[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-73]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE CLOSURE,
FACILITIES OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 3, 2009
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READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii ROB BISHOP, Utah
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GLENN NYE, Virginia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Tom Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Megan Putnam, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, June 3, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for Military Construction,
Family Housing, Base Closure, Facilities Operation and
Maintenance.................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, June 3, 2009.......................................... 33
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2009
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE CLOSURE, FACILITIES
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Readiness Subcommittee................................. 3
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Readiness Subcommittee......................................... 1
WITNESSES
Arny, Wayne, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and
Environment.................................................... 4
Calcara, Joseph F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army,
Installations and Housing...................................... 7
Ferguson, Kathleen I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force, Installations........................................... 9
Penn, Hon. B.J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations
and Environment................................................ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Arny, Wayne.................................................. 40
Calcara, Joseph F............................................ 79
Ferguson, Kathleen........................................... 121
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 39
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P........................................ 37
Penn, Hon. B.J............................................... 96
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted for the record.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 143
Mr. Kissell.................................................. 144
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 156
Mr. Franks................................................... 157
Mr. Ortiz.................................................... 147
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE CLOSURE, FACILITIES
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 3, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Ortiz. This hearing will come to order, but before we
do that I talked to some members, and I thought that it would
be appropriate to have a moment of silence for those that
perished in that French flight from Brazil going to Paris.
And if we could just take a moment of silent prayer
honoring those and remembering those who perished, there was a
couple, an American couple who were on that flight. If we just
take a moment of silence.
[Moment of silence.]
I thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before
this subcommittee today. Today the Readiness Subcommittee will
hear about our military construction and Base Closure and
Realignment (BRAC) programs. In general, I am pleased with the
budget request this year.
I think they have done a good job of advancing a number of
important initiatives including fully funding the BRAC 2005
process and providing the infrastructure to support our growing
force and re-capitalizing on an aging infrastructure.
However, I am also concerned about the trends that I see
within the Department of Defense. First of all, in the BRAC
2005 process I am disturbed about the apparent cost escalation
over the past few years. Since the Department submitted the
first budget request to implement the findings of BRAC 2005
commission, the cost to implement this program have almost
doubled to $34 billion.
While a variety of reasons have been attributed to this
growth, I believe the assumptions underlying the 2005 BRAC
recommendations were flawed. The department has indicated that
its analysis of the BRAC recommendation were based on
consistent planning assumptions.
Unfortunately, those planning assumptions were completely
inadequate. This type of bad cost data leads us to make bad
decisions. I am also concerned about whether we can meet the
statutory completion date of September 2011. I am concerned
that the shortcuts may be taken and money may be wasted in an
attempt to meet the deadline.
It is important that the department take a critical look at
this program and review the implementation timelines to ensure
that government waste is eliminated and artificial acceleration
initiatives are avoided.
We owe the men and women of our Armed Services and the
taxpayers of this Nation the very best BRAC implementation plan
that smoothly relocates forces in strict compliance with the
BRAC decisions.
On another subject, I wanted to discuss strategic
realignment of United States forces in the Pacific. The most
pressing issue relates to Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam. In
Guam alone we are expecting more than $10 billion in
construction in the next few years. It is important to note
that Guam is not the only expanding location.
Included in this realignment is the expansion of forces to
the Futenma replacement facility at Camp Schwab in Okinawa. I
believe it is important to get both of these decisions right
and to make sure our long-term relation with our Pacific
partners remain vibrant and viable for the foreseeable future.
Let me turn our attention to another equally important
subject, the basing of aviation assets. I understand the
department is facing a number of basing decisions this year.
The most expansive involves the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The
Air Force alone is to determine the location of four
operational JSF bases and one additional pilot training center.
The problem is that the Joint Strike Fighter is much louder
than the F-15, F-16 and F-18 aircraft. In the basing of future
aviation assets the department is to take great caution in
balancing the needs of the armed forces with the competing
requirements of expanded local communities.
A long-term outlook needs to be taken into account to
ensure that the Nation has a viable, unencumbered aviation
infrastructure that fully supports the missions of the armed
forces.
Finally, I remain concerned about the continued
underfunding of the sustainment of our military infrastructure.
Funding only 90 percent of the Navy's requirement is short-
sighted and only raises costs over the long term.
This chronic underfunding for infrastructure will remain a
critical issue of interest for this subcommittee. We can do
better, and I look forward to working with the department to
making this a reality. Gentlemen, I think that we have a lot to
discuss today and I look forward to hearing you address these
important issues.
The chair recognizes my good friend, the distinguished
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks he would
like to make.
Mr. Forbes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just, again,
appreciate your leadership in holding this hearing. And I also
want to thank the witnesses and appreciate each of them being
here today to discuss building and maintaining the best
possible facilities for our troops, whether at home or deployed
and their families.
And I want to just pause a moment and sincerely thank you
for what you have done. You have made some enormous strides and
oftentimes we are so focused in the limited amounts of time
that we have on where we are going tomorrow that we really
don't step back and just say how much we appreciate what you
have done and how you have gotten us to this point.
So I want to make sure I am thanking you for that, but then
Mr. Chairman, I am a bit frustrated with the budget the
department has submitted. And while we need to hold this
hearing in preparation for our subcommittee markup next week,
we have been given incomplete information at best.
And while it is not the fault of any of our witnesses,
transparency has certainly not been an adjective describing
this budget process and we can and must do better.
It is difficult enough to properly consider a complex
military construction budget under our compressed schedule,
worse, we have no Future Years Defense Plan or FYDP to help us
understand future intent.
Finally, most disturbing, major Defense Department
decisions announced after the budget was locked will require
budget adjustments and detail on these adjustments is still not
available, at least not available to us.
And while understandable to some degree in a new
administration, many large decisions have been pushed to the
quadrennial defense review or QDR, leaving us in a quandary
about what is real and what is changed in the budget request.
For example, the Secretary of Defense's recent decision to
limit the Army's Brigade Combat Team (BCT) growth to 45 rather
than 48 brigades calls into question the Army's military
construction program. Even though the Army finally identified
the brigades that will be lost, the ultimate BCT footprint is
still undetermined pending QDR review of re-stationing two BCTs
from Europe.
The reality is that the Army cannot articulate with any
precision how the fiscal year 2010 budget request should be
adjusted. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense delayed
the Navy's earlier recent decision to home port a nuclear
aircraft at Mayport, Florida, pending the outcome of the QDR.
While I support the department's review of the decision,
the Navy still has requested funding that could be used in
furtherance of making Mayport a carrier home port.
It is difficult for me to support a legitimate request to
have another East Coast port in a storm when I know that it
could be used as a down payment for the unnecessary expense of
making Mayport a nuclear carrier home port.
There are equally vexing unresolved issues involved in the
basing of Joint Strike Fighter squadrons around the United
States due to pending environmental reviews. The Marine Corps
realignment from Okinawa to Guam and the department's
brinkmanship on completing BRAC moves in a number of sites.
This budget also defers a number of land acquisition
challenges. Even without a FYDP we know the Navy wants an
outlying landing field for Oceana-based aircraft squadron. The
Army wants to acquire more training land in Colorado and the
Marine Corps intends to acquire large tracts adjacent to
Twentynine Palms Marine base in California.
Each of these actions is important for the readiness of
Army, Navy and Marine Corps units and each comes with
considerable public concern or opposition. All of these
acquisition and basing issues are sensitive national security
and local matters, requiring the considered judgment of
Congress in possession of all of the facts.
But we don't have the facts, nor do we have transparency.
Instead we are asked to approve a budget and funding decisions
that will be revisited during the QDR. Mr. Chairman, I think it
is fair to expect that we will make modifications to this
request unless today's witnesses are prepared to resolve some
of the questions I have posed.
Our constituents rightfully expect us to understand the
consequences of budgets we approve and I don't believe we have
what we need to approve this request. But once again, to all of
our witnesses, we recognize the great job you have done up to
this point. We thank you so much for that.
Mr. Chairman, once again, I just thank you for your
leadership and your direction and I yield back the balance of
my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. Today we have a panel of
distinguished witnesses representing the department and again
thank you so much for your service.
Our witnesses include Mr. Wayne Arny, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, the
Department of Defense, Mr. Joseph Calcara, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army Installations and Housing and the
Honorable B.J. Penn, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Installations and Environment and Ms. Kathleen Ferguson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations.
We thank you for being with us today. And without objection
the witnesses' prepared statements will be accepted for the
record.
Secretary Arny, so good to see you again, sir. You still
look like a young pilot.
Mr. Arny. Not any more.
Mr. Ortiz. Without objection, of course, we now will begin
and Secretary Arny. Welcome and you can begin your testimony
whenever you are ready.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE ARNY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
Mr. Arny. Thank you sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I am honored to appear before you today and with your
permission, I will submit the full statement for the record.
From the last 10 years the Department has come a long way
in improving the facilities and the infrastructure in which our
military and civilian workforce and families work and live. We
could not have progressed as far as we have without the
continuing support of Congress and in particular the support of
this subcommittee.
Today, we manage over 500,000 facilities worth over $700
billion located in approximately 29 million acres of land
around the world. In comparison, about 10 years ago we had
115,000 more facilities in our inventory, which is in part a
testimony to our continuing efforts to right-size the
department's infrastructure.
The principal program that has helped us balance the
infrastructure is the BRAC Authority and using that we have
been able to close over 121 major installations and realign 79
major bases after five rounds. The 2005 decisions alone affect
over 800 locations and include 24 major closures, 24 major
realignments and 765 lesser actions.
However, it is not just enough to have closed bases and
moved functions. At the same time, we tried to focus on how we
conduct business so as to become more efficient caretakers of
the taxpayers' money. An excellent example of our efforts
toward efficiency is joint basing.
As part of BRAC 2005, we were required to form 12 new joint
bases from 26 existing locations so that installation
management functions will be provided by one component, not two
or three as it is currently.
The joint basing implementation process is complicated and
almost 50 different areas of responsibilities on these bases
have been identified for consolidation including food services,
environmental management, child and youth programs, facility
maintenance and many more.
But I can report to you that it is well on the way to
achieving success. In January 2008 we began issuing a series of
joint basing implementation guidance documents and for the
first time established a set of common definitions and
standards for installation support to be provided by each joint
base.
We established a schedule that divides the 12 planned joint
bases into two implementation phases. Five joint bases
involving 11 installations replaced into phase one with an
October 2009 milestone for full implementation, which includes
the transfer of personnel and funds to the joint base
commander.
The remaining seven bases involving 15 installations were
placed into phase two with an October 2010 full implementation
and that is on track. And this is just the beginning of where I
see the department and the application of common output levels
of service to provide consistent and superb support to our
service members at every installation.
As for housing, a decade ago we were maintaining over
300,000 family housing units, two-thirds of which were deemed
to be inadequate by the military departments. With your help
and vision we put housing privatizations in place, and the
private sector responded by delivering modern, affordable
housing.
With this year's request, over 98 percent of the Department
of Defense's (DOD's) housing inventory in the United States
will be funded for privatization. The military services have
leveraged DOD housing dollars by 10 to 1 with $2.5 billion in
federal investments generating $25 billion in housing
development at privatized installations.
With regards to barracks, it was about 17 years ago that
the military departments began an ambitious modernization
program to increase the privacy and amenities in permanent
party bachelor housing. Using the military construction funding
and a traditional government-owned business model much progress
has been made but there still is a need for almost $15 billion
to complete the permanent party buyout.
Privatized housing has unique--one of the ways we are
looking at this is through privatizing bachelor housing, which
has unique challenges compared to family housing. But if we
start viewing these buildings more as on-base apartments
instead of unique military training or operating facilities,
the private sector will see the potential for a new economic
niche in which both they and the department can come out
winners.
We have seen recent innovative concepts where the Army has
added bachelor office quarters and senior enlisted bachelor
quarters to its existing family housing privatization projects
at Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, Fort Drum, Fort Irwin, and a fifth
is planned for Fort Bliss.
In contrast, the Army and the Navy is mainly focusing its
unaccompanied housing privatization to bring shipboard junior
enlisted sailors ashore using a special pilot authority. The
first unaccompanied housing, privatization pilot project was
awarded in December 2006 to San Diego. The second in 2007 in
Hampton Roads, and a third is under consideration for Mayport
and Jacksonville.
Both of the awarded pilot projects for the Navy have
demonstrated that with the authority to pay junior enlisted
members less than full housing allowance, privatization of
single junior enlisted personnel is less costly on a lifecycle
basis than the traditional government-owned model.
I view this as just a starting point, and ask for the
subcommittee's support in the department's continued progress
in shifting toward this way of thinking. This year's budget
signals yet another banner year for installations with about
$23 billion in military construction and about $8 billion in
facility sustainment, restoration and modernization.
At $23 billion, the military construction program is very
robust, especially compared to the $8 to $9 billion levels we
were receiving 10 years ago. Similarly our sustainment budget
is also more robust as compared to 10 years ago.
Recapitalization has been more of a challenge. We moved
from believing a single recap rate expressed in years applied
across myriad category sources could provide funding levels
that was rational or defendable.
When I was in the Navy Secretariat, I personally observed
the inaccuracy of the recap rate as Hurricane Ivan hit
Pensacola. The sudden infusion of restoration funds skewed the
recap rate for Navy to a lower number than the targeted 67
years, yet the condition of the rest of the Navy facilities
across the board did not improve.
I was dissatisfied with that 67-year metric and I asked my
staff to go back to the basics and open the dialogue on the
facility condition indices that are already mandated for DOD in
real property records. These quality ratings or Q-ratings
represent the health of our facilities and I believe they have
been long ignored.
This summer my staff will be working closely with the
military departments and defense agencies to set up program
guidelines for determining which facilities require priority
for funding, reassessing how Q-ratings are conducted and their
frequency and most importantly reestablishing how the
department views and uses master planning at the installation
level.
Also, and equally important, in cooperation with our policy
secretariat, the joint staff, the combatant command and the
services, we hope to initiate joint installation master plans
at each overseas combatant command region.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you for this
opportunity to highlight our management of installation assets.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Arny can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Secretary Calcara.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH F. CALCARA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY, INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING
Mr. Calcara. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr.
Forbes, members of the committee. I too am honored to be here
today to present details on our fiscal year 2010 budget. We
continue on in the largest transformation in Army history. The
fiscal year 2010 budget does represent for us the second half
of the home stretch to complete all our transformation under
base realignment and closure, military construction, Grow the
Army and the Army modular force.
