations as quickly as possible.
We are asking the parties to take steps that would improve
the atmosphere, that would make it more conducive that these
negotiations be successful. And we have also reminded the
parties in that context, in building the right atmosphere of
trust and confidence you need for negotiations to succeed, that
the parties have made certain obligations to each other
already. The Israelis have accepted the road map that calls for
a settlement freeze, including natural growth, full stop.
So it is in that context we have been talking to the
Israelis about a settlement freeze, but it is not a condition
for negotiations. We want to get back to negotiations quickly.
In terms of the proposal that you are suggesting, it is
something that I believe would start to be--come in play as we
get back to negotiations, as people start to discuss borders,
and people start to talk about the territorial aspects of these
negotiations. It becomes much easier to say which settlements
are the ones that might be looked at a little bit differently,
but our goal is to get the parties back to direct negotiations
where all these issues can be discussed as quickly as possible
in the best atmosphere.
Mr. Wexler. Prime Minister Fayyad's plan, which I think is
the most intelligent statement ever put forward by a
Palestinian leader to push forward with 2 years of
institutional building across the board, what are we doing to
support those efforts, if I may ask?
Mr. Feltman. I agree with your statement. It is an
excellent plan. Prime Minister Fayyad, who I know you know
personally, is a very serious leader who sees that to have a
Palestinian state it is not enough. To declare statehood, you
have to have the institutions that make that state work, that
are accountable, that are answerable to the Palestinian people.
And we have full confidence in the vision that he has
outlined in that plan. We stand ready with the international
community to help Salam Fayyad realize that plan of building
those institutions the Palestinian state needs in 2 years. But
we want to be led by the Palestinians themselves. This is a
Palestinian effort. It is not some kind of international
effort. We will be supportive to the extent that they welcome
our support.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I know there have been serious mistakes
that America has made in foreign policy in the past. There is
no doubt about that. So my criticism of the Obama
administration and my negative analysis so far is not just
aimed at President Obama. There are things that should have
been done in the past that weren't done.
But since the President took over, he had what appears to
have been a sensitivity or a sincerity offensive in trying to
prove to the people of the world that the United States, we
really are sincere, good guys--and I at least interpreted it
that way, in trying to be as open-minded about it as I could
about it at the time. But his basically apologies for alleged
misdeeds that occurred decades ago in Iran, for example, has
that in any way worked to alter what we would consider the
negative policies of Iran, for example, support of terrorists
or perhaps moving forward on their nuclear program?
Mr. Feltman. Iran is still playing a destabilizing role in
the region, without question. Whether we are talking about the
nuclear file, whether we are talking about its support for
terrorism, Iran's rejection of a two-state solution or Iran's
repression of its own people, Iran is still playing a deeply
negative role in the region.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the President reaching out to these
people in an act of sincerity has actually perhaps resulted in
the opposite from what he would have wanted?
Mr. Feltman. He--what I--Mr. Congressman, how I would
respond would be to note that, by not talking to Iran for 30
years, we also were unable to modify Iran's behavior. So Iran
was supporting Hezbollah, building up its nuclear capacity in a
time when we in fact were refusing to deal with it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am exactly not talking about necessarily
talking with them, but when someone apologizes for an American
CIA operation back in the 1950s, 60 years ago in another
century, and takes that approach on trying to win or open up
dialogue, it looks like to me that that approach failed.
Mr. Feltman. I believe when the President has given his
speeches, such as the one in Cairo, he has been essentially
putting a challenge before the people of the Middle East. He
has said, ``We are willing to look at our history, our own
stereotypes. We are willing to look beyond our own stereotypes,
and we are asking you to do the same.'' It is a new language
that he hopes can be one of our tools in order to break through
on the impasse, whether we are dealing with Iran or any number
of other challenges that we have.
Mr. Rohrabacher. For example----
Mr. Feltman. It is not naive or ill considered. It is
allowing us to use diplomacy and engagement in a way that we
might be able to make some headway with the other side.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We will find out if it is ill conceived
when we look at the results.
For example, the President--is this perception wrong that
the President has stepped back from the intense human rights
criticism that we were actually focusing and directing toward
Iran prior to this administration? For example, during the
elections and the demonstrations after the elections, because
of the crooked elections there in Iran, there were many
demonstrators out; and some of us who had been watching the
scene noted a lack of intensity over America's, let's say,
support, verbal support for people who were in the streets
struggling for democracy.
Mr. Feltman. I think you are aware, Congressman, of the
attempts by the Iranian Government to say that those
demonstrations that took place after the results of the June
elections were something foreign grown. They were something
inspired from the outside. We all needed to be very sensitive
so that those----
Mr. Rohrabacher. That seems to be the word. This
administration, they are sensitive.
Let me ask you this. They have arrested--I only have a
little bit of time left--they arrested some of the leaders,
some of the democratic leaders of those demonstrations against
crooked elections and a mullah dictatorship. They are holding
these elections as a facade for their own control. What have we
done to challenge the Iranian mullah dictatorship on the lives
of these leaders who have now been condemned to death? What
have we said will happen as a result if they do indeed execute
these people?
Mr. Feltman. You know there are a number of things,
Congressman, that have been happening. I would draw your
attention to the statements the White House and the State
Department have made in response to the sentencing of an
American citizen, a fellow American, Kian Tajbakhsh, an Iranian
American scholar. We strongly condemned this. This was one of
the roundups after the elections where this American was
arrested. We have condemned this strongly and firmly.
We have addressed our concerns now directly to the Iranians
on the margins of the October 1st meeting. We have made our
statements clear, and we continue to look for other ways to
draw attention to Iran's dismal human rights record. It is
appalling treatment of its own citizens in the aftermath of the
elections.
