[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-30]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY:
HOW THE USE AND MISUSE OF
RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING AFFECTS
THE WAR EFFORT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009, Effective Counterinsurgency: How the
Use and Misuse of Reconstruction Funding Affects the War Effort
in Iraq and Afghanistan........................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 25, 2009........................................ 33
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2009
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: HOW THE USE AND MISUSE OF RECONSTRUCTION
FUNDING AFFECTS THE WAR EFFORT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Bowen, Stuart W., Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction................................................. 3
Fields, Maj. Gen. Arnold, USMC (ret.), Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction................................. 5
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Managing Director, International
Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office....... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bowen, Stuart W., Jr......................................... 37
Fields, Maj. Gen. Arnold..................................... 43
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L............................... 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: HOW THE USE AND MISUSE OF RECONSTRUCTION
FUNDING AFFECTS THE WAR EFFORT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Today, the House Armed Services
Committee meets to take testimony on Effective
Counterinsurgency: How the Use and Misuse of Reconstruction
Funding Affects the War Effort in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We are very fortunate to have three extremely qualified
witnesses to help us here today: Stuart Bowen, Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR); Major
General Arnold Fields, the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR); and Jacqueline Williams-
Bridgers, Managing Director for International Affairs and Trade
at the Government Accountability Office, the GAO.
Recently, the United States has engaged in two
counterinsurgency operations, Iraq and Afghanistan. And while
the campaign in Iraq is winding down somewhat, we are expecting
a new strategy that will reinvigorate our efforts in
Afghanistan to be announced in the next few days. We, of
course, all look forward to that. This makes today's effort so
very, very important.
Both SIGIR and GAO have written and testified repeatedly
about the problems in the U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq. Among
many other problems, at some point during the war in Iraq, the
reconstruction effort suffered from poor financial controls,
poor interagency coordination, which we are very concerned
about in this committee, and a lack of strategic planning,
which we have all been concerned about for some time.
While to some extent these problems were addressed over
time in Iraq, we must ensure that the lessons that we learned
there, at great expense, are not lost. So often we do not learn
the lessons of the past, and we, on this committee, are very
familiar with that.
To help ensure that we do not experience the same problems
in Afghanistan that we did in Iraq, this committee, as part of
the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
created the position of the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR. As the President will
announce the new strategy shortly, it is our hope that SIGAR
will help to take a critical look at the efforts in Afghanistan
to ensure they are properly coordinated.
At the same time, many people have heard the concern that,
in Afghanistan, we are faced with a proliferation of auditors
that we did not face in Iraq when the SIGIR began its important
work. I am hopeful that our witnesses will take the time to
address the difficult trade-offs between full accountability on
the one hand, and the flexibility needed in a war zone, and the
coordination that we need between auditors, on the one hand, to
ensure that we do not stifle creativity and the work product.
I would also like to note that many of the lessons learned
in Iraq, as pointed out by the GAO and then SIGIR, may be
applicable to the future as we consider ways to reform the
interagency system. We reiterate the problems with the
interagency system. We have done something on that in last
year's bill. We hope to continue on work on that.
It is my hope that the testimony and discussion here today
will help us understand these issues and problems and potential
solutions. I appreciate the witnesses that we have. We realize
you are the best at what you do, and we appreciate it very,
very much.
With that, John McHugh, Ranking Member, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And like you, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to welcome our
witnesses. I think your closing comments encapsulated their
skills and their expertise very well. And we are truly
fortunate today to have the benefit of their testimony as we go
forward on this very important issue.
And let me, in that regard, Mr. Chairman, compliment you on
holding this hearing. As you noted, sir, we hope that the
product of today's efforts will help us as we prepare for the
2010 budget in the wartime supplemental spending bills which
will be before us in pretty short order.
This committee spent a whole lot of time, rightfully so,
and a whole lot of energy focusing on the allocation of
reconstruction funding in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And in
that process, we have used the good work of these fine people
that have joined us here today, the GAO, the Inspector General
for Iraq, and of course now the Inspector General for
Afghanistan, as we have tried to implement their
recommendations and their oversight findings into both our
hearings as well as ensuing legislation.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, one of the direct results of
those experiences was, indeed, our efforts back in the 2008
Defense bill to create the Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction, something that I think was both very wise and
something we take great pride in.
As we look at the work of their assembled efforts, it seems
that one indisputable conclusion has been revealed: more work
needs to be done. And I know that sounds like we are stating
the obvious, but I don't think it is ever a fruitless effort to
remind ourselves that we have much business before us.
And although we have been at this now for nearly a decade,
as SIGIR Bowen's testimony reveals, we have not yet
internalized effectively the difficult lessons that are out
there for us to embody. And frankly, I am unsure if the
fundamental problem is that we are simply bad at doing
contingency relief and reconstruction, or we simply lack a
policy to institutionalize the best practices for this kind of
work. I hope it is the latter, but that is one of the primary
reasons, of course, we are here today.
SIGAR and GAO's reports suggest we are too reliant on
personalities and lack the organizational structures required
for an expeditionary post-conflict reconstruction. They contend
that we need to put an end to the culture of improvisation when
managing contingency operations, exigencies of the battlefield
notwithstanding.
If the problem is rooted in policy, then simply we on this
panel and in this Congress need to act. The House and the
Senate has appropriated some $48 billion for Iraq
reconstruction since 2003 and $32 billion for Afghanistan since
2001, and a large slice of these funds has gone to the security
sector.
In Iraq, we will continue to assist that nation with their
security forces for the foreseeable future. At the same time,
building up the Afghan national security forces is a vital
element of our counterinsurgency there. In other words, this
work is essential, and we cannot afford any longer the
inefficiencies and waste that has riddled our past efforts. And
toward that end, I am certainly interested in hearing from
Inspector General (IG) Fields and how SIGAR has used the Hard
Lessons from Iraq and applied them to Afghanistan. Where these
lessons don't apply, I know we would all be interested in
learning why and what steps we may be able to proactively take
to avoid any pitfalls in the path ahead.
So a lot of interesting work behind us. A lot of
interesting discussion I hope today. And again, I thank all
three of you for being here.
And with a final word of appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman,
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Well, I thank the gentleman. We are off to an
excellent start.
We, again, are very pleased with the panel, and we look
forward to your testimony.
And without objection, each of your testimony will be
entered in the record.
Stuart Bowen, you are on.
STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR., SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member
McHugh, members of the committee, it is my pleasure to address
the issue before the committee today, the use of reconstruction
funds in contingency operations, in particular in Iraq, an
issue I have been reporting on for over five years now.
Let me start by putting my comments in context. Six years
ago this day, the United States forces were engaged in the
bloodiest fire fight of the invasion, in the Euphrates Valley
around Najaf. Baghdad would fall two weeks later. Five years
ago, I had just returned from my second trip to Iraq, having
seen a deteriorating security situation and beginning the
process of issuing my first quarterly report on a
reconstruction program that had expanded tenfold from what had
been planned to $20 billion, now $50 billion.
One year ago yesterday, a rocket attack on the Green Zone
took the life of one of my auditors who was working on an audit
of a significant contract regarding that $50 billion. That
context sets an important tone for analyzing what happened in
Iraq, and that is, security drove up the cost of everything.
I just returned from my 22nd trip to Iraq, and the security
situation is much better there today than it was a year ago,
much better than three years ago and five years ago. It still
is not a safe place. It is still a dangerous place to work. I
traveled out to Anbar to visit a project and to get their
required significant security detail and major planning. But it
is much safer today than it was.
There is another stark reality that has caused the misuse
of U.S. taxpayer money in the Iraq reconstruction program, and
it echos the point, Mr. Chairman, that you were making, and
Ranking Member McHugh, about the need to learn our lessons
regarding these contingency operations, and that is, the United
States Government does not have an established framework for
the management and execution of contingency, relief, and
reconstruction operations.
I met with General Odierno, senior leadership in the
embassy, and senior leadership in Multi-National Force--Iraq
(MNF-I) during this latest trip. And they acknowledged to me,
as virtually all the leadership did in the course of producing
Hard Lessons: Our Study of Iraq, that reform is necessary to
improve the management of contingency relief and reconstruction
operations.
Hard Lessons addresses a number of points. It tells the
story of a reconstruction program that was very narrow, that
sought to do two things at the outset: namely, avert
humanitarian disaster and repair war damage. That quickly
expanded after the invasion concluded to a program that sought
to touch every aspect of Iraqi society, and then expanded
thereafter through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) to
rebuild the Iraqi Army and the police.
Fifty billion dollars later, what have we achieved? As Hard
Lessons points out, on the infrastructure front, the United
States program did not achieve the goals that it set for itself
back in 2003. On the security side, after significant
investment by the Congress, over $18 billion in the Iraqi
Security Forces Fund, another $5 billion from other sources,
the Iraqi Army is now a fairly capable force that has control
of most of the provinces across the country and, by the end of
May, will have control of all of them, according to the current
schedule.
Those are the realities of the challenges of the $50
billion, and the lessons learned are significant. Chief among
them, as I said, is the need to develop unity of command for
the management of contingency relief and reconstruction
operations, something that is not extant within our current
system. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of
State (State), the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) all agree that there has been weak
communication regarding the execution of the reconstruction
effort, and that there needs to be reform. And I think that
that reform should certainly come from the Congress, and there
are several ways that it could go.