I know there has been a challenging year for all of us. The
dynamics with the budget schedule and you have asked us to
address in detail the impacts from recent force structure
decisions. We are planning tomorrow to have a detailed session
with committee staff to go line item-by-line item project.
Let me just briefly cover for you the top line story in my
opening remarks. We have about $1.4 billion in the program tied
to the Grow the Army initiative. As you know, yesterday we
publicly disclosed our decisions on how we were going to apply
those changes to the budget.
I want you to know it was not a simple process. We have
worked diligently and deliberately over the last several weeks
to make sure that every nickel was looked at from both an
investment and a capabilities perspective. We are confident
that the solution that we will propose is exactly what is right
for the Army and right for the Nation at whole.
Of the $1.4 billion that is in the Grow the Army wedge in
the fiscal year 2010 program, approximately half of it is not
tied to the brigade configuration. It is tied to combat support
and combat services support. Of the remaining half of that
wedge, about half of that is tied to reserve and housing,
again, not connected to the Grow the Army decision.
So we are basically talking about 25 percent of the $1.74
billion that is in that budget roll out that needed to be
looked at for reinvestment use. Our plan is to take those
dollars and buy down capacity shortages that we had from the
other brigades that we built in the 45 total.
We also plan to buy out our relocatables sooner because you
have been telling us that is the right thing to do. So that is
essentially the impacts of the BCT decisions on a macro level.
Tomorrow you will cross walk one-by-one through them.
We think it is the right thing to do to get our capacity
back, to get our relocatables quicker. There is a business case
for that and the rest of the budget holds. Otherwise, I look
forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calcara can be found in the
Appendix on page 79.]
Mr. Ortiz. Secretary Penn, good to see you again, sir.
Whenever you are ready for your testimony, go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. B.J. PENN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
Secretary Penn. Thank you sir. Chairman Ortiz,
Representative Forbes, members of the subcommittee, it is a
privilege to come before you today to discuss the Department of
the Navy's installation efforts. I would like to touch on a few
highlights in the department's overall facilities budget
request, a very healthy $14.4 billion or 9.2 percent of the
department's Total Obligational Authority (TOA).
In Military Construction (MILCON) fiscal year 2010
continues the Marine Corps' Grow the Force initiative with a
$1.9 billion investment targeted primarily at infrastructure
and unit specific construction required to move Marines from
interim facilities and provide adequate facilities for new
units.
The fiscal year 2010 MILCON budget also provides funds for
the first 5 construction projects to support the relocation of
Marines from Okinawa to Guam in the amount of $378 million.
Our fiscal year 2010 budget request complies with the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy and the DOD
financial management regulation that establishes criteria for
the use of incremental funding.
The use of incremental funding in this budget has been
restricted to the continuation of projects that have been
implemented in prior years. Otherwise, all new projects are
fully funded or are complete and usable phases.
In family housing, our budget request of $515 million
reflects the continuation of investment funding for locations
where we still own and operate military family housing and
where additional privatization is planned.
Prior requests reflect a conservative program to address
additional housing requirements associated with Marine Corps
force structure initiatives. The Navy and Marine Corps have
privatized virtually all family housing located in the United
States.
Where we continue to own housing at overseas and foreign
locations, we are investing in a steady state recapitalization
effort to replace or renovate housing where needed. Our request
also includes funds necessary to operate, maintain and lease
housing to support Navy and Marine Corps families located
around the world.
Regarding legacy BRAC, we continue our request for
appropriated funds in the amount $168 million as we exhausted
all land sale revenue. We have disposed of 93 percent of the
prior BRAC properties, so there is little left to sell and the
real estate market is not as lucrative as it was several years
ago.
We expect only limited revenue from the sale of Roosevelt
Roads in Puerto Rico and other small parcels. With respect to
the BRAC 2005 program, our budget request of $592 million
represents a shifting emphasis from construction to outfitting
and other Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. One success
story I would like to highlight comes from New Orleans which
still struggles to recover from the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina.
We entered into a 75-year leasing arrangement agreement
with the Algiers Development District in September of 2008. In
exchange for leasing 149 acres of naval support activity in New
Orleans, the headquarters Marine Forces Reserve will receive
approximately $150 million in new facilities.
Demolition began recently and we have established temporary
quarters for the commissary so that military personnel,
retirees and their families still have access to the quality of
life service during construction.
We continue to work with Algiers Development District to
ensure this partnership's successful outcome. We have been able
to hold down our cost increases to a modest 2 percent for the
implementation period of fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year
2011.
We have made significant progress in the past year in
planning for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
The environmental impact statement for Guam is underway with a
targeted record of decision in time for construction in fiscal
year 2010.
The government of Japan ratified the international
agreement on 13 May, 2009 and appropriated $336 million, fiscal
year 2008 equivalent dollars, to complement our own investment
for fiscal year 2010. We expect to see Japan's contribution
deposited in our treasury by July.
Finally, it has been an honor and privilege to serve this
great nation and the men and women of our Navy and Marine Corps
team, the military, civilian personnel and their families.
Thank you, this committee, for your continued support and
opportunity to testify before you today.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Penn can be found in
the Appendix on page 96.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Ferguson, it is good to see you. And you can
begin with your testimony, ma'am.
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN I. FERGUSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTALLATIONS
Ms. Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
Forbes and distinguished members of the committee. On behalf of
America's airmen, it is my pleasure to be here today. I would
like to begin by thanking the committee for its continued
support of your Air Force and the thousands of dedicated and
brave airmen and their families serving our great nation around
the globe.
Today more than 27,000 airmen are currently deployed in
support of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of
Africa and many other locations, daily demonstrating their
importance in support of joint combat operations.
Within the Secretariat for Installations and Environment
and Logistics, we fully appreciate the impact our efforts have
in support of these airmen and how it affects their ability to
positively influence our Air Force's war fighting abilities and
capacity to counter hostile threats.
Military construction, family housing and BRAC programs
form the foundation of our installation structure. Our
installations serve as the primary platforms for the delivery
of global vigilance, reach and power for our nation, and our
fiscal year 2010 investments reflect a direct connection to
this vital work.
As we continue to focus on modernizing our aging weapons
systems we recognize that we cannot lose focus on critical Air
Force infrastructure programs. Our fiscal year 2010 president's
budget request of $4.9 billion for military construction,
military family housing, BRAC and facility maintenance is a
reduction from our 2009 request of $5.2 billion.
This reflects an increase in MILCON and fact of life
reductions due to the anticipated completion of the housing
privatization and BRAC 2005 round implementation.
Using an enterprise portfolio perspective we intend to
focus our limited resources on the most critical physical plant
components by applying demolition and space utilization
strategies to reduce our footprint, aggressively pursue energy
initiatives, continue to privatize family housing, and
modernizing dormitories to improve quality of life for our
airmen.
In regards to military family housing, our master plan
details our housing MILCON, operations and maintenance and
privatization efforts. Since last spring we have completed new
construction or major improvements on more than 2,000 units in
the United States and overseas, with another 2,286 units under
construction in the U.S. and almost 3,000 units under
construction overseas.
Our fiscal year 2010 budget request for military family
housing is just over $567 million. The Air Force request for
housing investment is $67 million to ensure the continued
improvement of our overseas homes. Our request also includes an
additional $500 million to pay for operations, maintenance,
utilities and leases for the family housing program.
At this point I would like to address our efforts in
support of base realignment and closure. BRAC 2005 impacts more
than 120 Air Force installations. Unlike the last round of BRAC
where 82 percent of the implementation actions affected the
active Air Force, in BRAC 2005, 78 percent of implementation
actions affect the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.
In fact the Air Force will spend more than $478 million on
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve BRAC MILCON projects.
The Air Force total BRAC budget is approximately $3.8 billion
in which the Air Force is fully funded.
Our fiscal year 2010 BRAC 2005 budget request is
approximately $418 million and less than 20 percent of that is
for BRAC MILCON projects. I would like to emphasize the Air
Force BRAC program is on track to meet the September 2011
deadline. Air Force MILCON, family housing and BRAC initiatives
will continue to directly support Air Force priorities.
It is imperative we continue to manage our installations by
leveraging industry best practices and state-of-the-art
technology. Our civil engineering transformation efforts, now
entering the third year, continue to produce efficiencies and
cost savings that enhance support for the war fighter, reduce
the cost of installation ownership and free resources for the
recapitalization of our aging Air Force weapons system.
More importantly, these investments reflect effective
stewardship of funding designed to serve our airmen in the
field, their families and the taxpayer at home. Mr. Chairman
and Congressman Forbes, this concludes my remarks.
Thank you and the committee once again for your continued
support of our airmen and their families. We look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferguson can be found in the
Appendix on page 121.]
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much. I see that we have a
tremendous turnout of members this morning. It is either that
things are going so well, or maybe they are not, and I am
pretty sure that they may have a lot of questions.
I am going to be brief. I am going to ask one question and
then I want to allow the members of this committee. I want to
give them a chance.
I know I have met with some of the freshman members, they
say, ``Oh, my, it takes a long time, before you get down to the
front, for them to ask a question.'' But I want to ask
Secretaries Penn and Ferguson, I know you will be starting the
process to determine the location of a variety of aviation
assets, including the Joint Strike Fighter.
As you are aware, the Joint Strike Fighter is pretty,
pretty loud and there are people who like the sound of freedom
and there are other people who are not too happy with the loud
noise. Could you explain how the noise associated with the
Joint Strike Fighter would influence basing decisions and
whether these communities have been contacted?
Also, can you explain to this committee how Joint Strike
Fighter basing criteria, included in the House report to the
2008 defense authorization bill, would be incorporated into
those basing decisions?
Secretary Ferguson or Penn, whichever is ready, we will
give you the opportunity to respond to that question.
Ms. Ferguson. I can answer the Air Force section.
Mr. Ortiz. If you could you get a little closer to the
mike, so that----
Ms. Ferguson. Okay, here we go. Based in part with what we
saw as we bedded down--tried to bed down the Joint Strike
Fighter at Eglin and the noise issues associated with that, the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Secretary Donnelly asked us
to look at doing enterprise-wide work for the basing of the
Joint Strike Fighter across the United States Air Force.
Back in February we accomplished a rapid improvement event
where we looked internally in the Air Force how we made basing
decisions and a couple of results came out of that and we are
implementing those right now.
One of which was to stand up a robust debasing shop within
the Air Force, and we had lost some of that as we had gone
through the previous round of BRAC. We had lost some of that
capability and we are now going to build that back up.
The second thing we have done is stood up an Air Force
senior basing executive steering group which I chair. And we
have cross-functional representation across the Headquarters
Air Force (HAF), at the general officer level that oversees the
basing process for the Air Force at the strategic level.
One of the objectives for the Chief of Staff and Secretary
was for the Air Force to have a defendable, repeatable,
transparent process as we worked through basing, not just for
the Joint Strike Fighter, but for all weapons systems across
the Air Force.
Where we are right now specifically with the JSF--in fact
tomorrow morning, I have a briefing where Air Combat Command is
the lead to the JSF bed-down process. We will come in and
embrace the executive steering group on proposed criteria to
bed that down.
We brief the Chief and Secretary on that proposed criteria
at the end of June. And then that criteria will be applied
across the inventory of installations across the United States.
As part of that criteria, we expect there will be some
consideration for noise and mission capabilities, mission
requirements. And then we will get that criteria over to the
committee once that is approved by the Chief and Secretary.
Mr. Ortiz. Secretary Penn.
Secretary Penn. Yes, sir, we have been working closely with
the Air Force. They are leading the noise analysis for us and
the facilities that we are looking at or we are seeing thus far
in the Navy are those that are really not in a populated area.
They are really quite isolated, so I am thinking that is going
to be good.
We have looked at the noise from day one, and it is very
difficult to get the noise specifications on the aircraft. It
is a lot more noisy than the tactical aircrafts that Mr. Arny
and I are used to, but we are working so that we will try not
to infringe on the areas around the bases.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. Now, I yield to my good friend, Mr.
Forbes, and I would like to see all the members who are here
with us today be able to ask questions this morning.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to try to
keep my questions relatively brief, to again, thanking you all
for what you have done and for being here today.
And I am going to address these questions to Mr. Arny and
Mr. Penn, and I want to preface it by saying, when Secretary
Gates was here, he indicated that we could ask for everybody's
personal opinions, and we didn't have to just get department
opinions or what was there.
So I wanted to address mine under the caveat that I would
like for your personal opinion on this issue, because we
respect the totality of evidence and experience each of you
bring to the table.
But the Navy's fiscal year 2010 unfunded requirements list
includes a shortfall of $395 million for aviation and ship
depot maintenance. Now, we have heard a lot of people say that
that shortfall is much greater than that. The aviation
shortfall is bouncing all over the place depending on which day
we see it. It is either 120 planes and the next day it may be
more than double than that.
Second thing, ship depot maintenance, last year we are
looking at maybe $120 million, this year we are talking about
upwards of $400 million, but whatever. The official list is
$395 million for aviation ship depot maintenance.
In light of such critical maintenance requirements, do you
think it is justified to put $76 million, a fourth of the total
amount that we have in there, on infrastructure improvements
for Mayport on a project that we are being told hasn't even
been approved yet?
Secretary Penn. Yes, sir, I do. First the MILCON that we
have for Mayport is for two projects, Pier Charlie 1 where we
put the small boys is deteriorating. I was in Mayport a couple
of weeks ago, and at this time we cannot drive a truck up to a
ship that is berthed at Charlie 1 to offload supplies because
the piers had sink holes in it and everything else.
At this time, we have to park the vehicles where we are
loading supplies on the ships, that is Charlie 1 about 50 feet
away, crane them across to the ship because of that
inconvenience, which is a real hardship on everyone concerned.
As I say, there are two projects. Second, in regards to the
outcome on the QDR on the carrier, we need to be able to
transient. We need to put a carrier into Mayport for transient.
We are not going to use the home porting now. We get the
message, no home porting of a carrier in Mayport, but to be
able to put a carrier into Mayport we have to dredge it.
The nuclear carriers, as you know, have different
requirements, different depths, and that is what we are
striving for.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Arny?
Mr. Arny. I concur with Mr. Penn. I was stationed on a
conventional carrier out of Mayport, and due to a maintenance
accident, some of our maintenance people installed a pump
backwards, and the ship sank at the pier and didn't go down
very far.
So to bring nuclear carriers in, to have the right safety
for supply and re-supply, you need to have the dredging done.
And Mr. Penn is right, the pier, apparently, is falling down,
whether you station a carrier there or not or whether you--just
for--that is more a maintenance of the facility rather than for
a specific ship.