Ultimately, the Iranian Government needs to earn the
respect of its own people, and that will help it gain respect
internationally. But we have been absolutely clear about our
support for democracy, civil society, the fact that the Iranian
voices of the people need to be heard in Iran.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It hasn't been clear to me.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Your time has expired.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you so much
for joining us, Mr. Ambassador. There are a couple of issues
that I would like to explore with you, if I may.
I am in favor of a two-state solution, and I am on record
for many years talking about it. Of course, it has to be a
viable Palestinian state with--as you stated, with functioning
government institutions, a functioning economy so that the
Palestinian people could get jobs to support themselves, and
with no Hamas living side by side with a secured Jewish state
of Israel.
When I met with Mr. Fayyad this summer, we had a most
engaging and lively conversation. And I, too, agree that he has
done an extraordinary job. But when I asked him whether the
Palestinians were prepared to give up the right of return in
order to move forward in the peace process and create a two-
state solution, he refused to answer my question. He was very
gracious and very charming, but he would not give me a
definitive answer. And that concerned me quite a bit, because
there cannot be a democratic Jewish state of Israel without the
Palestinians giving a right of return.
But there are two issues that I would like to explore with
you. One is the settlements; and I am glad that my dear friend
who I am going to miss terribly in Congress, Mr. Wexler,
brought this up. I think we made a very large strategic blunder
when we publicly dressed down the Israelis regarding the
settlement issue but should have and could have been said
behind closed doors I think created a problem.
I don't think that the settlements are the seminal issue.
There were no settlements in 1948 or 1956 or 1967, and Israel
still managed to get itself attacked. It wasn't an issue then,
and I don't believe it is an issue now.
Rather than bring the parties closer to sitting down and
negotiating for a comprehensive peace agreement, I think it put
the Israelis in a very uncomfortable and awkward position. And
it gave Abu Mazen something else to keep him from sitting down
at the peace table, saying that now he absolutely will not sit
down unless all settlement activity ceases, and that may not
happen for a while, and that is just keeping the two parties
further apart.
Another issue that you brought up that I always--it is the
linkage issue. And if only we could resolve this problem
between the Israelis and the Palestinians that everything else
would solve itself or we would be much closer to solving the
problems that plague the Middle East. But I will submit to you
that if Israel ceases exist tomorrow, would the plight of the
Palestinians be any better than it is today? I would suggest to
you that it would not be any better and their lives would not
be improved by the disappearance of the state of Israel.
Would Iran end their nuclear ambitions if Israel ceased to
exist? I don't think so.
Would the Sunnis and Shiites lay down their arms and stop
killing each other in Iraq if Israel ceased to exist? I don't
think so.
Would Taliban stop recruiting and lay down their arms
throughout the Middle East and other parts of world? Again, I
don't think so.
Would the Saudis move toward democratic institutions and
give women equal rights in their country? Absolutely not.
So I am always concerned when I hear members of the
administration or my colleagues, who I value very much,
creating this linkage which I don't think truly exists. And I
think it gives the Arab countries just the excuse they need to
do nothing to improve the situation in their own countries,
just blame it on Israel and we can buy more time to continue to
do what we already do.
And, frankly, I think a show of good faith would be--and if
we are going to put pressure on anybody, rather than on
settlements, how about the Arab countries and this ridiculous
economic boycott against the state of Israel?
And I thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Feltman. Representative Berkley, thank you.
I will comment on the last one first. Because I am sorry if
I wasn't clear. There is no formal linkage between these
issues. What I said is we would hope the progress on one could
lead to mutually reinforcing progress on the other. But there
is no formal linkage. I couldn't agree with you more on that.
What happens is that the Israeli Palestinian conflict
becomes a pretext. It becomes an ability for Iran to muck
around in the region. And so, by addressing that, we perhaps
could help address the question of Iran's misbehavior in the
region.
But I agree with you that these things are not formal
linkages. We need to be working on all of these issues
simultaneously on their own merits. We are a great power. We
should be able to have diplomacy focus on Iran and the
diplomacy focus on getting to an Arab-Israeli comprehensive
peace in which Israel can live in peace and security in the
region.
So I am sorry if I made it sound as though we are doing
formal linkages, because that is not in fact what we are doing.
In terms of Hamas, I think it is worth reiterating--you
have heard this from us a lot, but it is worth reiterating that
Hamas can come to the table when Hamas abides by the Quartet
Principles: Recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence,
and adherence to the PLO's past agreements. These shouldn't be
obstacles to some kind of Palestinian states. These are the
foundation stones, the building blocks of what the Palestinians
need to build that state. That is what we are asking before we
have any sort of dealings with Hamas on our side.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you,
Ambassador, for being here.
I wanted to focus I guess on I think we have seen the new
administration step up to the plate in an important way in
terms of their reengagement around the world and especially in
the region of the Middle East. We have seen I think an improved
credibility. I believe we have seen an increased priority in
what we are doing there.
I want to ask you, with regard to the Arab states in the
region, what you see as bright spots in terms of those states
stepping up to help make progress. Certainly we have seen some
leadership from Egypt in the heading talks, but I would like
you to explain some of the bright spots you see in terms of
Arab states stepping up to help make progress.
The other question I have is, we were in Lebanon this past
spring and got a chance to see some of the refugee camps there,
and I am especially curious of your opinion of what is going on
in terms of addressing the issue of refugees and the other Arab
states stepping up on that issue.
Mr. Feltman. Representative Carnahan, thank you.
We do see some--you have asked about some bright spots in
terms of Arab engagement with us in response to our own
engagement. I will give you some examples of bright spots, but
let me tell you from the start we would like to see more bright
spots.
Mr. Carnahan. We all would, indeed.
Mr. Feltman. So, just want to be clear, I am not looking at
this and saying, this is great. We have these bright spots and
are finished. No, we want to keep going.
