[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-43]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN
MILITARY PARTNERSHIP
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 23, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 23, 2009, Effective Counterinsurgency: The Future
of the U.S.-Pakistan Military Partnership...................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 23, 2009......................................... 35
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY
PARTNERSHIP
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Barno, Lt. Gen. David W., USA (Ret.), Director, Near East South
Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 4
Kilcullen, Dr. David, Partner, Crumpton Group, LLC, Senior
Fellow, EastWest Institute, Member of the Advisory Board,
Center for a New American Security............................. 7
Nawaz, Shuja, Director, South Asian Center, The Atlantic Council
of the United States........................................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Barno, Lt. Gen. David W...................................... 39
Kilcullen, Dr. David......................................... 49
Nawaz, Shuja................................................. 54
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY
PARTNERSHIP
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 23, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:28 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good afternoon. Today, we have with us an
outstanding panel of experts to discuss the future of the
United States-Pakistan military partnership.
I am pleased to welcome our friend, General David Barno,
Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic
Studies, a National Defense University; Dr. David Kilcullen,
former advisor to General Petraeus, and author of the recent
book, ``The Accidental Guerrilla''; Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Director
of the South Asia Center at The Atlantic Council. And we
certainly welcome you.
I might mention at this outset--I said that the next
hearing we would begin, and have our questioners come from the
bottom row, backwards, using the same general format. However,
I will take advantage of asking a question or two, as Mr.
McHugh will, and then we go to the bottom row, and come back.
Our hearing could not be more timely. This Congress, this
Administration, are committed to developing a mutually
beneficial long-term and consistent relationship with the
country of Pakistan.
Pakistan may well pose the most complex security challenge
facing us. The terrorist havens continue to thrive in
Pakistan's border area, providing refuge to Al Qaeda, and
negatively impacting stability in Afghanistan. Terrorist and
insurgent forces on Pakistan's territory also contribute to
Pakistan's own internal instability, which is further
compounded by the country's economic crisis, and civilian
government, with limited powers.
At the same time, Pakistan continues to possess enough
fissile material for about 55 to 90 nuclear weapons, and
tensions with its nuclear-armed neighbor, India, have
increased.
So how do we strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military
partnership to better address these challenges? In my opinion,
the Administration's recent Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is a
step in the right direction. However, the strategy alone does
not guarantee success. Implementation of the strategy,
benchmarks to measure progress, and accountability are all
critical, as well as close cooperation with our Pakistani
partners in all of these areas.
Accountability is particularly important, given the
significant resources the Administration is requesting from
Congress and the American people for efforts in Pakistan.
Following 9-11, Pakistan has received almost $12 billion from
our country, including about $6.4 billion in the Department of
Defense Coalition Support Fund reimbursements and $2.3 billion
in security-related assistance.
The recent supplemental budget request for the fiscal year
2009 also includes $400 million for a new Pakistani
counterinsurgency capabilities fund.
Does the current U.S. approach regarding reimbursements and
security assistance for Pakistan make sense? Or does need to
change in a way to better achieve its objectives and ensure a
measurable return on investment? And do we have the right
balance between security assistance and assistance for economic
development?
You should know there is legislation pending in Congress
that seeks to increase U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on security
matters by specifically conditioning U.S. assistance for
Pakistan on such cooperation.
I look forward to your thoughts, your recommendations.
Now, I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, John
McHugh, for comments he may wish to make.
And then we will hear our panel, and then go to questions.
And as I said before, we will begin our questions after Mr.
McHugh and I ask our questions, with the bottom row, using the
same procedure as we have from the top row, in recent days.
Mr. McHugh.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join
you in welcoming--a belated welcome, I might add, to our
distinguished panelists. And knowing some of you personally,
and all of you professionally, and admired your work, we are
deeply appreciative of your effort to be here, and your efforts
to stay here. We all apologize for the timing involved. But I
know you understand we really had no control over that.
As the chairman correctly noted, Washington--in fact, much
of the United States--has been, shall we say, abuzz over this
Nation's Pakistan policies. Certainly, the President helped to
increase the discussion on this very urgent issue when he
introduced a strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan just a
short time ago.
And a fundamental element of the plan is its call for
expanding our partnership with the Pakistani military, through
building counterinsurgency capabilities, and promoting closer
cooperation across the Afghan-Pak border.
Right after the legislation was dropped, the House had a
bill introduced before it, calling for an increase limitation
and conditions on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, to
include Title 10 reimbursement, and building partnership and
capacity programs.
And some have expressed--I think understandably so--concern
that this proposal would unnecessarily constrain the Department
of Defense amidst what is already a very fluid and dynamic
situation, to say the least, in Pakistan.
That was capped off, during our recently concluded Easter
recess, when the Administration submitted its fiscal year 2009
Wartime Emergency Supplemental Request, which includes funding
to reimburse the Pakistan military for its counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency efforts. As I understand, the measure also
includes a new authority and funding stream that would build
the capacity and capabilities of Pakistani security forces,
called the ``Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund,'' or
the PCCF.
Clearly, there has been a lot of activity. And we
appreciate our panelists' efforts here, today, to help us sort
through all of it.
And let us just start for a moment, briefly, with the
President's new strategic direction for Pakistan. It would seem
to me there is little debate that Pakistan rests in a critical
region, and is a central front on the War on Terror. They are
an essential partner.
But it is a complex nation, with its own set of challenges,
including internal political uncertainty; an economic crisis; a
rugged western border area that provides sanctuary to Al Qaeda,
Taliban and other extremist groups, who are expanding very
dramatically, in some instances, their reach eastward; and
ongoing tension with India, which was reignited following the
Mumbai attacks.
In this light, in my opinion, I believe the President's
strategic direction understandably focused on Pakistan. While I
agree that Islamabad must be part of the solution in the
region, I disagree with some who have implied that solving
Pakistan necessarily solves Afghanistan.
We can help make a true partner--will require elements
within Pakistan to make the strategic choices necessary to
sever ties with extremist groups who threaten both their own
internal security, as well as stability, in Afghanistan, and
the region as a whole. And a key to accomplishing this aim will
depend on our ability to understand and exploit Pakistan's
regional concerns, motivation and interest.
To that end, I believe Pakistan requires a strategy that
employs goals and requirements which support a long-term
respectful strategic partnership, instead of one that is merely
transactional in nature. This is where Congress must play an
important role.
As I stated earlier, I am concerned that efforts to limit
and condition existing security assistance in building
partnership-capacity efforts are counterproductive and, in
fact, cut against our overall long-term strategic objectives in
Pakistan. Moreover, such initiatives send mixed signals to
Islamabad.
Let me be clear: These programs demand oversight and
scrutiny. Still, I believe that intelligent application of
funding conditions should complement, not restrain, our
strategic interests.
And, finally--which leads me to the current security
environment in Pakistan. I am of the opinion the traditional
peacetime framework for security assistance--I am--sure, I am.
I am of the opinion the traditional peacetime framework for
security assistance is inappropriate and no longer works. The
scale, nature and frequency of violence in Pakistan, whether it
be the Red Mosque incident, the assassination of Benazir
Bhutto, or the conflict raging against Al Qaeda and the Taliban
on its western border, makes that nation more appropriately
comparable to a combat zone, like Iraq and Afghanistan, than
like a Central European country seeking foreign military
financing.
That is why, in response to a question from Chairman
Skelton during a recent hearing, General Petraeus said, ``The
correct analogy for our train-and-equip forces in Pakistan
should be what we are currently executing in Iraq.'' The
general further testified, ``We need an organization similar to
our security-transition command in Iraq.'' And I would remind
everyone that this is organization that successfully built the
Iraqi security forces.
In short, the Administration is militarizing foreign
assistance to Pakistan very rightfully, because the enemy has a
vote. The conflict, as the Administration's strategy concludes,
is in Pakistan, too; for our Pakistan partner requires--is
military capability for counterinsurgency and more.
As such, I feel that advocates of using peacetime paradigms
to deal with wartime problems simply fail to recognize the
profound security challenges Pakistan face, and the scope and
tools required to solve those problems.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing.
With that, I would yield back to balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman very much.
A word of apology to our panel: We got here just as quickly
as we could, after the series of votes. We thank you for your
patience. We look forward to your testimony.
Without objection, any written testimony you may have is
reserved for the record. We will remind the members here that
they were strictly under the five-minute rule.
And, General, we will start with you.
And, again, we thank you all for being with us.
General.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID W. BARNO, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR,
NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
General Barno. Thanks, Chairman Skelton, and Congressman
McHugh, and members of the Committee on Armed Services. Thanks
very much for the invitation to speak on the future of the
U.S.-Pakistan military partnership.
As the chairman noted, I am still working for the Defense
Department. But the views that I will offer today will be my
own.
In addition to my 19 months serving as the overall
commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan from late
2003 to 2005, I stayed very engaged on these issues in my
current job, taking approximately two dozen trips to Pakistan
over the last five or six years. And I recently returned from a
trip earlier this year, to Afghanistan, to the southern part of
the country, and visited several provinces there.
On a more personal note, my youngest son just returned from
a 12-month combat tour in Afghanistan, where he served as an
air cavalry scout platoon leader in the 101st Airborne
Division. So we are very proud of him. We are grateful to have
him home safe. And we pray every day for his fellow young
Americans that are still in harm's way.
So this is a personal issue for me, as it is for so many of
the members, I know, and for those that have young ones serving
in harm's way there.
I would like to summarize some of my written comments
today, as briefly as I can. First, I would note that I believe
Pakistan, today, presents the United States with its greatest
global strategic challenge.
As the second-largest Islamic country in the world, with a
population exceeding 160 million people, and a nation armed
with nuclear weapons. A meltdown of the government and society
in Pakistan would rapidly become the preeminent national
security threat facing the United States.