Mr. Forbes. When you are talking about the $76 million that
has been allocated in, though, it would be fair to say that
most of the dredging project and pier work would only be needed
if you were trying to put a nuclear carrier in there. Is that
not correct?
Secretary Penn. Not for the pier work, sir.
Mr. Forbes. How much would the pier work be Mr. Penn?
Secretary Penn. Yes, the pier work alone is $30 million.
Mr. Forbes. It is $30 million.
Secretary Penn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And what about the remaining $46 million? Would
that be to dig the ditch?
Secretary Penn. Yes, sir, that is for the ditch.
Mr. Forbes. Well the reason I ask that is because, you
know, basically we know that there are some of these needs. The
aviation needs--this 100 percent need that we have there we
know that there is a 100 percent need for the depot
maintenance. I think both of you would agree on that.
And the last question I will just ask you is this. Most of
the concern that has been expressed about needing to do that
dredging and get the nuclear carrier in that port was based on
the fact that we would only have one naval base capable of home
porting a nuclear carrier that has access to the Atlantic
Ocean, and that a natural disaster terrorist attack has shut
down the Norfolk's naval facility.
And so the question I would ask you is what risk assessment
has been given to you, and who has given it to you that
outlines the risk that such an attack would take place? And if
you could just contrast that with the fact that we know we have
a 100 percent need for the aviation shortfall and a 100 percent
need for the depot maintenance shortfall.
In other words have you ever asked what that risk
assessment is? Is it a 10 percent risk, 5 percent risk, 20
percent risk? Who gave you the risk assessment, and what was
that risk assessment?
Secretary Penn. Sir, I think it is very difficult to
quantify a risk assessment, either manmade or natural.
Mr. Forbes. Did you ever ask for it?
Secretary Penn. I have. I have asked my own staff for it. I
haven't gone to the Navy and asked the operators for it.
Mr. Forbes. Did you ask the admiral that did the strategic
dispersal plan, the one that we based the need to move the
carrier and having a second port?
Secretary Penn. I did not. No, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Do you know of anyone in the department that
did?
Secretary Penn. We will have to get back to you on that. I
did not know. I would have to check, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 143.]
Mr. Forbes. If I told you that the admiral said that no one
has ever asked him for that risk assessment. Would that be
contrary to any evidence that you have to rebut that?
Secretary Penn. I will have to get back to you on that
because he has a large staff working for him and, you know,
sometimes we go with the Action Officer (AO) level to get
responses.
Mr. Forbes. But normally he would know if that question had
been asked of his staff or to him, wouldn't he?
Secretary Penn. Not necessarily, sir.
Mr. Arny. Not necessarily.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Then Mr. Arny, do you know of anyone who
has ever asked that question?
Mr. Arny. No, I do not.
Mr. Forbes. And I would just finally ask you, don't you
think it would help to have asked what the risk assessment was?
In other words we might have a meteor that falls out of the sky
tomorrow, but we aren't putting money in the budget to cover
that because we don't think the risk is very high. And I will
just tell you that when I asked him if anyone had ever asked
him that question, his answer to me was no.
And second, when I asked him if he could quantify that
risk, he said it would be very, very small, less than 10
percent. And so my just comment to you is that when we are
looking at situations where budgets seem to be driving our
defense strategy.
And I know we can argue whether that is true or not. It
just doesn't make much sense to me when we are taking 25
percent of the cost, that we basically know we need the
aviation shortfall and for depot maintenance, and we are
putting it to a situation where the admiral that writes the
strategic dispersal plan will tell us that it is less than a 10
percent chance that we would ever need that.
But if you would go back and check with him and see if
anyone has asked that question. And if you could respond to us
on the record as to whether or not that question has ever been
asked to him and what the answer to that is.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 143.]
Secretary Penn. I will ask that question today, sir. The
only problem, and I think you will agree, is the loss of a
carrier is unacceptable.
Mr. Forbes. Oh, I don't think anybody disagrees with that,
but the shortfall in planes is unacceptable too, shortfalls in
depot maintenance from when we have ships that are failing our
Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections, that is not
acceptable to us either.
And Mr. Arny, I know--somebody slipped you a piece of
paper. If you want to get that in the record go ahead.
Mr. Arny. Well, sir, again I didn't question it because I
do believe the dredging is needed, whether you home port a
carrier there or not, because we are constantly bringing--even
when we had a conventional carrier there we would bring in
nuclear carriers that we have got to light load them to get in.
We have got to come in at high tide. It puts tremendous
restrictions on it. We needed, in my opinion, we need to dredge
that out whether you home port a nuclear carrier there because
you are going to bring them in. You may not home port them
there but you are going to bring them in and out as part of
your annual operations.
Mr. Forbes. And my time is up, so I will yield back the
balance of my time, but if you will get back to me on that risk
assessment question as to whether or not anybody has asked it.
And if you could give it to us for the record we would
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I am going
to yield my time to Mr. Kissell and take his when his is due.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Taylor for yielding your time.
I just wish you would give me your questions because Mr. Taylor
always asks the best questions. But I will try to make do with
a couple I came up with.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kissell. Mr. Calcara, I have noticed, unless I misread
the number, that Army National Guard construction money is down
$460 million in the 2010 request from what was actually
approved in 2009, and for Army families construction, housing
construction down $180 million from what was requested versus
what was approved. Just wondering what the thinking is behind
that?
Mr. Calcara. Okay. On the Army housing side, most of those
dollars are tied to capital investments into the Residential
Communities Initiative (RCI) program, and as we continue to
build out the RCI, we are at a 98 percent level. We don't
require as much capital investment from the military
construction account for those projects to keep going.
On the Guard side the numbers are down. I think if you
compare request versus request from last year. And you look at
some of the facilities that we are buying through the base
closure on the Reserve side, we are actually bringing more
capabilities to the Guard than was requested last year.
What I mean by that is if you will look about $300 million
worth of the Army Reserve projects, about half of those are
shared with the Guard. So if you add those two numbers
together, and you compare that to last year's requests, we are
within about 10 to 15 percent on the numbers.
Mr. Kissell. Secretary Ferguson, in a previous hearing it
was indicated, and I can't give you real specifics on this, but
there was just some indications that either through not having
the fighter planes available for our Air Force Guard, the Air
Guard, but somehow we are deemphasizing the Air Guard.
Just wondering if you could give me some reassurance that
we are going to have those good pilots that are training in
planes, that when we need them that they are going to be there?
Ms. Ferguson. The Air Force is not looking to deemphasize
the Air National Guard in anyway. The Air National Guard and
the Air Force Reserves are a tremendous multiplier for the Air
Force. They are deployed alongside our active duty members at
all times.
I can get you a better answer for that, but in all of my
meetings I have had I have seen no indication from the Air
Force that there is any emphasis to do that.
Mr. Kissell. So the emphasis is going to be there, as we
have seen it, in terms of the equipment they can train on and
the budgeting process so that they can continue to be there?
Ms. Ferguson. Absolutely.
Mr. Kissell. Okay. And Secretary Arny, one question, and I
hope this is not too much home cooking. I am from North
Carolina, and my district goes right to the edge of Fort Bragg,
and we have most of the military reservation but none of the
base.
A tremendous BRAC changes at Fort Bragg, tremendous
incoming commands and we are very, very tickled with that and
there is going to be a--I think the most flag officers outside
of the Pentagon will be at Fort Bragg when all this is said and
done.
But it has been mentioned to me that we are not going to
have an Air Force officer of flag rank on the base. But there
is still going to be a significant amount of Air Force
presence, and there is some concern that if we don't have an
officer of equal rank, that there might be some difficulty in
going back and forth in terms of communication and getting
things done.
It was suggested it might be a possibility of bringing in
an additional ranking officer and staff. Just wondering if you
know any on that?
Mr. Arny. No, sir, that subject hasn't come up. As a former
officer myself I don't see where that would be a problem. I
would defer to my Air Force and Army colleagues on the
specifics of it.
Mr. Kissell. Did you all have any knowledge of any
discussions on this? And once again I know this is getting down
in detail but this is a pretty big operation and will be our
largest Army base. If you all could get back to me on that I
would appreciate that. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 144.]
Mr. Ortiz. Recognize my good friend the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee from El Paso, Texas, yes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the
secretaries for being here with us this morning. I just wanted
to start out by taking a few moments to talk about what is,
from my perspective, something very frustrating, and that is
the overseas rebasing decisions, and actually indecisions is a
better word.
I think this morning I am frustrated beyond words with the
latest edict that has come down that we are going to restudy
this whole issue. I think, Mr. Chairman, this is an issue that
has been studied and restudied, was studied by the rebasing,
overseas rebasing commission, by the BRAC commission.
We thought that these decisions were made and had already
been ratified only to find out that we are in the process of
delaying the move of our troops back to the U.S., which in my
opinion is a great waste of time and money and a disservice
because most importantly it leaves soldiers and their families
in old substandard facilities.
And it also forces our troops that are primarily going to
be deploying to places like Iraq and Afghanistan to train in
ranges that don't look anything like the areas that they are
going to go into combat in. I think as a committee, Mr.
Chairman, we need to really stand strongly on this.
The other thing that frustrates me is the fact that we seem
to be rewarding the very countries that are reluctant to keep
their part of the bargain in places like Afghanistan.
They are refusing to add additional resources and troops to
help us out in Afghanistan which puts a further burden on our
troops. I think we ought to take the stand that if you are not
going to help us in these areas of the world that are critical,
not just to us but to the whole world, then we stick with the
original strategy and bring them home.
I guess my question this morning I would like to ask
Secretary Arny or Secretary Calcara the fact that the Secretary
of Defense recently announced that he planned to stop the
growth of the Army brigade combat teams at 45.
That means not creating the 46th, 47th, and 48th brigades,
as had been announced and planned under the Grow the Army
concept. And he also said that while he is stopping those three
brigades, he is going to continue with the same levels that
have been approved by Congress.
Part of the issue for me is that the Secretary said that
he, in his words, he was going to, ``thicken the force, and in
doing so help to decrease the draw time between deployments,''
which I think all of us agree we fundamentally need to address.
So my question is this, where does the department plan to
base the over 10,000 soldiers slated to serve in the now
canceled three BCTs? I assume that we have a detailed plan, and
that detailed plan has been discussed, has been presented
before the decision was made by the Secretary to cancel out
those three brigades.
So can you tell this committee what that plan is? How we
are going to accommodate those 10,000 troops?
Mr. Calcara. Sir, the answer is probably more detailed than
we could get into today. We have essentially looked at those
population spreads and where they are across the Army, and
there are incremental adjustments at certain locations.
I guess what I am saying, and the short answer is we have
identified Bliss, Carson, and Stewart as getting one less
brigade because of the announcement. In theory there is a 3,500
person population delta at each of those locations. It is not
exactly working out that way.
In some places we had BCTs that were not at full strength
so they will be getting some of those people. At Fort Bliss,
Fort Carson and Fort Stewart we didn't have people at full
strength. They will be getting some people.
So I don't have a display for you available today going
base by base where those numbers are spread, but the answer is,
wherever we had shortages in combat teams and combat
configurations across the Army.
Mr. Reyes. When will that be available? Mr. Chairman, if we
can get that information I would appreciate it. And when will
that be available?
Mr. Calcara. We are having a working session tomorrow with
staff and we will try to provide that information tomorrow.
Mr. Reyes. Well, can we get that, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Ortiz. Sure we can get that and I think that gentleman
has raised some very important questions that hopefully we can
get to the bottom of it. I know that we do have a lot of
soldiers who are injured and incapacitated. And even though
they are inactive duty, they can go back for combat duty, but
you raised some very interesting questions, and I think we need
to follow up.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Fallin.
Ms. Fallin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
questions about the public-private partnerships on the housing.
And I am pleased that we have made such tremendous progress and
are working with private sector to create better living
conditions for our soldiers. So thank you so much for doing
that.
I was reading where the Department of Defense plans to
privatize, hopes to have about 87 percent of the family housing
units privatized, including 188,000 units by 2010. And I have
had the opportunity in my state to visit some of the facilities
that we have had the public-private partnerships in, and my
state has been very pleased with that in Oklahoma.
But I want to ask a couple of questions. It has been
indicated that 36 percent of the awarded privatization projects
will have occupancy rates that are below the expectations from
some of the things I have read.
And I guess my question is what challenges will that
present, and how do we plan to address that issue to ensure
that we can increase those occupancy rates so that we can
optimize these facilities and make sure that we are getting
people in that need to be in there?
Secretary Penn. Yes, ma'am, let me take a shot at that. We
have seen some of those reports, and we are working with the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and they had one that
said that 36 percent of the occupancy rates were below
expectation and more recently said it was 29 percent.
Our data shows 10 percent. We think they are including--if
a house is occupied we have what we call a waterfall effect.
The house is available for rent to an active duty member. If no
active duty member wants the house, then we go down through a
waterfall of Reserve members, civilians living on the base
until you eventually get to--you can have civilians from the
outside come in with the proper clearances.
Early on, we saw rates that were lower than expected
because the management on the bases didn't quite understand how
that worked. That has changed, and what we have seen are
occupancy rates of 90 percent or greater.
Within the Navy we were looking at occupancy rates of like
95 percent. So again we have a disconnect with GAO, that we are
trying to figure out where they are getting their numbers from
if they are not including some of these people. If the house is
occupied by an active duty member or a DOD civilian, it is
still occupied.
Now the difference between everybody other than an active
duty military is that they can only do a one-year lease. An
active duty military person has a lease for as long as they are
stationed there. So the waterfall effect still protects--while
it protects our occupancy, we think we have balanced it to
protect our service members.
Ms. Fallin. Okay that makes sense. Now let me ask one other
thing if I can, Mr. Chairman.
When you think about the housing markets in the United
States and foreclosure rates and the availability of homes that
are on the marketplace and even the credit that is available to
build facilities, how will the financial markets affect the
ability for the partnerships to be able to get the credit they
need to be able to build these housing units? And will the
foreclosure rates, the vacant home rates affect, I guess, the
occupancy and the need?
Mr. Arny. We are seeing an effect. Most of our housing
projects were done prior--I would say the bulk were done prior
to the market changing. And we have seen some debt servicing
issues. We don't have any. We are still considered a good risk,
but we are seeing the fact that our rates aren't quite as good
that we can get.
So essentially what we are having to do is lengthen the
development. We are lengthening the development time in order
to accommodate that. We believe we have enough flexibility in
there. It is not perfect. We liked it when the market was great
but we are accommodating that.
Ms. Fallin. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, if I
can yield the balance of my time to Congressman Fleming?