You mentioned Egypt. Egypt has played a very, very
important role in sending some pretty clear messages to Hamas
about the need for Hamas to abide by those Quartet Principles.
Egypt has taken some very important steps, particularly since
the January conflict, in preventing smuggling of arms and money
to Hamas via the tunnels. That is one example.
Saudi Arabia has just recently given $200 billion to the
Palestinian Authority, to the government headed by Prime
Minister Salam Fayyad. This is an important step, because we
need to have these Palestinian institutions functioning and
healthy for the time that we get the Palestinian statehood.
We are working with a number of states in the Gulf in
particular on various aspects of military and security issues;
and this, of course, has to do with in large part the concern
that all of us have about Iran's ambitions.
In the countries of North Africa, where we have a very
robust counterterrorism with the countries of North Africa to
try to interrupt the networks across the Sahel, the al-Qaeda
and the Islamic Maghreb, as it is called, the terrorist
networks that both wreck havoc in the Sahel area of Africa and
North Africa as well as feed into the foreign fighter pipeline
that goes to Iraq.
So we have seen some bright spots in terms of Arab
responsiveness to the diplomacy that we are engaged with across
the region. We certainly would like to see more.
Mr. Carnahan. And in particular about the refugee camps.
Mr. Feltman. Oh, I am sorry. In terms of Lebanon, since you
visited there, I am sure you are aware of just how sensitive
this issue is in Lebanon, that the Lebanese are divided in
every which way on every issue you can imagine, but they are
united on the issue regarding the Palestinian refugees.
And I would just repeat what I said in my statement, is
that we understand that you are not going to have a
comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli peace conflict
without taking these Lebanese sensitivities into account. You
are not going to have a solution on the back of Lebanon, in
essence.
In terms of the broader issue of Palestinian refugees, this
is one of the reasons we need to get back to the negotiating
table as quickly as possible. We are not going to be able to
have an honest discussion on this issue except through the
context of direct negotiation between the Israelis and the
Palestinians; and the sooner we get to that, the better for all
the states in the region, certainly the better for the poor
Palestinian refugees.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
with us today, Ambassador.
Ambassador, Turkey is not, by definition, a Middle Eastern
country, but it most certainly has a profound influence on the
countries in the Middle East. What are the implications of
Turkey's evolving identity with regards to the Middle East and
the issues that we have spoken to today?
Mr. Feltman. Representative, I will have to be a little bit
careful, since I don't want my European Bureau colleagues to
question what I am doing, testifying before Congress about a
country that falls outside of my region. So I will talk about
it a little bit in terms of Turkey and my region, rather than
Turkey per se.
Turkey has played, for example, a very constructive role in
Iraq. Turkey obviously has some security issues in terms of
Kurdish terrorists who are located in northern Iraq, but in
general Turkey has played a very positive role in helping to
stabilize Iraq.
Turkey played a very important role in leading proximity
talks between Israel and Syria that have fallen apart,
unfortunately, for a number of reasons--the change of Israeli
Government, the war in Gaza in December and January. But Turkey
was able to use its good influence and offices to promote a
kind of dialogue that took place between Israel and Syria.
The Syrian-Turkish relationship is one that is evolving. I
would say evolving in what we would see as sort of a positive
healthy direction. A few years ago, Turkey and Syria were
hostile to each other. Now they have grown closer. To the
extent that Syria can build ties with others, see its interest
linked with others and not exclusively to Iran, I think that is
inherently good.
We are concerned about what led to the cancellation of the
multilateral exercise that was planned for Turkey, the decision
by the Turks that one of the partners would not be welcome, so
we are watching these sorts of elements. But, in general, the
role of Turkey in our region, it is strong, it is growing and
has basically been positive.
Mr. McMahon. And certainly, but for that event with the
exercise, certainly probably has a role that could be helpful
as a broker or as an ally to us toward peace. And it is in that
vein that I ask my next question.
I know we have spoken a lot about Iran and the sanctions
and the bill we voted on today, which we are all very pleased
with as a good step from the Foreign Affairs Committee here in
Congress, and what the administration's focus on that I would
like to ask about in relation to our allies.
One of the measures that I was able to put in as an
amendment was a reporting requirement where the administration
tells us how the members of the G-20 are dealing with Iran in
terms of whether or not they are providing equipment or refined
petroleum. So I guess my question is, does the Obama
administration support targeted sanctions against the providers
of petroleum in Tehran, which you have spoken of a little bit?
But, also, are we going to work with our allies and companies
within their countries such as with the Swiss, with Vitol and
Trust Egora, which are providing material and product to Iran.
Do we have an approach planned in that regard?
Mr. Feltman. You know, actually, Congressman, this is an
ongoing process, and it is largely done quietly. But we have
used, for example, the Iran Sanctions Act as well as the
general international desire to see Iran behave like a
responsible member of the international community in order to
effect some business decisions.
You may remember that, for example, Ambassador Burns had
testified--Bill Burns had testified expressing some concern
about Norway's state oil company plans for investment in Iran.
Soon thereafter, Norway said publicly that state oil would be
relooking at its plans, and they have not moved forward with
this. So we are using this in a variety of ways.
I haven't seen the legislation. I know it was marked up
this morning. So I won't comment on the legislation that the
administration, I am sure, will be looking at.
But, in general, what we have been trying to do is work
multilaterally, where can we get the most people on board to
have the greatest impact in Iran that we would hope would
influence Iranian thinking? So multilaterally. And we have also
tried to keep the focus on Iran's misbehavior, on Iran. Using
the tools we have to build alliances with others and to
basically send the message; and we have been somewhat
successful. I believe that now is not the time for normal
business operations with Iran.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I think we all, to varying degrees, support
bilateral and multilateral efforts; and I know this
administration is about 10 months into that effort. Senator
Mitchell has a difficult challenge, as you pointed out. He is a
patient man, clearly from his experience in the Irish peace
talks.