Events in Pakistan today are spiraling out of control. And
our options in reversing this downward trend are limited, at
best. I would say that a struggle for the very soul of Pakistan
has begun. And the state of Pakistan has a very weak hand to
play in this conflict.
A key role that the United States and our international
friends and allies has to play is to help strengthen this hand.
Compounding the challenge in the Pakistani state is the
internally conflicted nature of Pakistan, regarding this
extremist threat. The Pakistani military and intelligence
services are no longer the secular organizations that they were
10 or 15 or 20 years ago. In many ways, they have become much
more anti-American in their internal dynamics, and they have
growing sympathies, culturally, with the insurgents in this
fight.
Moreover, I think that the security services remain
convinced that their prime enemy continues to be India. No
experienced senior Pakistani military or, I believe, political
leader, truly believes in the depth of their heart, that the
U.S. is a long-term partner in this region, much less a long-
term partner to Pakistan.
The U.S.-India nuclear-power agreement cemented this
mistrust in Pakistan. And reversing this widely held belief in
the country will be difficult, if not impossible.
From this perspective, all decisions in Pakistan now tend
to be based upon the idea of what the region will look like the
day after the United States leaves--their so-called lack of
confidence and trust in a future that includes the U.S.
I believe that the senior Pakistani military leadership
remain convinced that soon after the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the U.S. give up on Afghanistan, that
their long-term struggle with India will resume once again, and
that they have to maintain capabilities for that next phase of
this war.
That is a very controversial outlook. But I think it
underlies much of the Pakistani decision-making.
I believe there are few realistic positive outcomes that
are imaginable for Pakistan over the next several years. But I
can outline three possible scenarios. And, of course, there are
others.
One scenario would be a state-failure scenario. This is the
worst-case option, where a combination of accelerating economic
decline and terrorist violence, fueled by ineffective
governance, could destroy the economic and political viability
of the country.
Some movement towards an internal revolution, led by the
hard-line Islamist factions could take place in this setting.
And, of course, this would be the most dangerous scenario for
us, given the nature of the military capabilities that Pakistan
has today.
A second option might be a continued stalemate, where the
military and intelligence services restore some amount of
control over the insurgents, and gain more proficiency in
counterinsurgency, but there is continued weak political
leadership, as governance capacity grows; but the same approach
to cutting peace deals with the insurgence continues. This is
essentially a continuation of what we see today.
And then a third--perhaps a more optimistic scenario--would
be a scenario of gradual improvement, where Pakistan achieves
some sort of political rapprochement with India; its economy
reaches some degree of precarious stability; and the civilian
leadership that is still new in power gains a foothold, and is
supported and buttressed by U.S. and international aid.
This, of course, is an outcome that we all seek. And we are
looking for remedies to move towards.
Some possible prescriptions in moving in this direction: I
would argue, first of all, that Pakistan requires its own
strategy with the U.S., and it is not simply part of a single
so-called Af-Pak strategy--that there are distinct differences
culturally, politically, economically, socially, between the
nations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And Pakistan deserves a
full-forced, focused, strategic appropriate in U.S. thinking
for that nation alone.
The U.S. must assist Pakistan in managing change--
economically, militarily, perhaps even societally, as it deals
with these huge problems that have been brought on by a deadly
combination of factors.
I think the U.S. has to assess what factors are required to
cause positive change in Pakistani decision-making, to abandon
this so-called double game--this hedging approach that is
expecting a future without the United States, and without the
international community; this idea that the resumption of the
cold war with India will be the long-term paradigm for the
region.
And I think a key part of that is that the U.S. has to
build a vision of a long-term strategic partnership between
Pakistan and the United States; one that is not simply based
upon fighting terrorists in the tribal areas, but is a parallel
to the emerging strategic partnership that many in the region
point to, between the United States and India; that we have to
grow this long-term, confident, mutually respectful strategic
partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan in the same way we
have begun to do that with their next-door neighbor, India.
And regarding Pakistan's relationship to the conflict in
Afghanistan, reversing the decline of our fortunes there, and
achieving success, would leverage our ability to influence
events in Pakistan.
I think the Pakistani approach to Afghanistan, which, in
some ways, is schizophrenic, would be changed if the U.S.
demonstrated success there, and that we move towards a
resolution of that conflict on our own terms, to meet our
policy objectives there. That would give us immense leverage
against our mutual adversary and, I think, with the Pakistani
government.
And, finally, continued and expanding resources for the
civil government of Pakistan and their security sources,
conditioned--although, perhaps, lightly conditioned to
performance, but also respectful of Pakistani sovereignty, I
think, is an essential step.
Pakistan, as a state, is on a trajectory heading towards
failure. And the U.S. must prevent this outcome, perhaps, at
almost all costs. That said, American aid that is not connected
to performance by the Pakistani government and military has
proved relatively fruitless.
Reasonable benchmarks of Pakistani progress in using
American aid is a reasonable price for the willingness of
American taxpayers to underwrite the future of Pakistan as a
state, and as a partner. Pakistan is not fighting for the West.
It is a nation fighting for its own survival. And we cannot
allow it to fail at this task. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Barno can be found in
the Appendix on page 39.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Dr. Kilcullen.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KILCULLEN, PARTNER, CRUMPTON GROUP, LLC,
SENIOR FELLOW, EASTWEST INSTITUTE, MEMBER OF THE ADVISORY
BOARD, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Dr. Kilcullen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me.
I have submitted written testimony on the details of the
bill that you are currently considering, which includes
benchmarks. I won't go through that testimony again, unless you
want to ask me about it.
What I thought I would do is briefly outline why I think
the--we are facing the problems we currently are facing in
Pakistan, which is--if you would like a diagnosis of the
problem--which is going to allow us to, then, move forward
toward a solution.
After 9/11, the United States pushed Pakistan to do more in
the Fatah, and on the frontier against Taliban and Al Qaeda.
And this was largely an enemy-centric approach, which saw the
Pakistani army moving into areas where it had never operated on
a war-footing before, and conducting armed activity against
tribes and the civilian population, in order to find and deal
with a small enemy element. It was an approach that was focused
on chasing and killing bad guys.
Since that time, 90 percent of U.S. assistance to Pakistan
has been military, and even within the realm of military
assistance, about 99.4 percent of our assistance has gone to
the Pakistani military, rather than the Pakistan police.
So, for example, in 2007, we spent about $730 million on
the Pakistani army, and $4.9 million on the Pakistani police. I
will come back to that as an issue, in a moment.
The Pakistani military have taken a highly kinetic and
coercive approach in what they have done in the Fatah, and on
the frontier. That kinetic approach has alienated local
populations, tribal groupings and communities, and has
empowered local extremists, and also foreign extremists.
Those extremists, in turn, have leveraged popular anger and
alienation to create a large and diverse movement that you
could describe as a coalition of the angry in the western part
of Pakistan. That movement has now contributed to a pulling-
back of Pakistani civilian authorities away from large parts of
Pakistan's population and territory. And we have seen the
spread of violence and instability through most of Pakistan,
including its largest cities.
And in my written testimony, I have given 24 examples, over
the last 5 years, of egregious breakdowns in security, and of
complicity by certain elements of the security forces, with
efforts to seize control of Pakistan's people and territory to
extremists.
What I am saying here is that the whole approach has been
flawed right from the outset. Doing more of the same will not
make things better. It will make things worse. We need a
fundamental change of approach if we are going to turn the
situation around.
We need to focus on protecting the population, not on
chasing the bad guys. And we need to do a much greater amount
to build up civil authorities and the police service, rather
than the military.
Now, I say ``we,'' but, of course, we can't do that. And
what we are looking for is a search for leverage, which is why
we are having this discussion about benchmarks.
As Bob Comer wrote after the end of the Vietnam War, ``No
amount of know-how and motivation on the part of an outside
intervening partner can substitute for lack of motivation on
the part of a local government.'' And that is the situation
that we are dealing with now.
I support the use of benchmarks and accountability measures
to ensure that the people that we are assisting are actually
doing the job that we have paid them $12 billion to do. But I
think I support the idea that we need to move well beyond a
transactional approach here, and make a long-term commitment.
But I think American taxpayers and legislators are entitled
to ask, you know, ``Why should we give more money, and keep
throwing good money after bad to the same people, until we get
a firm commitment to actually stop supporting the enemy, and
start protecting the Pakistani population?''
I will save the rest of my time, because I am sure there
will be questions that will come up in relation to that.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kilcullen can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Doctor, thank you very much.
Mr. Nawaz.
Please flip the----
Mr. Nawaz. Chairman Skelton----
The Chairman. Could you get a little closer to the
microphone, please?
STATEMENT OF SHUJA NAWAZ, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIAN CENTER, THE
ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Nawaz. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McHugh, members
of the committee, I am honored to be here to speak about this
important issue before your committee today.
We, at The Atlantic Council, recently produced a report on
Pakistan that offers very detailed suggestions on aid for that
country. The United States and Pakistan have had a
rollercoaster relationship, marked with highs of deep
friendship, and followed by estrangement.
The two countries now are partners again in an attempt to
roll back the tide of obscurantism and militancy that grips
Afghanistan and Pakistan today.
Yet, a deep distrust marks this relationship, arising out
of the pattern of engagement. And this distrust is rooted in
both perceptions and reality.
The United States befriended Pakistan most often when it
had autocratic rulers, and provided the most aid to Pakistan
during periods of autocratic rule, when Pakistan was seen as an
ally of U.S. strategic interests in the region.
The intervening periods of civilian rule often were marked
by distance and coolness. And the strong perception was created
over time, in Pakistani minds, that the United States did not
understand or care for Pakistan's domestic needs or security
concerns.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistan lives in a tough neighborhood. It is
in the shadow of India, a major nuclear power to the east, and
powerful neighbors such as China, Iran, and an unstable
Afghanistan. Internally, it is racked by a rising militancy
that is attempting to force its convoluted view of Islam on a
largely moderate population.