Mr. Ortiz. Go right ahead, no objections.
Go ahead, sir.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
gentlelady for yielding. My question, I have a very specific
question to Mr. Calcara. My district, fourth district for
Louisiana, is counter-cyclic to the rest of the country. We
have two large bases, Barksdale and Fort Polk, and both of them
are growing rather than declining. And we are real happy about
that of course.
But we do have a problem in Fort Polk. It is doubling in
size, taking in acreage, and at the same time building up
brigade strength. And it is surrounded by a rural area, so we
have a housing problem there. And so I would like to ask you if
you know specifically what your plans are to help solve that?
And if not, generally how we are going to attack that problem?
Mr. Calcara. Yes, we are looking at Fort Polk, and we have
been. It is not a simple answer from a privatization
perspective because of the market issue there. One of the
things that we have to look at is the ability to work within
the authority's limits on cash investment, as well as priority
or preferred returns that the private sector is now requiring
on equity.
When we originally started this program, payouts in that
range were in the 5 percent to 10 percent. We are now looking
at equity premiums in the 16 to 20 range. So as we start paying
more for private financing, as interest rates creep higher, as
the long bond grows and spreads against the long bond grow, our
ability to make privatization work there is limited.
But we think that is the best solution. We just think the
timing to do that right now is probably problematic. But we are
not ready to give up yet. We are looking at it and we will
continue to try to find a solution for the housing problem
there.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Reyes.
I mean, correction, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You actually may
have read my mind because I was going to bring up what Mr.
Reyes has already spoken about. It is terribly important for
readiness purposes, Mr. Chairman, that we have the active
cooperation of the community surrounding our installations as
we attempt to grow those installations.
For example, the local community has to make certain
investments in order to meet the needs of the population that
is going to be brought in. And that is particularly true of
parts of our country which are more rural, and an awful lot of
our installations are located in more rural areas.
If you are going to increase the size of the force by 3,000
or 4,000 people that effectively means 5,000 to 10,000 people
are coming into this rural community. If the rural community
does not prepare for that at our request, then when those new
troops arrive the facilities simply aren't there to meet their
needs, the needs of their families, the needs of their
children.
The decision to reduce from 48 to 45 brigades causes a real
problem for the communities that surround Fort Stewart,
Georgia. This is a rural part of the country. Those communities
are smaller communities that don't simply have excess capacity
available to meet the needs of 3,000 to 10,000 people being
brought in by DOD.
So at DOD's request, at Army's request, those communities
invested north of $450 million getting ready to receive a new
brigade, and that money is the sort of investment we ask our
partner communities to make routinely.
I think readiness in the future suffers if we don't live up
to our end of the bargain. If we don't live up to our word, to
our commitment to these communities, it causes them to
reasonably rely on our requests.
And I think we need to seriously look at the decision to
reduce brigades encouraging the Army and DOD generally to
figure out what compensating decisions can be made in order to
mitigate the negative impact of a decision like this?
Let us assume in fact we are not going to have the
additional brigades. The Army nevertheless is not shrinking. It
is growing. Certainly we can put warm bodies into Fort Stewart
to, you know, basically meet the obligation that we have with
those communities that have relied upon us in going ahead and
meeting our need to bring new troops in.
And Mr. Chairman, I think maybe we need to have some
committee report at the very least that directs that something
along these lines be done. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to yield the balance of my time, if there is no objection,
to Mr. Kratovil from Maryland.
Mr. Ortiz. Sure, no objection.
Go ahead, Mr. Kratovil.
Mr. Kratovil. Thank you very much. Thank you for yielding.
I was recently at Fort Meade in Maryland and toured the
installation there and went to some of the housing, the
privatized housing, which was very impressive. The units were
wonderful, had a great community room. There were certainly
other very nice amenities to it.
I noticed though that the occupancy rates at a lot of
these, in a lot of the relationships that we have in these
housing, privatized housing arrangements, are not where they
should be, or at least where it was expected.
One, is that true? And two, why is that and what can we do
to change that? And if we don't change that, are these private
partners going to be able to continue their investment in the
long term?
Secretary Penn. Sir, we don't see those same low rates, as
a matter of fact we have people standing in line. My son just
moved into the area, and there is a line for Fort Belvoir. So
he rented in the private sector. And again DOD-wide only 25
percent of our people are living on base and 75 percent are
living outside.
We believe there are enough. First of all we don't have the
evidence to show that occupancy rates are low. If they are low
then the private sector partner is allowed to rent to other
than active duty military people. He can rent to reservists, to
government civilians and eventually he can rent to private
citizens. So if there is a low occupancy rate we will take a
look at it, but there shouldn't be one.
Mr. Ortiz. Okay, are there any, go ahead.
Ms. Ferguson. If I can answer from the Air Force
perspective, certainly I don't have the info on Fort Meade, but
what we have found in the Air Force is in the initial
development period, our occupancy rate is lower there once the
developer gets in there and they build new houses or renovate
houses. And for our last quarter, Air Force overall is at 90
percent, which was our highest that we have had since 2006. We
have continually seen an increase.
But to also get to your point, as we continue to privatize
the remaining bases that we have in the Air Force inventory, we
have 22 bases left to privatize, we are going to go in with
lower numbers than what we think we need and then build to the
higher numbers when occupancy dictates it.
So we are going with a more conservative approach up front
based on some lessons learned that the Air Force has had in our
earlier projects.
Mr. Kratovil. Okay.
Mr. Ortiz. Go ahead.
Secretary Penn. Sir, you also can't compare occupancy rate
under privatized with our own occupancy rate in the old days,
because in the old days if a house was taken out for
maintenance, it wasn't counted as being occupiable. With the
private sector guy, if he has an empty house whether it is down
for maintenance or--it is an empty house so his numbers will be
different.
Mr. Kratovil. Okay, thank you. I was also recently at a
hospital in Harford County just outside of Aberdeen, and the
hospital was saying that, you know, of course there has been a
lot of discussion in terms of infrastructure related, the roads
surrounding the installations and preparing for this growth
that, of course, we are very happy to have in Maryland.
But they were saying that in terms of--they are very
concerned about infrastructure--in terms of health care, to
prepare for these folks coming. Are you hearing similar
concerns at all in terms of the communities where you are
going?
Secretary Penn. It depends on which community, but I
haven't heard the health care issue other than I have heard
some of the road issues, especially around the more urban
locations at Fort Belvoir and stuff, but not around----
Mr. Kratovil. All right but is that an issue that we
considered in terms of looking at the growth that is going to
occur with the changes with BRAC and the consequences of that
on these surrounding communities?
Mr. Ortiz. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Kratovil. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Ortiz. You were given time from another member so we--
--
Mr. Kratovil. Mr. Chairman, I have no time to yield back,
and please don't blame me.
Mr. Ortiz. We will see if we can have a second round, but I
want to go back to some of the questions that were asked. You
know, I have been here and I have gone through, I think, five
base closures.
This last base closure, I was able to see where the base
closure commission and QDR commission, they were never able to
synchronize with one another, and I think this is one of the
reasons why we are having the problem that we are having today.
And this is one of the reasons why the local communities
are going through what we are going through now. We made some
horrible mistakes at the expense of local communities, but now
I would like to yield to Ms. Bordallo, the lady from Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a
very important hearing for me and my constituents. To all of
our witnesses, thank you very much, Secretary Arny, Secretary
Penn, a most important thank you to you because you have had a
real leading role in the Guam military buildup, and also to
Secretary Calcara and Secretary Ferguson.
I also want to express my general support for the $787
million in total military construction funding in the fiscal
year 2010 budget for all of Guam's military installations,
including the Guam National Guard.
Secretary Arny, let me start with you. As you know, on
April 9th, GAO report called on more senior level involvement
from the DOD to make sure that Guam's local infrastructure
issues were given more consideration in the federal budget
process.
Specifically, the report calls for a meeting of the
economic adjustment committee (EAC) for executive level
coordination with other federal agencies. When can we expect
the EAC to begin meeting to address the Guam build-up and how
will Guam's local infrastructure concerns be addressed?
Mr. Arny. Yes, Ms. Bordallo, the economic adjustment
committee, we are working to set up a meeting. I don't have a
date at this time, but it may not be--with the agencies not
having their political appointees in place, it may not occur
for another couple of months.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. As soon as we hear of that date,
you could correspond with us.
Secretary Penn, it is very promising to see some $412
million requested for the Navy and Marine Corps construction,
as well as $259 million for the new hospital on Guam.
Obviously, one of the impediments to executing these funds that
I am confident this Congress will authorize and appropriate for
is the completion of the draft environmental impact statement
(EIS) and the record of decision.
So, Secretary, can you update the committee on its status
and when we can expect to see a draft EIS and along these
lines? I am also interested in learning more about how the
department plans on using mitigation funding that this Congress
authorized in Section 311 of last year's National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA)?
Can we expect to see roughly five percent to nine percent
set aside in each MILCON project for such mitigation efforts,
and is this something that we can count on from DOD?
Secretary Penn. Ma'am, we hope to get the master plan out
so we can do the construction. We want to start in fiscal 2010.
That is our goal and we are--at this plan for the EIS, we are
working 86 different studies to make sure we do Guam right,
okay?
And for saying the mitigation before we completed the
studies would be very difficult, would not be good on our part.
I know I specifically talked with the Department of Agriculture
yesterday on things we can do as far as the mitigation measures
are concerned.
I think we need the analysis completed before we can do the
mitigation. There will be some that requires a more significant
amount of funding than others, but until we have that analysis,
the baseline, I don't think we can say what a specific
percentage would be for the mitigation measures.
We are looking to mitigate all the areas that are impacted.
That will be done, okay? It is the right thing to do. I mean
the law requires it, but it is the right thing to do. So we are
not going to destroy anything.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Arny, do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Arny. No, I don't. I am not sure of the section you are
referring to, and I would like to get with your staff and
figure that out.
Ms. Bordallo. Good, all right. I am also concerned about
support needed but seemingly absent from DOD for local and
federal cooperating agencies in the EIS. It is my understanding
that some lawyers in the department contend the economic act
precludes DOD from helping to fund cooperating agencies for the
Guam military build-up.
I hope that this can be resolved, especially for our local
cooperating agencies that do not have the funds to review the
EIS. So how can we get it right and done on time if DOD is not
fully funding the EIS?
Can you comment on this matter and how it is being
resolved, Secretary Penn?
Secretary Penn. Yes, ma'am, we are fully funding the EIS.
The EIS is the Department of the Navy (DON) responsibility and
that is what we are doing. We have brought all of the local
agencies in. In fact, there is a major--Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is having a meeting later this month on
Saipan looking at all the Marianas, and I think Mr. Arny and I
both met with EPA Region 9 last month.
Ms. Bordallo. So that, for the record, will be fully funded
by DOD?
Secretary Penn. Exactly.
Ms. Bordallo. And then I have one last question. Go ahead,
Mr. Arny.
Mr. Arny. You may be referring to requests from Guam EPA
for funding for them to review.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
Mr. Arny. We are not allowed to fund Guam EPA to review our
documents in this particular case. This is not like a--we don't
have a Defense-State Memorandum of Agreement (DSMOA) to work
that and I can work with your staff on the details, but I
believe the government of Guam says they will review the
documents with the staff that they have.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Mr. Chairman, I have just one
question and then no second round for me, if you don't mind?
Mr. Ortiz. Make it short because----
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Ms. Ferguson, thank you for your
funding for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) and the STRIKEs, as well as northwest field activities at
Anderson Air Force Base.
As you know from past correspondence, I have been concerned
about the Air Force's commitment to Anderson's military
construction needs. We don't see these projects to be
overshadowed or unnecessarily compromised due to increased Navy
and Marine Corps program needs on Guam with the build-up.
Can we expect similar commitments in future years for
Anderson?
Ms. Ferguson. As you can tell from the 2010 budget, we have
one project in there that supports the STRIKE Forward Operating
Location (FOL) bed-down, as well as three projects that help
facilitate the movement of the folks off the Korean Peninsula.
I can't comment on any projects that we have beyond fiscal
year 2010 in this session.
Ms. Bordallo. All right, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, just
to you, with recent developments from North Korea and their
plans to now launch long-range missiles with supposedly Guam as
one of their targets, it is our responsibility to provide
security for the U.S. citizens of Guam, so I urge everyone to
work together to get this military movement right. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Now, I will yield to Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in
light of the fact that I had my question answered, I am going
to yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Ortiz. No objection.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr.
Fleming, appreciate that.
Mr. Penn, real quickly, did you say that the EIS has been
expanded on Guam to include all of the range areas that are
necessary to make this thing work?
Secretary Penn. No, sir, I did not say that.
Mr. Conaway. What did you say? You said the EPA----
Secretary Penn. I said we are conducting 86 studies for the
current EIS.
Mr. Conaway. You just said you were bringing somebody in to
talk about the Marianas.
Secretary Penn. I said EPA is having a meeting on Saipan. I
think it starts the 22nd of this month, to talk about all the
EIS.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. That is unrelated to the work that has
to be done for that?
Secretary Penn. Correct, right.
Mr. Conaway. While we are talking about the Guam movement,
can the Marine Corps waive the flight safety issues at the
replacement facility at Schwab?
Secretary Penn. No, sir, that is not the intent at all. We
do not intend to do that.
Mr. Conaway. Well, how do you intend to make that system
work? If the Navy is--how are you going to use that facility to
replace the Futenma facility if you can't waive the flight
safety issues that the Navy has?
Secretary Penn. I don't know what specific flight safety
issues you are referring to, but with aircraft there are many,
many things you can do to mitigate, everything from reducing
the weight, operating at different temperatures, all those
things that are always done on a daily basis.
In the pilot's pocket checklist, before I would launch,
except from a carrier, I would go through and check my outside
air temperature and----
Mr. Conaway. Well, wait, yes, but that----
Secretary Penn [continuing]. And weight and everything and
that is how you mitigate it. You can go down 1,000 pounds and
get within limits.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Secretary Penn. We are not going to violate safety. We are
not going to bend any safety rules at all to operate out of the
field.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. Is this like a boxing match with one
hand in your pocket?
Mr. Arny. No, sir.
Secretary Penn. I don't think so.
Mr. Arny. The Pacific commander has said, with the length
of the runway and the length of the overruns required, that
they can meet all their operational requirements, and the
Marine Corps has agreed with that.
Mr. Conaway. Okay, so the Navy will certify that is a safe
air place.
Secretary Penn. Yes.