But when we look at the visit here earlier this year by
King Abdullah from Jordan, when we look at the most recent
visit by President Mubarak in August, when we look at some of
the other efforts that are all, I would suppose, to be a part
of this multilateral and bilateral effort as it relates to the
Israeli Palestinian peace process, I think there is a concern,
a level of frustration that we see a number of the critical
peace partners in the area using this as a crutch or an excuse.
I mean, the cancellation, as you noted, with Turkey, the
relationship with Turkey and Syria right now with the 40
ministers that have been meeting----
I just picked up a quote earlier this month. King Abdullah
expressed dismay over a perceived lack of administration focus
on the Middle East peace process. In an interview with the
Italian daily la Repubblica, King Abdullah said, ``I heard
people in Washington talking about Iran and again Iran and
always Iran, but I keep on insisting on the Palestinian
question.''
Clearly, we are concerned about Iran and as you inferred to
the 5+1, but where are the milestones here that are going to
show that the countries in the neighborhood are focused at the
same level that we are about achieving the critical steps
necessary to achieve this peace that we talk about that is
always illusive?
Mr. Feltman. You know, I am surprised to hear the quote you
give. Because, given the amount of diplomacy that Senator
Mitchell himself as well as the Secretary and the President
have devoted to Middle East peace, it strikes me as somewhat
odd that someone would say, well, this administration is not
really trying on Middle East peace.
We want to see negotiations start as quickly as possible
but also in the best possible atmosphere so that those
negotiations succeed. It is not enough to just have Israelis
and Palestinians sit together.
Mr. Costa. I know, but sometimes that atmosphere is an
excuse for doing nothing.
And I just want to ask you about the question of elections.
The last administration went headlong into elections, and
sometimes be careful what you wish for. The elections that are
being proposed next year, are the Palestinians prepared to move
in that--do we have any confidence in what the outcomes may
bring?
Mr. Feltman. I wouldn't say that we would have confidence
that these elections would be taking place. We know what
President Abbas has said. We also have seen the reactions to
that. All I can say is that our partner for peace has got to be
Palestinians who accept Israel's right to exist, who agree to
negotiations, who reject the use of violence in order to try to
affect the outcome, who accept what has been agreed to already.
That is the Palestinian partner for peace. I think that we will
see a lot more intra-Palestinian debate before we will see any
kind of Palestinian elections.
Mr. Costa. Two other quick questions. I was saddened to see
an article this summer of children in Hamas camps, summer camps
reenacting the capture of Gilad Schalit. The Palestinians could
talk borders and agreements and talk all the good happy talk
that they want, but I think this was a deplorable incidence.
And I think summer camp events that recognize or glorify this
sets the peace process back many steps.
What is the administration doing about these kinds of
efforts in the curriculum? It is just not with Palestine. I
mean, still some of our partners in the Middle East, even
though they have indicated they are trying to clean up their
curriculum about references toward Jews and Christians and
others, it still seems to be a problem.
Mr. Feltman. The example you describe is awful. I couldn't
agree with you more. Every party in the area has a
responsibility to help build the atmosphere for peace, to help
build the atmosphere for trust and confidence, and the things
you describe I agree it takes us in absolutely the wrong
direction.
We have a dialogue going with a number of countries, it is
quiet, about the curriculum; and we have some programs that are
done to try to improve the curriculum that is being taught.
In the case of sort of Palestinian schools run by UNRWA,
for example, we have funded a tolerance program that is
supplemental material. We are very aware of the issue that you
raise. We agree----
Mr. Costa. But do we put these countries on notice?
Mr. Ackerman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Costa. It is unacceptable?
Mr. Ackerman. It is the chair's intent to offer a quick
second round. So if the gentleman would hold the additional
question for that time or ask any other questions then.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and
welcome, Ambassador Feltman.
Mr. Feltman. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Let me sort of start picking up a little bit
on Mr. Costa's questions.
You made reference earlier to institution building for
eventuality of a Palestinian state and Saudi investment with
respect to that. How can there be, however, stable institutions
for a Palestinian state so long as we have the kind of fracture
between the leadership in Gaza and the leadership in the West
Bank?
Mr. Feltman. You know, the Egyptians are attempting to
bring about a Palestinian reconciliation, and we would all
support a Palestinian reconciliation that abides by the Quartet
conditions, that builds a unified Palestinian partner for
peace. We are all supportive. But, in the meantime, there is a
functioning Palestinian Authority on the West Bank. It is
actually doing a pretty good job.
The IMF, the World Bank have given high marks to the
accountability of the institutions being set up. When we get to
the point that we have a unified Palestinian partner for peace,
we would assume that those institutions would apply also to
Gaza, but we don't want to neglect the ones on the West Bank
that are actually working and recognized by the international
community as being the Palestinian Authority responsible for
administration of the Palestinian territories.
Mr. Connolly. Would the United States welcome--pursuing the
answer to my own question, your hopes notwithstanding, if in
fact reconciliation cannot occur, would the United States
support some kind of interim peace agreement between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank leaving out Hamas
and the Gaza?
Mr. Feltman. Forgive me for making a technical point here.
The negotiating partner is the PLO, which is sort of above the
PA. The PLO is a unified organization that is recognized by the
Arabs to be the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people. So when we get back to negotiations, who is
actually sitting there would be representatives of the PLO and
the Palestinian Authority is administering the territories on
the ground.
Mr. Connolly. But you take my point.
Mr. Feltman. We want to get back to negotiations.