Pakistan has suffered repeated military rule and corrupt
civilian governments that, often, were in the hands of the
feudalistic elite or family-run political parties.
Today, the United States and Pakistan are at a new
crossroad. There is an opportunity to forage a new relationship
between the people of the two countries, and to overturn the
historical patterns. Civil society in Pakistan is on the rise,
and deserves support.
The chief of army staff of the Pakistan army is publicly
committed to withdrawing the army from politics, and the new
administration in Washington is committed to a strategy to help
build Pakistan via a long-term assistance program that will
strengthen its defense, while improving the economy.
If Washington succeeds in these efforts, it will help break
the yo-yo pattern of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But, Mr.
Chairman, there are challenges to overcome.
The U.S. must ensure that its aid is not seen solely in
support of its battle in Afghanistan, and directed largely
towards the border region of Pakistan. This aid must not be
seen by the people of Pakistan as short-term, and aimed at
propping up any single person, party or group.
The U.S. and its allies must attempt to reduce the causes
of regional hostility between India and Pakistan. Pakistan
needs to ensure that its government prepares viable and
practicable plans for using economic aid effectively and
efficiently, and controls corruption so aid reaches the poorer
segments of society.
The government of Pakistan also needs to craft a broad
consensus in support of a strategy to fight the militants, and
strengthen the hands of the silent and moderate majority.
Pakistan also needs to accelerate the doctrinal shift from
conventional military thinking to counterinsurgency, and build
its capacity to reclaim the areas of militancy. The civilians
can then hold and rebuild those areas.
In this regard, certain key elements of U.S. aid will be
needed. First, there must be a focus on building up police and
paramilitary capacity to isolate militants from within the
communities. Second, community-based assistance and a heavy
investment in infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, are
needed to help aid reach target communities directly. The
current system of aid flows must change so aid money is not
soaked up by expensive overheads in Washington, Islamabad, or
provincial capitals.
Third, the ability of the Pakistan army to fight a mobile
militancy should be enhanced by providing it more early lift
capability, helicopter gun ships, transport and night-vision
goggles.
Fourth, the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program for Pakistan's military needs to rise
dramatically. And additional training needs to be organized in
the country, and in the region, to expose larger numbers of
officers at all ranks, to new thinking on counterinsurgency.
Finally, I suggest strongly that the current coalition
support fund model of reimbursement for Pakistani operations in
the border region should be ended. This is a cause of deep
resentment in the army and civil society, since it makes the
Pakistani army ``hired force,'' and makes this America's war,
not Pakistan's own war.
Let both sides agree to the objectives, benchmarks and
indicators of success, and let the U.S. provide aid for those
broad objectives, without detailed accounting. We need to
rebuild trust between these two allies; questioning
reimbursement claims has the opposite effect.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe in blank checks. Mutually
agreed conditions of aid, rather than unilaterally imposed
conditions, are the best way of endangering trust. We have to
make sure that we set targets that help Pakistan achieve its
potential, while ensuring its security and integrity. Creating
a safe neighborhood in South Asia will help towards that end.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am prepared to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me ask one question to each of you, please.
Reference was made to Pakistan becoming a failed state.
Briefly, what must we do to help ensure that it does not become
a failed state, and that it be a strong partner in the fight
against those terrorists that occupy its border region?
General.
General Barno. I think a comprehensive whole-of-government
look at the needs of Pakistan, and how the U.S. could assist in
meeting some of those needs would be a first step.
I think the primary one may be--counter-intuitively--to
begin with--would be ensuring that the economic health of
Pakistan remains solid. Because an implosion of the Pakistani
economy, a--really, a dissolution of the middle class, you
know, widespread shortage of electricity, a breakdown of the
economic order, I think, would upend the country and threaten
its potential failure quicker than anything else.
I think we have to ensure that Pakistan remains on a solid
economic footing first. And then, I think, beyond that--to look
at--along the lines of what some of my colleagues have just
suggested--how we can improve the security capabilities of the
Pakistani military, their frontier core, their intelligence
services, so that the encroachment of the Taliban from the
remote areas, into the urban areas, does not continue.
So I think those are two areas I would suggest.
The Chairman. Doctor.
Dr. Kilcullen. I think we need to step back from the
frontier, where we are currently conducting a military-focused
operation of the bad guys, back to the east of the Indies, and
start focusing on police work and civil-authority work to
secure the parts of Pakistan that still remain under government
control, which are shrinking week by week.
We need to stop the rot and hold that area, which we are
currently in danger of losing. And, then, once we have
stabilized--then start expanding back out.
What we are doing in the frontier region now, particularly
with drone strikes and some of the other kinetic activity that
is going on, is creating such outrage that it has led to a huge
spike in Punjabi militant activity, both in the Punjab itself,
and in the western part of Pakistan.
The current path that we are on is leading us to loss of
Pakistani government control over its own population. So we
need to step back, control what we can control; and, then, once
we have stabilized, being a process of moving forward again.
The Chairman. Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. Nawaz. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the U.S. can help
by creating an enabling environment, because Pakistan has a
strong civil society. It has a middle class of 30 million
people, with a per capita income of $10,000 on a purchasing-
power parity basis. And it has the institutions that can pull
the country back from the brink.
We shouldn't confuse a state of chaos in a fledgling
civilian government with the failure of the state in Pakistan.
I believe that the military still is a disciplined and an
organized institution. But I agree with my colleagues on the
panel today that building up civil capacity and building up
policing capacity to protect the communities and--so that when
the military does clear the areas where it is used, that those
areas can be held. It is very critical.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, I mentioned in my opening comments about H.R.
1886, which is a bill that has been introduced that, from my
perspective, conditions and limits security assistance to
Pakistan that, I think, from the administration perspective, is
unnecessarily limiting and, certainly contradictory.
I think, as well, that if you look at the kinds of
processes that are put into place under that legislation--that
it tends to further, rather than limit, the transactional
nature of the relationship, which, I think, most of us could
agree, is not the proper way.
Still--and as a number of you commented--the American
taxpayer does deserve some sort of benchmark, some sort of
metric, by which to measure where the money is going, and how
it is being utilized, and how effectively.
How can we find a path forward that allows this long-term
commitment--not an overregulated, over-pontificated approach by
the U.S. government upon the Pakistanis, that makes it less
transitional--but we can still have some sort of
accountability? Have any suggestions as to how we could,
perhaps, construct those measurements?
General, you want to start?
General Barno. I am not sure I can give specifics, but in
broad terms, I think we have to be very careful that we don't
instill this idea that, somehow, this is a pay-for-performance
partnership. The transactional performance--that we are paying
the Pakistanis to do this, therefore, they should deliver.
I think that is utterly wrong in terms of the psychological
outlook there, and it undercuts any notion of mutual respect
between the two nations, and the idea of developing some sort
of a long-term partnership beyond what is required out there
today.
So, I do think that some conditionality is appropriate. I
would suggest that there would be some value in having more
private conditionality and less public conditionality, whether
that is done through closed hearings or done through some
mechanism between the U.S. government and the Pakistani
government that is done behind closed doors, as opposed to
being an overt, perhaps even legislated in part, of any
approach to, you know, the aid that is falling into Pakistan.
I think that will simply undercut entirely the idea that
this is a respectful partnership between two nations that have
many mutual interests out there.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you.
Doctor.
Dr. Kilcullen. I actually think that the emphasis on
benchmarks and accountability in H.R. 1886 is not necessarily a
bad thing. In fact, I quite support that.
The part of the bill that gives me a little bit of concern
is where it essentially pretends that Pakistan is a weak-but-
willing ally against extremism. Whereas, the fact is that
fairly substantial portions of the intelligence service,
smaller elements within the army, and some other elements, are
actively or passively supporting the enemy.
So I don't think it is in anyway unreasonable to expect
Pakistan to make a commitment to cease supporting the enemy,
before we give it more of the same money that has resulted in
no improvement, and, in fact a dramatic deterioration since
2001.
I agree with you that we shouldn't be taking a
transactional approach. But I don't think that the solution is
to take off any constraints, and just keep on handing over
money. I think that we need to push for a genuine change of
heart among certain elements within Pakistan.
I think it is also pretty clear that the Pakistani civilian
democratically elected leaders do not enjoy full control over
their own national security establishment. And that is another
reason why, I think, challenging funding to the military,
through elected civilian authorities, is a positive step,
because it strengthens the groups within the Pakistani
government structure that support the United States, and do
have a genuine relationship of trust. And it limits the power
of some of those elements that have, in fact, been working
against that relationship.
So it is a pretty complex picture on the ground. But I
think it is relatively straightforward in terms of assistance.
If we keep pretending that Pakistan is a weak-but-willing ally,
we are going to get the wrong answer. We need to recognize that
some parts of the Pakistani state are on our side, and others
are not.
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. Nawaz. In my view, it is not a good idea to frontload
conditions, as much as getting to a discussion on indicators of
success by defining the end goal--mutually agree upon those end
goals.
In that sense, a lot of what my colleague, Dr. Kilcullen,
has said makes sense--that you agree on the objectives. And,
then, I personally believe in what is known as a results-based
budgeting, where you give the money to people who decide what
the metrics will be. And then you agree upon those metrics,
rather than imposing conditions up front.
I think it will be much more effective that way, and won't
create the impression that this is a pay-for-hire scheme, as
General Barno said.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
By virtue of the previous agreement, we will begin toward
the front.
Mr. Kissell, you will lead off. And I will ask the
gentleman from Mississippi to assume the gavel.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel
for being here today. There is so many questions that come to
mind, and--as we look at this issue.
How do we get the forces within the intelligence community,
whatever, in Pakistan, that are working for the enemy--how do
we get them either through their government cracking down or
whatever--how can we get that to stop? And whoever feels free,
jump in on this one.