There are other important reforms that need to be carried
out, including the development of wartime contracting rules
that are more efficient to avoid waste; the need to emphasize
the integration and development of soft programs for the
projection of soft power, especially relevant in Afghanistan
today; programs that are geared well to indigenous needs, which
was not the case in Iraq. The program, as we have seen in our
asset transfer audits, we haven't built exactly what the Iraqis
wanted. And their complaints to us, in the course of our audits
and in the course of our lessons learned reports, have been
that it's not what they wanted; we didn't build to their need.
Building to scale, especially in Afghanistan as we move
forward, is essential, something that they can manage, that
they have capacity to do.
And finally, the U.S. Government needs to develop human
resources, management systems, information technology (IT)
systems, other systems for executing such operations.
Let me close by saying that I met yesterday with a chief
executive officer (CEO) of a contractor who did significant
electricity work in Iraq in 2003, 2004, part of the Task Force
to Restore Iraqi Electricity. He is now working in Afghanistan.
He said, Mr. Bowen, I have read every one of your reports, and
you are right, there was significant waste; that these large
contractors, through subcontractors, caused the loss of
significant taxpayer dollars.
But then he said, I want to tell you that the same thing is
going on in Afghanistan now, that there is significant waste
and that the lessons learned from Iraq are waiting to be
applied effectively in Afghanistan.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time. And I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We are certainly, of
course, so sorry about the loss of your auditor in Iraq. That
is very, very, very sad.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. The Inspector General for Afghanistan now,
General Fields.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ARNOLD FIELDS, USMC (RET.), SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
General Fields. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McHugh, and
members of the committee, I am pleased to be here for this
hearing on reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a
welcomed opportunity, our first since I was sworn in last
summer, to discuss the establishment of the Office of the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or
SIGAR for short, and, as well, our plans for oversight of
reconstruction programs in Afghanistan as mandated by the
Congress.
The nature and scope of U.S. reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq have many similarities. However, as
members of this committee are aware, conditions in Afghanistan,
from the standpoint of economic, geographic, demographic, and
political, offer unique challenges to the feasibility and
sustainability of reconstruction efforts.
Afghanistan remains a poor and undeveloped country after
nearly three decades of warfare and economic neglect. My
colleague, Stuart Bowen, recently identified lessons learned
from the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq. SIGAR will be
assessing how U.S. agencies are considering these lessons in
planning and implementing programs in Afghanistan.
In my written statement, submitted for the record, I
outline SIGAR's priorities in several areas, using some of the
lessons learned as a framework for my discussion. Now I want
to, one, highlight actions we have taken to begin providing
oversight; and two, discuss one of the lessons learned in Iraq
and how we will examine its applicability in Afghanistan.
Oversight is clearly an important and necessary function to
ensure accountability over the use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. I
want to mention four things we have done.
First, we have hired and continue to hire highly qualified
people willing to work in Afghanistan. Today, we have 41 people
as part of our team. As additional funding becomes available,
SIGAR plans to hire additional personnel and increase our
presence in Afghanistan.
Second, we are developing strategic plans to direct our
work. We have commenced several audits, delivered two quarterly
reports to the Congress, and established a hotline for
reporting complaints. Over the next several months, we
anticipate completing several reports containing analyses,
observations, conclusions, and recommendations.
Third, we have established an office in our embassy in
Kabul, Afghanistan, and we have secured space for personnel in
three other locations in Afghanistan. We feel this is important
to our work.
Fourth, we are working closely with our oversight
colleagues to share our plans and coordinate, as required, in
our authorizing legislation.
Now I would like to discuss one of the lessons learned in
Iraq and how we will examine it in Afghanistan.
The United States Government's capacity to manage the
contractors carrying out reconstruction work is an important
issue. SIGAR plans to conduct a number of reviews on the use,
oversight, and performance of contractors. And over time, we
expect this work will lead to improved contracting and contract
management processes. We have started an audit of U.S.
agencies' management of reconstruction funds, projects, and
contracts.
SIGAR is one of several audit entities responsible for
oversight of contracts in Afghanistan. SIGAR plans to prepare
the required comprehensive plan for audits of security
contracts and other contracts. And this plan will be
coordinated with other oversight entities, as appropriate.
In closing, SIGAR takes its responsibilities very
seriously. We are unique in our position in as much as we can
examine reconstruction programs and activities in Afghanistan
across all U.S. agencies.
I appreciate the support the Congress continues to provide
our office. And I certainly look forward answering your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fields can be found in
the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Ortiz [presiding]. Thank you, General.
STATEMENT OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I thank you very much. GAO
appreciates the opportunity to be here today to participate in
this very important hearing.
The United States faces unique challenges in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, GAO's work has shown that success in both
countries will depend on addressing common challenges. There
are three: The first challenge is establishing and maintaining
a basic level of security; second is building a sustainable
economic foundation in each country; and third, holding the
governments accountable to their political and economic
commitments while building their capacity. These challenges
underscore the need for the U.S. to chart comprehensive
strategies to lay the groundwork for joint operational plans.
I would like to first address the challenges the U.S. faces
in Iraq. In Iraq, many U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts took
place in an environment of deteriorating security. Oil,
electricity, and water projects were subject to insurgent
attacks, which raised cost, caused delays, changed scopes, and
denied central services to the Iraqi people. Although violence
has declined in Iraq, security conditions remain quite fragile.
Iraq's oil resources provide a foundation for economic
growth. With revenues from the world's third largest oil
reserve, Iraq has accumulated a $47 billion surplus. However,
Iraq's investment in its infrastructure has been limited,
resulting in slower-than-anticipated reconstruction in that
country.
The United States has held Iraq to its commitments to
address political grievances among Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd
populations. It has passed some key legislative reforms and
held several elections. However, the Iraqi Government still
needs to enact other laws to define how the country's oil and
gas revenues will be shared and how Kirkuk will be governed.
Finally, the Iraqi government's limited capacity to deliver
services to its people weakens its legitimacy. Iraq's
ministries lack personnel who can formulate budgets and procure
goods and services.
Also, the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) have demonstrated
limited capacity to provide security without coalition support.
Now let me turn to the challenges the U.S. faces in
Afghanistan.
A lack of security in Afghanistan has put U.S.-funded
development projects at risk. Concerns over security have
delayed projects, increased cost, and, again, changed the scope
and nature of the projects. Building the National Security
Forces (ANSF) is central to the U.S. effort to establish
security, but progress there has been slow.
The drug trade in Afghanistan is a significant challenge to
security and has required a multifaceted U.S. counternarcotics
program. Profits from opium production help fund the Taliban
and other insurgent groups, and it contributes to the
government's instability. Recent decisions, however, by DOD to
change its rules of engagement in countering narcotics are a
positive move.
As one of the world's poorest countries, Afghanistan is
dependent on foreign aid now and for the foreseeable future.
Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS), established
with U.S. and international support, is significantly
underfunded and may not be viable given the current levels of
assistance. The Afghanistan Government's lack of capacity also
hinders the country's ability to meet its economic and
development goals. The ministries do not have the expertise to
maintain U.S. and other donor-financed infrastructure and
capital investments, nor can it deliver the essential services
to its people.
I would like to turn now to the need for effective
strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As the Administration defines its strategy in Iraq and
develops a new one for Afghanistan, it should consider the
characteristics of an effective national strategy. Both
strategies should clearly define the objectives for U.S.
efforts, identify and mitigate any risk, estimate future costs,
and coordinate all U.S. agency, international, and host-country
efforts. For example, the U.S. strategy in Iraq should identify
the security conditions that the United States expects to
achieve to ensure that troops can be withdrawn responsibly. The
strategy should also consider how the U.S. would respond if
these conditions are not achieved.
The new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan should estimate what
financial commitments the U.S. is willing to make to contribute
to the Afghan National Development Strategy goals. It should
also assess the risk to U.S.-funded investments if Afghanistan
does not obtain the resources or develop the technical capacity
to maintain them. And it should, importantly, address the
external risk of regional influences, such as Pakistan.
This concludes my statement. I would be glad to take any
questions that the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers can be
found in the Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
I know that all of you at some time have criticized efforts
in Iraq and Afghanistan for a lack of interagency planning for
reconstruction. Can you elaborate for us what you would like to
see in such planning? What agencies and actors should be
involved? And what, if any, reforms are needed to ensure for
this to happen? Maybe each of you can elaborate a little bit on
that.
Mr. Bowen. Yes, Mr. Ortiz, I will start. I think there does
need to be reform to promote improved interagency integration,
not just coordination, of contingency relief and reconstruction
operations.
The chief players are the Department of Defense, Department
of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Other agencies play important but less significant roles.
The key is to ensure that there is, before the balloon goes
up, so to speak, before we engage in a contingency, a well-
practiced, well-exercised, well-resourced, well-developed
strategy for managing a contingency however it may unfold. And
that has not been the case.
As Hard Lessons points out, the U.S. approach to
contingencies since World War II has been chiefly ad hoc, and,
indeed, Iraq was a sort of ad hocricy, inventing temporary
organizations, like the Coalition Provisional Authority, like
the Program Management Office, like the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office, none of which exists now but all of which
had charge of billions and billions of U.S. dollars and tried
to spend it as quickly as they could within the framework of
their existence. That is no way to run a contingency operation.
There have been attempts, steps forward, significant steps
forward, embodied first in NSPD-44 over three years ago that
identified the importance of a Civilian Reserve Corps, but
these solutions, to a certain extent, have been balkanizing
themselves. The problem is one of balkanization, but the
solutions haven't led to integration.