Implementation of any agreement we would hope would take place
within a unified authority. But negotiation we believe should
start as soon as possible, and we would hope those negotiations
could help lead to a unified authority before we get to the
point of implementation.
Mr. Connolly. Are we prepared to go forward even absent a
unified authority?
Mr. Feltman. I am--at this point, with all that is going on
right now, I would prefer not to speculate at this point. We
are prepared to go forward with negotiations now.
Mr. Connolly. Okay.
Lebanon, we had some hopeful results in elections earlier
this year, but the ability to form a government has been
stymied. What is the current situation from the United States
point of view in terms of Lebanon, and are we concerned about
stability there as well?
Mr. Feltman. I think it is natural to be concerned when you
have elections in June, we are now almost to November, and the
government hasn't been formed. There is a Prime Minister
designate. He has been nominated twice to form a government,
and we hope he can do this as quickly as possible. There has
been a formula decided by all parties.
Mr. Connolly. Almost as long as waiting for the appointment
of an USAID administrator, Mr. Feltman.
Mr. Feltman. That is above my pay grade.
Mr. Connolly. I know. I couldn't resist.
Mr. Feltman. We have seen this several times in Lebanon.
There was no President for a while, and there was a government
that was boycotted for a while, and there was fighting on the
streets. And now there is no government. There is no government
again.
And when I look back and say, what is the unifying factor
of all of these things? It was that Hezbollah and Michel Aoun
were blocking the government, blocking the election of the
President, blocking the government again, going out to the
street to protest certain policies they didn't like. But, in
the end, the Lebanese were able to come together and solve
their own problems.
We hope they do that as quickly as possible. It is time to
have a government in Lebanon. There is a formula for doing so
and a constitution that lays out the process. The Lebanese need
to be left to their own devices to do just that.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
I thank the chair.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, Ambassador, thank
you for being here.
Recently, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton asking about
funding cuts for organizations that support democracy in Iran;
and we are awaiting a response. In fairness, it was only
October 6th, so I guess we will get a response at some point
soon.
So I am interested in what light you might be able to shed
on the United States policy toward these democracy supporting
groups in Iran. And what I understand is that the Iranian Human
Rights Documentation Center, Freedom House, and IRI all are on
record as saying that their funding has been cut. I wonder if
you could comment on that and whether you can corroborate that
or whether--and, if so, what is the policy of the United States
that would cause us to want to cut those democracy supporting
organizations?
Mr. Feltman. Congressman, thanks.
Let me reiterate, our policy toward our programs in Iran
hasn't changed. The fundamentals of what we are trying to do in
Iran and across the region hasn't changed.
What are we trying to do? We are trying to help create
space for a functioning, healthy civil society, where civil
society voices become stronger and where they can be protected.
We are trying to provide tools for civil society activists to
get information to connect with each other. We are doing these
things across the region. We are doing these things in a lot of
different places. This has not changed from one administration
to the other, from this week to the last because of elections.
We are continuing to work in these areas.
In terms of individual grants of organizations that are
working in Iran, all I can say is this is pretty competitive.
We have resources from Congress. We put out solicitations. We
do the evaluation. We do constant evaluation of a program's
effectiveness.
There is no drop in funding. Quite the contrary. The
individual cases you mentioned, we will look at your letter. I
am not aware of the cases, but what I can say is the broad
policy objectives, the broad thrust of what we are doing has
not changed. We are continuing to work to strengthen civil
society across the region, including in Iran, using a wide
variety of partners who tend to compete with each other.
Mr. Inglis. So I want to track with you on that, because
that certainly makes a lot of sense. But, on the other hand, we
have these reports of what seems to be three significant
organizations being cut, again, Iran Human Rights Documentation
Center, Freedom House, and IRI. As I understand, a fairly
significant operation is being cut. You don't have any specific
information on those three or----
Mr. Feltman. You know, we tend not to discuss--we tend to
look at grant information as proprietary information for a
number of reasons. If we have information, we will share it
with partners, but we don't share it publicly.
The other thing is that there is a particular sensitivity
on the funding of organizations that are doing work in Iran for
reasons that you can probably all understand. And I understand
there is, in fact, a staff briefing next week where staff from
my bureau and others will be coming up to talk to some of your
staff in more specifics about the programs that we have. And so
I will make sure that they have any details they can share when
they come for the staff hearing.
Mr. Inglis. I guess the overall concern--I will run out of
time here shortly--is that in our attempt to engage Iran, which
seems to me to make sense, to try to talk with them in some
way, I sure hope, though, that we are not giving concessions
and removing ourselves from support of the projects and
programs that would spread concepts of democracy in
constitutional republics in Iran, people wanting to emulate the
success of the United States and other countries that love
freedom. And to have us back away from those in order to get
some kind of engagement seems to me makes no sense, because
appeasement has never worked before, and it seems to me to fly
into that danger zone of appeasement which is not wise policy.
Mr. Feltman. Congressman, we are not backing away. We are
going full steam ahead with our programs with Iran and across
the region, again in order to create that space for civil
society to actually play the proper role that we would all
understand and building more accountable democratic governing
institutions.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I just came by to ask simple
questions about small amounts of money that are appropriated.
I believe we provided recently $2.5 million for democracy
in Syria; and we will be providing money for democracy in Syria
in the future, I would suspect. Can we be confident that if we
provide money to the State Department to promote democracy in
Syria that none of that money will be handed by the State
Department to President Assad or to his government or to his
family?
Mr. Feltman. Congressman Sherman, I am very aware of the
reference that you are making there; and I assure you we will
be transparent with the Congress. We will make sure that we
have done our due diligence about who the end recipients are so
we are actually helping civil society and not a family.