General Barno. I think I would, maybe, re-characterize that
a little bit. My judgment is not that there are elements inside
the Pakistani intelligence service and military that are
working for the enemy. I think there is very strong evidence
that the intelligence service, especially, has maintained
contacts with the enemy for various reasons over the last many
years--has a relationship with many of these groups, and has
significant influence, at a minimum, with any of these groups.
That is the least--I think I would say--and there is,
potentially, a lot more there. But I think it is done out of
what is perceived as national interest.
There is a belief that if the ultimate enemy of the state
of Pakistan is India, next door, that these groups provide a
weapon in that toolbox to use against India--not today, but for
the day after tomorrow, when the front in Afghanistan opens up
again, when there is not necessarily an international force
there, or to use as an irregular force in other parts of the
conflict with India.
So I think, ultimately, that many of these decisions aren't
made for reasons that we might suspect. They are made in what
are viewed as the national interests of the people that are
making the decision; that they are hedging against a different
future than the one that we see.
Mr. Kissell. If we have success in Afghanistan--and I have
just returned from over there. And I heard so many times that,
``We could do everything perfect in Afghanistan, and that could
be all negated by what happens in Pakistan.''
If we have success in Afghanistan--General, you mentioned
something about that--that could help bolster Pakistan. I could
see, perhaps, it might hurt Pakistan if the Taliban is forced
to stay over there, and they start looking for success there.
I wonder if you could elaborate on that possibility.
General Barno. It is my belief that if we defeat the
Taliban insurgency inside of Afghanistan--if that is a
inhospitable place for them, and if the population is dead-set
against them--if there is economic growth, if the security
forces are much more effective, and that we are winning two
years from now in Afghanistan--that that is going to be a very
difficult pill to swallow for the Taliban inside of Pakistan.
It is going to weaken them considerably. It is going to
take away, in effect, their rear area--if you want to look at
Afghanistan as their rear area.
So I think that we do have the ability to turn the
situation around in Afghanistan. And we actually have far more
tools at our disposal in Afghanistan, because of all the forces
we have there, because of our access to the Afghan army, and
all the territory and all their security forces there, and the
amount of international support.
So we have a huge range of things we can do in Afghanistan
to turn that around. And I think doing that will put us in a
much better position vis-a-vis Pakistan, and put the enemy in a
much worse position.
Mr. Kissell. The other two gentlemen--do you all disagree
with that?
Dr. Kilcullen. I think I would just offer some guiding
points, out of my written testimony, about the behavior of
certain elements within the Pakistani military, and
intelligence services.
July 2008, the India embassy in Kabul was destroyed in a
large bomb attack. Afghan intelligence concluded that it was
sponsored and supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) and the Pakistani intelligence service, and carried out
by the Haqqani Network, which is an organization that has close
ties to ISI.
In November last year, there was a very large-scale
terrorist attack in Mumbai, in India, launched from the
Pakistani port of Karachi, and carried out by terrorist
organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was sponsored and set
up by the Pakistani intelligence and military service.
The only surviving attacker claimed that he had training
for more than a year from retired members of Pakistani special
forces, and the intelligence service.
There have been numerous incidents where Pakistani forces
on the frontier have fired on our troops as they attempted to
prevent the Taliban from withdrawing back into Pakistan. Last
year, we lost over 400 NATO vehicles on a route through
Pakistan that is, supposedly, protected by the Pakistani
military.
So I agree that we shouldn't be paying for service. If we
are paying for service, we are not getting anything for our
money, anyway. What we should be doing is stepping back, and
trying to recreate this relationship on a completely different
basis, because it is simply not working as it currently stands.
Mr. Nawaz. If I could add, sir--there was a relationship
between the ISI and the LeT. And this has been written about
and spoken about quite often.
There doesn't seem to be any evidence linking the ISI or
the government of Pakistan to the Mumbai attacks. And if that
evidence had been available, it would have been provided to
Pakistan by India, where an exchange is taking place.
Indeed, the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi--have all now aligned themselves with the Tehreek-e-
Taliban of Pakistan, as well as with Al Qaeda, as a kind of
franchise arrangement. And in a substantial number of the
attacks that occurred in 2008, inside Pakistan, through suicide
bombings, the targets were the Pakistan military themselves.
So if anything, this kind of a break off the Frankenstein's
monster that was created at one time, by the ISI, for use
against India and Kashmir, is likely to, now, turn the military
into rethinking that relationship. The question is how soon
that thinking can begin.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Fleming, for five minutes.
Mr. Fleming. Can you hear me? Oh, okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, I have a question for the general.
What type of government would Pakistan end up with if there
was--you mentioned how unstable things are there. Obviously, we
worry about an Islamic theocracy, such as what we have in Iran
today.
What is your understanding, based on what you see and the
elements you observe, that we may end up with if that were to
occur?
General Barno. Well, again, this is a worst-case scenario.
And we all absolutely hope nothing like this transpires. But I
think there is some risk of this happening.
My guess would be it would look somewhat like what we saw
when the Taliban took over Afghanistan--that they would simply,
you know, seize all the organs of power. Afghanistan and
Pakistan are two very different nations. They have got very
different levels of development. They have very different kinds
of militaries on--it is not clear in my mind how that would lay
out in Islamabad--again, just a horrific scenario.
But I think that this idea of a popular uprising--someone
suggested that it might look something like the Iranian
revolution in 1979--that that type of a nationwide uprising
could sweep across Pakistan. Again, I don't think that is a
high-probability outcome, but I think it is possible.
And--and I think the outlook at that, at the end of the
day, would look very much like what the Taliban rules--their
mechanisms of ruling Afghanistan--that same philosophy of rule,
I think, would be in effect, if they were to take power.
Dr. Kilcullen. Could I just add--I just want to say,
whatever the political characteristics of that regime, that it
would be a nuclear-armed regime, with about 100 ballistic
missiles. And that is a factor we should be considering,
irrespective of its politics.
Mr. Fleming. And the reach of that ballistic missile would
be what?
Dr. Kilcullen. I don't have the technical details, but it
covers the bulk of South Asia, and out into Iran. So we would
have to ask ourselves what India's response would be to that
circumstance.
Mr. Fleming. Right.
Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Kilcullen, you mentioned that you feel like it would be
better to assist the police, or provide aid to police, rather
than military. And, of course, the police vary in terms of
locale, as to what level of corruption may exist, what their
sentiments might be--Taliban--pro or against.
Do you see problems there, you know? Or would we really get
into the same kind of problems we have in Africa today, where
we provide aid and it ends up in the bad guys' hands?
Dr. Kilcullen. There are a number of different police
forces in Pakistan. The principal police service is run at the
provincial level. But there is also a Pakistani police service,
and the Rangers, which are a paramilitary organization
operation. It is in Singh and the Punjab. And then, there is
the Frontier Constabulary, and the Frontier Corps, in the
Northwest Frontier Province in Balochistan. So there are a
number of different police forces.
There has not been the same level of complicity between the
police and militants, as there has been in the history of
Pakistan, between the military and the intelligence services,
and militants. They have a number of problems, as you rightly
said: corruption; lack of equipment; lack of evidentiary
capability, like forensics; lack of protected mobility. They
are intimidated. Their families aren't protected. They are not
unconnected with the fact that we have hardly given any
assistance to the policing and judiciary sector in Pakistan.
They are one of the weakest elements of the Pakistani Security
Service.
But, you know, as a counterinsurgency specialist, I can
tell you there has never been a successful counterinsurgency in
which there was not a very substantial role for a capable
police force. We can't expect to defeat these insurgents until
we have a police force that actually protects, and lives with,
and looks after, its own population.
I would also say that, from a policy standpoint, increasing
our age of the police would actually have four substantial
benefits, which are listed in my written testimony. It would
improve the protection we are giving to the Pakistani people,
which is one of the big weaknesses we have. It would improve
counterinsurgency performance. It would enhance the rule of
law. It would also weaken the political power of the army vis-
a-vis the civilian leadership.
The police are the only element of the Pakistani national-
security establishment that is more interested in preventing
state collapse and extremist takeover than they are in fighting
India. So they have got to be a prime candidate for our
assistance.
Also, it is much more difficult to turn police assistance
against us than it would be to turn military assistance against
somebody else. So it is a safer form of assistance than
providing high-tech military assistance.
I just think that you could double or triple the amount of
assistance we are giving to the Pakistani police, and it still
would only be 1.5 percent of what we are giving to the army.
So I think, you know, there is scope there for doing a lot
more, without necessarily cutting back on other forms of
assistance.
Mr. Taylor. Chair thanks the gentleman, now recognizes the
gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, for five minutes.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I
seemed to have heard a lot of common threads; the basic one
being, I think, that we need a change in strategy, and how
America approaches this part of the world and, in particular,
how America approaches Pakistan.
And I couldn't agree more. And I do want to echo a concern
that Mr. Kline had at our last hearing on these issues, where
he--and I don't know if any others feel this way--but to refer
to what we have there now as an Af-Pak strategy might be
somewhat insulting to many in Pakistan. If you want to comment
on that, that is fine.
But I do want to ask you, General Barno--you mentioned
that, really, what we need--and I think everyone probably
agrees on this--at least, on the panel--is some kind of a long-
term strategic partnership with Pakistan.
And all of you have been kind of addressing that without,
perhaps, laying out three or four or five aspects to what that
strategic partnership ought to be. And I would like to ask each
one of you to do that. I know, maybe, I am catching you a
little unawares. Maybe you have all this in your written
testimony already. And that is fine, if you want to repeat it.
But what is that strategic partnership? What should that
strategic partnership, in your view, look like, taking into
account not only our relationship with Pakistan per say, but
India and any other countries' interests in that region as
well?
General, would you like to start?
General Barno. That is a very good question. And I have not
thought this through all the way; so just, perhaps, some
initial thoughts about it.