The DOD has moved forward with 3000.05, and Stability
Operations is a big part of DOD's work. CJ-9 is an
extraordinarily significant new creation. But over on the State
side, there is the Reconstruction, Stabilization, Civilian
Management Act, which was Title XVI of the NDAA last year,
which puts huge responsibility in the Department of State for
managing this same issue. They need to be integrated. And I
think that that requires significant legislative analysis and
new policy to bring the agencies responsible together.
Mr. Ortiz. Anybody else that would like to respond?
General Fields. I would just like to add to what Mr. Bowen
has said, first off, concurring with his commentary on the need
for the interagency community to coordinate with each other. We
find that in our early, not so much assessment, but
observations regarding Afghanistan, that this is an issue in
Afghanistan as well. But Afghanistan, we also feel, I will not
say is more complicated than Iraq, but there are some
uniquenesses associated with Afghanistan, particularly that
which involves the international community. So as, on the one
hand, we certainly support the need for interagency
coordination and cooperation; there is also the need for
international coordination and cooperation.
As this committee knows, the United States has invested
already $32 billion in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This
is in addition to an overall $56 billion that the international
community has invested in Afghanistan. The complications of
Afghanistan, the period of time within which we would like to
bring closure to this event, require the cooperation and
coordination within the international community. We would like
to see more of that.
And I would agree that, to the extent possible, before we
engage in such matters, we should have reasonable, long-term
agreement from the international community if they are to bring
their wherewithal to bear upon a contingency as complicated as
that we have undertaken in Afghanistan.
Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, General.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers, did you have a comment on this?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes, just one brief addition. I
concur with my colleagues' conclusions that there is a need for
a coordinated interagency plan to be articulated. We believe,
however, that some years ago, the National Security Council
(NSC) did establish an interagency management system for
planning and executing contingency operations under the Bush
Administration.
In November of 2007, GAO published a review looking at
national security reforms within the context of many
independent commissions' recommendations calling for massive
reorganization of government agencies and new structures to
support security operations overseas. And what we said was that
that national security system that had never been tested needed
to be tested in a real-world situation. It has not. It
certainly would have some value in looking at whether or not
that particular system, developed for contingency operations as
we are now facing, could be employed.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
After I call on Mr. McHugh, we are under the five-minute
rule. Mr. Ortiz asked the one question I wished to ask, so we
will go to Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by noting, in my opening statement, I was
remiss. I did not extend my admiration and appreciation to the
brave men and women that work for you good folks.
Inspector Bowen mentioned the loss of life, but while those
of us in this town perhaps too often think of these kinds of
activities as folks just strolling around with pencils and pads
and kind of creeping around corners and wearing green
eyeshades, this has been, in the Iraqi experience and Afghan
experience, at least in its early stages, a very dangerous
undertaking.
Mr. Bowen, you were in my office a few weeks ago, and you
specifically spoke of the casualties that were suffered in your
ranks. I wonder, just for the record, if you could give us
those figures here today.
Mr. Bowen. Yes, as I said a year ago yesterday, one of my
auditors, Paul Converse from Corvallis, Oregon, was killed in
his trailer when a rocket impacted next to it. In 2007, I had
five employees in Iraq wounded by hostile fire.
I am pleased to say that the move to the new embassy
compound is a move to a much more secure environment, and
coincident with that has come a very, very significant
reduction in the threats around the embassy. The last two
trips, I haven't heard any evidence of incoming fire.
Mr. McHugh. Well, let's hope that continues. But
nevertheless, your good folks are at risk many, many times. And
we deeply appreciate their service as well was the point of
this discussion.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. During the testimony we just heard, there was
mention on several occasions about the new Afghan strategy
that, as the chairman noted in his opening remarks, we would
expect to be released perhaps as early as this week. And Ms.
Williams-Bridgers, you mentioned as well that, in your
estimation, this new Afghan strategy ought to estimate the
financial commitments that the United States is willing to make
and understand those parameters going in.
Let me ask a broader question just for curiosity's sake.
Have any of your offices been consulted by the Administration
or the Pentagon as this new strategy has been developed? Has
there been any discussion that you are aware of to try to
integrate some of these lessons we have learned into the new
strategy?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Mr. McHugh, we have been asking to
see the strategy as it is being developed because we do believe
that, based on much of the work that we have done about what is
necessary to be included in a strategy and what we have
identified as shortcomings in our existing operations, that
could be used. We have not yet been provided any drafts of that
strategy.
What I would also say, though, is, in addition to a
national strategy that would reflect on the skills and the
expertise of the various agencies, what we would like to see is
that that strategy would be used as a basis for then developing
joint operational plans. That currently is absent. We have seen
no evidence of a plan that would articulate what the specific
roles and responsibilities and an integration of those roles
and responsibilities by the various agencies. We know that a
joint operational plan, as called for in military doctrine,
would provide a good foundation then for developing sector-
level plans, which each agency would then be responsible for.
So we think there is an order of business that needs to
occur in development of better thinking about how to best use
our resources, anticipate the cost, and plan for any mitigating
strategies should the overall goals articulated in the national
strategy not be achieved.
Mr. McHugh. I appreciate that.
General Fields, any opportunity for input from the SIGAR
side of the equation?
General Fields. Thank you, sir. In direct answer to your
question, we have not been specifically asked to advise on the
new strategy that is eventually going to be formally announced.
However, we have two reports that have been made available by
way of having posted them on our Web. In our most recent
report, and specifically in the letter that I prefaced a report
by, sent to the Congress, we did identify some issues that we
would hope that the Administration would take into
consideration as they structure this new strategy.
One is a resounding or an echoing theme each time I have
visited Afghanistan; one is the lack of participation by the
very country in the reconstruction effort that we are trying to
advance in the 21st century. The bottom line is the senior
leaders of Afghanistan essentially complained to me about the
fact that they are not being involved enough, or at least not
to the capability that they feel they have, in the
reconstruction effort, in the decision process, and so forth. I
would hope that this is a measure that the Administration would
take under consideration as it puts together this strategy.
More specifically, the government and the industries, if
you will, of Afghanistan, would like to partake more in the
contracting effort. This is something that I noted in Mr.
Bowen's Hard Lessons that this, too, was an issue in Iraq. And
it is one that we have yet to get completely correct as we
address matters in Afghanistan.
One of our missions, and in fact our principal mission, is
to conduct oversight. And we will look into matters like this
where, subsequent to the strategy, and even as we continue the
work that we have been carrying on for the past few months, we
will look into the extent to which there are opportunities for
greater participation, for example, by the government and
various entities of Afghanistan in their own reconstruction
effort.
Thank you.
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Bowen.
Mr. Bowen. Yes, Ranking Member McHugh. We did brief the
embassy staff on lessons learned from Iraq and how they apply
in Afghanistan, as well as President Obama's Deputy Chief of
Staff.
Mr. McHugh. Great, well, I would simply suggest, as both
the chairman and I mentioned in our opening comments, the main
objective here is not to continue making the mistakes of the
past. And to whatever extent you may or may not have been
consulted, I was honored to get a call this week from the
Secretary of Defense, and he assured me this would be a
consultative process.
So I would hope, Mr. Chairman, we could use some of the
findings of this hearing and our past hearings with respect to
SIGAR and SIGIR to help evolve the best policy forward so that
Afghanistan becomes something of a template, not for the next
series of mistakes but for the next series of successes.
So, again, to all three of you, thank you for your effort.
And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ortiz has an additional question.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. General Fields, in your testimony, you stated
that the future capabilities would be determined by the funding
received. Your office identified a $7.2 million shortfall for
the remainder of Fiscal Year 2009. What impact does the lack of
funds have on your organization?
General Fields. Thank you very much, sir.
First, we appreciate the support that the Congress has thus
far provided to SIGAR. We appreciate the oversight legislation
that we are mandated to carry out, and we are proceeding
accordingly.
The Congress has made available to us $16 million, which
did come late into the year and late into the authorization
that, in fact, stood up this organization called SIGAR. We have
been using that $16 million to build our organization. We
advanced to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) late last
summer, early fall, a work plan that would require $23 million
to build our organization to a staffing of 90 personnel, with a
principal slice thereof here in the United States, and a very
good slice in Afghanistan. And as I said before, this is an
important measure to have our staff located in the very
environment in which they will carry out much of this mandate.
So we are, yes, sir, short the $7.2 million that we need to
flush out our work organization to the 90, to conduct the
audits, inspections, and investigations that we need to
conduct, and to provide our staff at several locations in
Afghanistan, where the cost is considerably higher, to maintain
personnel, to pay them, to protect them, to move them, than
they are here in the United States.
So we would certainly, sir, appreciate any support that the
Congress might provide in helping us to obtain that additional
funding for this year and certainly in support of our 2010
budget that we are currently working with OMB and the
Department of State on at this time.
Mr. Ortiz. I would rather see that we put that money into
your budget because I think, by doing that, hopefully we will
be able to save money someplace else that might be misspent
somewhere else.
I was going to ask just one more question of Ms. Williams-
Bridgers. I know that your office has come up with some
recommendations from GAO to DOD for them to implement certain
suggestions. Have they done that?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. With regard to?