Mr. Arny. There is one--there may be some need for waivers
in terms of, frankly, every field we have in America has
waivers, but we will make sure they are mitigated or taken out
or that we all agree that the risk is minimal.
Mr. Conaway. Okay, and then we can reduce the capacity of
what we are trying to do, to get under those guidelines. Okay.
You know, construction budgets fluctuate, unlike say a
personnel line where that is going to be pretty consistent, so
going up and going down is not automatically a flag.
Mr. Arny, how do you look at system-wide--Mr. Calcara
mentioned some of the requests being met is a better indicator,
versus just simply the budget number changing.
How does the system look at system-wide construction needs
to say, you know, what percentage of those needs are being
funded rationally and, I mean, how do you look at your overall
plan for deploying all these scarce resources against a
spectacular array of needs?
Mr. Arny. Well, what Mr. Calcara is referring to is that
the Guard budget in particular, that Congress is grateful and--
or we are grateful to Congress because they will usually add to
that request, so we measure it from what we requested the year
before, not from where Congress appropriated.
On the overall budget, we do look at it from year-to-year,
which is one of the reasons we are trying to go to this Q
rating, so that we have a measure of what buildings need to be
replaced and when they need to be replaced.
Part of the budget is also for new aircraft, new ships, new
tanks and the facilities that go with that. And we rely on the
services--we obviously rely on the services to meet their
operational need and then we oversee it and make sure it is
there.
Mr. Conaway. Did you just tell us that you intentionally
under-budget because you know that Congress is going to add
money on top of it?
Mr. Arny. No, sir. We compare our budgets to what we
requested----
Mr. Conaway. But let us just--earlier you----
Mr. Arny. Just for the Guard. For the Guard part of it we
compare our request for 2010 for instance to our request for
2009. We believe that fills the needs. If Congress adds things
on that makes us--that Guard budget--puts it in better shape.
We believe that the request will satisfy our needs.
Mr. Conaway. Okay, but you are counting on Congress
plussing that up?
Mr. Arny. No, sir, we aren't.
Mr. Conaway. All right, just making sure I hadn't
misunderstood that.
Mr. Calcara, the Army has got five million acres short of
places to run tanks and helicopters and all that kind of stuff.
You dropped the request at Pinon Canyon from 400,000 to
100,000. How are we going to keep training the kids we need to
train with this kind of a shortfall?
Mr. Calcara. Yes, the shortfall was there. It has been
validated through, you know, GAO and how we doctrinally compute
it. In the short term, our position is to only acquire property
in areas where the local delegation isn't supporting us.
In the case of Pinon Canyon, the mitigations are on battle
mixes, on configurations, on tempo. We are still accomplishing
a lot of training at Pinon Canyon. The question is how
efficient and effective could we get by acquiring more
training?
As communications systems develop, as unmanned vehicles
develop, we require more physical square footage to really,
truly test those types of equipment.
We are compromising some of that, obviously, with a reduced
footprint, but we are still training there and there are
workarounds. We just continue to work at it. We think we had a
plausible strategy for Pinon Canyon. We had a willing seller at
one point who changed course on us. We are going to continue to
work it hard.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to thank
all of you on the panel for being here today and for your
service to our country. And I am very glad and very relieved to
see that the three remaining BRAC 2005 sites in Iowa are in
fact funded in this budget request for 2010.
Those three, of course, are Iowa National Guard Reserve
Centers in Cedar Rapids, Middletown and Muscatine. Those
facilities were constructed in 1916, 1950, and 1973,
respectively, and are less than the current authorized size for
such structures. And improvements to these buildings will
enhance training, recruitment and retention.
And I think, in particular, in light of the increased role
that our National Guard Reserve components have been playing
overseas in our two conflicts, and potentially in conflicts
down the line.
I am also very glad to see the funding is included for
equipment infrastructure modernization at the Iowa Army
Ammunition Plant that is near Burlington, Iowa.
Most of the infrastructure at that plant, and I toured that
plant, is over 60 years old and requires significant
modernization in order to assure the safety of our workers,
continuity of operations and timely delivery to our service
members.
I just have two questions related to these two issues. I
understand that funding for the Muscatine Reserve Center may be
moved up to 2009. A decision may be coming soon. Could either
of you, either Secretary Calcara or Secretary Arny, address
yourself to that question?
Mr. Calcara. Yes, we currently have Muscatine tracking at
about $8.8 million in total program. We are experiencing some
savings in projects as we are opening bids. Our intent would
be, you know, once we think we have got past the lion's share
of the program to try to pull some projects forward.
I would tell you it would probably be in the next 30 to 45
days where we would make that decision. We would like to get
that one in at $9 million if we could.
Mr. Loebsack. Okay, thank you. And then my second question
has to do with not just the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, but
plants like it in general. There appears to be perhaps
inattention to the deteriorating infrastructure of Army
ammunition plants including the Army ammunition plant in Iowa.
Can you highlight how this budget supports modernization of
infrastructure at these facilities including security for
example, and also energy efficiency enhancements? Does the Army
or does DOD have a long-term plan to address these issues? And
either one of you or both of you can speak to that issue.
Mr. Arny. Over a long-term basis we used to look at
sustainment rates of 70, 75 percent. We are now at 90 percent.
We would like to go to 100 if the budget would allow. We are
also looking at developing this Q rating plan which will allow
us to better measure the condition of our facilities.
And then we will be able to defend ourselves in the MILCON
world against the procurement folks to say, ``Look, if you want
a Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army that is capable, you have
got to expend this much money.''
We were also beneficiaries this year of the stimulus funds
so we got an additional $7.4 billion. And also in the 2010
budget we were able to sustain our sustainment funding in the
latest budget round, so we are doing much better, and we have a
better long-term way to do it. It is not there yet, but it is
much better than we have done over the past 10 to 15 years.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you very much, and I will yield back
the balance of my time, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Ortiz. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
panel for being here today. Mr. Arny, I am concerned, and I am
going to ask for your personal oversight on the transfer of the
property at Roosevelt Roads.
I think that all of our Defense Department has a bad habit
of buying high and selling low, and I think again it is whether
it is on paying too much for ships or aircraft or taking things
that are of substantial value and selling it for less than they
are worth, we have got to do a better job.
I am going to give you a for instance that I still haven't
had an adequate response on. In my congressional district in
Gulfport, Mississippi, Navy Retirement Home purchased 10 acres
of land with 2 homes on it. One of the homes had a pool with
riparian rights, which means it had access to build a pier out
in the Gulf of Mexico.
They purchased that 10 acres in 2003 for $5.7 million. In
less than 12 months they sold off the 2 homes, the swimming
pool and the riparian rights for less than $1 million. So that
means you paid $570,000 for acreage timber that you could not
access from the road, which you turned around and sold 2 homes
and 3.4 acres for an average of $280,000 an acre.
That is a bad deal. That is a terrible deal for the
taxpayer, and quite frankly, I believe something is rotten
there. I think somebody in your system gave away, literally
gave away a public resource. Now the reason I say that is
number one, I want that looked into. That is in my own
congressional district, but I want it looked into.
I don't want to see that happen. I had visited Roosevelt
Roads on several occasions. That is a phenomenal piece of
property. I realize the market right now for real estate is at
an all time low so the first question is do we want to be
selling this phenomenal piece of property when the market is
terrible, or do we want to wait a few years and get an actual
value for that property when the economy recovers, and I
believe it will.
Has anyone given any thought to that? And the other perfect
example I will give is in our quest to balance the budget,
around 2004, 2005--I am sorry. Yes, in our quest to balance the
budget during the Clinton years, shortly after the 1994
election, we sold off the oil shale reserves when the price of
oil was at $11 a barrel.
What did it reach last summer, almost $150? So again, there
is a pattern here where we are not being good stewards. We are
in a rush to make this year's books look good. We do a very
poor job long term, and I am curious what is going to be done
to kind of change that mentality so we try to buy things for
the best price and sell things at the best price for the
taxpayer.
Mr. Arny. Mr. Taylor, I agree with you completely. Let me
mention in the Mississippi situation. A year or so ago you had
raised this, and I put it in the system. I don't believe that
the home falls under DOD anymore, and I am not sure. I was in
Navy for six years. That never came under our purview.
I think it is a separate management. When I was at OMB in
the mid-1980s, late 1980s, the various homes were separate
agencies from DOD. They were not controlled by DOD.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Arny, again, I remember the funds collected
from soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines fund that, so I
think that was very much a DOD nexus.
Mr. Arny. Yes, sir, and again, but it is not something
that--it is a separate little agency if I recall, and I read
the articles, and I agree with you that that should be
investigated.
Second, on Roosevelt Roads, if it were, and I did base
closure for Mr. Penn, if you will recall 4 or 5 years ago, we
sold several bases in California and brought in over $1.1
billion in revenue that then we used to monetize cleanup.
That is the position the department prefers to be in where
land has real value. We would like to have the flexibility to
be able to sell what the community doesn't need in terms of
direct economic development conveyances.
However, as you well know, we are frequently pressured, as
we are being again this year, to give things away for nothing,
so I would argue that if you leave--the services have now
plenty of tools in their toolbox to provide benefit to the
communities, and to provide value back to the taxpayers of the
country where land is valuable.
And they also have the ability to wait to sell if they are
not pressured to change their rules now.
Mr. Taylor. Well, again, I want to get it on your radar
screen because I hope someone, before a contract is let, is
going to look at that and say wait a minute. Is that a fair
price for the taxpayers, and shouldn't we just wait a little
while until the market recovers?
You sold that property in California when the market was
red hot. That was a smart move, but I would certainly hope that
someone is going to take the time to make sure that what we get
should it be sold is at a fair price to the taxpayers.
Mr. Arny. Well there are measures, I am told, that will be
in your bill that will demand that we do no cost transfers.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Kratovil.
Mr. Kratovil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
going over my initial time. I was so excited to be able to ask
a question I couldn't contain myself, so thank you. Sort of a
general question, can any of you discuss--I guess Mr. Arny, the
progress in the realignment process of Walter Reed to the Naval
Bethesda Hospital.
Mr. Arny. Yes, sir, I can't give you all the details, but
it is on track. The construction is underway. We have a plan
that will be complete on time and the facilities will be there.
Mr. Kratovil. So as of right now, it is on track and we
anticipate that it will be completed as scheduled?
Mr. Arny. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kratovil. All right, Fort Meade's Warrior Transition
Unit right now is about--my understanding is it is at about
150? My understanding is there hasn't been any decision as to
whether or not that is going to be a permanent unit, apparently
still pending.
The concern that I have is that those numbers are
continuing to grow and without a final determination, the
resources necessary to deal with that growth are not
forthcoming. My question is, assuming until that decision is
made, assuming the unit remains at that level or continues to
grow, can Fort Meade count of the resources necessary to deal
with it?
Mr. Arny. We have Warrior Transition Units all over the
Army, and I think our strategy is to meet surges and spikes
where we have capabilities for care. In the Fort Meade
situation we are monitoring it closely.
The center was sized based on the best information
available. The best I could tell you is I don't have any
reports that it is undersized or they are experiencing any
difficulties at this time.
Mr. Kratovil. My understanding was that the estimates were
around 80, and now it is about 150, and it is continuing. The
expectations are, because I was just there, are continuing to
grow, and again my concern is at the same time we are having
these units to provide obviously necessary resources, we are
going to set ourselves up for failure if we don't have the
resources in the places where we are sending these soldiers.
So it is something I would like to ask you to keep an eye
on, particularly as it relates to Fort Meade.
Mr. Arny. We will, and again, we are applying an enterprise
concept for Wounded Warrior Units looking across the Army where
capacity exists.
Mr. Kratovil. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Kissell.
You know, going back to what the Navy buys and sells,
without having to mention any service at all, we have a piece
of land in my district that they could have bought for about
$700,000 but they waited and waited and waited and waited.
When they came back, now they are going to have to pay $11
to $12 million or more. So this is why some of the members are
disturbed and rightly so, you know? I mean to us, taxpayers'
money is very sacred, and I don't have to mention the agency's
name. I think some of you know who I am talking about, but
anyway we are going to have votes in a few minutes.
We are going to have about 5 votes, which means that if we
don't finish our questions you guys will have to stay here for
the next 45 minutes to an hour, and we are not going to punish
you like that.
So I just have one last question for my good friend
Secretary Arny. This round of BRAC wasn't like any previous
round, and the implementation of the BRAC commission
recommendations were complex and interrelated. Is the
department going to complete all the realignment proposed by
the BRAC commission by September 2011?
If so, what extraordinary measures will the department
adopt to meet this deadline? Maybe you can clue us, are you
going to be able to meet this deadline?
Mr. Arny. Yes, sir, we are going to meet that deadline, and
I, you know, in our House Appropriations Committee (HAC) MILCON
hearing, you know, all the services agree. We are all on track.
We are going to meet it.
Mr. Ortiz. I know you for a long time. I trust you.
Mr. Arny. Okay.
Mr. Ortiz. Hearing no further questions, this has been a
very good hearing, and you can understand the concerns of the
committee and their interest as to why they ask some of these
questions, but thank you so much for your service.
Thank you so much for joining us today, and hearing no
further questions, this hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 3, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 3, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 3, 2009
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Secretary Penn. During the Navy's Strategic Laydown and
Dispersal review, the Navy Staff's Operations, Plans, and
Strategy directorate (OPNAV N3N5) considered a variety of
factors for various homeports including port force protection
postures and risk mitigation measures. The analysis of East
Coast strategic dispersal of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
was informed by referencing the following threat and
vulnerability documents:
a. LJoint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA)
on Naval Station Norfolk initiated by the Joint Staff and
conducted by a team of seven specialists from the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 6-11 August 2006.
b. LChief of Naval Operations Integrated Vulnerability
Assessment (CNOIVA) for Naval Station Mayport conducted by NCIS
from 21-26 January 2007.
c. L``Port Threat Assessment: Sector Hampton Roads''
conducted by the USCG dated 17 May 2007.
d. L``Port Threat Assessment: Sector Jacksonville''
conducted by the USCG dated 28 June 2006.
e. LSoutheast Virginia Threat Assessment conducted by NCIS
dated 27 August 2008 and 10 October 2008.
f. LMayport, Florida Threat Assessment conducted by NCIS
dated 30 May 2008.
g. LJacksonville, Florida Threat Assessment conducted by
NCIS dated 3 October 2008.
h. L``Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat
Assessment'' and ``Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat
Assessment (Update)'' conducted by the FBI dated 28 March 2008
and 17 April 2008 respectively.
i. L``Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating
Threats 2008-2013'' conducted by the Department of Homeland
Security dated 18 July 2008.
j. L``The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Maritime Domain''
conducted by the USCG dated 25 March 2004.
k. L``The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland'' conducted
by the Director of National Intelligence dated July 2007.