I think one of the parallel elements that has to be part of
this idea of a long-term U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership is
that we have to--without directly getting involved, we have to
encourage both Pakistan and India to continue their confidence-
building to reduce the tensions between those two countries.
In my judgment, the biggest factor that undermines any of
our goals and objectives with Pakistan right now--and would
undermine a long-term partnership--is their almost, you know,
fundamental, unalterable belief that India is their permanent
enemy, and that enemy is an existential threat to Pakistan, and
India will always be a force that they have to be postured
against.
If we can break that down, if we can help that cold war to
go away, much like our own Cold War with the Soviets went away,
then all things from that point are possible, and all changes
are possible. It changes the entire paradigm in the region. So
I think that has got to be a parallel effort.
In terms of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, I
think we have got to have an approach that has a--and an
economic interdependence. And there may be some things we can
do with trade, there, to facilitate the two nations being
linked better together in that department.
I think exchange of educational opportunities would be very
important. And, you know, we have got the best university
system in the world that is the envy of every country in the
world. Having more Pakistanis come to that and, perhaps,
eventually, more Americans going to Pakistan, would be very
useful to break down some of those barriers.
There is currently a military dimension. I think we could
do much more in terms of international military education and
training with Pakistanis. We had a nearly 10-year period, where
we had no Pakistanis at all coming to the United States for
training. That lost generation of Pakistani officers, now, are
among the most anti-American in their military, because they
had no exposure, you know, to our schools and our war colleges,
and our service schools, here, which is a terrible thing, a
terrible mistake; and we have to try and rebuild that.
Then, I think, clearly, there is an equipment and doctrine-
and-training correlation there, on the military side as well.
So, those would just be some preliminary ideas. But I think
all of these help instill some confidence that we are not just
interested in Pakistan for the next three years. That is the
outlook right now. It is all about killing terrorists and going
after Al Qaeda, in their view of our relationship with them.
And we have got to deepen that far beyond what it is today.
Mr. Loebsack. Right. And everyone seems to agree that the
whole transactional approach, as you call it, that we had in
the past--it is not the right way to go.
Dr. Kilcullen.
Dr. Kilcullen. I agree with the general. But I want to
comment on another category of issue, which is the multilateral
security guarantee, or the regional security architecture.
A number of other original players have very substantial
interests in the stability of Pakistan. China has a very
substantial port facility at Gwadar, in the southern part of
the country, and plans to open a north-south route in to
Western China, which will be extremely important to the future
economic development of Western China. They have had a very
strong economic and geopolitical interest in a stable Pakistan
not owned by extremists.
Iran--there were 30 million Shia in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi and other militants in Pakistan are currently carrying
out what I would call a slow-motion genocide of Shia in the
western part of Pakistan, with men, women and children being
killed in an incredibly gruesome fashion. If you go talk to
Pakistanis, there is imagery of this being passed around
Pakistan day by day. The Iranians have as strong interest in
preventing that kind of killing.
The Russians are extremely worried about the situation in
Pakistan, and its possible effects on the former Soviet Central
Asian Republics. The European Union (E.U.) has millions of
Pakistani citizens living inside of its borders, and has an
interest in a stable Pakistan.
India and the U.S., obviously, have interest. So it is
entirely possible that we have a relationship with the
Pakistanis, where there is not a lot we can do. But
multilaterally, there is an enormous amount that we can do,
diplomatically, to give the Pakistanis a feeling of security
that allows them to feel they can stop using support for
militancy as sort of a unconventional counterweight to Indian
regional influence.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman, now recognizes
the gentleman----
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Taylor [continuing]. From Colorado, for five minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me make a statement, and would love your response to
it. In just an observation of our current situation--and it
seems to be that the United States finds itself, at this time,
stumbling into an ever-widening war.
And when we look back at the policy, it seems that the
first phase was brilliant in Afghanistan. President George Bush
gave air advisory logistical support to the Northern Alliance,
who defeated the Taliban on the ground. And, then, we pushed
them aside and superimposed a political process that gave the
Afghan people the government that we wanted them to have.
And now, in fighting for stability for that government,
that doesn't have a lot of legitimacy outside of Kabul--that,
perhaps, our policy is destabilizing Pakistan in recruiting the
Pakistani government to fight the Taliban, who are not their
natural enemies--and now they are enemies.
And so we are there now. We have to do our best to,
obviously, make this policy work. I think extricating ourselves
is going to be difficult from this.
In terms of support for Pakistan, it doesn't seem that
there are any initiatives by the United States to be an honest
broker in the situation with Kashmir, which is the focus of the
Pakistani military.
And I certainly like the idea of, instead, giving aid,
perhaps, to the police, civil elements, and the Frontier Corps,
that could, hopefully, contain the spread of militancy from the
Fatah.
And so, could you--anybody--respond to those observations?
Yes?
Mr. Nawaz. If I may--just to go back to the broad issue of
what conditions would help stabilize Pakistan to begin with,
and prevent it from being destabilized has an unintended
consequence of the war in Afghanistan.
There are key roles that the region can play as an economic
unit. There are plans already on the drawing boards that were
discussed, and in very advanced stages of preparation for
linking Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and also
for linking Iran and Pakistan and India--the IPI pipeline.
Then, there is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-and-India
pipeline.
We have covered a lot of these possibilities, as the
practicable measures, in the report of The Atlantic Council. So
I would definitely refer the members to that document.
But the key point in all of this is that if you create
vested economic interests on both sides of the India-Pakistan
border that see it to their advantage to trade, and for there
to be a traffic of populations across that border, it will make
it impossible for the two countries to go to war.
The two countries, according to Economics 101, should be
each other's major trading partners. But the U.S. is a major
trading partner of Pakistan, and also of India. They don't
trade much with each other.
The United States sanctions against Iran also imposed an
impediment to the creation of the IPI, the Iran-Pakistan-India
pipeline, because Indian multinationals do not want to run
afoul of U.S. laws.
So there are these other conditions that the United States
can quite seriously change in the region, which would allow the
region to prosper by itself, without the infusion, necessarily,
of large amounts of aid. And I think that is the critical part,
because both India and Pakistan have a youthful population,
very productive. They will be very productive for the next 20,
30 years. They can take advantage of these opportunities, also,
by lowering tariff barriers to textile imports from these
regions.
You can help them help themselves.
Dr. Kilcullen. I would just pick up something you talked
about in terms of our success in Afghanistan in 2001, and build
on that.
The last Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan to fall was
Kandahar. It fell on the seventh of December, 2001. At that
time, there were 110 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
officers, and about 400 coalition special forces operating in
the south of Afghanistan. But we had 50,000 Afghans, fighting
on our side, against the Taliban.
The reason we defeated the Taliban so swiftly in 2001
wasn't the sheer brilliance of our air power or our high-
technology weaponry, or anything like that. It was the fact
that we had Afghans on our side.
We still have the bulk of the Afghan population on our
side. The approval rating for U.S. forces in Afghanistan is 64
percent, which is about 5 percent better than President Obama's
approval rating, here in the United States. So there is a lot
of support for our presence in Afghanistan.
We don't have anything close to that kind of support in
Pakistan. But large parts of the Pakistani population do not
like the extremists, are opposed to them. We have tribal
leaders in Swat and Waziristan raising their own groups to
fight the Taliban. We have community leaders turning against
them.
A friend in Pakistan told me that 70 percent to 90 percent
of people in the Swat Valley are appalled by the Taliban
takeover of the area. There is a lot of groundswell against the
enemy. If we can successfully build a partnership with the
Pakistani people--not necessarily the government, or the army,
or the intelligence services that we have been talking about,
but the Pakistani people--I think that is the key to turning
some of this around.
You know, as Mr. Nawaz said, it is not a matter of aid and
paternalistic development. It is a matter of equal partnership.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
Massachusetts, Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all very much.
And I have appreciated your testimony. And I have heard
several themes from all of you, one of which is the trade
deficit that we have with the country of Pakistan, and also an
emphasis on sort of development--the economy, civilian
capacity--all of which takes time to address.
And my sense is that we are running out of time; that we
are trying to change the dynamic on a dime, when we really--it
will take much longer than that.
So I am really wondering: Are there some strong signals we
can send that would communicate that message while we go about
the long-term process of addressing these very complicated
issues? To all of you--whoever wants to go first?
General Barno. Well, I do think there is a recognition with
a new U.S. Administration that there is a tremendous amount of
energy being put on thinking through revamping our relationship
with Pakistan right now.
I think Pakistanis recognize that. You know, we have--
Admiral Mullen is back out there this week, the second time in
two weeks. You know, we have had senior delegations going
through there. It is on the front page of American newspapers.
And there is a lot of money being looked at, not only here, in
terms of legislation on the Hill, but what the Administration
is proposing.
So I think there is an understanding that this is a time of
major focus and change, and that it is moving at a relatively
rapid rate. We are still only in--right at the edge of the
first 100 days of this Administration. So there is quite a bit
going on.
I think we could probably communicate that better in our
information strategy inside of Pakistan. I do think we do very
badly communicating to the Pakistani people. That might be an
area, whether it had done here, from Washington, or done better
in the region--that we would see something successfully,
because we are doing that, I think, quite poorly right now. And
it could better convey what our real goals are, and how much
interest we have in this partnership with Pakistan, over the
long haul.
Dr. Kilcullen. I think one of the things we could do that
could send a strong message right now is we could call off the
drone strikes that have been mounted in the Western part of
Pakistan.
I realize that they do damage to Al Qaeda leadership. Since
2006, we have killed 14 senior Al Qaeda leaders using drone
strikes. In the same time period, we have killed 700 Pakistani
civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly
unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And
they have given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the
population around the extremists, and leads to spikes of
extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are
mounting those attacks.
Inside the Fatah itself, some people like the attacks,
because they do, actually, target the bad guys. But in the rest
of the country, there is an immense anger about them. And there
is an anger about them in the military, and the intelligence
service.