Mr. Ortiz. How to save money. Because this is one of the
biggest problems we have: no accountability. We have seen that
we still have not sent the 30,000 troops that are due in
Afghanistan. And we already see that some of the suggestions
that have been put before, we have not learned the lessons that
we were supposed to have learned in Iraq. And I am pretty sure
you gave some suggestions to Department of Defense.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes.
Mr. Ortiz. Are they following through with some of your
suggestions?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes, they are, in fact. And others
we have not seen as much progress. But let me give you some
examples of where we are seeing some progress.
One of the areas of highest risk of waste is in
contracting. My colleague, Stuart Bowen, has alluded to the
need for greater attention to contracting. Since 1992, GAO has
identified contract management and contract oversight as a
high-risk area. Billions of dollars have been spent over the
years in the contracting arena. And increasingly, as we move
toward a drawdown in Iraq, we will more than likely see an
increase in our reliance on contractors to perform the services
that DOD heretofore has provided.
In the past, we have cited specific concerns and made
recommendations to DOD to improve their overall contract
management capabilities, specifically by articulating and
providing it to their contract officers' guidance and policy on
how to management contracts, how to provide oversight, how to
ensure that there are appropriate numbers of people in the
field to oversight the activities that are undertaken by
contractors, to provide specifically guidance to battlefield
commanders on what their authorities are and their
responsibilities are for ensuring that contractors deliver the
activities in various field locations.
About three years ago, DOD began developing such guidance
to improve their contract management capabilities. They still
aren't where we believe they need to be. We are in the process
now of reviewing use of contractors and various controls that
DOD has since put in place. But we will continue to monitor
that very high-risk area.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you very much, ma'am.
The Chairman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am very proud and grateful today. At this
hearing, we have two persons of distinguished South Carolina
heritage, Inspector General Bowen and Major General Arnold
Fields. And I want you to know that General Fields is a role
model for me. He has been an inspiration to the young people of
the congressional district I represent. It would make you so
proud. Each year we have the Hampton Watermelon Festival. And
at the Watermelon Festival, the General comes in full dress
Marine uniform. Despite the heat, he looks so strac. And he
leads the singing of the Star-Spangled Banner. We could not
have the festival if the General were not there.
So thank you, all three of you, for being here today. I
want you to know what a distinguished pedigree we have with our
persons here today.
I also am really grateful for your service in helping
address problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. I visited Iraq nine
times; Afghanistan seven times. I have had two sons serve in
Iraq. My National Guard unit that I retired from served for a
year, the 218th Brigade, in Afghanistan. I am so grateful that
our service members have, I believe, successfully defeated the
terrorists overseas to protect American families at home.
General Fields, I read your testimony. And I would
particularly like to know your view of what the local Afghan
government officials, tribal leaders, what their opinion is of
reconstruction efforts.
General Fields. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much for the
kind words. And I hope to see you at the Watermelon Festival as
well.
Mr. Wilson. We can't have it unless you come, so----
General Fields. Well, Lord willing, and the creek doesn't
rise, I will be there. Thank you, also, for your leadership.
Sir, in my capacity as Special Inspector General, I have
just completed my third visit to Afghanistan, from which I
returned, actually, last Thursday. Each time I have gone to
Afghanistan, I speak and have spoken with senior leaders, or
leaders in general, at all levels, first, our own United States
leaders, our ambassador, our military commanders at the Four-
Star level, and otherwise. I also meet with the government of
Afghanistan at all levels, the ministerial level, the
provincial level.
Most recently, on the 17th of this month, we were
privileged to visit with President Karzai himself. We were very
pleased that he would receive us and openly discuss a whole
number of issues, one of which he presented himself, and that
is the one that is sensitive and of interest to all of us,
corruption.
I want to say that, in comparing lessons learned in
Afghanistan and Iraq, I want to put up front that there is a
common element among the lessons learned between Iraq and
Afghanistan. The people of Iraq wanted, and to some extent
still want, clean water, electricity, good roads, and a secure
environment within which to live. If you ask the same question
about needs to the Afghans, they will tell you the same thing.
And every province I have thus far visited, I have met with
either the governor of the province or the deputy governor of
the province and any of his staff that he may have assembled.
Inevitably, the top four to five issues about which they are
concerned, water, medical, education, agriculture, and that the
country is 80 percent agricultural, if you will. So there are
very many similarities between Iraq and Afghanistan in that
regard. And I presume that when I make my next trip to
Afghanistan in just a few weeks, I will hear the same request.
So they thank us for our contribution to Afghanistan, but
at the same time, they help us to focus on the issues that are
of greatest interest to them.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you very much for your service.
General Fields. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder, the gentleman from Arkansas.
Mr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have several questions. And if you all can err on the
side of brevity, then maybe I can get to more than one or two.
The first question I want to ask, Mr. Bowen, is to you.
With regard to the man that you lost a year ago, Paul Converse,
he was a civilian employee; is that correct?
Mr. Bowen. That is right.
Mr. Snyder. Are you satisfied, after the year has passed
now, that from the time of his death, that both he and his
family received the honors and support that they should have,
given that, it has clearly come out, we did a report on this
committee, that we have treated civilians differently than
military people. Are you satisfied with how he and his family
have been supported?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, I am. I went out and visited them for a
day, April 4, actually, last year and took a number of honors
to them then. And the State Department awarded Paul the Thomas
Jefferson Star posthumously, one of their highest civilian
awards. And he also received medals from the Defense
Department.
Mr. Snyder. And in terms of financial support for his
family, if we were to visit with his family, do you think they
are satisfied with how he was----
Mr. Bowen. He was not married. And I visited with his
parents, and I think they were satisfied with the support they
were given.
Mr. Snyder. Thank you.
General Fields, you and Mr. Ortiz had a discussion about
the inadequate funding. Are you in the mix for a supplemental
request from the administration that should be coming up here
in the next week or two or three?
General Fields. Thank you very much, sir. We have advanced
to the Office of Management and Budget a formal request for the
$7.2 million that we do need.
Mr. Snyder. Through the supplemental?
General Fields. Yes, sir.
Mr. Snyder. Thank you. We can watch for it.
Any time we, or the American people, hear the word
``auditor,'' we all get pretty apprehensive in terms of the
tedium. We have four written reports here: your book, Hard
Lessons Mr. Bowen, that you and your staff put out, and then we
have your report from SIGIR, the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction. This is a mandated report, correct?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir. It is our quarterly report.
Mr. Snyder. And then, General Fields, this is yours here,
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
And then, of course, we are all used to the reassuring blue
color of the GAO reports. I suspect none of the members here
have read everything that is in these reports, but I think you
all are talking about something that is key to the national
security of the country for the next couple, three decades,
which is how to--you describe it, Mr. Bowen, the core problem
is, how do we get at this issue of redevelopment?
At the end of this, on page 332 of your Hard Lessons book,
you say, ``An emerging lesson from Iraq is that when violence
is pervasive, soft programs like those orchestrated by USAID
and provincial reconstruction teams are especially important in
advancing U.S. goals.''
I note--and it may just have been in a summary statement,
the reason why it is not there--you don't mention the CERP
funds, the Commanders Emergency Reconstruction Program. While
there has probably been mission creep in the use of those
funds, I think most of us think that, for the most part, a lot
of that money was well spent. Do you agree with that, that that
is, in fact, probably should be considered more of a
counterinsurgency fund than a reconstruction fund? Or how do
the CERP funds fit into your overall evaluation?
Mr. Bowen. They play a very important role, and they raise
an important issue. First, they are covered in chapter 26, it
is, ``The rise of CERP.'' And I think that is a good way to
describe how CERP evolved. It was used, initially, seeds funds,
the money that troops found on the ground to do quick projects.
Then Congress began funding it in 2005 with its own
appropriation. And $3.5 billion later and five SIGIR audits
later, the story is that the program has achieved many
important goals in Iraq.
The challenges, as we have documented, are that, early on,
there weren't good controls in place. The training wasn't
there. Now ``Money As a Weapons System'' is standard reading
for every person, every commander deploying to Iraq. And the
training on contracting and the support for it within the
brigades is significant. The Department of Defense has taken
this on and I think has vastly improved what we initially
looked at.
The challenge, though, as you are implying, is, how does
that integrate in the contingency relief and reconstruction
environment with the expenditure by USAID and Department of
State of economic support funds, which accomplish similar small
projects? And I ran into it last November in Hillah, when the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) director said, I wish I
had known about this CERP project, a courthouse that was being
built that didn't get finished because the Iraqis are asking me
to finish it. And that was sort of an on-the-ground, eye-
opening revelation about the difficulties in different
departments managing different funding streams, pursuing
similar reconstruction goals. It is not so much a criticism of
CERP; it is another argument for the need for reforming the
U.S. approach to managing contingency operations.
Mr. Snyder. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Before I call on Mr. Wittman, Mr. Bowen, let me ask you, in
light of the fact that you had five of your folks injured a
year ago and that you just lost one just a week or so ago and
reflecting on your book, I think it is on page 331, you state
that security is necessary for large-scale reconstruction.
The Chairman. How do we judge when there is enough
security? Can you always afford to wait before what you think
is sufficient security before beginning reconstruction? Tell us
about this whole effort.
Mr. Bowen. It is an excellent point, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It is a bothersome one.
Mr. Bowen. You are absolutely right. It is not an
absolutist measure. The frank reality is that Copenhagen
Contractors (CPH) pushed forward an enormous infrastructure
program building large power plants and wanted to build five
$200 million water-treatment facilities as the countryside
exploded in a civil war.