Most of these documents are classified but can be provided
via the appropriate channels, if required. The documents were
cited in briefs to Navy leadership during the Strategic Laydown
and Dispersal decision process.
The decision to create the capacity to homeport a CVN at
NAVSTA Mayport represents the best military judgment of the
DON's leadership regarding strategic considerations. The need
to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of
a catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in
the decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in
Mayport. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton
Roads area on the East Coast presents a unique set of risks.
CVNs assigned to the West Coast are spread among three
homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at
three locations as well. As a result, there are strategic
options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic event
occurs. By contrast, NAVSTA Norfolk is homeport to all five of
the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads
area is the only East Coast location where CVN maintenance and
repair infrastructure exists. The Hampton Roads area also
houses all Atlantic Fleet trained crews and associated
community support infrastructure. A second CVN homeport on the
East Coast will provide additional CVN maintenance
infrastructure and provide strategic options in case of a
catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area. [See page 14.]
Secretary Penn. The risk assessments for both Norfolk and
Mayport are classified. These documents were used by the OPNAV
N3N5 staff during the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal review.
The list of risk assessments was previously provided in
response to a HASC Department of Defense Priorities hearing
held on 27 Jan 09. Since then, there have been two new
assessments for the Hampton Roads area:
(1) LCNO Integrated Vulnerability Assessment for Norfolk,
Virginia dated 11 May 2009, classified.
(2) LSoutheast Virginia Threat Assessment produced by NCIS
dated 17 Jun 2009 concerning the terrorist threat in the SE
Virginia area, classified.
The information in these reports does not significantly
differ from previous reports, nor do they change the strategic
impact to naval forces if the Hampton Roads area was closed by
a catastrophic event. [See page 15.]
------
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL
Ms. Ferguson. There are currently no Air Force specific
General Officer positions at Ft. Bragg, but we will continue to
support the Air Force general presently assigned to the Joint
Special Operations Command position at that location. [See page
17.]
Mr. Calcara. The Army is not aware of any issues. [See page
17.]
Secretary Penn. There are no Department of the Navy Flag or
General Officers relocating to Fort Bragg because of BRAC. [See
page 17.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 3, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Mr. Ortiz. The Department has indicated that several basing
initiatives have been included in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
including Marine Corps training requirements associated with Guam,
nuclear aircraft carrier basing on the East Coast, and Brigade Combat
Team retention in the European theater.
In your estimation, how likely is it that the QDR will be able to
make these explicit decisions in time to include the responses in the
fiscal year 2011 budget submission?
Mr. Arny. The QDR process timeline was established to ensure
integration with the FY 2011 budget cycle. To date, QDR activities are
on track for completion within the specified milestone schedule. I have
no reason to believe that QDR will not proceed as planned in order to
inform the FY 2011 budget submission. However, some issues will require
additional analysis which will defer budget details to the FY 2012
submission.
Mr. Ortiz. The BRAC 2005 process requires the Department of Defense
to complete associated realignments and closures by September 2011.
Does the Department need additional flexibility in schedule to
accomplish the BRAC 2005 timeline?
Mr. Arny. No. The Department does not need additional flexibility
and is on track to implement all BRAC 2005 recommendations prior to the
September 15, 2011 statutory deadline. To ensure BRAC is fully
implemented in accordance with statutory requirements, the Department
assesses status of each recommendation during an annual Integrated
Program and Budget Review. The Department recognizes the unique
challenges associated with implementing the more complex
recommendations and the synchronization efforts required to manage the
interdependencies among many recommendations. To apprise senior
leadership of problems requiring intervention as early as possible, the
Department institutionalized an implementation execution update
briefing program in November 2008. These update briefings, representing
83 percent of the investment value of all recommendations, provide an
excellent forum for managers to review progress. The business managers
have and will continue to brief the status of implementation actions
associated with recommendations exceeding $100M on a continuing basis
through statutory completion of all recommendations (September 15,
2011).
Mr. Ortiz. How does the Department assess the strategic risk of
moving a significant amount of the Department's command structure
concurrently in fiscal year 2011?
Mr. Arny. The Department, specifically the Army, has not identified
any strategic risks with moving a significant amount of the Army's
command structure concurrently in 2011.
The Army employs a doctrinal concept of echeloned displacement when
moving its command and control headquarters in order to ensure
continuity of mission performance. Normally, a headquarters divides
into two functional elements (base and advance). While the base element
continues to operate, the advance element displaces to a new site
where, after it becomes operational, it is joined by the base element.
Three Army Commands (ACOMs) will experience the largest impact:
U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to Fort Bragg, NC; Army Materiel
Command (AMC) to Redstone Arsenal, AL; and Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) to Fort Eustis, VA. All three ACOMs have planned the
initial relocation of the advanced elements at different times,
beginning in FY 2010, and all three base elements join up with their
respective advanced elements prior to 15 Sep 2011.
Mr. Ortiz. How does the Department attribute the doubling of costs
associated with BRAC 2005 implementation from the fiscal year 2006
submission?
Mr. Arny. The BRAC 2005 program has seen a $14.9B (71%) cost
increase over the initial cost estimate ($21.1B). This increase
represents the combined impact of multiple factors, many of which were
not included in the cost estimating model (``COBRA''). These factors
include: inflation; changes in military construction, environmental
restoration and program management costs not included in COBRA;
additional Operation and Maintenance to support fact of life cost
increases; and construction of additional facilities to enhance
capabilities and/or address deficiencies. This last item--increasing
the scope above the initial plan--accounts for the overwhelming
majority of the increase.
Mr. Ortiz. DOD has indicated full funding for sustainment is its
goal. OSD has proposed 90 percent funding of the sustainment account in
fiscal year 2010.
Does OSD believe that the sustainment model accurately forecasts
sustainment requirements?
Mr. Arny. Yes. The Facility Sustainment Model (FSM) is a cost
estimating tool that planners use to estimate future budget
requirements for managing the maintenance and repair of the portfolio
of facilities under their stewardship.
The Department began developing the FSM in 1999/2000 and published
for use in 2001 to support development of the 2003 budget request.
The FSM calculates the theoretical annual sustainment requirement
for each facility in the official DoD Real Property Inventory (RPI)
based on the type of facility (i.e., the Facility Analysis Category--
FAC), the physical size of the facility (e.g., the facility square
footage), and the sustainment cost factor for that type of facility
(e.g., cost per square foot for a FAC). The model is derived from data
from the private sector and assumes that all facilities are new.
Mr. Ortiz. Considering the long-term detrimental effects of not
fully funding sustainment, what is the risk associated with accelerated
deterioration?
Mr. Arny. The risks associated with underfunding sustainment
translates into increased future repair costs and longer outages to
make the repairs. Deterioration that is not addressed results in
reduced service life of the asset and may lead to failure to fully
support military readiness. Structural deterioration, penetrations in
the building envelope that allow water intrusion, and aging service
systems (e.g., electrical or fire protection) each pose life/safety
concerns. Each structure, component, pavement, utility, etc. has its
own set of specific risks, including the following representative
examples:
Roofs that are not maintained or replaced as scheduled
develop leaks. Water intrusion into interior building spaces, which can
often go undetected for a long period of time, creates additional
damage to interior finishes and potentially to structural members which
significantly increases the future repair bill beyond the scope of a
roof replacement. Additionally, storm water on the interior of
buildings creates hazardous conditions for occupants.
Pavement crack sealing and surface rejuvenation helps
prevent potholes. When this maintenance is not performed, it leads to
road base deterioration and ultimately reduces the service life of the
pavement. The future costs to rebuild road pavements far exceed the
cost to provide preventive maintenance to the existing surface.
Concrete spalling on runways and aircraft parking aprons
create conditions for foreign object debris (FOD), which can cause
damage when sucked into aircraft jet engines or when blown out of an
engine into other aircraft or airfield operators. Aircraft must be
hauled by tugs over concrete surfaces that have not been maintained to
minimize the risk of causing injury to personnel or equipment,
adversely impacting military readiness.
Buildings with aging building service systems (e.g.,
heating, ventilation, cooling) create poor work environments which
impact morale, work place efficiencies, and even the health of building
occupants.
In conclusion, underfunded sustainment budgets lead to increased
requirements for more comprehensive repairs in the restoration and
modernization budgets and, if the repairs are neglected, to increased
military construction requirements for replacement structures.
Mr. Ortiz. DOD is on track to privatize 87 percent of the family
housing units, including 188,000 units by 2010.
Considering that 36 percent of the awarded privatization projects
have occupancy rates below expectations, are the housing private
partners going to be able to continue the long-term investment and
financial solvency to continue this program? What are the challenges
that need to be corrected?
Mr. Arny. The 36 percent figure represents a 2006 GAO report. A
newer 2008 GAO report indicates the number has decreased to 22 projects
(24 percent). The large majority of projects in the Military Housing
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) portfolio are only marginally below 90
percent and financial solvency and long-term investment is not an issue
as Debt Service Coverage Ratios (DCRs) generally remain strong. The
occupancy rate of the overall MHPI portfolio in the December 2008
Program Evaluation Plan is 92 percent.
Mr. Ortiz. Compared with the larger outlays required in our
personnel accounts to support Family Housing Privatization, is the
overall Family Housing program saving money or has it just moved money
from a discretionary account to a mandatory funding account?
Mr. Arny. In the long term, the costs for privatized housing are
estimated to be roughly 10 percent less than the costs to housing owned
by the government. Privatization ensures that the sustainment funding
is made to properly maintain the housing.
Mr. Ortiz. Does privatization mask the overall cost afforded to
general/flag officer quarters?
Mr. Arny. No. Such quarters, commonly referred to as executive
homes under privatization, are revitalized and sustained in the same
manner as ordinary privatized family homes. Because private costs
incurred for executive homes directly reduce funds available for other
houses, there may be a greater constraint on spending.
Mr. Ortiz. What is the impact of a deteriorating credit market on
the Public Private Venture program?
Mr. Arny. As would be expected, the stagnation in the housing and
overall financial markets has had an impact on the MHPI program. Market
forces have led to increased costs and tightening of credit standards.
Credit spreads relative to the LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate)
index are now as much as 300-400 basis points as opposed to 100-150
basis points previously. Additionally, Debt Coverage Service Ratios
(DCSR) are now commonly required to be in the 1.4 to 1.5 range versus
1.15 to 1.2 used for earlier projects.
This is not a reflection of distrust in MHPI projects but simply a
lack of liquidity in the market as a whole. Financial institutions
recognize that MHPI projects continue to have high occupancy and strong
operation and maintenance performance while continuing to execute their
renovation and new construction schedules. While our 94 existing
projects are operating normally, finding financing for new projects
presents unique challenges.
Previous tools such as bond insurance and Guaranteed Investment
Contracts (GICs) have all but disappeared. We continue to work closely
with private markets to ensure that our excellent track record puts us
at the head of the line when market liquidity returns. Additionally, we
are looking at uses of our authorities to replace financial products
which have disappeared from the market.
Mr. Ortiz. The Army has programmed $11.2 billion for the Grow-the-
Army initiative and has proposed $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2009
military construction and $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2010. This
military construction investment was based on a proposal to increase
the force structure to include 48 Brigade Combat Teams. Secretary Gates
recently announced that the Army will grow to only 45 Brigade Combat
Teams, causing a misalignment in the proposed infrastructure.
Where will the reduction in three Brigade Combat Teams occur?
Mr. Calcara. The Brigade Combat Teams will be reduced by one each
at Forts Carson, Stewart, and Bliss.
Mr. Ortiz. Considering the change in the overall force posture of
the Army to 45 Brigade Combat Teams, what fiscal year 2009/fiscal year
2010 military construction projects are misaligned to support the
future force?
Mr. Calcara. The Army is currently conducting a gap analysis to
determine this and will provide results to committee staff prior to
conference.
Mr. Ortiz. Considering the Army end strength to support Grow the
Army has not changed, what additional Combat Support/Combat Service
Support elements are required to support the Grow-the-Army initiative?
Where will these additional elements be homebased?
Mr. Calcara. The Army does not intend to build additional Combat
Support/Combat Service Support elements to support the Grow the Army
Initiative. Due to wartime operational demands, the Army has more
requirements for Soldiers than the Active Component 547,400 Army can
fill. By removing three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from the program in
fiscal year 2011, the Army is estimating the removal of approximately
10,300 requirements, allowing those associated Soldiers to be used to
offset requirements existing elsewhere in the force. In fiscal year
2011, this will allow the Army to improve manning levels of next-to-
deploy units much sooner than we are able. These three BCTs do not
exist until fiscal year 2011, and any savings from their removal cannot
be used to improve manning fill in the near term.
Mr. Ortiz. The Army has reported that it has 10,000,000 square feet
of relocatable space to support end-strength growth.
What is the Army's plan to discourage future use of relocatable
spaces?
Mr. Calcara. Garrison Commanders are cautioned to use the
relocatable authority only as a last resort. Relocatable buildings will
be used at about a 50 percent ratio to their real property counterparts
except for certain types of uses such as barracks and medical
facilities. The Army must use the relocatable authority wisely to
bridge the gap between mission requirements and availability of real
property facilities. The Army is to look at alternate options to
provide the needed space. The order of precedence is full utilization
of available real property, including World War II wooden structures
where economic considerations and good engineering judgment dictate,
construction of temporary facilities when the total funded cost does
not exceed $750,000, and short-term leased space off post. The last
option is to use relocatable buildings.
Mr. Ortiz. How does the Army intend to address the 10,000,000
square feet of existing relocatable, temporary space at various Army
installations?
Mr. Calcara. The Army is moving aggressively to eliminate the need
for relocatable buildings. Over the next two years, 16 percent of the
relocatable inventory will be replaced with permanent military
construction (MILCON) projects currently under construction. We
anticipate an additional 66 percent will be replaced with MILCON
projects by fiscal year 2015, 13 percent are awaiting programming, and
the remaining 5 percent satisfy temporary surge requirements and do not
require permanent construction.
Mr. Ortiz. The Army has reported that it has a 5,000,000-acre
training deficit across multiple installations.
How does the Army intend to address the existing deficit in
training space?
Mr. Calcara. The purpose of the Department of the Army's Range and
Training Land Strategy (RTLS) is to address the existing land deficit
in training space facing the Army. The RTLS prioritizes Army training
land investments and optimizes the use of all Army range and training
land assets. The RTLS also provides a long-range plan for the Army to
provide the best range infrastructure and training land to units.