I realize that it might seem counterintuitive, but we need
to take our foot off the neck of these people so they feel that
there is a degree of trust. Saying we want to build a permanent
relationship of friendship with them, whilst continuing to bomb
their population from the air, even if you do it with robot
drones, is something that they see through straightaway.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
Mr. Nawaz. I would suggest that something that can be done
rapidly and visibly is heavy investment in infrastructure,
starting off with Fatah, where, if you--the United States will
support, first, the Pakistan army, engineering battalions, as
well as their Frontier Works Organization, in building roads
and bridges and small dams, and erecting tube wells, to get the
economy going and integrated into the rest of Pakistan.
It would be seen visibly as something useful to the local
population; then, you will see a spontaneous growth of the
information sector of the economy around those roads. And in
economics, the most immediate and maximum returns are to roads,
in terms of rates of return.
The U.S. could also consider helping with some of the major
infrastructure projects, similar to what China has done in
Pakistan. That would show that it is there to stay, that it is
building for the long run. And one idea is to look at the right
bank of the--a highway that could connect Gwadar, all the way
up to the north of the country, and then through Afghanistan, a
road-and-rail link to Central Asia.
These are the kinds of heavy, long-term investments that
would yield some immediate employment, as well as a clear
signal that the U.S. was there to stay.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentlewoman.
And we now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Hunter, for five minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Could you go into a little bit--Dr. Kilcullen mentioned it
over and over--why don't we copy the success we had in--I
understand, in Iraq and Pakistan and Afghanistan--are totally
different places. Why don't we copy the success we have in the
Sunni triangle, with the Marine Corps, working at the tribal
level, in both Afghanistan--and I understand, too, all the
different things we are talking about--Pakistan--they have to
allow us to do that.
If we want to do certain things in Pakistan, the one thing
that they--they have to let us do it, because we haven't
invaded Pakistan, obliviously, and we can't do what we want to
do. So they have to allow all of these different things that
you are talking about. In a perfect world, they would have to
allow us to do all those things.
So how do we get down to that tribal success that we had in
Iraq, because Afghanistan and Pakistan are very tribal? And
there are certain areas cut off from other places, and they are
very family and tribally oriented there. So how do we really
bypass that top level, and start pushing from the ground up, as
opposed to the top down, and copy the success that the Marine
Corps had in the Sunni triangle.
Dr. Kilcullen. I might pick that up initially.
Pakistan and Iraq and Afghanistan, as you said, are very
different. And we don't have the leverage in Pakistan that we
had in Iraq, or that we have in Afghanistan. But I think the
history of the Pakistani army's relationships with the tribes
is instructive here.
The Pakistani army first went into the tribal areas during
the tour of Zawar Kili campaign of 2002. That was the first
time the regular Pakistani military had ever operated on a war
footing inside the Fatah. The reason they hadn't been there
before was because there was, basically, an agreement that had
been in place since the British period, whereby the tribes
essentially agreed to sit down quietly, under the political
agents--the Maliks, the Frontier Corps, and the other elements
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation--and provided they were
quiet, they would be left to govern their own affairs.
The unstated section was, ``If you step out of line, the
army will come in and kick your ass.'' In 2002, the military
went into the Tirah Valley, and lost.
And so they called their own bluff. And the tribes lost
respect for the army. The army, then, negotiated the Shakai
Agreement in 2004, where Nek Mohammad, who was then the leader
of the local Taliban, was essentially treated as an equal by a
Pakistani general. And the tribes further saw the extremists
being empowered, the traditional tribal leaders being
sidelined, and the army looking powerless.
So the basic system of how the frontier was governed has
broken down.
Mr. Hunter. I appreciate the history of it. And you know a
lot more about it than I do. But you also said in Swat, for
instance, 90 percent of the people there don't like Taliban.
And I am not talking about the Pakistan army coming in and
trying to assert authority with each tribe. I am talking about
us helping them, or them allowing us to work with them on a
tribal level, where we go in and empower the actual people to
want to get the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of their area.
And they will understand that we will protect them if they
do that.
Dr. Kilcullen. Last year, we started to see the Pakistani
army do that, and we saw a lot of success in the campaigns in
Malukan and Abuja, where they started to actually work with the
tribes, instead of against them. So we know the Pakistani
military, or some elements of it, is capable of that. I don't
think that we have the leverage to directly engage with the
tribes at this time. And the environment is probably too
dangerous for Western Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or
civil authorities to operate in there.
I think we are going to have to work on the ability of
Pakistani civil servants and the political agents, and the
elements of the Pakistani civil service, and their local law
enforcement, doing a sort of similar tribal bottom-up approach.
Mr. Hunter. But let me ask you this, then: All of these
things, that included, requires the Pakistanis do what we would
like them to do. So how do you make that happen?
Dr. Kilcullen. I don't think you can.
Mr. Hunter. Right. So there is a whole--the whole crux of
all of this--all these are great ideas, but how do you make
them do it? I don't understand how you make them do what we
want them to do, without doing pay-for-play, right?--which you
said we don't want to do.
There is no way to make them do anything.
General Barno. I think we have to convince them that this
is in their best interest, and this is the only way to solve
the encroaching threat of the Taliban seizing control of even
larger parts of the country.
You know, there is never going to be American Marines in
Swat Valley, and American soldiers in Swat Valley that--to do
what occurred in Anbar. And the reason, in large measure, that
Anbar worked is that the tribes finally believed that the
Americans were staying. And the Americans, rightfully,
convinced the tribe--I had an American brigade commander tell
me that the tribes came with us when we changed our message
from, ``Don't worry; we are leaving,'' to a message that said,
``Don't worry; we are staying.''
We are not going to be able to give that message in Swat,
or anywhere else in Pakistan, I don't think. But the Pakistanis
can. And they can do it, probably, best, in some ways, through
their Frontier Corps. Now, Swat--it is a bit outside of that
territory, but the rest of the Fatah in the Northwest Frontier
Province--that could be an approach that the Frontier Corps
could take, and the U.S. could very much help advise that,
provide information on how to approach that, help them work
with the tribal structures, and understand the tribal
structures, from a bit of a distance.
We have some ability to do that today, although the
Pakistanis are very resistant to having us present out there.
But it is never going to be--I don't think American forces--
they can do that there.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California,
Mrs. Davis--five minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here.
You were talking about this change in strategy--I think,
the message that we have to send. And I am just wondering, are
there some things that you see right now, that are not being
helpful, that, somehow counter this change in approach, that we
should be thinking about?
General Barno. Let me jump into that, because I disagree
with my good friend, David, here, on this. And he has mentioned
one, which I think he will bring up again--the drone attacks.
But I have a different perspective on that. And I think my
judgment is that even though that is disruptive in the minds of
many Pakistanis right now, I think that that has to continue,
in some ways, because it is the only pressure that the
insurgent groups in those denied areas, in those tribal areas,
are feeling--you know, I have seen open-source reports that say
that there is people living in orchards, now, because they are
afraid to live inside of compounds, and they are constantly on
the move. And it is having a very significant disruption effect
on the terrorist organizations that are there, because they are
not feeling any pressure from any ground component from inside
of Pakistan.
And I have heard, off the record, some Pakistanis say that,
``If that is the only way that we can strike at the elements
that are out there, and have success, then it should continue,
even though it is painful.''
So I think there is mixed reporting on that. From my
perspective, I think that there is value in continuing that.
I think the public proclamations of the Pakistani
government on that are not terribly helpful for us. So I would
like to throw a preemptive counter in front of Dave on that
one, first.
Mrs. Davis. Okay.
Dr. Kilcullen, could you also comment on--I think, in your
book, we talk about our not understanding the environment. Or,
at least, one of the experts that you spoke to had said that.
And do we understand the environment? Clearly, it is a
multifaceted environment. And I am just wondering whether we
are taking the state--the steps to understand what we are
really working with today.
Dr. Kilcullen. I would make two points. One, on the joint
strikes: I agree that they are doing a lot of damage to the bad
guys. It is us doing that damage. So, let me just review. We
are paying the Pakistani military to protect our vehicles,
which they are not doing. We are paying them to conduct
counterinsurgency in the Fatah. And the only damage we are
doing to the enemy is to our own strikes, which they are being
able to say, ``Oh, the bad Americans are striking the Pakistani
population.''
It is not a sound way to do business. There are other ways
to disrupt the terrorist movement than using robots from the
air. And I would suggest that, in a tribal culture like the
Pashtun culture--that, to a certain extent, looks both cowardly
and weak. There are other ways to do it.
I don't want to talk about that in an open hearing, but it
is pretty clear that drones are not our only option.
Secondly, in terms of understanding the environment, I
don't believe that we have listened enough to local people in
Pakistan. And I think one of the clearest examples of that is
that we have had a tendency to look back to how things used to
be under the Raj, and try and recreate a structure of sort of
paternalistic, internal colonialism inside the Fatah.
And we have repeatedly pushed back on the idea of
elections. And we have said, ``Well, we support the idea of the
political parties not being able to operate up in the frontier,
and the local people not having a vote.''
I spoke in detail with a Darabandi religious leader up in
the Fatah, who said, ``Look, why are you supporting this anti-
democratic stance towards the people of the Fatah. Just let us
vote for our own leaders.'' And, of course, the counter to that
is we say, ``Well, extremists will be elected.''
And that is maybe true. But if they do a bad job, they will
be unelected, as Mr. Nawaz just said earlier. And, also, in the
elections that we had in 2008, up in that area, it wasn't
extremists who were elected. It was the Awami National Party,
which is a secular group.
So I just think we overstate our ability to influence, and
we don't listen enough to local people.
Mrs. Davis. Mr. Nawaz, would--do you want to concur with
that, or do you have----
Mr. Nawaz. I agree with that. And, in fact, there was a
commitment by the prime minister of Pakistan to change the
local legal system, as well as to integrate the Fatah into the
rest of Pakistan. And we are still waiting for action on that.