Now, as was ultimately realized in 2007, an effective
counterinsurgency strategy scales its reconstruction plan to
fit the environment that it faces. Clear, hold, and build was
sort of a precursor, excuse me, to what sort of became the
counterinsurgency strategy. There wasn't enough of build in
2006 as part of that, and part of that was that the civil war
that was unfolding was really too much for any reconstruction
really to move forward.
So the challenge is that security is a prerequisite to the
success of long-term development and larger-scale
reconstruction, but as counterinsurgency doctrine explicates
that right alongside military power must come the projection of
soft power that is thoughtfully and strategically and
tactically targeted to the countryside and the difficulty
therein.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the panel.
Thank you so much for joining us today. We appreciate you
taking the time to coming and enlightening us about the issues
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers, just a question. The GAO studied the
efforts to build security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan
and has specifically pointed to a lack of mentors and equipment
in Afghanistan. I was wondering if you could enlighten us about
those shortages and give us a little bit of the details about
what those shortages would mean.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I would be glad to, Mr. Wittman.
Thank you very much for the question.
DOD has said they are critically short of the mentors and
trainers that they need to build the capacity of the Afghan
National Police (ANP) as well as the Afghan National Army
(ANA).
With regard to the Afghan National Army, they said that
they had about one-half of the mentors that they need in order
to effectively train the Army personnel.
And with regard to the police, DOD has reported that they
have about one-third of the number of trainers that they need
to effectively train the police.
That said, we have noted some progress in the overall
capacity-building efforts of both the police and the Afghan
National Army, but it is the police that the DOD reports as
being in critical need of additional attention, given that
about 34 units are now considered somewhat capable, either
fully capable or capable with coalition support of operating
there in Afghanistan.
With regard to the Afghan National Army, it is about 44
units.
This represents a discernible increase in the capabilities
of both of those security forces.
Mr. Wittman. You speak of that increased capacity and
capability. It still seems, though, to be lacking in some
areas. Can you tell us, how do you see that as affecting the
counterinsurgency fight there, and where do you think we would
need to be to be totally effective in our counterinsurgency
effort there?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I think it is totally critical to
the counterinsurgency efforts, and it speaks well of Mr. Bowen
about what level of security is good enough, and it also speaks
to what we have all alluded to earlier as the need for
strategic planning and operational planning that speaks to what
are the conditions that we expect to see in terms of the
capacity of the police to step forward so that we can then
begin this responsible withdrawal. I don't have the exact
number. That is something that we would like to see articulated
in a strategy. What are the conditions in terms of the level of
security that we expect to see? What are the conditions in
terms of the level of capacity that we would expect to see? And
if we cannot achieve either of those conditions, what, then, is
our next step; what then is our alternative strategy?
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
I want to ask all members of the panel, in the context of
that answer, what measures do you think Congress can take along
those lines of both the capacity and capability efforts there
and also the counterinsurgency efforts there? What efforts do
you think Congress would need to take to address those issues?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. May I begin quite directly? I think
the Congress needs to have strategic plans, clearly articulated
roles responsibilities. What are the conditions that you expect
to see? What are the metrics that are expected? What are the
cost requirements, and as importantly in the case of
Afghanistan, because we are the principal contributor to goals
that are established in the Afghan National Development
Strategy, goals which clearly prioritize infrastructure first,
security second and at a huge cost.
The goals in the outyears of what is identified in the
Afghan National Security Strategy anticipate an $18 billion
shortfall in the amount of available funding from all sources,
the international community, mostly foreign aid. We know that
Afghanistan doesn't have its own resources, and in the security
sector, it is a key area of the shortfall.
I don't have the number readily available, but I can
provide that to you, but security is one of those areas that is
going to suffer the greatest amount of revenue shortfall in
terms of achieving the goals that are clearly now established,
at least in the existing Afghan National Development Strategy.
But I want to add, we have not seen a U.S. strategy, the
complementary strategy, for what we anticipate doing, given
this national government strategy.
General Fields. Thank you, sir.
I concur with my colleague, and I would add that one of the
measures that the Congress can take, and, in fact, in my case,
and I will say our cases, you have taken, you have established
oversight entities that are independent, that report directly
to the Congress, and can advise by way of various mechanisms
those in senior positions capable of making pivotal decisions
when it comes to the reconstruction of any entity, in my
specific case Afghanistan.
I want to cite and add additionally to what Jackie has said
regarding what I believe to be the report surfacing on the
issue of weapons accountability and matters like that. I have
read that report, and we are looking into matters associated
with this particular issue, and I might add that the Department
of Defense inspector general is already looking into that
matter.
But I want to specifically say that we, first off, need to
be appropriately funded, and then where the gaps exist, then we
need to fill the gaps.
I noted in the GAO report that in terms of training, since
this is a fund that falls under my charge--in terms of
training, only 68 percent of the trainers, in reference to the
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), are available to
carry out their work. In addition to that, only 50 percent of
the mentors are available.
During my recent visit, having heard and read the report
regarding the weapons issue, I discussed this matter with the
senior leaders in Afghanistan, and they reiterated some of
these matters that may have contributed to what is believed to
be either unaccounted for or missing weapons at this point in
time.
Your oversight goal collectively, and, in my case,
Afghanistan, is to help uncover matters like this, report them
in a timely way to the Congress, and respectfully ask the
Congress to act accordingly. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Part of this is going to be personal testimony, but I will
start by saying I really appreciate what you are doing. It is
critically important to our ability as a Nation to deal with
issues like this in the future.
I have made some 15 trips to Afghanistan and Iraq. My first
was with Ike Skelton. He was then Ranking Member. He is now
Chairman. We were briefed by Bremer and Sanchez and their team
sitting across the table in the Green Zone, and I had decided,
as a new Member of Congress I was just going to pretty much
shut up and listen. And I pretty much stuck to that the first
two days of the trip until we were given a description of how
the $18.4 billion was going to be spent, and I couldn't resist
raising my hand and asking whether or not there was any
contingency for security issues. And the response--just to show
how naive we were, the response was, you cannot plan for that.
And my rejoinder was, you may not be able to plan for it, but
you can count on it. That is what is going to happen. You are
not going to be able to spend that money the way you proposed.
My impression is that we grossly underused and did not give
appropriate authority to the Corps of Engineers, and that we
would be far wiser, with regard to any large projects, to
forget about contractors for the most part and let the Corps
handle this directly. They are actually trained to deal with
security issues at the same time that they do construction.
And the CERP funds are terribly important to effective
counterinsurgencies. I am really pleased about that. I am
pleased there will be a institutionalization of that.
Vic Snyder and I had to send a letter to the Secretary,
when there was a gap in the CERP funds, and the commanders in
Iraq were crying for those CERP funds. It meant lives from
their perspective. Couldn't get it, but we had the $18.4
billion sitting over there that we couldn't spend because we
weren't competent to do that. So we had the money over there,
and we couldn't provide the CERP funds. We were really
incompetent.
I would like to talk about reconstruction teams in
Afghanistan. In my view, it should not be called
reconstruction. You should just get rid of that lingo here.
They should be provincial redevelopment teams, not
reconstruction teams. Reconstruction assumes there is something
there to start out with that needs reconstructing.
My first visit was in Christmas of 2003 with Pete
Schoomaker to Gardez. I was very impressed, thought this was
exactly the right thing to be doing.
Essentially they look the same now as they looked then; or
at least the last time I visited, they look the same now as
they looked then.
With hindsight, we obviously should have created a
university, if necessary funded a university, in the capital to
train Afghanis to do--Afghans to do what we have Americans
trying to do in these PRTs. It is less expensive, it is safer,
and it accomplishes the goal of showing some reasonable
presence by the Afghan Government instead of us being the face
of development.
So by calling them provincial development teams, I would
change the composition as rapidly as possible. By now there
should be very few Americans in those teams. After five or six
years, they should be almost entirely Afghan driven, and they
should be Afghan faces throughout the country, probably more of
them.
The challenge of Afghan First, you know, Iraq First, Afghan
First, is that the central government is corrupt and
incompetent. Where Iraq is concerned, they didn't have the
capacity, but, you know, there are some corruption issues. But
we didn't think it was major corruption problems. They just
didn't have the capacity to deal with large amounts of money
getting them out. So Afghanistan, no capacity, corruption, and
incompetence. Somehow we need to do that, but it needs to be an
Afghan face throughout the development of the country, and I
would like your comments about that.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. A comment. I think you are exactly
right, and you have hit a very key point here. These are two
very different environments, and our assumptions must be
different, given the environments that we are dealing with.
With Iraq you have an educated populace, and in Afghanistan
you have a 70 percent illiterate population.
Iraq is considered almost a middle-income country, $4,000
per capita, and Afghanistan substantially less than $500 per
capita to start with.
One of the key concerns expressed by DOD about the capacity
of the personnel that they are training is that they would not
be able to--this is the Afghan National Security Forces--would
not be able to exercise command, control; would not have the
capacity to perform the logistics; would not have the capacity
to perform the intelligence and data gathering.
Mr. Marshall. If I could interrupt, in my last visit I
found out that we have Afghan doctors who are serving as clerks
to U.S. Army units instead of being out there providing medical
services to the Afghan people. That is how skewed all of this
is.