The RTLS was developed in five phases. The first phase was to
inventory current Army training assets. The second phase examined land
values, parcel ownership, environmental constraints, environmental
requirements, and population trends from public records to identify the
best opportunities for training land acquisition and buffering. The
third phase analyzed available land data to recommend short-term and
long-term opportunities based on Army priorities. The RTLS process is
designed to ensure that Army planners continually reevaluate land
requirements against the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and current Army
priorities. The fourth phase was the establishment of planning
objectives and the identification of installations where land
acquisition supports the ACP. The fifth and final phase was to evaluate
public attitudes and provide outreach support for specific land
acquisitions.
The deliberate phases of the RTLS provide the framework for the
Army to select the most appropriate course of action to address
training land shortfalls at specific Army installations. The options
that the Army can pursue to overcome the 4.5 million acre training land
deficit include: focused management to maximize existing land holdings,
buffering through partnerships, utilization of other Federal lands
where possible, and land acquisition.
Mr. Ortiz. If the Army is unable to acquire the documented deficit
in real estate, will this adversely impact military readiness? How?
Mr. Calcara. If the Army is not able to address the documented
deficit in real estate through the Range and Training Land Strategy
(RTLS), there will be impacts to training capability. Commanders may
have to employ work-arounds to accomplish required training events.
While work-arounds can be successfully employed to address some
training capability shortfalls, long-term use of major work-arounds can
have a negative impact on training and unit capability. Significant
training land shortfalls require units, particularly at the brigade
level, to develop work-arounds that train units without stressing their
full operational capability. This creates the risk of developing bad
habits in training and imbeds false expectations as to true battlefield
conditions.
Army training standards are based on lessons learned in combat and
tactical wisdom purchased at great human cost. Every work-around is
essentially a trade-off that makes training less realistic than the
conditions they will face in a combat situation. This is a particularly
significant challenge with respect to operating over large operational
areas, employing manned and unmanned aviation, conducting logistics
operations, and using state-of-the-art communication and intelligence
collection and dissemination systems that require unfettered access to
the electro-magnetic spectrum.
Training capability will be impacted if the Army is unable to
address training land shortfalls. Unit training readiness levels are
determined by commanders. Each commander must assess the degree to
which work-arounds affect the unit's operational capability.
Mr. Ortiz. The Army initially indicated that it intended to acquire
more than 400,000 acres of land to support the existing Pinon Canyon
range. The Army has since reduced its requirements to 100,000 acres.
Why has the Department vacillated on the acreage required to
support training in southeastern Colorado?
Mr. Calcara. The Army's doctrinally based requirement for at least
418,577 additional acres of training land has never been reduced, and
was not challenged or questioned in the recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Report GAO-09-171. In May 2006, Fort
Carson's Department of the Army-approved Land Use Requirements Study
(LURS) validated the need for an additional 418,577 acres of training
land at Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site (PCMS) to support training for
Soldiers stationed at Fort Carson. In February 2007, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved the Army's request for a waiver to
pursue land acquisition for up to 418,577 acres at PCMS. The LURS and
OSD approval were completed before the Grow the Army decision was
complete.
At the request of Congress, the Army conducted additional review
and analysis of the feasibility of acquiring 418,577 acres and
determined that an acquisition of 100,000 acres was feasible and would
provide the greatest training benefit, at the lowest cost, the lowest
acreage footprint, and with the fewest number of affected landowners
and communities. While the acquisition of 100,000 acres, alone,
addresses less than one-quarter of the doctrinal requirement to fulfill
the training land shortfall at Fort Carson/PCMS, it would provide
operational benefits and enhanced training for Soldiers and units
stationed at Fort Carson. If combined with the existing PCMS acreage,
this expanded training area would significantly enhance the Army's
overall capability for maneuver training. Specifically, this area would
provide sufficient space to allow a Heavy Brigade Combat Team and an
Infantry Brigade Combat Team to conduct simultaneous combat training at
PCMS.
Mr. Ortiz. If the Department is unable to acquire additional land
in the Pinon Canyon region, will this adversely impact the stationing
plan at Fort Carson?
Mr. Calcara. The Grow the Army (GTA) Stationing Plan, published in
2007, directed the stationing of two Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
(IBCTs) at Fort Carson. This decision was based on a stationing
analysis and environmental assessment that analyzed growth capacity,
power projection, training and well-being. The Army has a shortfall of
training and maneuver land based on doctrinal and operational
requirements, totaling approximately 4.5 million acres in the United
States. In fact, almost every U.S.-based installation has a shortfall
in maneuver training land. However, most installations experiencing
training land shortfalls do not have any feasible opportunity to
rectify the situation through land acquisition. Encroachment at most
installations has created population densities, environmental issues,
and escalating land values, rendering significant land acquisition
efforts impossible. Fort Carson/Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site (PCMS) is
one of the very few feasible opportunities the Army will ever have to
address this issue through land acquisition.
The shortfall in maneuver training land at Fort Carson/PCMS (as
well as at other installations) has forced the Army to alter its
training by utilizing work-arounds that change the exercises and
scenarios in ways that make them less realistic. In short, these work-
arounds do not stress units to their full operational capabilities, and
run the risk of providing false expectations for units when they
experience real combat.
Because the land acquisition process often takes many years to
complete, and because of the need to complete the Grow the Army
Stationing Plan in the shortest possible time, the Army made a decision
not to link additional land at Pinon Canyon, with additional GTA BCTs.
Prior to the GTA stationing decision, Fort Carson had a validated
requirement shortfall of maneuver training land of approximately
418,000 acres. Stationing BCT #47 would have exacerbated the shortfall
to over 500,000 acres. The cancellation of BCT #47 brings the shortfall
back to approximately 418,000 acres.
Mr. Ortiz. Please explain how the Department is planning to acquire
land and specifically, how eminent domain is planning to be used.
Mr. Calcara. In some circumstances, the Army will pursue the
purchase of land to mitigate training land deficiencies. The current
Army position is to purchase land only where it is feasible,
operationally sound, and compatible with environmental conditions and
requirements. Additionally, there are no current plans to use eminent
domain condemnation authority to acquire land from unwilling property
owners.
Mr. Ortiz. The Marine Corps has requested $1.2 billion in the
budget request for 2010 to support an end strength increase of 27,000
marines.
Will infrastructure be built in time to support the arrival of the
new 27,000 Marines?
Secretary Penn. The target date for achieving 202,000 was FY 2011.
However, the Marine Corps attained its 202,000 end-strength goal in
2009. The Marine Corps infrastructure development plan remains on track
and we are prepared to support the accelerated growth in end strength
with the continued implementation of our interim solutions including
extended use of temporary facilities, slowing down of demolition, more
extensive use of BAH and assignment standards.
Mr. Ortiz. What alternatives are the Marine Corps pursuing to
accommodate growth?
Secretary Penn. Due to the long lead time for permanent facilities,
units may be in temporary facility solutions for 2-4 years after unit
standup. Temporary facility solutions include: doubling up existing
facilities, slowing planned building demolition for use in the short
term, and relocatable facilities (trailers, sprung shelters and pre-
engineered buildings).
The FY 2009 Military Construction plan for the Marine Corps
includes accelerated enablers common to 202,000 increased footprint--
utilities systems, family housing, barracks, training ranges, etc.
($1.4 billion). The Marine Corps military construction plan ensures
quality of life for our rapidly expanding force. Unit specific
construction begins in FY 2010 after the expected completion of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review.
For Marine Corps Bachelor Housing, until additional barracks are
constructed, the Marine Corps has increased authorization of Basic
Allowance for Housing (BAH) for senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs)
to allow them to live off-base and has taken steps to temporarily
billet Marines in surge/overflow barracks during renovations until new
barracks come on-line. Temporary trailers/modular facilities are also
being used to support initial training/accession pipeline throughput
requirements.
For Marine Corps Family Housing, the Marine Corps plan for
addressing the additional family housing requirement due to Growing the
Force relies on the communities near the military installations as the
primary source of housing. Through the conduct of housing market
analyses, housing for the additional families associated with our 202K
growth has been programmed where we've determined that the local
community cannot support the housing needs of our military members.
Almost 5,000 additional homes have been programmed in the current FYDP
to support Marine Corps family housing requirements.
Mr. Ortiz. The Navy has taken steps to secure real estate interests
in areas where aviation accidents are most likely to occur. However,
there remains significant real estate that could pose a threat to the
local community because of aviation operations.
What steps are the Navy and Marine Corps taking to limit aviation
accidents to the local community?
Secretary Penn. The Department takes a proactive approach to
maximizing aviation safety in and around our air installations using a
combination of airfield safety regulations, operational alternatives/
procedures, and Air Installation Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) studies.
Each station evaluates operational alternatives and establishes
procedures to reduce accident potential, e.g., flight track
modifications, altering hours of operation, changes in pattern
altitudes, etc.
Finally, the Department of Navy has a very aggressive AICUZ program
focused on air operations and land use compatibility in high noise and
safety zones. The DoN is continually evaluating our training
requirements and seeking alternatives to mitigate noise and safety
concerns while preserving our mission capabilities. Through the AICUZ
Program, installations work with local officials to foster compatible
land use development though land use controls such as zoning.
Additionally, most Navy and Marine Corps installations have a Community
Plans and Liaison Officer (CPLO) on staff to work with neighboring
communities to address their concerns.
Mr. Ortiz. Does the Navy and Marine Corps have a program for each
installation that limits aviation incidents to the local community?
Secretary Penn. The Department of Navy has a very aggressive Air
Installations Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) program focused on air
operations and land use compatibility in high noise and safety zones.
The DoN is continually evaluating our training requirements and seeking
alternatives to mitigate noise and safety concerns while preserving our
mission capabilities. Through the AICUZ Program, installations work
with local officials to foster compatible land use development though
land use controls such as zoning. Additionally, most Navy and Marine
Corps installations have a Community Plans and Liaison Officer (CPLO)
on staff to work with neighboring communities to address their
concerns.
Mr. Ortiz. The Marine Corps has proposed a realigned III Marine
Expeditionary Force command structure that relocates the Marine Corps
general officers to Guam with little command structure remaining in
Okinawa.
How does the proposed command structure enhance the III Marine
Expeditionary Force capabilities?
Secretary Penn. Guam, as the westernmost U.S. territory in the
Pacific, does provide strategic flexibility and freedom of action to
support the Range of Military Operations including Theater Security
Cooperation activities. III MEF forces are currently spread between
Okinawa, mainland Japan and Hawaii, while additional forces deploy to
the region from CONUS as part of the Unit Deployment Program. III MEF
major subordinate commands, 1st MAW, 3MARDIV and 3MLG are all presently
located on Okinawa and the current proposed command structure has all
three subordinate headquarters moving to Guam. Operational
relationships between these adjacent units will continue to remain
operationally effective after they relocate to Guam. Additionally, the
current plan calls for Marine Corps Bases Butler Headquarters to remain
on Okinawa.
Mr. Ortiz. The Marine Corps is programmed to depart a heavily
encroached Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, Okinawa, and move to a
new location on Okinawa at Camp Schwab. The Japanese construction
proposal for the Futenma Replacement Facility, embedded in the
previously agreed U.S./Japanese Defense Posture Review Initiative, has
several safety-of-flight issues that Naval Air Systems Command would
not waive. Opening up negotiations with the Japanese on this issue may
necessitate renegotiations on other provisions of the overall
agreement.
Is the Marine Corps prepared to accept the risk associated with a
Futenma Replacement facility that will be constructed with safety-of-
flight issues?
Secretary Penn. The Department of Navy is committed to the safety
of both aircraft operations and the community in which our aircraft
operate. As such, we will actively seek and support measures to
eliminate deviations from criteria as our bilateral planning processes
continue.
Mr. Ortiz. The Department of Defense has indicated that training
associated with the realigning force from Okinawa should be funded by
Government of Japan and U.S. Department of Defense funds. However,
transient Marine training enhancements would be funded by the Marine
Corps. This training enhancement may exceed $4 billion.
What is the projected funding requirement for transient Marines?
Secretary Penn. Training for all DoD forces in the Pacific,
including transient Marine forces, is being studied in the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). Any future programs resulting from the QDR to
expand training capacity in the Pacific theater, to include expansion
of training capacity in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI) for Guam-based and transient Marine forces, will be
addressed in a separate program of record and will be evaluated in a
future Environmental Impact Statement. Projected costs for additional
training capacity in the Pacific will be developed following the QDR.
Mr. Ortiz. When does the Department anticipate expanding the
Northern Marianas training capacity to support Marine training?
Secretary Penn. The Department is studying alternatives to meet the
Marine Corps Core Competency and associated collective training and
MAGTF readiness requirements as well as joint training requirements in
the Pacific in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Programs
resulting from the QDR, to include expansion of training capacity in
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, will be evaluated in
a future Environmental Impact Statement and established in a separate
program of record. Delivery of these capabilities is expected to
coincide with completion of other facilities to support the arrival of
relocating Marines.
Mr. Ortiz. The Navy has indicated that alternative CVN berthing is
an important consideration in managing CVN assets.
What is the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast
CVN homeporting facilities, and how might that risk be altered by
homeporting a CVN at Mayport?
Secretary Penn. It is difficult to quantify the likelihood of a
catastrophic event, natural or man-made, in the Hampton Roads area
(currently the only Atlantic Coast CVN homeport). The Navy must plan to
address the maintenance and repair infrastructure requirements for CVNs
as well as the operational considerations. Homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA
Mayport is the hedge against the unacceptable risk of having all five
Atlantic Fleet CVNs homeported in one area. The risk of a catastrophic
event in the Hampton Roads area is not altered by having a second CVN
homeport, the risk is mitigated and provides the assurance that the
Navy will be able to meet its national defense obligations.
Mr. Ortiz. Are the costs associated with homeporting a CVN at
Mayport worth the benefits in terms of hedging against the risk of a
catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities?
Secretary Penn. If a catastrophic event were to occur in the
Hampton Roads area, the only CVN Atlantic Coast homeport and
maintenance/repair facility, there would be an operational impact on
the CVN force. The costs would need to be balanced against the lost
operational time and capability if Atlantic Fleet CVNs were required to
transit 12,700 nautical miles to a Pacific Fleet maintenance and repair
facility if there was catastrophic damage to the facility in the
Hampton Roads area.
It is prudent to maintain a second CVN port facility on the East
Coast just as the Navy does on the West Coast to ensure there will be
no gap or lapse in Navy's ability to meet its Title 10 requirements and
maintain seamless CVN operation.