But quite important, I think, is the fact that a lot of the
discussions between the United States and Pakistan that are now
taking place through the media need to take place behind closed
doors.
And on the drones, there is clearly a Kabuki theater, of
sorts, going on, because there is some kind of tacit
understanding. And the people of Pakistan haven't been brought
into it. So it is very important to bring them into the
picture.
One way of continuing the drone attack, because they are
successful, is by allowing Pakistan to sit side-by-side with
the U.S., and take credit for the actual kill shots--then let
that be the approach; although, I agree with David, that there
are much better ways of doing it on the ground. And you can
train people to do it much more effectively, without the kind
of publicity that drone attacks generate.
Mr. Thomas. The chair thanks the gentlewoman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Wilson, for five minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all, for being here.
General Barno, thank you very much for your leadership at
Fort Jackson, your success in Iraq and Afghanistan, your son's
service in Afghanistan.
As we consider Pakistan, I know we all want the best for
the people of Pakistan.
I had the opportunity to visit and see firsthand, near
Muzaffarabad, the earthquake recovery and relief efforts--the
U.S. Marines working with the Pakistani military. And I was
very, very impressed by the talented military--the very
professional conduct that they had.
Additionally, very sadly, I had breakfast at the home of
Benazir Bhutto a month and a day prior to her murder. And so,
again, I am just so concerned for the country.
And, General, you have indicated that we need a long-term
strategic partnership. How can that best be shown to the people
of Pakistan--that we have a long-term interest in their
success?
General Barno. We touched on a few points to that, I think,
earlier, but I think it has to be a--not simply a military
relationship. And it can't be a relationship that is focused on
the crisis of the moment, which is terrorism in the tribal
areas of Pakistan, on the border areas, with Afghanistan.
It has to be a serious--looking across both governments,
and how both governments and the United States, and in
Pakistan, can find shared interest in the areas of trade and
the area of economics, and the areas of justice, perhaps in
border, perhaps in counter-narcotics.
There is a huge range of common interests that we could
bridge between the two governments of Pakistan and the United
States, to develop some type of a framework relationship that
really projects for the people of Pakistan that we are going to
work with them in multi-dimensions--not just a security
dimension, but in a multiple of dimensions to connect these two
nations together over the next 20 or 30 years.
That just simply doesn't exist today. And everything is
focused on this morning's newspaper headlines. So I think that
there would be a lot of utility in having enterprise that looks
at how we can pull that together into--whether it is a formal
agreement, or simply, you know, a series of meetings that
begins to bridge the two nations together. I think we would
make a lot of money by doing that.
Mr. Wilson. And Mr. Nawaz, I appreciate you pointing out
that Pakistan is an advanced country, with 30 million persons
in the middle class. This is not at all comparable to
Afghanistan. And in my visits there, the people I have met
are--it has just been very hopeful.
And the young students--I mean, it is just a positive
experience.
I have concluded four years as the co-chair of the India
Caucus. I made it very clear that it is my view the country
that benefits most from a stable Pakistan--and you have alluded
to this--is India.
And, then, as I have tried to work with the people of
India--one of the biggest criticisms is they feel like the
United States has been a strong ally and supporter of Pakistan
for 60 years. So there is a disconnect there.
But how can we promote the relationship between India and
Pakistan?
Mr. Nawaz. I think the United States, obviously, now, is a
friend of India. And, for the first time in six decades, of
life of India, for the first time, we actually had Ambassador
Holbrooke pronounce India one of the major allies with the
United States on his last visit.
At the same time, the United States is a major ally of
Pakistan. And these are not mutually exclusive.
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Nawaz. So it is very critical for the United States,
now, to use this leverage on both sides of the India-Pakistan
border to help them see the possibilities that exist for peace,
rather than war, in that region.
In effect, the U.S. has to take the lead, now, in helping
wage peace in the region, rather than siding with one country
against the other. And, in that, the economic relationships
between the countries of the region--and not just India and
Pakistan, but, as I said earlier, with Central Asia and
Afghanistan--the whole region has a network that needs to be
established, in which U.S. firms can play a huge role, because
many of them already have plans on the books for setting up
pipelines, for setting up rail links or roadways and so on.
All this can be done to pull these countries together,
which would make it impossible for them to go to war.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate your point. And I would even
extend it. I have been to Western Siberia, in Novosibirsk,
Chelyabinsk.
It would seem like, to me--and through the ``Stans,'' too--
that that whole region of Central Asia should be doing very
well economically, socially, and--so I appreciate your positive
view, and--however, I can be hopeful. I see great hope
throughout the region. So I now yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman from South
Carolina.
We now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett,
for five minutes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I was here for your very illuminating testimony. Thank you
very much.
I had to be gone for part of the question-and-answer
period. Maybe it is the scientist in me, but when I am dealing
with options, I am always more comfortable when I have some
probabilities associated with those options.
And so, if you would humor me, and each take a piece of
paper and write down the three potential outcomes that the
general mentioned--a failed state; a status quo or stalemate,
for number two; and gradual improvement, for number three. And
so that you are not influenced by others' prognostications, if
you would write down some percentages there that add up to
100--what probability do you think that it would be a failed
state? What probability do you think that it will simply
continue the status quo, or a stalemate? And what probability
do you think that there will be gradual improvement?
General, do you have your prognostications?
General Barno. I actually did this before we started,
because I thought I might get that question. It is a very
interesting question, and, of course, one that we can't really
give good answers to.
Here is the way I would key it up, Congressman. I said:
Failed state, 15 percent--one-five percent----
Mr. Bartlett. Okay.
General Barno [continuing]. Stalemate, six-zero--60
percent----
Mr. Bartlett. Okay.
General Barno [continuing]. And gradual improvement, 25
percent. And I really hope those add up to 100. I didn't do my
math check, here, so----
Mr. Bartlett. They do.
Okay.
Dr. Kilcullen.
Dr. Kilcullen. I am afraid I have a slightly different
view. I am making the assumption that there is no change in
U.S. policy, and there is no change in the attitude of the
Pakistani state. On that assumption: 75 percent, failed state;
0 percent, status quo--things simply cannot go on as they are;
25 percent, turnaround. That is on the assumption that we don't
change anything.
Mr. Bartlett. Very interesting, thank you.
And Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. Nawaz. In my book, the failed state would be 15 percent
probability. The stalemate, or what I would call ``muddling
through,'' would be 55 percent. And gradual improvement, 30
percent.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much. That is very
helpful.
I kind of have the feeling that unless we get halfway
through number three--and there is a fairly low probability
that we are going to get halfway through number three, if your
prognostications are correct--that what we are doing in
Afghanistan is the ultimate exercise in futility.
Even if we are able to do there what no one else has ever
done--Alexander the Great failed, the British Empire failed,
the Soviet Empire failed--and even if we are able to do what no
one else has ever done, it will amount to nothing, because the
bad guys will simply go to Pakistan, unless we are at least
halfway through number three, gradual improvement.
Is that not true?
Dr. Kilcullen. I think----
General Barno. Go ahead, David.
Dr. Kilcullen. Well, I think there is quite a good chance
that we will do better in Afghanistan, because we do have
something that none of those other empires----
Mr. Bartlett. But, sir, even if we are completely
successful--I am allowing that we will be completely successful
in Afghanistan, and do what no one else has ever done. Even so,
I don't think we will accomplish anything, because our goal is
to get rid of the bad guys. And the bad guys will simply go to
Pakistan, unless we get halfway through number three. And you,
collectively, believe there is a fairly low probability we are
going to get halfway through number three.
Dr. Kilcullen. If you articulate the sole goal as ``dealing
with the bad guys,'' then I would agree with you. But that is
not our sole goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The fact that we have treated that as our sole goal is one
of the problems that we have had since 2001.
General Barno. I think I would agree with that. And I would
say that the growth of success in both of those states
eventually marginalizes the bad guys.
I watched, during my time in Afghanistan, increasingly, for
a period of time, the Taliban becoming more and more irrelevant
to the people of Afghanistan. No one had any interest in being
in the Taliban, after the Afghan presidential election. The
economy was doing better, security was improving significantly.
No one had any interest in that outcome. But that is certainly
not the case today.
So I think if we can set those conditions so that the--
becoming a terrorist and insurgent is an irrelevant long-term
goal for any reasonable Pakistani of Afghan, then we have
established some enduring prospects for success.
Mr. Nawaz. Congressman, I would choose an analogy from
economics. After all, I spent 31 years at the International
Monetary Fund. And this is called the J-curve hypothesis, which
is when things grow worse before they start getting better.
And so what may appear to be a 70 percent probability, in
David's view, may be those kind of exogenous shocks that will
turn the population and the government and the leadership of
Pakistan around, into concentrating their efforts so that they
can, then, use the resources of the country, the inherent
strengths of the society, and the institutions that exist, to
pull the country out of the hole that it seems to be heading
into.
Mr. Bartlett. I hope, sir, that that is the outcome. My
hopes and my expectations are frequently different. In this
case, they are different.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman from Maryland.
Gentlemen, I very much have found this very enlightening.
On the near term--and I forgot which of you mentioned the
large number of casualties that the steam-ship companies that
the American military has contracted with to transport goods
through Pakistan, going to Afghanistan--it is my understanding,
about 130 drivers for one of the contractors have been killed,
about 15 drivers for another contractor.
Entire convoys have been hijacked, and entire convoys have
been destroyed, just transiting Pakistan.
It is my understanding that we will get sending about 130
to 150 trailer-equivalent units a day, just to re-supply the
troops we have now. Safe to assume that will be increased by at
least half again, with the additional troops on their way to
Afghanistan.
I say all this, and that you all have done, I think, a
really good job of telling us some of the things we need to be
doing, and what you expect could happen--hopefully, favorably.