Mr. Sherman. Let me at it this way. Assuming you do your
due diligence--and mistakes can happen, but will you use due
diligence just to do the due diligence or will you use due
diligence to make sure that you are doing your best job to make
sure that none of the money goes to President Assad or to his
government or to his family? Or are you going to do due
diligence----
Mr. Feltman. I will say yes, because we want to support
civil society in its role. So I will answer your question yes.
Mr. Sherman. So you will not be building the President
Assad Health Clinic in Allepo----
Mr. Feltman. No.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Under the control of the Syrian
Health Ministry?
Of course, then referencing the congressional notification
of September 15th dealing with the $2.5 million we provided to
promote democracy in Libya, I have been told at less formal
settings that this document is going to be superseded and that
no money is going to be spent until we get a new document.
Mr. Feltman. You are correct, and we will use the same
criteria you just outlined for Syria when we submit that new
document to you on Libya.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
The one thing I will point out about the Libyan document is
that in many cases it is unclear who gets the money. They
subdivide it, a half million here, a quarter million there. And
sometimes they specifically identify who gets the money, and
sometimes they don't.
So I will ask you not only to achieve the aims you stated
but to achieve a specificity in the congressional notification
so that we know who gets the money, not just what purposes the
money will try to serve.
Mr. Feltman. I give you those assurances, Congressman
Sherman. We understand the sensitivity.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Ambassador, the Obama administration has rightfully
denounced the Goldstone Report which I want to talk about for a
minute, which, if taken seriously, would make it legally
impossible for our country or any other country to defend
themselves from terrorists who hide between and among
civilians.
I would suspect that when a country responds to terrorist
attacks and terrorists, as we know them of recent vintage, have
found it to their advantage to hide that way among civilian
populations. And I would suspect that there were probably some
given days in our response to the terrorist attack against our
country that we responded in Afghanistan, maybe today in
Pakistan, maybe previously in Iraq, in trying to kill bad guys
who hung out among innocent people, that there were probably
some of those days where in 1 day we killed as many people as
who died in the Israeli incursion in Gaza.
Which, if we were susceptible to any General Assembly
resolution that might be passed based on Goldstone, other
countries might take it into their account to declare the
United States and the officers thereof as international war
criminals, cite international jurisdiction, and prosecute
American former soldiers who are now tourists, or the Vice
President, or you, whoever might venture into their country,
and put you on trial for being an international war criminal.
This would prevent us and any other country from defending
themselves. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been forcefully
arguing that the international community can't possibly expect
Israel to exchange land for peace, if, when peace breaks down,
Israel effectively is prohibited from defending itself.
Firstly, I think the Prime Minister is completely right;
and, second, there is not even a shred of possibility that the
Israeli public would agree to any peace agreement under the
absurd operational restrictions that the Goldstone Report
proposes to require of Israel and any other countries' armed
forces.
What is the administration doing both to protect our rights
to self-defense and to make it clear to the international
community that they can have the Goldstone view, or they can
have peace in the Middle East, but they can't have Goldstone
and Middle East peace?
Mr. Feltman. Mr. Chairman, you gave a very compelling
description of the problem that the Goldstone Report poses for
us in terms of our own role and in terms of Middle East peace.
You know, we were opposed to the mandate of the Goldstone
Report; and, as you outlined, its conclusions are sweeping. I
can tell you there is no--we see no role for the Security
Council. We see no role for Goldstone in the Security Council.
We will use our voice, our vote, and all organizations where
the Goldstone Report might appear in order to make it clear
what the stakes are here and why we have a problem with the
sweeping conclusion that the Goldstone Report poses.
You know, you mentioned our own reaction to 9/11 and
perhaps there were mistakes made now and again. We have
internal processes to look at those mistakes. Israel does, too.
It is a democratic state. And this is the point we are making
to everybody, that Israel has processes that they have and are
using to investigate any claims of abuses, any claims of--any
incidents cited by people as being beyond the law of war. So we
are working to make sure that, to the extent we have this, the
Goldstone Report doesn't become sort of enshrined
internationally, that people understand the implications of
this broadly.
Mr. Ackerman. Why would we be more successful down the road
when we weren't successful in dissuading the vote from coming
up in Geneva and being sent to the General Assembly? Why
would--is there a process where we are counting votes in the
General Assembly right now to see if we can kill this thing?
Because I don't know that the mass goes to our advantage here.
Mr. Feltman. I don't know. I would agree with you. I would
be skeptical about our ability to influence a General Assembly
vote. I am much more confident of our ability to have influence
in the Security Council, for all the reasons you know; and the
Security Council, frankly, on matters of international law
figures much more prominently than the General Assembly does.
Mr. Ackerman. I have more confidence that you are right
here than not as far as our influence in the Security Council,
looking at the lineup, but not completely sure. But,
nonetheless, if it passes in the General Assembly, that would
be sufficient enough in some countries to cite the General
Assembly passage of a resolution as an enabling matter for them
to invoke whatever they would want to invoke against us or any
other country. Do you think that there is a mathematical chance
of stopping it in the General Assembly?
Mr. Feltman. I----
Mr. Ackerman. Your answer--I am rephrasing--to the Security
Council would be, possibly we can, more likely than--but not in
the General Assembly. What is going to happen is my concern.
Mr. Feltman. Unfortunately----
Mr. Ackerman. In the neighboring countries.
Mr. Feltman. Unfortunately, I think our influence is
limited in the General Assembly. And it is a problem in many of
these U.N. bodies that you end up with this inherently anti-
Israeli bias that comes out in a variety of ways. This is one
that could have broader implications, unfortunately. I do know
that in Geneva the resolution passed the Human Rights Council,
but it passed by 25 votes out of 47 members. This is the lowest
margin of any of these anti-Israeli measures that the U.N.
Human Rights Council deals with.