And I am sorry I don't have more time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, a question on Iraqi reconstruction. I think
that there was a GAO report that came out last summer that at
that time, at least, talked about the surplus in the Iraqi
budget, and I think the question was raised, given our economic
situation and given theirs--and I know since that time,
obviously, there has been a decline in the price of oil, which
is the basis for the financing of their government--but, I
mean, at what point will the American taxpayer say enough is
enough?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. You are quite right. We did report
last summer and have updated our figures. It is captured in the
report that was just issued today. We estimate the Iraqi budget
surplus to be $47 billion. This reflects a somewhat--reduction
of the last estimate of up to $77 billion surplus that we
previously reported, and that is due to the declining oil
prices.
However, what this surplus largely represents is an
inability, a lack of capacity of the Iraqi Government to spend
and execute its budget. There is no doubt that the Iraqi
Government has the resources to cover what they anticipate this
fiscal year to be deficit spending. We believe that even with
their projected deficit that they anticipate incurring, that
they can more than cover it with the surplus that we have.
The Congress has even recently recognized the need to
increase the incentives to the Iraqi Government to spend more
of their money. This was realized in legislation that the
Congress enacted last year calling for the Iraqis to match
dollar for dollar their spending to U.S. spending under the
economic support funds.
We are concerned, sir, that the Department of State, who is
charged with reporting to the Congress on the Iraqis attendant
to this requirement for dollar-for-dollar matching, that the
State Department is merely looking at Iraq's reflection in
their budget of their commitment to spend, but is not actually
tracking their expenditures in this dollar-for-dollar matching
program, in this incentives-management program. So we think
this is an area that Congress needs to pay particularly close
attention to in order to achieve the kind of cost-sharing
arrangement that the Congress intended.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
To the other Members, and if you could address how critical
is--when I served in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 with the United
States Marine Corps, at this point in time how critical are the
reconstruction dollars to moving the political process forward
in Iraq?
Mr. Bowen. The era of spending U.S. dollars for significant
reconstruction is past. There is about $5 billion to put under
contract of the roughly $50 billion. Most of that is Iraq
Security Forces Fund (ISFF) money, and most of that is being
used to train, equip, provide logistics to the Iraqi Army and
the Iraqi Police.
CERP still does some significant reconstruction work, but
most of it, a vast majority of the reconstruction money, has
been spent. The burden is on the Iraqis now. So the issue is
the cost-sharing requirement, and we have an audit coming out
in the next month that will provide you insight and analysis on
the success and failures of that cost-sharing process. Again,
it is a challenge, an integration; it is a challenge in
interpretation of the statutes. It is a challenge to getting
Iraqis to seriously shoulder their long-term development and
the burden of their own nation.
General Fields. Thank you, sir.
Let me comment on the issue of capacity. Iraq and
Afghanistan are on different ends of the spectrum when it comes
to capacity. There are limited resources in Afghanistan. There
is no oil or any material such as that to help support the
economy of Afghanistan, so there is no surplus. The
international community is largely financing the reconstruction
of Afghanistan and other elements of its development at this
point in its history.
We do need to build a capacity, however, and in so
contributing, we need to involve the Afghans more in the
process. And I would add that in reference to the previously
asked question or comment regarding the participation or the
level there of Afghans in the PRT, I could only agree with
that.
At the same time, I would also encourage the contribution
that the Congress has made to CERP as an expedient mechanism
that the Commander can use to contribute to the overall
reconstruction efforts.
In my most recent visit to Afghanistan, I visited two PRTs,
and I have previously visited Gardez, in fact; but most
recently, a PRT in Kunar Province, Asadabad, and the PRT up in
the Panjshir Valley. Both are well-led PRTs, both lack the
participation of the Afghans in the process, and both shared
with me the significance of CERP.
But I want to make a key point to this committee that the
PRTs' commanders--both of them are U.S. commanders--tell me
that we have essentially, through process and bureaucracy,
taken the ``E'' out of ``CERP'', the emergency aspect of it,
such that it takes too long to work the process to get the
money down to the level at which it might be executed, which is
the PRTs, and CERP is a principal funding mechanism for the
PRTs.
So I am asking that there be consideration for relief,
whatever might be offered in that regard, to streamline the
process by which CERP arrives at the commander for execution.
The Chairman. Mr. Bowen.
Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Our committee has authorized some $40 billion
for reconstruction in Iraq. In your professional opinion, based
upon your review and investigation, how much or what percentage
of that has been wasted?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I remember we had this
discussion previously, and I said I would come back to you, and
that time is now, with respect to the waste.
The Iraq Relief Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), as you know,
has been the primary vehicle for spending on reconstruction,
and we have had oversight of that fund for four years, full
oversight. And my estimate, based on 135 audits that we have
conducted and 135 inspections, is about 15 to 20 percent of the
funds, or $3 to $5 billion, was wasted.
And I told you I was visiting with a contractor yesterday
who was talking to me about this issue, waste in Iraq, and he
echoed exactly what we have been saying in our reports, and
that is that the United States chose the wrong contracting
vehicle to carry out this mission.
You remember in April of 2004, we let 12 $500 million
reconstruction contracts, cost plus. I called them open
checkbook, I think, at the hearing two years ago because cost
plus covers everything. Your subcontractor messes up, that is
okay. We pay for it. Your second subcontractor messes up, okay,
we pay for it.
The Khan Bani Saad prison, 40 minutes north of Baghdad, $40
million down the tubes, no prisoner will ever be housed there,
and what are the consequences? Are we going to be able to hold
persons for that? No. Why? Because of the selection of this
vehicle for carrying out reconstruction in a war zone.
Cost-plus contracts, I think, is a huge lesson learned from
Iraq, and they need to be reformed. The National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) took some important steps to reining
in contractor abuses last year, this committee did, but more
needs to be done, and frankly, the $3 to $4 to $5 billion that
is lost, and I am speaking conservatively, was lost because
chiefly, one, we chose the wrong vehicle for the wrong
environment, and contractors took advantage of it.
The Chairman. Your testimony is that the 15 to 20 percent
of the $48 billion has been wasted as a result of the reasons
you just gave?
Mr. Bowen. Excuse me, of the $21 billion in the Iraq Relief
Reconstruction Fund. The other large fund, $18 billion in the
Iraq Security Forces Fund, is a different animal. We just had
oversight of that for a year.
The Chairman. Then let us go back.
Mr. Bowen. Yes.
The Chairman. Fifteen to twenty percent of what fund?
Mr. Bowen. Of the Iraq Relief Reconstruction Fund.
The Chairman. And how much was that?
Mr. Bowen. Twenty-one billion.
The Chairman. So 15 to 20 percent of the $21 billion, as
opposed to the $48- figure I gave you; is that correct?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir
The Chairman. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bowen, I would like to talk a little bit more about
contractors and some of the what you call lessons we have
learned or didn't know at the time. Are you being a little soft
by saying these are lessons? Is this something that should have
been pretty obvious at the outset?
Mr. Bowen. Well, as I have briefed, Ms. Shea-Porter, over
in Iraq just three weeks ago when I was there, these are
lessons, but I opened my briefing with some of them, and they
are self-evident. They really should be axioms.
It is not difficult, I think, to understand that you need a
secure environment to carry out large-scale reconstruction, but
a large-scale reconstruction plan continued to move forward in
the context of an exploding insurgency.
It wasn't until Ambassador Negroponte got on the ground,
looked at the situation, looked at the investment, and saw huge
discontinuity between the two that he put the brakes on it.
Unfortunately, he put the brakes figuratively. The meter was
still running on each of those contracts. And as our audits
pointed out, the overhead cost the taxpayers hundreds of
millions of dollars in waste.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I wanted to talk about those taxpayers.
People in New Hampshire say to me, where are the indictments?
Who is looking, and is there ever going to be anybody who has
to pay for this? And so I am asking you is there ever going to
be anybody who has to pay for what has been done to the
American taxpayer?
Mr. Bowen. To date we have achieved 15 indictments from our
investigation. We have 77 open cases. Another five indictments
will be coming down from--based on our arrests. I have
increased my investigator staff over the last year by 40
percent to address exactly this issue.
For whatever reason, whistleblowers have been more
forthcoming over the last year. Our caseload has increased just
in the last 4 months from 52 cases to 77, and that is
reflective, I think, of perhaps people feeling more safe in
Iraq to talk to us, and also because of our more robust results
on the investigative side.
So, yes, I am committed to making 2009 the year of success
in SIGIR investigations.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Is there anything we can do for you to
make that possible? The American public wants accountability.
We want accountability, and I think we also want to make sure
that it is not just a lesson learned because they think that
people in charge understood those lessons quite well. I think
there has to be some way to rebuild the confidence of the
American public as we go forward and do our work in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Bowen. I think there are important steps to take in
light of what Hard Lessons teaches, and it is what I said in my
opening statement. The United States does not have a coherent,
well-developed policy for managing contingency relief and
reconstruction operations. I think that is an issue for the
committee to take on.
It is not just DOD, it is not just State, it is a continuum
of operations that moves from conflict to development in a
contingency. The reality is we ad hoc'd it, and we have ad
hoc'd it for decades in this area, critical area, protecting
U.S. interests abroad.
We know who protects our interests abroad preconflict, the
State Department settled; conflict, DOD settled. They both do a
great job. Contingency operations, it is not clear, and it is
ad hoc in each case.