My question to you, given the immediate escalating of
American troops, and the need to re-supply them, is: What is
the probability in your minds that, during the next three years
and nine months that President Obama has been elected by the
American people to serve--that the Pakistani government, either
bowing to pressure from the Islamic fundamentalists, or because
of a change in their attitude themselves, within the internal
government--what are the chances that they deny passage through
Pakistan of goods bound for the American troops in Afghanistan,
in the next three years, nine months----
General Barno. I think my perspective would be, unless
there is a state failure in Pakistan, that that is--that won't
happen. And, again, we are--my handicapping of that was in the
15 percent range. So I think as long as the state of Pakistan
remains functioning and remains, you know, in, essentially,
alliance with the U.S., and we are mutually supporting each
other's goals and objectives--if those lines of communications
can stay open.
As you know, there are also a series of other possible
lines--the Northern Distribution Network----
Mr. Taylor. None of which are very pretty options.
General Barno. So, at least there is some redundancy in
that. But I don't think there is an extraordinarily high risk
to the Pakistan supply lines, unless there is a major change in
the state situation there.
Mr. Taylor. Doctor.
Dr. Kilcullen. I would just say it depends on what you are
actually talking about.
Those supply lines were cut and closed six times last year
already, and----
Mr. Taylor. I would talk about a hard closure.
Dr. Kilcullen. As in ``permanent closure''?
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
Dr. Kilcullen. I think that is reasonably low, unless the
Pakistani state loses control of that main north-south route
from Karachi, up into Peshawar, and west, to the Khyber Pass.
It is very, very hard to keep that open permanently. But
having it closed permanently, I think, is a reasonably low
possibility.
But I don't share the positive prognosis of, you know, a
low chance of state failure. I actually think, unless we turn
around the policies that we have in place, and unless the
Pakistani military, rapidly, gets a lot better at doing this,
we are going to see an increasing loss of control.
So, over three years and nine months, you know, that
probability drops away.
Mr. Taylor. Mister--I hope I would say this properly--Mr.
Nawaz?
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, you did, sir.
I agree that the probability is low. I don't agree that
even, given the further attacks within the country, as well as
the challenges faced by the military--that the military, as an
institution, would collapse to the extent that it would allow a
permanent stoppage to this.
However, there is always a possibility of a serious
breakdown of relationships between governments, in the U.S.,
and in Pakistan. And if that were to occur, for whatever
reason, then, of course, we would face this possibility.
I have, unfortunately, like many of my colleagues--have not
been able to get clearance to go to Pakistan. I have flown over
it a number of times going to Afghanistan.
I am amazed that on the western side of the country, it
just strikes me as amazingly sparsely populated.
And, again, I am going to open up to you, General. Would
there be any value to trying to route the traffic through the
western part of the country, where there are fewer people and,
therefore, fewer people to shoot at you?
Would there be any value of trying to work with the
Pakistani government to establish such a route, or would that
be--how would that be perceived, and is it even necessary?
General Barno. To clarify, Congressman, are you thinking
through Balochistan, or toward the Iranian border?
Mr. Taylor. Over closer to----
General Barno. Well, there is obviously a route up through
Karachi, through Spin Boldak, that comes out of Kandahar, and
then could come in that way. And there is some traffic there.
But my understanding is the majority of the traffic does come
through the Khyber Pass.
Mr. Taylor. Right.
General Barno. So my sense would be that it--that is an
excellent second option to have, in that route coming up
through the south. But that is also an area where most of the
military analysts are saying--and I agree--is the center of
gravity of the fight right now--the southern portion of
Afghanistan, on the Afghan side of the border.
So there is no particular good answer on this, in terms of
security for our route right now, I don't think.
Mr. Taylor. Is there anything--and, again, I am asking this
in the form of a question: Is there anything from the Pakistani
government's point of view that would make that beneficial for
them?
Mr. Nawaz. We have talked about the port of Gwadar. It was
also featured in a long article in the Atlantic Monthly this
month. And that was one of the ideas that I had presented,
which was to have a very heavy investment in infrastructure
development, linking Gwadar to Afghanistan and, potentially, to
Central Asia.
That kind of investment would yield immediate benefit in
providing employment for people in Balochistan, because they
have very little chance of employment otherwise. And you could
also bring into safeguarding that, because of the benefits of
transit fees that--and other economic benefits arising from a
road and a rail link that could link up to the Afghan border
first, and then, perhaps, beyond that.
Mr. Taylor. Do you think a significant number of Pakistani
individuals would think that is for the better for their
country?
Mr. Nawaz. If you were to give ownership to the provincial
population, yes. If it were done as a central, federally
controlled enterprise, and contractors brought from outside,
then, no.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Would any of you--either gentleman--care to comment on
that?
Dr. Kilcullen. I agree with that.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, the
ranking member, Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to be very brief. These folks have been
extraordinarily patient. And I should preface my comment by
saying that, in most ways, I am a supporter of the
Administration's recently released plan for Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
I do think there are some concerns with respect to
questions--vacuums--that exist in it, that can be filled in
less-than-helpful ways. But, nevertheless, I do think that, to
his credit, the President and his advisors have laid out a plan
forward.
As we have heard here today, obviously, there are other
things we can and can, perhaps, should be considering.
But, nevertheless, I have to ask, Mr. Nawaz: This week on
National Public Radio, you gave a very interesting interview
regarding the Administration's recent engagement in Pakistan.
I am going to read your quote. And I just would be very
interested in your refinement of these very--I guess it is fair
to say--strong words.
And I quote, ``This is probably the worst-ever visit by an
American team. It was a complete disaster. And if this is how
you want to win friends, I just wonder how you want to create
enemies.'' And that is the end of the quote.
Can you help those of us who, obviously, we're not privy to
the details of that visit--what so concerns you about what went
on?
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir. To paraphrase Orden, ``Words have no
words that are out of context.'' The discussion was about the
lead-up to the visit. This was a very critical visit, following
the release of the bill in the House, as well as the release of
the strategy.
And so there were tremendous expectations. And I began by
saying that the heart was in the right place, meaning that the
United States was saying and planning on doing a lot of very
good things for Pakistan.
Unfortunately, the public message that was conveyed before
the visit, through newspaper articles and leaks, created a very
serious public backlash within Pakistan.
So it ended up overshadowing whatever positive results may
have emerged in the closed-door meetings. And so the public
commentary in Pakistan, as well as private feedback that I
received, and many others received, was that, you know, ``The
U.S. is only focused on destroying the Pakistan army, and
destroying the ISI.'' And these are very powerful assets of
Pakistan.
It just totally took away from the positive message that
was contained in the strategy, as well as the many great
attributes of the bill that is now being looked at by Congress.
So it was in that context that the opportunity was missed.
And I, in fact, compared it to the visit of Prime Minister
Nehru, to the United States, in the 1950s, which was also, you
know--it was preceded by tremendous expectation. And it didn't
come through. And then, the result was many years of
estrangement.
And as a supporter of U.S.-Pakistan friendship, as a
supporter of the President's new approach, I feel that somehow
that message got lost.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.
Unless one of our other two panelists want to comment on
that question, I would yield back, with a final word of deep
appreciation to our three distinguished guests, both for their
endurance, but more importantly, for their perspective and
expertise.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman.
Gentlemen, it is the tradition of Chairman Skelton to limit
our witnesses to five minutes. That was in an effort to give
every member an opportunity to ask their questions. Since we
are still shy of the appointed 4:30 hour that we said we would
adjourn, if there is anything that any of you would like to say
for the record, before we adjourn, I would welcome your
thoughts.
General Barno. I think the only thing I would add would be
that, I think, in the dialogue today, it is clear to everyone
in this room that this is a very serious problem--perhaps, the
most serious security problem that the U.S. is facing over the
next several years.
If things go awry, if any of these perspectives on worst-
case scenarios begin to accelerate, and become more probable,
then there is a great risk that we are going to have an
extraordinarily dangerous situation in this part of the world.
And I think, based upon that alone, that the amount of
attention that the U.S. is giving this across the government
right now, needs to be extraordinarily high--that this could
become a crisis very quickly, and I think that, even though we
are--and I have personally been highly engaged in the
Afghanistan side of the--the drawn-line aspect here--this
particular challenge with Pakistan could escalate into an
extraordinarily serious crisis in a very short period of time.
And I think it deserves very, very serious attention. And I
am seeing indications that it is certainly getting that right
now.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, General.
Doctor.
Dr. Kilcullen. Nothing to really add, sir. But I just want
to summarize, I guess, briefly--my main points.
I think we need to develop, rapidly, a sense of urgency. I
am very encouraged by this hearing, and I think that is a good
sign. We need to put somebody in charge of Pakistan policy, one
person, and give them the right staff and authorities to
actually come up with a comprehensive plan.
And that may seem like an obvious statement, but we haven't
yet done that.
We need to hold the Pakistani military and intelligence
service accountable. And I think benchmarks are part of that.
But they are not the full story, because we don't want to get
into that pay-for-performance approach.
We need to dramatically increase support to policing and
rule of law in Pakistan, including civil authorities. And,
finally, we need to call off the drones.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir.
I would reiterate the issue of partnership; that it is very
critical that there be discussions; that if there are
differences, that they be resolved privately; and that Pakistan
understand that it will receive assistance; that it must be
prepared to do its bit to make sure that it has policies and
plans that are not only workable, but that it will follow
through on, so that there are results that it will achieve for
its own purposes, and not solely because the U.S. wants it to,
or the U.S. Congress is looking for those results.
I think this is part of the critical friendship between the
two countries. And in the long run, the more the U.S. is seen
as an ally of the people of Pakistan, and not allied with any
single group or individual, the better it will be for the
relationship. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Again, we want to thank all of our witnesses. I
think you all have done a really great job this afternoon. We
appreciate that you have traveled some distance to be here.
The committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 23, 2009
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April 23, 2009
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