Mr. Ackerman. If the Yankees win the World Series four
games to three, they are still winners.
Mr. Feltman. But it may be an indication that with U.S.
leadership and U.S. partnership with others we can start to
steer these U.N. organizations away from the number of anti-
Israeli resolutions that almost come up in a pro forma basis.
And that has got to be our ultimate goal as well, do what we
can to prevent the enshrining of the Goldstone recommendations
and do what we can to steer the U.N. bodies away from
inherently anti-Israeli bias that comes up so often.
Mr. Ackerman. Last question, is that your shop that is
doing that or Senator Mitchell's shop?
Mr. Feltman. It is a joint effort. Because we have
Ambassador Rice at US-UN, Cabinet official. She was just in
Israel and had meetings with the Israelis on October 21st where
this was discussed. We have the international organizations. We
have the State Department, the legal office. We have a lot of
people who are working on these issues.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just a note on the United Nations. There are some of us
here in Congress that are skeptical of the United Nations.
Period. You have an organization set up where it is made----
Mr. Ackerman. That means your attitude has gotten more
sympathetic.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. It is an organization who is made up
of governments, half of which are so authoritarian and corrupt
that we would think are totally contrary to what the United
States is all about, at least half of them. I don't see really
any future in basing our national security or anybody else's
security or prosperity on that organization.
I would like to ask you a little bit about our Government
policy. You basically told us today that there has not been a
retreat, even though there is a perceived retreat, from a tough
stance on human rights. And when given the examples of the
Human Rights Documentation Center being defunded, the Farsi-
English online journal for democracy and human rights being
defunded, efforts by the International Republican Institute,
areas that are focusing on human rights activities in Iran
being defunded, that those are aberrations and not reflective
of a broad policy. The broad policy has stayed the same. These
things are just all little things that don't really reflect the
overall commitment to human rights.
Mr. Feltman. Yes, I do say that. I sense your skepticism,
Congressman Rohrabacher, but I do say that.
There is a highly competitive process, as the American
taxpayers would expect, in order for any organization to
receive U.S. Government funding. I am not aware of these
individuals' cases but, as I said, there will be a staff
briefing next week. I will make sure our staff is aware of the
individual cases and can share what they can share, given
proprietary concerns and all of that.
What I said--I will say it again--is, we are continuing
full steam ahead with our programs to promote civil society,
promote the protection of human rights, to promote democracy,
accountable and responsible governments and the rule of law
across the region, including in Iran.
We have received funding from Congress for these programs.
We have asked for funding for these programs. We want these
programs to continue.
Perhaps the language sounds a little bit different to you
now than a year ago; I don't know. But the commitment to work
for accountability, for rule of law, for protection of human
rights, for protection of minorities, this is all the same. And
if you go back and you look at President Obama's speech on July
4 in Cairo, these themes were indeed there.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me--I have only got a couple of
minutes because there is a difference in words and there is a
difference in what is perceived as attitudes; and sometimes
what we perceive as sensitive and honest and reaching out is
perceived in other cultures as weakness and a lack of resolve.
And I would suggest if that is perceived in the Middle East,
then we will have the opposite results from what you were
hoping for.
Let me get another specific. Camp Ashraf in Iraq is--of
course, there is an encampment of people who are opposing the
Iranian dictatorship and actually involved in basically efforts
to fight the mullahs, and to fight the mullah dictatorship.
They now are being threatened with being returned. Some people
are actually talking about returning them to Iran, which would
probably result in a mass execution.
What is our position on that? And are we solidly
suggesting, or solidly and not just suggesting, but do we have
some penalty for the Iraqi Government if they throw these
people in Camp Ashraf over to the mullah dictatorship?
Mr. Feltman. We are watching the situation with Camp Ashraf
very, very closely. And unfortunately, there has been a recent
example of where violence could have been avoided by both the
MEK and the Iraqis, and in fact, it wasn't when the Iraqis, you
know, went in in a very provocative action to set up a police
station and the MEK responded with violence.
We have seen an example, fortunately contained, of what
could happen. So we are watching this extremely closely.
I think you are aware that with the turnover of Camp Ashraf
to Iraqi sovereignty at the beginning of the year, we got
assurances from the Iraqis that they would not forcibly return,
forcibly expel the MEK Camp Ashraf residents, MEK members, to
countries in which they had a reasonable expectation of
persecution. So we have written assurances.
Now, in addition, though, we are watching, and we have
asked the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq to also play a role
here; and the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Have we suggested to the Iraqis that there
would be a consequence, a negative consequence, that we would
then act in a way and do something today that would be harmful
to them if, indeed, they moved on Camp Ashraf and threw these
people over into the mullah dictatorship next door?
Mr. Feltman. Believe me, the Iraqis know how concerned we
are with this. And we have also sent messages to the MEK.
We are actually more concerned about an Iraqi desire to
move Camp Ashraf to someplace else inside Iraq. The expectation
is not that they are going to expel the MEK, Camp Ashraf
residents, but that they would to try to move them, forcibly
move them, to a different location in Iraq, and that too could
lead to bloodshed.
And so, believe me, Congressman, we are on top of this all
the time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. One last note on this, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you for indulging me.
I would think that moving that camp is certainly not on a
par with sending them back to Iran. They need, the Kurds, who
have a negative history with this group, may be open to
accepting them and that might be a useful compromise if the
Kurds show some leadership in this.
So thank you very much and I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, it is nice to see you. Thank you for your
service. We appreciate it.
I would like to focus on sanctions. And as you know, we
took up a bill today in Foreign Affairs, and I think there is a
general recognition that we in the United States need to send
strong signals. There are certain things that we can do that
are symbolic and certain things, including maybe today's
sanctions and others, that can have more of a broad effect.