So I think that there are several solutions. Let me just
list them real quick. One would be to create a sort of Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/United States Trade
Representative (USTR)-type contingency operation office within
EOP, the Executive Office of the President, where the Director
of Contingency Operations would regularly prepare, develop the
Civilian Reserve Corps, develop the Information Technology (IT)
systems, develop the contracts, develop the personnel process,
so that you are ready. Or put either--as the NDAA presumed to
do in the Reconstruction Stabilization Civilian Management Act
last October, put the State Department in charge. But DOD needs
to be integrated. Or, as DOD is already moving well down the
road in 3000.05, Stability Ops takes the lead.
But the key is achieving integration and preparation and
doctrine beforehand so that it doesn't get invented in offices
like the Program Management Office no one had ever heard of.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO), Project and Contracting Office (PCO),
all of these, this alphabet soup of agencies that are gone, but
had charge. And it is difficult to hold them responsible, hold
them accountable. They don't exist anymore.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. And I have one other question,
if any of you would like to answer this.
When I went to Iraq last time, we were using contractors to
guard the bases. And some of the contractors in this particular
group were from the continent of Africa, and I didn't even
think that they even understood English, never mind understood
what I thought they needed to know in order to properly defend
our troops there.
Is there a risk, an inherent risk, of having people besides
Iraqis or U.S. soldiers defending and protecting our bases, and
have you looked at any of those contracts?
Mr. Bowen. I think there is a risk, and you are right. The
Peruvian guards that worked for Triple Canopy that guarded the
palace didn't speak English. I experienced that personally.
I was walking out of the palace in August of 2007, very hot
day. The alarm ran off. I jumped in the bunker with several
Peruvian guards, and we weren't able to communicate about what
was going on.
The reality is that is part of how the contracting works.
They find the least expensive subcontractor. And that was an
issue that was raised by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who
I talked to yesterday is look down at the subcontractor level,
that we hired a bunch of contracting entities that made a lot
of money as they subcontracted at a much lower rate.
And so I think there is--we continue to do security
contract reviews, and we have several that are coming out this
quarter under the 842 plan.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While it is at once frustrating to be so late in the
question and answer (Q&A) session, while at the same time I
learn a lot from my colleagues from the panel, so it is a good
position to be in many ways.
The first question to Mr. Bowen. Do you think it is
possible that the only way we can get beyond sort of an ad hoc
approach to all of this is for us as a country to accept the
fact that we may, in fact, have to engage in nation-building?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Loebsack, that is a great point. It raises
the issue, the--managing contingency relief and reconstruction
operations, how we do it falls within a spectrum. At one end is
no nation-building whatever. At the other end is colonialism.
These are impossible options.
The place where the United States should find itself is
here in the center of this continuum, in a suitable,
appropriately funded, well-structured, developed doctrine for
executing contingency relief and reconstruction operations.
Where you achieve unity of command, that is the core issue in,
I think, in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are a number of commanders who control different pots
of money, and frequently the color of that money and who the
departmental reporting officials are shape this strategy rather
than an overarching strategy where one person is in charge so
that you achieve unity of purpose. So that the answer is the
history of the last 40 years show that we are going to engage
in contingency operations, call it some form of nation-
building. It is not out at this end of the spectrum, but we
have to prepare, as we were a little bit close to this side in
2003.
Mr. Loebsack. I really want to thank all three of you for
your wonderful testimony, and many of my colleagues have raised
really wonderful points prior to my asking you some questions.
Certainly the whole idea of interagency coordination and
cooperation is one that is so frustrating for, I think, all of
us, for sitting here and looking back on what happened in Iraq
and what may be happening in Afghanistan as well.
And I want to thank you, Ms. Williams-Bridgers, because I
was going to ask, well, who is really responsible for that? You
brought up the National Security Council (NSC), and that is
sort of the logical place for this. I hope that the current NSC
is, in fact, taking into account not only your study, but some
of your recommendations as well.
I want to thank Mr. McHugh, then, for raising the point,
too, as to whether this Administration has consulted with any
of you or not.
If we are going to have the most rational foreign policy we
possibly can, we have to learn from our mistakes. There is
absolutely no way around it.
I do have one question. I guess it is for General Fields
and for Ms. Williams-Bridgers, related to Afghanistan. There is
a Washington Times article published this morning, and it
states that at one point road projects accounted for 70 percent
of Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP) funding,
exceeding the capacity of the Army Corps of Engineers, and
leading to an 18-month backlog at the same time the Afghan
Health Minister was allegedly told there were no funds
available for urgent humanitarian needs.
This also goes to the issue of soft power that you have
mentioned that I think we all agree has to be an integral part
of whatever strategy we adopt with respect to Afghanistan.
Major General Fields, is SIGAR looking into who authorized
the use of such a high percentage of CERP funds for road
construction at this point?
General Fields. Thank you, sir. We have several audits
ongoing as we speak. And, in fact, I made the decision several
months ago, well in advance of the article of which you speak
and about which I am aware, to look into CERP. In my frequent
dialogue with the Congress overall, we receive occasional
vectors of interest to the Congress, and one of those has been
the issue of CERP.
So we have been planning for some time to look into CERP,
and we are in the midst of that as we speak, and I am not at
this point in time prepared to arrive at conclusions or
findings upon which any decisions can be made, certainly.
Mr. Loebsack. Can we go back to an original question that
was asked of you as to whether your budget--how much did you
say you requested from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)?
General Fields. Sir, for this year, fiscal year 2009, we
actually requested $23.2 million.
Mr. Loebsack. Was any of that accepted at this point by
OMB?
General Fields. Sir, we have in our bank, if you will, at
this point $16 million, and we have been spending that since
about October of last year. And that amount of money is now
down to at or about $11 million, and we still have the rest of
the year to go. And without the $7.2 additional to flesh us out
to that $23.2-, we will not be able to bring aboard the robust
staff that is commensurate with the robust mandate that the
Congress has imposed upon us.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you. I hope it is included on the
budget, then. Thank you very much.
Thanks to all of you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Susan Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of
you.
I wanted to follow up with the discussion of the extent to
which we put the Iraqi face, the Afghani face engaged
wholeheartedly in this effort. And I wanted to just talk about
the faces of women for a second. And I am wondering to what
extent you believe that there has been a conscious, a
significant effort to engage women in this redevelopment,
reconstruction, in the community.
And one of the issues I just want to point to quickly is I
think today's Washington Post, a representative from Mercy
Corps, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) with programs in
Afghanistan, suggested that those lines between United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State
Department have been so blurred.
And the question really is--I would like to talk about been
the faces of women and their involvement--but to what extent we
have had success, depending on whether it is a U.S. agency that
has been involved or the military in some of these programs;
what difference does it make in terms of the response, the
public opinion that is generated in this area, and to what
extent do you think women's voices have been ignored and/or
really engaged in this effort?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I will start. Unfortunately, none of
our work has focused specifically on the attention that is
given to women as part of our overall strategy. I do know in
the Afghan development strategy, for example, there is specific
reference to a goal, desire, to enhance the educational
achievements of women and incorporation of women into society,
but I have not looked at that specifically. Our work has not
spoken to that issue specifically. However, we do know that
generally when you look at investments in developing countries,
that investment in women is often a pivotal investment focus
for returns on economic growth and economic development in
countries.
So certainly it is an important issue, but one that we just
have not done any work to specifically address.
Mrs. Davis. Mr. Bowen.
Mr. Bowen. Yes. Ms. Davis, page 46 of our quarterly report
talks about the Daughters of Iraq program that has incorporated
women into the security programs, sort of a parallel to the
Sons of Iraq.
Also the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I)
chief, the major contracting arm for the Department of Defense,
has, through its Iraqi First program, gives preference to
women-owned businesses. So there are--those are two substantive
initiatives.
As a general matter, USAID's programs have reached out to
the women's community across Iraq for a number of years and
continues to develop at the grassroots level, using an Iraqi
face.
Chapter 26 in Hard Lessons really underscores that story,
how USAID, through its partner organizations, developed this
Iraqi face through its programs to both address the security
problem, but also to make the outreach more effective.
Mrs. Davis. What I would hope, perhaps, as we continue to
look at these issues and really to understand the role that the
grassroots is playing, is that we would be asking specifically
those questions with data to back that up in terms of
leadership, in terms of responsibility that is given in those
communities, because I think the women that we have had an
opportunity to speak with--and several of us will be trying to
focus on that specifically in Afghanistan--is that they haven't
necessarily been at the table, and we know that in terms of
building that civil society, it is really critical.
So I think if we have that as an accountability measure,
and we ask the question, how many are around the table, then I
think it begins to filter through. We know the capability is
there, that is not the issue, but it is whether or not they are
really asked and whether or not anybody thinks it is important.
I would hope that we could do that.
And just to follow up on that second question, it doesn't
matter who is doing the redevelopment, reconstruction project
in terms of public opinion, whether or not it is, you know,
pseudomilitary versus civilian. What do we know about that?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, it does matter. And, indeed, many
reconstruction projects around Iraq, they are purposefully
given through subcontracting an Iraqi face. A U.S.-funded
project, frankly, there is no evidence on the face of the
project that the source of funds is the U.S., and that is
purposefully done for security reasons.
The Chairman. Mr. Kissell. We have votes scheduled very
shortly. As I understand, we have Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Massa
after Mr. Kissell, and I believe everyone will have had a
chance to do the first round.