Mr. Ortiz. The Department has indicated that requirements
associated the nuclear aircraft carrier basing on the East Coast will
be determined in the context of the QDR.
In your estimation, how likely is it that the QDR will be able to
make this type of explicit decisions in time to include the fiscal year
2011 budget submission?
Secretary Penn. The QDR is not due to report out until early 2010;
however we do expect some of the specific issues to be briefed to the
Secretary of Defense for final approval prior to the written report.
Budgetary adjustments, if any, will be made at the appropriate time.
Mr. Ortiz. How does the QDR impact the fiscal year 2010 budget
request to include $75 million in Mayport improvements, which could
also be used to homeport a CVN at Mayport?
Secretary Penn. The proposed FY 2010 budget request includes $46.3
million for channel dredging in Mayport. Additionally, the FY 10 budget
requests $29.7 million for Charlie Wharf improvements at Mayport. These
improvements are necessary since Charlie Wharf is the primary
ammunition loading wharf for ships homeported in Mayport, and are not
associated specifically with an alternate carrier facility.
The Navy must perform maintenance dredging at NAVSTA Mayport every
two years. In FY 2010, the Navy is requesting MILCON funding to dredge
the channel to a depth adequate to allow a CVN to enter the port
without limitation. This would provide Navy a port in which a CVN can
berth with adequate support and force protection.
Mr. Ortiz. The fiscal year 2010 Air Force MILCON budget request
contains $1.0 billion. This limited infrastructure investment is
causing significant inefficiencies locally and accelerating degradation
of assigned aviation assets. Examples include: new F-22s arriving
without hangars and other support infrastructure at Elmendorf AFB, AK,
and trainers remaining in warehouses until the appropriate supporting
infrastructure is programmed and built.
Why did Air Force not program infrastructure in time to support
valuable aviation assets?
Ms. Ferguson. With regards to infrastructure, there is no single
``most'' critical area of risk. The risk in infrastructure the Air
Force has taken in facilities and infrastructure is broad and varies
according to the needs of the entire AF. We balance this risk across
all combatant commands, major commands (MAJCOM), and installations by
building our investment program utilizing the highest priority projects
with wing and MAJCOM commanders' input. The need for MILCON investment
is across all facility types, including operational, training,
maintenance hangars, research and development, and quality of service.
With a limited and fixed top line, the AF must determine priorities
using investment impact data and take risk where necessary. MILCON
projects included in the program are based on project merit and meeting
Air Force priorities.
Mr. Ortiz. The Air Force has proposed to defer investments in
facilities sustainment and restoration. The Air Force is requesting
funds necessary to support 59 percent of the required facility
recapitalization.
Why did the Air Force elect to take risk in the facility accounts
and delay critical restoration and modernization activities?
Ms. Ferguson. Modernizing the Air Force's aging aircraft fleet is
our toughest challenge; in order to recapitalize and modernize the Air
Force must take risk in some areas. Because the Air Force invested
heavily in infrastructure in the past, it was decided that risks in our
facility and infrastructure accounts were acceptable for a short
duration.
Mr. Ortiz. What is the long-term effect of a delay in funding
restoration and modernization activities?
Ms. Ferguson. Our current risk in facilities investment has
resulted in a $10.2B backlog in requirements and will create additional
future bow-waves. The effects of delays in Restoration and
Modernization will require investments in facility sustainment well
above modeled requirements. The Air Force views installations as
critical war-fighting platforms that provide a core Air Force
expeditionary combat capability. The AF fully understands the risk
taken in our modernizing our facilities and infrastructure cannot
jeopardize our ability to conduct critical operations from our
installation weapon systems.
Mr. Ortiz. The Air Force has indicated that it intends to determine
four JSF operational bases and one additional training base to support
JSF in the next two years.
How will encroachment and increased noise associated with the JSF
variant impact the decision to base aviation assets?
Ms. Ferguson. The Secretary of the Air Force directed an
``Enterprise-Wide Look'' (EWL) for the beddown of the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) to ensure the Air Force perform an objective review of
all potential F-35 operational and training basing options.
Additionally, the Secretary recently approved the basing criteria for
the JSF EWL, which include such factors as airspace and ranges;
weather; facilities; runways and ramps; environmental and cost factors;
logistics support; and availability of support facilities such as
housing, medical and child care. The Air Force's plan is to make the
criteria available through a briefing to all interested members of
Congress and their staffs, which we expect to provide in August 2009.
Mr. Ortiz. The Air Force has taken steps to secure real estate
interests in areas where aviation accidents are most likely to occur.
However, there remains significant real estate that could pose a threat
to the local community because of aviation operations.
What steps is the Air Force taking to limit aviation accidents to
the local community?
Ms. Ferguson. One of our main approaches to limiting aviation
accident impacts to the local community is to encourage compatible
development in the areas with the greatest history of aircraft
accidents occurring around the airfield. The areas with the greatest
accident potential is the runway, followed by the clear zone, Accident
Potential Zones (APZs) I and APZ II at the end of Air Force
installation runways. Air Force installations continually work with
local communities to limit development to low densities in APZs I and
II. The Air Installations Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) program
discourages land uses that concentrate large numbers of people in a
single area, e.g. churches, schools, auditoriums, residential, and
manufacturing that involves flammable materials from being located in
these two zones. Low intensity land uses such as some light industrial,
wholesale trade, some business services, recreation, agriculture, and
open space, mineral extraction can be compatible in APZ I if they don't
create emissions that create visibility problems or attract birds.
Compatible land uses for APZ II include all the ones compatible in APZ
I plus a few more types of manufacturing, low intensity retail trade
and low density single family residential (1-2 dwelling units per
acre).
The installations and local communities can also pursue
encroachment partnering projects within APZ and seek funding through
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Readiness and Environmental
Protection Initiative (REPI) program.
Mr. Ortiz. Does the Air Force have a program for each installation
that limits aviation incidents to the local community?
Ms. Ferguson. Yes. The Air Force conducts its aviation mishap
prevention program under policy, guidance and oversight issued by the
Air Force Chief of Safety. At the direction of the Air Force Chief of
Safety every installation responsible for a flying mission maintains a
flight safety program with the over-arching goal of preventing aviation
mishaps. An important part of that goal includes preventing mishaps on
and around installations where Air Force aircraft operate.
To accomplish that goal, Air Force installations incorporate mishap
prevention programs in concert with community involvement, partnering,
and information sharing. Some examples include:
Mid-Air Collision Avoidance (MACA) programs
- Base level safety office programs required by Air Force
regulation
- Community involvement is usually high
- Includes comprehensive web sites for most bases who share
airspace with local flying communities/airports/FBOs
- Can involve road-shows to local airports/flying orgs
- Bases are required to keep and update a MACA Pamphlet for
the local community on a regular basis
Usually contains basic information about the
military base traffic pattern, procedures for passage,
ATC radar codes, radio frequencies, etc.
- Very helpful for local aviators who may or may not have in-depth
knowledge on the local military operations
Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) programs
- Each base develops its own procedures depending on local hazards
in accordance with Air Force safety policy
- Includes risks from all wildlife, not just birds
- Many utilize local outreach programs to keep problem species
from public/private land surrounding bases. For example, with landowner
permission, McConnell Air Force Base utilizes a border collie to harass
geese on private land around.
- Local threat information is also available publicly via world
wide web (Avian Hazard Assessment System [AHAS] and Bird Avoidance
Model [BAM] web sites, which use historical data and Next Generation
Radar [NEXRAD] data to assess strike hazards for any particular time
period)
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Abercrombie. The Department of Defense has indicated realigning
forces from Okinawa should be funded by Government of Japan and DOD
funds. What assurances do we have that U.S. companies will receive
part, or all of the MILCON to construct the housing for the Marines on
Guam as opposed to outsourcing these requirements to foreign companies
?
Mr. Arny. US MILCON projects on Guam will have all of the same
protections that every other US MILCON project has that are outlined in
Title 10 and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). These govern
our actions and we must follow them. Projects funded with direct cash
contributions from the Japan will be openly competed on a fair and
level playing field and administered by the US Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC). NAVFAC will administer these projects in
accordance with the FAR. Regarding contractor housing, DoD and GovGuam
are determining strategies for mitigating impacts and opportunities for
long-term benefits to Guam. Contractors competing for work will be
evaluated on ability to address workforce impacts.
Mr. Abercrombie. Costs associated with Marine training enhancements
on Guam and the Northern Marianas would be funded by the Marine Corps.
This training enhancement may exceed $4 billion. What is the projected
funding requirement for transient Marines? When does DOD anticipate
expanding the Northern Marianas training capacity to support Marine
training?
Mr. Arny. Training for all DoD forces in the Pacific, including
transient Marine forces, is being studied in the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Any future programs resulting from the QDR to expand
training capacity in the Pacific theater, to include expansion of
training capacity in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI) for Guam based and transient Marine forces, will be addressed in
a separate program of record and will be evaluated in a future
Environmental Impact Statement. Projected costs for additional training
capacity in the Pacific will be developed following the QDR.
Asia-Pacific Training as a whole is a Directed Issue under the
current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Several courses of action are
currently under review to determine how best to ensure adequate joint
and combined training capacity to meet the broad spectrum of training
requirements in the region. A recommendation will be made as part of
the overall QDR process.
Mr. Abercrombie. The nation's four public shipyards are in
desperate need of modernization to be able to maintain a 21st century
fleet. Is there a capital investment/modernization plan for the four
public yards? If not, how is the Navy planning to ensure continued
investment to maintain and modernize the shipyards? The Fiscal Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) has not been released yet pending the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), but in the interim, public shipyards such as
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in my district, are dealing with cost
growth on old project plans and antiquated repair facilities that are
insufficient to address modern requirements. What does the Navy plan to
do about this? Push projects further out in the FYDP?
Secretary Penn. The Naval Sea Systems Command, the Navy's technical
authority for public shipyards, maintains a shipyard modernization plan
for the Naval Shipyards which acts to guide infrastructure investments.
Leveraging this plan and other locally generated requirements, specific
projects are developed at the installation level and validated
regionally. The Navy assesses each prospective MILCON project through a
structured approach aligned to Navy priorities. This objective
assessment leads to a prioritization of all MILCON requirements and
forms the basis of the Navy MILCON program.
Shipyard projects are evaluated and prioritized in the same manner
as, and with, all Navy MILCON requirements. Every year we review the
entire shipyard recapitalization program to ensure it meets or exceeds
the minimum capital investment requirements of U.S.C. Title 10 Section
2476 (Minimum capital investment for certain depots). The FY10
President's Budget Submission included two MILCON projects valued at
$296 million in support of Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, comprising 27% of the
total Navy MILCON program.
Recapitalizing the Public Shipyards is a long-term challenge that
the Navy will continue to keep at the forefront as we work within the
current limited fiscal environment.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Ms. Ferguson, you discussed in the hearing that
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz requested a re-look at the basing
process for the Joint Strike Fighter.
Part 1: Why did the Air Force decide that the criteria guiding the
selection of bases was insufficient and required a ``re-look?''
Part 2: Can you please discuss some of the changes you expect to
see as a result of this re-look?
Part 3: How much additional time will this ``re-look'' add to the
final selection decisions?
Part 4: Will the committee have an opportunity to review the new
criteria before final selection decisions are finalized?
Ms. Ferguson. Prior to the fall of 2008, our Major Commands de-
centrally managed and executed our basing process. Last fall, Secretary
Donley directed that these basing decisions take place at the
Headquarters Air Force level and established the Air Force Senior
Basing Executive Steering Group (SB-ESG) to oversee these actions and
ensure a standard, repeatable process in determining overall AF basing
opportunities. Additionally, Secretary Donley directed an ``Enterprise-
Wide Look'' (EWL) for the beddown of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to
ensure the Air Force perform an objective review of all potential F-35
operational and training basing options. To implement Secretary
Donley's new strategic basing process, the SB-ESG worked with Air
Combat Command (ACC), designated as the lead command for the JSF
beddown, and Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to finalize
basing criteria for both operational bases and for training bases in a
way that recognizes their differing requirements. Secretary Donley
recently approved the draft criteria for the JSF EWL, which include
such factors as airspace and ranges; weather; facilities; runways and
ramps; environmental and cost factors; logistics support; and
availability of support facilities such as housing, medical and child
care. The Air Force's plan is to make the criteria available through a
briefing to all interested members of Congress and their staffs, which
we expect to provide in August 2009. Finally, it is the Air Force's
intent to complete the Environmental Impact Statements and basing
decisions in a manner that supports the current JSF aircraft delivery
schedule.
Mr. Franks. Ms. Ferguson, what implications does the Air Force's
new Combat Air Forces Restructuring have on your BRAC activities?
Specifically at bases where the drawdown of legacy aircraft is
accelerated and a future mission designation, like the Joint Strike
Fighter, is yet to be determined?
Ms. Ferguson. The Air Force's new Combat Air Forces Restructuring
should have no adverse affect on actions required to complete BRAC
2005. MILCON projects associated with BRAC 2005 at Combat Air Forces
Restructuring-affected bases are already in progress. At bases where
the drawdown of legacy aircraft are accelerated, and future missions
have not been designated, there is the potential for unused excess
capacity.
Mr. Franks. Ms. Ferguson, you mention in your testimony several
large energy projects that are being touted as a huge success for the
U.S. Air Force. Specifically you mention, ``photovoltaic (PV) solar
array at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the largest PV array in North
America, generated 57,139 megawatt-hours in FY2008, and saving
approximately $1 million per year.'' When will these projects
transition from a ``great idea or initiative'' to something the Air
Force mandates at locations with very similar environmental conditions,
like bases in Arizona.
Ms. Ferguson. The Air Force is continually reviewing opportunities
to use the available renewable resources for energy projects to improve
the energy security at its installations, whether through enhanced use
lease authority or other forms of public-private partnership.
Capitalizing on development opportunities for large energy projects
requires leadership, partnering with industry, and a cogent strategic
approach. One of the pillars of the Air Force's infrastructure energy
strategic plan is to promote the development of renewable and
alternative energy for use in facilities and ground vehicles and
equipment. Opportunities to develop renewable and alternative energy in
any given locale are driven by four primary factors:
Availability of renewable resources
Utility and commodity cost
Federal, state and local tax incentives, rebates, and
mandates
Deployment and sustainability
The Air Force identifies and reviews executable projects each year
to ensure the best investment opportunities are identified. Projects
are addressed on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the project
provides the best opportunity to fulfill the Air Force mission and meet
its goals.
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