But ultimately the sanctions will be most effective if we
have our allies and our interested parties around the world
collaborating with us to do this. And we have been in constant
contact with the European Union; and it always comes back to
Russia and China, in addition to the Union, but China's
influence is quite substantial. They sort of operate in a
different sphere in many ways.
There are oil interests, and there have been some efforts
to substitute oil or some efforts from reaching out to some of
our friends in the oil-producing countries to replace United
Arab Emirates and, I think, others. Can you share with us some
of those, or what you can talk about, can you share with us the
attempts to try to bring China more effectively into this
process?
Mr. Feltman. Congressman, thanks for the question. You
certainly have zeroed in on a very important aspect of the Iran
policy.
We have had a lot of quiet discussions with the Arab states
about their concerns with Iran because their concerns with Iran
largely overlap with ours, but they are also somewhat different
because they live in the neighborhood. And they have very
strong concerns about Iran.
We have talked to them about the need to implement the
Security Council resolutions. We have got progress there in
terms of the sanctions on Iran that are mentioned in three
Chapter 7 Security Council resolutions. But we have also had
the conversations with them that, hey, you guys are concerned
about Iran; you have relations with China and you have certain
assets that you can bring to a discussion with China about
that.
So we have encouraged the sort of discussion that you have
talked about, and I think you have seen publicly some reference
to results on this. In general, China has played a constructive
role with us. China has assured us that they are with us on the
P5+1 approach to Iran.
So we are looking at the question of working
internationally in a variety of ways; one is the P5+1, one is
working to find other multilateral alliances, like-minded
states that will join with us on sanctions that may go beyond
what is less specifically in the U.N.
You may have seen last week, for example, that the United
Kingdom has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran shipping
lines, IRISL, which follows the designation we did a while ago,
which again adds a multilateral aspect to sanctions that we
think is useful.
Mr. Klein. Thank you for those comments.
I mean, I will share with you--and it is no big revelation
here--that all of us as members of this committee, we receive
the ambassadors and representatives of the Arab states
regularly, and they all mention in their talking points about
Ahmadinejad and the threat that Iran poses to the neighborhood.
And, in fact, you know, I give full credit to the first
President Bush, who was able to engage in a much broader way
the other Arab states, in part because the invasion of Kuwait
was a direct threat to the neighbors. Again, we need to be
building on that.
And the second question, which you have already gotten into
a little bit, was what else can our Arab allies do to help
facilitate changes here in behavior? And part of that is the
oil. Are there other issues out there besides oil that China is
interested in, that it deals with with Iran?
Mr. Feltman. Well, the other aspect that we talk to the
Arabs a lot about are--I mentioned it briefly--are the
financial sanctions, are the sanctions that are mentioned in
three Security Council resolutions.
Countries like the UAE--UAE have been implementing the
regulations needed to put these sanctions into effect. So that
is another aspect of that is to make sure that all of our
allies are complying with the Security Council resolutions, in
a way that Iran looks out of its borders and says, hey, wait a
minute, these sanctions are starting to hurt and they are
starting to be universally applied. That is one aspect of it.
Another aspect, frankly, are security and military
cooperation. We have a very strong security-military
cooperation going with each of the Gulf States. I would suspect
at some point, Iran is looking across the Gulf and saying, hey,
wait a minute. When did that happen? When did all these states
across the water from us get this kind of sophisticated armed
forces?
We are working in a lot of different ways to try to get
Iran's attention and persuade Iran that it is time to alter its
behavior and become a responsible member of the international
community, rather than a rogue member of the international
community.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, if I can just follow up, one last
question if you would indulge me?
Part of that whole sanctions process is to--when we pass
sanctions, to enforce them. The Iran Sanctions Act that was
passed a number of years ago, through the last couple of
administrations, I think that a lot of people feel like we have
not enforced enough of really what has been identified. And I
did a letter recently with about 50 Members, which went out to
encourage the administration to identify and facilitate the
enforcement. And the basis of that was from the Congressional
Research Service report that we got a copy of from October 8,
2009, which identified a number of businesses that are in
violation of the Iran Sanctions Act.
So my purpose in bringing that up in this hearing today is
to, if we are going to be serious about this, and have both a
diplomatic effort, which I fully endorse and support, as well
as the carrot and the stick, the stick has to be viewed as not
just symbolic, not just a piece of paper, but ready--and we are
willing and taking action to enforce its terms.
Mr. Feltman. If I may, Mr. Chairman, respond?
Our approach on sanctions in general has been, let's work
multilaterally. Let's keep the spotlight on what Iran is doing.
Let's not have fights among the allies. Let's bring the allies
together in order to bring the pressure to bear on Iran.
But we have heard your message loud and clear about the
Iran Sanctions Act. We have the message of this committee loud
and clear about the Iran Sanctions Act. We have the letter that
you and many others of this committee have signed.
And I will tell you that we have started a process of
looking into the 20 companies, the 20 deals that you list in
this letter, and we expect to have this preliminary review
finished in about 45 days, in which case we would be able to
say which of these need a further investigation as to whether
they violate the Iran Sanctions Act.
And we look forward to working with this committee, keeping
Congress informed as we go forward in this review process of
the deals listed in your letter.
I will comment that, in some cases, Iran announces all
sorts of deals that--they do it for political purposes that, in
fact, don't amount to anything. And there are a couple, like
with Total in particular that Iran has trumpeted, that we have
looked into; and in fact, nothing is there. So we have got to
start a review process of the 20 companies that are on that
list.
Mr. Ackerman. Well, Mr. Ambassador, it appears that my list
is exhausted. You have outlasted and endured us. We thank you
very much for your participation, your excellent testimony and
the frank discussion we have had and your answering all of our
questions. Hope to see you soon.
Mr. Feltman. Thank you for inviting me, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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