If there is an opportunity for the second round, if there
is time for it, fine. But probably not.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I sit here-- and
thank you all for your testimony. And I am going to probably
say a few things that are on my mind before I ask my question.
I read a book recently, and it was about a gentleman whose
life had not gone real well, and he made the statement that
history can repeat itself, but you have to try real hard to
make the same mistakes over and over again.
As I listened to the testimony today, I couldn't help but
to go back to that statement I hear about that we didn't build
the things that they wanted in Iraq, we are not building the
things they want in Afghanistan. We have spent $32 billion in
reconstruction in Afghanistan, but, as Mr. Marshall pointed
out, reconstruction from what? We really don't have anything to
show there.
We hear that we don't really have the procedures in place,
the accountability in place. It looks like we are repeating
history by making these same mistakes.
And one of the first things I went to, as being a new
Congressman, we were, as rookie Congressmen, challenged by a
general that had been in Iraq, would we have the courage to
stand up as Congressmen and address the tough issues of the
day? And I asked the general, I said--because it seems like we
have had a history of people that were associated firsthand
with the problems that we are talking about today who did not
discuss those problems until they were out of the position they
were in, then came back to us and said, oh, listen to the
problems we had. And I asked the general, were the people
firsthand, and knowledge of what is taking place, forthcoming
to us in a way that we could understand and deal with the
issues, and he said, no.
So my question to each of you, as we look towards trying
not to make the same errors again in Afghanistan that we know
we made in Iraq, do you all feel that you have the authority,
responsibility, obligation to present information to us--I
think you can tell the atmosphere here is very receiving--so
that we can see when things are not going right and have a
chance to do something about it before it becomes so far in our
rear-view mirror, we say how did that happen?
Mr. Bowen. Mr. Kissell, that is exactly the philosophy
behind my organization that has driven my auditing, trying to
do real-time audit, so to speak, so that the managers on the
ground know what is going on, and they can adjust course and
improve it.
But there are two issues you raised. One is strategic
solutions and tactical solutions. The strategic solution is
that we need to reform our government's approach to contingency
operations. That is going to take some time because it is
introducing a new framework for preparing. But there are
tactical solutions, lessons learned in Iraq that should become
lessons applied in Afghanistan, that could make a difference
and save taxpayer dollars and promote the success of our
mission.
One is develop new wartime contracting rules, rules that
are more effective, that are designed to execute rapidly on the
ground, and something that we have talked about in our reports
for a number of years.
Two is to take advantage of the civilians who have achieved
experience in Iraq through provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs) and others, and bring that expertise and understanding
to bear on the ground in Afghanistan.
Three is to take the tactical lesson from Iraq to build to
scale to what the capacity of the country is. That is not what
is happening in Iraq. It is not what has been happening in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan is much, much lower abilities, much
lower absorptive capacity for investment.
Any investment has to be aimed at their absorptive
capacity. We build above that, you lose it because they can't
sustain it. And we are going to have an audit coming out in a
month on asset transfer that underscores the real waste that
occurs when you build beyond capacity, that the assets don't
transfer, that they don't make a long-term difference.
So strategic solutions, tactical solutions, I think those
are both areas for the committee to grapple with and engage and
implement resolutions. The big one is how to manage these for
posterity.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Mr. Kissell, I would say, yes, we do
have the responsibility. We do understand our obligation to
report on what we have learned that has worked, as well as what
we have not. These hearings provide an excellent forum for us
to do that.
With the new Administration we reached out to provide them
the information based on what we have learned, and not the
outstanding recommendations that have never been addressed in
our mind and fully implemented. But I think we need to continue
to have the support of Congress to get the access to the
documents that allow us to render judgments of what works and
what does not.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
In contrast to your comment, Mr. Kissell, about history
repeating itself, my fellow Missourian Mark Twain once said,
history doesn't repeat itself, but it sure rhymes a lot.
We have two more, and we should break. I think we can get
them both in before we go vote, Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Massa.
Mr. Ellsworth.
Mr. Ellsworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here today. This is of great interest to me.
I have heard our distinguished Chairman refer to himself as
a simple country lawyer many times, and as a simple county
sheriff in a previous life, this is very disturbing to me.
There is a young man in the fourth row, blue shirt,
glasses. Sir, would you hold the book up you carried in?
Flimflam is the title. And I get the distinct impression we are
getting a lot of flimflam, not from you all, but from what is
going on over there. Doesn't matter how many times I have been
to Iraq and Afghanistan. I keep getting this report from people
about what is going on there.
I guess my question is that, you know, what are the things
that we are doing that they don't want? Who has the authority
to pull the plug and say, these things are going so wrong, why
doesn't somebody pull the plug, and we write those policies and
write those procedures. Instead of going and continuing the bad
behavior while--and keep spending the billions of dollars,
let's do food, water, medicine, and shelter, and then write the
policy, and then come back and do it.
Those are the things they need. That is what your polls
have showed. They want water, they want food. If we are
building roads, it is like buying a bunch of new Sony TVs and
nobody having cable or an antenna and not getting anything.
So why don't we do the things we need? Who has got that
authority, and why aren't we beating on somebody's desk to say,
pull the plug and let's step back a little bit and just do the
things we need? And that would be my first question.
Mr. Bowen. Well, Mr. Ellsworth, I would just say in Iraq
that lesson has been learned. The failure I was speaking to was
the failure of the original plan that built beyond
expectations. I think, though, that it is still applicable in
Afghanistan. And the key is to build not to just what they
want, but also what they can do to their capacity. For example,
the Fallujah wastewater treatment plant that I visited last
August, what they wanted was something that ultimately is
proving a little bit beyond their capacity.
So it is a balancing act. It is a tough issue.
But the reality is that we are contracting chiefly with
Iraqi firms now, and we are choosing projects chiefly by
working through the Provincial Reconstruction Development
Councils and the PRTs, and that means that the selection of
projects today is wiser. Unfortunately, it is also when the
money has run out.
Mr. Ellsworth. But, you know, we talked about the waste,
that I think it was $70-something million for the prison
because it essentially fell apart because of water and that.
And we built that prison, but it is my understanding, correct
me if I am wrong, that the police forces weren't built up. The
jails, the court system--we didn't have lawyers, judges,
anything. Other legs of the stool didn't exist. So we build
this prison out there somewhere, and there was not rule of law
or a way to put people in prison.
Mr. Bowen. That is right.
Mr. Ellsworth. Who thinks of that? What common sense--that
is not Missouri or Indiana common sense. I said, the flimflam.
Mr. Bowen. The Khan Bani Saad is a poster child for bad
project management, all of these issues we are talking about.
The Iraqis, when it finally came to turn it over to them, the
Deputy Minister of Justice said, no, we are not going to take
it. It is not finished. We don't want it, we never wanted it.
And they refer to in Diyala Province as ``the whale.''
Mr. Ellsworth. General Fields, you said some of the Afghans
want to partake in more of the process, and they should. I want
to be assured that they want to partake in the process of what
they need and not just in the profits and the corruption. I
know the corruption is pervasive. Every time I have gone over
there, they have told me that.
They need to partake in the process of what they need to
run it, but we just can't keep throwing these billions of
dollars of good money after bad. On your next trip I would love
to go with you. I don't know when you are headed out, but if it
is on a break, I would love to, and continue this kind of talk
with the folks over there, and build some common sense back
into this system that represents all of our districts.
And I will--if you got a comment, I will wind up my
questions.
General Fields. Sir, we welcome you and your staff to
travel with us. We, at least I personally, make at least
quarterly visits to Afghanistan, and that frequency may
increase as we get more deeply into our work.
In reference to the involvement of the Afghans in
reconstructing their country, I have seen work executed by
contractors solely of Afghanistan, and the quality of the work
has been good. I can cite a provincial police facility in
Helmand Province that I visited during January. In fact, it is
the only picture that I elected to put in our January report to
the Congress because it is profound; not the picture per se,
but the fact that there is capability, capacity in Afghanistan.
We, in our early observations, feel that there is more of this
capacity there than we have otherwise encouraged to participate
in the reconstruction effort.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Massa.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
hard work you are doing in representing so many people who
report to you, often in dangerous conditions.
We have had several very informative, strategic questions.
I would like to shift and just ask a very, very specific and
perhaps impassioned plea, and I will be brief.
From firsthand experience I know that dealing with large
numbers of contractors, hundreds of millions if not more
dollars of government-furnished equipment, often very durable
communication equipment and other items, have been delivered to
these the contractors and deployed in the field in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. I know from firsthand experience that
equipment is largely, at this point, undocumented and
potentially lost in the field.
As we shift focus in Iraq and redeploy our forces, I would,
with the strongest possible recommendation, ask that you would
consider deploying a very small number of personnel to do
whatever possible to find, document, either write off or
recover as much of this government-furnished equipment as
possible and return it to the United States, where people in my
district, like firefighters and emergency medical technicians
and others, could put this equipment to incredibly important
use in a very, very harsh economic time in our country.
So please take that for the record. I would be very
appreciative if you could get back to me, this committee, or
any responsible party with anything you might do to be able to
recapture--and it may be a small fraction--maybe tens of
millions, but I know you all know $1 million is still a lot of
money, especially back where I come from.
Again, thank you for your service, and thank you for your
patience to my long question.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman very much. We certainly
appreciate your excellent testimony, your appearance here
today. It has been very informative, and we wish you continued
success in your hard work as you perform your duties and advise
us. Thank you very, very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 25, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 25, 2009
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